Europe-Asia Studies
ISSN: 0966-8136 (Print) 1465-3427 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20
Identity and Media-use Strategies of the Estonian
and Latvian Russian-speaking Populations Amid
Political Crisis
Triin Vihalemm, Jānis Juzefovičs & Marianne Leppik
To cite this article: Triin Vihalemm, Jānis Juzefovičs & Marianne Leppik (2019): Identity and
Media-use Strategies of the Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking Populations Amid Political
Crisis, Europe-Asia Studies, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2018.1533916
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1533916
Published online: 07 Jan 2019.
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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1533916
Identity and Media-use Strategies of the
Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking
Populations Amid Political Crisis
& MARIANNE LEPPIK
TRIIN VIHALEMM, JANIS
JUZEFOVICS
Abstract
In this essay, we examine the connections between media use and trust strategies, and the identity
development of the Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia in the context of the political
crisis in Ukraine. We argue against the levelling, uniform view of Russian-speaking audiences as being
completely under the influence of Russian media and thereby politically identifying themselves with the
Kremlin. We present a typology of Russian-speaking audiences, explain how they construct their identities
as audience members within these types in times of political crisis, and discuss how this self-identification
as audience members shapes the development of broader civic and ethnic identities among the Estonian
and Latvian Russian-speaking populations.
THE SOVIET-ERA RUSSIAN-SPEAKING SETTLERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS in the Baltic
countries of Estonia and Latvia currently form 33% and 37% of their total populations
respectively, numbering approximately 1.48 million people. They constitute a heterogeneous
group in terms of citizenship status, language knowledge, immigration generation and
degree of ethno-linguistic concentration. Many researchers who investigated the identities of
Russian-speaking populations in the Soviet Union successor states in the 1990s forecast a
diversity of identity formations among these populations instead of the development of a
common group consciousness (Subbotina 1997; Laitin 1998; Lebedeva 1998; Poppe &
Hagendoorn 2001; Kosmarskaya 2002; Vihalemm & Kalmus 2010). However, Russianspeaking populations share a common, potentially unifying, communicative base: the
Russian language and mass media. The majority of Russian-speakers spend several hours
per day watching Russian television channels.1 At the same time, most of them follow these
channels in conjunction with local—mainly Russian-language—media channels and, to a
lesser extent, Western media outlets (Juzefovics 2017; Leppik & Vihalemm 2017).
This work was supported by research funding from the Estonian Research Council (PUT1624). The
survey ‘Me. The World. The Media’ (2014) cited in the essay was supported by an Institutional Research
Grant (IUT20-38) from the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research.
1
On average, ethnic minority audiences in Latvia spend 2 hours 55 minutes per day watching
Russian television channels and 1 hour 5 minutes watching national channels (TNS Latvia,
January–June 2016).
# 2019 University of Glasgow
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1533916
2
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
The recent Russia–Ukraine conflict has triggered debates about the consolidating
impact on identity of propagandistic messages aimed at Russian-speaking audiences in
the Baltic states (Rozukalne 2014; Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015; Juzefovics 2017;
J~oesaar 2015a, 2015b; Berziņa 2016a, 2016b). In the local media and political
discourses, media use among Russian-speaking audiences2 has been seen as having a
negative effect on their identity-construction processes—that is, weakening their local
civic loyalty and consolidating their identities around Russia—and, hence, is conceived
of as a threat to national security. In these discourses, Russian-speaking audiences are
often portrayed as susceptible to ‘Kremlin propaganda’. For this reason, the Russian
state-controlled television channel Rossiya RTR was twice banned in Latvia: for three
months in 2014 and six months in 2016.3
Cheskin (2012) has stated that the influence of Russia should not be ignored but also
not overestimated in the identity-formation processes of Russian-speakers in the Baltic
states. We agree with this statement and offer a more complex typology of how
Russian-speaking audiences construct their identities as audience members and explain
the relationship between their strategies of media use and broader identity
construction patterns.
For contextualising purposes, we first explain the transnationalism approach to the
study of migrant identities and provide an overview of the literature on the identity
(trans)formation perspectives of Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking populations,
as well as introducing an overview of their media-use strategies based on a
secondary analysis of survey data. The original empirical evidence comes from a
qualitative focus group study on the quotidian identity construction strategies of
audience members.
Transnationalism as an explanatory framework
Most research on the identity and integration perspectives of Estonian and Latvian
Russian-speakers has been conducted from a nation-centric position. Here, the
acquisition of Estonian/Latvian language, naturalisation, frequent communication with
ethnic Estonians/Latvians, and consumption of national, public broadcast media are
taken as the ideal. Consequently, other activities are interpreted in a somewhat utilitarian
manner, either as supporting or hindering factors in achieving these goals. Only recently,
and in a few studies, has the concept of transnationalism figured in Estonian and Latvian
academic discourses (Lazda 2009; Birka 2013; Bela 2014; EHDR 2017).
2
The ethnic make-up of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia and Estonia is very diverse,
including ethnic Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other ethnicities. The mass survey data cited in this essay
do not provide statistically relevant information regarding the breakdown of Ukrainians and other ethnic
groups. The sample of focus-group participants included people with relatives in Ukraine. However, a
detailed discussion of the media use and media-related practices of ethnic Ukrainians in particular is
beyond the scope of this essay.
3
For further details see, ‘The Rebroadcasting of Rossiya RTR in Latvia Restricted’, NEPLP, 5
October 2014, available at: https://neplpadome.lv/en/home/news/news/the-rebroadcasting-of-rossiya-rtr-inlatvia-restricted.html, accessed 21 September 2018; ‘NEPLP Restricts Rebroadcasting and Distribution of
Rossiya RTR in Latvia for Six Months’, NEPLP, 19 April 2016, available at: https://neplpadome.lv/en/
home/news/news/neplp-restricts-rebroadcasting-and-distribution-of-rossiya-rtr-in-latvia-for-six-months.
html, accessed 21 September 2018.
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
3
The central argument of the transnationalism concept is that instead of progressive
movement from one society to another, migrants create and maintain parallel ties
(business, family, religious and so forth) across individuals’ societies of origin and
settlement (Glick Schiller 1992; Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Vertovec 2001).
Transnationalism can be conceptualised as a persistently dynamic and fraught condition,
where people’s expectations, norms, values and interactions develop in a configuration
of two or more socio-political and economic systems (Levitt 2011).
Media-use strategies are considered to play a crucial role in the formation of
transnational identities. Scholars point to the different possible effect of transnational
media practices on the development of broader identity-formation processes of these
audiences. According to some previous studies, transnational audience members use
‘interpreting lenses’ based on either the values and perceptions of the society of descent
(Vertovec 2004), or on the media culture of the host society (Adams & Ghose 2003;
Hepp et al. 2011). Thus, we may hypothesise that, in the longer term, transnational
audiences will develop into more diasporic or more localised subgroups. However, other
studies provide a counter-argument: they show that transnational audiences are involved
in the process of autonomy-seeking by developing ‘double consciousness’ (Golbert
2001): a comparative, critical view of the media content of both sending and receiving
societies (Robins & Aksoy 2003).
Empirical studies of the Russian-speaking audience in Estonia provide a basis to
argue that parallel consumption of Russian, local and sometimes Western media outlets
is connected with autonomy-seeking, both as audience members and citizens (Vihalemm
& Leppik 2018). The use of different information channels, especially in times of crisis,
is rationalised by an awareness of complex interwoven relations of power, with no sole
attributable control centre. This raises suspicions regarding the limits of knowledge and
the control of messengers, regardless of their geopolitical or institutional origin
(Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013a; Kiisel & Vihalemm 2014).
Consequently, the exercise of a critical, comparative interpretation of media content
can support the construction of multiple, hybrid identities. The studies refer to the
possible development of new distinctive (hybrid) identities as a consequence of
transnational practices of ‘in-between-ness’ (L€ofgren 2001; Nederveen Pieterse 2003;
Elias & Zeltser-Shorer 2006; Glick Schiller & Salazar 2013).
However, in times of political crises, the users of media of various geopolitical
origins frequently experience essentialising and polarising media discourses. Some
authors argue that the maintenance of a hybrid identity, in the context where one
frequently faces racist essentialising discourses, is not realistic (Madianou 2006).
Indeed, scholars investigating identity changes among young people of Muslim
background in Britain have reported that, amidst a backdrop of fear of rising
political radicalism, national ‘securitisation’ discourses demolish the hybrid,
civic–ethnic–religious identities formed during socialisation. Instead, they encourage the
consolidation of essentialising religious identities (Mythen 2012). These reports confirm
reactive identity theory, which conceptualises the growth of ethnic resentment and the
renaissance of ‘historical’ solidarities and identity symbols as a reaction of members of
the minority group to growing hostility and discrimination in the host society (Portes &
Rumbaut 2001).
4
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
In this study, we investigate how Estonian and Latvian Russian-speakers reflect on
their media-use strategies (their selection of news sources and interpretation of
information) in the context of the Ukraine crisis and the accompanying media/
information warfare, something we define here as a clash of ideologically opposed
media narratives that may involve political instrumentalisation of media institutions
and weaponisation of information operations for the sake of geopolitical gains. In
doing so, we aim to forecast their future identity developments. Firstly, we ask how
previously heterogeneous information selection strategies change in times of political
crisis: towards consolidation around particular information channels or towards
diversification of information channels and navigation between various ideological
discourses in the media. We assume that there are different strategies to manage the
situation and aim to describe these approaches. Secondly, we ask how these different
strategies of media use and information retrieval are connected with civic and ethnic
identity development.
Identity developments and media use among Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking
populations
The cultural and political allegiances of Russian-speakers living in post-Soviet successor
states and their possible political mobilisation have been subject to extensive academic
discussion since the 1990s, when the nation- and state-building process in Estonia and
Latvia formally commenced (Rose & Maley 1994; Laitin 1998; Pilkington 1998; Kolstø
2000; Poppe & Hagendoorn 2001; Kosmarskaya 2002, 2011; Commercio 2008;
Muiznieks 2010; Cheskin 2016). Much of the scholarly literature has emphasised
questions of identity, loyalties and the political mobilisation potential of this group.
Since the very beginning of the nation-building process in Estonia and Latvia,
researchers have pointed out the accommodationist nature of the social practices of
Russian minority members (Rose & Maley 1994; Laitin 1998; Romanov 2000).
Although the situations of the Russian-speaking populations somewhat differ in Estonia
and Latvia (Muiznieks et al. 2013; Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013b), researchers
generally agree that during the two decades of the transition, the ethno-linguistic
minority has primarily used individual, not collective, strategies to manage problems of
education, language and citizenship. This helps to explain why mass-protest
mobilisations have been short-term and rare.
It is worth recalling the discussions of the early 1990s, when most scholars
anticipated the gradual transformation of post-Soviet, state-led identity into new forms of
identities among the Baltic Russian-speakers. In contrast to the Soviet legacy view,
some scholars countered this thesis by noting that settlers who came to the Baltic states
had already became ‘Balticised’ in Soviet times, and that they largely maintained
localised territorial identities and communication networks during the transition period
(Melvin 1995). Some authors have pointed to ‘locality’ as a hybrid form of
identification: ‘a form of living that is more complex than “community”, more symbolic
than “society”; more connotative than “country”; less patriotic than “patrie”’ (Bhabha
1990, p. 292). Local communication networks and self-positioning may also contribute
to how individuals make personal sense of the media war and discourses of
identification.
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
5
Although there are no directly comparable data, existing research (Vihalemm &
Masso 2007; Vihalemm 2008; Tabuns 2010; Vihalemm & Kalmus 2010) suggests that
before the onset of the political crisis in Ukraine, there were four basic patterns of
identity development among the Russian-speaking populations of Estonia and Latvia: an
ethno-cultural (minority) identity, mainly referring to commonly shared and distinctive
cultural attributes, such as language and religion; an emerging civic identity, combining
elements of ethno-linguistic distinctiveness and territorial/local identity; a diaspora
identity, fed by Soviet nostalgia and attachment to Russian imperial attitudes and
worldview; and a cosmopolitan identity, constructed from a European or global
standpoint and correlated with consumerist values.
The survey evidence in Estonia shows that self-identification with the general
category of ‘Russians’ (without any specification of country of habitation) increased
from 56% in 2003 to 75% in 2014 (University of Tartu 2014). The sense of togetherness
with the local ethnic minority group ‘Estonian Russians’ remained the same (52% in
both years). At the same time, solidarity with the broader civic category ‘all inhabitants
of Estonia’ became less widespread (42% in 2003, and 41% in 2014). A cosmopolitan
self-identification with Europeans increased from 18% in 2003 to 28% in 2014.
In a similar survey conducted in Latvia in 2010, Latvia’s Russians expressed a far
stronger ‘we-group’ sense of belonging to the ethnic minority group ‘Russians living in
Latvia’ (68%) than to the broader civic group ‘all citizens of Latvia’ (32%), Russians
living in Russia (31%), Russian-speakers all around the world (25%) or to Europeans
(16%) (University of Latvia 2010). However, we lack more recent data to judge whether
the recent geopolitical tensions have affected the solidarity felt by Latvia’s Russians
with various groups.
As mentioned above, cosmopolitanism is an important factor in analysing identity
developments. As survey data indicate, especially among the younger generation,
cosmopolitan or ‘Western’ aspirations are attractive, often including an emancipatory
resistance to the restored nation-state construct (Vihalemm & Kalmus 2010). National
identity, as constructed by ethnic Estonians and Latvians, has been strongly centred
around the language and culture of the ethno-linguistic majority. The motivation to learn
Estonian or Latvian language because of the desire to belong to the same group as
ethnic Estonians or Latvians is low among the Russian-speakers (Vihalemm 2012). This
may enhance the formation of ethno-cultural identity as a defensive minority identity
(Castells 1997). Some empirical studies suggest that Russian-speakers have used the
same pattern as the titular groups in their identity construction: making the Russian
language a central attribute of positive self-esteem, they develop an ‘ethnicised’ identity,
identifying themselves as a local ethnic minority (Vihalemm 2008; Vihalemm & Kalmus
2010). The ‘ethnicisation’ tendency has been paradoxically supported by Russia: in the
Yel’tsin era, the policies and messages addressed to those who remained outside the
borders of the Russian Federation were unsystematic and vague and therefore did not
offer Russian-speakers living in Estonia and Latvia a substitute for their lost Soviet
identity (Kosmarskaya 2002; Jakobson 2002). Today, Putin’s strong Russian
assertiveness is attractive to segments of the Russian-speaking minority but it came
fairly late, preceded by a decade of ethnic, language-centred minority identification
among Russians living in the Baltic states. Empirical measurements have shown that the
6
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
restructuring of these identities and value structures has developed considerably more
slowly than the changes to Russia’s institutional approach (Vihalemm & Kalmus 2010).
Thus, it is hard to estimate how the local minority identity that started forming in the
1990s has changed in the context of the more imperialistic ideology of the Russian
Federation that was cultivated from the start of the 2000s and, finally, how it is
currently developing amidst the on-going geopolitical tensions.
One possible path of development is the polarisation of Russian-speaking audiences
into more Russia-oriented and more locally oriented subgroups.4 Another path is the
formation of common local group solidarity, based on the desire to maintain stability
and physical security. This kind of common solidarity requires a certain anti-essentialism
and a readiness to accept different, mixed forms of self-identification. Comparative
research into individual identity representations of Russians living in the Russian
Federation and Estonia shows that Estonian Russian-speakers tend to avoid the use of
essentialising categories when defining their ‘Russianness’ compared with Russians
living in Russia (Vihalemm & Kaplan 2017). The analysis below is aimed at clarifying
how Russian-speaking audiences in Estonia and Latvia explain their information
selection and interpretation strategies within the framework of essentialising compared to
mixed and negotiable identity constructs: as citizens, ethnic group members and
media consumers.
The identity developments of Russian-speakers in the Baltic states shape and are
shaped by their media usage practices. The spread and development of national language
skills among local Russians have proceeded rather slowly in both Estonia and Latvia
(Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013b), and the media systems (in terms of institutions,
journalistic culture and media use) have remained linguistically rather separated
(Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013a). Following the Soviet era, local Russian-language
media systems in both countries were (trans)formed by market forces and technological
developments. The newspaper and magazine consumption that prevailed in Soviet times
and in the early 1990s (Vihalemm 2012) declined quickly. Today the media habits of
Estonian and Latvian Russian-speakers are generally characterised by the consumption of
broadcast and online media channels, the spread of personalised media devices, and the
fragmentation and optimisation of information offered by media enterprises. As noted
earlier, according to their media-related practices, the Russian-speaking populations in
both countries can be considered transnational. Indeed, 92% of the Russian-speaking
population in Estonia claims to follow at least one media channel originating in Russia
every day, 89% of Russian-speakers in Estonia claim to use at least one local media
channel either in the Estonian or Russian language on a regular basis, and 49% report
regularly following at least one non-Russian foreign channel (University of Tartu 2014).
Similarly, in Latvia, 59% of its Russian-speakers report regularly using Russian media
for news and 48% say the same about Latvian media, while 10% report using Western
media as a news source on a regular basis. According to this same survey, 97% of
Russian-speakers in Latvia get their news from Russian-language media, both homegrown and Russian-origin, and 54% use Latvian-language media (Berziņa 2016a). The
4
Local orientation here does not necessarily signify pro-Estonia/Latvia or pro-Western political
loyalties, but rather deliberation and frequent communication on political events from the perspectives of
local security and stability.
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
7
TABLE 1
TRUST IN MEDIA CHANNELS AMONG RUSSIAN-SPEAKING AUDIENCES IN ESTONIA AND
LATVIA, 2008 AND 2014
Estonia
Trust in
media channels
Local PSB
television
channels
Russian-language
broadcasts on
local
PSB channels
Local commercial
television
channels
(including
Russian-language
TV5 in Latvia)3
Russian television
channels
(excluding PBK)
PBK
Western news media
Local PSB radio
(including a
Russianlanguage channel)
Local Russianlanguage
news portals
Social media
Latvia
2008 20111
2014 20152
2008
2014
19%
19%
59%
29%
60%1
25%2
Missing data
Missing data
15%
16%
57%
50%
54%1
51%2
74%
71%
70%1
Missing data
55%1
45%2
18%2
26%2
64%
Missing data
49%
77%
22.5%
27%
47%1
21%2
43%
34%
Missing data
18%
Missing data
23%
Sources: For Latvia: Human Development Report, University of Latvia/SKDS (2008); ‘Audit of Democracy’,
University of Latvia/SKDS (2014); ‘Attitude towards Television’, State Chancellery/SKDS (2014). For Estonia:
‘Me. The World. Media’ (2008, 2014), University of Tartu/Saar-Poll; Integration Monitoring, Ministry of
Culture/Emor TNS (2011); Integration Monitoring, Ministry of Culture/Turu-uuringute AS (2015).
Notes: 1The data are from Integration Monitoring 2011 survey. Respondents were asked if they trusted the
named channel as a source of information on the problems and future of Russian-language schools. 2The data
are from the Integration Monitoring 2015 survey. Respondents were asked if they trusted the named channel as
a source of information about events in Ukraine. 3In early 2016 the channel was closed due to financial
difficulties. Answers were placed on a four-point scale from ‘trust completely’ to ‘rather trust’. Please note that
in Estonia questions about trust in information sources were asked in relation to a particular topic: in 2011
about the problems and future of Russian-language schools and in 2015 about the events in Ukraine.
media use of Russian-speakers in both countries has been thoroughly analysed elsewhere
(Jakobson 2002; Sulmane
2006, 2010; Juzefovics 2012, 2017; Vihalemm 2012;
Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013a; Rozukalne 2014; J~oesaar & Rannu 2014; J~oesaar et al.
2014). In order to provide an empirical, quantitative framework for this study we have
compiled a comparative picture of the attitudes of Russian-speaking audiences towards
different information sources (see Table 1). The answers examine trust and may reflect
general evaluations more than the frequency of actual use: some highly valued channels
may be used only in extraordinary situations, while otherwise frequently used channels
are considered less trustworthy (Vihalemm 2012). Thus the proportions in Table 1 reflect
8
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
imagined ‘normalities’: which channels are more trustworthy and important in forming
the ‘personal infrastructure of knowledge’.
Over the years, Russian television channels have continued to be trusted sources of
news for Russian-speakers in both countries, although Estonian Russian-speakers, in the
context of political crisis in Ukraine, tend to be more sceptical of Pervyi Baltiiskii Kanal
(PBK), the Baltic version of the state-owned, pro-Putin Russian Pervyi Kanal. We
cannot compare the trends in trust of Western news channels as they were not included
in the 2008 surveys, but their credibility is low, close to the local public state
broadcasting (PSB) channels. Although social media are considered relatively important
news sources, social normativity seems to evoke scepticism concerning the information
coming from them. Trust in local PSB television channels has recently decreased
remarkably; this is likely (partly) due to the poor relationships between the Baltic states
and Russia amid the political conflict over Ukraine. The difference in trust in Russianlanguage broadcasts when they cover local educational questions and the Ukraine crisis
demonstrates the shift vividly. The low trust in the local public television channel in
Estonia indicates that what is seen as ‘state television’, mainly airing Estonian-language
content, is regarded with scepticism. This is also the case with Latvia, where, in the
eyes of Russian-speakers, the Latvian public television channel LTV is heavily
associated with the power elite, much distrusted by both the ethno-linguistic minority
and majority (Juzefovics 2017). This, combined with their focus on entertainment, also
explains why in Latvia local private television channels, especially the Russian-language
TV5, are more trusted than PSB channels.
To sum up, according to the analytical categories described by Moring and
Godenhjelm (2011, p. 184) in their study of minority media landscapes, the Estonian
and Latvian media systems can be characterised as being very close to ‘institutional
completeness’, wherein a country provides media services for a minority (language)
group, but quite far from ‘functional completeness’, wherein the group depends on these
services in its media use (Juzefovics 2017). At present, a self-sustaining condition has
formed: the relatively small Russian-language media market (with fewer than 1.5 million
consumers) is fractured into various public and private substructures. This is also
mirrored on the demand side: the media consumption patterns of Russian-speakers are
heterogeneous. It requires considerable (subsidy) capital from the new content producers,
such as the ETV þ venture, Estonia’s recently launched public service Russian-language
television channel, to enter the market successfully, whereas the fragmentation trend is
part of wider global trends and cannot be stopped.
Another important trend is that participation in the public information sphere is
temporally limited and fragmented: increasingly, people do not follow daily news on
conventional media outlets but get their information from social media. For instance,
54% of Estonia’s Russian-speakers do not follow, on a daily basis, national Estonian
news through established media organisations (University of Tartu 2014). Thus,
information gathering is situational, occurring in an ad hoc manner through following
the online posts of friends and acquaintances.
Below, we analyse the impact of these patterns on information-seeking and
interpretation strategies in the context of the political crisis in Ukraine, accompanied by
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
9
ideological battles in the media. To address these issues a qualitative approach was
employed, allowing participants a more active role. We aimed to explain how members
of the Russian-speaking audience imagine the power relations between media institutions
and state powers, how they discuss journalistic work practices, and how they define the
nature of media texts/images: do they consider them to be artefacts constructed by
media professionals or reflections of reality? Likewise, we wanted to know how they
think and talk about themselves as media consumers, viewing media consumption as a
crucial element in identity construction.
Methodology
Informal interviews were chosen as an appropriate means to look at the issue from the
perspective of individual media users. Since the focus of our study was how implicit
social norms shape individuals’ identity constructions, focus group interviews were
chosen because of their semi-public and interactive nature. In employing this method,
we were, however, aware that the participants’ responses would be articulated in a
particular context: informal conversations with people of similar ethno-linguistic
backgrounds on politically delicate topics. The empirical analysis is based on a series of
focus group discussions with members of Russian-speaking communities in Latvia and
Estonia from late 2014 to early 2015: a time when the Russia–Ukraine crisis featured
prominently in national, Russian, Ukrainian and Western news media. The focus groups
were carried out in the capital cities Rıga and Tallinn and also in other cities with
significant Russian-speaking minority populations (see Appendix).
In Latvia, focus groups were conducted by the local public opinion research company
SKDS, who were commissioned by the Latvian authorities amid the Ukraine crisis and
in the context of plans by Latvian public television to open a new Russian-language
channel. During these focus group discussions, members of the Russian-speaking
community were asked about their television viewing habits and their attitudes towards
various offerings on television. Our study uses a secondary analysis of transcripts of
these group discussions. In Estonia focus groups were carried out as part of a University
of Tartu research project. Participants were invited to discuss representations of the
Ukraine crisis on the basis of different texts, and to reflect on their news media practices
more generally. In both countries, the main focus was on informants’ media practices
and media-related perceptions: namely, how Russian-speaking audiences make sense of
news media institutions and their messages and, equally important, how these audiences
position themselves as media users.
We are aware of the limitations of a cross-country comparative study of the kind
presented in this essay. We acknowledge that given the differences in fieldwork design,
as well as other, more general differences between the Latvian and Estonian cases, data
from both countries are not directly comparable. However, we believe that the prevailing
discourses that emerged from the focus group interviews allow us to make general
comparisons.
After a close reading of the interview texts, a coding framework was developed on
the basis of empirical evidence and theoretical concepts (explained below). The
10
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
recurring topics that emerged after the initial close examination of the transcripts were
later explored further and interpreted with the help of analytical tools of discourse and
narrative analysis. The categories of analysis used in this essay are: personal standpoints
regarding the Russia–Ukraine conflict; self-positioning regarding ‘competing truths’, that
is, the conflicting conceptions of the crisis as mediated via different news sources;
understanding of the nature of media texts as reflections of reality or constructed
artefacts; plurality of news media repertoire; self-positioning as ‘expert’ media users or
as confused ‘layman’ users; and self-reported levels of uncertainty, weariness and
escapism in regard to the media coverage of the political crisis in Ukraine.
The standpoints regarding the Russia–Ukraine conflict were divided into pro-Kremlin
and anti-Kremlin/pro-Ukrainian positions as two opposing poles and more uncertain inbetween positions. These positions are closely connected with self-positioning regarding
the conflicting conceptions of the crisis as mediated via different news sources and selfreported levels of uncertainty, weariness and escapism.
The news media repertoire was coded as either heterogeneous or homogeneous, with
the former being defined as a media diet consisting of news sources of different
geopolitical leanings that most often included news media of different geopolitical origins
(and in different languages). Accordingly, the homogeneous media repertoire was defined
as a non-plural media diet containing sources of news of uniform geopolitical orientation.
The understandings of the nature of media texts, trust-building strategies and selfpositioning as media users were interconnected. In creating the category of how the
news media was understood, we drew on the basic categories used in reception analysis
studies that are incorporated into conceptual mapping by Michelle (2007). Firstly, there
are strategies built on the conviction that media texts mirror reality (the belief that more
authentic information is more reliable). Secondly, there are strategies that are built on
the conviction that media texts/images are social constructions produced by journalists
and other content creators (the belief that there is no objective reality). Self-positioning
regarding the conflicting conceptions of the crisis as mediated through different news
sources was analysed via convictions regarding the ‘truth’, where the conviction that
‘there is no truth at all’ is at one end of the continuum and the conviction of the
existence of a firm ‘truth’ is at the other end. By ‘trust-building strategies’ we mean the
rationalisation of trust in information presented in the media (‘why I trust … ’), in other
words, the decisions about objectivity, authenticity and political motivation behind
information production. Uncertainty depended to a great extent on the convictions
regarding the ‘truth’ in media texts.
In analysing moments of identity construction as media users, we were influenced by
positioning theory (Harre & Van Langenhove 1999). During the analysis, we developed
two empirical positions: the expert position, demonstrated via the skills and will to
determine truth and avoid media indoctrination; and the layman position, demonstrated
via a lack of expertise and will to ‘sort out’ contradictory representations of reality in
the media.
It is best to think of these trust-building and self-positioning strategies as situated
along a continuum instead of being dichotomous. In the following analysis, we first
explain the categories and then present a typology based on the interrelations of
these categories.
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
11
Results
Respondents admitted that the political crisis in Ukraine, characterised by an overload of
conflicting news messages, made them more active news media users. Consequently,
they followed news more frequently and expanded their news media repertoires.
Ukraine-related news from different sources was compared. In addition to Russian and
national Russian-language (and in some cases also titular-language) news sources,
respondents mentioned the use of Western, Ukrainian and Belarusian media outlets and
word-of-mouth information obtained via online and offline social networks. Russianspeaking audiences’ activation of transnational communication and information-seeking
during the Ukraine crisis was similar to ‘expanded transnationalism’, defined by
Guarnizo and Smith (1998) as temporarily increased and widened following of the
media of the historical homeland among diasporic audiences during political crises or
natural disasters.
This extensive exposure to conflicting information had varying durations. Some
respondents reported weariness and confusion, which they resolved by no longer
following political news, a fact that was emphasised in their self-positioning during
group discussions. Other respondents actively engaged with political news, following
discussions about news topics or political debates on television and in other media.
Strategies of (dis)trust
Strategies of trust regarding everyday decisions about objectivity, authenticity and
political motivation behind the news were closely linked with general understandings of
the nature of media texts. Respondents’ understandings of the nature of media texts, in
the context of an ideological conflict, were divided broadly into three subgroups: those
who made a distinction between constructions and reflections; those who made a
distinction between more and less truthful constructions; and those who saw all media
texts as equally untruthful constructions. Audience members in the first group believed
‘depicted persons and events … to be transparent reflections of an external “real”
world’ (Michelle 2007, p. 196) if this information came from ideologically trusted media
channels. Unmediated real-life encounters, be they personal experience or eyewitness
accounts via interpersonal communication, were considered significant sources of
authenticity, or ‘sources of referential information’ (Michelle 2007, p. 200). Even if, in
some cases, the limited capacity of ‘witnesses’ was recognised, their physical proximity
to the events provided them with credible ‘authenticity’ (for example, relatives living
close to the battlefield). News coming from ideologically mistrusted media channels was
considered to be constructed by journalists, lacking authenticity and untrustworthy.
The members of the second subgroup did not draw clear distinctions between media
reflections and media constructions. Their trust strategies were based on the belief that
some media constructions were more truthful (closer to reflections of reality) than
others. Accordingly, alongside convincing visual evidence, it was a mixture of expertise
(being well-informed, proximity), performance and charisma that made news messages
on Russian television more trustworthy than on the national channels. The use not of
neutral mediators but of journalistic opinion-leaders mixing the roles of expert and
12
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
performer also attracted audiences to a confrontation of different worldviews on
Russian television.
Audience members belonging to the third subgroup saw all media texts as equal
constructions of reality. Instead of relying on first-hand, unmediated experiences of
reality, they relied primarily on their own analytical capacities to ‘sort out’ the mediated
reality of mass media. In group discussions, these individuals talked about their personal
encounters with cynical propaganda in the media, for example, digitally altered images
or broadcasts of videos taken from other contexts (such as Chechnya) as evidence of the
events in Ukraine.
Self-positioning as a media user
Two dominant strategies of self-positioning as media users emerged in the context of
excessive volumes of diverse and clashing conceptions of the Ukraine crisis as mediated
through different information sources: the ‘smart’ media user (‘expert’) and the
‘helpless, confused’ media user (‘layperson’).
The smart user/expert positioning involved elements of critical and selective media
use: the ability to distinguish between media reflections and media constructions; the
capacity to separate more ‘truthful’, realistic media constructions from those less
‘truthful’; and the aptitude to ‘discover the truth’ between various media constructions.
This also appeared to be the strategy of neutralising media indoctrination (or at least
producing a feeling of being immune to it). In the following example, the respondent
talks about her use of multiple news sources and the employment of rigorous
information processing procedures in order to negotiate incompatible streams of
information. Interestingly, this is presented as a skill inherited from her experience under
Soviet rule:
I watch both Latvian and Russian channels. To balance … . Just like during Soviet times
people listened to BBC radio and Russian [Soviet] media, then put it all together and divided
by two, and then they got something … . Today we have the same situation with Latvian and
Russian channels. Political motives are present in both cases. That’s for sure. On Russian
channels there is pro-Russian news, while Latvian channels provide news from the point of
view of Latvia. Hence, you need to listen to both, and then you get something that is
in between.5
In the eyes of some respondents, non-mainstream news sources, including social
media, are of greater value than established news media. There are also some extreme
examples in which individuals replaced the gathering of political information from
media organisations with learning via word-of-mouth. Additionally, individuals
emphasised their independence from mainstream news sources to differentiate
themselves positively from fellow audience members, as ‘experts’ rather than ‘dupes’.
Another self-positioning consisted of a self-reported lack of interest and/or lack of
expertise in geopolitics and news, confusion and uncertainty, as well as other forms of
civic self-disempowerment. For example, 31-year-old Yuliya from Tallinn, in discussing
the news about NATO’s increased presence in Estonia, positioned herself as an average,
Irina, 56, Rıga.
5
Self-positioning as
‘expert’ media
user or as
confused
‘layman’ user
Self-reported level of
uncertainty in
regard to media
coverage of the
political crisis
in Ukraine
Self-positioning
regarding
‘competing truths’
Plurality of
news sources
Understanding of the
nature of media
texts: reflections
of reality or
constructed
artefacts
Standpoint regarding
the
Russia–Ukraine
conflict
Subtype 2
‘moderate loyalist’
Constructed (though
reality
constructions of
‘our’ news sources
are more truthful
than reality
constructions of
‘their’
news sources)
Smart, expert
Moderate
‘Our’ news sources
as reflections
of reality
No or low
Smart, expert
High
Little
Strong geopolitical
Moderate geopolitical
allegiance: proallegiance: proKremlin/antiKremlin/antiWestern
Western
sentiments or
sentiments or
vice versa
vice versa
‘There is one truth
ore truthful than others’
Subtype 1 ‘hardline loyalist’
‘Loyalist’
Subtype 2
‘neutral optimistic’
High
‘There is a truth
in-between’
High
Smart, expert
Constructed
Helplessconfused, layman
‘There is no truth’
Impartial
self-positioning
Subtype 1 ‘neutral
pessimistic’
‘Neutral’
TABLE 2
TYPOLOGY OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKING AUDIENCES IN LATVIA AND ESTONIA
High
Helplessconfused, layman
Not discussed
‘Do not (want to)
know where the
truth is’
Little
Apolitical selfpositioning
‘Apolitical’
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
13
14
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
worried citizen who has little expertise in understanding complicated, contradictory
political issues and who, in common with other laypeople, is a passive object in the
hands of elites who are motivated by money:
Naturally, we are carefully following what is going on in Ukraine, because it really is very
disturbing. This is geopolitics, which is difficult to comprehend and evaluate. Anyway we
understand now that all this is going on for money, for someone’s ambitions or desires, and the
people here are like raw material. Of course, we are in the Alliance area, and we need to
understand the risks to our security. But can you ever, following the developments in Ukraine,
know what’s really going on? … Russian, American and Ukrainian media each give one type
of information, and Estonians give another.6
It was typical of respondents presenting themselves as non-experts to take a
distanced, somewhat non-committal position towards complicated, uneasy questions
about the Ukraine crisis in the group discussions.
Audience typology in the context of political crisis
The media trust strategies and self-positioning as media consumers, as described above,
interacted in various ways with ideological positions vis-a-vis the Russia–Ukraine
conflict and the self-reported levels of uncertainty, weariness and escapism. The
typology presented below explains these combinations. These types are not clear-cut and
fixed entities; they overlap and a single audience member may opt for different
strategies under different circumstances. However, in the context of the political crisis in
Ukraine, transnational audiences crystallised into distinct types (see Table 2).
The first type represents the consolidated loyalty position, characterised by little
plurality in personal news sources, and an understanding of the news media as
instruments in the hands of the power establishment. Trust in news sources supporting
one’s geopolitical allegiances (either pro-Kremlin/anti-Western sentiments or vice versa)
was very strong. For these respondents, ‘if what is on the news corresponds to my
worldview, then that for me is the truth’.7 In the context of an ideological conflict, facts
and opinions that were provided by the news sources of supported parties were assumed
to be ‘transparent reflections of an external “real” world’ (Michelle 2007, p. 196), while
the opponents’ information was seen as constructed. These respondents positioned
themselves as smart media users able to distinguish between the two.
Many such users held strong pro-Kremlin views and were highly loyal followers of
Russian state television. In this respect, we can observe some link with the identity
pattern we earlier labelled ‘diaspora identity’ in combination with elements of the ethnocultural (minority) identity pattern. The Estonian survey data reported above indirectly
support this assumption, showing a recent increase in self-categorisation as ‘Russian’
(without any specification of country of habitation), while the self-identification with
‘Estonian Russians’ remained stable. Other survey data show that Latvia’s Russianspeakers were more ready to accept official Russian news discourse when it came to the
Ukraine crisis, but were more resistant when it dealt with Latvian national issues
6
Yuliya, 31, Tallinn.
Alla, 51, Rıga.
7
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
15
(Berziņa 2016a, 2016b). Consequently, while a number of focus group respondents in
the eastern region of Latgale, bordering Russia, expressed strong pro-Kremlin attitudes,
they opposed any potential separatist sentiments in their region.
Nevertheless, holding a consistent pro- or anti-Kremlin position was not necessarily
connected with homogeneous news media repertoires. Another subtype of audience
members holding certain ideological sentiments can be labelled moderate, characterised
by the use of plural news sources because of an interest in diverse viewpoints, including
oppositional ones. Members of this group acknowledged that at the global level there
were plenty of different media institutions offering information and viewpoints framed
in various and conflicting ways for consumers to choose in order to ‘form your own
opinion’.8 These globally focused, consumerist sentiments resemble some elements of
the identity pattern we earlier categorised as ‘emancipatory identity’. However, rather
than articulating pro-Western sentiments, audience members with multiple media
repertoires and emancipatory orientations were also the most critical of media
institutions, and the most likely group to express disappointment about what was
published in the media (Leppik & Vihalemm 2017).
Negotiated and conditional trust-building strategies were often paired with a general
understanding of news media operations as politically or economically motivated. In
these cases, the audience members’ own selective assessment of media content was
often presented as a source of autonomy (agency), allowing the media user to be (or at
least to feel) immune and resistant to media propaganda or ‘mass indoctrination’.9
Various trust-building strategies were thus employed, such as attempts to assess visual
evidence or preferring information providers who were physically close to the events,
and the watching of court-like confrontational, infotainment-style political debate shows;
this all produced feelings of authenticity that, in turn, allowed consumers to ‘pick sides’.
For example, for 57-year-old Dimitrii from Tallinn:
I like ‘Echo of Moscow’, a radio station; I recommend it! There is an opportunity to express
opposing opinions, even extremely contradictory opinions, and you have a right to choose. The
opportunity to analyse, to think, to choose, to understand the situation.10
The literature notes that emotional engagement (signified by referential reading) in
conjunction with intellectual analysis (signified by critical reading) can support learning,
that is, the acquisition of new knowledge (Parsemain 2016). In such cases, individuals
are able to shift between referential (media as mirror of real life) and critical,
constructivist approaches. It is the shifting modalities of reception that characterise the
moderate audience subtype, facilitating civic engagement and curiosity. Here the belief
that all news media institutions are politically orchestrated (often derived from the
Soviet experience) combines with a feeling of being part of an imagined transnational
audience with free choices regarding information sources and meaning-making. It is
likely that, despite moments of uncertainty and fatigue, people enjoy this: this audience
subtype is characterised by interplays and juxtapositions between enthusiasm and fatigue
Nikolai, 37, Rıga.
Vladimir, 47, Rıga.
10
Dimitrii, 57, Tallinn.
8
9
16
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
regarding news flows. This can be seen in the following example, where trust in Russian
state media is mixed with confusion and escapist sentiments:
Don’t know whom to believe, to be honest. [I believe] Russian channels more. But I still don’t
know whom to believe. Sometimes I switch off the television when I think ‘I’m sick and tired
of the news and will stop watching it’. In the evening I manage to do without the news but
then the next morning [I watch it again] … . It’s an addiction.11
This may be another side of the identity pattern combining the enjoyment and
compulsion arising from the exercise of institutionally non-prescribed individual freedom
as media consumers. This also has some connection with the emancipatory
identity pattern.
There are also two subtypes of ‘neutral’ audience. These groups are characterised by
scepticism towards media channels and reticence in taking sides regarding the conflict
between Ukraine and Russia. In these cases, the ideal of a liberal media system with
neutral journalistic practices for the sake of the public interest is hardly compatible with
the realities of a political crisis and mediated ideological opposition. This creates a sense
of pessimism, uncertainty and general distrust. At the same time, the hope of
discovering ‘some grain of rationality’12 or ‘a piece of truth’13 adds a temporary
optimism. Such ‘neutral’ audience members fluctuated between the more pessimistic and
more optimistic subtypes. The use of diverse news sources is not a source of enjoyment,
as it is for the previous ‘moderate loyalist’ subtype; the crisis situation is accompanied
by a high level of uncertainty and, in the case of the ‘pessimistic’ state, a sense of
helplessness. As media users, they are aware of the constructed nature of media content
and the limits of audience members in deconstructing these messages and assessing their
authenticity. For audiences of the pessimistic subtype, the only possible response to
contradictory interpretations of reality is scepticism and suspicion regarding media
institutions and their messages:
Are there any Russian troops (in Ukraine)? … it is not clear where the truth is. There is not
much to talk about; the topic is too controversial. … everyone will defend his point of view,
and we ordinary readers, who are not present in the Donbas, cannot check if the Russian troops
are there. This is probably the main disadvantage of modern [mass media].14
Similar to the loyalist type of audiences, everyday experience is highly valued in the
pessimistic subtype of neutral audiences. This is seen in the conviction that there are no
reliable representations of the conflict as mediated via media organisations, and that you
can only rely on personal experience: the belief that one has to go to Ukraine and see
with one’s own eyes.
The optimistic subtype group employ similar understandings and ideals about the
media system and the constructed nature of media texts. However, they also exercise a
smart consumer self-positioning by hoping, via encounters with a miscellaneous
11
Igor, 41, Liepaja.
Boris, 65, Rıga.
13
Anastasiya, 30, Rıga.
14
Alexei, 25, Tallinn.
12
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
17
collection of news sources, to extract ‘the truth’ in between: an ‘average/middle’
viewpoint, or a grey zone, where black-and-white extremes can be negotiated and
reconciled instead of having to choose between opposing viewpoints. In so doing, these
audience members also employ elements of the ‘emancipatory identity’ pattern; they
tend to avoid essentialising identities and, instead, prefer hybrid identities which provide
a space in between different national allegiances: ‘I intentionally read both the Latvian
[-language] and Russian [-language] [local internet news site] Delfi. … When there are
highly different opinions, none of the sides are right’.15 In contrast to loyalist audience
members who rely heavily on word-of-mouth as a source of news, along with
established institutional news sources, ‘neutral optimistic’ audiences rely primarily on
their own analytical capacities on the basis of mediated contents.
Finally, there is a group of audience members who position themselves as being
neither loyalist nor neutral but ‘apolitical’ in their geopolitical attitudes. These people
report little interest in, and also little understanding of, the conflict, as well as its
representations in the media. Here little variety in news sources correlates with a high
degree of confusion and escapist sentiments. This shows that individuals who do not
even engage in the practice of following various sources of news can suffer from
significant confusion. This conclusion is supported by the findings of survey research
done in Estonia examining the connections between the use of multiple news sources
and opinion formation about the news on the shooting down of the Malaysian passenger
aeroplane MH17 in Ukraine in the summer of 2014 (Vihalemm & Leppik 2018). Here
the state of confusion might be as much a cause as an effect of the absence of a
multiplicity of news sources.
While Guarnizo and Smith (1998) note that ‘extended transnationalism’ emerges in
times of crises, it is important to understand that, in the case of the Ukrainian conflict,
the crisis has lasted for a long time; people admit that they are getting tired and
confused and report avoiding news about Ukraine. Some of the respondents who fell
into the apolitical subtype claimed their avoidance to be a temporary condition: from
time to time, they opted in and out of following the news about the events in Ukraine.
This seemed to also be the experience of 55-year-old Nadezhda from Daugavpils. For
her, (temporary) escapist sentiments seemed to be the result of the conflicting bilingual,
Latvian-language and Russian-language news flows her family was exposed to in their
day-to-day news media practices:
I prefer watching Discovery. You watch one channel—they say this, then you watch another
channel—they say something different. Why should I watch it? … It’s better to watch
something about nature and enjoy it … . Sometimes, of course, you want to know what will
happen there [in Ukraine] next.16
For others, opting out of news and politics was something that coincided with their
general media practices during ‘peaceful’ (non-crisis) times. Here, the political crisis in
Ukraine had simply amplified their pre-existing apolitical sentiments. However, as the
case of 30-year-old Nikita from Rıga suggests, because of the omnipresence of political
Lana, 60, Rıga.
Nadezhda, 55, Daugavpils.
15
16
18
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
information during the time of crisis, some individuals may have experienced a shortlived wave of politicisation:
I do not follow politics much, only recently … . It is senseless [to follow politics] as you
cannot influence it much. I was initially interested in the situation in Ukraine. I followed it for
some time but then realised that there was no sense in it … . I understood the essence of the
conflict, the positions of all sides … . And I stopped watching [the news about the events in
Ukraine]; the story is not interesting to me anymore.17
This kind of escapist strategy, compensating for unpleasant media content by
replacing it with less painful content, may also be a way to maintain hybrid, in-between
identities and avoid the consolidation and essentialisation of one’s identity which
implicitly appears in media discourses. As observed in previous research, both in
Estonia and Latvia consumerist mental patterns are used to maintain positive self-esteem
(Kalmus & Vihalemm 2008). This approach may therefore also help to deal with
complicated issues of geopolitics.
Conclusions
The depiction of the Russian-speaking population as a pro-Russia loyalist audience,
which dominates Estonian and Latvian public discourse, is only partly justified. This
analysis, instead, reveals five subtypes of audiences and shows different ways the
audience members strove towards autonomy as media users.
Audience members holding consolidated ideological loyalties can be divided into
two subtypes. The first subtype is characterised by a narrow media repertoire and a
strong belief that media texts of ‘our’ side are mirrors of life, but are artificial
constructs when they carry oppositional ideology. These media-related strategies
support the consolidation of ethno-diasporic identity. This type generally corresponds
with the popular view of the ‘Russia-minded’ audience in Estonian and
Latvian societies.
The members of the second subtype also hold a certain ideological allegiance,
but their media-use strategies are characterised by endeavours for a plurality of
information sources and opinions, motivated by the wish to draw individual
conclusions and locate information that they consider authentic. Thus, some of the
loyalist audience are somewhat emancipated. Considering the wide geopolitical
circle of information sources (occasionally) consulted, and the fact that following
the news is an important citizenship practice, we may call this an exercise in
quotidian transnational media citizenship. This kind of media-related practice may
combine with more general ethnic and civic identity constructions in various ways:
to support emancipatory identity as a reactive anti-national identity or to support
consolidation of a certain local identity around the idea of stability and security in
the region.
The two subtypes of the more neutral ideological position are divided similarly
according to their trust strategies and self-identification as media consumers. It is
Nikita, 30, Rıga.
17
IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
19
noteworthy that, in the context of the political crisis in Ukraine, the
acknowledgement that the media does not properly serve public interests nor convey
neutral information makes individuals feel that their ability as media users to
decode biased media production is in fact limited. Therefore, the civic engagement
of the members of neutral audiences is deliberate but emotionally distant (not taking
sides), although they actively follow the news. The more pessimistic subtype, who
are closer to civic cynicism, and the more optimistic subtype, who feel occasional
fatigue, can be differentiated as ideal types. It is likely that these positions are not
static and vary from situation to situation. Both aforementioned types can be, at
certain times, motivated to escape from disturbing news streams and seek out
substitute media products—such as the Discovery channel—thus avoiding
essentialising media discourses. Therefore, the fifth type, ‘apolitical’ audience
members who distance themselves from the following of political news, at least
about the Ukraine crisis, may include people who otherwise may not belong to
this group.
In general, it seems unlikely that the political conflict between Russia and Ukraine
and Russia and Western countries and the media coverage of the relevant issues will
have a longer-term homogenising social impact on the transnational population.
Rather, it will maintain its previous, multi-directional identity development patterns.
In parallel with the consolidation of ethno-diasporic identities, media-related
strategies aimed at maintaining local civic or emancipatory identities are utilised. The
geopolitically plural media menus provide an opportunity for one segment of the
Russian-speaking audience to maintain civic dignity as audience members and to
reconstruct quotidian in-between-ness, as well as to negotiate hybrid identification in
the context of essentialising media discourses. We agree with other authors
(Panagakos & Horst 2006; Vathi 2013) that hybridity and reflexivity may become
tiring; in our study, we found two modes of management during the political crisis in
Ukraine that we call emancipatory and escapist strategies. In the case of the
emancipatory strategy, heterogeneity has become a self-sustained aim, sometimes
approaching an obsession. These audience members may look critically both at
attempts by the local PSB media to ‘domesticate’ Russian-speaking audiences and at
pro-Russia reporting by Russian media, but at the same time follow their journalistic
production enthusiastically since such media practices help these audiences reproduce
their identity.
The other strategy to avoid taking sides is escapism. This can be exercised in
either hedonist/consumerist or depressive modes. Both the hedonistic and cynical
subtypes of audiences avoid taking sides but this may lead to uncertainty and selfdistancing from public issues and thus to the erosion of civic identity. Paradoxically,
holding to the normative ideal of liberal media seems to lead to escapist strategies
and to discourage emancipatory strategies.
Thus, during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the media war that has
accompanied it, part of the Russian-speaking population has demonstrated an ability to
maintain transnational ‘in-between-ness’, exercise quotidian acts of citizenship as
audience members and emancipatory identity construction strategies. The nature of the
qualitative evidence does not allow us to speak authoritatively about the proportions of
20
TRIIN VIHALEMM ET AL.
different identity strategies. However, the rich data present a general picture that is far
from black and white. The evidence suggests that Russian-speakers engage with media
in a variety of ways, reflecting their multidimensional and complex identities.
TRIIN VIHALEMM, Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu, Lossi 36, Tartu
51003, Estonia. Email: triin.vihalemm@ut.ee
, Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu, Lossi 36, Tartu
JaNIS JUZEFOVICS
51003, Estonia. Email: janis.juzefovics@ut.ee
MARIANNE LEPPIK, Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu, Lossi 36, Tartu
51003, Estonia. Email: mari19@ut.ee
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IDENTITY AND MEDIA USE
23
Appendix
TABLE A1
THE SAMPLE OF THE FOCUS GROUPS
Total number of people who
participated in focus groups
Time period of focus groups
Locations of focus groups
Estonia
Latvia
33
80
6 January–11 March 2015
3–27 November 2014
Tallinn (four groups); Kohtla-J€arve Riga (five groups); Daugavpils
(one group)
(two groups); Liepaja (one group);
Rezekne (one group)
Gender
Male
Female
15
18
37
43
Age
Up to 35
36–55 years
56þ years
17
11
5
25
35
20
Education
Basic
Secondary
Higher
1
18
14
2
41
37