1.
Custodial /Miranda Rights
•
in any questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It refers to the investigation conducted by law enforcement immediately after arrest
for the commission of an offense (People v. Marra)
•
The Miranda warning means that a person in custody who will be interrogated must be informed of the following:
1. He has right to remain silent;
2. Anything said can be used as evidence against him;
3. He has the right to have counsel during the investigation; and
4. He must be informed that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. (Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S 436, 13 June 1966)
•
Rights of a person under custodial investigation:
During custodial investigation, suspects have the rights, among others (S-I-P-A-R)
•
1.
to remain silent;
2.
to have an independent and competent counsel;
3.
to be provided with such counsel, if unable to secure one;
4.
to be assisted by one in case of waiver, which should be in writing, of the foregoing; and
5.
to be informed of all such rights and of the fact that anything he says can and will be used against him
The rights of a person under custodial investigation include the right to remain silent, the right to have competent and
independent counsel, and the right to
•
be informed of these rights. (Sec. 12 (1), Art. III, 1987 Constitution)
silence cannot be taken as a tacit admission; otherwise, the right to remain silent would be rendered nugatory. Considering
that his right against self-incrimination protects his right to remain silent, he cannot be penalized for exercising it. (People v.
2.
Galvez, G.R. No.
•
3.
157221, 30 Mar. 2007)
Extrajudicial Confession, when inadmissible and when admissible
According to the SC, an extrajudicial confession must satisfy the following requirements (VC2-Not FreE)
1.
It should be made Voluntarily and truthfully.
2.
It should be Competent.
3.
It should be supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and corroborated by other prosecution evidence.
4.
It should Not suffer from any MATERIAL discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.
5.
It must be given by the person with Free will.
6.
It must be corroborated by Evidence of the actual commission of the crime.
Exclusionary Rule and the applicability of the Totality of Evidence Rule
•
Exclusionary Rule
o
Section 12(3) provides: "Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him."
o
•
Section 17, Article III provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
According to this rule, once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible. The fruit of the poisonous tree is at least once removed
from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained [People v. Samontañez, G.R. No. 134530 (2000)].
•
Violations of the Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during the custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of the custodial
investigation [People v. Malimit, G.R. No. 109775 (1996)].
•
Confession to the media can likewise be properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by suspects to news
reporters during televised interviews are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. (People v. Andan, G.R. No.
116437, 03 Mar. 1997)
•
Totality of Evidence Rule
o
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not
affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies, where there is consistency in relating the principal concurrence
4.
and the positive identification of the accused (People v. XXX).
Distinction between the Police line- and the Police Show-up
•
•
Show-up
-
Out-of-court identification
-
The accused is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification
Police Line-up
-
The suspect is identified by witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose;
-
When the petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held yet to answer for a
criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest; hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel.
-
The identification of a private person, by an eyewitness during the line-up cannot be excluded in evidence. In accordance
with the ruling in People v. Hatton (G.R. No. 85043, 16 June 1992) the accused is not entitled to be assisted by
counsel during a police line-up, because it is not part of custodial investigation since he was not being questioned
but was merely being asked to exhibit his body for identification by a witness.
5.
Right to an Independent and Competent Counsel
•
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers - (a) Any person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all time be assisted by counsel.
6.
Waiver of the Right to Counsel
•
•
Rule on Waiver [Art. III, Sec. 12]
a.
Must be in writing;
b.
Must be in the presence of counsel
The three essential elements of a valid waiver are:
(a) existence of a right;
(b) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and,
(c) an intention to relinquish such right.
•
1.
Under Sec. 12(1), Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, the counsel assisting a person being investigated must be independent.
Definition of Bail
•
Rules of Court, Rule 114, Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
•
Q: A law denying persons charged with crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or death the right to bail. State whether or
not the law is constitutional. Explain briefly. (2006 BAR)
A: The law is invalid as it contravenes Sec. 13, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua where evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The accused may not be deprived of his
constitutional right to bail even if charged with a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is not strong.
•
Q: State with reason(s) whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion in the following cases: (2005 BAR) (a) The
imposable penalty for the crime charged is reclusion perpetua and the accused is a minor;
A: A minor charged with a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Under Article 68
of the RPC, in case of conviction the penalty would be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua. This rules out reclusion
perpetua. (Bravo v. Borja, G.R. No. L 65228, 18 Feb. 1985)
•
•
(b) The imposable penalty for the crime charged is life imprisonment and the accused is a minor;
A: Bail is a matter of discretion for a minor charged with an offense punishable with life imprisonment, because Art. 68 of
the RPC is inapplicable and he is not entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance under it (People v. Lagasca, G.R. No.
73818, 27 Feb. 1987)
•
(c) The accused has been convicted of homicide on a charge of murder and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
A: Bail is a matter of discretion for an accused convicted of homicide on a charge of murder, because an appeal opens the
whole case of review. There is a possibility that he may be convicted of murder, which is punishable with reclusion perpetua
2.
to death. His conviction shows the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Obosa v. CA, G.R. No. 114350, 16 Jan. 1997)
Types of Bail
•
Bail as a Matter of Right
o
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
o
o
Excessive bail shall not be required [Art. III, Sec. 13]
The court must first make a determination of the strength of the
evidence on the basis of evidence already
presented by the prosecution, unless it desires to present some more, and give the accused the opportunity to
present countervailing evidence. If, having done this, the court finds the evidence not to be strong, then it
becomes the right of the
accused to be admitted to bail. The error of the trial court lies in outrightly denying the
motion for bail of the accused.
•
Bail as a Matter of Discretion
o
When the accused has been convicted in the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, the admission to bail becomes discretionary [Sec. 5, Rule 114, ROC].
3.
Requisites before a court may issue an order granting bail
•
4.
Rules of Court, Rule 114, Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. — In the application for bail under section 8 of this
Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation.
Conditions which may attach to the grant of bail
•
SEC. 9, Rule 114 -. Amount of bail; guidelines. - The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a
reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
1. Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;
3. Penalty for the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Age and health of the accused;
6. Weight of the evidence against the accused;
7. Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bail;
9. The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
11. Excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Concept of criminal Due Process
•
Requisites
1. Accused is heard by a court of competent jurisdiction;
2. Accused is proceeded against under the orderly process of law;
3. Accused is given notice and opportunity to be heard; and
1.
4. Judgment rendered is within the authority of a constitutional law.
Concept of Presumption of Innocence
•
•
The presumption of innocence has given rise to a jurisprudential rule referred to as the equipoise rule.
Where the evidence adduced by the parties is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
balance in favor of the accused [Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016 (1991)].
•
The application of the rule is triggered by a situation where:
a. The court is faced with conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense; and
b. The evidence, facts, and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt.
•
Administrative proceedings need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. Thus, while desirable, the right to
counsel is not available in administrative proceedings. Since the proceedings involved in this case is an investigation being
conducted by a PNP committee, which is administrative and not a custodial investigation, Mrs. W is not entitled to the
2.
assistance of counsel. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the PMA, G.R. No. 211362, 24 Feb. 2015)
Evidence required to Convict
•
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind [Sec. 2,
Rule 133, ROC].
•
In order that circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction, the following requisites must concur:
1. There is more than once circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived from are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt [People
3.
v. Bato, G.R. No. 113804 (1998)].
Right to Speedy, Impartial, and Public Trial
•
4.
Article III, Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies.
Trial in Absentia
•
Requisites:
a. Accused failed to appear for trial despite postponement and notice;
b. Failure to appear is unjustified;
c. After arraignment.
•
Consequences of the Accused’s Failure to Appear for Trial
•
When Presence of the Accused is a Duty
o
o
Waiver of right to cross-examine and present evidence [Gimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L- 37933 (1988)].
General Rule:
a. Arraignment and Plea
Section 1(b) of Rule 116 requires that the “accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea.”
b. During Trial for Identification
Common reason suggests that the prosecution must be afforded the right to identify the accused
as the perpetrator of the offense and the very person named or described in the complaint or
information because rights during the trial are not designed to be for the accused alone.
5.
6.
c. Promulgation of Sentence
Distinction between subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum
•
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.
•
The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things
or documents therein specified.
Right to Confront Witnesses
•
•
Serves as the basis of the right to cross- examination.
Two-Fold Purpose
a. To afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross- examination.
b. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of [the] witness [Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527 (2012)].
1.
Nature of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
•
A writ issued by a court directed to a person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf [Sombong v. CA, G.R. No. 111876 (1990)].
2.
Basis when the court may issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus
•
Availability
1. Involuntary restraint of liberty.
2. Voluntary restraint of liberty i.e., right of parents to regain custody of minor child even if the child is in the custody of a
third person of her own free will [Sombong v. CA, supra].
3. Illegal arrest with supervening event when restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information [Velasco
v. CA, G.R. No. 118644 (1995)].
a. The issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
b. Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained [Sec. 4, Rule
102].
4. Where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the
excess [Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-30026 (1971)].
5. “Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person
is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained” [In re Salibo v. Warden, G.R. No. 197597
(2015)].
1.
Distinguish between the Right to Speedy Trial as an Integral Component of Criminal Due Process and the Right to Speedy
Disposition of Cases
•
•
2.
Right to Speedy Trial as an Intergral Component of Criminal Procedure (Section 14)
-
Speedy, impartial, and public trial (S-I-P)
-
Applies to Criminal Proceedings
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases (Section 16)
-
Memory Aid for the Factors of determining probable cause: (L-R-A-P)
-
Length, reason of the delay, assertion or non-assertion of the right, prejudice to the accused
-
Applies to cases before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies
Factors to Consider if One is Denied the Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
•
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy
trial, four factors must be considered:
(a) length of delay;
(b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and
(d) Prejudice to the defendant.
•
Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3, 2000, pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial
was set for March 7, 8, and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its postponement and cancellation of
the other settings because its principal and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had to go
abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge instead dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the grant
of the motion for postponement have violated the accused's right to speedy trial? (2000 BAR)
o
A: The grant of the motion for postponement would not have violated the right of the accused to speedy trial.
Since the motion for postponement was the first one requested, the need for the offended party to attend to a
professional commitment is a valid reason, no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced, and the
prosecution should be afforded a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should be granted. (People v.
Leviste, G.R. No. 104386, 28 Mar. 1996)
Instances where the Suspect/ Accused may Invoke the Right against Self Discrimination
•
When to Invoke:
1. This right may only be invoked for that specific incriminating question and cannot be claimed for any other time [Sabio vs.
Gordon, G.R. Nos. 174340, 174318 & 174177 (2006)];
2. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena and decline to testify altogether. The witness must still take
the stand, be sworn, and answer questions. It is the duty of his/her counsel to advise him/her of his/her right against self
incrimination [People v. Ayson, supra].
•
The results of the “confirmatory” urine test should therefore be rejected as evidence against him. It should be noted that RA
9165 allows the conduct of urine tests only for persons arrested for acts prohibited under said law, such as, among others,
the manufacturing, sale, use or possession of illegal drugs, and not for any unlawful act, like extortion, for which PO1 Adrian
was arrested. (De la Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014)
•
Alienmae cannot invoke her right against self incrimination even if the fear of incrimination is in regard to her foreign law.
Under the territoriality principle, the general rule is that a state has jurisdiction over all persons and property within its
territory. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessary, exclusive, and absolute. However, there are a few
exceptions on when a state cannot exercise jurisdiction even within its own territory, to wit: 1) foreign states, head of states,
diplomatic representatives, and consults to a certain degree; 2) foreign state property; 3) acts of state; 4) foreign merchant
vessels exercising rights of innocent passage or arrival under stress; 5) foreign armies passing through or stationed in its
territories with its permission; and 6) such other persons or property, including organisations like the United Nations, over
which it may, by agreement, waive jurisdiction. Seeing that the circumstances surrounding Alienmae do not fall under those
exceptions, that she is a foreign tourist who received a complaint for fraud, such principle of territoriality can be exercised by
the State to get the information it needs to proceed with the case.
Grant of Immunity from Criminal Prosecution – Distinction between Transactional Immunity and Use Immunity
•
“Use and Fruit of Immunity”
o
“Use immunity” prohibits use of a witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the
criminal prosecution of the witness.
•
“Transactional immunity”
o
“Transactional immunity” grants immunity to witnesses from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates [Galman v. Pamaran, supra].
Concept of Involuntary Servitude as an Element of Criminal Retribution and Reformation
•
Involuntary Servitude refers to a condition of enforced and compulsory service induced by means of any scheme, plan or pattern,
intended to cause a person to believe that if he or she did not enter into or continue in such condition, he or she or another
person would suffer serious harm or other forms of abuse or physical restraint, or threat of abuse or harm, or coercion including
depriving access to travel documents and withholding salaries, or the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process [R.A. No.
9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364].
The Concept of Cruel, Degrading, or Inhuman Punishment
•
Cruel Punishment
▪
Involve torture of lingering death [Legarda v. Valdez G.R. No. 513 (1902)].
▪
Not only severe, harsh, or excessive but flagrantly and plainly oppressive.
▪
Wholly or disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community [People v. Estoista,
G.R. No. L-5793 (1953)].
Reduction of Death Penalty to Reclusion Perpetua
•
Revisit R.A. 9346
▪
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
•
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code; or
•
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
•
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete.
Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition [People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L- 5790 (1953)].
•
The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, R.A. No. 8177, otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly [Sec. 1,
R.A. No. 9346].
Reinstatement of the Death Penalty
•
The import of the grant of power to Congress to restore the death penalty requires:
1. That the Congress defined or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
2. That Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition
or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in
which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that
characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill;
3. That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by “compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.”
For a death penalty bill to be valid, Sec. 19(1) does not require that there be a positive manifestation in the form of higher
incidence of crime first perceived and statistically proven. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society [People v.
Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472 (1997)].
Concept of Non-imprisonment for Debt of Non-Payment of a Poll Tax
•
Poll Tax
o
A specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class without regard to property or occupation (e.g.,
community tax).
•
In a case where the accused was convicted and imprisoned for estafa (where the accused failed to render promised service
to the injured in exchange for the latter’s retrieval of the former’s cedula), the Court held that the imprisonment was correct
since it was for estafa and not involuntary servitude or imprisonment for debt [Ramirez v. De Orozco, G.R. No. 11157 (1916)].
Concept of Double Jeopardy
•
Double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which explicitly states that "No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act."
The first sentence sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence embodies an exception
to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged
under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal
Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
This provision is mirrored in the Rules of Court, which further elaborates the conditions under which this principle applies.
For a claim of double jeopardy to be valid, three requisites must be met:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,
(2) the first jeopardy must have terminated, and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
•
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. ( Sec. 21, Art.
III, 1987 Constitution).
•
Recent jurisprudence provides that “As a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the
express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however,
admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. x x x x It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are
not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State.” (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 Apr. 2009). In these cases, the Court focused on discussing
why there was no violation of the right to speedy trial hence there was no first jeopardy to speak of. The facts stipulated in
the question, however, do not provide that there was an issue on the first jeopardy other than it was secured upon the
motion of the accused.
•
The only instance when an accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be
demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a
sham. (Bangayan v. Ban-gayan, G.R. No. 172777, 19 Oct. 2011; People U. Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, 16 Mar. 2007)
Types of Double Jeopardy
1. Person is tried for the same offense
2. Person is tried twice: under a national law and under an ordinance (Ivler v. Hon. San Pedro)
•
Two Types of Double Jeopardy [People v. Relova, G.R. L-45129 (1987)]:
1. Prosecution for the same offense
a. Same offense charged;
b. Attempt of the same offense;
c. Frustration of the same offense;
d. Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the elements
of the 1st offense);
e. Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense (All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the elements
of the 2nd offense).
2. Prosecution for the same act
a. If punished by law and at the same time punished by an ordinance;
b. There is conviction or acquittal under either.
3. Factors to Consider if an Accused may invoke the Right Against Double Jeopardy
•
Requisites and Limitations
a. First jeopardy attached prior to the second;
b. First jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
c. Second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the first
offense; or is an attempt or frustration thereof.
•
Requisites for First Jeopardy to Attach: A previous case must be filed and must contain the following:
1. There must be a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
2. The complaint or information must be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charges;
4. The accused must have been convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent [Sec. 7, Rule 117; People v. Obsania, G.R. No. L-24447 (1968)].
4. Effects of a Ruling Granting a Demurrer to Evidence
•
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
•
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (15a)
•
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a nonextendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
•
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
•
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
5.
Proper Property to Challenge the Acquittal of the Accused
•
Remedy for the above cases: special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
•
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned [Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995 (2014)].
•
6.
The prosecution can appeal where the accused is deemed to have waived or is estopped from invoking his right against
double jeopardy [Cruz, p. 778].
Grounds to Challenge the Acquittal of the Accused
•
Appeal by Prosecution; When Allowed General Rule: A judgment of acquittal is final and no longer reviewable. It cannot be
reconsidered because it places the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. [Cruz Commentary, p. 777]
•
Exceptions: Appeal from acquittal is not double jeopardy if: (DuMi-GAD)
i.
Deprivation of due process: Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case [Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258 (2012)]. Provided, that the judge considered the evidence, even if
the appreciation of the evidence leading to the acquittal is erroneous, an appeal or motion for reconsideration
by the prosecution will not be allowed. [People v. Judge Velasco, G.R. No. 127444 (2000)].
ii.
iii.
Mistrial [Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670 (1986)].
Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction [People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157 (2005)].
1. The Rationale behind the Adoption of the Ex Post Facto Rule
•
An ex post facto law is one that would make a previous act criminal although it was not so at the time it was committed
[Cruz, p. 589].
•
In general, ex post facto laws prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. Moreover, the mode of procedure provided for in the
right to appeal, which is statutory and not natural, is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws [Lacson v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096 (1999)].
•
Equivalent of the impairment clause in criminal matters.
Ex Post Facto Laws:
•
•
•
•
Makes criminal an action done before the passage of the law which was innocent when done, and punishes such action;
Aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
Alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense in order to convict the defendant [Mekin v. Wolfe, G.R. No. 1251 (1903)];
•
Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;
•
3.
Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty [In re: Kay Villegas Kami, G.R. No. L-32485 (1970)].
The Factors to Consider to Determine if an Act of Congress is a Bill of Attainder
•
Elements
1. There must be a law;
2. The law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily ascertainable members of a group;
3. There is a direct imposition of penal burden without judicial trial.
Concepts/Factors to Consider to Issue the following Writs:
1. Writ of Amparo
1. Extralegal Killings
2. Enforced Disappearances
-
In order to prove, there must be
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. (Navia v. Pardico)
2. Writ of Habeas Data
•
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information,
and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
4.
privacy. [A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (2008)]
Writ of Kalikasan
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces [Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010
(2017)].
1. Types of Filipino Citizens
•
•
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
•
Those whose father or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
•
Those born before Jan. 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Phil. citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
•
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law [Section 1, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution]
Q: Discuss the evolution of the principle of jus sanguinis as basis of Filipino citizenship under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constituions.
A: Sec 1, Art. III of the 1935 Constitution adopted the jus sanguinis principles as the basis of the Filipino citizenship if the father is
a Filipino citizen. However, Sec 4, Art III of the Constitution provided that if the mother was a Filipino citizen who lost her Philippine
citizenship because of her marriage to a foreign husband, her children could elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Sec. 1(2), Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child born of a father or a mother who is a citizen of the
Philippines is a Filipino citizen. Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1973 Constitution provided that a child whose father or mother is a Filipino
citizen is a Filipino citizen. Sec. 1(3), Art. IV of the 1987 Constitution provided that a child born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1973 Constitution is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. (Tecson v COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, 03 Mar. 2004)
•
Atty. William Chua should not be disbarred. In accordance with Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act, he became a
naturalized Philippine citizen when his father became a Filipino citizen during his minority. Hence, there was no need for
him to elect Philippine citizenship. (Co v. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, 30 July 1991)
Q: Miguel Sin was born a year ago in China to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. His parents met in Shanghai where
they were lawfully married just two years ago. Is Miguel Sin a Filipino citizen? (2003 BAR)
A: YES, Miguel Sin is a Filipino citizen because he is the legitimate child of a Filipino mother. Under Sec. 4, Art. IV of the 1987
Constitution, his mother retained her Philippine citizenship despite her marriage to an alien husband, and according to Sec. 1(2), Art.
IV of the 1987 Constitution, children born of a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens.
2.
Different Ways to Acquire Philippine Citizenship
•
By Birth
a. Jus Soli - “Right of Soil;” a person’s nationality is based on a place of birth; formerly effective in the Phils. (Roa v.
Collector of Customs)
b. Jus Sanguinis - “Right of blood;” a person’s nationality follows that of his natural parents. The Phils. currently adheres to
this principle.
•
By Naturalization
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with
the privileges of a citizen.
Three modes by which an alien may become a Filipino citizen by naturalization:
1.
Administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139;
2. Judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. 437; and
3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress granting Philippine citizenship to an alien [So
v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603 (2007)].
•
Filipino citizens who marry aliens retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to
have renounced it. (Sec.4, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)
•
Derivative Naturalization
Under Sec. 15 of CA 473, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of
their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization [Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110
(2013)].
Pursuant to the principle of derivative naturalization, Section 15 of CA 437, extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the
minor children of those naturalized thereunder.
The following are requisites should be applied to the minor children in order to be entitled to Philippine citizenship:
•
They are legitimate children of petitioner
•
They were born in the Philippines, and
•
They were still minors when the petitioner was naturalized as a Filipino citizen [Tan Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R.
No. 138496 (2004)].
•
Under Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, a foreign woman who marries a Filipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen
provided she possesses none of the disqualifications for naturalization. (Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration,
G.R. No. L-21289, 04 Oct. 1971) A foreign man who marries a Filipino citizen does not acquire Philippine citizenship.
However, under Sec. 3 of the Revised Naturalization Law, in such a case the residence requirement for naturalization will
be reduced from ten (10) to five (5) years. The children of an alien and a Filipino citizen are citizens of the Philippines.
(Sec. 1 (1), Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)
•
Election of Filipino Citizenship
The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children and not to one
who was concededly an illegitimate child, as her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. Being an illegitimate
child of a Filipino mother, respondent is a Filipino since birth, without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reaches
the age of majority [Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 153883 (2004)].
•
Reglementary Period
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age
of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma is resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship, should be made within “reasonable time” after attaining
the age of majority. This phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean the election should be made within three
years from reaching the age of majority [Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter
No. 914, October 1, 1999].
•
Eligibility under the Administrative Naturalization Law; Rationale
R.A. No. 9139 is an act providing for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship for (1) aliens born in the Philippines and (2)
residing therein since birth by administrative naturalization subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and
interest.
R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It also addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of
citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain drain for the Philippines [So v. Republic, supra].
•
Qualifications Prescribed Under Act 473 NOT APPLICABLE to R.A. No. 9139
The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of
C.A. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an
applicant for naturalization by administrative act.
Rationale:
1. C.A. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws - the former covers all aliens regardless of class
while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other
country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines
and affinity to customs and traditions.
2. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the
coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native- born.
Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to
liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country [So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603 (2007)].
3. Classification of Citizens
•
•
Natural-Born Citizens
Citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship [Sec
1(1) & Section 1(2), Art. IV, 1987 Consti]
•
•
•
•
•
Those who elect Phil. citizenship in accordance with Sec. 1(3), Art. IV
Naturalized Citizens
Those who are naturalized in accordance with the law [Section 1(4), Art. IV, 1987 Consti]
Modes:
By direct conferment of Congress
Here, Congress passes a private bill conferring citizenship on a foreigner, subject to approval or veto of the President.
•
By application under Naturalization Statutes
i. Via Judicial Action (CA 473)
ii. Via Administrative Action with Special Committee on Naturalization (RA 9139)
4. The Distinction between Dual Citizen and Dual Allegiance
•
Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such person, ipso facto is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
•
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive acts, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
5. Requisites of Filipino Citizenship to Enjoy Constitutional Rights –
•
Right to Seek Public Office
o
Article VII, Section 4: “The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a
term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and
shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter.”
•
Right to Practice Profession
o
Article XII, Section 14: “The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save
in cases prescribed by law.”
•
Right to Register Land
o
Article XII, Section 7: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
•
Right to Enjoy Natural Resources
o
Article XII, Section 2: “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State.”
•
Right to Own Mass Media
o
Article XVI, Section 11: “The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens.
•
Right to Own Advertising Company
•
Right to Establish a Recruitment Agency
Kindly refer to the ratio/doctrines of the ff. cases:
1.
Calilung v. Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108 (2007) – Discuss the distinction between “retention” and “reacquisition” under R.A.
2.
David v. Agbay, 753 SCRA 526 (2015) – Discuss the requirement of citizenship to acquire land.
3.
4.
9225.
Tan v. Crisologo, 844 SCRA 365 (2017) – Discuss citizenship as a qualification to seek an elective public office.
In Re: Benjamin M. Dacanay (Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law), 540 SCRA 424 (2007) – Discuss the requirement
of citizenship to practice law in the Philippines.
5. Right of a Refugee to be Naturalized
Read Rule on Facilitated Naturalization of Refugees and Stateless Persons
Doctrine on Republic v. Karbasi:
Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must be considered
in this case, to wit:
Article 6 of the 1951 Convention: For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies that any
requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to
fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements
which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention: The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges
and costs of such proceedings.
Subsequently, Article 7 of the said Convention expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest
obligation of contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees."
As applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance with
Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the developments
in international human rights law specifically the granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons.
Dickerson v. U.S. (2000) - Discuss why the U.S. Congress cannot impair the rights of a suspect under custodial investigation.
Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of
committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of
Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received "Miranda warnings" before being interrogated. The District Court
granted his motion to suppress. The United States Court of Appeals agreed that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings
before making his statement.
The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible
under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."
The Court ruled that the protections outlined in Miranda, are protections mandated by the Constitution. Therefore Congress, through
a federal law, cannot overrule Miranda. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of
evidence and procedure. While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally
required
People v. Malngan (2006) - Distinguish between the admissions of Edna Malngan before the Barangay Chairman and to one of the
neighbors of the Separa family.
Malngan was a househelp who was so angry with his employer. She committed the crime of arson which killed the people inside the
house. She narrated to one of their neighbors what she did – that she placed gas on a newspaper and lighted it with a matchstick
then placed it in the kitchen. She also admitted it to Barangay Chairman Bernardo, to a newscaster in a media coverage and to Gus
Abelgas in the show “True Crime.”
1.
2.
Admission to neighbor - admissible to evidence at was voluntarily relayed.
Reporters - was not discussed by the court as they were not presented as witnesses.
Investigation by the barangay chairman - inadmissible because Malngan’s confession to Barangay Chairman Bernardo was made in
response to the 'interrogation made by the latter' admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under
the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. Nonetheless, it will not acquit Malngan because the evidence was sufficient to
convict her beyond reasonable doubt.
3. People v. Lauga (2010) - Discuss the nature of the duty of barangay tanods in a custodial investigation.
Antonio Lauga raped his 13-year-old daughter AAA in their home. AAA's brother BBB found her crying after the incident. They sought
help from their grandmother, uncle, and a "bantay bayan" named Moises Boy Banting. Banting invited Lauga to the police station
where he admitted to raping AAA. AAA was medically examined and found to have lacerations in her hymen.
The Court ruled that Barangay-based volunteer groups like "bantay bayan" perform state functions related to peace and order. Thus,
any inquiry they make has a state-related objective covered by the Miranda rights under the Constitution. Since Lauga confessed
without counsel, it is inadmissible.
The Miranda rights under Article III, Section 12 apply to confessions elicited by police/agents in custodial investigations. However, they
do not cover ordinary verbal admissions not prompted by such questioning [thus in such a case, admissible.
Miguel v. People (2017) - Discuss why Miguel was acquitted by the Supreme Court. Relate the ruling on the rights of a person under
custodial investigation and the basis of the warrantless arrest. Discern why the Court ruled that the evidence obtained on Miguel
should be excluded. Petitioner Miguel was urinating and was then interviewed, frisked, and eventually apprehended by Bantay Bayan
Agents. He was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs after it was found on his person during the frisk. RTC found
petitioner guilty, CA affirmed.[similar with Lauga[ The Court held that the Bantay Bayan Agents, although composed of civilian volunteers,
are considered as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the bill of rights. They are not government agents like the
Philippine National Police (PNP) or NBI but they are an accredited auxillary of the PNP.The arrest of the petitioner was not valid since
the warrantless arrest did not fulfill any valid ground on warrantless arrest. Neither can the evidence be used against petitioner since
it was acquired during an invalid warrantless arrest and is thus the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. Decision reversed.
Inacay v. People, G.R. No. 223506, 28 November 2016 – Not in the syllabus
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due
process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be
heard before being condemned. "Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel."
"The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at
all times. More so, in the case of an ongoing litigation, it is a right that
must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company."
Unless the accused is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.
Considering that there was a denial of due process, there is a need to set aside
the judgment of conviction against Inacay and remand the case to the trial court for new, trial. Further, Manila, for representing herself
as a lawyer, should be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (2016) - Explain why Enrile was accorded the right to bail despite the fact the crime of Plunder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong. Also explain the purpose of bail.
The Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the
trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of fragile health and advanced age of Enrile.
The trial may consider the personal circumstances of the accused in the grant of bail.
OCA v. Judge Flor, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2503, July 28, 2020 – Not in the syllabus
The Supreme Court found Judge Flor liable for gross ignorance of the law due to his failure to adhere to procedural requirements in
granting bail for non-bailable offenses. The Court underscored that bail cannot be granted without a prior hearing in cases punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as the grant or denial of bail hinges on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The Court
highlighted that Judge Flor's actions disregarded the procedural necessity of hearings, especially in capital offenses where utmost
diligence is required.
The resolutions issued by Judge Flor in several criminal cases lacked a brief summary of evidence adduced by the prosecution, which
is necessary to determine the basis for granting bail. Considering Judge Flor's repeated infractions and refusal to correct his ways
despite a previous warning, the Court imposed the supreme penalty of dismissal from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government. This decision serves as
a stern reminder of the judiciary's expectations of its members to maintain competence, integrity, and independence in the administration
of justice.
People v. Wagas - The court emphasized that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, including the identity of the offender. In this case, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Wagas was
the one who defrauded the complainant by issuing the postdated check.
Daayata v. People, G.R. No. 205745, 08 March 2017 – Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
The failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of petitioners beyond reasonable doubt, a ground for acquittal of the petitioners.
The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is guaranteed under Section 14(2), Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This fundamental right of the accused is also embodied under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, which specifically states that "in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
Sergio v. People (2019) - Explain the right to confront witnesses through deposition.
The accused were never denied the right to confront Mary Jane Veloso under the rule of modes of discovery.
The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the deposition through written
interrogatories. The Court granted the petition and reinstated the trial court's resolution allowing the deposition through written
interrogatories.
Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 243411, August 19, 2020 - Discuss why Petitioner was granted provisional liberty.
The court cited sufficient evidence of conspiracy and rejected Reyes' claim of forgery. The court upheld the denial, stating that there
is strong evidence of Reyes' guilt based on the testimonies of witnesses and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. the
Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that there is strong evidence of the guilt of petitioner, and in
denying her bail application. The concept of law of the case is more appropriate, for our decision in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan
declared a legal rule that is controlling of the determination of the existence of conspiracy among the accused in SB-14-CRM-0238.
As quoted earlier, this legal rule is that the conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence. Rather, it can be inferred from the
totality of the facts and circumstances regarding their participation that they pursued a common design and purpose. No direct proof
of agreement is necessary. This rule shall govern the determination of whether there is strong evidence of the involvement of petitioner
in the conspiracy to commit plunder and corruption by causing the release of the PDAF for ghost projects and the diversion of the
funds to the accused persons. It should be emphasized that applying to petitioner's bail application the foregoing law of the case as
defined in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan is quite different from denying petitioner's bail application because, as held in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution had presented strong evidence against Napoles and, by extension, her co-conspirators.
Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan (2015) – Explain the loss of the right to appeal a conviction under the doctrine of trial in absentia.
The Court held that all accused and their counsel were notified of the promulgation of judgment but chose to be absent. Thus, their
conviction was affirmed.
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said judgment. The right to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal is a
statutory grant and must be exercised in accordance with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
The accused must strictly comply with the conditions attached to the right to file a motion for reconsideration, including surrendering
and filing a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies within 15 days from the promulgation of judgment.
The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by the petitioners because it
did not operate to regain their standing in court. The petitioners failed to surrender and ask for leave to avail themselves of the
remedies, and they did not state valid reasons for their absence at the promulgation. Therefore, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan
became final and no longer subject to review.
Torralba v. People (2022) [Explain why the Court affirmed the conviction of Torralba for carnapping.]
●
The accused Oligario failed to establish his mental state, much less his insanity → there could have been some impairment
of his mental faculties due to psychosis BUT NO evidence that such impairment was so complete as to deprive him of his
intelligence.
●
There was one opinion testimony by expert Dr. Evangelista who opined that the accused is suffering from psychosis
HOWEVER
she declared that it is difficult to assess the exact mental condition of the accused, having seen the latter
only once, and she could not even identify the kind of psychosis the accused is afflicted with.
Miguel v. Director of Prisons (2021) [Explain the nature of a petition for habeas corpus.]
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. First, it pointed out Miguel's failure to observe the principle of hierarchy
of courts by directly filing with the Supreme Court without special and important reasons.
On the substantive issues, the Court ruled that those convicted of heinous crimes like Murder are excluded from the benefits of the
GCTA Law, as clearly stated in Section 1 of the law and reiterated in the 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations. Murder
is considered a heinous crime as it is mandatorily punishable by death under the Death Penalty Law.
The Court also clarified that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code does not literally cap the duration of reclusion perpetua at 30 years
only. The 30-year period stated therein only serves as the basis for determining a convict's eligibility for pardon and for applying the
three-fold rule in serving multiple penalties. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment of at least 30 years, after which the convict only
becomes eligible for pardon, not automatic release.
As of August 15, 2021, Miguel had only served 27 years and 7 months of his sentence. Therefore, his continued detention remains
valid and justified. The Court held that Miguel utterly failed to show that he is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty. Accordingly,
the Writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be issued.
Reyes v. Sandiganbyan, supra [Discuss why Petitioner was granted provisional liberty.]
Both parties are partly mistaken. The doctrines of res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment are inapplicable in the given case. The
Court holds that its findings and conclusions in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan regarding the strength of the evidence on the existence of
conspiracy and the commission of acts of plunder and corruption by Napoles are not binding on the right to bail of petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan was mistaken when it applied these findings and conclusions wholesale to resolve the bail application of petitioner.
Nonetheless, the Court's definition of the legal rule regarding the type of evidence necessary to establish conspiracy is the law of the
case that shall govern even petitioner's bail application. Moreover, the Court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
reliability of their testimonies is relevant. Finally, the Court notes that the Sandiganbayan arrived at its own determination that there is
strong evidence that petitioner was in conspiracy with her co-accused and that she committed the acts of plunder and corruption for
which she was charged. This assessment is well-founded.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that there is strong evidence of the guilt of petitioner,
and in denying her bail application. The concept of law of the case is more appropriate, for our decision in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan
declared a legal rule that is controlling of the determination of the existence of conspiracy among the accused in SB-14-CRM-0238.
As quoted earlier, this legal rule is that the conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence. Rather, it can be inferred from the
totality of the facts and circumstances regarding their participation that they pursued a common design and purpose. No direct proof
of agreement is necessary. This rule shall govern the determination of whether there is strong evidence of the involvement of petitioner
in the conspiracy to commit plunder and corruption by causing the release of the PDAF for ghost projects and the diversion of the
funds to the accused persons. It should be emphasized that applying to petitioner's bail application the foregoing law of the case as
defined in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan is quite different from denying petitioner's bail application because, as held in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution had presented strong evidence against Napoles and, by extension, her co-conspirators.
Ecleo v. COMELEC (2023) [Explain the concept of inordinate delay in an election case.]
The Court grants Glenda Buray Ecleo's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, finding that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
gravely abused its discretion by directing its Law Department to file an Information against Ecleo seven years after the complaint was
filed against her, resulting in inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation. Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution guarantees the
right to speedy disposition of cases, and the Court applies a four-factor test to determine violations of this right. Despite COMELEC's
self-prescribed timelines for conducting preliminary investigations, it took seven years to determine probable cause for Ecleo's alleged
election offense, violating its own procedural rules and failing to justify the delay. The Court nullifies the assailed Resolution and grants
Ecleo's petition, emphasizing COMELEC's obligation to ensure prompt prosecution of election offenses in accordance with its mandate.
Zaldivar- Perez v. Sandiganbayan (2019) [Explain the inordinate delay in determination of probable cause.]
The 6-year period to be determine probable cause denied the petitioner of her right to speedy disposition of cases.
QF: Perez-Zaldivar hired an Attorney, Atty. Hortaleza, who only had 3 years of experience as an attorney but the Local Government
Code requires 5 years of practice of law. The issue was simple but it took 6 years for the prosecutor to determine probable cause.
Memory Aid for the Factors Determining probable cause (L-R-A-P)
Length, Reason for the delay, Assertion or non-assertion of the right, and Prejudice to the accused.
Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (2018)
Determine when the case has commenced, to ascertain if there really was delay
●
●
A case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation
The Court acknowledged that that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with
due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case
●
The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the
determination of whether there has been inordinate delay
●
In case at bar, the Court admitted that there was delay – as the 6 years spent for the fact-finding was beyond the
reasonable period of 90 days.
.Dela Cruz v. People (2014) [Discuss the limitations in the conduct of the custodial investigation.]
An entrapment was organized against Dela Cruz allegedly asked for P100,000 later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release
of a certain Ariel. Dela Cruz was assigned in the PNP Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office. After the successful
entrapment operation, he was found positive for use of “Shabu.”
RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 15, Art. I of R.A. 9165. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction.
HOWEVER, the SC acquitted Dela Cruz as it cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense
for which the arrest is being made during a custodial investigation.
NOTE: Custodial investigation will only cover testimonial/oral evidence. Urine sample are extractions and are therefore not allowed in
custodian investigations.
Lucas v. Lucas (2011) [Discuss the allegations required if the DNA sample is required to establish paternity.] Before the RTC in
Valenzuela City, petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a petition to establish illegitimate filiation and asked for an order for DNA testing.
The petitioner asserted that he is the respondent's biological son and that his mother had an intimate relationship with Jesus S.
Lucas, respondent. The respondent contended that there was no prima facie case to support a DNA testing order and that the
petition was not in due form and substance. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction
to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal,
the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made.
Galman v. Pamaran (1985) [Explain when an offer of immunity may be invoked under P.D. No. 1886.]
The testimonies from the Agrava Board hearings are inadmissible in the criminal cases because it was assumed that the private
respondents were offered and granted immunity due to the special aspects of this case. First off, Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 4 of PD
1886 shows that persons called to testify are forced to do so, and any refusal would hold them in contempt and penalize them with
imprisonment and a fine. Thus, even if there was no invocation by the private respondents of their rights, it would not have
mattered, because a normal person would simply be forced to testify because of the penalty provided by PD 1886.
The SC made it clear that the Constitutional rights are inviolable and given such a presidential decree that provides for penalties for
not choosing to speak in its hearings, the only remedy to such an oppressive compulsion by such law, there has to be an offer of
immunity first before subjecting the persons to testify. But in this case, there was no offer of immunity. Thus, in order to simply
uphold the Constitutional rights granted to the people, the SC decided to simply assume that there was indeed an offer and a grant
of immunity to the private respondents. Thus, the evidence are now inadmissible due to this immunity.
The Constitution is always superior. If there are laws that tend to oppressively compel persons to forego such rights granted to them
by the Consti, then the Court must act in a way as to harmonize these laws and place the Constitution at the forefront. Thus, here,
there can be no “implied” waiver of Consti rights because they were simply forced to obey the Agrava Board in fear of sanction.
U.S. v. Pompeya (1915) [Explain the nature of police power in mandatory night duty of qualified male Filipino siblings.]
Prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo charged Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo (Executive
Order No. 1, series of 1914, based on section 40 (m) of the Municipal Code. : fail to render service on patrol duty; an act performed
in violation of the law) for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required
under said municipal ordinance.
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that
the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of
the citizens.
Municipal ordinance, enacted under Act No. 1309, which required able-bodied male residents to assist in maintaining peace and order,
was constitutional. The Court ruled that such requirements fell within the state's police power, and therefore, the ordinance did not
violate the Philippine Bill or the Organic Act of the Philippines.
Corpuz v. People (2014) [Explain the distinction between imposable penalty and imposed penalty the attending circumstances.]
The Supreme Court upholds the conviction of Corpuz for estafa. The Court rejects Corpuz's arguments regarding the admissibility of
evidence and the defectiveness of the information. The Court affirms the constitutionality of the penalties for estafa under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC before conviction to determine whether the charge is
bailable or not, while the penalty actually imposed pertains to the prison sentence upon conviction.
Lozano v. Martinez (1986) [Explain the nature of the crime under the Bouncing Checks Law.]
Petitioners question the constitutionality of BP 22, assailing that it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt
The Court finds the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt. The essence of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.
Austria v. People (2022) [Discuss the right of a private party in assailing judgments or orders in criminal proceedings and
the OSG.]
role of
In 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Mamerto Austria, a schoolteacher, of five counts of acts of lasciviousness against
two 11-year-old female students. Mamerto appealed, and in 2008, a new judge acquitted him based on his motion for reconsideration.
Unsatisfied, the complainants filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the judge's decision lacked a clear
basis. Mamerto argued against the petition, claiming it would violate double jeopardy and required the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). In 2012, the CA ruled in favor of the complainants, stating that the acquittal was void due to the lack of
clarity in the judge's decision. Mamerto sought reconsideration, which was denied, leading to a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In 2021, the Court requested the OSG's opinion on the complainants' legal standing. The OSG asserted that prosecuting crimes is
the state's responsibility, with the people of the Philippines represented by the OSG and public prosecutors. The private complainant's
role is primarily related to civil liability, and they cannot challenge the acquittal or dismissal of criminal cases without the OSG's
involvement. Any attempt to do so independently is considered inadmissible.
In any criminal case or People or State before the Supreme Court (SC) and the CA. This is explicitly provided under Section 35 (1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code of the Philippines, thus:
As to the civil liability of the accused, the private complainant has the legal personality to appeal. When the petition for certiorari filed
by the private complainant challenges the acquittal of the accused, the dismissal of the criminal case, and the interlocutory orders in
criminal proceedings on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process, the reviewing court shall require the OSG
to file a comment within a non-extendible period of 30 days from notice. If the OSG denies the request for conformity, the reviewing
court shall dismiss the private complainant’s appeal/petition for lack of
legal personality.
Ivler v. Hon. San Pedro (2010) [Explain the first type of double jeopardy. Cite the requisites of a claim of double jeopardy.]
Jason Ivler, petitioner, was charged with 2 separate offenses before the MeTC of Pasig. The first charge is Reckless Imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries and second charge is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. Ivler
pleaded guilty on the first offense and then moved to quash the information of the second offense on the grounds that it will place
him in jeopardy of second punishment of the same offense which is reckless imprudence. The MeTC denied his motion. The RTC
also denied his motion. Hence the petition.
The Supreme Court ruled that Reckless Imprudence is a single crime arising from one act which is the negligence or careless act of
the respondent. In the case at bar, Ivler’s negligent act resulted in not only death but damages on the car and physical injuries.
Therefore, the MeTC should not have denied Ivler’s quashes on the grounds of double jeopardy because by starting the trial of the
second charge would put him in double jeopardy that is because he is being punished by the
was his negligent driving.
same act in the first offense which
Reckless imprudence is a single crime which may have multiple effects. The filing of two separate complaints may allow the accused
to invoke double jeopardy for the first information.
QF: What was involved in here is a car accident that resulted to the (1) physic
3. People v. Hon. Relova (1987) [Focus on why there is double jeopardy in information involving the same acts under a national
law and an ordinance.]
SC denies the petition; case is remanded to the Batangas CFI for determination of civil liability
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that while the offense charged in the first information, which was a violation of a city ordinance, is
different from the offense charged in the second information, which was theft under the Revised Penal Code, the protection against
double jeopardy is available to Opulencia.
●
●
The Court applied the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the Constitution, which provides that if an act is punishable by
a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
The Court held that the acts committed by Opulencia in both cases were the same, as they involved the unauthorized
installation of electric wiring and devices to lower electric consumption, which resulted in the ‘taking’ of electricity from
Batangas City.
●
The Court also noted that the dismissal of the first information on the ground of prescription amounted to an acquittal of
Opulencia for that offense.
However, the civil liability arising from the offense charged was not extinguished. The Court remanded the civil action for related civil
liability to the lower court for further proceedings.
4. People v. Webb (2010) ) [Explain the right to appeal an acquittal. Also, explain why the benefit of the defense of alibi benefited
the other co-accused.]
The same with the People v. Lejano.
1. Only the state may appeal an acquittal on a Petition for Certiorari. The victim or relatives are only witnesses only by the state.
This was on the Visconde Massacre where Webb and other accused were acquitted. However, when Visconde appealed, the SC ruled
that he had no right to appeal.
2. Since this involved a massacre with several defendants (Co-accused), Webb’s alibi that he was not in the Philippines at the time
of the commission of the crime benefits the other co-accused because in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Thus, Webb’s
acquittal also acquits his co-accused in the criminal case.
People v. Lejano (2010) [Explain the right to appeal an acquittal. Also, explain why the benefit of the defense of alibi benefited the
other co-accused.]
Only the state may appeal an acquittal on a Petition for Certiorari. The victim or relatives are only witnesses only by the state.
This was on the Visconde Massacre where Webb and other accused were acquitted. However, when Visconde appealed, the SC
ruled that he had no right to appeal.
6. President Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan (2017) [Explain the effect of the grant of demurrer to evidence.]
A demurrer to evidence is a ruling on the merits and will therefore bar a subsequent prosecution for the same facts.
When the prosecutor rested its case, Arroyo and Aguas moved for demurrer to evidence because the crime of plunder has the
threshold of 50M. The prosecution was only able to prove the amassed value of 37M. The SC agreed with Arroyo.
1. Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2018) [Explain why the Court held that the amendments of the Anti-Money Laundering Act
do not constitute an ex post facto law.]
The AML’s inquiry and examination into the accounts are undertaken whimsically based on its investigative discretion.
The RTC and CA are respectively required to ascertain the existence of probable cause any bank inquiry order is issued. Section 11
of R.A. 9160, even with the allowance of ex parte application therefore, cannot be categorized as authorizing the issuance of a
warrant. This is because a search warrant or warrant of arrest contemplates a direct object but the bank inquiry order does not involve
the seizure of persons and property.
Lastly, the holder of a bank account subject of a bank inquiry order issued ex parte is not without recourse. He has the opportunity
to question the issuance of the bank inquiry order after a freeze order is issued against the account. He can then assail not only
the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the freeze order, but also the finding of the probable cause for the issuance of the
bank inquiry order.
2. Valeroso v. People (2008) [Explain why the amendment of the law is beneficial to Valeroso despite an increase in the monetary
fine]
Petitioner was arrested and a gun not registered under his name was found in his possession. Petitioner was charged and found
guilty with violation of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866. CA reduced sentence to 4 years. The Court held that the
prosecution was able to establish the two elements required to establish the crime and the RTC Judge correctly favored the testimony
of the prosecution rather than that of the defense. Decision affirmed.
We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a
firearm.
The law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal
laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and
exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law.
An
exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not
as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination * of
the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of
strict justice."
Caram v. Segui (2014) [Not in the syllabus; discussed in Consti I]
This was the case of a mother who filed a petition for writ of amparo for custody of her child.
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” and its
coverage, in its present form is confined to these instances or to threats thereof.
If what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied [Caram v. Segui, G.R. No. 193652
(2014)].
Agcaoili v. Farinas (2018) [Explain why the petition for writ of amparo was not issued by the Court.]
Congressman Rodolfo Fariñas conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation. The Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability
wanted to know how the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte utilized its shares from the excise taxes on locally manufactured
cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided for by RA 7171 (Virginia Tobacco Law).
The Ilocos 6 were among the resource persons invited in the inquiry. Allegedly, during the inquiry, members of the Committee
threatened and intimidated the Ilocos 6. Some of them were even cited in contempt and were ordered detained.
Fearing for their liberty, petitioners filed with the CA a petition for writ of amparo to protect them from the alleged actual violations of
their rights to liberty and security.
Guidepost:
Issue 1: The individuals in question have already been released from detention.
Issue 2: Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a petition, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is terminated. The Supreme Court
cannot assume jurisdiction over a case pending before another court, as this would risk conflicting decisions and promote judicial
interference.
Issue 3: There is no evidence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative
body. The inquiry is within the constitutional authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Why did the court not issue a Writ of Amparo?
Issue 4: The privilege of the writ of amparo is limited to instances of extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
The petitioners failed to demonstrate that their case fell within this scope.
Furthermore, if legislative inquiry is within Constitutionally-prescribed requirements, courts have no authority to prohibit Congressional
committees from requiring the attendance of persons to whom it issues a subpoena.
Navia v. Pardico (2012) [Explain why personnel of a private security agency cannot be subject of a writ of amparo.]
This involves of a certain disappearance of Ben. Ben allegedly stole a lamp post. Ben was detained thereafter but was subsequently
released. Witnesses, including his wife even signed the logbook to prove that he was released. However, Ben no longer returned
home. Thus, this petition.
The writ of amparo cannot be issued on mere allegations or on the fact that a person has disappeared. It must be shown and proved
by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out or at least approved by the State or a political organization, as well
as a refusal to acknowledge or give whereabouts of such person. In short, the petitioner for the writ must prove that there was
government participation.
In this case, there was no evidence given by the respondents showing that the government participated in the alleged disappearance
of Ben since no government agents, officials or employees were present nor even impleaded in the amparo case.
Writ of amparo can also be applied against private individuals or entities, but government involvement is still an indispensable element
for a writ of amparo to be granted.
InRE: Alice Jasper Lucena (2020) [Explain why the Court ruled that the resolution of the conflict besetting petitioners and their
daughter AJ is simply beyond the competence of the writs applied for.]
The case involves a petition filed by Relissa and Francis Lucena, parents of Alicia Jasper S. Lucena (AJ), for the issuance of writs
of amparo and habeas corpus. AJ, their daughter, became involved with Anakbayan, a student organization, during her Grade 11 year
in FEU in 2018. She informed her parents of her membership on February 2, 2019, and subsequently left home for three days without
explanation. In March 2019, she left again, returning over two months later, having been in the custody of Anakbayan leaders, engaging
in recruitment and campaigning for Kabataan Party list and Neri Colmenares.
In July 2019, AJ left home for the third time and did not return, dropping out of FEU. Concerns were raised about Anakbayan's
alleged recruitment tactics, leading to a Senate hearing where Relissa testified about AJ's experiences. AJ later appeared in a press
conference with representatives of various party-lists, claiming she hadn't been abducted but joined Anakbayan voluntarily.
The petitioners seek the return of AJ, primarily aiming to regain custody, through the petition for amparo and habeas corpus.
ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO [NO]
As it stands now, the amparo remedy is limited to cases of "extralegal killings" or "enforced disappearances" and threats of those
things. "Extralegal killings" are killings that happen outside of the law, without legal protections or court procedures. On the
other hand, here are some of the things that make up "enforced disappearance,":
(a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction,
or any other form of deprivation of liberty; (b) That it be carried out by, or with the permission, support, or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization; (c) That it be followed by the State or political organization refusing to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person who is the subject of the Amparo petition; and (d) That the purpose of the refusal is to remove
subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In
this
case,
it
is
pretty
clear
that
AJ's
situation
does
not
qualify
as
a
forced disappearance or an illegal killing, either
because it has already happened or because it could happen. AJ is not missing. You can figure out where she is. All signs point to
the fact that she is staying with the Anakbayan and its officers, who, at least in AJ's case, are not State agents or organizations. In
fact, Spouses Lucena's use of the amparo remedy cannot go through in light of these facts.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [NO]
The Rules
of
Court
see
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
as
a
way
to
fix
illegal confinement or detention, which is when a
person is kept from having their freedom or their rightful custody is taken away from the person who is supposed to have it.
Spouses Lucena failed to show that the Anakbayan is holding AJ against her will or keeping her against her will. First of all, no one
ever said that the Anakbayan used violence, force, or threats against AJ, which might have made her decide to stay with the group.
Also, it can't be said that Spouses Lucena weren't given the right to care for AJ as they should have. Since it was
that AJ is an
adult, he or she
already known
is free from parental control. This meant that AJ no longer belonged to the Spouses Lucena, and
they no longer had the right to care for him or his property.
At least in the eyes of the State, AJ is old enough to make her own decisions about where she wants to live and who she wants to
be with. As long as these choices don't break the law or someone else's rights, they must be respected and left alone. Otherwise,
the Court would be trampling on AJ's personal freedom, which is what the writs of amparo and habeas corpus are supposed to
protect.
Thus, the petition was denied.
Abogado v. DENR et al. (2019) [Explain the basis of grant of a writ of Kalikasan. Discuss why the Court allowed the withdrawal of
this environmental case.]
Petitioners were fisherfolks of Palawan and residents of Zambales. They filed a petition for the issuance of writ of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus over Panatag Shoal, Panganiban Reef, and Ayungin Shoal against the respondent-government agencies for their
neglect on their duties which resulted to environmental damage. However, one by one, fisherfolk-petitioners manifested to withdraw the
case as some claimed that they did not sign such, some claimed that there were petitioners who were not part of the association,
some claimed that they were misinformed, and some cannot anymore be contacted. The manifestation made by fisherfolk-petitioners
regarding their withdrawal from the case was presented by Solicitor General Calida during the oral arguments. This series of events
led the petitioners’ counsel to file motions to withdraw the petition and as counsel.
The Court granted the motion to withdraw the petition because the petitioners wanted to withdraw the case and that it would be unjust
to compel the 2 remaining fisherfolk-petitioners to continue the case without legal counsel.
Parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or on others’ behalf, carry the burden of substantiating
the writ’s elements. Before private parties or public interest groups may proceed with the case, they must be ready with the
evidence necessary for the determination of the writ’s issuance.
Poe-Llmanzares v. COMELEC (Discuss why the Court resolved the issue in favor of the petitioner.)
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Grace Poe in her qualifications to run for president on “equitable grounds.”
First, the SC held that “foundlings” are natural born citizens based on the intent of the framers of our constitution. Although they were
not included in the list since their number at that time did not warrant their inclusion, they were still considered as natural-born citizens
in adherence to the adopted general principles in international law.
Second, Poe’s repatriation under R.A. 9225 restored her “natural-born citizenship” after he was naturalized as an American Citizen
when she moved to the U.S. In a plethora of cases following the doctrine of Bengzon III v. HRET, there are only two kinds of Filipino
citizens, the “naturalized” and “natural-born” Filipino citizens; and no third class which implies that upon taking her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, she’s now a “natural-born citizen.”
The reckoning period of Poe’s residency in the Philippines should be the time she went back to the Philippines with the intention to
stay for good (May 2005). This is in adherence to the rule in acquiring a new domicile (since residency should be equated with
domicile in Election law):
To acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. An intention to remain there (anomus manendi) ;
and 3. An intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi).
It was her honest mistake that she considered the reckoning period (Her taking the oath of Allegiance on July 7, 2006).
Lastly, since the population of Iloilo at that time she was abandoned was 99% Filipino. Grace Poe also embodies the typical Filipino
features: height, almond shape eyes, black hair, fair skin, flat nose bridge. etc. It was only a matter of common sense to conclude
that her parents are also Filipinos.
We also now have a foundling law, R.A. 11767, “Foundling Recognition and Protection Act” promulgated on May 6, 2022.
Macquiling v. COMELEC (Discuss the effect of use of a foreign passport for a person seeking reinstatement as a Filipino citizen.)
The requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40 (d) of the Local Gov’t Code
which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to
run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Phil. citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the
Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
3. Tan v. Crisologo (Discuss citizenship as a qualification to seek an elective public office.)
SC emphasized that the right to vote in the Philippines is reserved for Filipino citizens, as stated in the Constitution and RA 8189.
Regarding RA 9225, the Court noted that it distinguishes between citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship before and after its
enactment - finding that once Philippine citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath of Allegiance required in RA 9225, the effect
doesn't retroact to the period before taking said oath. SC also reiterates that once you renounce your citizenship there is a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. Thus, Section 2 of R.A. No.
9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may
be applied retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of
the said law. SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that Tan wasn't a Filipino citizen at the time of her voter registration, rendering
her inclusion in the voter's list irregular.
Guidepost:
1.
When you renounce your citizenship - a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
2.
Once Philippine citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a foreign country, we cannot consider one a Filipino
3.
granted the citizenship.
citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed
Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains
no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of
a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law.
4. Uy-Belleza v. Republic (Not in the syllabus)
The case involves Sheila Marie G. Uy-Belleza (petitioner) who filed a petition for correction of entry in the civil registry before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City. The petitioner sought to correct the entry in her birth certificate stating that the nationality
of her mother, Adelaida Go Uy (Adelaida), is "Chinese" instead of "Filipino." To support her petition, the petitioner submitted various
documentary evidence, including her certificate of live birth, marriage contract of her parents, voter's certification, and expired Philippine
passport of her mother. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition, contending that the evidence presented
did not prove that Adelaida is a Filipino citizen.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the petitioner had sufficiently established her petition for correction of entry as to
her mother Adelaida's citizenship. The Court held that the issuance of a Philippine passport to Adelaida is a recognition of her Filipino
citizenship, and the fact that she merely executed an affidavit when she applied for a passport does not overturn the presumption of
regularity in its issuance. The Court also gave weight to the certificate of live birth of petitioner's brother, which stated the citizenship
of Adelaida as "Fil." Furthermore, the Court noted that Adelaida's illegitimate status and the citizenship of her mother, Teodora Guinto,
were never questioned by the prosecutor.
HIGHLIGHT FROM THE BOC:
The requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when a child reached the age of majority under the Consti. applied only to legitimate
children.
These would not apply in the case of Adelaida who is an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother
were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino
citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, Adelaida automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
IOW, she is a Filipino since birth w/o having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
5. So v. Republic (Discuss the concept of credible witnesses in a petition for naturalization.)
Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under CA No 473. He as well as two other witnesses testified that he
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be
a citizen of the PH.
Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a
crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is
not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it.
The petition was denied. The SC held that Petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies
do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
6. David v. Agbay (Discuss the requirement of citizenship to acquire land.)
Petitioner David migrated to Canada in 1974 and became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. He and his wife returned to the
Philippines upon retirement and bought a 600 sqm land along the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential
house. Later, he came to know that the land was a salvage zone. Petitioner filed an MLA indicating in his application that he is a
Filipino citizen. Respondent Agbay, who allegedly sold the land to petitioner, opposed the application on grounds that petitioner is a
Canadian citizen. Respondent also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months
later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status
is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph
1.
7. Republic v. Karbasi (Discuss the obligation of the Philippines to allow a refugee to file a petition for naturalization)
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi, an Iranian national, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dipolog City a petition for
naturalization. Karbasi claimed that he has resided continuously in the Philippines for more than 11 years and has all the qualifications
required under the Naturalization Law. He also presented evidence of his marriage to a Filipino citizen, his employment as a repair
technician, and his income. The RTC granted Karbasi's petition for naturalization, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the grant of Filipino citizenship to Karbasi.
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make
every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.
People of the Philippines v. Mario Esperidion, Albecio Nadura, Jr., Gideon Señarosa, et. al., G.R. No. 239480, FIRST DIVISION,
September 28, 2022, ZALAMEDA Señarosa’s degree of education should have led SPO3 Subong to proceed with caution and
prudence while taking down the former’s statements. SPO3 Subong should have ascertained whether Señarosa genuinely and clearly
understood his rights as communicated to him.
There were also notable lapses on the part of SPO3 Subong that leads Us to conclude that Señarosa was not fully informed of his
rights. First, Señarosa was not advised that he had the option to reject the assistance of Atty. Llasus, the counsel who was
provided for him by the police authorities. Second, the police officers failed to inform Señarosa that he may waive his constitutional
rights only in writing and in the presence of counsel.
These lapses are detrimental to the admissibility of Señarosa’s alleged extrajudicial confession. Similar to Our observations in People
v. Agustin, the punctilious and artificially stately style of the subject extrajudicial confession do not create an impression of
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of Señarosa. The statements do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform
and explain to Señarosa his constitutional rights, much less satisfy the constitutional prerequisites. Indeed, the showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained surrender of a right is wanting. This lack of understanding on the part of Señarosa also belies
his voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent, among others.
Likewise, We find that Atty. Llasus was remiss in his duty to act as a competent and independent counsel for Señarosa during the
latter’s custodial investigation. To become a competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation, the lawyer
representing the accused must be present at all stages of the interview and should be actively counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation and stopping the interrogation occasionally either to give advice to the accused that he
or she may either continue, choose to remain silent, or terminate the interview. Most importantly, the lawyer should ascertain that
the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his
or her extrajudicial confession in relation to his or her constitutional rights.
Further, there is no evidence to support the prosecution’s claim that Atty. Llasus was indeed Señarosa’s counsel of choice. There is
no showing that Atty. Llasus was indeed engaged by Señarosa himself or his “relative or person authorized by [him] to engage an
attorney[,] or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.” Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect,
as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
We note that Señarosa was consistent in his claim that there was no lawyer present to represent him when he signed the Sworn
Statement. In contrast, SPO3 Subong testified that it was, in fact, the victim’s family, or one allegedly connected to them, that
brought in Atty. Llasus to assist Señarosa during the investigation.
Further, SPO3 Subong also revealed that Atty. Llasus’s participation during the custodial investigation had been reduced to
translating the questions and answers to Señarosa, witnessing him sign the sworn statement, and signing the same statement
himself. The record is bereft of any allegation that Atty. Llasus conferred with Señarosa or that he explained to the latter the
possible consequences of his confession. There is also no indication that Atty. Llasus advised Señarosa not to give any statement if
he was in doubt and to think things over. He never advised the accused that he had the right not to sign the extrajudicial
confession if he believes that it may incriminate him.
The violation of Señarosa’s right during his custodial investigation also triggers the application of the exclusionary rule and his
extrajudicial confession should be struck down as inadmissible.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906. October 07, 2008
Since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life,
liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because
respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of
threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo.
Jessica Lucila Reyes vs Director of Camp Bagong Diwa, G.R. No. 254838
Whether or not Gigi Reyes is entitled to the remedy of habeas corpus.
Yes. This is on the ground that her constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated. While the writ is generally not available to
a person whose liberty is under custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, when such custody becomes vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive amounting to an infringement on the constitutional right to speedy trial of an accused, habeas corpus may
be provisionally availed of. In this light, the Supreme Court provided the following:
Guidelines in availing habeas corpus when speedy trial is invoked:
1. Petitioner must be illegally restrained;
2. If not illegally restrained, there must be a violation on the petitioner’s constitutional right. Mere allegation of a violation of a
constitutional right is not enough. The violation of constitutional right must be shown to be sufficient as to possibly void the proceedings;
3. One of the constitutional rights violated must be the right to speedy trial. Any of these grounds must be shown and may be proven
to exist under the Barker Balancing Test or the Cagang Guidelines:
a.
b.
The
proceeding
Unjustified
is
postponements
attended
of
by
the
vexatious,
trial
capricious,
are
asked
and
for
oppressive
and
delays;
secured;
c. Without cause of justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the Petitioner having his or her case
tried.
4. The petition is only to seek provisional liberty and not to determine the merit of the case.
In this case, the Prosecution was at fault for the delays. Even though some of the delays were caused by Reyes, still, the Prosecution
should have justified the delays they caused. Here, they merely invoked that under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, Reyes is not
entitled to habeas corpus because her detention was ordered by the Sandiganbayan. Due to the protracted hearing, Reyes’ detention
has become vexatious, capricious, and excessive.
Reyes was ordered released. She was not directed to post bail but was ordered to attend the scheduled hearings, give periodic
reports, and cannot leave the country without authority from the Sandiganbayan.
What is the Barker Balancing Test?
Under the BBT, the following must be considered:
a.
Length of delay
c.
Assertion or non-assertion of the right by the accused
b.
d.
Reasons for the delay
Prejudice caused by the delay
What is the Cagang Guidelines?
1. Burden of proof in proving violation of the speedy trial rule is on the Accused;
2. Entire context of the case must be considered, i.e., complexity or simplicity of the case; volume of evidence to be considered;
3. Right to speedy trial must be timely raised.
Mohamed v. Republic, G.R. No. 220674, December 2, 2021
●
Whether or not petitioner should be granted naturalization and shall take his oath of allegiance.
○
No. Section 5 of C.A. No. 473 strictly enjoins the applicant to file with the OSG a declaration under oath that it is
his or her bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines one year prior to the filing of the petition for
admission to Philippine citizenship. As aptly discussed in Republic v. Li ChingChung,the
one-year
period
is
to
give
the
OSG
sufficient
time
to
investigate
purpose
of
the
the qualifications of the
applicant and adduce evidence to protect the interest of the State. The filing of such declaration of intention, upon
faithful compliance with the statutory requirements, is mandatory and an absolute prerequisite to naturalization.
“The language of the law on the matter being express and explicit, it is beyond the province of the courts to take
into account questions of expediency, good faith and other similar reasons in the construction of its provisions.
“Hence, the premature filing of the petition for naturalization before the expiration of the one-year period is fatal.
Relatively, the declaration of intention shall set forth the applicant’s “name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last
foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines,
and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration. “We stress that it is imperative upon the
applicant to ensure that the facts contained in the declaration are complete and accurate since these are the same facts that shall
form part of the petition and which will ultimately bestow jurisdiction to the courts. In this case, among the contents of Mohamed's
Declaration of Intention are the names for which he is known for. However, Mohamed's original declaration provided the
name"Abdelkahim Mohamed, “and it was
only
in
the
supplemental
declaration
that
the
name"Abdelhakim
Mohamed
Hussin"wasincorporated. Contrary to Mohamed's theory, the change he introduced in the declaration as to the names he was known
for is substantial. It is only after the inclusion of Mohamed's other name that the State may proceed with its investigation and gather
evidence pertaining to his qualifications. It is also at this
authorized
to
use
alternative
point
that
the
State
may
verify
whether
Mohamed
is
names. Significantly, in cases of substantial changes in the original declaration, the mandatory
one-year period to file the petition for naturalization must be computed from the submission of the supplemental declaration.
Otherwise, it will deprive the OSG of sufficient time to investigate the qualifications of the applicant and adduce evidence to protect
the interest of the State. In this case, Mohamed filed his petition for naturalization on August 21, 2007 or only a month after he
submitted his Supplemental Declaration of Intention on July 20, 2007. Obviously, the period of one month is insufficient for the OSG
to verify the person of the applicant "Abdelkahim Mohamed"a.k.a."Abdelhakim Mohamed Hussin" and to conduct inquiries as to his
qualifications.
Tan v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993, November 8,2017
●
Whether Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter –NO
○
A natural-born Filipino citizen who renounces his or her Philippine Citizenship, effectively becomes a foreigner in
the Philippines with no political right to participate in Philippine politics and governance.
○
Without any doubt, only Filipino citizens are qualified to vote and may be included in the permanent list of voters.
Thus, to be registered a voter in the Philippines, the registrant must be a citizen at the time he or she filed the
application.
○
It is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26 October 2009, and that she only took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more than a month after the ERB
approved her application.
●
Whether her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a retroactive effect, such that a natural-born
Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or her Filipino citizenship –NO
○
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost their Philippine citizenship through
naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.
○
Congress declared as a state policy that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions laid out by the law.
○
Retention of Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225:
■
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are deemed hereby to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I _____________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that
I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of
a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
●
It would seem that the law makes a distinction between Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and reacquired their citizenship under the same law from those who lost their Philippine
citizenship after R.A. No. 9225 was enacted and retained their citizenship.
●
Reacquiring Philippine citizenship after taking the Oath of Allegiance required in R.A. No. 9225, does not mean that the
effect on the citizenship status retroacts to the period before taking said oath.
●
Once Philippine citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a foreign country, we cannot consider one a Filipino
citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed. Simply stated, right after a
Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a foreigner (cf. Maquiling vs. Comelec)
●
●
Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship requires a voluntary act for it to produce any legal effect.
Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the USA on January 1993, prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on 29 August 2003
applying retroactivity to her would render the different use of the words "reacquire" and "retain" in R.A. No. 9225 futile.
Court applies the principles of Verba Legis and the Holistic Approach In statutory construction as well as the principle of
prospectivity of laws.
●
To consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost would result in an absurd
scenario where a Filipino would still be considered a Philippine citizen when in fact, he had already renounced his
citizenship.
●
During the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No. 9225 was not yet enacted and the applicable law was still
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which provided for how a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
○
○
By naturalization in a foreign country;
By express renunciation of citizenship;
The loss of her Philippine citizenship is but a necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that time, Tan was presumed to
know the legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen
People v. Campos, G.R. No. 252212, July 14, 2021
In determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identification:
1. the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. the witness’ degree of attention at that time;
3. the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
4. the length of time between the crime and the identification;
5. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
6. the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Austria v. People, G.R. No. 205275. June 28, 2022
1. Whether the private complainants had the legal personality to question the acquittal of the accused.
●
"In any criminal case or proceeding, only the OSG may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or State before the Supreme Court (SC) and the CA. This is explicitly provided under Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code of the Philippines.
"The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the state is the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action and not
the private complainant. The interest of the private offended party is restricted only to the civil liability of the accused. In the prosecution
of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the OSG.
The private offended party may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. Differently stated, the
private offended party may file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG, but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. Also, the private complainant may file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only
to the end of preserving his or her interest in the civil aspect of the case.
While the private complainants filed the petition before the CA without the OSG’s prior conformity, they cannot be
faulted for relying on jurisprudence allowing them to assail the criminal aspect of the case through a petition for
certiorari on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion and denial of due process. Hence, the Court should not
dismiss their remedy. In any event, the OSG joined the cause of private complainants, and gave its conformity to
●
2.
the petition for certiorari that the private complainants filed before the CA.
Whether the RTC’s orders of acquittal valid.
○
The RTC orders, which simply copied the allegations of Austria in his motions for reconsideration and memoranda were
not valid. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly provides that "no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis
therefor." The failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The CA properly struck down as a nullity the RTC's Joint Orders which simply copied the allegations of Mamerto
in his motions for reconsideration and memoranda followed by a conclusion "that the prosecution miserably failed
to overcome the legal presumption of innocence of the accused beyond cavil of reasonable doubt." They contained
neither an analysis of the evidence nor a reference to any legal basis for the conclusion. Thus, the Joint Orders
are void for failure to meet the standard set forth in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
●
3. Whether Austria's right against double jeopardy was violated.
As the RTC’s acquittal orders were void judgments, they have no legal effect and thus did not terminate the case. Hence, Austria’s
right against double jeopardy was not violated.
Tahira S. Ismael and Aida U. Ajijon v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 234435-36, SECOND DIVISION, February 06, 2023
●
The non-inclusion of other conspirators in the indictment did not violate petitioners' right to be fully informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them.
●
The delay in the proceedings did not amount to a violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases or speedy
trial.
●
Petitioners were not liable under Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 as there was no evidence of manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence on their part.
●
●
Petitioners were liable under RA No. 8291 for their failure to remit GSIS contributions.
The penalties imposed by the Sandiganbayan were modified, acquitting Ismael of the charge under Section 3 (e) of RA
No. 3019 and finding Ajijon guilty of violating Section 52 (d) and (g) of RA No. 8291.
A lower penalty was imposed on Ajijon and the fine imposed on Ismael was increased.
Re: Disturbing Social Media Posts of Lawyers/Law Professors, A.M. No. 21-06-20-SC, April 11, 2023
●
The Court ruled that such right of lawyers to privacy is limited, especially when it concerns their social media accounts.
Citing the 2016 case of Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, the Court said it is clear that “there can be no reasonable expectation of
privacy as regards social media posts, regardless if the same are ‘locked,’ precisely because the access restriction settings
in social media platforms do not absolutely bar other users from obtaining access to the same.”
The Court further reiterated that restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” only does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of other users. Thus, the Court said, it cannot give credence to the invocation of Atty. Antay,
who started the post, of his right to privacy.
“His excuse—that his social media account is locked and the contents thereof cannot be accessed by outsiders—is a mere
allegation at best. Allegations are not proof. Further, the fact that the exchanges leaked means that his social media account
is not locked as he claims or that there is a rat amidst them,” lamented the Court.
In finding the lawyers liable for violation of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law and prohibits them from behaving in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession, the Court said that inappropriate, disrespectful, and defamatory language of
lawyers, even in the private sphere, are still within the Court’s disciplinary authority.
It further stressed that members of the legal profession must respect the freedom of LGBTQIA+ individuals to be themselves
and express who they are, as part of their constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
The Court likewise reiterated that the Philippines adheres to the internationally-recognized principle of non-discrimination and
equality. “As such, every member of the legal profession is bound to observe and abide by them, especially when dealing
with LGBTQIA+ individuals.”
The Court also pointed out that inappropriate, disrespectful, belligerent, or malicious language can be a source of criminal liability
under the Safe Spaces Act. “Gender-based sexual harassment ‑ encompassing transphobic and homophobic slurs – in streets and
public spaces as well as online, may warrant progressive penalties ranging from community service, fines and imprisonment,” said
the Court
People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053. March 21, 2022
●
The accused were never denied the right to confront Mary Jane Veloso under the rule of modes of
discovery.(J.HERNANDEZ CASE)
●
QF: Sergio was sent to Bali, Indonesia. She thought it was only a trip but a person arrived to give her illegal drugs to be
placed in her baggage, she was used as a courier of the illegal drugs. Unfortunately, she was found guilty of possessing
illegal drugs. She was sentenced to death penalty. Meanwhile, the other accused were tried in the PH.
●
Right To Compulsory Processes
○
●
Trial In Absentia
Some Instances When the Accused Must Be Present in Trial:
1. Identification Purposes (rape cases or conspiracy cases)
2. Promulgation of judgment
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.