I.
Cebu State College of Science and Technology vs. Luis Misterio, et al.
G.R. No. 179025; June 17, 2015
FACTS:
On December 31, 1956, the late Asuncion Sadaya, mother of the herein respondents,
executed a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land in favor of Sudlon Agricultural High School (SAHS).
The sale was subject to the right of the vendor to repurchase the property after SAHS shall
have ceased to exist or shall have transferred elsewhere.
On August 19, 1988 or 31 years after, the herein respondent Heirs of Sadaya informed
the Governor of the Province of Cebu of their intention to repurchase the subject property as
stipulated in the Deed of Sale. The petitioner argues that they still exist only that they
changed its name from SAHS to CSCST.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs of Sadaya can still repurchase the subject property based
on the stipulation on the Deed of Sale?
RULING:
No, the Heirs of Sadaya can no longer repurchase the subject due to prescription.
Under the Roman Law, no attempt was made to limit the duration of the contracts
with pacto de retro. It was generally held that the right to repurchase was perpetual. The
Supreme Court of Spain later on attempted to place a restriction upon the length of such
contracts by holding that they gave rise to a personal action of prescription in accordance
with the law on prescription of actions.
Consistent with such view, the Court frowned upon agreements indicating indefinite
stipulations for the exercise of the right to repurchase and restricted the redemption period
to ten (10) years from date of contract of sale, in consonance with the provisions of the Civil
Code. Article 1606 expressly provides that in the absence of an agreement as to the period
within which the vendor a retro may exercise his right to repurchase, the same must be one
within four (4) years from execution of the contract. In the event the contract specifies a
period, the same cannot exceed ten (10) years.
Hence, in the case at bar, the Heirs right to repurchase has already prescribed.
II.
Prudential Bank vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108957; June 14, 1993
FACTS:
On June 23, 1986, Aurora Cruz invested Php 200,000 with the Prudential Bank for 63
days at 13.75% interest. Upon maturity on August 25, 1986, Cruz returned to the bank to
renew her investment for the same amount to which she was subsequently issued with
Confirmation of Sale by Susan Quimbo, an employee of the bank.
On October 27, 1986, the supposed maturity date of Cruz’s second investment, she
was informed that the investment appeared to have been withdrawn by her. There was no
copy on file of the Confirmation of Sale and the Debit Memo allegedly issued by Quimbo.
Quimbo herself was not available for questioning as she had not been reporting for work.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was breach of contract when the bank refuses to pay Cruz the
proceeds of her investment?
RULING:
Yes, there was breach of contract.
The liability of the principal for the acts of the agents date s back to the Roman Law
maxim, qui per alium facit per seipsum facere videtur which means “he who does a thing by
an agent is considered as doing it himself”. This rule is affirmed by the Civil Code in Articles
1910 and 1911.
The bank is then liable for the wrongful acts of its officers (Susan Quimbo) done in
the interests of the bank or in the course of dealings of the officers in their respective
capacity.
III.
The Heirs of Jumero vs. Jacinto Lizares, et al.
G.R. No. 5051; September 27, 1910
FACTS:
Nicolas Jumero was drafted for the army and to secure his release from the military
service or to pay the attorney who was to negotiate his release, Php 50 were required. It is
for this reason that the land of Jumero came into the possession of the herein respondent,
Jacinto Lizares.
The heirs argues that the transaction was a mortgage loan, while the defendants
assert that the land was sold outright to Lizares for the price of Php 50.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Php 50 is received as mortgage loan or as a price of sale?
RULING:
The Court said that the transaction was one of sale.
In accordance with the legislation of Partidas, patterned after Roman Law, the
contract of purchase and sale is eminently consensual and, consequently only requires
consent for its perfection. In order that an instrument be necessary, it was required that this
form should also be the subject of consent and that the validity of the contract should be
made by the defendant thereon.
IV.
The Heirs of Pedro Escanlar, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 119777; October 23, 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Nombre and Victoria Caria-an died in 1924 and 1938, respectively. Nombre
was succeeded by his nephews and grandnephews, while Victoria was succeeded by her late
brother’s son, Gregorio. When Gregorio died in 1971, his wife and children succeeded him as
Heirs of the Victoria Estate.
On September 15, 1978, Gregorio’s heirs executed a Deed of Sale of Rights, Interests
and Participation on ½ of the property of the late Gregorio and Victoria in favor of Pedro
Escanlar and Francisco Holgado. They paid Php 50,000 and promised to pay the balance of
Php 225,000 on or before May 1979 as evidenced by the Deed of Agreement.
By the end of the due date, the petitioners failed to pay. However, the heir still
received at least 12 installment after the due date.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is rescission of the sale when the petitioners failed to pay the
heirs on or before the due date?
RULING:
No, there is no rescission.
Ownership, under Roman law and the legal systems based on it, such as the Civil Law
of the Philippines based on the Spanish Civil Code, cannot be transferred by mere agreement.
Non nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia rerum transferentur. Tradition or delivery is needed
to pass ownership. As a mode of acquisition of property, it consists in putting a thing at the
disposal of the person to whom one wishes to convey it. The normal mode of accomplishing
this is by real traditio or actual physical handing over of the thing by the transferer to the
transferee. In contrast, there may be symbolical tradition, belonging to the class called
feigned or fictitious tradition, one of which is traditio brevi manu where the buyer, being
already in possession of the thing sold due to some other cause such as lease, merely remains
in possession after the sale is effected, but now in concept of owner.
After the petitioner failed to pay the installments due, the heirs made no judicial
demand for rescission of the contract nor did they execute any notarial act demanding the
same, as required under Article 1592. Consequently, the buyers could lawfully make
payments even after May 1979 deadline, as in fact they paid several installments to which
the heirs accepted. This act in effect waived and are now estopped from exercising their right
to rescind.
V.
Teodorico Alejandro, et al. vs. Ambrosio Geraldez, et al.
G.R. No. 108957; June 14, 1993
FACTS:
On January 20, 1949, spouses Gabino and Severa executed a Deed of Donation in favor
of Regina, Olimpia, Angel and Andrea.
Gabino died in 1962. On October 20, 1964, Severa executed a deed of donation (mortis
causa) over ½ share in Lot 2377-A on condition that Andrea would bear the funeral expenses
to be incurred after Severa’s death (her share is Lot 2377-A-1). The other half of the share in
Lot 2377-A or Lo 2377-A-2 was previously adjudicated to Angel because he defrayed the
funeral expenses when Gabino died.
On May 1970, Andrea sued her brother, Angel for the partition of Lot 2377-A. Angel
alleged that he had been occupying his share for over 20 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was made inter vivos or mortis causa?
RULING:
It was held that the donation was inter vivos because of the the phrase “I will not take
away the property” meant that the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of
the property in favor of another person and thereby manifested the irrevocability of the
conveyance of the title to the donee. The donor retained the beneficial ownership. Being an
inter vivos donation, it could be revoked only on the grounds specified by law. No such
grounds existed. The donee was not guilty of ingratitude.
There used to be a prevailing notion, spawned by a study of Roman Law, that the Civil
Code recognizes a donation mortis as a juridical act in contraposition to a donation inter
vivos. As explained by Justice Reyes in the Bonsato case, article 620 broke away from the
Roman Law tradition and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and
retain. Article 620 merged donations mortis causa with testamentary dispositions and thus
suppressed the said donations as an independent legal concept.