MODELING FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES IN THE DRILLING
OPERATIONS OF THE RUBIALES WELL
JANUARY, 2024.
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MODELING FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES IN THE DRILLING OPERATIONS OF THE RUBIALES WELL
CONTENT
1
OBJECTIVE............................................................................................................................................................ 4
2
SCOPE................................................................................................................................................................. 4
3
CONTEXT............................................................................................................................................................. 4
4
ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES ........................................................................................................................ 4
5
4.1
SUBSTANCES LISTS .................................................................................................................................. 4
4.2
SUBSTANCES COMPOSITION.................................................................................................................... 5
4.3
PROCESS CONDITIONS.............................................................................................................................. 5
4.4
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
................................................................................................................... 6
4.5
LIST OF LAUNCHERS.................................................................................................................................. 6
4.6
IDENTIFICATION OF MODELED SCENARIOS....... ..................................................................................... 7
4.7
RANKS OF AFFECTION.... ......................................................................................................................... 9
4.8
RESULTS................................................................................................................................................... 11
4.9
RESULT ANALYSIS............. ..................................................................................................................... 13
4.9.1
POZO RUBIALES SYSTEM – MAJOR SCENARIO (880 PSI) ........................................................... 13
4.9.2
POZO RUBIALES SYSTEM – MINOR SCENARIO (880 PSI) ... ........................................................13
4.9.3
TEA SYSTEM (3M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM) ............................................................... 14
4.9.4
TEA SYSTEM (7M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM)................................................................ 14
4.9.5
TEA SYSTEM (7M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM). .............................................................. 14
4.9.6
RESULTS SUMMARY........................................................................................................................14
RECOMENDATIONS..........................................................................................................................................16
ANNEX A1. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF AFFECTION FOR THE POZO RUBIALES
SYSTEM – MAJOR SCENARIO (880 PSI).................................................................................................................18
ANNEX A2. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF AFFECTION FOR THE POZO RUBIALES
SYSTEM – MINOR SCENARIO (880 PSI) ...........................................................................................................
19
ANNEX B1. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF AFFECTION TEA SYSTEM (3M) –
CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM) .........................................................................................................................20
ANNEX B2. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF AFFECTION TEA SYSTEM (7M) –
CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM).. .........................................................................................................................21
ANNEX B3. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF AFFECTION TEA SYSTEM (10M) –
CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM).. .........................................................................................................................22
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TABLE INDEX
Table 1. List of Substances....... ............................................................................................................................... 4
Table 2. Rubiales Well Fluid Composition......... ..................................................................................................... 5
Table 3. Composition of Tea Fluid. ......................................................................................................................... 5
Table 4. Process Conditions Analysis of Consequences Pozo Rubiales................................................................ 6
Table 5. Environmental Conditions Analysis of Consequences Pozo Rubiales. ................................................... 6
Table 6. List of Initiators Analysis of Pozo Rubiales Consequences...................................................................... 6
Table 7. List of Pozo Rubiales Consequence Analysis Scenarios................. ......................................................... 8
Table 8. Ranges of Affectation by Thermal Radiation.. .......................................................................................... 9
Table 9. Ranges of Affectation by Overpressure... ................................................................................................10
Table 10. Ranges of Affectation by Flammable Cloud. ........................................................................................ 10
Table 11. Rates of Affectation Analysis of Pozo Rubiales Consequences... ...................................................... 12
Table 12. Final Frequencies. .............................................................................................................................. 13
Table 13. Summary of results Analysis of Rubiales Consequences....................................................................15
3|Pa ge
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1 OBJECTIVE
•
Carry out modeling for the analysis of consequences in fires, explosions and cloud dispersion in drilling
operations.
•
Establish safe distance for the location of personnel and camps.
2 SCOPE
This report applies to the drilling operations of the Rubiales Well belonging to Ecopetrol S.A.
3 CONTEXT
For the operation, hypothetical process safety events have been defined that can be presented as: minor
scenarios, which include hydrocarbon releases through orifices smaller than 2", major scenarios, which
include hydrocarbon releases through 2" orifices and catastrophic scenarios, which include total pipe rupture
or blowout events.
The probability of occurrence of these events ranges from frequent for minor scenarios to very unlikely for
catastrophic scenarios (includes total rupture of equipment or pipeline and blowout events).
4 ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES
4.1 SUBSTANCES LIST
The list of substances modeled in this analysis of consequences is shown below:
Name
Code
Quantity
Present
Classification
GHS
UN Number
MET
NE
H221
1971
CRU
NE
H226
H411
1267
MET
NE
H221
1971
Safety
Rhombus
Pozo Rubiales
Tea
Table 1. Lists df Substances.
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4.2 SUBSTANCES COMPOSITION
Component
% Molar
C6 (Hexane)
0,30
C8 (Octane)
0,04
C9 (Nonane)
0,06
C10 (Decane)
0,26
C15 (Pentadecane)
15,09
C20 (Eicosane)
25,13
C30 (Triacontane)
32,79
C32 (Dotriacontane)
26,33
Table 2. Rubiales Well Fluid Composition.
Component
% Molar
CO2 (CO2)
5,12
N2 (Nitrogen)
9,24
C1 (Methane)
84,96
c3 (Ethane)
0,11
c3 (Propane)
0,03
iC4 (i-Butane)
0,01
nC4 (n-Butane)
0,02
iC5 (i-Pentane)
0,02
nC5 (n-Pentane)
0,01
C6 (Hexane)
0,10
C7 (Heptane)
0,12
C8 (Octane)
0,11
C9 (Nonane)
0,08
C10 (Decane)
0,06
C15 (Pentadecane)
0,01
Table 3. Composition of Tea Fluid.
4.3 PROCESS CONDITIONS
This consequence analysis was developed based on the process conditions shown below and defined by
mutual agreement with Ecopetrol S.A.
Equipment or Element
Pressure (psi)
Temp. (°F)
Volume/Flow
Pozo Rubiales
880
154
NE
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Equipment or Element
Pressure (psi)
Temp. (°F)
Volume/Flow
Atm
154
NE
Tea
Table 4. Process Conditions Consequence Analysis Pozo Rubiales.
4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
One of the key factors to consider when determining the post-release behavior of a substance is the
environmental conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to define the environmental characteristics that
determine the behavior of the product after the loss of containment and therefore the effects that their
materialization may generate.
Area
Parameter
Pozo Rubiales
Value
Ambient Temperature Day (ºF)
95
Ambient Temperature Night (ºF)
68
Relative Humidity Day (%)
75
Relative Humidity N ight (%)
88
Wind speed and stability (m/s)
Entre 1F y 3D
Table 5. Environmental Conditions Consequence Analysis Pozo Rubiales.
4.5 LISTS OF LAUNCHERS
Table 6 presents a summary of the launchers analyzed for each of the equipment defined jointly
with Ecopetrol S.A and belonging to the Rubiales Well.
Equipment or Element
•
Pozos (Well head, production
line).
Generic launcher (G) /
Specific launcher (S)
Pozo Rubiales
• PP1 (G)
•
• PP3 (G)
•
• PP4 (G)
Launcher Description
PP1: Leak continues through a ¼ (6.35 mm)
hole in the surface production line.
PP3: Continuous leak of smaller diameter
(between 50 mm to 76 mm; 2” to 3”)
PP4: Total breakage on the production line.
•
•
Teas
•
S5 (S)
•
Relief of the entire mass of design gas in
torches.
Table 6. List of Launchers Analysis of Consequences Pozo Rubiales.1
1
Nomenclature and descriptors taken from the HSE-G-022 guide
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4.6 IDENTIFICATION OF MODELED SCENARIOS
Starting from the Initiators considered applicable (defined in Table 6) and the type of discharge obtained, the
identification of the final scenarios was carried out from the event trees related in the HSE-G-022 guide and
evidenced in the Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Figure 1. Event tree for a continuous download
Figure 2. Event tree for instant download.
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The summary of the final scenarios to be considered in this consequence analysis is listed in the following
Table:
Scenario Code
Equipment
Launcher
Pozo Rubiales
/PP4/Three-phase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
PP4: Total breakage in the superficial
production line. 4 1/2".
Pozo Rubiales/PP3V/Three-phase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
PP3-V: Leakage continues through the
smallest diameter connection (between
50 mm to 76 mm; 2” to 3”).
Vertical Release
Pozo Rubiales/PP345V/Three-phase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
PP3-45V: Leakage continues through
the smallest diameter connection
(between 50 mm to 76 mm; 2” to 3”).
Release 45° Vertical
Pozo
Rubiales/PP1/Three-ph
ase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
PP1: Continuous leak through a ¼”
(6.35 mm) hole in the surface
production line
Horizontal Release
Tea (3m)/S5/Gas
Tea (Atm)
Tea (7m)/S5/Gas
Tea (10m)/S5/Gas
Substance
Biphasic
Biphasic
Final Event
Jet of Fire
Pool Fire
Jet of Fire
Pool Fire
Biphasic
Jet of Fire
Pool Fire
Biphasic
Flare
Jet of Fire
Pool Fire
Fireball
S5: Relief of the entire mass of
design gas in torches.
Gas
Jet of fire
Tea (Atm)
S5: Relief of the entire mass of
design gas in torches.
Gas
Jet of fire
Tea (Atm)
S5: Relief of the entire mass of
design gas in torches.
Gas
Jet of fire
Table 7. List of Pozo Rubiales Consequence Analysis Scenarios.
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4.7 AFFECTION RANGES
Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 present the ranges of affectation by thermal radiation for personnel and
equipment, by overpressure and by flammable cloud respectively.
Radiation
kW/m2
Conditions
37,5
Sufficient intensity to cause damage to process equipment.
20,9
Probability zone of 90% lethality for exposure times greater than 30 seconds.
14,5
9,5
Probability zone of 50% lethality for exposure times greater than 30 seconds. No staff is expected in this
area.
Maximum radiant heat intensity anywhere where emergency action by personnel is required. When
personnel enter or work in an area with the potential for radiant heat intensity greater than 6.3 kW/m2,
consideration should be given to wearing special protective clothing (e.g. a fire protective suit).
Safety precaution: It is important to recognize that appropriately clothed personnel cannot tolerate
thermal radiation at 9.5 kW/m2 for more than a few seconds.
6,3
Maximum intensity of radiant heat where personnel without protection but with adequate a clothing
may require emergency actions in a time no longer than 30 s.
4,7
Maximum radiant heat intensity in areas where unprotected but appropriatelya lothed personnel may
require emergency action within a 2 to 3 minute time period.
1,6
Maximum intensity of radiant heat in any location where appropriatelya clothed personnel may be
continuously exposed.
Appropriate clothing consists of a hard hat, long-sleeved shirts with buttoned cuffs, work gloves, long-legged pants, and
work shoes. Appropriate clothing minimizes direct skin exposure to thermal radiation.
a
Table 8. Ranges of Affectation by Thermal Radiation
Shock Wave
Range (psi)
Impact on people and infrastructure
14
Maximum shock wave peak that an unconfined explosion of hydrocarbon vapors can develop. This level of
shock wave does not cause mortality, but it does reach a 45% probability of being affected by a ruptured
eardrum. Probable total destruction of buildings.
6,4
Probability of involvement of 10% due to ruptured eardrum.
Above this value, there is almost complete destruction of houses.
Possible damage to storage tanks and process equipment.
4,3
100% lethality is considered for people who are within this area as a result of falling objects and dispersion
of projectiles.
Breakage of storage tanks.
3,25
Eardrum rupture threshold (1% probability).
Heavy machinery (3000 lbs.) suffers minor damage.
3
2
Within this zone, severe damage occurs to steel and masonry structures (industrial buildings).
From this overpressure, the partial collapse of roofs and walls of houses occurs.
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Shock Wave
Range (psi)
0,4
Impact on people and infrastructure
Establishes the safety distance for the population in the event of an explosion.
Shock wave levels sufficient to cause minor damage to house and building structures (glass breakage).
Table 9. Ranges of Affectation by Overpressure.
Condition
LII
LII/2
Description
Area in which there should be no ignition sources. A 100% probability of death of a person is assumed.
It corresponds to the distance at which the cloud dilutes up to 1/2 of the LII.
Table 10. Ranges of Affectation by Flammable Cloud.
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4.8 RESULTS
Modeling was performed for environmental conditions in the range between 1.5F and 3D due to the absence of formal and robust site statistics. The results listed below present the radius of
impact (in meters) for each of the systems/equipment analyzed. The meaning of the different levels of thermal radiation, overpressure and flammable cloud can be seen in Table 8, Table 9 and
Table 10 respectively.
Equipment
Scenario
type
Descripción
Escenario
Scenario Code
Final Event
Inflammability
LFL
Pozo
Rubiales
Pozo
Rubiales
Pozo
Rubiales
Pozo
Rubiales
Catastrophic
880 psi
Major 880
psi
Major 880
psi
Minor 880
psi
Blowout 7"
2" vertical
leak
Pozo
Rubiales/PP4/Biphasic
Pozo Rubiales/PP3V/Biphasic
Leakage 2" Pozo Rubiales/PP345° Vertical 45V/Biphasic
Leakage
0.25"
Horizontal
Pozo
Rubiales/PP1/Biphasic
Radiation (kW/m2)
Overpressure (psi)
1,6
5
6,3
7,3
9,5
14,5
20,9
280
153,6
132
118,4
94
50,4
11,7
Jet Fire 3D
160,7
95,2
84,7
78,2
67
48,8
31
3,3
Pool Fire 3D
509,7
492,9
490,1
488,3
485
479,4
476,5
474,3
Jet Fire 1.5F
80,2
44,9
39
35,3
28,8
17,4
Jet Fire 3D
86,2
51,4
45,9
42,6
36,8
27,5
18,2
Pool Fire 1.5F
418,2
400,6
397,6
395,8
392,6
388,3
385,7
383,5
Pool Fire 3D
638,3
621,8
619,2
617,5
614,3
608,7
605,7
603,4
Jet Fire 1.5F
87,2
54,8
49,7
46,6
41,3
35,1
30,2
19,1
Jet Fire 3D
92,2
58,3
53
49,8
44,4
37,1
32,4
23,9
Pool Fire 1.5F
385,7
367,8
364,8
363
359,8
355,4
352,9
350,7
Pool Fire 3D
544,5
527,7
525
523,2
519,9
514,3
511,5
509,2
9,6
6,5
6,1
5,9
5,5
4,9
4,5
3,9
Jet Fire 1.5F
Flash Fire 1.5F
24,2
Flash Fire 3D
29,7
Jet Fire 1.5F
LFL/2
37,5
0,4
2
3
4,3
6,4
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Equipo
Tea
Tea
Tea
Scenary
Type
Scenario
Description
Scenario Code
Catastrophic
Atm
Discharge
without
ignition 8”
Tea (3m)/S5/Gas
Catastrophic
Atm
Discharge
without
ignition 8”
Tea (7m)/S5/Gas
Catastrophic
Atm
Discharge
without
ignition 8”
Tea (10m)/S5/Gas
* Ignition is assumed 30 meters from the loss of containment zone..
Final Event
Inflammability
LFL
LFL/2
Radiation (kW/m2)
Overpressure (psi)
1,6
5
6,3
7,3
9,5
14,5
20,9
37,5
Jet Fire 3D
10,5
7
6,5
6,3
5,8
5,2
4,7
4,1
Pool Fire 1.5F
66,9
54,2
52,2
51
48,9
45,6
42,5
39,3
Pool Fire 3D
82,3
70
68,2
67,2
65,4
62,4
58,8
54,6
Jet Fire 1.5F
21,7
Jet Fire 3D
26,2
Jet Fire 1.5F
16,2
Jet Fire 3D
23
Jet Fire 3D
18,5
0,4
2
3
4,3
6,4
6,5
Table 11. Radio of Affectation Analysis of Consequences Pozo Rubiales.
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Scenario Code
Equipment
Pozo Rubiales
/PP4/Three-phase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
Pozo Rubiales/PP3V/Three-phase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
Pozo Rubiales/PP345V/Three-phase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
Pozo Rubiales/PP1/
Three-phase
Pozo Rubiales
(880 psi)
Launcher
Frequency
(events/year)
Ignition
Probability
Final
Frequency
(Events/year)
PP4: Total breakage in the
superficial production line. 4 1/2".
6,50E-05
6,00E-01
3,90E-05
4,40E-05
2,35E-01
1,03E-05
4,40E-05
2,35E-01
1,03E-05
1,00E-04
8,31E-03
8,31E-07
PP3-V: Leakage continues through
the smallest diameter connection
(between 50 mm to 76 mm; 2” to
3”). Vertical Release
PP3-45V: Leakage continues
through the smallest diameter
connection (between 50 mm to 76
mm; 2” to 3”). Release 45° Vertical
PP1: Continuous leak through a ¼”
(6.35 mm) hole in the surface
production line Horizontal Release
Table 12. Final Frequencies.2
4.9 RESULTS ANALYSIS
The simulations were carried out for catastrophic scenarios, major scenarios and minor scenarios. Given that
catastrophic scenarios are unlikely and that the wind speed is on average between 1.5m/s and 3m/s, the
results will be analyzed based on the largest scenarios and the most critical distances obtained between a
stability of 1.5 F and 3D.
4.9.1 POZO RUBIALES SYSTEM – MAJOR SCENARIO (880 PSI)
•
•
•
•
No distances are reported for the LII (lower flammability limit).
Effects for radiation of 37.5 kW/m2 by Jet Fire are on the order of 603 meters for a release from the
system.
Effects for radiation of 6.3 kW/m2 by Jet Fire are on the order of 619 meters for a release from the
system.
The distance for radiation values o
​ f 1.6 kW/m2 by Jet Fire is of the order of 638 meters for a release
system.
See Annex A1.
4.9.2 POZO RUBIALES SYSTEM – MINOR SCENARIO (880 PSI)
•
2
The greatest effects due to flammable cloud (flare) are found, for the LII (lower flammability limit), in the
order of 29.7 meters caused by the discharge without ignition.
Source:
•
•
•
•
•
Guide for Quantitative Risk Analysis HSE-G-022 - Annex 6.
IOGP Report 434-01 RISK ASSESSMENT DATA DIRECTORY: Process Release Frequencies.
IOGP Report 434-02 RISK ASSESSMENT DATA DIRECTORY: Blowout Frequencies.
IOGP Report 434-06 RISK ASSESSMENT DATA DIRECTORY: Ignition Probabilities.
API 581-Third Edition. Risk Based Inspection Methodology.
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•
•
•
Effects for radiation of 37.5 kW/m2 by Jet Fire are on the order of 54.6 meters for a release from the
system.
Effects for radiation of 6.3 kW/m2 by Jet Fire are on the order of 68.2 meters for a release from the
system.
The distance for radiation values o
​ f 1.6 kW/m2 by Jet Fire is of the order of 82.3 meters for a release from
system.
See Annex A2.
4.9.3 TEA SYSTEM (3M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM)
•
•
•
•
No distances are reported for the LII (lower flammability limit).
Radiation levels of 37.5 kW/m2 are not reached.
Radiation levels of 6.3 kW/m2 are not reached.
The distance for radiation values of 1.6 kW/m2 by Jet Fire is of the order of 26.2 meters for a release
from the System.
See Annex B1.
4.9.4 TEA SYSTEM (7M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM)
•
•
•
•
No distances are reported for the LII (lower flammability limit).
Radiation levels of 37.5 kW/m2 are not reached.
Radiation levels of 6.3 kW/m2 are not reached.
The distance for radiation values of 1.6 kW/m2 by Jet Fire is of the order of 26.2 meters for a release
from the System.
See Annex B2.
4.9.5 TEA SYSTEM (7M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM)
•
•
•
•
No distances are reported for the LII (lower flammability limit).
Radiation levels of 37.5 kW/m2 are not reached.
Radiation levels of 6.3 kW/m2 are not reached.
The distance for radiation values of 1.6 kW/m2 by Jet Fire is of the order of 18.5 meters for a release
from the sysyem.
See Annex B3.
4.9.6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Table 13 presents the summary of the impact radio (in meters) of the major and minor scenarios for the
Rubiales and Tea well; These radii are graphed in ISO contours which can be detailed in the related annex
(each ISO contour is generated according to the color detailed in the table). If you wish to observe all the
distances obtained for each of the scenarios applicable in this analysis, refer to Table 11.
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The meaning of the ranges of affectation by thermal radiation for personnel and equipment, by overpressure
and by flammable cloud can be detailed in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 respectively.
Equipment
Scenary
Type
Scenary
Description
Scenario Code
Major 880
Pozo
Rubiales psi
2" Vertical
Leakage
Pozo Rubiales/PP3V/Biphasic
Pozo
Minor 880
Rubiales psi
Leakage
0.25"
Horizontal
Pozo
Rubiales/PP1/Biphasic
Discharge without
ignition 8”
Tea
Tea
Tea
Catastrophic
Atm
Catastrophic
Atm
Catastrophic
Atm
Final Event
Infla
mma
bility
LFL
Pool Fire 3D
Flash Fire 3D
Radiation (kW/m2)
1,6
6,3
Annex
37,5
638,3 619,2 603,4
A1
29,7
A2
Pool Fire 3D
82,3
68,2
54,6
Tea (3m)/S5/Gas
Jet Fire 3D
26,2
B1
Discharge without
ignition 8”
Tea (7m)/S5/Gas
Jet Fire 3D
23
B2
Discharge without
ignition 8”
Tea (10m)/S5/Gas
Jet Fire 3D
18,5
B3
Table 13. Summary of results Analysis of Rubiales Consequences.
According to best practices, owners/operators can define the location of their campsites from 2 different
approaches:
•
•
Consequence-based approach: This approach takes into consideration the impact of scenarios based on
explosion, fire or release of toxic substances. This approach should be based on maximum credible
events.
Risk-based approach: This quantitative approach takes into consideration numerical values ​for both the
consequence and frequency of explosion, fire, or toxic substance release scenarios.
The presentation of the results of this report was carried out with a consequence-based approach,
establishing restriction areas for the location of camps and personnel accommodation. Based on the
above, good practices propose:
•
Establish differences between essential and non-essential personnel for the operation.
•
The NO location of personnel accommodation camps within the areas of greatest consequence
(areas with radiation greater than 6.3 kW/m2, with overpressure values greater than 200 mbar (3 psi)
or with the presence of concentration within the LFL ( LII) or 100 m from the source).
•
The location of accommodation camps only for essential personnel3, within areas of intermediate
consequence (areas with radiation values between 1.6 kW/m2 and 6.3 kW/m2 or overpressure values
between 0.4 psi and 3 psi).
3
Essential Personnel: Personnel necessary to control the well in an emergency scenario.
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•
The location of accommodation camps for non-essential personnel within the areas of least
consequence (areas with radiation values less than 1.6 kW/m2 and overpressure values less than 0.4
psi).
5 RECOMMENDATIONS
Regardless of whether catastrophic and major scenarios are of very low or low probability, measures must be
established to minimize their occurrence and/or mitigate the impact if they occur.
To manage risks during drilling operations, the following actions are recommended, among other things:
•
Check preferred wind direction to ensure that staff accommodation camps are upstream of potential
sources of flammable cloud release.
•
Minimize the number of personnel on location. Only essential personnel needed at work sites. Do not
expose personnel unnecessarily to Risk.
•
Ensure verification of the inspection, maintenance and functional testing status of the SCEs (safety
critical equipment) of the equipment to be used during the abandonment operation.
•
Physically protect equipment and pipe systems that can potentially be affected by blows and/or impacts
from equipment and/or vehicles.
•
Carry out simulations of major and catastrophic events (worst case), and ensure the understanding and
appropriate response of all those involved.
•
Ensure the evacuation of personnel prior to and during the handling of loss of well control events.
•
Install gas detectors and alarms in critical areas of the operation, where leaks may potentially occur, and
carry out permanent monitoring of the atmosphere by operational personnel in the areas in order to early
detect leaks of dangerous fluids, including the camp.
•
Avoid and/or minimize the handling of loads on equipment that could potentially generate the release of
dangerous fluids.
•
Ensure verification of competency certification for critical positions in the operation.
•
Ensure that good industry practices regarding the location of personnel camps and restriction areas are
complied with as much as possible:
o The NO location of personnel accommodation camps within the areas of greatest
consequence (areas with radiation greater than 6.3 kW/m2, with overpressure values greater
than 200 mbar (3 psi) or with the presence of concentration within the LFL ( LII) or 100 m from
the source).
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The location of accommodation camps for essential personnel only, within intermediate
consequence areas (áreas con valores de radiación entre 1.6 kW/m2 y 6.3 kW/m2 o valores de
sobrepresión entre 0.4 psi y 3 psi).
o
4
The location of accommodation camps for non-essential personnel within the areas of least
consequence (areas with radiation values less than 1.6 kW/m2 and overpressure values less
than 0.4 psi).
Essential Personnel: Personnel necessary to control the well in an emergency scenario.
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ANNEX A1. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF
IMPACT OF THE POZO RUBIALES SYSTEM – MAJOR SCENARIO (880
PSI).
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ANNEX A2. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF
AFFECTION FOR THE POZO RUBIALES SYSTEM – MINOR SCENARIO (880
PSI).
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ANNEX B1. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF
AFFECTION TEA SYSTEM (3M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM)
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ANNEX B2. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF
AFFECTION TEA SYSTEM (7M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM)
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ANNEX B3. GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF POTENTIAL AREAS OF
AFFECTION TEA SYSTEM (10M) – CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO (ATM)
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