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Deryk Lemuel Dela Cruz
Reco Xu
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Topic 2: Rethinking Animal Pain and Death
In this paper, I will deal with this question: do we have strong reasons against causing
animals pain? Elizabeth Harman in her “The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal
Death” assumes that we do, and thus, she argues that we also have strong reasons against killing
animals. She rejects the common view known as the Surprising Claim—that “we have strong
reasons not to cause intense pain to animals [...] [and] we do not have strong reasons to not kill
animals [...] unless it is justified by other considerations” (715). People who hold such a view
often use it to justify that humane farming in which the animals are happy until they are killed is
permissible while factory farming is not. I adopt Harman’s definition of animals as beings with
intermediate mental sophistication such as cows, pigs, or dogs. One problem, however, is that
Harman does not explain why we may have strong reasons against causing animals pain. A
possible argument (which I will later refer to as the proposed argument) is constructed as
follows: we have strong reasons against causing humans pain; humans and animals share
equivalent moral value, and therefore, we have strong reasons against causing animals pain. I
find this difficult to believe. In the following paragraphs, I will first consider Harman’s argument
and the need for the proposed argument. Second, I critique the proposed argument, showing that
it is implausible for humans and animals to morally count the same, and consider a possible
objection, which I will reject. Third, I consider a view that establishes why humans have greater
moral value than animals, reject two objections, suggest that we only have weak reasons against
killing animals, and thus, the Surprising Argument still stands.
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Harman argues that the Surprising Claim is false: one cannot believe that we have strong
reasons not to cause intense pain to animals while also holding that we do not have strong
reasons to kill animals unless it is justified by other considerations. Harman argues that because
it is impermissible to cause intense pain to animals, it necessarily entails that we ought not to kill
them even if it is done painlessly. For example, we generally believe that there are no good
reasons that animals should live in overcrowded areas and be genetically manipulated as in
factory farms, or that they should be subject to mass eradication unless there are justifiable
circumstances. Contrary to popular belief, Harman says that there are also no good reasons that
healthy animals should be raised happily and later killed painlessly in the prime of their life as in
humane farms. What is missing from Harman’s account is an explanation of why these animals’
pain carries such strong moral weight. The proposed argument fills this gap, putting humans and
animals on a par—both have the same moral value. Although it is not explicitly stated, it seems
to me that, for the proposed argument, what matters morally—namely the capacity to be harmed
by death and intense pain—calls for equal consideration. This assumption, however, is difficult
to maintain. Consider the following variation of the trolley problem:
There is a trolley whose brakes have just failed. On the track ahead of it is one healthy
human in the prime of life; this human is unable to escape the tracks. Ahead is a diverging track
to the left of the main track and Daniel can turn the trolley onto it. However, there is a cow in the
prime of life on the left-hand track. Daniel can turn the trolley, killing the cow, or he can refrain
from turning the trolley, killing the one human.
Intuitively, it appears that Daniel is morally required to turn the trolley, killing the cow to
save the human. A possible reason for this, and perhaps the most likely one, is that the cow’s
moral value is lower than the human’s moral value. The problem, however, is that a proponent of
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the proposed argument is not granted the ability to use the same reasoning and make the same
decision. This is because they believe that humans and animals morally count the same, and thus,
both have equally strong reasons against experiencing pain. The proposed argument is committed
to saying that the decision does not matter; it can effectively be decided by a coin flip in which
one side represents saving the human and the other saving the animal.
One objection to the position that I have taken is the ‘bite the bullet’ approach: all lives,
human and animal, have equal moral worth. Daniel does not have a moral requirement to turn the
trolley. The popular belief that he ought to is based on our misguided intuitions that are
influenced by social relationships, anthropocentrism, personal bias and many other factors. The
proposed argument highlights that intuitive judgement may be mistaken, as in the case where we
believe that Daniel should save the human over the animal.
My response is that this raises a universal issue that all trolley problems face—our
intuitions are often influenced by external factors such as emotional bias or relationships. For
example, let us consider another trolley case:
There is a trolley whose brakes have just failed. On the track ahead of it are ten humans
instead of the initial one human; these ten people are unable to escape the tracks. Ahead is a
diverging track to the left of the main track and Kathryn can turn the trolley onto it. However,
there is her son on the left-hand track. Kathryn can turn the trolley, killing ten people, or she can
refrain from turning the trolley, killing her own son.
Intuitively, Kathryn might save her son at the expense of ten other human beings because
of her maternal relationship with him. This shows that intuition can be skewed, but it does not
directly challenge the human-animal moral distinction. The initial variation of the trolley
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problem still supports that humans and animals do not have equal moral value, irrespective of
biases that influence trolley problems.
Having critiqued the proposed argument and the rejected objection, I now turn to why
humans have a higher moral value in comparison to animals. Harman says that if we have strong
reasons against harming animals, there is one partial reason: “animals have moral status”,
“significantly harming something with moral status is impermissible” and therefore, significantly
harming animals is impermissible (716-717). I find the second premise problematic because,
although Harman does not explicitly use ‘moral status’ as a dyad, she seems to assume it
implicitly: something either has moral status or it does not. It follows that, if animals do not have
moral status, harming them would not be morally impermissible. I argue quite the
contrary—moral status is a continuum or a spectrum. Humans, who are on the higher end of the
spectrum, have higher moral value and there are strong reasons against harming them. Animals,
who are on the lower end of the spectrum, have lower moral value and there are weak reasons
against harming them. I argue that one determinant of this is the hierarchy of losses and harms.
This is the basic idea:
When a human dies, she loses out on the future she would have had. She was capable of
complex expectations, hopes, plans, and dreams that are frustrated. Animals, however, do not
lose out on complex expectations, hopes, plans, and dreams for the future. They are incapable of
them and cannot lose out on them. Although, they do lose out on a future life.
This view argues that the capability for complex future desires and goals is a greater loss
than a future life. Because animals are incapable of such complexities, death is not as bad for
animals. Animals do experience some harm from the deprivation of a future life but this is
incomparable to human loss, as death frustrates humans’ capability for complex desires and
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future goals. Animals have a weaker claim to moral consideration because of this limitation, and
we have weaker reasons not to kill them.
One objection may claim this view is false because a human might be incapable of
complex future desires and goals, yet her death could still be bad for her. For example, a
newborn infant with very limited cognitive functions lacks the capability for complex future
desires and goals. If she dies now, death deprives her of a good future but it does not currently
frustrate any complex future desires and goals. It follows that the infant may experience some
harm, but none that would give her a claim to higher moral value.
I argue that although a newborn infant has not yet fully developed complex desires or
future goals, she has the capacity to develop them as she grows. This potential is morally
significant because death then deprives her of a future with complex desires and future goals.
However, animals lack this capacity altogether. Their futures will never contain these complex
goods, and thus, death inflicts a much greater harm on humans in comparison to animals.
A second objection takes a similar approach but proposes a bigger concern for the
hierarchy of losses and harms view. Consider a human with severe cognitive impairments, who
throughout her entire life, is unable to form complex future-oriented desires. If she dies now,
death deprives her of a good future but it does not frustrate any complex future desires and goals
because they will never develop.
I argue that human beings as a species have the capabilities for complex desires and
future goals. Humans are morally significant because as a species, we typically have long-term
interests even if some cannot form them. My argument focuses on the potential for complex
desires and goals, not specific limitations of individuals.
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In conclusion, Harman’s rejection of the Surprising Claim depends on the assumption
that animals’ pain carries strong moral weight, but this requires further justification. The
proposed argument attempts to provide this by claiming that humans and animals have equal
moral value; however, this view is not plausible, as shown through the trolley case variation and
its implications. I have argued instead that moral status should be understood as a spectrum,
where humans have a higher value due to the greater losses they suffer, particularly in relation to
complex future desires and goals. While animals do experience harm through the loss of a future
life, it is of a lower degree. Although objections concerning infants and cognitively impaired
individuals raise important concerns, they do not undermine the view that humans, as a species,
have a greater capacity for complex future goods. Therefore, we have weaker reasons against
killing animals, and the Surprising Claim remains a defensible position.
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References
Rosen, G. A., Byrne, A., Cohen, J., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, & Harman, E. (2018). The Norton
introduction to philosophy (2nd ed., pp. 714–721). W.W. Norton & Company.