1 Essay Outline Introduction - - - Research Question: How does political polarization in Canada compare to the United States? Clarify difference between affective and ideological polarization BEFORE thesis o Affective polarization is the degree to which one group, party, or individual feels negatively toward the other(s) (Boxell, Gentzkow, Shapiro 2022, 2) o Ideological polarization is the polarization of ideas, beliefs, and ideologies between political groups/parties (Kubin and von Sikorski 2021, 188) Scholars remain divided on its extent Argumentative Thesis Statement: The United States exhibits more affective and ideological polarization in the mass public and political elites than Canada, which increases political participation, but centralizes political power. Road map of paper: this paper will outline differences in affective and ideological polarization in Canada and the United States. Then, it will address it affects political participation and governance. The counterargument, that ideological polarization is in fact not significant, will also be addressed. Section 1: effect on political engagement Topic sentence: affective polarization increases political participation in the United States. - - There are theories that affective polarization the United States is a consequence of a unified party identity (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018, 201-202) o Republicans tend to be white, male, Christian, concentrated in rural areas o Democrats tend to be non-white, religiously unaffiliated, female, concentrated in urban areas Negative feelings about the other party have become the primary motivator for political participation (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018, 212-213) Canadian political parties started to polarize in the 1980’s (Merkley 2022, 933) Theories/findings on American polarization cannot be directly translated to Canada (Johnston 2023, 373) o There are other divisions in Canada, such as regionalism, especially Quebec o Multiparty system Section 2: effect on political parties/governance Topic sentence: affective polarization hinders democratic processes - United States’ affective polarization against parties leads to breaking convention o Example: effect of polarization on Obama and Trump administrations o Obama’s election in 2008 angered white conservative, evangelical Christian voters, which led to less votes in 2012, and eventually Trump (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 30) 2 - - o Trump’s 2016 campaign relied much on a form of “us against them” populism Republicans then opposed many bills put forth by Obama administration, which led to the use of executive orders, most of which were reversed by Trump (31) Effect of party polarization: Since 1990’s, Senate has increased use of filibusters to oppose majority party’s agenda, which prevent votes from being made, and decreases efficiency of legislative process (Lee 2015, 270) Canada’ strict party discipline is an example of affective polarization o Members of parliament are instructed to vote according to party interests, not the interests of their constituents (Greenaway 2023) o Contributes to centralization of power Section 3: Counterargument - - - - Counterargument: ideological polarization is in fact not as severe as the public thinks While researching this argument, scholars Morris Fiorina and Alan Abramowitz were often cited by journal articles on polarization in the United States o Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope argue that ideological polarization in the mass public is not significant, and that most Americans are centrist (2008, 556) While a good portion of the United States population may remain centrist, the polarization of elites drives policy change o Polarization of elites leads to centralization and low efficiency of government (see Section 2) Degree of polarization also depends on research method o A more recent article compared public opinion between cultural and non-cultural issues (Castle and Stepp 2021, 1311) Castle and Stepp, in a sense, also confirm Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope’s argument o Half of the respondents were indeed neutral on many issues (1321) o However, at least 25% of respondents were polarized (strongly left or rightleaning), which is a strong minority (1321) Conclusion - Reiterate thesis Lack of study on relationship between political polarization and democracy in Canada Difficult to state definitively whether polarization is a “good” or “bad” thing o While it increases political participation, which is essential for democracy, it hinders democratic processes and conventions 3 Annotated Bibliography Boxell, Levi, Matthew Gentzkow, and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2022. “Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1–60. doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01160. This article compares trends in affective polarization in OECD countries over a span of forty years. This data was collected from 149 different surveys which Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro conclude that the United States has seen the greatest increase in affective polarization. Canada and a few other countries also saw an increase, but it was less significant than the United States, and some countries even saw a decrease overall. However, Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro also admit that this data is limited due to variations such as political systems and survey format in each country, and therefore cannot make any causal claims. This paper supports my thesis that affective polarization is worse in the United States. Castle, Jeremiah J., and Kyla K. Stepp. 2021. “Partisanship, Religion, and Issue Polarization in the United States: A Reassessment.” Political Behavior 43 (3): 1311–35. doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09668-5. Castle and Stepp’s paper studies the relationship between religion, social identity, and partisanship regarding positions on both cultural (such as abortion) and non-cultural issues (such as the environment). They found that public opinion is indeed still generally clustered in the middle on the conservative-liberal scale. Additionally, while religion affects people’s opinion on cultural issues, they found that it has little effect on non-cultural issues. This paper is used in my counterargument, to confirm Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope’s claim, but to also provide further insight into the issue of ideological polarization in the United States. Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel A. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2008. “Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings.” The Journal of Politics 70 (2): 556–60. doi.org/10.1017/S002238160808050X. This paper is a direct response to Abramowitz and Saunders’ argument that ideological polarization in the electorate is deepening. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope argue that Americans hold generally centrist views, and that while affective polarization may be an issue, most Americans hold the same beliefs. Through surveys that asked Americans about how they feel on certain topics such as government services, health insurance spending, and defense spending, they found that public opinion has not polarized much in the past couple decades. This paper introduces my counterargument. Greenaway, Chris. 2023. “Sec 33 & Centralization of Power.” October 16, 2023. Toronto. q.utoronto.ca/courses/313182/files/28191779?module_item_id=5147427 4 These are POL224 lecture slides, written by Professor Chris Greenaway. This lecture was on the centralization of power in Canada, and strict party discipline, which affirms Section 2’s argument that affective polarization leads to centralization of power. Iyengar, Shanto, and Masha Krupenkin. 2018. “The Strengthening of Partisan Affect.” Political Psychology 39 (S1): 201–18. doi.org/10.1111/pops.12487. Iyengar and Krupenkin argue that the strengthening of partisan social identity in the United States has increased affective polarization and has created biases against parties. This has also fostered strong party loyalty, which can lead to less accountability within it. The statistics presented in this paper confirm that affective polarization has worsened in the United States since 1980 and supports my argument that polarization increases political participation. Johnston, Richard. 2023. “Affective Polarization in the Canadian Party System, 1988–2021.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 56 (2): 372–95. doi.org/10.1017/S0008423923000112. Johnston confirms that affective polarization has also increased in Canada, which includes Quebec. He argues that Canada contends not just with the political Left-Right scale, but also questions that pertain to regional interests. He also compares sentiment between political parties, particularly the rivalry between the Liberals and the Conservatives. This paper affirms Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro’s findings. Kubin, Emily, and Christian von Sikorski. 2021. “The Role of (social) Media in Political Polarization: a Systematic Review.” Annals of the International Communication Association 45 (3): 188–206. doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2021.1976070. Kubin and von Sikorski examine a variety of media content that addresses affective polarization and social media. They conclude that research on polarization has increased since 2012, and that samples from the United States and Twitter are overrepresented. This aligns with Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro’s argument that asserts polarization in the United States is particularly severe. Moreover, they find that exposure to like-minded media increases affective polarization, but that the effect of counter-attitudinal media is unclear. Within this, they argue that arguments found on polarization are inconsistent, and often fail to differentiate ideological and affective polarization. This paper provided a good definition of ideological polarization, which is used in the introduction. Lee, Frances E. 2015. “How Party Polarization Affects Governance.” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (1): 261–82. doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-113747. This paper details the effects of party polarization on governance in the United States. Lee notes that despite no changes in the constitution, conventions have changed, which is used by parties to veto majority agendas. They argue that this decreases productivity and efficacy of the 5 government. This paper supports this essay’s argument that polarization contributes to the centralization of power. McCoy, Jennifer, Tahmina Rahman, and Murat Somer. 2018. “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities.” The American Behavioral Scientist (Beverly Hills) 62 (1): 16–42. doi.org/10.1177/0002764218759576. This paper outlines the potential outcomes of increased political polarization, by using case studies from Hungary, United States, Turkey, and Venezuela. The potential negative outcomes include unwillingness to compromise and lack of trust between parties. The authors mention the Obama and Trump administration’s challenges as examples of party polarization, which are used in Section 2 of the essay outline. Merkley, Eric. 2022. “Polarization Eh? Ideological Divergence and Partisan Sorting in the Canadian Mass Public.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 86 (4): 93243. doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfac047 This paper seeks to provide insight into ideological polarization in the Canadian public. Merkley argues that while there is little evidence of ideological polarization in Canada, there is more ideological consistency within political parties. Merkley affirms Johnston’s argument that affective polarization has increased in Canada, and that there is more ideological distance between the Conservatives and Liberals than before.
