PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
(OUTLINE)
Art. 2 – EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (Bar Q-1990)
-When a law does not provide for its effectivity, it shall take effect after the expiration of the 15-day
period following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation (as amended by EO No. 200-June 18, 1987).
-The phrase “ unless it is otherwise provided” solely refers to the 15-day period and not to the
requirement of publication.
-If the law provides for a different period, shorter or longer than the 15-day period, then such shorter
or longer period, as the case may be, shall prevail.
Tañada vs. Tuvera
146 SCRA 448
Must all laws be published and what must be published?
-Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Non-publication means violation of the
due process clause guaranteed by the Constitution.
-All statutes, including those of local application and private laws or laws that name a public place
in favor of a favored individual or laws that exempt an individual from certain prohibitions or
requirement, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. EO 200 allows the publication of
laws in a newspaper of general circulation due to erratic releases of the Official Gazette and of its
limited readership.
Must decisions of the SC be published to be binding?
-The SC held in the case of De Roy vs. CA (157 SCRA 757) that “ there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as
a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court” . (As laid down in the case of
Habaluyas, Inc. vs. Japzon, 138 SCRA 46, the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In the case at bar, the parties filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration. At the time of the filing of the motion however, the
Habaluyas decision has yet to be published.)
-Ordinances are governed by the Local Government Code.
Art. 3 - IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (85,96)
-Covers all domestic laws but only applies to mandatory or prohibitive laws not on permissive or
suppletory laws.
-Foreign laws are likewise excluded because we do not take judicial notice of foreign laws as well
as judgments/decisions rendered by their courts. These are factual matters that must be pleaded and
proved before our courts in the absence of which it is presumed that their laws are the same as our laws
(principle of processual presumption).
-Not applied with equal force to minors, they occupy a privilege position before our laws. Neither
would this apply to laws susceptible of 2 or more interpretations.
MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
354 SCRA 1
-It is significant to note that in their respective affidavits executed on March 22, 1993 and
sworn to before respondent Judge Sanchez himself, Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact
of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
“ separated.” The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely
de facto, as in the case at bar.
-Neither can respondent judge take refuge on their joint affidavit that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for 7 years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Such cohabitation is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license it could not serve as a
justification for respondent judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment
of a prior existing marriage.
-Respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized
a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special
application to judges, who should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Art. 4- PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS as a general rule.
Exceptions: 1. If the laws are remedial/procedural in nature.
Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr.
243 SCRA 32
Brillantes’ prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 without the requisite license so when he married
de Castro in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in good faith that he was capacitated to marry.
Accordingly, Art. 40 does not apply as his prior marriage was governed by the New Civil Code which does
not require any court decree of nullity if void ab initio.
SC held: Article 40 of the Family Code applies to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides Article 256 of the same Code is given
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retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is a rule of procedure and
Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40.
Casupanan and Capitulo vs Laroya
August 26, 2002- Lawyers Review/September 30, 2002
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the wellsettled rule that – x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of the passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.”
CANCIO vs. ISIP
November 12, 2002
-The modes of enforcement of the civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that
statutes regulating the procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL (expressly provides for prospectivity despite being a rule of procedure) December
16, 2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in application.
CHENG vs. SY 592 SCRA 155 (July 7, 2009)
-The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural
laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.
Other exceptions:
2. Penal laws favorable to the accused provided he is not a habitual delinquent.
3.Curative laws. 4. Emergency laws. 5. Laws creating new rights. and 6. Tax laws.
Article 6. Waiver (04) A N C - F F
Requirements of a valid waiver: 1. the waiving party must actually have the right he is renouncing
or it must be in existence at the time of the waiver;
2. he must have the full capacity to make the waiver;
3. the waiver must be clear and unequivocal;
4. the waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or
prejudicial to a 3rd person with a right recognized by law; and
5. when formalities are required for its validity such as an express condonation of a debt the
formalities must be complied with.
GUY vs. CA
502 SCRA 151 (September 15, 2006)
- To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave
no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver
may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a
right. In this case, there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver does not state with
clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters “ by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and
all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.” The
document did not specifically mention minors’ hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be
construed as a waiver of successional rights.
- Moreover, assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of the children, such waiver
will not bar the latter’ s claim. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted
by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only
by judicial authorization.
-Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property that must pass the court’ s
scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward.
- Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
Article 9- In case of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of laws – no judge shall decline to render judgment.
Applies only civil cases not to criminal proceedings because of the principle that “ there is no crime when
there is no law punishing it (nullum crimen, nulla sine poena lege).
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and petitioned the court that his name be
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to
reflect the result of said surgery.
The Republic opposed the same alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Issue: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the ground of equity?
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It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “ no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or
amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law
on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Art. 15 – ADHERENCE TO NATIONALITY THEORY (75,78,81,83,87,95,97,98,99,02,03,04, 05)
RENVOI DOCTRINE – where the conflict rules of the forum (ex. Philippines) refer to a foreign law
(ex.USA), and the latter refers it back to the internal law, the law of the forum (Philippine law) shall apply
(Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).
TRANSMISSION THEORY – if the foreign law refers to a 3rd country, the laws of said country should
govern; this situation is a variety of the renvoi doctrine (ex. If B, a nationality of Canada who is a resident of
the Philippines and has properties in Switzerland dies, his estate shall be governed by the laws of Canada
based on Article 15 but if the laws of Canada states that it is the law of the place where the property is
situated that will be applied then the laws of the 3rd country will govern in the distribution of his estate.)
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
39 SCRA 139
- a Filipina wife obtained a divorce decree in Nevada which was actively participated by the foreign
husband. WON the divorce decree can be recognized in Phil. courts?
-SC: The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility
in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty,
Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx
xxx
xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do
an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1.
That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2.
That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3.
'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx
xxx
xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this
case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
174 SCRA 653
- Foreigner husband sought a divorce decree against Filipina wife which was granted. Thereafter,
he filed a criminal case of adultery against the former spouse WON he has legal standing to file the
case?
-We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates
the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
3
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a
civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying
that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage
the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia- Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
-But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. Therefore, before our courts
can recognize a foreign divorce decree, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient. Under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or document may be proven as
public record of a foreign country by either (1) official publication of the writing or document or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
QUITA vs. CA – 300 SCRA 406
Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship turned sour Fe went to the US and in 1954
obtained a decree of absolute divorce. Fe got married thrice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate. Fe is now
claiming her right over the estate of the deceased spouse.
The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the second marriage of the
spouse during the subsistence of the first marriage was contracted before or after her changed of
citizenship. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her 1 st divorce, Van Dorn
would become applicable and Fe could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. CA, CATINDIG
January 27, 2006
Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each other and upon advice of a friend
obtained a divorce from the Dominican Republic. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of
Virginia, USA. Elmar later on learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic
dissolving the marriage of Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to
Tristan was void under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would obtain an
annulment of his marriage with Lily. In 2001, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lily.
Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming that she has an interest in the matter
in litigation that was granted by the lower court.
Issue: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily?
SC: Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of
such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant.
The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her
the requisite legal interest, lacks merit. Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence her
claim of legal interest has no basis. When they got married in 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily.
The divorce decree obtained by Tristan and Lily from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he/she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code which took effect on August 30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs. Escano we held:
(1)
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (RA No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
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party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS divorce decree, how proved.
February 6, 2007
Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. His 1 st marriage was terminated
when his wife died leaving behind 6 children. Five years later Felicisimo married Mary Lee, an American
citizen with whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when Mary Lee divorced Felicisimo. The decree of
absolute divorce was granted in December 1973. He then contracted his 3 rd marriage in June 1974 with
Felicidad. When he died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’ s estate and prayed that letters of administration be issued to her. Two of the
children of the 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss citing as ground, among others, that Felicidad has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death was still legally married to Mary Lee. Petitioners (Felicisimo’ s heirs) cited Articles 15 and 17
(3) of the NCC in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
SC: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the FC, particularly
Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative.
In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’ s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad
and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. The presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular official of the Philippines who is stationed in the
foreign country where the document is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidad’ s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, USA, she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA and ORLANDO CATALAN and MEROPE BRAGANZA 514 SCRA 607
(February 6, 2007)
Felicitas and Orlando were married in June 1950 in Pangasinan but migrated to the United States
after the marriage. Allegedly, they became naturalized citizens thereof and after 38 years of marriage or in
1988, they divorced. Two months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas then
filed a petition for declaration of nullity with damages against Orlando and Merope alleging that Merope
had a prior subsisting marriage with one Eusebio Bristol. Orlando and Merope moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground of lack of cause of action as Felicitas was not a real party-in-interest.
SC:
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national
law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should
each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently contract. x x x
Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since
the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status
of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even
in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
xxxx
Bayot vs Bayot
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Art. 16 -law governing real and personal property is the law of the place where the property is situated
exception – in cases of succession it is the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration par. (2) (76,77,84,85,86,89,91,95,98,01,02,04).
Art. 17 par. (1) – Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationis
(75,77,78,81,85,91,93,95,96,98,02,03)
(2) - Rule respecting Prohibitive Laws
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
15 SCRA 355
May our courts recognize a decree of divorce validly obtained abroad by spouses who are Filipino
citizens?
-The SC applied par. 3 of Article 17.
-For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation
of the declared public policy of the State, specially in view of the third paragraph
of Article 17 of the Civil Code.
-The court also applied Article 15 of the same Code.
Article 19 – Golden Rule of the Civil Code (81)CA
- solidary liability, you cannot divide a moral wrong
Globe Mackay Cable Radio Corp. vs. CA
176 SCRA 778
-This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’ s rights but also in the
performance of one’ s duties. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19
of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom.
FAR EAST BANK (FEBTC), NOW BANK OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS vs. PACILAN, JR.
465 SCRA 372
Facts: Pacilan’ s current account was closed by FEBTC on the ground that his account was
“ improperly mishandled” . This was due to Pacilan’ s issuance of 4 checks to different persons with an
aggregate of amount of P7,410.00 but the balance of his current deposit was only P6,981.43 resulting to
the dishonor of Check No. 2434886. Pacilan then complained in writing to the bank about the closure of his
account and when he did not receive any reply from FEBTC he sued the bank for damages. He alleged
that the closure of his account was unjustified inasmuch as he immediately deposited the following day an
amount sufficient to fund the check. Moreover, the closure exposed him to criminal prosecution for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was
patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. He alleged that he is a prominent and respected
leader in the civic and banking communities (as cashier of Prudential Bank). The alleged malicious acts of
the bank besmirched his reputation and caused him “ social humiliation, wounded feelings,
insurmountable worries and sleepless nights.”
Held: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad
faith is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to
be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith
or with ill motive.
- Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It refers to a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to
some motives or interest or ill will that partakes the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
- In the case at bench, the facts as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do not
establish that, in the exercise of this right, FEBTC committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the
2nd and 3rd elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in the present case. The evidence
presented by the bank negates the existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing
Pacilan’ s account on April 4, 1988 because on said date the same was already overdrawn.
Further, it was shown that in 1986, the current account of Pacilan was overdrawn 156 times due
to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In 1987, the said account was overdrawn
117 times for the same reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also several instances when
Pacilan issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file
with bank. All these circumstances taken together justified the bank’ s closure of Pacilan’ s
account on April 4, 1988 for “ improper handling.”
UYPITCHING et al vs. QUIAMCO (December 6, 2006)
Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso surrendered to Quiamco a red Honda XL- 100 motorcycle and
a photocopy of its certificate of registration as settlement of their civil liability. Quiamco asked for the
original certificate of registration but the 3 never came back to see him again. He parked the motorcycle
in an open space in his business establishment – visible and accessible to the public. It turned out however
that Gabutero bought the motorcycle on installments secured by a chattel mortgage from Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc. that was managed by Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. The mortgage indebtedness
was assumed by Davalan but stopped the payments in 1982 and told the corporation’ s collector that the
motorcycle had been “ taken by Quiamco’ s men” . Nine years later, Uypitching accompanied by
policemen went to Avesco (the business establishment of Quiamco) to recover the motorcycle. While the
leader of the police team P/Lt. Vendiola asked for Quiamco, Uypitching paced back and forth uttering
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“ Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle.” Unable to find Quiamco, and upon Uypitching’ s instructions and
over the objection of Quiamco’ s clerk, they took the motorcycle. Uypitching then filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law but was dismissed by the Office of
the City Prosecutor. Later, Quiamco filed an action for damages against Uypitching.
SC: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation’ s exercise of its
right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken. True, a mortgagee may take
steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon.
There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a
mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must
bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial
foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession
of the motorcycle. Instead Uypitching descended on Quiamco’ s establishment with his policemen and
ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the
illegal seizure, Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. No doubt, the corporation, acting thru
Uypitching blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
Quiamco. Their acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of
human relations. This basic principle of human relations is embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Also
known as the “ principle of abuse of rights” , it prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or
contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of,
or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. In this case, the
manner by which the motorcycle was taken was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’
exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to Quiamco.
The precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of
petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule Quiamco.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court,
for his improper behavior.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. (CCCI), DAPAT, et. al. vs. ELIZAGAQUE
January 18, 2008
Elizagaque was designated as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI by San Miguel
Corporation. In 1996, Elizagaque filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The price of a
proprietary share was around P5 million, Unchuan however, offered to sell a share for only P3.5 million but
Elizagaque bought the share of a certain Butalid for only P3 million. Elizagaque’ s application for
proprietary membership was deferred twice by the board and eventually, disapproved his application.
Elizagaque wrote the Board thrice for reconsideration but no reply was ever made by CCCI. In 1998,
Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages against CCCI.
SC: As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the “ black ball
system” of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents
conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. A unanimous vote of
the directors is required pursuant to the amendment made in Section 3 © of its articles. Obviously, the
board has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right
should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations
provide restrictions.
In rejecting respondent’ s application for membership, the petitioners violated the rules governing
human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings
and for the stability of social order. Petitioners’ committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving
respondent’ s application.
The amendment to Section 3 © of CCCI’ s amended by-laws requiring the unanimous vote of the
directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled
and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3 © which was
silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member. The
explanation that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons, is
flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way
back in 1978 or almost 20 years before Elizagaque filed his application. It cannot be fathomed why such a
prestigious and exclusive golf country club whose members are affluent, did not have enough money to
cause the printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required.
When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his application,
petitioners apparently ignored him. At the very least, they should have informed him why his application
was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Petitioners’ disapproval of
respondent’ s application is characterized by bad faith as found by both the trial and appellate courts.
As to petitioners’ reliance on damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state
that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy vs. Gutierrez (351SCRA731), we held that this principle does not
apply when there is an abuse of a person’ s right, as in this case.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES DOYON
582 SCRA 403 (March 25, 2010)
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The spouses Doyon obtained a 10-million peso loan from DBP secured by real and chattel
mortgages. The obligation remained unpaid despite having the loan restructured. DBP the initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings but was forestalled when the spouses filed a civil action for its
nullification claiming payment. Three years later, DBP withdrew the application for foreclosure while Doyon
withdrew the civil case. Weeks later, DBP demanded the payment of the loan that has now ballooned to
20 million. Doyon still ignored the demand so DBP applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of Doyon’ s real and
chattel mortgages and took constructive possession of the properties, then its sheriff issued notices of sale
at public auction.
Meanwhile, Doyon filed a complaint for damages against DBP claiming that by withdrawing the
earlier application for extrajudicial foreclosure and the dismissal of the earlier civil case DBP led them to
believe that it would no longer seek satisfaction of its claims and that their loans had been extinguished.
DBP therefore, acted contrary to Article 19 of the Civil Code when it foreclosed on the real and chattel
mortgages anew.
SC: for an action for damages under Article 19 to prosper, the complainant must prove that: (a)
defendant has a legal right or duty; (b) he exercised his right or performed his duty with bad faith and (c)
complainant was prejudiced or injured as a result of the said exercise or performance by defendant.
On the 1st requisite, the petitioner had the legal right to foreclose on the real and chattel
mortgages. When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the
creditor may foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of alienating the property to satisfy his credit.
2nd requisite, bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity or conscious doing of a
wrong that partakes the nature of fraud.
Nothing in the RTC order, re on withdrawal of the application foreclosure, that stated or even
hinted, that Doyon’ s obligation to DBP had in fact been extinguished. Thus, there was nothing on the part
of DBP even remotely showing that it led Doyon to believe that it had waived its claims.
Lastly, the fact that a demand for payment was made negated bad faith on the part of DBP.
Despite giving Doyon the opportunity to pay their long overdue obligations and avoid foreclosure, Doyon
still refused to pay.
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. vs. CLEMENTE, JR. 585 SCRA 300 (April 16, 2009)
Clemente became a delinquent member of the club due to his failure to pay his monthly dues for
more than 60 days. The demand letters that were sent to his mailing address were returned with the postal
note that the address had been closed. A 3rd and final demand was again sent to Clemente in the same
postal address were the 1st 2 demand letters were sent. Clemente’ s share was later sold through auction.
SC: Bad faith on Calatagan’ s part is palpable. As found by the CA, Calatagan very well knew that
Clemente’ s postal box to which it sent its previous letters had been closed, yet it persisted in sending that
final letter to the same postal box.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address
along with residence and office telephone numbers.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions enunciate a general obligation under the
law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation like
Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its members. The obligation of a
corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members,
even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the corporation. A
certificate of stock cannot be the charter of dehumanization.
Sesbreno vs Veco G.R. No. 160689
Art. 20 – Acts Contrary to Law (78,03)
Art. 21 – Acts Contrary to Morals (75,81,82,96)
1) Bunag, Jr. vs. CA
211 SCRA 440
-In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time honored rule that an action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced
by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge
with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability,
only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for 21 days, irremissibly
constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs.
These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions that indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral
and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21.
2) Wassmer vs. Velez
12 SCRA 648
-Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.
3) Tanjanco vs. CA and Santos
18 SCRA 994
-No case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion, for had she been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
8
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
March 31, 2005 no moral damages in PI cases
Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void by reason of psychological incapacity
of the other spouse entitled to moral and exemplary damages under article 21 of the New Civil
Code?
SC: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or
injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence
that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his/her disability
and yet willfully concealed the same.
ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COQUIA
559 SCRA 300 (July 14, 2008)
The appellate court’ s citation of Article 21 is misplaced not only because of the pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties which bars the application of this provision, but more importantly
because we cannot deem ACI to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Art. 22 – Unjust Enrichment
Gonzalo vs Tarnate G.R. No. 160600
REPUBLIC vs. LACAP
517 SCRA 255 (March 2, 2007)
In 1992, Lacap, who was doing business under the name Carwin Construction, was awarded the
contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare by the District Engineer of Pampanga. On October 29,
1992, the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga found the project 100% completed in
accordance with the approved plans and specification and was then issued Certificates of Final
Inspection and Acceptance. When Lacap sought to collect payment, the DPWH withheld the payment
because COA disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’ s license of
Lacap had expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer then sought the
opinion of the DPWH Legal Department twice whether the contracts of Carwin for various rehabilitation
projects were valid although its contractor’ s license had already expired when the projects were
contracted. Its Legal Department opined that since RA 4566 known as the Contractor’ s License Law does
not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no law which
expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and may be paid, without
prejudice to administrative liabilities that may be imposed on the contractor and the government
employees or officials concerned. Yet, despite such recommendation, no payment was made. Thus, in
July 1995, Lacap filed a complaint for damages and specific performance against the Republic.
SC: The wordings of RA 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed therein (Section 35 of said law states: “ x x x x. or use an expired or revoked
certificate or license, shall be guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a
fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.” ). Besides, Article 22 of the
Civil Code embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be
made rich out of another’ s injury).
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as “ basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for
the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience, x x x guides human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the
end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.” The rules
thereon apply equally well to the Government. Since Lacap had rendered services to the full satisfaction
and acceptance of petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to
acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner
to the prejudice of the respondent.
Art. 26 – (77) – Acts though not constituting a criminal offense but may produce a cause action for
damages, prevention and other relief.
CASTRO vs. PEOPLE
559 SCRA 676 (July 23, 2008)
Castro, assistant headmaster of Reedly International School (RIS), was informed thru phone that
Tan, the parent of the child dismissed by RIS but whose dismissal was overturned by Dep-Ed, was planning
to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, Castro told the caller: “ Okay,
you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that’ s dangerous.” Sued, he was found guilty by the
MeTC of Grave Oral Defamation.
The SC however, enunciated that “ At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under
Article 26 of the Civil Code21 :
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Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he
should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 27 – Liability of Public Officers
Ledesma vs. CA and Delmo
160 SCRA 449
-Ledesma, then President of the West Visayas College, was adjudged liable for damages under
Article 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a student with honors. Ledesma’ s behavior
relative to Miss Delmo’ s case smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of
power. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal that was brought
about by Ledesma’ s neglect of duty and callousness.
Arts. 29, 30, 31 – Civil Action for Damages (Art. 31-88,03,06)
-Civil actions arising from felonies are based on the principle that “ every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable” Article 100, RPC. Exceptions where no civil liability shall arise: 1. The fact from
which the civil action may arise did not exist; 2. The accused did not commit the crime; or 3. No crime
existed but prescription of the criminal action does not bar the filing of civil action for damages.
-Only the civil aspect arising out of the offense charged is deemed instituted in the criminal case except if
1. There is a reservation; 2. There is a waiver of the civil action; or 3. The complaining party institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Exception to the exception – reservations of civil action arising from
violations of BP 22 shall not be allowed or recognized.
-Actions premised on quasi delicts and other independent civil actions such as 1. civil action not
based on the act or omission complained of as a felony but on some other sources of obligation (Art. 31),
2. violation of one’ s civil liberties, whether direct or indirect, committed by a public official or employee or
by a private individual (Article 32), 3. fraud, defamation, or physical injuries [intentionally committed and
used in its generic signification] (Art. 33), 4. refusal of any member of the municipal or city police force to
render aid or assistance in times of danger to life or property without just cause (Art. 34), and 5. quasi-delict
(Art. 2176) may be filed separately by the complainant/plaintiff without any reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action (2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The “ no reservation” clause has retroactive
effect, the same being a rule of procedure (Casupanan vs. Laroya, Cancio vs. Isip cases). The failure to
make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent
civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
Cases:
1) Padilla, et al. vs. CA
129 SCRA 558
-Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for
the same criminal act or omission.
-There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and
a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A
judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish
the civil liability unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
2) People vs. Bayotas
236 SCRA 239
-Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? Death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard “ the death of the
accused prior to the final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
stricture.
-Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the used, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
CANCIO vs. ISIP
November 12, 2002
Is the dismissal of an estafa case a bar to the institution of a civil action for collection of the
value of the checks subject of the estafa case?
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34 and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code];
or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action [Article 33, Civil Code]. Either of these 2 possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
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offended party “ cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission” or under both
causes.
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint shows that the cause of action is based on
culpa contractual, an independent civil action. It is respondent’ s breach of the contractual
obligation that served as basis of the complaint. The nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint not by the claim of the party filing the action.
-Being an independent civil action arising from contracts, it may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the
Civil Code “ when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g. culpa contractual such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.”
Thus, not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling
on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on
an entirely different cause of action, i.e. culpa contractual.
SANTOS vs. PIZARRO
465 SCRA 232 (July 29, 2005)
Facts: In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries for which Sibayan was eventually convicted in December
1998. As there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was
made by the MCTC. In October 2000 Santos filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan and Rondaris,
the president and chairman of Viron Transit. Viron Transit moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing,
among others, prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4 years from the
accrual of the cause of action.
Held: Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result
of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation the MCTC did not make any
pronouncement as to the latter’ s civil liability. Although there were allegations of negligence on the part
of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of
action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has
the choice between an action to enforce liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e. (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and (2) independent civil
liabilities (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34,
and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal proceedings.
While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed, petitioners can still pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is
so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement
of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the
employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the RPC operates the controlling force to obviate the possibility
of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting
the employee.
FRIAS vs. SAN DIEGO-SISON
520 SCRA 244 (April 3, 2007)
Frias entered into an agreement with Sison whereby the latter shall buy the house and lot of the
former covered by TCT No. 168173 for a sum of P6.4 million pesos with a down payment of P3 million
although Frias actually received only P2 million because the check covering the P1 million was dishonored.
The buyer was given 6 months to decide whether to buy the property or not and if she does, she is given
another 6 months to pay the balance of P3.4 million. Frias is also given the right to offer the property to a
3rd party within the 6-month period and if sold to said 3rd party, to return the down payment to Sison with
interest based on prevailing compounded bank interest. But if there is no other buyer and Sison should also
decide not to buy the property, Frias has another 6 months within which to pay the P3 million with
compounded bank interest for the last 6 months only and the 3 million shall be treated as a loan with the
property as security. There was no buyer and after the lapsed of the period, Sison decided not to buy the
property. Frias failed to pay the amount despite demand so Sison instituted a complaint for sum money.
The debtor was later investigated for perjury and false testimony when Frias made a false report of the loss
of owner’ s copy of TCT No. 168173, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition for the issuance of
a new owner’ s duplicate of title. When the civil case was decided against her and was ordered to pay
Sison the amount due plus damages, she claimed that such award is without basis because she was
acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony.
SC: Article 31 provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings regardless of the result of the latter.
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against
her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by
respondent against petitioner. Frias’ act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by
executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for issuance of a new owner’ s duplicate
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copy of TCT No. 169173 entitles respondent to damages. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa
contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes the nature of fraud.
CHENG vs. SY 592 SCRA 155 (July 7, 2009)
Cheng filed two estafa cases against the spouses Sy due to dishonor of the two checks that were
issued by the Sys as payment for a loan obligation. She also filed against the spouses two cases for
violation of BP 22. Both cases were however, dismissed because the prosecution failed to prove the
elements of the crime of estafa and, in the case for violation of BP 22 for failure of Cheng to identify the
accused in open court. In one of the estafa cases, the court made a pronouncement that the “ liability of
the accused, if any, is purely ‘ civil’ , not criminal in nature.”
Cheng then instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money based on the same loaned
amount. The lower court dismissed the civil action for lack of jurisdiction as the civil action to collect was
already impliedly instituted in the BP 22 cases.
SC: Where the trial court declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature –
produced the legal effect of a reservation by Cheng of her right to litigate
separately the civil action
impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code.
If the loan be proven true, the inability of Cheng to recover the loaned amount would be
tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may conveniently evade payment of their
obligation merely on account of a technicality.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at
the expense of or with damages to another. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved
party has no other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quase-delict or any other provision
of law.
Art. 32 – Violation of Rights (88)
MHP Garments, Inc. vs. CA
236 SCRA 227
-Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private
respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be
proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizures.
-Petitioners’ argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their
participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents, the Court, citing
Aberca vs. Ver (160 SCRA 590), in explaining the liability of persons indirectly responsible, held: The
decisive factor in this case in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or
employee or person “ directly or indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. In the case at bar, petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the
right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
Article 33 – Independent Civil Actions (76,81,83,88)
1) Reyes vs. Sempio-Diy and Malicsi
141 SCRA 208
-Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced,
there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for
damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action. The Court then
allowed the complainant to pursue the action for damages.
2) Casupanan vs Laroya
August 26, 2002
May an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence validly file, simultaneously
and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in
the criminal case?
- The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in par. 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 that states that the counterclaim of the accused “ may be litigated in a separate
civil action.” This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up
any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.
Second, the accused who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is
to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
- Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be
filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.
Article 36 – Prejudicial Question (88,97)
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
2 elements:
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1. the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related with to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
2. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed (as
amended by the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure and cited in the case of Dreamwork
Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola 591 SCRA 466, June 30, 2009).
- Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can
be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil
action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. (Dreamwork vs.
Janiola)
- The present criminal action shall be suspended as the resolution of the issue in the civil
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal. But court has no
authority to motu proprio suspend or dismiss the criminal action but only upon petition of
the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court (Yap vs. Paras, 205 SCRA 605).
- Petition (generally, by the accused) to suspend the criminal proceedings may be filed in
the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. If the
criminal action has already been filed in court for trial, it shall be made in the same
criminal action before the prosecution rests its case.
Where Prejudicial Question was considered even if one action is not criminal but administrative.
1) Quiambao vs. Osorio
158 SCRA 674
-The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is
obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is
the intimate correlation between said two (2) proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of
private respondent to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the pending
administrative case.
Where the cases are both civil in nature.
1) City of Pasig vs COMELEC
314 SCRA 179
-The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil
and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil as in the instant case.
The SC held that “ while this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad vs RTC of Negros
Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case
pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first” .
Other cases:
2) Umali vs. IAC
186 SCRA 680
-No prejudicial question.
-Even if the civil case were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be
annulled, such declaration would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case, the latter involving violation of BP 22.
3) Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan
249 SCRA 342
-All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is
no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are clearly
related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners’ alleged partiality and evident
bad faith in not paying private respondents’ salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives,
while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designation of private
respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.
4) Bobis vs. Bobis
July 31, 2000
-Not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the criminal action.
-Respondent thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage only after
petitioner sued him for bigamy. The obvious intent therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to
the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his
criminal prosecution.
Beltran vs. People
334 SCRA 106
- The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid 2 conflicting decisions.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
-The accused’ s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
-In the case at bar it must be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage runs the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy or for concubinage.
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Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI) vs. Lichauco
496 SCRA 588 (July 27, 2006)
Then DOTC Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. confirmed, by letter, the government’ s assignment of Phil.
orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its Agila Satellites. PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the
launching, ownership, operation and management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans.
In connection with the loan, PASI President de Guzman later informed Landbank President and CEO Lapuz
about the assignment of the orbital slots and requested the bank’ s confirmation of its participation in a
club loan amounting to US$11 million, the proceeds of which would be applied to PASI’ s interim satellite.
Lapuz sent a copy of the letter to then Undersecretary Lichauco who denied the assignment of the 2
orbital slots to PASI but that PASI is only getting 144E orbital slot. Subsequently, Lichauco issued a Notice of
Offer for several orbital slots including 153E. Claiming that the offer was made without its knowledge and
that another company was awarded for orbital slot 153E, PASI filed a complaint for injunction, nullity and
damages against Lichauco and the “ unknown awardee” . A month later PASI filed a complaint against
Lichauco before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Upon evaluation by the said office it found the existence of a prejudicial question and recommended its
dismissal. The recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
Issues: 1. Whether there exists a PQ and, in the affirmative, 2. whether the dismissal of the complaint
on that account is proper.
Held: If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153E is, in the civil case, declared valid
for being within Lichauco’ s scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be
no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by
PASI. The finding by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus well taken.
As laid down in Yap vs. Paras, said rule directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not
dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or as in
this case, the investigating officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsman’ s dismissal of petitioner’ s complaint due to a prejudicial
question would only not run counter to the provision of Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would
sanction the extinguishments of criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis-àvis Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
OMICTIN vs. CA and LAGOS
512 SCRA 70 (January 22, 2007)
Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag, Phils., filed a complaint of estafa against Lagos
due to the latter’ s refusal, despite repeated demands, to return the 2 company vehicles entrusted to him
while he was still the president of the firm. Lagos moved for the suspension of the criminal proceedings due
to the existence of a prejudicial question in view of a pending case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filed by the latter against Omictin, Saag Pte. (S) Ltd., Ng, Yeo and Tan. The case before
the SEC stemmed from the appointments of Tan as President Ad Interim and Omictin as Operations
Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Incorporated. Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of Singapore. Lagos was appointed Area Sales Manager in the Philippines where he was
authorized to organize a local joint venture corporation known as Saag, Phils., with Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as the
majority stockholder and Lagos was appointed as one of the directors. Due to intra-corporate disputes, 2
of the directors resigned and divested their shares in Saag Corporation. Lagos resigned as president while
retaining his post as director. He later requested Executive Director Yeo to call for a board meeting
because in their joint venture agreement (JVA) between Saag Phils. and Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. it was agreed
that should the controlling interest in the latter company be acquired by any other person or entity without
his prior consent, he has the option to either require the other stockholders to purchase his shares or
terminate the JVA and dissolve Saag Phils., Inc. No meeting was made, instead Tan was appointed as
president ad interim and Omictin as operations manager ad interim.
SC: Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine the
guilt or innocence of Lagos in the crime of estafa. One of the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence
under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.
Logically, under the circumstances since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the
demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such
demand on the company’ s behalf. Lagos is challenging petitioner’ s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in
the corporate case. If the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no demand
was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE and LIBROJO
527 SCRA 125 (July 10, 2007)
Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Magestrado. It was alleged that Magestrado
executed an affidavit of loss before a notary public stating therein that he lost Owner’ s Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. N-173163 when in truth the said title was surrendered by Magestrado to Librojo as security for a
loan. Subsequently, Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial
question because he alleged that Civil Cases No. Q-98-34348 to 9, cases for cancellation of mortgage,
delivery of title and damages and recovery of a sum of money, must be resolved first before the criminal
case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised
in the criminal action.
SC: A perusal of the allegations in the civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a
loan was obtained by petitioner from Librojo and whether Magestrado executed a real estate mortgage
involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, the criminal case involves the
determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his
request for issuance of a new owner’ s duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other.
Regardless of the outcome of the 2 civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in
the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by Magestrado of the land or his execution of a real estate
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mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a
false affidavit of loss.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.), INC. vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (SSC)
560 SCRA 719 (July 31, 2008)
Dr. Climaco was the retainer physician of the company’ s Bacolod plant. Their contract explicitly
provided that no employer-employee relationship shall exist between the company and Climaco while
the contract is in effect. Meantime, upon inquiry from DOLE and the SSS, he was informed by both
agencies that he is an employee of the company. He then filed a complaint before the NLRC for
recognition as a regular employee of the company and demanded payment of 13th month pay, COLA,
and all other benefits. During the pendency of the complaint, Coca Cola terminated its retainer
agreement with Dr. Climaco, thus he filed another complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. While
the NLRC cases were pending, he filed before the SSC a petition that Coca Cola be ordered to report him
for compulsory coverage.
Coca Cola contended that the previous complaint for regularization and/or illegal dismissal, which
is now pending resolution before the SC, poses a prejudicial question to the subject of the present case.
SC: Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is no pending criminal case. The
consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as “ previously instituted action.” In Berbari v.
Concepcion, it was held that a prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the
criminal action, that which requires a decision with which said question is closely related.
Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed
by Dr. Climaco with the SSC involves the question whether or not he is an employee of Coca-Cola and
subject to compulsory coverage of the SSS. On the contrary, the cases filed by Climaco before the NLRC
involved different issues. In his 1st complaint, Climaco sought recognition as a regular employee of the
company and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, COLA, holiday pay, service incentive pay,
X’ mas bonus and all other benefits. The 2nd complaint was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for
reinstatement to his former position as company physician, without loss of seniority rights, with full payment
of back wages, other unpaid benefits, and for the payment of damages. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases
are not determinative of whether or not the SSC case should proceed. It is settled that the question
claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case before the court.
YAP vs. CABALES 588 SCRA 426 (June 5, 2009)
Yap purchased several parcels of land from Te. In consideration of the sale, he issued several
postdated checks to Te. Subsequently, Te had the checks rediscounted. While the 1st few checks were
good the remaining checks were dishonored for the reason that the “ account is closed” . Mirabueno and
Dimalanta, the persons who rediscounted the checks, filed separate cases for collection of sum of money.
Subsequently, on various dates, several informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against Yap. Yap
subsequently filed an action for the rescission of the sale and moved for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings on account of existence of a prejudicial question.
SC: The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
Even if Yap is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of BP Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.
LAND BANK of the PHILIPPINES v. RAMON P. JACINTO
G.R. No. 154622 August 3, 2010
First Women’ s Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from Land Bank in the aggregate
amount of P400 million. As security for the loan, Jacinto, FWCC president, issued in favor of Land Bank 9
postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn against FWCC’ s account at the PNB. Before the
checks matured, the parties restructured the credit agreement. Still FWCC defaulted so Land Bank
presented the post dated checks as they matured but were all dishonored. When sued for violation of BP
22 Jacinto contended that the issue whether the credit line agreement has been novated or not by
reason of the restructuring agreement is determinative whether or not he should be prosecuted for
violation of the Bouncing Check Law. If it be proven that the loan of FWCC had been novated and
restructured then his liability under the dishonored checks would be extinguished.
SC: It is well-settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely for an accommodation, is
covered by BP 22. Thus, it has held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Even if it be subsequently declared that novation had taken place between FWCC and Land Bank,
respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of BP 22 for the dishonored checks.
PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL 630 S 436 September 13, 2010
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel. 4
months later Joselito received summons for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case that sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage between the spouses by reason of Joselito’ s psychological incapacity. He then
filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question.
He asserted that since relationship is a key element in parricide, the outcome in the civil case would have
a bearing in the criminal case filed against him.
SC: The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted before the filing of the criminal action. In
the case at bar, the Information for Frustrated Homicide was raffled on October 25, 2994 while the civil
case was filed on November 5, 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
criminal case.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, it
distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide or murder. However, the issue in the annulment of
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marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case of annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
Joselito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed Maria Chrysantine as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of Joselito’ s
will. Even if their marriage is annulled, Joselito could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to Maria Chrysantine.
The Tenebro ruling (423 S 272) does not apply. There was no issue of prejudical question in that
case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “ there is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court
declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’ s penal laws are concerned.”
Art. 37-(96) definition of terms re: Juridical Capacity and Capacity to Act; Art.38-(85) restrictions on
capacity to act; Art. 39-(85) circumstances modifying or limiting capacity to act.
Art. 40 – 41 Civil Personality (81,86,91,99,03)
What determines personality (Art. 40) and its exception and the requisites in order that the
exception may apply (Art. 41).
Continental Steel vs CA G.R. No. 182836
Art. 43 – If there is a doubt as to who died first involving persons who are called to succeed each other;
the person alleging the death of one prior to the other has the burden of proof and in the absence of
proof it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to
the other. Applies only in cases of succession between two or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, all other cases apply presumption of survivorship under the Rules of Court. Ex. Between a
parent and a child. (98,99,00)
Ex. (2000 Bar) – Cristy and her late husband Luis had 2 children, Rose aged 10 and Patrick, 12 years
old. One summer, her mother-in-law, aged 70, took the 2 children with her on a boat trip to Cebu.
Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the 3 were never found. None of the survivors
ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her mother-in-law’ s estate, Cristy filed a claim for a
share of her estate on the ground that the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in
representation of their father, and she inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? Ans. No, her
action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the 3 are deemed to have died at
the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the
NCC. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies
only to those cases where the issue involved is not succession.
(1998 Bar) – Jaime, aged 65, and his son Willy, 25 years old and married to Wilma, died in a plane
crash. There is no proof as to who died 1st. Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife Julia, and his son,
Willy, as the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that ½ of the proceeds should belong to Willy’ s
estate? Ans. Yes, Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that ½ of the proceeds
should belong to Willy’ s estate, as the dispute does not involve succession. Under this presumption, the
person between the ages of 15 and 60 years is deemed to have survived one whose age was over 60 at
the time of their deaths. The estate of Willy endowed with juridical personality stands in place and stead of
Willy, as beneficiary.
ARTICLES 44 TO 47
44 – Who are juridical persons:
1. State and its political subdivision;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; and
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose.
45 – Law that governs these juridical persons:
a. 1 and 2 are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
b. Private corporations are governed by laws of general application.
c. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code.
46 – Rights and obligations of juridical persons:
1. Acquire and possess property of all kinds.
2. Bring criminal or civil actions.
3. Enter into obligations.
ARTICLES 50 – 51 DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
50 – Domicile of a natural person for the exercise of his civil rights and fulfillment of civil
obligations shall be the place of his habitual residence.
- DOMICILE – means permanent home and has 2 requisites:
1. The fact of residing or personal presence in a particular place.
2. The intention to remain in said place permanently (animus manendi).
Distinction between DOMICILE and RESIDENCE:
DOMICILE is a legal or juridical relation, which can exist without actually living in the place
while RESIDENCE is a material fact, that is, connoting the physical presence of a person in a place.
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RESIDENCE however, when used in election, suffrage and naturalization laws, means
“ DOMICILE” (political or legal residence) which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place, but also personal presence in the place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention
(Arevalo vs. Quilatan 116 S 700).
Thus, a man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another (Koh vs. CA 70 S
298).
51 – DOMICILE OF JURIDICAL PERSONS:
- are generally fixed in the law creating or recognizing them. If it is not fixed then the
domicile is the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their
principal functions.
FAMILY CODE
Executive Order No. 209 (August 3, 1988)
I.
MARRIAGE
Art. 1 – definition of marriage
Art. 2 – Essential Requisites:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
2. Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
legal capacity does not only mean the age but also the absence of legal impediments
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
-One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Art. 3 – Formal Requisites of Marriage (96)
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer;
mayors not authorize to solemnize marriage from aug3,1988 to dec31,1992
but authority was granted by LGC effective jan1,1992
2. A valid marriage license except a. marriages in articulo mortis;
b. parties residing in remote places;
c. Muslim marriages and marriages of members of other ethnic
cultural communities;
d. ratification of marital cohabitation.
3. A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of at least 2 witnesses of legal age.
- Hence, no marriages by proxy under our jurisdiction.
Cases:
1)
Sy vs. CA and Sy
330 SCRA 550
-Incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would
lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning. Date of issue
of marriage license is September 17, 1974. The date of the celebration of their marriage is
November 15, 1973.
2)
Republic vs. CA and Castro
236 SCRA 257
Facts: Husband personally attended to the processing of the documents relating to their
application for a marriage license. The marriage lasted only 4 months. It was discovered by the wife that
no marriage license was issued by the LCR of Pasig City who certified to that effect. In her petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the wife presented as evidence the certification issued by the LCR of
Pasig City. The SC held that:
-A certificate of “ due search and inability to find” unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion issued by the local civil registrar is sufficient proof that no marriage license is issued to the
contracting parties.
-“ Secret marriage” – a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties.
3)
Sevilla vs. Cardenas
497 SCRA 428 (July 31, 2006)
Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage
License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to
declare their marriage null and void ab initio.
Facts: Jaime Sevilla filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Carmelita Cardenas
on the ground that he never applied for a marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. That although marriage license no. 2770792
allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was
fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license. As proof, he presented 3 certifications that have,
more or less, the same contents as the first, issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Rizal that reads:
“ TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
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No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic)
to Marriage License Number 2990792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, MetroManila
March 11, 1994
(SGD) RAFAEL ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar”
SC: The certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document
does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
Note that the first 2 certifications bear the statement that “ hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.” It could easily be implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its “ loaded work.” Likewise, both certifications failed to
state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued. This implication is confirmed by the
testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, who stated that
they could not locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had
already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony
could not be secured. Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts
were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official functions by the LCR in issuing certifications is
effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that the absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. Semper praesumitor pro matrimonio – Always presume
marriage.
NOLLORA, JR. v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 191425 09/07/2011
Nollora first contracted marriage with Jesusa in 1999 then in 2001 he contracted another marriage with
Rowena whom he married twice- first in accordance with Catholic rites and the second, in accordance
with Muslim rites. Sued for bigamy, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10,
1992, even before he contracted he first marriage with Jesusa. As a convert, he is entitled to marry 4 wives
as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. He presented as proofs a Certificate of Conversion where it
stated that Nollora allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 and a duly approved Pledge
of Conversion dated January 10, 1992.
He was not aware why in his marriage contract with Jesusa it was indicated he was ‘ Catholic
Pentecostal’ when she was aware that he was already a Muslim convert at the time of their marriage.
While in his marriage contract with Rowena, the religion indicated was ‘ Catholic’ because he was
keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was ‘ single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage secret.
HELD: Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “ in case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim Law or this Code, the
Family Code or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code shall apply.” Nollora’ s religious affiliation
is not an issue. Neither is the claim that Nollora’ s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law.
Regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for bigamy.
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is “ single” . Both of
Nollora’ s marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one’ s religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential for marriage, such omissions are
sufficient proofs of Nollora’ s liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.
Art. 4 – Effect of Absence, Defect, or Irregularity (96,99)
Absence – renders the marriage void.
Defect – annullable.
Irregularity – valid but may subject person responsible for irregularity to criminal, civil and/or
administrative sanction.
In Morigo vs. People (422 SCRA376) where the parties merely signed the marriage contract without
the presence of the solemnizing officer and no actual marriage ceremony took place, the SC held that
the 1st element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. In the
case at bar, legally speaking Morigo was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no 1 st marriage to
speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the 2 were never
married “ from the beginning” . The contract of marriage is null, it bears no legal effect.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract on their own bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Morigo might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
NOTE: Both the 1st and 2nd marriage happened during the effectivity of the NCC. Hence, petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage for purpose of remarriage was not yet a requisite. Had the facts been
that the 2nd marriage was executed during the FC, then declaration of nullity of marriage would have
been required and the offending spouse could have been prosecuted for bigamy.
18
Bangayan vs bangayan G.R. No. 201061
Abbas vs Abbas G.R. No. 183896
Instances of irregularity that would not affect the validity of marriage as enunciated by the SC in the case
of Alcantara vs. Alcantara 531 SCRA 466 (August 28, 2007):
1. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties.
2. Issuance of a marriage license despite absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication.
REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There
was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit
for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Liability of Public Officers
Cosca vs. Palaypayon, Jr.
237 SCRA 249
-The judge in the case at bar solemnized the marriage without a marriage license, did not sign the
marriage contracts or certificates, no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they
were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local
Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract.
-As the solemnizing officer, he is responsible for the irregularity and under Article 4(3) of the Family
Code the judge shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
-In Aranes vs. Occiano (380 SCRA 402) the SC held citing Navarro vs. Domatoy 259 SCRA 129
where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’ s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him
to administrative liability.
Art. 5 – re. Age of parties to the marriage (1989, 2006); Article 7 (06)- those authorized to solemnize
marriages (enumeration is exclusive) 1. Incumbent members of the judiciary within the court’ s jurisdiction;
2. Priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious
sect and registered with the civil registrar general; 3. Only in marriages in articulo mortis (awareness of an
impending death) – ship captain or airplane chief whether crew members or passengers and military
commander of a unit in the absence of the chaplain during military operation whether the parties are
members of the military or civilians; 4. Consul-general, vice consul or consul - only between Filipinos
residing or sojourning abroad; and 5. Mayors by virtue of the Local Government Code effective January 1,
1992 (99); Article 8 – place where the ceremony shall be held (89); Article 10- authority of consul-general,
vice consul, or consul to solemnize marriages between Filipino citizens abroad but the contracting parties
are not exempt from the license requirement as Article 10 states that the issuance and duties of the LCR as
well as that of the solemnizing officer shall be performed by the said consular official (94); Art. 14-necessity
of parental consent if one or both contracting parties are between the ages of 18 & 21 no parental
consent – voidable (99).
DE LA ROSA, et. al. vs. HEIRS of MARCIANA RUSTIA vda. de DAMIAN
January 27, 2006
- Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado’ s cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as “ spouses.”
- Although the marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. The evidence need not
necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as
19
-
-
Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under
oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles
to the properties in the name of “ Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado” more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents that are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried (senorita) civil
status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact, married. This
is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves
out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Art. 21 – Requirement when either or both parties are foreigners
Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-Is failure to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the marriage? The Supreme Court held that legal capacity to contract marriage
is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21
of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of the respondent,
had he duly presented it in court.
-SC also ruled that compliance with Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code is not necessary;
Philippine personal laws no longer bound respondent Recio after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992.
CORPUS VS STO. TOMAS. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil
Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient
basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
FUJIKE VS MARINAY. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean
that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54
the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits,
the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."
20
Art. 26- Validity of marriages celebrated abroad subject to certain exceptions (89, 92, 96, 99,05,06)
GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE GARCIA-RECIO vs. RECIO
October 2, 2001
- In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “ validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.”
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS IYOY
470 SCRA 508 (September 21, 2005)
Crasus and Fely’ s marriage ended when the latter left for the United States in 1984. In 1985, Fely
divorced her husband and contracted a subsequent marriage with an American. In 1988, she obtained
American citizenship. She now claimed that her marriage to her American husband was legal because
now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.
Is the argument tenable?
SC: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married
couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. At the time she filed for divorce she was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
October 5, 2005
Issue: Given a valid marriage between 2 Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Facts: Cipriano and Lady Myros were married in 1981. They had 2 children. In 1986 Lady Myros left
for the United States, obtained American citizenship and in 2000 obtained a decree of divorce and
married one Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter, filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. The Republic thru the OSG contends that the cited provision is not
applicable to the instant case because it applies only to a valid mixed marriage; that is, between a Filipino
citizen and an alien.
Held: On its face, Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 Quita vs. Court of Appeals. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
par. 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the literal purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the spirit of the law.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of par. 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
Art. 31-Marriage in Articulo mortis – (95)
Art. 34 – Legal Ratification of marital cohabitation – (02)
Niñal vs. Badayog
328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000)
-The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of the
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no 3rd party was
involved at any time within the 5 years of continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire 5 years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
-The 5-year cohabitation should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
-Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party, that is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
- In the case at bar, the SC applied Article 76 of the Civil Code, the subsequent marriage having
been celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
21
MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
354 SCRA 1
-The Supreme Court enumerated the requisites that must concur in order that the provision on legal
ratification shall apply: L N F E S
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of the marriage (underscoring supplied);
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
-In the case at bench, the SC held that the absence of the legal impediment is only required at the
time of the celebration of the marriage no longer during the entire 5-year period of cohabitation.
De Castro vs. De Castro 545 SCRA 162 (February 13, 2008)
The parties applied for a marriage license but forgot about it. The license expired so parties
executed an Affidavit of Cohabitation in lieu of the license.
SC: Falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. The false affidavit has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT vs. JOSE A. DAYOT
550 SCRA 435 (March 28, 2008)
Jose and Felisa were married in November 1986 and in lieu of a marriage license, the parties
executed a sworn affidavit attesting, among others, that both of them being unmarried lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years. It turned out that the statement is a complete falsity for they started
living together barely 5 months before the celebration of their marriage.
Issue: Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum 5-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of
marriage license.
SC: For the exception in Article 76 of the Civil Code to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that a man
and a woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
- The Civil Code in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of 5 years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
-The minimum requisite of 5 years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but one that partakes of a mandatory
character.
- To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow circumvention
of the law.
- The falsity of the allegation in the sworn statement relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’ s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to the
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn statement is a lie, then it is merely a
scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL and TEOFILO CARLOS II
GR No. 179922, December 16, 2008
- The failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Felicidad and Teofilo, although irregular, is not as fatal
as Juan represents it to be. Felicidad’ s affirmation of the existence of said marriage
license, the Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, corroborated
her statement stating that “ the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not
placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled the
blanks in the marriage contract who in turn may have overlooked the same.”
BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be
void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the
month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err
in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab
initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the
trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did
notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring
22
that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and
void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28]
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued
in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither hehe nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of
the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
ABAS VS ABAS. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance
of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.
Article 36 – Psychological Incapacity- (93,97,02,06[2Qs])
- based on Canon 1095 of the Canon Law.
CASES:
1)
Santos vs. CA defines psychological incapacity
January 4, 1995
-What constitutes psychological incapacity- should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Art. 68 of the
Family Code include their mutual obligation to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support.
-Intendment of law has been to confine the meaning of “ psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
-Psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
-Did not meet standards required - the incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity- the party
would be incapable of carrying out the duties required in marriage, b) juridical antecedence – it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage, and c) incurability or if otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
2)
Ching Ming Tsoi vs. CA the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
January 16, 1997
23
-Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which
brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is —
a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
-In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
-An ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
3)
Republic v. CA and Molina Molina Guidelines
February 13, 1997
-No clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an “ incapacity” . It appears to be
more of a “ difficulty,” if not outright “ refusal” or “ neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations.
-SC laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. M A P E
-Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
-Made definite and clear as to what are the essential marital obligations of marriage (Articles 6871, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code).
4)
Marcos vs. Marcos
343 SCRA 755
- The personal or medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. The totality of evidence presented may
serve as basis of the determination of the merits of the petition.
- The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v CA: “ psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “ medically or clinically identified.” What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’ s
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
- Although this court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable. The behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was unemployed for 6 years.
- And because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner has not faithfully
observed them. She failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; and for her failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
5)
Hernandez vs. CA and Hernandez
December 8, 1999
-Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which made respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to respondent’ s youth and self-conscious
feeling of being handsome.
- Expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of spouse’ s
psychological incapacity, if only to show, that it existed at the time of the marriage.
6)
REPUBLIC vs. DAGDAG
351 SCRA 425
-May a spouse be declared psychologically incapacitated based on the following grounds?
1. would disappear for months;
2. if with his family, often drunk and in such a state forced the wife to have sexual
intercourse, in case of refusal beats the wife; and
24
3. had been unheard of since last disappearance although rumored to have escaped
from jail.
-In Republic vs. Molina, the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda
failed to comply with Guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
7.) PESCA vs. PESCA
356 SCRA 588
- In 1994 wife filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 because
of the alleged emotional immaturity and irresponsibility of her cruel and violent husband.
A habitual drinker who, when advised to stop, would beat, slap and kick her. Prior to the
filing of the case, petitioner was battered black and blue that led to the imprisonment of
respondent for 11 days.
- Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
- The phrase “ psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel
provision in the statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family
Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first
time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally given the
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of
marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not
overturned, Santos. At all events petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of her husband, let alone at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage.
- The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the of the family that the State cherishes and protects (Section 2, Article XV,
1987 Constitution).
8. BARCELONA vs. CA
the new Rules require the petition to allege physical manifestations
indicative of psychological incapacity.
412 SCRA 41
-Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Void Marriages (effective March 15, 2003). Procedural rules
apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules
providing that “ expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is also no need to allege
the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do
not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is no
need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. What the new Rules require
the petition to allege are physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.
(Facts: Petitioner merely alleged that his wife was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage which exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage and which
incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. In
her motion to dismiss, the wife argued that the petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and
Molina. Specifically the petition is defective because it failed to allege the root cause of her alleged
psychological incapacity. It is also devoid of any reference of the grave nature of her illness to bring about
her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage which were not even stated what those
marital obligations that she failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.)
DEDEL vs. CA
421 SCRA 461
Sharon is an immature wife and mother and had extramarital affairs with several men one of whom
she ran away with and had 2 children with him. She was also confined once in a hospital for treatment by
a clinical psychiatrist. During the trial, a doctor testified that Sharon was suffering from anti-social
personality disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions
and had no capacity for remorse. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of anti-social personality
disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Held: Sharon’ s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychologically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that Sharon’ s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage.
Respondent’ s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
TENEBRO vs. CA
423 SCRA 272
What is the effect of a judicial declaration of nullity of a 2 nd or subsequent marriage on the
individual’ s criminal liability for bigamy?
Veronico married Leticia on April 10, 1990. Sometime 1991 Veronico informed Leticia that he was
previously married to Hilda in 1986. He then left the former to live with the latter. When Veronico
25
contracted another marriage in 1993 with one Nilda, Leticia filed a complaint for bigamy. Convicted. On
appeal he argued that the declaration of nullity of the 2 nd marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date on which the 2nd marriage was celebrated.
Held: A declaration of nullity of the 2nd marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
absolutely of no moment insofar as the State’ s penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of Veronico’ s valid marriage to Hilda, Veronico’ s marriage
to Leticia would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of Leticia’ s psychological incapacity or
capacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this 2nd marriage is not per se an argument of the avoidance of the criminal liability for
bigamy. Although the judicial declaration of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects, Article 54 states that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’ s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with
the
promise
of
futurity
and
commitment.
JARILLO vs. PEOPLE 601 SCRA 236 (September 29, 2009).
Jarillo contracted marriages twice. Her defenses were 1.) her marriage with Alocillo was null and
void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to Loretta Tillman at the time of their marriage; and 2.) her
marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license. While the case
was pending appeal, Jarillo’ s marriage to Alocillo was declared void under Article 36. She now invoked
said declaration as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.
SC: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of Jarillo’ s marriage to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment Jarillo contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of nullity of Jarillo’ s
marriage to Uy make any difference. A plain reading of Article 149 of the Revised Penal Code, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
REPUBLIC vs. HAMANO
May 20, 2004
Are the norms laid down by the SC in Santos and Molina cases applicable to marriages where one
of the parties to the marriage and alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is a foreigner?
SC: We find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in
the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply
to any person regardless of nationality.
-The SC in this case reiterated the complete guidelines, as stated in the Molina case, in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and bar with emphasis on (2)
thereof i.e. “ The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
-In the case at bar, the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Although, as a rule, there was no need
for an actual medical examination, it would greatly helped respondent’ s case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through expert
witness. This Lolita did not do.
-As we held in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical illness.
LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES pathological lier is considered as a psychological
incapacity
G. R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Barely 4 years after the marriage, Antonio filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Ivonne
declared null and void under Article 36. As manifestations of the wife’ s alleged psychological incapacity,
Antonio claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. In support of his petition, he presented Drs.
Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted,
that they observed that respondent’ s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. They concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations. During the pendency of the case, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the catholic marriage of the parties that was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal with modification stating that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion. That respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. The
Roman Rota of the Vatican upheld the findings of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
SC: Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity “ is a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.” Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the
family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do
not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
26
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules.
We find the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First. Petitioner had sufficiently
overcome his burden by proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’ s behavior. He also presented 2 expert
witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. Second. The root cause of respondent’ s psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’ s decision. Dr. Lopez concluded that respondent “ is a
pathological liar that she continues to lie and loves to fabricate about herself. While these witnesses did
not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos vs. Marcos that personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. Third. Respondent’ s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at
the time of and even before the celebration of the marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters
from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Fourth. The gravity of respondent’ s
psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to
induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of the respondent to
distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’ s witnesses and the trial court were
emphatic on respondent’ s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths,
which according to them were revelatory of respondent’ s inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. Fifth.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity. It is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The CA clearly erred
when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. Evidently, the conclusion of psychological
incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Church rulings will hold
sway if they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’ s
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’ s version as correct, and the appellate
court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on the matter would have diminished
persuasive value. Seventh. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent’ s psychological incapacity has been established by petitioner. Any lingering
doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
NOTE: Compare the facts of ANTONIO and NAJERA cases and the decision rendered by the SC in each
case.
NAJERA vs. NAJERA 591 SCRA 542 (July 3, 2009) conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal
knowledge and evaluation of respondent
Digna prayed that her marriage with Eduardo be declared void by reason of the alleged
psychological incapacity of Eduardo to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In
support of her petition she presented Dr. Gates who testified that Eduardo is afflicted with Borderline
Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred selfimage and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo’ s psychological impairment
as traced to his parent’ s separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life,
antedates his marriage to Digna. Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and
marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent
and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave and irreversible.
Likewise, during the pendency of the petition, Digna also filed a petition for annulment of her
marriage before the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church based on
psychological incapacity under Canon 1095. And twelve (12) days before the decision of the appellate
court was issued, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal declared her marriage annulled stating that
“ the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract.” The trial court decreed only the legal
separation of the spouses, but not the annulment of their marriage. The CA affirmed the lower court’ s
decision.
SC: The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."[24] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.[25] In fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
27
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.[27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity
was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her
personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28]
Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged
personality disorder of respondent was incurable
REPUBLIC vs. CUISON-MELGAR
486 SCRA 177
-Reiterated the decisions rendered in Santos vs. CA – that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
-Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic vs. Molina the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36.
- In Marcos vs. Marcos, the Court later clarified that that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
- In this case, Norma failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, Eulogio
was suffering from a psychological defect that in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In fact, Norma
admitted that her marital woes started only after the birth of their 1st born and when
Eulogio lost his job. It was alleged that Eulogio is a habitual alcoholic, refuses to look for a
job after he was dismissed from work, every so often goes to her office, utters
unwholesome remarks against her and then drags her home because of his unbearable
jealousy and had abandoned the family.
- Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the
basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72, 220, 221 and 225.
- While an actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is not a condition sine
qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have
strengthened Norma’ s claim of Eulogio’ s alleged psychological incapacity. Norma’ s
omission to present one is fatal to her position, there can be no psychological incapacity
where there is absolutely no showing that the “ defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS
495 SCRA 396 (July 17, 2006)
- The term “ psychological incapacity” to be a ground for nullity of marriage under Art. 36
of the FC, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “ psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage (Santos vs.
CA). It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
- In the case at bar, their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent’ s
fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his socalled marital obligations.
- Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called “ schizoid” , and why he is the “ dependent and avoidant
type.” The doctor’ s statement lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Inputs about respondent’ s problematic history were all supplied
by petitioner herself, hence self-serving. Petitioner likewise failed to prove that
respondent’ s supposed psychological illness or mental malady existed even before the
marriage.
- Respondent’ s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “ leaving-the-house” attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time
with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
ZAMORA vs. CA 515 SCRA 19 (February 7, 2007)
28
-reiterated its ruling in Santos, Molina and Marcos.
-the case of Santos v. CA did not specifically mention that the presentation of expert opinion is a
vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Even in the
subsequent case of Republic v. CA (also known as the Molina case), examination of the person by a
physician in order for the former to be declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not
considered a requirement. What is important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos, is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’ s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
REPUBLIC vs. TANYAG-SAN JOSE 517 SCRA 123 (February 28, 2007)
-SC cited its ruling in Santos, Molina and Ferraris.
-Doctor Tayag’ s conclusion about Manolito’ s psychological incapacity was based on the
information supplied by Laila which she found to be “ factual” . Undoubtedly, the doctor’ s conclusion is
hearsay. It is “ unscientific and unreliable” .
Dr. Tayag’ s psychological report does not even show that the alleged anti-social disorder of
Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither did it explain
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor did it identify its root cause.
Manolito’ s alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user,
as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. His state or condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder
rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., vs. CYNTHIA NAVARRO
521 SCRA 121 (April 13, 2007)
Petitioner claims that the marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out of
the question because he would go insane if he were to go back to his wife. That she was not supportive of
his career, and marriage counseling did not work. He also alleged that if they quarreled, she refused to
have sex with him and would tell him to look for other women.
- SC reiterated decision in Santos vs. CA on characteristics of psychological incapacity, the
guidelines laid in Republic vs. CA (also known as the Molina case- Zamora vs. CA) and
elucidated that;
- 1. Spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’ s refusal to sleep with petitioner and be
supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity;
- 2. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “ difficulty” , “ refusal” , or “ neglect”
in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage; and
- 3. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage and respondents
scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their immaturity and immaturity does not
constitute psychological incapacity.
PARAS v. PARAS 529 SCRA 81 (August 2, 2007)
May factual findings in a disbarment case be considered conclusive in a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 where the husband was suspended from the practice of law because
of immorality and abandonment of his own family?
-Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is
that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in
the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
Accordingly, one’ s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’ s unfitness as a
husband or vice versa. The disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. In the disbarment case, “ the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.” On the other hand, in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity, the question for determination is
whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina. In
the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. What is important is “ the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’ s psychological condition.”
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual
infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support given to the children are
true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological
disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
There is no evidence that Justo’ s “ defects” were present at the inception of the marriage. His
“ defects” surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their 2 children died; he lost in
the election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and he felt the disdain of his wife and
family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of
their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’ s “ defects” are incurable or grave.
RENNE ENRIQUE BIER vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and REPUBLIC
547 SCRA 123 (February 27, 2008)
3 years after the marriage, petitioner found out that respondent is no longer the spouse he knew
and married. She became aloof towards him and began to spend more time with her friends than with
29
him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and
a chain-smoker. She also neglected her husband’ s needs and upkeep of the home, and became an
absentee wife.
SC: If a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity,
root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage
must always be proved.
-This must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
- Even if Molina was never meant to be a check list of the requirements in deciding cases
involving Article 36 of the Family Code, a showing of the gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability of the party’ s psychological incapacity and its existence at the inception
of the marriage cannot be dispensed with.
- Even if Marcos relaxed the rules such that the personal examination of the party alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated by a psychiatrist or a psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity. Failure in this regard will spell failure of
the petition.
HALILI vs. SANTOS-HALILI
551 SCRA 576 (April 16, 2008)
Petitioner alleged that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations
to respondent. That after the wedding they never lived together as they continued to live with their
respective parents although they maintained their relationship. The marriage was never consummated
and that they are constantly fighting.
SC: Although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity the same hardly constitutes sufficient
cause for declaring the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
Their not having lived together in one roof does not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one
of them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting
along with each other as they constantly fought over petty things. However, there was no showing of the
gravity and incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere
statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report which report dismally failed to prove
petitioner’ s alleged was grave enough and incurable to bring about his disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
SC reiterated its ruling in the Santos and Molina cases.
HALILI vs. SANTOS-HALILI 589 SCRA 25 (June 9, 2009)
The SC reversed its earlier denial of Lester Halili’ s petition citing the ruling it held in the case of Te vs.
Te (G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009).
Lester is suffering from dependent personality disorder by reason of petitioner’ s dysfunctional
family life.
He had a very abusive and domineering father. The mother was very unhappy and the children
never had an affirmation. Wife and children were practically robots so Lester grew up without selfconfidence, very immature and somehow not truly understanding what it meant it to be a husband, and
what it meant it to have a real family life. Hence, Lester’ s personality disorder was grave, incurable and
existing at the time of the marriage.
NILDA NAVALES vs. REYNALDO NAVALES
556 SCRA 272 (June 27, 2008)
-The totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated.
-The psychological report which concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally
immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has
complete denial of her actual role as a wife, etc., etc. is insufficient to establish Nilda’ s psychological
incapacity. It lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda’ s psychological incapacity; and
failed to demonstrate that there was a “ natal or supervening disabling factor” or an “ adverse integral
element” in Nilda’ s character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying
with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even before
the marriage.
- The standards used by the Court in assessing sufficiency of psychological reports may be
deemed very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.
REPUBLIC vs. LYNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO
556 SCRA 711 (June 30, 2008)
Lynette is married to Martini, a seaman, whom she alleged to be suffering from psychological
incapacity being a “ mama’ s boy” that will endanger the integrity of the marriage because instead of
establishing a permanent relationship with the wife the husband-defendant would remain dependent on
his family. The clinical psychologist concluded that Martini shows immature personality disorder,
dependency patterns, and self-centered motives
-The mere showing of “ irreconcilable differences” and “ conflicting personalities” does not
constitute psychological incapacity. Nor does the failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons.
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-It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of
meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness, which insensitivity
or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
-How the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her
deposition, that such personality disorders of Martini had been existing since Martini’ s adolescent years
has not been explained.
-While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychologically
incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be “ medically or clinically identified.” There
must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.
DIMAYUGA-LAURENA vs. CA 566 SCRA 154 (September 22, 2008)
Ma. Darlene and Jesse were married on December 19, 1983 and had 2 children. In 1993, Darlene
filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose. She alleged that the latter’ s psychological
incapacity was manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his family’ s needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity
and tendency to lead a bachelor’ s life. During the trial Darlene claimed that the root of Jose’ s
incapacity was his homosexuality (during their honeymoon, they were accompanied by a 15-year old
boy, and that he had feminine tendencies).
-SC reiterated Santos and Molina decisions. Santos on the 3 characteristics while Molina – on the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. In the case at bar, both the trial and
appellate courts found that petitioner failed to satisfy the guidelines in the Molina case. Sexual infidelity,
repeated physical violence, homosexuality, or moral pressure to compel one to change religious affiliation,
and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void.
In Marcos vs. Marcos, the court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence presented are enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is no need to resort to the actual medical examination
of the person concerned. While the examination by a physician of a person to declare him
psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified. Darlene failed to prove that respondent’ s psychological incapacity was
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In sum, the totality of the evidence failed to show
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs. ROWENA TE
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
Edward met Rowena in a gathering. 3 months after their 1st meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they eloped but he refused. She persisted and so they went to Cebu but Edward’ s P80,000.00 lasted
only a month. Unable to find jobs, they decided to return to Manila. Rowena went to live in her uncle’ s
house while Edward returned to his parents’ home. Edward however, was forced to live with Rowena and
her uncle because she kept on telephoning him, threatening that she would commit suicide if Edward
would not live with her. On April 23, 1996, they got married and continued to stay in her uncle’ s house
where Edward was treated like a prisoner, as he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle
showed him his guns and warned not to leave Rowena. When he was able to call home, a brother
suggested that they stay at their parents’ home and live with them. Rowena instead suggested that
Edward should get his inheritance so they can live on their own. When he relayed this to his father, the
latter got mad and told him that he would be disinherited and insisted that he must go home. Edward
escaped.
After knowing that Edward does not have any money, she stopped tormenting him and informed
him that they should live separate lives.
The clinical psychologist who examined Edward found both parties are psychologically
incapacitated. Edward’ s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and Rowena’ s that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. Yet despite said
findings, the CA reversed the earlier ruling of the lower court that granted the petition.
SC: The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which
the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
straitjacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court in applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. We are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina. And,
to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
Petitioner’ s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’ s, that of narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.
Hernandez v. CA emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party’ s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
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marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented as enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes
they are wrong, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people.
He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Respondent’ s affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations. Her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society. She is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
TING vs. VELEZ-TING 582 SCRA 694 (March 31, 2009)
Did the SC abandon the Molina Doctrine in view of its ruling in TE vs. TE?
Far from abandoning Molina, We (SC) simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements
set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages inasmuch as “ to require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist
or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice for
poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. The need for
the examination of the party or parties by a psychologist or psychiatrist and the presentation of psychiatric
experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.”
But if the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrist
tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’ s alleged psychological incapacity then, such
expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to
grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
MARIETTA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC GR. No. 180668 (May 26, 2009)
Marietta married Rodolfo 2 months after their 1st meeting. The marriage lasted only for 4 years and
subsequently Marietta filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. She alleged
that Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life
and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband. He never bothered to look for a job and
instead relied upon his mother for financial assistance including the payment of rentals of the room they
were occupying. He pretended that he found a job but when confronted as Marietta discovered that he
really did not actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from
his mother, he cried like a child and told the wife that he did it so she would stop nagging about applying
for a job. When they discussed about their sexual problem as theirs is an unsatisfactory sex once a month,
Rodolfo would always say that sex is sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. He did not even want
to have a child yet because he was not ready. The psychiatrist testified that Rodolfo was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept,
characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people.
SC: The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence
with a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self-confidence, independence, responsibility and
maturity. It existed prior to the marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital
stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his
life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe and grave in
degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustment.
His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the
mother’ s love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother, so that his
continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and
crippled him psychologically.
The SC also cited Santos, Marcos, and Te decisions. It further stated that, “ there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.”
SO vs. VALERA 588 SCRA 319 (June 5, 2009)
Renato So was a 17-year old high school student while Lorna Valera was a 21-year old college
student when they fell in love. They cohabited for about 19 years before they decided to get married. Five
years later, Renato filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for want of the essential and formal
requisites. He also claimed that Lorna is psychologically incapacitated as shown by her refusal and failure
to cohabit and make love with him, does not love or respect him. If he comes home late, Lorna would
refuse to let him in and in several instances he has to sleep in his car. She also refused to practice her
profession by selling her dental equipment that he bought and provided. Instead she joined him in his
electronics business and interfered in his decisions that would sometimes make him lose face before his
employees.
On nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites, Renato alleged that Lorna merely
asked him to sign a blank marriage application form and marriage contract and that no marriage
ceremony took place.
32
He presented Dr. Gates, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Lorna suffers from Compulsive
Behavior Patterns – evident in her marijuana habit, gambling and habitual squandering of Renato’ s
money. That her Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior Patterns already existed prior to her
marriage to Renato. That it is continuing and appears to be irreversible.
SC: The allegation on nullity due to absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage was
negated by the fact that during the trial Renato himself presented a certified true copy of the marriage
contract/certificate duly signed by the officiating officer.
On psychological incapacity, the SC held that “ Shorn of any reference to psychology, We
conclude that We have a case here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been
together for some time; and who are now tired or each other. to be tired and to give up on one’ s
situation and on one’ s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of
love be so labeled.
The statements made by Dr. Gates merely testify to Lorna’ s impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and
lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. Dr. Gates failed to prove that all these emanated
from a behavioral disorder so grave and serious that she would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondent’ s medical or psychological history
before the marriage; and that a cure was beyond the respondent’ s capacity to achieve.
RODOLFO ASPILLAGA vs. AURORA ASPILLAGA G.R. 170925 October 26, 2009
The marriage disintegrated when, after arrival from Japan, Aurora discovered that Rodolfo
cohabited with her cousin in their house and subsequently, left the family abode in favor of the
concubine. On the other hand, Rodolfo, in his petition, alleged that Aurora is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He complained that Aurora is a
spendthrift, domineering and frequently humiliated him. Psychiatrist Maaba explained that the spouses
harbor psychological handicaps that could be traced from unhealthy maturational development. Rodolfo
has an unhealthy familial relationship during the early maturational development specifically in the form of
a domineering and protective maternal lineage.
Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness, and emptiness hamper Aurora’ s objectivity. She also
projected signs of immaturity and has the desire to regress to a lower level of development.
SC: Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or
serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. While he was
able to establish the parties’ personality disorder; however, Maaba failed to link the parties psychological
disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as
husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their
marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under
Article 36 of the FC. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to
prove that each party’ s condition is so grave or is of such as to render said party incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is
incurable and permanent.
EDWARD LIM vs. MA. CHERYL LIM G.R. No. 176464 February 4, 2010
Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report stated that, “ clinical evidence showed that Mr. Edward Lim is
suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder while Cheryl is suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder,
associated with immaturity, that render both of them psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.”
The conclusion was based on what Villegas termed as “ psychodynamics of the case” where he
alleged that Edward did not build close attachments to his parents. His father was exceptionally
temperamental and moody, while the mother was extremely asocial, isolated, withdrawn and seclusive,
that repelled him from both of them.
Cheryl, on the other hand, was initially congenial, which lasted only for a short period of time. Later,
her immaturity interfered with her behavioral pattern and adjustment. Apparently, she could not
recognized realities in their family set-up and will insist on her fantasized wishes.
SC: It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Villegas with nary a link
drawn between the “ psychodynamics of the case” and the factors characterizing the psychological
incapacity.
Villegas’ global conclusion of both parties’ personality disorders were not supported by
psychological test properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests’ use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were
made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to
measure specific aspects of people’ s intelligence, thinking, or personality.
The SC also cited its rulings in the Santos (characteristics of psychological incapacity and its
definition) and Molina (guidelines) cases.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ G. R. No. 166579 February 18, 2010
Wife Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan. She alleged that
Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage. That it was
manifested by Jordan’ s uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his
pre-disposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.
According to psychiatrist Gates, Jordan was afflicted with “ Borderline Personality as manifested in his
impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.”
SC: Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
33
In this case, the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’ s psychological incapacity were based
exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanice’ s testimony
before the trial court.Gates only diagnosed Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of
her cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and evaluate Jordan. Her report and
testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the facts she was testifying on.
The SC also cited the following cases: 1. Santos vs. CA – on the 3 characteristics of psychological
incapacity;
3. Dimayuga-Laurena vs. CA;
4. Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris – on certain quirks and idiosyncrasies do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity;
5. Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio
Other issues:
Requirement of filing motion for recon on denial before appeal (Rule of Procedure on
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage).
SUAZO vs. SUAZO G. R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
Cases cited by the SC 1. Santos on characteristics;
2. RP vs. CA otherwise known as the Molina doctrine;
3. Marcos vs. Marcos – totality of evidence is sufficient to prove that respondent is suffering from
psychological incapacity;
4. Yu-Te vs. Te where the SC states that, “ Santos’ doctrinal value was sustained in Te, saying that
its interpretation is consistent with the Canon Law. But the Te doctrine did not abandon Molina;
far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements (Ting
vs. Velez-Ting).
- The SC denied the petition because the methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from psychological disorder. The psychologist meager information coming from a directly
interested party (petitioner).
LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2010
Wife had an extra marital affair with whom she subsequently lived with after telling the husband
that she had no more love for him. Thus, the husband came to believe that with the wife’ s irresponsible,
immature and immoral behavior, she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
SC: The psychologist failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause
of the psychological incapacity must be identified as psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained and established by the totality of evidence presented during the trial.
The acts of the respondent do not even rise to the level of the “ psychological incapacity” that the
law requires. Her act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’ s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
TORING v. TORING GR# 165321 August 3, 2010
- Santos ruling re. Characteristics.
- Molina guidelines.
- The law does not require that the alleged incapacitated spouse must be personally
examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the FC.
- Such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends, or even family doctors or lawyers.
REPUBLIC vs. GALANG 650 S 524 June 6, 2011
Nestor alleged that wife Juvy is a gambler, does not attend to her husband’ s needs, irresponsible,
would steal money from Nestor and used it for gambling, would make stories so that people would feel pity
on her and give her money.
- SC cited: Santos on the 3 characteristics of psychological incapacity.
- The Molina guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36.
- Marcos where the SC stated that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion
in a petition under Article 36 if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.
- The Rule on Declaration of absolute Nullity of Void Marriages provided that “ the
complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert
opinion need not be alleged.”
- The 2009 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te ruling placed some cloud in the continued applicability of the
time-tested Molina guidelines as the guidelines unintentionally became a straightjacket; it
forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it which is
contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on “ all fours” with another but in Ting v. Velez-Ting, the SC
held that far from abandoning Molina it merely suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. In Suazo, it states that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity.
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In the case at bar, the acts attributed to Juvy, do not per se rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
a person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriagehad to be shown. Thus, her acts only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of
responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations.
The psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively
from the information given her by Nestor. Evidence from independent sources who immediately
knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference
and could have added weight to the psychologist’ s report. The psychologist failed to trace the
history of Juvy’ s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
OBSERVATIONS: RE. DECISIONS OF THE SC INVOLVING CASES FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 36
The SC almost always would state:
-What constitutes “ psychological incapacity” and its 3 characteristics and the meaning of
each (Santos and Laurena cases);
-The intendment of the law as to the meaning of “ psychological incapacity” ;
-The essential marital obligations of marriage;
-The Molina guidelines although the requirement on medical or clinical examination of the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated may be dispensed with if the totality of
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity (Marcos vs. Marcos); and
-If there is no clinical or medical examination, the alleged psychological incapacity of the
spouse must be proven by independent evidence adduced by the party alleging said
disorder (Paz vs. Paz).
Art. 37 – Incestuous marriages – void from the very beginning.
Art. 38 – Marriages which are void by reason of public policy – (99)
Art. 39- Non-prescription of action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage (89)
Article 40 – Need for Judicial Declaration of a Void Marriage (91, 93)
1)
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 11
-For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
2)
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
-Husband alleged that the marriage being void ab initio, there is no need for declaring its nullity
and hence, the petition is superfluous and unnecessary and Article 40 is only for purposes of remarriage. Is
the husband correct?
-A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required as a cause of action or
a ground for defense.
-For purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
-Where a party desires to enter into another marriage, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
-A party may invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage
such as an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property as well as custody
and support of their common children.
-The court before which the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple’ s properties.
3)
Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr.
243 SCRA 32
-Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August
3,
1988
regardless
of
the
date
of
the
first
marriage.
-Article 256 on retroactivity applies as Article 40 is a rule of procedure.
4)
Beltran vs. People
334 SCRA 106
-Reiterated Domingo ruling.
-SC also held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
5)
Carino vs. Carino
February 2, 2001
- For purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise the second would also be void.
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RULES ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES (A.M. No. 02-11-02-SC): Effectivity –
March 15, 2003
1. Prescription – action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage does not
prescribe (Article 39, FC).
2. Only the husband or wife may file the petition before the Family Court.
3. A petition under Article 36 of the FC must specifically allege the complete facts including physical
manifestations, if any, showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
RULES ON ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGES:
1. Persons given the right to file action – Article 45, FC.
2. Prescriptive period – Article 47, FC.
PROVISIONS COMMON TO BOTH ACTIONS:
1. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court in the province or city where the petitioner or
respondent had been residing for at least 6 months prior to the date of filing, or if respondent is a
non-resident, where he may be found in the Philippines at the election of the petitioner.
2. The petition must be verified accompanied by a certification against forum shopping and
personally by the petitioner, not solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
3. No motion to dismiss is allowed except if ground is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
over the parties and, if respondent fails to file an answer within the required period, the latter shall
not be declared in default.
4. A pre-trial is mandatory and the respondent who failed to file an answer is likewise entitled to
notice of said pre-trial.
5. Dismissal of the action if petitioner fails to personally appear or through his counsel or his authorized
representative. If it were the answering respondent who failed to appear, the pre-trial shall proceed
but the public prosecutor is required to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
6. The presiding judge must personally conduct the trial, no delegation of reception of evidence is
allowed except to matters involving property relations. The grounds must be proved, no judgment
on the pleadings, summary judgment or confession of judgment is allowed.
7. Persons having no direct interest in the case may be excluded from the courtroom on any of the
following grounds, namely: 1) if the court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify
in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth; 2) would cause to the party
psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear or timidity;
3) would violate the right of a party to privacy or would be offensive to decency or public morals.
Furthermore, records of the proceedings are strictly confidential and no copy of the records may
be taken or examined, or perused except by a party or counsel of a party unless upon order of the
court.
8. If the court grants the petition, the decree of either annulment or nullity shall only be issued if the
parties comply with the requirements set forth in Articles 50 (liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes) and 51 (value of the presumptive legitimes and the form that shall constitute
it – cash, property or sound securities) of the Family Code as provided for in Article 52 thereof.
9. The prevailing party has the duty to register the decree both in the civil registry of the place where
the marriage was recorded and the civil registry of the place where the Family Court granting the
petition for annulment or nullity is located. The decree shall be the best evidence to prove the
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage that will also serve as notice to 3 rd persons
concerning the properties of the parties as well as the presumptive legitimes delivered to the
common children.
10. Effect of death- before entry of judgment – the case shall be closed and terminated without
prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings. If after entry- judgment shall be
binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, and TEOFILO CARLOS II
GR No. 179922, December 16, 2008
-The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. Both rules have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
-Only the aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. It cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.
-The Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although
the marriage is within the coverage of the Family Code. The new Rule which became effective on March
15, 2003 is prospective in its application.
Article 41 – Subsequent Marriage contracted based on absence of spouse- (92)
-Need for declaration of presumptive death of absentee.
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1.) Republic vs. Nolasco art 41 applies when the 2nd marriage happened during the
effectivity of the FC.
220 SCRA 20
-Four requisites that must be met for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41. These
are 1. the absentee spouse must have been absent for 4 consecutive years or 2 years if the
disappearance is accompanied by any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 391 of the Civil
Code; 2.the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is already dead; 3.
there is a judicial decree of presumptive death; and 4. for the purpose of remarriage.
-Spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leaves the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage.
NOTE:
IN NCC, ART 83.
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a)
HOWEVER, IN ART 41, FC... Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)
2.) Calisterio vs.Calisterio
April 16, 2000
-Subsequent marriage was solemnized on May 8, 1958 the law in force at that time was the Civil
Code (Article 83).
-A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence (7 consecutive years or if less, generally considered to be dead and
believed to be so) is met. In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
marriage may exceptionally be considered the following conditions must concur: (1) the prior
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for 4 consecutive years or 2 years where
there is danger of death under Article 391 of the NCC, (2) the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead, (3) there is a judicial declaration of presumptive
death and (4) for the purpose of remarriage.
3.) EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE
November 29, 2005
Is the spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage
still liable for bigamy despite the absentee spouse having been missing for 21 years?
Facts: Eduardo married Rubylus in 1975. She went missing also in the same year and was unheard
of since then. In 1996, he married Tina. When he left Tina in 2001, the latter became curious and made
inquiries with the NSO in Manila and learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Sued for bigamy,
Eduardo avers that when he married Tina in 1996, Rubylus had been “ absent” for 21 years since 1975. He
points out that, under the 1st paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code she was presumed dead as a
matter of law because if one has been absent for 7 years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for succession. Thus, the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of 2 requirements: the specified period and the
present spouse’ s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil
Code does it require that there must be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive
death would apply.
Held: It was the burden of petitioner to prove his defense that when he married Tina in 1996, he was
of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the RPC (Bigamy- The penalty
x x x x or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in a proper proceedings.), in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration
constitutes proof that petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married Tina and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy. The requirement of judicial
declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the “ State
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance.
REPUBLIC vs. CA and ALEGRO
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December 9, 2005
Alan filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) when barely
a month after the marriage, Lea left their conjugal abode. He then looked for her in his in-laws house, in
her friend’ s house where the brother-in-law of Lea’ s friend told him that his wife left for Manila. He also
inquired from his friends of Lea’ s whereabouts but to no avail. He also sought the help of Barangay
Captain Magat who promised to help him locate his wife. In 1995, he left for Manila and went to the house
of Lea’ s friend but despite repeated talks with her, he failed to find her. He also looked for Lea in the malls
but to no avail. In 1997, he decided to return to Catbalogan and again looked for his wife but failed. In
2001, he reported Lea’ s disappearance to the local police and also to NBI. Magat corroborated his
statements during the trial.
SC: The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is already dead, in Republic vs. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties
when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also a maxim
that “ men readily believe what they wish to be true.”
In this case, Alegro failed to present a witness other than Magat. He failed to present Janeth or
Nelson or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his
testimony. What is worrisome is that, Alegro failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law considering that
Lea’ s father was the owner of DYMS. He did report and seek the help of the local police and the NBI to
locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) and the SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (SSC) vs. TERESITA JARQUE vda. DE
BAILON
March 24, 2006
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead, Bailon contracted a
subsequent marriage with Teresita in Casiguran, Sorsogon. When Bailon died Teresita claimed the death
benefits from the SSS. It now appears that Alice is very much alive and that it was Bailon who abandoned
or deserted the spouse. Alice alleged that she lived with her parents at Barcelona, Sorsogon because she
found out that Bailon was having an extra marital affair but Bailon used to visit her there after their
separation. That she only recently knew of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead.
The SSS denied Teresita’ s claim contending that her subsequent marriage with Bailon is void as it was
contracted while Bailon’ s marriage with Alice was still subsisting and that there is no need to require Alice
to execute an affidavit of reappearance as there is no disappearance of Alice. In fact, the CFI order
declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her (ALICE) “ presence” being “ contrary
proof” against the validity of the order. Teresita, however, maintains that her marriage with Bailon was not
declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for
all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary. Went to the Social Security
Commission but the SSC upheld the denial of the SSS respecting Teresita’ s claim for death benefits.
SC: The 2 marriages having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code specifically Art. 83 which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. Under the said provision, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the 3 exceptional circumstances (7 continuous years absence or if less than 7
years, generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or disappeared
under any of the circumstances mentioned in Articles 390 or 391) falling under said Article. It bears noting
that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid “ until declared null and void by
a competent court.” It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when
Bailon sought the declaration of presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who
reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article
42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance
being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the
Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
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subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite
of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial
declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)
Santos vs Santos G.R. No. 187061
VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009
Sofio, married to Angelita, disappeared in 1972. He returned in 1975 and the spouses agreed to
separate and executed a document to that effect. That was the last time Angelita saw Sofio. After that
she did not hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or whether he was alive or not.
Believing that Sofio is already dead, Angelita contracted a subsequent marriage in 1985.
Subsequently, however, Virgilio’ s (Angelita’ s 2nd husband) application for naturalization filed with the
United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because Angelita’ s marriage to Sofio was
subsisting. She then filed a petition seeking for the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC denied the petition contending that by petitioner’ s own admission, she did not try to find
her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately.
SC: The marriages of Angelita to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985,
respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law[19] and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead starting
October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required.
Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not
yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not
change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-founded belief”
will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was
celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family
Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s
death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was
celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
Art. 43 – effects of termination of subsequent marriage upon reappearance of absentee spouse – (90)
Art. 44- Void- status of subsequent marriage falling under Article 41 if both parties acted in bad faith- (90)
Art. 45 -Voidable marriages; Art.46-what constitutes fraud under Art. 45 (3), & Art. 47-period within which to
institute action for annulment-(90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 02)
VILLANUEVA vs. CA
505 SCRA 565 (October 27, 2006)
Orlando and Lilia got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992,
Orlando filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress
forced him into marrying Lilia, that he never cohabited with her after the marriage. Lilia moved for the
dismissal of the complaint, arguing that Orlando freely and voluntarily married her.
SC: The letters admitted to be written by Orlando contained expressions of love and concern for his
wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul
a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of the marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it
arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of
parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify
his failure to cohabit with Lilia on any of those grounds, the validity of the marriage must be upheld.
MANUEL ALMELOR vs. RTC OF LAS PINAS CITY and LEONIDA ALMELOR
39
563 SCRA 447 (August 26, 2008)
Leonida filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Manuel based on Article
36. The court instead, annulled the marriage based on Article 45 (3) in relation to Article 46 (4) of the Family
Code. She alleged that she noticed Manuel to be peculiarly close to his male companions. That she
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller and that
she found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. Worse, she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips that she identified as Doctor Nogales.
SC: Even assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground
to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear- a marriage may be annulled when the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision
was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage
and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not
homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad
faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’ s sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. It took cognizance of Manuel’ s peculiarities and interpreted it against his
sexuality.
The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud.
Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment. It is only a ground for legal
separation.
Article 48 – Court orders the prosecuting attorney to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Par. (2)- no
judgment shall be based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA
424 SCRA 725
Spouses Rodolfo and Marietta separated-in-fact but had their conjugal partnership property
dissolved judicially. One of the properties adjudicated in her favor was a resort named Munting Paraiso
that is now used as residence of Marietta and the children. Rodolfo intending to remarry filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of the wife docketed as Sp.
Proc. NC-662. Although Rodolfo knew that Marietta is residing at Munting Paraiso he had the summons
served at another address. For failure to file an Answer Rodolfo had the respondent wife declared in
default and was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. After the grant of the petition, Rodolfo
contracted another marriage with Teresita on February 14, 1998. Marietta then filed a petition for the
annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite.
Held: The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection
to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith rendered judgment against Marietta without a
whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor
are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code which states that “ In all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.” They also ignored Rule 18, Section 6, 1985 Rules of Court now
Rule 9, Section 3 (e) of the 1997 Rules of Court that “ there is no default in actions for annulment of
marriage or legal separation.”
Art. 50, 51, 52 – delivery of presumptive legitimes of common children in cases of termination of marriage
& in Art. 52-necessity of recording in the appropriate civil registry and in the registry of property the decree
of annulment or nullity, dissolution, liquidation and partition of either the conjugal partnership or absolute
community property and the delivery of the children’ s legitimes- (89,91,92,93,99)
Noveras vs Noveras G.R. No. 188289
Art. 53- Effect re: non-compliance of the requirements under Art. 52-(89,90,93)
Subsequent marriage is void. Art. 54- children born of 1.an annullable marriage but prior to
annulment, and 2. void marriages under Arts. 36 and 53 are legitimate.
Art. 55- Legal Separation (94,97,02,06)
-In cases of legal separation, where violence (physical or sexual or psychological) is alleged by the
petitioner the mandatory 6-month cooling-off period under Article 58 shall not apply [Section 19, RA 9262
or VAWC Law].
ONG vs. ONG
505 SCRA 76 (Oct. 23, 2006)
SC: The argument that since Lucita abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not
be granted, following Article 56 (4) of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when
both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the FC is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than 1 year. As it was established that Lucita left William
due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
Art. 56 – grounds when petition for legal separation will be denied.
Art. 57- prescriptive period in instituting petition for legal separation (94)
- 5 years from the occurrence of the cause.
Arts. 61 – 64 – effects of legal separation.
SIOCHI v. GOZON 616 S 87 March 18, 2010
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Elvira obtained a decree of legal separation against her husband Alfredo. The dispositive portion
reads: “ x x x. Being the offending spouse, respondent Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and
the same is rewarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.”
ISSUE: Does the forfeiture refer to one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property?
Article 63 shall have the following effects:
(1) x x x x;
(2) The absolute community or conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community t conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with
the provisions of Article 43 (2);
(3) X x x x.
Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
(1) x x x.
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, x
x x x his or her share of the net profits community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of their common children or, x x x x x;
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the community property or
conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to
any share of the net profits of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’ s
share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102 (4) of the FC provides that
“ for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43 (2)
and 63, No. 2, the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the
time of its dissolution.” Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’ s share in the
conjugal partnership property but the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
Arts. 65 – 66 – reconciliation of spouses.
Art. 67 – revival of the property regime.
Art. 68 – Rights and Obligations between husband and wife.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
332 SCRA 169
-May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss?
- Facts: Erlinda and Potenciano were married for 30 years. In 1972, the spouse separated from bed
and board. When Potenciano arrived from the States in 1991 he stayed with Erlinda. The children
alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of antidepressant drug. On May 31, 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City with
Erlinda, but instead stayed with a daughter at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. The wife then filed
a petition for habeas corpus. Proper?
-No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriff or by any other
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’ s
free choice.
Article 73 – exercise by either spouse even without the consent of the other of any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity. Objection shall be based only on valid, serious, and moral grounds
otherwise the act of the husband in preventing the wife from engaging in such activity shall constitute a
violation of RA 9262 (VAWC Law).
-In case of disagreement the court shall decide whether objection is proper or not and if proper,
when did the benefit accrue – if prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against
the community or conjugal partnership property. If benefit accrued after, the obligation shall be charged
to the separate property of the spouse who did not obtain consent.
Art. 74, 75, 76, & 77-property regime of future spouses, requisites (92,95,05)
-Property relations between husband and wife is governed in the following order:
1. Marriage settlements which might either be the a. absolute community property or b.
conjugal partnership of gains or c. complete separation of property;
2. By the provisions of this Code; and
3. By local customs.
-Absence of marriage settlement or if regime agreed upon is void – system of absolute community
of property.
-The marriage settlement as well as any modification thereof must be in writing, signed by the
parties, and executed before the celebration of the marriage.
Art. 82- Donations by reason of marriage
Requisites:
1. made before the celebration of the marriage;
2. in consideration of the same; and
3. in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
Art. 83 – Formalities to be observed involving donations propter nuptias are the formalities on the ordinary
rules of donation unlike that of the Civil Code where donations propter nuptias are governed by the Statue
41
of Frauds (Article 1403 (2), ©-an agreement made in consideration of marriage other than a mutual
promise to marry as enunciated by the SC in Locquiao vs. Valencia).
NOTE: If what has been donated is a real property, the donation must be in a public instrument and the
acceptance must be in a public instrument. If the property donated is a personal property the value of
which is greater than Php. 5, 000.00 then the donation must be in writing, the acceptance must be in
writing too.
Art. 84- Limitation in cases of donation of present property (91)
-if the spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community property, they cannot
donate to each other in their marriage settlement more than 1/5 of their present property. The excess is
void. The law on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills will govern donations involving future
property.
Art. 86- grounds for revocation of donations propter nuptias (96)
Art. 87 – Donation between husband and wife
ARCABA vs. TABANCURA, et al.
November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco and his late wife were owners of a parcel of land. As he was alone, he invited his
niece, a cousin of the niece, and Arcaba to stay with him at his house. Later on, the niece and the cousin
of the niece left Francisco’ s home leaving only Francisco and Arcaba. Before his death Francisco
donated a 150-sq. meter lot to Arcaba. The heirs of Francisco are now questioning the legality of the
donation. Arcaba contended that the property donated is payment for her past services rendered to the
deceased. She further contends that sexual intercourse is no longer possible considering that Francisco is
already old.
SC: -Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public
assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and
wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such.
-Their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient but
that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Thus, the donation made by Francisco in favor
of Cirila is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Art. 92 – what are excluded from the community property (89)
Art. 116 – Conjugal partnership property
Article 121 (2) – Charges upon and obligation of the conjugal partnership (00,06)
1. Ayala Investments vs. CA
286 SCRA 272
-The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself.
-Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and probably increase in the value of stocks
might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation
agreement was entered into are not only incidental but also speculative and too small to qualify
the transaction as one “ for the benefit” of the surety’ s family.
-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits from PBM (the debtor corporation), only
because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits are not the
‘ benefits’ contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code.
The ‘ benefits’
contemplated by the exception in Art. 122 (Family Code) are those benefits derived directly from
the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by
PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family.
2. CARLOS vs. ABELARDO
380 SCRA 361
-May the husband notwithstanding his alleged lack of consent in obtaining a loan be held solidarily
liable for such together with the wife?
- While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed
by the wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was
used to purchase the house and lot that became the conjugal home of respondent and
his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under
Article 121 of the Family Code, shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
3. CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
423 SCRA 357
Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million
peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching together
with 2 other persons executed a continuing guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos.
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges
amounted to P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied
the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp. stocks registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of
Mr. Ching then moved to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of stocks were
acquired by her and her husband during the marriage out of conjugal funds after the CityCorp Investment
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Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?
Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of
CityCorp Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that the husband, not the
conjugal partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the burden of ABC to prove that the source of the
money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to
adduce evidence to prove this assertion. In AIDC vs. CA, this Court ruled that the “ signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often
an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to
mean that he thereby embarked in the business of guaranty or suretyship.”
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No presumption can be inferred
that when a husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited.
It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of
the top 20 stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could
be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that Alfredo’ s career would be enhanced should PBMCI
survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by
Article 161 of the Civil Code (Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.
They cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).
Article 124 – Administration of the conjugal partnership property (00)
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
453 SCRA 283
Spouses Dailo purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City and had it titled in the
name of the husband alone. In 1993, the husband obtained a P300,000-peso loan from
Homeowners secured by the house and lot. With the loan unpaid, the bank foreclosed the security.
For failure to redeem, Homeowners consolidated ownership over the property. In 1995, the
husband died and the wife found out about the mortgage, foreclosure and consolidation.
Claiming absence of knowledge of the loan obligation, the wife filed an action to annul the
mortgage, certificate of sale, etc. Homeowners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the property is the exclusive property of the husband having been titled in the
husband’ s name alone. That assuming that the property is conjugal, Article 124 of the FC should
be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership where the co-owner may
alienate, assign or mortgage and even substitute another person in its enjoyment but the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership. Moreover, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family as the proceeds thereof were used to fund the husband’ s subdivision projects.
Held: In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent
of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that
the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle squarely
applies to the instant case. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of conjugal
partnership of gains governed the property relations between the spouses. The rules on coownership do not even apply to the property relations of Marcelino and Miguela even in a
suppletory manner. The conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses their efforts or by chance. Unlike
the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in
the absence of court authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance. Where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership lies with the creditor claiming as such. Petitioner’ s sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to
the benefit of his family is without adequate proof. Other than petitioner’ s bare allegation, there is
nothing from the records to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan redounded to the benefit of
the family.
GUIANG vs. CA
291 SCRA 372
-Court applied Art. 124 of the Family Code.
-Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by
the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Such contract is void as one of the essential elements of a contract is absent.
- Neither can the “ amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was accepted
and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of events is clear:
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after the sale, Guiang filed a complaint for trespassing against Corpuz, after which the barangay
authorities secured an “ amicable settlement” . The settlement however, does not mention a
continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to
the effect that Corpuz would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court
interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
HEIRS of AYUSTE vs. CA and MALABONGA
313 SCRA 493
-As the alienation was made prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the Court applied Art. 173
of the Civil Code.
-Contract is voidable but spouse must bring the action for annulment within 10 years from
execution of the contract and during the subsistence of the marriage.
- A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of
his wife is voidable[14] The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within
ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife.[15] Where the law speaks in clear and
categorical languange, there is no room for interpretation – there is room only for application.[16]
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on
October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint
with the lower court asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten
years from the questioned transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage
which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989.[17] Clearly, the action for annulment
filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time.
NOTE: During NCC, sale or encumbrance of conjugal property without consent of other spouse
renders the sale voidable which can be annulled by the other spouse lacking consent within
10years from date of execution and during the existence of marriage. But in FC, the transaction is
void and the action to nullify the sale is not subject to prescription.
MANALO vs. CAMAISA
374 SCRA 361
-Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a conjugal property without the wife’ s written
consent?
Facts: Manalo was interested to buy the Taytay and Makati properties of spouses Camaisa. During
the negotiations for the sale of the parcels of land both spouses were present and that Manalo and Mr.
Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and the terms of the payment, and a down payment
was made but the wife of the vendor refused to sign the contracts to sell. Having been aware of the
transactions Manalo argues that Norma Camaisa had consented to the transaction. And if she unjustly
refused to affix her signature to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family
Code is warranted.
Held: The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases require the written consent of the wife; otherwise, the disposition is void. The properties,
subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
husband and wife must concur. Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
conjugal properties but being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. While Manalo is correct insofar
as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the
matter may be brought to court which will give the same if warranted by the circumstances. However, it
should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who
does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case Manalo failed to allege and prove that Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife’ s
incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
HEIRS OF REYES vs. MIJARES
410 SCRA 97
If the sale of the conjugal real property is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with
respect to the share of the spouse who did not give consent?
-The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790) held that the plain meaning attached to the plain
language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife’ s
consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the
contract shall “ prejudice” the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. To be
underscored here is that upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal
partnership is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as
those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161
have been covered, if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, “ should have no exclusive
property or if it be insufficient.” These are the considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of
the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the
conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is
decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the
contract under Article 166.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community) property concluded after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition as void if done without the conjoint consent of the spouses or, in case of a spouse’ s inability,
the authority of the court (footnote).
PELAYO vs. PEREZ
459 SCRA 475
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In January 1988, Pelayo, by a deed of absolute sale, conveyed to Perez 2 parcels of land situated
in Panabo. Lorenza, Pelayo’ s wife, signed only on the 3rd page in the space provided for witnesses on
account of which Perez’ application for registration of the deed with the office of the Register of Deeds in
Tagum was denied. Perez thereupon asked Lorenza to sign the 1 st and 2nd pages of the deed but she
refused, hence, he instituted an action for specific performance.
SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the
space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or
implied. A wife’ s consent to the husband’ s disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be
explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is given. In the present case, although it
appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness,
circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of
the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in
effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it
has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought
by the wife whose consent was not obtained.
DOLORES ANNO vs. ALBERT ANNO and SUANDING
January 27, 2006
Wife Dolores instituted an action for cancellation of waiver of rights, deed of sale against her
husband Albert and Suanding, Albert’ s cousin. It appears that Albert executed an affidavit of waiver of
rights over a portion of a parcel of land in favor of Suanding and later sold the remaining portion through a
deed of sale to Suanding. In both documents, Albert claimed that he is the possessor and owner of said
land. According to Dolores, the unregistered, virgin, agricultural land is a conjugal partnership property
having been acquired by them during the marriage as evidenced by a 1974 tax declaration. They even
hired the services of a caretaker to oversee the land. Thus, Albert could not have validly conveyed the
property to Suanding without her consent.
SC: Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party invoking it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
In the case at bar, Dolores failed to substantiate by preponderance of evidence her claim that the
subject land was conjugal in nature. She did not identify when she and her husband 1 st occupied and
possessed the land. Neither did she present any witness to prove that they 1st occupied the property
during the marriage and that they worked on the land. While she claimed that they also hired the services
of a caretaker, records show that the caretaker was appointed only in 1989. The initial tax declaration she
presented although dated 1974 cannot automatically be deduced that the occupation of the subject
property was likewise done in 1974. To so conclude will amount to speculation and conjecture on the part
of the court. Declaration of a land for tax purposes cannot be equated with its acquisition for, in the
ordinary course of things, occupation of a piece of land comes before declaring it for tax purposes. The
1974 tax declaration cannot be made a basis to prove its conjugal nature as the land was declared for
tax purposes solely in the name of Albert, who sold it as his exclusive property. In a long line of cases, this
Court held that tax declarations, especially untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and
are good indicia of possession of an owner. Thus, the presumption of conjugal nature of the property
allegedly acquired during the subsistence of the marriage cannot be applied.
FRANCISCO vs. GONZALES
565 SCRA 638 (September 17, 2008)
Estranged couple Cleodualdo and Michele, whose marriage was later on voided, entered into a
compromise agreement involving their property covered by TCT No. T-167907 and located at 410 Taal St.,
Ayala Alabang Village where they agreed that said conjugal property shall be transferred by way of a
deed of donation in favor of their 2 minor children when they reach they reach 19 and 18, respectively.
Meanwhile, Michele and George Matrai were ordered by the court to vacate the premises leased to them
and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bills and attorney’ s fees. A notice of sale by execution was
then issued by the sheriff covering the property in 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang that was still under the name
of Cleodualdo and Michele.
SC: It should be noted that the judgment debt for which the subject property was being made to
answer was incurred by Michele and her partner, Matrai. Gonzales alleged that the lease of the property
in Lanka Drive redounded to the benefit of the family. By no stretch of one’ s imagination can it be
concluded that the said debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or that
some advantage accrued to the welfare to the family.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support
of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband’ s failure to deliver the
needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by
the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of these
circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife’ s personal
obligation.
BUADO vs. CA and NICOL 586 SCRA 397 (April 24, 2009)
Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also adjudged to pay the sum of P35,000.00
representing moral and exemplary damages, attorney’ s fees and cost. Erlinda’ s property however, was
insufficient to answer for the liability so the sheriff levied the conjugal property of the Nicol spouses. The
husband questioned the levy and the subsequent sale claiming that he is a stranger to the suit and hence,
levy upon the conjugal property was improper.
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SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be
deemed a “ stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must further be settled whether the obligation of
the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
Unlike in the system of absolute community property where liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising
from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
RAVINA v. VILLA ABRILLE 604 S 120 (October 16, 2009)
In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a 555-square meter lot adjacent to the land that
was acquired by Pedro while still single. They then introduced improvements on the property. In 1991,
Pedro offered to sell the house and the 2 lots to Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified Ravina of her
objections but Pedro, nonetheless, sold the house and 2 lots without Mary Ann’ s consent.
SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was conjugal in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively
owned by Pedro.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the FC is void if done
a.) without the written consent of both the husband and the wife, or b.) in case of one spouse’ s inability –
the authority of the court.
If the sale is with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date of the
contract implementing the decision to institute the case.
HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ, SR. v. MINGOA, SR. 608 S 394 12/18/2009
Hernandez married to Sergia, was awarded a piece of real property by PHHC by way of salary
deduction. After full payment, TCT No. 107534 was issued to the spouses. It bears a restriction of any
unauthorized sale to 3rd persons within a certain period. The heirs learned, after Hernandez’ s death in 1983
that TCT No. 107534 was cancelled in 1982 and in lieu thereof TCT No. 290121 was issued in favor of
respondents. Apparently, Hernandez was unable to fully pay the purchase price so to prevent forfeiture of
his right to purchase, Hernandez sold his rights to Camisura in 1963. To circumvent the prohibition, the
spouses Hernandez executed an irrevocable special power of attorney to enable Dolores to sell the lot to
Plaridel Mingoa without the need of requiring Hernandez to sign a deed of conveyance. Plaridel then sold
the property to his daughter Melanie, then 20 years old. It was alleged that Sergia’ s signature on the SPA
was falsified. The forgery is so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary
person. Petitioners now contend that the SPA and the deed of sale are fictitious, hence null and void
under Article 1409 of the NCC. The declaration of the non-existence of a contract under Article 1410 does
nor prescribe.
SC: Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable. The subject matter involves conjugal property. The
events occurred before the effectivity of the FC. Article 173 of the NCC governs these transactions and it
states: “ The wife, may during the marriage, and within 10 years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest
in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.”
The failure of Sergia to file an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within
10 years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject property to 3rd
persons.
FUENTES v. ROCA 618 S 702 04/21/2010
Tarciano married but separated-in-fact sold a parcel of land to the Fuentes spouses by way of an
agreement to sell. The vendees gave a down payment with the balance to be paid as soon as Tarciano
clears the lot of structures an occupants and secure the consent of the estranged spouse Rosario to the
sale. Allegedly, Atty. Plagata worked on the requirements including Rosario’ s consent to the sale. He
alleged that Rosario signed the affidavit of consent in Manila but notarized it in Zamboanga City. Tarciano
then executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.
When Tarciano and Rosari died in 1990, their children, in 1997, filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the land claiming that the sale was void since Rosario did not give consent to the
sale. Her signature on the affidavit was forged.
SC: Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958, it would have been
quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her
consent to the ale or demand a stiff price for it.
The affidavit of consent has a defective notarization that strip the document of its public character
and reduce it to a private instrument, a falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the
signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’ s consent to the sale of the land.
While Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, the property was sold on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 124 of the FC provides that without the other
spouse’ s consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
Under the provisions of the NCC governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force
and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of the law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’ s written
consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be
validated either by ratification or prescription.
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Ultimately, the Roca’ s ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their
mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law
gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’ s sale of conjugal land. But Rosario died in
1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is lost forever?
No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of
Tarciano and Rosario despite the sale. When the 2 died, they passed on the ownership of the property to
their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the NCC, to
exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
REIMBURSEMENT RE: CONJUGAL FUNDS:
JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPS. MANUEL & VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL & FLORA FERRER
508 SCRA 570 (November 29, 2006)
Before his marriage to Josefa, Alfredo acquired a parcel of land. Improvements introduced by
Alfredo on the property consisting of a residential house and a 2-door apartment building were made
during the marriage using their conjugal funds to pay off the loan obtained by Alfredo for the construction
of said improvements. Subsequently, a warehouse was also constructed on the lot using the spouses’
conjugal funds. Sometime in 1989, when Alfredo was already bedridden, spouses Ismael and Flora Ferrer
made the former sign a document purported to be his last will and testament. It turned out however, that
it was a sale covering Alfredo’ s lot and the improvements thereon to the herein respondents. Alfredo then
instituted an action for the annulment of the sale but the trial court held that the sale is valid and should
be complied with by the parties in good faith. The appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court.
Alfredo died in 1999 and relying on the decision rendered in the previous case where the court held that
inasmuch as the lot is of greater value than the improvements and since Article 120 of the Family Code
provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the principal, then the subject
lot with all its improvements became an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at the time of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, Josefa is now demanding reimbursement for the cost of the improvements from
respondents.
SC: What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite allegations contained in the complaint
that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner’ s spouse nor can they ever be
deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is
the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who
expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the
obligation to respect petitioner’ s right to be reimbursed.
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
Article 134- In the absence of express declaration in the marriage settlements, no separation of
property shall take place during the marriage except upon judicial order. The separation of property may
either be for sufficient cause (Article 135) or voluntary (Article 136).
Article 135 – For causes falling under numbers (1), (2), and (3) i.e.1. sentenced to a penalty that
carries with it civil interdiction, 2. judicially declared an absentee art 390, NCC, and 3. loss parental
authority decreed by the court, the presentation of final judgment is enough basis for the grant of the
decree of judicial separation of property.
Article 136 – Voluntary dissolution must be verified and jointly filed by the spouses.
Articles 137, 138, and 139 – liquidation of either the absolute community or conjugal partnership
upon grant of petition, effect – the property relations of the spouses is now governed by the regime of
complete separation of property and the requirement of registering the petition for separation of property
and the final judgment granting the same with the appropriate registries.
Article 141- revival of the former property regime that existed prior to its separation upon proper
motion. Thereafter no voluntary separation of property shall again be granted by the court.
ELENA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER
August 29, 2006
Elena and Helmut, a German national, were married in 1989 in Hamburg, Germany. They initially
lived in Hamburg but in 1992, the spouses decided to move and permanently reside in the Philippines.
Helmut sold the house he inherited from his parents in Germany. With the money, he bought a P528,000.00
lot in Antipolo and constructed a P2.3 million peso house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in
Elena’ s name. The marriage however, did not last due to Helmut’ s alleged womanizing, drinking and
maltreatment and eventually the spouses separated. In 1994, Helmut filed a petition for separation of
properties. He claims that he is not praying for the transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property as he is
aware of the constitutional prohibition of aliens acquiring lands of the public domain but merely
reimbursement. That the property is titled in the name of Elena because of said prohibition. That the funds
paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to Elena; that funds were given to
her in trust and equity demands that he should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo
property?
SC: Aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. It has been held that equity as a
rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands.
47
Further, the distinctions between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondent’ s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property that he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is, likewise proscribed by law.
The CA erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view
of Helmut’ s marriage to Elena. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
Helmut’ s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of fraud. To hold otherwise would be
to allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
The Court decreed the separation of property between the spouses and ordering partition of the
personal properties located in the Philippines only.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
524 SCRA 166 (June 8, 2007)
Virgilio and Dita’ s marriage that was blessed with one son turned sour when the former discovered
that the latter was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which resulted to the conviction of Dita
and her paramour of the crime of adultery. Thereafter, Virgilio filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the pre-trial of said case,
they entered into a Compromise Agreement as partial settlement of their conjugal partnership property.
This was given judicial imprimatur by the judge hearing the case. In an omnibus motion however, Virgilio
prays for the repudiation of the compromise agreement on the ground that it is against law and public
policy; that the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance and
participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that
respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal
property.
SC: Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise agreement that was judicially
approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if
the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure
of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the compromise agreement. There is no
exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State Prosecutor because nothing in the
subject compromise touched into the very merit of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the
court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties. The agreement pertains merely to an
agreement between petitioner and respondent Dita to separate their conjugal properties partially without
prejudice to the outcome of the pending case.
The conviction of adultery does not carry with it the penalty of civil interdiction that deprives the
person of the rights to manage to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
Buemer vs Amores G.R. No. 195670
Lavadia vs Luna G.R. No. 171914
Art. 147 – Property of Unions without Marriage (92,97) art 35 par 2,3,5,6 art 36, art 40
Valdes vs. RTC B. 102, Q.C., Gomez-Valdes
July 31, 1996
-Marriage was declared void under Art. 36.
-Property acquired during the union is governed by Art. 147. It applies when a man and a woman
so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage.
-The term “ capacitated” (1st par. of Art. 147) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e. any “ male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards not under any of the
impediment mentioned in Art. 37 and 38 of the Code” .
-If the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions.
-Art. 50 (Family Code) applying pars. (2), (3), (4) and 5 of Art. 43, relates only, by its explicit terms to
voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Art. 40 of the Code i.e. the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA
March 31, 2005
Noel and Isabel got married in 1979. The marriage later on was declared void by reason of Noel’ s
psychological incapacity. The court, among others, ordered for the liquidation of the assets of the
conjugal partnership where the wife was given ½ of Noel’ s retirement benefits with 12% int. from date of
decision, and ½ of his outstanding shares of stocks with Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies. Noel opposed the sharing claiming that the retirement benefits he received from Far East
Bank are gratuitous in nature and therefore, his exclusive property. He likewise acquired the shares of
stocks with the mentioned companies before his marriage and are, again his exclusive properties.
SC: Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that
she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child
as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership
48
properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said defendant
husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to
one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park
and the Provident Group of Companies.[22]
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Family Code, providing dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rules applies,
which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of co-ownership. The trial court did not commit a reversible
ruling that petitioner and respondent own the “ family home” and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of
the co-ownership that exists between common law spouses.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’ s separate property are not
included in the co-ownership. Since the properties to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both
by the trial and appellate courts, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would
be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in the distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
owned by the parties herein ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis
of co-ownership and not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN
July 31, 2006
In 1986, Juliet and John decided to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. During the cohabitation, they purchased a 2-storey house where the tax declaration was
transferred in the name of Juliet. The house was renovated as annexed to it is a new structure that housed
a sari-sari store. In 1991, Juliet went to Korea and while there she would send money to John who would
deposit it in their joint bank account. When she returned from Korea, they continued to live together, with
John working as an employee of Lepanto Mines and Juliet managing the store. In 1995, they partitioned
their properties and executed a Memorandum of Agreement that was unsigned by the parties but signed
by their witnesses where it was agreed that John shall leave the house with Juliet paying him the amount
of P428,870.00 representing John’ s share in the properties. Juliet made a down payment of P232,397.66
with the balance to be paid in 12 monthly installments. She failed however, to make good the balance so
John demanded that she vacate the annex. When she refused John filed an ejectment suit against Juliet
claiming that he alone spent for the construction of the annex using his own funds with the tax declaration
for the structure under his name and thru money he borrowed from his relatives as proofs. The proof of
indebtedness is a 1990 affidavit of one Macaraeg who stated that John borrowed P30,000.00 from him.
The MTC found for John which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The CA however, reversed the ruling of
lower courts holding that “ their property relations cannot be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
but by the rules on co-ownership” . John went to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of John.
SC: Other than John’ s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed
form his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John failed to reveal how much he spent therefore. Neither did he divulge the names of
the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed
from them. All he could offer by way of reinforcing his claim is the affidavit of Macaraeg but the affidavit
stated that it was in 1990 when John borrowed P30,000.00 from him. The annex structure was constructed
in 1992 or 2 years after he borrowed the P30,000 from Macaraeg. There is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support John’ s self-serving allegation that the annex structure was put up
thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best
an indicia of claims of ownership.
In this connection Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. (Cite Article 147 in toto).
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by
common-law spouses during the period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint
efforts, work or industry and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by
the rules in co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “ in equal
shares.” Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly stated by the CA, may
not be ejected therefrom.
True, under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a
co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. In this
case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John’ s or Juliet’ s exclusive ownership of the property in
question. As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject structure by virtue of being a coowner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.
Juliet’ s failure however, to pay the balance of John’ s share in their common properties could at
best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and
not for ejectment.
METROBANK v. PASCUAL 547 S 246 02/29/2009
The marriage was declared void under Article 36. In said decision, the court ordered the
partition/dissolution of the conjugal partnership. No liquidation was, however, made. Subsequently, ex-wife
Florencia mortgaged the property to Metro Bank to secure a loan. Attached to the loan documents were
the decision of the court nullifying the marriage to Nicholson and a “ waiver” purportedly signed by
Nicholson where he waived his share in the conjugal property. Florencia failed to pay the loan so Metro
49
Bank foreclosed the mortgage. When Nicholson learned of the foreclosure proceedings, he instituted a
complaint for declaration of nullity of the mortgage as it was made without his consent.
SC: While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond
and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal
partnership’s assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title
IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant
provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of
separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the
conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving
spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.[17]
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the
former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less
than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation
of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the
mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell
her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson.
However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided
portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half..
ALAIN DINO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DINO G.R. No. 178044 01/19/2011
The marriage was declared void by reason of the wife’ s psychological incapacity. The trial court
also held that “ A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under article 147 of the Family Code.” This is pursuant
to Section 19 (1) of the Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
SC: It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted. Under Article 40, “[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which
are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In
both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of
property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the
parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not
the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should
be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is .
Art. 148- other kinds of cohabitation (91,92,98,00) art 35 par 1,4 art 37, 38
Agapay vs. Palang
July 28, 1997
50
-Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast
to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.[9]
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and
sell and had a sari-sari store[10] but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the
subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was
only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property,[11] there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case
from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced
their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland
was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in
Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their
compromise agreement “in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of
property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership.”[12] Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.[13] The judgment which
resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and
should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that
Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be
placed as the vendee.[14]
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,[15] for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union
Tumlos vs. Fernandez
330 SCRA 718
-Applicable law is Art. 148 of the Family Code.
-Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage.
-Article 148 of the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Art. 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
-Nothing in Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to
a contribution in its acquisition.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Both parties were already married when they cohabited together. During the relationship they
established a business enterprise and by reason thereof acquired several properties. The properties
however, were all registered in the name of Castillo. When they decided to end the relationship, Mallilin
demanded for his share in the properties they acquired during the cohabitation. Castillo countered that
Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot be applied as the same covers only properties acquired by a man
and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married or under a void marriage. In their case,
their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.
SC: Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties
in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
- It applies as all but one property were acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. With respect to the property acquired under the regime of the New Civil Code, then it should be
excluded. The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered by Article 148 of the Family Code
under which all properties acquired out of their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall constitute a co-ownership.
-Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other.
-A trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership.
Carino vs. Carino
February 2, 2001
51
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,[12] and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,[13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement.
A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by
the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue
and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime.[16] Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio,
the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,[17] “... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary,
it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal
wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license.
52
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them,
even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even
if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article
147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is
no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in
good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
6. JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA
June 10, 2003
-Under the property regime governed by Art. 148 “ x x x x only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions x x x x.” Proof of actual contribution
is required.
- In the case at bar, nowhere in Gina’ s testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction
materials on 11/17/95 and 12/23/95 in the amount of P11,413.00. With respect to the disputed
personal properties both claimed that the money used in the purchase thereof came partly from
their joint account. There is however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares in the said account. And pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof
of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here,
the disputed properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not
questioned by Jacinto, hence, their share therein is equivalent to ½ , P55,687.50 each. And on the
basis of the evidence established, the extent of Gina’ s co-ownership over the disputed house is
only up to the amount of P11,413.00 her proven contribution in the construction thereof.
-In Adriano vs. CA, the SC ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name
of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence
of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
RIVERA vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA
496 SCRA 135 (July 21, 2006)
- Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their
property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code which
applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married.
According to the doctrine laid down in Juaniza vs. Jose (89 SCRA 306), no co-ownership exists
between parties to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay vs. Palang, we expounded on this
doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his
or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. The presumption of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO
508 SCRA 593 (November 29, 2006)
Lupo, married and the president and general manager of 2 corporations, hired the services of
Yolanda as accountant thereof. The 2 became intimate and eventually lived together and had 2 children.
The relationship turned sour and they parted ways. Lupo then filed a petition for judicial partition involving
a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City. He alleged that the
property was acquired during their union and hence, the property is co-owned by them. He claimed that
the funds used in the acquisition of the said property were his exclusive funds and that the title was
transferred to Yolanda’ s name alone was done without his knowledge and consent. And since the
property was acquired in 1987, therefore Article 144 of the Civil Code should be applied. That he is not
burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition thereof because with or without contribution by
either partner, he is deemed a co-owner of the subject property. He added that Article 484 of the Civil
Code states that as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital
union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rules on coownership, which shall apply in default of contracts or special provisions.
SC: Here although the adulterous relationship commenced in 1983, Article 148 of the Family Code
applies because this provision is intended to fill up the hiatus/gap in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before
Article 148 of the FC was enacted, there was no provision governing property property relations of couples
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the FC took effect, Article 148 of the FC governs.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase used as consideration for
the property, Lupo diverted the burden upon him to Yolanda as a shrewd and scheming woman without
capacity to purchase any property. Petitioner’ s claim of ownership is without basis because not only did
he fail to substantiate his allege contribution but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say
so and voluminous bank records, which sadly finds no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome his burden of proof.
Respondent had sufficiently established that she derived funds used to purchase the property from
her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented clientele and promissory notes evincing
substantial dealings with her clients, her bank account statements and bank transactions.
BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR 580 SCRA 175 (February 24, 2009)
Austrian Jambrich met and fell in love with Descallar, a married but separated woman, who was
working as waitress at a local hotel in Cebu City. She was earning P1,000.00 per month and another
P1,000.00 in the form of tips. Subsequently, they bought 3 parcels of land with a house constructed
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thereon. The deed of sale originally included Jambrich as buyer but because of the refusal of the Register
of Deeds to register the property in Jambrich’ s name on the ground that a foreigner could not acquire
alienable lands of public domain they erased his name but not his signatures appearing in all pages of the
document. Jambrich and Descallar however, separated.
Subsequently, Jambrich incurred debts and to pay the obligation, he sold his rights and interest in
the property that is now registered in Descallar’ s name in favor of his creditor. Is the sale made by
Jambrich valid?
SC: The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich could have been
declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the property to Borromeo. Citing United
Church of Christ vs. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling that if land is invalidly transferred to
an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is considered valid.
Art. 150 – who are members of the same family for purposes of Art. 151
Art. 151 – Suit between members of the same family
1)
O’ Laco vs. Co Cho Chit and CA
220 SCRA 656
-It is well settled that earnest efforts towards a compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Hence, the
defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of
cause of action.
- Admittedly, the present action is between members of the same family since petitioner Emilia
O'Laco and respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters. Consequently, there should be an averment in
the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, pursuant to Art. 222 of
the New Civil Code, 6 or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of
the Rules of Court. 7 For, it is well-settled that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to
succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. 8
Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
for lack of cause of action. 9
But, plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the defect if the amendment does
not actually confer jurisdiction on the court in which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action
was originally within that court's jurisdiction. 10 In such case, the amendment is only to cure the
perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be allowed.
2)
Guerrero vs. RTC Br. XVI, Bello, Jr. and Hernando
January 10, 1994
-Requirement is mandatory, so that “ if it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, it must be
dismissed.”
-Rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than
litigation between members of the same family.
Exclusion to the requirement on earnest efforts:
1. Common law relationships;
2. Sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-in-law);
3. Between collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters (Mendez vs. Eugenio);
4. Suit between a woman against her sister and the latter’ s husband, the inclusion of the husband
is not within the “ family relations” provided for by law (Hontiveros vs. RTC);
5. If included in the suit is a stranger not of the same family as the interest of such stranger may
differ from the interest of the member of the same family ex. A co-owner; and
6. Special proceedings- the term “ suit” clearly implies only civil actions (Manalo vs. CA)
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. ACUNA and ALBERTO MORENO
500 SCRA 514 (August 31, 2006)
Moreno filed a case against Hiyas, his wife, spouses Owe and Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not obtain any loan from Hiyas nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage, that his wife, spouses Owe were the ones who benefited from the
loan. He could not have executed and signed the contract because he was then working abroad.
Hiyas moved to dismiss the complaint alleging non-compliance with Article 151 of the Family Code
on “ exerting earnest efforts toward a compromise” between members of the same family which
members include a husband and wife.
SC: Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.
Article 151 is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the
same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked by a party who is a member of that same
family.
FAMILY HOME
Articles 152 & 153 – definition of a family home (89,94)
In Buenaventura vs. CA the SC held that the provisions of the Family Code on the “ family home” ,
i.e. the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and in effect regardless of
the property regime of the spouses. So there can be a family home in common law relationships.
Article 154- beneficiaries of a family home (89)
Article 155 – exceptions to the general rule that a family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment.
1)
Modequillo vs. Breva prospective application of family home
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Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest
before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155.
D
The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: N D D
(1)
For non-payment of taxes;
(2)
For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3)
For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4)
For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle
on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that
"the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does
not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or
liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
Manacop vs. CA and E & L Mercantile, Inc. occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or
by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual.
215 SCRA 773
- Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the
United States is merely temporary. He asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and
that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This contention lacks
merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by
“any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. That which is “actual” is something real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive.[10] Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically.
Rather, the property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated by Article 154 of the
Family Code.
“Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of the family; and
(2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the
family for lead support.”
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife.[11] But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers.
Taneo, Jr. vs. CA 304 SCRA 308
-Reiterated ruling in Modequillo and Manacop cases
-In the case at bar, Taneo constituted the house in question as the famly home on March 7, 1964
but the instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The
money judgment against Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus at the time when the
“ debt” was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered.
55
-The house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another as by the very definition of
the law that the “ family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the
land on which it is situated.
-The constitution of a family home by Taneo was merely an afterthought in order to escape
execution of their property.
PERLA PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO DARIO III requisites to be considered as beneficiary of a family
home
507 SCRA 438 (November 20, 2006)
Marcelino died intestate and survived by his wife Perla and 2 sons, Marcelino Marc and
Marcelino III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a preschool building constructed thereon located at Oxford St., Cubao, Quezon City. After the heirs
extra-judicially settled the estate, Perla and Marcelino Marc advised Marcelino III that they intend
to partition the property and terminate the co-ownership but the latter refused on the ground that
a minor beneficiary who is Marcelino III’ s 12-year old son and a grandson of the decedent still
resides in said home. He contended that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same
continues as such until the beneficiary comes of age. That despite the expiration of 10 years from
the date of death of Marcelino in 1987 i.e. even after July 1997, the subject property continues to
be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, who is a beneficiary of said family
home, still resides in the premises.
SC: The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by “ any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. Actual occupancy, however, need not be
by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
“ beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which include the in-laws where the
family home is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife. But the law definitely excludes
maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites (A L D)must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Art. 159 of the FC provides that the family home shall continue despite the death
of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long
as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Thus, may Marcelino Lorenzo IV, minor son of respondent be considered as a beneficiary
under Article 154 of the FC? As to the 1st requisite, the term “ descendants” contemplates all
descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence,
it must necessarily include the grandchildren and the great grandchildren of the spouses who a
family home. Thus, Marcelino III’ s minor son, who is a grandchild of Marcelino satisfies the 1 st
requisite.
2nd requisite: minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Article 159. Marcelino Lorenzo IV has been living in the family since 1994, or
within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the 3rd requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo IV cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal
support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo IV’ s parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. And only in default of his parents is the
obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his
father. Thus despite, residing in the family home and his a descendant of Marcelino Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the 3rd requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
KELLY, JR. vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. 557 SCRA 499 (July 9,2008)
GR: FAMILY HOME EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION
XPN: THOSE MENTIONED IN ART. 155 and ART. 160-claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155
obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually
worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157 (urban-300k, rural - 200k)
In 1989, Kelly failed to pay the value of the agricultural chemical products that he obtained on
consignment from Planters Products. The sheriff levied and sold on execution a real property located in
Naga City to satisfy the judgment award. The Kelly spouses questioned the levy and the subsequent sale
alleging that the property is a family home and is, therefore, exempt from execution.
SC: The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family
home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise, (that is, if it was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either
judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The express exceptions are found in Articles 155 and 160 of the
Family Code.
JOSEF vs. SANTOS 572 SCRA 57 (November 27, 2008)
Judgment was rendered against Josef for the P404,836.50 he owed Santos representing the price
of shoe materials which he bought on credit from the latter on various dates in 1994.
Josef opposed the writ of execution claiming that was levied is their family home and that the
household furniture and appliances found therein belonged to his children.
SC: The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love
and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime.23 It is the sanctuary of that union
56
which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that
union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which
ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the
preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect,24 the trial court’s failure to observe the proper
procedures to determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioner’s
allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same,
whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to
someone else.
CABANG vs. BASAY 582 SCRA 172 (March 20, 2009) where to build the family home
Cabang mistakenly occupied the lot owned by Basay that was the subject matter of a case that
was earlier decided up to the Supreme Court. The writ of execution was opposed on the ground that the
houses of petitioners’ family home was still subsisting and being such, it is not subject to execution.
SC: The family home must be established on a) the absolute community, or b) the conjugal
partnership, or c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be
established on a property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on
the community property, or conjugal partnership and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with
the consent of the owner-spouse.
In the case at bar, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family
home stands is owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the
finality of the appellate court’ s judgment. Thus, Cabang’ s continued stay on the subject land is only by
mere tolerance of respondents.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Articles 164 (06) - (1)-status of children conceived or born during the marriage
(2)- status of children conceived through artificial insemination
- requisites in order that a child conceived through artificial insemination shall be considered
legitimate.
166 (exclusive) grounds to impugn legitimacy (89)
170 – prescriptive period within which to institute an action impugning legitimacy of child
171- Instances when heirs of the husband may impugn legitimacy
1)
Badua vs. CA
229 SCRA 468
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 are not applicable in the instant case. These articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife but not where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
-A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in
the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his
own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that
for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170
and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or
any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the
case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not
his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel.
2)
Babiera vs. Catotal
333 SCRA 487
Alleged mother was already 54 years old at the time of her birth. The certificate of live birth was not
signed by the civil registrar or by the supposed mother.
-Article 171 is not applicable to the present case. It applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife’ s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was
the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did
not give birth to petitioner. The prayer is not to declare the petitioner an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter’ s child at all.
-Ruling in Badua case applied.
3) DE JESUS vs. ESTATE of DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON
366 SCRA 499
In a notarized document Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own
illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de Jesus who were both born during the subsistence of the
marriage between Carolina and Danilo de Jesus. May the children be given due recognition as the
illegitimate children of Dizon?
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[4] The due recognition of an
57
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.[5]
In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.[6] Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.[7]
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.[8] This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse.[9] Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,[10] and in
proper cases Article 171,[11] of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners,
in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for
the child born in wedlock, and only the father,[13] or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs,[14] can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
4.) LIYAO, JR. vs. TANHOTI-LIYAO
378 SCRA 563
Husband and wife were separated-in-fact. The wife then lived with William Liyao and had a child
with him. During the birth of the child it was William who attended to the needs of Corazon, visited and
stayed with the mother and child at the hospital. He also shouldered the hospitalization expenses of
Corazon and William, Jr. The children of Corazon with her husband also acknowledged that William, Jr. is
the illegitimate child of William Liyao, Sr.
Whose child is William?
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the
time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it
bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Article 262 of the Civil Code.[27] Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of
the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.[28] It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.[29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of
the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as
the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[30] We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present
petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances,
his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy
of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.[31]
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with
Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo
has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this
proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period
limited by law.
Article 168 – rule, in the absence of proof to the contrary, if wife contracted a subsequent marriage
within 300 days after termination of prior marriage and gives birth thereafter. (99)
GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. CA and MA. THERESA ALMONTE
58
August 31, 2005
Gerardo and Theresa were married on December 29, 1989 and after the marriage lived with
Theresa’ s parents at Fairview, QC. Almost a year later or on December 8, 1990 Theresa gave birth to Jose
Gerardo. The marriage turned to be short-lived because on December 19,1991 Gerardo filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Theresa on the ground of bigamy. It was found out that Theresa married
one Mario Gopiao on December 10, 1980, which marriage was never annulled and that Mario is still alive
and is residing in Loyola Heights, QC. The annulment was granted and declared Jose Gerardo as an
illegitimate child. Custody was granted to Theresa but Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Feeling
betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled and held him responsible for the
bastardization of the child, she moved for a partial reconsideration of the trial court’ s ruling contending
that there is nothing in the law granting “ visitation rights in favor of a putative father of an illegitimate
child.” She further maintained that the surname of the child should be changed from Concepcion to
Almonte following the rule that the illegitimate shall use the surname of the mother. The court denied
Theresa’ s motion applying the “ best interest of the child” principle. Theresa went to the CA that also
denied her appeal. She then moved for reconsideration. The appellate court in resolving the
reconsideration ruled that when Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990, Theresa was legitimately
married to Mario therefore Jose Gerardo – under the law- is the legitimate child of Mario and Theresa.
Shocked and stunned Gerardo filed this appeal.
SC: The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised, Article 164 of the Family Code is
clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in
favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: “ The
child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.” Gerardo cannot invoke Article 166 (1) as he has no standing to
dispute the status of the child. Only Mario, Theresa’ s husband, or, in a proper case, his heirs who can
contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any
right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
To rebut the presumption of legitimacy it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was
no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Here, during the period that Gerardo
and Theresa were living together in Fairview, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in QC. Fairview
and Loyola Heights are only a scant 4 kilometers apart.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG vs. MINOR JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ rep. by her mother and guardian JINKY C. DIAZ
540 SCRA 480 (December 17, 2207)
Jinky, who was already married to a Japanese national Hasegawa Katsuo, had an affair with
Rogelio Ong. They lived together for about 4 years (January 1994 to September 1998) and had a child
Joanne Rodjin. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned the Jinky and Joanne and stopped supporting the
minor alleging that he is not the father of the child. Subsequently Jinky filed a complaint against Rogelio
because of his continued failure and refusal to give support to the child and to acknowledge the child as
his. The heirs, who substituted Rogelio when he died, insisted that the decision of the appellate court
remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis is set aside and to declare Joanne as the
legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa. It was established however, that Hasegawa was living outside of
the country and comes home only once a year. No evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the
country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of Joanne Rodjin.
-The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child.
-A child born to a husband and a wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. This
presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary.
-With the advancement in the field of genetics, and availability of new technology, it can be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
testing. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual
from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
-The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological samples include blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Article 172 – Proof of Filiation
1)
Mendoza vs. CA failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, she has nevertheless established that status by another
method through common reputation respecting his pedigree
201 SCRA 675
-Although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child, she has nevertheless established that status by another method—through
common reputation respecting his pedigree (falling under the phrase “ any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,” Art. 172, par. (2), (2), Famil Code)
-If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her
witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's
husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the
proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build
a house on his land after he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less
remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably
conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
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We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances
of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such.
2)
Fernandez vs. CA
230 SCRA 130
-Photographs showing the presence of the alleged father in the baptism of the child are far from
proofs that he is the father of the child.
-Pictures showing putative father showering affection to the child fall short of the evidence required
to prove paternity.
-Baptismal certificate naming respondent as father of the child has scant evidentiary value. No
showing that he participated in its preparation.
-Certificate of live birth identifying the alleged father as father of the child is not also competent
evidence on the issue of paternity if records do not show that the alleged father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate.
-while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child’s paternity.9 Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
3)
Trinidad vs. CA
289 SCRA 188
-Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the “ other
means” allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws” to show pedigree.
4) FERNANDEZ vs. FERNANDEZ
363 SCRA 811
-May filiation be collaterally attack in an action for declaration of nullity of sale of real property?
HELD: While one’ s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, this doctrine finds no application in the instant case as respondents’ claim was that
Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Fernandez, not a situation wherein the
respondents’ deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle’ s wife.
-May an application for Recognition of Back Pay under RA 897 be considered as proof of one’ s
filiation?
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay is a public document
nevertheless it was not executed to admit filiation of Jose with Rodolfo. The public document
contemplated under Art. 172 refers to a written admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this
case wherein the public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to
back pay, the contents being, only a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
-The claim that he enjoyed and possessed the status of a legitimate child, the Court in Quismundo
vs. WCC, held that “ possession of the status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.”
6. LABAGALA vs. SANTIAGO
December 4, 2001
-Is an income tax return that listed her as filer’ s daughter sufficient to prove filiation?
-The entries made in an income tax return only shows that income tax has been paid and
the amount thereof.
-Use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
7. LOCSIN vs. JUAN LOCSIN, JR.
December 10, 2001
As between the original certificate of live birth issued in the place where the alleged birth
took place and a certified true copy issued by the civil registrar general but has entries different
from the one issued by the local civil registrar, which copy must prevail?
HELD: The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs.
Court of Appeals [17] where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father
(who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article
172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.[18] Its evidentiary
worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local
Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without
doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies
between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of
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Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil
Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.
8. BERNABE vs. ALEJO (2005 Bar Exam)
January 21, 2002
The child was born in 1981. The alleged father died in 1993. May the child be allowed to
prove his filiation despite the clear provision of Art. 175 of the Family Code which requires that if the
action to establish illegitimate filiation is based on the 2 nd paragraph of Art. 172 the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent?
HELD: The child should be allowed to prove his filiation as he was born in 1981, and
therefore, his rights are governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code, Article 285 of the Civil Code
provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
“ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1)
If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2)
If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
“In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.”
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles
172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
“ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”
“ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.”
“ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.”
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the
lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still
a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to
dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy
and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should
thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if
he or she is already dead.”[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
“ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
ECETA vs. ECETA
May 20, 2004
Vicente predeceased his mother Rosalina. During his lifetime, however, he sired an
illegitimate daughter, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case for partition, accounting
with damages against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’ s death, she became
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Rosalina’ s co-heir and co-owner of a certain property located at Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City.
During the pre-trial both parties admitted their relationship to one another, that Rosalina is Maria
Theresa’ s grandmother and vise versa. When Rosalina was ordered by the court to give 1/8 of the
Cubao property to Maria Theresa, the former questioned the latter’ s filiation, raising the following
issues: 1. whether the certified Xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to
prove the alleged filiation of Maria Theresa as an “ illegitimate daughter” of her alleged father
Vicente Eceta?
2. whether the admission made by Rosalina that Maria Theresa is her granddaughter
is enough to prove respondent’ s filiation with Vicente Eceta, her only son, and
3.whether the action for recognition has already prescribed.
SC – Maria Theresa had successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a
duly authenticated birth certificate which Vicente himself signed thereby acknowledging that she is his
daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.
- the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
DE LA ROSA, et. al. vs. HEIRS OF VDA. DE DAMIAN
January 27, 2006
Facts: One of those claiming the estate of the late spouses Rustia is Guillerma Rustia who claimed
to be the illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia where she sought recognition on 2 grounds: first, compulsory
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing. As proof of the latter, she presented the report card that
identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. Also in Josefa Delgado’ s obituary that was prepared
by Guillermo Rustia, named Guillerma as one of their children.
SC: There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her
birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the
courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for
compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, Guillerma’ s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent. This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. Did Guillerma’ s report card from the
University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’ s obituary prepared by Guillermo qualify as authentic
writings under the Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card did not bear the signature of Guillermo
Rustia. The fact that his name appears there, as her parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no
participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo himself who drafted
the notice of death of Josefa which was published in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 2, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original
signed manuscript was fatal to Guillerma’ s claim.
RODRIGUEZ vs. LIM
509 SCRA 113 (November 30, 2006)
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. presented as proofs of his filiation, to wit; 1. Certificate of Birth indicating that
his mother was Dominga Goyma; 2. Statement of Assets, Income and Liabilities of Dominga indicating
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. as her son and 3. Income Tax Returns for 1953-1955 of Dominga, where she invariably
claimed personal exemption as head of the family.
SC enunciated that “ the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in, any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate civil action for judicial approval. These pieces of documentary evidence, whose authenticity
were not refuted by petitioners, were properly considered by the court a quo and the appellate court to
establish that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was acknowledged by Dominga Goyma to be her illegitimate son.
TEOFISTO VERCELES vs. POSADA
522 SCRA 518 (April 27, 2007)
Posada, a young lass from a barrio in Catanduanes, was impregnated by Verceles, the mayor of
Pandan, Catanduanes. Verceles denied fathering the child. He argued that he never signed the birth
certificate of Verna Aiza Posada and that it was Clarissa Posada who placed his name on the birth
certificate as father without his consent. Clarissa, on the other hand, presented as evidence the letters sent
to her by Verceles starting from the very time that she missed her menstruation and 3 other handwritten
letters, 2 of which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. There were also pictures Verceles gave her
of his youth and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back. That she was given
P2,000 pocket money and another P2,000 for her delivery. Clarissa’ s testimony was corroborated by her
mother.
SC: The letters of petitioner are declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired
Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias (Ninoy) in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in
these letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioner’ s fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable.
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Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same
person, petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
In his memorandum, Verceles admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters
between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’ s filiation
under Article 172(2) of the FC. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates,
letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
petitioner’ s illegitimate child.
FIDEL vs. CA 559 SCRA 186 (July 21, 2008)
A baptismal certificate was the only evidence submitted by respondents that they are the heirs of
Primitivo Espineli, the only child of Vicente and Juliana Asas.
SC: Records show that Primitivo was born in 1895, at that time, the only records of birth are those
which appear in parochial records. As to the nature and character of the entries in parochial books and
the certificates thereof issued by a parish priest, the same have not lost their character of being public
documents for the purpose of proving acts referred to therein, inasmuch as from the time of the change of
sovereignty in the Philippines to the present day, no law has been enacted abolishing the official and
public character parochial books and entries made therein. Parish priests continue to be the legal
custodians of parochial books kept during the former sovereignty, and as such they may issue certified true
copies of the entries contained therein in the same manner, as do keepers of archives. The birth certificate
of Primitivo is, therefore, a valid and competent evidence to prove his filiation with Vicente.
DELA CRUZ v. GRACIA 594 S 648 07/31/2009
Jenie and Dominique lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They
stayed in Dominique’ s parents’ house. During his lifetime, Dominique wrote his autobiography that reads
in part:
“ As of now I have my wife named Jenie de la Cruz x x x. Then we fell in love with each
other. X x x. And as of now she is pregnant and for that we live together. X x x.”
After Jenie gave birth, she applied for registration using the deceased’ s surname AQUINO in
support of which she attached the Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father
(AUSF) signed by Jenie and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’ s father. Attached to
the AUSF is the autobiography. The LCR denied the registration citing that the child cannot use the
surname of the father because the child was born out of wedlock and the father died prior to his birth and
has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity. Moreover, the AUSF was unsigned by the father.
Jenie argued that Article 176 as amended by RA 9255 does not require the signature of the putative
father.
SC: Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA 9255, does not, indeed, explicitly state that
the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’ s paternity must be signed by the putative
father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the FC which require
that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Article 175 in relation to Article 172 particularly paragraph 1 (2). “ An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.”
The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child’ s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.
That a father who acknowledges paternity through a written document must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the FC.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’ s
autobiography, though unsigned substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
1st. Dominique died about 2 months prior to the child’ s birth.
2nd. The relevant matters in the autobiography, unquestionably written by Dominique, correspond
to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proferred.
3rd. Jenie’ s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’ s father
and testimony of his brother whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child.
These circumstances indicating Dominique’ s paternity of the child give life to his statements that
“ JENIE DELA CRUZ is “ MY WIFE” as “ WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER” and “ NOW SHE IS PREGNANT
AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.”
The SC now adopts the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1.)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2.)
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such evidence.
NEPOMUCENO vs. LOPEZ G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
Araceli, for and in behalf of minor Arhbencel filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Nepomuceno.
She alleged that Arhbencel is the product of her extramarital affair with Nepomuceno but that the
latter refused to affix his signature on the child’ s birth certificate. But as proof of his acknowledgment that
the child is his child, Araceli presented as proof a handwritten note where he obligated himself to give
financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 on the 15th and 30th of each month. She claimed that the
child’ s filiation was established by the said note.
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SC: Arhbencel’ s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to Nepomuceno as his
illegitimate daughter falls under Article 195 (4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is
dependent on the determination of her filiation.
To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be
a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions,
together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to father’ s operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be
taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism or family pictures are sufficient
to establish filiation.
In the present case, Arhbencel relies on the handwritten note executed by petitioner:
“ I, Ben Hur Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the
amount of x x x x x , to Arhbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez
without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child
and my income.”
The above-quoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’ s filiation
to Nepomuceno. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172 (2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the FC, which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the
child. For it is not even notarized. And the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative
father’ s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Live
Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
Art. 173 – Action to claim legitimacy
Marquino vs. IAC
difference of prescriptive period to file action for legitimacy between NCC and FC
233 SCRA 348
The first issue to be resolved is whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in
character.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1)
If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2)
If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from discovery of the document.
The rationale for the rule is to give the alleged parents opportunity to be heard. The reason for the
exceptions is to protect the heirs. 5
In Conde vs. Abaya, 6 we held that the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to
which Article 285 (Article 137, Old Civil code) refers, can never be transmitted. The reason is that the code
makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. 7
In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock on
December 2, 1926, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single.
Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died on March 17, 1983
before she could present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its personal
nature and intransmissibility. Art. 174 – rights of a legitimate child – (90)
- The second issue for resolution is whether or not after the death of the putative father the action for
recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former.
We rule against its continuance. In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to
oppose the same is the putative parent himself. 10 The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an
overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and
harmonious relationship in the family of the putative parent. For this reason, Article 285 provides only two
(2) exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent. Neither of
these exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the
minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case was filed on
January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in which Bibiana was
expressly acknowledged as a natural child. Consequently, the respondent court erred in ruling that the
action can still be continued against the heirs of Eutiquio.
- Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an action for recognition, however, has been superseded by
the New Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. Under Article 173 of the Family Code, it is now
provided:
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The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five (5) years within which to institute the action.
The action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this provision, the child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime (not during the
lifetime of the parents) and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not
prescribe as long as he lives. 13
Be that as it may, Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the
case at bench because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of
the death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino.
Art. 175 – filiation of an illegitimate child (95)
May be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Art. 176 as amended by RA 9255– rights of an illegitimate child (90)
Grande vs Antonio G.R. No. 206248
Art. 177 – Legitimated children
De Santos vs. Angeles
251 SCRA 206
-Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimated because of the impediment present at the
time of conception of the child.
RA 9858 – AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING
AGE
- Amended Article 177 of the Family Code that now reads “ Art. 177. Children conceived and born
outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were
below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated. (Underscoring supplied)”
Articles 183 to 193- ADOPTION (83,94,95,96,00,01,03,05,06)
The Family Code provisions on adoption had been repealed by Republic Act 8552 or the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998 but determining factor whether the new law is applicable or not is when was the
petition for adoption filed because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for
adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force and cannot be impaired by the enactment of a
new law on adoption (Republic vs. Miller, April 21, 1999).
Effect of Adoption under RA 8552:
Section 13-“ x x x x, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a
decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed.
This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to
protect the interest of the adoptee.
In Tamargo vs. CA, 209 SCRA 518, the SC said that “ we do not consider that retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Put a little differently, no presumption
of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents could have arisen since the adopted child was
not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.”
In Lahom vs. Sibulo (July 14, 2003) the SC held that RA 8552 had abrogated and repealed the right
of the adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. The adopter
while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons caused the forfeiture of
certain benefits. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
Section 18 of RA 8552 does not give the adopter the right of representation because this does not
involve a “ reciprocal” right between a parent and child.
RA 9523 – AN ACT REQUIRING THE CERTIFICATION OF THE DSWD TO DECLARE A CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE
FOR ADOPTION.
- This law effectively made the adoption process “ administrative in nature” as it now
requires a certification signed by the DSWD Secretary in lieu of a judicial order.
- The certification, in cases of abandoned and neglected children, shall be, for all intents
and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available in a domestic
adoption proceeding as provided in RA 8552, and in an inter-country adoption
proceeding as provided in RA 8043.
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-
Said certification by itself shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local
civil registrar of a foundling certificate that mandates the said office to transmit the
foundling certificate to the National Statistics Office (NSO).
- Repealed Sections 2 © (iii), 3(b), (d), (e), and 8(a) of RA 8552, Section 3(f) of RA 8043, Title
VII, Chapter 1, of PD 603.
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC written consent of natural parent is indispensable
June 27, 2006
Minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene were the children of Amelia and the late Manuel Ramos. After
Manuel’ s death, the children were left under the custody of their paternal grandmother because Amelia
left for Italy. When the paternal grandmother died, the children were taken cared of by a paternal uncle.
Landingin, the 57-year old aunt and sister of the late Manuel and an American citizen residing in Guam,
now desires to adopt the 3 children. In her petition, she alleged that the mother of the children had
abandoned them and had not communicated with her children neither with her in-laws. In fact Amelia
has already remarried and has 2 children with her 2nd husband. That petitioner and her other siblings were
the ones financially supporting the children. That she is already a widow and living alone because all her
children are already married and are gainfully employed. They have given their consent in writing to the
adoption, and also promised to help her in supporting the children financially. Likewise, the paternal uncle
where the children are currently staying also signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
while in petitioner’ s custody.
The Child Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Pagbilao stated that the surviving
parent consented to the adoption as evidenced by the Affidavit of Consent executed by the children’ s
mother Amelia as the mother came home on May 2, 2002 and stayed for 3 weeks. The minors likewise,
consented to the proposed adoption. Pagbilao then recommended that the children be adopted by
petitioner. During the trial however, Landingin failed to present Pagbilao as witness and also failed to
adduce documentary evidence that, indeed, Amelia assented to the adoption.
Issues: 1. Whether petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of the
biological mother?
2.Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by petitioner’ s children sufficiently
complies with the law? and
3.Whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees?
SC: Section 9 of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) provides: Whose consent is necessary to
the adoption:
X x x x.
(b) The biological parents of the child, if known x x x .
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interest of the child.
Clearly, the written consent of the natural parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia to the adoption.
Petitioner’ s argument that her consent is no longer necessary because she left for Italy and never
came back, hence, Amelia had abandoned the children and it was just by twist of fate that after 12 years
Amelia was on vacation and was able to meet Pagbilao, must be rejected. If, as claimed, that the
biological mother had abandoned them, she should have adduced the written consent of the children’ s
legal guardian. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others does not
constitute abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown
to have existed at the time of adoption.
Here, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine, the eldest of the 3, to prove that
Amelia abandoned them.
The Home Study Report tends to show otherwise. Elaine during the interview said that “ in serious
problems she already consult her mother and petitioner-aunt.” And while petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing for most of their needs and education, Amelia would also send
financial support ranging from P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 a month through her parents and share P3,000.00 to
P5,000.00 thereof with the children.
Thus, Amelia left for Italy without intention of abandoning her children, or to permanently sever their
mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing her children to
her now deceased mother-in-law.
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’ s report and the joint affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. As to her
financial capacity, the Report stated that petitioner is 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a
waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000.00 per month. That she owns her house at
Quitugua Subd., Yigo, Guam but the same is still being amortized. Given these limited facts, it is doubtful
whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the 3 children in the US.
While she claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children, the OSG is correct in
stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, no proof was adduced to prove her allegation that
her children and siblings are willing to support the minors herein.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELE P.LIM and MICHAEL JUDE LIM 588 SCRA 98 (May 21, 2009)
Michelle was given to the spouses Lim in 1977 while Michael was delivered in 1983. They were only
about 11 days old when they were given to the spouses Lim who had them registered as if they were their
own children. They were reared and cared for and were sent to exclusive schools and used the surname
“ Lim” in all their school records and documents. In 1988, the husband died and the surviving spouse
entered into another marriage with an American citizen, Olario. Monina (the surviving spouse) then filed
two separate petitions to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 or the
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Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 to those individuals who simulated the birth of the child. Both children, who
are already of legal age, gave their consent including Michelle’ s husband to the adoption. Olario likewise
executed an affidavit of consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. The lower court denied the
petition because inasmuch as Monina has remarried, her petition should have been jointly filed with her
new husband.
ISSUE: Whether Monina, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
SC: It is undisputed that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petition by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads “ Husband and wife shall jointly adopt subject to the exceptions. The
word “ shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule is to insure harmony between the spouses.
Neither would the exceptions apply. 1st the children are not the legitimate children of the petitioner
or of her husband; 2nd the children are not the illegitimate children of the pettioner ; and 3rd, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
There are also certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. None of
the qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. Neither are the requirements on residency and
certification waivable as the children are not relatives within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of
petitioner or Olario.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation- that is, when he attains the age of
majority or 18 years of age-emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of
the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered the legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child as provided for under Article 174 of the Family
Code. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to
which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
While petitioner insists that joint adoption is no longer possible because Olario has filed a case for
dissolution of his marriage to petitioner before the Los Angeles Superior Court, the filing of said case is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. until and unless there is a judicial
decree for the dissolution of the marriage between Monina and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
Lua vs Lua G.R. Nos. 175279-80
SUPPORT
DE ASIS vs. CA
303 SCRA 176
The mother filed an action for recognition and support. The putative father denied paternity and
instead filed a counterclaim. The parties agreed to dismiss the case provided the alleged father would no
longer pursue his counterclaim. Subsequently, the mother filed another case against the alleged father
again, for support and recognition. The putative father moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
of res judicata.
SC: Such manifestation does not bar the mother from filing a subsequent case for support on behalf of the
same child against the same defendant because such manifestation and the agreement to dismiss the
case on condition that the defendant will not pursue the counterclaim constitute a form of renunciation as
they severed the vinculum that gives the child the right to claim support from the putative parent.
-The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person.
-To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is
virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden.
-An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon
the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise that cannot be countenanced.
-If paternity is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially established and cannot
be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
GAN vs. REYES
May 28, 2002
Apprehensive that she would be unable to send her 3-year old daughter to school, she
wrote Gan demanding support for their “ love child” . Gan denied paternity of the child. He
argued that since the child’ s birth certificate indicated her father as “ UNKNOWN” , then there is
no legal basis for the claim for support. Gan was declared in default and was ordered to recognize
the child Francheska Joy as his illegitimate child and to support her. A writ of execution was issued
citing as reason the child’ s immediate need for schooling. Meanwhile, Gan appealed the
judgment of the CA. He then filed a petition for certiorari insisting that the judgment sought to be
enforced did not yet attain finality. He also seeks the setting aside of the default order and the
judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that he should be allowed to prove his defense of
adultery.
SC: There is no evidence to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was
issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. The Rules of Court clearly states that,
unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule, which provides that the
taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls
for immediate execution of all judgments for and makes no distinction between those that are the
subject of an appeal and those that are not. To consider then petitioner’ s argument that there
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should be good reasons for the advance execution of judgment would be to violate the clear and
explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns.
There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice
to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip
away. Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not
even hinted that he was married to the mother of the child.
MANGONON vs. CA grandfather was ordered to support grandchildren for the lack of financial
capacity of parents
494 SCRA 1 (June 30, 2006)
Ma. Belen Mangonon and Federico Delgado were civilly married. The marriage however,
was subsequently annulled due to absence of the required parental consent under Article 85 of
the Civil Code. 7 months after the annulment, Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
Federico totally abandoned them and Mangonon had to rely upon her 2nd husband for assistance.
Demands made upon Federico and the latter’ s father, Francisco, the latter being generally well
known to be financially well-off, were unheeded. Petitioner then filed, for and in behalf of the twins
a petition for declaration of legitimacy and support with application for support pendente lite
before the RTC of Makati. As legitimate children and grandchildren, the twins are entitled to
general and educational support under Articles 174 and 195 (b) in relation to Articles 194 (1) and
(2) and 199 (c) of the Family Code. Mangonon argued that in case of default on the parents’
part, the obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents of the children; thus, Federico,
or in his default, Francisco should be ordered to provide general and educational support in the
amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per year. Francisco stated in his answer that as the birth
certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of Federico, it is essential to 1 st establish their
legitimacy as “ there is no basis to claim support until a final and executory judicial declaration has
been made as to the civil status of the children.” Whatever good deeds he may have done to the
twins were founded on pure acts of Christian charity. And assuming that he could be held liable for
support, he has the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or receiving and
maintaining in the dwelling here in the Philippines the person claiming support. He further posits that
because petitioner and the twins are now US citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code
provisions on support because “ laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. (Article 15, NCC).” Federico, on the other hand, alleged that he left for abroad and
stayed there for a long time “ within the 1st 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding March
25, 1976 (birth of the twins)” and that he only came to know about the birth of the twins when the
latter introduced themselves to him 17 years later. He did not tell them that he could not be their
father in order not to antagonize them.
The trial court said that, “ the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied.
They had maintained constant communication with their grandfather Francisco. Francisco
admitted having written several letters to Rica and Rina. In said letters, particularly at the bottom
thereof, Francisco wrote the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware
that the twins bear the surname Delgado. Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as “ Lolo
Paco” or “ Daddy Paco” . In his October 13, 1989 letter he said, “ as the grandfather, am
extending a financial help of US$1,000.00.”
SC: The pertinent provision is Article 199 of the FC; “ Whenever 2 or more persons are
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
Tolentino explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely
related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the
responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not
have the means to do so.
There being prima facie showing that Mangonon and Federico are the parents of Rica and
Rina, they are primarily charged to support their children’ s college education. In view however of
their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support shall be borne by Francisco. Under Article
199 of the FC, as the next immediate relative of the twins, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. It having been established that he has the financial
means to support the twins’ education, he, in lieu of Federico should be liable for support
pendente lite.
While respondents have the option under Article 204 “ to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
has the right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral
or legal obstacle thereto.” In this case, Francisco cannot avail himself of the 2nd option. Prior to the
commencement of this action, the relationship between Francisco and the petitioner and
daughters was quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound
feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for another’ s well being. The photographs presented a
seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All these, however, are things of the past. With the
filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another, the relationships had been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they considered and
claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not
see the twins moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who disowned them.
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LIM v. LIM 604 S 691 10/30/2009 daughter-in-law not entitled to receive support from mother-in-law
Spouses Edward and Cheryl and their 3 children live with Edward’ s parents, and his
grandmother. Edward is receiving P6,000.00 from their family business. Cheryl, on the other hand,
had no steady source of income.
In 1990, Cheryl together with the 3 children left her in-law’ s house after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of his grandmother in what
the court described as “ a very compromising” situation. She then sued Edward together with his
parents and grandparents for support.
The court ordered Edward, his parents and grandparents toprovide support in the amount
of P40,000.00. P6,000.00 from Edward while the balance of P34,000.00 shall be borne by his parents
subject to the subsidiary liability of the grandparent. The court held that Edward’ s parents
(petitioners in this case) and his grandmother Chua Giak were jointly liable with Edward because of
the latter’ s “ inability to x x x give sufficient support x x x.”
The petitioners argued before the CA that while Edward’ s income is insufficient, the law
itself sanctions its effects by providing that the legal support should be “ in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family” under Article 194 of the Civil Code as amended by the Family
Code. Further, their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either
by termination or suspension during the children’ s minority. At the time Cheryl sued for support,
Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children hence, the obligation ends with
them.
SC: While parental authority under Title IX pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only
upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants
not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’ s inability to provide sufficient support.
There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient
legal support to her children, then all-school bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward and
Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in
the nearest degree, both in the paternal and maternal line (Cheryl’ s family had already been
giving support to respondents) following the order established in Article 199 of the FC. To hold
otherwise, and thus, subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of paternal inability to give adequate
support even if the ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as
this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives by blood of lower degree. Hence, only the
children of Cheryl and Edward are entitled to receive support from their grandparents. Cheryl’ s
right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their
marital bond.
Petitioners’ wish to exercise the option under Article 204 is unavailable. It will force Cheryl to
return to the houe which, for her, is the scene of her husband’ s infidelity. While not rising to the
level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’ s charge against Edward for concubinage did not
prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral
impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Espiritu vs. CA
242 SCRA 362
-The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to
be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or
over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child’ s interests.
-In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under 7 years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It
can be overcome by “ compelling reasons.”
-Either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody
but it is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the
child which is the paramount consideration.
1)
2)
Santos, Sr. vs. CA
242 SCRA 407
-The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. Only in case of parents’ death, absence, or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
-The legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents despite the latter’ s demonstrated love
and affection. Wealth, too, is not a deciding factor.
-The father’ s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism. It cannot,
however, be construed as abandonement.
3)
Eslao vs. CA
266 SCRA 317
-When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
LAXAMANA vs. LAXAMANA
September 3, 2002
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The results of the psychiatric evaluation submitted to the trial court states that “ Reymond
Laxamana is not yet considered completely cured (of his drug dependency) even though his drug urine
test for “ shabu” was negative.” Likewise the children aged 14 and 15 when asked whether they like to be
with their father but they said that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is
no longer a drug dependent. The trial court then awarded custody of the children to their mother. Is the
court correct?
While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his
moral, financial and social well-being. The psychiatric evaluation that he is not yet “ completely cured”
may render him unfit to take custody of the children but there is no evidence to show that he is unfit to
provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and
development. While the children were asked as to whether they like to be with their father but there was
no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children.
In controversies involving the care, custody, and control of their minor children, the contending
parties stand on equal footing before the court who shall make a selection according to the best interest
of the child. The child if over 7 years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to
live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned
taking into account the respective resources as well as the social and moral situations of the opposing
parents.
JOYCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V
461 SCRA 451 (June 28, 2005) [2006 Bar]
Is a mother allegedly a lesbian unfit to have custody over a child below seven years of age?
SC: The convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “ in all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration. The principle of “ best
interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status,
minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in
choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount
consideration. Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a
bearing on the children’ s well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral
and social situations of each parent, other factors may be considered to ascertain which one has the
capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.
As a general rule a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of 7.
The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to
order otherwise. The so-called “ tender-age presumption” under Article 213 may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’ s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have
custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relationship as the compelling reason to
deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’ s
immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not
even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to
have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that
her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising parental care.
SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA
August 29, 2006
Loran and Marie Antonette are the parents of Lorenzo Emmanuel. They lived with Marie’ s parents.
Due to in-law problems, Loran suggested that they transfer to their own house but Marie refused so he,
alone, left the house and was, later on, prevented from seeing his son.
He then instituted a petition for habeas corpus and custody. Ordered to show cause why Lorenzo
Emmanuel should not be discharged from restraint Marie moved for the reconsideration of the order which
the court denied. She went to the CA which the affirmed the denial of the lower court. On certiorari, she
contended that there was no evidence at all that the 3-year Lorenzo was under restraint and no evidence
of maternal unfitness to deprive the mother Marie of her son of tender years. That the writ is unwarranted
considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the mother and considering further that the law presumes
the fitness of the mother, thereby negating any notion of such mother illegally restraining her own son. She
maintains that Loran had the burden of showing a compelling reason but failed to present even a prima
facie proof thereof. Accordingly, the proper remedy is an action for custody and not habeas corpus as
the latter is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor.
Loran, on the other hand, argued that under the law, he and Marie have shared custody and parental
authority over their son. That at times that Marie is out of the country as required of her job as an
international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal
grandparents.
SC: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the FC, Loran and Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over
their minor son and consequently, joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the
issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to
one parent, both parents are entitled to the custody of their child. In this case, Loran’ s cause of action is
the deprivation of his right to see his son, hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
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In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’ s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 213 of the FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for
the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counterargument for Loran’ s
petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under 7 years of age.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. CA 527 SCRA 380 (July 11, 2007)
Spouses Franklin and Agnes have a 4-year old daughter named Simone. Their problem started
when Agnes wanted to stay in Makati while Franklin would like to stay in their conjugal home in Diniwid,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. One day, Agnes went to Boracay, asked for money and for Franklin’ s
permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation. He later however, discovered
that neither Agnes nor their daughter would be coming back to Boracay. He then filed a petition for
habeas corpus for Agnes to produce Simone. The CA granted joint custody of the minor child to both
parents.
SC: The CA committed grave abuse of jurisdiction when it granted joint custody of the minor child
to both parents.
The Convention of the Rights of the Child provides that “ in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
The so-called “ tender age presumption” under Article 213 of the FC may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’ s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable diseases. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring
for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mother’ s custody.
MADRINAN vs. MADRINAN 527 SCRA 487 (July 12, 2007)
Spouses Felipe and Francisca have 4 children. On May 12, 2002, after a bitter quarrel, Felipe left the
conjugal home taking with him their 3 sons and went to Ligao, Albay. Patching up things proved futile so
Francisca filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA. Felipe questioned the jurisdiction of the CA
claiming that the family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition for habeas
corpus as provided for in Section 5 (b) of RA 8369 otherwise known as the “ Family Courts of 1997” .
SC: Citing Thorton vs. Thorton (436 SCRA 550), the SC resolved the issue of the CA’ s jurisdiction to
hear writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision of RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
“ The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.”
The family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue.
HERALD DACASIN vs. SHARON DACASIN G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
Sharon, Filipino, married to an American, Herald, obtained a decree of divorce from an Illinois
court. The court awarded to Sharon sole custody of their daughter Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over
the case for enforcement purposes. Subsequently, the parties executed in Manila an agreement for the
joint custody of their daughter and chose the Philippine courts as the exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the agreement. Sharon, in fact undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
“ relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon for alleged violation of the
agreement as the latter exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
SC: At the time the parties executed the agreement on January 28, 2003, 2 facts are undisputed:
(1) Stephanie was under 7 years old (having been born on September 21, 1995); and (2) Sharon and
Herald were no longer married under the laws of the US because of the divorce decree. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law is also undisputed: “ no child under 7
years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x. (Article 213 (2) FC)” . This award of sole parental
custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow
exception not alleged to obtain here. The agreement’ s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between them over their minor child under 7 years old contravenes Philippine law.
The agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses,
the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below 7 years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. The separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the
maternal custody of children below 7 years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will
have sole custody of a child under 7 as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application
of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the 2nd paragraph of Article 213.
The rule’ s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated
parents may wish to enter such as granting the visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with regime of sole maternal custody under the 2 nd paragraph of A. 213 which merely grants
to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under 7 years of age, in case of
disagreements.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default
standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.[
- Default custodial regime or mandatory maternal custody regime – 2nd paragraph of A.
213 of the FC vesting on the mother sole custody of a child under 7 years of age.
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- Default standard on child custody proceedings - the best interest of the child.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10165 – THE FOSTER CARE ACT OF 2012
- CHILD – refers to a person below 18 years of age, or one who is over 18 but unable to fully take
care of or protect oneself from ( DANCE ) abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition.
- Child with Special Needs – refers to a child with developmental or physical disability.
- Foster Care – the provision of planned temporary substitute parental care to a child by a foster
parent.
- Foster Placement Authority (FPA) – the document issued by the DSWD authorizing the placement
of a particular with the foster parent. The Foster Family Care License is renewable every 3 years unless
earlier revoked by the DSWD.
- Matching – the judicious pairing of a child with foster parent and family members based on the
capacity and commitment of the foster parent to meet the individual needs of the particular child and
the capacity of the child to benefit from the placement.
- WHO MAY BE PLACED UNDER FOSTER CARE:
a. A child who is abandoned, surrendered, neglected, dependent or orphaned;
b. a child who is a victim of sexual, physical, or any other form of abuse or exploitation;
c. a child with special needs;
d. a child whose family members are temporarily or permanently unable or unwilling to
provide the child with adequate care;
e. a child awaiting adoptive placement and who have to be prepared for family life.
f. a child who needs long-term care and close family ties but who cannot be placed for
domestic adoption;
g. a child whose adoption has been disputed;
h. a child who is under socially difficult circumstances such as, but not limited to, a street
child, a child in armed conflict or a victim of child labor or trafficking;
i. a child who committed a minor offense but is released on recognizance, or who is already
in custody supervision or whose case is dismissed; and
j. a child who is in need of special protection as assessed by a social worker, an agency or
DSWD.
Provided, That in the case of (b), (c), (f), (i) and (j), the child must have no family
willing and capable of caring and providing for him.
WHO MAY BE A FOSTER PARENT:
a. must be of legal age;
b. must be at least 16 years older than the child unless the foster parent is a relative;
c. must have a genuine interest, capacity and commitment in parenting and is able to
provide a familial atmosphere for the child;
d. must have a healthy and harmonious relationship with each family member living with
him or her;
e. must be of good moral character;
f. must be physically and mentally capable and emotionally mature;
g. must have sufficient resources to be able to provide for the family’ s needs;
h. must be willing to further hone or be trained on knowledge, attitudes and skills in caring
for a child; and
i. must not already have the maximum # of children under his foster care at the time of
the application or award, as may be provided in the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) of this Act.
Provided, That in determining who is the best suited foster parent, the relatives of the child
shall be given priority, so long as they meet the above qualifications: Provided, further, That an
alien possessing the above qualifications and who has resided in the Philippines for at least 12
continuous months and maintains such residence until the termination of placement by the DSWD
or expiration of the foster family license, may qualify as a foster parent.
- Foster parents shall have the rights, duties and liabilities of persons exercising substitute
parental authority.
Foster parents shall only have the rights of a person with special parental authority to
discipline the foster child as defined under Article 233 of the FC, insofar as it prohibits the
infliction of corporal punishment upon the child.
- Grounds termination of placement which shall be done by the DSWD:
a. return of the child to biological parents;
b. placement for adoption of the child;
c. death of the child;
d. death of both foster parents;
e. expiration of the FPA; and
f. in all cases where placement becomes prejudicial to the welfare of the child,
such as, but not limited to, abandonment, maltreatment, sexual assault,
violence or other forms of abuse.
Provided, That in case of (f) the foster child with the assistance of a
registered social worker, shall have the option to apply for termination of
placement.
- Long-Term Foster Placement Authority (LFTA)- if a child has been under the care of a foster
parent for a period of at least 7 years, the foster parent may apply for LFTA subject to the
following conditions:
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a. return of the child to his biological parents or placement in an adoptive family is
not imminent;
b. foster parent continues to possess the qualifications required this Act and a valid
foster family care license for the entire duration of the foster care;
c. if the child is 10 years or over, assisted by a social worker, give written consent for
a long-term stay with the foster parent; and
d. the DSWD, aside from regular monitoring, shall reassess and reevaluate the foster
home situation every 3 years, to determine it is in the best interest of the child to
continue living in the foster home on a long-term basis.
- LFTA grants the foster parent custody over the foster child without the requirement of the
eventuality of adoption of the child. The child shall enjoy the rights of the child under
Article 3 of PD 603, and other laws. There shall be no mandatory rights to succession in
favor of the foster child.
- Unilateral termination of LFTA by foster parent before child reaches the age of majority or
finishes tertiary education, the foster parent shall make provisions for the education and
basic needs of the child, in accordance with the standards in which the child had been
raised or has become accustomed to within said period if the foster has the means to
support the child in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
- Adoption of foster child by foster parent – conditions:
a. must have all the qualifications as provided by RA 8552 or RA 8048;
b. trial custody is waived: Provided, that a harmonious relationship exists between
the child and his foster parent and family members;
c. procedure is governed by RA 8552 or RA 8043, as the case may be.
- Assistance to a Foster Child:
a. is entitled to a monthly subsidy from the DSWD. It is primarily aimed at supporting
the expenses of the child to lessen the foster parent’ s financial burden. It may
be waived if the foster parent is capable of supporting the child.
b. Is automatically a PhilHealth beneficiary of the foster parent. If not, the foster
parent must seek enrollment with PhilHealth.
Articles 218 and 219- (03)
ST.MARY’ S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
376 SCRA 474
-Under Art. 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: 1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or
2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. Such authority and responsibility applies to field
trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Art. 219 those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
-For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to
the accident.
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY vs. TAGUIAM 558 SCRA 223 July 14, 2008
Taguiam was an adviser of a Grade V class of the above said school. The grade school principal
granted the written request of the class president authorizing the class to hold a year-end celebration at
the school grounds and to use the swimming pool. Taguiam distributed the parents/ guardian permit forms
to the pupils. One of the pupils’ , Chiara Mae Federico, form was unsigned but Taguiam presumed that
she was allowed to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit. Taguiam warned the children not to go the deeper portion of the pool. Subsequently,
2 of the children sneaked out and went after them. While she was away Chiara Mae drowned.
SC: As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, Taguiam should have made sure that
the children were protected from all harm while in her company. She should have known that leaving the
pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder “ not to go
the deepest part of the pool” was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation
presented to the children, especially Taguiam knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent
created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This a clear
violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school
itself.
Article 231 – grounds for suspension of parental authority – (94)
CF-RA 7610 – CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION
- Child abuse refers to maltreatment of a person below 18 years of age or over but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition. It includes:
- A. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
- B. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
- C. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;
or
- D. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
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Article 236 as amended by RA 6809 – effects of termination of parental authority and its exception – (93)
TITLE XI
The SC in Republic vs. CA (May 6, 2005) said that a petition for declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding under the Family Code and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court.
In Republic vs. Lorino (January 19, 2005) the SC held that “ In Summary Judicial Proceedings under
the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are “immediately
final and executory”. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec,[11] “the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.” Since, by express mandate
of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law
are “immediately final and executory”, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.
The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should
not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.
Others – Constitutional provisions strengthening marriage as an institution (91).
SURNAMES
Art. 364 of the New Civil Code– Legitimate and Legitimated Children shall use the surname of the father
Republic vs. CA and Vicencio
300 SCRA 138
-A legitimate child generally bears the surname of the father. It must be stressed that a change of
name is a privilege not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
-More confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if a legitimate child is allowed to use
the surname of the stepfather, who did not legally adopt her.
-While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their respective stepfather
even without the benefit of adoption such as in the cases of Calderon and Llaneta, wherein the
Court allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the stepfather, in those cases the
children were not of legitimate parentage.
- In Republic vs. Hernandez[7], we have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds to
warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based
on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
Art. 368 – Surname of illegitimate children
Mossesgeld vs. CA
300 SCRA 464
-Illegitimate children shall generally, use the surname of their mother.
In Re: Petition of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
454 SCRA 2155, March 30, 2005
May a person be allowed to drop his middle name?
Facts: Julian is the legitimated son of spouses Anna Maria Carulasan and Song-Pei Wang. Since the
couple decided to settle in Singapore where Julian will study together with his sister, Anna Maria filed a
petition seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang as he might be discriminated against when he studies in
Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden name surname of
the mother is not carried in a person’ s name.
Held: Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or affiliation of a person and further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public instrument or a private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother’ s surname as his
middle name and his father’ s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate
child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
Before the registered name of a person may be changed he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason that may justify such change. Among the grounds are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as
a legal consequence as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and is unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alien parentage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name is for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by Julian for dropping his middle name is
convenience. How such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion
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and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
March 31, 2005 [2006 Bar]
May an illegitimate child be allowed to use her natural mother’ s surname as his/her middle name
when the child has been subsequently adopted by his/her natural father?
Facts: Catindig decided to adopt his illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia with
Gemma Astorga Garcia. The petition for adoption was granted and ordered that Stephanie’ s surname
be changed from “ Garcia” to “ Catindig” but nothing was mentioned with respect to Stephanie’ s
middle name. In his motion for clarification/reconsideration petitioner Catindig prayed that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. He contends
that 1. there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; 2. it is customary for a every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother;
3. the middle name or initial is part of the name of a person; 4. adoption is for the benefit of the and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; 5. permitting
Stephanie to use the middle name “ Garcia” (her mother’ s surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; 6. her continued use of “ Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
SC: As correctly submitted by the parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the family Code, as amended by RA 9255, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’ s surname is only considered in Article 375 (1) of the Civil Code, in case
there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle
name or the mother’ s name shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her mother and father.
Stephanie’ s continued use of her mother’ s surname as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189 (3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA
8552 provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
To allow Stephanie to use her mother’ s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill the noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
REPUBLIC vs. CAPOTE
514 SCRA 76 (February 2, 2007) [more on procedure – Rule 103 of the Rules of Court]
Capote is the guardian of minor Giovanni Gallamaso who is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. Giovanni was born in 1982 and his mother used the surname
of the father when she registered the child despite absence of marriage between them. The alleged
father failed to take up his responsibilities on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual
concerns. The child’ s pleas for attention along that line fell of deaf ears. As his mother is in the US and
might eventually petition the child to join her in the US, the continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of the natural father, may complicate Giovanni’ s status as natural child. The Republic contends
that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child’ s change
of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
SC: “ The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish
him from all others; this symbol is his name.”
When Giovanni was born in 1982, the provision that will apply is Article 366 of the Civil Code: “ A
natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized
by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.”
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’ s surname from birth. The records
do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’ s putative father to actually recognize him.
Meanwhile Art. 176 of the Family Code which repealed, among others, Art. 366 of the Civil Code provides:
“ Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. X x x x x.”
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mother’ s surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’ s surname as his middle name
and his father’ s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated or an acknowledged child.
RA 9048- AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Approved: March 22, 2001
- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order except: 1.
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which is defined as a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
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the naked eye or obvious to the understanding, and can be changed only by reference to other existing
record/s; and in Section 4 thereof - 2. the first name or nickname is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 3. the new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously use and he has been known by that first name or nickname in the community; or 4. the
change will avoid confusion.
- First name refers to a name or a nickname given to a person which may consist of one or
more names in addition to the middle and last names.
- No correction must involve the change of a. nationality; b. age; c. status; or; d. sex.
- The remedy may only be availed of once (2006 Bar)..
- Petition must be verified.
- If the petitioner has migrated to another place in the country and it would be very
expensive and impractical to appear before the local civil registrar keeping the documents
to be corrected or changed then it can be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the
place where he is residing or domiciled.
- Filipinos presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries – with the nearest Philippine
Consulates.
- The civil registrar general shall exercise his power within 10 working days from receipt of the
decision granting a petition, to impugn such a decision on any of the following grounds: 1.
the correction is substantial or controversial as it affects the civil status of a person; 2. the
correction is not clerical or typographical; or; 3. the basis in changing the first name or
nickname of a person does not fall under Section 4 of RA 9048.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
SC: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under
the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating the change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.
Petitioner’ s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’ s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’ s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Assuming it could be legally done, it was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly,
it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
RA 9255 – AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER
-Approved on February 24, 2004.
-There must be an express recognition by the father either a. record of birth appearing in the civil
register; or b. admission in a public or private handwritten instrument (Article 172 in relation to
Article 175 of the Family Code.)
-Applies to 1. unregistered births; or 2. registered births where the illegitimate children use the
surname of the mother.
-Who may file: 1. father; 2. mother; 3. child, if of age; or 3. guardian where an Affidavit to Use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) is executed.
-What to file –
1. Certificate of live birth with accomplished Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity at the back; 2. Public Document-affidavits of Recognition
executed by the father such as the Affidavit of Admission of Paternity or the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment; and 3. AUSF including all supporting documents.
-When to register – the public document not made on the record of birth, or the AUSF shall be
registered within 20 days from the date of the execution at the place where the birth was
registered.
Article 412 – Civil Register (87,06) cf. RA No. 9048 – An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of
First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register without need of a Judicial Order. Amending Articles 376 and
412 of the NCC.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC 537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
-No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment.
-The change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
-The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided for in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
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-The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
-To correct simply means “ to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to
change means “ to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute.” The birth certificate of the petitioner contained no error. All entries therein including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
-Sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
-“ The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or
his being married or not. X x x.” (Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 Edition).
-A person’ s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’ s legal
capacity and civil status.
-The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’ s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
-While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
565 SCRA 72 (September 12, 2008)
Jennifer was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth
but while growing up, she developed 2ndary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. She was diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy in her early years and at age 6,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age 13, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development and that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
In support of her petition, Dr. Sionzon testified that genetically Cagandahan is female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has 2 sex organs
– female and male. This condition is very rare, and that Cagandahan’ s uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. That this condition is permanent
and recommended the change of gender because Cagandahan has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
Does her medical condition i.e. congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) make Jennifer a “ male” ?
SC: Article 412 together with Article 376 of the Civil Code had been amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
Cagandahan undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “ inappropriate”
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be the subject of outright denial.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes.
However, respondent’ s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
We are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of her/his sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of androgen there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
The Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’ s position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
As for respondent’ s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. Considering the consequence that respondent’ s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’ s change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry of his birth certificate from female to male.
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169902 March 5,
2010
Remo requested the DFA, upon application for the renewal of her passport, to revert to her maiden
name and surname in the replacement passport. The DFA denied her request.
SC: The word “ may” in Article 370 indicates that the use of the husband’ s surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory.
A married woman has an option, not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways
provided by Article 370 of the NCC. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the 3 names provided
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in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her
civil status. This interpretation is consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.
The conflict between A. 370 of the NCC and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of
1996), is more imagined than real. RA 8239including its implementing rules and regulations, does not
prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’ s surname in her passport, she
may not revert to the use of her maiden name except (1) death of the husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’ s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport. A married woman’ s reversion to the use of her maiden
name must be based only on the severance of marriage.
If we allow petitioner’ s present request definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting
to the use of her husband’ s surname. Undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport
holders will arise.
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