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Research > Publications > Essay: Truth and Reality
Truth and Reality
Are "alternative facts" simply untrue? And can we even
objectively describe social reality? A linguistic-philosophical
examination based on Donald Trump's first inauguration to
date.
Essay by Colin von Negenborn, February 24, 2023
The inauguration of Donald Trump in front of the Capitol in Washington DC from the perspective of the US
Presidential Office.
The inauguration of Donald Trump as US President in 2017 was a remarkable
event not only politically, but also from a linguistic-philosophical perspective.
Politically, it marked the beginning of a presidency that many observers had
previously considered impossible—until it became reality. Since then, numerous
theses have been put forward regarding the lessons to be learned for socio-political
practice from this new reality. This text, however, will not focus on the political
aspects, but instead illuminate the linguistic-philosophical lessons and examine
the question of what is actually "real" and "true."
But what does the social construct of an inauguration teach us about the initially
so construction-independent concept of truth?
This became apparent just a few days after the inauguration.
At the time, the White House press secretary stated that Trump's
inauguration had been watched by more people than any previous inauguration.
However, aerial photographs and public transportation data contradict
this: both sources suggest that more people attended
Barack Obama's inauguration eight years earlier, rendering the press
secretary's statement inaccurate.
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President Trump points to the crowd as he walks past the grandstand of the 58th Inauguration
Parade in Washington DC with his wife Melania Trump.
From alternative facts to alternative truths?
This discrepancy was subsequently justified by the Republican camp on the grounds
that the two statements were based on different facts. While aerial photographs
and public transport data constitute a form of fact, the press secretary had
presented "alternative facts," according to presidential advisor Kellyanne Conway.
Years earlier, Trump himself had spoken of the art of "truthful exaggeration" in his
book "Trump: The Art of the Deal".
But how should such alternative facts and exaggerations be categorized?
Are they simply to be dismissed as fake news? Do different truths coexist,
complement each other, or compete with one another? At first glance, two
opposing camps appear. The camp of subjectivism sees truth as lying in
the eye of the beholder, a truth that, while justifiable, defies independent
judgment. In contrast, objectivism takes an independent reality as given and seeks to
describe it from a neutral perspective.
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Reality and its
facets
A closer look from a philosophy of
language perspective is worthwhile
here. Against the
backdrop of the
inauguration and the subsequent
discussion, it gains new relevance,
Portrait of John Rogers Searle, an American
as it can help to clarify the debate
surrounding different descriptions of
philosopher
social reality. For example, more than two decades before the debate
surrounding the future president of his country, the American philosopher John
Searle, in his book "The Construction of Social Reality," developed a framework
[1]
that rejects the bipolar distinction between subjectivism and objectivism as too
simplistic.
In this framework, Searle doesn't reject the two terms outright, but points
out that they can be used in two different ways—and that these uses are often
unarticulated. Consider the two statements "I get a headache reading this text" (A)
and "This text is the most boring text ever written" (B). Both statements
contain a degree of subjectivity and, at the same time, a form of objectivity—but of
very different kinds, according to Searle. It is important to distinguish between
them.
Statement A describes a pain that exists solely due to my perception, meaning
it does not exist independently of the observer. However, it is independent of
human attitudes or opinions, both my own and those of others. Therefore,
Searle sees this pain as both subjective and objective: On the one hand, the
existence of the pain depends on me as the experiencing subject. Its mere
being, its "ontology," is subjective. However, once the existence of myself and the
text is established, the pain is independent of any attitudes on the part of the
other. Its validity is thus not linked to a subjective acceptance as true by me as the
sender or by the reader as the receiver. These two observations lead Searle
to the diagnosis of ontological subjectivity but epistemic objectivity.
In contrast, there is statement B. It refers to a text that exists
independently of the observer and is therefore ontologically objective.
However, the truth of the statement depends on human attitudes; it is epistemically
subjective. To describe the text in an epistemically objective way, I would
have had to refer, for example, to the number of words in it instead of my opinion
about its content.
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Epistemic vs. Ontological
Epistemic means that something relates Ontological means that something
to the speaker's knowledge or
relates to the being or existence
understanding. The following
of things. This sentence expresses
sentence expresses that the
that the apple has a certain
speaker has a specific subjective
property that exists independently
understanding about an apple: "I know that
ofthis
the apple
speaker:
is red."
"This apple is red."
Orwell sends his regards.
According to Searle, the distinction between
these two dimensions is essential for
understanding our reality: on the one hand,
the epistemic-ontological dimension,
and on the other hand, the subjective-objective
dimension.
The interplay of these two dimensions
It's an apple's head.
then yields four forms (two times two) for
describing the truth content of the world that surrounds us and that we partly
construct. For Searle, social institutions and practices in particular require such a
more nuanced distinction than the original two-part one. This is because, on the
one hand, they are ontologically subjective: they exist merely as a product of
social and political interaction.
On the other hand, their truth content is independent of how I "define" and
epistemically classify them.
This allows us to differentiate between statements about Trump's inauguration.
Those who describe it as "great" or even "the greatest" are expressing their
own personal attitude toward the event. While the statement refers to an
observer-independent object—the inauguration or the
assembled crowd—it is ontologically objective in Searle's sense.
However, it also reflects a personal judgment that initially only holds validity
from the perspective of the speaking subject.
This makes them epistemically subjective.
However, when speaking of the goosebumps one experienced—for better or
for worse—during the inauguration, the situation is exactly the opposite. In
this case, as with the headache example above, a state independent of
opinion is described, the mere existence of which depends on the subject
experiencing it. Thus, epistemic objectivity is again present
alongside ontological subjectivity.
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Both statements about the inauguration thus
possess a form of subjectivity: In the first case,
"greatness" describes a subjective assessment,
while in the second case, goosebumps describe
a subject-dependent state. In both cases,
one could speak of alternative factuality if, for example
(first case), one finds the event less edifying, or
if (second case) another participant experiences
nausea instead of goosebumps. However, the
situation is different with a statement about
the number of people present: This is
epistemically and ontologically objective; it is valid
regardless of the observer. Here, one cannot
refer to alternative facts. The statement is simply not
true, or indeed, "fake news."
The cover of the book "1984" by
George Orwell.
The philosophy of language in general, and Searle's theory in particular, thus fails
to provide a foundation for the statements of the press secretary and the
presidential advisor. We are not required, in the spirit of Orwellian "Newspeak," to
accept two contradictory statements as equally true. A closer look at the
concepts of reality and truth can help to clarify the discussion following
the inauguration.
literature
• Searle, John R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. Free Press.
Dr. Colin von Negenborn
In his research, Colin von Negenborn combines analytical
Methodology of mathematics and microeconomics with the
He addresses normative questions in practical philosophy. He explores
questions of justice in distributions and procedures: How can "sustainable"
resource use balance current and future needs? What does it mean when
common goods like the high seas are considered the "common
heritage of mankind"? And what do "fair" voting processes even look like? Colin
von Negenborn studied physics, philosophy, politics, and economics, among other subjects. After earning
a doctorate in economic design at
After studying at Humboldt University in Berlin, he worked as a postdoc at CAU Kiel in the
His areas of expertise include environmental ethics and international law. Since autumn 2022, he has been conducting research on...
the University of Hamburg as part of the interdisciplinary excellence project “Grounds, Norms, Decisions”.