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Middle East Politics Exam Study Guide

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Exam Overview
Your final exam will be held on May 7 at 07:40 PM - 09:40 PM. You will have 120
minutes to complete a number of essay questions. This will be a closed-book exam, so
prepare accordingly.
Preparation
Study your notes very well. You may be tested on anything mentioned in class. Also
make sure you thoroughly understand all your readings. You will likely be tested on the
ones that came up in class. Please feel free to ask me any questions before the exam.
Focus on:
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Iraq, especially:
- The logic and effects of Saddam’s Baathist ‘homogenization’ project
- Logic:
- Pan-Arabism (Baathism) requires a unified Arab identity and
no risk of internal conflict due to ethnic/religious divisions
- Transcend new identity and build new ones
- Take Iraq ethnic, tribal, and sectarian division and crush them
into Iraqi arab nationalism under Sadam Hussein
- Wanted to make a new Secular (Sunni), Baathist, Iraqi
government where the people trust in the full control under
Saddam Hussein
- Effect:
- Friends and family gained power and they were all sunnis
- Creates an even more divided nation from within the other
non-sunni iraqi populations living within iraq
- People didn’t like for their culture to be erased (homogenize)
- Further divided the country
- Faith campaign that he did pushed for a more islamic country
- Iraq began to change
- Alcohol was banned
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State started to mass print Qurans and build
Mosques
- Religion was expanding
The reasons behind Iraq’s descent into sectarian civil war after 2003
- Winners: Shias (Kurds as well)
- American invasion allowed for the Shias to grow as the “real
winners”
- Shia Centric State in which Iraq was built up as a new state
for the Shia people
- Losers: Sunnis
- Sunnis ‘lost’ – the new Iraqi constitution was pro-Shi’a and
deeply sectarian (divided factions officially), making being a
Sunni an salient identity
- Made even more risky due to the belief that they were
the natural rulers of the Iraqi state and pretty
nationalistic
- “We woke up one day and discovered we were all
Sunnis”
- New Era-Government:
- Nouri Malki Prime Minister is put into power in the hopes that
he would run Iraq in a stable way so that we don't get
dragged back into war
- New constitution was pro-shia and deeply sectarian and
divided Iraqis up into factions
- Secular Sunnis became more religious and prideful
from the social arrogance brought by government
labor of them
- Ministries of Iraq were looted
- Sunni insurgency fought US backed troops and Shia Militant
Groups
- US Attitude Change:
- Destroyed Iraqi Army (450k people lost their position)
- DeBaathinization
- Looked into institutions and removed people from
middle to upper baath members, which lead to more
sunni alienation
- A lot of former baath members became
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disenfranchised and so they joined the Sunni
army
“Turning powerful people unhappy is one thing,
but powerful people with guns being unhappy is
another”
2005 constitution
- Civil rights, separation of powers, decentralized federal
system (kurds benefit) and formed sectarian policies and
sunni ???
- Disempowering sunnis
- Favored shias and put sunnis down
- Many denounced the constitution since they saw it as a
US-Iraqi proxy state and especially the Ex-Baathists
- Sunni Communalization (GREAT TERM)
- Al Qaeda sent Al Zarkawi to start a branch in Iraq
- They formed it on kicking america out of Iraq
- Al Zarkawi wanted to start war on Shias with sunni
winning in his mind
- Roots of Isis
- Killing shia was part of process to get sunnis to
mobilize and help them
Current challenges to Iraqi stability: (PMF+Voter Turnout+Shia
Political Legitimacy+Corruption+Bad Infrastructure+Low Gov
Stability)
- The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is an Iraqi state security
service that Iran has infiltrated and uses to wield significant
influence in Iraq and undermine the Iraqi’s government authority
and military
- The PMF will not let Iraq develop a strong state, but the only
way the Iraqi government can confront them successfully is if
they are a strong state
- The Iraqi government and PMF have had to crush uprisings
with thousands of people in 2019
- The current prime minister of Iraq decided to double the size
of and increase the profitability of the PMF, which is not good
- Having a military that doesn’t listen to you makes an
illegitimate state - the PMF does whatever they want
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Lack of infrastructure, high unemployment, need for humanitarian
aid, deep corruption and low voter turnout weakening political
parties and legitimacy of the Shia dominated government
The Iraqi Militancy is separate from the Iraqi military, and have
infiltrated state institutions and are extremely powerful, and even
have a menu of extortion
The Iraqi Militancy use the state budget to manage their affairs,
manage oil fields, have a real-estate wing, and provides an
extremely powerful challenge to Iraqi central leadership
Failing hospitals and schools, and lack of water and energy, along
with high unemployment and high corruption, and the fact that
nearly half of the country needs humanitarian aid has made Iraqi
people extremely angry
The Iraqi has parliamentary elections, but the corruption, coercion,
and more lead to extremely low turnout and a weakening of the
major political parties,
ISIS, especially:
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The “The Management of Savagery” doctrine
- Founded by Abu Bakr Naji
- Forms critical part of Isis Strategic thinking
- Goes back to Zarqawi principles
- Salafi Jihadi Ideology
- Salafi Jihadism is a fundamentalist ideology that
advocates for the establishment of an Islamic state
governed strictly by Sharia law, achieved through
violent jihad against perceived enemies of Islam,
including secular governments and other Muslims
considered apostate.
- Regimes around that hate Islam that are too powerful and first stage
is establishing savagery
- Best place to start a caliphate is in a place of chaos and sectarian
war
- HOW:
- Provoke enemies, exhaust, and spread them thin
- To create this situation, you must market your
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operations as slick and cool to attract others, loot all
lands taken, infiltrate all institutions and turn them for
you, polarize all acts of violence in religious terms,
and bring about a general situation of chaos and
collapse
- Propaganda to make you look good, looting and
pillaging all lands taken (capture resources),
infiltrating the institutions of the state, bring chaos,
justifying every violent thing you do with religion
- How to manage once established
- Interior Security
- Resist Invaders
- Provide food and medical treatment
- Through population establish justice through their
interpretation Sharia LAW
- Immobilized socially
- Establish spy networks and spy on society and keep the
people in line
- Resources and enemy resources get taken and Buy the
people with resources and supply them
Why ISIS emerged in the time and place it did
- First they were in Syria before they spread to Iraq
- Ugly sectarian (religious) policies in Iraq after US withdrawal
- Anti-Shia sentiment
- Syrian civil war helped
- Next to iraq
- Tribes found it convenient in eastern syria to work with ISIS
- Money: by taking over parts of Syria they have oil networks,
extortion network, and checkpoints
- Luckily they had Sunnis who hated Assad regime and
ignored ISIS and instead fought against Assad
- What makes ISIS different and possible is the fact that they
are financially independent (funds from oil and looting)
- Operational Advantages
- Money meant no state sponsor so no accountable state
- Bought recruits domestically and internationally
- Called on Jihadi networks in US run Iraqi Jails
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Former Sudan people and baathists and they brought
their skills
How ISIS established a degree of political legitimacy and control
- Isis takes Mosul with 800 fighters and now runs a city with 1.8
million people
- Abu Bakr al Baghdady declares caliphate in mosul
- Jihadi groups disapprove this
- Non muslims ignored it
- 30k foreigners join islamic state
- Isis kept power by persuasion
- They were the protectors for the sunnis against the
shias
- Provided food
- Price controls
- Fear into people
- Manipulation of tribes
- Baathist form ISIS Security State
- Power by persuasion / stability
- Price controls: put a cap
- Food
- Some peace/justice through fear
- Protecting Sunnis
- Taking Mosul with only 800 fighters
- Iraqi military ran away
- They were poorly led and low morale (don’t want to die for
Malaki)
- Huge win because of size of Mosul
- Declaring a caliphate in Mosul
Lebanon, especially:
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The causes and effects of Lebanon’s civil war
- 1975-90 (can be thought of in multiple parts)
- Causes
- There are many different factions in Lebanon (Maronites,
Sunnis, Shia)
- Originally Maronites vs. Sunni / PLO
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Sunni / PLO were winning the war so the Maronite
president called Hafez al-Assad for help
- He was backing the PLO until this moment
- Thought that a Sunni uprising would flow into
his government (overthrow the Alawites)
- Hafez is considered the protector of the
minorities so he felt it was his duty to help the
maronites
- He also doesn't want palestinians to
have a lot of power as to still have them
rely on him
- Maronites are going to realize that he was there for
too long and eventually hate him
- Refugees in general (specifically Palestinian ones and the
formational of the PLO)
- 1982 Israelis
- Israelis reach an agreement to the Maronites to solve
the PLO moment
- Isralies would invade up to Beirut and
overthrow other factions and put Maronites in
power so that he can negotiate with the
Israelites
Effects
- Towards the end and after the Civil War in the 80s/90s
onward saw the the rise of Hezbollah
- First appear in 1983 on the attack of the U.S.
embassy in Beirut
- What do they want → release statement and
says: anti-American, anti-imperialist, let people
choose the government they want
- All militias were forced to let go of arms except Hezbollah
- New reality was the packed Syrian overlordship and
Hezbollah
- Balance from Maronite dominance and shift to Sunni
- Dominate player here is Syria
- New figure: Rafic Hariri (billionaire with connections to
Saudis and Americans)
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Newcomer; Syrians agree to make him PM and
rebuild Lebanon
- Two conditions: defer to Syria on foreign policy
question, cut the regime in on the action ($$$)
The current drivers of instability in Lebanon
- Political Economy under Hariri
- To get money: tax people or borrow money (what he decided
to do)
- To reassure investors, he created the Lebanese Lira pegg
(investors like stability)
- At core of program was to build infrastructure and privatize
state businesses
- Neoliberal World Bank ideas
- GDP began to grow but from the start it was seen with
corruption
- More money flowing in leads to more corruption (from
Syria and other actors)
- Used as an instrument of policy (bribe politicians to
pass certain bills)
- Secret pact between Hariri and Hafez (held throughout the 90s)
- Contradictions: Lebanon needed growth and investments
while Syria needed Hezbollah to keep fighting the Israelites
- Things brokedown when Bashar al-Assad took office
- Feb 2005: assassination of Rafic Hariri (car bomb in Beirut)
- UN accused Syria and then Hezbollah
- Resulted in mass protest against Syria and they left
after 29 years
- Syria 2011 Syrian Civil War
- Important that the Syrian government likes you if you are in
power
- Politics of Lebanon literally froze during the Civil War (wanted
to see the outcome of the war)
- Ended up with over a million Syrian refugees
- War + other pressures led to economic downfall
- Debt By the time the war ended Lebanon was doomed
- 140 billion in debt, 30 billion GDP
- Banks were in a ponzi scheme
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Banks agreed to lend central bank at a certain rate (good)
and central bank agreed to do this unless the banks kept
flowing
- By the time the money was hollow, the central bank had
began screwing with the numbers
- Banks had to keep lending money
- Unemployment surged, people fell below the poverty line
- Beirut gets 2 hours of electricity per day
Outside help
Lebanon sought help abroad
- Were told to stop public spending, raise taxes
- 2019: Government decided to raise taxes through WhatsApp
- Kicked off protest movement across multiple sects
- Demands: resignation of the government, new electoral law
that is non sectarian (light regime change)
- Hezbollah looked to mobilize protesters
Currency issues → Lebanese Lira is pegged to the U.S. dollar
The advantages and disadvantages of the confessional
system
- Confessional system definition: political legitimacy is
given that certain sects artificially ,leadership is elected,
mutual veto (difficult for one faction to take over)
- Agreement of the National Pact: President is Maronite,
PM is Sunni, Speaker of House will be Shia
- Remaining 14 sects got a certain amount of
representation in parliament, cabinet, army, etc.
- Parliament and Military were to be dominated by
Christains (6:5 ratio Christian to Muslims)
- Issues began to arise because not all Lebanese
people are represented equally
- Negatives:
- Confessionalism can harden sectarian identity
(what you can run for)\
- Mutual vetoing (Get nothing done)
- A lot of sectarian bandwagoning
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Extremely vulnerable to foreign intervention
(Palestinians, Syrians, U.S., Lebanon, Iran)
- Positives:
- Every sect is guaranteed power
- Mutual vetoing (checks the system)
- Hard for one party to dominate
- Channels politics away from violence
Hezbollah’s constraints, challenges, and strategy in
Lebanon
- Challenges
- Ideological challenges if they ran the country
- They also forfeit the ability to control the state on
a day to day level vs on a governmental level
- Hezbollah is a complicated actor (International stage)
- Shia Islamist
- Pledges absolute leadership to the Supreme
Leader of Iran
- Receives money from Iran
- Culture of resistance (anti-Western and
anti-Israelis)
- Hezbollah the Lebanese entity
- Most of Lebanon is not Shia and not even Muslim
- Not many Shia that want to live in an environment
like Iran
- Big chunk that feeds fighters are in tribes
- Other ways of legitimizing themselves: need to do this
because, protection against Israel
- Complicating strategies for Hezbollah:
- Keep their weapons but no longer do a lot of
wacky stuff they used to do
- Much like Hamas in Palestine, Hezollah is far
more focused on the goal of “liberation” rather
than the imposition of any strict religious order
- They have pledged not to enforce an Islamic state
in Lebanon
- Remind the Israelis that the fight is still going on
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Not to use arms against Lebanese (didn’t happen
until 2008)
- Joined the Syrian Civil War in 2013 to put down
Sunni uprising
- 1992 they have a party
- After 2008, Hezbollah decided to join politics and that
they would have veto power (to guarantee that it has
legal cover to keep their militia)
- Technically Hezbollah could take the whole place over
and control it, but haven’t done it
- Interesting question as to why they don’t do that
- Don’t have to answer institutions to the
country
- If a country invades Lebanon to overthrow
Hezbollah, they are also invading the state
- Khatib: Hezbollah is an hybrid actor that is not
accountable to the state that does not have
orders given to them, but has legitimacy
- Can rule without having to face sanctions from
other countries
- Party approach: field candidate in national
elections, use other alliances with certain sects
Saudi Arabia, especially:
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The political legitimacy foundations and tools of the regime
- Because it is a monarchy, there is a clear line of succession and
therefore challenges to the ruler’s authority must come from outside
the law, while also setting a clear expectation for who will take
power next
- The King has legislative, executive, and judicial power,
and though the Shura Council can draft legislation to
recommend to the ruler, there is no requirement to listen to
them
- Wahhabis generally keep out of politics due to their alliance with
royalty and believe that they’ve essentially got the best they can get
- Their religious influence allows them to also provide
legitimacy to controversial policies
- Education and some social rules and laws like
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drinking
- Islamist groups are not excluded in the 50s and 60s, and
they helped set up the Saudi education system and
influenced mosques as well
- After the Grand Mosque Incident in 1979, the regime
conceded more policy ground to Wahhabis to maintain
support
- Security forces include many family members and, like many
other regimes, are used frequently to quell dissent
The pressures on Saudi society, political economy, and
stability
- Shi’a in Saudi Arabia (approx. 10% of the
population) are marginalized by the state and social
institutions, and the regime fears their ties to Iran, Iraq,
and Bahrain, which all are Saudi Arabia’s neighbors
- Another pressure on Saudi society is that it is socially
religious but politically secular. The authorities are
not religious but the religious authorities keep out of
politics.
- There are 30 million people in Saudi Arabia and half
of them are under 25 years old. This means that they
either will want jobs now or in the future.
- Saudi Arabia is a rentier state
- They have a fairly bloated (and fragmented
and disorganized) bureaucracy
- Additionally, the private sector (real estate,
services) is inefficient and unequal, plus
industries require access to power to obtain the
licenses necessary to be involved
- The private sector is supported by cheap
foreign labor such that 85% of the private
sector is employed from outside Saudi Arabia
despite attempting to force companies to hire
quotas of Saudis
- The bureaucracy and public sector fail to
make jobs, and the government is does not
have the money to put everybody in a
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government job, with high unemployment also
leading to discontent among urban youth
especially which contributes to crime and drug
use
Mohammed Bin Salman’s reform agenda and challenges to
it
- Vision 2030: seeks to build a new Saudi Arabia by 2030
by doing away with the current socioeconomic system
by diversifying (investing abroad, gaining taxes),
lowering public spending (cutting subsidies and
government salaries), and engaging in social
liberalization (incentivizes foreign investment, calming
tempers of those hurt by these changes and satisfying
young people)
- This is all to overhaul the current Saudi social
contract while strengthening the economy and
controlling corruption
- The base of support would also change from old
alliances closer to populism, while also seeking to
incite nationalist sentiment and unity
- This involves preventing dissent via preemptive
repression of rivals and dissidents
- Additionally, MBS seeks to make a more moderate
form of Islam in the government and cracking down
on religious extremism while providing fewer
benefits to extreme Wahhabi clerics, done partially to
appeal to potential investors
- This latter part is also a balancing act, as the
Wahahbi also provide some legitimacy to the
regime’s policies and some (at least moderate
ones) must support these policies
- Example of textbooks: problematic examples of
Christians and Jews (not really Shi’a) are
increasingly softened or removed, emphasizing
the importance of peace and tolerance while
criticizing extreme religious ideologies, and
softening their portrayal of Israel
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Challenges:
- The changing base of support for the policies
MBS seeks to implement means that the regime
is making lots of enemies quickly, hurting
traditional alliances, those in bureaucracy
- Introducing more taxation is never popular,
especially in a low-trust environment
- Tension between promised transparency and
current repression and crackdowns on corruption,
all done fairly unpredictably
- These projects (especially Neom) are crazy
expensive and will require lots of oil money, which
is running out
Syria, especially :
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The underlying drivers that led to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.
- Corruption:
- Privatization of certain industries and the handout of these
industries to close family and friends of Bashar Al Assad
- Abuse of Rights
- Freedom of speech
- Rebels getting funds from Gulf regions
- Extremism overtook Syria to fight regime
- The rebels were getting funding and were able to slowly
develop themselves into a opposition force
- Economic Strain and Drought: Prior to the civil war, Syria faced
significant economic difficulties, exacerbated by a reduction in
agricultural subsidies and a drought from 2005 to 2009, which
severely affected rural communities. This economic hardship,
particularly in rural areas, fueled discontent against the regime.
- Lack of Reforms: The Assad regime’s repressive nature and lack
of genuine political reforms created widespread disenchantment
among various sectors of Syrian society. Despite some superficial
reforms, the government's authoritarian practices continued
unabated.
- Sectarian and Ethnic Tensions: The Assad regime, dominated by
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the Alawite minority, had historically marginalized the Sunni majority
and other groups, contributing to deep-seated tensions.
- Arab Spring Inspired revolting
Why did Bashar Al-Assad opt to use force to quell the uprising
instead of compromising with the opposition
- Fear of Losing Power: The Assad regime, particularly given its
Alawite minority base, feared that any concession could lead to a
loss of control and potentially endanger the Alawite community,
which had been historically marginalized before Assad’s rule.
- Historical Reliance on Repression: The regime had a long history
of suppressing dissent through force, as evidenced by the brutal
suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s in Hama. This
established a pattern of responding to opposition with extreme
measures.
- Perceived Threats of Sectarian Division: Assad and his
government viewed the uprising not merely as a demand for reform
but as a threat to the sectarian balance, potentially leading to
sectarian violence or even genocide against minorities, including his
own sect.
- Messing with the inner circle
- Especially security forces
- Heavily based relationships with tribe leaders and military
and political leaders within syria
- Basher didn’t want to use heavy brutal force because of recent nato
intervention in Libya and US presence in region
- Conceding admits being wrong!!!!!!!!!! (EGO)
- He is a dictator
- Don’t want to share the power
- Afraid to give majority rights
How a regime led by a minority managed to crush an uprising with
broad support among the largest sect in the country.
- Civil War
- Control over the Military and Security Forces: The Assad
regime had strategically placed loyalists, predominantly
Alawites, in key positions within the military and security
forces, ensuring their loyalty and effectiveness in
suppressing uprisings.
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Country was franchised into pieces that would
make it easier to run by the Alawites who Bashar
put in places to run for him.
Playing into the connections in the party
International Support: The regime received substantial
military and economic support from allies like Russia, Iran,
and Hezbollah, which bolstered its ability to combat the
opposition.
Exploiting ethnic tensions: The regime effectively exploited
sectarian and ethnic divisions within Syria, portraying the
conflict in sectarian terms to rally minority groups around the
government and paint the opposition as extremist Sunni
Islamists. This strategy undermined the unity of the
opposition and increased fears among minorities about the
outcomes of an opposition victory.
Israel and the Palestinians, especially:
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Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” doctrine
- Jabotinsky explains that a native population will NEVER willingly agree to
give up their territory (to a colonial power) and therefore in order for Israel
to exist it must build an “Iron Wall”.
- And only way to legitimize is through military means
- This “Iron Wall” means Israel must have a strong military apparatus to
defend itself as well as force the point that it is here to stay and legitimize
itself
- He explains that any agreement can only be made when Arab states have
lost all hope of militarily removing Israel
- Need strength to back up your claim
George Friedman’s view on the two state solution and the Palestinian
movement’s relations with Arab regime
- Friedman’s view on the two state solution is that it is doesn’t solve
Palestinian desires for a state because a state that consists of Gaza and
the West Bank would be independent in name only with economic
dependence on Israel due its lack of resources and surplus labor force
- The two state solution would only work if many actors would be willing to
bite the bullet for Palestine to thrive, which if the following 4 bullet points:
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The recreation of the state of hostilities that existed prior to
Camp David between Egypt and Israel. Until Egypt is strong and
hostile to Israel, there is no hope for the Palestinians.
- The overthrow of the Hashemite government of Jordan (due to
their alliance with Israel so they want to take them down), and the
movement of troops hostile to Israel to the Jordan River line.
- A major global power prepared to underwrite the military
capabilities of Egypt and those of whatever eastern power moves
into Jordan (Iraq, Iran, Turkey or a coalition of the foregoing).
- A shift in the correlation of forces between Israel and its
immediate neighbors, which ultimately would result in the collapse
of the Israeli state.
- He explains that Palestinian nationalism is a threat to Arab regimes
and that Arab states wouldn’t necessarily allow for a Palestinian state
in a hypothetical destruction of Israel because it’s not in their interests to
do so and they have their own claims as well
- Furthermore, Palestinian intentions are unclear and suspect to Arab
states who have always pushed for the destruction of Israel, but
never a Palestinian state
- The only state that has pushed for and has supported Palestinians in more
than theory is non Arab Iran which makes Arab states even more hostile
towards a Palestinian state
The factors - on both the Israeli and Palestinians sides - that led to the
October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas
- 2006 Elections and Hamas' Rise:
- In the 2006 elections in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas emerged
victorious.
- This led to Hamas taking control of Gaza in 2007 and rejecting
negotiated settlements with Israel.
- Response from PLO and Israeli Dilemma:
- The PLO forged agreements with Israelis to monitor Hamas
activities.
- Israel faced the challenge of maintaining its identity as a Jewish
state, upholding democratic principles, and retaining control over
occupied territories.
- Two-State Solution and Netanyahu's Stance:
- The two-state solution, aimed at resolving issues, failed due to
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Hamas' actions.
- Israeli leaders, notably Benjamin Netanyahu, responded by ignoring
the existence of Palestinians and Hamas.
- The situation escalated on October 7, making it impossible to ignore
Hamas, prompting Netanyahu to focus on destroying Hamas.
- Post-destruction plans for Gaza and its people were unclear, with
only a security perimeter around Gaza being proposed.
Netanyahu's Pre-October 7 Beliefs and Strategies:
- Netanyahu believed Israel could thrive without peace with the
Palestinians, using four main strategies:
- Israeli blockades of Gaza.
- "Mowing the grass" operations to periodically reduce Hamas'
capabilities.
- Allowing financial aid from Qatar to keep Hamas pacified.
- Facilitating Palestinian labor into Israel.
- These measures helped maintain calm and contributed to Israel’s
economic and diplomatic advancements, including the U.S.
embassy relocation to Jerusalem and recognition of Israel's
annexation of the Golan Heights.
- Several Arab nations established peace and cooperated with Israel
in various fields, further isolating Iran.
- Unsolvable but manageable
- Didn’t have to do anything to resolve the conflict
- Containment of the problem
- Through Iron Dome
- Mowing of the lawn (go in once in a while and kill people and
destroy leadership)
- General attitude to Palestinians
- Change in politics: brought elements of Israeli politics that
were seen as fringe into the mainstream
- Detering relationship between Bibi and IDF / Intelligence through
the judicial review saga
Netanyahu’s Political Resilience and Cabinet:
- Despite electoral setbacks and corruption allegations, Netanyahu's
approach remained effective over 15 years.
- He reclaimed power and appointed figures known for their hostility
towards Palestine, such as Ben Gvir as national security minister
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and Bezalel Smotrich as finance minister.
- Initiatives like judicial reform limited the Supreme Court's oversight
of occupied territories.
Regional and International Context:
- Netanyahu ignored warnings from IDF and intelligence services
about Palestinian mobilization.
- Some Arab leaders close to Israel, like Saudi Arabia's MBS, urged
Palestinians to accept Israeli terms or remain silent.
- Despite warnings of potential attacks, Netanyahu was not
concerned, but the situation remained volatile as demonstrated by a
Hamas attack two weeks later.
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Israel factor: movement of bulk military forces to West Bank to aid settlers
over Gaza border protection, neglect and intervention operations in Gaza
leading to false sense of security in Gaza, Bibi leadership
“His (Bibi) reckless prewar policy of dividing Israelis made the country
vulnerable, tempting Iran’s allies to strike at a riven society. Netanyahu’s
humiliation of the Palestinians helped radicalism thrive. It is no accident
that Hamas named its operation “al Aqsa flood” and portrayed the attacks
as a way of protecting al Aqsa from a Jewish takeover. Protecting the holy
Muslim site was seen as a reason to attack Israel and face the inevitably
dire consequences of an IDF counterattack.”
No peace process in sight and attitudes are more militaristic less open to
land for peace
Mowing the lawn
“Ultimately, then, Israel’s future may look very much like its recent history.
With or without Netanyahu, “con- flict management” and “mowing the
grass” will remain state policy—which means more occupation,
settlements, and displacement.This strategy might appear to be the least
risky option, at least for an Israeli public scarred by the horrors of October
7 and deaf to new suggestions of peace. But it will only lead to more
catastrophe. Israelis cannot expect stability if they con- tinue to ignore the
Palestinians and reject their aspirations, their story, and even their
presence”
Palestinian factors: Change in hamas leadership, normalization with the
arab world lessens their (HAMAS) legitimacy
- Palestinian Labor mobility into Israel
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Gaza outlook had changed over the years in hamas
Shift in Hamas leadership towards new offensive priorities
In the 2006 elections in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas emerged victorious, leading to
its subsequent takeover of Gaza in 2007 and rejection of negotiated settlements with
Israel. In response, the PLO forged agreements with Israelis to monitor Hamas
activities. This posed a dilemma for Israelis, who had the 3 goals of maintaining their
identity as a Jewish state, uphold democratic principles, and retain control over the
territories they occupied. The two-state solution was supposed to help Israel attain the
goals but that fell through because of Hamas, prompting Israeli leaders, notably
Benjamin Netanyahu, to adopt a stance of ignoring the existence of Palestinians and
Hamas. However, everything broke down on October 7 and ignoring it wasn’t an option
anymore so Bibi’s response was to destroy Hamas. Nothing was however discussed
about what comes after the destruction of Hamas when it comes to the land and the
people of Gaza. The only proposal was to establish a security perimeter around Gaza.
Pre October 7, Bibi believed that Israel could thrive without peace with Palestinians,
despite domestic and international pressures. Before October 7, Netanyahu viewed
Hamas as a manageable threat, employing 4 strategies which were the israeli
blockades, the mowing the grass operations which means that every number of years,
Israel instigated in gaza to mow the grass and cut hamas capabilities, letting in financial
aid from Qatar to keep Hamas silent, and facilitating Palestinian labor into Israel. These
measures maintained relative calm and contributed to Israel's economic and diplomatic
growth, including the United States’ embassy relocation to Jerusalem and the
recognition of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. Most importantly, several Arab
nations made peace with Israel not just diplomatically, but also cooperated on culture,
technology and military operations. The Arabs became Israel’s allies further isolating
Iran as the remaining adversary. The Israeli Defense Forces repositioned some of their
Gaza forces to the West Bank, since they saw Hamas's actions in Gaza as predictable.
Netanyahu's approach proved effective over the past 15 years, despite electoral
setbacks and corruption allegations. His resilience was evident as he reclaimed power
and redesigned his cabinet, appointing influential figures like Ben Gvir as national
security minister and Bezalel Smotrich as finance minister, both known for their hostility
towards Palestine. Initiatives such as judicial reform curtailed the Supreme Court's
authority, particularly regarding oversight of occupied territories. Netanyahu disregarded
warnings from the IDF and intelligence services regarding Palestinian mobilization. Arab
leaders who are somewhat close to Israel, such as Saudi's MBS, adopted a dismissive
attitude towards Palestinians, insisting they accept Israeli terms or remain silent. They
also warned Bibi of the potential attack but he wasn’t worried. However, Hamas's
subsequent attack, just two weeks later, underscored the volatility of the situation.
READINGS MENTIONED IN CLASS:
- Week 7: Iraq and ISIS
- Sole, “‘Management of Savagery’ - A Model for Establishing the Islamic
State” (2016)
- This article summarizes and contextualizes a pamphlet also titled
“The Management of Savagery” by Abu Bakr Naji, a “suspected
al-Qaeda strategist”, which was popular in Salafi-Jihadi circles in
the early 21st century and served to justify violence
- The original article discusses a strategy of building a new Islamic
(specifically Sunni) Caliphate based on establishing a state of
“savagery”, initiated by mass violence that spreads security forces
thin and incites fear in the people leading to a breakdown in the
state
- Through managing that savagery by controlling food and health,
building Sharia justice systems, guarding from enemies, and
mobilizing constituents, Naji argues that Jihadis will be able to
create a new state that is accepted by people because it is stable
and satisfies their basic needs
- (probably) Haddad, “Shi’a-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in
Post-2003 Iraq” (2016) – on Blackboard
- Week 8: Syria
- Kaplan, “Syria: Identity Crisis” (1993)
- “Syria… was a writhing ghost of a would-be nation” – it contains
myriad groups with strong allegiances toward themselves but not
the nation, concentrated in geographic areas
- Though leaders have sometimes sought to de-emphasize these
identitarian divisions, it remains a primary source of division and
violence, and Kaplan anticipates Syrian territory changing despite
efforts against it by Hafez al-Assad
- Younes, “The Wandering Alawite” (2021)
- Alawites cling to the Syrian regime (and have since Hafez,
-
-
essentially) because, unlike a lot of other religious groups in the
area, Alawites hold little power anywhere else and don’t really
complain because the alternatives are worse, traumatized and
motivated by events like Hama in 1982
International Crisis Group, “The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide”
(2011) – on Blackboard
- In Daraa, after opposition began to mobilize against the Syrian
government there, it would seem like the Syrian government would
suffer a similar fate to Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring, but
the route opposition took was far more gradual
- Bashar al-Assad portrayed the small number of protests to
be a demonstration of his legitimacy, argued they were
isolated phenomena by extremists, argued they were
Israeli-backed, highlighted sectarian divisions to stoke
popular fear and rally the predominantly-Alawite security
services – the slow pace gave the regime time to adjust
- However, this sectarian manipulation, the regime’s brutality,
crude propaganda, and the grudging concessions meant that
many believed fundamental change required the fall of
al-Assad’s regime
- Ultimately, the consequences of Daraa and the turmoil since are of
the Syrian government’s own making, both from its “long-standing
domestic mismanagement and its more recent gross mishandling of
the ensuing unrest” (p. 1)
- It was undermined by its own reflexive response of violence,
paranoia, and conspiracy theories, and especially its lack of
a clear plan
- Meanwhile, the opposition emphasized democratic and
non-sectarian motivations while provoking regime violence
Walter, “The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars” (2017) – on Blackboard
- Extremist ideology is very advantageous when there are several
rebel groups, weak rule of law, and bad governance, even if the
leaders of those groups don’t actually believe in that ideology
- Militias have a challenge in organization — Salafi-Jihadi
groups overcame this collective action problem through
these ideological tactics (e.g., righteous death and
martyrdom) and prevent commitment problems via
-
-
ideological filtering, which means there are fewer desertions
and betrayals
- Salafi-Jihadi groups were also generally less corrupt than
other rebels, reassuring the local population that they’re not
worse than what came before
- Key points:
- Ideology is partially a strategic decision, as certain ideologies
and identity cleavages may be better based on the dynamics
of the conflict itself – extremist ideologies are better with
collective action problems
- Ideology is ultimately cheap talk, and we cannot assume that
the ideology of a group is genuine, nor that followers
necessarily believe that it is – extremist ideologies will be
perceived as more committed to their goals because its
extreme beliefs are likely to inflict some costs on leaders
- Fighters are strategic actors rather than blind followers, and
they are more likely to join the group that delivers
Week 9: Lebanon
Week 10: Saudi Arabia
- Yetiv, “How Saudi Arabia Has Dodged the Arab Spring” – on Blackboard
- Despite minor mobilization in its al-Hasa oil province and legitimate
claims from Shi’a in the country, the Arab Spring never fully
materialized in Saudi Arabia due to its coalition-building skills,
foreign backing, oil wealth, and intimidation of Shi’a through its
interventionism in the Shi’a uprising in Bahrain
- Notably, these factors are all dependent on oil — it only got
through because of oil money funding its military, foreign
backing from states that needed its oil, money for bribery,
etc.
Week 11: Israel and Palestine
- Friedman, “The Geopolitics of the Palestinians” (2009) – on Blackboard
- Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall” – on Blackboard
FRANCHISE GOV
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