WAR
RIVER
THE
VOL.
I.
THE EIVEE WARAN HISTOEICAL ACCOUNT OF
THE KECONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN
BY
WINSTON SPENCEE CHUECHILL
AUTHOB OF 'THE STOBY OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FOBCE, 1897"
EDITED BY COL.
Illustrated by
F.
EHODES,
D.S.O.
Angus McNeill, Seaforth Highlanders
IN
TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME
I.
AND
GEEEN,
LONGMANS,
39
PATEENOSTEE EOW, LONDON
NEW YOEK AND BOMBAY
1899
All
rights
reserved
Op.
THIS BOOK IS INSCRIBED
TO
THE MAEQUESS OF
SALISBIJEY,
KG
UNDER WHOSE WISE DIRECTION
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY HAVE LONG ENJOYED POWER
AND THE NATION PROSPERITY
DURING WHOSE ADMINISTRATIONS THE
REORGANISATION OF EGYPT HAS BEEN MAINLY ACCOMPLISHED
AND UPON WHOSE ADVICE HER MAJESTY DETERMINED
TO ORDER THE RECONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN
PREFACE
The
object
first
of this
book
exact
to relate in
is
by Lord Kitchener
military detail the operations directed
to
April
1896
Nile
from
Upper
the
on
of Khartonm
February 1899, which I have called
and which
The Eiver War,'
resulted in the reconquest of the Egyptian
in order that the reader
But
Soudan.
'
may
understand,
these
which
emotions
the
with
sympathise
and even
ents excited, I
have prefixed a general survey
the geography, aspect,
have
show
to
tried
This
Great Britain.
to
occupy
and history of the country, and
its
connection with Egypt and
summary was
about thirty
originally intended
pages, but
itself to five lengthy chapters,
own
it
has distended
which must make
their
excuses.
At
and
begins,
chronicle
military
Chapter VI. the
thereafter
I
have
described
every
exercised an appreciable influence
campaigns.
I
anticipate
that
incident
which
on the course of the
the
accounts
disagreement.
some
provoke
will
various actions
man
of
of the
Each
and
view,
of
point
different
a
sees a tumult from
THE RIVER WAR
Vlii
the narratives I have examined are frequently contra-
Uncertainty
dictory.
is
inevitable; but I
that all statements of fact in this
must observe
book are based upon
the written evidence of independent, disinterested eyewitnesses,
the advantage
the
in nearly every action I
and that
officer
have had
account of
of comparing the personal
who commanded, both with
the
official
reports and with the private letters of his subordinates.
I
shall
therefore
hope that the story
accurate as any other that
I
am under
who has
is
likely to
as
be written.
great obligations to Colonel llhodes,
not only assisted
me
with his store of know-
ledge and experience, gained during
in the
at least
is
many
Soudan, but has also procured
years of war
me much
valuable
information which I could not have otherwise obtained.
may win the
His name on the title-page
tale a popularity
with the officers of the Egyptian service which
is
not
courted in the text.
I desire to
acknowledge the help and kindness
I
have
received from most of the principal actors in the River
War, from the Cairene
Intelligence
supplied
me
authorities,
and
from
the
Many of those who have
narratives, or who have undertaken
Departments.
with
the no less tedious task of reading the proofs, have done
so on the understanding that their
mentioned.
I therefore
general form.
offer
names should not be
them
mv
thanks in a
PliEFACE
At Chapter XV.
am
I
IX
able
my own
evidence of others by
supplement
to
observation.
I
the
was
attached to the 21st Lancers on condition that I paid
my own
expenses to and from Egypt
and as
;
I hold,
with Napoleon, that war should support war, I wrote
a series of letters to the
cover the outlay.
By
Mokning Post
6
newspaper to
'
the courtesy of the proprietors
of that journal I have been permitted
whatever passages from them
in quite the same style
to
reproduce
They
I desired.
are not
as the rest of the narrative,
but they have the merit of being the actual impressions
of exciting days.
The maps and plans are the most expensive
—
the most valuable—part of these volumes.
topographical features I
Military Intelligence.
am
The
perhaps
For
their
indebted to the Director of
positions
and movements of
the troops are taken from the statements and diagrams
of
mv
believe
various
them
sible for
informants.
correct.
I
have every reason to
It is of course absolutely
impos-
anyone to understand a campaign or an action
trust
and
I
map,
the
to
referring
continually
without
that the reader will not be irritated by
exhortations to
The
each
him
footnotes
map may
to
do
marked with
*
asterisks
be found as soon as
by Colonel Ehodes.
repeated
so.
useful in explaining the text.
are
my
it
is
show where
likely to
be
Those signed 'Editor'
The others
are mine.
For the
;
WAR
THE RIVER
X
most part they explain themselves
sary for
me
name
mentioned, his
is
to state that the first time
rank he then held
is
of the
is
only neces-
a military
officer's
designation with whatever
full
printed as a note.
I will not venture to
value
and it
;
pronounce upon the
artistic
sketches with which Mr. McNeill has
adorned the account
:
but I think that they are in even-
detail scrupulously accurate.
The military
criticisms of all kinds are
my own
yet while I accept the fullest responsibility for them, I
am
entitled to state that they
have been carefully
dis-
cussed with several distinguished soldiers in the British,
Indian, and Egyptian services, and, although admittedly
matters
of
have
controversy,
not
been found un-
reasonable.
A long book
does not justify a long preface, and
hasten to conclude.
It is
not for
me
to say
T
whether
these pages contain anything of the slightest merit, but
I assert with
some pride that
fear or favour, only
what
and I venture to think
I
have written, without
I believe to
that,
the
if
trouble to follow the account on the
it,
he will
know
as
much about
be
fair
and true
reader take
the
maps which explain
the Eiver
War as I
have
been able to learn in twelve months of diligent studv.
WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL.
35a Great Cumberland Place, London
September 25, 1899.
:
;
LIST OF PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED
Fire and Sivord in the Soudan (Slatin), 1895.
Ten Years' Captivity in
Mahdism and
the
the
Mahdi's
Camp (Ohrw alder),
1892.
Egyptian Soudan (Wingate), 1891.
England in Egypt (Milner),
Ten Years in Equatoria
1893.
(Casati), 1880-1889.
2 vols.
Life in the Soudan (Williams), 1882.
The Buin of
Soudan (Russell),
the
'83 to '87 in the
Soudan (Wylde),
1892.
1888.
2 vols.
Life of Emin Pasha (Schweitzer), 1898.
Lord Cromer
Journals at
(Traill), 1897.
Khartoum (Gordon),
1885.
Life of Gordon (Boulger), 1887.
Colonel Gordon in Central Africa (Hill), 1884.
With
From
the
Camel Corps up
Korti
to
the Nile (Gleichen), 1886.
Khartoum (Wilson),
The Campaign of
The Egyptian
1885.
the Cataracts (Butler), 1885.
Soudan
:
its
Loss and Recovery (Alford &
Sword), 1898.
Letters
from
Soudan (Knight),
the
Towards Khartoum (Atteridge),
1896.
1896.
Sirdar and Khalifa (Burleigh), 1898.
With Kitchener
to
The Downfall of
Khartoum
(Steevens), 1898.
the Dervishes (Bennett), 1898.
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Report on the Soudan, 1883 (Lieut-Col. Stewart), Egj^pt, No.
11, 1883.
Report on the Administration of Egypt (Lord Cromer). Egypt, No.
1,
1895.
Report on the Progress of Reorganisation in Egypt (Mr. Villiers
Stuart), Egypt, No.
2,
1895.
Report on the Administration of Egypt (Lord Cromer), Egypt, No.
1,
1896.
Correspondence respecting the Lawsuit brought against the Egyptian
Government in regard
General Reserve
Egypt, No.
1,
Fund
Appropriation of Money from the
the Expenses of the Dongola Expedition.
to
to
the
1897.
Report on the Administration of Egypt (Lord Cromer), Egypt, No.
2,
1897.
Reports on the Province of Dongola
Dawkins), Egypt, No.
3,
(Sir
William Garstin, Mr.
C. E.
1897.
Report on the Administration of Egypt (Lord Cromer), Egypt. No.
1,
1898.
Correspondence with the French Government respecting the Valley of
the Upper Nile, Egypt, No. 2, 1898.
Farther Correspondence with the French Government, Egypt, No.
3,
1898.
Agreement between H.B.M.'s Government and the Government of H.H.
the Khedive, relative to the Future Administration of the Soudan,
Egypt, No.
1,
1899.
Declaration relative
to the
British and French Spheres of Influence in
Central Africa, Egypt, No.
2,
1899.
THE RIVER AVAR
x iv
1899.
Report on the Soudan, 1899
Handbook of
the
War
(Sir
William Garstin), Egypt, No.
5,
1899.
the Soudan, 1898 (compiled in the Intelligence Division of
Office
by Captain Count Gleichex).
Suakin,
Kassala,
and
Dongola,
between
Country
and
Nile
the
on
Report
Omdurman, 1898 (compiled in the Intelligence Division of the War
Office
And
by Captain Count Gleichen).
various other Blue Books and Official Reports.
CONTENTS
.
OF
THE EIBST VOLUME
CHAPTER
I
THE MILITARY SOUDAN
PAG E
Nile— The real Soudan
—The Military Soudan—The desert— The river— The banks— The
in
the
desert
Lost
Extent—
Desolation
sunset
vegetation At
The
scale
miracle—
annual
The
source—
Its
river—
The eternal
The scope
of the
work— The Soudan and
of the
—
—
—
the
1
account
CHAPTER
II
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
The
Soudan— Its beasts—Its
empire
—The
rule of
army
inhabitants— Their history— The
Egypt
Two
ma
personalities
—
spirit
shame
General Gordon in
fanaticism—
Its
of
force
The
administration—
the Soudan— His
Early
days
leader—
quarrel—
just
A
A
influence on the revolt—
protest—
His
Mohammed's
Island—
Abba
of the Mahdi— Sherif—
Mahdi
of
the
Fame
taunt
A
disgrace The im
conspiracy—Rebellion
great
The
fortunes—
His
Abdullahi—
DeFashoda—
of
Mudir
The
Hegira—
The first success— The
—
—
revolt— Egyptian
Pasha— Spread
Destruction
Pasha—
Hicks
intervention—
—British
work.
His
Mahdi—
the
of
Triumph
struction of Yusef
of the
of his
politics
army12
I
——
TIIH
xvi
RIVER
CHAPTER
WAR
III
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
Natural decay
— The
military spirit
— The
Arab
inspiration
—The
PAGE
— Gordon— Zubair Pasha
—Baring's view — The beginning of the mission — The Tanjore
memorandum— At Khartoum — The situation — Gordon and Zubair
The man on the spot — The case for Zubair — The decision of the
Government — British responsibility — The quarrel between Gordon
—
Baker's Teb
and the Government — The Eastern Soudan
The action of El Teb — Tamai —A flying column — Blockade of
Khartoum — The defence of the city — The Journals at Khartoum
— Gordon and Slatin— Slatin's appeal — Its reception — The
solitary man — Within besieged Khartoum — Gordon's troubles
hope
His consolation — The maintenance of discipline, and
Public opinion — In Parliament — Mr, Gladstone — The Gordon
Belief Expedition — The River Column —The Desert Column
Abu Klea— Abu Kru— Too late — Fall of Khartoum— The death
Gordon— His place in history — The excuse for the Government
—Retreat of the expedition — Continental opinion — Daylight
policy of evacuation
— British
authority
'
*
'
4
of
'
'
of
at
r.
last
7
CHAPTER IV
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
dominion— The Dervish rule— Death of the Mahdi— The
Khalifa Abdullahi— His triumph— His methods— A perilous prize
Military
— Soudan annals — Rival claimants—Treatment of the Ashraf
power
The military policy— The Taiasha Baggara — The balance
— The quarrel with Abyssinia — Gallabat —Abu Anga —His deeds
in Darfur and Kordofan — His justice— The great review — The
Abu Anga
Gondar — Death
Abyssinia — Sack
invasion
the Negus
Gallabat— Death
Abyssinia— Battle
King John
A Pyrrhic victory — The Western revolts — Osman- Wad-Adam
El Fasher— The war with
The Man of the Fig-tree — Battle
Egypt — Wad-el-Nejumi — Adjusting the balance — Famine
Plagues — The Arab capital — The weekly review— A Council
of
of
of
of
'
of
of
of
'
of
of
State
— Trouble in the north
Ill
——
—
CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME
xv ii
CHAPTER V
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
PAGE
— A transformation scene England in Egypt — Regeneration — The
Egyptian army — The European system — The
Egyptian soldier — The
of war — Increase of the army
Sambo — The defence of the frontier — Suakin— The lean years
The sword of reconquest— Herbert Kitchener — His education
He learns Arabic— Kitchener in 1882 — A military crime — Its
reward— Kitchener in the Nile expedition — Gordon's complaints
— Governor of Suakin—Handub — Adjutant- General—The post
of Sirdar— Colonel Wodehouse — Cromer's choice — The Intelligence Department — Fugitives from Omdurman — Change of
public opinion in England — Sentimental, fanatical, and
causes — The opinion of the Cabinet — Adowa — The immediate
cause — Some diplomatic arrangements — The Egyptian point of
anview — War or water — The beginning of the expedition —A.
digression — The fetters of Egypt — The Caisse de la Dette
—
Extraordinary expenses — The French action
Political justice
— Their triumph—An unexpected development— Decline of
Weariness
4
'
test
4
'
political
fin
cial
'
'
..........
French influence
147
CHAPTEE VI
THE BEGINNING OF THE wX.R
The advance
to
Akasha— The
concentration on the frontier
— Suakin— A miserable
Digna — Politics on the Red
— The
— The
communications
town
— Osman
Sea shore— The Suakin
fortifications
Force— The plan of action— The affair of Teroi Wells—And
Khor Wintri The casualties— A triumphant return— The
Field
of
—
Indian contingent
—An unnecessary dispute—Arrival of the Indian
—The squabble with the Egyptian authorities —Troubles of
contingent— Scurvy— Return to India — On the Upper Nile—
troops
the
Wady Haifa— Sarras— Akasha—Alucky shot— Arrivalof the Sirdar
—The
ravine
cavalry fight on the 1st of
May— The
scrimmage in the
—The concentration at Akasha— The eve of Firket
vol.
i.
.
.
a
181
——
—
WAR
THE RIVER
xviii
CHAPTER
PIBKET
f§|'
The Dervish Emirs
— A change of
— The
position of the force
VII
;
leadership— Osman Azrak
Column— The main
Desert
Sarkamatto
—A false
deployment
— MacDonald's brigade — Capture
pursuit— Casualties
alarm— The
first
shot
— Com-
PAGE
force
— Firket village— The
of the village— The
— Comments
220
CHAPTER
VIII
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
—
—
The element of chance — 111 luck The flotilla Extension of the railway The move to Kosheh The new gunboats Cholera A time
The Second Cataract— The gunboats
of trouble— The north wind
—
ascend
it
—The
luck
pation of Absarat
4
—
—
turns — The
—
—
advance on Dongola— Occu-
The Death March
1
—A
time of crisis— The
— Composition of the Expeditionary Force -An explosion — Resumption of the advance — The enemy —Wad Bishara
— He inspirits his soldiers —Hafir, September 19 — The river action
— A striking scene —Artagasha Island—Retreat of the Dervishes
The casualties — The Sirdar crosses the Nile — Bombardment of
Dongola — The advance of the army — Its array — Unequal forces —
Capture of Dongola — The pursuit of the enemy — Occupation of the
Dongola Province — Losses and rewards of the campaign
Sirdar's
power
.
.
CHAPTER IX
THE DESERT RAILWAY
— The waterway— The Dongola campaign
The Dongola railway — A battalion of the line — Education — The
advance — The
floods — The extension to Kerma — The line
strategy of the war
Via Abu Hamed — The Desert Railway
Questions— Water — Into the wilderness — The town of Rail-head
—The daily trains — The daily work —A peculiar peril — Abu
Hamed at last — The cost — Wells of water— Breaking the record
The stem
of the flower
of
SW5
CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME
Babel— A matter
of
trade
— England
and America
— Further
I'AGK
— The country— The business supply— The Victualling Yard — The Akasha phase — Dongola— Abu Hamed — The
—Arrival of the railway— The subalterns'
Berber
of
extensions
difficulties
victory
.
.
.
.
•
•
•
275
•
•
•
CHAPTER X
ABU HAMED
Omdurman
upon
concentration
Dervish
harangue—
The
Salamat
The
patrol
to
plans
Khalifa's
The
tribes—
riverain
The
Cavalry action of the 1st of June The Jaalin Their revolt against
the Khalifa— Two letters Mahmud at Metemma— The hour of
march
Hunter—
Archibald
The
-Sir
column
flying
The
advance—
Khalifa's
—
—
—
—
from Kassingar to
Abu Hamed— Description
man— Casualties —An
Hamed
idle
of the village— Storm
tale— Consternation in Berber— The gunboats ascend the
Fourth Cataract
—The
loss of the
Capture of Berber— A decisive step
war begins
.
.
.
•
Teb—A
—The
•
wonderful escape
critical period of the
•
•
•
310
.
CHAPTER XI
BERBER
i
Berber — The
plans— Gunboat reconnaissance of Metemma
to
moves
Digna
Osman
army—
Mahmud's
combat—
uneven
—An
Shendi— Flying column to Adarama— The beginning of the
retroIts
Kassala—
patrolling—
Gunboat
entrenchment—
Atbara
situationCritical
advance—
to
threatens
Khalifa
cession—The
General
Brigade—
British
The
Berber—
towards
Concentration
Khalifa's
v
Gatacre— Railway work— Disposition
January
The
15,
1898— Field training— Bad
of
the
Egyptian
boots and worse bullets—
Khalifa' s difficulties— Break-up of the Kerreri
expected development
forces
— Forward to the Atbara
.
camp—An
un-
—
THE RIVER WAR
XX
CHAPTER
XII
RECONNAISSANCE
PAGE
A
— The strategic aspect — Concentration at Kunur
March to Hudi — The Dervish march— Ras-el-Hudi— The Atbara
scenery — The outpost affair of the 21st of March — Deserters — The
camp at Ras-el-Hudi — Capture of Shendi — The reconnaissance of
the 30th of March — Dervish prisoners — The moment approaches
— The reconnaissance of the 5th of April—The Egyptian trooper —
873
His officers — Advance to Abadar — The eve of battle
general view
.
.
|
CHAPTER
XIII
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
—
—
—
—
—
—
march Night marches A halt N earing the
zeriba Waiting for dawn Sunrise Mahmud\s dim — The bombardment The cavalry The formation for attack The plan
The general advance The passage of the zeriba The storm
The capture of the enclosure The bed of the
of the trenches
The beginning
of the
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
river
— The
pursuit
— The
Sirdar— On the
—
ridge — The
wounded
— The funerals —Description the zeriba — The Dervish prisoners
— Mahmud — The return to Umdabia— The casualties
of
.
.
.
416
CHAPTER XIV
IN
SUMMER QUARTERS
—
Summer quarters Ferntit — The British camp — The day's work
—
—Greek traders The Atbara Derby —Footprints of conquest
— Monotony —The strategy of the Atbara campaign — The tactics
—The British formation— General Gatacre's mistake—The
lery preparation — The palm of honour — An insane dispute — The
'
*
'
'
artil-
Sirdar's
summer
449
I
ILLUSTRATIONS
IN
THE FIKST VOLUME
Viscount Cromer
Frontispiece
{Photogravure Portrait)
General Gordon's Palace at Khartoum, 1883 (From a
Photo.) page 59
Sir Budolf Slatin
face page
84
(By Angus McNeill) page
154
A
'
.
(Photogravure Portrait)
Soudanese Piper
Sambo's
Wife
'
face page
166
(By Angus McNeill) page
184
(Photogravure Portrait)
for Eailway Irox
155
99
99
Wingate
Sir Eeginald
A New Use
.
to
to
Convoy Duty
99
99
99
188
An Egyptian Patrol
99
99
99
218
A
99
99
99
223
99
9*
99
239
Dervish Scout
Gunboats
the 1885 Class
:
Water Transport
Prisoners of
A
War
.
Beast of Burden
Into the Wilderness
A
'
Gyassa
Sir Archibald
Hunter
Field Telegraph, 1897
In
A
91
99
99
99
9'
271
99
99
9*
276
99
99
99
293
9*
99
99
99
306
Dervish Mare
99
315
face page
322
(By Angus McNeill) page
325
(Photogravure Portrait)
Abu Hamed
On Guard
.
'
On Vedette
244
9'
to
99
99
333
99
91
99
339
9*
99
99
364
THE RIVER
xxn
At Kunur
:
WAR
(By Angus McNeill) 'page
the only Shirt
The Mule
1
A Timely Shot
•i
Through the Zeriba
.
.
At the End of the Battle
.
11
383
38t>
11
J1
11
390
, 1
11
**
397
1 1
11
11
433
11
486
A Dust Devil
After the Reconnaissance
*
381
11
The Lament
11
11
11
441
After the Atbara
11
11
11
445
11
11
451
>1
11
454
Darmali
The Atbara Derby
.
ft
MAPS AND PLANS
IN
THE FIKST VOLUME
No.
1.
The Dervish Empire
2.
The Nile from Cairo
3.
Around Suakin
4.
The Advance to Akasha
5.
The Action of Firket
6.
The Capture of Dongola
7.
Bail and Eiver
8.
The Nile from Merawi to Abu Hamed
9.
The Nile from Abu Hamed to Shabluka
to
Wady Halfa
To face page
146
page
189
„
207
„
219
.
.
.
.
.
...
10.
View Sketch of Mahmud's Zeriba
11.
The Keconnaissance of April
234
page
273
To face page
308
„
.
.
.
5th, 1
To face page
.
.
.
.
„
338
page
371
„
395
To face page
.
402
i
12.
The Eeconnaissance of April
13.
The Campaign on the Atbara
14.
The Night March
15.
The Battle of the Atbara: The Artillery
5th, 2
Preparation
16.
The Battle of the Atbara
for Assault
:
406
page
413
To face page
420
To face page
424
The Formation
.
17.
The Battle of the Atbara: The Assault
18.
The Soudan
i
„
„
.
.
.
„
430
„
432
462
*
THE EIVEE WAR
CHAPTEE
I
THE MILITARY SOUDAN*
Aut
Nilus, aut nihil
The scope of the work— The Soudan and the Nile— The real Soudan—
The Military Soudan The desert The river— The banks— The vege
tation At sunset— Desolation Extent Lost in the desert The
eternal river Its source The annual miracle The scale of the
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
*
account.
He who may
be attracted by interest or driven by
ness to examine
blood and war.
this
book
idle-
will find therein a tale of
The extremes of fortune are
displayed,
—
and he may read of battles that were massacres of
others that were mere parades, of joyful victory or
forlorn defeat, of exultation or of disappointment.
the story of the long and fierce contention he
In
may
and
reckless
cowardice
shameful
of
remark occasions
emergency
and
haste
in
conceived
plans
heroism of
wild
of
deliberation:
slow
with
of schemes laid
:
:
extravagance and
barbarous
may
still:
*
VOL.
waste
of wisdom
men
observe
cruel
:
of
economies more
and incompetence.
He
under many conditions, but mostly
Map, The Soudan,'
'
to face page 462.
B
I.
s
THE RIVER WAR
2
unfortunate, and applaud or
He may
condemn
their behaviour.
study a peculiar warfare fought under varied
circumstances, the like of which have not been seen
And
he should be persuaded or compelled
to follow the long road from initial tragedy to final
before.
triumph, he
race
if
may admire
who pursue
the perseverance of a vigorous
their policies in spite of delay
and
disaster to victorious ends.
The north-eastern quarter of the continent of Africa
is drained and watered by the Nile.
Among and about
the headstreams and tributaries of this mighty river lie
the wide and fertile provinces of the Egyptian Soudan.
Situate in the very centre of the land, these remote
regions are on every side divided from the seas
by
five
hundred miles of mountain, swamp, or desert. The
great river which has already called them into beingis their only means of growth, their only channel of
progress.
It is
by the Nile alone
that their
commerce
can reach the outer markets, or European civilisation
can penetrate the inner darkness. The Soudan is joined
to
Egypt by the
surface
by
his
Nile, as a diver
air-pipe.
is
connected with the
Without
it
there
is
only
suffocation.
The town of Khartoum, by the confluence of the
Blue and White Niles, is the point on which the trade
of the south must inevitably converge.
It is the
port
whence goods are shipped across the desert ocean. It
is the great
spout through which the merchandise
collected from a wide area streams northwards to the
Mediterranean shore.
It
marks the extreme northern
THE HILITAKY SOUDAN
3
Between Khartoum and
twelve hundred miles through
limit of the fertile Soudan.
Assuan the
river flows for
At
deserts of surpassing desolation.
last
the wilder-
ness recedes and the living world broadens out again
into
Egypt and the
Delta.
It is
with the events that
have occurred in the intervening waste that these pages
are concerned.
The
known
real Soudan,
to the statesman
explorer, lies far to the south
exuberant.
But there
—moist,
and the
undulating, and
another Soudan, which some
is
Mle
mistake for the true, whose solitudes oppress the
from the Egyptian frontier
Soudan of the
soldier.
to
Omdurman.
This
is
the
Destitute of wealth or future,
it
The names of its squalid villages
The
are familiar to distant and enlightened peoples.
barrenness of its scenes has been drawn by skilful pen
is
rich in history.
and
pencil.
brave men.
tragedies.
Its
ample deserts have tasted the blood of
Its hot,
black rocks have witnessed famous
It is the scene of the
This great tract, which
may
war.
conveniently be called
'The Military Soudan,' stretches with
definiteness
plains of
over the face of
smooth sand
paler than salmon
peaks of rock
—a
—are
—black,
little
the
apparent
continent.
in-
Level
rosier than buff, a little
interrupted only by occasional
stark,
and
shapeless.
Eainless
storms dance tirelessly over the hot, crisp surface of the
The fine sand, driven by the wind, gathers into
deep drifts, and silts among the dark rocks of the hills,
exactly as snow hangs about an Alpine summit only it
The earth
is a fiery snow, such as might fall in hell.
ground.
;
burns with the quenchless
thirst of ages,
and in the
b2
THE RIVER WAR
4
steel-blue sky scarcely a cloud obstructs the unrelenting-
triumph of the sun.
—
Through the desert flows the river a thread of blue
silk drawn across an enormous brown drugget and even
the blue thread is brown for half the year.
Where the
;
water laps the sand and soaks into the banks there grows
an avenue of vegetation which seems very beautiful and
luxuriant by contrast with what
through
all
The
an old
it, is
Nile,
course vital
its
never so precious
traveller clings to the strong river as to
staunch in the hour of need.
friend,
world blazes, but here
but the Nile
The
beyond.
the three thousand miles of
to everything that lives beside
as here.
lies
is
shade.
The
All the
deserts are hot,
The land is parched, but here is
The picture painted in burnt sienna
cool.
is
abundant water.
by a grateful flash of green.
Yet he who had not seen the desert, nor felt the
sun heavy on his shoulders, would hardly admire the
is
relieved
Unnourishing reeds and
fertility
of the riparian scrub.
grasses
grow rank and coarse from the
The dark, rotten
soil
water's edge.
between the tussocks
is
cracked
and granulated by the drying up of the annual
The character of the vegetation
bushes,
antly,
bristling
like
is
inhospitable.
hedgehogs and thriving
flood.
Thornarro-
everywhere predominate and with their prickly
tangles obstruct or forbid the path.
Near
to the river
they often form an impenetrable jungle, and, though
more scattered
as
the
bank
is
left,
they stretch out
hardily into the desert sand, following the reentrants
and thrusting
moisture.
their roots
The
deep in search of percolating
soldier thinking of zeribas
may applaud
THE MILITARY SOUDAN
The
usefulness.
their
artist
delicate
buds and long white
pricked
all
may
5
find beauty in
But the
spines.
the
traveller,
over and his clothes torn, will judge these
insufficient
Smaller
than
apology for their existence.
thorn-bushes,
but
numerous, the caustic plant abounds.
Its
the
quite
as
long stalks
garnished with pale green leaves, and from the
are
jointed branches large, luscious-looking fruits depend.
But when the unwitting hand grasps these pretentious
apples, they burst at once and expose their contents.
They are only bladders puffed with air and filled with a
poisonous white milk, which produces blindness if by
chance
it is
growths.
men
their
squirted in the eye.
These are malignant
Only the palms by the brink are kindly, and
Mle must look often towards
where among the spreading foliage
journeying along the
bushy
tops,
the red and yellow glint of date clusters proclaims the
ripening of a generous crop, and protests that Nature
is
not always mischievous and cruel.
The banks of the
desert,
display
characteristic
sadness.
is
Nile, except
by contrast with the
Their
an abundance of barrenness.
monotony.
Yet there
is
Their attraction
one hour when
all is
is
changed.
Just before the sun sets towards the western
delicious flush brightens
their
cliffs
and enlivens the landscape.
a
It
hour of inspiration
is
as
though some Titanic
w
is
retouching the picture, painting in dark purple
artist in the
shadows among the rocks, strengthening the lights on the
sand, gilding and beautifying everything, and making the
whole scene
live.
whose windings give the
turns from muddy brown to silver-
The
impression of a lake,
river,
THE RIVER WAR
6
grey.
The sky from a
dull blue deepens into violet in
Everything under that magic touch becomes
the west.
vivid and alive.
And
then the
sun sinks altogether
behind the rocks, the colours fade out of the sky, the
and gradually everything darkens
and grows grey, like a man's cheek when he is bleeding
flush off the sands,
We
to death.
are left sad and sorrowful in the dark,
until the stars light
up and remind us that there
is
always something beyond.
In a land whose beauty
whose face
desolate,
is
was hardly needed
Where everything
effect.
burning, the caustic plants
deserts
where
the beauty of a
and whose character
stern, the curse of Avar
a melancholy
is
strangely
to
produce
hot
and
appear superfluous.
In
thirst is enthroned,
and sand appeal to a
is
moment,
is
and where the rocks
was a
e trick to add the mockerv of the mirage.
Yet
a philosopher might draw comfort from the reflection
that strife
is
pitiless
sky for moisture,
it
rightly relegated to unprofitable regions,
and may acidly observe that those who seek to destroy
each other have no right to rail at Nature.
The desolation of the theatre of the Eiver War,
though appalling, will be realised more
its
vast area.
easily
than
Distances that the eye cannot measure
are appreciated with difficulty and vagueness
by the
mind. Africa in the atlas looks neither enormous nor
obstructed. Those, indeed, who have travelled by march
or caravan may understand the size by observing the
distance between two places on the map and reflecting
on the weary days that were consumed in journeying
from one
to the other.
Memorv, by modelling on
the
THE MILITARY SOUDAN
7
smooth, page mountain, valley, and ravine, by painting
marsh and scrub, by recalling successive
camping grounds and reflecting on the tedious hours
of hot sun and constant movement, may create a true
But those
impression of the oppressive distance.
in
forest
who have
only travelled by railway in the developed
countries of
Europe
will find
grave
enormous
ting the extent of the
difficulty in estima-
territories over
which
science has not yet established her authority.
The area multiplies the desolation. There is life
only by the Nile. If a man were to leave the river, he
ht journey westward and find no
nor the smoke of a cooking
of a Kabbabish
caravan
till
fire,
human
habitation,
except the lonely tent
Arab or the encampment
of a trader's
Or
he reached the coast-line of America.
he might go east and find nothing but sand and sea and
sun until Bombay rose above the horizon. The thread of
fresh water is itself solitary in regions where all livin
The
things lack company.
made known
terrors of these wastes are
to the traveller
fortune should lose his way.
who by stupidity or misThe camp may be within
Yet in the darkness, if once the true
for
wait
content
to
be
must
he
lost,
been
has
direction
a few miles.
desonight
the
the
of
hours
dragging
the
In
morning.
Dayhis
nerve.
assail
and
mind
his
oppress
will
lation
but
road
the
reveal
and
courage
his
restore
light may
;
while he lives
a one
we may
he
will
remember the
desert.
With such
return to drink at sunrise from the river.
The thirst of the night
is
quenched and
pelled by the sweet and cool water
;
its
anxieties dis-
nor will he
the
thank
forget
to
ungratefully
thus refreshed
who is
God he
;
THE RIVER WAR
8
when He made
worships, that
the world,
He
made
also
the Nile.
In the
account of
naturally supreme.
River
the
War
Nile
the
is
It is the great motif that recurs
The general purposing
military operations, the statesman who would decide
upon grave policies, and the reader desirous oi
studying the course and results of either, must think
throughout the whole opera.
of the
Nile.
which
it
It is
the
means by which we
of the
fight
;
through
lands
cause of the war.
It is the
flows.
life
It is
the end at which
we
the
aim.
Imagination should paint the river through every page
in the story.
It glitters
between the palm-trees during
the
It
is
the
explanation of nearly every
movement.
By
actions.
military
banks the armies cam}) by
Backed or flanked on
nisrht.
they
its
offer or
its
unfordable
accept battle by day.
morning and evening, long
lines
transport mules, and slaughter
1
To
its
stream
brink,
of camels, horses,
cattle
hurry eagerly.
Emir and Dervish, officer and soldier, friend and foe,
kneel alike to this god of ancient Egypt and draw each
day
their daily
water in goatskin,
bottle, or canteen.
Without the river none would have started. Without
Without it none could
it none might have continued.
ever have returned.
All
who journey on
the Nile, whether in
commerce
or war, will pay their tribute of respect and gratitude
for the great river has befriended all races
age-
It
has borne with an impartial smile the stately
The author
Editor.
and every
is
here thinking only of the actions of the River War.
•
THE MILITARY SOUDAN
9
barges of the Pharaohs and the unpretentious stern-
wheel steamers of Cook.
It
has seen war with the
and the short Eoman sword, and has witnessed the
military employment of quick-firing guns and Lyddite
balista
shells.
by
its
Kingdoms and dominations have
fallen
Eeligious sects have sprung into
banks.
gained strength in adversity,
and
and
risen
relapsed
into
the
life,
triumphed over opposition,
obscurity
of
non-existence.
The knowledge of men has grown, withered, and revived.
The very shape and structure of the human form
may have
A
altered,
but the Nile remains unchanged.
cynic might observe that this
is
true of
all
other
and that every natural feature proclaims the
insignificance of man.
But the thought seems less
rivers,
unwelcome of the
Nile,
and we remember that
has always been to relieve and vivify.
centuries
it
mission
Through
all
has performed the annual miracle of
the
its
phenomenon has been unEvery year when the rains fall and the
That
flood.
its
surprising
interrupted.
mountain snows of Central Africa begin
become
headstreams
torrents
are filled to the brim.
A vast
and
the
to melt, the
great lakes
expanse of low, swampy
by secondary channels and flooded for
regulates the flow, and by a sponge-like
lands, crossed
many
miles,
action prevents the excess of one year from causing the
deficiency of the next.
and
Far away in Egypt, prince,
southwards with
anxious
attention for the fluctuating yet certain rise.
Gradu-
priest,
ally
the
peasant look
flood
begins.
The Bahr-el-Ghazal from a
channel of stagnant pools and marshes becomes a broad
and navigable stream.
The Sobat and the Atbara from
WAR
THE RIVER
10
dry watercourses with occasional pools, in which the
fish
and
But
all this is
crowded, turn
alligators are
remote from Egypt.
rushing rivers.
to
After
connuenc
its
with the Atbara no drop of water reaches the Nile, and
it
flows for seven
hundred miles through the sands or
rushes in cataracts
among
Nevertheless,
desert.
the rocks
of
spite
in
Nubian
tremendous
of the
the
diminution in volume caused by the dryness of the
earth and
air,
drink greedily
and the heat of the sun
—the
river
—
below Assuan
of which
all
is
sufficiently
great to supply nine millions of people with as
much
water as their utmost science and energies can draw,
and
pour into the
yet
a low- water
Mediterranean
surplus current of 61,500 cubic feet per second.
is
its
water
plexion
is
its
only
changed.
As
gift.
The
the Xile rises
clear blue river
and red, laden with the magic
mud
it-
Nor
com-
becomes thick
that can raise cities
from the desert sand and make the wilderness a garden.
The geographer may
describe the Nile as
by the
still
in the arrogance of science
a great, steady-flowing river, fed
'
by the existence
rains of the tropics, controlled
of a vast head reservoir and several areas of repose,
and annually flooded by the accession of a great bod}' of
water with which
but
all
waters
will
its
eastern tributaries are flushed
who have drunk deeply
—
fateful, since
understand
its
they give both
why
the
old
the river, nor will they even in
sociate
of
2
'
;
soft yet fateful
life
and death
Egyptians worshipped
modern days
easily dis-
from their minds a feeling of mystic reverence.
Amid
these regions
and along the river was fought
Ency clop ce dia Britavnica.
THE MILITARY SOUDAN
war with which
the
not exaggerate
day
these pages are concerned.
Even
importance.
its
only one
it is
among
In the near future
insignificant.
The past
but a fleeting moment
in the
present
it
seem almost
will
in relation to the present
nor
;
is
to
it
chronicled will attract their attention.
tion exults in
I
have
Each genera-
immediate possession of
the
is
be expected that
occupy the world, the events
others
do
I
the various great enterprises
of the State.
when
11
life,
and
regards with indifference, scarcely tinged by pride or
pity, the records
The
no more.
and monuments of those that are
greatest events of history are
nine ant beside the
that
ever lived
serve
The
of fare.
bill
an
pass
to
greatest
men
hour.
The
idle
Eoman Empire
tremendous crash of the
insig-
scarcely
is
The past is
remembered as by what
heard outside the schools and colleges.
insulted as
is
much by what
altogether forgotten.
is
Yet
extends beyond the span of
since the desire to live
and men long
life,
memory, when the world
refuge in
from beneath their
owe
;
a distant age
write
—I
have
we may
will con-
chroniclers, desiring in
for his present
our past, may, rummaging among old
this
for a
have slipped
sympathy posterity
and since some
to
shall
feet like a trapdoor; since
credit ourselves with the
tinue to
—
a history of
books, find
set forth in the expression of the times
a true and impartial account of events which, though
they will
be
forgotten
in
a
century,
extended over thirteen years of
strife
nevertheless
and involved
the untimely destruction of three hundred thousand
human
lives.
—
12
THE RIVER
WAR
CHAPTER
II*
—
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
Thrice
is
he armed
who hath
his quarrel just'
The Soudan— Its beasts— Its inhabitants— Their history— The spirit of
Empire The rule of Egypt— Its magnificence Its shame The army
Two personalities— General Gordon in the Soudan
of occupation
His administration The force of fanaticism Its influence on the
A just quarrel A leader Early days of the Mahdi Sharif
revolt
Abba Island Mohammed's protest His disgrace The implacable
Sheikh A taunt Fame of the Mahdi Abdullahi His fortunes
The great conspiracy— Rebellion The first success The Hegvrc
The Mudir of Fashoda— Destruction of Yusef Pasha— Spread of the
—
—
—
—
—Egyptian
struction of his
—
—
—
politics
army
That part of the
as the
—
—
—
—
revolt
—
—
—
— British
—Triumph
—
—
—
intervention
of the
—
Mahdi
—Hicks
Pasha
—His work.
earth's surface geographically
—De-
known
Egyptian Soudan extends from Assuan to the
Equator, and from Suakin to Darfur.
The previous
chapter has described the scenery and character of the
northern portion of this wide region, in which the opera-
have taken place a great
South of Khai
river flowing through greater deserts.
The numerou>
to urn the land becomes more fruitful.
tions of the British troops
:
tributaries of the Nile multiply the areas of riparian
fertility.
Equator
to
A
is
considerable
increasing as
rainfall,
the
approached, enables the intervening spaces
support vegetation and
consequently
The greater part of the country
Map,
'
The Soudan,'
to face
is
human
feverish
page 462.
life.
and un-
:
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
13
healthy, nor can Europeans long sustain the attacks
of
its climate.
Nevertheless it is by no means valueless.
On
the east the province of Sennar used to produce
abundant grain, and might easily produce no less
abundant cotton. Westward the vast territories of
Kordofan and Darfur afford grazing-grounds to a multitude of
and give means of livelihood to great
numbers of Baggara or cow-herd Arabs, who may also
pursue with activity and stratagem the fleet giraffe
and the still fleeter ostrich. To the south-east lies
cattle,
Bahr-el-Ghazal, a great tract of country occupied by
dense woods and plentifully watered.
Further south
and nearer the Equator the forests and marshes become exuberant with tropical growths, and the whole
face of the land
is
Amid
moist and green.
groves of
gigantic trees and through plains of high waving grass
the stately elephant roams in herds, which occasionally
number four hundred, hardly ever disturbed by a wellarmed hunter. The ivory of their tusks constitutes
the wealth of the Equatorial Province.
abound that Emin Pasha
pest of these valuable
are only assailed
no
is
provoked
pachyderms
1
So greatly they
to
complain of a
and although they
by the natives with spear and gun,
than twelve thousand hundredweight of ivory
2
has been exported in a single year.
All other kinds
less
of large beasts
retreats.
The
undergrowth.
known
fierce
1
Life of
Emin
man
inhabit
these
obscure
rhinoceros crashes through the
Among the
huge hippopotami,
and increase.
to
reeds of melancholy
crocodiles,
swamps
and buffaloes prosper
Antelope of every known and many
Pasha,
vol.
i.
chapter
ix.
2
Ibid.
:
-
THE RIVER WAR
14
unclassified species
;
serpents of peculiar
venom
;
count-
and beetles are among
Nature. Nor would the daring
less millions of birds, butterflies,
the offsprings of prolific
sportsman who should survive his expedition
fail to
add
achievements of science and the extent of natural
to the
history as well as to his
own
reputation.
The human inhabitants of the Soudan would not,
but for their vices and misfortunes, be disproportioned
fauna or less happy. War, slavery,
and oppression have however afflicted them until the
in
numbers
to the
total population of the
most
at the
huo'e
whole country does not exceed
liberal estimate three million souls.
many
area contains
differences of climate
The
and
and these have produced peculiar and diverse breeds of men. The Soudanese are of many tribes,
situation,
but
the
two main races can be
aboriginal natives,
clearly
distinguished
and the Arab
settlers.
The
indigenous inhabitants of the country were negroes
as black
Strong,
as coal.
savages, they lived as
—hunting,
beyond the
no
virile,
and simple-minded
we may imagine
fighting, marrying,
prehistoric
and dying, with no ideas
gratification of their physical desires,
fears save those
men
and
engendered by ghosts, witchcraft,
the worship of ancestors, and other forms of superstition
common among
peoples of low devekmement.
played the virtues of barbarism.
honest.
The smallness of
Yet
dis-
They were brave and
their intelligence excused the
degradation of their habits.
their innocence.
They
Their ignorance secured
their eulogy
must be
short, for
though their customs, language, and appearance vary
with the districts they inhabit and the subdivisions
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
15
which they belong, the history of all is a confused
legend of strife and misery, their natures are uniformly
cruel and thriftless, and their condition is one of equal
squalor and want.
to
Although the negroes are the more numerous, the
Arabs exceed in power. The bravery of the aboriginals
outweighed by the intelligence of the invaders and
their superior force of character.
During the second
is
century of the
Mohammedan
era,
when
the inhabitants
of Arabia went forth to conquer the world, one adventurous army struck south. The first pioneers were
followed at intervals by continual immigrations of Arabs
not only from Arabia but also across the deserts from
Egypt and Morocco. The element thus introduced has
spread and is spreading throughout the Soudan, as water
soaks into
a
dry sponge.
The
aboriginals
the invaders they could not repel.
imposed
absorbed
The stronger race
customs and language on the negroes. The
vigour of their blood sensibly altered the facial appearits
ance of the Soudanese.
The
faith of
Islam appears to
possess a strange fascination for negroid races.
For more
than a thousand years the influence of Mohammedanism
has been permeating the Soudan, and, although
j
and natural obstacles obstruct the progress of new ideas,
the whole of the black race is gradually adopting the
new
religion
and developing Arab
characteristics.
In
the districts of the north, where the original invaders
settled, the evolution is complete,
and the Arabs of the
Soudan are a race formed by the interbreeding of negro
and Arab, and yet distinct from either. In the more
remote and inaccessible regions which lie to the south
THE RIVER
16
WAR
yet
unchanged
as
remains
by
race
negro
the
west
and
extremes
these
every
between
And
influence.
Arab
the
decree of mixture
Arabic
is
to
In some tribes pure
be found.
spoken, and prior to the rise of the Mahdi
is
practised.
was
faith
Moslem
orthodox
the
In others
dialects,
ancient
and the
the
modified
merely
has
Arabic
Mohammedan religion has been adapted to the older
superstitions
;
but although the gap between the Arab-
negro and the negro-pure was thus
intermediate blend, the two races were
filled
at
by every
an early date
quite distinct.
The
qualities of
mongrels are rarely admirable, and
Arab and negro types has produced
a debased and cruel breed, more shocking because they
The
are more intelligent than the primitive savages.
stronger race soon began to prey upon the simph
the mixture of the
some of the Arab tribes were camel
some were goat-herds some were Baggaras
breeders
But all, without exception, were hunters
or cow-herds.
aboriginals;
;
;
of men.
To
the great slave-market at Jeddah a con-
tinual stream of negro captives has flowed for
hundreds
The invention of gunpowder and the adoption
by the Arabs of firearms facilitated the traffic by placing
Thus
the ionorant negroes at a further disadvantage.
the situation in the Soudan for several centuries may
The dominant race of Arab
be summed up as follows
of years.
:
—
aders was unceasingly spreading
customs, and language
lation,
and
The
at the
its
among the black
same time
it
blood,
aboriginal popu-
harried and enslaved them.
state of society that arose out of this
easily imagined.
reli
The warlike Arab
may be
tribes fought
and
THE KEBELLION OF THE MAHDl
11
brawled among themselves in ceaseless fend and
The negroes trembled in apprehension
of capture, or rose
locally against their oppressors. Occasionally
tant Sheikh
wonld
effect the
strife.
combination of
and a kingdom came into existence
an impor-
many
tribes,
—a
community
consisting of a military class armed with guns and of
multitudes of slaves, at once their servants and their
merchandise, and sometimes trained as soldiers. The
domination might prosper viciously
till
thrown by some more powerful league.
was overAlthough the
it
Arab race impressed itself on the negro so strongly, yet
the power of numbers was asserted, and in the fifteenth
century the old negro tribal names of Fung, Hameg,
&c, reappear, while the Arab classifications are forDuring the sixteenth century the Fung tribe
gotten.
became all-powerful, and with rare fortune maintained
its supremacy until about 1750, when the Hameg arose
and destroyed it. The Hameg broke up after a brief
spell of rapine
and oppression, and the Soudan relapsed
into the anarchy
from which
it
had never been very
far
removed.
All this was unheeded by the outer world, from
which the Soudan
it
is
separated by the deserts,
and
seemed that the slow, painful course of develope-
But at
ment would be unaided and uninterrupted.
changed.
Another
last the populations of Europe
civilisation
reared
triumph and
itself
above the ruins of
Mohammedan
aspiration
—a
Eoman
civilisation
more powerful, more glorious, but no less aggressive.
The impulse of conquest which hurried the French and
English to Canada and the Indies, which sent the
VOL.
I.
c
THE RIVER WAR
18
Dutch
Cape and the Spaniards
to the
to Africa
and led the Egyptians
to the
to Peru, spread
Soudan.
In the
year 1819 Mahomet Ali, availing himself of the
dis-
orders alike as an excuse and an opportunity, marched
The Arab
up the Nile with a great army.
tribes, torn
by thirty years of general war,
and no longer inspired by their neglected religion,
Their slaves, having known
offered a weak resistance.
the worst of life, were apathetic.
The black aboriginals
Avere silent and afraid.
The whole vast territory was
by
dissension, exhausted
conquered with very
fighting,
little
and the victorious
army, leaving garrisons, returned in triumph to the
,l
Delta.
'
^h-f'r 4
\
What enterprise that an enlightened community
may attempt is more noble and more profitable than
the reclamation from barbarism of fertile regions and
large populations
To give peace
?
where
to administer justice
the
chains off the
the
soil,
to
warring
tribes,
was violence, to strike
draw the richness from
all
slave, to
to plant the earliest seeds of
commerce and
learning, to increase in whole peoples their capacities
and diminish their chances of pain
for pleasure
more beautiful
inspire
human
invigorating,
ideal
effort ?
and the
or more
The
act
valuable
is
— what
reward
can
virtuous, the exercise
result often extremely profitable.
Yet as the mind turns from the wonderful cloudland
of aspiration to the ugly scaffolding of attempt
achievement,
a succession
of
opposite
ideas
and
arise.
Industrious races are displayed stinted and starved for
the sake of an expensive Imperialism which they can
only enjoy,
if
they are well
fed.
"Wild peoples, ignorant
:
THE EEBELLION OF THE MAHDI
19
of their barbarism, callous of suffering, careless of
but tenacious of
philanthropic
before they
liberty, are seen to resist
and
invaders,
are
perish
to
convinced
of
their
life
with fury the
in
thousands
The
mistake.
gap between conquest and dominion becomes
filled with the figures of the greedy trader, the inopportune missionary, the ambitious soldier, and the
inevitable
lying speculator,
who
minds of the con-
disquiet the
quered and excite the sordid appetites of the conquerors.
And as the eye of thought rests on these
features,
sinister
it
hardly seems possible for us to
believe that any fair prospect
is
approached by so foul
not,
however, a matter of
a path.
The
desire to prevail
is
reason but of constitution.
spirit of
existence.
It is
only one form of the
competition, the condition of our continued
All the vigorous nations of the earth have
sought and are seeking to conquer.
Even the feeblest
cling to their possessions with desperation. The Spaniards
fought for the last remains of their empire with the
last
Few
remains of their strength.
features strike the
reader of modern Egyptian history so strongly as the
educated classes to hold or regain the
desire of the
Soudan.
In a nation where public
spirit is
almost un-
known, Cherif Pasha resigned rather than consent to the
abandonment of the southern provinces. Even cataleptic
China
instinct
for,
may
protests
against
not be wise, but
as in the
Eoman
State,
dismemberment.
it is
when
The
apparently healthy
there are no
more
worlds to conquer and no rivals to destroy, nations ex-
change the desire for power for the love of
art,
and so
c 2
—
WAR
THE E1VER
20
a gradual, yet continual, enervation and decline turn
from the vigorous beauties of the nude to the more
subtle allurements of the draped, and then sink to actual
The writer of a tale of
war may not follow such an argument even to the depths
which average men can plumb nor can he examine the
eroticism and ultimate decay.
;
question whether a conspiracy for the arrest of develope-
ment
is
justified
science of
man
by the unexpected powers which the
has snatched from Nature.
possible to recognise the desire to prevail
empire
— as
and then perforce return
:
with the reflection that,
if
by pursuing the path of conquest,
if
only
spirit of
men must
to the Egyptians
even noble races
mean breeds avoided it
From 1819 to 1883 Egypt
well
— the
a great fact, which practical
reckon with
selves
It is
altogether.
it
soil
them-
would be
3
Her
Its aim was
rule was not kindly, wise, nor profitable.
The
to exploit, not to improve the local population.
of the
miseries
lessened
:
ruled the Soudan.
people were aggravated rather than
but they were concealed.
For the rough
sword there were substituted the intricate
laws of corruption and bribery. Violence and plunder
justice of the
were more hideous, since they were cloaked with legality
and armed with authority.
The land was undeveloped and poor. It barely
sustained its inhabitants.
The additional burden of a
considerable foreign garrison and a crowd of rapacious
officials
3
1
One thing
out of his
1879.
increased the severity of the economic condi-
own
is
certain, that the
country.'
Egyptian should never be allowed
Colonel Gordon in Central Africa, April 11,
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
tions.
Scarcity was frequent.
21
Famines were periodical.
The Egyptians had only pressed upon the tortured face
of the Soudan the bland mask of an organised Government.
Corrupt and incapable Governors-General succeeded
each other at Khartoum with bewildering rapidity.
The constant changes, while they prevented the conany wise policy, did not interrupt the misrule.
With hardly any exceptions the Pashas were consistent
tinuity of
in oppression.
The success of
measured by the Ministries
money they could
officials in
in
their administration
Egypt by the amount of
extort from the natives
the Soudan,
they could create.
was
by the number of
;
among
the
useless offices
There were a few bright examples
of honest men, but these, by providing a contrast only
increased
the
discontents.
Yet
iniquitous.
it
The
rule
of
Egypt was
preserved the magnificent appear-
The Egyptian Proconsul
lived in state at the confluence of the Niles. The representatives of foreign Powers established themselves
in the city.
The trade of the south converged upon
Khartoum. Thither the subordinate governors, Beys
and Mudirs, repaired at intervals to report the state of
ance of Imperial dominion.
I
their provinces
was
and
to
receive instructions.
Thither
sent the ivory of Equatoria, the ostrich feathers of
I
Kordofan,
gum
from Darfur, grain from Sennar, and
taxes collected from
all
the regions.
entrapped in the swamps and
the
capital
on
forests,
their journey to
Strange beasts,
passed through
Cairo and Europe.
Complex and imposing reports of revenue and expenditure were annually compiled.
An elaborate and
—
—
THE RIVER WAR
22
dignified
correspondence
Egypt and
its
astonished
at
was
The casual observer,
great dependency.
government
unusual capacity for
the
between
maintained
displayed by an Oriental people, was tempted to accept
the famous assertion
mouth
which Nubar Pasha put
of the Khedive Ismail
Africa, but in Europe.'
Yet
'
:
all
We
are no longer in
was a hateful sham.
The arbitrary and excessive taxes were
If
4
collected
If a petty chief fell
only at the point of the bayonet.
into arrears, his neighbours
into the
were raised against him.
an Arab tribe were recalcitrant, a military expedition
The
was despatched.
depended on
their
of
ability
success
as
the
Arabs
had been a good catch, the revenue
The
Egyptian
had
joined
national League against the slave trade.
however, indirectly but deliberately,
out of
4
i
it.
pay
When
slave-himters.
there
Government
to
profited.
the
Inter-
They continued
to make money
6
The government
of
the Egyptians in these far-off countries
is
nothing else but one of brigandage of the very worst description/
Colonel Gordon in Central Africa, April 11, 1879.
5
A very concise description of the methods of the Egyptian Govern-
ment
and a
clear testimony to the source from which it was derived, is found in
Lieut.-Colonel Stewart's report (1883).
Say the annual
He wrote
tribute of the tribe was 5,000Z.
Having no money, and no wealth but
their cattle, it was evident that they were quite unable to pay the sum.
In such cases the Kordofan merchant (Djellab) would offer to pay it, if
the tribe would supply him with an equivalent in slaves, say 1,000.
Should the required number of slaves not be forthcoming, then the tribe
would agree to pay the balance by selling him cows at a certain rate.
Should the tribe fail in the bargain, the merchant would refuse to pay
the Government, and the latter would have to send troops to harry the
tribe.
These troops would probably plunder and destroy far more than
was necessary, with the result of still further impoverishing the tribe,
making the Government detested, and the people only too willing to
seize any opportunity of escaping from it.'— Egypt, No. 11, 1883.
in the collection of their revenue throughout the Soudan,
:
4
THE KEBELLTON OF THE MAHDI
In
the
miserable,
harassing
23
warfare
that
ac-
companied the collection of taxes the Viceregal commanders gained more from fraud than force. No
was too mean for them to
adopt. No oath or treaty was too sacred for them to
break. Their methods were cruel, and if honour did
not impede the achievement, mercy did not restrict the
subterfuge, no treachery,
effects of their inglorious successes
:
and the
effete ad-
ministrators delighted to order their timid soldiery to
carry out the most savage executions.
methods and
political
social style of the Governors-General
more or
imitated
The
less exactly
by the subordinate
were
officials
according to their degree in the provinces.
Since they
were completely hidden from the eye of
civilisation,
they enjoyed a greater licence in their administration.
As
was inferior, so their habits became
more gross. Meanwhile the volcano on which they
The Arab
disported themselves was ominously silent.
their education
and the black population cowered.
tribes obeyed,
The authority of a tyrannical Government was supported by the presence of a worthless army. Nearly
forty thousand
men were
distributed
and numerous minor garrisons.
among
eight main
Isolated in a roadless
country by enormous distances and natural obstacles,
and living in the midst of large savage populations of
fanatical character
tion
and warlike
was yearly growing with
regal
forces
habits,
whose exaspera-
their miseries, the Vice-
might depend for their safety only on
the skill of their officers, the excellence of their
ine,
and the superiority of
Egyptian
officers
were
at
their weapons.
dis-
But the
that time distinguished for
—
WAR
THE RIVER
24
nothing but their public incapacity and private mis-
The
behaviour.
evil reputation of the
Soudan and
its
more educated or more wealthy from
serving in such distant regions, and none went south who
could avoid it. The army which the Khedives maintained in the Delta was, judged by European standards,
climate deterred the
was badly trained, rarely paid, and
very cowardly and the scum of the army of the Delta
was the cream of the armv of the Soudan. The officers
only a rabble.
It
;
t/
remained for long periods,
many
all their lives, in
the
Some had been sent
Some had been
there in disgrace, others in disfavour.
forced to serve out of Egypt by extreme poverty, others
were drawn to the Soudan by the hopes of gratifying
peculiar tastes.
The majority had harems of the
6
women of the country, which were limited only by the
amount of money they could lay hands upon by any
obscurity of the remote provinces.
Many were
method.
Nearly
all
hopeless and habitual drunkards.
All were indolent and in-
were dishonest.
capable.
Under such leadership the finest
soon degenerated. The Egyptians
not fine soldiers.
Like their
soldiery
in the
officers,
slothful
and
to the south.
Their discipline was lax.
was even
6
'
In one
this
all
district the
the
thev were the
Like them, they were
was imperfect.
Their courage was low. Nor
Their
effete.
training
weakness and
commander
peril
of their
was carrying off not
young girls.' Colonel
of the troops
only the flocks and herds of the natives, but their
Gordon in Central Africa (Campaign of Gessi Pasha).
'
Soudan were
Like them, they
worst part of the Khedivial army.
had been driven
would have
—
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
position;
while
for
regular
the
were thus
a powerful local irregular
demoralised, there existed
7
troops
25
armed as the soldiers, more
numerous, more courageous, and who regarded the
force of Bazingers,
as well
with fear that continually diminished,
alien garrisons
and hate that continually grew.
and irregulars
and
injustice,
tribes of the desert
forests,
goaded by suffering
thought the foreigners the cause of
and were delayed only by
their woes,
behind regulars
Arab
alike the wild
and the hardy blacks of the
And
combine from sweeping them
all
their inability to
off the face of the earth.
Never was there such a house of cards as the Egyptian
dominion in the Soudan.
long, not that
it fell
The marvel
is
that
it
stood so
so soon.
The names of two men of extraordinary character
and great fame are
outburst.
Arab
for ever connected with the actual
One was an English
priest
;
general, the other an
and vivid
yet, in spite of the great gulf
contrast between their conditions, they resembled each
many
thusiastic men
other in
emotions.
fervour.
who came
respects.
of
Both were earnest and en-
keen sympathies
and
passionate
Both were powerfully swayed by
religious
Both exerted great personal influence on
in contact with them.
all
Both were reformers.
The Arab was an African reproduction of the Englishman the Englishman a superior and civilised developement of the Arab. In the end they fought to the death,
;
but for an important part of their lives their influence
on the fortunes of the Soudan was exerted in the same
direction.
Mohammed Ahmed, 'The
7
Soudanese riflemen.
Editor.
Mahdi,' will be
THE RIVER AVAR
26
own
discussed in his
no
Long
introduction.
Charles Gordon needs
place.
"before
this
tale begins
his
The fame of the 'Everwas European.
Army had spread far beyond the Great Wall
reputation
'
victorious
of China.
The
misgovernment
of
the
and
Egyptians
the
misery of the Soudanese reached their greatest extreme
in the seventh
decade of the present century.
From
such a situation there seemed to be no issue other than
by
The Arab
force of arms.
no provoca-
tribes lacked
Yet they were destitute of two moral forces
The first was the knowledge
essential to all rebellions.
tion*
The second was a spirit of
General Gordon showed them the first.
that better things existed.
combination.
The Mahdi provided the second.
It
is
impossible
to
study any part
Gordon's career without being drawn to
As
his
wild
and
varied
fortunes
of
all
lead
Charles
the rest.
him from
Sebastopol to Pekin, from Gravesend to South Africa,
from
Mauritius
fascinated.
dramatic.
to
Every
the
Soudan, the reader follows
scene
is
strange,
terrible,
or
Yet, remarkable as are the scenes, the actor
more extraordinary a type without comparison
in modern times and with few likenesses in history.
Eare and precious is the truly disinterested man.
the
Potentates of many lands and different degree
Emperor of China, the King of the Belgians, the Premier
competed to
of Cape Colony, the Khedive of Egypt
secure his services.
The importance of his office^
One day he was
varied no less than their nature.
is
the
;
—
—
a subaltern of sappers
;
on another he commanded the
THE EEBELLION OF THE MAHDI
Chinese army
;
27
the next he directed an orphanage
;
or
was Governor-General of the Soudan, with supreme
powers of life and death and peace and war or served
But in whatever
as private secretary to Lord Eipon.
;
capacity he laboured he was true to his
Whether he
is
portrayed bitterly criticising to
the tactics of the assault on the
head of Lar
reputation.
Wang
Eedan
;
Graham
or pulling the
from under his bedstead and waving
paroxysms of indignation before the astonished
eyes of Sir Halliday Macartney or riding alone into
the camp of the rebel Suliman and receiving the
in
it
;
respectful salutes of those
who had meant
or telling the Khedive Ismail that he
whole Soudan to govern
'
;
much
'
;
'
he thought
it
was
or ruling a country as large as Europe
perceive a
man
or the smiles of
of
life
;
efforts,
careless alike of the frowns of
women,
;
must have the
or collecting facts for Lord Eipon's rhetorical
we
him
or reducing his salary to
half the regulation amount because
too
4
to kill
men
or comfort, wealth or
fame.
It
was a pity that a man, thus gloriously
the ordinary restraining influences of
should have found in his
own
free
human
character so
little
from
society,
mental
Mercury uncontrolled by the force of gravity
was not on several occasions more unstable than
Charles Gordon. His moods were capricious and
ballast.
uncertain,
and
his
passions violent,
inconsistent.
his
impulses sudden
had become a trusted
The friend
Scheme after
ally before the night.
he loved to-day he loathed to-morrow.
scheme formed in
the morning
The mortal enemy of
his fertile brain,
and jostled con-
THE RIVER AVAR
28
All in succession were pressed with
fusingly together.
All at times were rejected with disdain.
enthusiasm.
A temperament naturally
neurotic had been aggravated
by an acquired habit of smoking; and the General
carried this to so great an extreme that he was rarely
seen without
a
cigarette.
His virtues are
famous
among men.
His daring and resource might turn the
tide of war.
His energy would
animated a whole
His achievements are upon record, but
people.
must
haw
also
be
set
impracticable
down
more uncertain and
Gordon have ever been
that few
than
forces
it
introduced into diplomacy.
Although the Egyptian Government might loudly
proclaim their detestation of slavery, their behaviour
in
Soudan was viewed with suspicion by the European
Powers, and particularly by Great Britain. To vindithe
cate his sincerity the
Gordon
in
1874 appointed
Governor of the Equatorial Province
to be
in succession to Sir
General was a
Khedive Ismail
Samuel Baker.
The name of the
guarantee that the slave trade
sufficient
was being earnestly attacked.
The Khedive would
gladly have stopped at the guarantee, and satisfied the
world without disturbing
mission,
became
in Gordon's energetic
hands very
Circumstances enlisted the sympathies of the
Egyptian Government on the side
agent.
But the
vested interests.'
which may have been originally instituted as a
pretence, soon
real.
'
The
slave dealers
of atrocity for which
their
zealous
had committed every variety
the most odious
world afforded occasion.
ship of Zubair
of
traffic
in
the
But when, under the leader-
Rahmana, they refused
to
pay
their
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
annual tribute
it
was
felt in
29
Cairo that their crimes had
cried aloud for chastisement.
Zubair
said
is
sufficiently described
when
he was the most notorious
that
Africa has
beyond the
it
has been
slave
dealer
His infamy had spread
ever produced.
limits of the continent
which was the scene
of his exploits to the distant nations of the north and
In
west.
reality, his rule
was a
anarchy which had preceded
no worse than others of
distinct
advance on the
and certainly he was
it,
His scale of
his vile trade.
more extended. What William
respect of goods and chattels, that was
business was, however,
Whiteley was in
Zubair in respect of
slaves
—a
universal
provider.
Magnitude lends a certain grandeur to crime
;
and
Zubair in the height of his power, at the head of the
slave merchants' confederacy, might boast the retinue
of a kincr and exercise authority over wide regions and
a powerful army.
may be
It
he
is
difficult for
those
who meet
him,
now that
a pensioned prisoner in Cairo, to realise his former
greatness.
8
Yet when he
when he conquered
is
asked to speak of the days
Darfur, the old man's face lights
memory, and, in
of the incongruous frockcoat and shiny boots, the
up, his eye glitters with triumphant
spite
visitor
may
imagine the savage conqueror before whose
golden couch chained leopards walked, and the wild
peoples of the Soudan were
As
early
as
pendent ruler of
8
of
1869
the
made
to
bow
in
awe and
fear.
he was practically the indeBahr-el-Ghazal.
The
Khedive
Through the kindness of Sir Keginald Wingate I had the pleasure
a long and interesting conversation with Zubair in May 1899.
WAR
THE EIVER
30
resolved to assert his rights.
was
sent
to
A
subdue the rebel
small Egyptian force
slaver,
who
not only-
disgraced humanity but refused to pay tribute.
Like
most of the Khedivial expeditions the troops under
They came, they saw,
they ran away. Some, less speedy than the rest, fell on
The rebellion was open. Xeverthe field of honour.
Bey met with
Belial
theless
it
ill-fortune.
was the Khedive who sought peace.
apologised
defeating
for
the
Viceregal
soldiers
remained supreme in the Bahr-el-Ghazal.
planned
the
conquest
independent kingdom.
of
Darfur,
at
and
Thence he
that
time an
The Egyptian Government were
The man they
glad to join with him in the enterprise.
had been unable
Zubair
to conquer, they
found
it
expedient to
The operations were successful. The King of
Darfur, who was distinguished no less for his valour
than for his folly, was killed. The whole country was
subdued. The whole population available after the
Zubair thus wielded a formibattles became slaves.
dable power. The Khedivial Government, thinking to
ensure his loyalty, created him a Pasha a rank which
assist.
he could scarcely disgrace
—and
—
the authority of the
was thus unwillingly recognised by the
Such was the situation when Gordon first came
ruler.
rebel
to the
Soudan.
It
was beyond the power of the new Governor of
the Equatorial Province to at once destroy the slave-
hunting confederacy.
the slave trade, and
to England,
Yet he struck heavy blows at
when
he returned
in 1877, after a short visit
to the
Soudan
as Governor-
General and with absolute power, he assailed
it
with
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
redoubled energy.
Fortune assisted his
was enticed
able Zubair
Government refused
to
to Cairo, and,
31
efforts, for
the
once there, the
allow their faithful ally and
distinguished guest to go back to his
Although the slave
rounds.
happy hunting
dealers were thus robbed
of their great leader, they were
son, the brave
still
strong.
Zubair's
Suliman, found a considerable follow-
Furious at his father's
captivity,
and alarmed
own
should follow, he meditated revolt. But
the Governor-General, mounted on a swift camel and
lest his
attired in full uniform, rode alone into the rebel
and compelled the submission of
its chiefs
could recover from their amazement.
was severely shaken, and when,
camp
before they
The confederacy
in the following year,
Suliman again revolted, the Egyptian troops under
Gessi Pasha were able to disperse his forces and induce
him
to surrender to terms.
and Suliman and ten of
by
shooting.
9
his
The league of
The terms were broken,
companions suffered death
the slave dealers
was thus
destroyed.
Towards the end of 1879 Gordon left the Soudan.
With short intervals he had spent five busy years in its
provinces.
His energy had stirred the country. He
had struck at the root of the slave trade, he had
attacked the system of slavery, and, as slavery was the
had undermined the
Indignation had stimulated his
greatest institution in the land, he
whole social system.
activity
to
an extraordinary degree.
In a climate
usually fatal to Europeans he discharged the
five officers.
work of
Careless of his methods, he bought slaves
9
Slatin,
Fire and Sword,
p. 28.
THE RIVER
32
WAR
formed
thus
soldiers
the
with
and
himself drilled them,
Tr
hunters.
the
of
caravans
pounced on the
a
sing
which
in
on
dromedary—
the country on a fleet
ed
scatte:
he
miles—
3,840
covered
year he is said to have
He
natives.
astonished
the
among
justice and freedom
wicked.
the
executed
weak,
the
fed the infirm, protected
To
some he gave actual help, to
many
Nor were
freedom, to
all
the tribes ungrateful.
hopes and aspirations.
the
respected
cannibals
and
savages
The fiercest
The women
the strange white man.
new
life
blessed him.
of
He
of
brigade
a
where
alone
and
unarmed
could ride
knew
he
as
he
was,
But
venture.
not
soldiers dared
the herald
himself,
of
the
storm.
Oppressed
yet
The
rights.
had
they
that
learned
had
ferocious races
knowtheir
but
lessened,
was
Soudanese
of the
was
population
whole
The
increased.
ledge had
slowly
to
began
change
of
wheels
The
unsettled.
accomplished
had
they
until
stop
they
did
revolve, nor
a mighty revolution.
The part
obscure.
Few
played
by the second
facts are so
force
is
more
encouraging to the student
men
most
which
desire,
the
as
development
of human
associate
to
times,
all
at
manifest
and all communities
moral
of
appearance
the
least
at
with their actions
rieht.
virtue,
their
may be
their conceptions of
However
distorted
however
feeble their efforts to attain even to
own
ideals,
it is
a pleasing feature and a hopeful
comjustified.
No
be
to
wish
should
they
ury that
munity embarks on a great enterprise without fortifyof
points
some
from
that
belief
the
with
ing itself
an
It
is
and
disinterested.
loftv
are
motives
its
view
a
I
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
33
involuntary tribute, the humble tribute of imperfect
beings, to the eternal
The
temples of Truth and Beauty.
sufferings of a people or a class
may
be intolerable,
but before they will take up arms and risk their
some
and
unselfish
impersonal
mental activity or refinement,
human motive
traditions, in a
is
found
and
education
is
high and often ultra-
this
the
in
must animate
spirit
In countries where there
them.
lives
pride
of
glorious
keen sympathy with surrounding misery,
or in a philosophical recognition of the dignity of
the
Ignorance deprives
species.
savage
nations
of
Yet in the marvellous economy of
such incentives.
nature this very ignorance
is
a
source
of
greater
them the mighty stimulus of
fanaticism.
The French Communists might plead that
they upheld the rights of man. The desert tribes
strength.
It
affords
proclaimed that they fought for the glory of God.
although the force of fanatical passion
far greater
is
than that exerted by any philosophical belief,
is
just the same.
think
is
It gives
sublime to fight
excuse for wars which
totally different reasons.
war.
It is
fight.
the
and
is
this serves
desirable
Fanaticism
is
to
them
they
as
common
an
beein for
not a cause of
means which helps savage peoples
It is the spirit
the great
it
unction
its
men something which
for,
But
to
which enables them
to
combine
object before which
all
personal
become insignificant. What the horn
is to the rhinoceros, what the sting is to the wasp, the
Mohammedan faith was to the Arabs of the Soudan
or tribal disputes
—
faculty of offence or defence.
It
was
VOL.
all this
I.
and no more.
It
was not the
—
;
THE RIVER AVAR
34
did not cause.
own
their
strengthened,
It
of the revolt.
10
it
characterised, but
Those whose practice
it
is
it
to regard
nation as possessing a monopoly of virtue
and common-sense, are wont to ascribe every military
They
enterprise of savage peoples to fanaticism.
The
calmly ignore obvious and legitimate motives.
most
conduct
rational
simple
are
persons
When
mad.
considered
is
by some cunning and
puzzled
wonderful invention, they not infrequently endeavour to
conceal their ignorance by explaining that
by
In a similar vague
electricity.'
way
'done
is all
it
rebellions of
by brutal oppression are airily
fanaticism, and the question is dis-
natives goaded to fury
down
set
to their
missed as unworthy of further reflection.
been freely stated, and
is
has therefore
some extent believed, that
to
Soudan was
the revolt in the
It
entirely religious.
If the
some appearance
greatest untruths are those that have
of veracity, this impression must be very false indeed.
It
is,
I believe,
an historical
fact that the revolt of a
great population has never been caused solely or even
In every case social
mainly by religious enthusiasm.
or racial
1897 on the Indian Frontier
instance
was
— was
in
political.
—
the
10
their
tolerant
to take the
character religious
The Mullahs
against the infidel; but they
conceived
The
causes have predominated.
influence
scepticism
of
;
rising
of
most recent
but
preached a
its
holy
cause
war
preached because
they
by
contact
W
with
assailed
the
Indian Government
do not believe that fanaticism exists as it used to do in the world,
judging from what I have seen in this so-called fanatic land. It is far
4
1
and is more like Communism under the
General Gordon's Journals at Khartoum, bk. i. p. 13.
more a question
of religion.'
of property,
flag
;
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
and the tribesmen were
by
stirred
35
their
preaching,
because, having seen the forts and roads being
made
in their territory, they rightly thought their liberties
were
by
threatened
annexation.
The high
moral
principle
is
used to excuse, not to explain, violent
courses.
It
would scarcely be
less
absurd to contend
Soudan was caused by fanaticism,
that the French Eevolution was brought
that the revolt in the
than to assert
about by the great admiration which the French people
had
for the philosophy of the
'
Contrat
Social.'
The reasons which forced the peoples of the Soudan
to revolt were as strong as the defence which their
Looking at the
oppressors could offer was feeble.
question from a purely political standpoint,
that
upon the whole there
exists
case for rebellion than that
property was plundered
liberties
oppressed
which presented
the
their
were curtailed
Aliens
threatened.
;
;
ruled the
many
;
brave
say
no record of a better
itself to
Their country was being ruined
Soudanese.
their
we may
women were
even their
inhabitants
men were
the
their
;
ravished
were
lives
;
the
few
harried by
weak compelled the strong. Here were
Since any armed movement against
sufficient reasons.
an established Government can be justified only by
cowards
;
the
success, strength
is
a cardinal revolutionary virtue.
was a virtue that the Arabs might
boast.
It
They were
indeed far stronger than they, their persecutors, or the
outside world
had yet
learned.
All were soon to be
enlightened.
The storm gathered and the waters
rose.
Three
great waves impelled the living tide against the tottering
D 2
;
THE
36
PJVEIt \VA1{
The Arab suffered
acutely from poverty, misgovernment, and oppression.
Infuriated, he looked up and perceived that the cause
of all his miseries was a weak and cowardly foreigner, a
house founded on the desert sand.
The antagonism of races increased
the hatred sprung from social evils.
The moment was
Then and not till then the third wave camt
at hand.
despicable 'Turk."
the
wave of fanaticism, which, catching up and surmounted
-
all
foam, and, bearing on with the
beat in thunder against the
and great was the
fall
:
momentum of the
weak house
waters,
so that
fell
it
thereof.
The chemist knows
quantitative analysis
the flood
the difficulty and delicacy of
and when, instead of a concrete
substance, there are substituted the fluctuating passions
of wild and savage
intelligence.
men, the inquiry
To decide
the
relative
bailies
human
strength of
t
lie
which together produced the rebellion
of the Arab tribes would be an exercise more wearisome
different forces
in the
attempt than useful in the achievement.
the causes are thus obscured, their results
clearly apparent.
Down
no fanatical movement
to the year
in the
Soudan.
are
But
if
most
1881 there was
In their utter
misery the hopeless inhabitants had neglected even the
They were nevertheless prepared
however desperate, which might free
practices of religion.
for
any enterprise,
them from the Egyptian yoke. All that delayed them
was the want of some leader who could combine the
tribes and restore their broken spirits.
In the summer
of 1881 the leader appeared.
within the
limits
His subsequent career
of this account, and since his
is
life
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
37
throws a strong light on the thoughts and habits of
the Arabs
Soudan
of the
I shall trace
from the
it
beginning.
The man who was the proximate cause of the
Eiver War was born by the banks of the Mle, not very
far
from Dongola.
His family were poor and of no
But
account in the province.
as
the
Prophet had
claimed a royal descent, and as a Sacred Example was
sprung from David's
that he
was of the
'
humble
priest
;
Mohammed Ahmed
Ashraf,'
cannot be disproved,
a
line,
may
11
and the
asserted
assertion, since
be accepted.
it
His father was
yet he contrived to give his son
some
education in the practices of religion, the principles of
Then he died at
Khartoum, and left the
the Koran, and the art of writing.
Kerreri while on a journey to
future Mahdi,
a child, to the mercies of the world.
still
|
Solitary trees, if they
boy deprived of a
grow
at all,
grow strong
:
and a
father's care often developes, if
he
escape the perils of youth, an independence and vigour
of thought which
may
of early days.
It
was
looked around
,for
restore in after
so with
life
the heavy loss
Mohammed Ahmed.
an occupation and subsistence.
He
A
large proportion of the population of religious countries
pass
their lives at
leisure,
supported by the patient
The young man determined to
follow the profession for which he felt his talents suited,
and which since all great men are ambitious in their
youth would afford him the widest scope. He became a priest. A large proportion of the religious
labour of the devout.
—
—
teachers of heathen and other countries are devoid of
11
Descendants
of the Prophet.
TJIE
38
RIVER AVAR
enthusiasm and turn their attention to the next world
because doin<x so affords them an easy living
Happilv
not true of
this is
all.
was
It
in
this.
true
not
of
Even at an early age he manifested a zeal
for God's service, and displayed a peculiar aptitude lor
learning the tenets and dogmas of the Mohammedan
Mohammed.
long lack a
So promising a pupil did not
belief.
master
in a
countrv where intelligence and enthusiasm
His aspirations growing with his years
were scarce.
and knowledge, he journeyed to Khartoum as soon as
his religious education was completed, and became a
renowned and holy Sheikh,
disciple of the
|
Sherif.
Mohammed
-
His devotion to his superior, to his studies and
to the practice of austerities,
influence
he
was
already
and
a strange personal
won
show,
beginning to
him by degrees a few disciples of his own: and with
them he retired to the Island of Abba. Here bv the
waters of the White Nile Mohammed Ahmed lived
His two brothers, who were boatfor several years.
builders in the neighbourhood, supported him by
-
But
industry.
their
it
must have
been
an
easy
burden, for we read that he 'hollowed out for himself
a cave in the
seclusion,
paying a
him of
M
mud
fasting
visit
bank, and lived
often
to
the
his devotion
I take this passage
for
days,
almost entire
in
and
head of the order
and obedience/
12
to
MBurc
Meanwhile
hia
from Fire and Sword in the Soudan, by
the most graphic and reliable of all known
He had terrible opportunities of collecting
His account is
records of the Mahdi.
information.
I have followed his version (chapter
on this subject.
Slatin.
occasionally
iv.)
very closely
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
39
and the labour and charity of the
brothers were assisted by the alms of godly travellers
sanctity increased
on the
river.
,
This virtuous and frugal existence was disturbed
and terminated by an untoward event.
and holy Sheikh made a
cision of his sons.
The renowned
feast to celebrate the circum-
That the merriment of the auspicious
occasion and the entertainment of the guests might be
increased, Sherif, according to the lax practice of the
time, granted a dispensation from any sins committed
during the
festivities,
and proclaimed
name
in God's
the
suspension of the rules against singing and dancing by
which the
Abba
religious orders
The
were bound.
ascetic of
island did not join in these seemingly innocent
dissipations.
With
all
the recklessness of the reformer
he protested against the demoralisation of the age, and
God
loudly affirmed the doctrine that
dve
alone could for-
These things were speedily brought to the
sins.
ears of the
renowned Sheikh, and
in all the righteous
indignation that accompanies detected wrong-doing, he
summoned Mohammed Ahmed before him. The latter
obeyed. He respected his superior. He was under
obligations to him.
it
His
had been expressed.
giveness; but in vain.
discipline
ire
He
had disappeared
as soon as
submissively entreated for-
Sherif
felt
must be maintained among
that
some
his flock.
connived at disobedience to the divine law.
sort of
He had
All the
in
Eising
authority.
own
his
uphold
he
must
more
his
from
disciple
presumptuous
the
anger he drove
his
expunged
forthwith
and
words,
bitter
presence with
name from
the order of the elect.
THE RIVER WAR
40
Mohammed went home.
Yet
his fortunes
He was
greatly distressed.
His sanctity was
were not ruined.
still
a valuable and, unless he chose otherwise, an inalienable
—
The renowned Sheikh had a rival nearly as holy
and more enterprising than himself. There the young
asset.
priest
warm welcome.
might expect a
Nevertheless he
Placing a
did not yet abandon his former superior.
heavy wooden
collar
on
his neck, clad in sackcloth
and
sprinkled with ashes, he again returned to his spiritual
and
leader,
He was
in this penitential guise implored pardon.
Nor
ignominiously ejected.
revisit the
But
unforgiving Sheikh.
did he venture to
it
happened
that in
a few weeks Sherif had occasion to journey to the Island
His former disciple appeared suddenly before
of Abba.
him,
still
clad in sackcloth and defiled
less of his plain misery,
by
ashes.
and unmoved by
Care-
his loyalty,
which was the more remarkable since it was disinterested, the implacable Sheikh poured forth a stream
Among many
of invective.
'
Be
insults,
one went home
you wretched Dongolawi.'
Although the natives of the Dongola province were
off,
despised and disliked in the Southern Soudan,
at first
apparent
why Mohammed
category
will
is
it
is
not
should have resented
so bitterly the allusion to his birthplace.
Btit
abuse by
a dangerous though effective practice.
A man
perhaps tolerate an offensive word applied to himself,
but will be infuriated
if
fession are insulted.
'
1
:
Fool'
is
his nation, his class, or his pro-
Soldier
'
is
an honourable term.
an abusive word. Yet a military
more justly angered if he were
soldier' than
if
told he
he were called a
4
was
officer
'
a
would be
thick-headed
thick-headed
fool.'
THE REBELLION OE THE MAHD1
Mohammed Ahmed
to
make amends he had
publicly called
he would
6
All that
rose.
done.
41
man
could do
he
had been
Now
a wretched Dongolawi.'
Henceforth
Sherif with his repentance no longer.
afflict
Beaching his house, he informed
— they
trouble — that the
his disciples
for
had not abandoned him in all his
Sheikh had finally cast him off, and that he would
The
now take his discarded allegiance elsewhere.
Sheikh
rival, the
He was
Koreishi, lived near
el
jealous of Sherif and envied
monious
his sancti-
He was therefore delighted to
from Mohammed Ahmed announcing
disciples.
receive a letter
and
his breach with his former superior
most devoted
and the
him
Mesalamia.
services.
priest of
Abba
He
offering his
returned a cordial invitation,
island
made
preparation for
all
the journey.
This
new developement seems
his
rival.
and noble.
have
startled
was no part of his policy
his followers, still less to add to those of
After all, the quality of mercy was high
the unforgiving Sherif.
to alienate
to
He would
It
at last graciously forgive the im-
pulsive but repentant disciple.
But
to this effect.
it
He
was now too
wrote him a
late.
letter
Mohammed
had committed no
a
crime, that he sought no forgiveness, and that
wretched Dongolawi would not offend by his presence
is
scene
the
Although
Sherif.
el
the renowned Sheikh
replied with grave dignity that he
'
•
'
v—
laid in the wilds of Africa,
and the actors
differ
from us
and custom, the story will recall the
them
enable
and
readers,
many
of
personal experiences
in colour, faith,
to svnrpathise
with Mohammed's
satisfaction in writing
THE RIVER WAR
42
this
reply.
After
this
he
indulgence
departed
to
Mesalamia.
But the fame of his doings spread
'Even
throughout the land.
in distant
the principal topic of conversation.'
been known to offend his superior
forgiveness.
Mohammed
did not
13
;
far
and wide
Darfur
it
was
Barely had a Fiki
never to refuse his
hesitate
to
declare
had done what he had done as a protest against
the decay of religious fervour and the torpor of the imes.
Since his conduct had actuallv caused his dismissal, it
appears that he was quite justified in making a virtue
that he
t
of necessity.
At any
rate
he was believed, and the
people groaning under oppression looked from
all
the
grow on the political
Eumour, loud-tongued,
His fame grew.
horizon.
carried it about the land that a great Befornier was
come to purify the faith and break the stony apathy
regions to the figure that began to
which paralysed the hearts of Islam.
Whisperings
added that a man was found who should break from
off the necks of the tribes the hateful yoke of Egypt.
Mohammed now
deliberately entered
upon the path of
ambition.
Throughout Nubia the Shukri belief prevails: some
day, in a time of shame and trouble, a second great
Prophet
will arise
— a Mahdi who
shall lead the faithful
The people of
the Soudan always look inquiringly to any ascetic
who rises to fame, and the question is often repeated,
nearer
God and
sustain the religion.
'Art thou he that should come, or do we look for
another?'
Of
this
13
powerful element of disturbance
Slatin,
Fire and Sword.
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
Mohammed Ahmed
resolved
avail
to
43
He
himself.
requested and obtained the permission of the Sheikh
Koreishi to return to Abba, where he was well known,
and with which island
and
so
came back
Thither
many
in
village his
name was
connected,
triumph to the scene of his disgrace.
He
pilgrims began to resort.
received
valuable presents, which he distributed to the poor,
acclaimed him as
'
Zahed
He journeyed
sures.
'
—a renouncer of earthly
And
plea-
preaching through Kordofan, and
received the respect of the priesthood and the
of the people.
who
homage
while he spoke of the purification
of the religion, they thought that the burning words
might be applied to the freedom of the
He
soil.
supported his sermons by writings, which were widely
When
read.
a few months later the Sheikh Koreishi
died, the priest of
Abba proceeded
forthwith to erect
a tomb to his memory, directing and
controlling the
voluntary labours of the reverent Arabs
who
carried
the stones.
While
Mohammed was
thus occupied he received
the support of a man, less virtuous than but nearly
as
Abdullahi was one of four
famous as himself.
brothers,
sons
the
an
of
obscure
priest
but he
:
inherited no great *love of religion or devotion to
observances.
capacity.
He
He was
a
man
and
to rule
it
there
determination and
distinct ambitions,
to free the
Soudan of
He seems
his career.
would be a great
would be his lieutenant and
:
:
himself.
had a queer presentiment of
knew
two
set before himself
both of which he accomplished
foreigners,
of
This
to
have
much he
religious leader
his
its
successor.
and he
When
—
'
THE RIVER WAR
44
Zubair conquered Darfur, Abdullahi presented himself
him and hailed him
before
as
4
the expected Mahdi.'
Zubair,
however, protested with superfluous
that he
was no
saint,
energy
and the impulsive patriot was
As soon
compelled to accept his assurances.
as he
saw Mohammed Ahmed rising to fame and displaying
qualities of courage and energy, he hastened to throw
himself
No
perils
at his feet
and assure him of
his devotion.
part of Slatin Pasha's fascinating account of his
and sufferings
is
so entertaining as that in
which
Abdullahi, then become Khalifa of the whole Soudan,
describes his early struggles and adversity
4
Indeed
my
that time
and he had
him.
it
But
was a very troublesome iournev.
on
his back, so that I could not ride
made him carrv mv
of corn, over which I spread
and drove him along
O
wore the white cotton
.
Mv
clothes
At
entire property consisted of one donkey,
a gall
I
:
and
mv
my
rough cotton garment,
me.
in front of
dialect at once
;
At that time
my
marked me
and when
1
-
the rest of
shirt, like
stranger wherever I went
water-skin and bag
tribe.
out a-
a
I crossed the Xile
was frequently greeted with "What do you want?
Go back to vour own country. There is nothing to
I
steal here."
What
was a long stride
from the ownership of one saddle-galled donkey to the
a life of
ups and downs
undisputed rule of an empire.
!
It
The weary wayfarer
mav have dreamed of this, for ambition stirs imagination nearlv as much as imagination excites ambition.
But further, he could not expect or wish to
could he anticipate
as, in
see.
the complacency of a
Nor
man
THE KEBELLION OF THE MAHD1
who had done with
rise to the
he told the story of his
evil days,
submissive Slatin, that the dav would come
when he would
men
45
lead an
army of more than
fifty
thousand
and that the night would follow
when, almost alone, his empire shrunk again to the
to destruction,
saddle-galled donkey, he
would seek
Kordofan, while this same Slatin
before
the
•
him would
knelt so
humbly
trail.
Mohammed Ahmed received his new adherent kindly,
carried
stones
to build
For some months Abdullahi
tomb of
the
Gradually they got to
Koreishi.
me
But long before he entrusted
Abdullahi to
Guide."
4
who
in distant
lay the fierce pursuing squadrons on
but without enthusiasm.
4
home
his
'
Slatin,
4
1
knew
And though
14
the
know each
with his
that he
Sheikh
was
44
el
other.
secret,' said
the expected
the world might think that the
Messenger of God was sent to lead
'
men
to happiness
I
in heaven, Abdullahi attached to the phrase a signifi-
cance of his own, and
knew
that he should lead
him
to
power on earth. The two formed a strong combination.
The Mahdi for such Mohammed Ahmed had already
in secret announced himself brought the wild enthusiasm of religion, the glamour of a stainless life, and
But if
the influence of superstition into the movement.
he was the soul of the plot, Abdullahi was the brain.
—
He was
the
—
man
of the world, the practical politician,
the general.
There now commenced a great conspiracy against
the Egyptian Government.
contents and justified
14
Slatin,
It
by the
was
fostered
by the
dis-
miseries of the people of
Fire and Sword,
p. 131.
THE PJVER WAR
46
the Soudan.
and
The Mahdi began
to
collect
adherents
to extend his influence in all parts of the country.
He made
received
a second journey through Kordofan,
everywhere
promises
support
of
and
from
all
The most distant tribes sent assurances of
devotion and reverence, and, what was of more imThe secret could not
portance, of armed assistance.
be long confined to those who welcomed the movement.
classes.
As
the ramifications of the plot spread they were per-
ceived by the renowned Sheikh Sherif,
his chagrin
and thirsted
Egyptian Government.
for revenge.
who still nursed
He warned the
They, knowing his envy and
hatred of his former disciple, discounted his evidence
some time paid no attention to the gathering
But presently more trustworthy witof the storm.
nesses confirmed his statements, and Eaouf Pasha, then
and
for
Governor-General,
finding
himself confronted with
growing agitation, determined to
act.
sent a messenger to the Island of
Mohammed Ahmed to Khartoum
and explain his
intentions.
He
Abba,
accordingly
to
summon
to justify his behaviour
The news of
the despatch
of the messenger was swiftly carried to the Mahdi.
consulted with his trusty lieutenant.
risk everything,
a
He
The}' decided to
and without further delay
to defy the
remembered how easily an
organised army, even though it be in a bad condition,
can stamp out the beginnings of revolt among a population, the courage of their resolve must be applauded.
The messenger arrived. He was received witli
Government.
When
it
is
courtesy by Abdullahi, and forthwith conducted before
the
Mahdi.
He
delivered
his
message,
and urged
THE EEBELLION OF THE MAHDI
Mohammed Ahmed
47
comply with the orders of the
Governor-General. The Mahdi listened for some time
in silence, but with increasing emotion
and when the
to
:
messenger advised him, as he valued his own
journey to Khartoum,
6
overcame him.
if only to j ustify himself, his
What
!
his breast with his hand.
God and
Prophet
/ am
master of
By
4
the grace of
The
messenger withdrew.
and
this country,
never shall I go to Khartoum to justify myself.'
terrified
passion
he shouted, rising suddenly
'
and striking
his
safety, to
15
rebellion
The
of the
Mahdi had begun.
Both the
priest
and the Governor-General prepared
The Mahdi proclaimed a holy
for military enterprise.
war
against the foreigners, alike the enemies of
He
and the scourge of men.
He
roused the local
tribes.
parts of the Soudan, calling
collected his followers.
He
wrote
holy prophet
who
who
to those
fell,
all
to fight for
and God's
He promised the
16
the favour of God
lived,
lastly that the land should
and
cleared of the miserable
it
soil,
to
the expected Mahdi.'
honour of men
to those
letters
upon the people
a purified religion, the freedom of the
6
God
'
became the watchword
raves than a dollar tax.'
Turk.'
'
Better,'
of the revolt,
'
he
said,
be
and
thousands of
17
Nor was Eaouf Pasha idle. He sent two companies
infantry with one gun by steamer to Abba to arrest
of
the
who
fanatic
15
Slatin,
16
He announced
Fire and Sword,
should earn the
and Sword,
17
disturbed the public peace.
p. 135.
that all persons taking part in the religious
title of
'
Emir
Slatin,
p. 136.
Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity in the
>
What
Mahdi's Camp.
war
Fire
THE imvkk
48
followed
Each company was
peculiarly Egyptian.
is
commanded by a
whichever
w.vi;
To encourage their efforts,
captured the Mahdi was promised
captain.
oilicer
At sunset on an August evening in 1881
steamer arrived at Abba. The promise of the
promotion.
the
Governor-General had
emulation of
the
provoked the
officers.
strife,
not the
Both landed with
companies and proceeded by different routes
their
undei
the cover of darkness to the village where the Mahdi
Arriving simultaneously from opposite direc-
abode.
tions,
this
they tired into each other, and, in the midst of
mistaken combat, the Mahdi rushed
with his scanty
partially.
A
following
and
destroyed
upon them
them im-
few soldiers succeeded in reaching the
bank of the river. But the captain of the steamer
would run no risks, and those who could not swim out
to the vessel
were
With such
left to their fate.
tidings
the expedition returned to Khartoum.
Mohammed Ahmed had
been himself wounded in
the attack, but the faithful Abdullahi
injury, so that
bound up the
none might know that God's Prophet
had been pierced by carnal weapons. The effect of the
success was electrical.
The news spread throughout
the Soudan.
Men with sticks had slain men with rifles.
A priest had destroyed the soldiers of the Government.
Surely this was the Expected One.
ever,
profited
retreat
by
his
More troops would be
near to Khartoum.
regions
victory only to
without loss of prestige.
illusions.
more remote.
The Mahdi, how-
Prudence
accomplish
a
Abdullahi had no
sent.
They were
counselled
But before
this
new
flkdit
too
to
He<jira the
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
Mahdi appointed
his four Khalifas, in accordance with
prophecy and precedent.
the others
it is
49
The
first
was Abdullahi.
only necessary at this
moment
Ali-Wad-Helu, the chief of one of the local
Of
to notice
and
tribes,
among the first to rally to the standard of revolt.
Then the retreat began; but it was more like
triumphal progress.
a
Attended by a considerable follow-
and preceded by tales of the most wonderful
miracles and prodigies, the Mahdi retired to a
,
4
#
mountain
Kordofan
which he gave the name of
J ebel Masa, that being the mountain whence
the
expected Guide' is declared in the Koran sooner or
later to appear. He was now out of reach of Khartoum,
in
to
4
but within reach of Fashoda.
of that
even
The Egyptian Governor
town, Eashid Bey, a man of more enterprise and
less military
knowledge than
is
usual in his race,
determined to make an attempt to seize the rebel and
disperse his following.
Taking no precautions, he fell
on the 9th of December into an ambush, was attacked
unprepared, and was himself, with fourteen hundred
men, slaughtered by the ill-armed but valiant Arabs.
The whole
country
stirred.
The
Government,
thoroughly alarmed by the serious aspect the revolt
had assumed, organised a great expedition.
Four
thousand troops under Yusef, a Pasha of distinguished
reputation, were sent against the rebels.
Mahdi and
Meanwhile the
his followers suffered the extremes of want.
Their cause was as yet too perilous for the rich to join.
Only the poor flocked
Mohammed
to the holy standard.
All that
possessed he gave away, keeping nothing
for himself, excepting only a horse to lead his followers
VOL.
I.
E
WAR
THE RIVER
50
Nevertheless the rebels
Abdullahi walked.
in battle.
were half-famished, and armed with scarcely any more
deadly weapons than sticks and stones. The army of
Government approached
the
selves to post sentries
a slender thorn fence,
And
leaders
Their contempt for the
anticipated an easy victory.
enemy was supreme.
Their
slowly.
They did not even trouble themby night, but slept calmly inside
unwatched save by their tireless
came to pass that in the half-light of
the early morning of the 7th of June the Mahdi, his
18
army, rushed
ragged Khalifas and his almost naked
upon them, and slew them to a man.
The victory was decisive. Southern Kordofan was
Stores of arms and
at the feet of the priest of Abba.
foes.
so
it
'
1
ammunition
of every
had
fallen
into
hastened to
class
hands.
his
join
his
Thousands
standard.
No
one doubted that he was the divine messenger sent
The whole of the
Arab tribes all over the Soudan rose at once. The
revolt broke out simultaneously in Sennar and Darfur,
and spread to provinces still more remote. The smaller
to free
them from
their oppressors.
Egyptian posts, the tax-gatherers and local administrators,
were massacred
in every district.
Only the larger
garrisons maintained themselves in the principal towns.
Thev were
at
t/
were
All
once blockaded.
interrupted.
All
legal
communications
authority was
defied.
Only the Mahdi was obeyed.
It is
now
necessary to look for a
The misgovern ment which
the
rebellion of the
18
Slatin,
in the
Mahdi,
in
moment
to Egypt.
Soudan had caused
Egypt produced the
Fire and Sivord in the Soudan
p. 145.
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
revolt of Arabi Pasha.
As
the people of the Soudan
longed to be rid of the foreign oppressors
'
Turks
'
—
— the
were eager
so those of the Delta
from the foreign regulators and the
selves
influence.
51
so-called
to free
them-
real Turkish
While men who lived by the sources of the
Nile proclaimed that tribes did not exist for officials to
harry, others
who
nations were not
aliens.
priest
;
dwelt at
made
protested that
be exploited by creditors or
The ignorant south found their leader in a
the more educated north looked to a soldier.
Mohammed Ahmed
broke the Egyptian yoke
;
Arabi
expression to the hatred of the Egyptians for the
;*ave
Turks.
the
to
mouth
its
But although the hardy Arabs might
effete
Egyptians, the
scatter
Egyptians were not
effete
likely to disturb the solid battalions of Europe.
much
hesitation
and many attempts
Liberal Administration of Mr.
at
compromise, the
Gladstone sent a
forts of
city to anarchy.
The bombardment of the
followed by the invasion of a powerful army.
thousand men were landed in Egypt.
was conducted with
fleet
Alexandria to silence and the
which reduced the
five
After
celerity
and
skill.
armies were slaughtered or captured.
was
Twenty-
fleet
The campaign
The Egyptian
Their patriotic,
but commonplace leader was sentenced to death and
condemned
to exile,
and Great Britain assumed the
direction of Egyptian affairs.
The
British soon restored
law and order
in Egypt,
and the question of the revolt in the Soudan came
before
the English
withstanding
the
advisers
of
poverty and
the
Khedive.
military
Not-
misfortunes
which depressed the people of the Delta, the
desire to
E 2
THE RIVER WAR
52
hold
their
British
southern
was
provinces
Government, which
at that time
evident.
The
was determined
to pursue a policy of non-interference in the Soudan,
<*ave
tacit consent,
a
and another great expedition was
prepared to suppress the False Prophet, as the English
and Egyptians deemed him ' the expected Mahdi,' a>
—
the people of the
Soudan
believed.
A retired officer of the
European
oflicers
Khartoum
Indian
Stall*
Corps and a few
of various nationalities were sent to
to organise the
new
field force.
Meanwhile
by storm,
laid siege to
the Mahdi, having failed to take
El Obeid, the chief town of Kordofan.
summer
During the
of 1883 the Egyptian troops gradually concen-
Khartoum until a considerable army was
formed. It was perhaps the worst army that has ever
19
The officers and men who had been
marched to Avar.
trated
at
defeated fighting for their
own
liberties at Tel-el- Kebir
were sent to be destroyed, fighting to take away the
They had no spirit,
hardly any training, and in a force of
liberties of others in the
no
discipline,
over eleven thousand
Soudan.
men
there were scarcelv a dozen
The two who were the most notable
of these few
General Hicks who commanded, and
Colonel Farquhar the Chief of the Staff must be
capable
officers.
—
—
remarked.
El Obeid had fallen before the
left
Khartoum.
Austrian
19
One
officer
extract
But the
in
the
fact
that
Egyptian
from General Hicks's
expedition
ill-fated
Bev,
Slatin
service,
letters will suffice.
was
Krupp battery deserted on the way
still
Writing on the
1883
the
an
here, although in chains
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
maintaining himself in Darfur might provide
53
it
with
On the 9th of September Hicks and his army 20
left Omdurman and inarched to Duem.
Although the
actual command of the expedition was vested in the
object.
English
officer,
Ala-ed-Din Pasha, the Governor-General
who had succeeded Eaouf
all
the
officers
were agreed
onward towards
in a south-westerly direction
its
in
through Shat and Eahad.
Here the condition of the force was
demoralised that a
to the Mahdi's
an English
On
German
servant
He was
camp.
taking the
The miserable host
destruction, marching
darkest views of their chances.
toiled slowly
exercised an un-
Differences of opinion were frequent,
certain authority.
though
Pasha,
21
so
obviously
actually deserted
paraded in triumph as
officer.
Government troops the
Mahdi had marched out of El Obeid and established
himself in the open country, where he made his
followers live under military conditions and continually
the approach
practised
them
of the
in warlike evolutions.
More than
forty
men collected round his standard, and the
Arabs were now armed with several thousand rifles and
thousand
number of swords and
To these proportions had the little band of
spears.
The disparity
followers who fought at Abba grown
The
of the forces was apparent before the battle.
Mahdi thereupon wrote to Hicks, calling on him to
a few cannon, as well as a great
!
surrender
20
The
and
offering
terms.
His proposals were
was 7,000 infantry, 400 mounted
100 Circassians, 10 mountain guns, 4 Krupps,
actual strength of the force
Bashi-Bazooks, 500 cavalry,
6 Nordenfeldt machine guns.
21
Gustave Klootz, the servant
of
Baron Seckendorf.
THE RIVER WAR
54
treated with disdain, although the probable result of
an engagement was
clear.
Kahad only
expedition reached
Until the
cavalry patrols had watched
a
slow advance.
its
few
But
on the 1st of November the Mahdi left El Obeid and
inarched with his whole power to meet his adversary.
The
took place on the 3rd of November.
collision
through that day the Egyptians struggled slowly
men
ward, in great want of water, losing
from the
fire
On
for-
continually
of the Soudanese riflemen, and
several guns behind them.
All
leaving
the next morning thev
were confronted by the main body of the Arab army,
and
their attempts to
with heavy
loss.
The
advance further were defeated
force began to break up.
another day was consumed before
destroyed.
death
hardly as
;
officers
Scarcely five hundred
many
sword
his fate
body of
was completely
Egyptians escaped
The European
the end, and the General met
of the
perished fighting to
it
Yet
Arabs
in hand, at the
fell.
head of the
his troops, his personal valour
last
formed
and amazing
physical strength exciting the admiration even of the
fearless
his
enemy, so that in chivalrous respect they buried
body with barbaric honours.
Mohammed Ahmed
celebrated his victory with a salute of one hundred
guns; and well he might, for the Soudan was now
and
his boast that,
by God's grace and the favour of
the Prophet, he was the master of
made good by
Xo
his,
all
the land had been
force of arms.
further
attempt was
made
to
subdue
the
The people of the Soudan had won their
freedom by their valour and bv the skill and courage of
country.
THE REBELLION OF THE MAHDI
their saintly leader.
It
55
only remained to evacuate the
towns and withdraw the garrisons
safely.
But what
looked like the winding-up of one story was really the
beginning of another, much longer, just as bloody,
commencing
in
shame and
triumph and,
let
us hope, in peace.
disaster,
but ending in
•
_
moment to take a more general view
Mahdi's movement than the narrative has allowed.
I desire for a
of the
The original causes were
as was the misery of the
social
and
racial.
But, great
people, their spirit
was low,
and they would not have taken up arms merely on
Then came the Mahdi. He gave
enthusiasm they lacked. The war broke
material grounds.
the tribes the
out.
It is
Ahmed
all
customary to lay to the charge of Mohammed
the blood that
was
spilled.
To my mind
it
may divide the responsibility with the
unjust rulers who oppressed the land, with the incapable commanders who muddled away the lives of their
men, with the vacillating Ministers who aggravated
seems that he
the misfortunes.
account,
it
But, whatever
is
set to the
should not be forgotten that he put
Mahdi's
life
and
soul into the hearts of his countrymen, and freed his
native land of foreigners.
The poor miserable
natives,
eating only a handful of grain, toiling half-naked and
without hope, found a new,
added to
life.
Within
their
if terrible
magnificence
humble breasts the spirit of
of patriotism and religion.
Mahdi roused the fires
Life became filled with thrilling, exhilarating terrors
They existed in a new and wonderful world of imaginathe
tion.
done
;
While they lived there were great things to be
and when they died, whether it were slaying the
;
WAR
THE RIVER
56
Egyptians or charging the British squares, a Paradise
which they
materialist
may
deplore the loss of
life,
the interruption
of trade, and the destruction of property
philosopher,
Christians
whom
There
eye.
are
many
who reverence the faith of Islam and yet regard
Mahdi merely
force
commonplace
as a
of circumstances
In a certain sense, this
how
men's souls as well as
realises that
tumult with impassive
the
but the true
;
stomachs are capable of developement, will view
their
the
who
The
them.
could understand awaited
a genuine
may be
may be
religious impostor
elevated
true.
to notoriety.
But
I
know
not
distinguished from a spurious
Prophet, except by the measure of his success.
The
triumphs of the Mahdi were in his lifetime far greater
Mohammedan faith
between orthodox Moham-
than those of the founder of the
and the chief difference
medanism and Mahdism was that the original impulse
was opposed only by decaying systems of government
and society and the recent movement came in contact
with a mighty civilisation and the machinery of science.
Eecognising
this, I
and I believe that
come
do not share the popular opinion,
if
in future years j>rosperity should
to the peoples of the
and happiness follow in
historian
new
who
its
Upper
train,
Nile,
and learning
then the
first
Arab
shall investigate the early annals of that
nation, will not forget, foremost
of his race, to write the
name
of
among
the heroes
Mohammed Ahmed.
57
*
III
CHAPTEE
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
—
—
—
—
Natural decay The military spirit The Arab inspiration The policy
British authority Gordon— Zubair Pasha Baring's
of evacuation
view The beginning: of the mission The Tanjore memorandum
Khartoum The situation Gordon and Zubair
man
spot The case for Zubair The decision of the Government British
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Government
El Teb—Tamai
responsibility
The Eastern Soudan— Baker's Teb '—The action of
A flying column Blockade of Khartoum The defence of the city
The Journals at Khartoum
Gordon and Slatin Slatin's appeal
Its
reception The solitary man Within besieged Khartoum
Gordon's troubles His consolation The maintenance of discipline,
and of hope Public Opinion In Parliament Mr. Gladstone The
Gordon Belief Expedition The Biver Column The Desert Column
Abu Klea—Abu Kru— Too late '—Fall of Khartoum— The death of
Gordon His place in history The excuse for the Government
6
—
'
'
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
'
—
—
Betreat of the expedition
— Continental opinion—Daylight at
last.
All great movements, every vigorous impulse that a
community may feel, become perverted and distorted
as time passes,
fatal to the
and the atmosphere of the earth seems
noble aspirations of
its
peoples.
A
wide
humanitarian sympathy in a nation easily degenerates
into
A
hysteria.
Liberty
brutality.
military
leads
to
tends
spirit
licence,
towards
restraint
to
The pride of race is distended to blustering
arrogance.
The fear of God produces bigotry and
tyranny.
There
superstition.
mournful
rule,
*
appears
and the best
Map,
'
The Soudan,'
no
exception
efforts
to face
to
the
of men, however
page 462.
;
THE RIVER
58
WAR
glorious their early results, have dismal endings
;
like
which shoot and bud and put forth beautiful
flowers, and then grow rank and coarse and are withered
plants
by the
winter.
It is
when we
only
decay gives birth to fresh
reflect
that the
and that new enthusiasms
life,
spring up to take the places of those that die, even as
the acorn
is
nourished bv the dead leaves of the oak or
«
the phoenix rose from the ashes of the pyre, that the
hope strengthens, that the
rise
and
fall
movements are only the changing
their
ever-growing tree of
men and
of
of the
foliage
while underneath a greater
life,
evolution goes on continually.
The movement which Mohammed Ahmed created
common
did not escape the
Nor was
clot
and
religious
revolt
of a
military
empire.
sion
or destruction
and
traders,
The reason
increasing
for
warm
long before the
it
a patriotic
dark
fate of
the
racial
element
for its existence
disorders
communism
the
congealed into the
With
began
necessity
for
sanctity
a
leader
passed
grew weaker.
subside.
dwindled
the wealth
There
the
Mahdi had
soldiers,
With the
agitation
pre-supposes wealth, and
divine mission of the
his
to
was removed.
social
expul-
the
officials,
Soudan was greatly diminished.
mained only the fanatical fury which the
of
enterprise.
generous blood of
foreign
of the
human
re-
belief in the
excited.
And
away, the
But meanwhile
as th<
belief
a
in
new
was making itself felt on the character of the
revolt.
The triumph no less than the plunder which
had rewarded the Mahdi' s victories had called into
force
existence a military
spirit
distinct
from the warlike
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
59
—
;
WAR
THE RIVER
60
;
spirit of the professional
passions of the tribesmen— the
soldier.
The sie^e of
carried on while this
Khartoum was
original
of
the
place
the
taking
was
new influence
neutral
when
a
period
a
was
There
forces of revolt.
languished.
power
Mahdist
the
and
obtained
was
point
Soudan
Eastern
the
of
invasion
the
But
by the
British
and the necessary advance of the
the
revived
of
1884
winter
in
the
columns
relieving
The tribes who had made a great
patriotic element.
saw
domination
in
foreign
from
themselves
free
effort to
and
LordWolselej
Graham
Gerald
of
Sir
operations
the
troops in the spring
yoke.
under
the
again
bring
them
to
attempt
an
The
impulse which was given to the Mahdi's cause was
sufficient to raise a fierce opposition to the invading
relief
the
of
despatch
the
in
delay
The
forces.
expedition had sealed the fate of Khartoum, and the
the
<>f
the
supremacy
established
town
the
of
fall
military spirit on which the Dervish Empire was after-
wards founded.
All the warlike operations of
are characterised
reservation
Yusef,
who
it
by
Mohammedan
fanaticism, but with this general
may be said
— that the Arabs who destn >yed
who
assaulted El Obeid,
annihilated Hicks,
fought in the fflorv of religious zeal
who opposed Graham,
that
conquered by Kitchener fought
charged
warriors at
1
at
;
that the
Shekan
1
the
in
Arabs who were
in the pride of
patriots at
of Hicks Pasha's disaster.
an army.
Abu
Omdurman.
The scene
Arabs
Earle, and Stewart, fought
defence of the soil; and
Fanatics
peoples
Editor.
Klea
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
61
#
In
order to describe
conveniently the
changing
character of the revolt, I have anticipated the story
and must revert to a period when the social and racial
were already weakening and the military
influences
was not yet grown strong. If the defeat of
Yusef Pasha decided the whole people of the Soudan
to rise in arms and strike for their liberties, the defeat
spirit
of Hicks satisfied the British Government that those
The powerful influence of
prompted the Khedive's Ministers
were won.
liberties
desire to rule
make
further efforts to preserve their
still
possessions.
left
to
to
country's
herself,
other
would have been made.
But the
Government had finally abandoned its policy of
desperate
British
Had Egypt been
the
2
efforts
non-interference with Egyptian action in the Soudan.
They 'advised'
its
abandonment.
The
protests
of
Cherif Pasha provoked Lord Granville to explain the
meaning of the word advice.' The Khedive bowed to
'
superior authority.
It
was simple
resigned.
was firmly adopted.
of evacuation
the Ministers,
The Minister
'
collect the garrisons
to decide
c
it.
us,'
said
and come away.'
on the course
but almost impossible to follow
Let
The policy
to be pursued,
Several of the
Egyptian garrisons, as in Darfur and El Obeid, had
The others were either besieged, like
Sennar, Tokar, and Sinkat, or they were cut off from
already fallen.
the north, as in the case of the Equatorial Province,
2
The
idea of abandoning
Soudan] was intensely unpopular.
Had the Egyptian Ministry been left to themselves, there is no
saying what new disasters their reluctance to look facts in the face might
not have brought upon their country.'
Sir A. Milner, England in Egypt,
.
.
6
it
[the
.
—
chapter
v.
'
WAR
THE RIVER
62
rebellion.
of
area
the
by
The
capital of the
Soudan
its
as
and
Egyptian
unmolested,
yet
as
however,
was,
the
provincial
of
aggregate
the
exceeded
population
towns the
first
task of the Egyptian
Goverment was
obvious.
Mr. Gladstone's Administration had repressed the
Through
revolt of Arabi Pasha.
their policy the British
were in armed occupation of Egypt. British officers
were reorganising the army. A British official super-
A
vised the finances.
British plenipotentiary
the re-established Tewfik.
A British
The
before the ruins of Alexandria.
at
which the Jingo might
rejoice, for
fleet
advised
lay attentive
spectacle
it
'
was one
was evident
that
Great Britain could annex the country in name as well
But Imperialism was not the object of the
Radical Cabinet. Their aim was philanthropic and
disinterested.
As they were now determined that the
Egyptians should evacuate the Soudan, so they had
as in fact.
always been resolved that the British should evacuate
Egypt.
Throughout
this
chapter
will
it
be seen that the
desire to get out of the country at once
of the British policy.
directed to
act,
the keynote
whether of war or
Every despatch
breaking the connection between the two
administration,
is
Every
is
is
intended to be
final.
up the severed strings. But
responsibilities which had been lightly assumed clung
The ordinary practice of
like the shirt of Xessus.
civilised nations demanded that some attempt should be
made to justify interference by reorganisation. The
British Government watched therefore with anxious
countries and winding
'
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
solicitude the efforts of
Egypt
and bring the garrisons
63
to evacuate the
safely
home.
Soudan
They
utterly
declined to assist with military force, hut they were
generous with their advice.
Everybody
at that time
distrusted the capacities of the Egyptians.
The evacua-
was thought, might be accomplished if it were
entrusted to stronger and more honest men than were
bred by the banks of the Nile. The Ministers looked
tion,
it
wondering how thev could assist the
Egyptian Government without risk or expense to them
about
them,
selves,
and in an
someone
—
is
it
evil
hour for
said,
their
Mr. Stead
fame and fortunes
—whispered
the
word
Forthwith they proceeded to telegraph to
Would General Charles Gordon be of any use
'Gordon.'
Cairo
:
'
you or to the Egyptian Government and
what capacity?' The Egyptian Government
to
:
if
so in
replied
through Sir Evelyn Baring that as the movement in the
Soudan was partly religious they were very much averse
4
to the appointment of a Christian in high
The eyes of
were turned
one
all
those
who
might perhaps restore the
who might
possessed local knowledge
to a very different individual.
man who might stem
command.
There was
the tide of Mahdism,
who
dominion of Egypt,
falling
at least save the garrisons of the Soudan.
In their necessity and distress the Khedivial advisers and
the British plenipotentiary looked to the
liberty they
confiscated,
man whose
had curtailed, whose property they had
and whose son they had executed Zubair
—
I
Pasha.
It
was a desperate remedy.
This was the
Egypt hankered.
man
whom
Government of
The idea was supported by all who
for
the
THE RIVER
64
WAR
A
week
conditions.
local
the
with
were acquainted
Gordon's
General
declined
had
Baring
after Sir Evelyn
faults,
Zubair's
be
may
Whatever
services he wrote
and
resoluenergy
great
of
man
a
be
to
he is said
that
his
considers
Government
Egyptian
The
tion.
Baker
Pasha
is
useful.
very
be
services may
4
:
.
.
.
services.'
Pasha's
Zubair
of
himself
avail
anxious to
3
had the Egyptian Government been a
the
Soudan
to
sent
been
have
would
Zubair
free agent,
perhaps
and
money,
arms,
by
assisted
and
its Sultan,
It is certain that,
men,
to
make head
against
Mahdi.
the
It
is
probable that at this particular period the Mahdi would
nearly
was
fame
whose
man
a
before
collapsed
have
much
been
have
would
resources
whose
and
equal to,
would
Ministry
British
the
But
own.
his
greater, than
They
man.
such
a
with
dealings
no
countenance
scouted the idea of Zubair, and
their
obligation
being
rejected,
to
suggest
Gordon
by
so doing increased
an alternative.
remained.
It
is
Zubair
scarcely
which
that
than
contrast
greater
a
conceive
possible to
the
from
leap
was
a
It
presented.
men
two
these
Equator to the North Pole.
When difficulties and dangers perplex
all
minds,
it
men
many
that
history
in
happened
has often
conclusion.
same
the
at
arrive
thought
of
lines
different
may
fall
of public
life
The choice
circle
own
affairs.
on some individual outside the
and engaged contentedly on his
he received the message of the Senate.
conferring with the King of the Belgians
3
Sir
when
Gordon was
when every-
Cincinnatus was ploughing his
Evelyn Baring,
letter of
December
9,
fields
1883.
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
body decided that he must go
to the
65
Soudan and bring
the garrisons away.
No
complete record has yet been published of the
telegrams which passed between the Government and
The Blue Books preserve
a disingenuous discretion. But it is known that from
the very first Sir Evelyn Baring was bitterly opposed to
their agent at this juncture.
General Gordon's appointment.
No personal
friendship
existed between them, and the Administrator dreaded
the return to the feverish complications of Egyptian
of the
politics
with
unrest,
man who had
improvisation,
always been identified
and
The
disturbance.
him to withEvelyn Wood, the Foreign
pressure was, however, too strong for
stand.
Nubar Pasha,
Sir
Office, the British public,
appointment.
everyone clamoured for the
Had Baring
refused to give way,
probable that he would have been overruled.
it
is
At
length he yielded, and, having once withdrawn his op-
he gave the General his heartiest support. As
soon as Baring's consent had been obtained, the Governposition,
ment turned with
On
delight to Gordon.
the 17th of January Lord Wolseley requested
On
the 18th he
him
met the Cabinet.
come
That same night he started on the long journey from
consewhich
from
but
return,
to
never
which he was
countryhis
convulse
would
which
arise
quences would
to
to England.
men and
excite the interest of the civilised world.
his mission in high spirits, sus-
Gordon embarked on
often
too
which
personality
in
tained by that belief
w
It
women.
beautiful
and
misleads err eat men
him
upon
conferred
ever
he said, the greatest honour
VOL.
I.
F
THE RIVER
66
WAR
The nation was delighted. The
Ministers were intensely relieved. The most unbounded
His interview
confidence was reposed in the envoy.
His complete
with the Khedive was very satisfactory.'
authority was proclaimed to all the notables and
4
He was assured of the support
natives of the Soudan.
5
The London Foreign
of the Egyptian Government.
Office, having with becoming modesty admitted that
6
accorded
they had not sufficient local knowledge,'
7
him 'widest discretionary power.'
One hundred
Everything smiled.
'
'
thousand pounds was placed to his credit, and he was
informed that further sums would be supplied when
this
was exhausted.
He was
assured that no
effort
would be wanting on the part of the Cairene authorities,
whether English or Egyptian, to afford him all the
support and co-operation in their power.
sort of difference,' wrote Sir
8
'
There
is
no
Evelyn Baring, 'between
General Gordon's views and those entertained by Nubar
Pasha and
myself.'
9
Under these propitious auguries
the dismal and disastrous enterprise began.
His task, though
difficult
and,
as
in mind,'
to
wrote Sir Evelyn Baring,
be pursued
object
...
the Khedive,
4
5
G
7
8
9
is
ultimately
You
will bear
that the
main end
proved, impossible, was clearly defined.
6
it
'
the evacuation of the Soudan.'
'
The
of your mission to the Soudan,' declared
'
is
to carry into execution the evacuation
Proclamation of the Khedive, January 26, 1884.
Sir E. Baring to Major-General Gordon, January 25, 1884
Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, January 22, 1884.
Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville, February 1, 1884.
Sir E. Baring to Major-General Gordon, January 25, 1884.
Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville, February 1, 1884.
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
67
of those territories and to withdraw our troops, civil
and such of the inhabitants ...
officials,
leave for
Egypt
.
.
and
.
mav wish to
as
after the evacuation to take
the necessary steps for establishing an organised Govern-
ment
in the different provinces.'
He drew up
under any misconception.
when on board
same
the
expression,
4
memorandum
a
the Tanjore in which he fully acquiesced
in the evacuation of the Soudan.
breathes
Nor was he himself
In a sentence which
Mr. Gladstone's famous
as
spirit
10
a people rightly struggling to be
free,'
he
would be an iniquity to
conquer these peoples and then hand them back to the
Egyptians without guarantees of future good g
wrote
6
:
ment.'
1
must say that
it
Finally, he unhesitatingly asserted
'
:
No
one
who
has ever lived in the Soudan can escape the reflection
What
a
useless
possession
is
this
land
!
"
'
And
who accompanied him and endorsed
And what a huge enmemorandum, added
Colonel Stewart,
6
the
:
cumbrance to Egypt
!
'
Thus
far there
was complete
agreement between the British envoys and the Eadical
Cabinet.
beyond the scope of these pages to describe his
long ride across the desert from Korosko to Abu
It is
Hamed,
his interview with the notables at Berber, or his
proclamation of the abandonment of the Soudan, which
have been an important cause of his
Khartoum.
at
arrived
he
February
of
ruin.
22nd
the
On
He was received with rej oicing by the whole population
some affirm
10
It is
to
perhaps
interesting to notice that this
same memorandum was
copied out for the General by the Editor of this book, then a subaltern
officer
en route for Egypt.
F 2
THE RIVER
68
their just Governor-General
They recognised again
and
Those who had been about
their present deliverer.
fly for
WAR
They believed
the north took fresh heart.
to
that
behind the figure of the envoy stood the resources of an
The Mahdi and the gathering Dervishes were
Confusion and hesitancy disperplexed and alarmed.
turbed their councils and delayed their movements.
Gordon had come. The armies would follow. Both
Empire.
friends
and
foes
The great man was
were deceived.
Khartoum, but there he would remain
—
at
alone.
Whatever confidence the General had felt in the
power of his personal influence had been dispelled on
the journey to Khartoum.
He had no more illusions.
His experienced eye reviewed the whole situation.
saw himself confronted with a tremendous
ment.
The people of the Soudan had
foreigners.
the revolt were the
Arab
Samuel Baker, had
Lastlv, the
fanatical character.
Gordon was a
slave dealers, furious at the
Islam marched against the
His
commander was
accursed.
and particularly
hostile to
bined forces of race,
the
one, not even
it
than
whole movement had assumed a
Christian.
He bowed
No
tried harder to suppress
own
soldiers
the spell they were to try to destroy.
him.
He was
Foremost among the leaders of
attempted suppression of their trade.
Gordon.
move-
risen against
His only troops were Soudanese.
himself a foreigner.
Sir
racial
He
were under
To them
Everv influence was
him
class,
infidel.
personally.
their
hostile,
The com-
and religion were against
before their irresistible strength.
On
very day of his arrival at Khartoum, while the
citizens
were cheering
his
name
in the streets
and the
*
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
were
batteries
firing joyful
69
salutes, while the people
of England thought his mission already accomplished
and the Government congratulated themselves on the
wisdom of
their
down and
telegraphed a formal request to Cairo for
action, General
The Christian hero asked
abandoned ruffian.'
Zubair Pasha.
of the
6
Gordon
4
'
The whole story of
for the help
with Zubair
administration of the Soudan and with his
'
had
Thus,' he
said,
from London on
his
Evelyn Baring,
dangerous
4
does
complete
God make gaps
He had
in the ranks of His enemies.'
Sir
ex-
not by Gordon's orders, at least during his
if
approval.
is
Zubair's son, Suliman, had been
tremely characteristic.
executed,
his relations
sat himself
hardly started
new mission, when he telegraphed to
telling him that Zubair was a most
man and requesting that he might be
deported to Cyprus.
This was, of course, quite beyond
the powers or intention
of the British Agent.
The
General arrived in Cairo like a whirlwind close behind
his telegram,
was still
went to
and was very angry
in Egypt.
Before starting up the river he
see Cherif Pasha.
room he met
Zubair.
the very
He
In the ex-Minister's ante-
man he had
greeted
him with
ong talk about the Soudan,
after
Agency and informed
Zubair must accompany him
to the
Baring was amazed.
the plan.
He
to hear that Zubair
He
determined to avoid
They had a
which Gordon hurried
effusion.
Sir
Evelyn Baring that
to
Khartoum
at
once.
did not himself disapprove of
had, in fact, already
recommended
it.
But he thought the change in Gordon's attitude too
sudden to be relied on. To-morrow he might change
I
THE KIVER WAR
70
a<»ain.
He
sudden.
in the
'
with
his
more
usual
seriously
frankness
change of mind had been very
that his
admitted
feeling
Gordon
matter.
the
of
the General to think
He begged
had been conscious, he said, of a
that Zubair
*
mystic
was necessary to save the situation
Soudan.
Gordon
soon as he
Cairo
left
made
his formal
the assistance of Zubair
in the old slave
As
considering the matter.
still
it
demand from Khartoum
was evident that
for
his belief
dealers usefulness was a sound con-
and not a mere passing caprice. Besides, he
had now become 'the man on the spot,' and as such
Sir Evelyn Baring
his words carried double force.
viction
determined to support the recommendation with his
Never was so good a case made out
The Envoy
for the appointment of so bad a man.
Colonel Stewart, his
Extraordinary asked for him
whole influence.
;
concurred
colleague,
urged the request
;
the
;
Soudan.
the
who had
all
it is
the slightest acquaintance with
Nothing could exceed the vigour with
Gordon
impossible to
unless the
strongly
these were ranged every
On
which the demand was made.
General
Agent
Egyptian Government were
the
unanimous; and behind
single person
British
the 1st of
March
you plainly,
get Cairo employes out of Khartoum
'I
telegraphed:
Government helps
....
They
refuse Zubair
And
again on the 8th
but
in the
it
tell
way
I told you.
was the only chance.'
you do not send Zubair,
getting
awav;
have
no
chance
of
tne
garrisons
vou
O
O
O
J
:
'
If
*
*
I believe,' said Sir
telegrams,
'
Evelyn Baring in support of these
that General
Gordon
i^
quite right
when
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
he says that Zubair Pasha
Nubar
is
is
71
the only possible man.
strongly in favour of him.
Dr. Bohndorf, the
African traveller, fully confirms what General Gordon
says of the influence of Zubair.'
The Pasha was
vile,
but indispensable.
Her Majesty's Government refused absolutely to have
anything to do with Zubair. They declined to allow the
Egyptian Government to employ him. They would not
entertain the proposal.
They scarcely consented to
discuss
it.
decision,
was
all
Parliament and the nation approved their
and
has never since been impugned.
it
It
no degree a party matter. The position which
men assumed was, that great States cannot stoop to
in
employ such
The
and
agents.
historians of the future
exercise
their
wits
in
may occupy their leisure
whether
deciding
Ministers and the people were right or
wrong
;
the
whether
they had a right to indulge their sensitiveness at so
terrible a cost
wise
;
whether they were
;
not,
more nice than
whether their dignity was more offended by what
was incurred or by what was avoided.
But, on what-
ever issue they meet, they will soon, revert to the old
question, whether the end justifies the means, whether
commit a smaller sin to avoid a greater
wrong. They are welcome to the problem, which has
teased and baffled all generations.
it is
right to
General Gordon has explained his views very clearly
and concisely
I
6
:
Had
Zubair Pasha been sent up when
asked for him, Berber would in
have
fallen,
Government
and
one
all
probability never
might have made a Soudan
in opposition to the Mahdi.
We
choose
THE RIVER WAR
72
coming up because of his antecedents in r<
slave trade; granted that we had reason, yet, as we
to refuse his
take no precautions as to the future of these lands with
respect to the slave trade, the above opposition seems
I will not send
absurd.
up A. because he
but I will leave the country to
the same.
But
'
if
B.,
who
do
will
this,
do exactly
will
11
the justice of the decision
consequences were obvious.
was doubtful,
its
Either the British Govern-
ment were concerned with the Soudan, or they were not.
If they were not, then they had no reason or right to
prohibit the appointment of Zubair.
If they were, they
were bound to see that the garrisons were rescued.
was
open
an
It
question whether Great Britain was
originally responsible for the safety of the garrisons.
General Gordon contended that
them
at all costs,
Others
we were bound
and he backed
to save
his belief with his
may hold that Governments have no
life.
right to lay,
or at any rate must be very judicious in the laying
burdens on the backs of their
that
they
may
indulge
towards foreigners.
own countrymen
of,
in order
a refined sense of chivalry
England had not misgoverned the
Soudan, had not raised the revolt, nor planted the
garrisons.
All that Egypt had a right to expect was
commiseration.
But the moment Zubair was prohibited,
was changed. The refusal to permit his
employment was tantamount to an admission that affairs
in the Soudan involved the honour of England as well
When the British people for
as the honour of Egypt.
adopted
this was not merely the act of the Government
the situation
—
11
Major-General Gordon, Journals at Khartoum.
—
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
73
a high moral attitude with regard to Zubair, they
bound themselves ipso facto to rescue the garrisons,
peaceably
if
possible,
forcibly if necessary.
what the Government refused
this,
among many other
to recognise;
This
and
is
for
things, they will deserve the
censures of posterity.
With
their refusal to allow Zubair to
go to the
Soudan began the long and miserable disagreement
between the Government and their envoy.
Puzzled
and disturbed at the reception accorded to his first
request,
Gordon
He
cast about for other expedients.
had already stated that Zubair was the only chance.'
But it is the duty of subordinates to suggest other
'
courses
when
those they
recommend
are rejected
;
and
with a whole-hearted enthusiasm and unreserved loyalty
the General threw himself into the affair and proposed
plan after plan with apparent hope.
do not purpose to chronicle all the pitiful details
of the breach yet some account is compelled by the
I
:
course of the narrative.
Gordon considered
that he
was personally pledged to effect the evacuation of
Khartoum by the garrison and civil servants. He had
appointed some of the inhabitants to positions of trust,
thus compromising them with the Mahdi.
Others had
undoubtedly been encouraged to delay their departure
by his arrival.
was involved
inflexible.
He
therefore considered that
in their safety.
honour
Henceforward he was
move him.
would induce him to
Neither rewards nor threats could
Nothing that men could
leave
his.
Khartoum
Government on
till its
offer
inhabitants were rescued.
their side
The
were equally stubborn, but
THE RIVER AVAR
74
was unattended by personal dan 6
their firmness
it
has seemed less admirable to the nation.
Nothing,
however sacred, should induce them to send troops to
Khartoum, or in any way involve themselves in the
middle of Africa.
The town might
possibilities
the garrison
;
But what
envoy
their
might be slaughtered;
fall
they were prepared to face
him, history
decide
be able to
not
will
as
regards
until
all
of this and the next generation are buried and forgotten.
To some men
The deadlock was complete.
the
Foreign Office might have suggested lines of retreat,
covered by the highest
official
an order to leave so perilous a post.
had sent was the one man of
give
or
who
take
all
But the man they
others
who was beyond
cared nothing for what they could
away.
on
So events dragged
more impracticable
as the best courses
he could devise
were successively vetoed by the Government, and
and disappointment increased.
his Journals has
He had asked
The
as his
editor of
enumerated them with indignant
for Zubair.
Zubair was refused.
had requested Turkish troops.
refused.
their
Gordon's proposals became more and
wretched course.
irritation
to
Others would have welcomed
preferment and reward.
their control,
and leading
praise,
He had
asked for
care.
He
Turkish troops were
Mohammedan
regiments
The Government regretted their inability
to comply.
He asked for a Firman from the Sultan to
strengthen his position.
It was
peremptorily refused.'
from India.
'
He proposed
to
go south
in his steamers to Equatoria.
The Government forbade him
to proceed
beyond Khar-
;
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
He
toum.
75
asked that two hundred British troops
They were
might be sent to Berber.
None
begged that a few might be sent to Assuan.
were
sent.
He
proposed to
visit
him
try to arrange matters with
he recognised a kindred
this case
At
Perhaps
personally.
The Government
spirit.
He makes no
last the quarrel is open.
delible disgrace of
abandonment
in
4
1 leave you,'
abandoning the
he says,
garrisons.'
effort
4
the in-
12
Such
4
is,
he declares, the climax of meanness.'
reiterates his determination to abide
son of Khartoum.
all
Mahdi himself and
very naturally forbade him.
to conceal his disgust.
He
the
He
refused.
6
13
with the garri-
1 will not leave these people after
they have gone through.'
contemptuously from
him
He
14
:
'
I
tosses his
would
commission
ask her
also
Government to accept the resignation of my
15
The Government trust that he will not
commission.'
Majesty's
£
resign,'
16
and
his offer remains in abeyance.
Finally, in
and vexation, thinking himself abandoned
and disavowed, he appeals to Sir Evelyn Baring personally
1 feel sure, whatever you may feel diplomati-
bitterness
6
:
— and that of
private
professing himself a gentleman—
cally,
I have
your support
in
last
12
hope he begs
Sir
Samuel Baker
every
man
17
as a
'
to appeal to
and
4
British
Major- General Gordon to Sir E. Baring (telegraphic), received at
Cairo April 16.
13
Ibid, despatched April 8.
Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring, Khartoum, July 30 received at Cairo October 15.
15
Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring (telegraphic), Khartoum,
14
;
March
9.
March
16
17
Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring (telegraphic), received at
Cairo April 16.
8
WAR
THE RIVER
76
and American millionaires
two hundred
to subscribe
'
thousand pounds to enable him to carry out the evacua-
and even in
tion without,
London
Cairo and
;
and
spite of, the
Governments
Samuel Baker writes a long
Sir
Times in passionate protest and entreaty.
letter to the
Such are the chief features in the wretched
Even
the Blue
Books
in their
still
more
business.
dry recital arouse in the
reader painful and indignant emotions.
other and
of
stirring events
But meanwhile
were passing outside
the world of paper and ink.
The
Gordon
arrival of
perplexed and alarmed
themselves feared
of armies.
seriously
Mohammed Ahmed and
lest the
his
the}'
General should be the herald
His Berber proclamation reassured them,
the
as
Khartoum had
Their following was discouraged, and
Khalifas.
and
at
weeks
passed
without
reinforcements
Mahdi and Abdullahi, with that courage
several great emergencies drew them to the
arriving, the
which
in
boldest courses, determined to put a brave face on the
matter and blockade Khartoum
assisted in this enterprise
by a
revival of the patriotic
impulse throughout the country and
stimulus to the
revolt.
To discover
next tragedy, after the defeat of Hicks,
leadership of the
the
consequent
cause
it
is
where the
is laid.
by oppression and
had joined the rebellion under the
The Hadendoa
misgovernment,
a
to the Eastern Soudan,
necessary to look
18
They were
itself.
tribe, infuriated
celebrated, and
perhaps immortal,
would appear to have been caused by
the robbery of Rashid Pasha and Ibrahim Bey.'
Major-General Gordon
to Sir E. Baring, Assuan. February 1, 1884.
1
'
As
for the
Hadendoa
revolt,
it
—
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
Osman
77
The Egyptian garrisons of Tokar
and Sinkat were beleaguered and hard pressed. Her
Majesty's Government disclaimed all responsibility.
Digna.
Yet, since these towns were not far from the
coast,
they did not prohibit an attempt on the part of the
Egyptian Government to rescue the besieged soldiers.
Accordingly an Egyptian force 3,500 strong marched
from Suakin in February 1884 to relieve Tokar, under
command
of General Baker, once the gallant colonel
of the 10th Hussars.
Hard by the wells of Teb they
the
were, on the 5th of February, attacked by about a
thousand Arabs.
6
On
the square being only threatened
force of the
down
enemy
.
.
.
the Egyptian
by a small
troops threw
arms and ran, carrying away the black
troops with them, and allowing themselves to be killed
their
without the slightest resistance.'
European
The
officers in
19
The
British
and
vain endeavoured to rally them.
Soudanese battalion fired impartially on
friend and foe.
The General, with that unshaken
courage and high military skill which had already on
single
Danube gained him a Continental reputation, col20
lected some fifteen hundred men,
mostly unarmed,'
the
6
and so returned to Suakin,
thousand
two hundred
Ninety-six officers and two
and
Krupp guns, machine guns,
of ammunition
fell
fifty
rifles,
men were
killed.
and a large supply
to the victorious Arabs.
Success
inflamed their ardour to the point of madness.
The
attack of the towns was pressed with redoubled vigour.
I
19
20
General Baker to Sir E. Baring, Feb. 6
Ibid.
(official
despatch), telegraphic.
THE RIVER WAR
78
garrison of Sinkat, eight hundred strong, sallied
The
out and
way
attempted to fight their
to
The
Sua kin.
destroyed.
were
Both
surrendered.
Tokar
garrison of
complete.
was
slaughter
The
done.
was
evil
The
it.
The
to
add
to
resolved
Government
British
Yet the
garrisons they had refused
mined to
In
avenge.
professions, and in
Gordon,
be
still
who
to rescue they
spite
deter-
philanthropic
advice
of the
further compromised
line of retreat,
their
that his position at
felt
21
of
spite
now
General
of
Khartoum would
by operations on
his only
a great military expedition, consistii -
sent
brigades,
was
infantry
two
and
of one cavalry
Suakin.
The
command was
entrusted
to
to
General
concentrated.
The
hurriedly
were
Troops
Graham.
and
stopped
were
from
India,
returning
Hussars,
10th
With
admigendarmerie.
the
of
horses
the
on
mounted
Within a montli
rable celerity the force took the field.
on
almost
the
enemy
engaged
they
Teb
at
defeat
of the
ery scene of the disaster.
On
Hadendoa and drove
Four weeks
ground.
they slew three thousand
in
disorder from
the
March
the 4th of
the rest
later
a
second action was fought at Tamai. Again the success
slaughter
the
again
complete
was
troops
British
the
of
;
was
victory
neither
But
enormous.
was
Arabs
of the
El Teb cost 24 officers and 168 men;
bloodless.
Tamai, 13 officers and 208 men. The effect of these
operations was the dispersal of
Osman
Digna's gather-
"
I think if
General
Gordon
from
following
the
received
have
I
Tokar has fallen Her Majesty's Government had better be quiet, as I see
Sir E.
no advantage to be now gained by any action on their part."
Baring to Earl Granville, Cairo, February 23.
21
'
:
'
—
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
That astute man, not
ing.
good
79
for the first time,
made
a
retreat.
Ten thousand men had thus been killed in the space
of three months in the Eastern Soudan.
By the
discipline of their armies the Government was triumThe tribes of the Eed Sea shore cowered
phant.
But as they fought without reason, so
before them.
they conquered without
profit.
Gordon had been finally refused the
assistance of Zubair Pasha, it was evident that the
rescue of the garrisons was impossible.
The General
had been sent as the last hope. Eightly or wrongly
His mission was
his recommendations were ignored.
an admitted failure. After that the only question was
how to bring him away as quickly as possible. It
was certain that he would not come willingly. Force
Yet it was difficult to know how
was necessary.
As soon
to
apply
as
After
it.
the
in
victories
the
Eastern
Soudan the opportunity presented itself. The road
was open. The local tribes were crushed. Berber
had not then fallen. The Mahdi was himself still
on the road from El Obeid to Khartoum. Sir Evelyn
Baring saw the chance.
the
formidable
politics
that
his influence
column
to
and
He
did not then
imposing
position
he has since attained.
in
occupy
Egyptian
But with
all
he urged the despatch of a small flying
Khartoum.
His
thousand or twelve hundred
idea
men were
camels and ride thither via Berber.
or whose camels broke
chance by the roadside.
was
One
mount on
simple.
to
Those who
down would have
fell ill
to take their
Such was the plan
;
and both
gO
THE RIVER
WAR
Lord Wolseley and
Sir
Evelyn
Wood
admitted
possi
its
allowed
be
to
to
begged
Stewart
Sir Herbert
bilitv.
of
hundred
couple
a
that
true
was
make the attempt. It
men would probably
willingly paid later on.
down
A
Gordon.
rescue
would
lose their lives
;
but
still
greater
far
the rest
was
price
The scheme, however, broke
in the military detail.
Everyone can understand
become
they
until
dash
rough-and-tumble
a
responsible
considerations
of
sorts
all
Then
for arranging it.
might
camels
on
men
thousand
obtrude themselves. One
turned
was
this
when
but
with loss have succeeded
;
of
the
fatuity
the
war,
scientific
of
into the language
much
for
clamoured
doctors
The
idea was apparent.
transport for medical
insisted
stores.
on much more.
Corps, the
Ordnance Store
Army Pay Department, the
The various departments
The Signalling Corps, the
Army
Army
otherwise the
'
Chaplains, must
Flying Column
be represented
unit
detached
complete
not be a
;
Service Corps, the
'
soldiers of civilisation
'
would not be
;
'
all
would
and the precious
signalled to, armed,
the
of
dignity
the
befitted
as
for
prayed
fed, paid, or
so
be
must
There
belonged.
nation to which they
and
Asia
that
accessories,
the
carry
many camels to
was
plan
The
demand.
the
meet
not
Africa could
course
honourable
one
Only
rejected as impracticable.
remained
British
—
a regular military expedition.
Agent
at
once
began
to
urge.
admit.
to
refused
obstinately
Government
This the
This the
Meanwhile
time was passing.
before
even
grave
became
Khartoum
The
Gladstone
Mr.
and
Gordon
General
the breach between
situation at
'
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
Cabinet was complete.
While the
81
British
Government
was indulging in vengeful operations in the Eastern
Soudan, the Mahdi advanced slowly but steadily upon
the
town with a following variously estimated
at
from
twenty thousand men. On the 7th of March
Colonel Stewart telegraphed from Khartoum: 'The
Mahdi has attempted to raise the people of Shendi
fifteen to
We may be cut off;
by an emissary.
the 11th Gordon himself reported: 'The
.
.
22
.
four hours distant on the Blue Nile.'
23
and on
rebels are
Thereafter no
wire
was
the
15th
the
for
on
came,
telegrams
more
cut between
Shendi and Berber, and the blockade
had commenced.
The long and glorious defence of the
always fascinate the historian.
Khartoum
man, a European among
Mohammedans, should by
will
town
of
That one
9
efforts
Africans, a Christian
his genius
among
have inspired the
of 7,000 soldiers of inferior race, and
by
his
courage have sustained the hearts of 30,000 inhabitants
of notorious timidity,
and with such materials and en-
cumbrances have offered a vigorous resistance to the
cruel,
though
who,
enemy
an
of
attacks
increasing
period
of
317
a
during
surrender,
accept
yet
would
it
may
But
history.
in
parallel
without
days is an event
an
write
ever
will
one
no
that
safely be predicted
in
detail
or
interest
in
compare
will
which
account
with that set forth
'Journals
soldier
at
Khartoum.'
may draw
22
23
VOL.
by the man himself
Eeading
in the
their
famous
pages
instruction from the military events
1884.
March
Baring,
7,
E.
Sir
to
Stewart
Lieut.-Col.
1884.
March
Baring,
11,
E.
Sir
to
Gordon
Major-Gen.
I.
the
G
;
;
f
THE RIVER AVAR
82
Christian
the
faith;
will
may
the patriot
in
rejoice
exult
grandeur
the
of
his
the pride of natio-
in
perplexed
by
the
philosopher,
the
even
and
nality;
will
find
soul,
human
a
of
magnificence
unforeseen
bright
gleam
a
by
disturbed
reasonings
his mournful
of doubt.
of
thousands
readers
delighted
has
account
The brief
is
he
is
because
it
Perhaps
America.
and
in Europe
Gordon
so
Charles
that
men,
of
sympathy
the
careless of
readily wins
Before the
it.
first
of the six parts into
which the Journals were divided is finished, the reader
through
world
the
sees
he
Henceforth
won.
has been
Gordon's eyes. With him he scoffs at the diplomatists
the
despises
Government
reasonably, perhaps
in
the
Intelligence
carried or
—with
;
becomes
impatient
a certain Major Kitchener
Branch, whose information mis-
was not despatched
impracticable Shaiggia Irregulars
;
;
is
wearied by the
takes interest in the
turkey-cock and his harem of four wives
'
black
— un-
;
laughs at the
sluts' seeing their faces for the first
time in the
With him he trembles for the fate of the poor
mirror.
little beast,' the Husseinyeli, when she drifts stern foremost on the shoal, a penny steamer under cam Km
'
4
fire
'
;
day
after
day he gazes through the General's
powerful telescope from the palace roof
brown reaches
down
the long
of the river towards the rocks of the
Shabluka Gorge, and longs for some sign of the relieving
steamers and when the end of the account is reached,
;
no man of British birth can read the last words, Xow
mark this, if the Expeditionary Force and I ask for
4
—
no more than two hundred men
— does not
come within
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
may fall ; and
ten days, the town
for the
I
honour of our country.
have done
then the account stops short.
The
ever be broken.
my
best
Good-bye,' without
being thrilled with vain regrets and
And
83
futile resolutions.
Nor
will the silence
sixth instalment of the Journals
was despatched on the 14th of December; and when
it
.
finished,
is
the
separated suddenly from
reader,
the pleasant companionship, experiences a feeling of
and
loss
is
Imagination, long supported,
annoyance.
brushed
aside
by
stern
Henceforward
reality.
Gordon's perils were unrecorded.
I
would
select
one episode only from the Journals
an example of the strength and the sternness of
Charles Gordon's character his behaviour towards
as
—
Slatin.
This Austrian officer had been Governor of
Darfur with the rank in the Egyptian service of Bey.
For four years he had struggled vainly against the
He had fought numerous engagements with
rebellion.
He had been several times wounded.
varied success.
Throughout his province and even beyond its limits he
bore the reputation of a brave and capable
The story of
by
himself,
his life of suffering
is
and adventure, written
widely known, and he
who have read it to be
By those who enjoy
a
man
his
soldier.
is
thought by those
of feeling and of honour.
personal acquaintance this
belief is unhesitatingly confirmed.
He
had, however,
committed an act which deprived him of Gordon's
fighting
in
Darfur,
the
During
respect.
sympathy and
were
soldiers
Mohammedan
his
after several defeats,
discouraged and attributed their evil fortune to the fact
that their
commander was an
infidel
under the curse of
G 2
I
WAR
THE RIVER
84
Almighty.
the
therefore proclaimed himself a
Slatin
follower of the Prophet, and outwardly at least adopted
The
the faith of Islam.
troops, delighted at his conver-
and cheered by the hope of success, renewed their
efforts, and the resistance of the Governor of Darfur
sion
The
was prolonged.
The
was
deferred, not
After the destruction of General Hicks's army
averted.
was compelled
Slatin
end, however,
religion
to
surrender to
the Dervishes.
he had assumed to secure victory, he
The Arab leaders, who
admired his courage, treated him at first with respect
and kindness, and he was conducted to the Mahdi in his
encampment before Khartoum. There during the siege
observed to escape death.
he
remained,
Thence
he
closely
wrote
watched but not imprisoned.
letters
Gordon explaining
to
his
surrender, excusing his apostasv, and beiiuiim- that he
might be allowed
Khartoum.
who
reads
The
—not
even
assisted
letters are extant,
— to
and scarcely anyone
them, reflecting on the twelve years of
and degradation that lay before
danger
escape to
man,
this
will refuse their compassion.
Gordon was
inflexible.
Before the arrival of the
letters his allusions to Slatin are
contemptuous
:
—
cannot help being amused at the Mahdi carrying
Europeans
Austrian
Major
officers
24
!
about
'
surrender.
He
:
—what
is
him
—nuns,
a medley,
priests,
a
One
all
the
Greeks,
regular
fitat-
suspicious of the circumstances of his
'The Greek
ardebs of doura,
tion
with
'
....
had 4,000
1,500 cows, and plenty of ammunisays, Slatin
he has been given eight horses bv the Mahdi.'
2i
Journals at Khartoum.
25
Ibid.
25
—
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
He
will not
vouch
characteristic justice,
with reserve.'
man
for such a
6
all this
;
85
but he adds, with
information must be taken
26
At length the letters came. At the peril of his life,
when ordered to write and demand the surrender of
the town, Slatin substituted an appeal to Gordon to
This
countenance his escape.
minute in the Journals:
them, and cannot
Oct.
I have
have arrived.
Slatin
4
of
letters
no remarks to make on
make out why he wrote
In
them.'
some pity
;
but
it
is
man for a mouse.
He is evidently not a
.... he will want some quarantine .... one
the pity of a
feels
The
16.
the afternoon, indeed, he betrays
Spartan
the uncompromising
is
'
The next day he
sorry for him.'
exorable and gives his reasons clearly.
is
6
again
in-
1 shall have
nothing to do with Slatin's coming here to stay, unless
he has the Mahdi's positive leave, which he
to
get
;
his doing so
which should be
Mahdi
as to
safety
Mahdi.'
when given
sacred
as
any other power, and
of
all
not likely
would be the breaking of
parole,
the
is
these
it
his
to the
would jeopardise
Europeans, prisoners with
27
Slatin's position, it
should be observed, was not that
of an officer released on parole, but of a prisoner of
war
in durance in the enemy's
camp.
Under such
cir-
cumstances he was clearly entitled to escape at his
own proper
risk.
If his captors
gave him the chance,
they had only themselves to blame.
His position was
who had
and were now made
not dissimilar from that of the black soldiers
been captured by the Dervishes
2tJ
Journals at Khartoum.
27
Ibid.
.
THE RIVER "WAR
86
Khartoum
their
daily,
doing
fully acquie-ced
and the General
As
so.
These deserted to
Government.
to serve against the
to
Slatin's
in
escape affecting the
must
it
prisoners,
be
European
other
the
of
treatment
times
escapes
were
various
at
when
that
observed
when
Slatin
ultimately
and
Omdurman,
from
effected
himself escaped, no ill-treatment was inflicted on the
ill-treatment
such
had
even
and
prisoners
the
of
rest
;
that
escape,
need
an
of
consequence
certain
the
been
not have debarred a man, according to the customs of
Xothii
war, from attempting to regain his liberty.
favours
for
return
obtained
promise,
in
formal
his
but
received, can alienate that right.
If the
Mahdi chose
to slaughter the remaining prisoners, the responsibility
rested with the
Mahdi
;
and by such act he would have
excluded himself from the mercy of
the wrath of
incurred
God
Slatin was, however, in
case.
men and
no position
to
argue his
His correspondence with Gordon was discovered.
For some davs his life hung on a thread. For several
months he was heavily chained and fed on a daily
handful of uncooked doura, such as
and mules.
Gordon.
He
'
is
given to horses
Tidings of these things were carried to
Slatin,'
he observes
icily,
4
is still
in chains.'
never doubted the righteousness of the course he
had adopted, never
for
an instant.
The subject
is
one
on which there is room for considerable difference of
But
I have been unable to conceal mine.
opinion.
few will deny that there were strong arguments on
both
sides.
balanced.
Many
will assert that the}'
were nicely
Gordon must have weighed them
carefully.
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
87
He never wavered. Yet he needed Slatin. He was
alone.
He had no one in whose military capacity he
Again and again
could put the slightest confidence.
the
He
subordinates.
'
expresses his want
Journals he
of trustworthy
could not be everywhere, he said.
Nearly every order has to be repeated two or three
am weary
times.
I
much
here
is
of
my
4
life.'
What
want of men like
but I have no one
the
daglia, or Slatin,
entrust expeditions.
This was the
.
one has
felt
so
Gessi, or Messo-
whom
to
I could
.
man who would have employed Zubair
and bowed to expediency.
'
in
But Zubair had never
denied his Lord.'
The actual defence of Khartoum
within the pro-
is
vince of the Journals, nor shall I attempt a chronological
Gordon
when General
Stewart and Messrs. Power and
After the 10th of September,
account.
sent Colonel
Herbin down the river in the
he was altogether alone.
weight of responsibility.
undivided.
as
an equal.
ill-fated
Abbas steamer,
Many men have bowed
to the
Gordon's responsibility was
whom he could talk
to whom he could
as
There was no one to
—
There was no one
to a trusty subordinate
—reveal
minds the exercise of power
is
his doubts.
To some
pleasant, but few sensa-
more painful than responsibility without
control.
The General could not supervise the defence.
The officers robbed the soldiers of their rations. The
sentries slumbered at their posts.
The townspeople
tions
are
bewailed their misfortunes, and
intrigued with
safety
when
enemy in
town should
the
the
all
the
fall.
ranks and classes
hope of securing
Frequent
efforts
THE RIVER
88
were made
up the inhabitants or sap
to stir
Spies of
fidence.
WAR
all
their con-
The
Once
kinds pervaded the town.
Egyptian Pashas, despairing, meditated treason.
an attempt was made to fire the magazine. Once no
were
grain
stolen
of
ardebs
thousand
eighty
than
less
from the arsenal. From time to time the restless
and
activity of the
ceaseless
commander might
dis-
or,
some plot and arrest the conspirators
checking some account, might detect some robbery
but he was fully aware that what he found out was
scarcely a tithe of what he could not hope to know.
cover
;
;
The
Egyptian
officers
Yet he
were untrustworthy.
The inhabitants were thoroughly
He had
broken by Avar, and many were disloyal.
The town itself was
to feed and inspirit them.
had
trust them.
to
It
scarcely defensible.
must be defended
end.
to the
From the flat roof of his palace his telescope commanded a view of the forts and lines. Here he would
spend the greater part of each day, scrutinizing the
defences and the surrounding country with his powerful
When
glass.
had
he observed that the sentries on the
left their posts,
and
flogged
he would send over to have them
superiors
their
forts
punished.
When
his
penny steamers' engaged the Dervisli batteries he
would watch, 'on tenter-hooks,' a combat which might
4
be
fatal to the defence,
direct
it,
reckless
:
must be
and
left
in the
not even watch.
but which, since he could not
to officers
by turns timid and
dark hours of the night
lie
could
The Journals, the only receptacle of
his confidences, display the bitterness of his sufferings
no
less
than the greatness of his character.
6
There
is
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
no contagion,' he writes,
'
equal to that of
89
fear.
I
have
been rendered furious when from anxiety I could not
eat, I would find those at the same table were in like
manner affected.'
To the military anxieties were added every kind of
worry which may weary a man's soul. The women
clamoured for bread. The townsfolk heaped reproaches
upon him. The quarrel with the British Government
had cut him very deeply. The belief that he was
abandoned and discredited, that history would make
light of his efforts, would perhaps never know of them,
mind with a sense of wrong and injustice, which
preyed upon his spirits. The miseries of the townsfolk
wrung his noble, generous heart. The utter loneliness
filled his
depressed him.
certainty.
To
And
over
lay the shadow of un-
all
the very end the possibility that
might be well' mocked him with
first
light
hopes.
all
The
of any morning might reveal the longed-
for steamers
soldiers.
false
'
of relief and the red
He was
coats
of
British
denied even the numbing anaesthetic
of despair.
Yet he was sustained by two great moral and
mental stimulants his honour as a man, his faith as a
:
Christian.
The
had put
first
all
not think right, once and for
courses which he did
all
out of the question,
and so allayed many doubts and prevented many vain
regrets.
But the second was the real source of his
strength.
He was
beyond this hazardous
wrongs and inequalities, another
sure
existence, with all its
life
awaited him
—a
life
that
which,
if
he had been faithful
•
and true here upon earth, would afford him greater
THE RIVER
DO
faculties for good,
me
and wider opportunities
'
Look
'
with small armies to
I
at
now,'
hope that death
WAR
lie
for their use.
once said to a fellow-traveller,
command and no
will set me free from
cities to
pain,
govern.
and that
great armies will be given me, and that I shall have vast
under
cities
28
my command.'
Such was
hope
his bright
of immortality.
As
also
the severity of military operations increases, so
must the sternness of
soldiers, their warlike instincts,
excitements of war
may
The
discipline.
and the
zeal of the
and
interests
ensure obedience of orders and
the cheerful endurance of perils and hardships during a
But when fortune
short and prosperous campaign.
dubious or adverse
are necessary
carry,
when
retreats as well as advances
supplies
arrangements mis-
fail,
and disasters impend; and when the struggle
protracted,
things
;
when
;
men can
by the
only be persuaded to accept
is
is
evil
lively realisation of the fact that greater
The ugly truth
terrors await their refusal.
that fear
is
the foundation of obedience.
is
revealed
It is certain
Gordon upon the garrison
and townspeople of Khartoum owed its greatest strength
that the influence of General
to that sinister element.
'It
in his Journals in September,
when they come and
quite painful,' he writes
is
6
to see
men
tremble
so,
see me, that they cannot hold the
match to their cigarette.'
methods of inspiring their
Yet he employed
efforts.
As
all
other
the winter drew
on, the sufferings of the besieired increased and their
2S
Lieut. -Colonel
cences,' published in
1898.
N.
Newnham
The
Man
Davis.
'
Some Gordon Reminis-
of the World newspaper, December
14,
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
91
commander and his promises of relief
To preserve their hopes — and, by their
diminished.
hopes, their courage and loyalty was beyond the
power of man. But what a great man in the utmost
exercise of his faculties and authority might do, Gordon
faith in their
—
did.
His extraordinary
than in these
last,
spirit
The money
gloomy days.
He
troops was exhausted.
with his
never burned more brightly
The
own name.
to
pay the
issued notes, signing
citizens
triple scourge of scarcity, disease,
them
groaned under the
and war.
He
ordered
the bands to play merrily and discharged rockets.
was
said that they
were abandoned, that help would
never come, that the expedition was a myth
of a General
It
who was disavowed by
his
—the
lie
Government.
Forthwith he placarded the walls with the news of
and of the advance of a triumphant British
or hired all the best houses by the river's bank
victories
army
;
for the
accommodation of the
force.
A
He
officers of the relieving
Dervish shell crashed through his palace.
ordered the date of
its
arrival to be inscribed above
For those who served him faithfully he struck
medals and presented them with pomp and circumstance.
Others less laudable he shot. And by all these means
and expedients the defence of the city was prolonged
through all the summer, autumn, and winter of 1884
the hole.
and on into the year 1885.
All this
time the public anxiety in England had
Gordon was abandoned, he
was by no means forgotten. As his mission had been
been steadily growing.
If
followed with intense interest throughout the whole
'
THE RIVER
92
WAR
had caused general despondency.
Disappointment soon gave place to alarm. The subject
country, so
its
failure
of the personal safety of the distinguished envoy was
House of Commons on the 16th of
March by Lord Randolph Churchill. Availing himself
first
raised in the
of the opportunities provided by Supply, he criticised
the vacillating policy of the Government, their purpose-
slaughter in the Eastern Soudan, and their failure
less
to establish the
He
Suakin-Berber route.
draw attention to the
Gordon at Khartoum.
to
proceeded
perilous position of General
Khartoum may
General Gordon is
Colonel Coetlogon has stated that
'
be easily captured;
we know
that
surrounded by hostile tribes and cut off from communications with Cairo and London;
and under
these
Her
circumstances the House has
a
rkrht
ask
to
Government whether they are going to
do anything to relieve him. Are they going to remain
Majesty's
indifferent to the fate of the
one
man on whom
they
have counted to extricate them from their dilemmas, to
leave
him
effort
on his behalf
The
to shift for himself,
made an
Ministerial cheers.
single
29
?
Government
Fitzmaurice
and not make a
remained
impassive.
effective reply,
E.
and there were
But the subject, once
not allowed to drop.
Lord
raised,
was
Inspired and animated by the
young man, the Opposition were
continually growing stronger. The conduct of Egyptian
earnest energy of a
ample opportunity for criticism and
All through the summer months and almost
afforded
affairs
attack.
•29
Hansard' 8 Parliamentary Debates, March
16. 1884.
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
93
every night Ministers were invited to declare, whether
they would rescue their envoy or leave him to his fate.
Mr. Gladstone returned evasive answers. The Conservative Press took the cue.
The agitation became intense.
Even among the supporters
was
dissatisfaction.
But
obdurate and unflinching.
Government there
Prime Minister was
of the
the
At
length, at the end of the
the whole matter was brought forward in the
gravest and most formal
way by the moving
of a vote of
The debate that followed Sir Michael Hicks
Beach's motion was long and acrimonious. Mr. Gladcensure.
stone's speech only increased
the
disquietude of his
followers and the fury of the Opposition.
Mr. Forster
openly declared his disagreement with his leader and
although Lord Hartington in winding up the debate
;
threw out some hopes of an expedition in the autumn,
the Government majority fell on the division to twentyeight.
The House then adjourned, but
the controversy
was carried on with undiminished vigour outside the
walls of Parliament, and the clamour in the country
grew louder and louder.
look upon Mr. Gladstone's conduct
in the matter of the relief of Gordon as dictated by
It is usual to
benevolent weakness.
History
may
take another view.
Strong and stubborn as was the character
of
General, that of the Minister was
Gordon
its
equal.
If
the
was the better man, Gladstone was incomparably the
greater.
It was easy for the First Minister of the
Crown
to despatch an expedition against savages.
was accustomed
to the exercise of power.
with the resources of the Empire, the
He
Compared
enterprise was
.
THE
94
HI V Eli
WAR
responsibility
less
feared
have
men
Few
insignificant.
the
expressed
hand,
other
the
On
than Gladstone.
desire of the
nation was
a force
to
which he had
his
owed
political
he
indeed
which
to
bowed,
always
agitation
the
growing
of
spite
in
Yet,
existence.
throughout the land, he remained stern and silent.
Most men do what is right, or what they persuade
themselves
is
right
;
nor
Mr. Gladstone did not
nation in
is
it
feel justified
that
in involving the
operations in the heart of the Soudan for
the purpose, not of saving the
Gordon had but
—
home
difficult to believe
to
"b u t simply
honour of a man.
embark on
of the envoy
life
his steamers
in order to vindicate
And
it
is
—
for
and come
the personal
possible that a
feelii
-
whose
intractable
officer
the
against
resentment
of
nature was bringing such odium upon the Go\
ment may have
coloured his resolution with a darker
tinge
power and influence he was forced to
The Government which had long ignored
give way.
by
the
Soudan
driven
to
was
abroad,
honour
of
call
the
Lord Hartington, at that
the cries of shame at home.
time Secretary of State for War, must be dissociated
from the general censure which his colleagues have
But
for all his
He was
incurred.
the
first
to recognise the obligation
which lay upon the Cabinet, and through the Cabinet
upon the nation, and it was to his influence that
the despatch of the relieving expedition was mainly
due.
The
General,
Commander-in-Chief
who were
Khartoum, added
and the Adjutant-
fully alive to the critical position at
their recommendations.
But even
at
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
95
moment Mr. Gladstone was induced to sanction
advance only by the belief that the scale of the
the last
the
operations would be
small,
and that only a
single
brigade would be necessary.
The decision was taken
Ministry and announced to the
by the
nation.
The Adjutant-General, however, asked for a
very different force from that which the Government
had anticipated, and the single brigade was expanded
forthwith,
into an expedition of ten thousand
men, selected from
the whole army.
To
now however impossible,
reverse the decision was
and the
Gordon
Belief Expedition
The commander to whom the conduct of the operations had
been entrusted reviewed the situation. He saw himself
confronted with a task which was easy and safe if it
were undertaken at leisure, and which was doubtful
and perilous if begun in haste. All the fruits of a long
'
'
began.
and successful career were staked on the
is
result,
and
it
scarcely wonderful that he declined to be swift and
reckless.
Shrewdly estimating the military
difficulties,
he made his plans for a methodical and deliberate
advance which should leave nothing to luck, and which
resembles in character that afterwards carried out by
Sir
H. Kitchener.
lorious rush
He
excluded the idea of a wild
which might
result in astonishing success
or terrible disaster.
Troops and stores were steadily collected
Haifa and along the Nile.
consisting
of
four
To
at
Wady
The new Camel Corps,
regiments,
practised
their
drills
up the Cataracts
voyageurs were brought from Canada. At length, when
and evolutions.
pilot the boats
I
THE RIVER
96
WAR
preparations were complete, the expedition started.
all
A strong column of infantry in
The plan was simple.
that
In
case
should
river.
the
up
work
to
was
boats
not arrive in time, the Camel Corps was to strike across
Having
the Bayuda Desert from Korti to Metemma.
arrived there, a small detachment was to be thrown
Khartoum bv Gordon's steamers to sustain the
defence until the arrival of the main body in March or
even April of 1885, when the town could be regularly
into
relieved.
The dramatic character of the
enterprise
and
its
picturesque and original features fascinated the nation,
and the advance was watched with breathless interest.
The fortunes of the Eiver Column have been graphically described
their attempt.
by one who played no small part in
30
is a
'The Campaign of the Cataracts'
record of hard and unceasing
Day
toil.
after
day the
long lines of soldiers hauled on the tow-ropes or pulled
at the oars of the
night they
broad-bottomed boats.
camped on
tion of the
the banks
Monassir Desert.
labours were encouraged
swiftly to
the
Yet their monotonous
by the knowledge
And
it
that
as
Abu Hamed was
strong north wind would
Khartoum.
after
amid the grim desola-
soon as the bend of the river at
reached
Night
carry them
seemed a strange and
bitter ironv that the order to turn
back and the news
had been in vain was announced to the troops
on the very day when they had cleared the cataracts
and were moving forward at five times their former
that
all
speed.
30
Bv
Sir
William Butler.
—
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
The Desert Column
30th of
December.
started
97
from Korti
on the
Their strength did not exceed
1,100 officers and men, but they were the flower of
the army.
Dropping their communications, they set
forth along the caravan route towards
Metemma.
The
knowledge which we have since gained of the resources of the Mahdists enables the peril of their
desperate venture to be fully appreciated.
Although
the Dervishes were neither so well armed, nor trained
as
they were
a later date,
at
and equally devoid of
fear.
numerous
nearly as
Their tactics, as will be
explained in a future chapter, were more in accordance with modern conditions
their fanaticism was
:
at its
The
height.
British force,
on the other hand,
w
equipped with weapons scarcely comparable to
those employed in the concluding campaigns.
Instead
of
powerful
the
powder,
less
its
Lee-Metford
magazine
of recoil, they were
rifle,
action,
armed with
with
and
the.
smoke-
its
its
absence
Martini-Henry,
which possessed none of these advantages.
In
Maxim there was the Gardner gun
very gun that jammed at Tamai, and that jammed
of the deadly
the
again at
Abu
The
Klea.
respect inferior to that
this,
artillery
now
was
also in
in general use.
the principles of fire-discipline and
musketry were new,
mitted.
little
every
Besides
all
of scientific
understood, and hardly ad-
Camel Corps went boldly
forward, and engaged an enemy whose destruction
Nevertheless
the
ultimately required the strength of a better-armed and
better-instructed
On
army twelve times
as strong.
the 3rd of January they reached
VOL.
I.
Gakdul Wells.
H
—
HIE EIVER
98
A hundred
WAR
march was
miles of their
a<
<
omphahed.
I
Wit
of
escorting
necessity
a
the
by
delayed
now
were
thev
alter
and
Gakdul,
that
to
supplies
of
column
Becond
until the arrival of reinforcements which raised their
strength
1,800
to
employed
of
march
was not
interval
was
building two small forts and establish-
in
ing an advanced depot
the
The
ranks.
all
nor was
;
resumed.
wafl
it
until the 13th that
The number of camels
31
sufficient for the necessities of the transport.
The food of the camels was too poor for the work
By the 16th, however, they
they had to perform.
had made
Abu
Here
Klea.
bv the enemy.
The news of
and
miles,
fifty
approached the wells of
their further
advance was disputed
been duly reported to the Mahdi and his
A
small party of English,
it
some cavalry were coining
the
accursed
'the expected
had
;
said,
swiftly to
'
the
rescue
of
and the conquering -Ansar who
They were mad; yet they
not one should escape.
The delay in the
Hicks?
advance afforded ample opportunity.
Arabs was concentrated.
thousand
with camels and
should they hope to prevail against
Mahdi
destroyed
should die
was
Their numbers were few, scarce
city.
How
2.000 men.
Column had
Arab generals.
the advance of the Desert
A
Slatin relates
great force of
how
several
men under important Emirs were detached
from the army before Khartoum and marched north-
ward eager
:!1
for the slaughter of the 'enemies of God.'
The
necessity for the halt at Gakdul had been foreseen by Lord
Wolseley from the outset, and was alluded to in his orders. The insufficient
number
of camels rendered
it
inevitable.
Editor.
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
99
At Metemma the main strength of the Jaalin tribe was
collected.
With the reinforcements from Omdurman
the total force of the Arabs actually at
than 10,000,
less
32
hand was not
and behind were many thousands
t
They permitted
more.
until their
retreat,
if
column to advance
defeated, was impossible, and
the
little
then, confident of victory, they offered battle near the
wells of
Abu
Klea.
The Camel Corps remained halted during the morning of the 16th, and built a small fort, in which they
placed their reserve of stores, and made some arrangement for the reception of wounded. At one o'clock
they moved leisurely forward, passed through the
which led into the valley of Abu Klea,
and bivouacked. That night the camp was fired
rocky
defile
and a few casualties occurred.
into
morning the force moved out
advanced
in square formation
upon the enemy.
followed.
the valour
of the
and
The most savage and
the Soudan by British
bloody action ever fought in
troops
Early the next
Notwithstanding the numbers and
Arabs, that
they
penetrated
the
square, and that they inflicted on the troops a loss of
nine officers and sixty-five
men
and eighty-five men wounded
entire
force
— thev
killed
— ten
and nine
per cent, of the
were driven from the
great slaughter, and the Desert
officers
with
field
Column camped
at the
wells.
On
their
32
the morning of the
wounded
in
18th they rested, placed
the small fort they had built, and
Between 9,000 and 11,000 according
to
Sir
Charles Wilson,
Editor.
h
2
!
THE RIVER
100
AV A 1
In the afternoon they continued
buried their dead.
their advance, marched
all
through the night, and,
having covered twenty-three miles, halted exhausted,
on
the
daylight
river,
at
of
the
sight
within
almost
collected
in
again
had
enemy
the
Meanwhile
19th.
was
opened
effective
fire
rifle
an
and
strength,
great
on
column.
the
Sir
Herbert
received
Stewart
the
wound of which a tew weeks later he died. The
command devolved upon Sir Charles Wilson. The
Water was running short.
position was desperate.
The Nile was onlv four miles away; but the column
were impeded by their wounded and store-, and bemen
the
Dervish
lay
tween the river and the thirsty
W
*
/
army, infuriated by their losses and
sore straits to
which
fully
their astonishing
aware of the
enemy was now
reduced.
It
now became
necessary to divide the small force.
Some must remain to guard the baggage and the
wounded; the others must fight their way to the water.
At three o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th, 000 men
left the hastily made zeriha and marched towards the
river.
Without
their camels or those of the transport
they appeared insignificant, a mere speck on the broad
plain of
Metemma.
The' Dervishes hastened to clinch
the matter.
The square advances >lowly and
stony ground,
painfully over the
with frequent jerky halts to preserve
order and to pick up
the wounded.
white smoke dot the distant sandhills.
a gaudy flag waves defiantly.
of the palm-trees
by the Nile
Little
puffs
of
Here and there
In front the green tops
tantalise
but stimulate
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
On
the soldiers.
Metemma
stops.
the
stretches
left
in front
ing figures of the enemy.
Eagged white
Emirs on horses appear
men running
mud
alive with the
is
firing:
swarm-
All the flags dance forward
figures spring
by magic.
forward, waving
swiftly
labyrinth of
Suddenly the
indefinitely.
The low scrub
together.
the great
101
as if
up
in hundreds.
Everywhere are
their spears
and
upon the Prophet of God to speed their enterprise.
The square halts. The weary men begin to fire
with thoughtful care. The Dervishes drop thickly. On
then, children of the desert you are so many, they are
so few.
They are worn with fatigue and their throats
are parched.
You have drunk deeply of the Nile.
One rush will trample the accursed under the feet of
the faithful.
The charge continues. A bugle sounds
in the waiting square.
The firing stops. What is this ?
They lose heart. Their ammunition is exhausted. On,
then, and make an end. Again the smoke ripples along
the line of bayonets and fire is reopened, this time at
closer range and with far greater effect.
The stubborn
calling
!
grandeur of the British soldier
The
a
—horse
walk—
The road
water
is
hit.
and
The attack
man
—
collapse.
for they will not
back towards the town.
forward.
the
to
Emirs
The others turn and
sullenly
displayed by desperate
The men shoot
circumstances.
crumples.
is
to the river
is
The square
open.
run
starts
With dusk
reached, and never have victors gained
more precious
prize.
The Nile
is
won.
Gordon
remains.
Sir
Charles
Wilson, having collected
his
force,
remained three days by the bank of the Nile before
THE
102
i:
I
Villi
WAR
He
Khartoum.
on
advance
further
any
attempting
why
explained
was necessary, to the
this delay
has
satis-
possible
is
it
to
Nor
critics.
military
most
faction of
efforts
splendid
such
made
had
who
men
believe that
would have williniilv lost a single moment, (hi the
embarked on two of Gordon's steamare,
fourth day he
with
taking
and
column,
relieving
the
awaited
which
and a lew blue-jackets set
forth towards the Shabluka Gorge and the town that
On the 27th of January the rescuers
lay beyond.
him twenty British
soldiers
«
came
in sight of
Many
enemy.
Khartoum and under
than
rather
to
with the
strujrjrlinu
dropping disconsolately down
bank
;
strong stream of
Arab gnus,
with their
river
news or wrecked and stranded on the sandStuart-Wortley rowing to the camp before
Metemma
for help
ing steamer;
shell:
the
the tinv
reality:
the cataract, running the gauntlet of the
terrible
of the
lie lire
of their perilous adventures seem to
belong to romance
oimcrack boats
t
;
Beresford starting in the remain-
the burstim; of the boiler by a Dervish
Benbow mendinir
in a single
it
day; Wilson-
rescue and the return to the entrenchment
at
(lubat.
But the scene that appeals to the imagination above
all the others is that where with both banks ablaze with
and
musketry
artillery,
through the shot-holes
in spurts
from the
in the funnels, the
bullets, the
and.
^eeiiiLr
that thev
no
flair
flvimr,
had come too
water rising
men who had come
and braved so much stared
far
smoke pouring
black
the
knew
the p alace roof
at
that
all
was over and
late.
The news of the Dervish
defeat-
at
Abu
Klea
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
Abu Kru
and
impelled the Mahdi
The
venture.
were but
English
103
a desperate
to
120
away.
miles
They were few, but victorious. It was difficult to
say what force could stop such men. In spite of
the wrath of the true God and the valour of Islam
they might prevail. The Mahdi depended on success
for existence.
The tremendous forces of fanaticism
exerted only in
are
meant
assault.
And,
Arab
the
All
ruin.
forward direction.
a
must be staked on an immediate
besides,
moment was
the
chiefs reasoned,
Thus
ripe.
and wisely resolved
Thus the night of the
reckless.
Eetreat
to
be
25th of
January
as usual in the evening.
Gradu-
arrived.
The band played
ally
the
shadows
fell
and
became
it
dark.
hungry inhabitants betook themselves
avert
done
night
*
I
ft
to
bed.
commander knew that the
impended, and knew, also that he was powerless
anxious but indomitable
crisis
to
The
The
his
it.
Perhaps he
duty
the
;
and
slept, satisfied that
in the
silence
he had
of the moonless
savage enemy crawled stealthily towards
The weary and disheartened sentinels,
weakened by famine and tired of war, maintained a
The subsiding
doubtful vigilance along the ramparts.
the
town.
waters of the river had
White Mle and the
treachery.
If so,
it
left
a bare gap between the
may have been also
was superfluous. On a sudden the
wall.
There
loud explosion of musketry broke the
night and
the slumbers
of the
people
stillness
;
of the
and with a
swarmed
through the unprotected space and entered Khartoum.
continual shouting thousands
of Dervishes
—
WAR
THE RIVER
104
There followed massacre,
sack of a city
often
seen,
a
is
hut
The
and confusion.
pillage,
which the world has
spectacle
belongs
it
;
to
other
At
days.
the
end of the nineteenth century it is an anachronism.
Yet
events.
such
with
done
had
humanity
Civilised
with every ancient circumstance, was the un-
here,
expected horror— a foul thing raked out of the ashes
of the past.
One mob of Dervishes made their way to the
Gordon came out to meet them. The whole
palace.
courtyard was filled with wild, harlequin figures and
sharp,
Where
'
is
influence
save
the
in that
He
blades.
glittering
attempted
vour master, the Mahdi
of
'
some of the
He knew
inhabitants.
his
to
Perhaps
supreme moment imagination flashed another
picture before his eyes
with the
false
;
and he saw himself confronted
prophet of a
with the European prisoners
false religion,
who had
6
himself facing that savage
to,
confronted
denied their
Lord,' offered the choice of death or the
equal
parley.
Perhaps he hoped
over native races.
lives
?
a
Koran
;
saw
with a fanaticism
circle
and a courage greater than their own
;
like
Abdiel—
Among
Among
the faithless, faithful only he
innumerable false unmoved,
Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified
marching
scorn
It
'
in all the pride of faith
'
and with retorted
to a martyr's death.
was not
to be.
Mad
with the iov of victory and
religious frenzy, they rushed
disdained even to
fire his
upon him and, while he
revolver, stabbed
himinmany
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
heap
the steps and lay
— a twisted
There it was decapitated.
The head
The body fell down
places.
—
at the foot.
was carried
105
The trunk was stabbed
Mahdi.
to the
again and again by the infuriated creatures,
but a shapeless bundle of torn
till
nothing
and bloody rags
flesh
remained of what had been a great and famous
and the envoy of her Britannic Majesty.
soaked into the ground, and left a dark
man
The blood
stain which
was not immediately effaced. Slatin mentions that the
Arabs used often to visit the place. Ohrwalder went
himself, and more than six weeks after the capture of
But they
the town, saw black spots upon the steps.
'
have since been
'
all
Such, briefly,
wiped
out.
the story of the
is
The
and of the death of Gordon.
of
fall
Khartoum
fact that
the two
steamers arrived only two days after the capture of the
town, has given colour to the belief that, but for the
Metemma,
three days' delay at
This view appears incorrect.
have been averted.
Arabs had long held Khartoum
hoped indeed
to avoid
an
compel
to
assault,
the catastrophe might
mercy.
surrender by famine and
its
which
at their
The
They
after their experience at
El
Gordon has
stated in his Journals that the town became defenceless
by the middle of December. The arrival of twenty
Obeid thev knew must cost them dear.
%J
British
soldiers
materially
and a few
affected
the
officers
situation
loss.
reads
the
wish
some
help,
man
that before the darkness
;
will
however
— could
only, in fact,
Yet nearly everyone who
have increased the
tale
could not have
—
little,
in
spite
had
fell
of
reason
— that
reached the lonely
he had grasped an
THE RIVER
106
WAR
countrymen
his
had
that
learned
and
hand,
English
O
would
forgotten—
never
not
had
him,
abandoned
not
7
>
forget.
The
*y
Wl
'
thus briefly described are too
events
recent,
are
still
excited
too
they
controversies
bitter
and the
and
definite
impartial
an
for
men,
of
minds
fresh in the
be passed on the character of the General
judgment
or the conduct of the
to
But
Government,
several
features stand out with such prominence that, although
ultimately
bow
must
chronicler
contemporaneous
the
forbidden
to
altogether
not
is
he
historian,
the
to
pronounce
exact
may
It
?
which Charles Gordon
place
It is certainly
English history.
he
will
rank
appreciate
of
the
the
relative
and
past,
size
Whether
may
accurately
and importance of the
We
may, however,
that he was a man of stainless honour and
therefrom.
rise
enduring courage,
who
in varied capacities displayed a
and abundant genius.
the honours
severity
amiability
He was
careless alike of
and comforts of the world, and looked
forward with firm
The
in
commander with Peterborough,
those who come after us must decide.
plain
eminences that
fertile
a high one.
occupy
the lofty peaks of the future they will look out
over the
assert
will
fix the
a
as
Wolfe, and Clive,
From
not be possible as yet to
faith to the
of
of his
his
reward- of a future
did
religion
character.
moods may have frequently
not
state.
impair
The uncertainty of
the
his
affected the soundness of
his
opinions, but not often the justice of his actions.
He
perished with
every heroic
circumstance
post of duty, lamented by his countrymen,
at the
who found
THE FATE OF THE- ENVOY
in
his
an
life
and
example
in
107
memory an
his
inspiration.
up in the indignant grief of the
nation in the space which is appropriated to the
monuments of Great Captains by sea and land, claims
Gordon's statue,
set
the attention of the passer-by, not only because
comparatively new.
The
figure, its pose,
and
its
is
it
story
London and
United Kingdom. Amid
are familiar to even the poorest citizens of
from
to people
the noise of the
all
parts of the
traffic, as
formerly in that of the battle,
the famous General seems
thoughtful countenance,
still,
with bowed head and
revolve
to
the
problems of
dark Soudan and, inattentive to the clamour of
It was
men, inquires what is acceptable to God.
the
easy to put up such a statue to Charles Gordon.
It
has since been possible to send an army corps thirteen
hundred miles across the deserts and, beating down
all opposition with the flaming sword of science, to
celebrate his obsequies on the scene of his death.
though the might of
many
of the
people
united
a
blunders of the past
repaired some, the noble
life
that
was
may
But
repair
and has already
lost in the
dark
days of 1885 was not one that even the greatest Empire
could spare.
The case against Mr. Gladstone's administration
is so black that historians will
be more likely to
exercise their talents in finding explanations and
excuses
may be
Somethin
than in urging the indictment.
said of grave
intentions
;
of ill-luck.
difficulties
something of
But the
human
real
;
something of good
fallibility
;
something
plea for oblivion
is
found
WAR
THE RIVER
108
Egypt by the
the spring of 1885 partly,
in the fact that the conduct of affairs in
Radical Government Avas in
and
autumn of 1885
in the
A tremendous minority
electorate at General Elections.
with horror and contempt.
regarded their behaviour
A
at
Here
majority voted for them.
the bar of history
;
supported by the
fully
and since
is
it
their best defence
can be sustained,
that tribunal will be prevented from meting
most
its
scathing censures and will only be able to pronounce
that
Ministry were
the
an hour when
nation in
sluggish,
With
its
courage and
representatives
the
its
its
spirit
of
was tame
the
and
fortunes low.
the capture of the city and the death of the
envoy the reason
the expedition disappeared.
for
remained only to withdraw the troops.
The
It
stores
which had been brought across the desert at a terrible
cost, were thrown hastily into the Xile.
The battered
steamers which had waited so lono- at Metemma were
hurriedly dismantled.
ordinary efforts
futile
The Camel Corps, their extraand their camels killed, marched
back on foot to Korti.
Their retreat was pressed by
The Eiver Column, whose boais
after months of labour had just cleared the Cataracts,
and who had gained a success at Kirbekan, were
carried back swiftly by the strong current against
the exultant enemy.
which
had
they
Expeditionary
Hussars,
hopefully
Force
struggled.
— Guards,
The
Highlanders,
whole
sailors,
Indian soldiers, Canadian voyageurs, mules,
camels, and artillery
desert sands,
— trooped back
and behind them the
followed swiftly, until the
forlornly over the
rising tide of barbarism
whole vast region of the
THE FATE OF THE ENVOY
Soudan
was
submerged.
garrison of Kassala under
For
109
months
several
the
a gallant Egyptian main-
tained a desperate resistance, but at last famine forced
them
to surrender,
and they shared the
fate of the
of El Obeid, Darfur, Sobat, Tokar, Sinkat,
garrisons
Sennar, and Khartoum.
The evacuation of the Soudan
was thus completed.
These
produced
events
despondency in Great Britain.
with the Soudan made
people.
all
The heavy
its
profound
a
of
The shame associated
name odious
losses in
feeling
to the
whole
men and money caused
projects for the recovery of the territory to be un-
The nation was prepared
humiliation and acquiesce in its defeat.
popular.
resjDonsible
for the
disaster
to
accept
its
The Ministers
were again returned
to
power by a substantial majority, and when they lost
office, it was on a matter wholly unconnected with
foreign
Abroad the
affairs.
military
operations,
in
which four generals, seventy-five other officers, and
1,891 men had perished and, in consequence of which
and 6,560 men had been wounded or
invalided, were severely criticised.
The European
303
officers
opinion about Great Britain was not dissimilar from
that
lately
held
about
Italy
after the
Abyssinian
about Spain since the Cuban war.
defeats, or
not denied that the soldiers were
brave.
was
That was
also
admitted in the cases of Italy and Spain.
had
failed,
to
It
They
and Continental observers did not hesitate
declare that this failure was only the beginning of
the end.
And
in a hopeless
shared in England.
way
the belief was widely
HO
THE RIVER
WAR
brighter
day.
a
dawned
there
hour
Yet in this dark
vigorous
and
new
a
cowered,
While the whole country
England
and
towns
of
great
the
spirit was growing in
DemoTory
of
breeze
freshening
Scotland; and in the
future
the
for
hope
and
past
the
cracy pride in
came
back to the British people.
and
the
end,
disasters
the
chapter
Thus with the
tale is
henceforth one of triumph.
—
Ill
*
CHAPTEB IV
*
THE DEKVISH EMPIEE
—The Dervish rule —Death of the Mahdi—The Khalifa
Abdullahi — His triumph — His methods —A perilous prize — Soudan
annals — Eival claimants — Treatment of the Ashraf — The military
policy — The Taiasha Baggara — The balance of power — The quarrel
with Abyssinia— Gallabat —Abu Anga — His deeds in Darfur and
Kordofan — His justice — The great review — The invasion of Abyssinia
Sack of Gondar— Death of Abu Anga — King John
Abyssinia
Battle of Gallabat — Death of the Negus —A Pyrrhic victory — The
—
Western revolts— Osman Wad Adam 'The Man of the Fig-tree'
Battle
El Fasher — The war with Egypt —Wad
Nejumi
Adjusting the balance — Famine — Plagues — The Arab capital— The
weekly review —A Council
State — Trouble in the north.
Military dominion
of
of
el
of
The
students
of
the
more philosophical
aspects
of
history have discovered that the larger the associations
which men form themselves, the surer and the
swifter their progress usually becomes.
The institution
into
of the family has shaped
all
the mental and
moral
The most savage tribes must
observe some rude code of justice and honour anion
themselves.
The national and patriotic idea has given
development of mankind.
new
opportunities
to
combination of millions
the generous
is
is
raised.
strive only for the
*
Map,
4
And
there are
perceiving the good results, would
multiply the cause and, disdaining
would
The
the foundation on which the
stately palace of civilisation
many moderns who,
impulses.
all racial distinctions,
brotherhood of men.
The Dervish Empire,'
to face page 146.
THE
112
It
might, therefore, seem
WAR
at first
a great ad\
«-
peoples of the Soudan, instead of being a
the
that
KIVEli
multitude of wild, discordant tribes, should unite of
their
by a
a
own accord into one strong community, actuated
common spirit, living under fixed laws, and ruled
But there
sovereign.
single
is
one form of
Government which is almost entirely unprogressive and beyond all other forms costly and
Such a combination
the rule of an army.
tyrannical
centralised
—
depends, not on the good faith and good will of
stituents,
Mutual
fear,
the co-operation of
its
many such
civilised or barbaric
may
con-
but on their discipline and almost mechanical
obedience.
records
its
to expediency,
—a
trust, j)romotes
individual members.
History
dominations, ancient and modern,
;
and though education and culture
modify, they cannot
characteristics
not mutual
change their predominant
continual
subordination of justice
an indifference to suffering, a disdain of
ethical principles, a laxity of morals,
ignorance of economics.
hierarchies are uniform.
universally unfortunate.
and a complete
The evil qualities of military
The results of their rule are
The degree may vary with
time and place, but the political supremacy of an army
always leads to the formation of a great centralised
capital, to the
consequent impoverishment of the pro-
vinces, to the degradation of the peaceful inhabitants
through oppression and want, to the ruin of commerce,
the decay of learning, and the ultimate demoralisation even of the
military order through overbearing
pride and sensual indulgence.
Of the military dominations which history
records.
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
113
Dervish Empire was probably the worst.
All
others have displayed compensating virtues.
A high
the
sense of personal honour has counterbalanced a low
An
standard of public justice.
may
partly repair economic
follies.
ennobling patriotism
The
miseries of the
people are often concealed by the magnificence of the
army.
by
The
laxity of morals
the elegance of manners.
is
in
some degree excused
But the Dervish Empire
developed no virtue except courage, a quality more
vented magnificence.
The poverty of the land preThe ignorance of its inhabitants
excluded refinement.
In the passage of years the Arabs
admirable than rare.
might indeed have worked out their own salvation,
as
have the nations of Europe.
effete,
The army, becoming
would wither and disappear, leaving behind
only the consciousness of nationality.
might
arise
who
The natural course of developement
The British people have selected a
long, but true.
shorter though
wise ruler
should establish a more equitable and
progressive polity.
is
A
it
more
terrible
road for the tribes to follow.
The Dervish dominion was born of war, existed by war,
and fell by war. It began on the night of the sack of
Khartoum. It ended abruptly thirteen years later in
the battle of Omdurman.
Like a subsidiary volcano
it was flung up by one convulsion, blazed during the
period of disturbance, and was destroyed by the still
more
violent shock that
ended the eruption.
Khartoum and the retreat of the
British armies the Mahdi became the absolute master of
the Soudan.
Whatever pleasures he desired he could
command, and, following the example of the founder of
After the
VOL.
I.
fall
of
THE RIVER WAR
114
Mohammedan
the
seem
to
he indulged in what would
Western minds gross
harem
extensive
an
faith,
for
He
excesses.
own
his
established
peculiar
immured
therein the fairest captives of the war.
conduct
of the
The presence of
warriors
:
was imitated by
ruler
nor was
women
it
and
use,
his
The
subjects.
increased the vanity of the
long before the patched smock
which had vaunted the holy poverty of the rebels
the
conquerors.
of
jibba
gaudy
the
into
developed
Since the unhealthy situation of Khartoum amid
swamps and marshes did not commend itself to the
now luxurious Arabs, the Mahdi began to build on the
western bank of the White Nile a new capital, which,
from the detached fort which had stood there in
Egyptian days, was called Omdurman. Among the
first
buildings which he set his subjects to construct
were a mosque
for the services of religion,
for the storage of military material,
w
an arsenal
and a house
for his
But while he was thus entering at once
upon the enjoyments of supreme power and unbridled
lust, the God whom he had served, not unfaithfully,
and who had given him whatever he had asked, required
and so all that he had
of Mohammed Ahmed his soul
1
benefit.
;
won by
his brains
and bravery became of no more
account to him.
In the middle of the month of June, scarcely five
months
after
paigns, the
not
the completion of
Mahdi
fell
victorious
cam-
For a few days he did
sick.
The people were filled
They were reassured by remembering the
appear at the mosque.
with alarm.
his
prophecy that
their
.
liberator
should not perish
till
'
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
115
Mohammed, however,
who attended him could
he had conquered the earth.
grew worse. Presently those
doubt no longer that he was
attacked
by typhus
The Khalifa Abdullahi watched by
fever.
On
continually.
soldiers
the sixth day the inhabitants and the
were informed of the serious nature of their
ruler's illness,
classes for his
and jmblic flayers were offered by all
On the seventh day it was
recovery.
evident that he was dying.
— the
his fortunes
the armies
who had
own
whom
family
For
All those
Khalifas he
priests of the religion
room.
couch
his
shared
had appointed, the
chief
he had reformed, the leaders of
followed
him
he had hallowed
some
who had
hours
and
to victory,
— crowded the small
he lay unconscious or
delirium, but as the end approached he rallied a
and, collecting his faculties
his faithful follower
4
honour.
He
by a great
adjured
of me, and
is
in
little,
declared
effort,
and friend the Khalifa Abdullahi
and
successor,
his
his
show him
am of him as you
the
I
rest
to
;
have obeyed me, so you should deal with him. May
1
Then he immediately
God have mercy upon me
!
Thus
expired.
most
died,
remarkable
the
at the age of thirty-seven,
Mohammedan
of
modern
times,
and one of the most famous Africans the world has
yet seen/
If the merits of a ruler are to
affection of his
Ahmed
the
is
city.
law of
all
be judged by the
subjects, the position of
rare and estimable.
Mohammed
Grief and dismav
filled
In spite of the emphatic prohibition
loud lamentations, the sound of
Slatin,
'
by
weeping
Fire and Sword
i
THE RIVER
116
WAR
and wailing arose from almost every house.'
The
acknowledged
whole people, deprived at once of their
and
sovereign
spiritual guide,
were shocked and
Only the Mahdi's wives,
frighted.
if
we may
Slatin, 'rejoiced secretly in their hearts at the
their
forth
2
af-
credit
death of
husband and master,' and, since they were henceto
be doomed to an enforced and inviolable
chastity, the cause of their satisfaction
as its manifestation
as obscure,
is
was unnatural.
The body of the Mahdi, wrapped in linen, was
reverently interred in a dee]) grave dug in the floor of
the room in which he had died, nor was it disturbed
until after the capture of
forces in 1898,
when bv
Omdurman by
the British
the orders of Sir H. Kitchener
was opened and the corpse exhumed. The
Khalifa Abdullahi had been declared by the Mahdi's
the sepulchre
latest
breath his successor.
choice ratified once for
all
He
determined to have the
by the popular
vote.
Hurry-
ing to the pulpit in the courtyard of the mosque, he
addressed the
assembled multitude in a voice which
trembled with intense excitement and emotion.
oratory, his reputation as a warrior,
Hi-
and the Mahdi's
expressed desire aroused the enthusiasm of his hearers,
and the
thousands.
oath of allegiance was at once sworn by
The ceremony continued long
after
it
was
With an amazing endurance he harangued till
past midnight, and when the exhausted Slatin, who
had attended him throughout the crisis, lay down
upon the ground to sleep, he knew that his master's
succession was assured
for, says he,
I heard the
dark.
'
;
2
Slatin,
Fire and Sword.
;
THE DEKVISH EMPIRE
117
passers-by loud in their praises of the late Mahdi, and
assuring each other of their firm resolve to support his
successor.'
Few men
of their
are satisfied with the
ambitions,
mere accomplishment
although the
and,
efforts
nearly
always give more pleasure than the prize, they hold
tenaciously to what they have won.
The Khalifa
Abdullahi had achieved his not inconsiderable desires.
His country was at his feet. He had obtained the
supreme authority in the Soudan.
to preserve
is
nothing
it.
own
had
remained, however,
Like Macbeth he reflected,
but to be safely thus
;
were directed
actions of his reign
of his
It
position.
He
To be thus
And
'
all
the
to the strengthening
ruled a turbulent people
learnt their power, tigers
The nice methods of
6
who had
who
tasted blood.
Government were
scarcely suited to such a task.
Sterner and bloodier
measures were necessary. Nor was Abdullahi the man
constitutional
shrink from the harshest
to
His cruelty indeed
expedients.
land where
or the most treacherous
all
men
hold
with callous indifference
life
;
may
escape notice in a
cheap and regard suffering
but his low and unscrupulous
cunning must excite the disgust and indignation even of
the most tolerant chronicler.
He was a crafty, vain,
and savage man,
faithless
in
all
respects save one.
His unswerving loyalty to the Mahdi must be credited
to
him
as a single virtue.
indisputable.
war
;
and
their
He
His talents were, however,
understood
affairs
had studied the characters of
knew
his
peace
and
countrymen
how he might avail himself of
He could take advantage of their
exactly
fanaticism.
of
THE RIVER
118
weaknesses and
WAR
With
utilise their strength.
punctilious
His sensual
care he fostered their religious prejudices.
passions were discreetly veiled from the public eye, and
Arabs were impressed by the appearance of a
the
sovereign
which
who always
preserved that dignified gravity
His
distinguished the noblest of their race.
lias
tyrannical and despotic actions were cloaked with the
forms of
and the Khalifa bowed before the
legality,
judgment of the courts which were
his instruments, or
whom
paid an 'exaggerated respect to judges
by
tively controlled
fear
he
effec-
and bribery.
The exercise of despotic power never improves the
As the years
ruler and rarely gratifies the subjects.
pass, their vexation increases and the spectacle of their
dissatisfaction jDrovokes the suspicion
Abdullahi was an evil
of the sovereign.
he presented
man when
His vices grew
succeeded the Mahdi.
until
and the cruelty
deplorable
a
witli his
must, however, be
tion.
To
find
potentates.
his
just
sense
as terrible as
of proportion
The Khalifa
standards of European
cultivated.
judged by the
rightly
A
Egyptians.
that of the
peers
age
and the
spectacle,
Soudan groaned beneath an oppression
he
we must look
is
not
civilisa-
barbaric
to
His methods and his manners were not
widely different from those which prevail throughout
the dominions of the Shah of Persia, or in the territories
of
'
our
ally
'
the
which he ordered
Amir
at
of Afghanistan.
Xo
Omdurman was more
execution
terrible
than
those which, with the approval of the British Govern-
ment, accompanied
Mutiny.
the
suppression
of
the
Indian
His chastisement of rebellious tribes was
less
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
119
brutal than the massacres of Armenians, and far
rational
most
more
than the anti-Semitism from which even the
have not purged themselves.
polite nations
His
morals compared not unfavourably with those of several
Asiatic Princes, and
captives
much worse
prisoners
treatment of the European
was admirable by contrast with that
by some of the
not
his
of
Italian
prisoners
suffered
and
in Abyssinia,
than the methods of keeping French
war practised
in
England
*
within the
*
*
present century.
The sovereignty that Abdullahi had obtained must
be held, as it had been won, by the sword. The
passionate agitation which the Mahdi had excited,
survived him. The whole of the Soudan was in a
The success which had crowned rebellion
ferment.
encouraged rebels. All the turbulent and fanatical
elements were aroused. As the various provinces had
been cleared of the Egyptians, the new Executive had
appointed military governors by whom the country was
ruled and taxed, subject to the pleasure of
Ahmed.
Mohammed
His death was the signal for a long series of
revolts of all
kinds
Garrisons mutinied
;
—
military, political,
Emirs plotted
;
and
religious.
prophets preached.
was the land torn only by internal struggles. Its
On the east the tremendous
frontiers were threatened.
power of Abyssinia loomed terrible and menacing.
There was war in the north with Egypt and around
Suakin with England. The Italians must be confronted
JSTor
Far to the south Emin
Pasha still maintained a troublesome resistance. Yet
the Khalifa triumphed over nearlv all his enemies and
from the direction of Massowa.
:
WAR
THE RIVER
120
the greatest spectacle
which the Soudan presented from
1885 to 1898 was of
this strong,
up against
all
coming each
every
reverses,
meeting each danger, overoffering
arid
difficulty,
capable ruler bearing
a firm
front to
foe.
It
is
unlikely that any complete history of these
events will ever be written in a form and style which
will interest a later generation.
The complications
of
extraordinary names and the imperfection of the records
might
the
deter
alone
The
chronicler.
universal
squalor of the scenes and the ignorance of the actors
add discouragements.
Xor, upon the other hand, are
there great incentives.
The
cruellest, bloodiest,
tale is
one of war of the
and most confused type.
One savage
army slaughters another. One fierce general cuts his
The same features are repeated with
rival's throat.
When
wearying monotony.
all
may be
imagined.
one battle
Above
is
the tumult the figure of
the Khalifa rises stern and solitary, the
which may attract the
Yet
even
the
monotonous.
revolts
might
invariable
many
the
Khalifa's
only object
interest of a happier world.
methods were
oppressively
For although the nature or course of the
differ witli the occasion, the results
and the heads of
;
understood,
all his
chief enemies, of
of his generals, of most of his councillors,
capacious pit which yawned
shall not therefore
It will
be
in
were
met
Omdurman.
in
I
attempt any chronological account.
sufficient to select
from the confusion one
or two striking events illustrating main characteristics,
and,
if
reader
they can be found, a few striking figures.
may
The
glance at the general colouring of the
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
picture
;
nor must he complain
much
if
of the canvas
unpainted.
is left
During the thirteen years of
have sought to
fortify their perilous sovereignty.
shrank from nothing.
three
He
was the guiding
object and his only
Self-preservation
principle of his policy, his
first
Among many wicked and
excuse.
his reign Abdullahi
every device by which Oriental rulers
nearly
tried
121
ingenious expedients
main methods are remarkable.
Firstly,
he
re-
moved
or rendered
rivals.
Secondly, he pursued what Sir Alfred Milner
6
has called
innocuous
a well-considered policy of military concen-
among
Thirdly, he maintained
tration.'
or potential
real
all
the desert and
power on the side of his
three methods merit some atten-
riverain peoples a balance of
own
All these
tribe.
tion or illustration.
The general massacre
usually follows
the
of
all
accession
possible
of
a
The Khalifa was
Oriental throne.
extreme measure.
claimants
usurper
to
an
able to avoid this
Nevertheless he took precautions.
4
Availing himself
followed
of the
erief
Mohammed Ahmed's
and from the
But these
Ashraf
had extorted
death, he
from the two other Khalifas
the oath of allegiance
6
and terror that had
'
complaisant
or relations of the Prophet.
men
3
soon repented of their
Each Khalifa boasted his independence.
Each marched attended by a numerous retinue. Each
submission.
asserted
his
right
to
beat
his
own
great
copper
drum. Both the unsuccessful Khalifas combined against
The Mahdi had superseded the original Mohammed
His relations consecmentlv became the Ashraf.'
3
'
THE RIVER WAR
122
But while they had been busy with the
Abdullahi.
beating of war-drums and the preparation of pageants,
that
sagacious ruler had
Baggara
secured the loyalty of the
a section of which he belonged, and
tribe, to
At length
of a considerable force of black riflemen.
Both parties prepared
matters reached a climax.
Abdullahi drew up his array without the
war.
for
city,
The
combined forces of the ousted Khalifas were the more
numerous. But the fierce Baggara waved their swords,
and challenged
his rivals to the
and the Soudanese riflemen
utmost proof.
were famous for
their
For some hours a bloody struggle appeared
valour.
Then
imminent.
the
confederacy
broke
The
up.
Khalifa Ali-Wad-Helu, a prudent man, talked of com-
The Khalifa
promise and amity.
Sherif, thus seriously
weakened, hastened to make peace while time remained.
Eventually both bowed to the superior force of the
ruler and the superior courage of his followers.
a barbaric
plebiscite,
fifty
men
their
their forces to
each, deprived
war-drums
was
with swords for voting-papeis.
Once they had submitted,
dullahi reduced
It
power was gone.
a
them of
personal
their flags
Ab-
escort
of
and their
— the emblems of royalty—and they became
for the future the useful supporters of a
Government
they were unable to subvert.
To other
less
powerful or more stubborn enemies
he showed a greater severity.
named
respectively
The Mahdi's two uncles,
Abdel Kerim and Abdel Kader,
were thrown chained into prison, their houses were
destroyed, and their wives and other property confiscated.
The numerous persons who claimed
to be of
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
123
Ashraf,' found the saintly
honour a burden upon
earth for, in order to keep them out of mischief, the
Khalifa enjoined them to attend five times every day at
the
'
;
the prayers
in the
mosque.
Eighteen months of the
devotions, declares the Christian chronicler, were con6
sidered
punishment.'
highest
the
4
more bar-
Still
barous was the treatment meted out to the unfortunate
Emir who had charge of the Treasury. Ahmed Wad
Suliman had been accustomed under the Mahdi's mild
rule to keep
no public accounts, and consequently he
had amassed a large fortune. He was actively hostile
to Abdullahi, and proclaimed his sympathy with the
Whereupon
Ashraf.
an account of his stewardship.
unable to do.
pointment.
He was
to give
This he was, of course,
then dismissed from his ap-
His private property was taken to
deficiencies of the State,
Omdurman applauded
justice.'
him
the Khalifa invited
fill
the
and the brutal population of
his
punishment
as
6
an act of
5
Although the Khalifa might
by such
atrocities,
military policy
its
establish his authority
maintenance depended on the
which he consistently pursued.
The
power of a standing army may usually be
exerted by whoever can control its leaders, as a mighty
engine is set in motion by the turning of a handle
Yet to turn the handle some muscular force is necessary.
Abdullahi knew that to rule the Soudan he
must have a great army. To make the great army
terrible
obedient he must have another separate force
influences
4
which keep European armies
Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity.
5
Slatin,
;
for the
in subjection
Fire and Sword.
THE 1MVER
124
WAR
were not present among the Dervishes.
was compelled
years, indeed, he
chance or the loyalty of his
to
much
leave
But
officers.
For some
latterly,
when
he had perfected his organisation, he became quite
He
the
6
invited his
ability
own
he carried out his schemes.
tribe,
Taiasha section of
the
Baggara Arabs, to come and
live in
Omdurman.
Come,' he wrote in numerous letters to them,
take possession of
God has
the
lands which
promise of
the
herdsmen came to the number
Their path was
on the
were newly clothed
and
Lord your
power, the
of
made smooth and
were erected along the route.
vessels waited
the
4
Allured by the hopes of wealth
given you.'
and wives and
in-
By degrees
dependent and had no need to trust anyone.
and with astonishing
to
7,000
easy.
at the
warriors.
Granaries
Steamers and
Arrived at the
Nile.
savage
sailing-
capital, all
expense of the State.
An
was forcibly cleared of its
the accommodation of the strangers.
entire district of the city
inhabitants for
What
the generosity of the Khalifa forgot or refused,
the predatory habits of his clansmen procured; and
they robbed, plundered,
and swindled with
arrogance and impunity of
royal
all
favourites.
the
The
populace of the city returned a bitter hatred for these
injuries
;
and the Khalifa's object was attained.
had created a
class in
attached to him.
local tribes.
land.
Omdurman who were
He
indissolubly
Like him, they were detested by the
Like him, they were foreigners in the
But, like him, they were fierce and brave and
His dangers, his enemies, his interests were
their own.
Their lives depended on their loyalty.
strong.
JL
mm
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
125
Here was the motor muscle which animated the
The Taiasha Baggara controlled the black
rest.
Jehadia, once the irregular troops of the Egyptians,
now become
the regulars of the Khalifa.
Jehadia overawed the Arab army in
army
the
in
capital
dominated the forces
inhabitants.
by the concentration of military
stores of
ammunition,
all
material.
frontiers, the
personal bodyguard
Taiasha tribe,
habitually
Cannon,
the necessities of
were accumulated in the arsenal.
on the
the
in
The forces in the provinces subdued the
The centralisation of power was assured
provinces.
rifles,
The black
the capital.
The
war
Only the armies
and the Khalifa's
carried firearms and
The enormous population of Omdurman
was forced to be content with spears and swords.
Eifles were issued to the Soudanese whenever safe and
cartridges.
necessary;
cartridges
only
when they were about
to
Thus several millions of warlike and savage
people, owning scarcely any law but that of might, and
be used.
scattered about a vast roadless territory, were brought
the firm grip of a single
The
third
principle
of
government
which
the
Khalifa was compelled, or inclined, to adopt was to keep
the relative
power of the various
conveniently proportioned.
influence
If
tribes
and
an Emir rose to great
and wealth, he became a possible
suffered forthwith death, imprisonment,
If a tribe
classes
rival,
and
or spoliation.
threatened the supremacy of the Taiasha
it
was stricken down while its menace was vet a menace.
The regulation of classes and tribes was a far more
complicated
affair
than the adjustment of individuals.
126
THE RIVER WAR
Yet
for thirteen years the Khalifa held the balance,
held
it
Such was the
exact until the very end.
craft of a savage
and
state-
from Kordofan.
His greatest triumph was the Abyssinian war.
is
It
not likely that two great barbaric kingdoms living
side
by
side,
but differing in race and religion,
continue at peace
;
nor was
it difficult
will long
to discover a
cause of the quarrel between the Dervishes and the
After the
Abvssinians.
of
fall
Khartoum and
the
army the garrison of Kassala
hold out.
The well-considered
retreat of the British
still
continued
to
proposal of a British officer
6
relieve the
to
town by
a small Indian brigade operating from Massowa was
disdained, in spite of the heroic spectacle which
resistance of the
Mudir presented.
7
t
lie
Mr. Gladstone's
Government, however, made attempts to induce the
Abvssinians to
undertake the
While these
relief.
negotiations were dragging on, the Ministry changed,
and the Conservatives, coining into
The Abyssinian expediThe town was taken and the garrison
them
to their abortive result.
tion
failed.
slaughtered.
power, carried
There,
as
far
concerned, the matter ended.
as
Great
Britain
was
But the Abvssinians had
thus been placed in direct antagonism to their Dervish
neighbours.
Frontier raids were planned and resisted
by both sides.
For some time a harassing and desultory warfare (listurbed the border. At length in 1885 a Dervish half-
—
6
Captain Speedy to Mr. Egerton, August 31, 1884.
7
There is extant a very pathetic telegram from Captain Speedy to
Nubar Pasha, describing the Mudir's defence.
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
trader, half-brigand
127
—sacked an Abyssinian church.
Adal, the Governor of the
Amhara
province,
Eas
demanded
that this sacrilegious robber should be surrendered to
justice.
swift.
The Arabs haughtily refused. The response was
Collecting an army which may have amounted
to 30,000
men, the Abyssinians invaded the
of Gallabat and
Emir
host the
marched on the town.
district
Against
this
Wad
Arbab could muster no more than
But, encouraged by the victories of the
6,000 soldiers.
previous four years, the Dervishes accepted battle, in
spite of the disparity of
numbers.
Neither valour nor
The Moslems,
could withstand such odds.
discipline
broken by the
fierce onset
whelming numbers of
together with
their
and surrounded by the over-
their enemies,
intrepid
were destroyed,
Scarcely
leader.
any
The Abyssinians indulged in all the triumphs
The wounded were massacred the slain
of savagery.
the town of Gallabat was sacked
were mutilated
and burnt. The women were carried into captivity.
Under this
All these tidings came to Omdurman.
heavy and unexpected blow the Khalifa acted with
escaped.
:
:
prudence and promptitude.
He opened
negotiations
with King John of Abyssinia for the ransom of the
captured wives and children, and at the same time he
Emir Yunes with a lame
sent the
The immediate
necessities
force to Gallabat.
having thus been dealt with,
Abdullahi prepared for revenge.
Of
all
continual
the
Arab
war
and
leaders
which
successes,
years
of
tumult throughout the Soudan
produced, none displayed higher
greater
fifteen
ability,
none obtained
and none were more honourable,
—
THE RIVER
128
"W AR
though several were more famous, than the man
the
Khalifa
selected
to
avenge
destruction
Abu An^a had been
the Gallabat army.
Abdullahi's family long before the
Abba
the
and
whom
a
of
slave in
Mahdi had preached
Egypt yet oppressed the
After the revolt had broken out, his adcountry.
venturous master summoned him from the distant
Kordofan home to attend him in the war, and Abu Anga
at
island
wliile
came with that ready obedience and strange devotion
Nominally as
for which he was always distinguished.
a slave, really as a comrade, he fought by Abdullahi's
Nor was
side in all the earlier battles of the rebellion.
it
until after the capture
of El
The Khalifa was a judge
suddenly to power and place.
of men.
troops,
town
He saw very clearly that the black Soudanese
who had surrendered and were surrendering as
after
town was taken, might be welded
powerful weapon.
who
Obeid, that he rose
And
in
Abu Anga
into I
he knew a man
could not only fashion the blade, but would hold
ever loyally at his master's disposal.
The former
slave
command
with
threw himself into the duties of his
extraordinary energy.
His humble origin pleased the
hardy blacks, who recognised
in birth, their superior in
other Emir,
Abu Anna
it
in their leader their equal
prowess.
More than any
contributed to the destruction of
The Jehadia. as his soldiers were called
8
because they had joined in the Jehad
were armed
with Remington rifles, and their harassing fire inflicted
was
heavy losses on the struggling column until
finally brought
standstill,
and
the
to
a
moment
for
lie
C
Hicks's army.
—
it
t
9
ml
8
Jehad (Arabic) =
*
Holy War.'
Editor.
THE DERVISH EMPIEE
129
spearmen to charge arrived.
of
Abu
Henceforward the troops
Anga became famous throughout the land for
weapons, their courage, and their cruelty.
their
numbers
at first did not
exceed 5,000
Their
but as more
;
towns were taken and more slaves were turned into
soldiers they increased, until at
one time they reached
the formidable total of 15,000 men.
During the siege of Khartoum the black riflemen
distinguished themselves
fort,
by
the capture of
Omdurman
but their violent natures and predatory instincts
made them an
capital,
undesirable garrison even for the Dervish
and they were despatched under
to Kordofan,
where they increased
their general
their reputation
by
a series of bloody fights with the Nubas, an aboriginal
mountain people who cared for nothing but
their in-
dependence.
While the general and
his valiant
riflemen were
thus warring in Kordofan, events occurred which in-
creased his
A
tions.
own
authority
and the Khalifa's obliga-
mutiny broke out in El Obeid.
black soldiers, formerly belonging to the
Some 200
Egyptian
Government, now in the service of the Khalifa and
disgusted with their treatment, revolted.
the
Arab Emir and his
to the
forces, they
Nuba mountains under
officer
of the
Beating
marched
down
in triumph
the leadership of an ex-
Khedivial army
named
Beshir.
The
Nubas welcomed the reinforcement with enthusiasm.
Abu Anga was eager to attack. The Khalifa had, how-
more important duty for him to perform.
A great Sheikh in Darfur was meditating revolt. He
had already collected a force of 3,000 riflemen and
ever, a
still
VOL.
I.
a
'
THE RIVER
130
WAR
1,000 horse, supported by a numerous armed rabble.
Abu Anga.
orders reached
Secret
Marching
to the scene, he arrived while the rebellion
swiftly
was yet
in
embryo and surrounded the camp of the Sheikh. The
morning light revealed to the revolutionists both the
Their leader was sent
situation and its hopelessness.
in chains to Omdurman.
His army swelled the force
under Abu Anga, who now turned his attention from
He
the rebels to the mutineers.
They were
On
rejected.
offered Beshir terms.
Anga attacked with a large part of his force.
were
He was,
forced to accept the pardon offered them
mild punishment, considering their offence.
old servant,
to
After these
summoned
ing
who was among
him with a
him
as
Beshir was killed, and his followers
usual, victorious.
'
Abu
the next day therefore
polite
affairs
the prisoners,
letter
his faithful general to
to bring his
—
Slatin's
was returned
by the princely
had been disposed
9
slave.
the
Khalifa
Omdurman,
instruct-
of,
whole army and leave only a small
Abu Anga
detachment in Darfur.
complied forthwith
;
yet I desire to relate two incidents
which occurred
before he
may form some
that
started,
the reader
estimate of the character of this remarkable barbarian.
A poor woman complained that
a soldier had robbed
her of some milk which he drank.
tested his innocence.
The culprit
The general was perplexed.
length a solution occurred to him.
man's stomach,' he
punished
;
said.
if not, let
the
'If
4
die.'
At
Kip open the
milk be found, he
woman
pro-
is
justly
The operation
was immediately performed, and the presence of the
9
Slatin,
Fire and Sword,
p. 399.
^
:
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
milk confirmed the j ustice of the
cated the woman's testimony.
131
udgment
and
j
10
vindi-
Otherwise the
would, of course, have been acquitted and the
The milk was
witness slain.
in
any case
man
false
beyond
spilt
recall.
The second incident
reveals a loftier strain, since the
prostitution of public authority to personal vengeance
A
must always be censured.
Emir named
certain
Madibbo was convicted of treasonable
practices and
Furious at being condemned by
sentenced to death.
one of servile origin, the proud criminal broke out
A slave like you can never become noble. The traces
'
of the lashes of
my
whip can
and were well deserved.'
11
still
be seen on your back
memory of his
moved the just and
Neither the
old flogging nor the bitter taunts
inexorable Anga, and, although he could at his pleasure
have
inflicted the
most
he abstained
frightful tortures,
from interfering with the ordinary course of the law.
Madibbo met his fate with composure, by a method
in strict accordance with constitutional practice.
At
the end of June
Abu Anga
reached
Omdurman
with an army variously estimated at from 22,000 to
31,000 men, of
Eemington
whom
at least
10,000 were armed with
The Khalifa received him with the
utmost honour. After a private interview, which lasted
for several hours, a formal entry into the town was
arranged.
At daybreak on the following morning the
whole force marched into the city and camped along the
northern suburbs, applauded and welcomed alike by the
rifles.
4
10
11
Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity,
Slatin, Fire and Sivord, p. 398.
p. 246.
K 2
—
.
WAR
THE RIVER
132
population and
their ruler.
A few days
Kerreri
the
under
held
was
review
oround where the Dervish
shattered.
But the
He
hills,
on the very
Empire was doomed
fateful place
with no forebodings.
after this a great
to be
oppressed the Khalifa
exulted in his power: and
thundered
had
cannon
the
after
for
might,
well he
armed
men
than
100,000
less
no
salutes,
indefinite
11
the
Ombyas
and
war-drums
the
of
music
the
defiled to
of
the
spectacle
The
Flag.
Black
famous
before the
enthusiasm.
their
provoked
numbers
enormous
mighty
his
by
cheered
was
Khalifa
triumphant
The
host,
until
loyalty
exuberant
their
in
him
upon
who pressed
stirring
indeed
a
was
It
crushed.
almost
he was
throng.
with
the
filled
was
plain
whole
The
scene.
the
in
gaily
waved
shape
and
hue
Banners of every
spearinnumerable
from
glinted
sunlight
the
and
breeze,
bright
their
displayed
Dervishes
swarming
The
points.
circled
cavalry
Baggara
wild
The
jibbas.
parti-coloured
The brown dome of
on the flanks of the array.
Mahdi's Tomb,
rising
above the
warriors of supernatural aid.
.
city,
seemed
the
to assure the
Abdullah! was at the
The movement initiated by the
Behind,
climax.
its
attained
had
island
Abba
priest of
rose
Hill
Surgham
of
rocks
frowning
the
plain,
in the
summit of his power.
ragged and gloomy,
as if their silence
guarded the secrets
of the future
After the feast of Bairam
aio-antic scale,
had been celebrated on a
Abu Anga was
despatched to Gallabat
from
reinforcements
considerable
and
with his army
that
evident
became
it
and
Omdurman,
in
the troops
12
War-horns made from the hollowed tusks
of elephants.
Editor.
—
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
133
war with Abyssinia was imminent. The great leader
relieved the Emir Yunes, much to his disgust, of the
chief command, and, since the strong Gallabat garrison
was added to his own force, Abu Anga might take the
field at
the head of 15,000 riflemen, 45,000 spearmen,
and 800 horse.
;*reat
13
The Khalifa had embarked on a
venture in planning the invasion of Ab}^ssinia.
The vast strength of the Negus was known
to
Dervishes, and has since been proved
world.
to
the
the
The Mahdi had forbidden such a war.
An illomened prophecy further declared that the King of
Abyssinia would tether his horse to a solitary tree by
Khartoum, while his cavalry should ride through the
city,
fetlock
neither
killed.
in. blood.
God nor man.
situation,
frontiers
deep
He
and determined
reviewed
the
political
at all risks to maintain his
His Emir "Wad Arbab had been
inviolate.
Blood must
But Abdullahi feared
settle the matter.
The Abyssinians had not watched the extensive
hostile preparations apathetically.
Eas Adal had collected an army which in numbers actually exceeded
that of the Dervishes.
But the latter were far superior
in
rifles,
valour.
and the black infantry were of invincible
Nevertheless, confident in his strength and re-
lying on his powerful cavalry, the Abyssinian general
allowed the Arabs to
toil
through
all
the mountainous
country, to traverse the Mintik Pass, and to debouch
unmolested on to the plain of Debra
neglected no precaution.
He knew
13
nature of the Abyssinian highlands.
Abu Anga
that since he
number
Editor.
Sin.
must
WAR
THE RIVER
134
heart of Abyssinia, with the
the
fight in
mountains
behind him, a defeat would involve annihilation. He
drew up his army swiftly and with skill. Then the
Abyssinians attacked.
repulsed them.
rate
gallantry.
and
superior
The
rifle
fire
of the Soudanese
The onset was renewed with despeIt was resisted with equal valour
weapons.
After
frightful
losses
the
Abyssinians wavered, and the wise Arab seized the
moment
of his
for a counterstroke.
In spite of the devotion
cavalry Eas Adal was driven from the
field.
Great numbers of his army were drowned in the river
in
of which he had recklesslv elected to fight.
front
His camp was captured, and a valuable spoil rewarded
the
victors,
who
also
gratified
with
passions
their
—
wounded a practice
commonly followed by savages. The effect of the
The whole of the Amhara province
victory was great.
submitted to the invaders, and Abu An<>a was able to
a wholesale
slaughter
of the
advance without further fighting to the capture and
sack of Gondar, the ancient capital of Abyssinia.
Meanwhile the Khalifa had been anxiously expectin
tidings of his army.
The long
silence of thirty days
which followed
their plunge into the
him with
and Ohrwalder
visibly'
fear,
during that period.
mountains
relates that
But
his
he
filled
'
aged
judgment was
proved by the event, and the arrival of a selected
assortment of heads turned doubt to triumph.
The
Dervishes did not long remain in Abyssinia, as they
suffered
from the climate.
In December the army
returned to Gallabat, which they
and
their
commenced
to fortify,
victorious general followed his grisly, but
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
135
convincing despatch to Omdurman, where he received
the
welcome
usual
accorded by warlike peoples to
But the famous and faithful slave
may have been more gratified by the tears of joy
which his master and sovereign shed on beholding
him again safe and successful.
The greater struggle was still to come. The whole
military heroes.
of Abyssinia
John
in
was
is
fury,
person prepared to take the
the quarrel for
which
with
convulsed
ever.
said to have
20,000 horsemen.
He
field
and
King
and
settle
assembled a mighty host,
amounted
to 130,000 foot
The rumours
of this
and
formidable
Omdurman, and
caused deep alarm. The
concentration reached Gallabat and
in spite of the recent victory
Khalifa saw his frontiers
— even
his existence
—menaced,
King John had declared that he would sweep the
Dervishes from off the face of the earth and in the
for
:
hour of need the General on
whom
so
much depended
died of some poisonous medicine with which he had en-
deavoured to cure himself of indigestion.
was buried
in his red-brick
Abu Anga
house at Gallabat amid the
lamentations of his brave black soldiers, and gloom
pervaded the whole army.
But, since the enemy were
approaching, the danger had to be faced.
appointed Zeki Tummal,
to
the
command
of the
The Khalifa
one of Anga's lieutenants,
forces
at
Gallabat,
which
by strenuous exertions he brought up to a total
of 85,000 men. King John sent word that he was
coming, lest any should afterwards say that he had
come secretly
thief.
The Dervishes resolved to
remain on the defensive, and fortified themselves in an
THE RIVER
136
WAR
zeriba around the town.
Then they awaited
the onslaught.
March
within sight of their
came
enemies, and early the next morning
the battle began.
Great clouds of dust obscured the
At dawn on
scene,
and
the 9th of
all intelligible
the Abyssinians
sounds were
lost in the appal-
The Abyssinians, undaunted by
ling din.
the
rifle
lire
of the Soudanese, succeeded in setting the zeriba alight.
Then, concentrating
all
their force
on one part of the
defence, they burst into the enclosure
division of
Wad
Tin
Ali, a fourth part of the entire Der-
vish army, which bore the
brunt of
almost completely destroyed.
zeriba
and town.
The
this attack,
was
of
the
interior
was crowded with women and
children,
who
were ruthlessly butchered by the exultant Abyssinians.
The
assailants scattered in all directions in search of
plunder, and they even had time to begin to disinter the
body of Abu Anga, which they were eager
to insult in
The Dervishes wavered. Their
ammunition began to fail. Suddenly a rumour spread
about among the Abyssinians that the King was killed.
Seizing what booty they could snatch, the victorious
armv began a general retreat and the zeriba was soon
cleared.
The Arabs were too exhausted to jmrsue, but
when on the following day the attack was not renewed
revenge for Gondar.
they learned, to their surprise, that they were the victors
and that
Atbara
their
river.
enemy was
Zeki
falling
Tummal
back towards the
resolved to pursue, and
by the fact
that the Abyssinians had carried off with them a large
number of Dervish women, including the harem of the
his
further incited to the chase
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
late
beloved
Abu Anga.
Two
137
days after the battle the
Dervishes overtook the enemy's rearguard, and, surpri-
and captured much
The temporary Negus who had been appointed
sing their camp, inflicted severe loss
booty.
to
fill
by the death of King John,
The body of that courageous
the vacancy caused
was among the killed.
monarch fell into the hands of the Dervishes, who struck
a tangible proof of victory
off the head and sent it
The Abyssinians, still formidable,
to Omdurman.
—
—
made ^ood
their retreat
:
to
follow into the mountains.
his
dominions prevented the
the
offensive,
to, as it
in
arrival
intoxicated
venture
Internal strife
within
new Negus from resuming
war
and thus the Dervish-Abyssinian
dwindled down
The
Tummal
nor did Zeki
had
Omdurman
Khalifa
the
arisen out
with
of,
of King John's head
joy.
its
was
greater power
Abyssinia
regarded throughout the Soudan as a far
than Es;ypt, and here was
frontier raids.
mighty ruler
and
slain
But the victory had been dearly purThe two great battles had been fought with
decapitated.
chased.
indescribable ferocity
was appalling.
it
may be
tained
No
by both
sides,
and the slaughter
reliable statistics are available,
but
reasonably asserted that neither side sus-
a loss in killed during the war of less
than
30,000 fighting men. The flower of the Dervish army, the
heroic blacks of Abu Anga, were almost destroyed.
Khalifa had
won
a Pyrrhic triumph.
he able to put so great a force in the
The
Never again was
field,
and, although
army which was shattered at Omdurman was better
armed and better drilled, it was less formidable than that
which broke the might of Abyssinia. I am drawn to
the
THE RIVER WAR
138
the conclusion that even this small world
for its inhabitants
bv the
is
large
tremendous
reflection that these
battles with their prodigious slaughter excited
interest in
enough
no more
Europe than did the Franco-German war
in
the Soudan.
Next
importance after the Abyssinian war among
in
was the supAbu Anga was
the military undertakings of the Khalifa
When
pression of the western revolts.
summoned
Omdurman
to
Gallabat he
left his
cousin,
representative in El Obeid.
command the army at
Osman- Wad-Adam, as his
to
This Emir, whose reputa-
had been made by his complete destruction of the
Kabbabish or camel-breeding Arabs, was a man of little
tion
talent but great brutality.
He
harried and oppressed
the population until they thought the Egyptian days
were come back again.
strain
;
every liquid
troubles of
life
its
Every rope has
its
As soon
boiling point.
outweigh the fear of death
a
people need only a leader to rise in revolt.
in the East, the leader
sat
under a
was a
He
miraculous powers.
From
feed hundreds.
raised a fruitful
for
As
A youn*
a
Soon
all
usual
r
man
fasted.
admitted his
could produce milk from his
single plateful of food he could
Within the space of one hour lie had
palm-tree from the desert sand.
Is it
quite wise to call
enthusiasts
fanatic.
as the
maddened
and preached, prayed, and
fig-tree
His influence rapidly increased.
finger-tips.
breaking
such
men impostors?
the most
part care nothing for the
pains and pleasures of earthly
a scene of misery
These wild
life.
They
rise
above
and despair, and vaguely point to the
promise of better things beyond the sky. They come
to distressed
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
139
peoples in their bitter
hour of need,
even as the Judges came to Israel and Judah.
Behind
them follows the fury of rebellion. Tyrants tremble
and oppressors quake before the passions they arouse.
|
And
there be some
who
think they hear above the
fury of wronged thousands the heavy menace
shrill
of an angered God.
to
From being a worker of miracles it was but
nor was it long
the command of an army
:
Man
'The
of the Fig-tree,'
Abu
war
before
Gemaiza, headed a
formidable revolt against Mahdism.
quences, he declared merciless
a step
Careless of conse-
against all
the patched jibba and believed that
who wore
Mohammed Ahmed
was a holy Prophet. The Western Soudan seethed and
fermented. Thousands flocked to the standard of the
new
The
deliverer.
despatched
against
man was
Khalifa, who was
bloody
Abyssinian
perils,
victorious
1889, while
which Osman-Wad-Adam
him were
closely
annihilated,
and that
The
penned in El Fasher.
same time confronted by the
sent him positive orders to remain on
at the
But death terminated the career of the
the defensive.
6
forces
Man of the Fig-tree,' and
still
in the beginning of
blockading El Fasher, he died of small-
The confidence of the rebels was destroyed the
inspiration had departed.
The elated Osman sallied
out of the town in which he had so long been beleaguered, and in a fierce battle under its walls on the
22nd of February, 1889, dispersed the besiegers. A
pox. -«
!
:
great slaughter accompanied the struggle
massacre followed the victory.
of the Fig-tree
'
The
—exhumed according
:
a greater
skull of the
to the
6
Man
customs of
—
THE RIVER WAR
140
savages
man.
—met that of the
Negus
The Khalifa, delighted
prepared a special house for
But
before
in the pit at
at his general's success,
Osman near
the mosque.
triumphant Emir could
the
Omdur-
enjoy
honours he had won, he was summoned to answer
the
for
the crimes he had committed, and he died in the year
of his victory near
its
scene at El Fasher.
During the jnogre^s of the struggle with Abyssinia
war against Egypt languished. The Mahdi, counting upon the support of the population, had always
declared that he would free the Delta from the Turks,"
and was already planning its invasion, when lie and his
the
4
schemes were interrupted by death.
inherited
of
all
the quarrel, hut not
the power.
all
Mohammed Ahmed's influence died
he might conquer the Moslem world
a saint.
All fanatical
Nevertheless the
He
feeling in
His successor
;
with him.
Much
Alive,
dead, he was only
Egypt soon subsided.
Khalifa persisted in the enterprise.
always feared the danger in the north.
weight of a stronger hand
condition of his existence.
;
and, besides,
The
He
felt
the
war was a
military operations
the trouble at Suakin, the actions of Ginniss, Gemaiza,
—
Argin and Toski will be noticed in the next chapter
from the Egyptian point of view.
I will avoid repetition
motives.
by examining only the Dervish
The success of the Abvssinian war encou-
raged and enabled the Khalifa to resume the offensive
on
his northern frontier,
and he immediately ordered
Wad-el-N ejumi, who commanded in Dongola,
with his scanty force to
mad
march
the invasion of Egypt.
The
to
enterprise ended, as might have been foreseen, in
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
the destruction of both
received
difficult
He was
news
the
to
141
Emir and army.
with
apparent
The Khalifa
grief,
but
it
is
avoid suspecting him of dark schemes
far too clever to believe that
conquered by five thousand men.
Egypt could be
He knew
was a strange white
the Egyptians there
that besides
tribe of
men,
had so nearly saved Khartoum. 'But
for the English,' he exclaimed on several occasions, I
would have conquered Egypt.' Yet, knowing of the
the same that
'
British occupation, he
ruin.
inevitable
its
deliberately
It
is
difficult
sent
an army to
to reconcile such
conduct with the character for sagacity and intelligence
which Abdullahi has deserved. There is no doubt that
he wanted to conquer Egypt.
Possibly
by some
extra-
ordinary chance Wad-el-Nej umi might succeed, even
with his small force.
If so, then the glory of
God and
power of the Khalifa would advance together. If not
and herein lies the true reason for the venture the
riverain tribes would have received a crippling blow.
the
m
f
m
—
f
The
terrible slaughter of the
Abyssinian war had
mainly on the Jehadia and the eastern Arabs.
The jealous tribes in the north had not suffered. The
fallen
balance of power was in need of readjustment.
and
Barabra were
The
becoming dangerous.
Nejumi's army was recruited almost entirely from these
sources.
The reinforcements sent from Omdurman
consisted of men selected from the flag of the Khalifa
Jaalin
fast
who was growing too powerful, and of the
14
Batahin tribe, who had shown a mutinous spirit.
The
Sherif,
success of such an
14
army
in
Egypt would be
Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity.
glorious.
1
THE RIVER
142
"NY
A1
What
convenient.
be
would
anywhere
destruction
Its
been, his advantag
.Yhdullalii S
was
certain.
upon
to prey
But the
itself
life
of the empire thus Compelled
must necessarily be
short.
Other forces were soon added to the work
of
The Tear following the end of the Abyswar was marked bv a fearful famine. Slatin and
exhaustion.
sinian
Ohrwalder vie with
men
eating the
eacli oilier in relating its horrors
raw
of donkeys;
entrails
mothers
devouring their babies; scores dying in the
all
more ghastlv
the
in the bright sunlight
down
of corpses floating
fighting.
hundreds
among
The depopulation caused by the
the hideous features.
scarcity
—these
;
street^,
the Xile
are
was even greater than that produced by the
Nature, more wholesale than any human
engine of destruction,
terrible vengeance.
the whole
as far as
15
when she
takes,
is
roused, a
The famine area extended over
Soudan and ran along the banks of the river
Lower Egypt. The deserted villages, which
excited the indignation of the soldiers of the British
expedition and have been
made a heavy
accusation
against the Dervishes, protest the severity of Nature
rather than the cruelty of man.
The
effects of the
famine were everywhere appalling.
Entire districts between
wholly depopulated.
almost
all
Omdurman and Berber became
In the
salt regions
the inhabitants died of hunger.
near Shendi
The camel
cannot
500 persons have perished
four
months
Omdurman.
day science
of plague
The machinery
may
call
great
of
modern war
is
still
defective.
Some
the mighty bacillus into the disnnt«i nf not;™?.
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
143
breeding tribes ate their she-camels.
The
riverain
peoples devoured their seed-corn.
The population of
Gallabat, Gedaref, and Kassala was reduced by ninetenths, and these once considerable towns shrank to the
Everywhere the deserted
size of hamlets.
crumbled back into the
plain.
The
fact that
may be gauged
Zeki Tummal's army, which before the
famine numbered not
muster 10,000
houses
frightful mortality,
general throughout the whole country,
by the
mud
men
less
than 87,000 could scarcely
in the spring of 1890.
The new harvest came only in time to save the
inhabitants of the Soudan from becoming extinct.
The
remnant were preserved
scarcity,
War,
and oppression there had always been. But
for further misfortunes.
strange and mysterious troubles began to
afflict
the tor-
The face of Heaven was pitiless or averted.
In 1890 innumerable swarms of locusts descended on the
impoverished soil. The multitude of their red or yellow
bodies veiled the sun and darkened the air, and although
tured
tribes.
their flesh, tasting
afford a delicate
a
toll
when
roasted like fried
meal to the
fish,
natives, they took so
might
heavy
of the crops that the famine was prolonged and
scarcity
became
constant.
Since their
first
appearance
f
the locusts are said to have returned annually.
destructive efforts were aided
mice,
who
by
16
Their
millions of little red
destroyed the seeds before they could grow.
So vast and immeasurable was the number of these
tiny pests that after a
heavy rain the whole country
was strewn with, and almost tinted by the
squirrel-
coloured corpses of the drowned.
16
Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity in the Soudan.
THE RIVER WAR
144
the
Khalifa
fate,
of
strokes
the
all
of
spite
Yet, in
maintained
ligation
his
unshaken.
authority
which always occurs
by
accelerated
the
The
centra-
military States was
in
The provincial towns
famine.
perished;
thousands
of
tens
and
thousands
dwindled;
ruler
still
its
and
grew,
continually
but Omdurman
Thus
army.
powerful
of
a
energies
the
directed
the present I would
the gloomy
by
leave the Dervish Empire.
city of blood,
mud, and
filth
for
Yet
that arose
the confluence of the Niles deserves a final glance
while
still
in the pride of independent barbarism.
It is early
morning, and the sun,
horizon, throws the shadows of the
the brimful waters of the Nile.
lifting
above the
Khartoum
The old
capital
ruins on
is
solitary
and deserted. No sound of man breaks the silence of
Only memory broods in the garden where
its streets.
the Pashas used to walk, and the courtyard where the
Imperial envoy
houses,
lininG;
stretching
hills,
sun
fell.
Across the river miles of
the banks as far as
back
into the desert
mud
Khor Shambat, and
and towards the dark
Arab metropolis. As the
Along the road from
live.
display the extent of the
rises,
the city begins to
Kerreri a score of camels pad to market with village
produce.
The north wind
is
driving a dozen sailing-
boats, laden to the water's edge with merchandise, to
One of Gordon's old steamers lies moored
Another, worked by the crew that
by the bank.
manned it in Egyptian days, is threshing up the Blue
Nile, sent by the Khalifa to Sennar on some errand of
State. Ear away to the southward the dust of a Darfur
the wharfs.
caravan breaks the clear-cut skyline with a misty blur.
THE DERVISH EMPIRE
The prolonged beating
]45
of war-drums
and
loud
booming notes of horns chase away the silence of
It is Friday, and after the hour of prayer
the night.
all err own men must attend the review on the
without the
Already the
city.
streets
with devout and obedient warriors.
square of the mosque
—
for
many thousand worshippers
Soon the
no roof could
—
is
crowded
are
filled
srreat
shelter so
with armed men,
kneeling in humble supplication to the stern
God
of
Islam and his most holy Mahdi.
It is finished.
They
and hurry to the parade.
flags, and all form in the ranks.
The Emirs plant
their
rise
and
let
the speedy see that he
Woe
wear
and carry a sharp sword and
Presently the array
A
is
salute of seven
to the laggard
his
at least
;
newest jibba,
three spears.
complete.
guns
is fired.
Mounted on a
fine
by a gigantic Nubian, and attended
by perhaps two hundred horsemen in chain armour, the
Khalifa rides on to the erround and along the ranks.
It is a good muster.
Few have dared absent themcamel, which
Yet
selves.
pened
?
is
led
his
Is there
brow
clouded.
is
What
another revolt in the west
has hap?
Do
the
Have the black troops
mutinied or is it only some harem quarrel ?
The parade is over.
The troops march back
to the arsenal.
The rifles are collected and the
Abyssinians threaten Gallabat
?
;
warriors
the
disperse
to
their
market-place
to
make
latest
are
homes.
Many hurry
purchases,
to
rumour, or to watch the executions
usually
Eekik and
VOL.
I.
executions.
criticise the
Others
hear
—
to
the
for there
stroll to the Suk-er-
points of the slave girls as
L
THE RIVKK wai;
146
the dealers offer
them
But the Khalifa has
for sale.
and
returned to his house,
his council
have been sum-
ruler
the
and
small,
is
room
The
moned.
1
Before him squat
leoo-ed upon an angarib}
Yakub
and Kadis.
Only the Sheikh-ed-Din
the Khalifa Sherif.
for
he
is
a dissolute youth and
Abdullahi
is
cross-
the Knurs
Ali-Wad-Helu and
there, with
is
sits
much
is
absent,
given to drinking.
A
grave and anxious.
messenger has
on
the move.
Turks
are
The
north.
the
from
come
Advancing beyond their frontier, they have established
Wad
themselves at Akasha.
may
attack the faithful Ansar
itself this
is
Bishara fears
18
who
is full
hold Firket.
but a small matter, for
has been frontier fighting.
there
of menacing
significance.
lest
In
these years
all
But
they
what
follows
The enemies of God
1
*
—
have begun to repair the railway have repaired it,
Even
so that the train already runs beyond Sarras.
now
they push their iron road out into the desert
towards their position at Akasha and to the south.
What is the object of their toil ? Are they coming
again
?
Will thev bring those terrible white soldiers
who broke
Hadendoa and almost
Degheim and Kenana ? What should
the hearts of the
destroyed the
draw them up the
love of war; or is
True, they are
as
now
Nile
it
Is
?
for plunder, or in sheer
a blood feud that brings them
far
Perchance thev
off.
nor for
a
day.
Of a surety
A
1S
Ansar = helpers
native bed, identical with the Indian charpoy.
in the
Holy War.
is
not
there are
war-clouds in the north.
17
?
will return,
Yet the iron road
thev returned before.
built in a day,
it
S
,
THE
^
1 1 *
•
*
A*•
ITALIANS
•
AB YS SINIAN
DEKVISH EMPIRE
lohar
1885
Sixalm
1898
-
Scale
o
50
lOO
200lffle8
3
Ea
Note
TH& strengths of GvesVccrixjxjA JJervishj
mo
900
„
MM
MAI
Um WML
s
Infantry
o
EGYPTIAN.
Ad/xrama
200
1000 Spfzarmen
f««t»
Jj00u
\
<^^^
AHM
garrisons are* taken; from,
Mw/n
cat/ estimate/
made/ vccrly t>l 7896 They const aitily
varied' fvtOi fiie< fortunes of c&zseless
sgZnien
.
eon /Lavaby
yvarcatdj aJL estimates vaust/bes
accepted, as temporary aruL< ccpprootxrrtfxij>
FEDIL
t£TL
500
6
Berber.
•
A.
AbuIEcwiej
B<iyvud cu
boo
gj
Mirat Well*
OMDU
Desert
Cayoilry
(haiM
TOIIM
4s5,000
~Jooo
•,000
_
,500 Cay
KHALI FA
T
72 Guns
W A dV
loski
igjypHxuv Oittp
E L -
R
NEJU
Firket
angola
0(9
Spearmerv
[5000 Spearmetv
250. Infantry
-
LOO
\
2400 lhtantry
500 Qavairy
6 (rune
Garrisons dispersed Uu-oiujhautI)arfiLrSi^Kordofanj
OS
MAN
I)
A R
-
WAD -ADAM
151 Tosher
Reference.
Tfte ID ervish
Empire
—
i..,.
.
•
•
*
tiki
mi
» **
hi «J
Denish Garrisons
Dervish Commanders in me
Provinces where their Greatest
Operations *werc performed
MAHMUD
George Pkiiip
Longmans, Greeo *
Co
.
L anion He-wYork^Bombay.
.
it
Son London 6c Liverp ooL
—
—
147
CHAPTEE Y
THE YEAES OF PEEPAR AT 1 0 N
—
England in Egypt — BegeneraWeariness— A transformation scene
tion — The Egyptian army — The European system — The Egyptian
Sambo — The
soldier— The test of war —Increase of the army
defence of the frontier — Suakin— The lean years — The sword of
re-conquest — Herbert Kitchener — His education —He learns Arabic
— Kitchener in 1882—A military crime — Its reward — Kitchener in
the Nile expedition — Gordon's complaints — Governor of Suakin
Handub — Adjutant -General — The post of Sirdar — Colonel "Wodehouse — Cromer's choice — The Intelligence Department — Fugitives
from Omdurman— Change of public opinion in England — Sentimental, fanatical, and political causes — The opinion of the Cabinet
Some diplomatic arrangements
—
Adowa — The immediate cause
—
The Egyptian point of view "War or water — The beginning of the
Egypt — The
expedition — A financial digression — The fetters of
—
Caisse de la Dette— Political justice 'Extraordinary expenses'
The French action — Their triumph—An unexpected developement
'
'
4
'
Decline of French influence.
In the
summer
treated to
of 1886,
Wady
when
Haifa and
all
all
the troops had re-
the Soudan garrisons
had been massacred, the British people averted their
eyes in shame and vexation from the valley of the Mle.
A lonsf succession of disasters had reached their disThe dramatic features added
graceful culmination.
much
to the bitterness
the tragedy.
The
cost
and nothing
was heavy.
to the
grandeur of
Besides the pain
produced by the death of General Gordon, the heavy
and men, and the serious expenditure
of public money, the nation smarted under failure and
losses in officers
L 2
:
THE RIVER
148
WAR
disappointment, and were, moreover, deeply sensible
1
had been humiliated before the whole world.
The situation in Egypt was scarcely more pleasing.
The reforms initiated by the British Administrators
that they
as yet only caused unpopularity.
had
Baring's inter-
ference galled the Khedive and his Ministers.
Vincent's
Moncrieft's energy had
parsimony excited contempt.
convulsed the Irrigation Department.
Wood's army
was the laughing-stock of Europe. Among and beneath
the rotten weeds and garbage of old systems and
But England
abuses the new seed was being sown.
saw only the stubborn
saw no signs of the crop
husbandmen begrimed with the dust and dirt, and
;
herself hopelessly
and so
in
involved in the Egyptian muddle
utter weariness
and disgust, stopping her
ears to the gibes and cat-calls of the Powers, she turned
towards other lands and other matters.
Great and impressive are the
A
prosperous
man
ugly, are woeful spectacles.
evil things give place to
tion of the pain
is
of contrast.
happy man
woman grown suddenlv
And on the other hand
fallen into poverty, a
become miserable, a beautiful
when
effects
good, besides the subtrac-
and the addition of the pleasure, there
an extra delight
—the joy of
relief.
When the attention
was again directed to Egypt the scene was
transformed.
It was as though at the touch of an angel
of the nation
the dark morasses of the Slough of Despond had been
changed to the breezy slopes of the Delectable Mountains.
The Khedive and his Ministers lay quiet and
docile in the firm grasp of the Consul-General.
The
bankrupt State was spending surpluses upon internal
—
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
149
The disturbed Irrigation Department
The derided army held the
was vivifying the land.
improvement.
frontier against all comers.
Astonishment gave place to
grew
faction
if
and
satis-
The haunting nightmare
ended. Another dream began
into delight.
of Egyptian politics
a bright
satisfaction,
vague vision of Imperial power, of
trans-
continental railways, of African Viceroys, of conquest
and commerce.
in
the
interest of the
work of regeneration grew
many
plause.
British
people
continually.
of doing good began to
fascination
of
The
appeal to
The
men
Each new reform was hailed with apEach annual Budget was scrutinised with pride.
classes.
England exulted in the triumph of failure turned into
There was a general wish to know more
success.
about Egypt and the men who had done these great
things.
In
1893
desire
this
was
satisfied
and yet
stimulated by the publication of Sir Alfred Milner's
'
England
His
in Egypt.'
had been overcome, no
By
less
skilful
pen displayed what
than what was accomplished.
explaining the difficulties he enhanced the achieve-
ment.
He showed how,
occupied elsewhere, her
repeated on a lesser
evolution which
is
while
brilliant,
scale in
Great Britain was
persevering sons had
Egypt the marvellous
working out in India.
Smaller
The Administrators
The movement had been
were guided by experience.
far swifter.
The results were more surprising. Such
was the wonderful story, and it was told in a happy
systems circulate more rapidly.
The audience were eager and sympathetic.
The story-teller had
The subject was enthralling.
moment.
WAR
THE RIVER
150
a wit and a style that might have brightened the
In these propitious circumstances the
dullest theme.
book was more than a book. The words rang like
the trumpet-call which rallies the soldiers after the
summons them
parapets are stormed, and
to complete
the victory.
The summons was not unheeded. If there had been
a change in Egypt since 1880, there had also been a
change in England. The idea of Imperial Democracy
a great empire ruled under the crown by a greater
—
people
— was no longer a philosophic dream.
The spark
which had fallen in the principal towns and centres of
thought and action had been fanned into a llame which
burned bright and steady during the years of recovery
following the
Home
Eule
18U2 the flame flickered
stone's eloquence,
it
of 188(5
crisis
in
blazed
;
and though
in
the breath of Mr. Gladthe brighter
all
And
when
that
came to passthat men looked towards Egypt, and so remembered
the lost provinces and the tragedy with which the
name Khartoum must, despite all later successes, be
power was withdrawn.
terrible
it
'
'
for ever associated.
The regeneration of Egypt
would
it
fall
is
not a theme which
within the limits of this account, even
had not been
fully
— though,
with by Sir Alfred Milner.
I
hope, not finally
is
an essential feature.
transcribe whole pages of
subject,
were
it
4
dealt
But the reorganisation of
the Egyptian army, the forging of the
conquest,
—
if
England
I
in
weapon of rewould willingly
Egypt on this
'
not incongruous to patch the garb of
a wayfarer with the raiment of a king.
But though
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
I choose
my own
151
words, the ground covered
is
the
same.
On
the 20th of December, 1882, the old Egyptian
—
army or, rather, such parts as had escaped destruction
was disbanded by a single sentence of a British decree.
The sure foundation of society is force, and it was
evident that some military body must replace that which
had been swept away. To try to make soldiers of the
Egyptians seemed a task better suited to the students of
Laputa than to ordinary men. It appeared easier to draw
sunbeams out of cucumbers than to put courage into
All sorts of schemes for the employment
the fellah.
of foreign legions or Turkish janissaries were devised.
But Lord DufFerin
—to
his
honour
— adhered
firmly to
the principle of entrusting the defence of a country to
its
inhabitants.
It
was determined
form a new
to
The poverty of the Government, no
less than the apparent folly of the experiment, demanded
The force was inthat the new army should be small.
Egyptian army.
tended only for the preservation of internal order and
the defence of the eastern and western frontiers of
Egypt against the Bedouin Arabs.
slumbered out
was the
—
Six thousand
long nightmare.
still
men
—
drawn by conscription for
no volunteers in Egypt from a population
number
there are
of
its
The Soudan
originally
—
Twenty-six British
more than 6,000,000.
either poor
men
attracted
or ambitious allured
by
by the high
recruits
rates of pay,
the increased authority
a score of excellent drill-sergeants
of teaching the
officers
to
fight.
— and
undertook the duty
Sir
Evelyn
directed the enterprise, and became the
first
Wood
British
WAR
THE RIYKK
l')2
The work began and
Sirdar of the Egyptian
army.
immediately prospered.
Within three months of
formation the army had
6,000 paraded in their
The whole
battalions and marched past
its
lirst
the Khedive and their country's
and
its
review.
Their bearing
flair.
their drill extorted the half-contemptuous praise of
the indifferent spectators.
other points.
from the
recruits
Experienced soldiers noticed
'
new army
Indeed, the
In the
old.
first
were treated with
not stolen by the
place,
justice.
it
differed greatly
was
paid.
The
Their rations were
They were given leave
officers.
to
go to their villages from time to time. When they
fell sick, they were sent to hospital instead of being
In short, the European system was substituted
flogged.
for the Oriental.
tion.
is
Still
That of
itself
was a complete revolu-
the difficulties appeared insuperable
beyond dispute that the Egyptian
is
;
for
it
not a fighting
animal.
It
was hardly possible
that
the
fertile
soil
and
enervating climate of the Delta would have evolved a
Ages of oppression and poverty rarely
produce proud and warlike spirits. Patriotism does
not grow under the
Kourbash.' The fellah soldier
warrior race.
'
lacks
the
cruel.
courage
to
kill.
Even the Mohammedan
has failed to excite his ferocity.
religion
be
desire
He
is
never
— a courage
fierce.
Yet he
is
He may
not without
which bears pain and hardship
in
which confronts ill-fortune with indifference,
and which looks on death with apathetic composure.
It is the courage of down-trodden peoples, and one
which stronger breeds may often envy, though they
patience,
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
can scarcely be expected to admire.
He
military virtues.
is
He
153
has other
obedient, honest, sober, well-
behaved, quick to learn, and above
all
physically strong.
Generations of toiling ancestors, though they could
not brace his nerves, have braced his muscles.
pressure
the
of local circumstances there has been
developed a creature
with
little
merciless
Under
who can work with
little
food,
incentive, very hard for long hours under a
Throughout the river campaigns,
sun.
the intellect of the army,
if
if
the spirit of the troops,
have come from without, Egypt herself has provided
the sinews of war.
Such was the material out of which the British
At first,
officers have formed the new Egyptian army.
indeed, their task was embittered by the ridicule of
comrades in the British and Indian services
their
;
but
I
and bearing of the force improved, the
thoughtless scorn would have been diverted from the
Englishmen to fall only upon the Egyptian soldiers.
as the drill
But
this
tified
was not allowed.
The
themselves with their men.
the fellah soldier
British officers iden-
Those who abused
were reminded that they insulted
Thus a strange bond of union
was established between the officers and soldiers of the
Egyptian service and although material forces may
have accomplished much, without this moral factor the
extraordinary results would never have been achieved.
English gentlemen.
;
was not long before the new military organisaThe army
tion was exposed to the stern test of war.
that was raised to preserve internal order was soon
The revolt in the
called upon to guard the frontier.
It
THE RIVER WAR
154
arlier stages
Soudan, which
seemed
the Egyptian difficulties, speedily dwarfed
The
alue of the
June 1883 we
new
force
find General
of
the rest.
all
was soon recognised
Hicks
In
preparing for
J
A SOUDANESE PIPER.
his fatal
me
march, writing to Sir
four battalions of your
Evelyn
Wood
new army, and
:
'
Send
I shall
be
But fortune protected the infant organisanew
The
tion from such a disastrous beginning.
army remained for a space in Cairo and although
content.'
'
;
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
155
during the Nile expedition of 1884-85 the Egyptians
were employed guarding the
it
was not
from
lines of
until the British troops
communication,
had been withdrawn
Dongola, that they received at Ginniss their
baptism of
fire.
Henceforth their place was on the
<
SAMBO'S
'
WIFE.
troops
Egyptian
the
onward
1886
from
frontier, and
northward
the
resisting
of
task
the
proved equal to
pressure of the Dervishes.
The numbers
bilities.
Up
of the
army grew with
to the end of
its
responsi-
1883 the infantry
still
WAR
THE RIVER
156
consisted
of eight fellahin
Soudanese
first
battalion
In 1884 the
battalions.
was
The
raised.
black
was of a very different type from the fellahin.
The Egyptian was strong, patient, health}', and docile.
The negro was in all these respects his inferior. His
delicate lungs, slim legs, and loosely knit figure
soldier
contrasted unfavourably with the
massive frame and
iron constitution of the peasant of the Delta.
excitable
strictest
and often insubordinate, he required the
At once slovenly and uxorious,
discipline.
he detested his
earnestness.
drills
his wives with equal
the cannibal habits of his ancestral
and altogether
;
and loved
Often his teeth carefully sharpened into
points, betrayed
tribe
Always
Sambo
6
danese equivalent of
'
'
—
Tommy
'
for
such
— was
a
is
the Sou-
lazy, fierce,
But he displayed two tremendous
To the faithful loyalty of a dog lie
military virtues.
added the heart of a lion. He loved his officer, and
disreputable child.
With the introduction of
Egyptian army became a formidable
feared nothing in the world.
this
element the
Chance or design has placed the
the forefront of the battle, and in Lord
military machine.
blacks ever in
Kitchener's campaigns on the Nile the losses in the six
Soudanese battalions have exceeded the aggregate of
the whole of the rest of the army.
was well that the Egyptian troops were strengthened by these valiant auxiliaries, for years of weary war
It
lay before them.
Sir
Reginald Wingate, in his exhaustive
account of the struggle of Egypt with the Mahdist
power,
1
1
has described
Mahdism and
the
the
successive
Eauvtian Soudan.
actions
which
Sir Reginald Winsrate.
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
157
accompanied the defence of the Wady Haifa frontier
and of Suakin. I shall not attempt to do more than
recapitulate
expedition
northward.
them.
in
After the retreat of the British
1885
the
They soon
frontier force,
and
Dervishes pressed
came
at Ginniss,
in
contact
on the
last
steadily
with
the
day but one
of the year, they sustained a severe repulse at the hands
of Sir Frederick Stephenson.
reprisals followed
;
Three years of raids and
while the Khalifa, in the intervals
of his Abyssinian wars, was preparing for the invasion
of Egypt.
In
1889
this
Wad-el-Nejumi, the Emir
hopeless enterprise
who had
began.
defeated Hicks and
Khartoum, started from Dongola with
about 5,000 warriors. The Sirdar, at that time General
led the assault on
Grenfell, awaited him.
Colonel Wodehouse, the com-
mander of the frontier force, hung on his flank, headed
him from the river, and on the 2nd of July defeated a strong detachment of his army in the small
but brilliant action of Argin. The Dervish main body,
however, marched resolutely on, and on the 3rd of
August were practically destroyed by General Grenfell
at Toski.
Wad-el-Nejumi, and with him whatever
designs the Khalifa may have had upon Egypt,
perished.
The Wady Haifa frontier became again the
scene of raids and desultory skirmishes but all danger
of a Dervish invasion of Egypt passed away.
The fighting round Suakin was the cause of greater
loss of life and of less satisfaction.
In 1885, after the fall
of Khartoum, and while the idea of re-conquering the
Soudan was cherished by the Liberal Administration,
an expedition of 13,000 British and Indian troops had
;
*
158
KIVKK
Tin:
At Hashin (March
been sent to Suakin.*
(March
22),
andTamai
Dervishes under
(
avai:
(April 3) this force engaged the
)sman Digna, without other
than the heavy loss of valuable
difficulty
or persuaded
attempt.
having
in the
Soudan
with liussia in Afghanistan obliged
Radical Ministers
the
The railway was broken up
lost nearly
result
The growing
lives.
unpopularity of the disastrous warfare
and the
Tofivk
2(1),
800 men
embarked; and Suakin
killed
settled
to
;
abandon the
the expedition,
and wounded, was
down
into a
permanent
In 1888 the Dervish activity
state of blockade.
re-
in-
Osman Digna advanced upon the town. The
Handub followed, and lighting continued
creased and
action
of
throughout the year.
In December Sir Francis Gren-
was sent from Cairo with a single
talion and some Egyptian reinforcements.
fell
British bat-
A successful,
though purposeless engagement was fought at Geniaiza,
The disturoutside Suakin, on the 20th of December.
bances continued actively until
in 181*1
Colonel
Smith, defeating the Dervishes at Afafit, occupied
Digna's base in the Tokar delta.
I
<
lolled
)sman
This was a serious
blow to the influence of the Emir, and, although the
country around Suakin was freely raided by the
Dervishes, no important
attempted on either
operations
were thereafter
side.
The ten years that elapsed between f4hini<s and
the first movements of the expedition of re-conquest
were the dreary years of the Egyptian army. The
Though the opera**
service was hard and continual.
tions were petty, an untiring vigilance was imperative.
•
Map, Around
4
Suakin." page 207.
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
159
The public eye was averted. A pitiless economy was
everywhere enforced. The British officer was deprived
of his leave and the Egyptian private of his rations,
a few pounds might be saved to the Egyptian
that
The clothing of the
Treasury.
battalions
wore thin and
tnreadbare, and sometimes their boots were so bad that
the
soldiers' feet
bled from the cutting edges of the
the convoy escorts
rocks, and
left their trails
behind
But preparation was ever going forward. The
army improved in efficiency, and the constant warfare
them.
began to produce, even among the fellahin
experienced soldiers.
Wady
Haifa
and
The
officers,
Suakin,
infantry,
sweltering at weary
looked
at the
gathering
and out into the deserts of the
declining Dervish Empire and knew that some day
The sword of re-conquest
their turn would come.
which Evelyn Wood had forged, and Grenfell had
resources
tested,
of Egypt
was
process was
wield
it
gradually
sharpened
almost complete,
the
;
when the
man who was to
and
presented himself.
Horatio
Herbert Kitchener, the eldest son of a
lieutenant-colonel,
was born
in 1850, and, after being
privately educated, entered in 1869 the Eoyal Military
Academy
Engineers.
at
Woolwich
He
as
a
cadet of
the
Eoyal
passed through the ordinary routine of
a military training without attracting the attention of
comrades or instructors either by promise in study
or prowess in athletics.
In the spring of 1871 he
his
obtained his commission, and for the
of his
military service
first
ten years
remained an obscure
officer,
performing his duties with regularity, but giving no
THE RIVER AVAR
160
talents
of the
promise
afterwards to display.
and character which he was
One powerful weapon, however,
In 1874 accident
acquired in this time of waiting.
he
him to seek employment in the surveys
Palestine,
and
and
in
Cyprus
of
made
beim>were
or instinct led
that
Cm/
the latter country he learned Arabic.
F
knowing a language with which few
him
no
brought
profit.
familiar
were
officers
British
For procuring military preferment Arabic was in 1874 as
the advantage of
All this was swiftlv changed
valueless as Patauxmian.
The year 1882
brought the British fleet to Alexandria, and the connection between England and Egypt began to be apparent
•
the surprising
course
of events.
Kitchener did not neglect his opportunity.
leave of absence, he hurried to the scene of
delays
leave,
which preceded actual
though
at his earnest request
and while Arabi was
the time
hostilities
it
when Kitchener must
climax was also approaching.
Alexandria were advised to
He
As a
devoured
his
was once extended,
return to the crashing
But the
political
The British residents in
embark in refuge ships.
meditated disobedience of orders.
?
The
harbour the future martinet
a steamer in the
leave or not
crisis.
strengthening his fortifications
still
routine of ordinary duty arrived.
On
Securing
last
Should he break
his
chance he applied for a further
would be refused, and it
was at the suggestion of a newspaper correspondent
that he added that he would assume it granted unless
he was recalled by telegraph. The telegram came
extension.
felt
that
with promptness, but
friendly
it
it
fell
into
the
hands of the
newspaper correspondent, who did not manage
THE YEAES OF PREPARATION
to
deliver
it
weekly Cyprus mail had
until the
and compliance with
161
orders
its
was
left,
for the time being
impossible.
Much might happen
Thus a week was gained.
The event was fortunate.
before the week was out.
Four days later Alexandria was bombarded. Detachments from the
The
were landed
to
restore order.
Government decided to send an army to
British officers and soldiers were badly wanted
British
Egypt.
at
fleet
the seat of the
war
an
;
officer
who
could speak
Arabic was indispensable.
Thus Kitchener came
firmly on the high road to
the soldier
who is
of the Press that
in
England,
assistance
'
special
in
the
at
at this
moment
the bitterest opponent
received
turning-point
of
much
his
life
material
from a
and that the General who,
of regularity, has
uncompromisingly, though
—the
set his feet
It is strange that
fortune.
have
correspondent,'
interests
Egypt and
modern militarism has yet produced
should
the
to
opposed
— always
sometimes unsuccessfully
enterprising subaltern,
should have based his
upon an act of pardonable indiscipline. But it
is his work and not his character that now claims our
attention.
He came to Egypt when she was plunged
in misery and shame, when hopeless ruin seemed
already the only outcome of the public disasters, and
when even greater misfortunes impended. He remained
to restore empire
to see her prosperous and powerful
to her people, peace to her empire, honour to her
army and among those clear-minded men of action by
success
;
;
whom
the marvellous
VOL.
I.
work
of regeneration has been
M
—
THE RIVER
162
WAR
occupy
will
certainly
Kitchener
Herbert
accomplished,
place.
second
the
even
possibly
the third, and
employment
found
soon
arrival
his
on
Lord Wolseley
for the active
As
amajor
Arabic.
speak
could
who
officer
the
campaign
of
through
served
he
cavalry
of Egyptian
was
formed
which
army
new
the
joined
1882. He
the
original
of
one
as
war,
the
of
at the conclusion
In the Nile expedition of 1885
twenty-six officers.
Arabic again led him to the front, and in the service of
opporample
found
he
Department
Intelligence
the
His
tunity for his daring and energy.
municate with Gordon
in
efforts to
Khartoum did
com-
not, however,
meet with much success, and the 'Journals' bristle
with so many sarcastic comments that their editor has
been at pains to explain in his preface that there was
really
no cause
One
for complaint.
covered by this assurance.
Gordon's
6
own
laconic words
It
incident
is
scarcely
is
best related
in
:
A curious thing has happened my friend Kitchener
;
sent
up the post
;
he wrapped the
newspapers (he gave
me no news
who knew some
about, and gave
who knows
them
old
in his letter), the old
newspapers were thrown out in the garden
clerk
some
letters in
there a
:
English found them blowing
to the apothecary of the hospital,
The doctor found* him reading
them, saw date 15th September, and secured them for
me they are like gold, as you may imagine, since we
English.
;
have had no news since 24th February, 1884
Major Kitchener, however, gave
superiors in Cairo,
2
if
2
!
'
satisfaction to his
not to the exacting General at
Gordon's Journals at Khartoum, November
5,
1884.
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
Khartoum, and
163
1886 he was appointed Governor of
in
This post, always one of responsibility and
Suakin.
danger, did not satisfy Kitchener, whose ambition was
now taking definite
Eager for more responsibility
form.
and more danger, he harried and raided the surrounding tribes
he restricted and almost destroyed the
;
was again springing up, and
slender trade which
in
consequence of his measures the neighbourhood of
Suakin was soon in an even greater
usual.
ferment
than
This culminated at the end of 1887 in the re-
appearance and advance of Osman Digna.
The movements of the Dervishes were, however, uncertain. The
defences of the town had been greatly strengthened
and improved by the skill and activity of its new
3
Osman Digna retreated. The friendlies
Governor.
were incited to follow, and Kitchener, although he had
'
'
been instructed not to employ British officers or Egyptian
regulars in offensive operations, went out in support.
At Handub on the morning
of the 17th of January,
1888, the friendlies attacked the
They were
at first successful
to plunder, the
them back with
enemy
loss.
;
camp
of
Osman Digna.
but while they dispersed
rallied
and, returning, drove
Kitchener arrived on the
field
T
defeat
instead
of
victorj
a
find
a
to
with the support,
awaiting him.
He
bravely endeavoured to cover the
retreat of the friendlies,
as
The
and
was
severe!}
—
seemed dangerously wounded in the jaw
anions the friendlies and the support amounted
it first
loss
in so doing
from Mai
With
mi
my
m
2
THE RIVER
1G4
WAR
British
officers,
and
two
and
killed
men
twenty
to
Governor
returned
in
The
wounded.
men
twenty-eight
Suakin.
In
spite
to
discomfiture
some
and
great pain
impatient
was
to
he
reverse
his
and
wound
of his
renew the conflict, but this was definitely forbidden by
the British
Government.
Colonel Kitchener's military
conduct was praised, but his policy was prevented.
'The policy which
the Eastern Soudan
it
is
'
should consist
purely on the defensive against any hostile
movement or combination
ing
in
wrote Sir Evelvn Baring on the
'
14th of March, in measured rebuke,
in standing
...
desirable to follow
Arab tribes, in avoidwhich might involve the
of the
any course of action
ultimate necessity of offensive action, and in encoura-
ging legitimate trade by every means in our power.'
The Governor could scarcely be expected
out a policy so
inclinations,
much
and
at variance
in the
summer
4
to carry
with his views and
of 1888 he was trans-
ferred to a purely military appointment and
became
Adjutant-General of the Egyptian army.
For the next
War
Office at Cairo,
four years he
effecting
worked busily
many
in the
useful reforms
and hard economies,
and revealing strange powers of organisation, which,
although not yet appreciated by his comrades in the
Egyptian service, were noticed by one vigilant eye.
In 1892 Sir F. Grenfell resigned the post of Sirdar,
and the chief command of the Egyptian army was
Two men
vacant.
dates
— Colonel
stood out prominently as
candi-
Wodehouse, who held the command
of the Haifa Field Force, and- the Adjutant-General.
4
Sir E.
Baring
to
Consul Cameron, March
14, 1888.
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
Colonel
Wodehouse had undoubtedly
He had been
the greater claims.
command
for several years in
of a large
He had
continual contact with the enemy.
force in
won
165
the
action
known through-
of Argin, and was
out the Soudan as
6
the conqueror of Wad-el-Nejumi.'
He had conducted
the
with
frontier province
administration
civil
conspicuous
ranks of the Egyptian army.
all
Kitchener had
to set against this.
He had shown
He was known to
himself a brave and active soldier.
be a good
But he had been a
official.
the
and he
success,
was popular with
little
of
failure in civil
i
administration,
less liked
by
and was moreover
his brother officers.
little
—indeed,
to the disgust
•
— of
men
7,000
in
service,
To the
astonish-
and,
Wodehouse retired
having commanded
war, became the officer in charge of
He
a single battery of Horse Artillery.
him
and
the Egyptian army,
Kitchener was promoted Sirdar.
from the Khedivial
to
Evelyn Baring's
Sir
influence, however, turned the scale.
ment
known
to India, however,
carried with
the regrets of his comrades-
in-arms and a high reputation, which, in spite of an
unfortunate wound, he fully maintained in the Frontier
War.
Lord Cromer had found the military
officer
whom
he considered capable of re-conquering the Soudan
\
when
the opportunity should come.
against
owned
many
facts
He set
and considerations.
But
that time has justified his choice.
which he
ffave to
his career has
Kitchener at
this
his opinion
it
must be
The support
important
crisis
been continued to the present day.
many moments
of doubt and
difficulty
in
In
the General
THE KIVER
166
"WATi
the British Agent,
looked towards
confidence and encouragement,
'Whatever you
happen, I will support you.
and whatever may
are
and always found
the best judge of the situation.'
do,
You
Such was the
Atbara;
and
the
of
battle
the
preceded
telegram that
Administrator
great
the
of
attitude
the
describes
it
as
to his
subordinates, so in
some measure
it
explains
work they have done.
The years of preparation, wasted by no one in Egypt,
were employed by no department better than by the Intelligence Branch. The greatest disadvantage from which
Lord Wolseley had suffered was the general ignorance
The British soldiers had
of the Soudan and its peoples.
to learn the details of Dervish fighting by titter experiBut the experience, once gained, was carefully
ence.
the wonderful
1
Branch of the Egyptian
army rose under the direction of Colonel (now Sir
Eeginald) Wingate to an extraordinary efficiency. For
ten years the history, climate, geography, and inhabitants
preserved.
of the
The
Intelligence
Soudan were the objects of a
ceaseless scrutiny.
The sharp line between civilisation and savagery was
drawn at Wady Haifa but beyond that line, up the
great river, within the great wall of Omdurman, into
;
the arsenal, into
the treasury, into the mosque, into
the Khalifa's house
itself,
the spies and secret agents of
—
Government disguised as traders, as warriors, or as
women worked their stealthy way. Sometimes the ro; d
by the Nile was blocked, and the messengers must toil
across the deserts to Darfur, and so by a tremendous
journey creep into Omdurman. At others a trader
the
—
might work
t
his wtiy
from Suakin or from the Italian
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
settlements.
But by whatever route
—whispered
tion
it
167
came, informa-
at Haifa, catalogued at Cairo
—
steadily
accumulated, and the diaries of the Intelligence Depart-
ment grew in weight and number, until at last every
important Emir was watched and located, every garrison
estimated, and even the endless intrigues and brawls
in
Omdurman were
carefully recorded.
In the centre
of the elaborate system of investigation which he
had
created sat Sir Eeginald Wingate, a military Lecoq,
applying to the perplexing masses of detail a keen
ligence, guided
by profound study and experience
intel;
and
thus throughout the years of preparation the increasing exhaustion
of the Dervish
contemplated by
its
Empire was
silently
inexorable foes.
The reports of the spies were at length confirmed
and amplified by two most important witnesses. At
the end of 1891 Father Ohrwalder
made
his escape
from Omdurman and reached the Egyptian
Besides
giving
the
Intelligence
territory.
Department
much
valuable information, he published a thrilling account
which created a wide and profound
England. In 1895 a still more welcome
of his captivity,
impression in
5
Early on the 16th of March
fugitive reached Assuan.
a weary, travel-stained Arab, in a tattered jibba and
mounted on a lame and emaciated camel, presented
himself to the Commandant.
He was received with
delighted wonder, and forthwith conducted to the best
bath-room available.
Two
hours later a
little
Austrian
gentleman stepped forth, and the telegraph hastened to
tell
the
news that
Slatin.
sometime Governor of Darfur,
Malidi
THE RIVER
168
WAR
Here
at
last
clutches.
Khalifa's
the
from
had escaped
concerned
the
that
everything
knew
who
was a man
Dervish Empire —
Slatin, the Khalifa's trusted
who had
fidential servant, almost his friend,
and con-
lived with
him
alone,
with
dine
to
permitted
even
was
him, who
his
Emirs,
knew
all
who
counsels,
his
all
heard
who had
and moreover
who
soldier
the
Slatin,
could appreciate
all
and administrator,
he had learned, was added
Intelli
the
of
staff
the
to
Pasha
of
rank
the
with
While
Department.
the belief of the
power was
Soudan
'
his accurate
knowledge confirmed
Egyptian authorities that the Dervish
declining, his tale of
6
Fire and
Sword
in the
increased the horror and anger of thought-
ful people in
at the cruelties of the Khalifa.
England
Public opinion began to veer towards the policy of
re-conquest.
I shall not
try to trace the course of the gradual
change that took place.
Its characteristics
may, how-
There had always been the military
spirit, which regarded the evacuation of the Soudan
with shame and horror, and was eager now, as on all
ever, be noted.
other occasions, to
once restore the honour and
at
extend the frontiers of the Empire.
be a very broad, but
—
for
it
exerted
is
it
is
This
may
not
a very powerful, influence
ceaselessly applied.
It is,
moreover, often
by men of capacity, possessed
of
expert
information, occupying responsible positions, and en-
joying the power of giving
official
expression to their
views in reports, despatches, and Blue Books.
This
was aroused no less by the memory of
Khartoum than by that of Majuba Hill. But in the
military spirit
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
former case
it
169
received a great accession of strength from
which the closing scenes in the life of
General Gordon had excited. The personal character
the emotions
of
'
the
Christian
hero
had produced a profound
'
impression upon the people of Great Britain.
death at the hands of
him
something
into
savages transformed
infidel
There was an
a martyr.
like
His
earnest desire on the part of a pious nation to dis-
name from
sociate his
ever attractive
the
to
The idea of revenge,
failure.
human
heart,
altogether free from fanaticism
Crusaders stirred
civilisation
;
beneath
the
?
to
What community
receive the consecration of religion.
is
appeared
The
spirit
of
surface
of the
scientific
and as the years passed by, there continued
England a strong undercurrent of public opinion
in
which ran
in
the direction of
£
a holy war.'
The
publication of the books of Ohrwalder and Slatin added
The misery
of the Dervish dominions appealed to that great volume
of generous humanitarian feeling which sways our
a third to these already powerful forces.
civilised State.
found
—not
Hall.
Extremes of thought met.
the
for
first
time
—support
The name of Gordon fused the
fanatical,
and the philanthropic
and moving influence
;
to this
momentum
forces
of
spirits into
Exeter
one stron
were added the impulse
modern Imperialism
—the sentimental, the
at
military, the
of the national pride in the regeneration of
the
Jingoism
;
intellectual,
Egypt and
and these three
and the political
gradually overcame the fear and hatred of Soudan
warfare which a long series of profitless campaigns had
created in the
mind of the average taxpayer.
The
THE RIVER "WAR
170
re-conquest of the Soudan became again, as far as British
public opinion was concerned, a practical question.
The year 1895 brought
a Conservative
in
and
A
Government came into
office supported by a majority which was so strong
that there seemed little reason to expect a transference
Ministers were likely
of power for five or six years.
Unionist Administration.
be able to carry to a definite conclusion any projects
They belonged chiefly to that
they might devise.
to
party in the State which had
consistently
assailed
Here was an opportunity of repairing the damage done by their Eadical
opponents. The comparisons that would follow such
Mr. Gladstone's Egyptian policy.
an accomplishment were self-evident and agreeable even
The idea of re-conquering the Soudan
to anticipate.
presented
to the
itself indefinitely,
but not unpleasingly, alike
Government and the people of Great
The unexpected course of events
Britain.
crystallised the idea
into a policy.
On
the 1st of March, 1896, the battle of
Adowa was
fought, and Italy at the hands of Abyssinia sustained a
Two
crushing defeat.
other nations.
at
results followed
Firstly, a great
European prestige
in
which
affected
blow had been struck
Korth Africa.
It
seemed pro-
bable that the Abyssinian success would encoun
Dervishes to attack the Italians at Kassala.
It
was
possible that they might also attack the Egyptians at
Suakin or on the
Wady
Haifa frontier.
Secondly, the
value of Italy as a factor in European politics was
depreciated.
assisted
The
fact
that
her defeat had
been
by the arms and munitions of war which had
;
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
171
.
been supplied to the Abyssinians from French, and
The Triple
partner had been
Eussian sources complicated the situation.
Alliance was concerned.
The
third
The balance might be restored if Great
Britain would make some open sign of sympathy.
Germany looked towards England. The precise form
weakened.
of the negotiations
is
shrouded in mystery.
England
and Italy had long been on the most friendly terms
but the London Cabinet required from Germany some
substantial return for their intervention on behalf of a
partner of the Triple Alliance.
Perhaps they asked for
Germany from
the detachment of
the South African
But whatever they may have asked, they
received enough to make it worth their while to show
by definite action their sympathy with Italy.
Eepublic.
The expectations of the Egyptian military authorities
had been fulfilled. The Dervishes threatened Kassala
as soon as the
news of Adowa reached them, and indeed
there were signs of increased activity in
Omdurman
Under these circumstances the British Government determined to assist Italy by making a demonThey turned
stration on the Wady Haifa frontier.
itself.
had always been recognised that the
recovery of the lost provinces was a natural and legitimate aspiration.
The doubtful point was to decide
the time when the military and financial resources of
to Egypt.
It
'
the country were sufficiently developed to justify an
assumption of the
From
possible
offensive.'
6
a purely Egyptian point of view the best
moment had
G
not yet arrived.
Lord Cromer's Reports
:
Egypt, No.
2,
A
1869.
few more
WAR
THE RIVER
172
years of
were
recuperation
The
needed.
country
Soudan campaigns more easily if first
refreshed by the great reservoirs which were proFor more than two years both projects had
jected.
been pressed upon the Government of His Hi
would
fight the
Khedive
—
or, to write accurately,
At regular
intervals
Sir
upon Lord Cromer.
Herbert Kitchener and
William Garstin would successivelv
Agency
House ')
(it
would be treason
—the one
Sir
visit
the British
6
Government
to call
it
to urge the case for a war, the other
to plead for a reservoir.
The
reservoir
had
Only
Avon.
a few weeks before the advance to Dongola was ordered
Garstin met Kitchener returning from the Agency. The
engineer inquired the result of the General's interview.
4
6
I'm beat,' said Kitchener abruptly
dam
'
— and Garstin went on
The decision of the
his
British
;
way
you've got your
rejoicing.
Government came
there-
fore as a complete surprise to the Cairene authorities.
The season of the year was unfavourable to military
operations.
The hot weather was at hand. The Xile
was low. Lord Cromer's report, which had been published in the early days of
March, had
shadowed the
frontier
in
no wise
fore-
tranquil.
With
the exception of a small raid on a village in the
Wady
event.
The
was
Haifa district and an insignificant incursion into the
Tokar Delta the Dervish forces had during the year
7
maintained
Lord
a strictly defensive attitude.'
'
t,
Cromer, however, realised that while the case for the
would always claim attention, the re-conquest
of the Soudan might not receive the support of a Radical
reservoirs
7
Egypt, No.
1,
1896.
a
THE YEAES OF PREPARATION
173
The increasing possibility of French
upon the Upper Nile had also to be considered.
Government.
intrigues
All politics are series
of compromises and bargains,
and while the historian may
mark what would
moment for any great
easily
have been the best possible
moment must
Those who guarded the
undertaking, a good
ministrator.
could hardly consent to an
Wady
the
Haifa
frontier
content the Adinterests of
Egypt
empty demonstration on
at
her expense, and the
Government was at once
extended to the re-conquest of the Dongola province
definite and justifiable enterprise which must in any
original intention of the British
—
case be
the
first
step
towards the recovery of the
Soudan.
Such were the circumstances under which the Eiver
War began. The discussions had been brief, and the
England as well as Egypt was
decision was sudden.
astonished
by the news.
The Eadical
leaders at once
But the
denounced the project in scathing terms.
nation, influenced by the forces that have been deIt
The diplomatist said
The politician said It
is to please the Triple Alliance.'
is to triumph over the Eadicals.' The polite person said
6
scribed, acquiesced timidly.
:
6
:
:
'
It is to restore the
the
man
streets
in the street
— said
thereafter
It will
all
6
:
But
Khedive's rule in the Soudan.'
— and there are many men
It is to
in
avenge General Gordon.'
many
And
awaited the outcome of the expedition.
be convenient, before embarking upon the
actual chronicle of the military operations, to explain
how
the
money was obtained
to
pay
for the war.
I
—
THE RIVER
174
WAR
fascinating
tangles
of
though
intricate
the
avoid
to
desire
Yet even when the subject is treated
which
difficulties
harass
the
way
general
most
in the
and
insult
Administrators
the
British
the
impede
and
Egyptian finance.
sovereign power of Egypt
—the mischievous interference
intolerable
and
almost
galling
the
nation,
vindictive
of a
financial fetters in
may
which
a
prosperous country
arouse in the sympathetic reader a
is
bound
Hush of annoy-
ance, or at any rate a smile of pitying wonder.
About
half the revenue of
Egypt
is
devoted to the
developement and government of the country, and the
other half to the payment of the interest on the debt
and other external charges
;
and, with a view of pre-
venting in the future the extravagance of the past, the
London Convention
in
1885 prescribed that the annual
expenditure of Egypt shall not exceed a certain sum.
When
the expenditure exceeds this amount, for every
pound
that
of Egypt,
is
spent on the government or developement
another pound must be paid to the Com-
missioners of the Debt
;
so that, after the limit
is
readied,
pound that is required to promote Egyptian
interests, two pounds must be raised by taxation from
an already heavily taxed community. But the working
for every
of this law was found to be so severe that, like
all
laws
which exceed the human conception of justice, it has
been somewhat modified. By an arrangement which
was effected in 1888, the Caisse de la Dette is empowered,
instead of devoting their surplus
fund, to
pay
it
pound
to the sinking
which
into a general reserve fund, from
may make
the Commissioners
ordinary expenses
'
;
grants to meet
those expenses, that
is
•
to say,
extra-
which
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
may be
considered
'
once for
all
'
175
(capital) expenditure
and not ordinary annual charges.
The Dongola expedition was begun,
said,
as has
been
without reference to the immediate internal con-
dition of Egypt.
not the best.
It
The moment was a good one, but
was obviously impossible for Egypt to
provide for the extraordinary expenses of the military
The Ministry of Finance there-
operations out of revenue.
fore appealed to the Caisse de la Dette for a grant
from
Here was an obvious case
extraordinary expenses.' The Egyptian Govern-
the general reserve fund.
of
6
ment asked for £E500,000.
The Caisse met in council.
England,
representing
Austria,
and Italy
—duly
Six Commissioners
France,
Eussia,
discussed the
Germany,
application.
Four Commissioners considered that the grant should
made.
be
Two
Commissioners,
those
representing
The majority
The grant was made. The money was
decided.
handed to the Egyptian Government and devoted to
France and Eussia, voted against
it.
the prosecution of the war.
Egypt
as a sovereign
power had already humbly
begged to be allowed to devote part of the surplus
of her
own revenues
humiliation remained.
to her
own
objects.
A
greater
The Commissioners of France
and Eussia, who had been out-voted, brought an action
ainst their colleagues on the grounds that the grant
was
ultra vires
;
and against the Egyptian Government
for the return of the
money
thus wrongly obtained.
Other actions were brought at French instigation by
various people purporting to represent the bondholders,
THE RIVER WAR
17C,
wlio
interests
their
declared that
were threatened.
The case was tried before the Mixed Tribunals, an
institution which exists in Egypt superior to and independent of the sovereign rights of that country.
On
the part of the Egyptian
Government and the
was contended that the Mixed
Tribunals had no competency to try the case that
that the
the attacking parties had no right of action
four Commissioners
it
;
;
Egyptian Government had,
in applying,
the law of liquidation required
;
done
all
that
and that the act of
sovereignty was complete as soon as the Caisse, which
was the legal representative of the bondholding
had pronounced its decision.
interest,
The argument was a strong one but had it been
ten times as strong, the result would have been the
same. The Mixed Tribunals, an international institustrictly political
tion, delivered its judgment on
;
grounds,
the judges
different countries
taking
their
they represented.
It
pronounced that war expenses were not
expenses.'
from the
orders
4
was solemnly
ext raordinary
The proximate destruction of the
Khalifa's
power was treated quite as a matter of everyday
occurrence. A state of war was apparently regarded
as
usual in Egypt.
On
this
wise and philosophic
ground the Egyptian Government was condemned
pay back £E500,000 together with
interest
and
to
costs.
After a momentarv hesitation as to whether the hour
had not come to join
financial
on the whole subject of the
restrictions of Egypt, it was decided to bow
issue
The money had now to
had already been spent. More than
to this iniquitous decision.
be refunded.
It
I
THE YEARS OF PREPARATION
177
sums were needed for the carrying on of the
The army was by then occupying Dongola, and
that, other
war.
was
in actual expectation of a Dervish counter-attack,
was evident that the military operations could
not be suspended or arrested. It was impossible to stop
and
it
;
seemed impossible to go on and,
besides, it appeared that Egypt would be unable to repay
the £E500,000 which she had been granted, and of
yet without
money
it
;
which she was now deprived.
Such was the painful and
difficult situation
which
her
of
wit
exercise
utmost
the
in
nation,
friendly
a
and
had
rights,
succeeded
legal
her
of
compass
extreme
the
welfare
had
she
whose
for
country
a
in
producing
in
Such was the
regard.
exaggerated
an
professed
always
French diplomacy.
international
on
waits
that
Nemesis
a
is
there
But
Now, as before and
malpractices, however clever.
Ministers
and
French
the
of
astuteness
since, the very
effect of
gents
w is
to strike a terrible
blow
At
French
at
interests
period France
and
French influence in Egypt.
still
politics.
Egyptian
on
force
considerable
exercised a
One
Egyptian party, the weaker, but
insignificant, looked
this
towards her for
news of the French success cheered
raised their spirits.
result
was
by no means
The
support.
still
their hearts
The
Orientals appreciate results.
British.
the
to
reverse
distinct
a
and
The con-
Britain
Great
obvious.
was
mind
clusion to the native
found
and
balances
European
had been weighed in the
In
wanting.
all
proportion
large
a
countries
Eastern
to
only
eager
uncertainly,
of the population fluctuate
be on the winning
VOL.
I.
side.
All this volume of ag
/
N
THE RIVER
178
WAR
and opinion began to glide and flow towards the
stronger Power, and when the Egyptian Government
found their appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of the Mixed
Tribunals to the Inter-
national Court of Appeal at Alexandria quashed and
the
original
British
decision
was no
less
the defeat
confirmed,
of the
complete than the triumph of the
French.
But meanwhile the Consul-General acted. On the
2nd of December he telegraphed to Lord Salisbury, reporting the judgment of the Court of Appeal and asking
that
he might be
'
authorised
state
to
directly thai
Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to advance
the money on conditions to be hereafter arranged.
You are
The reply was prompt, though guarded.
authorised,' said Lord Salisbury,
by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer to state that though of course the
primary liability for the payment of the £E-30(),000
rests with the Egyptian Government, Her Majesty Government will hold themselves prepared to advance,
1
'
6
on conditions
to be decided hereafter,
such a sum as
they feel satisfied that the Egyptian Treasury
less to provide.'
8
is
power-
This obvious developement does not
seem to have been foreseen by the French diplomatists,
and when on the 3rd of December it was rumoured in
Cairo that Great Britain was prepared to pay the money,
a great feeling of astonishment and of uncertainty was
created.
But the chances of the French interference
8
The original £500,000 was afterwards increased to £800,000 which
sum was paid by the British Exchequer to the Egyptian Government,
;
at first as a loan,
and
later as a gift.
THE YEAES OF PREPARATION
proving effective
still
seemed good.
It
179
was known that
Government would not be in a position to
make an advance to the Egyptian Government until
funds had been voted by Parliament for the purpose.
It was also thought that Egypt would be utterly unable
In the meantime the
to find the immediate money.
the English
position of
Egypt was humiliating.
herself mistress of the situation.
France conceived
A complete disillusionThe
ment, however, awaited the French Government.
taxes in Egypt, as in other countries, are not collected
evenly over the whole year.
there
is
a large cash balance in the Exchequer.
others the
this
During some months
money
drains
period of the year,
in slowly.
It
happened
the cotton crop
after
In
been gathered, that a considerable balance
had
at
had
ac-
cumulated in the Treasury, and on the guarantee of the
English Government being received, to the
they would ultimately
assist
effect that
Egypt with regard
to the
expenses of the expedition, Lord Cromer determined to
repay the money at once.
On the 5th of
The event was foreshadowed.
December the Egyptian Council of Ministers, presided
over in person by the Khedive, decided on their own
initiative to
despatch an
warm terms their
official
letter
gratitude for the financial help offered
them by Her Majesty's Government.
Boutros Pasha, to beg your lordship
6
to
expressing in
'
1
to
am desired,'
said
be good enough
convey to his lordship the Marquess of Salisbury
the expression of the lively gratitude of the Khedive
and the Egyptian Government
for the great kindness
N 2
THE
180
WAR
RIVEIi
shown
has
Government
which her Majesty's
this occasion.'
to
them on
9
together
with
£E500,000,
December
On
conveyed
in
were
gold,
in
costs,
and
interest
£E15,600
the 6th of
the
offices
to
Treasury
Egyptian
the
from
cart
boxes in a
of the Caisse de
All
la Dette.
Cairo knew of the
manner in which
The
effect
difficulty.
was tremendous.
All Cairo witnessed
The
overcome.
been
had
the
mind.
native
the
on
lost
be
plain
to
lesson was too
greater
far
was
diplomacy
French
the
of
The reverse
even than its success had appeared. For many years
Egypt had not received
French influence in
blow; yet even
story covers
it
it
in the short space of time
was to receive a
wound.
9
Egypt, No.
1,
1897.
still
so heavy a
which
more
this
terrible
—
181
CHAPTEE YI
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
— The concentration on the frontier—The communications — Suakin —A miserable town — The fortifications — Osman
The advance
to
Akasha
—
—
—
—
Digna Politics on the Bed Sea shore The Suakin Field Force
The plan of action The affairs of Teroi Wells And of Khor Wintri
The casualties A triumphant return The Indian contingent An
unnecessary dispute Arrival of the Indian troops The squabble
with the Egyptian authorities Troubles of the contingent Scurvy
Eeturn to India On the Upper Nile Wady Haifa— Sarras
Akasha A lucky shot Arrival of the Sirdar The cavalry fight on
the 1st of May The scrimmage in the ravine The concentration at
Akasha The eve of Firket.
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Shortly before midnight on the 12th of March 1896,
the Sirdar received instructions from Lord Cromer
authorising an expedition into the Dongola province
and directing him to occupy Akasha.* The next
morning the news was published in the Times,
ostensibly as
coming from
its
correspondent in Cairo
:
and the Egyptian Cabinet was convened to give a
formal assent by voting the decree. Throughout the
day the military department was a scene of frantic
activity.
On the 14th the reserves were called out.
On
and
the 15 th the Khedive reviewed the Cairo garrison
at the termination of the
parade Sir H. Kitchener
:
i
Map
H. H. Kitchener, K.C.M.G.,
army
C.B.,
Mai
Eoyal Engineers and Egyptian
—
THE RIVER
182
informed him
WAR
that the earliest battalions
would
start
for the front that
always
been
had
kept
force
frontier
Egyptian
The
restless
the
by
readiness
immediate
of
in a condition
of
the
longbeginning
The
enemy.
the
of
activity
delight
with
hailed
by the
was
advance
expected
sweltering at Wacly Haifa and Sarras.
British officers
Sunday, the 15th of March, three days after the
On
Sirdar had received his orders and before the
first re-
inforcements had started from Cairo, Colonel Hunter,
who commanded on
2
the frontier, formed a column of
and hold Akasha. The force consisted
3
of the Xlllth Soudanese under Major Collinson, two
4
squadrons of cavalry under Captain Broad wood, one
arms to
all
seize
Camel Corps, No. 2 Field Battery, and
5
The mounted troops started on the
two Nordenfeldts.
afternoon of the 16th, and, camping for the night at
Gemai, reached Semna the next day. Here thev were
company
of the
overtaken by the infantry,
who had been
railed
from
Haifa to Sarras, and had marched on from the
head.
At dawn on the 18th
the
rail-
column started
for
Akasha, and the actual invasion of the territory whicli
for ten years
began.
country
war
2
had been abandoned
to
the Dervishes
The route lay through a wild and rocky
— the debateable ground, desolated
— and
by years
of
the troops straggled into a long procession,
Brevet Colonel A. Hunter, D.S.O., Koyal Lancaster Regiment and
Egyptian army.
3
Major J. Collinson, Northamptonshire Regiment and Egyptian army.
4
Capt. R. G. Broadwood, 12th Lancers and Egyptian army.
5
The batteries of the Egyptian army, though in some ways more like
Mountain Batteries, the guns being carried by mules, are always called
Field Batteries. Editor.
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
183
and had several times for more than an hour
in single
file
move
to
over passes and through narrow
defiles
strewn with the innumerable boulders from which the
'
Belly of Stones
has derived
'
its
The
name.
right of
march was protected by the Nile, and
although it was occasionally necessary to leave the
bank, to avoid difficult ground, the column camped
each night by the river. The cavalry and the Camel
their line of
Corps searched the country to the south and east
;
for
was expected that the Dervishes would resist the
advance no living enemy was, however, seen. Creep-
it
;
ing along the bank, and prepared at a moment's notice
to stand at
proceeded on
bay
its
at the water's edge, the small force
Wady
way.
Atira was reached on the
18th, Tanjore on the 19th, and on the 20th the
marched into Akasha.
The huts of the mud
into
the
number of storehouses
Expedition
—were in
had been pulled
were crumbling back
The old
sand.
desert
village
—
relics of
ruins.
to pieces.
column
British
the
fort
Gordon
and a
Eelief
The railway from Sarras
Most of the sleepers had
disajDpeared, but the rails lay scattered along the track.
All was deserted
:
yet one grim object proclaimed the
Dervish occupation.
the river a single rail
the ground.
Beyond the old station and near
had been fixed nearly upright in
From one
of the holes for the fish-plate bolts
there dangled a rotten cord, and on the sand beneath
this
improvised, yet apparently effective, gallows lay a
and bones, quite white and beautifully
Half-a-dozen
polished by the action of sun and wind.
friendly Arabs, who had taken refuge on the island
human
skull
THE RIVER AVAR
184
below the
cataract,
were the only inhabitants of the
district.
The troops began
to place themselves in a defensive
On
22nd the cavalry and
Camel Corps returned with the empty convoy to Sarras
and
larger
column,
second
front
a
the
to
escort
to
position without delay.
A
under the
NEW USE FOR RAILWAY
command
sisting of the
the
IRON
of Major MacDonald,
6
and con-
Xlth and Xllth Soudanese, one company
of the 3rd Egyptians (dropped as a garrison at
Am-
bigole Wells), and a heavy convoy of stores number-
ing six hundred camels.
Starting from Sarras on the
24th, the column, after four days' marching,
arrived
6
Major H. A. MacDonald, D.S.O., Royal Fusileers and Egyptian
army.
%
i'..
-
;
':"
—
THE BEGINNING OF THE
WAR
185
without accident or attack, and MacDonald assumed
command
of the whole advanced force.
Akasha was now converted into a strong entrenched
camp, in which an advanced base was formed. Its
garrison of three battalions, a battery, and the mounted
troops, drew their supplies by camel transport from
The country to the south and east was
Sarras.
continually
patrolled,
movement,
and
guard
to
communications
the
a
turning
were
further
against
strengthened by the establishment of fortified posts at
Semna,
Wady
Atira,
and Tanjore.
—Bedouin, Kabbabish,
tribes
more widely
The
friendly
and Foggara
Arab
—ranged
still
and occupied the scattered
in the deserts
All this time the Dervishes watched supinely
wells.
from their position
Firket,
at
and although they were
within a single march of Akasha they remained inactive
and made no attempt to disturb the operations.
Meanwhile the concentration of the Egyptian army
on the
frontier
was proceeding.*
the distribution of troops
four
5th,
7
and a half battalions
6th,
and XlVth)
IXth, and Xth)
1st,
(the 3rd,
reservists
own
was
;
;
at
at
Before the expedition
as follows
(the
2nd,
:
—At
4th,
Cairo
half the
Suakin three battalions (the
Wady
Haifa six battalions
8
The
XHth, and XIHth).
obeyed the summons to the colours of their
7th,
8th, Xlth,
and with gratifying promptness, instead
of being tardily dragged from their homes in chains
free-will
Map, The Nile from Cairo to Wady Haifa,' p. 189.
7
The rest of the 5th battalion was at Suakin. Editor.
8
For convenience throughout the text and maps the Arabic numerals
are used for the Egyptian battalions and the Roman for the Soudanese,
thus 3rd Egyptians, IXth Soudanese.
*
<
:
WAR
THE RIVER
186
All the battalions of the
as in the days of Ismail.
t
strength.
war
to
up
brought
army were
the
formed,
were
reservists
battalions of
The 15th was placed
16th.
on
the
despatched
there
of
battalion
The
16th
was
Suakin to release the two battalions
to
garrison
in
15th and
Assnan and Korosko
communications.
of
line
at
Two new
the
service
for
on the
The
Nile.
1st
North Staffordshire Regiment was
moved up
the river from Cairo to take the place of
Wady
Haifa garrison of six battalions, which had
the
moved on
of
A
Sarras and Akasha.
was
guns
four
sections
to
formed
from
The 2nd,
the
battery
machine-gun
Oonnaught Bangers
of the Staffordshires and
and hurried south.
Maxim
4th,
5th,
6th,
and
battalions from Cairo were passed in
XTVth Egyptian
a continual succession along the railway and river to
the front.
In
all
this
busy and complicated movement
of troops the Egyptian
and clearly showed
War
the
worked smoothly,
Ofiice
with which
ability
it
was
organised.
The
line of
communications from Cairo, the per-
manent base, to the advanced post at Akasha was
825 miles in length. But of this distance only the
section lying south of
Assnan could be considered
as
The ordinary broad-gauge
Balliana. where a river base
within the theatre of war.
railway ran from Cairo to
t
was
established.
From
Balliana
to
Assuan
reinforce-
ments and supplies were forwarded by Messrs. Cook's
fleet
a
of steamers, by barges towed
number
of native sailing craft.
by small
A
tugs,
and
stretch of seven
miles of railway avoids the First Cataract, and joins
WAR
THE BEGINNING OF THE
Assuan and
Above
Shellal.
187
Shellal a second flotilla of
gunboats, steamers, barges, and Mle-boats was collected
between Shellal and Haifa.
to ply
ran from Haifa to Sarras.
The military railway
South of Sarras supplies
were forwarded by camels.
To meet
the
increased
demands of transport, 4,500 camels were purchased
in Egypt and forwarded in boats to Assuan, whence
they marched vid Korosko to the front. The British
Government had authorised the reconstruction of the
railway to Akasha,
military
was
battalion
collected
at
place sleepers and other
The
and
a
special
railway
Assuan, through
material
at
which
once began to
railway construction
pass
to
will,
however, form the subject of a later chapter,
which
By
Sarras.
strategic
I shall not anticipate.
the 1st
of April, less than three weeks from
commencement of the advance, the whole line of
communications had been organised and was working
the
although
efficiently,
ting troops.
It
crowded with the concentra-
still
was the
first
and not the
least
remark-
able instance of Sir H. Kitchener's strange powers of
rapid and comprehensive arrangement.
As soon
at
Suakin,
as the 16th battalion of reservists arrived
the
IXth Soudanese were conveyed by
marched thence across the
The distance was 120 miles, and the
transports to Kossier, and
desert to Kena.
fact
that
phenomena
is
two heavy thunderstorms
in spite of
—
—rare
was covered in four days
a notable example of the marching powers of the
in
black soldiers.
Egypt-
It
it
had
Xth Soudanese should
been
determined
that
the
follow at once, but circumstances
4
THE RIVER
188
WAR
occurred which detained them on the
Eed Sea
littoral
and must draw the attention of the reader thither.*
The aspect and history of the town and port of
Suakin
may
afford a useful
instance to the political
The majority of the houses stand on a small
barren island which is connected with the mainland by
a narrow causeway.
At a distance the tall buildings
cynic.
of white
coral,
often
five
storeys
high,
jDresent
an
imposing appearance, and the prominent chimneys of
CONVOY DUTY
the condensing machinery
fresh
water— seem
to
for there is scarcely
surest manufacturing
-
anv
activity.
But a nearer view reveals the melancholy squalor of
the scene.
A large part of the town is deserted. The
narrow
streets
wind among tumbled-down and neglected
The quaintly carved projecting windows of
the facades are boarded up.
The soil exhales an
odour of stagnation and decay. The atmosphere is
rank with memories of waste and failure. The scenes
houses.
Map, Around Suakin,' page 207.
'
THE BEGINNING OF THE
WAR
189
•
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Toskl
I
CAIRO TO WAD Y HALFA
audy Haifa
&
Son.,
32FleetSt.
THE RIVER "WAR
190
meet the eye intensify these impressions. The
traveller who lands on Quarantine Island is first conthat
fronted with the debris of the projected Suakin-Berber
Two
Eailway.
the pressure of steam nor tasted
felt
lie
or three locomotives that have neither
a decade,
oil for
rusting in the ruined workshops.
Huge
piles
of
railway material rot, unguarded and neglected, on the
Boiling stock of
shore.
vans,
and
ballast
waggons
near the sheds, and the
distinctly
all
kinds
—are
trucks,
strewn
heaped
or
H.B.W.B.B. painted
initials
upon them show
— carriages,
that they were originally
part of the stock of the bankrupt Hull and Barnsley
Bailway, and have hence played their part in disasters
The Christian cemetery
alone shows a decided progress, and the long lines of
white crosses which mark the graves of British soldiers
of peace as well as of war.
and
sailors
who
lost their lives in action or
during the various campaigns, no
and newly enclosed areas
less
by
disease
than the large
meet future demands,
to
The numerous
a study of whose epitaphs
increase the depression of the visitor.
graves of Greek traders
—
may
conveniently refresh a classical education
that
the
of
climate
the
island
is
—
protest
pestilential.
The
high loopholed walls declare that the desolate scrub of
the mainland
savages,
who
is
inhabited onlv by fierce and valiant
love their liberty.
For eleven years
all
trade
had been
practically
stopped, and the only merchants remaining were those
who
carried on an
illicit traffic
with the Arabs
or,
with
Eastern apathy, were content to wait for better days.
Being utterly unproductive, Suakin had been wisely
WAR
THE BEGINNING OF THE
191
starved by the Egyptian Government, and the gloom of
was matched by the poverty of its inhabitThe condensers, which alone of Suakin institutions
the situation
ants.
continued to do useful work, were capable of supplying 50,000 gallons
of fresh, but unwholesome water
The harbour, though not very capacious, is
The water is deep. There is no tide. There is
good.
scarcely any place where a ship cannot draw up within
The bottom is hard and firm,
forty feet of the shore.
The
and, as there is no silt, no dredging is required.
wooden piers which had been built for the disembarkation of the British troops in 1884 are in the last stage
a day.
devoured the
piles flush
over and half
durable
screw
float
stages
piles,
with the water, they half hang-
upon
and, as Suakin
It
But fresh and
surface.
its
could easily be built with cast-iron
trade, this will probably be
few years.
submarine insects have
the
and, since
of disrepair,
is
is
a natural outlet of Soudan
an undertaking of the next
impossible, however, to contemplate
this miserable spot in its present forlorn condition with-
out remembering with a
thrill
of indignation the gallant
and hard-earned millions that have been recklessly
squandered to preserve it as an Egyptian possession.
lives
The
island
on which the town stands
mainland by a causeway,
is
at the further
joined to the
end of which
an arched gateway of curious design called
Gate of the Soudan.'
Upon
mean
mud
coral-built
houses,
'
the
the mainland stands the
crescent-shaped suburb of El Kaff.
the
is
It
comprises a few
a large area
covered with
huts inhabited by Arabs and fishermen, and
barracks and military buildings.
The whole
all
is
THE
192
RIVKIi AVAK
surrounded bv a strong wall a mile and a half long.
fifteen feet high, six feet thick, with a parapet pierced
armed with Krupp guns.
bastions
wall,
strengthened
and
musketry
for
the
extensive
may
traveller
view
of
around the suburb,
the
refresh
at
intervals
by
Standing upon this
memory
his
l>v
country.
surrounding
an
All
at the distance of 2,000 yards, there
drawn a ring of small redoubts. Upon a high embankment to the westward the outlines of the right
and left water forts are clearly seen, and beyond it is
is
possible to distinguish the green patch of verdure near
the wells and solitary fig-tree from
which the action of
To the northward rises
To the south-west lie
the black rock of Hashin.
The whole scene and all its
Tofrek and Tamai.
Gemaiza derived
name.
its
memories are framed by the dark
circle of hills,
which
at a distance of seven miles terminate the view.
Three strong detached posts complete the defences
Ten miles
of Suakin.
to the
northward, on the scene
of Sir H. Kitchener's unfortunate enterprise,
of
Handub.
among
the
Tambuk
hills.
is
Situate
is
the fort
twenty-five miles inland and
upon a high rock, and
consist-
ing only of a store, a formidable block-house and a look-
out tower, this place
with
artillery.
outset of the
The
latter
is
safe
from any enemy unprovided
Both Handub and Tambuk were
campaign provisioned
may be
at the
for four months.
the site of a reservoir for a future
Suakin water-supply.
The
hills,
which near the
fort
are scarcely 300 yards apart, open into a wide valley
stretching
so
lame
a
away towards Berber and
catchment area would make
;
it is
it
possible that
worth while to
—
THE BEGINNING OF THE
construct a
The
dam
third post,
coast to
for
Tokar Fort,
No
lies fifty
Its function
the south.
fort is strong,
its
193
to store even the small annual rainfall.
Arabs of a base in the
The
WAR
fertile delta
defended by
miles along the
to deprive
is
the
of the Tokar river.
artillery,
and requires
garrison an entire battalion of infantry.
description of Suakin
would be complete with-
man to whom it owes its fame.
Osman Digna had been for many years a most success-
out some allusion to the
ful
The attempted
trade by the Egyptian Government
and enterprising Arab
suppression of his
slave-dealer.
He
drove him naturally into opposition.
revolt of the Mahdi,
and by
joined in the
his influence
roused the
whole of the Hadendoa and other powerful
of the
Eed Sea
shore.
The
rest is
after year, at a horrid sacrifice of
upon
tribes
Year
record.
men and money,
the
Imperial Government and the old slaver fought like
wolves over the dry bone of Suakin.
Baker's Teb,
El Teb, Tamai, Tofrek, Hashin, Handub, Gemaiza
fights of
Osman Digna, and through
he passed unscathed.
Often defeated, but never
such were the
all
Arab might justly boast to have run
further and fought more than any Emir in the Dervish
armies.
Nor are his deeds forgotten and to this day,
if the name of Osman Digna be whispered in Pall Mall,
crushed, the wily
;
the Generals begin to talk of brigades and divisions,
and the whole
War
Office buzzes like a bee-hive.
had scarcely seemed possible that the advance
Doneola could influence the situation around
It
on
Kassala, yet the course of events encouraged the belief
that the British diversion in favour of Italy
VOL.
I.
had been
o
THE
194
effective
WAR
end of March
for at the
;
KIVEli
— as
soon, that
is
to
news of the occupation of Akasha reached
Osman Digna separated himself from the army
say, as the
him
—
threatening Kassala, and marched with 300 cavalry, 70
camelry, and 2,500 foot towards his old base in the
Tokar Delta.
orders of the
rumour of
Xth Soudanese to move
On
the
first
his
advance the
and
via Kossier
n
Kena
to the Nile
were cancelled, and they remained
At home
Garrison at Tokar.
War
the
Office,
in a tender spot, quivered apprehensively,
forthwith
to
make
plans
touched
and began
strengthen the
to
in
Suakin
garrison with powerful forces:
The
state
of affairs
The authority of the Governor
always been turbulent.
of the
Eed Sea
littoral
the Eastern Soudan has
in
was not
at this time respected
beyond the extreme range of the guns of Sua kin.
The Hadendoa and other tribes who lived under
town professed loyalty to the
Egyptian Government, not from any conviction that
their rule was preferable to that of Osman Digna,
the
walls
of
the
but simply for the sake of a quiet
distance
of
alternately
their
less
miles
all
pronounced, and at a
the
Sheikhs oscillated
between Osman Digna and the Egyptian
Omar
tried to avoid,
Tita,
Erkowit, found
intriguing
even
twenty
Government, and
either.
As
from Suakin increased, the loyalty of the
tribesmen became
radius
life.
Sheikh of the
himself
neutrality.
situated
to
hostilities
district
on
with
round about
fringe
of
Although he was known
to
this
was believed that if he
choose he would side with the
have dealings with Osman,
had the power
open
it
THE BEGINNING OF THE
Egyptian Government.
reported that
Early in
Osman Digna was
WAR
195
Omar
April
Tita
neighbourhood
in the
of Erkowit with a small force, and that he, the faithful
ally of the
defeated
that
if
Government, had on the 3rd of the month
him with a
the Egyptian
to fight
Osman,
in play until
it
he,
He
loss of four camels.
also said
Government would send up a force
the aforesaid ally, would keep him
arrived.
After a few days of hesitation and telegraphic com9
munication with the Sirdar, Colonel Lloyd, the Governor
of Suakin,
who was
then in very bad health, decided
had not enough troops to justify him in taking
the risk of going up to Erkowit to fight Osman.
that he
Around Suakin,
as along the Indian frontier, a battle
is
When
a
always procurable on the shortest notice.
raid has taken place, the
Government may choose the
of their reprisals.
scale
If they are poor, they will
arrange a counter-raid by means of friendlies,' and
nothing more will be heard of the affair. If they are
rich, they will mobilise two or three brigades, and make
'
an expedition or
fight a pitched battle, so that another
may be added
glory
to the annals of the British army.
In the present instance the Egyptian Government was
poor, and as the British Government did not desire to
profit
by the opportunity,
it
only a small-scale operation.
was determined to have
The Governor therefore
the
foot
of
the
at
demonstration
for
arranged a plan
a
hills
near Khor Wintri by means of combined movefrom Suakin and Tokar. The garrison of Suakin
Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) G. E.
Lloyd,
D.S.O.,
Staffordshire
o 2
South
:
THE
196
WAB
RIVE1I
consisted of the 1st and half the oth Egyptian battalions
who had
the Kith Egyptian reservists,
;
just replaced the
IXth Soudanese, and were as yet hardly formed into a
military body one squadron of cavalry, one company
;
artillery.
of
detachments
some
and
Corps,
Camel
of
The garrison of Tokar consisted of the Xth Soudanese
and a few gunners. From these troops there was
organised in the second week in April, with
mony,
a
4
Suakin Field Force/
16
composed
all
due
cere-
as follow-
SUAKIN COLUMN
Commanding
Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd
:
Egyptian cavalry, 8th squadron
Two guns
Camel Corps,
1
company
companies
5th Egyptians, 3 companies
One company formed from the depots
of the IXth and Xth Soudanese
1st Egyptians, 3
Mule Transport,
1
company
TOKAR COLUMN
Commanding
:
Major Sidney
11
Xth Soudanese, 3 companies
Tokar Camel Transport
The plan of campaign was simple. Colonel Lloyd
was to march out from Suakin and effect a junction
with the Tokar Column at Khor Wintri, where the
Erkowit road enters the hills. It was then hoped
1
'
that
Osman Digna would descend and
fight a battle of
the required dimensions in the open;
victorious, the force
In order to
possible, the
10
11
would return
make
to
Suakin and Tokar.
Column as mobile
was mounted on camels,
the Suakin
whole force
See Appendix A, vol. ii., for Staff, &c.
Captain (temporary Major) H. M. Sidney,
Infantry and Egyptian army.
after which, if
Duke
as
of
of Cornwall's Light
THE BEGINNING OF THE
WAR
197
which more than 1,000 were requisitioned, as well as
60 mules and 120 donkeys.
Two hundred Arabs
accompanied the column to hold these beasts when
Six days'
necessary.
and
forage
one day's
rations,
reserve of water, 200 rounds per man, and 100 shell
per gun were carried.
of Tuesday, the
At
five o'clock
on the afternoon
14th of April, the troops paraded
outside the walls of Suakin, and bivouacked in
open ready to march
the
at daylight.
I
The next morning the column, which numbered
about 1,200 men of all arms, started. After marching
for four or five hours in the direction of Khor Wintri
the cavalry, who covered the advance, came in contact
with the Dervish scouts. The force thereupon assumed
an oblong formation the mixed Soudanese company and
the two guns in front, three Egyptian companies on
each flank, the Camel Corps company in the rear,
and the transport in the centre. The pace was slow,
and, since few of the camels had ever been saddled
or ridden, progress was often interrupted by their
:
behaviour and bv the broken and
the country.
the
Teroi
were reached
nineteen miles,
While
the
nature of
Nevertheless at about four o'clock in
afternoon,
Wintri,
difficult
;
Colonel
infantry
cavalry were sent
eight
wells,
and
here,
Lloyd
were
miles
from Khor
having
determined
making
the
marched
halt.
to
the
zeriba,
on under Captain Fen wick
12
(an
infantry officer employed on the Staff) to gain touch
with the Tokar force,
12
Captain
M. A.
Egyptian army.
C.
B.
who were expected
Fenwick, Royal
Sussex
to
have
Regiment
and
THE RIVER AVAR
198
Apparently, under
already reached the rendezvous.
timely
of
notice
have neglected
consequence
Tita and his Arabs would give
Omar
the belief that
at
an
attack,
cavalry
the
appear to
of the usual precautions, and in
manv
about
when approaching
five o'clock,
Khor Wintri, thev found themselves suddenly confronted
with a force of about 200 Dervish horsemen supported
wheeled
The
squadron
infantry.
of
large
body
by a
about with promptitude, and began to retire
The Dervish horsemen immediately
result was, that the Egyptians
at
began
at a trot.
pursued.
The
a disorderly flight
a gallop through the thick and treacherous scrub
Sixteen horses
and over broken, dangerous ground.
fell; their riders
were instantly speared by the pursuers.
The undisturbed courage of
saved the situation.
Rallying by his personal
thirty-eight troopers, Captain
and
hillock,
British officer alone
the
dismounting
Fenwiek
with the
efforts
seized a rocky
natural
instinct
of an infantry soldier, prepared to defend himself to
the
last.
its
flight,
officer
The remainder of the squadron continued
and thirty-two troopers under an Egyptian
(whose horse
is
said to have bolted) arrived
the Teroi zeriba with the
news
that their
been destroyed, or had perhaps
1
at
comrades had
returned to Suakin,'
and that they themselves had been closely followed by
The news caused the gravest anxietv,
the enemv.
which was not diminished when it was found that the
bush around the zeriba was being strongly occupied by
Dervish spearmen. Two mounted men, who volunteered
for
the
through
perilous
this
duty,
were sent to make their way
savage cordon, and try to find either the
0
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
199
remainder of the cavalry or the Tokar Column.
were hunted down and
The
killed.
Both
rest of the force
continued in hourly expectation of an attack.
Their suspense was terminated towards midnight,
when
the Dervishes
began
approach the
to
In the darkness what was thought to be
seen moving
were
horsemen
by
a loud yell was raised
other side.
An
broke out.
The guns
a body
of
along a shallow khor
opposite the right face of the defence.
moment
zeriba.
the
uncontrolled musketry
fired blindly
At the same
enemy on the
fire
immediately
up the
valley
the
;
The fusillade continued
furiously for some time, and when by the efforts of the
British officers the troops were restrained, it was found
that the Dervishes had retired, leaving behind them a
infantry
single
wildly on
all
wounded man.
sides.
Occasional shots were fired from
the scrub until the morning, but no fresh attack
was
attempted by the Dervishes.
Meanwhile Captain Fenwick maintained
and perilous position on the
hillock.
his solitary
He was
soon
ounded bv considerable bodies of the enemy, and
as soon as it became dark he was sharply attacked.
But the Dervishes fortunately possessed few rifles, and
I
the
officers
and
succeeded in holding their
The sound
of
by firing steady volleys,
ground and repulsing them.
troopers,
the
guns
at
Teroi
encouraged the
Egyptians, and revealed the direction of their friends.
With
the daylight the Dervishes,
who seem throughout
the affair to have been poor-spirited fellows,
drew
off,
and the detachment remounting made haste to rejoin
the
main body.
THE RIVER AVAR
200
its
pursued
united,
again
force,
The
way
Khor
to
from
Tokar
column
Wintri
15th,
Major
the
on
early
Marching
already arrived.
only
the
Soudanese,
Xth
the
of
Sidney with 250 men
Khor
readied
had
force,
the
in
troops
really trustworthy
where thev found
Wintri the same
the
He
afternoon.
khor,
post occupying the
Dervish
drove out the small
and was about
to
force
of
by
a
attacked
sharply
was
he
when
bivouac,
foot.
and
500
horsemen
80
numbered
have
to
Arabs said
the
and
courage,
usual
their
with
The Soudanese
upon
dead
thirty
leaving
were
repulsed,
Dervishes
ground. The regulars had three men wounded.
fouirht
Up
this
to
successfully
carried
Erkowit road.
The columns from Sun kin
a junction at Khor Wintri on
out.
and Tokar had effected
the
It
now remained
attack of
Osman Digna, and
him.
was decided, however,
It
been
point Colonel Lloyd's plan had
inflict
to
await
the
heavy blow upon
a
view of what had
in
occurred, to omit this part of the scheme, and both
forces returned together without delay to Suakin,
The
they reached on the 18th.
follow
18,
:
— British
wounded
officers, nil
;
casualties
Egyptian
which
were as
soldiers, killed
3.
Their arrival terminated a period of anxious doubt as
The town, which had been almost entirely
denuded of troops, was left in charge of Captain Ford13
Hutchinson.
At about two o'clock in the afternoon
to their fate.
of the 16th a few stragglers from the Egyptian cavalry
with
13
half-a-dozen
riderless
horses
knocked
at
the
Captain G. H. Ford-Hutchinson, Connaught Rangers and Egyptian
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
and
fates,
vague but
The
201
rumours
sinister
spread
on
had overtaken
the Egyptian force greatly excited the Arabs living
within the walls, and it apjoeared that they were
sides.
all
about to
rise,
belief that
good fortune
disaster
plunder the town, and massacre
Her
Christians.
a
Majesty's ship Scout was, however,
by
Strong parties of blue-
in the harbour.
The guns of
jackets were landed to patrol the streets.
the warship were laid on the
measures had a tranquillising
in
the
Arab
effect,
quarter.
These
and order reigned
Suakin until the return of the Field Force, when their
victory was celebrated with appropriate
It
was announced that
as a result of the successful
the Dervish enterprise
operations
for
In
ever broken.
unfortunate
incident
Xth Soudanese were
Trinkitat, instead of
order,
should
sent
against the
Osman
Delta had collapsed, and that
was
festivities.
the
to
marching direct
Digna's power
however, that no
mar
back
Tokar
;
triumph, the
Tokar by sea via
and the garrison
of Suakin confined themselves henceforward strictly to
their defences.
Osman Digna remained
bourhood and raided the friendly
arrival of the Indian
in the neigh-
On
villages.
the
contingent he was supposed to
be within twelve miles of the town, but thereafter he
retired
to
Adarama on
the
Atbara
river,
remained during the Dongola campaign.
no further
the
offensive
operations
Eastern Soudan prevented
where he
The
fact that
were undertaken
all
fighting,
for
in
the
Dervishes were, of course, unable to assail the strong
permanent
took
fortifications
shelter.
behind which the Egyptians
They nevertheless remained
in
actual
THE RIVER WAR
202
possession of the surrounding country, until the whole
was altered bv the successful advance of
powerful forces behind them along the Xile and by the
situation
occupation of Berber.
After the
it
affair of
Khor Wintri
was evident that
it
possible to leave Suakin to the defence
would not be
On
only of the 16th battalion of reservists.
the other
%J
hand,
required
H. Kitchener
Sir
every
soldier
the
Egyptian army could muster to carry out the operations
on the
was therefore determined to send
Suakin to garrison the town and forts,
Nile.
Indian troops to
It
and thus release the Xth Soudanese and the Egyptian
battalions for
month
early in the
Accordingly
the Dongola Expedition.
of
May
the Indian
Army
were ordered to prepare a brigade of
service in Egypt.
all
The request caused the
citement
throughout military
circles
Empire.
The
serving
British
officer
authorities
in
in
arms
for
greatest ex-
the Eastern
India
has
always looked with longing eyes towards the land of
the Nile
and
£LS
Si
happy hunting-ground
distinction.
for
decorations
Conscious that his countrymen can
neither understand nor appreciate the stern and bloody
conflicts of the
mountains, he aspires to participate
The Indian
in the easier warfare of the river.
no
less
than his
beyond the
seas.
officer,
keenly enjoys being sent to fight
His adventurous and conquering
exults in the prospect of
new
enemies.
campaigns
village,
will,
soldier,
war
in other lands
spirit
and against
The fact that he has made foreign
when the Sikh returns to his native
procure him the deference of his inferiors and
the respect of his equals.
Nor
is
the Indian Govern-
—
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
ment
insensible
to
the
improvement
in
203
recruiting
which usually follows the return to their homes of
the soldiers from across the sea with strange medals
and stranger
stories.
Under these circumstances the dispute which arose
about the payment of the expenses was unfortunate.
The decision of the Secretary of State was sensible and
would have
about 5,000£. a month
cost had it remained in India
was to be paid by India. The extraordinary expenses
necessitated by the expedition were to be defrayed by
The amount which the
not unjust.
force
—
the British Government.
No
extra strain was placed
upon the finances of India, and her troops were furthermore ordered on a service which might have increased
their own experience and the popularity of the army.
It seems strange that this fair and convenient arrangeThe
ment should have aroused a violent outcry.
protest of the Council of the Governor-General was
pported by the influence of the Times. For some
days,
and
until the public attention
was
distracted, the
gross injustice to India in compelling her to pay the
ordinary expenses, while her troops were abroad, was
a
popular theme.
reminded by the
Ministers were
Opposition that the Indian Empire was not a large
from which a worn-out
barrack beyond the seas
Mother Country might draw thousands of soldiers to
and they were,
prosecute her misguided enterprises
'
'
;
moreover, warned of the fate of States that put their
They replied with
sole trust in mercenary troops.
vigour, and
I
think with force,
that
Government had an undoubted right
f
to
Her Majesty's
use the armed
THE KIVEK WAE
204
of Egypt,
position
India in
interested
loss
Empire
of the
forces
was nothing
as
they thought
fit
on the high road to
the
event
that
;
;
that the
-the
India's
East,
financial
that the diminution of her internal
;
upon the temporary reduction of
her native army, was insignificant that they did not
wholly confide in mercenaries and that the enterprise
was not misguided nor the Mother Count rv worn out.
Meanwhile the Indian Army authorities were swiftly
preparing the brigade. They looked around for the
soldiers and a General to do honour to the army
from which they came. The trooj)s selected were as
security, consequent
;
;
follow
:
— 26th Bengal Infantry, 35th
Bombay Mountain
Lancers, 5th
guns, one section Queen's
Miners
— in
all
Own
Bombay
two Maxim
Sikhs, 1st
Battery,
(Madras) Sappers and
about 4,000 men.
The command was
entrusted to Colonel Egerton, of the Corps of Guides,
a soldier
On
worthy of the regiment that produced him.
May
14
town of Suakin was
enlivened by the arrival of the first detachments, and
during the following week the whole force disembarked
at
the 30th of
the
rotten
defence.
It
is
piers
the dreary
and assumed the duties of the
mournful
to
tell
how
this
gallant
which landed so full of high hope and warlike enthusiasm, and which was certainly during the
summer the most mobile and efficient force in the
brigade,
Soudan, was reduced in seven months to the sullen
band who returned to India wasted by disease, embittered by disappointment, and inflamed by feelings
of resentment and envy.
It is easy to understand how
14
Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., Indian Staff Corps.
—
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
205
a jealous dislike might spring up between the British
Indian and Egyptian armies.
officers of the
Perhaps
newcomers were scarcely conciliatory. They despised the Egyptian soldiers, saw none of their virtues,
the
and remembered only the dark tales of the past. Their
contempt was returned with interest by the officers in
the Khedive's service, and a long, petty, and miserable
disagreement began.
The Indian contingent landed in the full expectation
of being immediately employed against the enemy.
After a week, when all the stores had been landed,
f
officers
I
and men spent their time speculating when the
order to march would come.
was no transport
easily
their
in Suakin, but
that
difficulty
way from
the Somali coast to enable the force to
or Berber.
General Egerton
15
Sirdar, in
up
As
which he undertook
to the
was returned,
these did not arrive,
sent in a proposed scheme to the
Kokreb range,
to hold all the
if
to the effect that
it
characteristic answer
was not intended
garrison for Suakin, and a garrison for
Suakin they should remain.
This information was not,
who
however, communicated to the troops,
to
hope
to
They had
use the Indian contingent as a mobile force.
as a
advanced
he were supplied with
A
1,000 camels for transport.
come
was
overcome by rumours that 5,000 camels were on
move on Kassala
posts
was true that there
It
for orders to
advance until the
fall
continued
of Dongola.
The heat when the contingent arrived was not great,
but as the months wore on the temperature rose steadily,
until
August
in
15
He
and
September
the
held temporary rank of Brigadier.
thermometer
Editor.
THE EIVER WAR
206
below 103° during the night, and often rose
Dust-storms were frequent. A verito 115° by day.
table plague of flies tormented the unhappy soldiers.
rarely
fell
The unhealthy
climate, the depressing inactivity,
and
the scantiness of fresh meat or the use of condensed
water, provoked an outbreak of scurvy.
nearly
were
all
the followers and
affected.
India.
fifty
At one time
per cent, of the troops
Several large drafts were invalided to
The symptoms were painful and disgusting
open wounds, loosening of the teeth, curious fungoid
growths on the gums and
legs.
The cavalry horses and
transport animals suffered from bursati, and even a pin-
prick expanded into a large open sore.
It is
doubtful
whether the brigade could have been considered
active
service
suffered acutely
September.
after
All
from prickly heat.
the
fit
for
Europeans
Malarial fever was
common.
There were numerous cases of abscess on
the liver.
Twenty-five per cent, of the British officers
were invalided to England or India, and only
a stay in hospital.
six escaped
The experiences of the
battalion
holding Tokar Fort were even worse that those of the
troops in Suakin.
At length the longed-for time of departure arrived.
With feelings of relief and delight the Indian contingent
shook the dust of Suakin
India.
The
last ship,
off their feet
and returned to
with the Headquarters Staff of
the brigade on board, sailed on the 9th of December,
and the Egyptian authorities terminated a policy of
studied
salute,
by neglecting
which the customs and
slights
service prescribed.
to
give
the
farewell
courtesies of military
WAR
THE BEGINNING OF THE
207
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THE RIVER AVAR
208
It is
with satisfaction that I turn from the dismal
events
the
Eastern
narrative
of
successful
campaign on the Nile.*
By
in
Soudan
to
the
the middle of April the concentration on the
The communications were
cleared of their human freight, and occupied only bysupplies and railway material, which continued to pour
frontier
was completed.
Eleven
south at the utmost capacity of the transport.
thousand troops had been massed at and bej'ond
Wady
But no serious operations could take place
Haifa.
until
a strong reserve of stores had been accumulated at the
Meanwhile the army waited, and the railway
front.
The battalions were distributed in three
Haifa, Sarras, and Akasha
principal fortified camps
and detachments held the chain of small posts which
linked them together.
Including the North Staffordshire Begiment, the
grew
steadily.
—
Wady
garrison of
The
town
and
Haifa numbered about 3,000 men.
cantonment,
nowhere
more
than
400 yards in width, straggle along the river-bank,
squeezed in between the water and the desert for nearly
The houses, offices, and barracks are all
of mud, and the aspect of the place is brown
three miles.
built
and
A
squalid.
few buildings, however, attain
dignity of two storeys.
town
a
group
At
to the
the northern end of the
of fairly well-built houses occupy the
river-front,
and a distant view of the clusters of palm-
trees, of the
white walls, and the minaret of the mosque
refreshes the
weary
traveller
from Korosko or Shellal
with the hopes of civilised entertainment.
*
Map,
1
The Advance
to Akasha,'
The
page 219.
hospital.
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
which enjoys a
health resort
significant
—displays
importance
windows
glass
the buildings, though shaded
shutters,
which
is
that
so
—
209
for Haifa
;
but the rest of
when
the
dust
— the occupants must be
content to shut out the daylight with the dust.
draw
to
row
of shadoofs
their water,
and a
not a
by deep verandahs, have
a frequent occurrence
the river-bank a
is
16
Along
enables the inhabitants
single
steam-pump
at the
southern end of the town proclaims and rewards the
terprise
of an
agriculturist,
assured even in the most sultry
by this means
summers of a regular
is
Beneath the shade of a palm-
and abundant supply.
tree near the hospital
who
is
buried the head of King John
The trophy which Zeki Tummal sent
Omdurman as a proof of victory had become the
of Abyssinia.
to
and
at last,
Wady
17
Khalifa's gage of battle to the Khedive,
after
much wandering, found peace
at
The whole town is protected towards the
and heavy Krupp
a ditch and mud wall
;
Haifa.
deserts
by
field-pieces
mounted on little bastions where the ends of the
rampart rest upon the river. Five small detached forts
strengthen the land front, and the futility of an Arab
attack at this time was evident.
are
The North
Staffordshire
Kesiment was accommo-
dated in the barracks, and from the account of an officer
who
served with them
18
we
learn that the days passed
10
Shadoof'= an ancient contrivance of rope, lever, and bucket whereby
the water is scooped up from the Nile and brought to the crop.
17
Here it has recently been joined by the head of the Mahdi, which
had also experienced vicissitudes.
18
The Egyptian Soudan
its Loss and Becovery, Alford and
:
Sword.
VOL.
1.
P
THE RIVER AVAR
210
The great
slowly and tediously.
and, above
employed
all,
heat, the discomfort,
the uncertainty whether they
the front, or held
at
would be
garrison like the
in
Indian contingent, preyed upon the troops, and in some
measure explained the large proportion of sick. The
Egyptian and Soudanese battalions had strong drafts of
recruits
who
the walls, and the
drilled daily outside
place resounded during the cool hours of the morning
with
the
stentorian
of
tones
the
sergeant-
British
The only diversion was to be found at the
The Club as it was called and
Egyptian Army Mess
here the officers and the press correspondents, of whom
ten had already arrived, bewailed the monotony of the
instructors.
station
—
'
'
;
and the delav of the advance.
t/
Haifa had
now become
the terminus of a railway,
which was rapidly extending
;
and the continual arrival
and despatch of tons of material, the building of sheds,
workshops, and storehouses, lent the African slum the
bustle
and
activity of a civilised city.
rumours passed up and down the
and speed.
line
Officers
with frequency
Daily trains carried supplies forward to
Sarras Fort
Sarras and construction plant to Bail-head.
is
and
an extensive building, perched on a crag of black
rock rising on the banks of the Nile about
miles
south of
preparation
it
Haifa.
thirty
During the long years
of
had been Egypt's most advanced out-
post and the southern terminus of the military railway.
The beginning of the expedition swelled
it
entrenched camp, holding nearly 6,000 men.
each end of the black rock on which the
fort
into an
From
stood
a
strong stone wall and wire entanglement ran back to
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
211
The space thus enclosed was crowded with
rows of tents and lines of animals and horses
and
in the fort Colonel Hunter, commanding the district
known as Sarras and the South,' had his headquarters.
the river.
;
'
From
army seemed to have chosen a
of advance.
The railway reconstruction
Sarras
double line
the
followed the old track which had been prepared through
The convoy route wound along hj
Both were protected from attack. The
the desert in 1885.
the
river.
7 th Egyptians
guarded Bail-head, while the chain of small
by the
was four days'
The advanced base grew during the
posts secured the road
march to Akasha.
months of April and May
Nile.
It
into a strong position.
It lay
in a small half-circle of hills rising in the distance to
The broken
and confused nature of the ground, commanded by high
and often inaccessible rocks, and intersected by frequent
small khors, which afforded good lines of approach to
precipitous peaks of dark reddish rock.
an enemy, made Akasha a
difficult
place to defend.
Indeed, Colonel Wingate, writing six years before, had
called
it
'
rounded on
an impossible military position
all sides
by hills
.
.
.
....
sur-
and quite untenable.'
19
But the Dervish force at Firket was known to be
neither very numerous nor enterprising, and the troops
holding Akasha were
a powerful
and well-equipped
and j udicious work an efficient
outpost line was formed, strengthened by numerous
detached posts and small forts. Towards the end of
body.
By
dint of hard
April the force under Colonel
MacDonald was reinforced
by the IXth Soudanese, another squadron, and the
19
Mahdism and
the
Egyptian Soudan,
p. 296.
p 2
WAR
THE RIVER
212
Battery; and there
Maxim
is
no reason to believe
thai
advanced depot was ever in any danger. Only
once during the two months did the Arabs venture
the
to
artillery range.
approach within
made
horse and camel-men
A
.
a sort of haphazard recon-
and being seen from the outpost
naissance,
body of
small
line
were
by a field-gun. They fell
back immediately, but it was believed that the range
was too great for the projectile to have harmed them,
on
fired
and
great distance
at a
was not
it
two davs
until
later that the discovery
on the spot of a swollen,
blistering
bright jibba, apprised
delighted gunners
of their
effect
the
Warned by
fire.
corpse, clad in
this
of the
lucky shot the
Dervishes came no more, or came unseen.
The
20
accompanied by Colonel Bundle, his
had left Cairo on the 22nd of March, and
Sirdar,
Chief of
Staff,
Wady Haifa
Assuan reached
after a short stay at
on the
Here he remained during the month of April,
29th
superintending and pressing the extension of the railroad
and the accumulation of
On
supplies.
the 1st of
May he
arrived at Akasha, with a squadron of cavalry under
Major Burn-Murdoch,
a
convoy had come
were two
extra
Almost
post.
21
as his escort.
It
happened
thai
in the previous day, so that there
cavalry squadrons at the advanced
at the
same moment
that Sir H. Kitchener
entered the camp, a party of friendly Arabs came
in
with the news that they had been surprised some four
miles to the eastward
20
army.
Colonel
by a score of Dervish camel-
H. M. L. Rundle, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A. and Egyptian
\'
[
•
Major
?Jis3;&s;
J. F.
;
'
'•;!••>
Burn-Murdoch,
"•
'
.
p.s.c, 1st
.'•
-'i
'-i
.
Royal Dragoons.
>Vo*yii
THE BEGINNING OF THE
WAR
21
men, and had only succeeded in escaping with
the
loss of two of their number.
In the belief that the
enemy in the immediate vicinity were not in force, the
Sirdar ordered the three squadrons of Egyptian cavalry,
supported by the Xlth Soudanese, to go out and reconnoitre
ds Firket and endeavour to cut off
am
might be found
Captain Broadwood, who knew the ground to the
outhward
hly had
ted with a
pie of
troopers on one of his frequent reconnaissances of
hostile patrols that
ex
AN EGYPTIAN PATROL
Under cover of the darkness
he had crossed the river and was already moving
along the west bank.
The reconnoitring squadrons
the Dervish
position.
were thus deprived of the
the country.
Murdoch
lances.
the hills
At
officer best
acquainted with
ten o'clock, however, Major Burn-
started with
four British officers, and 240
among
After moving
for
seven
or
eight
miles
c
o
O
which surround Akasha, the cavalry jDassed
through a long, sandy
defile,
flanked on either side by
rocky peaks and impracticable ravines.
of the
column was about
to
As
debouch from
the head
this,
the
advanced scouts reported that there was a body of
THE RIVER
214
WAR
in front of the defile.
Dervishes in the open ground
look
to
forward
rode
commander
The cavalry
and
as
he had ex-
of camel-men, but
by a strong
not,
found himself confronted,
by a score
force of Dervishes, numbering at least 1,500
had
trotting,
by
cavalry,
The
250 horse.
pected,
them,
at
foot
and
the
left
The
them.
behind
distance
some
supporting infantry
horseThe
threatening.
was
enemy
appearance of the
yards
away,
300
scarcely
up
drawn
were
who
men,
flank
right
their
attack,
the
to
advancing
were already
was
and
behind
camelry
of
force
small
protected by a
:
the solid array of the spearmen.
his
on
back
fall
to
determined
Burn-Murdoch
Major
infantry support and escape from the bad ground.
He
gave the order,
and the squadrons wheeled about
by troops and began
Forthwith the Der\
to retire.
horse charged, and galloping furiously into the defile
attacked the cavalry in rear.
in the
The
narrow space.
and the dust raised by
like a vellow
London
no
fog,
all
been
at the
were now
lecting
a
at
hung over
pistols
and thrust
meet the attack.
A
British officers,
troopers,
at first
The tumult
who had
they
random.
disaster appeared
the rear and nearest the
of
at
showed
head of the column during
score
all
amid which the bewildered
words of command.
But the
imminent.
were crowded
wildest confusion followed,
cavalry, thus highly tried,
disposition to turn to
drowned
sides
the horses' hoofs
combatants discharged their
The Egyptian
Both
its
naturally
advance,
enemy.
made
such
Col-
an
revolvers
and
swords
their
resistance
with
astonishing
O
that thev actually held the defile and beat back the
THE BEGINNING OF THE
who
Dervish horse,
on
retired
WAR
215
their infantry, leaving a
Two
dozen dead upon the ground.
of the Egyptian
squadrons continued to retreat until clear of the
a distance
of
700 yards
most was compelled by
;
defile,
but the third and rear-
the
British
officers
about, and galloping with this force
down
Major Burn-Murdoch drove the Arabs
to face
the ravine
pell-mell out of
The cloud of dust prevented a clear view, and
the squadron, pursuing blindly, was astonished by a
sharp fire from the Dervish infantry.
The other two
squadrons had now returned, and the whole force dismounted, and, taking up a position among the sandhills near the mouth of the defile, opened fire with their
carbines.
The repulse of their cavalry seemed to have
it.
disheartened the Dervishes, for they
to attack the
made no attempt
dismounted troopers, and contented them-
with maintaining a desultory
selves
so ill-aimed that but
Fitton,
22
little
loss
fire,
which was
was caused.
who had accompanied
the
Captain
reconnaissance,
The heat of the weather was
terrific, and both men and
horses suffered acutely
from thirst. The squadron which had escorted the
Sirdar had performed a long march before the reconThe cavalry, however,
naissance and was exhausted.
held their position among the sandhills and easily
At noon
defeated a feeble attempt to turn their right.
From the
they were joined by Captain Broad wood.
other side of the river he had seen that the enemy's
camp was unusually empty, and had ridden hurriedly
back to Akasha to report. He now caught up the
was
slightly
wounded.
#
22
Captain H.
Gr.
Fitton, p.s.c, Royal Berkshire Regiment,
THE KIVER WAT!
216
reconnaissance and had the opportunity of witnessing
At a quarter
the end of the skirmish.
past twelve the
Dervishes began to retire slowlv and deliberately, and
by one o'clock, when the Xlth Soudanese arrived, eager
and agog, the last Arab had disappeared. The force
then returned to camp, bearing many spears and lead*
ing six captured horses as trophies of victory.
intensity of the heat
may
be gauged by the fact that
one of the Soudanese soldiers
negro
—died
May, and
fierce fight the loss
was
— that
of actual sunstroke.
of the 1st of
slightly
it is
is
to sav, an African
Such was the
affair
pleasing to relate that in this
was not
wounded.
The
severe.
One
One
British officer
native soldier was killed
;
one was mortally and eight severely wounded.
During
May
the preparations for the advance on
the Dervish position at Firket continued, and towards
month it became evident that they were
The steady accumulation of stores
nearly complete.
at Akasha had turned that post into a convenient base
from which the force might operate for a month without
drawing supplies of any kind from the north. The railthe end of the
way, which had progressed
at the rate of
about half a
mile a day, had reached and was working to Ambigole
Wells, where
a
four-«run fort
and entrenchment had
The distance over which convoys must
plod was reduced by half, and the business of supply
was doubly accelerated. By degrees the battalions and
been
built.
squadrons began to move forward
Sarras, deprived of
its
towards Akasha.
short-lived glory,
the solitary fort on a crag.
space enclosed by the walls
became again
The camp was gone, and the
and the river was deserted.
THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
217
The garrison had shrunk from 6,000 regulars to 300
reservists, armed only with Eemington rifles.
It was
no longer the railway terminus, but only a station on
line and the depot for the construction plant which
had been collected to extend the line beyond Akasha
as soon as Firket should
also deserted, and, except
garrison,
be
Wady Halm
seized.
was
for the British battalion in
could scarcely boast a soldier.
Both
the
Egyptian battalions from Suakin had arrived on the Nile.
The Xth Soudanese were on their way. The country
beyond Akasha had been thoroughly reconnoitred and
mapped
to within three miles of the Dervish position.
Everything was ready.
The actual concentration may be
on the
when
1st of June,
said to have
begun
the Sirdar started for the front
from Haifa, whither he had returned after the cavalry
skirmish.
Construction work on the railway came to a
full stop.
The railway
battalions,
dropping their picks
and shovels, shouldered their Eemington rifles and
became the garrisons of the posts on the line of communications.
On
the 2nd of June the correspondents
were permitted to proceed to Akasha.
On
the 3rd the
Xth Soudanese passed through Ambigole and marched
south.
The Horse battery from Haifa followed. The
Egyptian battalions and squadrons which had been
camped along the river at convenient sjDOts from
Ambigole to Akasha marched to a point opposite Okma.
Between
this place
and the advanced post an extensive
camp, stretching three miles along the Nile bank, arose
with magic swiftness.
On the 4th the 7th Egyptians moved
from Eail-head, and with these the
last battalion
reached
THE RIVER
218
WAR
ample
supplies
men
with
thousand
Nine
the front.
the
enemy.
of
distance
striking
within
were collected
All
time the Dervishes at Firket watched in
this
preparamachine-like
deliberate,
the
apathy
senseless
They should have had
tions for their destruction.
for although the
good information,
patrolled ceaselessly,
Egyptian cavalry
and the outpost
was im-
line
passable to scouts, their spies, as camel-drivers, water-
and the like, were in the camp. They may
not, perhaps, have known the exact moment of Unintended blow, for the utmost secrecv was observed.
But though they must have realised that it was imcarriers,
did
they
minent,
There
nothing.
was,
indeed,
no
Once the arm}- was
course open to them but retreat.
concentrated with sufficient supplies at Akasha, their
was
position
Hammuda,
The
and ammunition were bad;
rifles
supplies scanty.
Emir-in-Chief,
men around
then had scarcely 3,000
Their
flag.
utterly untenable.
Nor could
his
their
the valour of fifty-seven
notable Emirs sustain the odds against them.
There
back on Kosheh, or even on
Suarda anywhere outside the sweep of their terrible
They would not budge. Obstinate
enemy's sword.
and fatuous to the last, they dallied and paltered on
was
still
time
to fall
—
the
fatal
ground, until sudden,
catastrophe
fell
upon them from
blinding,
all
sides at once,
swept them out of existence as a military
On
inevitable
and
force.
the afternoon of the 6th of June the Expedi-
tionary Force was warned that the Dervish position
would be attacked
at daylight.
followed deserves a chapter of
its
The operation which
own.
THE BEGINNING OF THE
WAR
219
G.PkLUp & Sorv32 Fleet St LoruLon,.
i
A
THE RIVER WAR
220
CHAPTEK
VII
*
FIRKET
June
7,
—
1896.
—
—
The Dervish Emirs A change of leadership Osman Azrak Composition
The desert column The main force Sarkamatto
of the force
The first shot Firket village The deployment
false alarm
MacDonald's brigade Capture of the village The pursuit Casualties
Comments.
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Since the end of 1895 the Dervish force in Firket had
been under the command of the Emir Hammuda, and
it
was through the indolence and neglect of
this
dis-
Arab that the Egyptian army had been able to
make good its position at Akasha without any fighting.
Week after week the convoys had straggled unmolested
sipated
through the
difficult
No
advanced base.
communications.
unnoticed by
Wad
attack had been
No
brigade in Akasha.
its
country between Sarras and the
enterprise
made upon
was directed against
This fatal inactivity did not pass
Bishara, the Governor of Dongola
command
but although he was nominally in supreme
all
the
;
of
the Dervish forces in the province, he had hardly
any means of enforcing his authority.
His rebukes
and exhortations, however, gradu'ally roused Hammuda,
and during
May two
or three minor raids were planned
and executed, and the Egyptian position
at
Akasha
several times reconnoitred.
Map, The Action
4
at Firket,' to face
page 234.
wa.s
FIRKET
221
Bishara remained unsatisfied, and at length, desp
energy
into
infusing
of
g
Osman Azrak,
subordinate,
was a
Dervish of
Hammuda,
lie
ordered his
to supersede him.
very different
type.
Osman
He was
a
and devoted believer in the Mahdi and a
For many years he had
loyal follower of the Khalifa.
fanatical
served on the northern frontier of the Dervish Empire,
and
his
ment
name was
known
well
to the
Egyptian Govern-
most daring and the most
His cruelty to the wretched inhabitants
as the contriver of the
brutal raids.
of the border villages
had excluded him from
of mercy, should he ever
enemy.
among
His crafty
skill
fall
all
hop
into the hands of the
however protected him, but
the Emirs gathered at Firket there was none
whose death would have given greater
the military authorities than the
satisfaction to
man who was now
Hammuda.
Whether Osman Azrak had actually assumed command on the 6th of June is uncertain. It seems more
to replace
likelv that
Hammuda
that the matter
still
declined to admit his right, and
stood in dispute.
Osman was determined
his
activity,
camp
in
any case
to justify his appointment
by
and about midday he started from the
at Firket, and,
camel-men,
But
set
accompanied by a strong patrol of
out to reconnoitre Akasha.
Moving
cautiously, he arrived unperceived within sight of the
position at about three o'clock in the afternoon.
columns which were
actually parading.
to
The
storm Firket at dawn were then
But the clouds of dust which the
high wind drove across or whirled about the camp
obscured the view, and the Dervish could distinguish
—
222
THE RIVEE
nothing unusual.
He
WAR
therefore
made
the customary
pentagonal mark on the sand to ensure good luck, and so
returned to Firket to renew his dispute with
bearing the reassuring news that
The
force
Hammuda,
the Turks lay quiet.'
which the Sirdar had concentrated
for the
capture of Firket amounted to about 9,000 men, and
was organised
as follows
:
Commander-in-Chief
The Infantry Division
1st
The Sirdar
Colonel Hunter Commanding
:
2nd Brigade
Brigade
Major Lewis
':
1
Brd Brigade
Major MacDonald
Major Maxwell
IXth Soudanese
Xlth
Xllth
„
2nd Egyptians
3rd Egyptians
4th
Xth Soudanese
XHIth
Mounted Forces
:
2
7th
8th
„
Major Burn- Murdoch
Egyptian Cavalry
Camel Corps
7 squadrons
8 companies
Artillery
Horse Artillery
1 Battery
.......
Field Artillery
Maxim Guns
Two
2 Batteries
1 Battery
roads led from Akasha to Firket
bank of the
river,
the
other inland
—one by the
and along the
The Sirdar determined to avail
himself of both.
The force was therefore divided into
two columns. The main column, under command of
the Sirdar, was to move by the river road, and conprojected railway
line.
0
sisted
of
the
infantry
and the Maxim
division,
the Field
Artillery,
The Desert Column, under
command of Major Burn-Murdoch, consisted of the
mounted forces, the Horse Artillery, and one battalion
1
2
guns.
Major D. F. Lewis, Cheshire Regiment and Egyptian army.
Major J. G. Maxwell, Black Watch and Egyptian army.
FIE.K ET
223
of infantry (the Xllth Soudanese, under
Major Towns-
3
hend ), drawn from MacDonald's brigade and mounted
upon camels in all about two thousand men. Very
precise orders were given to the smaller column, and
:
Burn-Murdoch was instructed
to
occupy the
south-east of the centre of Firket village
hills to
by 4.30
the
a.m.
;
A DERVISH SCOUT
to
dispose
on the
left,
his
the
force
facing west,
Camel Corps
Xllth Soudanese on the
his discretion
Horse battery.
Mai
army
right.
was the position
He was
with the cavalry
T
in the
centre,
and the
The only point
to
especially
left
to
be occupied by the
warned not
to
come
THE RIVER
22±
under the
of the
fire
WAR
main infantry
As soon
force.
Soudanese
Xllth
the
routed,
be
should
as the enemv
camelry,
cavalry,
The
Sirdar
the
were to return to
t
and
Horse Artillery were to
being,
firstly,
pursue— their
objective
Koveka, and, secondly, Suarda
out
of
Akasha
march
The
southtrailed
and
6th,
the
of
afternoon
the
in
at 3.30
following
the
in
river
the
track
by
the
wards along
Xth
Soudanese
the
with
brigade,
Lewis's
order
Macartillery
the
and
guns
Maxim
two
leading
infantry
column began
to
:
;
;
and
Donald's brigade; Maxwell's brigade;
hospitals
field
guard.
The
and
The Sirdar
rear of the long
4.30,
a
forming
half-battalion
marched
behind
column was
and about two hours
lastly, the
the
rear-
artillery.
clear of the
camp
mounted
force
later the
The Eiver Column made
advance
was
the
thereafter
dark,
but
till
progress
good
slow and tedious. The track led through broken rocky
o-round, and was so narrow that it nowhere allowed
started
by
the desert road.
four
than
of
formed
be
to
front
larger
a
men
abreast.*
In some places the sharp rocks and crumbling heaps
while
altogether,
gun-mules
the
stopped
almost
stone
of
the
infantry
moon had
Still
tripped
and
stumbled
painfully.
The
not risen, and the darkness was intense.
the long procession of men, winding like a whip-
lash between the jagged
hills, toiled
onward through
the night, with no sound except the tramping of feet
and the
rattle of accoutrements.
At
half-past ten the
head of Lewis's brigade debouched into a smooth sandy
plain about a mile to the north of Sarkamatto village.
Map, The Capture of Dongola,' page 273.
•
FIEKET
This was
the
spot
enemy's position
little
three
miles
Sirdar had
the
from the
decided to
The bank and foreshore of the
were convenient
were
— scarcely
—where
and bivouac.
halt
225
for
watering
;
all
bottles
and skins
and animals drank deeply. A
food was eaten, and then battalion by battalion,
filled,
and
soldiers
down
as the force arrived at the halting-place, they lay
to
river
rest.
The
tail
of Maxwell's brigade reached
the
bivouac about midnight, and the whole column was
then concentrated.
Meanwhile the mounted force was
also
on
way.
its
Like the Eiver Column, they were disordered by the
broken ground, and the Xllth Soudanese, who were
unused to camel-riding and mounted only on transport
saddles,
were soon wearied.
many
After one o'clock
Camel Corps and in the battalion,
fell asleep on their camels, and the officers had great
difficulty in keeping them awake.
However, the
men, both
in the
force reached their point of concentration
miles to the south-east of Firket
—
— about three
at a quarter to three.
Here the Xllth Soudanese dismounted from their camels
and became again a fighting unit. Leaving the extra
camels under a guard, Major Burn-Murdoch then ad-
vanced towards his appointed position on the
hills
overlooking Firket.
at
The Sirdar moved on again with the infantry
2.30.
The moon had risen over the rocks to the
was only a thin
crescent and did not give much light.
The very
worst part of the whole track was encountered immediately the bivouac was left, and the column of nearly
left
of the
VOL.
I.
line
of march, but
it
Q
THE RIVER WAR
226
6,000
men had
single
file.
of
through one narrow place
Dervish camp was near;
the
his Staff
He
began to look anxious.
the
Sirdar
sent
many
messages to the leading battalions to hurry;
soldiers,
through
m
There were already signs of the approach
dawn;
and
to trickle
although
the
now
difficult
By
through a gate.
and the
very weary, ran and scrambled
passage
like
sheep crowding
four o'clock the leading brigade
had cleared the obstacle, and the most critical
moment
seemed to have passed.
Suddenly, a mile to the southward, rose the sound
Everyone held
of the beating of drums.
their breath.
The Dervishes were prepared. Perhaps they would
Then the
attack the column before it could deploy.
marchthe
of
clatter
the
but
for
and
away,
died
sound
but
alarm,
no
was
silent.
It
again
was
all
columns
ing
only the call to the morning prayer and the Dervishes,
;
still
ignorant that their enemies approached and that
was upon them, trooj>ed from their
huts to obey the pious summons.
The great mass of Firket mountain, still dark in the
of
line
the
of
left
the
upon
rose
up
now
half-light,
march. Between it and the river stretched a narrow
strip of scrub-covered ground; and here, though obswift destruction
structed by the long grass, bushes, palm-trees, and holes,
the leading brigade was
ordered to deploy.*
was, however, as yet only
room
for the
There
Xth Soudanese
and the 3rd and 4th Egyptians contented
themselves with widening to column of companies the
to
form
line,
—
*
Map, The Action
'
at Firket,' to face page 234.
FIRKET
3rd
m
227
rear of the right of the Xth, the 4th in rear of
the centre.
The
now began
force
emerge from the
to
narrow space between the hills and the river, and
debouch into open country. As the space widened
No. 1
field
battery came into line
on the
A
No. 2 on the right of the Xth Soudanese.
ground hid Firket
village,
be within a mile and
though
swell of
was known
it
was now daylight.
it
and
left,
Still
to
there
was no sign that the Dervishes were prepared. It
seemed scarcely possible to believe that the advance
had not yet been discovered. The silence seemed to
forebode some unexpected attack. The leading brigade
and guns halted
to
for a
few minutes to allow MacDonald
form his battalions from 'fours' into column of
companies.
Then
at
resumed, and at this
five
o'clock
advance
the
moment from
the shoulder
Firket mountain there rang out a solitary shot.
Dervish outposts had at
Several
other
last
followed
shots
was
learned
their
of
The
danger.
quick succession,
in
and were answered by a volley from the Xth, and
then from far away to the south-east came the report
of
a
The Horse Artillery battery had
The operation of the two columns
field-gun.
come into action.
was simultaneous
:
the
surprise
of the
enemy was
complete.
The great object was now to push on and deploy as
fast as possible.
The popping of musketry broke out
from many points, and the repeated explosions of the
Horse battery added to the eager excitement of the
troops.
and
For what
swift
is
more
thrilling
than the sudden
developement of an attack at dawn
?
Q 2
The
THE RIVER AVAR
228
Dervish outpost which had fired the alarm
the
rockv
hills
two of
losing
to
their
to fire several shots,
the
left
fled toward:
front of Lewis's brigade
number bv the way, but
by one of which Captain
waitii
Fitton's
horse was killed.
The Xth Soudanese had now reached the top of
the rise which had hidden Firket, and the whole
scene came into view. To the right front the village
of Firket stretched by the side of the river a con-
—
mud
of
fusion
houses nearly a mile
On
perhaps 300 yards broad.
tents
and straw
the landward side ihe
shelters of the Dervish force
A
white and yellow.
system of
Behind
it
as a
mud
wall-
and
background stood
clusters of palm-trees, through
lo<>p-
lines
and
which the broad river
and the masts of the Arab boats might be
front of the troops, but a
showed
northern end of the
the
holed houses strengthened
CD
village.
length and
in
little
to
their
seen.
left,
In
rose a
low rocky ridge surmounted with Hags and defended
r
a stone breastwork running along
its
base.
Across
the open space between the village and the hill hundreds
of Dervishes on horse and on
to
man
foot
were hurrying
and others scrambled up the
themselves the numbers of the enemy.
their defences,
rocks to see for
smoke already speckled the
Mack rocks of the ridge and the brown houses of the
Scores of
little
puffs of
village.
The attack developed very rapidly. The narrow
passage between the mountain and the river poured
forth its brigades and battalions, and the firing-line
stretched away to the right and left with extraordinary
i
FIRKET
229
The Xth Soudanese opened fire on the village
they topped the rise. The 3rd and 4th Egypt
speed.
leployed on the right and
left
as
of the leadin 6 AC
6
two companies of the 4th extending down on to the
4
foreshore below the steej) river-bank.
Peake's battery
and the Maxim guns, coming into action from a
spur of Firket mountain, began to fire over the heads of
(No. 1)
the advancing infantry.
The whole of Lewis's brigade now swung to the
right and attacked the village
MacDonald's, coming
;
up
at
the double
in
line
of battalion columns, de-
round the shoulder of the
mountain, and, bearing away still more to the left,
ployed to the
left,
inland,
advanced swiftly upon the rocky ridge.
in
The ground
was much broken bv boulders
MacDonald's front
and scrub, and a deep khor delayed the advance. The
enemy, though taken at obvious disadvantage, maintained an irregular fire
but the Soudanese, greatly
:
excited, pressed
When
about
on eagerly towards the breastworks.
the brigade
fifty
was
With
200 yards from the ridge,
Dervish horsemen dashed out from among the
rocks and charged the
shot
still
down by
joyful
left flank.
a wild but
yells
the
All were immediately
heavy independent
blacks broke
carried the breastworks at the bayonet.
into a
fire.
run and
The Dervishes
thev saw their
As soon as
horsemen among whom was the Emir Hammuda himself and Yusef Angar, Emir of the Jehadia
swept
did not await the shock.
—
—
away, they abandoned the
on another which lay behind.
4
first
ridge and
fell
back
The Soudanese followed
Major M. Peake, R.A. and Egyptian army.
THE RIVER WAR
230
enemy up one,
rocky hills, up again
outnumbered
the
pursued
and
closely,
the other side of the
and down
and down
and
bringing
shouldering
continually
again,
round the
left
hills
the
last
were
at
until
brigade,
the
of
all
except the dead, and the fugitives were
cleared of
scattered
the
Then
river-bank.
the
towards
running
©
pantii
the
and
west,
facing
re-formed
battalions
soldiers looked about them.
hills,
the
storming
was
brigade
MacDonald's
Whilst
Dervish
the
and
village
the
on
advanced
had
Lewis's
made
houses
loopholed
their
from
Arabs
The
camp.
and the 4th battalion by the
a stubborn resistance,
engaged, their commanding
river-bank were sharply
officer,
Captain Sparkes, having his horse shot in four
places.
5
Encouraged by
number
and
considerable
zeal
in
on
this
augury
enormous superiority
the Egyptians showed
their
weapons,
in
the
occasion was
for the war, of
attack,
regarded
which
as
this
conduct
and their
a
very
happy
first
general
was the
engagement.
As
Lewis's
brigade had swung to
MacDonald's had borne away to the
had opened
in
immediately
filled
the
centre
its
left,
of the attack.
by Maxwell's brigade,
whole force was now formed
in
one
and wheeled continually to the right
line,
right,
and
a wide gap
This was
so that the
which curved
until,
by
the time
had been taken, all three brigades
practically faced west and were advancing together
towards the Nile. The Dervishes penned between the
river and the enemy, and unable to prevent the
rocky
the
hills
—
8
Captain
W.
S.
Sparkes,
Welsh Regiment and Egyptian army.
*
FIRKET
to
moment
advance, which every
remorseless
them
231
narrower limits
—now
restricted
thought only of
flight,
and they could be seen galloping hither and thither
The foreshore of
seeking for some means of escape.
the river at the southern end of Firket
is
concealed
from a landward view by the steep bank, and by
this
sandy path the greater number of the fugitives found
safety.
The
Column would have
Xllth Soudanese, by moving down to the
position
enabled the
of the Desert
river, to cut off this line
fearing lest
doubtless
of retreat
;
but the Sirdar,
they should come under the
fire
of his main force, failed to take this advantage.
The
battalion, forbidden to advance,
remained the
idle
spectators of the Dervish flight.
The cavalry and the
Camel Corps, instead of cutting
at the flank, contented
-
themselves with
making a
enemy had crossed
several
the
west bank.
of
pursuit
and
in
after
the
consequence
their
escape to
swam the river and fled by the
The wicked Osman Azrak, his authority
Others
longer disputed, for his rival was a corpse
galloped from
rest
their front,
hundred Arabs made good
south.
now no
direct
the
field
and reached Suarda.
The
and
houses,
the
to
held
Dervish
force
the
prepared to fight to the death or surrender to their
conquerors.
The three brigades now
closed
upon the
village and,
edge.
water's
the
to
advanced
it step by step,
had
they
until
stop
indeed
MacDonald's brigade did not
clearing
crossed the
The Arabs,
isthmus and occupied the island.
swampy
many of whom
refused quarter, resisted
WAR
THE RIVER
232
though without much
desperately,
than eighty corpses were
By
group of buildings.
ceased
the Egyptian
o'clock
camp was
and more
found in one
afterwards
7.20
the entire Dervish
;
effect,
all
firing
in the
had
hands of
and the engagement of Firket
troops,
was over.
The Sirdar now busied himself with the pursuit,
and proceeded with the mounted troops as far as
Mograka,
cavalry
five
miles
south of
force,
with
the
Artillery, pressed
the
Firket.
Camel
vigorously
retreat
Osman Azrak, however, succeeded
women and
escort, to the
On
of
The Emir
Horse
to
Suarda.
in transporting the
cavalry he
the
range
by
along
retired
mounted
force,
without
charge of the escort on the
in
other side delayed, and was
long
and
west bank before the arrival of the troops.
the east bank, with a small
fighting.
whole
children and some stores, with a sufficient
approach
the
Corps
The
consequence shelled
in
Horse
The local
inhabitants, tired of the ceaseless war which had
desolated the frontier province for so long, welcomed
at
their
the
battery.
new masters with an appearance
of enthusiasm.
The main pursuit stopped at Suarda, but a week later
two squadrons and sixteen men of the Camel Corps,
under
Captain
Mahon,
G
were
miles further south, and an
pushed
Arab
out
twenty
store of grain
was
captured.
The Dervish loss in the action was severe. More
than 800 dead were left on the field, and there
were besides 500 wounded and 600 prisoners. The
'
Captain B. T. Mahon, 8th Hussars and Egyptian army.
—
FIKKET
the Egyptian
casualties in
mounted
the
forces
233
army were
among
chiefly
:
British Officer
Wounded
7
Captain Legge, Egyptian Cavalry
Native Banks
Killed
Wounded
3
18
1
2
18
1
3rd
4th
„
„
Xth
Xlth
.
„
„
„
XHIth
....
.
A
3
15
14
2
5
6
.
2
1
1
Total
Firket
3
5
3
is
officially
special despatches
20
.
classed
as
.
83
a general
action
:
were written, and a special clasp
The reader will have formed his own estimate
The whole
of the magnitude and severity of the fight.
operation was well and carefully planned, and its
The long and
success in execution was complete.
struck.
niofht
difficult
march, the accurate arrival and com-
bination of the two
columns, the swift deployment,
movement, proved alike the discipline
and training of the troops and the skill of their
officers.
The only point on which criticism may be
the enveloping
made
cept
the
which
rifles
the failure of the Desert
is
flying
may
it
7
is
Dervishes.
to inter-
There are two reasons
excuse the neglect.
very dangerous
Column
to
Firstly,
make
with modern
attacks
Captain N. Legge, 20th Hussars and Egyptian army.
from
THE RIVER WAR
234
at
directions
several
and
once,
it
is
said
that
the
have
probably
would
advancing
Xllth Soudanese
But
the
force.
main
the
of
fire
the
under
come
in
reader, by looking at the plan of the
action, will
once perceive that as soon as MacDonald's wheel
force
was
whole
the
completed,
right
was
the
to
practically facing west, and the Xllth, in advancing
at
would merely have prolonged the line.
The second explanation is perhaps the more conAs it is so much cheaper to kill men in
vincing.
to the river,
flight,
than when they are
6
cornered,'
it
is
usually
expedient to leave some line of escape to an enemy.
If
this
was the
Xllth Soudanese
reason for forbidding the
Sirdar's
to
on
close
the
foreshore,
then
must be observed that this cautious policy? when
the Dervishes were already outnumbered by more
than three to one, besides being under a terrible
it
disadvantage in weapons, shows
was
at
The
brilliant
great
this
time
placed
aspect
satisfaction
of
in
the
in England,
how
the
affair,
little
confidence
Egyptian
troops.
however, caused
and the further prose-
cution of the campaign was looked for with increasing
interest.
mans
in
York 1 Bomb ay
CHAPTEE
VIII
THE EECOVEEY OF THE DONGOLA PEOVINCE *
element of chance— 111 luck
—The flotilla—Extension
—
of the railway
—
The move to Kosheh— The new gunboats Cholera A time of
trouble— The north wind—The Second Cataract— The gunboats ascend
it— The luck turns— The advance on Dongola— Occupation of
Absarat— The Death March '—A time of crisis— The Sirdar's power
'
— Composition of the Expeditionary Force — An explosion— Eesumption of the advance— The enemy—Wad Bishara— He inspirits
his
soldiers —Hafir, September 19th— The river action —A striking scene
—Artagasha island—Eetreat of the Dervishes— The casualties — The
Sirdar crosses the Nile — Bombardment of Dongola — The advance of
the army— Its array — Unequal forces — Capture of Dongola— The
pursuit of the enemy — Occupation of the Dongola province — Losses
and rewards
of the
campaign.
Countless and inestimable are the chances of war.
Those who read the story, and
still
more those who
share the dangers, of a campaign feel that every inci-
dent
is
surrounded with a host of
of which,
had
it
become
possibilities,
any one
would have changed the
The influence of Fortune is
real,
whole course of events.
powerfully and continually exerted.
In the
flicker-
ing light of conflict the outlines of solid fact throw
on every
live in
gular;
try to
a
side the
vague shadows of
world of
'
ifs.'
6
What
happened,'
'What might have happened,'
gauge the influence of
utterly futile,
*
and
Map,
'
it
is
possibility.
legion.
is
We
sin-
But
this uncertain force
to
were
perhaps wise, and indisputably
The Capture
of Dongola,'
page 273.
;
;
THE RIVER
236
WAR
convenient to assume that the favourable and adverse
chances equate, and then eliminate them both from
the calculation.
The
in the
Sirdar's luck
'
As
Soudan.
'
has become almost proverbial
the account progresses numerous
instances will suo-gest themselves.
was luckv
It
that
the Dervishes did not harass the communications, or
Akasha before
assail
they fought at Firket
that
Mahmud
before
;
that
;
that they retired from Berber
that
;
that
that he did attack at dawn.
instinctively try to explain astonishing success.
been no
less
easy
— though
perhaps
an array of opposite chances.
or that happened, or did not happen.'
it
less
6
would have
congenial
By
luck
ill
It appears,
ever, to the unprejudiced student, that, in
Much depended on
the
was
left to
forethought
chance.
:
—
to
this
how-
the Biver
War, fortune played a comparatively unimportant
little
he
the Khalifa did not hold
But had the expedition been disastrous
collect
that
he did not attack on the night
Omdurman, and
We
was lucky
It
that he did not retire before the
;
Atbara
the Shabluka
;
fortified.
did not advance in Januarv
advanced in March
battle of the
was
it
part.
much on machinery
I shall, further on,
examine
peculiar military facilities that Sir H. Kitchener
They were undoubtedly
tremendous. But, as far as luck was concerned, the
balance of advantage throughout the war was insigenjoyed in his campaigns.
nificant,
and
in the earlier stages fortune
was
distinctly
adverse.
After Firket
all
things were contrary.
pected misfortune succeeded another.
One unex-
Difficulties
were
THE EE CO VERY OF THE DONG OLA PROVINCE
237
replaced by others as soon as they had been overcome.
The autumn of 1896 was marked by delay and disappointment. The state of the Mle, the storms, the
floods, the cholera, and many minor obstacles, vexed
but did not weary the commander. The victory at
Firket was succeeded by a long pause in the oj)erations.
The army had made one spring forward. It must now
gather energy for another.
A
proceeded rapidly.
ever,
at Firket.
days after
advanced
The preparations, howstrong camp was formed
MacDonald's brigade occupied Suarda two
the fight, and this place now became the
Akasha had been in the first
phase of the campaign. The accumulation of stores
at Firket and Suarda began forthwith.
Owing to the
post, just as
arrangements which had been made before the engage-
ment
it
was possible
to collect within one
week of the
action two months' supplies at Suarda for the garrison
of 2,000 men, and one
troops
encamped
necessity
the
of
month
there.
at Firket for the 7,000
Thereafter,
however,
the
hurrying the railway construction and
considerable
daily
demands of 9,000 men only
allowed this margin to be increased very gradually.
The army had now passed beyond
the scope of a
camel, or other pack-animal, system of supj)ly, except
for
very short distances, and
it
was obvious that
it
could only advance in future along either the railway
or a navigable reach of the river, and preferably
both.
clear
From
alon2;'
Kosheh there is a
Merawi. To Kosheh,
the Dal Cataract near
waterway
at high
therefore, the railway
Mle
to
must be extended before active
operations could recommence.
A
third condition
had
:
THE RIVER WAR
238
For the expulsion of the Derwas
desirable
it
Dongola
that
and
Kerma
from
vishes
also to be observed.
a
flotilla
of gunboats should co-operate with the land
Four of these
forces.
vessels
the Tamai, El Teb, the
:
three
steamers
and
Klea
Abu
the
and
Metemma,
the Kaibar, Dal, and Akasha, which it was proposed
to arn*, had, since 1885, patrolled the river from
;
Assuan
Wady
to
and
Haifa,
All seven were
the frontier from Dervish raids.
at
the
awaited the
rise
collected
To strengthen
of the river to attempt the passage.
the
three
flotilla
new and very powerful
gunboats had been ordered in England.
to be
there.
It
was thus
the railway to reach
the
These were
brought in sections over the railway to a point
above the Second Cataract, and
to
now
Second Cataract, and
the
of
foot
protecting
in
assisted
rise
thirdly,
;
Cataract
;
necessary to
Kosheh
the
for
fourthly,
;
old
for the
accumulation of supplies.
now
fitted
wait,
together
firstly,
for
secondly, for the Nile
launched on the clear waterway
the Sirdar
be
With
gunboats to ascend
new gunboats
;
and,
all
to be
fifthly, for
the
of these matters
busied himself.
The reconstruction of the railway to Akasha and
its extension beyond this place towards Kosheh was
pressed forward. By the 26th of June Akasha was
reached.
Thenceforward
the
engineers
no longer
followed an existing track, but were obliged to survey,
and to make the formation for themselves.
fatigue
parties
battalions were,
from
the
Egyptian
and
Strom;
Soudanese
however, employed on the embank-
ments, and the line grew daily longer.
On
the 24th of
;
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
J uly the
first
239
train ran across the battlefield of Firket
and on the 4th of August the railway was working
Kosheh.
Kosheh
is
six miles south of Firket,
most places in the
'
once a
On
village.
and consists, like
Military Soudan,'
and a few
than
to
of
little
more
uined mud-huts which were
the 5 th of July the whole
camp
The
was moved thither from the scene of the action.
reasons were clear and apparent.
Kosheh is a point
*
GUNBOATS
:
THE
*
1885
•
•
** •
^»^rtf
CLASS
on the river above the Dal Cataract whence a clear
waterway runs at high Nile to beyond Dongola. The
camp
at Firket
bodies of the
had become
dead,
and insanitary.
in revenge, the bodies of
if
The dysentery which had broken out was
probably due to the
4
green
'
water of the Nile
the false rise
foreshore
all
'
washes the
filth
;
for
is
known
and sewage
off the
during the early period of the flood what
as
The
swelling and decaying in their
shallow graves, assailed, as
the living.
foul
along the river, and brings
down
the green
THE RIVER
240
WAR
from the spongy swamps of
impure.
and
dangerous
then
is
water
The
and rotting vegetation
Equatoria.
else for the
There was nothing
army
to drink; but
it
keer
evil
by
the
aggravate
was undesirable to
troops in a dirty camp.
The
earliest freight
Kosheh was the
Train after
iron,
first
which the railway carried
of the
arrived with
train
or with the cumbrous
warship
stores
—
in
new
pieces
soon lay stacked
stern-wheel gunboats.
its
load of steel and
sections of the hull
— engines,
armaments,
by the
to
and a
fittings,
side of the river.
and
An
powerful
twentywith
equipped
dockyard,
improvised
and
the
established,
was
appliances,
other
and
ton shears
work
—
complicated as a Chinese puzzle
— of
fitting
and
parts
provarious
of
hundreds
the
together
riveting
parts
heaps
of
strange
the
Gradually
swiftly.
ceeded
to evolve a
began
mighty engine of war.
every
fninboats were in
way remarkable.
The new
The old
had been 90 feet long.. These were 140 feet.
Their breadth was 24 feet, They steamed 12 miles per
They had a command of 30 feet. Their decks
hour.
were all protected by steel plates, and prepared by
loopholed shields for musketry. Their armament was
vessels
formidable.
Each
carried one twelve-pounder quick-
two six-pounder quick-firing guns
Evenin the central battery, and four Maxim guns.
modern improvement- such as ammunition hoists, tele-
fir in e
cmn forward
;
—
graphs, search-lights,
Yet with
all
this
and steam-winches
— was
added.
they drew only thirty-nine inches of
water.
The design and construction of
these vessels
was
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
241
They were planned by Mr. Thubron,
of the Nile Engine Works, Cairo, a north countryman,
and not, as was stated, a German. The order to build
them was given to Messrs. John Stewart and Son,
Limited a London firm. The contract specified that
entirely British.
—
they should be delivered at Alexandria by the 5 th of
September, but, by extraordinary exertions, the firstboat,
the Zajir, reached Egypt on the 23rd of July, having
been made in eight weeks, and in time to have assisted
in the advance on Dongola.
The vessels and machinery
had been constructed and erected in the works in
London they were then marked, numbered, and taken to
;
pieces,
and
after being shipped to
Alexandria and trans-
ported to the front were finally put together at Kosheh.
Although in a journey of 4,000 miles they were seven
times transhipped, not a single important piece was
The London firm
vise
sent out three engineers to super-
the re-erection
Mr. F.
W.
L. Shaw,
of machinery falling
transportation there.
at
Kosheh.
Of
these the chief,
was killed at Balliana by a piece
on him when superintending the
The second, Mr. M. Nicholson,
Wady
a Newcastle man, died from cholera at
The
third
lost.
of these brave
citizens,
Haifa.
McDonald,
Mr.
completed the undertaking, and remained at the front
during the campaign.
The convenience of Kosheh on the
clear waterway,
and the dirty condition of Firket, were
sufficient reasons for the
change of camp
and graver cause lay behind.
VOL.
I.
;
but another
During the month of
up the Nile
On the 29th there were some cases at
E
June an epidemic of cholera began
from Cairo.
in themselves
to creep
:
THE RIVER
242
On
Assuan.
the
consequence of
marched
into
30th
camp
reached
it
this the
WAR
Haifa.
In
North Staffordshire Regimenl
Gemai.
at
Wady
Their three months'
occupation of the town had not improved their health
dwells
account
Sword's
Lieutenant
spirits.
or their
with a persistence that
is
almost unsoldierly on the
and privations to which his regiment was
exposed throughout the campaign hardships which,
although undoubtedly severe, did not bear comparison
hardships
—
with those suffered by the regiments in the expedition
and were no greater than those experienced
But of all
the British Brigade before the Atbara.
their misfortunes the cholera was undoubtedly the
to Tirah,
worst.
way
During the sixteen-mile march along the
track to
Gemai the
first fatal
rail-
case occurred, and
thereafter the sickness clung to the regiment until
tin-
middle of August, causing continual deaths.
The cholera spread
.
steadily
southward up the
claiming successive victims in
second week of July
Kosheh, whence
all
it
each camp.
river,
In the
reached the new camp
possible precautions to exclude
at
it
The epidemic was at first of a virulent
form.
As is usual, when it had expended its destructive
But of
energy, the recoveries became more frequent.
the first 1,000 cases between Assuan and Suarda nearly
800 proved fatal. Nor were the lives thus lost to be
1
altogether measured by the number.
To all, the time
had proved
vain.
The
attacks and deaths from cholera in the Dongola Expeditionary
Force were as follow
1
British troops
Native troops
Followers
Attacks
Deaths
24
406
788
19
260
640
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONG OLA PROVINCE
was one of
battle
may be
The violence of the
almost of terror.
trial,
243
cheaply braved, but the insidious attacks
Death moved continually
of disease appal the boldest.
about the ranks of the army
—not
the death they had
been trained to meet unflinchingly, the death in high
enthusiasm and the pride of
life,
with
all
the world
weep or cheer but a silent, unnoticed, almost
ignominious summons, scarcely less sudden and far
more painful than the bullet or the sword-cut. The
to
;
Egyptians, in spite of their fatalistic creed, manifested
The English
profound depression.
soldier
was moody
Even the light-hearted Soudanese
their merry grins were seen no
lost their spirits
their laughter and their drums were stilled.
longer
and ill-tempered.
;
;
Only the British
preserved a stony cheerful-
officers
by
energy
and
example to sustain the courage of their men.
Yet
education
had
and imagination,
else-
and
ness,
endeavoured
ceaselessly
most
they suffered
of
developed their imaginations
where a
priceless gift,
Their
all.
;
amid such circumstances a
is
dangerous burden.
It
the
was, indeed, a time of sore trouble.
servant
dead in the camp kitchen
;
to
To
find
catch a
hurried glimj^se of blanketed shapes hustled quickly
on a stretcher
to the desert
the grave
and well
though
it
into
six
which
was
still
night
to hold the lantern over
friend
a
hours before
;
—was
;
or
comrade
—
alive
hastily lowered, even
and through
it
all to
work
incessantly at pressure in the solid, roaring heat, with
a mind ever on the watch for the earliest of the fatal
symptoms and a
thirst that
could only be quenched by
E 2
THE RIVER AVAR
244
Nile
all
these
contaminated
and
deadly
the
drinking of
which
experience
those
an
produce
to
things combined
:
who
but
unlikely
remember,
to
unwilling
are
endured
one some of the best of
One
to forg
staff
army and the
Gallant Fenwick, of
'
whom
Held
were stricken dowi
they used to say that he was
twice a Y.C. without a Gazette
2
?
;
Pohvhele, the railway
WATER TRANSPORT
subaltern,
soldiers
whose strange knowledge of the Egyptian
had won
their stranger love; Trask,
8
an heroic
doctor, indifferent alike to pestilence or bullets
;
Mr.
Vallom, the chief superintendent of engines at Haifa
4
Farmer, a young
officer
already on his fourth campaign
Mr. Nicholson, the London engineer
kind-hearted
'
Eoddy Owen
'
5
—
all filled
graves in Haifa
Lieut. R. Polwhele, R.E.
3
Surg.-Captain J. E. Trask, A.M.S.
Lieut. H. H. F. Farmer, 60th Rifles and Egyptian army.
5
;
long, quaint,
;
2
4
;
and Egyptian army.
Brevet-Major E. R. Owen, D.S.O., Lancashire Fusileers.
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
cemetery or
at the foot of Firket
mountain.
the epidemic burnt itself out, and
August
it
had practically ceased
by
245
Gradually
the middle of
to be a serious danger.
But the necessity of enforcing quarantine and other
precautions had hampered movement up and down the
line of communications, and so delayed the progress of
the preparations for an advance.
Other
unexpected
hindrances
arose.
Kitchener had
clearly
equipped as
then was, would be
doubtful
large
it
means
force
many
H.
recognised that the railway,
the
for
Sir
miles
at
continual
ahead of
the best
supply
it.
He
of
a
a
therefore
organised an auxiliary boat service and passed gyassas
and nuggurs
the
up the Second Cataract.
freely
summer months,
wind
up
6
prevails,
against
the
in
Soudan, a strong north
which not only drives the
the
stream
twenty miles a day
— sometimes
—but
During
at
sailing-boats
the
rate
of
also gratefully cools the air.
This year, for forty consecutive days, at the critical
period of the campaign, the wind blew hot and adverse
from the south.
thus practically
The whole auxiliary boat serv
service was
arrested.
But in spite of these
vating obstacles the preparations for the advance were
forced
onwards.
It
soon became necessary for the
unboats
and
steamers
to be brought on to the upp
&
reach of the river.
The Second Cataract has a total descent of sixty
feet, and is about nine miles long.
For this distance
the Nile flows
down
a rugged stairway formed
sive ledges of black granite.
6
Native sailing
The
craft.
by succes-
flood river deeply
THE EIVER
246
submerges
and rushes along above them with
but with a smooth though swirlin n
these steps,
tremendous
surface.
WAR
force,
As
the Nile subsides, the steps begin to show,
until the river tumbles violently
from ledge to ledge,
its
foam
white
the
of
to
churned
miles
for
surface
whole
broken water, and thickly studded with black rocks.
At the Second Cataract, moreover, the only deep
channel of the Nile
is
choked between narrow
limits,
walls
stern
between
furiously
struggles
stream
the
and
These dark gorges present
of rock.
many
perils
to
The most formidable, the Bab-el-Kebir,
The river here takes a
is only thirty-five feet wide.
plunge of ten feet in seventy yards, and drops five feet
the navigator.
bound.
at a single
An
extensive pool above, formed
by the junction of two arms of the river, increases the
volume of the water and the force of the stream, so
that the
'
Gate
'
constitutes an
obstacle of difficulty
and danger which might well have been considered
insurmountable.
had been expected that in the beginning of
July enough water would be passing down the Second
Cataract to enable the gunboats and steamers waiting
below to make the passage. Everything depended upon
It
the rise of the river, and in the perversity of circumstances, the river this year rose
than usual.
By
much
and slower
later
the middle of August, however, the
attempt appeared possible.
On
the 14th the
first
gun-
Metemma, approached the Cataract The North
Staffordshire Regiment from Gemai, and the 6th and
7th Egyptian battalions from Kosheh, marched to the
4
Gate to draw the vessel bodily up in spite of the current.
boat, the
'
.
THE RECOVERY OF THE PONGOLA PROVINCE
247
The best native pilots had been procured. Colonel
Hunter and the naval officers under Commander Colville
directed the work.
The boat had been carefully prepared for the ordeal. To reduce, by raising the freeboard, the risk of swamping, the bows were heightened
and strengthened, and stout wooden bulwarks were
bow
Guns and ammunition
were then removed, and the vessel lightened by every
possible means.
A strop of wire rope was passed
built
running from
to stern.
completely round the hull, and to this strong belt the
were fastened
five cables
—two on each
So steep was the slope of
the bow.
found necessary to draw
the
all
the
fires,
side
and one
water that
it
at
was
and the steamer
upon external
was thus dependent
entirely
was luckily possible
to obtain a direct pull, for a crag
force.
It
rock rose above the surface of the pool
of black
opposite the
6
On
Gate.'
this a steel
and the hawser was led away
block was fixed,
at right angles until
it
reached the east bank, where a smooth stretch of sand
afforded
convenient place for the hauling parties.
a
Two thousand men were
then
set
to
pull
at
the
0
such was the extraordinary force of the
cables, yet
current that, although the actual distance in which
these
great
were necessary was scarcely one
efforts
hundred yards, the passage of each steamer occupied
an hour and a
exertions
of
half,
the
and required the most strenuous
soldiers.
JSTo
accident,
however,
occurred, and the six other vessels accomplished the
ascent
flotilla
on successive days.
In
week the whole
steamed safely in the open water of the upper
'
reach.
a
•
*
;
WAR
THE RIVER
248
And now
seemed that the luck
it
had returned. The cholera was
The new gunboat Zafir was nearly
expedition
of the
moment
for a
practically extinct.
ready at Kosheh, and her imposing appearance de-
and impressed
lighted
August
the
all
seven
the Cataract arrived in
Almost
the camp.
to
freshed the weary
a whole
fleet
On
army.
23rd of
the
had
steamers which
passed
a stately procession opposite
same time the wind changed
at the
and a cool and delicious
north,
the
the
breeze
men and bore southward
to
Suarda
of sailing boats laden with supplies, which
had been lying weather-bound during the previous
weeks
head of the rapids.
the
at
Staffordshire
relief of officers
in readiness
troops had
camps
in
first
for
to
The mounted
the front
from the
distributed.
At
last the
From Kosheh
to
Kerma,
which they had been
over.
to the intense
to hold themselves
an immediate move.
already returned
Dervish position, the distance by river
127 miles.
marches
The preparatory
Eegiment were,
and men, warned
miserable delay was
the
six
advance tinkled along the telegraph.
orders for the
The North
re-
A
this
study of the
map shows
that
is
by land
can be shortened by nearly 41 miles
30 miles being saved by cutting across the great loop
of the Nile from
Kosheh
to Sadin Fanti,
avoiding the angle from Fereig to
Kerma
which
and 11 miles by
Abu Fatmeh.
From
town was the objective
of the expedition, a further distance of 35 miles must
be traversed, making a total of 120 miles by land or
to Dongola,
101 by
latter
The long desert march from Kosheh
Sadin Fanti was the only natural difficult v bv land.
river.
to
;
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
Although the river from Kosheh
by continual
rapids,
it
is,
to
249
Kerma is broken
with one interval, freely
The Amara Cataract, ten miles
beyond Kosheh, is easily ascended by sailing boats with
a fair wind, and by steamers without assistance.
From
navigable at half Nile.
Amara
Kaibar Cataract stretches a reach of
miles of open water.
The Kaibar Cataract is,
to the
sixty-five
during the flood, scarcely any hindrance to navigation
but at Hannek, about thirty miles further on, the three
miles of islands, rocks, rapids, and broken water
which
are called the Third Cataract are, except at high Nile,
a
formidable barrier.
Once
this
is
passed, there
is
open water for more than 200 miles at all seasons
to Merawi.
The banks of the river, except near
Sadin Fanti, where .the
low.
trees
what
The Eastern bank
and a thin
is
is
close
in,
are
flat
strip of cultivation,
the
desert
Along the right bank of
was now to move.
and
lined with a fringe of palm-
which constitutes
called 'the fertile province of Dongola.'
the other side
The
hills
reaches
the water's
this part of the river the
On
edge.
army
act of the advance
was the occupation of
Absarat, and on the 23rd of August MacDonald's brigade
marched thither from Suarda, cutting across the desert
to
first
Sadin Fanti, and then following the bank.
The
march of twenty-one miles proved most painful to the
troops.
The day was intensely hot. The soldiers were
in heavy marching order.
All the remaining camels of
the army
for hundreds had died during the campaign
were absorbed by the Transport.
Economy had
—
forbidden the purchase of more, and, in consequence,
THE RIVER WAR
250
could
carry
in
they
as
water
the soldiers had only such
accompanied
by
was
not
column
their bottles, and the
water-skins.
with
laden
camels
The brigade
suffered
Although the battalions were Sou-
terribly from thirst.
apoplexy,
heat
of
cases
twenty-nine
danese there were
>ers
Great
numl
fatal.
two of which proved immediately
of
men
fell
and
out,
all
struggled into cam])
in
an
exhausted condition.
next
the
movecovered
Absarat
of
occupation
The
to
ordered
was
brigade
Lewis's
26th
On the
ment.
Fanti.
Sadin
to
Kosheh
from
loop
march across the
and reinforce the brigade
of thirty-seven miles
was
at
Absarat.
The
distance
far too great to be
This the
plished without a system of watering-places.
Sirdar rapidly organised.
accom-
Water-depots were formed
to
two
camels
on
water-skins
and
tanks
carrying
by
points in the desert, and replenishing them by daih
on
descended
calamity
heavy
now
a
But
convoys.
the arrangements of the General and the hopes of the
troops*
:
K
'fh
During the afternoon of the 25th the wind veered
of
storm
terrific
a
thereupon
and
south,
suddenly to the
sand and rain, accompanied by thunder and lightning,
burst over the whole of the Nubian desert, and swept
aloni)-
On
the line of communications from Suarda to Haifa.
the next day a second deluge delayed the
Lewis's brigade.
march of
with
started,
they
27th
on
the
But late
disastrous results.
Before they had reached the
watering-place a third tempest, preceded by
sandstorm, overtook them.
Nearly 300
its
men
first
choking
fell
out
during the early part of the night, and crawled and
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
251
Before the column reached
staggered back to Kosheh.
Sadin Fanti 1,700 more sank exhausted to the ground.
Out of one battalion 700 strong, only 60 men marched
Nine deaths and eighty serious cases of prostrain.
and the movement of the brigade from
The Death
Absarat was grimly called
tion occurred,
Kosheh
to
'
March.'
would perhaps be scarcely
It
just to accuse the
Sirdar of having caused the misfortune
by
the neglect
The fact that on subsequent days
other brigades made the march without great
of any precaution.
the
proves the
suffering
sufficiency
of
arrangement
his
by such phenomenal occurrences as
It was imperative that the
these fearful storms.
It was desiraadvance, once begun, should be rapid.
ble to avoid the loop of the river and save a thirtyThe desert march was therefore not
mile detour.
when not
upset
The
unnecessary.
as
an
'
disaster
can
fairly
be
described
Doubtless the original conception
Act of God.'
of this phase of the campaign
contemplated the
in-
on the troops of arduous and severe marches.
7
They
Such circumstances will often occur in war.
were in this case aggravated by the pitiless economy
fliction
which was enforced
for
;
which the Sirdar cannot be
held alone responsible, and which was the necessary
condition
to
British nation
The
the
recovery of the Soudan
became
whole
of
until
the
interested in the enterprise.
the
Camel
Corps,
the
officers'
march
Eighteen
Malakand
battalion
fell
down dead by
men
in this one
the roadside between Jalala and Dargai.
WAR
THE rJYER
252
chargers, every available animal
promptitude
into the
up the wretched stragglers; and the
pick
desert to
was sent our
which the General acted minimised
But the 'Death March' was the least
witli
the evil results.
by the storms. The violent
such as had not been seen in the
of the misfortunes caused
rains
produced
Soudan
broad
floods,
for fifty years.
valleys,
The water, pouring down the
formed furious torrents in the narrower
More than twelve miles of the railway were
washed away. The rails were twisted and bent the
formation entirely destroyed. The telegraph wires were
broken. The work of weeks was lost in a few hours.
The advance was stopped as soon as it had been begun.
At the moment when every military reason demanded
speed and suddenness, a hideous delay became in-
gorges.
;
evitable.
In this time
campaign hung
of crisis
the
success
in the balance.
Sir
of the
whole
Herbert Kitchener
did not then possess that measure of the confidence and
affection
of his officers which his
have since compelled.
military successes
Public opinion was
still
decided on the general question of the war.
initial
bad luck had frightened many.
were ready.
'
A
Jingo Government
—
General'
'Another
were the whispers.
disaster
A
in
un-
The
All the croakers
'
the
—
'
An
incapable
Soudan'
— such
check would be the signal for
The accounts of 'The Death March' had
reached England
but the correspondents,
an outcry.
not
yet
irritated
;
— not
without reason
—
at
being 'chained to
Headquarters,' were going to see about that.
besides
all
this,
there
was
the
army
to
feed
And,
and
—
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
the Dervishes
to
In this serious emergency,
fight.
which threatened to wreck
moment
in
his schemes, the Sirdar's
more
organising talents shone
other
253
account.
this
than at any
brilliantly
Travelling swiftly
Moghrat, he possessed himself of the telephone,
to
which luckily
But
All depended on
worked.
never
better
He knew
displayed.
position of every soldier, coolie, camel, or
the
donkey
exact
at his
In a few hours, in spite of his crippled trans-
disposal.
port,
him.
power of arrangement
grasp of detail and
his
were
still
men on
he concentrated 5,000
sections of the line,
damaged
the
and thereafter fed them
until the
work was finished. In seven days traffic was resumed.
The advance had been delayed, but it was not
prevented.
On
the 5th of September the 1st (Lewis) and 2nd
(MacDonald) brigades moved to Dulgo, and
at the
same
time the remainder of the army began to march across
the
from Kosheh by Sadin Fanti to Absarat.
loop
Every available
soldier
had been
collected for the final
operation of the campaign.
The Expeditionary Force was organised
Commander-in-Chief'.
The Infantry Division
1st
:
Major Lewis
The Sirdar
3rd Brigade
Major MacDonald Major Maxwell
Brigade
8
Major David
1st Egyptians
4:th
3rd Egyptians
4th
Xlth Soudanese
Xllth
2nd Egyptians
7th
5th
IXth Soudanese
XHIth
8th
15th
Xth
s
:
Colonel Hunter Commanding
2nd Brigade
Brigade
as follows
Major E. F. David, E.M.L.I. and Egyptian army.
„
THE RIVER
254
WAR
Cavalry Brigade and Mounted Forces: Major Burn-Murdoch
8 Squadrons
Cavalr\
Camel Corps
6 Companies
Horse Artillery
1
Artillery
:
Battery
Major Parsons
9
Field Artillery
2 Batteries
Maxims
1
Divisional Troops
North Staffordshire Regiment
The
Flotilla
:
Battery (British)
Major Currie
•
.
*
1st Battalion
Commander Colville
:
10
11
Gunboats
Zafir, Tamai, Abu Klea, Metemma, El Teb
Armed Steamers
Kaibar, Dal, AJcasha
....
.
Total
Thus
:
15.000 men, 8 war-vessels, and 36 guns
thirteen
of
the
sixteen
battalions
Egyptian army were employed at the
front.
the 6th and XlVth, were disjDosed along
communication, holding the various
of
the
Two others,
the line of
fortified posts.
The
16th battalion of reservists remained at Suakin.
The
whole native army was engaged
in the war,
and the pre-
servation of domestic order in the capital and through-
out the Khedive's dominions was
police
9th
and
all
Dulgo
Army
left entirely
to the
By
the
four brigades had reached the rendezvous
at
to the British
of Occupation.
on the 10th the British regiment, which it was
determined to send up in the steamers, was moved to
;
Kosheh by
from Sarras and Gemai.
The Sirdar
prepared to start with the flotilla on the 12th.
But
rail
a culminating disappointment remained.
9
Major C. S. B. Parsons, R.A. and Egyptian Army.
10
Major T. Currie, North Staffordshire Regiment.
11
Commander Hon. S. C. G. Colville, R.N.
By
'
THE EECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PEOVINCE
255
tremendous exertions the Zafir had been finished in
The Sirdar had
time to take part in the operations.
watched the vessel grow day by day with a strange
She became his toy, his pet. Throughout
attention.
army
was expected that the Zajir would be the
feature of the campaign.
At length the work was
finished, and the Zafir floated, powerful and majestic, on
the
it
1
On
the waters of the Nile.
September many
officers
the afternoon of the 11th of
and men came to witness her
The bank was lined with spectators. Colville
took command. The Sirdar and his Staff embarked.
Flags were hoisted and amid general cheering the moorings were cast off.
But the stern paddle had hardly
revolved twice when there was a loud report, like that
trial trip.
of a heavy gun, clouds of steam rushed up from the
boilers,
and the engines stopped.
Commander
latter
Sir
H. Kitchener and
were on the upper deck.
Colville
rushed below to
The
learn what had happened, and
found that she had burst her low-pressure cylinder, a
misfortune impossible to repair until a
be obtained from Haifa and
fitted.
waiting on the deck, expecting to
accident,
when
6
the General's face.
take to repair her
she
6
?
'
A
How many days,'
4
To
absolutely
repair her
useless,
4
She has
slight flush passed over
have to wait until a new one
is
The Sirdar was still
hear of some trifling
the naval officer returned.
burst her cylinder,' he said.
will
new one could
is
is
he asked,
6
will
You
impossible.
sent up.'
it
6
Then
and put out of action
?
The Sirdar stood immovable, while
everyone, remembering all the disappointments and
Absolutely.'
misfortunes, watched and expected another explosion
*
'
THE RIVER
256
of a different kind.
WAR
His face was impassive, and only
slight twitching of the eyes
betrayed his intense emotion.
There was a long and unpleasant
said
:
'
By God,
a
Colville, I don't
silence.
know which
Then he
of us
it's
—
you or me. Well, get her guns out
at once and put them on board the other steamers
and with that he left the ship. Within a quarter of an
hardest luck on
;
hour of the accident the guns were being dismantled,
—
and before night the Zafir proudly named the Victorious
was cleared of everything. The Sirdar in
—
bitterness
the
and vexation shut himself
Dal steamer,
in the cabin of
figuring out his calculations again and
estimating his forces,
now
deprived of so powerful a
was not until the next day that he reappeared,
and only the passionate telegrams which he had de-
factor.
It
spatched to Cairo revealed the depth of his emotions.
The advance was now finally begun. On the 13th
the 1st. 2nd, and 3rd brigades occupied Kaderma.
Here the flotilla overtook them, and henceforward the
boats on the river kept pace with the army on the
Farem was reached on the 14th, and as the
numerous palms by the water afforded a pleasant shade
bank.
On
a halt of two days was ordered.
the 16th the 4th
brigade arrived, and the concentration of the force was
then complete.
Meanwhile the reader has heard nothing of the
enemy, for the enemy in
this
phase of the Dongola
campaign were the smallest part of the
M
ties.
The
Sirdar's difticul-
m
cholera, the adverse winds, the floods, were
redoubtable antagonists.
appeared insignificant.
Beside them the Dervishes
Yet
it is
necessary to consider
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
them, for although
it
was within striking
would
was certain
that,
257
once the army
distance, their destruction or rout
add a pleasing excitement to the
labours of the troops and a romantic interest to the
follow, they
account of the campaign.
After the annihilation of his strong advanced post
Firket, the Dervish Emir, Wad Bishara, concentrated his
*
remaining forces in Dongola.
Here during the summer
he had waited, and in the middle of August some small
reinforcements under one Emir of low rank reached
him from Omdurman. The Khalifa, indeed, promised
that many more should follow, but his promises long remained
unfulfilled,
and the greatest strength that Bishara
could muster was 900 Jehadia, 800 Baggara Arabs, 2,800
spearmen, 450 camel-men, 650 cavalry in all 5,600 men,
—
with six small brass cannon and one mitrailleuse gun. To
augment in numbers, if not in strength, this small force
of regular soldiers, he impressed a large
local tribesmen
;
number of
the
but as these were, for the most part,
anxious to join the Government troops at the
portunity, their effect in the conflict
The army was
first
op-
was inconsiderable.
small, but the spirit of its leader
above contempt; for among the later commanders of the Dervish forces it is difficult to find a
placed
it
better
type of
thirty-two, he
service.
Arab than
had
He was
Bishara.
Although only
risen to a high place in the Khalifa's
a Baggara of Baggaras, and the fact
that he belonged to Abdullahi's particular
Taiasha,
may
promotion.
in Darfur,
VOL.
I.
clan,
the
explain, as his conduct justified, his rapid
His military experience had been gained
where he had commanded a rub or brigade
s
THE RIVER
258
throughout
Osman-Wad-Adam
'Man of the Fig-tree.'
under
the
WAR
On
the
of
revolt
death of Osman
the
command
of
supreme
the
held
Bishara for some time
superseded
course
due
in
was
He
the Army of the West,
by Mahmud,
whom
much
later take
story must
this
man
and
a
Khalifa,
the
of
relation
a
chief disgusted the chaste and
The
notice.
and the incapacity of
cruelty, the sensuality,
of
new
his
valiant Bishara, and,
subject,
the
on
himself
expressed
incautiously
having
Mahmud
he was degraded by
second in
command
of the
from the position of
army
com-
to that of the
After this, the breach
mander of a simple rub.
between the two being open, the Khalifa, who seems
to have had some regard for Bishara, recalled him to
Omdurman, and appointed him to the command of a
brigade of his own guard or mulazemin. The vice
which was
at
this
time
unhappily rampant
capital soon assailed the virtue of the
in the
his
Omdurman
giddy whirl of
in
the
young Emir, and
society he
fell
from
high standard of austerity: nor was he able to
regain
army
it
in
when he was
Dongola
after the recall of
that he lived in the
and concubines.
sent to take
command
of the
Yunes, and we read
town surrounded by
singing-girls
His courage and his talents were,
however, undoubted.
He was
the
first
to recover
from
the general consternation that followed in Dongola the
news of the
disaster
at
Firket.
restored the firmness of the others.
His determination
The delay
in the
and they were further
cheered by the tidings of the floods and cholera by which
their enemies were afflicted, and which seemed to prove
advance raised
their
hopes
:
;
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
them
to
God would defend
that
Some
the right.
of the
Emirs, indeed, desired to send their wives and families
Metemma
to
;
but Bishara, fearing
lest
should follow, decided to keep the
they themselves
women
at the front
a sort of sheet-anchor to his nervous but uxorious
warriors.
them
To
in July that pestilence
army of
the
further fortify their resolution he informed
'
the Turks
'
;
and famine had dispersed
that the
4
God-forsaken Sirdar
'
had retired
to a small island, attended only
and
the cook having died, the impious general
that,
was about
cautions,
to starve.
and
Nor did he
by
his
cook
neglect military pre-
as soon as his Dervishes
had regained
t
their
courage he ordered Osman Azrak to reoccupy
and Kerma.
During the month of August
rumours that the advance was about to recommence
reached him, and he thereupon marched north with his
whole force and his whole harem, and began to fortify
Hafir
Kerma,
as if finally determined to abide the issue there.
The
first
sign that the forces were drawing closer
was the cutting of the telegraph-wire by a Dervish
patrol on the 6th of September.
On the 10th the
Sirdar heard that
Kerma was
strongly held.
15th of September the Egyptian cavalry
lished
On
estab-
the 18th the whole force ad-
vanced to Sardek, and as Bishara
Kerma it looked as if an
still
held his position
action was imminent.
resolved to attack the Dervish position at
Although
it
It
was
Kerma at dawn.
seemed that only four miles separated the
With the first light
move, and when the sun rose the
combatants, the night passed quietly.
the
the
contact with the Dervish scouts, and a slight
skirmish took place.
at
first
On
army began
to
s 9
WAR
THE RIVER
260
moving masses of men and artillery,
The
inspiring.
was
right,
on
the
with the gunboats
spectacle of the
themselves for the expected
soldiers braced
But no sooner were the
village
and
fort
of
action.
Kerma
ranks
the
that
along
passed
report
the
than
visible
it
certaint
in
merged
soon
was
Eumour
y, for
was
on reaching Kerma it was found that the Dervishes had
evacuated the place, and only the strong, well-built mud
deserted.
fort attested the recent
presence of Bishara.
The question was not
had he gone?
left
Whither
unanswered.
Half a mile to the southward, on the opposite bank
of the river,
among
and continuous
walls.
The
the groves of palm-trees ran a long
line of shelter trenches
flanks of this
new
and loopholcd
position rested on
t
lie
deep morasses which extend from the river both on he
t
north and south sides of Hafir.
fleet
to
A
small steamer, a
moored
of large gyassas and other sailing vessels
the
further
Conscious
of
shore
his
explained what had happened.
weakness,
the
prudent Emir had
adroitly transported himself across the river, and had
thus placed that broad flood between his troops and
their destruction.
Meanwhile the three gunboats
mained of the armed
flotilla,
rock in the Hannek Cataract
—
all
for the Teb
that
now
re-
had run on a
—were steaming gradually
army swung to the right, and,
forming along the river bank, became spectators of a
scene of fascinating interest.
At half-past six the Horse
nearer the enemy, and the
battery unlimbered at the water's edge, and began to
fire
first
obliquely up and across the river.
few
shells
As soon
as the
had reached the Arab entrenchment the
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
whole
of shelter trenches was ed^ed with smoke,
line
and the Dervishes replied with a heavy
rifle
distance was, however, too great for their
inferior
261
ammunition, and their
bullets,
occasionally struck the ground on
The
fire.
bad
and
rifles
although they
which the infantry
were drawn up, did not during the day cause any
to the
loss
watching army.
The Dervish position was about half a mile in
length.
As the gunboats approached the northern end
they opened
fire
with their guns, striking the
mud
en-
trenchments at every shot, and driving clouds of dust
The Maxim guns began to
search the parapets, and two companies of the Staffordshire Eegiment on board the unarmoured steamers
Dal and Akasha fired long-range volleys. Now, as on
other occasions throughout the war, the Dervishes by
and
splinters into the air.
their military behaviour excited the admiration of their
enemies.
Encouraged by the
of a reinforcement from
arrival in the
Omdurman
morning
of 1,000 Black
Jehadia and 500 spearmen under Abdel Baki, the Dervish gunners stood to their guns
and the riflemen to
their trenches, and, although suffering severely,
tained a formidable
fire.
The gunboats continued
slowly against
the
main-
strong
opposite Hafir, where
up
came
to advance, beating
current.
As
they
the channel narrows to about
600 yards, they were received by a very heavy
fire
from guns placed in cleverly screened
and
from the riflemen sheltered in deep
pits
batteries,
by the
water's
edge or concealed amid the foliage of the tops of the
palm-trees.
These aerial skirmishers commanded the
•
THE RIVER
202
WAR
were
guns
the
of
shields
the
and
vessels,
of
decks
the
thus rendered of
little
the gunboats was torn
The
bullets
where
One
All the water round
protection.
pattered
into
foam by the
against their sides, and, except
were protected by steel plates, penetrated.
struck the Abu Klea on the water-line, and
the}'
shell
Luckily
entered the magazine.
it
did not explode, the
Dervishes having forgotten to set the fuse.
struck the
leading,
;
Three
shells
the Tamai, which
was
was severely wounded
Armourer-Sergeant Eichardson was killed
Maxim
occurred.
On board
Metemma.
Commander
the wrist
his
projectiles.
Colville
gun, and on each boat some
So hot was the
fire
that
it
in
at
casualties
was thought
doubtful whether to proceed with the bombardment,
and the Tamai swung round, and hurried down the
river with the current and at full steam to report to
action,
in
remained
<>unboats
other
The
the Sirdar.
and continued to shell the Dervish defences. The
Tamai soon returned to the
fight,
and, steaming again
up the river, was immediately hotly re-engaged.
The siffht which the army witnessed was thrilling.
against
backed
river,
the
of
Beyond the flood waters
the
sunlight,
blazing
the
in
and
of
staring
blue
a sky
whole of the enemy's
position
was
plainly
of shelter trenches was outlined
visible.
by
the
The long row
brightthe
with
dotted
and
white smoke of musketry
coloured flags waving defiantly in the wind and with
Behind the
the still brighter flashes of the guns.
entrenchments and among the mud houses and enclosures strong bodies of the jibba-clad Arabs were
arraved.
Still
further
back
in the plain a large force
;
<
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONG OLA PROVINCE
of cavalry
— conspicuous
from their broad-bladed spears
flected
By
manoeuvred.
trees
were
the Nile
crowded
all
with
light
—wheeled
when some
or
daring
riflemen,
tiny black figure
rook, to the ground.
re-
and
the tops of the palm-
whose
were indicated by the smoke-puffs of
positions
rifles
by the gleams of
263
fell,
their
like a shot
In the foreground the gunboats,
panting and puffing up the river, surrounded on
all
by spouts and spurts of water, thrown up by
the shells and bullets, looked like portly gentlemen
It was, however, a more dangerpelted by schoolboys.
ous game. Again the flotilla drew near the narrow
channel again the watching army held their breath
and again they saw the leading boat, the Metemma,
turn and run down stream towards safety, pursued by
It was evident that the
the wild cheers of the Arabs.
gunboats were not strong enough to silence the Dervish
sides
;
fire,
and
it
having at
was too perilous
least subdued it.
Zafir was acutely
v
The
firing
to
run the gauntlet without
The want of the
terrible
felt.
had
lasted
two hours and a
and
half,
the enemy's resistance was no less vigorous than at
the beginning of the action.
his plans.
to
silence
He saw
the
—
that
The Sirdar now
his flotilla
Dervishes.
He
De Eougemont who had assumed
to run past
Colville was wounded
—
without trying to crush their
Dongola.
fire,
To support and cover
altered
could not hope
therefore
the
ordered
command
after
the entrenchments
and steam on
to
the movement, the
Major Parsons were
brought into action from the swampy island of Arta
three batteries of artillery under
.
WAR
THE RIVER
264
which was connected
by a
shoal.
at this season with the right
At the same time three battalions of
were moved along the river
position.
At
9
a.m.
bank
infant rv
Arab
until opposite the
the eighteen
guns on the island
opened a tremendous bombardment
1,200 yards
at
range on the entrenchments, and at the same time the
infantry and a rocket detachment concentrated their
fire
The
on the tops of the palm-trees.
succeeded in silencing three of the
five
artillery
now
Dervish guns
and
in sinking the little Dervish steamer Tahra, while
the
infantry
by a tremendous long-range
the riflemen out of the palms.
by
Profiting
gunboats at ten o'clock moved up the river
drove
fire
this, the
in line, and,
disregarding the fusillade which the Arabs
still
stub-
bornly maintained, passed by the entrenchment and
steamed on towards Dongola.
After this the firing on
both sides became intermittent, and the
light
may
be
said to have ended.
Both forces remained during the day facing each
other on opposite sides of the river, and the Dervishes,
who
evidently did not admit a defeat, brandished their
rifles
and waved
their flags,
and
their shouts of loud
defiance floated across the water to the troops.
they had suffered very heavily.
But
Their brave and skilful
was severely wounded by the splinters of a shell.
The wicked Osman Azrak had been struck bv a bullet
and more than 200 Ansar had fallen, including several
leader
Moreover, a long train of wounded was seen to
start during the afternoon for the south.
It is doubtful,
Emirs.
however, whether Bishara would have retreated, if he
had not feared being cut off.
He seems to have
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONG OLA PROVINCE
believed
right
bank
at
Sirdar
the
that
march
would
265
along
the
once to Dongola, and cross there under
Like
cover of his gunboats.
all
Moslem
nervous about his line of retreat.
soldiers,
Nor, considering
we wonder.
the overwhelming force against him, can
There was, besides
this strategic
more concrete cause.
he was
reason for retiring, a
All his supplies of grain were
accumulated in the gyassas which lay moored to the
west bank.
accurate
fire
Artagasha
These vessels were under the close and
of
the
island.
artillery
and Maxim guns on
Several times during the night the
hungry Dervishes attempted to reach their store but
Each
the moon was bright and the gunners watchful.
;
time the
enemy exposed themselves, a vigorous
opened and they were driven back.
When
was
morning
fire
was found that Hafir was evacuated, and
that the enemy had retreated on Dongola.
Wad Bishara's anxiety about his line of retreat was
unnecessary, for the Sirdar could not advance on
Dongola with a strong Dervish force on his line of
dawned,
it
communications
and
:
it
was not desirable
to divide the
army and mask Hafir with a covering force. But as
soon as the Dervishes had left their entrenchments the
At daybreak all the Arab
situation was simplified.
boats were brought over to the right bank by the
villagers, who reported that Bishara and his soldiers had
abandoned the defence and were retreating
Thereupon the
Sirdar,
forcing the passage,
to the other bank.
relieved
of the
transported his
The operation
to Dongola.
necessity
of
army peacefully
afforded scope to his
powers of organisation, and the whole force
— complete
—
THE RIVER WAfi
260
with cavalry, camels, and guns
—was moved across
the
thirty-six
hours
and
than
less
in
river
rushing
broad,
without any apparent
The
casualties
difficulty.
on the 19th were not numerous, and
in a force of nearly 15,000
Commander
nificant.
men
Colville
they appeal ed insig-
One
was wounded.
and one Egyptian officer were killed.
Eleven native soldiers were wounded. The total
amounted to less than one per thousand of
fourteen
British sergeant
—
Nevertheless, this picturesque and
the troops engaged.
bloodless affair has been solemnly called the 'Battle of
Special despatches were written for
Hafir.'
officiallv
action.'
counted in records of service as a
Telegrams of congratulation were
from Her Majesty and the Khedive.
was struck.
'lory
Hafir
it.
Of
all
A
6
i-
general
received
special clasp
the instances of cheaply bought
which the military history of recent years
is
It
affords,
the most remarkable.
The 20th and part of the 21st were occupied by the
passage of the army across the Xile. The troops were
still crossing when the gunboats returned from Dongola.
The distance of this place by water from Hafir is about
36 miles, and the flotilla had arrived opposite the town
during the afternoon of the 19th.
the
small Dervish
sailing
vessels
movement of
be looked for
garrison,
A few shells expelled
and a large number of
were captured.
The
results
of the
the gunboats to Dongola must, however,
at Hafir.
In consequence of the Sirdar's
manoeuvre that place was evacuated and the unopposed
passage of the river secured.
Bishara continued his retreat during the 20th, and,
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
marching
all
Wounded
as
forthwith to
day, reached Dongola in the
267
evening.
he was, he reoccupied the town and began
make
preparations for the defence of
considerable fortifications.
The knowledge of
his
its
em-
ployment was not hidden from his enemy, and durin
the
21st a gunboat under Lieutenant Beatty,
arrived with
the
design of keeping
him
12
E.N.,
occupied.
Throughout the day a desultory duel was maintained
between the entrenchments and the steamer.
the Dervish artillery
Although
was repeatedly dismounted, they
continued to reply to the
fire,
and, changing their brass
guns from one embrasure to the other with great
rapidity, puzzled the gunboat.
But
their
aim was bad.
The ten Egyptian artillerymen who had been forced to
serve in the batteries at Hafir had now escaped from
The Dervishes themselves had
their long captivity.
no
skill in shooting,
intervals for
and although they were
two days they did not once hit
firing at
their target.
At daylight on the 22nd, Beatty was reinforced by
another gunboat, and an unceasing bombardment was
made on the town and its defences.
Notwithstanding that the army did not finish crossing
the river until the afternoon of the 21st, the Sirdar deter-
mined
to continue his
force accordingly
advance without delay, and the
marched t welve miles further south and
camped opposite the middle of the large island of Argo.
At daybreak the troops started again, and before the
sun had attained its greatest power reached Zowarat.
This place was scarcely six miles from Dongola, and, as
it
was expected that an action would be fought the next
12
The Abu Klea,
Lieut. D. Beatty, R.N.
THE RIVER AVAR
268
welcomed by the
weary soldiers. All daylong the army remained halted
by the palms of the Nile bank. Looking through their
might
watch
the
gunofficers
the
river,
the
up
glasses
boats methodically bombarding Dongola, and the sound
day, the rest of eighteen hours was
of the guns
was
At
clearly heard.
intervals during the
day odd parties of Dervishes, both horse and foot, approached the outpost line and shots were exchanged.
All these things, together with the consciousness that the
culmination of the campaign was
now
at hand, raised
army to a high pitch, and everyone lay down that night warmed by keen anticipations.
An atmosphere of unrest hung over the bivouac, and few
At three o'clock the troops were aroused,
slept soundly.
the excitement of the
and
at half-past four the final
advance on Dongola had
beg
was
It
still
The
night.
full
moon, shining with
tropical brilliancy in a cloudless sky, vaguely revealed
the rolling plains of sand and the huge
the army.
closely
as
it
warmer, yellower light of dawn
moonlight as
corpse
palms.
is
— as
from the
the flush of youth from the pallor of a
Gradually, as the sun rose and
it
became day-
dense formation of the army was extended to
an array more than two miles long.
On
the
left,
nearest
—
marched Lewis's brigade three battalions
and the fourth in column as a reserve. Next
the river,
order Maxwell's three battalions
The
different
—began to grow across the river and through the
light, the
line
of
was dark the battalions were
quarter columns. But presently the
As long
formed in
moving mass
artillery
prolonged the
in
in
line.
were in the centre, supported by the North
;
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
269
The gunners of the Maxim
Staffordshire Eegiment.
battery had donned their tunics, so that the lines and
columns of yellow and brown were relieved by a single
flash of British red.
MacDonald's brigade was on the
David's brigade followed in rear of the centre
right.
The cavalry, the Camel Corps, and the
Horse Artillery watched the right flank. On the left
as a reserve.
the gunboats steamed along the river, and all
who looked
towards them experienced a feeling of delighted confidence when they saw that a fresh vessel had joined the
flotilla.
The
Zafii\ her
new
cylinder fitted
ordinary exertions, had arrived in time to be
death.'
It
is
strange
to
reflect
of 15,000 bayonets and sabres
by
4
extra-
in at the
that this fine
and the strong
force
flotilla
which together advanced swiftly upon the enemy were
commanded by a British colonel. Such are the rewards
which the Egyptian service has given to capable men.
For two hours the army was the only living thingon the smooth sand, but at seven o'clock a large
body of Dervish horse appeared on the right flank.
visible
The further advance of half a mile displayed the Arab
Their numbers were less than those of the
forces.
Egyptians, but their white uniforms, conspicuous on the
sand,
and the rows of
flags
of
many
imposing appearance to their array.
colours lent an
Their determined
no less than the reputation of Bishara, encouraged
the belief that they were about to charge.
The disparity of the forces was, however, too great
aspect,
and
as
the Egyptian
army
Dervishes slowly retired.
covered bv
the
steadily
advanced,
the
Their retreat was cleverly
Baggara horse, who, by continually
THE RIVER WAR
270
progress
the
of
the
delayed
flank,
desert
threatening the
the
town,
re-enter
to
attempt
not
did
Bishara
troops.
on which the gunboats were
fire,
but
now
concentrating their
towards
order
excellent
in
retire
to
continued
the south and Debba.
The Egyptian infantry halted
in
Dongola, which
the
hands
in
already
of
found
they
arrived
they
when
flag
witli
red
The
the
flotilla.
the
from
detachments
waved once again from the roof of
The garrison of 400 black Jehadia had
crescent and star
the Mudiria.
with
fraternising
their
already
were
and
capitulated,
Soudanese captors whose comrades-in-arms they were
soon to be. While the infantry occupied the town the
cavalry and Camel Corps were despatched in pursuit.
firm
maintained
a
however,
horse,
Bao^ara
The
attitude,
and attempted several charges to cover the retreat of
In one of these an actual collision
their infantry.
13
squadron of Egyptian
occurred, and Captain Adams's
cavalry inflicted a loss of six killed on the
cost to themselves of eight
men wounded.
enemy at a
The cavalry
and Camel Corps had about twenty casualties in the
But although the Dervishes thus withdrew in
pursuit.
an orderly manner from the field, the demoralising
influence of retreat soon impaired their discipline and
and many small parties, becoming detached from
The
the main body, were captured by the pursuers.
line of retreat was strewn with weapons and other
order,
and so many babies were abandoned by their
parents that an artillery waggon had to be employed to
effects,
collect
13
and carry them.
Wad
Bishara,
Oman
Azrak,
Captain R. H. Adams, Scots Greys and Egyptian army.
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
271
and the Baggara horse, however, made good
their
flight across the desert to
terrible sufferings
from
Metemma,
thirst, retained sufficient disci-
pline to detach a force to hold
PRISONERS OF
the retreat
their
way
and, in spite of
was followed.
along the river to
Abu Klea
Wells in case
WAR
The Dervish infantry made
Abu Hamed, and were much
harassed by the gunboats until they reached the Fourth
Cataract,
when
the pursuit
The Egyptian
was brought
to
losses in the capture of
an end.
Dongola and
THE RIVER
272
subsequent pursuit were
in the
ranks
:
killed, 1
wounded,
;
WAR
:
—
British,
nil.
Native
Total, 2G.
25.
The occupation of Dongola terminated the campaign
About 900 prisoners, mostly the Black
of 1896.
Jehadia,
all
the six brass cannon, large stores of grain,
and a great quantity of
flags, spears,
and swords
fell
to
the victors, and the whole of the province, said to be
the
most
fertile in
Egyptian authority.
was restored
the Soudan,
to the
The existence of a perpetual
clear
waterway from the head of the Third Cataract to
Merawi enabled the gunboats to at once steam up the
more than 200 miles, and in the course of
the following month the greater part of the army was
established in Merawi below the Fourth Cataract, at
Debba or at Korti, drawing supplies along the railway,
river for
and from Bail-head by a boat service on the long reach
of open water.
The position of a strong force at
—
Merawi only 120 miles along the river bank from
Abu Hamed, the northern Dervish post was, as will
—
be seen, convenient to the continuance of the campaign
whenever the time should
the advance was
destined
to
forces of the
now
pass
But a long delay in
and nearly a year was
arrive.
inevitable,
without any collision between the
Khedive and those of the Khalifa.
The success of the operations caused great public
satisfaction in England.
The first step had been taken.
The Soudan was re-entered.
After ten years of
defensive war the Dervishes had been attacked, and
it was clear that when they were attacked with adequate forces, they were
all.
The croakers were
not
silent.
so
A
very terrible
after
general desire was
THE RECOVERY OF THE DONGOLA PROVINCE
273
G Philip & San,3ZfleetStlondon
VOL.
1.
T
THE RIVER
274
WAR
operations
should
the
that
manifested in the country
did
not
yet
Government
the
continue, and although
abandon
tentative policy, or
their
to utterly
resolve
that,
decided
as
was
it
power,
Khalifa's
destroy the
there
was
pleasant,
and
safe
been
the road had so far
back.
turn
or
stop
to
need
at present no
14
published.
was
honours
of
A generous gazette
invidious
be
would
it
which
exception,
With a single
.
the
of
officers
the
all
specify,
to
mentioned
Colonel
despatches.
in
15
distinguished
—
Major-Generals
the field; a special
rated
by
medal—
is
ment at Firket and the affair at Hafir were
clasps.
for
shown flowing through
was struck; and both the engage-
on whose ribbon the Blue Nile
the yellow desert
H. Kitchener and
Sir
Hunter were promoted
service in
Egyptian army were
The
commemo-
casualties during the campaign,
and
killed
43
were
Suakin,
round
including the fighting
cholera
from
died
men
and
officers
130
139 wounded
;
;
and there were 126 deaths from other causes.
number of British officers were also invalided.
14
15
Appendix C,
Appendix B,
vol.
ii.
vol.
ii.
A large
—
—
275
CHAPTEE IX
THE DESERT RAILWAY
—The waterway —The Dongola campaign—The
Dongola railway —A battalion of the line —Education — The floods
advance — The strategy of the
The extension to Kerma — The line
war Via Abu Hamed— The Desert Eailway — Questions —Water
Into the wilderness — The town of Eail-head— The daily trains — The
— The cost —Wells
daily work —A peculiar peril—Abu Hamed at
of water —Breaking the record —Babel — A matter of trade — England
and America — Further extensions — The country— The business
of supply— The victualling yard— The Akasha phase — Dongola
—Arrival of the railway — The
Abu Hamed — The Berber
The stem
of the flower
of
last
difficulties
subalterns' victory.
t
It often
happens that in prosperous public enterprises
applause of the nation and the rewards of the
the
sovereign
bestowed on those whose
are
splendid and whose duties have been dramatic.
whose labours were no
it is
also true of things.
mind
is
filled
vivid scenes,
dous results
moving
and
men,
If this be true of
In a tale of war the reader's
with the fighting.
its
Others
less difficult, responsible,
vital to success are unnoticed.
are
offices
incidents,
The
its
battle
plain
— with
its
and tremen-
— excites imagination and commands
atten-
on the fighting brigades as they
move amid the smoke on the swarming figures of the
enemy on the General, serene and determined, mounted
tion.
The eye
is
fixed
;
;
in
the
The long trailing
The fierce glory
unnoticed.
middle of his
of communications
is
Staff.
line
that
;
THE RIVER
270
WAR
dazzles
the
observer
bayonets
triumphant
plays on red,
where,
along
to
a
behind
look
to
care
he
nor does
the
convoys
river,
and
road,
rail,
of
thousand miles
succession.
uninterrupted
in
front
the
to
are crawling
flower.
bright-coloured
beautiful,
the
Victory
is
port
the stem without which
is
blossomed.
Trans-
could never have
it
Yet even the military student, in
his zeal
A BEAST OF BURDEN
to master the fascinating combinations of the actual
conflict, often forgets the far
more
intricate complica-
tions of supply.
It
which
cannot be denied that a battle, the climax to
all
military operations tend,
is
an event which
not controlled by strategy or organisation.
may be
is
The scheme
well planned, the troops well fed, the annnuni-
THE DESERT RAILWAY
277
and the enemy entangled, famished, or
tion plentiful,
numerically inferior.
The
glorious uncertainties of the
can yet reverse everything.
The human element
in defiance of experience, probability, and logic
may
produce a wholly irrational result, and a starving, outmanoeuvred army win food, safety, and honour bv their
But such considerations apply with greater
bravery.
force to wars where both sides are equal in equipment
field
—
and
In savage warfare in a
discipline.
power of modern machinery
is
flat
country the
such that
flesh
and
blood can scarcely prevail, and the chances of battle
are reduced to a
minimum.
Fighting the Dervish was
primarily a matter of transport.
The Khalifa was con-
quered on the railway.
Hitherto, as the operations have progressed,
it
has
been convenient to speak of the railway in a general
manner as having been laid or extended to various
and
merely indicate the direction of the lines
of communication.
The reader is now invited to take
points,
to
a closer view.
This chapter
is
concerned with boats,
and pack animals, but particularly with railThe details are important, for from them great
railways,
ways.
events depend
;
nor would the pen of Eudyard Kiplin
search vainly for the element of romance.
Throughout the Dongola campaign
in
1896 the Mle
was the main channel of communication between the
Expeditionary Force and its base in Egypt. All supplies
were brought to the front as far as possible by water
Wherever the Mle was navigable, it was used.
Other means of conveyance by railways and pack
transport.
animals
—though
—
essential,
were merely supplementary.
;
THE RIVER WAR
278
form
of
other
any
than
less
cost
and
Boats carry more
transport.
the
is
plant
The
service
is
not so liable to interruption
readv-made.
But the Nile
Frequent cataracts obstruct
is
its
not
To
waterway
always available.
many miles.
when the river is
course for
Other long reaches are onlv navigable
in Hood.
the
repair;
needs only simple
prethus
and
reaches,
navigable
the
join
complex
a
communications,
the
of
continuity
serve the
necessary.*
was
caravans
and
railways
of
system
was
railway
of
line
a
Dongola
to
expedition
In the
required
to
the Nile which extend
and from Kerma
the
Before
distance
was
it
is
was
at first
only
the
years
shortened
navigable
In conse-
necessary to construct
Wady
when Wadv
108 miles between
Durino;
Haifa,
capture
the
Third Cataract and Kerma.
stretch of
Kosheh.
this
Wady
fact that the river at high Xile
between the
quence
from Assuan to
Merawi.
to
of Dongola, however,
by the
reaches of
connect the two navigable
Haifa and
Haifa
was
southernmost garrison of the Egyptian forces a
the
In
Sarras.
at
maintained
been
had
strong post
the
had
Haifa
from
railway
188-5
the
of
expeditions
Nile
been completed through Sarras and as
a distance of eighty-six miles.
far as
Akasha,
After the abandonment
far
as
line
the
roved
dest
Dervishes
the
Soudan
of the
The old embankments were still
north as Sarras.
rails
the
and
burnt
had
been
sleepers
the
but
standing,
The
twisted.
or
bent
cases
many
in
torn up, and
be summed up as follows
position in 1896 may,
was
Sarras
to
Haifa
Wady
from
The section of 33 miles
in fact,
*
Map,
4
Rail and River,' to face page 308.
:
THE DESERT RAILWAY
immediately available and
section of 53 miles
279
working order.
in
The
from Sarras to Akasha required
The
partial reconstruction.
section of 32 miles from
Akasha to Kosheh must, with the exception of 10 miles
of embankment completed in 1885, at once be newly
made. And, finally, the section from Kosheh to Kerma
must be completed before the Nile flood subsided.
The first duty therefore which the Engineer officers
had
perform was the reconstruction of the
to
No
Sarras to Akasha.
from
line
trained staff or skilled work-
The lack of men with technical
knowledge was doubtfully supplied by the enlistment
men were
of a
6
available.
Eailway Battalion
many
were drawn from
only
tribes
and
prisoners,
sleepers.
shovelled
but
released
stalwart
assisted
wearing
still
Egyptians
Dinkas,
and
Jaalin,
Shillooks,
civilian
—were
also
Soudanese
employed
;
—
for
Dervish
their
unloading
in
contentedly together at the
One hundred
Their
classes.
They presented a motley appearance.
work.
men
These
800 strong.
was capacity and willingness
qualification
soldiers
'
jibbas,
rails
and
Barabras
embankments.
chiefly time-expired
and
these, since they
were trustworthy and took an especial pride in their
work, soon learned the arts of spiking
fishing
rails
too-ether,
rails
and sleepers,
and straightening.
To
direct
and control the labours of these men of varied race
and language, but of equal inexperience, some
civilian
foremen platelayers were obtained at high rates of
pay from Lower Egypt.
These, however, with very
few exceptions were not satisfactory, and they were
gradually replaced by intelligent
men
of the
'
Eailway
THE RIVER
280
had learned their trade as
who
Battalion,'
WAR
of Engineers, of
Girouard.
line
projection, direction,
and execution
to a
few subalterns
The
entrusted
was
work
whole
the
of
progressed.
the
whom
the best-known was
Edouard
1
end
latter
the
at
Sarras
of
south
was begun
Work
of March.
At
first
the
workmen, instructed
efforts of
many
so
by few experienced
unskilled
officers,
were
than important.
rather
ridiculous
results
of
productive
of
the
energy
and
knowledge
the
however,
Gradually,
of
devotion
and
intelligence
the
and
young director
effect.
take
to
began
subordinates
youthful
still more
labour
was
the
and
increased,
construction
The pace of
skill.
and
experience
of
contrivances
the
lightened by
As
the line
commissioned
grew
officers
longer, native officers
and non-
from the active and reserve
lists
station-masters.
appointed
were
army
Egyptian
of the
were
men
and
officers
non-commissioned
Intelligent
converted
was
Traffic
into
shunters,
controlled
by
guards,
and
telephone.
pointsmen.
To work
the
and
read
could
who
discovered
were
men
telephone,
their
only
write
and
read
could
who
often
wr it e very
difficulty
such
with
that
even
and
names,
own
—
They developed
imTo
selection.
of
process
simple
a
by
that they usually preferred
into clerks
a
seal.
and to train a staff in the
instituted
were
schools
two
railway,
of
a
work
office
In these establishments, which were formed
at Haifa.
pi ive
their
education,
by the shade of two palm-trees, twenty pupils received
The simplicity of the
the beginnings of knowledge.
1
Lieut. E. P. C. Girouard, R.E.
and Egyptian army.
:
THE DESERT RAILWAY
was aided by the
instruction
281
zeal of the students,
and
more quickly
per-
learning grew beneath the palm-trees
haps than in the more magnificent schools of
civilisation.
rolling stock of the Halfa-Sarras line
The
was
in
ood order and sufficient quantity, but the eight locomotives were out of all repair, and had to be patched
up again and again with painful repetition. The
regularity of their breaks-down prevented
the regu-
and the Soudan military railway
gained a doubtful reputation during the Dongola
Nor were there
expedition and in its early days.
larity of the road,
wanting those who employed their wits in scoffing at
the undertaking and in pouring thoughtless indignation
on
the
Nevertheless
engineers.
the
work went on
continually.
The
of the task were aggravated
initial difficulties
On
an unexpected calamity.
the 26th of
the violent cyclonic rain-storm of which
has been given in the
Au s
some account
chapter broke over the
last
Dongola province.
A
phases of the war
writer on the earlier
forcibly
explained
why
consequences
the
2
were
has
so
serious
'
In a country where rain
engineer lays his railway
lley,
Where he
all his
carry off flood-water.
not in the bottom of a
on one slope or the other
embankments large culverts to
But here, in what was thought
rainless Soudan, the line
be the
•
an ordinary event the
passes across branching side valleys, he takes
care to leave in
to
line,
at a higher level
but
is
2
A. Hilliard Atteridge,
1
south of Sarras
Towards Khartoum.
THE RIVER
282
WAR
bottom of the long
valley of Klior Alirusa, and no provision had been
made, or had been thought necessary, for culverts in
the embankments where minor hollows were crossed.
followed for mile
after mile the
was not merely that the
railway was cut through here and there by the rushing
It was covered deep in water, the ballast
deluge.
swept away, and some of the banks so destroyed that in
places rails and sleepers were left hanging in the air
Thus, when the flood came,
1
it
across a wide gap.'
Nearly fourteen miles of track were
destroyed.
The camp of the construction gangs was wrecked and
—
Some of the rifles of the escort for the
were afterwards
conditions of war were never absent
flooded.
—
recovered from a depth of three feet of sand.
place,
where the embankment had
In one
partially withstood
the deluge, a great lake several miles square appeared.
By
extraordinary exertions the damage was repaired in
a week.
As soon
Kosheh was completed,
the advance towards Dongola began.
After the army
had been victorious at Hafir the whole province was
cleared of Dervishes, and the Egyptian forces pushed on
to Merawi.
port.
as the line as far as
Here they were dependent on
But the Nile was
falling rapidly,
river trans-
and the army
was soon in danger of being stranded by the interruption
of river traffic between the Third Cataract and Kernia.
The extension of the line from Kosheh to Kerma was
The survey was at once
undertaken, and a suitable route was chosen through
the newly acquired and unmapped territory.
Of the
therefore of vital importance.
THE DESERT RAILWAY
ninety-five
extended
of
miles
283
track,
were
fifty-six
through the desert, and the constructors here gained
was afterwards of value on the
great desert railway from Wady Haifa to the Atbara.
the experience which
Battalions of troops were distributed along the line and
ordered to begin to
make
the embankments.
Track-
commenced south of Kosheh on the 9th of October,
and the whole work was carried forward with feverish
As it progressed, and before it was completed,
energy.
the reach of the river from the Third Cataract to Kerma
ceased to be navigable. The army was now dependent
laying
on the partly finished railway, from
for its existence
head of which supplies were conveyed by an
the
Every week the
elaborate system of camel transport.
line
the
grew, Kail-head
moved forward, and
upon
But the problem
pack animals diminished.
feeding the field
the strain
army without
.
interfering with
of
the
railway construction was one of extraordinary intricacv
and
The carrying capacity of the line was
The worn-out engines frequently
limited.
difficulty.
strictly
broke down.
On many
occasions only three were in
working order, and the other
five
undergoing
e
heavy
which might secure them another short span
Three times the construction had to be
of usefulness.
suspended to allow the army to be revictualled. Every
repairs'
difficulty
of
May
was, however, overcome.
the line to
Kerma was
of the Railway Battalion,
its
By
finished,
the beginning
and the whole
subalterns and
its
director,
turned their attention to a greater enterprise.
In the
from
first
England
week
with
in
December the Sirdar returned
instructions
or
permission
to
THE RIVER
284
continue
the
WAR
towards Khartoum, and the
advance
momentous question of the route to be followed arose.
It may at first seem that the plain course was to continue to work along the Nile, connecting its navigable
reaches by sections of railway. But from Merawi to Abu
Hamed the river is broken bv continual cataracts, and
the broken ground of both banks made a railway nearly
an inrpossibility.
The movements of the French expeditions towards the Upper Nile counselled speed. The
poverty of Egypt compelled economy. The Nile route,
though sure, would be slow and very expensive. A
short cut must be found.
Three daring and ambitious
schemes presented themselves:
by the Desert Column
in
—
(1)
The
1884 from Korti
line followed
to
(2) the celebrated, if not notorious, route
to Berber
or
Wady
;
Metemma
;
from Suakin
Nubian desert from Korosko
Abu Hamed.
(3) across the
Haifa to
The question involved the whole strategy of the
war.
No more important decision was ever taken
by Sir Herbert Kitchener, whether in office or in
The request for a British division, the attack
on Mahmud's zeriba, the great left wheel towards
action.
Omdurman
Marchand
during that battle, the treatment of the
expedition, were matters
of lesser resolve
than the selection of the line of advance.
strength of the Khalifa
force
made
would be required
and the capture of
it
The known
evident that a powerful
for the destruction of his
The use of railway
Nile whence there was
his capital.
transport to some point on the
a clear waterway was therefore imperative.
and Metemma were
army
known, and
Berber
Abu Hamed was
THE DESERT RAILWAY
believed to
fulfil this
Metemma were
condition.
285
But both Berber and
important strategic points.
It
was
improbable that the Dervishes would abandon these
keys to Khartoum and the Soudan without severe
resistance.
seemed
It
likely, indeed, that the Khalifa
would strongly reinforce both towns, and desperately
contest their possession.
The deserts between Korti
and Metemma, and between Suakin and Berber, contained scattered wells, and small raiding parties might
have cut the railway and perhaps have starved the
army at its head. It was therefore too dangerous to
project the railway toward either Berber or
until they
is
were actually in our hands.
The argument
The towns could not be taken without
circular.
a strong force
so strong a force could not advance
;
until the railway
be made
Metemma
till
was made
;
and the railway could not
the towns were taken.
Both the Korti-Metemma and the Suakin-Berber
routes were therefore rejected.
The resolution to exclude the latter was further strengthened by the fact that
the labour of building a railway over the hills behind
Suakin would have been very great.
The route
vid
Abu Hamed was
so
strongly garrisoned
by the
But it had distinct and
exclusion of the alternatives.
apparent advantages. Abu Hamed was within striking
It was not a point
distance of the army at Merawi.
essential to the Dervish defences, and not therefore
likely
to
Metemma.
be
It
might,
therefore,
be
selected
as
Berber
or
captured by a
column marching along the river, and sufficiently
small to be equipped with only camel transport.
The
:
WAR
THE RIVER
286
Abu
Hamed
to
railway
the
which
deserts through
it
would
be
therefore
and
wells,
few
contain
pass
would
small
for
difficult
raiding parties to cut the line or
attack the construction gangs
;
and before the
at
garrison
Dervish
the
reach
of
within
line g
Abu Hamed,
seized.
the
place
and
dislodged
be
would
that garrison
argument
in
its
the
and
perfect,
was
plan
The
on
one
point
however,
turned,
It
conclusive.
favour
With
this
possibility?
a
Kailway
Desert
Was the
He
question the General was now confronted.
appealed
opinion.
Eminent
railway
They replied
England were consulted.
unanimity that, having due regard to the
engineers
with
expert
to
in
circumstances, and remembering the conditions of
under which the work must be executed, it
Distin
impossible to construct such a line.
soldiers
They
were approached on the subject.
war
was
replied
was not only impossible, but absurd.
Many other persons who were not consulted volunteered the opinion that the whole idea was that of
that the scheme
a lunatic,
expedition.
Having received
on
the
it
duly,
Sirdar
disaster
ordered the
Abu Hamed
Wady Haifa ?
start
to
the
reflected
railway to be
3
further question immediately arose
railway to
and
this advice,
constructed without more delay.
A
and
and predicted ruin
:
Should the
from Korosko or from
There were arguments on both
sides.
The
adoption of the Korosko line would reduce the river
however, only fair to state that in 1884 Sir Evelyn Wood had
recorded his opinion that the only route from Egypt to the Soudan was
via Abu Hamed— Editor.
3
It
is,
THE DESERT RAILWAY
from Assuan
stage
by
287
hours
forty-eight
upstream.
The old caravan route had been from Korosko vid
Murat wells to Abu Hamed. It was by this road
that General Gordon had travelled to Khartoum on his
last
ourney
j
appliances
Wady
On
.
for
the other hand,
many workshops and
construction were
already existing at
was the northern terminus of the
Dongola railway. This was an enormous advantage.
Both routes were reconnoitred that from Wady Haifa
The decision having been taken, the
was selected.
Haifa.
It
;
enterprise
was
Lieutenant
entrusted,
was
in
his
Sitting
comprehensive
want was
seen
at
once begun.
Girouard,
told
to
hut at
list.
to
make
whom
Haifa,
Nothing was
he drew up
a
Every
forgotten.
every difficulty was fore-
every requisite was noted.
;
was
the necessary estimates.
Wady
provided for;
everything
The questions
be decided were numerous and involved.
carrying capacity was required?
to
How much
How much
rolling
How many engines ? What spare parts
How much oil ? How many lathes ? How many cutters ?
How many punching and shearing machines ?
stock
?
What arrangements of signals would be necessary?
How many lamps ? How many points ? How many
What amount of coal should be ordered ?
trolleys ?
How much water would be wanted ? How should it be
carried
?
To what
extent would
hauling power and influence
How much
miles of rail
all
its
carriage affect the
previous calculations
railway plant was needed?
?
How many
How many
thousand sleepers
Where
?
could they be procured at such short notice
I
?
?
How
WAR
THE RIVER
288
What tools would
What
machinery?
appliances?
What
required?
be
How much skilled labour was wanted? How much
many
were necessary?
fish-plates
How were the
How much food
of the class of labour available?
work-
men
would
they want
feed
to
and watered
to be fed
How many
?
them and
the estimate
How
afflict
day must be run
How many
?
must be run
The answers
to all
and to many others with which
I will
reader, were set
the
to
did these requirements affect
for rolling stock ?
these questions,
not
trains a
their escort
carry plant?
?
forth
by Lieutenant
Girouard in a ponderous volume several inches thick
;
and such was the comprehensive accuracy of the
estimate that the working parties were never delayed
by the want even of a piece of brass wire.
Under any circumstances the task would have
been enormous. It was, however, complicated by five
It had to be executed with
important considerations
There was apparently no water
military precautions.
along the line. The feeding of 2,000 platelayers in a
barren desert was a problem in itself. The work had
to be completed before the winter. And, finally, the
The Sirdar
monev voted was not to be outrun.
:
—
t
attended to the last condition.
Girouard was sent to England to buy the plant and
rolling stock.
Fifteen
trucks were ordered.
Avere
commenced
were
procured
additional
at
to
men were
and trained.
new
engines and two hundred
The necessary new workshops
Haifa.
direct
Experienced
them.
enlisted in
mechanics
Fifteen
hundred
the Eailwav Battalion
Then the water question waa
dealt
with.
—
;;'
THE DESERT RAILWAY
289
The reconnoitring surveys had reported that though
the line was certainly good and easy for 110 miles
4
'
Arab accounts, for the remaining 120
miles
no drop of water was to be found, and only two
Camel transport was,
likely spots for wells were noted.
Each engine must first
of course, out of the question.
and, according to
—
of
all
haul enough water to carry
it
to Eail-head
and
was
evident that the quantity of water required by any
locomotive would continually increase as the work proback,
besides
ressed
a reserve
against
accidents.
and the distance grew greater,
It
until finally the
material trains would have one-third of their carrying
power absorbed
in transporting the
water for their
own
The amount of water necessary is largely
dependent on the grades of the line. The flat desert
proved to be a steady slope, up to a height of 1,600 feet
consumption.
6
above Haifa, and the calculations were further com-
The difficulty had, however, to be faced, and
These
a hundred 1,500-gallon tanks were procured.
were mounted on trucks and connected by hose
and the most striking characteristic of the trains of
the Soudan military railway was the long succession
of enormous boxes on wheels, on which the motive
power of the engine and the lives of the passengers
plicated.
depended.
The
first
spadeful of sand of the Desert Eailway was
turned on the
the line to
day of 1897
first
Kerma was
;
finished,
but until May, when
no great
efforts
were
made, and only forty miles of track had been laid. In
the meanwhile the men of the new Eailway Battalion
were being trained the plant was steadily accumulating
;
VOL.
I.
u
THE RIVER
290
engines, rolling
and material of
stock,
From
arrived from England.
at
Wady
Haifa the
hammers and
%f
and clang of
clatter
rose to
The malodorous incense of
civilisa-
was one red
this
was preparation
to the startled
gods of Egypt.
nor was
;
that track-laying into
until the
All
8th
of
the desert was begun
in
it
The whole of the construction gangs and
earnest.
railroad
staff
were brought from Kerma to
Haifa, and the daring pioneers of
on
had
smoke of manufacture
tion
May
sorts
all
the growing workshops
continual
the black
the African sky.
WAR
modern
Wadv
Avar started
march through the wilderness, dragging
railway behind them
a safe and sure road
their long
—
their
which
infantry,
guns,
cavalry,
and gunboats might
follow with speed and convenience.
power of words to describe
the savage desolation of the regions into which the line
scarcely within the
It is
and
constructors
its
bright-coloured sand
horizons.
The
plunged.
A
smooth ocean of
spread far and wide to
tropical
be touched with a naked hand,
there
and shimmered
nut
sun beat with senseless per-
severance upon the level surface until
glittered
(list
it
could scarcely
and the filmy
air
Here and
as over a furnace.
huge masses of crumbling rock rose from the
plain, like islands of cinders in a sea of
this vast
expanse stood Rail-head
—a
Alone
fire.
in
canvas town of
2,500 inhabitants, complete with station, store-, postoffice,
telegraph-office,
and canteen, and
nected with the living Avorld
two
parallel iron streaks,
growing dim and
of
only
men and
con-
ideas
bv
three feet six inches apart.
pel
THE DESERT RAILWAY
291
they were twisted and blurred by the mirage
and
vanished in the indefinite distance.
Every morning
the
in
remote nothingness there
appeared a black speck growing larger and clearer,
until
with a whistle and a welcome
aching silence of ages, the
carrying
its
6
clatter,
material
own water and
train arrived,
'
2,500
amid the
yards of
rails,
noon came another
speck, developing in a similar manner into a supply
train, also carrying its own water, food and water
half-battalion of the escort and the 2,000
for the
and
sleepers,
accessories.
At
and platelayers, and the letters, newspapers,
sausages, jam, whiskey, soda, and cigarettes which
enable the Briton to conquer the world without disartificers
And
comfort.
presently
process
reversing the
depart,
the
empty
trains
of their
would
and
arrival,
vanishing gradually along a line which appeared at
last to
turn up into the air and run at a tangent into
an unreal world.
The
life
the
of
by
characterised
a
and lonely town was
machine-like regularity, born
strange
perhaps of the iron road from which
it
derived
Daily at three o'clock in the morning
nourishment.
the camp-engine started with the bank parties.'
'
'
'
dawn the material
gangs swarmed over it
6
the
its
'
With
train arrived, the platelaying
like clusters of
flies,
carried to the extreme limit of the track.
and were
Every man
knew his task, and knew, too, that he would return to
camp when it was finished, and not before. Forthwith
they set busily to work without the necessity of an
order.
A
hundred yards of material were unloaded.
v2
THE RIVER "WAR
292
The
were arranged
sleepers
rails
were spiked to every alternate
the
great
moved
engine
80-ton
The
in a long succession.
sleeper,
and then
cautiously
forward
along the unballasted track, like an elephant trying a
The operation was repeated continu-
doubtful bridge.
Behind
through the hours of the burning day.
ally
the train there followed
other gangs of platelayers,
who completed the spiking and ballasting process and
when the sun sank beneath the sands of the western
;
empty trucks and
the weary men home to the Rail-head camp, it came
back over a finished and permanent line. There was
horizon, and the engine pushed the
a brief interval
while the camp-fires twinkled in the
waste, like the lights of a liner in mid-ocean, while the
officers
then
and men chatted over
darkness and
the
unbroken
their evening meal,
silence
of
the
desert
morning brought the glare and
till
and
was
toil
of
another long day.
So week
in,
week
out, the
work went
Every
on.
few days saw a further advance into the wilderness.
The scene changed and remained
yet the same.'
and
As Wady Haifa became more remote
Abu Hamed grew
more appalling
—
'another,
unaltered
since
it
near, an element of danger, the
was
peculiar,
was added to the
strange conditions under which the inhabitants of Kail-
head
lived.
behind them
What
?
if
the Dervishes should cut
They had
t
lie
line
three days' reserve of water.
After that, unless the obstruction were removed and
traffic
restored, all
must wither and
die in the sand,
and only their bones and their cooking-pots would
attest the folly of their undertaking.
THE DESERT RAILWAY
THE RIVER WAR
294-
of
miles
thirty
and
hundred
a
July
Bv
dangerous
to
too
became
it
and
finished,
been
had
been
cleared
of
the
had
Hamed
Aim
until
advance further
the 20tli of
miles
away,
hundred
a
still
were
They
force.
Dervish
of
the
resources
and
far,
and
fast
travel
but camels
progress
that
appeared
It
uncertain.
were
the enemy
would be checked, but on the 7th of August General
Hunter, marching from Merawi along the river bank,
Abu Hamed. The
Work was at
hereafter.
attacked and took
operation will
be described
once resumed
with renewed energy.
became remarkable;
The pace of construction now
A- much as 5,300 yards of
track were surveved, embanked, and laid in a single
On
day.
the
and
reached,
1st of
bv
who had fought
hands with those
November Abu Hamed
was
banks of
men
the
their
way
who had
Nile
the
the
joined
across the desert
fought
their
along
vvav
the river.
The
strain
without
its
and hardship had
effect
on the constructors.
Engineer subalterns
4
been
not, however,
Two
of the
out of the eight concerned in the
laving of the Dongola and the Desert railways had
Their places were eagerly
died.
the
men
remains.
tions
;
filled
by
Of
little
record
to the local
condi-
of the construction gangs but
They were accustomed
others.
the heat of the sun did not sap their strength.
Nevertheless there are
manv nameless mounds
in the
which mark the changing sites of Rail-head
Town, and show that nothing good is ever achieved
desert,
4
Lieut. R.
Cator. R.E.
Polwhele, R.E. and Egyptian army; Lieut. E. M. S.
and Egyptian Army.
THE DESERT RAILWAY
in
this
295
world without someone having to pay the
cost.
The completion of the line was accelerated by
nearly a month by the fortunate discovery of water.
At the beginning of July a well was sunk in what was
thought to be a likely place at 'No. 4 Station,' 77 miles
from Haifa.
at a
After five weeks'
depth of 90
feet in
work water was found
abundance.
A
steam-pump
was erected, and the well yielded a continual supply.
In October a second well was sunk at No. 6 Station,'
'
55 miles further on, whence water was obtained in
greater quantity.
still
These discoveries modified, though
They substantially increased the carrying capacity of the line.
They
reduced the danger to which the construction gangs
were exposed. The sinking of the wells, an enterprise
at which the friendly Arabs scoffed, was begun by
they did not solve, the water question.
5
Lieutenant Gorringe, E.E., on the Sirdar's personal
initiative
that
the
;
but the chronicler must impartially observe
success was
calculation,
for, since
won by
the
luck as
much
as
by
two wells were made,
first
eight others of greater depth have been bored
and in
no case has water been obtained.
As
had,
rails
the railway had been made, the telegraph- wire
of course,
followed
it.
Every consignment of
and sleepers had been accompanied by
their pro-
An-
portion of telegraph-poles, insulators, and wire.
<
)ther subaltern of Engineers,
Lieutenant Manifold,
6
who
ed this part of the military operations against
:>
6
and Egyptian army.
Lieut. M. G. E. Manifold, R.E. and Egyptian army.
Lieut. G. F. Gorringe, E.E.
THE RIVER
290
WAR
the Arabs, had also laid a line from
Hamed,
so that immediate correspondence
round the
On
Merawi
entire circle of rail
the 3rd of
November
and
Sir
to
was
effected
river.
Herbert Kitchener had
owed
the satisfaction of travelling over the line which
its
Abu
existence to his judgment, and the rapidity of
construction to the influence of his personality.
its
He
accomplished in sixteen hours a journey which had
previously consumed ten days.
when
he
subalterns
train
from
returned
improved on
At
the end of the war,
Fashoda,
this
from Atbara Fort to
the
enthusiastic
record by running his
Wadv
Haifa
— 384 miles—
in
thirteen hours without breaking his neck.
The labours of the Eailway Battalion and
its officers
Abu
had now
did not end with the completion of the line to
Hamed.
The Desert Eailway was made.
to be maintained,
It
terminus at Haifa had become a busv town.
village
grown with the
The
line
equipped with diverse and elaborate machines.
all
A mud
was transformed into a miniature Crewe.
great workshops that had
of
The
worked, and rapidly extended.
were
Plant
kinds purchased in Cairo or requisitioned from
England, with odds and ends collected from Ismail's
scrap heaps,
the depots with an extraordinary
filled
variety of stores.
Foundries, lathes, dynamos, steam-
hammers, hydraulic
presses,
cupola
furnaces,
sereAv-
cutting machines, and drills had been set up and were
Thev needed constant attention.
Every appliance for repairing each must be provided.
To haul the tonnage necessary to supply the army and
in continual work.
extend the line nearly forty engines were eventually
;
THE DESERT RAILWAY
Purchased
required.
at different times
297
and from
dif-
they included ten distinct patterns
ferent countries,
each pattern needed a special reserve of spare parts.
The permutations and combinations of the stores were
multiplied.
Some of the engines were old and already
worn out. These broke down periodically. The frictional parts of all were affected by the desert sand, and
needed ceaseless attention and repair. The workshops
were busy night and day for seven days a week.
To the complication of machinery was added the
confusion of tongues.
Natives of various races were
Foremen had been obtained
employed as operatives.
No
from Europe.
fewer than seven separate languages
were spoken in the shops.
Haifa became a
Yet the undertaking prospered.
second Babel.
Engineer
Wady
officers
displayed qualities of tact and temper.
Their director was cool and indefatigable.
the
exercised
Sirdar
The
a
regular
control.
Over
all
Usually
ungracious, rarely impatient, never unreasonable, he
moved among
the workshops and about the line, satisfy-
was proceeding with economy and
The sympathy of common labour won him
despatch.
Nowhere in the Soudan
the affection of the subalterns.
was he better known than on the railroad. Nowhere
ing himself that
all
was he so ardently believed
confidence
beyond dispute.
is more doubtful.
is
the affection
in.
That he deserved the
That he reciprocated
upon
the line grew.
New engines had to be ordered. The
director, being patriotic, looked to England and sent his
As
order.
the
army
But
in
at Eail-head increased, the strain
England
all
the operatives were busily
THE RIVER AVAR
^98
engaged
in the great
and had no time
strike in the engineering trade
to spare to
manufacture locomotives.
There were, however, a number of engines which had
been made by Messrs.
Buluwayo Railway.
Xeilson,
Scotland, for the
in
The matter was
urgent.
It
was
decided to ask the President of the South African line
to allow the
Egyptian army to purchase two or three
of these engines in order to prevent a
breakdown
in the
The request was accordingly made.
The President, who happened to be Mr. Cecil Rhodes,
gave an amiable and immediate assent. Five locomotives which might have traversed the South African
communications.
veldt
they
now run by t he banks of the Nile.
may reach Cape Town some day.
The continued
made
it
Nevertheless
paralysis of the eneineerinff trade
necessary to give a further order
engines to the United States.
for three
The money which should
have refreshed the industries of Britain, stimulated those
The
of America.
order, though small,
cepted and promptly executed.
were delivered without delay, and
was eagerly
ac-
The new locomotives
it
may be
instructive
comparison between the products of the
great commercial rivals.
to institute a
As
traffic,
the
British
engines
and the American
were designed
for
goods
for passenger service,
no ex-
amination of their relative speeds and hauling powers
is
possible.
But
it
is
necessary to remark that the
American engines were sooner delivered and 1,000/.
cheaper.
They broke down rarely. All their similar
parts were interchangeable.
If two engines had been
disabled, the third might have supplied the material for
a
THE DESERT RAILWAY
299
The fact that they were considerably faster
soon won them a good reputation on the railway, and
the soldier who travelled to the front was as anxious to
the repairs.
avoid his country's locomotives as to preserve
6
They
its
were,' said one of the subalterns,
honour.
the pro-
'
ducts of a higher class of labour than that employed
in England.
less
toil.
They represented greater
While appearance was not
talent,
though
neglected, no
Thus
parts.
unnoticeable
on
wasted
was
"finish"
economy was increased and efficiency preserved.'
They
facts.
these
recording
in
pleasure
no
is
There
not, unfortunately, even the merit of being new.
have
Let us return to the railway and the war.
It
now
is
events.
necessary
to
the course of
anticipate
as the railway reached
As soon
Abu Hamed,
General Hunter's force, which was holding that place,
Merawi
with
communications
camel
slender
its
dropped
and
drew
its
from
Wady
Haifa.
line there
for
supplies
were
new
the
line
direct
After the completion of the desert
still
construction,
along
left
seventeen miles of material
and the railway was consequently
of
south
miles
sixteen
Dakhesh,
to
extended
at once
Meanwhile Berber was seized, and
Abu Hamed.
military
considerations
of a larger force
to
compelled
the
concentration
maintain that town.
The four
floated
were
Merawi
at
remained
had
which
battalions
were
entraining,
there
and,
downstream to Kerma,
carried
by Haifa
and
Abu Hamed
to
Dakhesh—
journey of 450 miles.
it
desert,
the
across
begun
been
When the railway had
navigable
always
was
Nile
the
was believed that
THE RIVER WAR
00
above
In former campaigns
Abu Hamed.
it
had been
reconnoitred and the waterway declared clear.
the river
fell
it
became evident that
as
was untrue.
the subsidence of the waters cataracts began to
With
appear, and to avoid these
all
this
But
to
it
became necessary
first
of
extend the railway to Bashtinab, later on to
Abadia, and finally to the Atbara.
money had
difficulties
to
To do
more
this
be obtained, and the usual financial
presented themselves.
Finally, however, the
matter was settled, and the extension began at the rate
of about a mile a day.
varies
The character of the country
considerably between
Atbara
river.
For the
first
Abu Hamed and
the
sixtv miles the line ran
On
beside the Nile, at the edge of the riparian belt.
was the cultivable though niostlv uncultivated
and silted up with fine sand
strip, long neglected
drifted into dunes, from which scattered, scraggy domthe right
palms and prickly-mimosa bushes grew.
Between the
branches of these sombre trees the river gleamed, a
cool and attractive flood.
On
the
left
was the
desert,
here broken by frequent rocks and dry watercourses.
From Bashtinab
fiftv
Abadia another desert section of
miles was necessary to avoid some very dillicult
to
ground by the Nile banks.
bara the
alluvial
From Abadia
last stretch of the line
expanse
to the At-
runs across a
from whose surface
broad
plane-trees
of
mean appearance, but affording welcome shade, rise,
watered by the autumn rains. The fact that the railway was approaching regions where rain is not an
almost unknown phenomenon increased the labour of
construction.
To prevent the embankments from being
THE DESERT RAILWAY
washed away
sixty culverts
in the
had
transport over the
301
watercourses, ten bridges
made and this involved the
railway of more than 1,000 tons of
to be
;
material in addition to the ordinary plant.
By
and
7
the arrival of the reinforcements at Berber the
was doubled doubled also
providing
the
of
The
task
supply.
of
business
the
was
food of an army in a desert, a thousand miles from its
at
the
of
subsistence
means
apparent
no
with
and
base,
fighting force at the front
:
end of the day's march, is less picturesque, though not
along
railways
of
building
the
than
important
less
which that nourishment is drawn to the front. Supply
and transport stand or
fall
together
;
history depends
Commissariat
the
explain
to
order
in
and
on both
and
repeat
both
again
must
I
War,
Eiver
aspect of the
;
anticipate the account.
The Sirdar exercised a
direct
department
of
whole
the
over
supervision
personal
and
entirely
to
almost
restricted
was
action
his
supply, but
the distribution of the
rations.
Their accumulation
Eo
Colonel
of
task
the
were
supply
and regular
and
calculation
exact
of
years
three
by
and this officer,
unforeseen,
the
for
allowance
unfailing
has well deserved
armies.
of
feeder
a
as
reputation
high
his
has
been
as
was,
the
war
of
necessity
The first militarv
Egyptian
the
of
bulk
the
place
described, to
army
at
parties, with rails and sleepers
working
The
the
of
the
success
vital
to
business
a
throughout
and other material, was
different
at
officers
three
to
belongs
credit
whole enterprise. All the
Maxwell
7
regular feeding of the
W
Gordon, at
9
Cairo—Editor.
armyEgyptian
and
A.S.C.
Rogers,
Lieut. -Colonel J.
THE RIVER WAi:
302
Under ordinary circumstances
Akaslia.
this
would not
have been a serious Commissariat problem. The frontier
reserves of food were calculated to meet such an emer-
gency. But in 189-5 the crops in Egypt had been
much
below the average. At the beginning of 1896 there was a
great scarcitv of grain.
was
When
the order for the advance
frontier grain stores
issued, the
were nearly ex-
The new crops could not be garnered until
Thus while the world regarded
the end of April.
Egypt as a vast granary, her soldiers were obliged
hausted.
tons of dour a and 1,000 tons
to purchase 4,000
of
barley from India and Russia on which to begin the
campaign.
The chief item of a
bread.
soldier's diet in
most armies
is
In several of our wars the health, and conse-
quently the efficiency, of the troops have been impaired
by bad bread or by the too frequent substitution of
hard biscuit. For more than a year the army up the
river ate twenty tons of flour daily,
imagine
how
bitter
and
it
easy to
is
under ordinary circumstances would
have been the battle between the Commissariat
whose duty
contractors
intent
it
—
was
to insist
often, I fear, meriting the epithet
only upon
Department had
were
on proper quality, and the
'
profit.
Egyptian service no such
gun
officers,
in
But
in the
4
rascally
well-managed
difficulties arose.
The War
1892 converted one of Ismail Pasha's
factories near Cairo into a victualling-yard.
set
up
their
own
mills for grinding flour,
Here
machinery
manufacturing biscuit to the extent of 60,000 rations
daily, and even for making soap.
Three great advantages sprain? from this wise arrangement.
Firstly.
for
THE DESERT RAILWAY
the good
plaints
was assured.
quality of the supply
about
and
bread
303
biscuit
were
Com-
practically
unknown, and the soap
— since the soldier, in contrast to
the mixture of rubble
and grease with which the con-
had formerly furnished him, could actually
wash himself and his clothes with it was greatly prized.
tractors
—
Secondly,
all
risk of contractors failing to deliver in
time was avoided.
Lastly, the
economy had been
the
And
of 150 bakers.
funds resulting from
utilised to
form a useful corps
thus, although the purchase of
foreign grain added to the expense, the beginning of
war found the Commissariat of the Egyptian army
the
in a
thoroughly
efficient state.
Vast reserves of stores were quickly accumulated
at
Assuan.
issued
From
these not an ounce of food
without the Sirdar's direct sanction.
subsidiary depot, formed at
Wady
was
At the
Haifa, the same rule
The man who was responsible to no one,
took all the responsibility and the system whereby a
Chief of the Staff is subjected to the continual bombardment of heads of departments was happily avoided.
prevailed.
;
Sufficient supplies
to allow for a
having been accumulated at Akasha
forward movement, Firket was fought.
became difficult, and the
problem of the Supply officers was to keep the troops
After Firket
alive
the
situation
without delaying the progress of the railway with
the carriage of their food.
A
small quantity of pro-
was painfully dragged, with an average loss of
fifty per cent, from theft and water damage, up the
succession of cataracts which obstruct the river-way
visions
from Haifa to Kosheh.
Camel convovs from Rail-head
A
THE RIVER
304
carried the
rest.
But
WAR
reached Kosheh
until the line
were terribly strained, and
was even necessary to send the mounted
the resources of the Transport
at one time
it
The
apparent
famine.
actual
avoid
to
north
troops
reached
a
climax
end
the
to
means
the
of
inadequacy
from
Dulgo,
southward
moved
armv
when the
The
marches and halts to Dongola were estimated to take
of
camel
and
capacity
utmost
the
was
which
ten days,
grain
might
be
of
boat-loads
few
A
transport.
steam
ptured
;
a few handfuls of dates might be plucked
any local supplies would be
but
scarcely
The
sailing-boats,
available.
which were the only regular means
by the adverse winds.
Fortune returned at the critical moment. Bv good luck
on the first day of the march the north wind began to
of transport, were all delayed
blow, and twelve days' supplies, over and above those
moved by camel and steamer, reached Dongola with
With this reserve in hand, the occupation
the troops.
of the province was completed, and, although the army
onlv existed from hand to mouth until the railway
reached Kerma, no further serious difficulty was experienced in supplying them.
to
The account of the Commissariat
the end of the Dongola Expedition
now complete
but it may con-
is
;
veniently be carried forward with the railway construetion.
In the
Abu Hamed
phase the supplies were so
regulated that a convoy travelling from Murat Wells
alono-
the
caravan route arrived the day after the
and thereafter communications were opened
with Merawi. The unexpected occupation of Berber,
following Abu Hamed, created the most difficult situafight;
;
THE DESERT RAILWAY
tion of the war.
Until the railway
Berber a peculiarly inconvenient line
305
was forced on
of supply had
be used; and strings of camels, scattering never
to
to
less
than thirty per cent, of their loads, meandered through
the rough and thorny country between
Abu Hamed.
This line
Merawi and
was strengthened by other
convoys from Murat and the approaching Kail-head,
and a system of boats and camel portages filtered the
supplies to their destination.
Even when the railway had reached Dakhesh the
tension was only slightly relaxed.
The necessities of
supplying the large force at Berber, 108 miles from the
Eail-head,
required the maintenance of a huge and
still
complicated system of boat and camel transport.
course', as the
railway advanced,
stage of river
and portage, and the
it
Of
absorbed stage after
difficulties decreased.
But the reader may gain some idea of
their
magnitude
by following the progress of a box of biscuits from Cairo
to Berber in the month of December 1897.
The route
was as follows :—From Cairo to Nagh Hamadi (340
by rail; from Nagh Hamadi to Assuan (205
miles) by boat
from Assuan to Shellal (6 miles) by
rail
from Shellal to Haifa (226 miles) by boat from
Haifa to Dakhesh (Eail-head) 248 miles by military
miles)
;
;
;
—
railway
—
from Dakhesh to Shereik (45 miles) by boat
from Shereik by camel (13 miles) round a cataract
;
from Bashtinab by boat (25 miles) to
from Omsheyo round another impracticable
to Bashtinab;
Omsheyo
;
reach (11 miles) by camel to Geneinetti, and thence
(22 miles) to Berber
box of
biscuits
VOL.
I.
by
boat.
The road taken by
this
was followed by every ton of supplies
x
THE KIVER
306
men
WAR
The uninterrupted
working of the long and varied chain was vital to the
It
welfare of the armv and the success of the war.
could only be maintained if every section was
adequately supplied and none were either choked or
required by 10,000
in the field.
%f
starved.
f /• /
A
A GYASSA
This problem had to be
day by the Transport
solved correctly
officers, in spite of
every'
uncertain
winds that retarded the boats, of camels that grew
sick or died, and of engines that repeatedly broke
down.
In the face of every difficulty a regular supply
was maintained.
The construction of the railway was
not delayed nor the food of the troops reduced.
THE DESERT RAILWAY
The
307
continued to grow rapidly, and as
grew
The weight was
the difficulties of supply decreased.
shifted from the backs of the camels and the bottoms
line
of the sailing-boats
it
to the trucks of the iron road.
The strong hands of steam were directed to the prosecution of the war, and the swiftness of the train
replaced
The
the toilsome plodding of the caravan.
advance of the Dervishes towards Berber checked the
progress of the railway.
perative.
Military precautions were im-
Construction was delayed by the passage of
the 1st British Brigade from Cairo to the front, and
by
volume of daily supplies.
By the 10th of March, however, the line was completed
On the 5th of May it had reached Abadia.
to Bashtinab.
the consequently increased
On
the 3rd of July the whole railway from
to the
Atbara was
finished,
Wady
Haifa
and the southern terminus
was established in the great entrenched camp
at the
confluence of the rivers.
The question of supply was then settled once and
for all.
In less than a week stores sufficient for three
months were poured along the line, and the exhausting
labours of the Commissariat officers ended.
Their relief
and achievement were merged in the greater triumph
of the Eailway Staff.
The director and
his subalterns
had laboured
long,
were crowned with complete success.
and
inresource
of
qualities
high
All had displayed
Their perseverance had been magnificent.
vention.
and their
efforts
They endured hardship
which
was
not
danger
and
adventure,
unrelieved by
of
war
circumstance
and
pomp
exciting.
All the
Their energy was
tireless.
i 2
THE RIVER
308
WAR
passed through their hands reduced to avoirdupois.
Scarcely anyone has
appreciated their work.
pleasing to note that
among
the
commander who
It
the discriminating few
is
is
directed and inspired their enter-
Girouard has since been placed at the head of
the Eailway Administration in Egypt, and in that important office may find still fuller scope for the remarkable
prise.
qualities he
known
is
The subalterns have
to possess.
received the Distinguished
Order
Service
—a
reward
which, though better suited to their rank than to their
services,
best
may
prize
yet help
that
them
to fresh opportunities, the
a soldier can desire.
Besides
The
decoration they were granted a holiday.
south from Haifa, the
last
their
last train
steamer from the Atbara
encampment, bore the Eailway Staff
to the front
and
;
as
gallopers to the various Brigadiers they were afforded
every chance of losing their lives and of witnessing
the great event for the accomplishment of which they
9
had worked so long and worked so well.
On the day that the first troop train steamed
the fortified
camp
at the confluence of the Nile
Atbara rivers the doom of the Dervishes was
It
had now become
possible, with convenience
into
and the
sealed.
and speed,
Soudan great armies independent of the season of the year and of the resources
of the country; to supply them not only with abundant
to send into the heart of the
food and
ammunition, but with
paraphernalia of scientific war
;
all
the
variegated
and to support
their
by a powerful flotilla of gunboats, which
could dominate the river and command the banks, and
action on land
9
For names of Railway and Supply
Staff, see
Appendix A,
vol.
ii.
RAILand RIVER.
EX PLANATION
navigable: river
AT FLOOO
__
&ASSUAN
UN NAVIGABLE RIVER
id
-J
CARAVAN ROUTES
RAILWAY
LU
f
KOROSKO
\
\
9
'ADY HALFA \
SARRAS
s5
\
J
AKASHA
\
0
OMURAT WELLS
ft
\
KOSHEH
N
A
\
T
R
BU HAM ED
^AKHESh
SUAKIN ft
Sh*rm*. o\ BASHTINAB
DO N GO LA
Omsheyo
W
To
SUA
ABAOIA
KORTI
M
\v
\
ATBARA CAMP
PomrjfAiii
\
JL
%vti
\
KLEAO
5<silSj 6.50
Miles -Ibu h
ft
A8(;
METEMMA OSHENDY
Id
SHABLUKA
OMDURMAN C
HARTOUM
FX £ A
AM
Id
X
Scale,, 1 Jhvch. -
-AftJ*w
»4J».
/»
A 3 HA*
KMA*10U*\
6'
Longmans, Green & Co
Laadoii,
Pldlip
&Scm London
NewTarkl Bombay.
,
Jt
Liverpool
THE DESERT RAILWAY
could at any
moment make
even to Sennar, Fashoda, or
309
way past Khartoum
Sobat.
Though the battle
their
was not yet fought, the victory was won. The Khalifa,
his capital, and his army were now within the Sirdar's
reach.
It
remained only to pluck the
fruit in the
most
convenient hour, with the least trouble and at the
smallest cost.
—A
THE RIVER WAR
310
CHAPTEK X
ABU HAM ED
Khalifa's harangue
The
— Dervish
Omdurman
concentration upon
—The
—The Khalifa's plans— The patrol to Salamat— Cavalry
Their
revolt
against
the
Jaalin—
The
June—
of
1st
the
action of
of
—
The
hour
advance
Metemma
at
Mahmud
—
Two
—
Khalifa
march
from
Kassingar
The
—
Hunter
Archibald
Sir
—
Column
Flying
The
to Abu Hamed — Description of the village— Storm of Abu Hamed,
Con—
An
—
Casualties
man—
determined
A
7th
—
August
sternation in Berber — The gunboats ascend the Fourth Cataract
The loss of the Teh —A wonderful escape — Capture of Berber —
begins.
the
war
of
period
The
—
step
decisive
riverain tribes
letters
idle
tale
critical
The
at
chapter carried the account of the war forward
last
express
speed.
The
who had
reader,
already on
encampment and was
advance on Khartoum, must
to a period when the Egyptian
the railway reached the Atbara
the final
prepared
for
allow his
mind
to revert
forces are distributed along the river in garrisons at
Dongola, Debba, Korti,
organisation
beoun
;
of
the
and Merawi
conquered
when
province
and when the Desert Eailway
steadily forward towards
;
is still
the re-
has
been
stretching
Abu Hamed.
The news of the fall of Dongola created a panic in
Omdurman. Great numbers of Arabs, believing that
the Khalifa's power was about to collapse, fled from
For several
All business was at a standstill.
the city.
days there were no executions.
his house,
Abdullahi himself kept
and thus doubtfully concealed
Ins vexation
ABU HAMED
and alarm from
On
his subjects.
having recovered his
ever,
311
the
fifth
day, how-
own confidence, he proceeded
mosque, and after the morning prayer ascended
small wooden pulpit and addressed the assembled
to the
his
After
worshippers.
Dervishes under
the
'
admitting
Wad
the
'
He
the
Bishara, he enlarged on the losses
Turks had sustained and described
condition.
of
retreat
their miserable
deplored the fact that certain of the
Jehadia had surrendered, and reminded his listeners
with a srim satisfaction of the horrible tortures which
was the practice of the English and Egyptians
upon
captives.
their
God which had
in
He
it
to inflict
bewailed the lack of faith
allowed even the meanest of the
Ansar to abandon the Jehad against the
infidel,
and he
condemned the lack of piety which disgraced the age.
But he proclaimed his confidence in the loyalty of his
subjects
the
and
his
counsels
enjoyment of the favour of
of the late
Mahdi
;
God and
and having by
his
oratory raised the fanatical multitude to a high pitch
of excitement he thus concluded his long harangue
is
true that our chiefs have retired from Dongola.
they are not defeated.
have perished.
6
:
It
Yet
Only they that disobeyed me
I instructed the faithful to refrain from
It was by my comand return to Metemma.
mand that they have done what they have done. For
fighting
the angel of the
warned me
Lord and the
spirit of the
Mahdi have
in a vision that the souls of the accursed
I
Egyptians and of the miserable English shall leave their
bodies between Dongola and
which
Omdurman,
their bones shall whiten.
be conquered.'
Thus
at
some spot
shall the infidels
Then, drawing his sword, he cried with
I
/
a
WAR
THE RIVER
312
loud
voice
victorious
'
:
who
great quadrangle
—saw
din
mansur !
Islam shall triumph
!
worshippers,
voice
Ed
his
to the
number
The religion is
Whereupon the
!
'
of 20,000
—although they could not
sword flashing
hear his
all
in the sunlight,
the
filled
and with
d imitated him, waving their swords and spears
and
raising a
When
mighty shout of fury and defiance.
the tumult had subsided, the Khalifa announced that
who
those
where they
did not wish to remain faithful might go
liked,
but that he for his part would remain,
knowing that God would vindicate the
Public
faith.
confidence was thus restored.
In order that the divine favour might be assisted
human
effort,
Abdullahi adopted every measure or
At
precaution that energy or prudence could suggest.
first
he seems to have apprehended that the Sirdar's
army would advance
at
once upon Omdurman, follow-
ing the route of the Desert
to
Metemma.
spite
of his
He
Column
in
therefore ordered
severe
wound
with the survivors of his
— to
1885 from Korti
Osman Azrak
—
in
flag.
Abu Klea wells
Bishara, who had rallied
hold
and reorganised the remains of the Dongola army, was
instructed to occupy
Jaalin,
who had
quarters.
Metemma
lately
made
in
that
concert with the
town
Messengers were despatched
their
to
the
head-
most
distant garrisons to arrange for a general concentration
upon
Omdurman.
The Emir Ibrahim
recalled from the Ghezira, or
the land
Khalil
was
between the
Blue and White Xiles, and with his force of about 4,000
Jehadia and Baggara soon reached the city. Another
chief,
Ahmed
Fedil,
who was
actually
on
his
way
ABU HAMED
to
was ordered
Gedaref,
Osman Digna
Thither also
But
to
313
return to
the
capital.
from Adarama.
repaired
appears that the Khalifa only required
it
the
advice of that wily councillor, for he did not reduce
the
number
Atbara
line of the
Fasher
tion
of Dervishes in the small forts along the
—and
Darner, Adarama, Asubri, El
after a short visit
Osman Digna returned
Last of
leave
and a long consulta-
to his
post at Adarama.
but not least in importance, Mahmud,
all,
who commanded
to
—Ed
the
'
Army
of the West,' was ordered
very reduced garrisons
in
Kordofan and
march with his whole remaining- force,
which may have numbered 10,000 fighting men, to the
Nile, and so to Omdurman.
Mahmud, who was as
daring and ambitious as he was conceited and incapable,
received the summons with delight, and began forthwith
Darfur, and
to collect his troops.
The Khalifa saw very clearly that he could not
trust the riverain tribes.
The Jaalin and Barabra were
discontented.
He knew that they were weary of his
rule and of war.
In proportion as the Egyptian army
advanced,
decreased.
and the taxes they paid
He therefore abandoned all idea of makin
so
their
loyalty
—
The Emir Yunes who, since he
had been transferred from Dongola in 1895, had ruled
the district
was directed to collect all the camels, boats,
a stand at Berber.
—
grain,
and other things that might
army and send them
assist
an invading
Metemma. The duty was most
thoroughly performed.
The inhabitants were soon
to
relieved of all their property
and of most of their means
of livelihood, and their naturally bitter resentment at
THE RIVER WAR
314
the
explains
to
some
extent
treatment
this merciless
of
Abu
the
capture
followed
which
events
astonishing
This last place Abdullahi never regarded as
Hamed.
more than an
was not large, and
the
most
northerly
become
now
had
it
although
Dervish position, only a slender reinforcement was
added
outpost.
to the force
Its garrison
under command of Mohammed-ez-
Zein.
The power of the gunboats and their effect in
the Dongola campaign were fully appreciated by the
Arabs
;
and the Khalifa, in the hopes of closing the
Sixth Cataract, began to construct several forts at the
The Bordein, one
of Gordon's old steamers, plied busily between Omdurman and Wad Hamed, transporting guns and stores
northern end of the Shabluka gorge.
;
and
Ahmed
Fedil was sent with a sufficient force to
hold the works
of the
when they were made.
Mahdi exercised a powerful
But the prophecy
effect
on the Khalifa's
mind, and while he neglected no detail he based his
hopes on the issue of a great battle on the plains of
when the invaders should come to the walls of
With this prospect continually before him he
the city.
drilled and organised the increasing army at Omdunnau
Kerreri,
with the utmost regularity, and every day the savage
soldiery practised their evolutions
were presently to strew with
upon the
plain they
their bodies.
'
became apparent that the Turks
were not advancing. They tarried on the lands they
had won. The steamers went no further than Merawi.
The iron road stopped at Kerma. Why had they not
But
after a while
followed up
their
6
it
success
?
Obviously because thev
.;
ABU HAM ED
feared the
army
this the Khalifa
that awaited
them
315
at
Omdurman.
At
took fresh courage, and in January 1897
he began to revolve schemes for taking the offensive and
expelling the
The army
invaders
from the Dongola
province
and manoeuvred continually on the
Great numbers of camels were
plains of Kerreri.
drilled
#
<
ON VEDETTE
collected at
or
6
Soudan
tions,
Omdurman.
biscuit,' the
Large stores of dried kisru
food of Dervishes on expedi-
were prepared.
The Sirdar did not remain in ignorance of these
preparations.
The tireless enterprise of the Intelligence Branch furnished the most complete information
THE RIVER WAR
316
and preparations were
made
to concentrate the troops
the
should
point,
enemy
threatened
any
on
Dongola
in
advance. Eegular reconnaissances were made by the
Gakdul Wells
cavalry both into the deserts towards
end
of
it
the
May
Towards
and
was reported that the Emir Yunes had crossed the
Nile and was raiding the villages on the left bank below
along-
the
Abu Hamed.
river.
In consequence the Sirdar ordered a
strong patrol under Captain
Le
Gallais,
and consisting
Mahon,
of three squadrons of cavalry under Captain
three companies of the
Camel Corps, and of 100 men of
Maxim
the IXth Soudanese on camels with one
reconnoitre up the Nile through the
gun, to
Shukuk Pass and
as far as Salamat.*
The
force started at daylight
on the 31st of May,
the cavalry scouting ten miles in front, and the
Corps
and mounted infantry acting as
Bivouacking
at a
a
Camel
support.
convenient spot, they pushed on the
next morning, and by three o'clock in the afternoon
the
support had arrived
on
the
old
battlefield
of
Kirbeckan and the cavalry had reconnoitred several
miles
The
and
beyond Salamat.
officers
climbed the
scanned
the
Not an enemy was
that rose above the level
hills
whole
to be seen.
horizon.
The
wilderness
contained no moving thing except the Nile, which
rambled along among the dark rocks and sandy shoals
of the Monassir Desert
stage of
its
—the
most barren and dismal
long journey to the
sea.
The object of the reconnaissance accomplished, and
the reports of the Dervish movements being apparently
Map,
4
The Nile from Merawi
to
Abu Hamed,'
to face
page 338.
ABU HAMED
317
disproved, the order was given to return.
The support had already cleared the Shukuk Pass, and the
cavalry were watering about two miles on the homeward side of Salamat, when the enemy appeared. Two
squadrons were dismounted to feed and water. The
1
under Captain Peyton, was acting as rearguard.
third,
All of a sudden the last squadron perceived that ten
Dervish horsemen were watching them at
a
hundred
Egyptian
yards'
officer
distance.
Thereupon the young
who commanded
a recklessness so rare in his
scarcely
the rear troop, with
nation that
it
may be
pardoned, wheeled about and galloped wildly off in
pursuit.
Salamat.
The ten Arabs fled in the direction of
The Egyptian troop followed. As they
approached the
village,
with their horses blown by the
long gallop across the sand, there rushed from behind
§
more than ninety mounted Dervishes, who
were uniformly dressed in red and white jibbas, and
the houses
who
savagely assailed the rash officer and his confiding
troop.
To
*
•* .*
jv.
combat there could only have
But as soon as he saw his rear troop
so unequal a
been one end.
galloping off in pursuit without his orders, Peyton had
determined to follow and support them with the rest
of the squadron.
His arrival on the scene was almost
simultaneous with that of the Dervish reinforcement.
He
immediately charged to extricate the
troop.
disordered scrimmage ensued, in which Peyton,
who
A
is
said to have killed three Dervishes in personal combat,
was very severely wounded by a spear which pierced
1
Captain
W.
E. Peyton, 15th Hussars and Egyptian army.
THE RIVER
318
Finding his strength failing him, the
his lungs.
felt
WAR
himself unable
squadron,
continue the fight,
to
been
having
worsted
the
in
officer
and the
encounter,
the
ground,
to
a
men
on
nine
leaving
away,
galloped
small rocky knoll, where they dismounted and opened
While
was passing the
other two squadrons, who had mounted their horses in
great haste, came up at a gallop, led by Captain Mahon.
fire
with their carbines.
Thus outnumbered, the Dervishes
this
fled,
waiting only to
wounded troopers who had fallen into their
hands. The cavalry pursued for four miles, and then
The Dervishes left fifteen killed
returned to Salamat.
and no wounded on the scene of the fight, and this
curious proportion is perhaps best explained by the stern
destroy the
law of
reprisals.
The cavalry then
Shukuk
fell
back very slowly towards the
Abu Hamed end of which they found
Pass, at the
They were delayed by the wounded, and
In the
did not return to Merawi till the 3rd of June.
skirmish nine men were killed, one man was mortally
wounded, Captain Peyton and two men were severely
the support.
—
wounded a
known that
total of thirteen casualties.
the Dervishes
Teatest vigilance
It
being
now
were on the move, the
was exercised
in
all
the Dongola
garrisons.
at
At the end of May, Mahmud with his army arrived
Omdurman. The Khalifa received him with deand several imposing reviews were held outside
light,
the
Mahmud
city.
against the
rifles,
and
*
Turks.'
felt
was
march
He had no experience of modern
himself
eager
confident that he could
to
easily destroy
ABU HAMED
or at least
roll
319
back the invading
forces.
Partly per-
suaded by the zeal of his lieutenant, and partly by
the wavering and doubtful attitude of the Jaalin, the
Khalifa determined
early in June to send the
Kor-
dofan army to occupy Metemma, and thereby either to
awe the
tribe into loyalty, or force
the Egyptian troops were
He summoned
still
them
to revolt while
too distant to assist them.
the chief of the Jaalin, Abdalla-Wad-
Omdurman, and informed him that the Jaalin
territories were threatened by the Turks.
In the goodness of his heart, therefore, and because he knew that
they loved the Mahdi and practised the true religion,
he was resolved to protect them from their enemies.
The chief bowed his head. The Khalifa continued
that the trusty Mahmud with his army would be sent
for that purpose; Abdalla might show his loyalty
in furnishing them with all supplies and accommodaSaad, to
t
tion.
He
intimated that the interview was over.
But
had the temerity to protest.
He
assured the Khalifa of his loyalty, and of the ability of
his tribe to repel the enemy.
He implored him not to
impose the burden of an army upon them. He exaggethe
Jaalin
chief
rated the poverty of
Metemma; he lamented
fortunes of the times.
for
Finally he begged forgiveness
making his protest.
The Khalifa was infuriated.
self-control
Forgetting his usual
and the forms of public utterance, he broke
out into a long and abusive harangue.
chief that
the mis-
He
told the
he had long doubted his loyalty, that he
despised his protestations, that
he was worthy of a
shameful death, that his tribe were a blot upon the face
THE RIVER
320
of
the
and
earth,
that
WAR
he hoped
Mahmud would
of
their
wives.
those
and
manners
improve
and
from
the
presence,
crept
Abdalla-Wad-Saad
their
colMetemma.
Having
to
disgust
and
returned in fury
informed
he
them
of
tribe,
his
of
men
head
lected the
need to be told that
They did not
the quartering upon them of
Mahmud's army meant
the plunder of their goods, the
his
reception and the Khalifa's
intent.
their
of
rape
the
and
homes,
their
of
ruin
women.
It
forces.
Egyptian
the
join
and
revolt
to
resolved
was
As
wrote two
chief
Jaalin
the
council
the
of
result
a
and
Sirdar,
the
to
addressed
was
first
The
letters.
reached him by messenger on the 24th of June. It
Government,
declared the Jaalin submission to the
and begged for help, if possible in men, or, failing
no
or
help
that,
saying
ended
by
but
arms
in
that,
help, the tribe was resolved to fight the Dervishes and
;
hold
Metemma
and
fatal letter
The
—carried defiance
Sirdar,
who was
messenger found him,
of
The second
to the death.
ammunition
and
speedily collected
letter
— a mad
to the Khalifa.
Merawi when the Jaalin
no time. A large amount
at
lost
1,100
Eemington
rifles
were
and hurried on camels across the
by the Korti-Metemma route, escorted by a
The Khalifa
strong' detachment of the Camel Corps.
But
did not receive his letter until the 27th of June.
he acted with even greater promptitude. Part of Mah-
desert
mud's army had already started for die north.
and the
rest followed
on the 28th.
On
Mahmud
the 30th the
advanced guard arrived before Metemma. The Jaalin
prepared to resist desperately. Nearly the whole tribe
ABU HAMED
had responded to the summons of
men were
than 2,500
But
town.
serviceable
collected behind the walls of the
this
force there were only eighty
and only fifteen rounds of ammunition
rifles,
their heaviest attack
on the south side of Metemma,
and he therefore disposed
his
The defence of the
front.
and more
their chief,
Abdalla expected that the Dervishes would
for each.
make
in all
321
few riflemen along that
rest of the
town had per-
force to be entrusted to the valour of the spearmen.
On
the morning of the 1st of July,
Mahmud, with
force variously estimated at 10,000 or 12,000
The
his assault.
first
attack
pated, on the southern face.
fell,
It
a
men, began
as the chief
had
antici-
was repulsed with severe
by the Jaalin riflemen. A second attack followed
immediately. The enemy had meanwhile surrounded
the whole town, and just as the Jaalin ammunition was
loss
exhausted, a strong force of the Dervishes penetrated
the northern face of their defences, which
was held
The whole of Mahmud' s army
through the gap, and the garrison, after a
by spearmen.
only
poured in
stubborn resistance, were methodically exterminated.
An inhuman
women
butchery of the children and some of the
followed.
Abdalla-Wad-Saad was among the
killed.
A
few of the Jaalin who had escaped from the
Here they
general destruction fled towards Gakdul.
found the Camel Corps with their
and ammunition.
anced by
this
Like
another
had
ad-
men
had arrived too
late.
The remnants of the Jaalin were
I.
force that
rifles
very road to carry succour to
in desperate distress, the relief
VOL.
caravan of
left in
occupation of
Y
THE RIVER AVAR
322
The convoy and
Gakdul Wells.
its
escort returned to
Korti.
But while the attention of the Khalifa was directed
more
to these matters, a far
further
July
it
menace
offered
Unnoticed by the Dervishes,
another quarter.
unappreciated,
noticed,
serious
the
railway
was
from
or, if
stretching
and further into the desert. By the middle of
had reached the 130th mile, and, as is related
in the last chapter,
Abu Hamed was
The Xile was
work had
in the
to be suspended until
hands of the Egyptian
rising fast.
forces.
Very soon steamers would be
able to pass the Fourth Cataract.
It
should have been
movement in the advance of the
The Khalifa seems indeed to have
evident that the next
1
'
Turks impended.
understood that the
for
rise of the river increased his peril,
throughout July he continued to send orders to the
Emir
in Berber
the Monassir
—Yunes— that he
district,
should advance into
harry such villages as existed,
and obstruct the frequent reconnaissances from Merawi.
Yunes, however, preferred to do otherwise, and remained
bank opposite Berber until, at length,
master recalled him to Omdurman to explain
on the
left
conduct.
his
his
Meanwhile, determined with mathematical
exactness by the rise of the Xile and progress of the
railway, the
moment
of the Egyptian advance arrived.
At the end of July preparations were made, as
secretly as possible, to despatch a flying column against
Abu Hamed. The Dervish garrison, under Mohammed
ez-Zein
was not believed
to exceed <;00
men, but
in
order that there should be no doubt as to the result
it
was determined
to
employ a strong
force.
'
// /, // /-.
ABU HAMED
A brigade
of all arms
Commanding
Cavalry
.
:
323
was formed
as folio ws
:
Major-General Hunter
.
.
.
One troop
.
Artillery
No. 2 Field Battery
/ 3rd Egyptians
Infantry
th Soudan ese
.
MacDonald's Brigade.
0
1 J£
Xtn
Xlth
„
Major-General Sir Archibald Hunter, the
whom
the
officer to
operation was entrusted, was from
many
points of view the most imposing figure in the Egyptian
He had
army.
served through the Nile Expedition of
1884-85, with some distinction, in the Eoyal Lancaster
Eegiment. In 1888 he joined the Khedive's service.
Thenceforward his
officer,
and
rise
was
rapid, even for an Egyptian
in ten years he passed through all the grades
from Captain to Major-General
.
His promotion was not,
however, undeserved.
wounded
— once
Foremost in every action, twice
the head of his brigade
always
—
at
distinguished for valour and conduct, Hunter
admiration of his comrades and superiors.
Eiver
War
he became, in
spite of his
won
the
During the
hard severity, the
darling of the Egyptian army. All the personal popularity
which great success might have brought to the Sirdar
focussed itself on his daring, good-humoured subordinat
and it was to Hunter that the soldiers looked whenever
there
was
under his
fighting to be done.
command
The
for the attack
now placed
upon Abu Hamed
force
amounted to about 3,600 men. Until that place was taken
all other operations were delayed.
The Sirdar awaited
2
gun. and one Nordenfeldt
Maxims
— an effective m
t 2
THE RIVER
324
the
issue
at
Merawi.
desert.
The railway paused
in
mid-
'
?i
necessity of continuing the construction of the
The
line at the earliest
Sir
WAR
moment and
his
own
anxiety
made
Herbert Kitchener very desirous of being connected
with the Flying Column by
field telegraph.
Lieutenant Manifold and told
him
to
He
make
sent for
arrange-
ments to lay the wire as the force advanced.
officer,
whose enterprise and services
This
manage-
in the
ment of the whole system of telegraphy during the war
have never been questioned, as they have never been
rewarded, was for once at a loss. He pointed out that
there were no appliances for laying the wire, no spools to
unwind
it
from, no saddles to carry
it,
and not even any
The Sirdar looked annoyed. After
he said, 'Get some donkeys from the
transport animals.
some
reflection
villagers.
If they are given a free ration they will like
accompany the Flying Column with their donkeys.'
The next morning, when a sufficient number of
villagers had been persuaded to see the matter in the
to
proper
light,
Manifold
ventured
to
ask
about the
saddles for carrying and the appliances for laying the
The Sirdar came slowly to the spot where the
telegraph plant was collected.
The coils of wire lay on
the ground the donkeys and their proud proprietors
wire.
;
grouped themselves picturesquely around. The General
contemplated both for a long time sourly. Then he
walked
to the largest coil of wire, picked
it
up and
approached the smallest donkey. He took the little
animal's two hind legs in his left hand, and put them
into
the coil.
He
lifted the
wire up until
it
passed
ABU HAMED
around the donkey's back,
325
a horse-collar, only
like
hun
between the fore and hind legs. He
caught hold of the loose end of the wire, and smacked
the donkey with the other hand.
The beast moved
that
it
forward, tripping and stumbling over the wire which
began,
albeit jerkily,
to
Then he walked
By this method the Field
unwind.
abruptly back to his house.
Telegraph accompanied the Flying Column, and within
FIELD TELEGKAPH,
a few days of the capture of
1897
Abu Hamed
the wire
was
working between that place and Merawi.
The troops composing the 'Flying Column' concentrated at Kassingar, a small village a few miles above
Merawi, on the right or
Abu Hamed bank
of the Nile.
General Hunter began his march on the 29th of July.
The
total distance
133 miles.
The
Abu Hamed
is
had been observed
in
was known that
as
from Kassingar to
greatest secrecy
the preparation of the force, but
it
;
THE
326
pjyei;
WAH
soon as the column actually started, the news would he
Speed was therefore
carried to the enemy.
Dervish garrison in
for if the
essential
Abu Hamed were
forced from Berber, the Flying
rein-
Column might not he
strong enough to take the village.
On
the other hand,
the great heat and the certainty that the troops would
have to
fight
an action at the end of the march, imposed
opposite considerations on the commander.
the sun, the greater part of the distance
To avoid
was covered
Yet the advantage thus gained was to some
at night.
by the dillicultv of marehinff over
such broken ground in the darkness.
Throughout the whole length of the course of the
extent neutralised
no more miserable wilderness than the
Monassir Desert. The stream of the river is broken,
and its channel obstructed by a great confusion of
Xile there
is
among which
boulders, between and
the water rushes
dangerous cataracts.
The sandy waste approaches
the very brim, and only a few palm-trees, or here and
in
there a squalid
life.
The
mud
line of
hamlet, reveal the existence of
advance lay along the river
road relieved the labour of the march.
trailing across a
;
but no
Sometimes
broad stretch of white sand, in which
the soldiers sank to their ankles, and which
boots with a rasping grit
;
their
filled
sometimes winding over a
pass or through a gorge of sharp-cut rocks, which, even
in the moonlight, felt hot with heat of the previous day
always in a long, jerky, and interrupted procession of
men and
camels, often in single
painfully like the serpent to
file
— the Column
whom
it
was
said
thy belly shalt thou crawl, and dust shalt thou
toiled
:
eat.'
*
On
ABU HAMED
327
The Column started at 5.30 in the evening, and by
a march of sixteen and a half miles reached Mushrael-Obiad at about midnight.* Here a convenient watering-place, not commanded by the opposite bank, and
the shade of eight or ten thorny bushes afforded the
first
suitable bivouac.
At
3.30 p.m. on the 30th the
march was continued eiffht and a half miles to a
The pace
spot some little distance beyond Shebabit.
It was
was slow, and the route stony and difficult.
dark when the halting-place was reached.
after
Several of the men strayed from the column, wandered
and reached the bivouac exhausted
General Hunter had proposed to push on the next day
in
the
eloom,
to Hosh-el-Geref, but the fatigues of his troops in the
two night marches had already been
after
Abu
severe,
and
as,
Haraz, the track twisted away from the river
was no water for five miles, he resolved to
Hosh-el-Geref was therefore
halt for the day and rest.
not reached until the 1st of August a day later than had
benefit
such
of
proved
had
rest
the
but
expected
been
so that there
—
;
to the troops that the
fully
subsequent acceleration of progress
compensated for the delay.
The Column moved
Salmi.
at
daybreak
at
halted
and
midnight,
at
again
on
In the small hours of the next morning the
march was
difficult
too
found
was
Nile
the
road
by
resumed. The
these
and
wheels,
on
were
which
guns,
Maxim
for the
the
into
miles
twenty-eight
of
detour
had to make a
the
along
miles
ten
moved
infantry
desert, while the
arrive
not
should
Maxims
the
In order that
river.
alone at Dakfilli,
Map
thither
marched
had
Hunter
General
THE RIVER WAR
328
with the IXth Soudanese
The
the
at
11 p.m. on the previous day.
Column followed a few hours later. On
4th, by an eighteen-mile march through deep sand, El
rest of the
Kab was
reached.
A
single shot
was
from the
fired
opposite bank of the river as the cavalry patrol entered
the village
the
;
and there was no longer any doubt
knew
Dervishes
thai
of the advance of the Column.
Both the troops and the transport were now moving
admirably
;
nevertheless, their sufferings were severe.
consumed
were
The nights
o
in
movement.
shade the soldiers could not sleep by day.
Without
All ranks
men would frequently, during the night
down upon the ground in profound
wearied, and the
marches,
sink
slumber,
only to be sternly aroused and hurried on.
But the pace of the advance continued
to be swift.
On
the 5th, the force, by a fourteen-mile march, reached
Here they were joined by Sheikh Abdel-Azim
with 150 Ababda camel-men from Murat Wells. Up to
Khula.
this point three
had been
left
Egyptians had died and fifty-eight
behind in depots exhausted.
A
double
of meat was issued to the whole force.
ration
men
The
column moved on during the night, and arrived at
Ginnifab at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 6th. Here
startling news of the enemv was received.
It was
known
and a
force
Mohammed ez-Zein was determined
reliable report was now received that
that
was coining down from Berber
Hamed
garrison.
tofi"ht,
a large
to support the
Abu
In spite of the long marches
and
the fatigues of the troops, General Hunter resolved to
He had already made up the day
Abu Haraz. He now decided to improve on
hurry on.
spent at
the pre-
: :
:
:
)
ABU HAMED
scribed itinerary, accelerate his
329
own
pate that of the Dervish reinforcements.
troops marched
and
arrival
antici-
Accordingly the
through the night of the 6-7 th with
all
only a short halt of an hour and a half, so as to attack
Abu Hamed
dawn.
at
bad ground the
6
After covering sixteen miles of
Flying Column' reached Ginnifab, 131
miles from Kassingar
post, at
3
and only two from the Dervish
3
3.30 on the morning of the 7th of August.
A
The following
is
the actual itinerary
March of the Flying Column : Kassingar to Abu Hamed
(July 29th—August 1th, 1897)
'
'
First march, 16^ miles
:
July 29 to
3 a.m. July 30
Second march, 8 miles
3.30 p.m. July 30 to{
9 p.m. July 30
Third march, 9 miles
a.m.
5
July 31 to[
10.30 a.m. July 31
Fourth march, 9A miles
5.30
p.m.
9i hours
[
5^ hours
)
Best till 3.30 p.m.
July 30, 1897
(Kest
5
till
12£ hours
a.m.)
J
(
8 hours
July 31, 1897
:
5*
2 hours
August 1 to _ gj^
hours
9 a.m. August 1
fth march, 11 mile
Midnight August
= 7 hours
7 a.m. August 2
xth march, 11 miles
11 p.m. August 2 to)
6^ hours
5.30 a.m. August 3
j
jventh march, 18 miles
Midnight August 3 to
8 hours
August
Rest tiU 3 30 A M
j
August 1, 1897
\
'
-
'
I
)
^ es ^
3.30 a.m.
|
i
midnight
August 1, 1897
(Best
{
till
August
11
2,
17 hours
15 hours
p.m.)
- 16 hours
1897
(
midnight
August 3, 1897
Kest
till
18^-
hours
j
:
I
j
Best till 12.30 a.m.
August 5, 1897
)
16^ hours
)
miles
12.30 a.m. August 5 to
|
9 a.m. August 5
8^ hours
1
)
Ninth march, 18 miles
7 p.m. August 5 to
|
8 a.m. August 6
Tenth march, 18 miles
5.30 p.m. August 6 to
6.30 a.m. August 7
Eest
hours
1
till
7
August
5,
p.m.)
1897
Rest
tiU 5 30 P M
J
August 6, 1897
1
-
'
10 hours
j
-
1
9^-
hours
:
9^ hours
78A hours
Intervals of halt
3^ hours
126£ hours
THE RIVER WAR
330
two hours was allowed for the troops to prepare
Half the 3rd Egyptian battalion remained
themselves.
as escort to the transport and reserve ammunition, and
halt of
then the force
moved
off in the
enemy's position.
The
darkness towards the
.
village of
Abu Hamed
.
straggles along the
bank
of the Nile, and consists of a central mass of mud houses,
by a network of winding lanes and alleys,
about 500 yards long by perhaps 100 yards wide. To
intersected
north and south are detached clusters of ruined
the
huts,
and
of rocks.
ragged
pile
up from
the
to the south there rises a large,
The ground
slopes gradually
river, so that at a distance of
300 yards the village
surrounded on three sides by a low plateau.
this plateau
erected
is
Upon
stand three stone watch-towers, which were
by General Gordon.
The Dervish garrison
were strongly posted in shelter trenches and loopholed
houses alom>- the eastern face of the village. The towers
were held by their outposts.
Makino- a wide circuit to their
round
and then swinging
to the right, so as to front facing the river, the
brigade silently
and
left,
at
moved towards
the enemy's position,
a quarter past six occupied the plateau in a
crescent-shaped formation; the IXth Soudanese on the
right, opposite the north-east
From
corner of the village
5.30 p.m. July 29, 1897 to 6.30 a.m. August
7,
the
1897 = 205 hours, of
which 78£ hours we
rest and camp duties.
hours = 8J2 days
;
126^
/.
138 * 24
= 1557 miles
20o
m
recovered from the fatigue of the unavoidably long march at starting. In
the last 42 hours they marched 50 miles, and in the last 35£ hours they
marched 36
miles,
and then proceeded
to the assault.
ABU HAMED
331
by the remaining half-battalion of the
3rd Egyptians, next then the Xlth in the centre, and
As the troops
the Xth Soudanese on the left flank.
battery, escorted
;
watch-towers
approached the
fired
and
fell
the
Dervish outposts
back, and the force continued to advance
until the edge of the plateau
From
was reached.
here
the whole scene was visible.
The day was
just breaking,
and the mist hung low
and white over the steel-grey surface of the river. The
outlines of the mud houses were sharply defined on this
pale background.
The Dervish riflemen could be seen
the
trench that ran round the village.
lining
shelter
Their cavalry, perhaps a hundred strong, were falling
in hurriedly
on the sandy ground
ragged rocks.
dark
The curve of the
of the
line
Within
picture.
after a
to be enacted.
half past six the battery
few
shells
crowned with the
small amphitheatre one of the
minor dramas of war was now
At
hills,
completed and framed the
troops,
this
to the south near the
had been
came
into action,
fired at the loopholed houses
in the left centre of the position, a general advance
ordered.
and
was
In very excellent order the three Soudanese
battalions, with General Hunter,
Major MacDonald, and
the other British officers on horseback behind.their line,
advanced slowly down the
hill,
opening a destructive
on the entrenchment. The distance was scarcely
three hundred yards but the crescent formation of the
before
and
converge,
advance
lines
of
attack made the
fire
;
I
was covered the Xth were compelled
should
flank
right
on
the
Soudanese
the IXth
half the distance
to halt, lest
fire
into
them.
until
silent
remained
Dervishes
The
THE RIVER
332
WAR
the troops were within 100 yards,
when they discharged
which were
two tremendous
volleys,
upon the halted
battalion.
chiefly effective
Major Sidney, Lieutenant
and a dozen men were shot dead. More
men were wounded. All the Soudanese there-
Fitzclarence,
than
fifty
upon with a loud shout rushed upon the entrenchment,
stormed it, and hunted the Dervishes into the houses.
In the street-fighting which followed, the numbers of the
The advance scarcely paused until the
river bank was reached, and by 7.30 Abu Hamed was
One single
in the possession of the Egyptian forces.
troops prevailed.
house, however, continued to hold out desperately.
A
whose name
Bao-gara Dervish,
not recorded
is
p
had
advised
that
each
house should be separately
held as a citadel, declaring that,
if this
were done,
although the troops might enter the village, they could
not take
the
it.
Mohammed
unknown Arab
He had
alone.
ing, and,
ez-Zein thought differently, but
resolved to
fortified
make
and loopholed
even when he saw that
an end, refused to surrender.
experiment
the
own
his
resistance
all
He was
dwell-
was
well supplied
with Martini-Henry and revolver ammunition, and
the
troops
he
house,
soldiers
succeeded single-handed
man had
wished to lose their
seven
hours,
others.
held his
At
foes
in
killing
length,
at
bay
the ruins.
four
after this
—
for
lives in so profitless a quarrel
two field-guns were brought up.
house was then smashed to pieces by rejjeated
close range,
when
endeavoured to force their way into the
and wounding
stubborn
at
none
—
for
The
shells at
and the intrepid defender perished amid
Had
the rest of the garrison followed his
•
ABU HAMED
333
advice and emulated his behaviour, the attacking force
would have
defeat.
suffered terrible
But men of
and even, perhaps,
loss,
this mettle
have already become
scarce in the world.
The Dervish horsemen, who had remained
spectators
near the southern crag during the attack, fled towards
Berber
as
soon
as
they saw the
attack successful.
Scarcely any of the infantry escaped.
the column,
who had
But
any case
in
only one troop of
and
airy,
-
IN ABU
..r
HAMED
unbeen
have
would
marches,
their
wearied
by
were
ez-Zein,
Mohammed
Emir,
Dervish
The
able to pursue.
havin
was among the
prisoners,
Egyptian
on a promise that
pared
officer
y
surrendered to an
his life
should be
to
proved
he
Hunter,
General
before
Hurried
He
w
man.
intellig
and
interesting
be an
the
a
all
justified
and
Mahdism,
in
devout believer
anointed
Lord's
the
of
those
being
of the Khalifa as
informed the General that
Ab
Hamed would
a
He
soon be
—
THE RIVER WAR
334
and proclaimed
retaken,
belief in
his
ultimate
From
his examination
transpired that the enemy's force in
Abu Hamed had
triumph of the Dervish cause.
it
the
consisted before the action of 400 real Dervishes, of
whom
Of
120 were horsemen.
these 250 were killed,
50 became prisoners, and the remnant bore the
captured.
south.
the
to
disaster
One
small
brass
tale
of
gun was
Three hundred local tribesmen, who were
watching from the other side of the
their intention of joining the
their submission
after the
troops were as follows
river, carried
out
winning side and made
The
action.
losses
of the
:
British Officers killed
(2)
Major H. M. Sidney
Lieutenant E. Fitzclarence
Native Ranks
3rd Egyptians
Wounded
Killed
......
.....
.....
......
3
19
IXth Soudanese
Xth
Xlth
„
„
Transport
*•
s
The
-Total
.
British officers
.
1
1
34
!
5
j
21
.
61
were buried with their
khor near the village, and the spot
two large marble
14
is
a
now marked by
The months have grown
years since the
ey
when the Khalifa
riflemen fought in the streets of Abu Hamed.
The
railway runs near the plateau where the battery opened
on the village. The English world has forgotten the
crosses.
Kegiinent and Egyptian army
;;
ABU HAM ED
335
But the Arabs still shun the
event.
when the
of the black soldiers march
and whisper how
ghosts
solitary desert Jchor,
nights are dark, the
that,
in a ceaseless
who
6
sentry-
them
For
straight, and challenge all who may approach.
more than a year, so prevalent was the belief, it was
go
'
beside the graves of the officers
led
impossible to persuade servants to live in the adjacent
may
sceptical age
The superior philosophy of a
houses.
enable
us to smile
nevertheless, the tale
is
barbarous
at
superstition
worth recordin
The news of the capture of Abu Hamed was carried
swiftly by camel and wire to all whom it might concern.
The Sirdar, anticipating the result, had already ordered
of
the
Fourth
passage
the
commence
to
gunboats
the
The camp at Eail-head, 130 miles away
Cataract.
from the river
—or
unaccustomed
rest,
rapidly.
the world
and the
— sprang
line
to life after
an
began again to grow
who were hurrying from
twenty miles from Abu Hamed
The Dervishes
Berber were only
immediately
They
fugitives.
the
met
when they
the
Fifth
of
foot
the
to
retired
and
turned back,
continued
they
halt
days'
few
a
after
whence
Cataract,
their
retreat.
Their
shows how
village
proximity
little
time the
captured
the
to
column
had
to
press
his
to
wise
was
Hunter
General
spare, and that
heard
Berber
at
commanded
who
Emir
marches. The
the
on
outpost
the
of
loss
of the
messeng
>r
on
the 11th that he
army
to
Metemma.
was
9th.
Mahmud
He
sent
the
replied
on
starting at once with his whole
to reinforce Berber.
Apparently, however, he
permission
Khalifa's
the
without
did not dare to move
WAR
THE RIVER
336
show
for his letters, as late as the 20tli,
broken
his
camp, and was
was plenty
On
to
had not
asking the Emir for
still
information as to the doings of the
there
that he
'
Of a truth
Turks.'
tell.
the 4th of August the
gunboats El Teb and
Tamai approached the Fourth Cataract to ascend to the
Abu Hamed-Berber reach of the river. Major David
was
Lieutenants
in charge of the operation.
Hood
5
and Beatty (Boyal Navy) commanded the vessels. Two
hundred men of the 7 th Egyptians were towed in
barges to assist in hauling the steamers in the
places.
it
The current was, however, too
was found necessary
160 soldiers
barrier,
ascent.
5th,
About 300
collected,
and
Nevertheless,
make the attempt.
Tamai tried the
local Shaifffiria tribesmen
their efforts
who had
to
the
therefore,
result proved, misdirected
soldiers
and
was not considered a very formidable
Major David determined
Early on the
strong,
to leave three barges containing
at the foot of the rapids.
as the cataract
difficult
were directed
—
had been
or,
as the
—by those few of the Egyptian
not been
left
behind.
The steamer,
with her engines working at
full
mounting half the distance.
But the rush of water
speed, succeeded in
was then so great that her bows were swept round,
and, after a narrow escape of capsizing, she was carried
swiftly
The
down
the stream.
was due to the
accidental fouling of a rope at a critical moment, and
to the fact that there were not enough local tribesmen
pulling at the hawsers.
Four hundred more Shaiggia
officers
thought that
5
Lieut.
this failure
Hon. A. Hood, R.N.
ABU BEAMED
337
were therefore collected from the neighbouring villages,
and in the afternoon the Teb attempted the passage.
Her fortunes were far worse than those of the Tamai.
Owing
to the lack of co-operation
and
discipline
the local tribesmen, their utter ignorance of
among
what was
required of them, and the want of proper supervision,
power was again too weak. Again the
bows of the steamer were swept round, and as the
the hauling
hawsers held, a great rush of water poured over the
bulwarks. In ten seconds the Teb heeled over and
turned bottom upwards.
this
new
strain,
The hawsers parted under
and she was swept down stream with
only her keel showing.
Lieutenant Beatty and most
of the crew were thrown, or glad
to
jump, into the
foaming water of the cataract, and, being carried down
were picked up below the rapids by the
Tamai, which was luckily under steam. Their escape
the
river,
was extraordinary, for of the score who were flung into
the water only one Egyptian was drowned.
Two
other
men
were, however,
missing,
and
their
fate
The capsized steamer, swirled along
by the current, was jammed about a mile below the
cataract between two rocks, where she became a total
wreck. Anxious to see if there was any chance of
seemed
certain.
raising her, the officers
proceeded in the Tamai to the
The bottom of the vessel was just visible above
the surface.
It was evident to all that her salvage
would be a work of months. The officers were about to
scene.
leave the wreck,
within the
hull.
when suddenly
a knocking was heard
Tools were brought.
A
plate
was
removed, and there emerged, safe and sound from the
VOL.
I.
z
f
THE RIVER
338
WAR
thus
been
had
they
hold in which
stoker.
a
and
engineer
second
the
terribly imprisoned,
When
the rapidity
with
the
down,
upside
turned
steamer
with which the
boilers
and
the
burning,
fires
the
engines working,
full— the darkness, with
the violent inrush of
all
the floors
water— the
—
stream are remembered, it
experience of these men was
Search was
will
become ceilings—
down
wild career
the
be conceded that the
sufficiently remarkable.
This was
now made for another passage.
found on the 6th nearer the right bank of the river. On
the 8th the Metemma arrived with 300 more men of the
Three days were spent
7th Egyptians.
and
to allow the Nile to rise a little
elaborate
in preparations
more.
On
precautions being observed, the
the 13th,
Metemma
passed the cataract safely, and was tied up to the bank
on the higher reach. The Tamai followed the next day.
On the 19th and 20th the new gunboats Fateh, Naser,
and Zafir, the most powerful vessels on the river, accomplished the passage.
Meanwhile the Metemma and
Tamai had already proceeded up stream. On the L^rd
the unarmed steamer Dal made the ascent, and by the
29th the whole
flotilla
reached
Aim Hamed
safely.
After the arrival of the gunboats events began to
move
at
the
double.
The sudden dart upon Abu
caused the utmost consternation among
the Dervishes. Finding that Mahmud was not going
Hamed had
to reinforce him,
tribes,
and fearing the treachery of the
local
Zeki Osman, the Emir in Berber, decided to
fall
back, and on the 24th he evacuated Berber and marched
south.
On
the 27th General Hunter at
heard that the Dervish garrison had
Abu Hamed
left
the
town.
MAP OF
THE NILE
iro:
MERAWI TO ABU HAMED
ScaZe
i
i
i
t
i
?,ooo,ooo
i
i
i
6&
or llrtch = 16 l\iKLes
dawn 7^ Aug*
i
5l
5*? Aug
The Patrol to SaJUunat fMcuy 31*-Juru> 3^)
(
March, of the ^Flyirvg CoTxcntrC'* voider
AJfixntier
_ ^
to AbusHaTTheds (July ZOfc-Anutpist 7^)
KLRab
4* Aug,
Sal am at:
Cavalry Skirmish
June
W
ShnkakTass
ZcLof
ecKccn, 1885
AbixHaicuc
Juh
SKebahit
31*
30* Jufa
MaushrcLeZO]
JDissuiq*
(Point of
concentration)
ip
Longmans,
Green.
&
Co. London,
NewYarklBambay.
A l9on .London
6\
Lvrerpoo
ABU HAMEU
339
The next day he despatched Abdel-Azim, the chief
of Irregulars, and Ahmed Bey Khalifa, another friendly
Sheikh, with forty
Ababda
tribesmen, to reconnoitre.
These bold fellows pushed on recklessly and found
inhabitants
the
everywhere
or
terrified
acquiescent.
Spreading extraordinary tales of the strength of the
army
all
that
was following them, they created a panic
along the river, and, in spite of a sharp fight with a
Dervish patrol, reached Berber on the 31st.
was no
armed
force
in
the
As
there
town, the enterprising
A DEEVISH MAKE
allies
store
rode into the streets and occupied the gram
the
nly public building
—
in the
Government. They then sent word back to
of
what they had done, and
sat
down
name
of the
Abu Hamed
in the town, thus
audaciously captured, to await develop ements.
The astonishing news of the fall of Berber reached
General Hunter on the 2nd of September. He immediately telegraphed to Merawi. Sir Herbert Kitchener was
confronted with a momentous question
be occupied or not
?
It
may
at first
:
should Berber
seem that there
z 2
THE RIVER
340
could be
WAR
The
doubt about the matter.
little
objective
The occupation of
settle
would
at
once
garrison
Egyptian
an
Berber by
The town was believed to
the difficulties near Suakin.
capital.
Dervish
The
the
to
waterway
the
clear
be on
of the expedition was
moral
effect
of
its
Omdurmau.
capture upon the riverain tribes and
throughout the Soudan would be enormous.
was
Berber
most important strategic point on the
This great prize and advantage
of advance.
in fact the
whole
line
was now to be had for the asking.
The opposite considerations were, however, tremendous. Abu Hamed marked a definite stage in the
advance.
As long
as
Merawi and the other
Dongola were strongly held, the
line
posts in
Abu Hamed
Abu Hamed
from
Debba was capable of easy defence.
could soon be made impregnable to Dervish attack.
The forces in Dongola could be quickly concentrated on
any threatened point. At this moment in the campaign
In
it was possible to stop and wait with perfect safety.
the meantime the Khalifa would steadily weaken and
to
the
railway might steadily grow.
reached the
an<?le
of the river,
it
When
the
would be time
continue the systematic and cautious advance.
then prudence and reason counselled delay.
Berber was to risk much.
army
Mahmud
line
to
Until
To occupy
with a large and
Metemma. Osman Digna with
^,000 men held Adarama almost within striking
distance.
The railway still lagged in the desert. The
victorious
lay at
Dongola garrisons must be weakened to provide a force
for
Berber.
The Dervishes had
the
advantage of
occupying the interior of the anole which the Nile
ABU HAMED
forms at
341
Abu Hamed.
have to draw their
The troops in Berber would
supplies by a long and slender line
of camel communication, winding along
from Merawi, and exposed, as a glance
show, throughout
than
all
this
:
the
way
map
will
all
at the
whole length to attack.
its
to advance to Berber
force the developement of the
More
must inevitably
whole war.
The
force in
town would certainly have its communications
threatened, would probably have to fight for its very
existence.
The occupation of Berber would involve
the
sooner or later a general action
Hafir, or
Abu Hamed,
;
not a fight like Firket,
with the advantage of numbers
on the side of the Egyptian troops, but an even
battle.
For such a struggle British troops were necessary.
.
this
time
granted.
At
seemed most unlikely that they would be
But if Berber were occupied, the war, until
it
would cease to be so largely
and must pass almost entirely
the arrival of British troops,
a matter of calculation,
The whole situation was
premature and unforeseen. The Sirdar had already
won success. To halt was to halt in safety to go on
was to go on at hazard. Most of the officers who had
served long in the Egyptian army understood the
question.
They awaited the decision in suspense.
The Sirdar and the Consul-General unhesitatingly
into the sphere of chance.
;
faced the responsibility together.
On the 3rd of Septem-
ber General Hunter received orders to occupy Berber.
He
started at once with
350 men of the IXth Soudanese
on board the gunboats Tamai, Zaftr, Naser, and Fateh.
Shortly after daybreak on the 5th the Egyptian flag
was hoisted over the town.
Having disembarked the
THE RIVER
342
infantry detachment, the
WAR
flotilla
steamed south to try to
for
on
succeeded
They
Emir.
harass the retreating
along
the
bank
moving
him,
caught
the next day they
;
opening
a
and,
disorder,
considerable
in
of
crowd
mixed
drove the
away
from the river into
then returned
grain-boats.
the
front
to Berber,
fugitives,
the desert.
heavy fire, soon
horse and foot,
The gunboats
towing a dozen
captured
Meanwhile the Sirdar had started
himself.
Biding
swiftly
with
a
for
small
he
crossed
Merawi,
the
from
desert
the
across
escort
Berber
reached
on
the
and
Cataract
Baggara
the
Nile at
the
immediate
inspected
Having
September.
10th of
arrangements for defence, he withdrew to Abu Hamed,
the
developements
meet
to
prepared
busily
there
and
at
once,
follow
and
must
might
knew
well
he
which
months.
few
of
a
course
the
in
follow
—
I
343
CHAPTER XI
—The Khalifa's plans — Gunboat reconnaissance of Metemma—An
uneven combat — Mahmud's army— Osman Digna moves to Shendi
Flying column to Adarama — The beginning of the Atbara entrenchment — Gunboat patrolling— Kassala — Its retrocession — The Khalifa
threatens to advance — Critical situation— Concentration towards
Berber— The British Brigade — General Gatacre — Railway work — Disposition of the Egyptian forces January 15, 1898 — Field training — Bad
—Break-up of the
boots and worse bullets — The Khalifa's
Kerreri camp — An unexpected developement — Forward to the Atbara.
Berber
difficulties
The town
of Berber
stands at a
little
distance from
bank of a channel which is full
only when the river is in flood. Between this occasional stream and the regular waterway there runs a
the Mle, on the right
long strip of rich alluvial
soil,
covered during the
greater part of the year with the abundant crops which
result
from
annual submersion and the thick coat-
mud which
ing of Nile
of Berber
its
fixed
is
by
it
then receives.
this fertile tract,
The
situation
and the houses
more than seven miles along it and the
channel by which it is caused. The town, as is usual
stretch for
on the
Nile, is
length
it
is
comparatively narrow, and in
*
Map,
'
Two wide
streets
run longitudi-
and south from end to end, and from
many narrow
these
its
only at one point broader than three-
quarters of a mile.
nally north
all
twisting alleys lead to the desert
The Nile from Abu Hamed
to Shabluka,'
page 371.
THE RTVER WAR
344
lies
in
days
Egyptian
of
Berber
The
or the river.
roads.
The
main
the
of
end
southern
ruins at the
the
north.
at
stands
Dervishes
the
new town built by
Berber
Old
is
if
and
unhealthy
and
Both are foul
T
to
the
seemed
Berber
JS
ew
dilapidated,
the more
more
active
a
in
be
to
it
visited
who
British officers
;
#
The
of decay.
state
architectural style of both
was
simple
a
by
constructed
were
houses
The
similar.
method. A hole was dug in the ground. The excavated mud formed the walls of the building. The
roof consisted of palm-leaves and thorn-bushes.
hole became a convenient cesspool.
and
this
'
emporium of Soudan
The
Such was Berber,
trade,' as it
has been
by enthusiasts, contained at the time of its recapture by the Egyptian forces a miserable population
of 5,000 males and 7,000 females, as destitute of
property as their dwellings were of elegance.
called
The Egyptian, garrison of Berber
IX th Soudanese, and two
Camel Corps, who arrived on the 16th
men
only of the 350
companies of the
at first consisted
of the
of September, having marched across the desert from
Merawi. But the proximity of Osman Digna at Adarama
made
it
necessary to speedily strengthen the force.
During the
latter part of
September MacDonald's
brigade, with the exception of half the 3rd Egyptians,
was moved south from Abu Hamed, and by the end of
the month the infantry in Berber were swelled to three
and a half
the
battalions.
This was further increased on
11th of October bv the arrival of the XHIth
Soudanese and the remaining half of the 3rd Egyptians,
and thereafter the place was held by
five battalions
BEEBEE
345
No. 2 Field Battery,
(3rd, IXth, Xth, Xlth, Xlllth),
and two companies of the Camel Corps. As
Dervishes on the right bank of the Nile had fled
all
the
to the
was found possible to establish
a small advanced post of Camel Corps and friendlyArabs in the village of Dakhila,* at the confluence of
From this humble beginning the Atbara fort
the rivers.
south of the Atbara,
with
great entrenchment was soon to develope.
its
The
tribes
it
occupation of Berber upon the
effect of the
around Suakin was decisive, and
the whole
country between these towns became at once tranquil
and
Osman
loyal.
The friendly
Digna's influence was destroyed.
villages
no longer raided.
were
governor of the town became in
reality, as well as in
The route
Berber was opened and a Camel Corps
name, the governor of the Eed Sea
littoral.
from Suakin to
;
patrol, several small caravans of traders,
of
war correspondents
the
first
years
—
and a party
—who might boast that they were
Europeans to make the journey for thirteen
passed safely along
It is
The
now
it.
necessary to look to the enemy.
the Khalifa allowed the
Emir Mahmud
to
Had
march north
immediately after the destruction of the Dervish outpost in
Abu Hamed,
have been very
the course of the operations would
different.
Mahmud would
certainly
have defended Berber with his whole army.. The
advance of the Expeditionary Force must have been
delayed until the desert railway reached the river, and
probably for another year.
But, as the last chapter
has described, the sudden seizure of
*
Dakhila
is
marked on the map
Abu Hamed,
as Atbara Fort.
the
THE RIVER AVAR
346
defection of the riverain tribes,
and the appearance of
persuaded
Cataract
Fourth
the
above
the gunboats
approached,
and
war
the
of
climax
the
that
Abdullahi
that he was about
be attacked
to
He
in his capital.
preparations
for
his
to
himself
devoted
accordingly
north
advance
to
of
lieutenant
his
forbade
and
defence,
Metemma
In con-
or attempt any offensive operations.
sequence Berber
fell,
and
its fall
convinced the Khalifa
He worked
was well founded.
that his belief
redoubled energy.
An
with
elaborate system of forts armed
with artillery was constructed outside the great wall
of
Omdurman
tion of
The concentra-
along the river-bank.
Arab and black soldiery from Gedaref, Kordofan,
and Darfur continued.
Large quantities of grain, of
camels and other supplies, were requisitioned from the
people of the Ghezira
1
and stored or stabled
in the city.
The discontent to which this arbitrary taxation gave rise
was cured by a more arbitrary remedy. As many of the
doubtful and embittered tribesmen as could be caught
were collected
pelled
to
in
drill
Omdurman, where they were com-
regularly,
protest their loyalty.
ruler
and found
prudent to
it
The strength and tenacity of
were surprisingly displayed.
The Khalifa
the
Sherif,
who had been suspected of sympathising with the Jaalin,
was made a prisoner at large. The direct penalties
attended the appearance of sedition.
around the
much
vented
troops
city,
;
close cordon
and especially towards the north, pre-
information from reaching the Egyptian
and though small revolts broke out
The country
(Arabic) = island.
1
A
....
lying between the Blue and
White
in
Kordofan
Niles.
Ghezira
BERBER
Empire
a whole remained submissive,
.as
and the Khalifa was able
force to
347
withdrawal of Mahmud's army,
in consequence of the
the Dervish
1
muster
to
all its
meet the expected onslaught of
remaining
his enemies.
During the first week in October the Sirdar decided to
send the o-unboats which now plied, though with some
difficulty, up and down the Fifth Cataract
to reconnoitre
—
Metemma and
tion
of
—
discover the actual strength and posi-
Mahmud's army.
Fateh, and Naser steamed
On
14th the Zajir,
the
south from Berber, under
2
Commander Keppel, each carrying, besides their ordinary native crews, fifty men of the IXth Soudanese
and two British sergeants of Marine
after
daybreak on the 16th the
enemy's position.
So
silently
still
approached the
flotilla
had they moved that a
small Dervish outpost a few miles
Shendi was surprised
Shortly
Artillery.
sleeping,
to
the
north of
and the negligent
by a splutter of firing from the
Maxim guns, awoke to find three terrible machines
The gunboats pursued their way,
close upon them.
guards,
aroused
and, disdaining a few shots which were fired from the
ruins of Shendi, arrived, at about seven o'clock, within
range of Metemma.
The town
itself
a thousand yards from the Nile,
mud
forts
armed with
the riverside.
east bank,
came
into
stood more than
but six substantial
artillery, lined
and defended
Creeping leisurely forward along the
remote from the Dervish works, the
action
at a
1
range of 4,000 yards.
flotilla
The
was at first concentrated on the two northern
forts, and the shells, striking the mud walls in rapid
fire
2
Commander
Colin Keppel. D.S.O.,
•
R N.
THE RIVER AVAR
348
enveloped
soon
interior,
the
in
bursting
succession or
immediately
Dervishes
The
smoke.
and
them in dust
skill
and
weapons
their
of
inferiority
the
but
replied,
projectiles
their
reached
although
and,
marked,
was
the
flotilla,
very few took
effect.
One
shell,
how-
mortally
of
the
deck
the
Zafir,
through
ever, crashed
two
struck
the
and
soldier,
Soudanese
a
wounding
Fateh.
After the long-range
tinued for about an hour the
bombardment had congunboats moved forward
opposite to the enemy's position,
and continuous
all
fire
and poured a heavy
of shrapnel and double shell into
The
the forts, gradually subduing their resistance.
from the batteries, and small parties of Baggara
horse who galloped about on the open plain between the
works and the town, afforded good targets to the Maxims,
fugitives
and many were licked up even at extreme ranges.
No sooner had the gunboats passed the forts than
the Dervish fire ceased entirely, and it was discovered
commanded
that their embrasures only
approach.
As
southward, the
that
had been
the northern
the guns could not be pointed to the
flotilla
left
need fear nothing from any
behind.
The
officers
were con-
gratulating themselves on the folly of their foes,
danger threatened from another quarter.
had hugged the eastern bank
as
fort
when
The boats
closely as possible
They were scarcely
a hundred yards from the shore, when suddenly a
sharp fire of musketry was opened from twenty or
thirtv Dervish riflemen concealed in the mimosa scrub.
The bullets pattered all over the decks, but while many
recorded narrow escapes no one was actually hit, and
during their duel with the
forts.
BERBER
Maxim
the
took
the
for
their pivots,
The
surprise.
then steamed slowly past the town, and, having
flotilla
thoroughly reconnoitred
down
on
guns, revolving quickly
bloody vengeance
a
349
turned
it,
and ran
about
stream, again exchanging shells with the Dervish
All firing ceased at half-past two
artillery.
grain were
sailing-boats containing
;
but six
captured on the
return voyage, and with these the gunboats retired in
triumph to a small island six miles north of Metemma,
where they remained
being
It
was no
to
for the night.
now known
that
bombarding the Dervishes
enjoyable than exciting,
less
spend another day with them
the next morning the
flotilla
and
it
been
was
idle
at
before day-
sides with the
dawn,
once evident that the Dervishes had not
during the night.
previous day
at four o'clock
Metemma
was opened on both
Fire
and
was determined
again steamed southward,
so as to be in position opposite
light.
;
it
Mahmud had
It
appeared that on the
expected a land attack
from the direction of Gakdul, and had placed part of
army in position to
But as soon as he was convinced that the
resist it.
gunboats were unsupported he moved several of the
his
artillery
and nearly
all
landward guns into the river
new works,
into
his
forts,
and even
built
two
on the 17th the Dervishes brought
action eleven guns, firing from eight small round
so that
The gunboats, however, contented themselves
with keeping at a range at which their superior
weapons enabled them to strike without being struck,
forts.
and
so,
while inflicting heavy loss on their enemies,
sustained
no injury themselves.
After four hours'
THE RIVER WAR
350
remorseless
and
methodical
bombardment
Captain
complete,
and
reconnaissance
the
considered
Keppel
stream.
The
Dervish
down
retire
to
order
the
gave
by the spectacle
redoubled their fire, and
losses
their
of
spite
in
elated
gunners,
the retreating vessels,
of
continued hurling shell after shell in defiance
river
the
As
their range.
officers,
their
until
were
adversaries
far
down
beyond
the gunboats floated northward their
looking back towards
Metemma, saw an even
exulting
but
impotent
the
than
scene
stranger
forts.
During the morning a few flags and figures had been
distino'uished moving about the low range of sandhills
and as soon as the retirement of
began, the whole of the Dervish army, at
near the town
the
flotilla
least
;
10,000 men, both horse and
foot,
and formed
in
an array more than a mile in length, marched triumtheir
waving
and
shouting,
singing,
view,
into
phantly
banners amid a great cloud of dust.
It
was
their
only victory.
single
the
limited
to
was
gunboats
the
on
The loss
few
and
a
wounds,
his
of
died
who
soldier,
Soudanese
trifling repairs.
The Arab slaughter
is
variously
esti-
half
But
men.
at
it
1,000
rating
account
mated, one
exaggeration.
no
be
probably
would
number
that
650
bombardment
days'
two
in
the
fired
The gunboats
shells and several thousand rounds of
munition.
fully
They then returned
to
Maxim-gun am-
Berber, reporting
on the enemy's position and army.
3
correspondent
then
of
the
account
the
episode
in
this
followed
I have
that
record
vivid
and
reliable
most
the
which
is
Post,
of the Morning
has been preserved of the reconnaissance.
8
*
BERBER
351
had been strongly occupied by
the Egyptian troops, Osman Digna realised that his
position at Adarama was not only useless but very
dangerous. The force at his disposal was small. He
As soon
as Berber
reflected that if the garrison near Berber
striking distance of
Adarama, Adarama was
was within
also within
And while he knew
the reach of the garrison.
that the
entrenched camp of the Egyptians was too strong for
him to attack, he felt no assurance that his antagonists
would be equally unable to profit by the proximity.
Besides
if,
as the Khalifa believed,
about to make their
the Turks
'
were
advance to Omdurman, he
final
might be very easily cut
6
off
and prevented from
rejoin-
ing his master.
Mahmud had
him
to
the forces
j oin
he hated the
superior
long been imperiously summoning
Kordofan
authority,
decided that in this
at
Metemma
general,
;
and
and although
resented his
wary and cunning Osman
case it would be convenient to
the
obey and make a virtue of necessity. Accordingly
about the same time that the gunboats were making
their
first
reconnaissance
and
bombardment
of
Metemma, he withdrew with his two thousand Hadendoa from Adarama, moved along the left bank
of the Atbara until the tongue of desert between the
became sufficiently narrow for it to be crossed
a day, and so made his way by easy stages to
rivers
in
Shendi.
When
the
Sirdar
heard
of
the
evacuation
of
Adarama he immediately determined to assure himself
of the fact, to reconnoitre the unmapped country in
THE KIVER WAR
352
any property that Osman
23rd
the
of October
On
him.
behind
left
might have
from
started
Berber under
column
living
a
therefore
that region, and to destroy
command
the
follows
:
of
General
Hunter,
and formed
—Xlth Soudanese (Major Jackson
one company
of the
4
),
as
two guns,
Camel Corps, and Abdel-Azim
Lightly equipped, and carrying
and 150 irregulars.
camels,
the small force
of
500
train
a
on
supplies
the
moved rapidly along the Nile and reached the post
at
the
confluence
on the 24th.
On
the
next day
column turned south-east along the Atbara river,
and marching via Hudi, Umdabia, El Hilgi, Gemaiza,
and Abruk, arrived at Adarama on the 29th, after
The report that
a journey of eighty-four miles.
the
Osman Digna had returned
correct.
to the Nile
proved to be
His former headquarters were deserted, and
although a patrol of sixty Camel Corps and the Arab
up the river,
Having thus colnot a single Dervish was to be seen.
lected a great deal of negative information, and delaying only to burn Adarama to the ground, the column
returned to Berber. A rough sketch of the country
covered by the reconnaissance was made by one of the
As the only instrument used was the cavalry
officers.
sketching-case, and as the distances were judged or
paced, this chart was afterwards found very inaccuBut there seemed no necessity to make a more
rate.
irregulars scouted for forty miles further
elaborate
thought,
sketch,
as
for
the
they marched
returning
soldiers
little
back through Nakheila,
Mutrus, Umdabia, and Hudi, of the significance these
4
Major H. W. Jackson, Gordon Highlanders and Egyptian army.
BERBER
would acquire, or that within
places
353
six
months they
would camp again by the banks of the Atbara on a
much more serious expedition.
was now November. The Nile was falling fast,
and an impassable rapid began to appear at Urn Tiur,
The Sirdar had a
four miles north of the confluence.
few days in which to make up his mind whether he
It
would keep
As
his
gunboats on the upper or lower reach.
in the latter case their patrolling limits
would have
been restricted, and they would no longer have been
able to
watch the army
at
Metemma, he determined
them on the enemy's
leave
to
side of the obstruction.
This involved the formation of a depot
at Dakhila,
where simple repairs could be executed and wood and
To guard this little dockyard
other necessities stored.
was moved from "Berber
and posted in a small entrenchment. The other halfThe post at the
battalion followed in a few weeks.
half the 3rd Egyptian battalion
confluence was gradually growing into the great
of a few
A
months
camp
later.
regular system of gunboat patrolling was estab-
on the upper reach, and on the 1st of November
the Zafir, Naser, and Metemma, under Commander
lished
Keppel, again steamed south to reconnoitre Mahmud's
The next day they were joined by the Fateh,
position.
and on the 3rd the three larger boats ran the gauntlet
of the forts.
A brisk artillery duel ensued, but the
Dervish aim was, as usual, erratic, and the
received no injury.
was observed that the position
was unchanged, but that three
It
of the Dervish force
new
vessels
the
of
south
the
to
constructed
forts had been
VOL.
I.
A
A
THE 1UVER WAli
354
their
on
way
and
continued
gunboats
The
town.
Arab
The
cavalry
Habeshi.
Wad
as
far
as
proceeded
ready
bank,
to
prevent
the
along
them
with
kept pace
Having seen all there was to be seen,
the
passed
batteries
again
at
and
returned
flotilla
the
Metemma. But this time they were not unscathed, and
a shell struck the Fateh, slightly wounding three men.
monotony
of
the
enlivened
incident
other
Xo
any landing.
The Khalifa continued
November.
parations.
Mahmud
his defensive pre-
remained motionless at Metemma
;
and although he repeatedly begged to be allowed to
advance against the force near Berber he was steadily
and had
refused,
to content himself
ing parties along the
with sending raid-
bank of the
left
Nile,
and
col-
lecting large stores of grain from all the villages within
Meanwhile
reach.
his
the
was stretching
railway
further and further to the south, and the great strain
which the sudden occupation of Berber had thrown
upon the transport was to some extent relieved. The
tranquillity
was
which had followed the advance
as opportune as
it
delighted that no evil
to Berber
was unexpected. The Sirdar,
consequences had followed his
daring move, and finding that he was neither attacked
nor harassed in any way, journeyed to Kassala
arrange the details of
The convenient
distant from
Bosaires
raise
it
its
to
retrocession.
situation of Kassala
— almost equally
Omdurman, Berber, Suakin, Massowa, and
— and
the fertility of the surrounding region
to the dignity of the
the Eastern Soudan.*
*
The
soil is rich
Map, The Soudan,'
'
most important place
to face
;
t
lie
page 462.
in
climate not
BERBER
A
healthy.
355
cool night breeze relieves the heat of
the day, and the presence of abundant water at the
depth of a few feet below the surface supplies the
deficiency of a river.
said
is
In the year 1883 the population
have numbered more than 60,000.
to
Egyptians considered the town of
sufficient value to
A
require a garrison of 3,900 soldiers.
adequately
fitted
The
cotton mill
with machinery and a factory chimney
gave promise of the future developement of manufacture.
trade.
A
regular revenue
But
attested
disasters fell in
the existence
of
heavy succession on the
Eastern Soudan and blighted the prosperity of
mud
its
In 1885, after a long siege and a stubborn
metropolis.
resistance, Kassala
was taken by the Dervishes.
The
garrison were massacred, enslaved, or incorporated in
The town was plundered and the
For nearly ten years an Arab force
trade destroyed.
occupied the ruins and a camp outside them. Kassala
the Mahdi's army.
became a
frontier
post of the Dervish Empire.
Its
population perished or fled to the Italian territory.
This
situation
might have remained unaltered until
after the battle of
Omdurman if
the Dervishes had been
content with the possession of Kassala.
the
Emir
in
command
But
in
1893
of the garrison, being anxious to
distinguish himself, disobeyed the Khalifa's instructions
to
at
remain on the defensive and attacked the Europeans
Agordat. The Arab force of about 8,000 men were
confronted
by
2,300
Italian
troops,
protected
by
Colonel Arimondi. Aft
under
entrenchments,
g
a fierce but hopeless attack the Dervishes were repulsed
with a loss of 3,000 men, among
whom was
their rash
A A 2
THE RIVER
356
leader.
to Italy
WAR
The engagement was, however, as disastrous
The fatal African policy
as to the Khalifa.
of Signor Crispi received a decided impetus, and in the
next year, agreeably with their aspirations in Abyssinia,
the Italians under
General Baratieri advanced from
Agordat and captured Kassala. The occupation was pro-
by Egypt without prejudice to her
and 900 Italian regulars and irregulars
visionally recognised
sovereign rights,
established themselves in a well-built fort.
defeat at
Adowa
The severe
in 1896, the disgrace of Baratieri, the
destruction of his army, and the
fall
of the Crispi
Cabinet, rudely dispelled the African ambitions of Italv.
Kassala became an encumbrance.
Nor was
that
all.
The Dervishes, encouraged by the victory of the
Abyssinians, invested the fort, and the garrison were
compelled to fight hard to hold what their countrvmen
were anxious to abandon. Under these circumstances
the Italian Government offered, at a convenient opportunity, to retrocede Kassala to Egypt.
accepted, and an arrangement made.
The offer was
The advance of
the Khedivial forces into the Dongola province relieved,
has been described, the pressure of the Dervish
attacks.
The Arabs occupied various small posts along
as
the Atbara and in the neighbourhood of the town, and
contented
themselves
with
raiding.
The
Italians
remained entirely on the defensive, waiting patiently
for the
moment when
the fort could be handed over to
the Egyptian troops.
The Sirdar had no
difficulty in
coming
to a satis-
factory arrangement with General Caneva, the Italian
commander.
The
fort
was
to
be
occupied
by an
BERBER
Egyptian force,
357
the stores and
chased at a valuation,
armament
and a force of
to
be pur-
Italian
Arab
be transferred to the Egyptian service.
H. Kitchener then returned to the Nile, where
irregulars to
Sir
the
situation
had suddenly become
November Colonel Parsons,
acute.
During
the 16th Egyptian battalion
and a few native gunners marched from Suakin, and
on the 20th of December arrived at Kassala.
The
Italian
Arab
irregulars
battalion
—henceforth
—were
to
be known as the
at once despatched to the attack
of the small Dervish posts at El Fasher and Asubri, and
on the next day these places were surprised and taken
with scarcely any loss. The Italian officers, although
a
little
disgusted
at
the turn of events, treated the
Egyptian representatives with the most perfect courtesy,
and the formal transference of Kassala fort was
arranged to take place on Christmas Day.
An
scene
an,
imposing ceremonial was observed, and the
itself
with
musketry.
was
mud
strange.
The
was oblong
in
ramparts and parapets pierced for
Tents and stores
the middle stood
fort
filled
the enclosure.
the cotton factory.
Its
In
machinery
had long since been destroyed, but the substantial
building formed the central keep of the fort.
The tall
chimney had become a convenient look-out post. The
The ruins of
the old town of Kassala lay brown and confused on the
lightning-conductor acted as a
flagstaff.
plain to the southward, and behind all rose the dark
rugged spurs of the Abyssinian mountains.
Egypt and of Italy were
both countries, drawn up in
of
hoisted.
line,
The
flags
The troops
of
exchanged military
THE E1VEK WAR
358
compliments.
Then
the Egyptian guard
marched across
the drawbridge into the fort and relieved the Italian
The brass band of the lGth battalion played
The Italian flag was lowered, and
appropriate airs.
soldiers.
with a salute of twenty-one guns the retrocession of
Kassala was complete.
Here, then, for a year
we
leave Colonel Parsons and
his small force to swelter in the
mud
fort, to
carry on
a partisan warfare with the Dervish raiders, to look
longingly towards Gedaref, and to nurse the hope that
when Omdurman has
The
the
fallen their
reader, like the Sirdar,
opportunity will come.
must return
in a
hurry to
Upper Nile.
Towards the end of November the Khalifa had begun
to realise that the
further
till
Turks did not mean
the next flood of the river.
to
advance any
He perceived that
the troops remained near Berber, and that the railway
was only a
still
little
way south
impended, but
it
of
Abu Hamed.
was delayed.
The blow
As soon as lie had
come to this conclusion, he no longer turned a deaf ear
to Mahmud's solicitations.
He knew that the fallingCD
Nile would restrict the movements of the gunboats.
He knew that there were onlv 2,000 men in Berber
*
—
a
mere handful.
He
did not realise the tremendous
power of rapid concentration which the railway
had given his enemies and he began to think of
offensive operations.
But Mahmud should not go
alone.
The whole strength of the Dervish army should
;
be exerted to drive back the invaders.
in
Omdurman were
ordered north.
again formed near Kerreri.
A
All the troops
great
camp was
Thousands of camels were
—
BERBER
359
and once more every preparation was made
At the beginning of December
a general advance.
collected,
for
lie
own secretary
sent his
and
him of
to assure
Mahmud
to
early reinforcements and supplies.
new Jehad, and
Lastly, Abdullahi preached a
markable
directed against
the infidel
believe in the Mahcli
occasion
—
summoned
as
to
threatened him.
Europeans
presence
in
is re-
'
i.e.
his letters
the
tribes
who
those
did not
and sermons on
not the
destroy,
to
this
The Khalifa had no
who inspired the movement which
Egyptians, but the
doubts
it
former exhortations had been
that, while all
'
to explain the plan,
Christians.
There were at
the Soudan
;
this
time scarcely 150
but they had made their
felt.
The Sirdar was returning from Kassala
when
the
rumours of an intended Dervish advance began to grow.
collected
assiduously
was
information
of
scrap
Every
until
not
was
it
but
Department,
Intelligence
by the
the 18th of December,
just as
he reached
Wady
Haifa,
that
news
certain
apparently
that the General received
the Khalifa,
Mahmud,
all
the Emirs, and the whole
army were about to march north.
doubt that even
this
tardy
There can be no
movement
of the
enemy
seriously threatened the success of the operations.
the Dervishes
critical
moved
swiftly, it
engagement would have
looked as
to
if
If
a very
be fought to avoid
the
to
reply
Kitchener's
H.
a damaging retreat.
congeneral
a
order
to
was
Khalifa's open intent
towards
army
Egyptian
centration of the available
Sir
Berber, to telegraph to
Lord Cromer asking
for a British
brigade, and to close the Suakin-Berber route.
THE RIVER AVAR
360
The gunboat
with
depot at the confluence,
emelv exposed
half-battalion
the
for
north,
steam
not
could
gunboats
The
position.
already
was
confluence
the
below
cataract four miles
the
enemy's
on
remain
must
they
Since
impassable.
held
must
be
depot
the
and
depot
side, so must their
:
Although the Sirdar
too
by a much
without
defensive
the
on
even
himself
maintain
weak to
still
push
to
compelled
now
was
he
reinforcements,
further south. On the 22nd of December Lewies brigade
the
along
was
hurried
battery
and
a
battalions
of four
stronger force.
Nile to
its
felt
junction with the Atbara, and began busily
entrenching
itself in the
angle formed by the rivers.
The Atbara fort sprang into existence.
Meanwhile the concentration was proceeding.
AH
the troops in Dongola, with the exception of scanty
garrisons in Merawi, Korti, and Debba, Avere massed at
Berber.
river in
The infantry and guns, dropping down the
boats, entrained at Kerma, were carried back
to Haifa, then
Eailway, past
Kail-head,
hustled
the
across
Abu Hamed, and
which then (January
The whole journey by
rail
invaluable Desert
finally
1)
deposited at
stood at Dakhesh.
from Merawi to Dakhesh
occupied four days, whereas General Hunter with his
column had taken eight
flying
that,
—a
fact
which proves
under certain circumstances which Euclid could
not have foreseen, two sides of a triangle are together
The Egyptian cavalry at
orders on the 25th of December,
shorter than the third side.
Merawi received
and the British
dinners
their
officers
to prepare
for
hurried from their Christmas
their
long march
across the
BERBER
bend of the Nile
tion which
Of the
to Berber.
three were pushed
on
361
to join Lewis's force at the posi-
will hereinafter
be called
campment,' or more familiarly
gathering
the
swelled
eight squadrons,
forces
6
6
the Atbara en-
the Atbara
Berber;
at
'
three
;
and two
remained for the present in the Dongola province,
Gakdul Wells and
looking anxiously
out
Metemma.
The War
who had been nervous about
Office,
towards
the
Soudan since the hasty occupation of
Berber, and who had a very lively recollection of the
events of 1884 and 1885, lost no time in the despatch
situation in the
and the speed with which a force,
so suddenly called for, was concentrated, shows the
of British troops
:
capacity for energy which
may on
occasions be de-
veloped even by our disjointed military organisation.
The
Eoyal Warwickshire Eegiment, of the Lincoln Eegiment, and of the Cameron
1st battalions of the
Highlanders were formed into a brigade and moved
The
from Cairo into the Soudan.
Seaforth Highlanders
1st battalion of the
was brought from Malta
to
Egypt,
and held in immediate readiness to reinforce the troops
Other battalions were sent to take the
at the front.
places
of those
moved
south,
so
that the
Army
of
Occupation was not diminished.
The
officer selected for the
command
of the British
brigade was a man of high character and ability. General
Gatacre
5
had already led a brigade
pedition, and, serving
under
Sir
in the Chitral ex-
Eobert
Low and
Bindon Blood, had gained so good a reputation that
5
Major-General
W.
F. Gatacre, C.B.
Sir
after
THE lilVER
362
AVAli
the
and
subsequent
Pass
Malakand
the
of
storming
the
thought
desirable
it
was
to
Khar
of
plain
the
in
action
transpose his brigade with that of
General Kinloch, and
send Gatacre forward to Chitral. From the mountains
was
General
ordered
to
the
Frontier
North-West
the
of
with
the
bubonic
struggle
stubborn
a
in
and
Bombay,
plague, which was then at its height, he turned his
attention from camps of war to camps of segregation.
He
left India,
leaving behind
him golden
opinions, just
before the outbreak of the great Frontier rising, and
was appointed to a brigade at Aldershot. Thence we
now find him hurried to the Soudan a spare, middlesized man, of great physical strength and energy, of
—
marked capacity and unquestioned courage, but disturbed by a restless irritation, to which even the most
inordinate activity afforded little relief, and which often
left
him the exhausted victim of
General Gatacre's Staff
his
officer,
own
vitality.
6
Major Snow, was a
soldier of varied experience in war,
having previously
served on the Indian Frontier, at the Cape, and in the
Soudan.
his
Like
many
private people he had nursed in
heart the long quarrel with the Dervish power
since the days of '84.
Column
As a
subaltern he marched with
Gordon Eelief Expedition.
Someone in England had given him a pint of champagne
to drink in Khartoum.
Strapped in his wallets the
bottle had passed safely through the actions of Abu Klea
and Abu Kru, had waited at Metemma, and returned
unopened to England with the disappointed troops.
The subaltern put it carefully away. An interval of
the Desert
fi
of the
Major T. D'O. Snow,
p.s.c,
Royal Inniskillen Fusileers.
—
BERBER
363
twelve years followed, and there were times
when
it
seemed very unlikely that the wine would ever be
drunk in the ruined town. But at last, in the inevitable continuity of British policy, the
hour approached.
become a major, was again ordered
to the Soudan, and with him, protected by a stout
Its suspense
leather case, came the patient bottle.
The
subaltern,
was nearly at an end.
The concentration on Berber strained the carryThe
ing powers of the Desert Eailway to the full.
terminus at Haifa was the scene of frantic and un-
The whole weight of the war fell upon
the Eailway Staff, and many minor worries were added
ceasing
effort.
great
their
to
officials
Mournful-looking
responsibilities.
of varied or doubtful nationality argue daily
with the Traffic Manager
—one
subalterns
of the
demanding transport and backing their demands with
most important (all
very urgent,' and
urgent,'
6
'
'
'
written in red ink) telegrams from their superiors at
the
A
front.
—merchants
servants,
motley crowd of would-be passengers
(Greek and native), camel-men,
with
syces
their
masters'
ragtag and bobtail of an army
The
transport.
can do.
Traffic
are loaded
till
officers
depart
—clamour
Manager
all
the
for railway
states the
utmost he
All look alarmed, miserable, or angry, accord-
ing as their station in
The
horses,
officers'
on
life
entitles
them.
The trucks
the springs are in danger of breaking
toil
their
till
far into
long
the
journey
night.
amid
The
trains
general
dis-
appointment and vexation.
Presently the rumours of a Dervish advance grow
;:
THE RIVER
364
WAR
The British brigade is hurried to the
the Merawi garrison hurled into Berber
front
the Egyptian Horse Artillery Battery despatched
from Haifa to Kail-head. The Merawi garrison, consisting of four Egyptian and Soudanese battalions,
into certainty.
:
appears at Kerma, and
hustled 450 miles round the
is
Abu Hamed.
great loop via Haifa and
the
the half-batta lions of
Haifa
from
and
Cairo
British
beyond.
One by one
brigade
arrive
Swiftly
they
bundled into trains and hurried south.
Then
at
are
follow
ON GUARD
departmental
medical
officers
officers
with stores and peculiar supplies
armed
looking packages
—
to the teeth,
and guarding weird-
stretchers, cacolets,
Staff officers full of
and such
like
importance and resplendent with
red tabs on their collars
;
parsons with revolvers
;
and
war correspondents equipped with ice machines, typewriters, cameras, and even cinematographs.
All are
bundled
off south.
7
It is a pity that these varied stores did not include the
apparatus.
Rontgen rays
This neglectful omission was afterwards to cause
much
need-
BERBER
By
365
the end of January the concentration was com-
and a powerful force lay encamped along the
The general
river from Abu Hamed to the Atbara.
distribution was as follows
plete,
:
Abu Hamed
5th Egyptians (half-battalion)
1
Squadron
Lincolns
Dakhesh
(Rail-head)
Warwicks
Camerons
.
No. 1 Battery
1st
Neddi
Geneinetti
and 8th Egyptians
2nd Egyptians
.
3 squadrons
Camel Corps
IXth,Xtb, XIth,XIIth, XHIth,
2 companies
Berber (Headquarters)
XlVth Soudanese
Nos. 4 and 5 Batteries
(3
Squadrons
3rd, 4th, 7th
Dakhila (Atbara Fort)
& 15th Egyptians
No. 2 Battery
collected the three
General Gatacre had
severe
most
a
began
he
than
brigade
battalions of his
w
British
the
of
camp
The
and rig
name printed on the
Brigadier
new
The
Eail-head.
of
south
map a few miles
enemy
the
which
at
distance
the
insisted, in pite of
formed at Gruheish, a placeless
i
being
tr
w
of
precautions
utmost
then were, on the
sleep
to
compelled
were
men
Officers and
observed.
in their boots,
by frequent
twice a
the
and
the rest of the troops
night-alarms
week and much
Kesnlar
field-firing
busily occupied
conceivable
every
while
brigade,
less suffering to the officers
the battle of the
and men who
Atbara— Editor.
was disturbed
marching
formation
sustained gunshot
wounds
to
at
366
THE RIVER AVAR
resist
attack
a Dervish
was
assiduously practised.
may have
General
the
of
enthusiasm
The excessive
provoked some
it
is
dissatisfaction
impossible
deny
to
among
that,
the soldiers
while discipline
;
but
and
the
general
efficimaintained,
successfullv
were
health
13th
of
February
the
On
increased.
greatly
ency was
the brigade
miles
moved
further
immunity
into a
south,
new camp
Abu
Dis, a few
where they enjoyed a greater
sandstorms,
from
at
and
here
they
made
preparations for a prolonged stay.
The
British soldiers
enjoyed two occupations in
which must not escape the chronicler
Their equipment was in many respects
their spare time
or the public.
excellent.
Their boots and their bullets were, however,
The former, manufactured by the worst
though by no means the cheapest process, were soon
completely worn out. It was found that the soles
useless.
dropped to pieces
after a fortnight's
hard marching.
The material of which they were made resembled
brown paper rather than leather. The simplicity of
the War Office and the knavery of the contractors had
combined to produce the most expensive and least
durable boot
in
the
Soudan.
And
the
astonished
Egyptian saw the British infantry tying the soles of
their boots to their feet with string, with strips of
hide,
and even with pieces of
linen.
The case of the bullets was even more serious.
The British brigade had been sent to the Soudan armed
with the nickel-cased Lee-Metford bullets (Mark II.).
As
these bullets
considered
it
do not
kill
an enemv, General Gatacre
desirable to have
them
altered to
meet
BERBER
that requirement
million rounds
improvised
as
so
case.
to
367
and during the month
;
at
Guheish a
ammunition were converted into
of
Dum-Dum
bullets
by
filing
off the
tips,
expose the heavy core within the outer
These
missiles
were afterwards used at the
Atbara, and the results were found satisfactory as far
power was concerned. But two serious disThe roughly cut bullets
advantages must be recorded.
destroyed much of the accuracy of flight. The fact
that their filed tips were uneven caused them to jam
as killing
when used
in the
fore necessary to
magazine of the
It
rifle.
was
have unconverted bullets to
there-
fire
when
the magazine action was used, and converted bullets
when
the single action
was
By
desired.
this arrange-
ment, which was undoubtedly the best that the General
could devise, the British troops were so equipped that
at single action at the longer
ranges they might
converted bullets, which were unlikely to
hit,
fire
and
at
moment, when magazine action was necesthey might fire unconverted bullets, which were
the critical
sary,
unlikely to
kill.
8
There was at
the
Dum-Dum
this
bullet
time in India a large supply of
—a
bullet
war had had an exhaustive
which
in the Frontier
practical test, and
been found to be in every respect
satisfactory.
had
Its
Moreover, it was not discovered
that the filing of the tips of the bullets would prevent tbem from being used
was
There
altered.
been
had
bullets
the
all
nearly
until
in the magazines,
British
each
and
magazines,
the
for
ammunition
of
reserve
no
therefore
8
The Author is hardly
exaggerating.
soldier on the Atbara just had his magazine
spectacle of a British brigade, sitting
full,
and that was
down within
all.
The
striking distance of the
dropping
the
sole's
with
ammunition,
their
manufacturing
enemy,
Editok.
serious.—
so
not
were
it
if
laugh,
one
make
would
boots,
off their
THE RIVER
368
WAR
but
denied,
not
were
advantages
was
it
that
felt
the
support
not
general
could
Hythe
dignity
the
The
British brigade
invention.
Indian
an
of
adoption
with
armed
the
enemy
the
face
to
sent
therefore
was
of
ft
obsolete bullet, pending the
ketry experts at
t
home
produce the results
resembling
invention
some
of
by the muswhich should
'
missile
Dum-Dum
of the
The
too closely.
it
'
bullet without
parties guilty of this
crime have not yet been brought to justice.
While the concentration of the troops was being
effected the Dervishes made no forward movement.
Their army was
collected at
Kerreri
supplies were
;
had been made.
plentiful; all preparations
Yet they
The burning question of the command had
A dispute that was never settled ensued.
arisen.
When the whole army was regularly assembled, the
Khalifa announced publicly that he would lead
tarried.
the
faithful
arranged
person
in
privately
but at
;
that
should beg him not
to
many Emirs and
expose
After proper solicitation therefore
appeals.
same time
the
Then he looked around
lie
notables
sacred
his
he
person.
yielded to their
subordinate.
for a
The Khalifa Ali-Wad-Helu presented himself. In the
Soudan every advantage and honour accrues to the
possessor of an army, and the rival chief saw a chance
of regaining his lost power.
not,
the
however,
offer
lost
upon
apparent
with
Abdullahi.
'
aspired
there are none.
to
But that
but
delight,
himself unable to spare any
Ali-Wad-Helu
This consideration was
rifles for
lead.
will
*
He
accepted
he
professed
army which
the
Alas
make no
!
'
he
cried,
difference to
BERBER
so famous a warrior.'
369
Ali-Wad-Helu
however, con-
,
would make a great deal of difference,
and declined the command. Osman Sheikh-ed-Din
sidered that
it
offered to lead the army, if
tribes
and use them
he might arm the riverain
as auxiliaries to swell his force.
This roused the disapproval of Yakub.
he declared, was
fatal.
Such a policy,
The riverain tribes were traitors
— dogs —worthy only of being destroyed.
upon the more
refined methods,
the
last
Khalifa,
by which
enlarged
his policy
The squabble continued,
might be carried out.
at
He
despairing of
any agreement,
Mahmud, and accordingly
march to Metemma with
decided merely to reinforce
ordered the Emir Yunes to
But
until
was then discovered that
Mahmud hated Yunes, and would have none of him.
about 5,000 men.
it
At this the Khalifa broke up his camp, and
army marched back for the second time,
and disgust, to the city.
It
seemed
to those
who were
Dervish movements that
their
all
the Intelligence Department
it
in vexation
acquainted with the
offensive
part had been definitely
the Dervish
operations
abandoned.
move
in
was believed that the
break-up of the Kerreri camp was the end
Khalifa's determination to
Even
on
north.
of the
There would
be a hot and uneventful summer, and with the flood
would begin its final advance. The
news which was received on the 15th of February came
as a great and pleasant surprise. Mahmud was crossNile the expedition
ing the Nile and proposed to advance on Berber without
reinforcements of any 'kind.
The
at this astounding piece of
good fortune, immediately
VOL.
I.
Sirdar, highly satisfied
BB
—
THE RIVER
370
WAR
On
confluence.
the
nearer
force
his
mass
to
began
hold
to
instructed
were
Dis
Abu
at
British
the
21st
the
themselves
J
in
The Seaforths began
readiness.
their
the
of
battalions
various
the
and
Cairo,
from
Durnev
and
Berber
towards
forward
Egyptian army pressed
as
reported
being
Mahmud
Atbara fort, On the 25th,
concengeneral
the
bank,
right
having crossed to the
was ordered.
tration
The
British brigade
had
just returned
when
at
from a route-
1.45 on that date
march of fourteen miles,
them
instructing
received
was
the telegram
to Dabeika,
train for
move
by
Berber,
of
south
miles
ten
village
a
During the night the battalions
forced marches.
•
to
Rail-head, which was by then
left
at Shereik,
some sixteen miles further south.
front.
the
to
march
From here
telecorrespondent's
war
in
error
a
clerical
Owing to a
attenmore
excited
has
followed
that
march
the
gram,
they started
tion than
it
perhaps deserves.
to
Marching
steadily,
and
camping ground seven miles
the
on
Dabeika
reached
brigade
Berber,
the
north of
3rd of March. The actual itinerary was as follows
with a halt of one
day
at a
:
Arrived at Shereik by train on the morning of the 26th February
13 miles
.
26-27 February, marched to Bashtinab
.
14
.
27-28
.
„
„
„ Omsheyo
28
„
1
March
2
„
3
.
.22
.
.
„
Abadia
„ El Hasa
„
through Berber to
,.
„
.
9
9
(halt)
|]
Dabeika
.
.
.
13£
714
Average
9
A
:
about eleven miles a day.
hamlet three miles north of Berber
9?
BERBER
Mograt I.
,U
371
UAMED
MAP
THE NILE
ABU HAMED
TO
SHABLUKA
Statute Miles
kibes
It.
Son. 32 Fleet St, London.
B B 2
THE RIVER
372
WAR
for
Dabeika
at
encamped
remained
The brigade
debut
rumours,
conflicting
by
eight days, disturbed
going
was
campaign
the
that
lighted
meanwhile
all
to begin
;
and
the forces at the disposal of the Sirdar
front.
the
near
drawing
gradually
were
—
373
CHAPTEE
XII
RECONNAISSANCE
A
— The
— Concentration at Kunur— March
to Hudi — The Dervish march — Kas-el-Hudi— The Atbara scenery
The outpost
of the 21st of March—Deserters — The camp at Kasel-Hudi — Capture of Shendi — Eeconnaissance of the 30th of March
Dervish prisoners— The moment approaches — The reconnaissance of
the 5th of April— The Egyptian trooper — His
—Advance to
Abadar — The eve of battle.
general view
strategic aspect
affair
officers
*
Although the story of a campaign is made up of many
details which cannot be omitted, since they are essential
to the truth as well as the interest of the account,
it is
of paramount importance that the reader should preserve throughout a
general idea.
For otherwise the
marches, forays, and reconnaissance will seem disconnected and purposeless
affairs,
and the battle simply a
greater operation undertaken in
fashion.
To
appreciate the tale
the same haphazard
it is less
necessary to
contemplate the wild scenes and stirring incidents, than to
thoroughly understand the logical sequence of incidents,
which
trial
all
tend to and ultimately culminate in a decisive
of strength.
of narration
is
The
difference
as great as
between the two
styles
between the appearance of
the paints which are squeezed on to the palette of the
and of those that are spread on the canvas of a
picture.
In the ambitious hope of producing the more
artist,
THE RIVER
374
WAR
anticiand
recall
extent
pleasing effect, I shall to some
of
view
general
a
take
and
pate the course of events
the Atbara campaign.
daring
the
by
courted
were
which
The hazards
the
last
in
discussed
been
have
occupation of Berber
was
situation
the
December
to
October
From
chapter.
critical.
became
suddenly
it
December
In
threatening.
Had the Emir Mahmud advanced with the
Metemma even as late as the middle of
Dervishes at
January, he
If the great
might possibly have recaptured Berber.
possibility
the
field,
the
taken
had
army
Omdurman
would have become a certainty. The young Kordofan
eneral saw his opportunity, and begged to be allowed
But it was not until the Khalifa had sent
to seize it.
his own army back into the city that, being very badly
informed of the numbers and disposition of the Egyptian
force,
he allowed the
Mahmud
Metemma
Dervishes to move.*
received permission to advance at the end
He
of January.
eagerly obeyed the longed-for order.
But the whole situation was now changed.
army was
tian
had arrived
;
concentrated
the
;
The Egyp-
British
brigade
the railway had reached Geneinetti
;
the
miserable hamlet of Dakhila, at the confluence, had grown
from a small depot to a
fort,
and from a
fort to
an en-
trenched camp, against which neither Dervish science
nor strength could by any possibility prevail.
Mahmud
ment
still
Perhaps
did not realise the amazing power of move-
that the railway
had given
his foes
;
perhaps
was held
is the more
believed, with the Khalifa, that Berber
only by 2,000 Egyptians
;
or else
— and
this
Map, The Campaign on the Atbara,' page 413.
'
lie
—
RECONNAISSANCE
—
375
was reckless of danger and strong in his
own conceit. At any rate, during the second week in
February he began to transport himself across the Nile,
with the plain design of an advance north. With all
probable
lie
the procrastination of an
Arab he crawled
forward towards the confluence of the
leisurely
At El
rivers.
Aliab some idea of the strength of the Atbara entrench-
ment seems
to
undecided.
A
He paused
Mahmud was for a
have dawned upon him.
council was held.
continued advance and for making a direct attack on
the
Osman Digna urged
enemy's position.
prudent course.
Many
a
more
years of hard fighting against
had taught the wily Hadendoa slaver
the power of modern rifles, and much sound tactics
disciplined troops
besides.
upon the
He
pressed his case with jealous enthusiasm
commander he
detested and
despised.
An
insurmountable obstacle confronted them.
Yet what
could not be overcome might be avoided.
The hardy
Dervishes could endure privations which would destroy
the soldiers of civilisation.
Barren and inhospitable as
the
at
army
the
round
move
might
was
they
Once
all.
after
Berber
capture
and
so
Atbara fort
were
ones
accursed
these
Egyptians,
were behind the
the desert, they
lost.
The railway
—could be
cut.
—that mysterious source of strength
The host
that
drew
its life
along
it
miserably.
perish
or
disadvantage
fearful
a
must fight at
Besides, he reminded
Mahmud — not
without reason
that they could count on help in Berber
itself.
council,
the
called
to
Emirs,
the
of
The agreement
himself
in
confidence
His
leader.
decided the Dervish
increased.
Digna
Osman
of
hatred
his
was weakened,
—
THE RIVER WAR
376
Nevertheless, following the older man's advice he
left
Aliab on the 18th of March, and struck north-east into
the desert towards the village and ford of
Atbara
Thence by a long desert
river.
But while
reach the Nile and Berber.
What Mahmud failed
was better served.
from spies
to derive
and
4
his
friendlies,'
obtained by gunboats and cavalry.
as Sir
his information of
movements was uncertain, the
the Sirdar's force and
British General
Hudi on the
march he might
As
adversary
soon, therefore,
H. Kitchener learned that the Dervishes had
the Nile and were
making a detour around
his left flank,
he marched up the Atbara river to Hudi.
Mahmud
the alternative of attacking
left
This offered
him
in a strong
making a still longer detour. Having
determined upon caution he chose the latter, and, deflecting his march still more to the east, reached the
or
position
Atbara
of
at Nakheila.
to Berber
was
But from
far too great for
this point the distance
him
not carry enough water in his skins.
few, and held against him.
possible.
The
running short.
wells were
Further advance was im-
what
exist,
c?dm-palms.
to
do.
Supplies
left
the Nile.
The Dervishes
but they did not thrive, on the nuts of the
Soldiers
began
to
desert.
Osman Di -
although his advice had been followed, was
enmity.
His army dwindled.
him
all
this
merciless,
at
open
time his terrible antagonist watched
as a tiger gloats
silent,
were
His magazines at Shendi had been de-
stroyed as soon as he had
And
conld
So he waited and entrenched himself, sorely
troubled, but uncertain
might
He
to cover.
on a helpless and certain prey
inexorable.
Then
the
end
came
EECONNAISSANCE
As soon
suddenly.
as
the
377
process
of attrition was
advanced to conveniently demoralise the
sufficiently far
Dervish host, without completely dissolving them, the
army moved. The victim, as if petriwas powerless to fly. The tiger crept forward two
Sirdar and his
fied,
— from Eas-el-Hudi to Abadar, from
Abadar to Umdabia — crouched for a moment, and then
measured
strides
bounded with
irresistible fury
upon
its
prey and tore
it
to pieces.
Such
campaign
a brief strategic
is
account of the Atbara
must be told in full.
On the 23rd of January the Khalifa, having learned
;
but the
tale
of the arrival of British troops near
baffled
by the
disputes about the
Abu Hamed, and
command
of his army,
ordered Kerreri camp to be broken up, and permitted
his forces to return within the city,
to fortify.
to
A
which he continued
few days later he authorised
advance against Berber.
such policy,
his reason for
I
if
Mahmud
shall not try to guess
What
reason there was.
he had not dared with 60,000
men he now
attempted
The course of action which had for three
months offered a good hope of success he resolved to
with 20,000.
pursue only when
it
led
to
He
ruin.
forbade
the
was advisable. When it had already
become mad and fatal he commanded it. And this
was a man whose reputation for intelligence and
advance while
military skill
it
had been bloodily demonstrated
planation there
proverb which
none, save such as
is
is
may
lie
!
Ex-
in a Latin
too hackneyed to quote.
The gunboats
ceaselessly patrolled the river,
exchanged shots with the Dervish
forts.
and
Throughout
THE RIVER WAR
378
The
reports
happened.
had
note
of
nothing
January
of spies showed the Khalifa to be at Kerreri or in
Ahmed
Omdurman.
Osman Digna
on
was
side
remained
had
Dervishes
February, however,
until the
15th that
withdrawn.
its
The
exerted
flotilla
impede
crossing
and
sailing-boats
Mahmud
succeeded in
Shendi by the
quarters were
village
more
other
about
than
28th
five
moving
his
at
several
army
own
His
A
south.
to
head-
Hosh-ben-Naga, a
followed,
a fortnight
Nile.
were captured,
whole
February.
further
miles
although
but
;
craft
established
it
definitely that
bank of the
river
of
But
fell
harass the Dervishes and
itself to
transportation
the
was
It
nature was apparent,
the east
to
of
This event
activity.
and the gunboats were able to report
Mahmud was
the
their small
movement impended.
some important
forts
the 12th
was noticed that
it
seemed to point to a renewal of
was not
presence
his
On
passive.
outpost at Khulli had been
that
and
Shendi,
at
by the construction of two new
But beyond this
of the river.
was attested
that
Fedil held the Shabluka Gorge.
little
delay of
during which
the
The Suakincaravans, and the
gunboats exercised the utmost vigilance.
Berber road was again closed for
On
Sirdar himself proceeded to Berber.
March
the
remnants
collected at Gakdul,
Metemma,
of
the
Jaalin
re-occupied the
to iind its streets
Egyptian
look-out
tribe,
having
now abandoned
and houses choked with
the decaying bodies of their relations.
the
the 11th of
station,
established on Shebaliya island,
On
which
the 13th
had
been
was attacked by the
—
RECONNAISSANCE
Dervishes,
and
the
in
skirmish
379
ensued Major
that
was wounded. On the same day the enemy
were reported moving northwards to Aliab, and it
became evident that Mahmud had begun his advance.
has
which
force
with
a
Shendi
from
started
He
1
Sitwell
been estimated
19,000 souls, but which included
at
many women and
numbered 12,000
with
a
month's
ammunition.
and
—to
concentrate
remaining
rations
and
Sirdar
Lewis's
squadrons
five
men, each and
army,
three
and may have actually
fighting
The
Anglo-Egyptian
cavalry
children,
the
at
fort
Kunur.
of
ordered
the
of
the
exception
Egyptian brigade
held
at
the
supplied
90 rounds
about
immediately
with
all
—which
the
with
confluence
Broadwood, with
the
squadrons, marched thither on the 16th
and the whole cavalry
force,
;
with the Camel Corps
reconnoitred
days
subsequent
three
the
on
in support,
twenty miles up the Nile and the Atbara.
Meanwhile the concentration at Kunur was pro-
ceeding apace.
On
the 14th the inhabitants of Berber
Soudanese
the
both
of
departure
the
by
were
the
and
by
town,
the
holding
been
which
had
brigades
startled
publication of the following order
:
recomstrongly
and
desires,
Sirdar
the
His Excellency
mends, that all merchants in Berber should remove themselves
and their belongings to Geneinetti as soon as possible.
guarantee no military protection
By Order
March
As
Geneinetti was twenty miles away, and hardly
Major W. H.
army
He
Sitwell, p.s.c,
Northumberland Fusileers and Egyptian
THE RIVER WAR
380
—
that is
any transport was procurable, the merchants
for the most part deterto say, the Greek traders
'
'
—
mined
where they were, and risk
to stay
their lives
To those who remained Remington rifles were served out, and they began to make
The two Soudanese
feeble preparations for defence.
with their property.
brigades, formed into
command of
artillery reached Kunur
division under
a
Maj or-Gener al Hunter, with the
The
on the night of the loth.
Lincolns, the Warwicks, and the
British brigade
Camerons
—the
— marched
thither from Dabeika.
The Seaforth Highlanders, who
on the 13th were
at
across
railed
first
the
half-battalion
The second wing
steamers few
still
desert
Wady
to
Haifa, were
Geneinetti.
swiftly
Thence the
were brought to Kunur in steamers.
— since
the need
— was jolted
was urgent and the
across the desert from Rail-
head on camels, an experience
training nor their clothes
for
which neither
had prepared them.
their
By
the
16th the whole force was concentrated at Kunur, and
on the following day they were reviewed by the
With
Sirdar.
the exception of the British brigade, whose boots
of inferior quality were
much worn, and whose
verted cartridges would not
fit
con-
their magazines, the
army was in every respect efficient and well equipped.
The first three days at Kunur were days of eager
expectation.
Rumour was king. The Dervish army
had crossed the Atbara at Hudi, and was within ten
miles of the camp.
flank
Mahmud was
march through the
already making a
desert to Berber.
A
battle
was imminent.
A
hours.
with field-glasses scanned the sandy
Officers
collision
must take place
in a few
RECONNAISSANCE
horizon for the
first
381
But the sky-
signs of the enemy.
remained unbroken, except by the wheeling dust
line
and gradually the excitement abated, and the
British brigade began to regret all the useful articles
they had scrupulously left behind them at Dabeika,
devils,
when they marched
in a
hurry and the
lightest possible
order to Kunur.
On
that
19th
the
Dervishes
the
March
of
were
AT KUNUR
—THE
gunboats reported
the
leavin
the
Nile,
ONLY SHIRT
movement became apparent
next day the whole force at Kunur marched
Mahmud's
the
flanking
angle between the rivers
desert
and
Hudi.
to
The
across
The
appearance of the army would have been formidable.
The cavalry, the Camel Corps, and the Horse Artillery
covered the front and right flank
the
British
masses
;
shrouded
the
on the
right,
transport
in a fearful
moved
followed.
dust-storm.
miles, was accomplished in
;
the infantry, with
of brigade
in line
All was,
The
five hours,
however,
distance, ten
and the army
THE RIVER WAR
382
reached Hudi
the
before
time to
in
Here
night/
a strong zeriba
construct
were
they
Egyptians
of
brigade
Lewis's
Fort
by
Atbara
exception of the
garrison
— and
troops
the
at
were thus raised to nearly 14,000
This force was organised as follows
Commander-in-Chief
British Brigade
1st Battalion
—with
loth battalion, which was
the
:
from
joined
Sirdar's
men
of
the
left
as
disposal
all
arms.
:
The Sirdar
:
Major-General Gatacre
Royal Warwickshire Regiment
(6
Companies)
Lincolnshire Regiment
Seaforth Highlanders
Cameron Highlanders
Egyptian Infantry Division
1st
Brigade
XHth
Soudanese
Major-General Hunter
2nd Brigade
I
Lieut.-Col. Maxwell
8th Egyptians
:
3rd Brigade
Lieut. -Col. Lewis
3rd Egyptians
i
Lieut. -Col. MacDonald
2nd Egyptians
IXth Soudanese
XIHth
4th
7th
Xth
Xlth
XlVth
Cavalry
:
Lieut.-Col.
Broadwood
8 Squadrons
2
Maxim guns
Camel Corps: Major Tudway
2
6 Companies
Artillery: Lieut.-Col.
Detachment, No. 16 Company,
E
Long
3
Division R.A., with 6 five-inch
B.L
howitzers
Egyptian Horse Battery (6 guns)
Nos. 1, 2. and 3 Field Batteries Egyptian
British
Maxim
Battery
Bocket Detachment
2
(4
Army
(18 guns)
guns)
(2 sections)
Captain (temporary Major) R.
J.
Tudway, Essex Regiment and
arm\
Artillery
and Egyptian arm;
RECONNAISSANCE
Mahmud had
383
early intelligence of the
the Anglo-Egyptian army.
His original
movement of
intention had
But he now learned that at
Hudi he would have to fight the Sirdar's main force.
Not feeling strong enough to attack them, he determined
been to march to Hudi.
to
march
now
to Nakheila.
as conspicuous as
The mobility of the Arabs was
their dilatory nature had formerly
THE MULE
been.
The whole Dervish army
men, women,
lery,
children,
—horse,
and
foot,
animals
and
artil-
— actually
day the forty miles of waterless
between Aliab and Nakheila, at which
traversed in a single
desert
latter
The
up
which
lie
place
20th.
the
of
night
the
on
arrived
they
Sirdar's
next object was
to
keep the enemy so
far
the Atbara that they could not possibly strike at
Berber or Kail-head.
Accordingly at dawn on the 21st
THE RIVER AVAR
384
the whole force
was ordered
to
five miles nearer the Dervishes'
march
to Bas-el-Hudi,
supposed halting-place.
The detour which the Arabs would have to make to
march round the troops was nearly doubled by this
movement.
The
utter
impossibility
of
their
flank
march with a stronger enemy on the radius of the
circle was now apparent.
The movement of the Anglo-Egyptian force was
screened by seven squadrons of cavalry and the Horse
Artillery, and Colonel Broadwood was further instructed
to reconnoitre along the river
the enemy.
is
The country on
and endeavour
either
to locate
bank of the Atbara
covered with dense scrub, impassable for civilised
troops.
From
these belts, which average a quarter of
a mile in depth, the t/dm-palms rise in great numbers.
All the bush
and looks very pretty and green
contrast to the sombre vegetation of the Nile.
Between the trees flew green parrots and many other
bright birds.
is
leafy,
The
river
itself
above Eas-el-Hudi
is,
during March and April, only a dry bed of hot white
sand about 400 yards broad, but dotted with deep and
beautifully clear pools, in
which peculiarly
and crocodiles, deprived of
crowded together. The atmosphere
fish
their
is
brilliant
stream,
are
more damp than
by the Nile, and produces, in the terrible heat of the
summer, profuse and exhausting perspiration. The
natives dislike the water of the Atbara, and declare
that
it
river.
does not quench the thirst like that of the great
It has, indeed, a slightly bitter taste,
which
strong contrast to the sweet waters of the Nile.
is
a
Never-
theless the British soldiers, with characteristic contrari-
RECONNAISSANCE
ness, declared their preference for
by the
deserted
former numbers.
now
villages
belt of bushes
alone
display
This tribe, which at one time
numbered nearly ninety thousand
its
The
it.
was formerly the abode of the Bisharin
river
Arabs, whose
their
385
breed of swift riding-camels
;
souls,
was famous
for
but pestilence, famine,
war, and oppression have practically destroyed the breed
#
and reduced the tribe to scarcely ten thousand.
the surviving Jaalin, this small
Like
remnant were not un-
naturally the implacable enemies of the Dervish power.
Their hatred was
numbers of
—worse
their
animated by the fact that large
women had become
than the
Khalifa's soldiery.
prisoners
— the
the prisoners and
concubines of the
Their chief, the Sheikh Ahmed, a
handsome Arab, accompanied all the reconnaissances and gave valuable information.
His whole soul
tall,
was surrendered to the desire for vengeance, and since.
as a fighting man, he won the respect of the British
officers, his
reputation need not be further examined.
Outside the bush the ground undulated gently, but the
surface
was
either stony
and fissured by the
and uneven, or
annual
overflow.
else
cracked
Both
these
made it hard for cavalry and still more
for artillery to move freely
and the difficulties were
complicated by frequent holes and small Mors full of
conditions
:
long grass.
Amid such scenes the squadrons moved cautiously
forward.
By 10.30, having made the ground good for
fifteen miles
force
at
from Hudi, Colonel Broadwood halted
Abadar, an old
fort,
and sent one squadron
under Captain Le Gallais seven miles further.
VOL.
I.
his
At two
o c
THE RIVER
380
clock
this
squadr
WAR
eturned, having met a few of
While
bodies.
the
formed
no
but
scouts,
the enemy
4
Captain
river
Baring's
the
at
turns
force watered by
of
outposts
a
about
line
in
a
extended
squadron was
But
reconthe
south-east.
the
to
quarter
mile and a
homeward
by
followed
been
had
squadron
noitring
horsemen,
Dervish
hundred
several
Creeping along
evadin
and
bank
the
bv
bush
dense
through the
i
the
A TIMELY SHOT
vedettes,
drove
in
these
all
suddenly
the
fell
outposts.
on the
the use of the revolver.
and
Captain Baring, indeed,
had scarcely time to mount, and owed
skill in
line
his life to his
The Arabs pressed on
impetuously at the heels of the outposts, and a sharp
But the other squadrons,
up
duly alarmed by the firing, now came galloi
and the Dervishes found themselves in a moment
hand-to-hand fight began.
4
Captain Hon. E. Baring, 10th Hussars and Egyptian army
RECONNAISSANCE
387
confronted by a powerful force, and thereat fled back
bush incontinently.
5
Colonel Broadwood then ordered Captain Persse,
with his squadron, to clear the scrub. That officer
into the
men and
dismounted his
opening
bushes,
fire
they pushed in
with
Dervishes proved to be in
their
much
among
the
But the
carbines.
greater strength than
had been estimated, and, firing from their horses with
The firing
skill and frequency, began to inflict loss.
grew louder and more sustained, and not wishing to
lose men Broadwood sent his galloper, Lord Tullibardine,
6
to tell Persse to withdraw.
As soon
as the
squadron was clear of the bush the Horse Artillery
battery
came
into action
Dervishes
the
to
and shelled
retire,
squadrons advanced
for
and
six
as
miles
it.
This obliged
they did
along
so
the
the
edge,
manner the whole
of the cavalry reached Umdabia, whence the fires of a
Then as the hour was
large hostile force were visible.
keeping pace with them.
In
this
they returned towards the camp.
late
On
reaching
the scene of the skirmish the losses were found to be
more severe than had been believed. Eight troopers
were killed and seven wounded, most of them in
the attempt to clear the bush by dismounted fire.
Thirteen horses were also
lost, as,
having rid themselves
of their riders on the broken ground, they galloped off
Arab mares on which the Dervishes were
mostly mounted. The wounded delayed the homeward
after
the
march, and
was not
it
5
Captain
6
Lieut. J. G.,
until nearly
midnight that the
2nd Dragoon Guards and Egyptian army
Marquis of Tullibardine, Royal Horse Guards.
W. H.
Persse,
c c
THE RIVER AVAR
388
The
enemy
cavalry reached the
wounded
their
bore
and
ground
left ten killed on the
camp
at Eas-el-Hudi.
off to their zeriba.
on
attack
an
of
The news
on
same afternoon.
this
Adarama was
received
appeared that the Arabs
It
the Abyssinian irregulars raised
had been repulsed by
Glowing
Parsons.
Colonel
by
details
were forthcoming,
struggles
Homeric
the
recount
but I do not propose to
of the
brance
'
friendlies.'
;
much
With
the
Little in
them
is
worthy of remem-
seeks oblivion.
first
light
of
the
next morning one
after
which
dead,
the
bury
squadron was sent out to
also
and
ground,
the
on
left
the skirmish had been
position.
Dervish
the
towards
to patrol the country
battalion,
Soudanese
XHIth
the
with
Major Collinson,
the
of
corpses
The
acted in support.
and
boots
their
of
stripped
were found
not mutilated in any way.
Their
first
fallen
troopers
bandoliers, but
duty performed,
wer
and
river
the
along
on
the squadron pushed
confronted
by
a large force of
mounted Arabs.
In the
.
once
at
cavalry
the
numbers
face of these superior
Dervishes
The
infantry.
fell back on the supporting
with
saluted
were
following came within range, and
inflicted
have
to
said
are
volleys at 900 yards, which
in
the
heard
was
some loss. The noise of the firing
Derthe
that
belief
the
camp at Eas-el-Hudi, and in
and
Sirdar
the
attack,
vishes were advancing to the
meet
to
desert
the
into
his whole army sallied out
the
of
parent
the
been
them. The wish may have
the
assuming
of
intention
no
thought, for Mahmud had
offensive.
After waiting in the desert for
two hours
/
KECONNAISSANCE
the force returned to
Collinson's battalion,
camp, followed
and
last of all
389
•
after a while
by the
by
cavalry.
During the day several deserters from the enemy
surrendered themselves,
approaching the camp with
and humility, holding up their weaponless
hands and tearing the motley patches from off their
jibbas, in token that their vows to slay the infidel were
caution
and that they were Dervishes no longer.
All were
They were mostly of the lowest rank.
Indeed, they had to be protected
ravenously hungry.
abandoned
from the fury of their appetites, and only a small allowAll
ance of biscuit was at first given to them.
brought
tales
of hardship and suffering, and, in the
hopes of conciliating their captors, painted the condition of
Mahmud's army
The
in the darkest hues.
black riflemen, they said, were aggrieved because the
Osman
As for
Baggara had the larger allowance of grain.
Dio*na
was
still
at
variance with
Mahmud.
the
nuts
of
the
but
nothing
received
them, they had
ddra-palm, an
exclusive diet of which had produced
truth
the
attested
appearance
Their
internal disorders.
workin
was
attrition
of
process
The
of their words.
on the Arab host.
For more than a
remained
halted
at
week
the Anglo-Egyptian force
Eas-el-Hudi,
privations to demoralise
waiting
Mahmud's army
perate him into making an attack.
the cavalry rode out towards the
for
or
to
the
ex-
Every morning
enemy's
camp
the
watched
or
with
All day long they skirmished
to
wearily
returned
they
Baggara horse, and at night
hopes
the
of
full
awoke
army
camp. Each morning the
THE RIVER WAR
390
of battle,
waited during
the long hours, and finally
peace.
profound
and
disgust
deep
retired to sleep in
The continual
interest.
was
of deserters
arrival
Sometimes a few
common
to leave their leaders,
their
chief
spearmen, driven
were brought
in.
by hunger
and
camel
on
a
mounted
Emir,
there came a subordinate
A DUST DEVIL
army
assume a more homely ap-
looking a very guilty wretch.
halted, the
camp began
to
And
while the
grew stronger and thicker the
the
the field kitchens more elaborate
acts wider
Half a mile behind
pools of the Atbara more dirty.
Here
the troops another encampment sprang up.
a score of brave and daring Greek traders opened
pearance.
The
;
zeriba
;
;
RECONNAISSANCE
391
a bazaar, and a scanty supply of tinned meats and
tobacco was offered to all customers, at prices
which, though high, were not disproportioned to the
Behind this bivouac a ragged crew
risk of business.
of
'
friendlies
'
— the
jackals
of
an army
—lurked
in
turn
a
arise,
to
to
chance
the
were
ready,
the bushes,
defeat into a rout or a victory into a massacre.
Last
women
of
other
and
wives
the
of
abode
of all was the
Without fear, if not without rethe black soldiers.
proach, these hardy and brazen creatures hung upon
few
a
baggage
only
their
brigades,
the
of
tail
the
earthenware
ebon
pots,
Over
babies.
persistence,
suffering
till
when
all
some scanty
all
the sun beat
white
in the
rags,
men
open
air,
and a
down
litter
of
in merciless
quivered with weary
and even under the
always
temperature
the
tents
improvised
grass huts or
the
day
of
hours
hottest
115°
the
during
istered
n
The nights were, however, cool and pleasant.
the
found
force
the
of
part
main
the
But although
spent
army
the
which
time
the
tedious,
days long and
work
The
uneventful.
means
no
was
by
at Eas-el-Hudi
the
with
only
ceased
and
hard,
was
of the squadrons
men
on
severely
told
patrolling
The continual
night.
far
were
Dervishes
the
that
fact
and horses and the
;
stronger in
the mounted arm than
required the
utmost
vigilance
of
the Sirdar's
the
army
cavalry com-
gunboats.
the
for
found
also
was
mander. Employment
established
had
he
Nile
the
left
When Mahmud had
the
of
wives
the
which
in
Shendi,
a sort of depot at
This
deposited.
been
had
stores
Emirs and the surplus
garrison
slender
a
only
by
treasure house was protected
THE EIVER AVAR
392
of 700 riflemen and 25 horsemen.
On
ordinary military
grounds, and also since the event might infuriate the
Arabs,
was decided
it
Accordingly on the afternoon
defenders.
its
and disperse
to capture this place
of the
24th the 3rd Egyptian battalion from Lewis's brigade
marched from Eas-el-Hudi
to
Atbara
fort
and relieved
the loth Egyptians then in garrison, and a small force
under
Commander
Keppel
— consisting
Egyptians under Major Hickman,
of Peake's
embarked
Za/ir,
for
batterv,
of two
the
15th
field-guns
and 150 Jaalin Irregulars
on, or in boats
— was
towed by, the three gunboats
Naser, and Fateh, and started the same night
Shendi.
light
7
of
It
on the 26th
evil luck,
hours to
had been proposed
;
to arrive at day-
but the Zafir, dogged by persistent
ran on a sandbank, and as
float
it
took several
her the enterprise was postponed until
the following day.
At dawn on the 27th the flotilla appeared
The Dervishes had been apprised of
Shendi.
approach and prepared to oner resistance.
force against
them was overwhelming.
of the gunboats the infantry and
off
its
But the
Under cover
guns were landed.
The artillery then came into action, but after they
had discharged two shells, the Arabs fled, firing their
rifles with little effect.
Shendi was occupied by the
Egyptians.
The pursuit was left to the Jaalin, and
in
it
they are said to have killed 160
men
— a revenge
which must have been doubly sweet since it was
consummated so near to the scene of the destruction
7
Major T. E. Hickman, D.S.O.. Worcester Regiment and Egyptian
army. This officer commanded the troops of the force when disembarked.
EECONNAISSANCE
was
of their tribe, and
Loot of
danger.
the gunboats
all
393
also attended
kinds
the
to
fell
by
scarcely any
victors,
and
were soon laden with a miscellaneous
The wives of the important Emirs made their
escape to Omdurman, but upwards of 650 women and
spoil.
children
of the inferior
and transported
contracted
new
ranks were taken prisoners
to the Atbara,
family
ties
where
in
due course they
with the Soudanese soldiery
and, as far as can be ascertained, lived happily ever
There
afterwards.
no
were
casualties
men
troops, but the Jaalin lost a few
among
the
in their pursuit.
The force then returned to the Atbara.
Meanwhile at Eas-el-Hudi the cavalry continued
Every day they
their patrolling and reconnaissance.
felt
themselves in contact with
a
superior force
although only the smallest outpost
Dervishes,
took place.
The
position of the hostile
approximately located on the 21st
;
of
affairs
camp had been
but as the
tales of
showed that the demoralisation of the
Dervishes was proceeding, and it was evident that the
the
deserters
moment
was ordered on the 30th
to
obtain
the afternoon of the 29th, the Xllth and
XHIth
sance in force
and detailed information.
precise
On
approached, a reconnais-
for offensive action
two squadrons and four
Abadar and halted there
Soudanese battalions, with
Maxim
marched to
during the night. At 4
guns,
Hunter, with
a.m.
six squadrons,
on the 30th General
two companies of the
Camel Corps, the Horse battery, and a battery
howitzers, left Eas-el-Hudi and joined the force
Abadar.
Thence
Colonel Broadwood,
with
all
of
at
the
THE RIVER AVAR
394
Maxim
cavalry, the
at
guns, and Horse Artillery, started
General Hunter accompanied
once for Nakheila.
The supporting force
moved two miles to the south of Abadar and occupied
they
were
not
which
in
position,
defensive
a strong
the
cavalry
reconnaissance.
molested, during the day.
In the afternoon, indeed, a
troop of Dervish horsemen
southward and were
the howitzers.
rapidly across
appeared a mile to the
by two
dispersed
shells
from
The cavalry were meanwhile trotting
One of the deserters was
the desert.
compelled to act as guide, and did not appear to enjoy
After
his prominent position at the head of the force.
going south-east for about four miles the Dervish outposts were encountered.
These at once
the squadrons pushed on behind
lively excitement.
From among
palms.
He
to evince a
pointed towards the river.
the bushes there arose a high clump of
The cavalry turned
direction
back, and
for nearly twelve
At length the wretched guide began
miles.
most
them
fell
half right
of the trees at a walk.
A
and rode
in the
single squadron
was sent on to reconnoitre, and reported 1,000 infantry
and 400 cavalry in the scrub. Major Mahon then rode
still
closer
and reported infantry
in trenches, palisades,
The reconnaissance halted at a
distance of about 1,200 yards from the position and examined it carefully. But the result was indefinite, and
it was evident that a nearer view was necessary.
The
artillery and the Maxims were brought into action at
1,000 yards, and began to fire into the entrenchments in
the hope of inducing the enemy to show themselves. The
and other defences.
Dervishes,
however, vouchsafed no reply.
Thinking
RECONNAISSANCE
that the position might be
to
obtain
clear
395
weakly held, and determined
information
at
all
costs,
General
THE RIVER WAR
396
8
Hunter, Colonel Broadwood, Captain Haig, and Lord
Tullibardine then rode directly towards
advanced they perceived a long zeriba
it.
As they
front of the
in
The ground sloped gently down on
trenches.
all sides
200 yards of the defences, when
until within
rather suddenly to a large, low,
flat
stituted the right of the position.
knoll,
The
rose
it
which conrode
officers
steadily forward until within 300 yards of the zeriba.
Suddenly General Hunter, who was leading, saw that
the whole interior space was crowded with men, and
adventurous
the
patrol
They
immediately retired.
had, however, examined the whole position, and
object of the reconnaissance
was thus accomplished.
appears that the Dervishes expected an attack from
It
the cavalry, and that
no shot was
enough
it
the
Mahmud had
issued orders that
to be fired until the troops
for their faces to be seen.'
was that the
sance were not
officers
making
all killed, as
were
This explains
6
near
how
this perilous reconnais-
they would assuredly have
been, had they been opposed to any other foe but the
Dervishes.
Their end attained, the cavalrv returned.
The Dervish horse hung on
the flanks and rear of the
force for ten miles, but did not attack,
and contented
themselves with cursing their enemies and brandishing
their
two
spears.
The whole
force,
including Maxwell's
battalions, returned that night to the
main camp
at
Ras-el-Hudi.
The two succeeding days were occupied only by the
usual patrolling, but on the 2nd of April a reconnais*
sance of two squadrons and
8
fifty
Camel Corps was sent
Captain D. Haig, 7th Hussars and Egyptian army.
—
RECONNAISSANCE
along the
bank of
left
camp looked
like
the Atbara to see
from that
fell
soldiers
and took them
turning from
this foray
On
prisoners.
all
Ed Darner
captors a pitiful tale.
on
side.
what the Arab
the
way
the
with a party of eight Dervish foot
cavalry
in
397
They were
re-
with forage, and told their
Out of thirty-one men, sent out
from the Dervish
zeriba, these eight alone
The others had fallen into the hands of the
The J aalin
friendlies,' and had of course been killed.
survived.
6
had
from the Dervishes,
suffered severely in the past
AFTER THE RECONNAISSANCE
but they were lucky in having a civilised army to
help
them
fortune
the
Nakheila.
it
their
tribal
feuds.
Of
they took a bloody advantage.
incident
so dense
settle
squadrons pursued their
But the bush on
and impenetrable
their
good
After this
way towards
this side of the river
was
for all civilised troops that
the
from
attacked
be
must
position
the
evident
was
eastern side or not at
all.
The event of the next day
laconic words of an
officer's
is
diary
best chronicled in the
:
'
THE RIVER WAR
398
—
March 3. The enemy to-day captured on the left
bank two camels and a friendly. What a jolly afternoon he will have
Bas-elat
spent
army
the
day
last
the
It was
Hudi. The period of waiting was over. The enemy's
strength
was
His
reconnoitred.
duly
been
had
position
6
!
believed to be
impaired for a successful
sufficiently
The camp at Hudi was becoming
satisfactory
situation,
the
Moreover
insanitary.
very
could
commander
the
which
one
not
was
was,
though it
was
'the
army
that
time
the
All
anxiety.
without
view
attack to be made.
operating on the Atbara
fort at
it
drew
Between
the confluence.
supplies from the
its
this
and the camp,
convoys, protected only by a handful of Camel Corps,
passed once in
every four
Only the
days.
idiotic
apathy of the Dervishes allowed the communications to
Mahmud was
remain uninterrupted.
It will
strong in cavalry.
*
who looks at the map
might have moved along the left
be evident to anyone
how
easily a force
bank
to attack the convoys.
occurred to most
campaigns
the
savage
Dervishes
Such
tactics
But
tribes.
thought
would have
their
in
only
of
last
battles,
and disregarded all smaller enterprises. Had they
assailed the communications, the Sirdar might have
been forced to build
a chain of forts
convoys with strong
infantry
and
escorts.
to
guard
The
his
fighting
would have been weakened the troops have
been wearied and the result must have been delayed.
The Dervishes had as yet attempted nothing. But
force
;
;
there
was no reason why they should not
*
Page 413.
at
any
RECONNAISSANCE
399
make
an end. On the 4th of April the whole force moved
to Abadar, and established themselves in a new camp
The tiger was tired of
five miles nearer the enemy.
moment become
watching
;
enterprising.
he had taken his
was time
It
first
stride
to
towards his
prey.
Although the information as to the enemy's strength
and position was accurate and complete, the Sirdar decided to order a final reconnaissance on the 5th of April.
The various Brigadiers were permitted to accompany the
cavalry and examine the ground over which they would
move to the assault. Colonel Maxwell was, however,
the
only one to
avail
himself
of
the
opportunity.
Colonel Long, Chief of Artillery, looking for positions
for his guns,
and General Hunter, looking
also rode with the cavalry,
for adventures,
but the entire conduct of
the reconnaissance was in the hands of Colonel Broad-
wood.
The
force
at
his
disposal consisted of eight
squadrons, the Horse Artillery battery, and four
guns.
The reconnaissance was not
this
Maxim
time supported
by an infantry brigade.
At four o'clock the cavalry started, and the first
light of morning found them already on their way
Broad wood cut off the sharp angle
across the desert.
Umdabia, and, avoiding the
Not
thick bush, soon approached the Dervish camp.
a sign of the enemy was seen during the march, nor
which the Atbara forms
was
it
zeriba
at
until the squadrons
that
a
single
were
picket, retiring
the river, attested their presence.
Atbara appeared deserted.
slowly towards
The bush by
The camp gave no
the
sign of
THE KIVER WA1!
400
life
;
The squadrons
an ominous silence prevailed.
moved forward at a walk, keeping about 1,200 yards
away from the zeriba and almost parallel to it.*
Presently,
became
they did
as
visible
their strength,
numbers
men
in front.
a large force of cavalry
was
It
The Dervish horse-
reconnaissance.
continued
to
retire
towards
always reaching round the Egyptian
the
eit
Their
moving on the
In consequence of
zeriba without exposing their rear.
Broad wood decided
south-east,
left flank.
position prevented the squadrons from
this Colonel
estimate
difficult to
but they appeared to be superior in
the
to
so,
her to disperse them
or to compel them to retire along the river, into the
bush or back
to the
the main position.
was very welcome
camp, before attempting
The
examine
to
possibility of a cavalry action
to all the British officers.
But while the Egyptian force advanced, and
as they
as soon
were opposite the southern end of the
zeriba,
another considerable body of Dervish horse issued from
the northern side and threatened the line of retreat.
same time the camp began to swarm with men,
and crowds of tiny figures were observed clambering
on to the entrenchments and gun emplacements,
At
the
eagerly watching the developement of the fight.
cavalry had
by
this
The
time approached to within 1,000
yards of the zeriba, and the Arab
artillery
began
to
fire
occasional round shot and clumsily fused shells.
The
direction of the gunners
shot high
the
projectiles
was good, but
as they
roared over the
moving
squadrons, and either buried themselves in the desert
*
Plan,
'
The Reconnaissance
of April
5,
1898/ to face page 402.
EECONNAISSANCE
401
beyond or burst without doing any harm and meanwhile the position of the guns was carefully noted.
;
The scene
moment was
at this
was not without
it
tian cavalry
—in
very small force
smooth
plain,
palm-trees
among
zeriba
by
the
whose surface was broken only by ocAll along their right ran the belt
and dense
showed brown and
scrub by the
thin
the
river,
line
and
of the
rimmed and spotted
and surmounted by a great
irregular,
white figures,
array of flags of
many
Behind the thorn
colours.
fence a confusion of straw huts
among
forward over
steadily
the dark green foliage
little
The Egyp-
aspect.
ordered masses, but looking a
—moved
casional bushes.
of
serious
its
solid,
picturesque, although
was
visible, clustering
dem with
the trees and filling the interior of the
a blur of yellow.
Every now and then a great puff of
smoke marked the
firing of a field-gun.
In front, in a
wide crescent to the south and south-east, the Dervish
cavalry gradually retired
;
some
in large masses, others
alloping about singly, but always
reaching out round the Egyptian
moving and alway
And behind
left.
between the squadrons and the camp, other stron
bodies showed at the edge of the scrub, and, slowly
advancing, stretched into the desert.
nant arms were enveloping the
and squeeze
its life
The
arm
and began
was
as if
two
force to crush
out.
Colonel Broadwood
action,
little
It
now brought
his
guns into
shelling the cavalry in his front.
their
of
accuracy
marvellous
the
displayed
artillery
6
coninflicted
snap-shots,'
firing
and, although
siderable loss.
VOL.
I.
battery
the
when
halted
squadrons
The
D D
WAR
THE RIVER
402
opened
fire,
and the
officers
watched the practice with
'Aim
at
fascinated interest.
white
that
near the solitary palm
flag,
with the
cluster
—1,800
yards.'
A
pause while the layer cranes along his gun and turns
Then
the elevating wheel.
—
all
the gunners stand back
The loud explosion
makes the horses of the attendant squadrons start and
and away
and
stiff
6
rigid.
Fire
!
'
All the field-glasses are directed to
toss their heads.
the distant group of Arabs.
arrives in their midst
Suddenly the projectile
a puff of smoke and great con-
:
The group breaks into fragments, like the
The horsemen scatter and gallop
that broke it.
fusion.
shell
away.
Two
Yet some remain.
the stricken horses
kicks and twists
;
—
or three
brown
spots
One
are lying on the ground.
the others are
Another pause.
still.
Then a few Arabs gallop back, hurriedly dismount,
and pull
smaller figures,
limp and shapeless, from
underneath and among the dead and dying steeds
so
away
again,
corpses and
:
and
wounded thrown
across
formidable, the
Maxim
their saddles.
Less imposing, but not
mns had
also
come
are standing on
less
into action.
a sandy knoll.
the dust begins to
jump
A
dozen Dervishes
All
in
moment
a
in front of them,
and then
the clump of horsemen melts into a jumble
on the
ground, and a couple of scared survivors scurry to
cover.
Yet even then a few brave men come back to
help their fallen comrades.
Their movements accelerated by the
fire,
the Dervish
cavalry to the south began to retire more rapidly.
The
guns limbered up, and the Egyptian squadrons followed
EECOMAISSAtfCE ofMAHMUD'S ZEEIBA
APRIL 5T? 1898
TIME-8 -30
R
A
G
G
A
8
°
(1500
CAPT. BARING
4-
Longmacas, Green & Co L andcm NewYark & £ ambay
.
,
It
Son, Loruian
i lira-pool
EECONNAISSANCE
403
with caution, suspicious of an ambuscade. Nor was
their care without reason, for as they advanced there
arose suddenly from a shallow khor about 300 yards
and
the
retreating
Egyptians
the
between
and
away,
Arabs, a long, well-ordered line of spearmen nearly
The Maxim guns immediately wheeled
2,000 strong.
about
and
began
The
sentences.
to
fire,
artillery,
out
stuttering
death-
unable to risk such close
back 200 yards before coming
The
with
case-shot.
opened
then
and
action,
into
squadrons retired at a walk. Meanwhile the Dervish
proximity,
infantry,
trotted
who belonged
advanced swiftly
companies,
the
steadily,
flag
defenders
had been
of the
spectators,
Ali
of
Senusi,
arranged in regular
At
camp, who up
each preceded by a white
same time the
this period
and
to
flag.
the
to
opened a sharp and
on the Egyptian right, their bullets flicking
in
the
Ear
out
significant^^/
a
with
sand
the
up
plain the enveloping arms of cavalry were closing for
Already the circle was almost complete, and
the grip.
galling fire
north-east.
the
towards
remained
opening
narrow
only a
the
and
sketched
again
been
had
position
enemy's
The
was time to go.
the
ordered
Broadwood
Colonel
o'clock
At nine
in
were
artillery
and
Maxims
The
begin.
retirement to
approaches reconnoitred.
It
three
and
Broadwood
Colonel
by
supported
the centre,
squadrons
three
with
Baring
Captain
squadrons.
watched
the left flank,
now
in retirement
become the
the
guarded
Persse
and
Gallais
Le
right.
Captains
back.
crept
troops
the
slowly
river flank.
Very
retire
would
artillery
the
Maxims
Under cover of the
D D 2
THE RIVER
404
WAR
perhaps 200 yards, and then come into action rear.
Protected by the
back
new
a
to
shells,
the machine guns might trot
The cavalry
position.*
alternate wino\s in the
same measured
enemy pressed on impetuously, and
retired
But the
fashion.
their horsemen, soon
completely enveloping the desert flank of the Egyptians,
began
threaten
to
Broadwood
a
To meet
charge.
sent one of his squadrons from the centre
under Captain Baring, so that
to join those
a quarter to ten the reconnoitring force
with four squadrons towards the desert
and two towards the
river.
The weakness of the
river
funs,
Colonel
this,
at
about
was formed
— two with the
flank
of
the
troops
encouraged the Dervish horse lurking in the scrub to
make a bold attempt
to capture the guns.
The move-
ment was shrewd and daring, but the cavalry comThe springing-up
mander met it with admirable skill.
of dust-clouds hardly 300 yards away was his only
He
warning.
immediately took
command
of the two
squadrons under Persse and Le Gallais, and ordered
them to right about wheel and charge. Headed by
Broadwood himself, and with their British officers
'
several
'
horse lengths in front, the Egyptians broke
into a gallop
and encountered the Baggara
numbered not
less
with firmness.
a third
of the
They struck them obliquely and perhaps
way down
in hand, rode at the
their line,
'
The Reconnaissance
and, breaking
Colonel Broadwood,
Emir but the
;
the proffered combat, only to
Plan,
which
than 400 men, but was in loose order,
through, routed them utterly.
sword
line,
of April
fall
5,
latter declined
ignominiously by
1898,' to face page 406.
RECONNAISSANCE
405
Lord Tullibardine, the
control of his horse, which
the revolver of a trumpeter.
Colonel's
galloper, lost
bolted, but fortunately carried
vishes in safety and
him through
the Der-
The
back towards the guns.
Sheikh of the Bisharin,
who
rode with the
Staff,
cut his
antagonist from the shoulder to the middle of the
—a
stroke impelled
vengeful fur}7
While
alike
body
by physical strength and
.
this
dashing operation was carried out on
the river flank the Dervish cavalry, following
the
ujd
retirement, also delivered an attack towards the guns.
Thereupon Captain Baring with two squadrons galloped
from the desert flank across the front of the artillery,
and, riding through the advancing enemy, repulsed
them with
The charge was good and
loss.
effective,
but the shock and confusion broke both squadrons, and,
although successful, they came through the Dervishes
and back on to the river flank
Persse and Le Gallais, who had just
mounted
their
men and opened
retreating Dervishes.
horses, any
some
rallied, at
carbine
disorder.
once
fire
dis-
on the
Their action not only checked
the enemy, but prevented,
their
in
by getting the troopers
off
chance of their being involved in
the disorder of the squadrons
who had
just charged.
Captain Baring immediately rallied and re-formed bebeimproved
the
charges
these
both
In
hind them.
remarkable
less
no
was
soldiers
of
the
haviour
fellahin
officers.
British
the
of
decision
and
the
enterprise
than
Although
the
their
horsemen were thus sharply checked,
Dervish infantry continued
advance rapidly, and
for a
in spite of losses to
few minutes a hot musketry
THE RIVER WAR
406
was exchanged by the Arab riflemen and the two
dismounted squadrons. Captain Persse was severely
wounded, and several other casualties occurred. But
fire
was drawing away from the enemy, and
eleven o'clock it had passed through the gap to
The
the north-east and had shaken off all pursuit.
One
casualties in the operation were fortunately small.
the whole force
'
was wounded; six Egyptian troopers
and about thirty horses
were killed, ten wounded
were lost or disabled. That the loss was no greater
was due solely to the skill and experience of the cavahy
British officer
;
leader.
Although the
squadrons returned
without
being further molested, the thirteen-mile march across
was a painful experience to the wounded.
The camp was reached at one o'clock.
Meanwhile the sound of the firing, and particularly
of the Maxim guns, had been distinctly heard in the
British camp, and considerable excitement prevailed.
It was rumoured that the reconnaissance had drawn the
enemy from their zeriba. and that a general attack was
imminent. The belief was encouraged when the Sirdar
the desert
ordered both Soudanese brigades to stand to arms,
and
later
on when the British brigade was warned to
hold themselves in readiness to
their retirement if necessary.
assist the
It
cavalry in
was, therefore, with
considerable disappointment that the battalions saw the
cavalry coming back with no
Yet a
reflection
on the distance
enemy
at
their heels.
—fourteen miles— which
camps should have
satisfied the soldiers that no attack by day was possible
for either side, unless preceded by a night march.
intervened
between the
hostile
:
RECO^JNAISSANCE
of APRIL 5
TH
THE WITHDRAWAL
TIMENOTE
Thxa plaru is
.
ft
10-20 A.M.
ru>t>
dra#rrv to
a.
scouLe
.
nV.VMVM?i)>C4>3
Squadrons
covering
retirement
Charge^
„ \ar<ngs
^
~
*m
I
it
J >.^-
Squadron^
Maxims
retiring/
PERSSE &
LE GALLAIS
\
retir/n
\
«0
PERSSE & LE GALL
jS/smountedj ^
.^^v.;.'
•
.
.
«
4
>
ft.
Longmans, Green &
Co. London,
-U
NewYork&Bombay.
RECONNAISSANCE
407
The bodies of the dead Egyptians
fell
into the
hands
of the enemy, and after the capture of the zeriba a few
days later their heads were discovered nailed to a palm-
One unfortunate trooper was taken prisoner.
Being unhorsed, he was about to be despatched, when a
Thereupon the Arabs
Sheikh rode up and saved him.
rushed upon him and bore him off alive. But their
clemency was explained when his remains were aftertree.
wards found, shockingly mutilated, in the bed of the
The Dervish loss in the affair was believed
river.
to
amount
together
to 200, for
which the Maxim guns, which
discharged more than 4,000 rounds, were
undoubtedly responsible.
I
have described the reconnaissance of the 5th of
April at length because the campaigns on the Nile afford
few instances of minor
The nice and
tactics.
delicate
operation of withdrawing a small force from the jaws of
an active and powerful enemy
officers
But
Sir
is
one with which military
on the Indian Frontier have become
only occasion of a rearguard action in
this is the
H. Kitchener's campaigns.
creditable that
Of course,
familiar.
it
It is therefore the
more
should have been so ably conducted.
as usual, the shooting of the Dervishes
contemptible
and
;
it
is
easy to imagine that
—
if
was
— as
would have happened on the Frontier three or four of
the British officers had been killed or badly wounded,
the squadrons would not have been so skilfully handled,
and in such operations the consequences of mistakes are
always serious.
But the great reason
and retirement are
for
which
remarkable
is
this
reconnaissance
apparent when the
THE RIVER WAR
408
of the 1st of
affair
or the incident near Teroi Wells
May,
The extraordinary
two years before, are remembered.
troopers
Egyptian
the
of
behaviour
which
the
contrast
on these two
occasions presents,
wonderful work
of the
is
indisputable evidence
of the British officers.
I shall
achievetheir
appreciating
of
opportunity
embrace the
ranks
campaigns
Nile
the
of
story
in
the
ment, which
subalterns.
railway
the
of
triumph
the
to
only
second
brigades
infantry
Egyptian
the
war
the
Throughout
w ire
carefully kept out of
all
at the action of Firket,
fell
and the chances of a reverse
outnumbered by
were small, were Xhefellahin troops made
six to one,
The
upon the Soudanese.
where the Dervishes were
brunt of the fighting invariably
Only
trying situations.
to share the
dangers equally with the black regiments.
But the
Egyptian squadrons could not be nursed in this fashion.
they
when
campaign,
last
the
of
exception
With the
were supported by the 21st Lancers, the whole of the
All patrolling and
cavalry duties fell upon them.
reconnaissance,
all
cavalry operations on the field of
battle, all the pursuits,
On some
troopers.
were carried out by the Egyptian
occasions they exposed the military
incapacity of their race
badly
and
;
but they
difficult
many
duties
;
once at least they behaved
times discharged their perilous
in
an honourable
manner, and
towards the end of the war they were distrusted neither
by
their
Soudanese comrades nor by the British cavalry,
whom
with
work
of forming an
of Egypt,
the
they had the honour to serve.
which
intrinsic
army
The great
of Egyptians for the defence
will for ever
stand as a plain proof of
merits of British military officers, finds
—
I
409
EECONNATSSANCE
the
cavalry.
of
the
case
in
example
perfect
most
its
The squadrons were many times tried, and they were
not found wanting.
The Egyptian cavalry consists of ten squadrons, each
commanded by an officer of the local rank of major.
to
and
British,
were
officers
these
of
six
During the war
attrientirely
be
must
result
admirable
their efforts the
officers are absolutely responsible
buted.
The squadron
for all
the arrangements within their command.
training, the
discipline,
the pay of the
soldiers,
The
the
are
horses,
of
the
management
and
forage, the shoeing
powers
wider
exercise
they
and
discretion,
left to their
whole
The
regiment.
English
an
of
colonel
than the
ten squadrons are under the
command
of a Brigadier,
internot
does
but
supervision,
general
maintains a
who
fere with the interior economy.
They
are occasionally
and
brigade,
in
drilled
and
regiments
formed into two
were actually so used
The
at the battle of
recruits are-obtained
entirely
Delta.
Omdurman.
by conscription, and drawn
from the amiable and pacific inhabitants of the
The cavalry pick the best from the annual
batch of
conscripts,
troopers are no way
but in race and qualities the
different
from the fellahin
infantry,
9
of
war
scenes
love|for
no
have
peasants
The inoffensive
thev are devoid of fighting instincts.
their British officers
Although under
fed, regularly
they are well
paid
squadrons
black
three
recommendation
Broadwood's
Colonel
Upon
always
have
scheme
the
against
arguments
are now being raised. The
(2) he will not
been
the black will be unrestrainable on a horse
9
:
(1)
;
that
hunter
keen
a
is
answer
The
(1)
look after his horse properly.
wants
that
one
unwilling
an
than
mount
wants steadying is a better
:
driving
;
(2)
why
not
?
Editor.
THE RIVER WAR
410
and
fairly treated,
they long for the happy day when
they will return in peace to their village homes.
In
the meanwhile they try their best to perform an uncon-
much
genial task, and are therefore worthy of
respect.
But neither praise nor pay, promotion nor medals, will
induce them to prolong the period, and scarcely any reengage after completing their six years' compulsory
As
service.
soldiers they lack
both vices and virtues.
Their limbs, though of great strength, are clumsy and
unfitted for quick
a horse
is
firm,
and active movements. Their seat on
but their heavy hands soon spoil the
animal's mouth, and in
horsemen.
They
all
other respects they are bad
treat their horses with kindness, but,
they are thoughtless
like all natives,
;
and were
the vigilance of their officers, their steeds
go thirsty and unfed.
On
it
not for
would often
parade their appearance
scarcely smart, for they cannot be
made
to understand
the
importance of lacing up their boots and
like
minor matters of
tidiness.
is
such
Their uniforms, their
saddlery, and their arms, however, claim their ceaseless
care
;
poor homes they have never seen
for in their
such valuable things, and they regard them with awe
and wonder.
They
are obedient, quiet,
and
docile,
and
their only serious troubles arise
from smoking opium,
which
through some dusky
is
strictly forbidden,
or
beauty.
To such simple
souls the white officer
sharp-spoken, just, and
rich, strange,
always apparently fearless
seemed a splendid demi-god
— a being of superior know-
Whatever the dangers he would
Certainly he would never desert them.
ledge and resource.
help them out.
—
RECONNAISSANCE
411
And
by him.
when this wild and wonderful creature showed that he
peculiarities
their
learning
was
and
them
studying
was
The only chance of
safety
their confidence increased.
He
out much.
find
was
to stay
He, for his part, began to
a squadron of a
learned that
hundred good and twenty bad men was a poorer weapon
men.
reliable
eighty
only
of
squadron
a
than
action
in
camp
learned which were the soldiers to leave in
He
when
there
was going
of those
ask
to
be a
fight,
he took to the
and what he could
field.
He gauged
the
Besides, he understood the
capacity of his squadron.
command.
one spirit which animates
great secret of
all
the dealings of
the British officer with the native soldier.
It is not seen
There
only in
is
Egypt
;
it
exists
The
cenary troops.
honour of his men.
In
wherever Britain
officer's
raises
military honour
mer-
is
the
many countries where the Empire
has varying shades of responsibility and power, the
Some
natives are formed into regiments and squadrons.
are cowardly and debased
;
others reckless and excitable.
officer
the
are,
they
wherever
or
are,
they
But whatever
them.
swears
by
and
them
in
believes
them
leads
who
The
British officer of a native corps
duty
is
never
known
— on
after
or
before
private,
in
or
officially
duty,
off
or
dinner,
of his
by word
own men.
or implication
— to speak disparagingly
The captain who commands a squadron
Sikh
stately
his
of
proudly
boasts
of Bengal Lancers
are
they
that
declare
to
hesitate
not
sowars, and does
better
all
absurd.
—which
round than British cavalry
The
is,
of course,
long-limbed,
the
prefers
Guides
of
officer
hawk-eyed Afridi. The Gurkha
subaltern's eyes glisten as
•
THE RIVER WAR,
412
he
tells
of the dark
follow wherever he
little
whom
devils
would dare
purposes, so
There
to go.
Hardly any race in India
tion.
is
he believes would
is
no excep-
despised, for fighting-
much as the Madrassi. Yet let the reader talk
to an officer of the
4
Queen's
and Miners,'
about Tofrek and how the Madrassi
6
and he will learn
all
company stood
firm,
'
though half were
Here, then,
soldiers ran.
Own Sappers
is
and
killed
the explanation of
finer
that
all
has been achieved in the Egyptian cavalry.
Gradually the timid recruit began to perceive that
the
actually proud
stranger was
splendid
who
led
him
used sometimes to have a very long lead
allow
him
to be insulted or
though he deserved
it
him
Gradually the
although he was poor and despised.
trooper learned that the officer
of
—and
they
—would never
abused by anybody, even
In time, since
richly.
men
all
improve under a generous treatment, he rose to the idea
and learned
Now,
to follow.
trained and encouraged
three years of successful war, the peasant
ing a military
spirit.
resolve he did not
into the desert
on
Initiative
was develop-
he did not possess, high
know, but he would ride out boldly
patrol,
mounted, would charge
He had
discipline.
by
—
would
if
fire
steadily
not with dash,
learned to
drill,
at
when
least
dis-
with
and no matter what
the danger, he would, though fearful, obey the white
And when
met the officers, I no longer
wondered. The certaintv of war had attracted the
the field of selection had been large the choice
best
officer.
I
'
;
;
has justified
itself.
I hasten to return to the course of the narrative.
Mahmud's
position
had been thoroughly reconnoitred.
RECONNAISSANCE
413
G. Philip
I.
Son..
32 fleet St.Londcm,.
THE RIVER WAR
414
The details of his defences were known his strength
was estimated from trustworthy information. It was
evident from the frequent desertions that his army was
;
from
and
disheartened,
his
inactivity
that
he was
The moment for destroyAt daybreak on the morning of
ing him had arrived.
the 6th the whole army broke camp at Abadar and
marched to the deserted village of Umdabia, where they
scarcely hopeful of success.
bivouacked close by a convenient pool of the Atbara
seven miles nearer the Dervish camp.
and
ments were left behind
stores,
and
friendlies
it
was
at the old zeriba to
also
Detach-
guard surplus
occupied by a force of Jaalin
who moved southwards from
Bas-el-Hudi.
had formerlv been the scene of a salt
industry, and several of the ruined houses were of subAround these
stantial appearance and construction.
The
the
village
new camp was
formed.
thorn bushes was built, and
A
all
very strong zeriba of
the scrub, which here
runs far out into the desert, was cleared to
glacis
of 400
yards
on
every
side
of
make
the
a
peri-
—
The loth Egyptian battalion moved up from
Atbara fort was established as the garrison to hold the
camp when the force marched out to fight a division of
meter.
—
:
agreeable to the British officers than to their
labour
less
men.
After the
camp had been formed
several of the
Brigadiers with their Staffs and a small cavalry escort
rode out to examine the line of advance towards the
Dervish camp
—now
only one march distant.
They
proceeded four miles, and returned without seeing a
sign of the enemy.
all
Extreme precautions were observed
night against attack, and a proportion of the force
•
KECONNA ISSANCE
was kept
actually under arms
;
415
but the dark hours
passed quietly.
Thursday was occupied by everyone in
parations.
The
final pre-
mended their boots,
which had now become disgraceful.
British brigade
the condition of
General Gatacre explained to the regiments the whole
formation
of
attack,
and the Cameron Highlanders
learned what duty was reserved for them.
The Sou-
danese celebrated the approaching event with barbaric
songs and the beatings of drums.
Officers
wrote
letters
The Sirdar muzzled the correspondents, and
allowed no telegrams to pass. All the camp throbbed
Only the Egyptian
with suppressed excitement.
soldiers were unaffected, and patiently awaited the
home.
utmost stroke of fortune.
Thus passed a day of strange
civilised
soldiers
felt
that
—an experience
awaited them
would never be able
to profit.
a
elation,
wonderful
when
the
experience
by which some
at least
416
THE EIVER
WAR
CHAPTER
XIII
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBAEA
APRIL
—
—
8,
1898
—
—
—
halt
Nearing
the
marches
Night
march
A
The
dem
Mahmud's
The bomSunrise
dawn
for
Waiting
zeriba
bardment The cavalry The formation for attack The plan The
general advance The passage of the zeriba The storm of the
trenches The capture of the enclosure The bed of the river The
pursuit The Sirdar On the ridge The wounded The funerals
Description of the zeriba The Dervish prisoners Mahmud The
return to Umdabia The casualties.
beginning of
—
—
—
the
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
April,
7th
of
the
army
the
Thursday,
of
evening
In the
on
Mahmud's
zeriba*
attack
the
for
paraded
Umdabia
at
The camp
lay in the scrub which grows
by the banks
Nile,
and
in
order
the
to
of
those
by
as
Atbara,
the
of
infantry
four
ground
the
level
open,
the
profit by
brigades
moved by
parallel routes into the desert,
and
in
column
of
brigade
south-east
facing
formed
then
squares,
the British brigade leading.
The mounted
waited
in
artillery,
camp
of
batteries
four
with
forces,
not
did
break
their
and
morning,
next
the
a.m.
until 2
march.
The
distance from the river-bank to the open
was perhaps a mile and a half, and the whole
six
o'clock.
sun
The
scrub
by
the
cleared
had
force
brightening
the
sandy
glow,
red
the
and
was setting,
Map, The Night March,'
'
to face page 420.
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
made
hillocks,
417
the western horizon indefinite, so that
it
where the desert ended and the skybegan. A few gazelle, intercepted on their way to the
water by the unexpected movement of troops, trotted
slowly away in the distance white spots on the rosywas hard
to tell
—
— and
on the great plain twelve
conscious of their strength and
brown of the sand
thousand
infantry,
to
sr
arranged
encounter
four
in
the
solid
enemy,
were
beautifully
march
Then the
from the camp
masses.
began. The actual distance
Dervish position was scarcely seven
miles,
to
the
but the
gradual
the
and
bushes
the
avoid
to
necessary
circle
the
five
to
another
perhaps
added
river
the
bends of
The pace of the advance was
and the troops had not gone far when the sun
length of the road.
slow,
sank and, with hardly an interval of twilight, darkness
enveloped everything.
In the
stillness
of the night the
and only the regular
scrunching of the hard sand betrayed the advance of
whelming force upon their enemies.
than
night
a
critical
more
is
war
of
operation
No
brigades
moved
march.
Over and over again in every country frightful
steadily forward,
force
that
daring
or
rash
the
overtaken
has
disaster
and
aspect
shape
the
gloom
the
In
it.
attempted
has
of the ground
is
altered.
Places, well
known by
day-
appear strange and unrecognisable. The smallest
crawl
only
can
which
column,
the
obstructs
obstacle
light,
and
checks
continual
with
forward
sluggishly
The
is
effect of the
gloom upon the nerves of the
soldiers
not less than on the features of the country.
man
tries to
VOL.
I.
walk
quietly,
and hence
all
halts.
Each
are listening
E E
WAR
THE RIVER
418
Every eye seeks
for the slightest sound.
darkness.
Every sense
of expectancy.
body
in the
is
to pierce the
raised to a pitch
In such hours doubts and fears come
unbidden to the brain, and the marching men wonder
anxiously whether all will be well with the army, and
whether thev themselves
will survive the event.
And
suddenly out of the black silence there burst the
jagged glare of
by the
yell of
rifles
an attacking
may be thrown
stops
a-foot,
and the crash of a
into
foe,
volley, followed
the steadiest troops
and a
confusion,
panic, once
only with the destruction or dispersal
of the whole force.
Nevertheless, so
paramount
the necessity of attacking at dawn, with
all
is
the day
to finish the fight, that in spite of the recorded disasters
and the known dangers, the night-march
is
a
frequent operation.
The Sirdar had neglected no precaution which
thought and experience could suggest. The line of
advance had been carefully reconnoitred. The information as to the enemy was exact.
Mahmud kept to
his defences.
The Expeditionary Force had been
moved to within easy striking distance of the zeriba.
Many
of the officers were familiar with the intervening
ground.
An
officer of special
from his success, of special
knowledge and, judging
talents,
with trusty native
guides, maintained the true direction.
Xear the camp
Umdabia, where the scrub might have impeded
the advance, a path a hundred feet wide had been cut
at
by
fatigue parties.
prise.
Careful patrolling prevented sur-
The nature of the country
assisted the care of
the General; for the open desert enabled the troops
—
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
to
march on a comparatively broad
419
and
front,
to
make
effective use of their rifles if attacked.
more than two hours the force advanced,
moving across smooth swells of sand broken by rocks
and with occasional small bushes. Several shallow
khors traversed the road, and these rocky ditches, filled
For
with a strange, sweet-scented grass, delayed the brigades
was hardly two miles an hour. The smell
of the grass was noticed by the alert senses of many,
and will for ever refresh in their minds the strong
until the pace
The breeze which had sprung
sundown gradually freshened and raised clouds
sand, which deepened the darkness with a whiter
impression of the night.
up
at
of fine
mist.
At nine
o'clock
the
army halted
in a previously
selected space, near the deserted village of
about two miles from the
tance to
four
Mahmud's
miles in the
tants.
It
was not
zeriba
direct
river.
Mutrus and
Nearly half the
dis-
was accomplished.
Barely
divided the
comba-
line
desirable to arrive before the dawn.
The soldiers, still formed in their squares, lay down
upon the ground. Meat and biscuits were served out
to the men.
The transport animals went by relays to
the pools of the Atbara bed to drink and to replenish
the fantasses.
1
All water-bottles were
refilled.
were thrown out to cover the business.
sufficient sentries
in
its
less
than the
Then, after
had been posted, the army
The expectations
array.
of the
coldness of the night and
slept, still
morning, no
the
sand, disturbed the slumbers of the troops, and
1
Portable iron water-tanks.
Editor.
Pickets
driving
all
were
THE RIVER AVAR
420
Just before midnight a vicious mule kicked a
restless.
The man, thus
Highlander.
painfully awakened, yelled.
falling swift h
Half the brigade stood to arms, the soldiers
into their places
and gazing with
fierce,
The grating buzz of armed men suddenly
the darkness.
alarmed and forming in their ranks
heard, never to be forgotten
square.
No
was time
to
eager eye* into
—a
—aroused
sound once
the rest of the
sooner had silence been restored than
move on
it
again.
During the halt the moon had risen, and when at
one o'clock the advance was resumed, the white beams
revealed a wider prospect and, glinting on the fixed
bayonets, crowned the squares with a sinister glitter.
For three hours the army
toiled
slow and interrupted crawl.
enforced, and
the
all
onwards
Strict silence
smoking was forbidden.
Camel Corps, and the
at the
five batteries
same
was now
The cavalry,
had overtaken
the infantry, so that the whole attacking force was con-
Meanwhile the Dervishes
centrated.
At
to
three o'clock the glare of fires
the
south,
satisfaction
great
that
distance.
position,
reserve
slept.
the
and
the
their
enemy awaited
became
visible
learned
with
soldiers
«
Thus arrived
squares,
with
the
before
them
the
exception
at
no
Dervish
of
the
brigade, were unlocked, and the whole force
The British, who were
on the extreme left, turned back their left battalion,
the Warwickshire Eegiment, to guard the Hank, and
assumed formation of attack.
the brigade
thus
formed a horizontal
L? three bat-
on the longer and one on the shorter side.
The whole force now advanced in one long line through
talions
THE NIGHT MARCH
APRIL, 7
1898.
8,
Scale
Miles
Mutrus
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THE BATTLE OF THE ATBAEA
421
The direction of the
march had been admirably kept by Captain Fitton, the
the scattered bush and scrub.
entrusted with this vital matter, and the army, un-
officer
known
to
itself,
had shouldered so
as to accurately face
the north front of the Dervish position.
Presently the
scrub ended, and the brigades emerged on to a large
overlooked Mahmud's zeriba from
plateau which
a
distance of about 900 yards.
was
It
dark, and the haze that shrouded the
still
Dervish camp was broken only by the glare of the
The
watch-fires.
impossible to
was profound.
It seemed
believe that more than 25,000 men were
silence
ready to join battle at scarcely the distance of half a
Yet the advance had not been unperceived,
mile.
and the Arabs knew that
their
terrible
antagonists
For
crouched on the ridge waiting for the morning.
a while the suspense was prolonged.
At
last, after
what
seemed to many an interminable period, the uniform
blackness of the horizon was broken by the
of the dawn.
first
Gradually the light grew stronger
a theatre curtain
is
glimmer
until, as
pulled up, the darkness rolled away,
the vague outlines in the haze
became
definite,
and the
whole scene was revealed.*
The
British
and Egyptian army lay along the low
ridge in the form of a great
on the
left,
MacDonald
forward on the right.
bow
— the British
in the centre,
The whole
bristle of
tiny figures of thousands of
men
:
bayonets and the
sitting or lying
and gazing curiously before them.
'
Maxwell curvin
crest of the swell of
ground was crowned with a
Map, Atbara
brigade
down
The MaH-clad
the Artillery Preparation,' to face page 424.
THE RIVER "WAR
422
British
were but a paler and yellower confusion on the
sand, but the dark jerseys of the Egyptian and Soudanese
brigades displayed
their
formidable
array.
Behind
them, in a solid square, was the transport, guarded by
The leading squadrons of the cavalry
were forming leisurely towards the left flank. The four
batteries and a rocket detachment, moving between
the infantry, ranged themselves on two convenient
Lewis's brigade.
positions about a
and in the
of the
stillness
line
Yet everything was very
All was ready.
of battalions.
quiet,
hundred yards in front of the
dawn
it
almost seemed
that Nature held her breath.
Half a mile away, at the foot of the ridge, a long
irregular black line of thorn bushes enclosed the
defences.
Behind
this
De rvish
low palisades and en-
zeriba
trenchments bent back to the scrub by the river.
shapeless
mounds
Odd
indicated the positions of the gun-
emplacements, and various casemates could be seen in
the middle of the enclosure.
Without, the bushes had
been cleared away and the smooth sand stretched in a
Within were
gentle slope to where the army waited.
crowds of
little
straw huts and scattered bushes, growing
thicker to the southward.
From among
this rose the
whose stems the dry bed of the
Atbara was exposed, and a single pool of water gleamed
palm-trees, between
Such was Mahmud's famous
zeriba, which for more than a month had been the
predominant thought in the minds of the troops. It
in
the
early
sunlight.
'
was scarcely imposing, and at first the soldiers thought
Only a dozen stray horsemen sat silently
it deserted.
on
their horses outside the entrenchment,
watching their
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
423
enemies, and inside a few dirty-white figures appeared
and disappeared behind the parapets. Yet, insignific
as the zeriba looked, the smoke of many fires cooking
the morning meal
—never to
be eaten
— showed
that
it
was occupied by men; and gay banners of varied
colour and device, flaunting along the entrenchments
or within the enclosure, declared that some at least
were prepared to die in its defence.
The hush of the hour and the suspense of the army
was broken by the bang of a gun. Everyone on the
A
ridge jumped up and looked towards the sound.
battery of Krupps a little to the right of the Cameron
Highlanders had opened fire. A great cloud of smoke
shot swiftly to the front, and then thinned and drifted
Over the centre of the zeriba
a pale yellow flash and a round white puff showed the
Underneath it the dust, beaten by the
bursting shell.
back
to the northward.
bullets,
sprang into the
The wop
air.
of the distant
1
came back, like the echo of the report.
Another gun further to the right was fired. Another
explosion
shell burst
over the straw huts
among
the palm-trees.
The two Maxim-JSTordenfeldt batteries had come into
action.
The officers looked at their watches. It was a
quarter-past six.
The bombardment had begun.
Explosion followed explosion in quick succession
until
all
four batteries were busily engaged.
cannonade grew loud and continuous.
detachment began to
fire,
The rocket
and the strange
hissed and screamed as they
left
erratically towards the zeriba.
The
projectiles
the troughs and jerked
In the air above the en-
closure shell after shell flashed into existence, smote the
THE RIVER AVAR
424
ground with
— into
its
leaden shower, and dispersed
—a
mere
smoke which still hung over
At the very first shot all the
the Dervish encampment.
dirty-white figures disappeared, bobbing down into their
but a few solitary horsemen remained
pits and shelters
film
the haze and
;
motionless for a while in the middle of the enclosure,
had no concern
with them. The British infantry stood up on tip-toe to
look at the wonderful spectacle of actual war, and at
first every shell was eagerly scrutinised and its probable
But the busy gunners multiplied the
effect discussed.
projectiles, until so many were alive in the air at once
watching the
effect of the fire, as if it
was prevented. Gradually even the
The officers shut
strange sight became monotonous.
up their glasses. The men began to sit down again.
Many of them actually went to sleep. The rest were
soon tired of the amazing scene, the like of which they
had never looked on before, and awaited impatiently
further developements and some new thing.'
After the bombardment had lasted about ten
that
all
criticism
'
minutes a great cloud of dust sprang up in the zeriba,
and hundreds of horsemen were seen scrambling into
their saddles
and galloping through a gap in the rear
face out into the
possibility of
open sand
to the right.
an attempt to turn the
attack, the eight squadrons of cavalry
guns jingled and clattered
The
danger.
horsemen
dust,
left
which the
flank of the
and two .Maxim
swift passage of so
raised, shut the scene
and the
the
off in the direction of the
tai-tat-tat-tat
many
from the eyes of the
infantry, but continual dust-clouds
the
left
To meet
of the
above the scrub to
Maxims seemed
to
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ATBARA
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THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
425
The Baggara horse, however,
declined an unequal combat, and made no serious
indicate a cavalry fight.
attempt to
interfere
Twice they
with the attack.
showed some sort of front, and the squadrons thought
they might find opportunity to charge but a few rounds
;
from the Maxims effectually checked the enemy, and
inflicted
on each occasion the
and
killed
wounded.
With
squadron detached on the
the
exception
one
of
Egyptian cavalry
right, the
however, remained on the
force,
about twenty
loss of
and shielded
left flank,
the operations of the assaulting infantry.
Meanwhile the bombardment
with curiosity
The
—no
longer watched
— continued with accuracy and
batteries
searched the
interior
of
precision.
the zeriba,
thrashing out one section after another, and workin
the whole ground regularly from front to rear.
zeriba
places,
and palisades were knocked about
and
The
many
in
at a quarter to seven a cluster of straw
huts caught
and began to burn
fire
At
briskly.
same time a spluttering musketry was opened
moment from
the
of
centre
was wounded.
For the
rest,
for a
and
the Dervish line
directed apparently at the batteries.
A
single
the Arabs
the
gunner
bore their
terrible ordeal in absolute silence.
During the
artillery preparation the force
drawn up, three infantry brigades in
flank refused, and the fourth brigade
line
had been
with the
left
At a
in reserve.
quarter-past seven the infantry were ordered to form
in
column
for assault.*
Maxwell and MacDonald, on the right and
#
Map,
1
Atbara
:
Formation
for Assault,' to face
centre,
page 430.
I
THE RIVER AVAR
426
assumed a formation with two battalions deployed,
three companies in line and three in support, covering
a central assaulting column of two battalions in double
companies, with the right flank well protected.
The
was much deeper. The Camerons crossed
over from the right and deployed into line. The
Lincoln Ee<riment moved to the riirht, and formed in
British array
column of companies in rear of the
The Seaforths formed
the Camerons.
of the centre.
shire
Two
Company o
1st
similarly in rear
companies of the Eoyal Warwick-
Regiment formed behind the 8th Company of
the Camerons,
column of route
and the remaining four
(i.e.
2
followed in
fours deep) in order to be able to
show an immediate front to the left flank should it
be threatened by the Dervish cavalry. The British
Maxim battery drew up on the extreme left and prepared
to conform to the general advance.
Thus the British
brigade was formed into columns nine companies deep,
whereas the depth of the centre brigade was but six,
and the right brigade exclusive of its flank column
—
only three companies.
General Gat acre, besides selecting
a deeper formation, had
made more
tions far passing the zeriba
;
elaborate prepara-
and the Cameron High-
landers, covering the advance of the British columns,
were provided with thick raw-hide glove- and
bill-
hooks in order to pull
and
it
to
pieces,
sacks to throw on the top of the
improvised
scaling-ladders
to
Regiment were in garrison
x companies in action at tl
thorns,
each
remembered that two companies
blankets
and two
company.
of the
Royal
An
Warw
battalion had
Editor.
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBAEA
interval of
200 yards was
left
•
427
between the British
and. MacDonald's Soudanese, to enable the
Lincolnshire Eegiment to deploy as ordered.
One
brigade
battalion of Lewis's brigade in reserve formed square
around
and
transport
the
water.
battalions supported the extreme left
also secured
by
The other two
flank, which was
the display of the cavalry force.
The plan of the attack
The long, deployed line was
army was
for the
simple.
to advance steadily against
the entrenchments, subduing
by
continual
its
fire
that
They were then to tear the zeriba to
Covered by their musketry, the dense columns
pieces.
of assault which had followed the line were to enter
of the enemy.
through the gaps, deploy to the
the defences
and march through the enclosure, clearing
bayonet and by fire.
At twenty minutes
all
with the
to eight the Sirdar ordered his
bugles to sound the general advance.
repeated by
it
right,
the brigades.
out above the noise of the
The
The
clear
artillery.
call
notes
was
rang
The superior
—with the exception of Hunter, Maxwell, and
MacDonald — dismounted and placed themselves
officers
at
the head of their commands.
infantry,
numbering not
less
The whole mass of the
than thirteen thousand
men, immediately began to move forward upon the
zeriba.
The scene
as this great force crested the ridge
and advanced down the slope was magnificent and
tremendous.
Large
a long double
line,
solid
columns of men, preceded by
with the sunlight flashing on their
bayonets and displaying their ensigns, marched to the
assault.
The array was regular and
precise.
The pipes
THE RIVER WAR
of the Highlanders, the bands of the Soudanese, and the
drums and
fifes
of the
English regiments, added a
As soon
wild and thrilling accompaniment.
advance masked the
forward with the firing
line, in
the
sruns
were run
order to
effectually
the
batteries,
as
The deployed battalions opened a
ceaseless and crushing fire on the entrenchment.
The
fire of the Cameron Highlanders was distinguishable by
the regular precision of the section volleys, no less
than by the sharp rattling report of the Lee-Metford
rifle.
The necessity of firing delayed the advance of
the attacking columns, and the pace did not exceed a
support the attack.
slow march.
The Dervishes remained silent until the troops
were within 300 yards. Then the smoke-puffs spurted
out all along the stockades, and a sharp fusillade
began, gradually and continually growing in intensity
until the assaulting trooj)s
and
effective
fire.
The
were exposed to a furious
right
of the
attack
curved
forward, and hence the whole line faced the Dervish
The right and centre gained
ground to the left, and the lines of advance of the
different brigades slowly converged.
The pressure
of Maxwell's brigade pushed MacDonald towards the
British, and the Xlth Soudanese, who were the left
battalion of the centre brigade, closed in upon the
position
British
interval
obliquely.
right
until
they absorbed the
which had been
Along the centre of the
left
line of
for
the
200 yards of
deployment.
advance of the British
brigade ran a dry kkor, a gentle V-shaped re-entrant,
to
the
lowest line
of which the
ground sloped on
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBAEA
As
either side.
landers,
the Xlth drew nearer, the Lincoln
away towards
edged
Eegiment
and so
opposite slope
bottom,
the
the Seaforth High-
The Seaforth
sidled towards the khor.
Highlanders on the
towards
429
so
that
also
inclined
two battalion
these
columns flowed down the water-course together,
common
streams which run into a
this,
became
like
gutter.
The Eoyal Warwickshire Eegiment,
the Dervish cavalry, formed to the
in
to
and, delayed
left,
practically a reserve.
guard against
by
The slow advance
*
of the firing line, and the impatience of those in rear,
closed the columns to quarter-column
thus, even before the enemy's fire
distance
had begun
;
and
to take
the nice and well-considered plan of assault was
effect,
deranged, and the British brigade was wedged into
one great mass which drove steadily onward along the
khor.
From 250 yards up
to
the position
the
troops
The whole entrenchment was
rimmed with flame and smoke, amid which the active
began to
suffer
loss.
Dervish riflemen
were
figures
of
visible,
and behind the filmy curtain
the
swordsmen and spearmen
interposition
the advance
tected
solid masses of
The fortunate
some degree pro-
appeared.
small knoll in
of a
momentarily
of the Lincoln Eegiment, but in
both Highland battalions soldiers began to drop.
was
of a strange chirping whistle
The
The
whole
air
hard
pebbly sand was everywhere dashed up into
dust-spurts.
Arabs,
rifles
full
Numerous
made queer
explosive bullets, fired
startling reports.
drowned even the noise of the
.
by
the
The roar of the
artillery.
All the
THE RIVER AVAR
430
deployed battalions began to
suffer.
But they and
assaulting columns, regardless of the
bore
fire,
tlie
down
—
on the zeriba in all the majesty of war a mighty avalanche of men, stern, unflinching, utterly irresistible.
Two hundred yards from the entrenchment and one
hundred and
fifty
from the thorn bushes the Cameron
Highlanders abandoned their section volleys, and
dependent firing broke out, running along the
from end to end.
in-
line
Shooting continually, but without
any hurry or confusion, the British and Soudanese
battalions continued their slow, remorseless advance
;
and
it
was evident
which was now causing many
defence,
assault
that, in spite of the fierce fire of the
would be
successful.
When
casualties, the
only a hundred
yards intervened, both Soudanese brigades charged the
zeriba with a wild
and furious shout.
But the British
infantry, heedless of their losses, steadfastly adhered to
the original orders, and
ful silence
Here
up
marched slowly and
in disdain-
to the thorn fence.
the
whole assault
halted.
The Cameron
Highlanders had been ordered to tear the zeriba to
exposed to a heavy
pieces, and, although
fire
at fifty
from the entrenchment, they began to
deliberately drag the thorn bushes round the flanks of
General Gatacre,
the column so as to open a gap.
yards' range
who had marched
in the centre of that regiment, his
position indicated
by a
large
hands upon the thorn bushes.
Union Jack, himself
laid
His Staff assisted him in
task which, however honourable, might with propriety
have been
left to others.
Map,
'
Atbara
:
But the zeriba proved a weak
the Assault,' to face page 432.
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THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
defence,
431
and the pressure of the mass rolling along
the Jchor was so great that before the path was clear
whole brigade
the
Warwicks
— Seaforths,
— crashed
Lincolns,
and
finally
through and, deploying as best
they could, advanced at once on the stockades and
The more impulsive men of the
Cameron Highlanders, carried away by the vigour of
entrenchments behind.
the attack, trampled through the thorns with the heads
columns, and were the
of the
bayonets into the bodies of the
moved
first
foe.
to
plunge their
The others
— un-
by the danger, the din, and the enthusiasm
continued calmly and methodically to pull the zeriba
to pieces and widen the gap, that the rear companies
might more conveniently pass through. Now, and
during the measured advance, the British infantry
displayed precisely the same qualities of discipline and
firmness for which they were renowned throughout
the Peninsular War and the Cameron Highlanders, to
whom the honours of the day belong, achieved one of
those sublime feats of arms of which we are convinced
all men of British birth are capable, but for which
alike
;
Scottish regiments
seem to
find particular opportuni-
ties.
The
loss
during the passage of the zeriba and in
the assault of the entrenchments was severe.
Captain
Findlay and Major Urquhart of the Cameron Highlanders were both mortally
stockades, and
expired
wounded
still
in the fight at the
cheering on their men.
Major Napier of the same regiment and Captain
Baillie
of the Seaforth Highlanders received the wounds, of
which they subsequently died, a few yards further
on.
THE RIVER WAR
432
Second-Lieutenant Gore,
3
young
a
from
officer fresh
Sandhurst, was shot dead between the thorn fence and
the stockade.
Other
Warwickshire
regiments
Many
soldiers
space.
These
were
the Lincoln and the
officers in
wounds.
severe
sustained
and wounded in the narrow
were general throughout the
killed
losses
assaulting brigades.
In the
minutes which were
five
occupied in the passage of the obstruction about four
The attack continued.
All along the front the brigades had struck the
zeriba, had burst through it, and had fallen upon the
It was as if a wave had
stockades and entrenchments.
hundred
casualties occurred.
broken on a
weak
the
child's castle
walls,
ing the whole
pouring in from every
side,
place clear and level
;
musketry was as
little
pebbles which a
the
advance
throw
might
child
^
5fV
and sweep-
and the Arab
stop the
able to
waters.
At
in the sand, toppling over
at
rising-
/
j
points the troops broke into the enclosure.
all
The
Behind the stockade there ran a treble trench.
whole interior was honeycombed with
From
these there
pits
now sprang thousands
endeavouring to
desperately
attack.
as
But the superior
show
a
discipline,
weapons of the troops bore down
all
and
holes.
of Dervishes,
front
to
the
numbers, and
resistance.
The
had struck the extremity of the north
of the zeriba, and thus took the whole of the
British brigade
front
eastern face in enfilade, sweeping
it
with their terrible
musketry from end to end, and strewing the ground
with corpses.
3
For
full
Although, owing to the lines of advance
designations of these officers, see casualty
list,
page 46.
.
4
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^
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ft.
SL E&SA ZAKARIA'
*
Reference
Dervish, Zeribcu of Thorns..
Tents ccnJL Grass Buts
TVew
Dervish, Stockades
Dervish, Trenches.
Scale of
$0°0©flo
,
j
Qt***^
.-^1 ±^
Yaurcls
100
200
30O
400
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500
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G. Philip
Longmans, Green &
Co. London
XewTork 1 B omb ay
A Son, SZTZttt St. LonSsorv.
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBAEA
433
having converged, there was not room for more than half
the force to deploy, the brigades pushed on.
The con-
duct of the attack passed to the company commanders.
All these officers kept their heads, and brought their
companies up into the general
line as the front gradually
widened and gaps appeared.
So the whole force
panies, battalions,
and formed
in
even brigades
—mixed
—com-
up together
one dense, ragged, but triumphant
line,
1
I
If
*
i
I
1
THROUGH THE ZERIDA
-marched on unchecked towards the river bed, driving
their enemies in hopeless confusion before them.
although the
Yet,
unable to
make head
against the attack, they disdained to run.
Many hun-
Dervishes were
dreds held their ground, firing their
the end.
rifles
valiantly
Others charged with spear and sword.
till
The
greater part retired in skirmishing order, jumping over
the numerous pits, walking across the open spaces, and
VOL.
I.
F F
—
THE RIVER WAR
434
The Xlth Soudanese
repeatedly turning round to shoot.
encountered the most severe resistance after the defences
were penetrated.
As
their three deployed
companies
pressed on through the enclosure, they were confronted
by a small inner zeriba stubbornly defended by the
Emir Mahmud's personal bodyguard. These devoted
men poured a sudden volley into the centre company
at close range,
all
the
and so deadly was the
company were
nearly
effect that
shot, falling to the
ground
still
in
their ranks, so that a British officer passing at a little
distance was provoked to inquire 'what they were doing
Notwithstanding
lying down.'
severe check the
this
regiment, gallantly led by their beloved Colonel and sup-
ported by the Xth Soudanese, rushed this last defence
and slew
captured.
made
last
its
Having duly inspected
his dispositions,
constructed
Mahmud was
defenders.
casemate.
his
himself
defences
and
he had sheltered in a specially
now
Thence he was
igno-
miniously dragged, and, on his being recognised, the
intervention of a British officer alone saved
him from
the fury of the excited Soudanese.
During the advance through the enclosure the firing
of the black troops was of the wildest and most
reckless description, and although their pluck was undeniable their discipline contrasted unfavourably with
the steadiness
of the
British
infantry.
The broken
nature of the ground and the confusion of the assault
led to a
Still
4
good many
casualties
from our own
the advance continued, and
The shooting was generally very
entirely exonerated or severely blamed.
free,
it
fire.
4
seemed to those
and no unit can be either
Editor.
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBAKA
who took
part in
than a waking
lected whatever
nationality,*
it
more
and strove
a horrible nightmare
like
Captains and subalterns col-
reality.
men
435
they could, heedless of corps or
to control
and direct
their fire.
t/
Jibba-clad figures sprang out of the ground, fired or
charged, and were destroyed
wards over their bodies
at every step.
— over
pits
And
on-
choked with dead
among heaps of mangled camels and donkeys,
and dying,
among
ghastly
the
trunks,
eviscerated
or
decapitated
results
of
the
for
by
mercy
in
their
chains
;
women and
;
bombardment or praying
the
killed
shell fire
little
children
in wild terror
blacks chained in their trenches, slaughtered
— always
onwards marched the con-
hands,
clothes,
blood
running
bayonets
querors, with
month's
of
a
stench
foul
the
besmeared
and faces all
;
;
accumulated
filth
in
nostrils,
their
and the savage
V
whistle of
random
bullets in their ears.
whole
the
eight
past
minutes
twenty
about
But at
on
forward
well
Highlanders
Seaforth
the
force, with
having
Atbara,
the
of
bank
the left,
or
shot
and
position,
the
through
marched completely
Dervishes
of
Hundreds
path.
their
in
all
bayoneted
arrived at the
were
still
visible retiring
across the dry bed of the
bank.
opposite
the
on
river, and making
and
Highlanders
Seaforth
the
of
The leading companies
had
as
Camerons
of
parties
odd
such
Lincolns, with
for the scrub
murderous
a
opened
attack,
the
with
on
been carried
run,
not
would
they
Since
fugitives.
fire on these
their loss
last
vivid
struggling
was a strange sight— the
them
watch
-to
day—
the
of
impression
was heavy, and
through the
it
deep
sand,
with
the
P F 2
dust
THE ELVER WAR
436
knocked up
into clouds
by the
bullets
which struck
all
Very few escaped, and the bodies of
round them.
the killed lay thickly dotting the river-bed with heaps
of dirty- white.
and the
Then
battle of the
6
at 8.25 the
Cease
fire
'
sounded,
Atbara ended.
Forthwith the battalions began to re-form, and in
every company the
surprises,
roll
was
and men thought
There were many
called.
to
have
fallen,
dead or
AT THE END OF THE BATTLE
wounded, reappeared
their places.
assault
British
—
Yet the
grinning and ensanguined
losses
had been
severe.
—
in
In the
—a period not exceeding half an hour— eighteen
and sixteen native
officers
and 525 men had
been killed or wounded, the greater part during the
passage of the zeriba. While the regiments were reforming the Sirdar rode along the
brigades, raising their
and the British
helmets on the dark smeared
line,
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
bayonets, cheered
successful war.
him
in all the loud enthusiasm
For almost the only moment
course of this story he evinced emotion.
an
officer
a quarter
break
who watched him closely,
of an hour.'
And indeed,
this stern
437
man's reserve,
cheers of the soldiers
it
4
of
in the
He was,' said
quite human for
'
if
anything could
should have been the
who had stormed
the Atbara
was the most memorable day in all
his life that had yet run out.
Within the space of two
hours not only were Mahmud and his army the scourge
of Kordofan and Darfur, the victors of Metemma, the
zeriba
;
for this
—
destroyers
of the Jaalin
there
was now no
in the
command
—
practically annihilated, but
possibility of his being superseded
of the expedition to Khartoum.
The actual pursuit was abortive. Colonel Lewis
with his two battalions followed a line of advance
which led south of the zeriba, and just before reaching
the river-bank found and fired
retreating
through the scrub.
upon a few Dervishes
All the
cavalry and
Camel Corps crossed the Atbara and plunged into
the bush on the further side.
But so dense and
tangled was the country that after three miles of peril
and perplexity they abandoned the attempt, and the
the
routed Arabs fled unmolested.
The Bagsrara horse had
ridden off during the action, headed by the prudent
5
Osman Digna whose position in the zeriba was con-
—
veniently suited to such a manoeuvre
careful leadership suffered
little
army was, however, destroyed
fugitives fled up the Atbara
5
See map,
4
Atbara
:
Formation
loss.
or
— and
under that
The
rest of the
The
dispersed.
river,
leaving
for Assault,' to face
many
page 430.
i
THE RIVER WAR
438
wounded
retreat.
to die in the scrub, all along their line of
A
strong patrol
Arabs under
of friendly
in
struck
Kassala,
from
west
moving
Major Benson,
killin
incessantly,
them
harried
and
flank
upon their
making
580
and
Emirs,
several
350 men, including
6
fighting
of
force
12,000
ful
power
the
Of
prisoners.
scarcely
Metemma,
at
gathered
had
Mahmud
which
men
These survivors were
4,000 reached Gedaref in safety.
added to the army of
Ahmed
and thus pre-
Fedil,
vented from spreading their evil tidings among the
Osman Digna, Wad
populace at Omdurman.
Bishara,
disand
devotion
whose
Emirs
important
other
and
cretion were undoubted, alone returned to the capital.
As soon
as the troops
were re-formed, the zeriba was
evacuated and the army drew up in
hbouring ridge.
the air was
still
It
line
was then only nine
cool and fresh.
The
along the
o'clock,
soldiers
made some tea, and ate their rations of
meat. Then they lay down and waited
lit
and
fires,
biscuits
and
for evening.
Gradually, as the hours passed, the sun became powerful.
There was no shade.
rose from the sand.
Only a few
thin, leafless
bushes
The hours dragged wearily away.
The day was peculiarly hot, even for the country and
season.
The sandy ridge beat back the rays till the air
above was like the breath of a furnace and the pebbly
ground burned. The British troops suffered acutely.
The fierce sun absorbed even the gratitude which all
men, freed from the immediate presence of death,
towards some vaguely defined Providence.
was
like a kitchen range.
6
The water
Major G. E. Benson, R.A.
feel
The ridge
in the fantasses
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
439
and bottles was hot and scarce. The pool of the Atbara
was foul and tainted. The water, a thick, muddycoloured liquid, exuded a vile smell. A little pure
water was obtained by digging holes in the river bed
and
letting
them gradually
the soldiers drank the
But
till.
filth.
As
for the
most part
the day drew on the
troubles of the British were aggravated.
The hardy
negroes cared nothing for the sun, and slept phlegmati-
Some
cally.
of the Highlanders took off their kilts and
spreading those invaluable garments on the bushes
little
the
made
patches of shade under which they existed until
But even
evening.
this
desperate
remedy was
denied to the English regiments.
The condition of the wounded was painful in the
extreme. They were placed beneath such shade as was
available, and every effort was made to attend to their
wants. But the Sirdar had reduced the Medical Staff to
insignificant proportions.
for the
Seven doctors were available
The Soudanese
whole of the British brigade.
simplest
the
Only
stinted.
equally
were
Egyptians
and
Instead of the comfortable
appliances were at hand.
Indian
doolies,
with their ample hoods and white curtains,
most
for
the
even
provided
was
stretcher
ordinary
the
the
few
of
efforts
devoted
of
the
spite
In
serious cases.
medical
officers
the force, the
who had been
wounded
officers
allowed to accompany
and soldiers endured the
and it is certain that several died of
their wounds who might under happier circumstances
regard
with
remembered
be
must
It
saved.
have been
been
had
victory
the
although
that,
Atbara
the
to
greatest miseries,
decisive,
it
was followed by a
retreat
;
and instead of
WAR
THE RIVER
440
the
Field Hospitals
had
troops
coming up
march back
to
wounded were
in
the
to
the action, the
after
Hence the
Umdabia.
wounded of a
position of the
defeated army, and suffered accordingly.
possible
to
avoid
this.
Misery
is,
was imfrom
inseparable
is
The care of the wounded
war.
It
after
all,
a minor
After a great European battle they would
matter.
rotting
in holes
and corners
The business of the General
Nevertheless,
that, if
more
when
all
perhaps three days.
to defeat the
is
has been fairly stated,
attention
arrangements might
for
had been paid
have
lie
it is
enemv.
t/
evident
to the subject,
been made which would
have increased the popularity of the commander and
diminished the sufferings of the troops.
At
three o'clock the soldiers
the ridge received
—almost with
who were
feelings
order to attend the funerals of the dead.
stewing on
— the
of relief
The digging
of the graves was a long and tedious business, for the
men were weary, and
But
the sand was hard and stony.
at length a shallow trench,
scarcely twelve inches
deep, was scraped, and in this the bodies were laid.
Surrounded by the comrades who had shared their
perils, the
debt
'
remains of those
were reverently
who had
interred.
6
paid a soldier's
The clergymen of the
various denominations read the last words of hope and
consolation.
The pipes wailed
The parting volleys crashed
4
Lochaber-no-inore.'
in the air,
and then the row
of figures, each shrouded in a blanket, were hidden
by
the hot sand on which thev had met their fates, in which
they must for ever lie.
Then everyone marched away
and
left
the lonely grave in the African bush to the
;
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
441
and the oblivion of the past and
affairs
the
strongown
and
their
to
busily
turned
so
enthusiasms of life. Such is the melancholy end of
brave men who fall in war. The living .divide the
silence of the desert
triumph.
;
The dead
—without whom perchance
it
would
THE LAMENT
I
hardly have been
Yet theirs
for,
is
won
—have
no worse than the common
I suppose,
when we
fate of
man
are ourselves overtaken
death, the surroundings of
make much
but a dull occupation.
home and
appreciable difference.
by
friends will not
To
struggle and
THE RIVER WAR
U'2
choke
in the
hushed and darkened room of a London
house, while, without, the great metropolis
and contriving
—while
the special editions report the
progress of the latest European
of the business of the
is full
planning
is
less unsatisfactory than,
crisis,
and
morrow
when
—
thrilled
all
the world
seem
will not
with
fierce
yet
generous emotions, to die in the sunshine and be spaded
under before the night.
During
the
afternoon
many
visited
officers
the
and examined the hideous sights it contained.
The dem or enclosure was about 1,000 yards long
All around the outside, except at the
by 800 deep.
zeriba
two gaps by which the Dervishes had
thorn fence.
On
the side of the river
fled,
it
ran the
was very
Towards
and made a formidable stockade.
the -desert, Avhence the troops had attacked, it was
Some have therefore conweak and badly made.
strong,
cluded that
Mahmud
expected to be attacked from
the direction of the river, and
arrival of the troops
was surprised by the
on the opposite
side.
seems
It
more probable, however, that the Arabs found the
labour of drawing the bushes into the bare desert too
arduous for their lazy dispositions, and so did not
finish the
work.
It
was a dangerous
neglect.
the zeriba. at about sixty yards' distance,
trenches,
sometimes double, sometimes
counterscarp of the
first
was a
Behind
line of
treble.
The
trench was revetted with dom-
which stuck up above the ground in lengths
varying from two to five feet, and made the so-called
The trenches were about four feet deep.
stockade.
palm
From
logs,
the rear trenches, and at right angles to them,
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
ones,
smaller
443
about eight yards long, ran back at
intervals of about ten yards.
These were apparently
used as places of storage, for littered about within
them were bags of
meat,
occasionally
grain, meal,
cooking-pots,
and dom-palm
picks,
nuts,
shovels,
and
The ten gun-emplacements were dotted
Most of the guns, brass rifled
about the interior.
such
like.
seven-pounders, appeared to have been fired once or
They had no time for
small
a
position
was
of
the
centre
the
In
more.
ten
about
logs
made
of
citadel
of
sort
a
enclosure
Mahmud
where
Here
was
loop-holed.
and
high
feet
had sheltered during the bombardment, and where the
Xlth Soudanese had suffered such severe loss in the
The whole inside of the zeriba was one mass
assault.
twice before they were taken.
—
—
of pits, in all of
which were animals
tied leg to leg
Thousands of these had been
thrown.
killed
and
by the
by the
The dead were ripped in pieces
The living lay gasping beneath
splinters of the shells.
The fallen Arabs lay thickest on the front
the dead.
artillery.
assaulted
were
and
by the
filled
British
brigade.
All the trenches
with dead riflemen, each with his weapon
a pile of eighty
to a
hundred cartridges beside
They were chiefly armed with Eemingtons, but
a
and
muskets,
Tower
or
elephant-guns
many had
him.
'86
pattern
the
of
rifles
Vetterli
few Swiss repeating
were noticed.
assault.
the
sustained
had
The
But the defenders of the right face had not escaped.
As soon as the British had entered the enclosure they
front of the zeriba
swept
all
the trenches
of the
right
face
with their
THE RIVER
444
and
musketry,
terrible
the
WAR
corpses
were
huddled
together as thickly there, as in the actual path of the
All through the position the spearmen were
assault.
scattered about as they
pits
men were
dead
the slaughtered animals
had fallen. In many of the
mixed indiscriminately with
—a
shocking jumble.
At
the
edge of the enclosure the crowding of the
further
had been
bodies
marked where the
made.
Beyond, in the sands of the river-bed, lay the
who had
vain
last
effort
was
a dreadful carnage. More than 2,600 corpses were
counted in the zeriba and its vicinity. The assessors
but the scrub must
did not go across the Atbara
fugitives
reach the bushes.
failed to
It
#
;
wounded who had crawled there to
The smell of the enclosure was appalling. For
die.
a fortnight Mahmud, fearing desertion-, had forbidden
Donkeys
his soldiers to leave the zeriba by night.
have been
full
and mules
left
of
unburied, and in an advanced state of
putrefaction, intensified the stench.
beating
down on
the
corpses
The blazing sun
increased
The raw odour of new blood added a
The wandering officer soon sickened and
the
slain,
final
fled
volume.
horror.
back
to
Only the Soudanese continued to
the burning ridge.
despoil
its
and collected a great number of
swords, spears, and other trophies of victory.
I rejoice to record the fact that, before the night
march
against
the
zeriba.
distinct orders that quarter
Sir
was
H. Kitchener issued
to be given to all
who
and that the wounded Dervishes were not
This
to be despatched unless they were dangerous.
was carefully impressed upon the troops, and the
asked for
it,
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA
Arabic word for quarter,
Aman I was
445
explained to the
Of course, in the actual assault very
few were spared. Even in European war indiscriminate
British brigade.
bayoneting often follows the storm of an entrenchment.
Men do
not
come
across the open and let themselves be
The black soldiers were beyond
scattered
shots were heard
regular control, and
throughout the morning as odd Dervishes were dis-
shot at for nothing,
But the private and
covered.
many
unofficial testimony of
impartial persons convinces
the Arabs fought to the death
;
me
that nearly
all
that hardly any un-
AFTER THE ATBARA
resisting
men were
in error or
and in
any
by
killed
;
that such few were killed
the Soudanese without the knowled
spite of the efforts, of the British officers.
In
case, the formal orders issued completely vindicate
the General.
In
obedience
to
hundred prisoners were
negroes
to
—
for the
the last or
who
fight
humane orders, several
taken.
Thev were mostly
these
Arabs refused
to surrender,
tried to escape.
and fought
The captive
with equal willingness on either
blacks,
side,
were
content to be enlisted in the Soudanese regiments
;
so
WAR
THE RIVER
446
many
that
who
of those
t/
served the Khalifa on the
Atbara helped to destroy him
Omdurman.
at
The
—a
most notable prisoner was the Emir
Mahmud
strong Arab, about thirty years old.
Immediately after
he was dragged before the Sirdar.
his capture
6
inquired the General,
to
6
burn and
?
kill
6
'
my
have you come into
1
have to obey
so have you,' retorted the
captive
my
Why,'
country
and
orders,
sullenly,
To other
without a certain dignity.
tall,
not
yet
he
questions
returned curt or evasive answers, and volunteered the
opinion that
slaughter would be
all this
He was removed
Omdurman.
in
avenged
custody
—a
at
fine
specimen of proud brutality, worthy perhaps of some
better fate than
Wady
to linger indefinitely in the gaol at
Haifa.
With
the cool of the evening the
army
left its
bed
on the ridge and returned to Umdabia.
of torment
The homeward march was a severe trial the troops
were exhausted the ground was broken the guides,
;
;
less
careful
;
or less fortunate than on
the previous
night, lost their way.
The columns were encumbered
with wounded, most of
whom
state of
witness.
It
camp was
ously
and whose
fever,
was not
arms
ing in the sun
—
sufferings
until
—marching,
—
British, Soudanese,
into their bivouacs,
victorious.
high
were painful to
midnight that the
fighting,
or
swelter-
The majority had
two days. Officers and
for thirty hours.
hardly closed their eyes for
soldiers
after
in a
The infantry had been continu-
reached.
under
were already
and
fell
and Egyptian
asleep,
—struggled
very weary but
)
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBAEA
The
follows
full
list
of casualties on the Atbara was as
:—
British Officers Killed or Died of Wounds (5)
Highlanders
Cameron
Napier,
L.
E.
R.
Major
Major
Cameron Highlanders
Findlay, Cameron Highlanders
B. C. Urquhart,
Captain C.
Captain A. C. D. Baillie, Seaforth Highlanders
Second Lieut. P. Gore, Seaforth Highlanders
British Officers
Wounded
(8)
Lieut. M. Green, Royal Warwickshire
Colonel T. E. Verner, Lincolnshire
Lieut. H. E. R. Boxer, Lincolnshire
Lieut. C. J. Rennie, Lincolnshire
Highlanders
Seaforth
C.B.,
Murray,
H.
R.
Colonel
Captain N. C. Maclachlan, Seaforth Highlanders
Lieut. R. S. Vandeleur, Seaforth Highlanders
Lieut. N. A. Thomson, Seaforth Highlanders
BRITISH BRIGADE
Wounded
Killed
Total
number
of
Officers
and
.
Officers
file
Rank
and
file
casualties
2
i
n
14
1
3
13
17
5
13
5
1
22
44
33
60
1
1
91
125
Eoyal Warwickshire
1st Battalion
Eegiment
Rank
.
.
1st Battalion Lincolnshire Begi-)
I
M
ment
1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders
1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders
.
.
Army Service Corps
.
i
2
i
3
Total
10
21
EGYPTIAN ARMY
British Officers
Wounded
(5)
Army
Egyptian
and
Guards
Dragoon
2nd
Persse,
Captain W. H.
Army
Egyptian
and
Brigade
Rifle
Walsh,
E.
C.
Hon.
Captain
Army
Egyptian
and
Corps
Staff
Indian
D.S.O.,
Major A. K. Harley,
Egyptian
Regiment
Lancashire
&
South
p.s.c,
Shekelton,
Major H. P.
Army
Captain W.
F. Walter,
p.s.c, Lancashire Fusileers
British
N.C
Officers
Wounded
and Egyptian
(2)
Army
::
—
.
WAR
THE RIVER
448
EGYPTIAN ARMY
continued
Native Ranks
Killed
Wounded
.
6
.
3
12
2
15
Cavalry
Camel Corps
Artillery
•
Infantry Brigades
:
Maxwell's
8th Egyptians
1
Xllth Soudanese
A
XHIth
6
XlVth
6
2nd Egyptians
IXth Soudanese
MacDonald's
Xth
7
6
17
*
99
IXIth
3rd Egyptians
99
52
61
5
61
37
78
!
5
(
Lewis's \ 4th
I
7th
3
5?
56
Total
General Total all ranks
(British and Egyptian)
|
.
371
1
19 British officers and 552
men
J
The ammunition expenditure was
as follows
Artillery
30
270
143
690
Case Shot
Common
Shell
.
Double Shell
,
Shrapnel Shell
Rocket Detachment
Rockets
13
.
Maxim Guns
4,800
.
Cavalry (Carbine)
.
.
.
.
.
.
Rounds
4,000
Infantry
British Brigade (Lee-Metford)
56,000
.
Maxwell's Brigade (Martini-Henry)
MacDonald's Brigade (Martini-Henry)
The
field states
Army
82 British
and 3,000 Dervishes
officers
99
as follow
101 officers and 3,357
The Dervish loss was
wounded
75,000
on the 8th of April were
British Brigade
Egyptian
101,000
men
and 10,202 men
officially
estimated at 40 Emirs
No
statistics as to their
killed.
are forthcoming.
449
CHAPTEE XIV
SUMMER QUARTERS
IN
—
Ferntit —The British camp — The day's work
Summer quarters
—
conquest
Greek traders 'The Atbara Derby' — Footprints
Monotony — The strategy of the Atbara campaign— The tactics
*The British formation — General Gatacre's mistake — The
preparation — The palm of honour — An insane dispute — The Sirdar's
'
'
of
artillery
summer.
Although
this
chapter
book, the period
it
tediously prolonged.
is
among
the shortest in the
describes seemed
As
to
the
troops
the battle of the Atbara
had
been decisive, the whole Expeditionary Force went into
summer
quarters.
The Egyptian army was
into three principal garrisons
camp,
six battalions
distributed
—four battalions
at
Atbara
and the cavalry in Berber, three
The artillery and transport were
The British brigade encamped
proportionately divided.
with two battalions at Darmali and two at the village
battalions at Abadia.
of Selim, about a mile and a half distant.
I
have invited several
at these various resorts, to
their doings
and of the
who spent the summer
give me some account of
officers
life
of the troops.
But the
most imaginative are unable to write more than a few
pages on the dull months which dragged wearily away.
The Soudanese and Egyptian soldiers were accustomed
Monotony had
to the heat and impervious to the flies.
VOL.
I.
G G
THE RIVER
450
were content
they
no terrors for them;
WAR
which we may
troubles, with both of
Only two
pathise, assailed
make
to
their
6
the second was the prevalence of
which
disease
way
few of
to the front
an odious
Ferntit,'
holding
troops
the
attacked
chiefly
was the
first
their wives, very
continued separation from
whom had managed
The
happiness.
their
exist.
to
Berber.
The African continent
To
the
that flesh
ills
rich in mystery
is
heir to,
is
it
and horror.
has contributed some
to
known
maladies
disgusting
and
of the most peculiar
who
Those
instance.
common
Ferntit
is
a
science.
'
have
'
travelled in the Equatorial regions will find
difficultv
in
others
recalling
6
Ferntit,'
or
sufficiently unpleasant.
A
loathsome.
still
more strange and
guinea-worm,
worm
small
no
however,
is,
enters the foot
or leg of the incautious bather; after some time the
foot swells
is
and becomes acutely
carefully opened
small.
A long
and the
worm
emerges, no longer
and delicate treatment
Gradually, and bit by
must be exercised not
is
now
necessary.
the parasite must be ex-
bit,
tracted from the body of
The swelling
painful.
The greatest care
break the worm, for if this
his victim.
to
What
unwittingly be done, he multiplies himself.
extracted
little
is
wound round
progress
—
there
is
is
little
Every day
perhaps a quarter of an inch
But since the worm often
the recovery
a small twig.
present the prognosis
;
is
a
made.
is
attains a length of four feet
slow and tedious.
danger
—
is
With
a single
worm
but when twenty or more are
bad.
The Soudanese troops who were stationed
at
Berber
IN
suffered acutely
SUMMER QUARTERS
from
this disease,
451
which appeared en-
demic in the town, and in one of the battalions as many
as thirty per cent, of the soldiers were at one time
The
affected.
British
brigade
at
Darmali, however,
escaped entirely, though whether this was due to the
precautions they observed or to the local conditions
is
impossible to say.
it
summer was a
Nevertheless, the
weary season.
The
villages of Selim
banks of the
Nile.
and Darmali stand
close to the
But the desert here approaches the
DARMALI
The
scraggy, miserable <idm-palms, sombre in colour and
ungraceful in shape, afford the only shade. Every
river,
and the
belt of scrub
is
morning the sun rose above the
narrow and
desert, climbed higher
in the cloudless sky, blazed with a fierce
persistence, crossed the river,
the
dust
intensity
At times high hot
and sand into clouds and
brought annoyance instead of
soldiers.
and merciless
and disappeared behind
the bushes on the opposite bank.
winds whirled
thin.
relief
to
the waiting
More usually a deadly calm enabled the full
The average
of the heat to be appreciated.
temperature
maximum
by day was 109°
often exceeded 120
The huts of the
the floors raised by
and
WAR
THE KIVER
452
the
walls
villages
in
shade
the
.
were thoroughly cleaned
;
mud
;
at least a foot of fresh Nile
many
in
the
;
cases
levelled
permit
to
The troops were thus fairly
The rations with which they were
well housed.
The enforced
supplied were also of excellent quality.
the free passage of
air.
by a free issue
To occupy
twice a week of rum, bacon, and jam.
their time and to make them handy the men were
made to do their own cookiim, and bv degrees they
grew into cunning campaigners, intent on making them-
abstinence from beer was compensated
selves
comfortable, and
acquainted with every trick
and makeshift bv which that result could be obtained.
The effects of the bad water which had been generalh
drunk during the few days preceding the
the Atbara produced a
number
euphemistically termed
enteric fever.'
period was passed,
uniformly good.
'
the
Still
health
of
But
the
after
this
brigade
was
the days dragged.
to blister, the
For an hour, or perhaps
bugles sounded for parade.
were exercised and
half, the troops
drilled
then the rest of the day was at their disposal.
officers,
taking guns or
rifles,
would
stroll
themselves
by
largely
imitated
number
of Nile fish
to
fishing.
their
;
The
out into the
scrub in search of sand grouse or gazelle
devoted
of
of CclSGS of typhoid,
Every morning, before the sun began
an hour and a
battle
;
several
Their example was
men, and a
considerable
—weird-looking creatures with long
gelatinous appendages hanging from
their
jaws and
SUMMER QUARTERS
IN
and red and blue
gills,
flushes
on their
captured and considered a great
heat
the
and
Those who were lucky
slept.
—were
During
silent
and
All books
The incoming
were eagerly read.
newspapers
fins
delicacy.
day everyone remained
of the
motionless.
453
mail punctuated the weeks with a single dot of excite-
The
ment.
gifts
of magazines and newspapers, which
thoughtful and patriotic people at
some fashion the hours passed.
the
proved a
camp began
failure
;
sent to their
were warmly welcomed.
soldiers in the desert,
in
home
Thus
In the cool of the
.
Cricket indeed
to stir again.
but the footballs were always in
demand, and the wilds of Africa witnessed the sports of
civilisation.
The
State,
necessities
of
life
but the demand for
were well supplied by the
all
kinds of comforts and con-
veniences soon drew a supply through the
Greek
the
trader.
A
medium
of
regular colony of these enterpri-
With
sing creatures arrived.
astonishing adaptability
they built a village and opened shops.
They proved
themselves invaluable, catering with business instinct for
every want, and during the whole
supplied
summer
conceivable commodities
all
their stores
— from
fishing-
tackle to tinned asparagus.
The
soldiers
greatest,
was
almost
the
only,
to bathe in the river.
carried this to excess,
it
regulate the indulgence.
pleasure
of the
But since they
was soon found necessary
The
officers
to
threw themselves
with energy into the business of amusing themselves
and
their
men.
frequent intervals.
Smoking concerts took place at
Athletic sports and gymkhanas
THE RIVER
454
were held every
On one
fortnight.
The
race meeting was organised.
and
in Berber
occasion a regular
officers of the troops
Atbara hurried down the
at the
A
attend or compete.
enclosure, rigidly select,
large
WAR
rude stand was erected.
The
was formed.
and the sport good.
won by
Highlanders
;
fields
An
were
Several exciting struggles
The hurdle
aroused the enthusiasm of the spectators.
race was
line to
Lieutenant McNeill
1
of the Seaforth
but his modesty excludes a picture of the
*
-
THE ATBARA DERBY
finish,
and the reader
will
be
satisfied
'—
tion of 'The Atbara Derby
The
Desert'
which was won by an
'
—
with a representa-
Blue Ribbon of the
officer
of the
21st
Lancers, on duty with the Transport.
The camp
Darmali
no
The
renovated mud huts are deserted or have become
again the homes of the Arabs.
The bazaar of the
Greek traders is empty and silent. It is unlikely that
at
exists
longer.
the civilised traveller will visit for pleasure or profit
the arid, sandy hamlet
1
by
the banks of the Nile.
Lieut. A. J. McNeill. Seaforth Highlanders.
Yet,
IN
SUMMER QUARTERS
455
should such a wanderer chance to pause on his way,
he would find the temporary resting-place of a British
legion
marked here
Indian Frontier
—
on the African
as
veldt or
the
—by a racecourse, a polo-ground, and a
cemetery.
Enlivened only by small incidents, the weeks passed
uneventfully.
for a
month
those
who
All officers
who could obtain leave hurried
But
to Cairo or a fortnight to London.
by the Mle have
summer. The hot days tried
stayed behind in the camps
no pleasant memories of the
and depressed the spirits of the soldiers.
All the correspondents had gone home, and the public
eye was averted from the scenes in the Soudan. All
the tempers
the songs
jokes
r
had been sung
made
ame soon
frequented
at the concerts,
the
all
The
so often that they ceased to amuse.
left
the neighbourhood in search of less-
Even
scrub.
Nile
the
delighted the angler or the epicure.
were cool and fresh
and the
;
fish
no
longer
Only the nights
soldiers, leaving the huts
which the heat of the day made hot
lie
and
on the sand underneath the bright
would
and wonder
as ovens,
stars
when the war was going to begin again.
Of course, the one unfailing subject of discussion
during the summer was the battle of the Atbara. Its
incidents were re-told
and
its
tactics
every conceivable point of view.
be inappropriate
if I
examined from
It will not, therefore,
take this opportunity of consider-
ing some of the questions which have been raised.
.
The strategy of the Atbara campaign was undoubtedly correct. There are some who say that the
Sirdar's position at Eas-el-Hudi
compelled
Mahmud
to
THE RIVER WAR
456
attack or retire, and that there was therefore no neces-
an offensive action.
for
sity
It
could have returned to the Nile
for
he might have been headed
is
along the east bank, supported by
impossible for
him
flank.
A
his
left
He might have
threatened
bv
its
A
attacked
Kassala.
march
civilised troops
enormous preparations.
was
safe
It
and
be
will
But the want of
few handfuls of grain and the nuts of the
sufficient water, to
which
river,
on Dervish move-
influence
little
dcm-palm enable the hardy Arab,
in
army moving
gunboats. It was
the
up the Atbara
contended that he had no supplies.
ments.
way he came,
however, was open.
course,
third
retired
supplies has very
he
that
to strike at Berber without exposing
even
or
the
L>v
off
unlikely
for a
as long as there
is
week through regions
could not operate without
But the great consideration
The long line of communications was
All the
while the army at its head was feared.
prestige.
inhabitants along the stretch of the Xile from Berber
Abu Hamed doubted and
They feared the
The destruction
Khalifa thev hated the Government.
Henceforward they
of Mahmud's army decided them.
recognised that a new order of things had been
Their altered demeanour when the troops
established.
to
wavered.
:
returned victorious, with the Dervish General prisoner
and the
des.
spoils
and trophies of war displayed on
was noticed bv
officers of
every rank.
It
all
has
been the custom to regard the re-conquest of the
Soudan
as a
work of
deliverance.
Pathetic pictures
of the unspeakable joy of the Arab, freed from
the
accursed yoke of the Khalifa, have been drawn with
IN
skill
SUMMER QUARTERS
and elaboration.
But
land.
the
The idea
Sirdar,
is
457
accepted in Eng-
although
preserving
pleasing legends for domestic circulation,
was
shrewd a soldier to allow them to influence
such
far too
his military
calculations.
The
tactics of the battle
afford a wider field for
Of course, after the zeriba had been
and when its strength and structure were familiar
controversy.
taken,
were many wise plans evolved by
might have been captured with less loss.
to everyone, there
which
That
it
is
the invariable rule.
The
tactics of Napoleon's
shown over and over again
to have been utterly foolish and puerile by the military
The composition of the Anglo-Egyptian army
critics.
was such that few liberties could be taken with firediscipline.
It was essential that all units
particularly
greatest victories have been
the Soudanese
right
and
—should have a
left
fronts.
—
clear field of fire to their
This excluded
all
idea
of a
simultaneous attack from different angles, and therefore the General
had very
little
choice in the plan of
attack.
The formation of the
was much
deeper than that of the Soudanese
and this was undoubtedly a disadvantage, because they were unable to
British brigade
;
deploy so quickly after passing the zeriba.
But
this
formation was assumed in the belief that the zeriba was a
much more
formidable obstacle than
and that the enemy's
severe.
It is impossible
it
fire-resistance
actually proved,
would be more
not to sympathise with General
Gatacre's obvious determination
—
pened to the other parts of the
that,
whatever hap-
assault, the
British
THE RIVER
458
WAR
at
enclosure
the
burst
into
brigade should
The fact, however, remains that
of
resistance
the
gauged
Maxwell
all
costs.
MacDonald and
the enemy more
to
the
suited
better
formations
accurately, and adopted
attack on this particular occasion.
exwere
Highlanders
The fact that the Cameron
has
brigade
British
whole
the
tended across the front of
although
that
contended
is
It
also excited criticism.
in
confusion of an action
the
mixed, every
minimise
effort
that
ought
event.
been made to cover
error to place one
its
to
be made
Each
own
battalion
must become
units
to postpone or
should have
battalion
front.
where
It
it
was a serious
was bound to
companies
leading
the
with
mixed
up
be immediately
covers
explanation
former
The
three.
of the other
the
of
power
the
over-estimated
Gatacre
this.
General
be
would
line
covering
that
the
believed
He
enemv.
tearing
while
and
advance
the
in
destroyed
practically
one
sacrifice
to
better
was
It
pieces.
to
the zeriba
complete battalion than to
Camerons
would
suffer
weaken
all
terribly; but
equally.
The
the fresh
bat-
coming up in column, would burst through
few
the
on
carrying
and,
made,
had
the gaps they
Gatacre's
survivors, would take the place by storm.
formation reveals the fact that he believed sincerely
talions,
that he
This
was sending one of
his battalions to destruction.
why he selected the centre of
his own place and that of his Staff.
explains
battalion as
that
He
has been censured for exposing himself to perils which
mifflit
have robbed his brigade of
there
is
to a civilian a certain
its
commander.
But
grim splendour in the
SUMMER QUARTERS
IN
of the
spectacle
General
who would
459
not take the
responsibility of sacrificing a regiment unless he him-
marched with them.
self
Happily the zeriba proved weaker, and the Dervish
fire
less deadly,
Camerons,
who
line, rolled in as
The
than had been expected.
should have acted as the containing
the
first
wave
of the assault, and, with
the exception of a few stolid heroes
who
continued to
became mixed with the
In fact, there was
leading companies of the columns.
not enough resistance to develope the mighty strength
pull the zeriba to pieces, they
of the British attack.
It is possible
to maintain that
General Gatacre formed his brigade unnecessarily deep,
arranged his regiments inconveniently, and exposed
himself unjustifiably.
But
all
these defects arose from
the original mistake of over-estimating the
enemy
power of the
— a wise and prudent error into which,
hoped, our Generals will frequently
it is
to
be
fall.
The shortness of the artillery preparation cannot,
however, be explained. The batteries came into action
at under 1,000 yards, and with practically no loss
to themselves they shelled the zeriba for an hour
and a
half.
In this period they inflicted a severe
upon the enemy, which is estimated by
competent officers who saw the corpses in the
slaughter
several
enclosure to have comprised 20 per cent, of the total
Arab
This
casualties.
artillery officers.
is
But one
bombardment only
very satisfactory
to
the
compelled to ask
why
the
is
lasted an
hour and a
half.
great a loss could be inflicted in such a short
If so
time
without any danger or inconvenience to the gunners,
THE RIVER WAR
460
they not allowed to continue for three or
why were
four hours?
This certainly
be suggested by
all
is
tactical
the course which would
experience
and by
all
modern books on war. Indeed, it is impossible to
doubt that, had the bombardment been prolonged, the
Dervishes might have been driven out of the zeriba
any rate would have suffered so
severely that their fire would not have inflicted such
lives
and
valuable
columns,
assaulting
severe loss on the
Again, no use was made of
ht have been saved.
or
altogether,
at
the infantry fire in preparation of the assault.
brigades had
fired, let
us sav,
fifty
rounds per
If the
man
into
must have killed some Dervishes, and
the subsequent attack would have been easier and
the zeriba, they
of their
and the spectacle of the assaulting
advancing on the entrenchments after an
weapons
columns
insufficient
open
advantage
Civilised troops should take full
cheaper.
fire till
;
artillery
and
preparation,
they were within a range
were on an equality with
those
of
disdaining
to
when
their rifles
the
Dervishes,
however magnificent it may be, suggests the hoghunter who dismounted from his horse, flung away his
spear, then dealt the boar a tremendous kick in
the throat, and eventuallv made an end of him with
his hands.
have alreadv discussed the bad boots and the
improvised bullets, which were the only dark spots on
the clothing and equipment of the British troops.
no occasion arose
at the
the disadvantage of the
is,
As
Atbara for magazine action,
bullets
however, one very delicate
was not
felt.
There
matter to which
SUMMER QUARTERS
IN
am
compelled to allude.
first
instance
by
'
beat
'
—
correspondents — that
first
has been said
It
several silly
Soudanese were the
461
the
the
and that they
at the zeriba,
Continuing
the British brigade.
in
absurd
this
competition, the different British regiments each con-
tend as to which of them was
I
first.
have received
three lucid statements from officers in the Lincolns, the
Seaforths,
and the Camerons.
All prove conclusively
own regiment had that doubtful honour. To
anyone who has followed the account of the assault in
that their
the last chapter the ridiculous nature of this dispute
will
The three brigades were formed
be apparent.
obliquely to the zeriba, so that naturally the right of
Maxwell's brigade was the earliest to strike
British,
The
it.
having the longest distance to cover, were of
course the
last.
Besides
this,
the Soudanese charged
over the final hundred yards of ground, as they were
marched
ordered, while the British
zeriba
is
in
up
to the
obedience to their different orders.
therefore
There
no especial merit in having been the
first
Indeed, the palm of honour
may
to reach the
enemy.
with reason be claimed by those
Highlanders
who
actual
truth
men
of the
to
is
close with the Dervishes.
that
the leading
by a
simultaneously, preceded
Yet
companies of
the Seaforths and the Lincolns entered the
Highlanders.
Cameron
continued to destroy the zeriba and
made no attempt
the
steadily
fringe of the
enclosure
Cameron
The Boyal Warwickshire Eegiment were
engaged in protecting the
left
flank from the possible
attack of the Dervish cavalry, and consequently did
not penetrate until a few moments
later.
THE RIVER
462
WAR
While the army was sweltering from the Atbara to
Darmali, the Sirdar shared their hardships. The utter
defeat of
Mahmud
attention,
his
brought him no
whole
great task which
soul,
His whole
rest.
was concentrated on the
was entrusted
As soon
to him.
as
he reached Berber after the victory, he held a parade
of
with
A
the troops.
all
flag's
;
on
this,
platform was erected and adorned
surrounded bv his
The Emir Mahmud,
took his stand.
Staff,
the General
hands bound
his
behind his back, was then compelled to march past at
the head of the army, preceded
on which was
by an enormous
inscribed in Arabic characters,
Mahmud, who
said he
'
flag,
This
is
Having
would take Berber"
thus enjoyed the pleasures of victory, the Sirdar turned
again to the conduct of the war.
For the
final
phase of the campaign three new
gunboats had been ordered from England.
now
These were
sent in sections over the desert railway.
Special
arrangements were made to admit of the clumsv loads
passing trains on the ordinary sidings.
As
usual, the
contrivances of the railway subalterns were attended
by success. Sir H. Kitchener himself proceeded
Abadia to accelerate by his personal activity and
genuity the construction of the vessels on which
to
in-
so
Here during the heat of the summer
he remained, nursing his gunboats, maturing his plans,
much
depended.
and waiting only
for the rise of the river to complete
the downfall of his foes.
END OF FIRST VOLUME
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