CHAPTER 3 The Nature and Method of Forensic Assessment 3.01. INTRODUCTION In this chapter, we examine the forensic evaluation process, focusing especially on the differences between “forensic” assessments (conducted at the behest of the legal system) and traditional, more common therapeutic assessments (initiated for purposes of helping patients). Although the previous two chapters have alluded to several such differences, this chapter explicitly compares these two types of clinical work, looking particularly at the types of information sought and the strategies used to gather it. We also critique typical and newly developed techniques of forensic evaluation. More specifically, after describing in general terms the differing demands of therapeutic and forensic assessment, this chapter discusses several specific aspects of forensic evaluations: (1) the role of conventional psychological and medical tests and procedures; (2) specialized assessment instruments and techniques; (3) archival and third-party information; (4) information recovery procedures from allegedly amnestic examinees; and (5) assessing “response style,” an examinee’s attitude toward and degree of cooperation with the forensic evaluation. Although this chapter emphasizes clinical content, it is as important to lawyers as it is to mental health professionals. In explaining how forensic assessments are crafted, we also hope to clarify the nature and basis of forensic “expertise.” Furthermore, the final substantive section of the chapter reviews the extent to which evidence law may limit the use of particular forensic techniques—information that should be useful to attorneys as well as to clinicians in planning evaluations. 3.02. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THERAPEUTIC AND FORENSIC ASSESSMENT Problem 3.1 You administer a forensic training program in your state, and have just begun a continuing education program with 30 psychiatrists and psychologists who, on average, have five years of experience providing therapy but have never conducted a forensic evaluation. They will have several training sessions on various aspects of civil and criminal law. But your present task is to tell them how the skills they presently possess may or may not be useful in forensic practice. What should you tell them? How will you explain the role of diagnosis, clinical interviewing, and psychological and medical testing in forensic evaluation? Will the mental health professionals have to learn new techniques, and if so, what types and which ones? Will they need to approach forensic examinees differently from their patients? If so, in what ways? When mental health professionals evaluate patients for purposes of therapy, they use a variety of tools and techniques to assess functioning and impairments, to diagnose mental disorders, and to plan treatment. The 79 most important technique is the clinical interview—a face-to-face discussion that explores the patient’s reasons for seeking help, as well as the patient’s present mental state, past experiences, and desires for the future. Additional or corroborating diagnostic information may come from psychological tests (e.g., measures of psychopathology, intelligence, or cognitive functioning) and medical tests (e.g., neuroimaging techniques, electroencephalograms [EEGs], blood tests). Mental health professionals also sometimes use archival information (e.g., records of prior treatment) and third-party information (e.g., independent accounts of the patient offered by family members) to better understand a patient’s problems and to aid in assessment and treatment decisionmaking. In short, mental health professionals who provide treatment are accustomed to gathering, sifting through, and synthesizing complex data from diverse sources. Yet the large bulk of information on which professionals rely comes from patients themselves. These same methods—interviewing, testing, and retrieval of archival or third-party information—are also useful in forensic evaluations. However, the nature of forensic work affects both the extent to which they are relied on and the manner in which they are used. Because it is a creature of the legal system, forensic assessment differs from therapeutic assessment on a number of dimensions.1 Summarized in Table 3.1, the differences include fundamental aspects of assessment such as the identity of the person being evaluated, the focus of the examination, the degree of privacy accorded the information that is shared with the mental health professional, inferences about how the individual responded to questions and approached the evaluation, and the dynamics and pace of the evaluation. Indeed, forensic examiners even use a different term to refer to the individual being evaluated—“evaluee” or, as in this chapter, “examinee”—to remind themselves and others that the individual is not a patient or client who has come for treatment.2 Clinicians who ignore these differences may select less-than-optimal procedures for conducting their assessments and offer opinions that do not withstand the scrutiny of the adversary system. TABLE 3.1. Dimensions Distinguishing Therapeutic from Forensic Assessment 1. Scope. In clinical-therapeutic settings, broad issues, such as diagnosis, personality functioning, and treatment to effect behavior change, are primary. Forensic evaluations more commonly address narrowly defined events or interactions of a nonclinical nature; clinical issues (e.g., diagnosis or treatment needs) are often background rather than foreground issues. 2. Importance of client’s perspective. Although accuracy of information is important in both settings, the treating clinician’s focus is on understanding the client’s unique view of the situation or problem; a more “objective” appraisal is secondary. In stark contrast, the client in forensic examination contexts is never the subject of the examination. Rather, the client is the referral source—typically an attorney, court, or agency such as an employer or insurer. The forensic examiner is concerned primarily with assisting the referral source by providing it with information about the examinee that it might not otherwise have; the examinee’s perspective and well-being, while important, are secondary. 3. Voluntariness. Persons seeking mental health therapy typically do so voluntarily. Persons undergoing forensic assessment, however, always do so at the request or direction of a third party (e.g., judge, attorney, employer, insurer) and in the context of some legal or quasi-legal issue. 4. Autonomy. As voluntary consumers of therapeutic services, people have greater autonomy and input regarding assessment objectives and procedures. The objectives in forensic evaluations are determined by the relevant statutes or common law “tests” that define the legal dispute. 5. Threats to validity. Therapist and client seek to develop a common agenda, based on the client’s treatment needs, that will guide their interactions. Although unconscious distortion of information is a threat to validity in both contexts, the threat of conscious and intentional distortion is substantially greater in the forensic context. 6. Relationship and dynamics. Treatment-oriented interactions emphasize caring, trust, and empathic understanding as building blocks for a developing therapeutic alliance. Forensic examiners may not ethically nurture the client’s perception that they are there in a “helping” role; 80 divided loyalties, limits on confidentiality, and concerns about manipulation in the adversary context dictate more emotional distance between forensic clinician and client. 7. Pace and setting. In therapeutic settings, evaluations may proceed at a more leisurely pace. Diagnoses may be reconsidered over the course of treatment and revised well beyond the initial interviews. In the forensic setting, a variety of factors, including court schedules and limited resources, often limit the opportunities for contact with the examinee and place time constraints on getting closure on the evaluation or reconsidering formulations. At the same time, the importance of accuracy is enhanced by the finality of legal dispositions. (a) Scope The most obvious difference between the forensic evaluation and the typical therapeutic encounter is that the former focuses on concerns of the legal system, which is only sometimes interested in treatment matters. Although therapeutic considerations dominate some forensic evaluations (e.g., dispositional assessments in juvenile delinquency proceedings), psychological well-being is only of tangential relevance in most such encounters. Evaluating a criminal defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, a parent’s fitness, or a potential ward’s capacity to manage his or her affairs requires answering legal questions about how and whether a mental impairment affects the examinee’s ability to exercise legally relevant capacities, not clinical questions about how to treat the impairment. Some clinicians, guided by conventional professional values that put patients’ treatment needs above all else, have difficulty adapting to this changed emphasis. Yet part of developing forensic expertise is the capacity to conceptualize and focus on the legally relevant aspects of the case. More tersely, although forensic examiners owe various duties to the people they evaluate, they should not regard or describe forensic examinees as “patients” or “clients.”3 At the same time, forensic evaluations almost always leave room for attending to an examinee’s treatment needs, if only in an informal manner. Even when immediate treatment considerations are not the focal point of a forensic assessment, examiners usually can suggest a consultation or note therapeutic issues connected with the case. Therefore, it is neither proper nor necessary to subvert the forensic assessment process with a misplaced emphasis on diagnostic and treatment concerns. (b) Importance of the Examinee’s Perspective In therapeutic encounters, the clinician’s primary interest is the patient’s perspective, revealed gradually and more candidly over the course of repeated contacts during treatment. The better the therapist understands the patient’s experience, the more effective the therapist becomes (at least in theory) at developing interventions or offering interpretations that facilitate change. A more “objective” understanding, although desirable, is of secondary importance, because useful clinical interpretations (e.g., suggestions to the patient of an alternative perspective) usually depend more on what a patient experiences than on objective features of the patient’s situation.4 In contrast, the legal system is interested in the just adjudication of disputes, and accuracy is therefore the primary focus in forensic assessments. With this in mind, the forensic evaluator should seek information not only from the examinee, but from all relevant sources, including sources that the examinee may not know about or would rather not have consulted. In many forensic assessments, considerations of alternative views 81 and the need to corroborate examinee/litigant reports make the examinee’s unique perspective of only secondary importance. (c) Voluntariness and Autonomy A third dimension in which forensic and therapeutic endeavors differ is the attitude of the subject. The typical treatment seeker enters into the clinician–patient relationship voluntarily. In contrast, examinees are often forced or cajoled into participating in forensic evaluations, either by court order or by their attorneys. Forensic examinees may resist an evaluation for a number of reasons. First, they may fear its outcome. A criminal defendant who asserts an insanity defense may be skeptical of a mental health professional selected by the prosecutor; conversely, some defendants may prefer going to prison to being labeled “crazy” and hospitalized, and thus will resent any clinician who has the power to affix such a label. Second, even if they are willing to abide by the outcome of the evaluation, forensic examinees may resent its intrusiveness and insult to autonomy. Parents in divorce and custody proceedings may view psychological evaluations as unnecessarily invasive, despite their attorneys’ or the court’s insistence that the evaluation take place. And in virtually any forensic examination context, an attorney or the court may provide the evaluator with personal information about the examinee, disclosure of which the examinee did not explicitly authorize. In short, to a much greater extent than a therapist, a forensic evaluator will have to assess sullen, resistant, recalcitrant, guarded, or otherwise uncooperative individuals—a situation that may be exacerbated by ethical rules requiring that examinees be fully informed of the examiner’s role [see § 4.05(d)]. Later portions of this chapter make some suggestions as to how to respond to such resistance. For now, the important point is that the examinee in a forensic evaluation is often an unwilling participant in the process, which leads to the next difference between forensic and therapeutic work. (d) Threats to Validity Persons who seek relief from psychological suffering have few motives for conscious or intentional distortion,5 and most of the third parties to whom professionals might turn for archival or collateral information—such as other health care providers or the patient’s friends and family members—will have little reason to be knowingly biased in their descriptions of the patient. To the extent that inaccuracy of a patient’s self-report is a concern in the therapy setting, its principal source is likely to be the individual’s shyness, embarrassment, defensiveness, or lack of insight and self-awareness. Forensic evaluations face numerous additional threats to validity, however. The relatively coerced nature of the evaluation process and the importance of its outcome often give examinees plenty of incentive to be less than candid about themselves. Beyond that, lawyers may pressure examinees to provide inaccurate information, or at the least to be uncooperative. For example, some defense attorneys may view prosecutionrequested or court-ordered evaluations of trial competence as “fishing expeditions” designed to circumvent a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to silence by obtaining statements about the offense from the examinee [see § 6.03(c)]. Or a personal injury attorney who represents a plaintiff alleging workplace discrimination may perceive a defense-initiated forensic examination as harassment designed to discourage the litigant from going 82 forward with the case. Accordingly, attorneys may instruct their clients to participate only minimally in the evaluation and to refrain from discussing certain issues that the examiner may be obligated to explore in order to address the referral question fully. Sources of information beside the examinee may also have an interest in the examiner’s findings and thus may also be tainted. Consciously or unconsciously, these parties—most likely the attorneys, but also the examinee’s relatives and friends, law enforcement officers, victims, treatment providers, and potential beneficiaries of any money involved—may distort the fact-gathering process by sharing only certain information with the examiner or presenting information in a biased light. (e) Relationship Dynamics Because of the need for accurate information, the relationship between the forensic examiner and examinee may differ dramatically from a treatment relationship. The typical therapist usually tries to be empathic with the patient. Confrontation, when used, is carefully timed and attempted only if the therapeutic situation requires it and the treatment alliance appears strong enough to withstand it. Maintenance of the relationship usually takes priority over resolving conflicting reports or convincing the patient to recant information or endorse a different view. A forensic examiner, on the other hand, is usually much more detached. Although examinees deserve compassion for their humanity and their difficult legal circumstances, the examiner’s primary goal is to assist the legal decisionmaker by providing information about the subject of the examination that the decisionmaker might not otherwise have. Forensic examiners cannot rely on the development of a trusting relationship over time to break down either conscious or unconscious barriers to disclosure; nor do they offer the types of interpretations that therapists use (e.g., comments about transference). Indeed, some commentators have argued that using empathy to obtain information from a forensic examinee is unethical.6 Although we do not adopt such a view, we do believe that examinees must be alerted to the nontreatment role that the evaluator will play [see § 4.05(c)]. Forensic examiners may be not only more dispassionate than therapists, but also more confrontational. Because forensic examinees are less likely than therapy patients to be wholly candid in their representations, and because an examiner’s conclusions are more likely to be scrutinized by others, inquiries tend to be more focused and probing than assessments in therapeutic contexts. Forensic examiners are more likely to seek out sources of information beyond the subject of the examination, and they will be more likely to challenge and confront examinees whose reports are dubious and inconsistent, or do not comport with credible information gained from other sources. More is said about these different techniques later in this chapter [see § 3.07]. (f) Pace and Setting Ideally, both mental health treatment and forensic assessments would allow for repeated contact and observation under optimum assessment conditions, unfettered by external constraints.7 As reflected in Table 3.1, however, these conditions may be met less often in forensic contexts. In criminal forensic evaluation contexts, conditions of incarceration often limit access to defendants—as can the costs involved in traveling to 83 jails or prisons, or the unwillingness of law enforcement professionals to transport defendants to examiners’ offices. Furthermore, in many jails and prisons, the physical settings and circumstances in which mental health professionals examine defendants fall far below optimal. In civil forensic evaluations, time constraints associated with scheduled depositions or court proceedings may affect forensic evaluations adversely, as can limited access to plaintiffs and witnesses. Finally, the forensic evaluation process is relatively finite, resulting from the fact of adjudication. In contrast to the therapeutic enterprise, opportunities to reconsider and revise clinical forensic opinions over a long period are rare. Once submitted to the court, the examiner’s report or testimony is likely to become part of the “record” and not subject to change. Having provided a general backdrop that lays out broad differences between therapeutic and forensic assessments, we now consider the utility and limitations of some particular assessment techniques and strategies. 3.03. TESTING AND ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES Mental health professionals can employ a vast array of tests and other assessment techniques to assess their patients. For a number of reasons, testing has also become a significant aspect of forensic evaluation. Some of these reasons are not particularly good ones. Historically, conventional psychological testing played an important role in justifying the participation of psychologists (as opposed to psychiatrists) in the legal process.8 Furthermore, at least historically, some psychologists (wrongly) believed that a forensic examination was incomplete unless it included a battery of tests devoted to assessing all aspects of the examinee’s functioning (cognitive, intellectual, personality).9 Additionally, testing in forensic examinations may sometimes be used to lend an air of science and objectivity to opinions, which some commentators suggest that lawyers and judges favor.10 Of course, testing can play an important role in forensic evaluation. But test-intensive evaluation that occurs after little thought, at significant expense, and at the cost of other more productive assessment activities is counterproductive and can result in less accurate and helpful opinions about the psycholegal issues in dispute. Commentators have identified several limitations of conventional tests and laboratory procedures,11 some of which might lead to exclusion under Daubert or other evidentiary screening tests.12 Deciding whether, when, and how to use these assessment techniques as part of a forensic evaluation requires consideration of several factors, identified in Table 3.2. TABLE 3.2. Factors to Be Considered in Using Psychological Assessment Techniques as Part of a Forensic Evaluation 1. What construct is to be assessed? 2. How directly does the instrument assess the construct of interest? 3. Are there alternative methods of assessment that assess the construct of interest in more direct ways? 4. Does use of this instrument require an unacceptable degree of inference between the construct it assesses and the psycholegal issue(s) of relevance? 5. Is the instrument commercially published? 6. Is a comprehensive users’ manual available? 7. Have adequate level of reliability been demonstrated? 84 8. Have adequate levels of validity been demonstrated? 9. Is the instrument valid for the purpose for which it will be used? 10. What are the qualifications necessary to use this instrument? 11. Has the instrument been subjected to peer review? 12. Does the instrument include measures of response style? It is helpful to separate tests and other assessment tools into three categories, following the lead of Heilbrun, Rogers, and Otto.13 The first category is clinical assessment instruments (CAIs)—that is, psychological and medical tests and other assessment techniques that facilitate assessment, diagnosis, and treatment planning in therapeutic contexts. Many of these assessment tools benefit from careful development, a considerable research base, and good attempts at validation. To the degree that they facilitate the forensic examiner’s understanding of some aspect of the examinee’s clinical functioning that could affect a psycholegal issue in dispute, CAIs can be of value in forensic contexts as well. However, as discussed further below, CAIs are less likely than the two other types of assessment techniques described here to be of assistance in forensic psychological and psychiatric evaluations. This is because these tests and tools assess general psychological or medical constructs (e.g., intelligence, depression, academic abilities, thyroid functioning, brain structure, metabolism) that do not speak directly to the specific issues of interest to legal decisionmakers (e.g., competence to proceed, best interests of the child, capacity to manage one’s personal and financial affairs). Forensically relevant instruments (FRIs), like CAIs, are techniques that aid in assessment of clinical constructs. But the clinical constructs assessed by FRIs are those that are most relevant to evaluation of persons who are involved in the legal system in some way (e.g., psychopathy, response style, violence risk). Because FRIs are less frequently used by mental health professionals, they tend to be less well researched. However, those FRIs that are well validated provide a good balance between clinical confidence and legal relevance. The final category includes forensic assessment instruments (FAIs). First defined and conceptualized by Grisso,14 FAIs are designed for use in the legal process and assess or structure assessments of psycholegal capacities, abilities, or knowledge. Examples of FAIs include assessment tools that structure an inquiry into a criminal defendant’s competence to stand trial (e.g., the Fitness Interview Test—Revised) or that provide comparative data about a defendant’s capacity to understand and exercise his or her constitutional right to avoid self-incrimination (e.g., the Instruments for Assessment of Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights). The development of FAIs reflects mental health professionals’ recognition that CAIs and even FRIs are of limited use in forensic contexts, and represents an attempt to focus forensic assessment on the psycholegal issues in dispute. Increasingly, forensic examiners use FAIs to supplement, if not replace, information obtained via more traditional assessment tools. (a) Tests That Assess Clinical Constructs (CAIs and FRIs) Table 3.3 identifies some of the more common types of psychological and medical tests and assessment techniques, and lists some of the more commonly used instruments for each type. As indicated above, these assessment tools provide information about some aspect of the examinee’s emotional, behavioral, and 85 cognitive functioning that might affect the psycholegal capacity at issue. Some instruments, like the SCID-5 (see Table 3.3 for full names of this and other tests), are highly structured interviews that formalize inquiries about symptoms and yield outcomes that closely track diagnostic categories of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Others are self-report personality inventories, such as the MMPI2/MMPI-2-RF and MCMI-IV, that consist of true–false items and produce results or indices that are related to global symptom patterns, likely diagnoses, and characteristics of general personality functioning and behavior. These inventories may inform judgments about specific diagnoses or provide hypotheses about general symptom clusters and behavioral patterns to look for with the examinee. TABLE 3.3. Sampling of Conventional Psychological Assessment Tools Structured diagnostic interviews Mini-International Psychiatric Interview for Children and Adolescents (MINI-KID) Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5) Checklists and rating scales Behavior Assessment System for Children, Third Edition Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale—Anchored (BPRS-A) Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D) Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (PCL-R) Structured self-report measures of emotional and behavioral functioning Beck Depression Inventory–II Miller–Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST) Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory–IV (MCMI-IV) Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2 (MMPI-2) Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2—Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF) Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) Personality Assessment Inventory—Adolescent (PAI-A) Structured self-report measures of personality California Psychological Inventory (CPI) NEO Personality Inventory—Revised (NEO PI-R) 16pf Questionnaire Unstructured self-report measures of emotional and behavioral functioning Rorschach Inkblot Technique Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) Tests of intellectual functioning Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales, Second Edition (RIAS-2) Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition (SB5) Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV) Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Fifth Edition (WISC-V) Tests of memory functioning Test of Memory and Learning, Second Edition (TOMAL-2) Wechsler Memory Scale—Fourth Edition (WMS-IV) A third type of test is the projective test, like the Rorschach Inkblot Technique or TAT. These tests do not 86 rely on self-reports of symptoms or experiences; rather, they require the examinee to view, interpret, and describe complex and ambiguous stimuli. The Rorschach stimuli are monochromatic and color inkblots, whereas the TAT stimuli are pictures, most of which portray individuals or interpersonal interactions, about which the examinee develops stories. The clinician then scores and interprets the examinee’s responses (often aided by reference to published norms) to develop hypotheses and draw inferences about diagnosis and personality functioning. The idea behind such assessments is that, by “projecting” their own perceptions and interpretations onto these ambiguous stimuli, examinees reveal features of their emotional, behavioral, and/or cognitive functioning. Still different in structure are measures of intelligence, academic achievement, and neuropsychological functioning. These instruments often contain multiple subtests consisting of problems to be solved or other kinds of items that have objectively or normatively “correct” answers. An examinee’s performance on these types of tests is typically interpreted in light of the performance norms of relevant populations. The results can help an examiner delineate specific strengths and weaknesses in the examinee’s cognitive functioning or academic achievement. In addition to radical structural differences, these tests vary in the range of psychopathology to which they are sensitive. The personality inventories and projective tests may be sensitive to a variety of symptoms, but are best used to assess mental disorders that are not usually accompanied by impaired consciousness or significant deficits in cognitive functioning. In contrast, measures of cognitive and neuropsychological functioning are preferred in a case where the examiner suspects more serious impairment and needs specific information about particular aspects of the examinee’s cognitive functioning (e.g., memory, problem-solving skills, executive functioning, capacity for abstraction, attention/concentration) that may affect some psycholegal capacity or deficit. Two major sources of information about psychological tests are the Mental Measurements Yearbook15 and Tests in Print.16 The Mental Measurements Yearbook periodically publishes updated lists of available tests and comprehensive reviews of research on selected instruments. Tests in Print is a comprehensive bibliography of commercially available tests that are currently in print in the English language. Information provided for tests referenced in this publication includes test purpose, intended test population, administration times, scores generated, price, test publisher, in-print status, test acronym, publication date(s), and test author(s). Readers of Tests in Print are also directed to test reviews that have been published in the Mental Measurements Yearbook. Test manuals and published research reports also provide information about the reliability and validity of tests, both for a given population and for the different purposes for which the tests have been developed. Examiners and lawyers should consult this information whenever they rely on these instruments. In addition to consulting results of psychological testing, psychiatrists may use a variety of medical tests and sources of information to gain insight into medical factors that affect an examinee’s functioning or presentation. In some referrals, medical results are available through documentation created prior to the assessment; in others, psychiatrists may request the studies themselves in the course of their evaluation. For example, pharmacy records can prove helpful for corroborating an examinee’s claims about past medications and dosages. Such records may also provide hints about possible substance use problems, as may urine testing initiated as part of the forensic evaluation. Treatment records or newly ordered blood tests may reveal information about medical conditions that cause psychiatric symptoms (e.g., thyroid abnormalities that could 87 explain symptoms reported by patients who feel depressed or anxious). Results from neurological testing (e.g., EEGs for evaluation of complaints suggestive of epilepsy, or neuroimaging studies that evaluate features of brain structure or functioning) may lead a psychiatrist to suspect or rule out brain conditions that often manifest themselves as mental symptoms.17 In certain high-stakes criminal cases, an attorney may even demand brain imaging studies of a defendant or plaintiff, in the hope that these will reveal concrete evidence that the client has an “abnormal” brain. Such findings may help confirm or establish the presence of brain disorders.18 In considering whether to rely on any of these CAIs or FRIs, examiners, lawyers and courts should be aware of several special problems that arise when CAIs and FRIs are used for forensic purposes. (1) Relevance to Specific Legal Inquiry The primary determinant of whether to administer tests in any assessment, whether for therapeutic or forensic purposes, should be the degree to which test results will provide data that will inform opinions relevant to the psycholegal matter(s) in dispute. Most psychological and medical tests have neither been developed nor validated specifically to inform judgments about legally relevant behavior. This fact should caution against their indiscriminate use. Instead, a first consideration in deciding whether to use conventional testing (i.e., CAIs) should be whether the information it provides is of merely background concern, given the psycholegal question being asked. If an examinee’s clinical condition is well established and the test results can provide no data that are directly relevant to the psycholegal issue(s) in dispute, then the clinician probably should forgo using the test.19 On the other hand, if research indicates a relationship between the results of a particular test and a construct that is related to legally relevant behaviors, use of the tests may be well advised.20 Examples of legal matters in which testing information might be particularly useful include dispositional decisions (e.g., sentencing); personal injury litigation involving allegations of impaired, emotional, behavioral, or cognitive functioning; and some entitlement cases (e.g., Social Security, private disability, workers’ compensation)—all of which hinge to a significant degree on information about the nature and extent of an individual’s current functioning and adjustment. In many forensic contexts, however, this type of information is of secondary concern, even when present mental state is the primary focus. For example, an assessment of competence to proceed focuses on the defendant’s present ability to assist counsel and to adequately understand the legal proceedings.21 These abilities are defined in functional, not clinical, terms, and if these abilities are present, lingering doubts about clinical issues such as differential diagnoses may not need to be resolved. Unless and until legitimate concerns about the examinee’s functional abilities arise, the clinical issues are less important. Similarly, diagnosis and treatment information is generally only of secondary importance in addressing the many other criminal and civil competence issues that arise in the legal system [see Chapters 6, 7, and 11]. (2) Hypothetical Nature of Test Results Some clinicians fall quickly into the trap of concluding that “testing indicates that this individual has characteristics or tendencies X, Y, and Z.” Yet norm-referenced interpretive guides for most tests of personality 88 and psychopathology (as distinguished from many medical tests and measures of intelligence, cognitive functioning, or academic achievement) merely represent compilations of features found in groups of individuals who produce a particular test profile. When an examinee produces a particular PAI or MMPI-2RF profile, or obtains a certain score on the Beck Depression Inventory–II, the chances increase that he or she shares at least some of the behavioral characteristics associated with other members of that criterion or comparison group. But the degree of fit between this individual and the reference group’s general characteristics can be determined only by gathering additional information about the examinee. Accordingly, as we suggested in Chapter 1 [see § 1.03(c)], the interpretive results of many psychological tests are best considered as hypotheses about emotional or behavioral functioning.22 In therapeutic contexts, investigation and confirmation of the hypothesis typically occur during the course of therapy. But in forensic contexts, where contact with the examinee is likely to be more limited, archival or third-party information may be necessary before these test-generated hypotheses can be accepted or rejected. Such corroboration can be crucial. Consider a hypothetical evaluation of a female plaintiff who alleges sexual harassment at her workplace. It would be one thing to assert that test results raise the possibility of personality traits such as manipulative and seductive behavior; it is quite another to assert, based on the test results alone, that the examinee meets criteria for histrionic personality disorder or was seductive in her relationship with her employer, and thus may have precipitated the conduct and situation that brought about litigation. In the absence of corroborating information, forensic examiners should be cautious in the conclusions they draw regarding specific behavioral tendencies or characteristics implicated by profiles on a psychological test or tests; these are best considered as tools for generating hypotheses worthy of further investigation and consideration. (3) Limitations in Reconstructive Contexts In several types of forensic assessments, the examiner is tasked with developing information about a person’s mental condition at some prior point in time. Perhaps most common are evaluations of criminal defendants who raise an insanity defense, but retrospective inquiries also occasionally arise regarding a criminal defendant’s competence to proceed or waive important rights at some point in the process23 or in cases dealing with testamentary capacity [see § 11.05(b)]. Conventional psychological and medical testing clearly has less utility in reconstructive evaluations than in assessments that focus on current mental state. Although some aspects of psychological and psychiatric functioning (e.g., intelligence) are more likely to remain relatively stable over time, other aspects of personality, symptoms (e.g., depression or anxiety), and biological status (e.g., lithium levels) are less static. The greater the length of time between the assessment and the time of interest, the greater the likelihood that natural processes (e.g., typical forgetting or the natural course of some illnesses) or situational factors (e.g., treatment received, the stress of incarceration, or adverse life events) will influence the test results. For these reasons, particularly when more dynamic factors are assessed, we encourage the use of archival methods (e.g., prior records and investigative interviewing) as superior data sources in reconstructive evaluations, and we advise forensic examiners to consider use of psychological and medical tests very cautiously [see § 8.06(c)(2)]. Furthermore, as other parts of this book discuss [§ 1.03(a)], neurobiological tests such as brain imaging 89 cannot provide evidence that leads directly to conclusions about a criminal defendant’s culpability, “mental disease or defect,” mens rea, or capacity to follow the law; they can only confirm that certain conditions exist, the consequences of which at a particular point in time must be determined through other means. This is not to say that accessing results of tests that were administered close to the time or event of interest cannot be of value. But these test results should be considered archival data. (4) Face Validity Considerations The ultimate practical utility of a forensic report, or testimony based on that report, depends on its persuasive message to a specific audience: the legal system and its personnel.24 Therefore, when selecting from among available evaluation procedures, examiners should also consider how the legal system will respond to those procedures. Receptiveness may vary somewhat from attorney to attorney or from court to court, and anticipating the reception that certain methods or data will receive may be difficult. It is fair to say, however, that courts often view psychiatry and psychology with skepticism.25 Judges and attorneys understand interviewing and can understand how behavioral trends might be gleaned from record reviews. But psychological test results may be less acceptable to judges, jurors, and lawyers, who (like most people) respond more immediately to explanations based on idiographic rather than nomothetic data26 [see § 1.03(c)(2)], and who may have trouble seeing how evidence that relies excessively on statistics can help dispose of individual matters.27 This is not to say that mental health professionals should avoid using traditional diagnostic testing and laboratory procedures simply because lay jurors and legal professionals may be unfamiliar with them. Indeed, as we noted earlier, research indicates that judges and attorneys sometimes prefer clinical opinions that are accompanied by testing—perhaps because of the perceived objectivity of such techniques. Thus mental health professionals should unapologetically use tests if doing so will best enable them to address the specific psycholegal questions. Other things being equal, however, psychologists and psychiatrists should consider the comparative face validity of available methods and ponder how those methods can help legal consumers understand the bases for clinical inferences and opinions. Our contention has a flip side as well: Psychologists and psychiatrists should not use tests simply because they impart an air of science to their efforts. Although positron emission tomography (PET) scans and computer-generated PAI and MMPI-2-RF profiles and interpretations may look sharp and have a welldeveloped research base, they should be used in forensic evaluations only when they genuinely help answer the psycholegal issue, not when they serve merely as “window dressing” to lend specious credibility to an opinion. As noted above, attorneys may occasionally insist on brain imaging “pictures,” in the belief that these will influence a jury. But research is at best ambivalent about whether neuroimaging is any more influential than a competent description of symptoms.28 Unless such images are useful for purposes of getting across a legally relevant clinical opinion, they are not appropriate courtroom evidence. (b) Forensic Assessment Instruments The first FAI—A Checklist of Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial—was published in 1965 and was 90 developed by psychiatrist Ames Robey.29 The number of such instruments has since increased dramatically. Heilbrun and his colleagues identified 32 assessment instruments and techniques published for use in forensic evaluations during the 1990s, in contrast to a total of 10 such instruments that existed previously.30 A perusal of publications on violence risk and response style assessment shows that many more FAIs are available today. For example, Singh and his colleagues identified more than 400 risk assessment tools that mental health professionals were using as of 2014.31 Most FAIs appear to be face-valid instruments; that is, the instruments incorporate content clearly relevant to the capacities or behavior that the FAIs purport to assess. Furthermore, the chain of inferences from test behavior to legal criterion is typically short, and when gathering normative data,32 FAI developers have often tested relevant legal populations. But an investigation of the conceptual development, psychometric sophistication, and validating research for the various instruments reveals radical differences among them. Some FAIs are best described (and in some cases intended) as aide-memoires or interview guides that help clinicians to structure their interviews and judgments about appropriate legal issues (e.g., Robey’s Competency Checklist or the Competence Assessment Instrument;33 the Fitness Interview Test—Revised34). These instruments offer no pretense of including objective scoring criteria or allowing norm-referenced interpretation based on known groups’ performance.35 Employing these tools in evaluations causes no problem, provided that examiners use them as intended (i.e., as ways to ensure a structured and comprehensive evaluation of matters pertinent to the psycholegal issues in dispute, rather than as “diagnostic tests”). Other FAIs provide some of the trappings of sophisticated, normed instruments (i.e., multiple scales and apparently quantified measures), but are conceptually flawed36 or have little empirical research to validate the authors’ claims about the instruments’ capabilities.37 Unfortunately, as Otto and Heilbrun have noted,38 an increasing number of these FAIs (as well as FRIs) are marketed without adequate research and development. On the other side of the ledger, some FAIs have been solidly constructed from conceptualization to validation.39 Nonetheless, forensic examiners should adopt a “caveat emptor” approach when considering use of any of these instruments, and should not simply assume that their commercial availability renders them valid and appropriate for use in forensic (or other) assessment contexts. It is beyond the scope of this handbook to provide a detailed analysis of all the FAIs that are currently available. We mention some of the more prominent instruments at appropriate points throughout the book [see, e.g., §§ 6.07, 8.06(c), 11.02(b)(2), 11.03(d), 16.04(e)]. Attorneys and clinicians who want more information may avail themselves of Grisso’s excellent, although today somewhat outdated, review of instruments that were published through the early 21st century.40 We encourage the use of well-validated FAIs because of their direct relationship to issues of concern to the legal decisionmaker. We caution practitioners, however, that valid instruments do not exist for most psycholegal questions that forensic examiners encounter. Other methods, such as investigative interviewing, may be more appropriate in these instances. 3.04. ARCHIVAL AND THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION In addition to the examinee and test results, documentary and third-party sources of information often inform forensic evaluations. After explaining why archival and third-party information play such a significant role in 91 the forensic context, this section describes, in a general way, the process of obtaining such information. Specific suggestions on the types of third-party information to seek for particular examinations are left to the relevant chapters. (a) Reasons for Seeking Third-Party Data As suggested earlier in this chapter, forensic evaluators are more likely than therapists to seek and rely on third-party data for three reasons: a greater need for accuracy; differences in response style between persons in therapeutic and forensic evaluation contexts; and the greater scrutiny that evaluators’ conclusions receive in the legal arena. The first goal is probably the most important. By stating that evaluators should be concerned about accuracy, we do not mean to suggest that they must resolve conclusively all conflicting accounts about the case. That task is ultimately the job of the legal system, and in any event, psychologists and psychiatrists usually have no specialized ability or insight that allows resolution of such “disputes of fact.” However, some understanding of what has happened or is happening to the examinee will obviously facilitate the evaluation; furthermore, reconciliation of different points of view may occasionally be possible, and examinees sometimes recant earlier accounts when confronted with the truth. Thus the evaluator should try to understand which accounts of relevant events and family, medical, and social history are most plausible. Given this goal, archival and third-party information is a mandatory component of most forensic evaluations.41 Traditional clinical methods (i.e., interviewing and testing) have inherent limitations as means of obtaining accurate information. Most obviously, they rely on an examinee’s memory, motivations, and communication abilities. Even if the examinee does not exaggerate or fabricate symptoms and does not deny or minimize problems, typical forgetting, impaired memory, treatment received since the legally relevant event, and other factors may influence what the examinee says and recalls. Concern about these considerations aside, traditional assessment techniques may still fail the forensic examiner: Such techniques tend to produce only a general diagnosis based on present functioning, whereas making judgments about how someone’s emotional, behavioral, and cognitive functioning is relevant to a psycholegal issue often requires developing information about specific symptoms experienced at a circumscribed point in time. For example, standard mental health evaluation methods may make it clear that a person has schizophrenia, but those methods usually will not provide enough information to assess the person’s parental behavior in the past two years, or his or her motivation for a particular crime (e.g., was a theft committed for “crazy” reasons, or to obtain money?). As these examples illustrate, archival and third-party information is particularly important in reconstructive evaluations (e.g., insanity, testamentary capacity, and psychological conditions existing before an accident) where the focus is the examinee’s mental state at some specific point in the past. [See § 8.06(a) and Table 8.4 for a case-specific illustration of how useful third-party information can be.] Using such information also can enhance the examiner’s credibility with the judge, jury, and attorneys. To the degree that these parties view the forensic examiner as the mouthpiece for the litigant’s self-serving story,42 they will discount and potentially disregard the examiner’s testimony or report. Efforts to corroborate statements provided by examinees and to weigh their accounts against information from other sources can significantly improve the weight assigned to the examiner’s conclusions. 92 (b) The Process of Obtaining the Data The first goal of the evaluator seeking archival and third-party information should be to identify the types of information needed. For instance, family history and mental health treatment records may be essential in criminal dispositional evaluations, but are less important in trial competence evaluations. In contrast, records detailing the charges, allegations, and penalties that the defendant is facing are critical in an evaluation of competence to proceed, but are of less significance in a capital sentencing proceeding. When an examiner is considering an individual’s testamentary capacity, family history will usually be irrelevant, but medical records that provide some insight into the testator’s emotional, behavioral, and cognitive functioning at and around the time the contested will was executed may provide crucial information. As noted earlier, each chapter of this book describes in more detail the most useful third-party information in the forensic context it covers. But the types of information so identified are not exclusive. Initial data may yield a variety of unanticipated leads, and in many kinds of forensic assessments the sources of potentially valuable third-party information are numerous and not so obvious. In many cases, the examiner may find that a multistage evaluation is optimal, on the theory that the earlier stage or stages will clarify the third-party information needed for subsequent evaluations.43 How one goes about accessing third-party information can be quite complicated. The process is affected by a number of factors, including the type of case, how the examiner gets involved in the case, the party retaining the examiner, the type of information sought, and the party to whom the information belongs.44 Once all the information needed has been identified, it would ideally be provided by the referral source (usually an attorney, occasionally the court, and at times a government agency). In reality, however, forensic examiners cannot depend on the referral source to carry out this task. Some attorneys appear to think that forensic examinations are no more complicated than outpatient doctor visits, at which patients report symptoms and clinicians produce diagnoses and treatment. Other attorneys who are willing to gather collateral information may still not be helpful, either because they are not familiar with the process for obtaining information (e.g., the fact that the examinee’s consent may be required before medical, educational, or other types of records are released), or because they are familiar with it but have been stymied [see, e.g., § 2.04(b) on discovery]. And finally, some attorneys may withhold information from examiners in an effort to shape a particular opinion or to conceal what that information reveals about their clients. Examiners can respond to such obstacles in various ways. When the referring attorney balks at providing assistance, the examiner can explain that he or she will not issue an opinion or report without getting and reviewing the necessary data. Alternatively, the examiner can tell the attorney that he or she will form an opinion and write a report, note what data are missing, and retain the right to change relevant opinions if and when the data become available—including at trial if the data are presented there by opposing counsel. Attorneys who are willing to help but are ignorant of the process can be educated. Explaining what information is needed and why the examiner needs it should help attorneys whose efforts have been blocked by opposing counsel to draft a motion for judicial sanctions. Even if such sanctions are not pursued, proof of a specific request can be invaluable at trial—especially if, during cross-examination, the party who refused to provide the information tries to suggest that the examiner’s opinion is compromised by not having obtained and considered it. 93 A final alternative for the frustrated forensic examiner is to contact third parties or possessors of relevant documents directly, by phone or letter. Generally, however, this approach should be a last resort, or should be used only when custom and common sense have established its permissibility (e.g., contact with jail officers in the context of a competence evaluation, or with the arresting officer in connection with an insanity evaluation). An examiner who does not independently pursue records he or she told the referral source were needed is unlikely to be faulted, and in any event can identify the true culprit. Moreover, if the examiner is an agent of an attorney, it may be unethical, under legal ethics rules, to make contact with a person represented by counsel without that counsel’s consent.45 Although it is not unethical for lawyers or their agents to contact witnesses or other third parties (as opposed to parties to litigation), these individuals may be misled about the adversarial nature of the process if the call comes from a mental health professional rather than a lawyer.46 Furthermore, the forensic examiner may end up working at cross-purposes with attorneys who are simultaneously collecting information from the witnesses. At the very least, the examiner should notify the attorney of any intended contact, and, when contact is made, immediately make clear to the third party for whom he or she is working. 3.05. AMNESIA Forensic examiners often encounter individuals who report loss of memory for some past period that is pertinent to the forensic assessment47—a condition that health care professionals call “focal amnesia” when it is genuinely present.48 In such a case, the claimed memory problem differs from the gross, permanent memory impairment observed with dementia or other severe brain diseases, in that the affected individual’s current memory functioning appears to be intact. Rather, the individual claims partial or complete amnesia for events that occurred during a restricted period. In ordinary conversation, people use the single word “memory” to refer to what actually are diverse mental processes, phenomena, and capabilities. Behavioral neuroscience recognizes this diversity by fractionating memory into various types and subdivisions.49 A first division involves distinguishing “short-term” memory (e.g., recall of a telephone number we have just heard), which involves a somewhat limited retention capacity, from “long-term” memory, which involves recall of things over a much greater time period (often months or years after their first registration and encoding). Long-term memory comes in two broad types. One type is “implicit” or “procedural” memory—that is, our ability to undertake activities and perform tasks that in common parlance we “know how” to do (even though we may do them without being consciously aware that we are remembering how). For example, someone who is reading and understanding the sentences in this book “remembers” how to read, just as someone who successfully drives to work each day can be said to “remember” how to operate a motor vehicle. People with severe dementia often remember how to eat and dress themselves, even when they can no longer recall the names of family members or what they ate or wore the day before. This is because the ability to remember names or one’s past actions involve a different type of memory: “explicit” or “declarative” memory—a term designating that we “know about” specific facts or “know that” we have experienced specific things. Explicit or declarative memory involves two subtypes of recalling: “semantic” memory and “autobiographical” memory.50 Semantic memory is the capacity to state things that we have 94 learned (e.g., state capitals, the number of months in a year, or the meanings of words) or to recognize faces of famous people. Typically, semantic memories are context-free; that is, they involve facts that we have learned (usually through repetition) without necessarily knowing exactly where and when we learned them. Autobiographical (also termed “episodic”) memory, by contrast, contains details of incidents associated with particular times and locations, such as our date for the high school prom or the time and circumstances in which we met our future spouse. Isolated memory problems for autobiographical events within a defined temporal period surrounding an alleged offense is the form of amnesia typically claimed by criminal defendants. To someone charged with a serious criminal offense, claiming amnesia can seem like a relatively easy way to avoid criminal prosecution, and some studies indicate that a large proportion of amnesia claims are fabricated.51 Defendants may have several motives for feigning memory gaps: (1) Claiming amnesia might allow a defendant to testify without having to answer questions about actions during the alleged offense; (2) it may be easier to claim memory loss than to try to lie successfully or to create a false alibi; (3) false claims of memory loss may be accepted as veridical by naïve examiners; or (4) claiming memory loss for an offense can allow a defendant to avoid discussing his or her actions and potentially painful memories associated with them.52 Not all defendants’ claims of amnesia are false, however. Several neurological and physiological conditions can affect the brain structures that help us encode and consolidate memories. Many medical conditions (e.g., delirium, hypoglycemia, seizures, and head injuries) can cause transient impairment of memory formation.53 Heavy alcohol consumption can impair most aspects of memory formation, and in particular can impede storage of memories for longer than several seconds. The result is that individuals can function coherently and respond relevantly to environmental surroundings, yet on the following day may have limited recollection of what happened. Studies demonstrate impaired memory formation at blood alcohol levels as low as those that produce moderate intoxication.54 Complete absence of memory for a period—an alcohol “blackout”—may occur at higher blood alcohol levels (>0.20 g/dL), particularly when the individual has consumed a substantial amount of alcohol (i.e., ten or more drinks) quickly.55 Alcohol blackouts are commonly reported among many young people (e.g., college students56), and because many criminal acts occur during periods of inebriation, alcohol is a commonly claimed cause of amnesia among criminal defendants.57 Concurrent use of other substances (particularly sedative drugs or marijuana) may enhance the potential for alcohol to produce a partial or complete blackout for some portion of the intoxication period.58 The term “functional amnesia” refers to a disruption of episodic/autobiographical memory that occurs in the absence of a direct, organic influence on brain functioning, and that results from intense psychological stress.59 Among the emotional states that might contribute to this form of amnesia are the kinds of extreme rage, anger, dissociation, or psychosis individuals may experience during or after their participation in a violent crime. Thus defendants charged with emotionally charged homicides are more likely to report amnesia (56%) than are defendants charged with “instrumental” homicides (i.e., killing to achieve some independent aim).60 Investigations of patients with episodic/autobiographical memory impairments suggest that intensely emotional events are associated with localized alterations in brain metabolism and subtle changes in brain structure. One resulting hypothesis is that functional retrograde amnesia results from a desynchronization in the areas of the brain that allow us to locate ourselves or “mentally travel” in time and to analyze our own 95 thoughts, and that are involved in evaluating emotions.61 Although it can be difficult to determine whether claimed amnesia is genuine or feigned, forensic examiners can use several types of evidence, interviewing, and information-gathering methods to try to sort matters out. As forensic psychiatrist Charles Scott explains,62 the process involves a systematic evaluation of the following: 1. Evaluating a defendant’s medical and psychological status for factors and conditions (such as head trauma) that, when present, are known to cause memory loss. As part of this evaluation, the examiner can conduct a detailed inquiry into various facets of memory (e.g., orientation, recent and remote memory, ability to recall newly presented material). 2. Detailed questioning of the examinee about the nature of the claimed amnesia and recovery afterward. This information can then be compared with what mental health professionals know about the usual course of amnesia in genuine cases of dissociation, head trauma, and so on. Similarly, certain types of memory deficits— such as abrupt onset and ending of an amnestic period—are not typical of genuine amnesia. Nor is complete amnesia for a violent act such as a homicide typical. 3. The relationship of substance use to claimed amnesia. As we noted earlier, alcohol and certain sedative drugs are known to produce at least partial blackouts when consumed in particular patterns, amounts, and circumstances. Does the defendant’s actual consumption pattern fit with the claimed pattern and duration of memory loss? 4. Offense planning. Planning and rehearsing an action should improve recollection of behavior, which implies that actions taken that require some advance planning (e.g., robberies) are unlikely to be forgotten later. 5. Independent information sources. An examiner should look at records and observations made contemporaneously with or shortly after the alleged offense for clues about the defendant’s mental state. Do these, for example, contain information about possible intoxication? What did witnesses say about the defendant’s actions? What about the defendant’s own statements and explanations close to the time of the offense? 6. Testing. Although no psychological tests speak directly to malingered impairment of autobiographical/episodic memory, symptom validity measures and detailed neuropsychological evaluation can sometimes disclose suspicious patterns of current functioning that can justify inferences about the genuineness of claimed amnesia for the alleged offense. Two other techniques that purportedly “recover” memories—hypnosis and “narcoanalysis”—might be considered by forensic examiners, but both are problematic. Use of hypnosis as an investigative and treatment method began in the 18th century. Although the mechanisms that underlie the therapeutic effectiveness of hypnosis are not fully understood, hypnotic therapies all rely on inducing “[a] state of consciousness involving focused attention and reduced peripheral awareness characterized by an enhanced capacity for response to suggestion.”63 In the 21st century, mental health professionals use hypnosis to aid in smoking cessation64 and to treat a variety of medical conditions, including phobias and other anxiety disorders,65 pain,66 irritable bowel syndrome,67 and certain skin disorders.68 96 “Narcoanalysis,” a term coined by British psychiatrist J. Stephen Horsley,69 refers to a medical procedure involving administration of intravenous sedatives to facilitate hypnosis. First described in the 1930s, this procedure was once believed “to draw forth the concealed contents of a person’s mind and compel him or her to reveal those contents,” yielding “accurate, true-to-life memories that have been stored in the brain”—a notion linked closely to colloquial use of the phrase “truth serum” to refer to the barbiturates used in the procedure.70 Discussions about intravenous injections of sedative drugs (e.g., benzodiazepines such as lorazepam [Ativan and others] or diazepam [Valium and others]) still appear occasionally in case reports on treatment of amnesia.71 Hypnosis and sedative injections have been used as forensic investigation methods in the belief that they could facilitate accurate recall by otherwise amnestic litigants. However, we do not recommend relying on such techniques—in part because, as discussed later in this chapter [§ 3.07], these methods are not favored by courts, but primarily because they are likely to produce compromised information. As Scott explains: Memories recovered under hypnosis are vulnerable to suggestion. Although witnesses may recover more correct information while hypnotized, they also provide more incorrect information. Neither examiners nor examinees have shown an ability to distinguish true versus false recovered memories. . . . Likewise, proposed “truth-serums,” such as Amytal or sodium pentothal, should be avoided, because these drugs have shown a memory-distorting effect, including confabulations and reporting fantasies as actual memory.72 3.06. ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSE STYLE CASE STUDY 3.1 Mr. Stanley has brought a personal injury claim against a grocery store for injuries he allegedly sustained after slipping on a banana peel in the store. He claims that the fall injured his back. He has since withdrawn from his job as a plumber, claiming an inability to work while bending over. His attorney has arranged for you to evaluate Mr. Stanley, because he also reports having been severely depressed since leaving his job. The attorney is interested primarily in the extent of Mr. Stanley’s present depression. Within minutes of entering your office, Mr. Stanley starts crying and tells you that he cannot talk because of his depression. After letting him cry for a few moments, you ask him if he is ready to talk, at which point he dries his eyes and says, “Yes.” He then describes the accident matter-of-factly. Questions: At this point, how might you investigate Mr. Stanley’s report of depression? What questions might you ask? What tests, if any, might you administer? What third-party information would you want? In treatment settings, patients who are not involved in any litigation may unconsciously distort the information they provide to clinicians. But they have little incentive to practice conscious deception and manipulation, if only because such actions may undermine accurate assessment and frustrate their treatment. In contrast, as noted in § 3.02, the typical forensic examinee has much to gain from a particular finding or formulation of the case, and a large fraction of forensic examinees manipulate their presentation.73 The response style they adopt, of course, is largely dependent on the legal and evaluation context. An examinee may fabricate or exaggerate symptoms or other impairments—a response style often referred to as “malingering”—to avoid or reduce criminal sanctions (e.g., capital sentencing) or to obtain remuneration (e.g., disability evaluations or personal injury claims). In contrast, in evaluation contexts where absence of mental illness would preserve rights or get them restored (e.g., guardianship or conservatorship proceedings, child custody proceedings, civil commitment proceedings, parole hearings), examinees may deny or minimize their emotional, behavioral, or cognitive impairments—a response style that may be described as “defensive” or 97 “disavowing.” Rogers described at least five different response styles that forensic examiners may encounter (“honest/candid,” “exaggerated/fabricated,” “denying/minimizing,” “irrelevant,” and “hybrid”), and concluded that hybrid responses (i.e., a combination or two or more of the first four response styles) are most common.74 For example, a defendant in a capital sentencing context may exaggerate and fabricate some problems (e.g., a history of abuse, the presence and severity of psychiatric symptoms at and around the time of the murder) while minimizing others (e.g., psychopathic tendencies or previous crimes that might have gone undetected). Or a litigant in a workers’ compensation suit may be candid about some events, claim a limited memory for others, purposefully manipulate accounts of some symptoms (via exaggeration, fabrication, denial, or minimization), and make still other statements that reflect unconscious motives (e.g., gratification from being categorized as ill). This potential for impression management by examinees, combined with the limited abilities of psychologists and psychiatrists, are strong reasons favoring cautious and conservative decisionmaking and opinion development in most forensic assessments. Examiners should not assume that their clinical impressions or results of psychological testing or instruments aimed at detecting malingering will accurately identify the response styles of examinees. Commentators have raised especially well-founded concerns about the validity of examiners’ unstructured assessments of response style.75 Moreover, examinees who want to learn about how to present themselves in examination contexts can learn much from libraries and the Internet,76 and many forensic examinees come to the consultation room after considerable discussion with counsel about the evaluation process.77 Given the significant potential for deception and the implications for the validity of their findings, mental health professionals should have a low threshold for suspecting less-than-candid responding. At the same time, given the limitations of science referenced above, and the weight that labels used to describe response styles (e.g., “malingerer,” “faker”) carry with legal decisionmakers, the examiner should make sure that conclusions about an examinee’s response style have a sound foundation. Thus the forensic examiner should combine a low threshold for suspecting dissimulation with a cautious stance about reaching conclusions on that issue. (a) General Strategies for Detecting Feigning of Symptoms A number of strategies are available for systematically investigating response style. The most common and venerable method is the clinical interview, usually consisting of a mental status examination or other relatively unstructured interview procedure. The cues and indicators of exaggeration or fabrication of mental symptoms that experienced interviewers look for have developed over decades of clinical experience78 and involve comparing scientific knowledge about the typical presentation, symptoms, and course of various mental disorders with examinees’ reports about their problems and their behavior during the evaluation.79 A problem with this approach is that it is difficult to quantify how accurately it works, and accuracy varies substantially among clinicians. For this reason, forensic examiners increasingly use structured interviews designed to detect particular symptoms and other tools specifically designed to detect exaggeration or fabrication. A third technique is the judicious interpretation of traditional psychological tests, including particular scales on those 98 tests, to detect dissimulation. Finally, having independent, reliable third-party observations is one of the most useful means of assessing response style. Indeed, information that contradicts an examinee’s descriptions of problems may well be the best ways of demonstrating exaggeration, fabrication, or denial, and may be the only viable one with examinees who are highly invested in sabotaging interview and testing efforts. In particular, forensic clinicians may use evidence from interviewing, testing, or other sources (e.g., documents or surveillance data that is incongruent with the examinees’ self-report or presentation) to confront examinees with questions about their response style and approach to the assessment process. Little is lost if an examinee does not confess to dissimulation, but much is gained if the examinee admits to misrepresenting symptoms or problems. Whatever the limitations of the interview or testing data that gave rise to the concerns, the examinee’s admission is a compelling piece of clinical information that brings closure to the issue. If such a confrontation is handled tactfully, the clinician may now have a relieved, cooperative, and candid respondent with whom to discuss remaining issues in the forensic referral. While the use of third-party information to detect dissimulation probably needs no further elaboration, below we discuss in somewhat more detail the use of the other three approaches (structured interviews, instruments designed to detect fabrication, and traditional psychological tests), in connection with discerning feigned psychosis, intellectual deficits, depression, anxiety, and guardedness or minimization. (b) Assessment of Feigned Psychosis Rogers identified several indicators of exaggeration or fabrication of serious mental disorder that might be detected during an interview.80 These include the following: An overplayed and dramatic presentation, including such features as theatrical style, eagerness to discuss symptoms or impairments, reports of extreme symptom severity, and indiscriminate endorsement of symptoms. Deliberateness and carefulness, including such features as slower rate of speech, extensive use of qualifiers, more hesitations, and repeating of interviewer questions. Inconsistency with psychiatric diagnosis or clinical functioning, including report of rapid onset and resolution of symptoms, and report of rare symptoms or unusual symptom combinations. Inconsistency of self-report, including report of contradictory symptoms and disparity between reported and observed symptomatology and functioning. Claims of obvious, blatant symptoms, including reports of hallucinations and delusional ideas in the absence of altered thought patterns and “negative” symptoms (such as paucity of speech and impoverished affect). Experienced forensic clinicians develop their own interview questions to look for these kinds of cues. For example, persons who appear all too ready to claim or acknowledge a wide range of positive or dramatic symptoms may be enticed by inquiries about exotic symptoms or ludicrous symptom combinations, such as “When you hear voices, do you also experience slight dizziness and the sudden smell of hamburger?” As another example, Schacter suggested that defendants who claim amnesia for a particular event be asked 99 whether they feel they could remember the incident with sufficient prodding; his research suggests that simulators are more likely to deny a “feeling of knowing” than those who truly cannot remember.81 When examinees fall into one or more of these interviewing traps laid by the clinician, a diagnosis of malingering may follow. However, this approach to detecting feigned impairment has limited utility. Because the specific questions examiners employ vary, clinicians have few to no systematically gathered data (e.g., explicit norms) to facilitate an objective interpretation of examinees’ responses. A clinician’s basis for concluding that an examinee is malingering may merely be “clinical experience,” which is subject to a number of biases in judgment and memory. Research indicates that the accuracy of clinical judgments of malingering is not impressive.82 Increasingly, mental health professionals have concluded that because interview-based approaches to detecting malingering are of such limited utility, “employment of instruments specifically designed for this purpose should be considered the standard of practice whenever there is a basis for suspecting overreporting of symptoms.”83 In this regard, one psychological assessment instrument that has received considerable praise is the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS), published originally in 1992 and now in its second edition (SIRS-2).84 Both versions conduct the test administrator through a 172-item structured interview that yields scores on several scales, each representing different strategies to detect feigned symptoms of serious mental disorders.85 The primary scales contain items that permit more systematic exploration of the various malingering strategies found in Rogers’s survey of the literature (summarized above). For example, one scale (RS) records an examinee’s endorsement of rare symptoms that do not often occur even in truly psychotic individuals; another scale (IA) captures the reporting of improbable or absurd symptoms; yet another scale (SU) is sensitive to the overreporting of everyday problems that are not indicative of a major psychiatric disorder. Rogers and his colleagues have investigated the capacity of the SIRS to detect malingering in a series of studies that have included so-called “simulation” and “known-group” designs.86 The original studies conducted to validate the SIRS showed that its scores could detect known87 or simulated88 malingerers without mislabeling “honest” responders as feigners. Rogers and colleagues also published studies showing that the SIRS did well even when the feigning subjects received information about the detection strategies employed in the test89 or were psychologically knowledgeable about specific disorders to be feigned.90 The original research on the SIRS has also consistently reported respectable indices of sensitivity91 and specificity,92 although investigators who completed a meta-analysis of research on the SIRS expressed concerns about lower specificity rates in later research.93 In response to concerns about its specificity, Rogers and his colleagues revised the SIRS scoring and classification rubrics via publication of the SIRS-2 (while not changing the instrument’s item content). However, at least two publications raise concerns about the accuracy of the revised scoring system and information presented in the SIRS-2 manual.94 Despite these and other concerns about its research base,95 the SIRS/SIRS-2 deserves serious consideration by forensic clinicians who want to evaluate the genuineness of reported symptoms of severe mental illness. The structured nature and objective scoring of the SIRS make it superior to clinical assessment of response styles. While other screening measures show some promise,96 the SIRS remains the most praised and best-validated measure with respect to this type of assessment. 100 Some commentators have suggested that projective tests such as the Rorschach Inkblot Technique and the TAT [see Table 3.3], because of their more ambiguous nature, show some potential in identifying persons feigning psychotic-spectrum symptoms (as well as symptoms of other disorders). Research, however, indicates that these claims are not well founded,97 a conclusion that, in conjunction with the ongoing debate about the validity and value of projective approaches,98 raises serious questions about the use of such measures in forensic evaluation contexts. Among traditional measures of psychopathology and behavior, the instrument most extensively researched and widely used in the assessment of dissimulation is the MMPI/MMPI-2/MMPI-2-RF [see Table 3.3].99 Potential indices of dissimulation on the MMPI/MMPI-2/MMPI-2-RF include several response style scales and indices (L, F, K; F-K index; Fb, Fp, F-r, VRIN, TRIN, Ds, Ds-R, Md, Mp, FBS, RBS). Greene has cautioned against the overinterpretation of these indicators, warning that “[i]t is not necessary to use several of these scales/indexes simultaneously since they are correlated highly and consequently are very redundant.”100 With this caveat, the MMPI/MMPI-2/MMPI-2-RF appears to have the most empirical support among conventional psychological tests for use in the assessment of malingered psychopathology. Finally, note must be made of two other psychological tests are sometimes suggested as means of detecting dissimulation of serious mental illness. The PAI [again, see Table 3.3], like the MMPI-2, is a structured selfreport measure of psychopathology and behavioral functioning.101 Like the MMPI-2, the PAI has standard response style scales as well as specially designed response style indices. Although the classification utility of the PAI scales has not been investigated as closely as that of their MMPI-2 counterparts, research to date is promising.102 In contrast, the response style scales of the MCMI-IV and its predecessors (the MCMI-II and -III) have not been examined in much research, and the research that has been conducted has been discouraging.103 (c) Assessment of Feigned Intellectual Impairment One might assume that detection of feigned cognitive impairment would rely primarily on intelligence tests. But a review by Schretlen revealed that much of the research on the usefulness of such tests for this purpose is dated and focused on instruments not currently in wide use.104 Furthermore, Schretlen found that even the more popular contemporary intelligence tests [see Table 3.3] are not well adapted to the kind of “scatter analysis” that has been the best indicator of malingering.105 Thus Schretlen’s review offers little support for the use of intelligence tests in assessing malingered cognitive impairment. Similar in conclusion is Rogers and colleagues’ review of several studies in which skilled clinicians have attempted to detect malingering of cognitive deficits by using intelligence tests, or a combination of those tests with neuropsychological tests and other clinical protocols. In most of these studies as well, clinicians performed poorly (even below chance in some cases).106 Sweet has identified six circumstances that should raise questions about response styles of examinees undergoing neuropsychological evaluations in forensic contexts;107 many of these are analogous to the strategies identified by Rogers in connection with assessing the validity of claims of thought disorder. Examiners should be alert for (1) insufficient effort on CAIs of intelligence, memory, and other cognitive abilities (i.e., an examinee obtains a score on a measure that is below what would be expected even of impaired 101 persons); (2) insufficient effort on FRIs that were designed to assess response style in forensic contexts (i.e., the examinee obtains a score on a measure that is below chance, or is below what would be expected even of impaired persons); (3) “nonsensical,” rare, or unique responses not typically associated with known neuropsychological or cognitive impairment (e.g., the examinee reports limitations or experiences that could not result from the reported or claimed injury); (4) inconsistent responding across tests that assess related aspects of cognitive functioning (e.g., the examinee obtains divergent scores on highly correlated measure of memory, intelligence, or other cognitive functioning); (5) observed inconsistency between test performance and real-life adaptive behaviors (e.g., test scores on measures of intellect, problem solving, or memory indicate very low functioning, yet the examinee exercises higher capabilities in day-to-day life tasks); and (6) inconsistencies in how deficits affect different areas of life (e.g., the examinee reports intellectual, memory, or cognitive impairments that limit his or her ability to work but have no effect on enjoyable activities, such as traveling and engaging in recreational activities). Although several of these strategies have shown promise in isolated studies, few are systematically used in commonly employed measures for detecting feigned cognitive deficits. In the past 30 years, however, several measures have been expressly designed to assess examinees’ response styles and effort during assessments of neuropsychological and cognitive functioning. These measures—which include the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM), the Victoria Symptom Validity Test, the Validity Indicator Profile (VIP), and the Word Memory Test (WMT)—can be administered in conjunction with and compared to the results of CAIs (e.g., measures of intelligence or memory). These specialized measures typically rely on two approaches with respect to assessing an examinee’s response style. First, the instruments employ a two-alternative forced-choice design that allows identification of “worse than chance” performance, which is strongly indicative of efforts to appear more impaired than is actually the case. In addition, these tests contain scales that allow evaluators to compare the performance of examinees with the performance of persons who have conditions that are known to produce cognitive impairment, but who have no motivation to exaggerate their impairment. Test scores significantly below those obtained by impaired persons are indicative of attempts to appear more impaired than is actually the case. (d) Assessment of Feigned Anxiety and Depression Assessment of the response styles of persons reporting symptoms of anxiety and depression is challenging. Few tests that assess symptoms of anxiety and depression have embedded within them measures of response style, and research indicates that those that do (such as the MMPI-2/MMPI-2-RF and PAI) are not particularly good at identifying exaggerated or fabricated symptoms of anxiety and depression.108 These findings may be due in part to the fact that such test takers have probably experienced some actual anxiety or depression in their lives, which is often untrue of examinees who want to feign symptoms of psychosis or cognitive impairment.109 Not surprisingly, research suggests that feigners are more likely to be successful when they rely on past experience in simulating symptoms.110 (e) Assessment of Denial, Disavowal, Guardedness, and Minimization 102 Assessment of examinee guardedness and defensiveness has received considerably less attention than assessment of feigned psychopathology and cognitive impairment. Although mental health publications largely agree in their depictions and descriptions of feigned mental problems, the professional literature offers no such consensus on the characteristics, behaviors, or styles of examinees who are guarded, minimizing, or defensive in their presentations. Similarly, in comparison to the large number of free-standing measures of feigned psychiatric symptoms and cognitive impairment, few measures of guardedness and defensiveness have been developed, and existing measures have not been subjected to significant validation research.111 Omnibus measures of psychopathology and personality (e.g., the MMPI-2/MMPI-2-RF, PAI, and MCMI-II/MCMI-III/MCMI-IV) have a number of response scales embedded within them that are designed to identify examinees who deny or minimize psychopathology or present themselves as having positive attributes. But these are of limited utility. The L and S scales of the MMPI-2 and MMPI-2-RF are designed to identify persons motivated to portray themselves as having positive attributes, and a variety of other scales and indices (e.g., K, F-K, O-S, Mp, Sd) are thought to be of some value in identifying persons motivated to deny and minimize problem behaviors or experiences. Yet available research recommends that evaluators use different cutoff scores for the scales with different populations. In his review of MMPI-2 measures of response style, Greene also noted research finding low intercorrelations between the scales that measure defensiveness and guardedness, and suggested that they thus may measure different phenomena.112 Even less research has examined the performance of the PAI’s scales and indices of guardedness/defensiveness, and the results are only modestly encouraging.113 Finally, the small amount of research examining the classification of the response style scales of the MCMI-II/MCMI-III/MCMI-IV offers little ground for optimism.114 (f) Summary In conclusion, clinicians should be cautious about their use of psychological tests to assess response style, and very cautious about drawing conclusions about response style based on their clinical judgment. With respect to omnibus measures of psychopathology and personality, use of the MMPI-2/MMPI-2-RF and PAI appears warranted in some circumstances. In contrast, the limited and discouraging research examining the utility of the response style scales of the MCMI-II/MCMI-III/MCMI-IV indicates that this measure is of little value for detecting feigning. Measures specifically aimed at assessing response style (e.g., the SIRS/SIRS-2, TOMM, WMT, and VIP) are more likely to be appropriate, but only if their use is tailored to the referral question. For example, the SIRS/SIRS-2 may have little value in a forensic examination where the reported complaints revolve around intellectual and memory impairment rather than symptoms of severe mental illness, whereas the TOMM, VIP, or WMT may be very helpful. Conversely, questions regarding the forensic examinee’s report of psychotic-spectrum symptoms may properly trigger use of the SIRS/SIRS-2 or M-FAST (see Table 3.3), whereas the TOMM, VIP, and WMT may well be useless in this circumstance. Many experienced clinicians advocate the use of a battery of tests of different types as an approach to overcoming the limitations associated with any one test. This approach is theoretically sound, and some research supports its potential value.115 However, these studies used a combination of experimental and conventional testing indices, and relied on strictly statistical (as opposed to clinical) interpretations to attain 103 their results. To our knowledge, no study shows that clinicians, using clinical interpretations of combinations of tests, have demonstrated extraordinary ability to identify people feigning impairment. Moreover, examiners should be cautious about using highly correlated scales or measures of response style, because doing so might increase the examiners’ confidence while actually decreasing classification accuracy.116 Yet researchers continue to look for potential combinations of indices or scores from multiple measures of response style that would improve identification of feigned impairment.117 Other caveats are also important. First, because they do not provide information about why an examinee might be feigning symptoms, even the best measures of symptom exaggeration/fabrication are not measures of “malingering”—a descriptor (not a diagnosis or condition) that, according to DSM-5, reflects efforts to feign illness or impairment to achieve some external goal (e.g., avoid criminal prosecution, obtain disability benefits). Second, given the limitations of existing assessment approaches, examiners should be cautious in their descriptions of examinees’ response styles and recognize the potential for error. Third, examiners should not make the fundamental error of assuming that evidence of symptom exaggeration indicates the absence of genuine impairment, because some persons who exaggerate and fabricate difficulties also have real problems. Relatedly, one cannot conclude that all accounts offered by a person who is less than candid in his or her response style are inaccurate in some way. Conversely, an examiner should not assume that simply because an examinee has a well-documented record of symptoms or impairment, all of the problems reported by the examinee during a forensic examination are genuine. 3.07. CHALLENGES TO THE BASIS OF EXPERT TESTIMONY As this chapter has explained, mental health professionals should base their expert testimony on multiple sources of information. Suppose an expert bases an opinion about insanity on a clinical interview of the defendant, a diary that police seized from the defendant’s home, psychological test data, interviews of the defendant’s family members, arrest reports, medical records, and the results of a polygraph test or narcoanalysis. It may be that, given common practice in the jurisdiction, the other side will not object to these various bases for the testimony. However, if in doubt on this score, the wise attorney should seek, prior to trial, either a stipulation from opposing counsel or a judicial determination that the opinion and its foundations are admissible. In practice, perhaps only opinions based on polygraph testing will give rise to serious challenge, but the law provides grounds for attacking the admissibility of any of these sources of information and the opinions based on the sources. The legal bases for such challenges are diverse. The results of a clinical interview might be tainted if the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not honored [see § 4.02]. The diary might be “suppressed” if it was seized illegally [see §§ 2.04(a)(1), 7.02]. Psychological testing the expert employed might be considered irrelevant [see § 3.03(a)]. The family interviews and the police and medical records might be challenged as inadmissible “hearsay” [see below]. And the polygraph and narcoanalysis results could be challenged either under the Frye test (which bars testimony unless the technique or theory on which it is based “is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”), or under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (which prohibit testimony based on evidence that is “unhelpful,” in light of its low probative value, error rate, lack of general acceptance, and other factors) [see § 1.04(c)].118 104 (a) General Rules If any of these challenges is successful, is an expert opinion based on such information also rendered inadmissible? In the federal courts, Rule of Evidence 703 answers this question, stating that facts or data underlying an expert opinion “need not be admissible in evidence” if “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” Although this language is similar to that in Frye, Rule 703 focuses on whether it is “reasonable” to rely on certain information, not whether doing so is “generally accepted”; further, it is meant to deal with situations involving any type of information, not just scientific information. Many states have adopted a version of Rule 703 as well. In contrast, however, some states do not permit expert testimony unless its basis is independently admissible.119 In these latter jurisdictions, if any particular information source is inadmissible, the expert’s opinion testimony may be barred unless the inadmissible information is considered merely corroborative. One further complication must also be noted. Most courts that permit an opinion under Rule 703 analysis would allow the expert not only to voice the opinion, but also to explain its entire basis so long as it is “reasonably relied upon.”120 But other courts, although allowing the opinion, prohibit informing the jury about any data that are not independently admissible.121 The Federal Rules of Evidence take a third, compromise position. Rule 703 states that expert opinions may rely on inadmissible information, but then cautions that “[f]acts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect” [see § 1.04(c)]. For ethical (if not legal) reasons, the second position described above is problematic. A forensic examiner may feel uncomfortable offering an opinion the basis of which cannot be explained [see § 1.04(a)]. Nor should the law allow unexplained opinions to be given, because this maneuver “usurps” the jury’s credibility assessment role. Thus, if the challenged information is important to the clinician’s opinion and the court insists that it not be mentioned, the clinician may consider declining to testify [see § 4.05(b)(1)]. The same dilemma might occur under Rule 703 (the third, hybrid approach). Although that rule does not bar description of inadmissible information, its requirement that the probative value of the information substantially outweigh its prejudicial impact will often lead to its exclusion. Ideally, instead, the prejudicial nature of the expert’s facts could be exposed through cross-examination. If the judge decides otherwise, the clinician will have to determine whether the expert can adequately explain the opinion without the excluded information. (b) Hearsay Although the issues just discussed can arise in connection with forensic reliance on any clinical technique— ranging from projective tests to syndrome or profile analysis—this discussion focuses on hearsay as a basis for clinical testimony, since clinicians frequently rely on this type of information, and the law governing such reliance is nuanced. “Hearsay” is simply an out-of-court statement sought to be used in a trial or similar proceeding to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Thus statements obtained from the subject’s family, the police, or the examiner’s colleagues who have assisted in the evaluation are usually 105 hearsay. A hearsay statement is generally not admissible, because its reliability (i.e., accuracy) cannot be assessed through cross-examination of the declarant at the time the statement is made; without crossexamination, it is assumed, the declarant’s motives, biases and opportunity to observe the relevant facts cannot be reliably ascertained. However, there are several exceptions to the hearsay rule, normally applying in situations in which the hearsay is considered reliable despite its out-of-court nature, or when it is the only available evidence. Based on the idea that parties have an incentive to avoid erroneous statements against their own interest, a prominent exception is the “party admission” exception, which admits statements made by a criminal defendant or a party to a civil lawsuit;122 analogously, declarations against interest, made by individuals who are not parties and are not available at trial (because they are dead, out of the jurisdiction, or asserting the right to remain silent), are admissible.123 Testimony given at a preliminary hearing, where the out-of-court declarant can be cross-examined, will also generally be admissible,124 whereas testimony given at a grand jury proceeding usually will not be, because in the latter case there has been no opportunity for crossexamination.125 Hearsay statements found in official, commercial, and medical records are also admissible, if they are of the type routinely recorded in such records (sometimes called the “business records” exception to the hearsay rule, to connote records considered reliable because kept in the ordinary course of business). Thus statements in a hospital record from a patient or about a patient that relate to the patient’s condition are probably admissible. But statements by a patient about how her husband constantly beat her would probably not be.126 One other important caveat to the business records rule is that the prosecution may not use hearsay statements found in law enforcement records against a criminal defendant. This rule originated out of concern that police may be biased against the accused; as discussed further below, it now also is required as a means of implementing the accused’s constitutional right to confront accusers. As this brief and incomplete survey of the hearsay rules makes clear, some of the standard hearsay information that mental health professionals use, refer to, and rely upon in court will be independently admissible, but at least some types of information (e.g., statements from family members, statements unrelated to treatment that are included in treatment records, statements in police reports used against a defendant) may not be. In the latter situation, most trial courts allow the expert to testify in any event, either under Rule 703 or simply because the judge and the parties have not given the situation any thought. It has been argued, however, that Rule 703’s “reasonable reliance” language should be narrowly construed to permit the clinician to report only those hearsay statements the validity of which can be demonstrated (e.g., through a hearsay exception, or through in-court cross-examination of the declarant about the out-of-court statement).127 According to this view, the jury should not have to judge the credibility of an unavailable source based solely on what the expert witness says. Indeed, recent legal decisions construing the “confrontation clause” of the Sixth Amendment may require such a result in criminal cases. The confrontation clause guarantees the accused person the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington,128 the United States Supreme Court held that this language prohibits the government from introducing any out-of-court statements that were not subject to cross-examination at the time they were made and are “testimonial” in nature—a term the Court stated included any declaration “made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”129 New York 106 courts have since held that this concept encompasses statements made by a third party during a forensic evaluation conducted by the state.130 Under this holding, if prosecution-retained examiners solicit information from a third party and intend to rely on that information at trial, the prosecutor must either (1) ensure that the third party testifies; (2) show that the third party is unavailable and that the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the third party at some earlier proceeding; or (3) obtain from the defense a waiver of confrontation rights. Even outside the criminal setting, one can make a strong argument that everyone who is a significant source of information for the forensic evaluator should be required to testify in court, including, for instance, all members of an evaluation team who have conducted independent components of the evaluation. A number of courts have so held, at least in civil proceedings (e.g., “sexually violent predator” hearings) that are similar to criminal trials.131 In contrast, in those situations in which the hearsay data are trivial or unlikely to be contested, or when they are significant but the source is practically unavailable,132 a strict rule seems counterproductive. In any event, forensic examiners, aided by the lawyers who retain them, should be prepared to explain why sources they have relied on are not available, and why they nonetheless feel comfortable in relying upon them. This is a rule that should be followed with respect to any other sources—from test results to novel theories—that form the basis for a clinical opinion. 3.08. CONCLUSION Moving from therapeutic to forensic work requires several adjustments in attitude and technique. In forensic evaluations, treatment usually is a secondary consideration; subjects are less likely to be cooperative and candid; considering data sources beyond what the subject says is more likely to be necessary; and “conventional” interview and testing techniques are less likely to be useful. Also, sources that a clinician finds forensically helpful (e.g., third-party statements, hypnotic interviews, and profile information) may be anathema to a legal system worried about unreliable information, and thus may legally taint the resulting clinical opinion. The clinician who fails to recognize the need for these adjustments or neglects to make them will be of limited aid to a legal system that, as the next chapter makes even clearer, is the forensic clinician’s ultimate client. BIBLIOGRAPHY CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION (Richard Rogers ed., 4th ed. 2017). EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS (Thomas Grisso ed., 2d ed. 2003). DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY chs. 11, 18, 38 (2016–2017 ed.) FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT: A CASEBOOK (Kirk Heilbrun et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). FORENSIC USES OF CLINICAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS (Robert Archers & Elizabeth M. A. Wheeler eds., 2013). Kirk Heilbrun et al., Third Party Information in Forensic Assessment, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (Alan Goldstein ed., 2003). KIRK HEILBRUN, THOMAS GRISSO & ALAN GOLDSTEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT (2008). MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 15 (6th ed. 2006) (admissibility of opinion based on inadmissible evidence). Randy Otto, Christopher Slobogin & Stuart Greenberg., Legal and Ethical Issues in Accessing Third Party Information, in 2 FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (Alan Goldstein ed., 2007). 107 108
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