Foreign Policy of Colombia
Foreign Policy of Colombia
María Catalina Monroy, Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.741
Published online: 21 December 2022
Summary
The study of foreign policy of Colombia has traditionally followed a path of thick description of specific events and
generalizations that have transcended from one generation to another. There is a tendency to claim that
Colombia’s foreign policy is presidentialist or personalist, of low profile, and excessively pro-American. These are
just a few examples of the conventional wisdom that has defined the study of Colombian foreign policy. Although
the field of foreign policy analysis is only in its preliminary phase in Colombia, there is a growing interest among
students and scholars to analytically examine foreign policy decision-making through multiple levels of analysis.
The foreign policy of Colombia is best understood by tracing the direction and alignment of specific foreign policy
decisions into respices, meaning “look at” or “upon.” The fact that Colombia has traditionally “looked upon” a
foreign entity to formulate foreign policy poses different questions regarding how autonomous foreign
policymaking in Colombia really is. On the one hand, the essence of Colombia’s foreign policy has traditionally been
found in a juxtaposition of the country’s interests alongside those of the United States. On the other hand, as a
consequence of the articulation of this foreign policy partnership between Colombia and the United States, security
has been the most recurrent topic in Colombia’s foreign policy agenda-setting, given the problems of illicit drugs,
armed conflict, terrorism, and, more recently, peace.
Keywords:
Colombia, foreign policy, respices, security-peace agenda, state of Colombian Foreign Policy Analysis
Subjects:
Diplomacy, Foreign Policy
Introduction
Colombian foreign policy varies from tragedy to glory, from the most appalling events, such as
being labeled a narco-state, to being considered the second happiest country in the world (Gill,
1
2018). Furthermore, from being classified as a failed state (Foreign Policy, 2009) to achieving
international recognition after the 2012–2016 peace process: “Colombia’s peace process is an
example for the world” (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office & Kariuki, 2021), “the
Colombian Peace Agreement is often cited as a model around the world” (European Parliament,
2021). Though this lack of coherence may be perceived as an obstacle to understanding the
country’s foreign policy, it represents how multifaceted and dynamic Colombian foreign policy
actually is. Colombian foreign policy has been built from the truth, facts, and stereotypes. This
article seeks to clarify different shades of Colombia’s foreign policy, allowing the reader to reach
their own personal conclusions, and by doing so, contributing to provide a comprehensive picture
of the ways in which Colombia’s relations with the world have been analyzed. There are three
common denominators that distinguish Colombian foreign policy from that of other Latin
American countries: First, Colombia’s foreign policymaking is intertwined with the U.S. foreign
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policy mandate toward the Americas. Second, both war and peace have been influential in
Colombian foreign policymaking. And third, unlike other countries in the region, the centrality of
security in Colombian foreign policymaking is key to understanding how the problems of illicit
drugs, armed conflict, terrorism, and more recently, peace, have been addressed by policymakers.
The most evoked milestone in the country’s foreign policy history can be dated back to 1903 and
the loss of Panama. Not only did Colombia lose an important part of its territory but its
autonomy, reputation, and international ambition were all compromised. Almost all history
students would focus on the loss of Panama as the biggest “geopolitical devaluation” (Drekonja,
2011, p. 53) of all times, while students of international relations and foreign policy analysis
would rather take a closer look at its implications for Colombia as a relevant (or irrelevant) player
in the international arena. The aspects that followed territorial loss defined the direction of
Colombia’s foreign policy toward the United States. Foreign policy formulation in Colombia has
historically followed Washington’s indications and guidelines, to the extent that changes in
American foreign policy will automatically imply changes in the making of Colombian foreign
policy. One of the most compelling articles ever written on this subject, for example, refers to the
way that Colombia relied heavily on Washington as a strategy in exchange for compromise and
assistance. Arlene Tickner notes: “It is important to examine the way in which weak countries are
able to promote and perpetuate relations of association and subordination with stronger
counterparts” (Tickner, 2007, p. 92) through a strategy that the author calls “intervention by
invitation,” which would be recalled as another hallmark in Colombian history. So far, it seems
essential that to understand foreign policymaking in Colombia, one must also observe
Washington’s policy toward its “closest ally” in the region as “Colombia’s success is the United
States’ success” (Atlantic Council, 2019).
The fact that Colombia became the United States’ most reliable ally in the hemisphere marked not
only the country’s regional isolation but also what remains today as a general conception of
Colombian national identity, which has not been very encouraging. Since states are social actors,
or somewhat “metaphysical abstractions” according to foreign policy analysts (Hudson & Day,
2020, p. 3), both Colombian and non-Colombian scholars of Colombian foreign policy have
traditionally constructed the history of Colombian foreign policy from a critical point of view.
Colombia came to be known as the “South American Tibet” (Drekonja, 2011, p. 51), “a case of
self-imposed dwarfism” (Bagley, 1982), with an “introverted” (Tokatlian, 2000, p. 36) and “low
profile” foreign policy (Drekonja, 2011, pp. 52–53). As may be noted, scholars of Colombian
foreign policy are frequently tempted to take a pessimistic view of the past, present, and future of
the country’s international performance. Sandra Borda, for example, accentuates how
Colombians tend toward “arrogance” because of the belief that “we are the best country to live
in” (Borda, 2019, p. 16), and that Colombians have an almost “structural lack of self-esteem” (p.
2
16) prompted by an inferiority complex (p. 17). According to Borda, Colombians hold a “third
world country position” (p. 17) as well as a “position of weakness” (p. 17) and are generally
understood to inhabit “a problematic country” (p. 16).
Despite these general considerations of Colombian foreign policy, what remains as a major
challenge is the development of strong academic programs in foreign policy analysis in the
country, which would help bridge traditional associations regarding Colombian foreign policy
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with strong case studies. Based on this argument, this article presents three core aspects of
Colombian foreign policy that will, overall, provide a more thorough understanding of the
country’s international performance and image. First, an explanation of the respices will be
provided. Respice (respĭce) is the Latin word for “to look” or “to look at,” and refers to the foreign
entity or entities that policymakers look to as they design foreign policy. The various respices will
guide the reader toward the preferences and strategies of those who formulate Colombian foreign
policy. Second, following the respices as the guiding theme, specifically, the respice polum
explanation, the centrality of the Colombia–United States relation will be further addressed
alongside the centrality of security in Colombia’s foreign policymaking and the growing military
and police involvement in foreign policy as a result of the country’s conscious dependence
(intervention by invitation) on Washington. Finally, a conceptualization of Colombian foreign
policy analysis will be addressed as a final remark to present that there is in fact a growing but
still incipient trend when it comes to more conceptually rooted analyses.
The Respices and the Alignment of Colombia’s Foreign Policy
One of the elements that distinguish Colombia’s foreign policy is its traditional alignment with
Washington. Nonetheless, Colombian foreign policy has not always “looked to" the United States.
In some cases, depending on the orientation of the Colombian President to the United States, the
country has “looked to” other countries that share similar political, social, economic, and
development characteristics. This foreign policy orientation is known as “respice similia,” or
looking to similar countries. In other cases, Colombian foreign policy has looked to “the universe
of countries,” an orientation known as “respice omnia.”
Respice Polum
In practice, respice polum refers to Colombia’s pro-Americanism as a sui generis case in the
region (Bernal & Tickner, 2017). The first time that Colombian foreign policymakers opted for an
explicit orientation of the country’s foreign policy practices was in 1914. Respice polum was first
proclaimed by Marco Fidel Suárez, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who advocated an alignment with
3
the United States of America. Why did he use a Latin phrase to designate a policy orientation?
Carlos Camacho claims that Suárez’s use of Latin was quite conscious, mainly because in the
years in question, the use of Latin allowed him to “ascend the last steps of the narrow Colombian
social ladder” (Camacho Arango, 2010, p. 179). In this discourse analysis, Camacho also
highlights the way that Suárez used poetic and metaphorical language strategically, indicating
that the meaning of “the north star” pointed to the path that Colombia should follow in order to
recover its battered standing and to be indemnified for its loss of Panama (Camacho Arango,
4
2010, p. 181).
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“We must direct our foreign policy there, toward that powerful Nation, the one that more
than any other, emanates decisive attraction from all other nations in America. If our
conduct could have a motto that encapsulates both desire and vigilance, it would be
respice polum, which is to say that we mustn’t lose sight of our relationship with the
great Northern Confederation.”
(Suárez, 1955, p. 163)
The indemnification of Colombia gave new life to its relationship with the United States, which
then flourished, and alleviated what was a generalized national discontent with the weakness of
Colombian policymakers in the face of what former president Alfonso López Michelsen had called
the country’s greatest “geopolitical devaluation” (Drekonja, 2011, p. 53). Colombia’s behavior has
been explained in several different ways. One of the most frequent explanations introduces the
concept of “subordination” meaning “submission” (Tickner, 2007, p. 95). Other foreign policy
scholars have referred to an “active subordination” that represented the pragmatic approach of
Colombian foreign policy (Ardila, 1990, p. 56). According to Martha Ardila, Colombian foreign
policymakers were aware of the inevitability of becoming subordinated to the United States, and
used the country’s subordinate status strategically by forging a closer link with that country
(Ardila, 1990, p. 83). Arlene Tickner also explains post-Panama policy, referring to a relationship
based on Colombia’s “dependence,” as well as “strategic dependence” (Tickner, 2007, p. 106). In
“Intervention by Invitation” (2007), Tickner also observes that Colombia’s general behavior
toward the United States indicated a lack of autonomy. She observes that this relationship
impacted Colombia’s relations with other countries, particularly its neighbors (Tickner, 2007, p.
93). Tickner enriches this point with the concept of “heterodox autonomy,” which perfectly
describes the pragmatic nature of Colombian foreign policy throughout the country’s history.
According to Tickner, this means “accepting the superpower’s policies in its areas of interest, in
exchange for exercising autonomy in other areas of similar importance to Latin American
countries” (Tickner, 2007, p. 94). In similar terms, Drekonja characterizes the concept of
autonomy as “peripheral” (Drekonja, 2011, p. 53) in arguing that “peripheral countries”
strategically surrender their autonomy in return for the benefits of development, which in the
5
case of Colombia could be provided only by the United States.
Even if just a phrase, metaphor, or discursive device, the orientation known as respice polum
deeply impacted both foreign policymakers and scholars. According to Camacho, what started out
as a metaphor became a historical explanation of Colombia’s performance toward the United
States throughout its history (Camacho Arango, 2010, p. 196). The author states that both respice
polum and respice similia, constitute no more than “labels that make the comprehension of the
problem more difficult” (Camacho Arango, 2010, p. 197). Nonetheless, the respices became
powerful tools for foreign policy analysts who have sought to understand “where” and “why”
Colombian policy goals are directed to specific geographic regions.
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Respice Similia
After years of an unconditional alignment, “submission,” and “lack of autonomy,” Colombian
foreign policy shifted from respice polum to respice similia, meaning “looking to your equals” or
“looking to your peers.” This new orientation was pioneered by former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Alfonso López Michelsen (1968–1970), son of former Liberal President Alfonso López
Pumarejo, who proclaimed “Colombia for Colombians” in the 1930s as a means of protesting the
1823 Monroe Doctrine, or “America for the Americans.” The peak period of respice similia
coincided with the left-wing political groups flourishing in the entire South American region,
including Colombia. Nevertheless, Colombia was the only country that managed to avoid a rightwing dictatorship.
López Michelsen led the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL) or Liberal Revolutionary
Movement, an independent and radical organization. Well-known historian Álvaro Tirado Mejía
describes foreign policy in Colombia during the period when López Michelsen was Minister of
Foreign Affairs as one of the most “intelligent and dynamic of the past century” (Tirado Mejía,
2007). López had always been concerned with what he called a “geopolitical devaluation” after
the loss of Panama, which left Colombia “locked up in its shell” (Drekonja, 1983, p. 260). And
López was also the first to use the Tibet metaphor, stating in a 1961 speech that Colombia was the
“South American Tibet” (Drekonja, 1983, p. 260). Obsessed with Panama, López understood how
detrimental it could be when a country’s foreign policy is subordinated to that of a stronger and
more ambitious country, which described the unfortunate dependence of Colombia on the United
States.
López Michelsen had not only experienced foreign policymaking (he was the son of a former
president) but also enjoyed it. Following Hermann and Preston’s classification of leadership
styles, López Michelsen can be considered a very efficient president, demonstrating both
experience and interest in foreign policy. He enjoyed and excelled at the job and was tolerant of
conflict (Hermann & Preston, 1994, pp. 81–82). During his time in office, there was a clear
presidential influence on the foreign policy agenda (p. 83). Motivation may be another key
variable to understanding how López’s personality and style provided him with the tools he
required to “turn his gaze away” from the United States.
In his biography of López, Stephen Randall (2007) provides insight into his influence on foreign
policy. He highlights certain aspects of López’s personality and leadership style that help explain
the way the president turned away from what had been a foreign policy responding primarily to
respice polum. “[López] understood the importance of having good relations with all those he
negotiated with, and exercised his personal charm with them” (Randall, 2007, p. 245). In his
book, Randall describes how López was able to carry out successful negotiations not only with
Henry Kissinger, but also with Fidel Castro, whom he considered a friend. In fact, López
advocated Cuba’s return to the Inter-American system, and also favored commercial ties with the
Soviet Union. Moreover, López continued to be a leader of the MRL, a cause of concern to the U.S.
government. Nevertheless, he was able to maintain a steadfast association with Washington
because he understood that commercial ties were vital for the country and its “economic
emancipation” (González Arana, 2004, p. 265).
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Respice similia marked an important pathway for Colombian foreign policymaking during the
Cold War. Geopolitically speaking, Colombia was a “third world” country that succeeded in
diversifying its foreign policy toward other similar countries. “Like his father, López Michelsen
did not oppose the United States, but he did try to avoid an exclusive orientation to the north star
in his foreign policy” (Randall, 2007, p. 245). Even though López “looked to” Colombia’s peer
countries, he maintained cordial relations with the United States. His foreign policy
demonstrated high levels of pragmatism and compared to other governments, higher levels of
autonomy.
Respice Omnia
If “looking to the north star” and “looking to your peers” did not suffice, then “looking to the
universe of countries” was intended to fulfill what had to be another approach to understand and
possibly guide foreign policy decision-making in Colombia. Just as the previous respices were
both originated by former ministers of foreign affairs (who later became presidents), “respice
omnia” is associated with Guillermo Fernández de Soto, who served as minister of foreign affairs
from 1998 to 2002. In his book “The Universe is the Limit” (2010, p. 72), Fernández de Soto
describes what would become the third respice of foreign policy in Colombia:
“Contemporary foreign policy should be oriented by the principle of “looking to the
universe” (respice omnia). This principle embraces interdependence with multilateral
forums, with other countries in the region, and with other countries in the world.”
While Fernández de Soto is the author of “respice omnia,” Tokatlian and Cardona had previously
referred to a “respice varia et mutabilia,” i.e., “looking to what is diverse and evolving” (Cardona &
Tokatlian, 1991), which helped pave the way for the principle of “looking to the universe.”
Cardona and Tokatlian promoted the importance of diversifying Colombia’s foreign policy from
an exclusive orientation toward only the United States and its own neighboring countries.
Respice omnia, although a recent concept in the Colombian foreign policy literature, can be
traced back to the decisions made by Colombian foreign policymakers when they sought to open
up to other countries, including other stronger powers, and not just the country’s “peers,” those
countries perceived to be similar. The question was: Is it possible to establish purposeful and
sustainable relations with other countries outside the U.S. sphere of influence? According to Juan
Fernando Palacio:
“an effective foreign policy does not have to suggest a complete separation from stronger
powers, but rather intelligent management of that relationship, in which the State can
broaden the scope of its policy orientation, cultivating relations with other actors without
both objectives becoming mutually exclusive.”
(Palacio, 2013–2014, p. 15)
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Evidence of respice omnia can be noted in the foreign policy of President Juan Manuel Santos. In
his opening speech as president, Santos exclaimed, “We can become a great power!” (Santos,
6
2010). Not only Santos’s energy and optimism for foreign policy, but his strategy, which Palacio
describes as a bold leadership style (Palacio, 2013–2014), marked a new era of diversified foreign
policy. An article by Socorro Ramírez (2011) was influential among international relations
scholars who sought to understand the “turn” of President Santos regarding foreign policy as
compared to his predecessor, former president Álvaro Uribe, keeping in mind that Santos had
served as Minister of Defense (2006–2009) during Uribe’s declared “war against terror.” In her
article, Ramírez explains how under Santos, Colombia achieved a more nuanced relationship with
the United States, yet managed to remain the superpower’s most important ally in the region
(Ramírez, 2011). Ramírez, an acerbic critic of Uribe’s foreign policy, also describes Santos’s new
foreign policy as the perfect opportunity for the country’s international power reconfiguration in
order to “make up for time lost” under Uribe’s foreign policy (Ramírez, 2011).
It has not been easy for Colombia to expand its foreign policy and “look to the universe,” for two
reasons. First, because Colombia still depends on the United States in commercial, political, and
geostrategic matters. This dependence on the “north star” has become part of the country’s
foreign policy identity, despite the fact that there is little or no reciprocity on the part of the
United States. Dallanegra explains that for the United States, the relationship with Colombia is
“pragmatic and non-vital” (Dallanegra, 2012, p. 40), while for Colombia, “it has become a
prerequisite for internal survival” (p. 40), mainly because Colombia came to be dependent on
economic and military assistance. Second, Colombia’s exports include little more than nonmining or energy products such as coffee, fruits, flowers, dairy, other manufactures and services
that do not represent a large share of income when compared to mining-energy derivatives such
as oil, carbon, refined petroleum products, and gold (Asociación Nacional de Comercio Exterior,
2021).
There is no consensus on what the respices are and mean. Some argue that they are principles
(Palacio, 2013–2014), while others call them metaphors (Camacho Arango, 2010), symbolic
depictions of a specific foreign policy (Dallanegra, 2012), or foreign policy traditions (Tickner &
Borda, 2011, p. 28). Still others consider them doctrines, guidelines (Tickner, 2007, p. 91), slogans
or “an ideological vision of Colombia’s role in the world” (Tokatlian, 2000, p. 36), a strategy of
emulation (Monroy, 2015, p. 34), or even a “concept” to “label” Colombia’s foreign policy
7
orientation (Drekonja, 2011, p. 56). No matter how the respices are defined, it is important to
identify the circumstances and foreign policy events that have followed one respice orientation or
the other. According to Tokatlian, one can trace evidence of the different respices among various
presidential administrations. For example, he identified different respices in the foreign policies
of both President Julio César Turbay and President Belisario Betancur. This variation can be as a
result of “internal and external circumstances depending on the issues and interests at
stake” (Tokatlian, 2000, p. 37).
Reviewing the respices was essential to understand the direction of foreign policy in Colombia
since the 1914 proclamation of respice polum (see Table 1 for more information). Moreover,
understanding the influence that three former ministers of foreign affairs had in shaping the
country’s foreign policy has turned out to be very useful for foreign policymakers, scholars, and
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students. However, students and scholars of foreign policy in Colombia must be aware of falling
in what Bernal and Tickner refer to “common places” to avoid implying that the respice polum
idea has almost naturalized a vis-á-vis subordination of Colombia to the United States (Bernal &
Tickner, 2017, p. 7). Avoiding this pitfall is key for the future of Colombian foreign policy analysis.
Table 1. Examples of Respices and Their Influence in Foreign Policymaking in Colombia
Foreign policy decision, issue, or trend
President
Evidences of
respices in
foreign policy
decisionmaking
Following President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy” in 1933,
the Colombian government accepted a mutual defense and military assistance
agreement with the United States.
Alfonso
López
Pumarejo
(1934–1938)
(1942–1945)
Polum
During the interwar period, Colombia realized its need for pursuing a strong
military. Coleman (2008) described the way in which in 1938, President
Eduardo Santos became impressed with U.S. pilots that came to Colombia for
his presidential inauguration ceremony. Since Santos desired a strong military,
he asked the U.S. special envoy if the United States could send military
advisors to Colombia. Coleman considered President Santos as the
“Colombian–United States cooperation architect” (Coleman, 2008). Martha
Ardila described the existence of “secret pacts” between Santos and President
Roosevelt mainly focused on secretly negotiating military cooperation,
including the use of military bases in Colombia as well as the presence of U.S.
military observers in the country (Ardila, 1991, p. 108).
Eduardo
Santos
(1938–1942)
Polum
German aviation was widely developed in Colombia. However, starting with
the WWII, the United States pressured Colombia so that U.S. Airlines were to
become number one in the hemisphere. The United States considered giving
assistance to foreign aviation companies a “threat against U.S.
interests” (Randall, 1992, p. 154). Moreover, “the Colombian government was
the first in South America to break relations with the German and its
allies” (Palacios, 2003, p. 165). Colombia became the U.S.’s strongest ally in
the hemisphere.
Eduardo
Santos
(1938–1942)
Polum
Colombia was the country in Latin America that sent an entire battalion,
“Batallón Colombia,” to assist the U.S.-led United Nations force in Korea.
Around 160,000 Colombian soldiers died as a result of the Korean War (Peckel,
2019, p. 255).
Laureano
Gómez
(1950–1951)
Polum
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Foreign policy decision, issue, or trend
President
Evidences of
respices in
foreign policy
decisionmaking
Following the “Eisenhower Doctrine” of 1957, which called for a more
proactive role of the United States, mainly in the Middle East to counter
communism, President Alberto Lleras Camargo asked the United States for
special assistance in 1959 to counter the guerrilla movement in Colombia.
Alberto
Lleras
Camargo
(1958–1962)
Polum
The formulation and implementation of Plan Colombia as a U.S. foreign policy
“state-building” strategy in Colombia.
Andrés
Pastrana
(1998–2002)
Polum
Álvaro Uribe
(2002–2010)
The Colombian government strategically “internationalizes” its internal
Álvaro Uribe
conflict by aligning the war against guerrilla groups with the U.S.’s “war on
terror” (Borda, 2007). Colombia also participated in the 2003 “Coalition of the
(2002–2010)
Polum
willing” led by President Bush. As a consequence, Colombia lost autonomy
and, according to Borda, “the ability to take independent decisions in this
field” (Borda, 2007, p. 69). She also defines “internationalization” as the way in
which “an actor takes an explicit and conscious decision: the decision to
involve external actors in any phase of the domestic conflict” (Borda, 2007, p.
72). Although controversial, for Vargas-Alzate et al., “Uribe’s efforts to achieve
a more secure country also meant important economic results” (Vargas-Alzate
et al., 2012, p. 273).
President Samper’s emphasis on strengthening Colombia’s alignment with the
nonaligned movement.
Ernesto
Samper
(1994–1998)
Similia
President Santos pursued Colombia’s leadership in UNASUR (Union of South
American Nations). According to Cujabante, the organization “presents the
most ambitious proposal on South American integration” (Cujabante, 2012, p.
75). Also, UNASUR functions under a “personalized presidentialist
diplomacy” (p. 75). Two Colombians were appointed Secretary Generals of the
organization, María Emma Mejía (2011–2012) and Ernesto Samper (2014–
2017).
Juan Manuel
Santos
(2010–2018)
Similia
The Pacific Alliance was established in 2011 between Colombia, Chile, Mexico,
and Peru. According to President Santos in his inaugural speech as presidentelect, “respect, cooperation and diplomacy will be the axes of our
Juan Manuel
Santos
(2010–2018)
Omnia
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Foreign policy decision, issue, or trend
President
Evidences of
respices in
foreign policy
decisionmaking
international relations.” As evidence of respice omnia, Vargas-Alzate points
out that “the alliance has high potential in economic terms and has generated
great interest from the Asian-Pacific region” (Vargas-Alzate, 2016, p. 33).
Peace Agreement with the FARC.
Peace, specifically the peace agreement 2012–2016, became internationalized
during this period. The international community embraced President Santos’s
Juan Manuel
Santos
(2010–2018)
Omnia
Iván Duque
(2018–2022)
Omnia
peace effort and diplomacy for peace strategy to the point that the
international community created a sort of “international shield” (Badillo,
2020) that aims to guarantee no changes will affect the signed agreement.
President Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize award in 2016.
President Iván Duque took an unexpected journey to China during his first year
as president. In relation to Colombia’s historic partnership with the United
States and Europe, a well-known economic magazine in Colombia stated that
“it is never too late, because China is a country that continues to grow rapidly
and has a great capacity of consumption” (Portafolio, 2021).
Respice Polum and the Centrality of Security in Colombian Foreign Poli­
cymaking
As a result of the respice polum foreign policy orientation, security has been the most recurrent
topic in Colombia’s foreign policy agenda-setting given the problems of illicit drugs, armed
conflict, terrorism, and, more recently, peace. Colombia is one of the few countries in Latin
America that has not had a military dictatorship. There has never been a Colombian Alfredo
Stroessner (Paraguay), Augusto Pinochet (Chile), Jorge Videla (Argentina), or Manuel Noriega
(Panama), just to mention a few. Some may argue that General Rojas Pinilla’s 4 years as president
(1953–1957) was a dictatorship imposed by means of a coup d’état, but his assumption of the
presidency was a strategic and deliberate measure, expressly intended to reduce the interparty
violence that had escalated alarmingly on April 9, 1948, in the urban conflagration known as the
Bogotazo. For some foreign policy scholars including Ronal Rodríguez, Colombia experienced
both a “positive and negative dictatorship” from 1953 to 1957 (Rodríguez, 2006, pp. 44–47).
Rodríguez points to some positive outcomes intended to contain the prevailing violence, but also
8
to negative factors such as Rojas Pinilla’s attempt to hold onto power indefinitely. Other authors
have called the coup that brought Rojas Pinilla to power a “coup d’état of public opinion” (Villar
Borda, 2020), or an “anticipated coup” (Atehortúa, 2010, p. 34) that was necessary in order to
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bring the widespread violence in the country under control. In his article on the coup, Atehortúa
also states that the U.S. embassy in Colombia was aware of the so-called (and, according to the
author, anticipated) coup and was more concerned with the problem of guerrillas than with the
military (Atehortúa, 2010, pp. 34–35): “the Embassy was convinced that if the government
wasn't flexible enough, there would be an increased risk of communist infiltration of the
guerrillas” (Atehortúa, 2010, p. 35).
In contrast to other countries in the region, the military government in Colombia did not actually
supplant civilian rule. Rojas Pinilla’s time in office was in fact a period of interparty negotiations
and a reconceptualization of interparty relations. Unfortunately, the violence continued anyway.
In fact, it was transformed and expanded, coming to affect the civilian population, national
institutions, politics, and the country’s international image. This phenomenon helps to explain
why military assistance and military matters were prioritized over other foreign policy issues. It
can be said that Colombia’s foreign policy became militarized, first because of significant military
cooperation with the United States, and second because Colombia’s violent internal conflict
hindered a more diverse and dynamic international performance. Sandra Borda describes this
phenomenon as “the internationalization of Colombia’s internal conflict” (Borda, 2007). This
was particularly the case during the administration of President Álvaro Uribe, when U.S.
involvement in Colombia’s internal security increased considerably.
Although there is a clear separation between the military and civilian authorities, security issues
have been the most important matters on the foreign policy agenda, particularly after the
implementation of Plan Colombia. It is important to state that the military took on the role of a
political actor in 1948, and as Leongómez points out, every Colombian government is attentive to
the military because of its capacity to influence state decisions (Leongómez, 1987). Other studies,
however, emphasize the limits of the military’s role in policy decisions due to its traditionally
“atypical obedience toward civilian authority” (Ruhl, 1981, p. 123). Ruhl also mentions that there
is a solid relationship between civilian authorities and the military as a result of the traditionally
bipartisan political system in Colombia, which was further strengthened during the period of the
Frente Nacional following the government of Rojas Pinilla (p. 129). He also describes different
characteristics of the alliance between the military and civilian governments in the interest of
countering internal enemies (Ruhl, 1981, p. 134). This aspect mirrors the discussion of the
“internationalization” of Colombia’s internal conflict.
One of the key factors to be considered in this discussion is the reputation of the armed forces.
Isacson explains that one goal of those who plan U.S. military operations in the region is to
uphold close relationships with their military counterparts and thereby strengthen military
engagement, “often with negative human rights consequences” (Isacson, 2005). Another
ongoing problem has been the material weakness of the Colombian armed forces (which explains
why 80% of Plan Colombia’s initial funding was directed toward the material strengthening of
the military) and their low visibility. According to Ruhl, in the 1930s, the Colombian army was
smaller and less respected than other armies in Latin America (Ruhl, 1981, p. 133). Thanks to Plan
Colombia and increased military alignment with the United States, the Colombian military is now
a strong and experienced institution.
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Foreign Policy Marketing: The “War”/“Peace” Dichotomy
Mintz and DeRouen provide a rich explanation of framing and marketing in foreign policymaking.
They mention that “just as marketers promote their products to generate sales, it is crucial for
state leaders to market their policies to different constituencies,” and they assert that leaders are
able to “market” foreign policy decisions such as war, peace, and international agreements
(Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 149). The authors state that “international relations marketing deals
with the marketing of foreign policy and national security policies, including peace and war
marketing” (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 149). Furthermore, foreign policy marketing follows
framing as a “marketing tactic” (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 149), in the sense that “the way the
decision information is presented can affect the choice” (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 76). The
concept of “foreign policy marketing” was developed by Rosenblatt (1998) in his search to
explain the extent to which the president can influence public opinion on policy issues. The
author also states that presidents “should be more successful in cultivating public support for the
use of troops to stop the violation of a state's sovereignty than to resolve an internal
conflict” (Rosenblatt, 1998, p. 227). His analysis, however, focuses on the effects of presidential
discourse on public opinion rather than presidential motivation or the policymaking process. In
Colombia, Arlene Tickner (2004) in her analysis on the “spillover effect” of the Colombian crisis
(the Colombian “security crisis regionalization”) (p. 14) states that the regionalization of the
crisis was a consequence of the internal dynamics and the way that policymakers “articulate
specific issues such as security problems” (p. 14) in reference to “the political use of the concept
of security for particular interests” (Tickner, 2004, p. 32), also known as securitization (Tickner,
2004, p. 14; see Buzan et al., 1998).
Framing is usually enhanced using metaphors, defined as “comparisons drawn from a completely
different realm of experience” (Shimko, 1994, p. 660) that predispose audiences toward
particular points of view. According to Shimko, “Cognitively speaking, both metaphors and
analogies are tools for understanding, forms of “mental economics” that use comparisons to
make the unfamiliar familiar” (p. 660). In his discussion, Shimko indicates that decision-makers
“with little direct foreign policy experience and/or knowledge are more likely to think in
metaphorical terms” (p. 668). He also refers to the expected impacts of metaphorical language as
“subtler but very pervasive” (p. 665). Metaphors, he says, “by definition always hide some parts
of reality” (p. 667). Regarding analogies, William Flanik explains that analogies compare similar
things while metaphors compare things within different semantic domains (Flanik, 2017). In
effect, leaders tend to frame policy issues and use metaphorical language so that public opinion
will easily accommodate itself to foreign policy events. Both analogies and metaphors help
simplify technical policy language so that leaders, in this article considered foreign policy
marketers, can easily coopt an audience and “shape the affective salience of a problem” (Flanik,
2017, p. 43).
In the Colombian case, for example, it has been very common to identify the use of metaphors in
foreign policy. Colombia is said to have always been at war, for example, be it a war against
“communism,” “drugs,” “terrorism,” “narco-terrorism,” “narco-guerrillas,” “narcoChavistas,” or whatever metaphorical label each president and his government has chosen to
evoke. It can be observed in the use of these war analogies that Colombian foreign policymaking
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has been guided in relation to U.S. influence. According to Shimko (1994), when war is labeled
metaphorically, problem-framing is necessarily impacted and thus problem-solving is
militarized.
“Either way, the war metaphor sets the groundwork by laying the conceptual foundation.
That is, the notion of “war” carries with it a whole set of intellectual baggage that is
brought along as the concept is transferred from one area to another.”
(Shimko, 1994, pp. 658–659)
The concepts discussed here are useful to understand how Colombian leaders have struggled for
national as well as international recognition in their quest for a “historical legacy.” Presidents
have a strong desire to be remembered by history, and de Rivera points out the way that a
president’s own program, power, prestige, and place in history determine his decisions at the
negotiating table (de Rivera, 1968, p. 131). In Colombia, “war” and “peace” have become iconic
words used in the implicit branding and marketing of both domestic and foreign policy for
electoral or reputational purposes, international assistance, and historical legacy.
Colombian leaders and their advisors have typically set the agenda by framing both war and peace
to promote their “product,” in this case, the decisions and policies that they wish to “sell” or
establish both at the domestic as well as at the international level. This article will discuss two
crucial aspects of foreign policy marketing: first, the branding of “war” that developed in what
was known as the militarization of Colombian foreign policy, specifically after the
implementation of Plan Colombia. This discussion reflects the respice polum orientation because
of the “inevitable” (Randall, 1992) links between Colombia and the United States in matters of
security. Second, the branding of “peace” will be addressed in reference to President Santos’s
peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -Ejército del Pueblo
FARC-EP commonly known as FARC (2012–2016).
“War” Branding: Plan Colombia
“Mr. President, our democracy is in danger and our Armed Forces are in an intensive care unit.”
This was the warning of General Fernando Tapias after the FARC guerrillas’ “Operación
Marquetalia,” their name for the November 1, 1998, siege of Mitú, the capital of Vaupés
Department. After attacking the local command post of the National Police, the insurgents took
control of the city for the first time in history. The United States, for its part, which had labeled
Colombia a “narco-State” during the 1994–1998 presidency of Ernesto Samper, now perceived
Colombia as a “failed state.” One of the most important actors in the making of Plan Colombia
was Barry McCaffrey, a retired U.S. Army General who was appointed Director of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy by President Clinton. The General explained the origins of Plan
Colombia in a personal interview (2011):
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“I saw that the situation in Colombia was deteriorating, so I went to President Clinton (in
1999) and told him: in five years, Colombia will become a failed state with a socialist
insurgency in power. This will happen during the next presidency and you will be blamed,
and you will deserve to be held accountable. Right there he gave me his support (and Plan
Colombia was designed).”
(Personal interview with Barry McCaffrey cited in 2015 Monroy, p. 54)
Once the United States had set the agenda, it was President Pastrana’s turn to contribute to a plan
that was thought of as a Colombian version of the original “Marshall Plan,” but turned out to be
the most important military assistance plan in the history of the country. President Pastrana
assembled a group of eight advisors to approve an extraordinarily large aid package with which
the Colombian government would redress the troubling legacy of the previous Samper
administration (Monroy & Sánchez, 2017, p. 14). And the stakes were high, because Pastrana had
been elected by marketing the concept of “peace” in his campaign. He also claimed to have
expertise on the “terrain of peace” after having been kidnapped by the Medellín Cartel in 1988
(Monroy & Sánchez, 2017, p. 15): “I promise change, and I want you to become involved in
changing Colombia (. . .) I want Colombia to live in peace” (Pastrana, 1998). Moreover, Pastrana
was aware that “his most important ally was the U.S., and its involvement would demonstrate
historical support for the ‘Diplomacy for Peace’ effort” (Monroy & Sánchez, 2017, p. 15).
Notwithstanding Pastrana’s efforts to fulfill his promise of bringing peace, he officially
announced the end of peace negotiations with the FARC on February 20, 2002, effectively
declaring open war on the insurgency. In his speech, Pastrana declared,
“In June 1998, almost 6.5 million Colombians supported my peace project. This was the
greatest number in any Colombian election. . . and I did all I could to achieve peace. . . I
risked my reputation and my place in history, but I don't regret it because I did it thinking
that we would be bringing peace to Colombia. . . Difficult times are coming; there is no
doubt about it. . . We must be prepared, because acts of terrorism may increase. . ., but we
won´t let terrorism divide us. . . An Army of 40 million Colombians is invincible, and [the
enemy] will never defeat us.”
(Pastrana, 2002)
With the help of U.S. officials, Pastrana’s government designed Plan Colombia. But it was
implemented during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe with the result that Colombia’s internal
conflict became internationalized (Borda, 2007). This marked the transition from an orientation
toward peace to an orientation toward war.
Uribe was elected president on May 26, 2002, only months after Pastrana officially ended peace
negotiations with the FARC. The failed negotiations, followed by a futile ultimatum that the
president made to the guerrillas, had demonstrated that that there was no longer room for peace
in the public mood, at least not at that time. There was a clear message that the country needed to
show strength. It was time for a new leader to show a strong hand and to implement a new
strategy that would protect civilians against the new period of terrorism in Colombia that
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9
Pastrana had anticipated. Plan Colombia was implemented in combination with Uribe’s policy of
“democratic security.” In his inaugural address, the new president described peace as a goal for
another time that was not to be had through “appeasement originating from a dishonest
dialogue” (Redacción EL TIEMPO, 2002). In the same speech, he focused on references to
terrorism, crime, and authority. The new policy of democratic security included “the declaration
of a state of domestic commotion, a special security tax, the recruitment of peasant soldiers to
strengthen different regions, and a network of informants to support the intelligence agencies,
10
among other measures” (Leal Buitrago, 2006, p. 4).
Security branding was completely successful in this period. The use of force was perceived as a
solution after the failure of peace negotiations under the previous president. According to Mintz
and DeRouen, “presidents reject passive foreign policy options when public opinion strongly
favors the use of force and reject pro-force options when the public opposes the use of
force” (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 160). According to Leal Buitrago, the year 2003 started with a
mood of public satisfaction because “Uribe was everywhere,” the military was having success in
rescuing kidnapped people, and perceptions of security improved (Leal Buitrago, 2006, p. 7).
Uribe also displayed an international “diplomatic offensive,” asking the international
community to condemn the FARC and blame the organization for all the security problems in
Colombia. In sum, his conception of seeking peace was to achieve it through military conquest
and strengthening the state against narco-terrorist groups. Nevertheless, Uribe had the highest
favorability of any president in Colombian history. According to several surveys, he had an
approval rating of 75%–80% when he left office. By 2008, he was even recognized as the most
popular president in the region (Portafolio, 2008). Furthermore, his popularity peaked after
high-stakes hostage rescue operations against the FARC, particularly the perilous but successful
Operación Jaque, in which former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, three American
contractors, and members of the military and police were liberated.
Uribe’s success in “marketing” security can also be explained by his unique use of metaphorical
language, which along with his rhetorical style boosted his popularity and governance. He was
perceived by the general public as a modest and friendly president, and his easygoing and
colloquial language, filled with content and meaning, allowed him to reach both the educated and
undereducated populations. As a result, the public was predisposed to approve of his sometimescontroversial security policies. Following Mintz and DeRouen’s description, it is possible to state
that Uribe succeeded in the use of metaphorical language because he was able to “sell” his
decisions to the public in order to enhance his standing (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 166).
According to Shimko, those with little or no foreign policy experience are “more likely to think in
metaphorical terms” (Shimko, 1994, p. 668) and such was the case with President Uribe. Table 2
presents examples of the metaphors and analogies most used by Uribe in an international
context.
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Table 2. Álvaro Uribe’s Most Common Metaphors, 2002–2010
Metaphor
Clarification
Context
Foreign policymaker’s motivation/objective
Bandits
The word “bandits” is used instead of “the
FARC guerrillas.”
President Álvaro Uribe’s
speech at the March 2008
To obtain the approval for “Operation Fénix”
from the many member states assembled at
summit of the Rio Group
in the Dominican
the summit.
“We have planned many operations
against these bandits.”
1
Republic.
Concentration camps
“In Colombia we have Hitler, which
is the FARC, and we also have
concentration camps, which are the
places where the FARC holds its
captives.”
The snake
“We have weakened the snake, but
2
it’s still alive.”
Little egg
Uribe makes a direct comparison between
the FARC and Hitler. In this case, the
policymaker uses analogy to highlight a
threat, insinuating the resemblance of
FARC practices to historical phenomena
agreed to be horrific.
Uribe’s 2004 visit to
Europe and his meeting
with members of the
European Parliament.
To generate associations between the FARC
and Hitler’s concentration camps in order to
underline the magnitude of the threat that the
FARC represents in Colombia.
“The snake” refers to the FARC, attributing
the characteristics associated with
aggressive, poisonous reptiles dangerous
to humans to the guerrilla insurgents.
Meeting with U.S.
president George W. Bush
in 2004.
To promote a negative perception of the
guerrilla enemy as a menacing and dangerous
threat.
“The little chicken” refers to Colombia,
“the little egg” refers to the policy of
democratic security, the “hawk” that
threatens them both is Venezuela. The
South American region is described as “the
neighborhood.”
National Police
promotion ceremony,
2010.
To reinforce negative stereotypes of
Venezuela. In this context, Uribe portrays
Colombia as weak compared to Venezuela (a
defenseless chicken versus a predatory hawk).
He also wants to stress how indispensable it is
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Metaphor
Clarification
Context
“If we don’t watch out for the little
chicken that guards the little egg of
democratic security, that little egg
will face danger because the hawk
is stalking the neighborhood.”
The plague
“We trust that the U.S. and
President Bush will continue
assisting Colombia until we get rid
of the plague of terrorism and
Foreign policymaker’s motivation/objective
for Colombians to safeguard the democratic
security policy implemented by his
government.
Terrorism and drugs are defined as
plagues, in that not only are they
undesirable, but they expand easily and
are difficult to control.
Meeting with President
George W. Bush in 2004.
To emphasize the acute and pernicious danger
of drugs and terrorism and to highlight the
need for U.S. assistance to control and
eradicate these problems.
drugs. We can’t leave this task half
done. We will win, but we haven’t
won yet.”
1 Note: On March 1, 2008, the Colombian military attacked a FARC encampment across the border in Ecuador. The attack was intended to kill a FARC member
known as Raúl Reyes, but it also caused the death of civilians who were visiting the camp and provoked a diplomatic crisis involving Colombia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela.
2 “The snake” was one of the metaphors most commonly used by former president Uribe. He often referred to “the snake” in his local speeches around the
country.
Source: Monroy, María Catalina & Cubides, Caren. Semillero de investigación: Análisis de Política Exterior Colombiana (APECO), Universidad del Rosario,
October 2021
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Foreign Policy of Colombia
Respices in Practice: From Respice Polum to Respice Omnia
War and peace have been key for foreign policy decision-making and presidential legacies and
reputation. While respice polum has defined the centrality of security in foreign policy in
reference to the Colombia–United States partnership, respice similia and respice omnia stand as
the leading shifts or changes in Colombia’s foreign policy orientation. The country’s foreign
policy agenda aims at social, economic, environmental, and cultural issues rather than just
security as the sole standpoint. Both similia and omnia, in practice, refer to a closer look of
Colombian foreign policymakers toward Latin America and Europe.
From respice polum to respice omnia; from security or hard power issues to peace. Presidents
have promised peace, but sometimes they have promised peace through war. No matter the
means, national interest has always revolved around bringing an end to the longest and only
ongoing civil war in the American hemisphere. According to President Juan Manuel Santos, “It
was not just a handful of Colombians who called for peace: it became a national priority” (Santos,
2019, p. 89). During this period, “Plan Colombia,” which was perceived internationally as a war
plan, became “Paz Colombia,” shifting the significance and aim of international assistance. In
fact, Presidents Obama and Santos met in Washington on February 4, 2016, to announce the
request for $450 million in aid for Plan Colombia, “the program under which the United States
has supplied Colombia with military equipment, training and economic assistance” (Landler,
2016). At this meeting, President Obama stated:
“Plan Colombia will be renamed Peace Colombia to reflect its new purpose of helping the
country keep the peace, rather than wage war. There is hope today in Colombia.”
(Landler, 2016)
Table 3. Peace Processes in Colombia
Period
President
Counterparts in the process
1982–1986
Belisario Betancur
Dialogues with the FARC-EP, EPL, and M-19
1986–1990
Virgilio Barco
Dialogues with the M-19, EPL, PRT, and MAQL
1990–1994
César Gaviria
Dialogue with the EPL
1994–1998
Ernesto Samper
Failed attempts to negotiate with the FARC-EP and ELN
1998–2002
Andrés Pastrana
The FARC-EP, ELN
2002–2010
Álvaro Uribe
The AUC
2010–2018
Juan Manuel Santos
Peace agreement with the FARC
Source: Villarraga (2015).
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After all the efforts and promises, President Santos succeeded in achieving what he secretly—at
first—hoped would be another opportunity for peace. It is important to note that Juan Manuel
Santos was President Uribe’s Minister of Defense from 2006 to 2009. He oversaw the most
warlike military operation ever mounted during the implementation of Plan Colombia and the
democratic security policy. It can be said that Santos was a “hawk” as the Minister of Defense but
a “dove” as the President. In his words, “I had to make war in order to achieve peace.” (Santos,
2021) According to Santos:
“And for the first time in 157 years my party won the [legislative] majority. And I had the
power to choose a ministry and I chose the Ministry of Defense. . . So that’s when I had to
be a hawk. I had to be successful in the war against the FARC if I wanted to eventually
have peace.”
(Santos, 2020)
The peace process (2012–2013) completely changed what had been a traditional respice polumoriented foreign policy in Colombia. A respice omnia orientation was central to Santos’s strategy
of peace diplomacy, which ensured that the international community would be directly involved,
not only with the negotiating actors but with the civilian population as well. One of the most
important aspects of this agreement was the inclusion of women, who were integrated in 2014
with the establishment of the permanent Subcommission on Gender. Cuba became directly
involved, as did Venezuela, Norway, and Chile. “Their role was key to achieve the final peace
agreement in Havana” (Caracol Radio, 2016). Another demonstration of the involvement of the
international community in guaranteeing peace in Colombia is the great amount of foreign
assistance that seeks to contribute to a lasting peace. Millions of dollars have been donated by
countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland,
Finland, South Korea, and Chile, which make up the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund for
Sustaining Peace in Colombia.
Badillo noted that the peace agreement and peace diplomacy represented a two-level game,
through which the president designed his foreign policy based on the recognition of domestic
goals (Badillo, 2020, p. 25). Like almost every president in Colombia, Santos promised that he
would end the armed conflict. Only this time, his strategy demonstrated that it was essential to
market “peace” and “sell” it at the international level. The result was clear: Both the Colombian
peace agreement and the president gained international recognition. In 2016, he won the Nobel
Peace Prize, which boosted his image and reputation.
“The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided to award the Nobel Peace Prize for 2016 to
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos for his resolute efforts to bring the country’s
more than 50-year-long civil war to an end, a war that has cost the lives of at least
220,000 Colombians and displaced close to six million people.”
(The Nobel Prize, 2016)
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What has been truly challenging when it comes to understanding Colombian foreign policy is how
volatile and changeable Colombian foreign policy is from one government to another. A common
perception is that Colombia has a “governmental foreign policy” rather than a “state foreign
policy,” which would imply greater continuity. The country´s presidentialist (in occasions
ideologist) foreign policy making trait demonstrate how leaders perceive and prefer to direct
foreign policy. The respices are a considerable guideline to understand the direction and possible
fluctuation of Colombian foreign policy from time to time and without public consent. The
problem Colombian foreign policy faces today is that because the peace agreement had a positive
impact on the international community, any policy decision in Colombia that affects the
implementation of peace in any way will draw the immediate attention of both donor and
nondonor countries, which will analyze developments in unpredictable ways. Colombia’s foreign
policy with respect to peace and security issues is no longer solely a matter of domestic politics.
Conceptualization of Colombian Foreign Policy Analysis
What conceptual, empirical, and/or methodological innovations to explain foreign policy in
Colombia are available? Foreign policy in Colombia requires more analyses based on a rich
description of foreign policy events aligned with a resourceful use of theory and analytical tools
to explain foreign policy decision-making. Considering that foreign policy analysis (FPA) has
been defined as a North American enterprise, following a North American mainstream and with
English as the “undisputed lingua franca in the field of FPA” (Brummer, 2015, p. 184), the
questions that need to be asked are: How can Colombian foreign policy analysts theorize foreign
policy and foreign policy decision-making? Which questions should scholars ask to analyze one
specific foreign policy decision? Which methods and levels of analysis should be consulted? What
does mainstream FPA require to become applicable, to extend its explanatory scope, in Latin
America?
In Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America, Hudson asserts how FPA has had an increasing
inclusion in the undergraduate and graduate curricula of political science and international
relations and that the field is “arguably experiencing a true renaissance” (Hudson, 2015). The
author reaffirms that the essence of the FPA enterprise are human beings with a focus on agentoriented theory, meaning those decision-makers that stand as a point of intersection between
external and internal to the nation-state (Hudson, 2015, pp. 1–2), also known as two-level game.
In tracing FPA beyond North America, Rita Giacalone’s chapter on Latin American foreign policy
analysis presents a detailed review of the publications of Latin American FPA authors from the
1970s to the 2000s describing the autonomy debate, based on autonomy-inspired foreign policy
decisions (Giacalone, 2015). As a contribution to foreign policy in Colombia, Giacalone refers to
the autonomy–dependency debate to explain how the “escalation of guerrilla and drug
trafficking activities determined Colombia’s closeness to the United States” (Giacalone, 2015, p.
126). The author also cites Arlene Tickner’s “intervention by invitation” article to strengthen the
explanation of Colombia’s dependency (respice polum). In addition, Giacalone mentions the
concepts of regionalism and regional integration as a means to explain the pragmatism of both
Colombia’s and Venezuela’s foreign policies. According to Giacalone’s review, regional
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integration became an instrument “through which the evolution of Latin American FPA can be
explored” (Giacalone, 2015, p. 126). Although Giacalone embraces the concepts of autonomy,
regionalism, and their respective debates as evidence of Latin American FPA, the truth is that the
FPA enterprise, understood as an agent-oriented theory, is rather in a preliminary phase.
There are a few but essential FPA research studies that exhibit recent scholarly engagement in
Colombian FPA. A major contribution to fully understand what has become the major trend of
foreign policy in Colombia, respice polum, originates from Bernal and Tickner who genuinely
question why Colombian foreign policymakers decided to preserve the country’s proAmericanism or association with the United States as a psychological tendency to maintain a
positive perception of the United States (Bernal & Tickner, 2017, p. 11). The authors interpret
decision-makers’ role throughout a thorough constructivist approach based on how identity and
ideas, understood as intersubjective systems of representation and reproduction of social
practices (Bernal & Tickner, 2017, p. 9), shape foreign policymaking. Following mainstream FPA
and the notion of the state as a social actor, Bernal and Tickner innovate by stating how foreign
policymakers perceive, interpret, and act in their milieu according to their preferences, ideas, and
personal perceptions of the role and place of their countries in the world.
In addition to advancing in the interpretation of specific foreign policy decisions and resolving
the “why” and “how” questions, Bernal and Tickner’s contribution to the development of FPA in
Colombia highlight the importance of investigating primary sources such as the elite’s public
discourses, political debates, and policy memoirs. In addition, the authors provide insights on the
role and perception of Colombian foreign policy elites (Bernal & Tickner, 2017, pp. 11–12) as well
as a comprehensive explanation of change in the perception and interpretation of these elites
with regard to pro-Americanism as a case study.
Another contribution toward an agent-oriented theory in analyzing foreign policy in Colombia is
Monroy and Sánchez’s (2017) article published in a special issue on foreign policy beyond North
America. In “Foreign policy analysis and the making of Plan Colombia,” the authors apply
mainstream FPA, namely groupthink theory and presidential role, to achieve the purpose of
analyzing small group decision-making and explore individual dynamics of President Pastrana’s
advisory system. As a result, the authors claim an existing boundedness of groupthink theory
when applied to a non-U.S. foreign policy decision-making process (Monroy & Sánchez, 2017, p.
247). The results also evidenced that informality or “groupy behavior” is also a key characteristic
of foreign policymaking and that the process doesn’t necessarily affect the final decision outcome
as Irving Janis, proponent of groupthink theory, claimed. In addition, Monroy and Sánchez claim
that powerless countries (such as Colombia) striving for foreign policy recognition, in the
presence of overlay, when a country (usually strong) is capable of influencing another´s foreign
policy making process (a common result of respice polum), will have a higher probability to shape
coherent, concurrent and loyal to the president groups, that, in its urge to conform, will end up
avoiding critical thought and affect the quality of decision outcomes.
Colombian FPA does not remain exclusively focused on the president as the leading policymaker,
but rather examining the role of domestic actors in shaping foreign policy is an innovative
perspective for FPA in general. This is the case of Long et al.’s (2020) study on domestic
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contestation and presidential prerogative in Colombian foreign policy. This study portrays
opposition as an influential actor in blocking or reshaping presidential foreign policy preferences.
The statement that foreign policy in Colombia is presidentialist by nature is questioned by the
model of “contested presidentialism” that integrates domestic actors and discusses how
opponents impose costs on presidents that may lead to rejection of their preferences (Long et al.,
2020, p. 469). This study challenges mainstream FPA as described by Klaus Brummer, which
focuses primarily on the role of the president and his advisors (Brummer, 2015). According to the
authors, “presidents may be first movers, but they do not always have the last word” (Long et al.,
2020, p. 479). Instead, this study highlights the game between the government and the
opposition and the costs imposed (mainly institutional and political veto); high costs will indicate
presidents to abandon policy, while low costs will result in presidents accomplishing their
preferred policy (Long et al., 2020, p. 469).
More recently, gender and feminist foreign policy is also present in the conceptualization of
Colombian foreign policy analysis. Jaramillo and Monroy provided an innovative research
pathway by gendering the peace process agreement between the Colombian government and the
FARC from 2014 to 2016. Through a gender dimension, the authors analyzed President Santos’s
foreign policy strategy evidencing how gender can be a significant factor in a government’s twolevel game, mainly because domestic politics and foreign policy are not necessarily gendered
independently (Jaramillo & Monroy, 2021). The results shed light on the extent that patriarchy
and/or feminism shape and influence foreign policymakers. Moreover, the study reveals how
pro-gender norms can be materialized in forms of soft power strategies.
The development of Colombian FPA illustrates how (a) the respices and the centrality of security
in Colombian foreign policy result from foreign policy elite’s interpretation and performance in
their milieu according to their preferences; (b) presidents are key actors in foreign policymaking
and, as such, they are free to decide on their own advisory system and foreign policymaking style
(small groups may often fall in groupy behaviors, but the outcome is preferred regardless the
process); (c) presidential influence in foreign policy finds limits when encountering domestic
actors that have the potential to shape and control presidential preferences by imposing costs;
and (d) gendering the foreign policy agenda may serve as a strategic source of soft power and
broader international engagement.
As noticed, the most prominent Colombian FPA contributions are presented in English with an
aim to impact mainly North American foreign policy scholars. Potential future research requires
Colombian FPA scholars to engage in specific foreign policy analysis nation-wide. These
discussions should be addressed in the context of the Colombian International Relations
Association (RedIntercol) and then be expanded on the Latin American region.
Conclusion
How does this discussion explain the history, present, future, and essence of Colombian foreign
policy? The article presents the history of Colombian foreign policy through the acknowledged
and cited respices to clarify what conditions, countries, or national/international events motivate
foreign policymakers. The article also reveals how the United States has been able to set the
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foreign policy agenda in Colombia as well as how central military and security issues are (and
have been) in the making of Colombian foreign policy. On the contrary, recent foreign policy
events are explained by analyzing how presidents market “war”/“peace” as being in the national
interest to a public audience that have experienced persistent violence. Presidents seek to be
remembered in time. Finally, Colombian foreign policy analysis faces serious challenges. A wider
orientation on addressing more “why” questions and engaging in specific foreign policy case
studies is vital to advance in the field of foreign policy analysis in Colombia. Although few in
number, the existing analyses evidence innovative interpretations of foreign policy in Colombia
through an agent-oriented assessment of foreign policy focusing on identity, small group
decision-making, the role of domestic actors, and gender as the leading perspectives.
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Notes
1. DEA agent attacks Colombia as “narco-democracy”; and a BBC Travel report questioned whether Colombia was
actually “the world’s happiest country.” “How have Colombians maintained their renowned happiness in the face of
unimaginable atrocity, loss and economic hardship?”
2. Borda states that Colombia has “sufficient arrogance to construct the idea that it is the best place in the world to
live” (Borda, 2019, p. 16).
3. Suárez would then serve as president from 1918 to 1921.
4. This indemnification was a result of the Thomson–Urrutia Treaty, signed by both parties on April 6, 1914, and
ratified on March 1, 1922. The United States rewarded Colombia with 25 million dollars, which brought about an
easing of tensions between the countries after the Panama crisis.
5. Gerhard Drekonja’s article was first published in 1983.
6. In Spanish, una gran potencia.
7. In Spanish, lema, which can also be translated as “motto.”
8. One positive outcome was that Colombian women were granted the right to vote for the first time under General
Rojas Pinilla’s dictatorship.
9. President Uribe’s proclaimed slogan was “Mano firme, corazón grande,” or strong hand, big heart.
10. A provision of the national constitution that permits the government to decree a range of security measures while
bypassing normal legislative procedures.
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Argentinian Foreign Policy
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