Hindy Lauer Schachter, Editor Stephen W. Kleinschmit North Carolina State University he Role of Public Participation in Environmental Book Reviews Governance Judith A. Layzer, Natural Experiments: EcosystemBased Management and the Environment. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 292 pp. $29.00 (paper), ISBN: 9780262622141. John M. Whiteley, Helen Ingram, and Richard Warren Perry, eds., Water, Place, and Equity. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 318 pp. $25.00 (paper), ISBN: 9780262731911. P erhaps the greatest challenge of Western civilization is to perpetuate personal liberty and economic expansion in the face of collective societal needs and the constraints of the natural world. Jared Diamond noted in Collapse (2005) that societies often choose to make decisions that are detrimental to their long-term interest. With the advancement of technology and improvement in our collective understanding of environmental systems, the study of natural resource administration has taken a more scientific and interdisciplinary approach to mitigating environmental degradation. he two works reviewed here examine the study of natural resource management with an eye toward helping us meet this great challenge. Natural Experiments is an assessment of ecosystembased management (EBM), a natural resource management methodology that arose in the late 1970s and 1980s. EBM utilizes landscape-scale landuse planning initiatives to overcome a fragmented and disjointed approach to environmental resource protection across multiple jurisdictional boundaries. he work provides a critical assessment of EBM in practice through the use of seven case studies; each takes a decidedly qualitative approach to acquiring information. he end result is a rather interesting and thought-provoking challenge to our perceptions about participatory governance structures. EBM emerged as a new form of governance in response to centralized management schemes that lacked the flexibility or ability to adapt to the contextual issues of individual locales, and also “ignored the interrelationships among natural systems elements” (1). To counter these shortcomings, EBM initiatives began to sprout up across the country. Judith A. Layzer lists three core characteristics of these plans: a landscape-scale focus, collaborative planning including stakeholder involvement, and flexible, adaptive implementation of planning goals. hese core characteristics became the basis for optimistic and pessimistic models of EBM. he optimistic model generally assumes a fair, consensus-based approach in which stakeholders develop mutual concerns, work toward common goals, and produce processes that will enhance environmental protection better than other management schemes. he pessimistic model emphasizes the various pathologies of consensus-based regulatory management (Coglianese 2001)—asymmetric power relationships among stakeholders, self-interested actors, the lack of political will, and the lack of elevation or even parity of environmental concerns to economic and political considerations. In line with general performance-based management systems theory, the case studies use outcome-focused evaluation criteria. Stephen W. Kleinschmit is a doctoral student in public administration in the School of Public and International Affairs at North Carolina State University. His research interests include land-use planning reform, environmental management, and cumulative impact assessment. E-mail: swkleins@ncsu.edu A theme that emerges across chapters 3–6 is the considerable disparity in professionalization and resource availability among stakeholders, which has the effect of favoring private development interests over public interest environmental organizations in deliberations, particularly in reference to the capacity to retain or provide legal representation (48). While consensus-based approaches were initiated with the intent of reducing conflict, they undermine the validity of the plan, as the ultimate goal of providing a truly sustainable ecosystem is displaced in the interest of gaining consensus. What was intended to be a cooperative forum for negotiation instead devolves into competition, in which stakeholders seek to use their advantages to dominate others. What emerges from these deliberations is an accord beset with satisficing; none of the stakeholders has their goals fulfilled, and some resort to external processes to undermine the Book Reviews 303 agreements through the use of political influence or litigation. What emerges are minimally protective plans that are easy to undermine. Chapters 7–9 examine case studies that utilize the ecosystem-based management approach, but dispense with much of the collaborative processes that plagued early attempts at EBM. he author notes that although public input was solicited in these cases, the process was not intended to be collaborative. he success of plans such as the Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan (chapter 7) was in part attributable to the fact that “planners did not adhere to a central tenet of ecosystem-based management: reliance on stakeholder involvement” (202). he success of a plan because of the outright rejection of a core assumption of EBM is certainly worth noting. he author challenges us to reconceptualize litigation as an indicator of success and not of failure. Ecosystem-based management is an inherently political undertaking; landscape-scale planning initiatives can encompass a large number of potentially affected parties, each with different (and often conflicting) values. In such a system, it is perhaps impossible to avoid conflict, as it is likely that measures will have to “impose substantial costs on some interests” to achieve “genuine environmental improvements” (271). In addition to resistance from private interests, groups may even encounter institutional resistance from the agencies themselves. Layzer finds that traditional politics leads to the most protective environmental management plans and that “policymakers made fewer concessions to development or user interests” under this regime (271). Likewise, when policy makers render a decision predicated on scientific assessment (rather than consensus), they might not avoid litigation, but a stakeholder should find that it is more difficult to discredit their action than in participatory structures. he removal of the regulatory “teeth” of a plan in an attempt to avoid conflict is a failure of political leadership that ultimately undermines the plan’s efficacy. It also does not preclude the regulated entities from filing suits to nullify the remaining tenets with which they disagree, or from seeking the assistance of lawmakers to undermine the plan’s authority. he entire concept of stakeholders included in a consensus-based framework begs consideration. Layzer notes that in an effort to reach agreement, groups in consensus-based decision making tend to include only participants who are deemed “reasonable” and marginalize those whose views are considered “extreme” (275). In terms of legal standing, theoretically, one private entity is not afforded any additional standing (other than perhaps right of ownership) than another, so it is curious how groups justify additional criteria 304 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011 for inclusion in decision making. he penchant for “perceived reasonableness” is disconcerting, as environmental issues generally have not enjoyed the same degree of salience as economic issues. he author notes that this tendency to marginalize group members has a disproportionately detrimental effect on environmentalists, who then become “disadvantaged by collaborative approaches” (275). he text suggests that EBM plans are much more effective when stakeholder input is encompassed within a format that encourages the public provision of information, instead of deliberation within a consensus-based rulemaking process. his helps advance a decision-making framework predicated on technical merit, not the ability of a group member to exercise power. What should emerge is a management framework that remains cognizant of its strategic goals and does not reward those who seek to derail the initiative. his text is not intended to challenge the concepts of adaptive management; the author notes that it can yield beneficial results, though only “when used in the service of a single goal” (279). hroughout the work, the author makes a convincing case that consensusbased approaches to environmental management are almost certainly doomed to failure. his analysis enjoins us to consider the wisdom of consensus-based decision making in strategic (or landscape) planning initiatives, and its lessons are easily devolved to the realm of local land-use planning, which also suffer from the same complications of ecological fragmentation, goal paradoxes, and goal displacement. he author notes that the work is not intended to disparage the inclusion of stakeholders in the policy-making process, but that such negotiation should occur within a “hospitable context” (292). Water, Place, and Equity is an examination of water resources across the world, emphasizing the growing potential for conflict and the ethics of allocation. he contributors stress the theme of equity (or perhaps more accurately, inequity) throughout the work; detailed within its nine chapters are a myriad of problems faced by various societies across the globe. At the root of many of these problems is the continuing expansion of water consumption to the detriment of disadvantaged populations and environmental sustainability. he work looks at the ethical and moral issues associated with water use and posits their consideration in contrast to traditional market based conceptualizations of how resources are apportioned. Hardin (1968) opined in “he Tragedy of the Commons” that conscience is self-eliminating: those who heed the call to reduce demand would only have the surplus of their previous allocation consumed by those who lack this conscience. Why would one entity cede the additional economic potential of an increased water allocation (in the name of sustainability) when doing so would only encourage others to waste? How, then, are we to reward deference to the common good when abusing the water commons is so rewarding? incentivized and generally less susceptible to the collective action problems that plague voluntary citizen groups. Expanding on the premise of the economic potential of water, Baer (chapter 7) studies the issue of privatization through the lens of Bolivian water politics. he example of Cochabamba, Bolivia is notable in the sense that it was “the first large-scale rejection of water privatization in Latin America” (195). Privatization was the strategy advanced by the World Bank under the premise that it was the best method to help ensure expanded service (in concert with other reforms) after “years of fiscal mismanagement by military regimes” (200) and as a response to abuse of the water commons. What emerges is a political catastrophe that unravels the plan, driven ostensibly by the lack of public input in the planning stages. While some literature cites a lack of public input as a contributing factor to the failure of the plan, it seems that the real criticism should be directed toward the policies of the contractor, Aquas del Tunari. Substantial rate increases, metering of private wells, and prohibitions on rainwater collection pushed a regressive fee structure that stoked popular discontent. But perhaps these policies committed a much more egregious error by attempting to assert ownership of a resource that is not inherently excludable. While examining trends in Northwestern U.S. and Western Canadian water management, Paul W. Hirt (chapter 6, Water) denotes a “semicyclical” shift in historical resource allocation regimes: from community control to market forces/economic elites, to political elites, a return to the markets, and eventually a partial return to “community-based decision-making” (178). Layzer suggests that an “appropriate scale for addressing environmental problems” may not be the same scale “at which participants most readily agree” (289). Both seem to hint that the scale at which environmental decision making is made expands and contracts, and is an important determinant of the efficacy of ecological management. his can be seen as an indicator of the state of societal values, as to whether environmental goals receive salience or parity with economic or social goals. hese two books contain common themes. he concept of technocratic administration principles is contained within both works. Layzer’s analysis reveals greater efficacy in obtaining stated goals when policy makers refuse to cede control of their technocratic decision-making processes. Maria Carmen Lemos (chapter 9 in Water) notes that Brazil has departed from principles of technocracy, which are described as “dysfunctional, insulated policymaking” (250), in an attempt to “increase the level of equitable allocation, democratization, accountability and transparency of water management” (251). hese reforms are conducted under the auspices of encouraging greater participation and democratic reform, but they are also susceptible to “elite capture of the decision making processes” (252). Both contradictory and confirmatory messages emerge in the two works. Layzer’s lesson is that direct participation by self-interested private entities undermines the efficacy of environmental management. Lemos suggests that more participatory measures may increase the “equitable” allocation of resources (251), but admits that the devolution of resource allocation to the public will likely advance a structure that will inevitably be dominated by those who have the capacity to dominate the proceedings and exacerbate power imbalances (252), consistent with Layzer. he problem of capture thus complicates participatory governance regimes, as economic interests are directly Water, Place, and Equity takes a much more reflective view of resource allocation than Natural Experiments, in that the intrinsic hope of the work is to pursue sustainability through a more just (and democratic) allocation of goods in concert with progressive social enlightenment. his speaks to a conservationist ethos and harbors a conciliatory tone, which is exemplified by its discussion of wise use and lengthy consideration of the environmental justice movement. homas Clay Arnold (chapter 1) challenges us to move past the commodity driven western view of water and instead supplant this conceptualization with the “moral economy of water,” the ability of a community to reconcile the “competing uses and meanings” (39) of water as a component of not only economic development, but also of social and environmental systems. Introducing the concept of a moral economy is a thought-provoking framework with which to examine competing values and helps create a more definitive construct of equity. Natural Experiments emphasizes a more ecological basis of resource allocation, stressing the preservation of threatened resources and remediation of degraded lands. While they might in theory have similar results, they sometimes have contradictory premises. In Natural Experiments, public participation is the problem. In Water, Place, and Equity, it is part of the solution. Perhaps the lesson is that a technocratic management scheme is advantageous in a government that remains politically accountable, and one predicated on public participation is advantageous in areas that resource allocation is one component of a larger goal of general democratic reform. A consideration extracted from both texts is that the management of water resources is fundamentally Book Reviews 305 different from that of other resources. Water does not have the degree of abstraction and excludability of physical property; its distributed collection makes it much more difficult for parties to assert an absolute right to its use. he effects of its degradation can also be much more noticeable and sudden than slower, incremental problems. It could be that participatory decision-making processes are more suited for water resources than other forms of natural resource management, particularly when they are able to elicit broad social mobilization. In the face of an apathetic citizenry or asymmetric deliberative processes, traditional political and technocratic procedures might be a more useful means of protecting the public interest than participatory democracy. here are several lessons that are extracted from comparing these texts. First, natural resource administrators must remain committed to the mission with which they have been tasked, to avoid displacing the goals of equity and sustainability with political expedience and finding agreement. he threat of litigation should not cause decision makers to compromise or be construed as failure. Second, managers need to be cognizant of the motivations of participants in deciding what role the public should play in the decision- 306 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011 making process. A well-attended and truly inclusive participatory process, in which actors are working toward stated goals may increase the provision of information and lead to better decision making. An anticompetitive process that promotes elite capture and the disparate provision of collective goods to private actors is generally undesirable. Decision makers might also perceive the lack of greater public participation in their supposedly “democratic” process as implied consent to perpetuate the existing management regime, instead of recognizing how the regime might undermine participation in the first place. Finally, administrators need to be cognizant that different resources have different meanings and values attached to them, and thus the nature of management must be tailored to the nature of the resource itself. References Coglianese, Cary. 2001. Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy? In Environmental Contracts, edited by Eric W. Orts and Kurt Deketerlaere, 93–113. Boston: Kluwer Law International. Diamond, Jared. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking. Hardin, Garrett. 1968. he Tragedy of the Commons. Science, December 13, 1243–48.
