Norwich University
Short Paper 1
Matthew Mulcaire
MH552 – Total War
Professor James Slaughter
3/31/2024
The Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars represented a significant
departure from earlier conflicts in their totalizing nature and profound impact on the societies
that endured their brutality. Both periods saw transformations in warfare that seemed to
foreshadow the bloodshed characteristic of later nineteenth and twentieth-century conflicts.
Monarchies were toppled, European geopolitical hegemony permanently altered, and whole
societies came face to face with the brutality of warfare in ways never imagined previously. To
varying degrees, many historians have characterized the period of the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic War as representative of the first beginnings of total war, contrasting with the
‘gentlemanly’ and limited wars of the earlier Ancien Regime.1 This narrative has generally
characterized the wars of this earlier period as limited, both in their objectives and their impact to
the societies involved, instead being described more as a theater for the aristocracy.2 There are
elements of truth to this description. The majority of European armies during this earlier period
fielded smaller professional or semi-professional armies, limiting the scale of conflict through
smaller-sized battles and pitting military forces against each other rather than whole societies.3
Further, it would be fair to say warfare was not unusual for the period, arguably a regular facet of
society in the eighteenth-century, particularly among the aristocratic order.4 However, this
narrative can be deceptive, providing an overgeneralized characterization and simplistic
periodization of warfare’s trajectory between these two periods. By failing to recognize the
elements of Revolutionary or Napoleonic warfare that share commonalities with this earlier
period, or even find their origin in it, a true appreciation of the unique totality of this later period
1 Bell, David A. The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 2007, 13. [Library link]
2
Bell, The First Total War, 30.
3
Bell, The First Total War, 89.
4
Bell, The First Total War, 18.
is hindered. I’d argue that by minimizing the commonalities shared between the two periods, this
narrative prevents a fuller appreciation of the truly groundbreaking evolutions in warfare that did
occur in the later period. While providing convincing analysis of the evolutionary characteristics
of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, the prevailing narrative overly generalizes
warfare of the early period, portraying them as limited, inconsequential, and unexceptional,
imposing a caricature rather than representing reality. Through a more nuanced recognition of the
shared characteristics of the two periods, we can gain a truer understanding of the diversity in
military experiences and provide new light to the fundamental changes seen in the later period,
which set conflict on a path of total war.
The prevailing historical narrative surrounding the two periods in question, has tended to
view the transformation of warfare witnessed during the French Revolution and Napoleonic
Wars as a natural progression towards total war. Frequently, the French Revolution has been
cited as the epoch of these developments, representing a clear shift in the nature of warfare from
that of the earlier period. Historian Roger Chickering highlights this theme in the traditional total
war historiography, stating:
“It begins in 1792, when the armies of republican France, backed by the mobilized
citizenry at home, revolutionized combat by virtue of their sheer numbers and the
intensity of their commitment to the cause they were serving.”5
This narrative suggests the French Revolution foreshadowed the later developments that
would mark the totality of modern warfare, the modernization of armies, weapons, technology
5 Chickering, Roger, “Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept” (PDF) in Manfred Boemeke, Roger Chickering
and Stig Förster, eds. Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999, 14.
and tactics driving the practice of warfare ever towards higher totality.6 Hew Strachan, in On
Total War and Modern War, highlights this trend in the predominant narrative as well, detailing
the increased popularity of the modernization theory in describing warfare’s path of totality,
particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War.7 Conversely, warfare before the French
Revolution is often portrayed as a mere benchmark against the transformative conflicts of the
later period, especially the eighteenth-century, which is often depicted simply as a gentlemanly
duel on a grander scale.8 Historian David Bell does not largely detract from this popular
characteristic of the narrative in his work, The First Total War, in which he documents the
evolution of warfare from the wars of the Ancien Règime, the French Revolution, and ultimately,
the Napoleonic Wars.9 Bell reinforces the generalized view of the predominant narrative by
highlighting the frequent wars of the period, the cessation of the religious wars of the previous
century, and the smaller size of armies, using these characteristics to suggest warfare of the
period was relatively limited and easy to control.10 Like other historians before him, Bell
proceeds to emphasize the unexceptional and restrained warfare of the eighteenth-century,
suggesting war served more as a ‘playground’ for the aristocracy, rather than the “apocalyptic”
conflicts seen in the later French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.11 While some historians have
challenged this narrative through arguments over the nature of total war, the causes for increases
in totality, and the influence of various ideological rhetoric on the battlefield, the complexities
and commonalities between the two different periods are frequently overlooked. Generally, the
6 Chickering, Anticipating Total War, 14.
Förster, Stig, and Jorg Nagler, eds. On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of
Unification, 1861–1871. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 343.
8
Scott, Hamish. "The Seven Years War and Europe’s ‘Ancien Régime.’" War in History 18, no. 4 (November 2011):
420. [Library link]
9
Bell, The First Total War, Whole Book
10
Bell, The First Total War, 12-13.
11
Bell, The First Total War, 14.
7
significance of wars prior to the French Revolution are disregarded, paling in comparison to the
totality of warfare in the early modern period. A more nuanced view is necessary to avoid broad
oversimplification of the period and to understand the significance these earlier conflicts held in
shaping the trajectory of warfare and future society.
Wars of the Ancien Règime, such as the Thirty Years’ War and the Seven Years’ War,
demonstrate a level of totality that conflict with the prevailing historical narrative of total war.
This narrative does not provide a convenient accounting of where conflicts like the Thirty Years’
War and the Seven Years’ War sit within the “limited” characterization of warfare prior to the
French Revolution. The Thirty Years’ War and the Seven Years’ War are problematic to the
“limited” viewpoint as they bear many striking similarities to conventional characteristics
typically associated with total war. As historian Michael Fellman argues, many “premodern”
wars reached horrific levels of destruction, citing the Thirty Years’ War as a primary example.12
Fellman's analysis strongly contradicts the notion that pre-revolution warfare was generally
limited, highlighting that an estimated 2-3 million Germans out of a population of 20 million
were killed during the war, and much of Germany destroyed.13 Finding a parallel with the
slaughter in Vendee during the French Revolutionary period, Fellman states:
“One village near Nuremburg was plundered eighteen times in two years. Peasants
organized guerrilla forces of their own to counterslaughter the mercenaries when
opportunities arose, but more often, the outgunned peasants died or fled. Desperation
induced all inhumanities, cannibalism included.”14
Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War, 519.
Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War, 519-520.
14
Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War, 520.
12
13
Not limited to just Germany, the Thirty Years’ War caused widespread devastation across Europe
and spurred profound political, economic, and social consequences for not simply the primary
belligerents but the entire European Continent.15 As Chickering states:
“The Thirty Years’ War is a chapter out of place in the narrative of total war, not only
because of the devastation of civilian populations but also because the “war aims” of all
sides in this conflict addressed fundamental questions of the social and moral order,
which are thought to be defining features of total war in the twentieth century.”16
Similarly, the Seven Years’ War, can be considered a global conflict in many regards, involving
both major European powers and their colonial possessions in the Americas.17 In contrast to the
‘unexceptional’ myth Bell presents of eighteenth-century warfare, the Seven Year’s War
witnessed monumental financial, military and political efforts by the belligerents, causing both
immediate impacts to society as well as setting in motion the creation of the modern European
system.18 These factors contrast with the caricature of warfare prior to the French Revolution, in
which wars of the preceding period are described as limited, producing no decisive outcomes,
and leaving no enduring impacts on the societies that fought them.19 As Scott proposes, when we
see warfare as a process, not a simple event isolated from the broader historical context, we can
appreciate the true significance of events that have been glossed over in the predominant
narrative.20
The examples of the Thirty Year’s War and the Seven Years’ War further support the
Chickering, Anticipating Total War, 23.
Chickering, Anticipating Total War, 23.
17
Hamish, “The Seven Years War”, 423.
18
Hamish, “The Seven Years War”, 448.
19
Hamish, “The Seven Years War”, 424.
20
Hamish, “The Seven Years War”, 426.
15
16
argument that warfare’s totality is best assessed on a spectrum, departing from
overgeneralizations of warfare and rigidness in defining characteristics. Taking both these wars
into account, we see that while modern warfare has the technological advancements to increase
war’s totality, this does not preclude acknowledgement of the totality of pre-modern wars. These
conflicts also serve to illustrate the inherent dangers of historical bias, which often result from
the benefit of hindsight. This bias leads us to naturally connect events in a way that fits into a
conveniently constructed narrative. The Thirty Years' War and the Seven Years' War deserve
recognition for their scale of totality and the significance of their impact on European society.
However, these aspects of their conduct are frequently overshadowed by later events, causing
them to be overlooked or downplayed in the predominant narrative, a narrative typically shaped
by more modern audiences. Scott reminds us that the people who actually lived through the
Seven Years' War would not have viewed or described the conflict as limited by any meaningful
metric.21 This underscores the importance of reassessing our historical perspectives in order to
acknowledge the full breadth of complexity and totality of past conflicts.
Having highlighted the enduring elements of warfare and their significance across the
two periods, it is valuable to examine the fundamental differences that did emerge in the Wars of
the French Revolution and Napoleonic period. A pivotal distinction from earlier periods, the
emergence of a fervent Revolutionary ideology pushed warfare’s extreme’s to new totalities.
Ironically, much of the rhetoric that spurred revolutionary violence to new, atrocious heights was
born from the influence of the Enlightenment and conceptions of "perpetual peace".22 As Bell
describes, Enlightenment ideals such as perpetual peace and the advancement of civilized
21
22
Hamish, “The Seven Years War”, 428.
Bell, The First Total War, 11.
society, transformed into something more sinister through Revolutionary rhetoric: "the architects
of the Terror justified mass murder with a language of historical progress.".23 As the
Revolution's political leadership veered towards radicalism and extremism, the rhetoric
surrounding warfare escalated in similar intensity and fervor. The fledging Republic faced
numerous enemies both within and outside her borders, propagating a starkly apocalyptic view of
warfare —one that abandoned the Old Régime's notion of the ‘honorable adversary’ and instead
depicted France's foes as "monsters" to be annihilated.24 The Revolutionary rhetoric of the
French did not merely represent theoretical extremes but manifested in tangible escalations in
totality, exemplified by the brutal carnage against counter-revolutionaries at Vendée. Through the
violence at Vendée, we see the role of Revolutionary ideology in bringing the conflict's totality to
brutal extremes. Newly promoted Republican generals, lacking little military experience but
finding a plethora of total war rhetoric to rely on, produced numerous atrocities against noncombatants.25 Reflecting the escalation in brutality even among former aristocratic officers,
General Francois-Joseph Westermann describes in a letter:
"There is no more Vendée, citizens. It has died under our free sword, with its women and
children. I have just buried it in the marshes and woods of Savenay. Following the orders
you gave me, I have crushed children under the hooves of horses, and massacred women
who, these at least, will give birth to no more brigands. I do not have a single prisoner
with which to reproach myself. I have exterminated everyone.”26
Bell, The First Total War, 80.
Bell, The First Total War, 189.
25
Bell, The First Total War, 176.
26
Bell, The First Total War, 172.
23
24
The French Revolution also laid the groundwork from which the Napoleonic Wars were
carried to new extremes of totality. Capitalizing on the influential effect of Revolutionary
rhetoric, Napoleon would eventually harness this power to establish a ‘cult of personality’ around
his own image.27 Distinctive from earlier conflicts, the Napoleonic period witnessed an
unprecedented level of propaganda production and sophistication, with the government
transforming into a highly efficient propaganda machine.28 Marking a significant departure from
Enlightenment ideals of perpetual peace, Napoleonic society embraced a culture of war. Within
French society, the divide between military and civilian spheres became more distinct than ever,
the military gaining significant prestige and notoriety. Idealized to great lengths within French
society, the military served as a model for the rest of society:
"In the forty-five new all-male elite lycées (high schools) that the regime created, the
boys were organized into “companies” commanded by “sergeants.” They wore uniforms,
walked to class to the sounds of drumbeats, underwent military training, and listened to
endless lectures on honor, patriotism, and duty to the emperor."29
Beyond ideology and changing conceptions of warfare, the Napoleonic period saw the full
realization of practical military improvements that capitalized on methods originating in past
conflicts. Mass conscription, which was initially implemented during the French Revolution,
became a permanent practice during this period, providing Napoleon with a fresh influx of new
recruits on a yearly basis.30 Mass conscription not only served to involve more of French society
Bell, The First Total War, 198.
Bell, The First Total War, 105.
29
Bell, The First Total War, 239.
30 Bell, The First Total War, 208.
27
28
in warfare, the scale of warfare inherently increased due to the larger armies that could be fielded
as a result. Bell describes the impact this practice had on war’s totality by stating:
“The battles themselves were swelling dangerously in size…Five years later, at
Austerlitz, the number had grown to nearly 165,000. Four years after that, at Wagram,
the largest battle yet seen in the gunpowder age, it was 300,000, with some 80,000 dead
and wounded. And in 1813, at Leipzig, the total number exceeded 500,000, with fully
150,000 dead and wounded.”31
Additionally, despite Napoleon's political acumen, the very nature of his power was predicated
on military conquest and pursuing the greater glory of France, inherently propelling France on a
path of perpetual war for almost two decades. Externally, Napoleon's new empire laid the
groundwork for the increasing totality evident during the period, the massive expanse of
occupied territory posing significant opportunities for insurrection. Through the annexing of
conquered territory, implementation of draconian French rule in occupied territories, and the
execution of captured prisoners, Napolean disrupted the Old Régime geopolitical power
structure, thus maintaining a regular supply of adversaries ready to take up arms against him.32
From this perspective, we see Napoleon not as the sole creator of total war, but one of its most
ardent disciples, ultimately intertwined and at the mercy of total war’s own independent logic
and momentum.
Contrary to the perception that the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars represented a
sudden and unparalleled escalation in the totality of warfare, it is important to recognize that
these conflicts were part of a continuum of military evolution, with various ebbs and flows, that
31
32
Bell, The First Total War, 245.
Bell, The First Total War, 232.
had been underway since the Old Regime. These later conflicts did not mark a complete apex of
military advancement, violence, or technological development, but rather, built upon the
advancements and strategies already in motion in preceding centuries. Furthermore, the French
Revolution, while significant in its impact, experienced fluctuations in its application of military
success and technological development, indicating a more nuanced and complex picture of
warfare during this period.33 Affirming the non-linear, evolutionary progression of warfare
during this period, Historian Jordan Hayworth rejects the idea that the emergence of
Revolutionary ‘nation-in-arms’ principles were the primary reason for French battlefield success,
stating:
“Three key developments explain the Sambre and Meuse Army's performance in 1794:
disciplined soldiers, flexible tactics, and organizational reforms. In addition, these
factors demonstrate the evolutionary nature of military change at the end of the
eighteenth century.”34
Hayworth's analysis reveals that French Revolutionary military practices not only find their
origins from advancements of the Old Regime, but also that the Revolutionary army experienced
several early setbacks before reverting to some of the principles found within Old Regime
warfare. Counter to the narrative of the zealous, liberty-loving ‘citizen soldier’, the
Revolutionary army undertook a renewed focus on discipline, the use of professional soldiers,
and the strategic application of shock tactics and firepower, which could now be employed
effectively due to the increased professionalism of the military.35 These early lessons learned in
Hayworth, Jordan R. "Evolution or Revolution on the Battlefield? The Army of the Sambre and Meuse in 1794."
War in History 21, no. 2 (April 2014): 173. [Library link]
34
Hayworth, “Evolution or Revolution”, 189.
35
Hayworth, “Evolution or Revolution”, 190.
33
blood would later be capitalized by Napoleon, and wielded with new, deadly effect. By tracking
both the progression and regression of the French Revolutionary army, and understanding its
lasting influences which became hallmarks of Napoleon’s Grande Armée, the prevailing
narrative is shown to be inefficient in describing the transformation of warfare between these two
periods. By viewing this transformation purely from a natural and linear progression of warfare,
analysis of events or concepts that do not conveniently fit the narrative are overlooked.
Ultimately, a more nuanced assessment is essential for a comprehensive understanding of the
transformation of warfare between these two periods, challenging the oversimplification of a
linear progression and highlighting the need to recognize the complexities and contradictions
inherent in historical developments.
The Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars marked a significant
departure from earlier conflicts, signifying an escalation of warfare's extremes. However, the
prevailing historical narrative oversimplifies this transformation by discounting the significant
totality and impact of earlier conflicts such as the Thirty Years' War and the Seven Years' War.
Through an analysis of the previous historiography, it becomes evident that a nuanced
understanding of warfare is not only needed, but crucial to comprehending its complexities and
developments across a variety of military experiences. Like Chickering’s call for a more careful
and diligent application of the total war moniker, it is essential to implement nuance in historical
analysis, particularly concerning the evolution of warfare.36 Recognizing the nuances and
complexities of historical events allows for a deeper understanding of their impact on society and
avoids falling into teleological traps that obscure rather than reveal historical truths.37 Thus, there
36
37
Chickering, Anticipating Total War, 28.
Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War, 540.
is a pressing need for scholars and historians to reassess their historical perspectives and
approach the study of warfare with a critical lens that acknowledges the diverse and multifaceted
nature of military experiences. It is essential to examine our ingrained historical perspectives and
appreciate the full spectrum of complexity and totality of past conflicts to gain a deeper
understanding of their enduring legacies. By encouraging a reevaluation of historical narratives,
we can enhance our understanding of the long and jagged chronology of the past and its
relevance to contemporary issues.38 Only through a nuanced and comprehensive lens can the
examination of past conflicts provide valuable insights into the complexities of human nature
and society, ultimately contributing to a truer conceptualization of our collective history.
38
Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War, 540.
.Bibliography:
Secondary Sources
Bell, David A. The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007. [Library link]
Chickering, Roger. "Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept." In Anticipating Total War: The
German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, edited by Manfred Boemeke, Roger
Chickering, and Stig Förster, 13-28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[PDF]
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Förster, Stig, and Jorg Nagler, eds. On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the
German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Hayworth, Jordan R. "Evolution or Revolution on the Battlefield? The Army of the Sambre and
Meuse in 1794." War in History 21, no. 2 (April 2014): 170–92. [Library link]
Scott, Hamish. "The Seven Years War and Europe’s ‘Ancien Régime.’" War in History 18, no. 4
(November 2011): 419–55. [Library link]
Strachan, Hew. "Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War." International History
Review 22, no. 2 (June 2000): 341-370. [Library link]