TITLE: G.R. No. 45633
CANDIDO MENDOZA Y PIMENTEL, petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA-LOPEZ, Judge, Branch III,
Municipal Court of the City of Manila, respondent.
FACTS:
Candidado Mendoza, petitioner, was charged with violating section 821 of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila for willfully and unlawfully behaving in a rude and indecent manner toward K. Severien on
May 10th of 1937. Mendoza pleaded “not guilty” on arraignment and the case was called for a trial.
Before the presentation of evidence, the fiscal orally applied for permission to amend the information by
changing the aggrieved party’s name from K. Severien to Aurea Almazan who was really the offended
one. The Municipal Trial Court denied the motion and the case was again called for a trial but the fiscal
asked to dismiss the case over having his motion denied and is intending to file another information
correcting the name of the aggrieved party. The petitioner urged the trial to continue but the MTC
granted the fiscal’s motion to dismiss the case.
The second information was docketed as a criminal case. The petitioner invoked the defense of double
jeopardy, contending that he could not be tried again for the same offense in the first information which
was dismissed against his will. The MTC overruled the defense and called for an immediate trial. The
petitioner was then absent on the trial despite having been notified. The court confiscated the
petitioner’s bond and ordered his arrest. The petitioner then instituted the present proceedings praying
the overruling of his defense be set aside and that it is declared that he cannot be tried again.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the defense of double jeopardy.
RULING:
The remedy applied for is granted. The petitioner is declared in double jeopardy and the order to
confiscate the petitioner’s bond and directing his arrest is set aside.
Doctrine:
According to Section 28 of General Orders, No. 58, in order that an accused may invoke the defense of
double jeopardy, he must prove: (1) that he has been previously brought to trial; (2) in a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance; (4) for
the same offense or an attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof; (5) that the case has been
dismissed or terminated after he had pleaded to the information but before judgment was rendered,
and (6) that the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent.
The first information against the petitioner was sufficient in the form and substance. According to
section 7 of General Orders, No. 58, an erroneous allegation as to the name of the person injured shall
be deemed immaterial. The municipal trial court should have allowed the amendment, but even if so,
the fiscal could have proceeded with presenting evidence showing that the offended party was Aurea
Almazan instead of K. Severien.
The violation in the second information is identical with the first information as admitted by the fiscal. It
is not needed for proof for the defense of double jeopardy as the facts have already been admitted by
the fiscal and the MTC is aware of such facts. The respondent contends that the petitioner could file an
appeal if he was convicted in the trial, however, the Supreme Court says that the suggested appeal
would not be an effective or adequate remedy.