Briefing
Is Sustainable Peace in Ukraine
Possible? Contributions of Quality
Peace Theory
Journal of Peacebuilding
& Development
2024, Vol. 19(1) 123–128
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/15423166231221776
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpd
Eremin Arkadiy
Webster University, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Oleg Petrovich-Belkin
RANEPA University, Moscow, Russian Federation
Keywords
military conflict, Ukraine, Russia, peacemaking, peacebuilding, quality peace
Introduction
The war in Ukraine has transitioned from an
unspeakable disaster that preoccupies the minds
of many people around the globe to a protracted
conflict with an evident degree of fatigue both
among politicians and ordinary people. This is
one of the many reasons behind the rapid popularization of the argument that Ukraine must negotiate a peace agreement with Russia, which has
replaced the debate about Ukraine pursuing
victory on the battlefield at any cost. This
policy brief apply’s Wallensteen’s Quality
Peace Theory to demonstrate that at this point
in time and with current conditions such a peace
would not be sustainable and long-lasting. The
theory itself offers a clear and comprehensive
framework for evaluating the sustainability of
peace agreements; and based on the analysis of
open-source data and abundant scholarly research
about the contemporary political, economic, and
social realities in Ukraine, Russia, and the war
itself we are able to assess the possibility and
quality of the potential peace settlement between
these countries.
February 24, 2022 Russian Federation launched a
“special military operation” (SMO) in Donetsk
and Luhansk to protect the pro-Russian population
allegedly targeted by “discriminative policies” of
Kyiv. This is the continuation of events of 2014
when Russia annexed Crimea and instigated separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Despite being
successful in annexing Crimea, Russia did not
proceed with annexing Donetsk and Luhansk,
leaving them as unrecognized quasi-states. The
anti-terroristic operation initiated by the interim
acting head of state Turchinov in 2014 and continued by President Poroshenko did not yield significant results and led to casualties. In 2018, the ATO
(Anti-Terroristic Operation) was formally concluded, resulting in a more stable status quo with
minimal civilian casualties with less than 25
people killed in 2021 (OHCHR, 2022).
However, intensifying international pressure on
Russia due to chemical weapon scandals and
the poisoning of political opponents has resulted
in a more aggressive foreign policy agenda. The
deteriorating internal political situation and lack
Corresponding Author:
Eremin Arkadiy, Webster University, Tashkent 100128,
Uzbekistan.
Email: arkadiyeremin@webster.edu
124
of support from the population have pushed the
Russian political establishment to seek another
quick victory, similar to the annexation of Crimea
in 2014, which boosted support for the government
and Putin with the so-called “Crimean Consensus”
(Nikolskaya & Dmitriev, 2020). Personnel changes
within the government, including the rotation of
Vladislav Surkov, who was criticized for his lack
of proactive approach towards Ukraine, have also
contributed to the shift towards a more aggressive
foreign policy paradigm and the ensuing full-scale
warfare against Ukraine by February 2022. Given
the complex nature of the political reasons behind
the Russian aggression, it becomes especially
important to analyze how these political realities
will affect the possibility of the potential peacebuilding process.
Vladimir Putin outlined the goals of the military
operation in Ukraine as “denazification” and
“demilitarization,” while questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the artificial
nature of Ukrainian statehood. Russian
state-owned media further propagated the narrative, portraying the Ukrainian government as
neo-Nazi and anti-Russian. The lack of clear
achievable targets and structural issues in the
Russian military have changed a swift military
intervention into a protracted stand-off with
regular Ukrainian troops. The main propaganda
narrative has changed, with the confrontation
with the “Collective West” becoming the new
focus (Foreign Affairs, 2023). Despite facing
initial military aggression, Ukraine was able to
secure significant military assistance from its
Western partners. This has become essential to
maintain the Ukrainian force’s effectiveness and
allowed them to re-take a significant part of the
occupied territory. The intensity of the warfare is
resulting in an increasing number of casualties,
prisoners of war, and collateral damage among
civilians. This has led to documented cases of violations of the customs of war, as well as human
rights abuses. Those are especially numerous in
the Russian military, known to have committed
several war crimes while occupying the suburbs
and outskirts of Kyiv (PBS Frontline, 2023).
The intensification of the war in Ukraine leads to
two conclusions: a) the war will be long-lasting;
Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 19(1)
and b) the damage caused by Russia will be difficult to repair and forgive (Bufacchi, 2022).
Ukrainian President Zelensky has repeatedly
stated that negotiations with Russia are not possible as long as any part of Ukraine is under occupation, including Crimea, which Russia annexed
in 2014 (Politico, 2023). This stance makes the
idea of a peaceful resolution to the conflict
seem unrealistic. In this context, the application
of the “Quality Peace” theory is necessary to
assess the potential for a lasting peace agreement.
Quality Peace theory in its modern sense has
mostly been systemized and conceptualized by
Peter Wallensteen (Wallensteen, 2015). It builds
on von Clausewitz’s idea that peace exists in different dimensions, each contributing to the sustainability of peace. The theory defines five basic
criteria for quality peace: governance dimension,
equal security, economic growth and new possibilities, and reconciliation between sides of conflict
and civil society. The lack of any of these indicates
an overall fragility of the specific peace configuration. Here we analyze how many criteria can
potentially be met in the case of a potential peace
between Russia and Ukraine.
Organizing Effective Governance
The first criterion is the ability of Ukraine and
Russia to establish functioning post-war governance. Both sides of the conflict have demonstrated their capacity to maintain strong
territorial control. Ukraine has demonstrated
effective governance over unoccupied territories
despite facing a formidable foe. Meanwhile,
Russia has rapidly appointed local pro-Russian
administrations to establish administrative
control over newly acquired Ukrainian territories.
It remains uncertain whether there will be any de
facto territorial concessions from either side.
However, both countries possess the capability
to successfully govern these territories.
The governance criterion also includes the international aspect, which is crucial to guarantee
peace and ensure adherence to a potential treaty.
Ukraine and Russia have shown interest in the
involvement of other nations in negotiations. In
the first round of peace talks, Ukraine proposed
Arkadiy and Petrovich-Belkin
the participation of Eastern European countries as
guarantors of its security and can do that again.
The United States and countries of the
European Union, being close allies of Ukraine,
can also serve as mediators and guarantors in
the process. Meanwhile, Russia has lost most of
its diplomatic capabilities and can only rely on
China to serve as an intermediary. In February
2023, the Chinese government published a nonspecific peaceful resolution plan for the war
between Russia and Ukraine, which affirms the
principle of sovereignty but fails to attribute
blame to Russia (China’s Position, 2023).
Ensuring Security
Achieving a long-lasting peace requires ensuring
equal non-discriminatory security for both sides of
the conflict, including active disarmament and reducing levels of violence. However, security is not
limited to physical safety, as the general feeling of
security is also crucial. The cessation of military
action alone does not guarantee overall security, particularly given the potential for black-market arms
sales. In the current conflict between Ukraine and
Russia, arms trafficking in the region is expected
to skyrocket, allowing various criminal organizations to obtain heavy weaponry.
Another issue is the future reintegration of discharged soldiers into society. In the cases of
Afghanistan and Chechnya, Russian soldiers
have turned to criminal activities due to unemployment and lack of support. Current news about skyrocketing levels of violent crimes among the
recently demobilized soldiers indicates that this is
already the case with modern-day Russia as well
(The Moscow Times, 2023). In Ukraine, successful foreign aid allocation and rapid national reconstruction are crucial for addressing similar issues.
Even if a peace agreement is reached, many,
including President Zelensky, feel that the
regime of Vladimir Putin is not reliable enough
to maintain the accords in the long term. This
uncertainty creates a potential threat to overall
security in the region.
Thus, the security criterion appears to be met in
the short term for the conflict between Ukraine
125
and Russia; but in the long run, the prospects
for the regional security remain uncertain.
Economic Development and
Opportunities
The third criterion is economic growth and equal
access to development opportunities. A mutually
beneficial deal is crucial, as one or both parties
may feel cheated, leading to a relapse into conflict. In the case of post-war Ukraine, economic
reconstruction is likely to occur with foreign aid
from the European Union and the United States,
due to its vital role in the upcoming security configuration in Europe. Western nations are directly
interested in helping Ukraine stay strong economically and politically to serve as a counterweight
to Russia in the region.
In contrast, Russia is facing a declining economy,
with real incomes of Russian people stagnating
rapidly ever since 2014. Russian “import substitution” strategy has been recognized as a
failure, and “parallel import” has been implemented to fulfill the demand for essential IT equipment and other necessary imports (Reuters,
2023). However, this contributes to the rapid
growth of the shadow economy, as businesses
receive clear motivation to switch to semi-legal
schemes to avoid taxes and regulations
(Independent Gazette, 2022). Retail of digital
electronics is a good example: small enterprises
using small-scale “parallel import” schemes can
avoid customs and taxation, thus winning any
competition with big retailers.
Another factor contributing to Russia’s economic
stagnation is the constantly rising war-related
expenditures, happening at the expense of critical
and socially significant infrastructure. The construction of a line of anti-tank and anti-infantry
defense in the Belgorod region cost 10 billion
rubles, several times higher than many critical
expenses of the local budget, including healthcare
and education. On a federal level, military spending has seriously undermined all other critical
expenditures, leading to a record budget deficit in
2022 and 2023, and a drop in the overall level of
life in Russia. In addition to that, The Collective
126
Security Treaty Organization members, as well as
Turkey and China, have been reluctant at risking
getting under secondary sanctions for the sake of
Russian economic needs.
Thus, economic development and opportunities
will not likely be equal for Russia and Ukraine,
making it challenging to meet this quality peace
criterion fully. A change in political leadership
in Russia may be the only possible way for reintegration into the world economy.
Reconciliation
Reconciliation is essential for a long-lasting
peace. To achieve this, both sides must be
willing to forgive and let go. Possible ways to
achieve reconciliation include financial compensation, public admission of guilt, criminal prosecution for war crimes, and human rights
violations (Wallensteen, 2015). However, the
specificity of the conflict at hand poses a significant challenge to achieving reconciliation due to
the number of casualties and war crimes
(Dukalskis et al., 2018, pp. 148–152).
Given that Russia initiated the conflict without any
legitimate cause, it is crucial for Moscow to
acknowledge its guilt. One of the most difficult
aspects of this will be addressing war atrocities.
Both sides have violated the customs of war and
human rights, but Russia’s transgressions are
more extensive and well-documented. Conversely,
Ukraine has responded appropriately to such cases
by condemning them and launching investigations.
Russia, however, has refused to accept responsibility for its actions and has instead attempted
to shift the blame to Ukraine by labeling such
cases as fabricated. Therefore, it is unlikely that
Russia will agree to any trials or investigations
regarding war crimes. Moreover, the Russian
Federation’s limited economic capabilities
would not enable it to offer financial aid to
Ukraine, despite discussions at the UN level
regarding reparations (UN News, 2022).
Additionally, any concessions to Ukraine may
threaten the stability of the current Russian government, which relies on support from proponents
of war.
Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 19(1)
Thus, reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine
is unlikely, while Vladimir Putin remains in
power and the current expansionist foreign-policy
agenda persists. Therefore, the criterion of quality
peace cannot be considered properly met, even if
the conflict between the two nations ends.
Civil Society
A robust civil society can hold politicians
accountable and prevent radicalization of rhetoric
that may lead to the renewal of conflict.
Additionally, civil society can provide whistleblowers who can alert international authorities
about potential signs of relapse.
In Ukraine, the war has significantly consolidated
civil society (RTI International, 2023). In addition, future foreign aid for reconstruction purposes from the European Union and the United
States is expected to positively influence the
adoption of progressive and liberal values (The
Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, 2023).
In contrast, Russia has introduced harsh war censorship and repressive laws that prevent people
from expressing their opinions on the war and
sharing relevant information (Human Rights
Watch, 2022). Criticizing the government and
military is a criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment. The lack of clarity regarding
terms like “fake news” and “discreditation of
the army” has allowed the government to
oppress any opposition. The government has fabricated criminal cases against notable opposition
politicians, leading to forced immigration or
imprisonment (Hall, 2023; Tertytchnaya, 2023).
As a result, civil society in Russia is virtually nonexistent, and social activists are under substantial
threat. The only real choices out there are to keep
internal disagreement or immigrate; and about 1
million qualified specialists have already left the
country (Insider, 2022). The absence of civil
society in Russia means that the country is
unlikely to be able to hold the government
accountable and prevent possible conflict
reoccurrence. The change of power may open a
window of opportunity for the nation to become
more liberal and democratic, but even if this
Arkadiy and Petrovich-Belkin
does not happen, whistleblowing may still be possible, as the majority of those against the war
remain unsupportive of the existing political establishment. Thus, the civil society criterion can only
be considered partially met in our scenario.
127
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest
with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
Conclusion
The conflict in Ukraine presents a significant challenge to the liberal international order, which was
previously weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The foreign policy principles of Western nations
towards autocratic Russia have been ineffective,
painfully resembling the “pacifying the aggressor”
strategy of the 1930s. The EU’s economic interests
in gas and oil have often taken precedence over
opposing human rights violations. The lack of
commitment to ensure Ukraine’s security after
2014 has led to the escalation of a full-frontal
war in Europe. The war in Ukraine is not only catastrophic for the direct participants but also poses a
significant challenge for Western countries, which
must learn to coordinate their policies more
effectively.
After evaluating the current state of the war in
Ukraine, it is evident that while some of the criteria for a quality peace accord have been fully
or partially met, others remain troublesome. As
the current scholarship on the quality of peace
suggests, such agreements would turn out to be
fragile and a significant possibility of conflict
relapse will remain in long-term perspective
(Davenport et al., 2018; Wallensteen, 2015).
The only way to increase the chances of achieving a long-lasting peace in Ukraine is a change
of power in Russia with a subsequent revision
of foreign policy and other political agendas.
However, this is an unlikely scenario, as the
current leadership under Vladimir Putin has a
firm grip on power and has access to ultimate
repressive mechanisms able to quell any protests.
Well-funded law enforcement, a compliant political establishment, and a fearful society make it
difficult for any change of power to take place.
Therefore, the only option left appears to be
achieving peace through a combination of battlefield efforts and smart international pressure
(Panasyuk, 2023).
The author(s) received no financial support for the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Author Biographies
Eremin Arkadiy, PhD, an expert in international relations and political theory, currently occupies the role of
assistant professor at Webster University campus in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Arkadiy has previously
worked at the People’s Friendship University of
Russia but had to leave due to his strong anti-war position and had to relocate to avoid mobilization.
Oleg Petrovich-Belkin, PhD, an expert in international
relations and European politics, currently occupies the
role of associate professor at RANEPA University and
works as an independent journalist. Because of personal and professional risks, Oleg relocated to
Georgia in 2021.