De Lima et.al vs. Gatdula Case Digest
G.R. No. 204528
Feb. 19, 2013
En Banc
FACTS:
Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila, directed against
petitioners.
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued summons and ordered the
petitioners to file an answer. He also set the case for hearing.
The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate for Amparo cases but the
Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied since an Amparo case is summary in nature,
thus, required an Answer.
The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda.
RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for namely:
Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.
The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 as enunciated in
Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?
2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ of Amparo?
3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?
4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?
5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs was correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was correct?
RULING:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule
could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary
procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a summary hearing only after the
Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not
filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.
4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
5. No. The decision was not correct. This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the
phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The
privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to
the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.
6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A Petition for Certiorari, on the
other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties
involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
HELD:
(1) NULLIFY all orders issued by the Judge in relation to this Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo case;
(2) DIRECT the Judge to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
Penned by: Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
MERALCO vs Lim G.R. No. 184769 Writ of
Habeas Data
JULY 5, 2018
FACTS:
Respondent Cherry Lim works as an administrative clerk at MERALCO. The HR directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa due to reports that there were accusations and
threats directed against her from unknown individuals, which could possibly compromise her safety and
security.
Lim appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on
the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the
grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions
on job security of their CBA, respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security.
Lim filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners claiming petitioners’
unlawful act and omission consisting of the latter failing to inform her of the cause of her transfer amounting
to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.
Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing
the following:
1. a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received
by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its
collection;
2. b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
3. c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply
with the disclosures required.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Writ of Habeas Data is the proper remedy.
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a
persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of amparo
and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right
under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on
the real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones
employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over
such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these
threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. And she even suspects that her
transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her
posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.