Article VII. Section 1.
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 1. EXECUTIVE POWER
Scope:
1) Executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines.
2) The scope of this power is set forth in Art. VII of the Constitution. But this power is not limited to those
set forth therein. The SC, in Marcos v. Manglapus, referred to the RESIDUAL powers of the President as the
Chief Executive of the country, which powers include others not set forth in the Constitution. EXAMPLE: The
President is immune from suit and criminal prosecution while he is in office.
3) Privilege of immunity from suit is personal to the President and may be invoked by him alone. It may also
be waived by the President, as when he himself files suit.
4) BUT The President CANNOT dispose of state property unless authorized by law.
The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated. Residual unstated powers
of the President are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare.
Marcos vs Manglapus (Residual power)
FACTS:
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Only about three years after Pres. Aquino replaced Marcos, the latter, in his deathbed, has signified his wish
to return to the Philippines to die. But Pres. Aquino, considering the dire consequences of his return to the
nation at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar his and his family’s return.
The Marcoses now seek to enjoin the implementation of the Pres. Aquino’s decision, invoking their
constitutionally guaranteed liberty of abode and right to travel. The petitioners contend that the President is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the
limits prescribed by law. The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos
and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines
for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents.
Issue:
whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and
reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return and residence will
endanger national security and public safety.
Ruling:
the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art.
VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it
touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President.
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se
enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert:
"The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.
we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive.
The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. it is not only the power of the President but
also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation
demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request
or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines.
If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely
abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as
earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present
time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
US vs Nixon (General claim of executive privilege)
Facts:
A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate
affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations
recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming
"executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve
confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest.
Following indictment alleging violation of federal statutes by certain staff members of the White House and
political supporters of the President, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 17(c)
for a subpoena duces tecum for the production before trial of certain tapes and documents relating to
precisely identified conversations and meetings between the President and others. The President, claiming
executive privilege, filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The District Court, after treating the subpoenaed
material as presumptively privileged, concluded that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to
rebut the presumption and that the requirements of Rule 17(c) had been satisfied. The court thereafter
issued an order for an in camera examination of the subpoenaed material, having rejected the President's
contentions that the judiciary lacked authority to review the President's assertion of executive privilege.
Issue:
Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power,
entirely immune from judicial review?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. Absent a claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of presidential communications is not
significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera
inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with
the function of the courts under the Constitution.
when a claim of presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is
here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a
generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.
Akbayan vs Aquino ( Exercise in JPEPA)
Facts:
Petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers requested, via the
petition for mandamus and prohibition, to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The Congress, through the House
Committee called for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive refused to give them the
said copies until the negotiation was completed.
JPEPA was the bilateral free trade agreement entered between the Philippine government with Japan,
concerned with trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the
business environment, and general and final provisions.
While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006.
petitioners’ claim that access to the Philippine and Japanese offers is essential to the exercise of their right to
participate in decision-making. In the same vein, they argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from
the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade
agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress.
Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the JPEPA
negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern13 and contravenes other
constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.14 Second, they contend that non-disclosure of the same documents undermines
their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political, and economic decisionmaking.15 Lastly, they proffer that divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been
concluded will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive, in violation of the
principle of separation of powers. They allege that Congress cannot meaningfully exercise the power to
regulate international trade agreements such as the JPEPA without being given copies of the initial offers
exchanged during the negotiations thereof
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public
disclosure.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to
concur in treaties, from the negotiation process.
Ruling:
it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should
be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" – the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in
future negotiations.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It being established that diplomatic negotiations enjoy a presumptive privilege
against disclosure, even against the demands of members of Congress for information, the Court shall now
determine whether petitioners have shown the existence of a public interest sufficient to overcome the
privilege in this instance.
The criteria to be employed in determining whether there is a sufficient public interest in favor of disclosure;
constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding, strong showing of need by
another institution of government- a showing that the responsibilities of that institution cannot responsibly be
fulfilled without access to records of the President's deliberations, critical to the performance of its legislative
functions.
Petitioners have failed to present the strong and "sufficient showing of need". The text of the JPEPA having
been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully
exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published.
Congress may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion.
To recapitulate, petitioners’ demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become
moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their
demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same
must be denied, respondents’ claim of executive privilege being valid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Soliven vs Makaslar ( Immunity from suit)
Facts:
Luis Beltran was a columnist for the newspaper Philippine Star. Maximo Soliven was the paper’s editor-inchief. They were sued for libel by then President Corazon Aquino due to an article written by Beltran wherein
he alleged that the president “hid under the bed” during a bloody coup attempt staged by military rebels in
December 1989. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Ramon Makasiar. Judge Makasiar then issued a
warrant of arrest against Beltran et al. Beltran et al filed a certiorari petition before the Supreme Court
alleging, among others, that (1) the warrants of arrest against them were irregularly issued due to the fact
that Judge Makasiar did not personally examine the complainant (President Aquino) and her witnesses before
issuing the arrest warrants, and (2) President Aquino cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her presidential immunity from suit; A president cannot be sued, however, if a president would sue
then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would
be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able
to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
Issue:
(1) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause; and
(2) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Ruling:
1. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard
to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
2. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.