Most of what I “know” about the world comes from what other people tell me—news reports,
textbooks, even directions from strangers. If testimony were generally unreliable, then I’d have
to give up a huge portion of my ordinary beliefs: that there are such places as Antarctica, that
capybaras exist, that my class meets in the room listed on the syllabus. But giving up all of that
would be irrational unless I had some specific reason to think testimony is unreliable in the
relevant cases. So, absent special defeating evidence, I’m justified in believing many things on
the basis of testimony.
P1) Most of what I “know” about the world comes from what other people tell me
P2) If testimony were generally unreliable, then I’d have to give up a huge portion of my
ordinary beliefs
P3) Giving up all I know would be irrational unless I had some specific reason to think
testimony is unreliable in the relevant cases.
C) I’m justified in believing many things on the basis of testimony, absent special defeating
evidence
Suppose you can prevent something very bad from happening at relatively small cost to
yourself, and doing so doesn’t require sacrificing anything comparably important. It seems
morally wrong to refuse in that kind of case. Now compare donating a modest amount of
money (that you’d otherwise spend on non-essentials) with saving a child from a preventable
death through a highly effective charity. If the sacrifice really is minor compared to the harm
prevented, then failing to donate looks like refusing an easy rescue. So, at least in many
ordinary cases, we have a moral obligation to give.
P1) It is morally wrong to not prevent something very bad from happening at relatively small
cost to yourself
P2) Donating a modest amount of money can save a child from a preventable death
P3) A modest donation is both a relatively small cost to yourself and prevents something very
bad from happening
C) We have a moral obligation to give
I can’t directly experience anyone else’s pain; I only see their behavior—wincing, crying out,
avoiding certain actions. Still, the best explanation for the systematic link between those
behaviors and my own experiences is that other people have inner experiences similar to mine.
If instead I insisted that everyone else is a mindless robot, I’d need a much more complicated
story to explain why their behavior mirrors the patterns I associate with my own sensations.
Since we should prefer simpler explanations that fit the data, I’m justified in believing that
other people have minds
P1) The best explanation for the systematic link between other people’s behaviors in response
to pain and my own experiences is that other people have inner experiences similar to mine
P2) If instead I insisted that everyone else is a mindless robot, I’d need a much more
complicated story to explain why their behavior mirrors the patterns I associate with my own
sensations
P3) We prefer simpler explanations that fit the data
C) I’m justified in believing that other people have minds
If determinism is true, then everything you do was fixed long before you were born by the
past and the laws of nature. If your action was fixed in that way, then you couldn’t have done
otherwise in the relevant sense—you weren’t the ultimate source of the action. And if you
couldn’t have done otherwise in that sense, then you’re not morally responsible in the deepest
way for what you did. So if determinism is true, deep moral responsibility is impossible.
P1) If determinism is true, then everything you do was fixed
P2) If your action was fixed in some way, then you couldn’t have done so otherwise in a
relevant sense
P3) If you couldn’t have done otherwise in that sense, you’re not morally responsible in the
deepest way
C) If determinism is true, deep moral responsibility is impossible