Exam Overview Your final exam will be held on May 7 at 07:40 PM - 09:40 PM. You will have 120 minutes to complete a number of essay questions. This will be a closed-book exam, so prepare accordingly. Preparation Study your notes very well. You may be tested on anything mentioned in class. Also make sure you thoroughly understand all your readings. You will likely be tested on the ones that came up in class. Please feel free to ask me any questions before the exam. Focus on: - Iraq, especially: - The logic and effects of Saddam’s Baathist ‘homogenization’ project - Logic: - Pan-Arabism (Baathism) requires a unified Arab identity and no risk of internal conflict due to ethnic/religious divisions - Transcend new identity and build new ones - Take Iraq ethnic, tribal, and sectarian division and crush them into Iraqi arab nationalism under Sadam Hussein - Wanted to make a new Secular (Sunni), Baathist, Iraqi government where the people trust in the full control under Saddam Hussein - Effect: - Friends and family gained power and they were all sunnis - Creates an even more divided nation from within the other non-sunni iraqi populations living within iraq - People didn’t like for their culture to be erased (homogenize) - Further divided the country - Faith campaign that he did pushed for a more islamic country - Iraq began to change - Alcohol was banned - - State started to mass print Qurans and build Mosques - Religion was expanding The reasons behind Iraq’s descent into sectarian civil war after 2003 - Winners: Shias (Kurds as well) - American invasion allowed for the Shias to grow as the “real winners” - Shia Centric State in which Iraq was built up as a new state for the Shia people - Losers: Sunnis - Sunnis ‘lost’ – the new Iraqi constitution was pro-Shi’a and deeply sectarian (divided factions officially), making being a Sunni an salient identity - Made even more risky due to the belief that they were the natural rulers of the Iraqi state and pretty nationalistic - “We woke up one day and discovered we were all Sunnis” - New Era-Government: - Nouri Malki Prime Minister is put into power in the hopes that he would run Iraq in a stable way so that we don't get dragged back into war - New constitution was pro-shia and deeply sectarian and divided Iraqis up into factions - Secular Sunnis became more religious and prideful from the social arrogance brought by government labor of them - Ministries of Iraq were looted - Sunni insurgency fought US backed troops and Shia Militant Groups - US Attitude Change: - Destroyed Iraqi Army (450k people lost their position) - DeBaathinization - Looked into institutions and removed people from middle to upper baath members, which lead to more sunni alienation - A lot of former baath members became - - - disenfranchised and so they joined the Sunni army “Turning powerful people unhappy is one thing, but powerful people with guns being unhappy is another” 2005 constitution - Civil rights, separation of powers, decentralized federal system (kurds benefit) and formed sectarian policies and sunni ??? - Disempowering sunnis - Favored shias and put sunnis down - Many denounced the constitution since they saw it as a US-Iraqi proxy state and especially the Ex-Baathists - Sunni Communalization (GREAT TERM) - Al Qaeda sent Al Zarkawi to start a branch in Iraq - They formed it on kicking america out of Iraq - Al Zarkawi wanted to start war on Shias with sunni winning in his mind - Roots of Isis - Killing shia was part of process to get sunnis to mobilize and help them Current challenges to Iraqi stability: (PMF+Voter Turnout+Shia Political Legitimacy+Corruption+Bad Infrastructure+Low Gov Stability) - The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is an Iraqi state security service that Iran has infiltrated and uses to wield significant influence in Iraq and undermine the Iraqi’s government authority and military - The PMF will not let Iraq develop a strong state, but the only way the Iraqi government can confront them successfully is if they are a strong state - The Iraqi government and PMF have had to crush uprisings with thousands of people in 2019 - The current prime minister of Iraq decided to double the size of and increase the profitability of the PMF, which is not good - Having a military that doesn’t listen to you makes an illegitimate state - the PMF does whatever they want - - - - - Lack of infrastructure, high unemployment, need for humanitarian aid, deep corruption and low voter turnout weakening political parties and legitimacy of the Shia dominated government The Iraqi Militancy is separate from the Iraqi military, and have infiltrated state institutions and are extremely powerful, and even have a menu of extortion The Iraqi Militancy use the state budget to manage their affairs, manage oil fields, have a real-estate wing, and provides an extremely powerful challenge to Iraqi central leadership Failing hospitals and schools, and lack of water and energy, along with high unemployment and high corruption, and the fact that nearly half of the country needs humanitarian aid has made Iraqi people extremely angry The Iraqi has parliamentary elections, but the corruption, coercion, and more lead to extremely low turnout and a weakening of the major political parties, ISIS, especially: - The “The Management of Savagery” doctrine - Founded by Abu Bakr Naji - Forms critical part of Isis Strategic thinking - Goes back to Zarqawi principles - Salafi Jihadi Ideology - Salafi Jihadism is a fundamentalist ideology that advocates for the establishment of an Islamic state governed strictly by Sharia law, achieved through violent jihad against perceived enemies of Islam, including secular governments and other Muslims considered apostate. - Regimes around that hate Islam that are too powerful and first stage is establishing savagery - Best place to start a caliphate is in a place of chaos and sectarian war - HOW: - Provoke enemies, exhaust, and spread them thin - To create this situation, you must market your - operations as slick and cool to attract others, loot all lands taken, infiltrate all institutions and turn them for you, polarize all acts of violence in religious terms, and bring about a general situation of chaos and collapse - Propaganda to make you look good, looting and pillaging all lands taken (capture resources), infiltrating the institutions of the state, bring chaos, justifying every violent thing you do with religion - How to manage once established - Interior Security - Resist Invaders - Provide food and medical treatment - Through population establish justice through their interpretation Sharia LAW - Immobilized socially - Establish spy networks and spy on society and keep the people in line - Resources and enemy resources get taken and Buy the people with resources and supply them Why ISIS emerged in the time and place it did - First they were in Syria before they spread to Iraq - Ugly sectarian (religious) policies in Iraq after US withdrawal - Anti-Shia sentiment - Syrian civil war helped - Next to iraq - Tribes found it convenient in eastern syria to work with ISIS - Money: by taking over parts of Syria they have oil networks, extortion network, and checkpoints - Luckily they had Sunnis who hated Assad regime and ignored ISIS and instead fought against Assad - What makes ISIS different and possible is the fact that they are financially independent (funds from oil and looting) - Operational Advantages - Money meant no state sponsor so no accountable state - Bought recruits domestically and internationally - Called on Jihadi networks in US run Iraqi Jails - - Former Sudan people and baathists and they brought their skills How ISIS established a degree of political legitimacy and control - Isis takes Mosul with 800 fighters and now runs a city with 1.8 million people - Abu Bakr al Baghdady declares caliphate in mosul - Jihadi groups disapprove this - Non muslims ignored it - 30k foreigners join islamic state - Isis kept power by persuasion - They were the protectors for the sunnis against the shias - Provided food - Price controls - Fear into people - Manipulation of tribes - Baathist form ISIS Security State - Power by persuasion / stability - Price controls: put a cap - Food - Some peace/justice through fear - Protecting Sunnis - Taking Mosul with only 800 fighters - Iraqi military ran away - They were poorly led and low morale (don’t want to die for Malaki) - Huge win because of size of Mosul - Declaring a caliphate in Mosul Lebanon, especially: - The causes and effects of Lebanon’s civil war - 1975-90 (can be thought of in multiple parts) - Causes - There are many different factions in Lebanon (Maronites, Sunnis, Shia) - Originally Maronites vs. Sunni / PLO - - Sunni / PLO were winning the war so the Maronite president called Hafez al-Assad for help - He was backing the PLO until this moment - Thought that a Sunni uprising would flow into his government (overthrow the Alawites) - Hafez is considered the protector of the minorities so he felt it was his duty to help the maronites - He also doesn't want palestinians to have a lot of power as to still have them rely on him - Maronites are going to realize that he was there for too long and eventually hate him - Refugees in general (specifically Palestinian ones and the formational of the PLO) - 1982 Israelis - Israelis reach an agreement to the Maronites to solve the PLO moment - Isralies would invade up to Beirut and overthrow other factions and put Maronites in power so that he can negotiate with the Israelites Effects - Towards the end and after the Civil War in the 80s/90s onward saw the the rise of Hezbollah - First appear in 1983 on the attack of the U.S. embassy in Beirut - What do they want → release statement and says: anti-American, anti-imperialist, let people choose the government they want - All militias were forced to let go of arms except Hezbollah - New reality was the packed Syrian overlordship and Hezbollah - Balance from Maronite dominance and shift to Sunni - Dominate player here is Syria - New figure: Rafic Hariri (billionaire with connections to Saudis and Americans) - - Newcomer; Syrians agree to make him PM and rebuild Lebanon - Two conditions: defer to Syria on foreign policy question, cut the regime in on the action ($$$) The current drivers of instability in Lebanon - Political Economy under Hariri - To get money: tax people or borrow money (what he decided to do) - To reassure investors, he created the Lebanese Lira pegg (investors like stability) - At core of program was to build infrastructure and privatize state businesses - Neoliberal World Bank ideas - GDP began to grow but from the start it was seen with corruption - More money flowing in leads to more corruption (from Syria and other actors) - Used as an instrument of policy (bribe politicians to pass certain bills) - Secret pact between Hariri and Hafez (held throughout the 90s) - Contradictions: Lebanon needed growth and investments while Syria needed Hezbollah to keep fighting the Israelites - Things brokedown when Bashar al-Assad took office - Feb 2005: assassination of Rafic Hariri (car bomb in Beirut) - UN accused Syria and then Hezbollah - Resulted in mass protest against Syria and they left after 29 years - Syria 2011 Syrian Civil War - Important that the Syrian government likes you if you are in power - Politics of Lebanon literally froze during the Civil War (wanted to see the outcome of the war) - Ended up with over a million Syrian refugees - War + other pressures led to economic downfall - Debt By the time the war ended Lebanon was doomed - 140 billion in debt, 30 billion GDP - Banks were in a ponzi scheme - - - - Banks agreed to lend central bank at a certain rate (good) and central bank agreed to do this unless the banks kept flowing - By the time the money was hollow, the central bank had began screwing with the numbers - Banks had to keep lending money - Unemployment surged, people fell below the poverty line - Beirut gets 2 hours of electricity per day Outside help Lebanon sought help abroad - Were told to stop public spending, raise taxes - 2019: Government decided to raise taxes through WhatsApp - Kicked off protest movement across multiple sects - Demands: resignation of the government, new electoral law that is non sectarian (light regime change) - Hezbollah looked to mobilize protesters Currency issues → Lebanese Lira is pegged to the U.S. dollar The advantages and disadvantages of the confessional system - Confessional system definition: political legitimacy is given that certain sects artificially ,leadership is elected, mutual veto (difficult for one faction to take over) - Agreement of the National Pact: President is Maronite, PM is Sunni, Speaker of House will be Shia - Remaining 14 sects got a certain amount of representation in parliament, cabinet, army, etc. - Parliament and Military were to be dominated by Christains (6:5 ratio Christian to Muslims) - Issues began to arise because not all Lebanese people are represented equally - Negatives: - Confessionalism can harden sectarian identity (what you can run for)\ - Mutual vetoing (Get nothing done) - A lot of sectarian bandwagoning - - Extremely vulnerable to foreign intervention (Palestinians, Syrians, U.S., Lebanon, Iran) - Positives: - Every sect is guaranteed power - Mutual vetoing (checks the system) - Hard for one party to dominate - Channels politics away from violence Hezbollah’s constraints, challenges, and strategy in Lebanon - Challenges - Ideological challenges if they ran the country - They also forfeit the ability to control the state on a day to day level vs on a governmental level - Hezbollah is a complicated actor (International stage) - Shia Islamist - Pledges absolute leadership to the Supreme Leader of Iran - Receives money from Iran - Culture of resistance (anti-Western and anti-Israelis) - Hezbollah the Lebanese entity - Most of Lebanon is not Shia and not even Muslim - Not many Shia that want to live in an environment like Iran - Big chunk that feeds fighters are in tribes - Other ways of legitimizing themselves: need to do this because, protection against Israel - Complicating strategies for Hezbollah: - Keep their weapons but no longer do a lot of wacky stuff they used to do - Much like Hamas in Palestine, Hezollah is far more focused on the goal of “liberation” rather than the imposition of any strict religious order - They have pledged not to enforce an Islamic state in Lebanon - Remind the Israelis that the fight is still going on - Not to use arms against Lebanese (didn’t happen until 2008) - Joined the Syrian Civil War in 2013 to put down Sunni uprising - 1992 they have a party - After 2008, Hezbollah decided to join politics and that they would have veto power (to guarantee that it has legal cover to keep their militia) - Technically Hezbollah could take the whole place over and control it, but haven’t done it - Interesting question as to why they don’t do that - Don’t have to answer institutions to the country - If a country invades Lebanon to overthrow Hezbollah, they are also invading the state - Khatib: Hezbollah is an hybrid actor that is not accountable to the state that does not have orders given to them, but has legitimacy - Can rule without having to face sanctions from other countries - Party approach: field candidate in national elections, use other alliances with certain sects Saudi Arabia, especially: - The political legitimacy foundations and tools of the regime - Because it is a monarchy, there is a clear line of succession and therefore challenges to the ruler’s authority must come from outside the law, while also setting a clear expectation for who will take power next - The King has legislative, executive, and judicial power, and though the Shura Council can draft legislation to recommend to the ruler, there is no requirement to listen to them - Wahhabis generally keep out of politics due to their alliance with royalty and believe that they’ve essentially got the best they can get - Their religious influence allows them to also provide legitimacy to controversial policies - Education and some social rules and laws like - drinking - Islamist groups are not excluded in the 50s and 60s, and they helped set up the Saudi education system and influenced mosques as well - After the Grand Mosque Incident in 1979, the regime conceded more policy ground to Wahhabis to maintain support - Security forces include many family members and, like many other regimes, are used frequently to quell dissent The pressures on Saudi society, political economy, and stability - Shi’a in Saudi Arabia (approx. 10% of the population) are marginalized by the state and social institutions, and the regime fears their ties to Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, which all are Saudi Arabia’s neighbors - Another pressure on Saudi society is that it is socially religious but politically secular. The authorities are not religious but the religious authorities keep out of politics. - There are 30 million people in Saudi Arabia and half of them are under 25 years old. This means that they either will want jobs now or in the future. - Saudi Arabia is a rentier state - They have a fairly bloated (and fragmented and disorganized) bureaucracy - Additionally, the private sector (real estate, services) is inefficient and unequal, plus industries require access to power to obtain the licenses necessary to be involved - The private sector is supported by cheap foreign labor such that 85% of the private sector is employed from outside Saudi Arabia despite attempting to force companies to hire quotas of Saudis - The bureaucracy and public sector fail to make jobs, and the government is does not have the money to put everybody in a - government job, with high unemployment also leading to discontent among urban youth especially which contributes to crime and drug use Mohammed Bin Salman’s reform agenda and challenges to it - Vision 2030: seeks to build a new Saudi Arabia by 2030 by doing away with the current socioeconomic system by diversifying (investing abroad, gaining taxes), lowering public spending (cutting subsidies and government salaries), and engaging in social liberalization (incentivizes foreign investment, calming tempers of those hurt by these changes and satisfying young people) - This is all to overhaul the current Saudi social contract while strengthening the economy and controlling corruption - The base of support would also change from old alliances closer to populism, while also seeking to incite nationalist sentiment and unity - This involves preventing dissent via preemptive repression of rivals and dissidents - Additionally, MBS seeks to make a more moderate form of Islam in the government and cracking down on religious extremism while providing fewer benefits to extreme Wahhabi clerics, done partially to appeal to potential investors - This latter part is also a balancing act, as the Wahahbi also provide some legitimacy to the regime’s policies and some (at least moderate ones) must support these policies - Example of textbooks: problematic examples of Christians and Jews (not really Shi’a) are increasingly softened or removed, emphasizing the importance of peace and tolerance while criticizing extreme religious ideologies, and softening their portrayal of Israel - Challenges: - The changing base of support for the policies MBS seeks to implement means that the regime is making lots of enemies quickly, hurting traditional alliances, those in bureaucracy - Introducing more taxation is never popular, especially in a low-trust environment - Tension between promised transparency and current repression and crackdowns on corruption, all done fairly unpredictably - These projects (especially Neom) are crazy expensive and will require lots of oil money, which is running out Syria, especially : - The underlying drivers that led to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. - Corruption: - Privatization of certain industries and the handout of these industries to close family and friends of Bashar Al Assad - Abuse of Rights - Freedom of speech - Rebels getting funds from Gulf regions - Extremism overtook Syria to fight regime - The rebels were getting funding and were able to slowly develop themselves into a opposition force - Economic Strain and Drought: Prior to the civil war, Syria faced significant economic difficulties, exacerbated by a reduction in agricultural subsidies and a drought from 2005 to 2009, which severely affected rural communities. This economic hardship, particularly in rural areas, fueled discontent against the regime. - Lack of Reforms: The Assad regime’s repressive nature and lack of genuine political reforms created widespread disenchantment among various sectors of Syrian society. Despite some superficial reforms, the government's authoritarian practices continued unabated. - Sectarian and Ethnic Tensions: The Assad regime, dominated by - - the Alawite minority, had historically marginalized the Sunni majority and other groups, contributing to deep-seated tensions. - Arab Spring Inspired revolting Why did Bashar Al-Assad opt to use force to quell the uprising instead of compromising with the opposition - Fear of Losing Power: The Assad regime, particularly given its Alawite minority base, feared that any concession could lead to a loss of control and potentially endanger the Alawite community, which had been historically marginalized before Assad’s rule. - Historical Reliance on Repression: The regime had a long history of suppressing dissent through force, as evidenced by the brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s in Hama. This established a pattern of responding to opposition with extreme measures. - Perceived Threats of Sectarian Division: Assad and his government viewed the uprising not merely as a demand for reform but as a threat to the sectarian balance, potentially leading to sectarian violence or even genocide against minorities, including his own sect. - Messing with the inner circle - Especially security forces - Heavily based relationships with tribe leaders and military and political leaders within syria - Basher didn’t want to use heavy brutal force because of recent nato intervention in Libya and US presence in region - Conceding admits being wrong!!!!!!!!!! (EGO) - He is a dictator - Don’t want to share the power - Afraid to give majority rights How a regime led by a minority managed to crush an uprising with broad support among the largest sect in the country. - Civil War - Control over the Military and Security Forces: The Assad regime had strategically placed loyalists, predominantly Alawites, in key positions within the military and security forces, ensuring their loyalty and effectiveness in suppressing uprisings. - - - Country was franchised into pieces that would make it easier to run by the Alawites who Bashar put in places to run for him. Playing into the connections in the party International Support: The regime received substantial military and economic support from allies like Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, which bolstered its ability to combat the opposition. Exploiting ethnic tensions: The regime effectively exploited sectarian and ethnic divisions within Syria, portraying the conflict in sectarian terms to rally minority groups around the government and paint the opposition as extremist Sunni Islamists. This strategy undermined the unity of the opposition and increased fears among minorities about the outcomes of an opposition victory. Israel and the Palestinians, especially: - - Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” doctrine - Jabotinsky explains that a native population will NEVER willingly agree to give up their territory (to a colonial power) and therefore in order for Israel to exist it must build an “Iron Wall”. - And only way to legitimize is through military means - This “Iron Wall” means Israel must have a strong military apparatus to defend itself as well as force the point that it is here to stay and legitimize itself - He explains that any agreement can only be made when Arab states have lost all hope of militarily removing Israel - Need strength to back up your claim George Friedman’s view on the two state solution and the Palestinian movement’s relations with Arab regime - Friedman’s view on the two state solution is that it is doesn’t solve Palestinian desires for a state because a state that consists of Gaza and the West Bank would be independent in name only with economic dependence on Israel due its lack of resources and surplus labor force - The two state solution would only work if many actors would be willing to bite the bullet for Palestine to thrive, which if the following 4 bullet points: - - The recreation of the state of hostilities that existed prior to Camp David between Egypt and Israel. Until Egypt is strong and hostile to Israel, there is no hope for the Palestinians. - The overthrow of the Hashemite government of Jordan (due to their alliance with Israel so they want to take them down), and the movement of troops hostile to Israel to the Jordan River line. - A major global power prepared to underwrite the military capabilities of Egypt and those of whatever eastern power moves into Jordan (Iraq, Iran, Turkey or a coalition of the foregoing). - A shift in the correlation of forces between Israel and its immediate neighbors, which ultimately would result in the collapse of the Israeli state. - He explains that Palestinian nationalism is a threat to Arab regimes and that Arab states wouldn’t necessarily allow for a Palestinian state in a hypothetical destruction of Israel because it’s not in their interests to do so and they have their own claims as well - Furthermore, Palestinian intentions are unclear and suspect to Arab states who have always pushed for the destruction of Israel, but never a Palestinian state - The only state that has pushed for and has supported Palestinians in more than theory is non Arab Iran which makes Arab states even more hostile towards a Palestinian state The factors - on both the Israeli and Palestinians sides - that led to the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas - 2006 Elections and Hamas' Rise: - In the 2006 elections in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas emerged victorious. - This led to Hamas taking control of Gaza in 2007 and rejecting negotiated settlements with Israel. - Response from PLO and Israeli Dilemma: - The PLO forged agreements with Israelis to monitor Hamas activities. - Israel faced the challenge of maintaining its identity as a Jewish state, upholding democratic principles, and retaining control over occupied territories. - Two-State Solution and Netanyahu's Stance: - The two-state solution, aimed at resolving issues, failed due to - - Hamas' actions. - Israeli leaders, notably Benjamin Netanyahu, responded by ignoring the existence of Palestinians and Hamas. - The situation escalated on October 7, making it impossible to ignore Hamas, prompting Netanyahu to focus on destroying Hamas. - Post-destruction plans for Gaza and its people were unclear, with only a security perimeter around Gaza being proposed. Netanyahu's Pre-October 7 Beliefs and Strategies: - Netanyahu believed Israel could thrive without peace with the Palestinians, using four main strategies: - Israeli blockades of Gaza. - "Mowing the grass" operations to periodically reduce Hamas' capabilities. - Allowing financial aid from Qatar to keep Hamas pacified. - Facilitating Palestinian labor into Israel. - These measures helped maintain calm and contributed to Israel’s economic and diplomatic advancements, including the U.S. embassy relocation to Jerusalem and recognition of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. - Several Arab nations established peace and cooperated with Israel in various fields, further isolating Iran. - Unsolvable but manageable - Didn’t have to do anything to resolve the conflict - Containment of the problem - Through Iron Dome - Mowing of the lawn (go in once in a while and kill people and destroy leadership) - General attitude to Palestinians - Change in politics: brought elements of Israeli politics that were seen as fringe into the mainstream - Detering relationship between Bibi and IDF / Intelligence through the judicial review saga Netanyahu’s Political Resilience and Cabinet: - Despite electoral setbacks and corruption allegations, Netanyahu's approach remained effective over 15 years. - He reclaimed power and appointed figures known for their hostility towards Palestine, such as Ben Gvir as national security minister - and Bezalel Smotrich as finance minister. - Initiatives like judicial reform limited the Supreme Court's oversight of occupied territories. Regional and International Context: - Netanyahu ignored warnings from IDF and intelligence services about Palestinian mobilization. - Some Arab leaders close to Israel, like Saudi Arabia's MBS, urged Palestinians to accept Israeli terms or remain silent. - Despite warnings of potential attacks, Netanyahu was not concerned, but the situation remained volatile as demonstrated by a Hamas attack two weeks later. —------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - - - Israel factor: movement of bulk military forces to West Bank to aid settlers over Gaza border protection, neglect and intervention operations in Gaza leading to false sense of security in Gaza, Bibi leadership “His (Bibi) reckless prewar policy of dividing Israelis made the country vulnerable, tempting Iran’s allies to strike at a riven society. Netanyahu’s humiliation of the Palestinians helped radicalism thrive. It is no accident that Hamas named its operation “al Aqsa flood” and portrayed the attacks as a way of protecting al Aqsa from a Jewish takeover. Protecting the holy Muslim site was seen as a reason to attack Israel and face the inevitably dire consequences of an IDF counterattack.” No peace process in sight and attitudes are more militaristic less open to land for peace Mowing the lawn “Ultimately, then, Israel’s future may look very much like its recent history. With or without Netanyahu, “con- flict management” and “mowing the grass” will remain state policy—which means more occupation, settlements, and displacement.This strategy might appear to be the least risky option, at least for an Israeli public scarred by the horrors of October 7 and deaf to new suggestions of peace. But it will only lead to more catastrophe. Israelis cannot expect stability if they con- tinue to ignore the Palestinians and reject their aspirations, their story, and even their presence” Palestinian factors: Change in hamas leadership, normalization with the arab world lessens their (HAMAS) legitimacy - Palestinian Labor mobility into Israel - Gaza outlook had changed over the years in hamas Shift in Hamas leadership towards new offensive priorities In the 2006 elections in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas emerged victorious, leading to its subsequent takeover of Gaza in 2007 and rejection of negotiated settlements with Israel. In response, the PLO forged agreements with Israelis to monitor Hamas activities. This posed a dilemma for Israelis, who had the 3 goals of maintaining their identity as a Jewish state, uphold democratic principles, and retain control over the territories they occupied. The two-state solution was supposed to help Israel attain the goals but that fell through because of Hamas, prompting Israeli leaders, notably Benjamin Netanyahu, to adopt a stance of ignoring the existence of Palestinians and Hamas. However, everything broke down on October 7 and ignoring it wasn’t an option anymore so Bibi’s response was to destroy Hamas. Nothing was however discussed about what comes after the destruction of Hamas when it comes to the land and the people of Gaza. The only proposal was to establish a security perimeter around Gaza. Pre October 7, Bibi believed that Israel could thrive without peace with Palestinians, despite domestic and international pressures. Before October 7, Netanyahu viewed Hamas as a manageable threat, employing 4 strategies which were the israeli blockades, the mowing the grass operations which means that every number of years, Israel instigated in gaza to mow the grass and cut hamas capabilities, letting in financial aid from Qatar to keep Hamas silent, and facilitating Palestinian labor into Israel. These measures maintained relative calm and contributed to Israel's economic and diplomatic growth, including the United States’ embassy relocation to Jerusalem and the recognition of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. Most importantly, several Arab nations made peace with Israel not just diplomatically, but also cooperated on culture, technology and military operations. The Arabs became Israel’s allies further isolating Iran as the remaining adversary. The Israeli Defense Forces repositioned some of their Gaza forces to the West Bank, since they saw Hamas's actions in Gaza as predictable. Netanyahu's approach proved effective over the past 15 years, despite electoral setbacks and corruption allegations. His resilience was evident as he reclaimed power and redesigned his cabinet, appointing influential figures like Ben Gvir as national security minister and Bezalel Smotrich as finance minister, both known for their hostility towards Palestine. Initiatives such as judicial reform curtailed the Supreme Court's authority, particularly regarding oversight of occupied territories. Netanyahu disregarded warnings from the IDF and intelligence services regarding Palestinian mobilization. Arab leaders who are somewhat close to Israel, such as Saudi's MBS, adopted a dismissive attitude towards Palestinians, insisting they accept Israeli terms or remain silent. They also warned Bibi of the potential attack but he wasn’t worried. However, Hamas's subsequent attack, just two weeks later, underscored the volatility of the situation. READINGS MENTIONED IN CLASS: - Week 7: Iraq and ISIS - Sole, “‘Management of Savagery’ - A Model for Establishing the Islamic State” (2016) - This article summarizes and contextualizes a pamphlet also titled “The Management of Savagery” by Abu Bakr Naji, a “suspected al-Qaeda strategist”, which was popular in Salafi-Jihadi circles in the early 21st century and served to justify violence - The original article discusses a strategy of building a new Islamic (specifically Sunni) Caliphate based on establishing a state of “savagery”, initiated by mass violence that spreads security forces thin and incites fear in the people leading to a breakdown in the state - Through managing that savagery by controlling food and health, building Sharia justice systems, guarding from enemies, and mobilizing constituents, Naji argues that Jihadis will be able to create a new state that is accepted by people because it is stable and satisfies their basic needs - (probably) Haddad, “Shi’a-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq” (2016) – on Blackboard - Week 8: Syria - Kaplan, “Syria: Identity Crisis” (1993) - “Syria… was a writhing ghost of a would-be nation” – it contains myriad groups with strong allegiances toward themselves but not the nation, concentrated in geographic areas - Though leaders have sometimes sought to de-emphasize these identitarian divisions, it remains a primary source of division and violence, and Kaplan anticipates Syrian territory changing despite efforts against it by Hafez al-Assad - Younes, “The Wandering Alawite” (2021) - Alawites cling to the Syrian regime (and have since Hafez, - - essentially) because, unlike a lot of other religious groups in the area, Alawites hold little power anywhere else and don’t really complain because the alternatives are worse, traumatized and motivated by events like Hama in 1982 International Crisis Group, “The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide” (2011) – on Blackboard - In Daraa, after opposition began to mobilize against the Syrian government there, it would seem like the Syrian government would suffer a similar fate to Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring, but the route opposition took was far more gradual - Bashar al-Assad portrayed the small number of protests to be a demonstration of his legitimacy, argued they were isolated phenomena by extremists, argued they were Israeli-backed, highlighted sectarian divisions to stoke popular fear and rally the predominantly-Alawite security services – the slow pace gave the regime time to adjust - However, this sectarian manipulation, the regime’s brutality, crude propaganda, and the grudging concessions meant that many believed fundamental change required the fall of al-Assad’s regime - Ultimately, the consequences of Daraa and the turmoil since are of the Syrian government’s own making, both from its “long-standing domestic mismanagement and its more recent gross mishandling of the ensuing unrest” (p. 1) - It was undermined by its own reflexive response of violence, paranoia, and conspiracy theories, and especially its lack of a clear plan - Meanwhile, the opposition emphasized democratic and non-sectarian motivations while provoking regime violence Walter, “The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars” (2017) – on Blackboard - Extremist ideology is very advantageous when there are several rebel groups, weak rule of law, and bad governance, even if the leaders of those groups don’t actually believe in that ideology - Militias have a challenge in organization — Salafi-Jihadi groups overcame this collective action problem through these ideological tactics (e.g., righteous death and martyrdom) and prevent commitment problems via - - ideological filtering, which means there are fewer desertions and betrayals - Salafi-Jihadi groups were also generally less corrupt than other rebels, reassuring the local population that they’re not worse than what came before - Key points: - Ideology is partially a strategic decision, as certain ideologies and identity cleavages may be better based on the dynamics of the conflict itself – extremist ideologies are better with collective action problems - Ideology is ultimately cheap talk, and we cannot assume that the ideology of a group is genuine, nor that followers necessarily believe that it is – extremist ideologies will be perceived as more committed to their goals because its extreme beliefs are likely to inflict some costs on leaders - Fighters are strategic actors rather than blind followers, and they are more likely to join the group that delivers Week 9: Lebanon Week 10: Saudi Arabia - Yetiv, “How Saudi Arabia Has Dodged the Arab Spring” – on Blackboard - Despite minor mobilization in its al-Hasa oil province and legitimate claims from Shi’a in the country, the Arab Spring never fully materialized in Saudi Arabia due to its coalition-building skills, foreign backing, oil wealth, and intimidation of Shi’a through its interventionism in the Shi’a uprising in Bahrain - Notably, these factors are all dependent on oil — it only got through because of oil money funding its military, foreign backing from states that needed its oil, money for bribery, etc. Week 11: Israel and Palestine - Friedman, “The Geopolitics of the Palestinians” (2009) – on Blackboard - Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall” – on Blackboard FRANCHISE GOV