Layla Samuel
100794769
Cyber Warfare
Dennis Molinaro
07/04/2025
Paper One
Theorists such as Jomini, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu offer ideas about war that can be
considered when addressing conflicts related to cyber warfare. However, it is clear that these
ideas and theories can only serve as a basic foundation for starting an ongoing discussion about
how to respond to cyber war crimes today.
Jomini, through The Art of War and his maxims, emphasized focusing on a single
important element or the most “decisive point” to prevent an attacker from succeeding
(Greathouse, 2013). While this idea may work in certain traditional warfare contexts, it is less
applicable to cyber warfare. The reason is that his theory lacks the complexity required to
address such a new and intricate domain. It is too simplistic for the nuanced and rapidly
evolving nature of cyber conflict.Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, in contrast, offer theories that are
more applicable to contemporary cyber warfare. Clausewitz’s theory of the “trinity” may have
some flaws, but it remains relevant, especially the element concerning chance and probability.
These themes are central to cyber warfare, where uncertainty and ambiguity often define the
battlefield (Greathouse, 2013).Sun Tzu’s ideas, however, appear to be the most relevant today.
His work emphasizes the art of deception in warfare—something fundamental to virtual
attacks, which often rely on deceptive tactics such as malware, phishing, and other
manipulative methods, all while preserving the attacker’s anonymity. This focus on deception is
crucial, as it underpins the success of most cyber attacks. Without deception, these attacks
would not be nearly as effective (Greathouse, 2013). Sun Tzu stands apart from the other
theorists due to his emphasis on knowledge, whereas Clausewitz and Jomini offer a more
limited perspective, making it harder to find direct relevance to cyber warfare in their work.The
distinction between Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and cyber warriors lies in how they gather
intelligence and conduct operations. SIGINT focuses on monitoring and collecting electronic
data, while cyber warriors are directly involved in countering attacks through proactive defense
and countermeasures (Robson, 2020), (Loleski, 2018). While their methods differ, both aim to
achieve a similar goal. I believe the distinction matters because each requires unique skill sets
and targets specific objectives. Both roles are equally relevant in combatting cybercrime but
must handle specialized tasks in accordance with the particular demands of different cyberwar
scenarios.
What I take away from all this is that cybercrime and its prevention are still too new for
fully developed and standardized solutions. Classical theorists offer valuable ideas and
frameworks that can be applied—as long as we adapt them to meet the needs of modern
warfare. Additionally, I understand that organizations have also had to revise their traditional
practices or establish new ones in order to effectively respond to these emerging challenges.
References
Greathouse, C. B. (2013). Cyber War and strategic thought: Do the classic theorists still
matter? Cyberspace and International Relations, 21–40. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3642-37481-4_2
Loleski, S. (2018). From cold to cyber warriors: The origins and expansion of NSA’s Tailored
Access Operations (TAO) to Shadow Brokers. Intelligence and National Security, 34(1),
112–128. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1532627
Robson, M. A. (2020). The Third Eye: Canada’s development of autonomous signals intelligence
to contribute to five eyes intelligence sharing. Intelligence and National Security, 35(7),
954–969. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1768477