Definitions:
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NLR - New Law Reports
SLR - Scottish Law Reports
BLR - Business Law Reports
All ER - All England Law Reports
Cr App R - Criminal Appeal Reports
Lloyd’s LR - Lloyd's Law Reports
WLR - Weekly Law Reports
EHRR - European Human Rights Reports
ICLR - Incorporated Council of Law Reporting
AC - Appeal Cases (part of the Law Reports of the House of Lords and the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council)
Ch - Chancery Division Reports
QB - Queen's Bench Division Reports
KB - King's Bench Division Reports (historical)
Fam - Family Division Reports
P - Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division Reports (historical)
1. actus non facit reum nisi mens rea - An act does not make a person guilty without a
guilty mind (refers to the requirement of both a wrongful act and a guilty mental state
for a criminal offense).
2. amicus curiae - Friend of the court (refers to someone who is not a party to the case
but offers information or expertise to assist the court).
3. animus revocandi - The intent to revoke (often used in the context of revoking a will
or contract).
4. corpus delicti - The body of the crime (refers to the essential elements or evidence of
a crime).
5. ceteris paribus - All other things being equal (used in hypothetical or controlled
situations).
6. de bonis non - Concerning goods not administered (refers to the handling of assets or
property not previously administered).
7. de bonis propriis - Concerning one's own goods (used in legal contexts to indicate
personal liability).
8. dies non - A non-working day (often refers to a day when courts or offices are closed).
9. ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat - The burden of proof is on the one who
asserts, not on the one who denies (a principle in legal proceedings).
10. ex abundanti cautela - Out of an abundance of caution (refers to taking extra
precautions).
11. ex aequo et bono - According to what is just and good (refers to decisions made based
on principles of fairness and equity).
12. ex debito justitiae - As a matter of right (refers to actions that are legally required).
13. ex hypothesi - By hypothesis (used to introduce a statement made for the sake of
argument).
14. ex turpi causa non oritur actio - No action arises from an immoral cause (refers to the
legal principle that prohibits recovery for actions arising from illegal or immoral
conduct).
15. exempli gratia - For the sake of example (abbreviated as "e.g.," used to provide
examples).
16. factum probandum (pl. facta probanda) - A fact to be proved (refers to the issues or
facts that need to be established in a legal case).
17. fraus omnia corrumpit - Fraud corrupts all (refers to the idea that fraudulent actions
undermine the integrity of legal proceedings).
18. id est - That is (abbreviated as "i.e.," used to clarify or specify).
19. in pari materia - On the same subject matter (used to indicate that two or more laws
or statutes deal with similar topics).
20. in solidum - In full (refers to joint and several liability where each party is responsible
for the entire obligation).
21. inter alia - Among other things (used to indicate that there are other unspecified
items in a list).
22. inter alios - Among others (used in the context of relationships between individuals).
23. ipse dixit - He himself said it (refers to an assertion made without evidence or
authority).
24. jus dare - To give the law (refers to the power to make and establish laws).
25. jus dicere - To declare the law (refers to the authority to interpret and apply the law).
26. leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus subveniunt - The law aids those who are vigilant,
not those who sleep (emphasizes the importance of diligence in legal matters).
27. nec calm - Not of sound mind (used in the context of mental capacity).
28. nec precario - Not by favor (refers to actions taken without permission or consent).
29. nec vi - Not by force (refers to actions taken without the use of force or coercion).
30. nemo dat quod non habet - No one can give what they do not have (refers to the
principle that a person cannot transfer better title to property than they possess).
31. nullus commodum capers post test de injuira sua a propria - No one can take
advantage of their wrongdoing (refers to the legal principle that prevents a person
from benefiting from their own wrongful actions).
32. pari pasu - On an equal footing (used to indicate equal treatment).
33. pendente lite - Pending litigation (refers to actions taken while a legal case is
ongoing).
34. qui facit per alium facit per se - He who acts through another acts for himself (refers
to the concept of agency).
35. quod approbo non reprobo - What I approve, I do not reject (refers to the principle
that one cannot accept the benefits of a transaction while rejecting its burdens).
These Latin phrases are commonly used in legal contexts to convey specific legal concepts and
principles.
Questions for the Subject
Answering Questions in Contract Law
Contract Law
There are two types of questions which are usually presented when answering the year end
exam.
These are problem questions and essay questions.
Detailed guidelines for approaching problem Questions:
1. Firstly you are required to identify the issue at hand. You are then required to discuss
the law in relation to the issue, analyse the material facts and there upon provide a
reason conclusion.
2. Each issue may require you to discuss a tricky area of the law or to apply a tricky set of
facts to an otherwise a well settled area of the law.
3. Each problem will require you to apply the ILFC structure over and over again.
4. There is no right or wrong answer you get marks for rationale argument.
5. Write short sentences like lord Denning.
6. No more than three to five lines a paragraph.
When in a problem question have to look at the opposing counsels argument as well.
Look at the literal and purposive approach when stating the facts.
THE OBJECTIVE TEST
1. Smith v Hughes (1871) – per Blackburn J: “If, whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so
conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms
proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with
him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to
the other party’s terms.”
2. RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mulller GmbH and Co (UK Production) (2010) - per
Lord Clarke: “Whether there is a binding contract between the parties and, if so, upon what
terms depends upon what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of
mind, but upon a consideration of what was communicated between them by words or
conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that they intended to create legal
relations and had agreed upon all the terms which they regarded or the law requires as
essential for the formation of legally binding relations.”
3. Centrovincial Estates PLC v Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd (1983) – per Slade J: There
are two instances where the objective test is displaced/modified. The first is where the offeree
knows that the offeror is mistaken as to the terms of his offer (but not the facts on which the
decision is based (Statoil ASA v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP (2008)) (e.g., Hartog v Collins
and Shields (1939)) and the second is where the offeree is at fault in failing to note that the
offeror has made a mistake (e.g., Scriven Bros v Hindley (1913)).
4. Longley v PPB Entertainment (2022) - references in the pre-existing case law to what a party
"must have known" or what the reasonable observer might have understood were evidentiary
tools rather than indicia that constructive knowledge is a requirement for the defence of
unilateral mistake.
Q1: An offeror offers to sell a land called Black Acre to the offeree. He brings a plan which
shows a hotel known as The Swan’s Inn is situated within the boundary of Black Acre. That
hotel is also owned by the offeror. He shows the whole plan to the offeror and says “I will sell
you all of this including anything standing on the land for 600,000.” The offeree accepts. In
court, the offeror gives evidence and states that and when he showed the plan to the offeree
he did not want to include the hotel in his offer of sale. What are his subjective intentions?
A: Subjective – he did not want to include the hotel in the offer of sale
Objective – He wanted to offer the hotel along with the property known as Black Acre
Q2: A fundamental rule of evidence is that a man is presumed to intend the ordinary result of
his actions. A man parks his car on the slope of a hill without pulling his hand brake. The car
crashes into another car downhill. He says that before he left his vehicle, he checked to see
whether he had pulled his hand brake. The firemen who rushed to the scene have observed
that the handbrake was not pulled. Is the man negligent objectively and subjectively?
A: Subjectively speaking he appears to not be negligent but objectively speaking he definitely
appears to be negligent.
Q3: Section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act states that if a person buys an object for a particular
purpose which is made known to the seller, the seller sells those goods to him for that purpose,
that object must be good enough to be used for that specific purpose. Case Law states that if
the object is obvious the buyer does not have to tell the seller the purpose for which he is
buying the goods. Objectively speaking, why would the following goods would be bought?
1. A smartphone - communication purposes, photography, watch videos
2. A carton of milk – to drink
3. A washing machine – to wash and clean clothes
Question
An act states that a man should not walk a cat, a dog or a horse through the park between
the hours of 3.00pm to 6.00pm.
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A man walks a tiger through the park at 4.00pm
A woman walks a Doberman through the park at 5.00pm
A man walks a donkey through the park at 5.55pm
A local councilor carries her poodle through the park at 3.30pm.
Answer
The act has been developed with the intention of keeping out dangerous and potentially
dangerous animals that would attack children and also adults in general.
Who decides whether there is an agreement between two parties and how do
they do so?
Use The tech data case n looking at the mirror image rule
Most contracts between parties are not contentious at all, there is no doubt as t whether there
is an greement and as to what the terms of the agreement are. In exceptional circumstances
however the parties will bring their matter before court. Here the usual question is whether the
parties have reached an agreement and if so what the terms of that agreement are. In
determining these questions the court will use and objective test. The commercial justification
for using the objective test is that it brings certainty into the assesmnet of whether the parties
intended to create legal relations.
2. RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Mulller GmbH and Co (UK Production) (2010) - per
Lord Clarke: “Whether there is a binding contract between the parties and, if so, upon what
terms depends upon what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of
mind, but upon a consideration of what was communicated between them by words or
conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that they intended to create legal
relations and had agreed upon all the terms which they regarded or the law requires as
essential for the formation of legally binding relations.”
In centrovincial estates, the claimants promised a certain property to the defendants at a rent
of 68,320 subject to reduce in December 1982. In June of 1982 the claimants wrote to the
defendants stating that the rent would be 65,000. The defendants immediately excepted the
claimants wrote back stating that they had meant to offer 126,000. The defendants refused to
budge, on the basis that there was a valid contract between the parties. In the court of appeal it
was held that the claimants had failed to show that an agreement for 65,000 was not reached.
Slade, J. held that there was an unambiguous offer which had been accepted by the defndants.
In centrovincial, an alternative argument was raised on behalf of the claimants to the effect
that the objective test was based on the principle of estoppel. However, the court rejected this
argument on the basis that mutual promises are not enough to conclude contracts. Professor
Atiyah has argued that centrovincial was wrongly decided on the basis that there was no way
and offeree can create legal rights for himself without relying on such an offer. Atiyah has halso
argued that the House of Lords case in the Hannah Bluementhal lends support to his argument.
However, Mckendrick submits that the Hannah Bluementhal is a special case. In the Hannah
Bluementhal, the function of reliance was to provide evidence of acceptance thus, McKendrick
argues that centrovincial is correctly decided.
This does not mean that the subjective test is not used in the law of contract, in centrovincial,
Slade, J stated that there were two instances where the objective test was displaced.
Centrovincial Estates PLC v Merchant Investors Assurance Co Ltd (1983) – per Slade J: There are
two instances where the objective test is displaced/modified. The first is where the offeree
knows that the offeror is mistaken as to the terms of his offer (but not the facts on which the
decision is based (Statoil ASA v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP (2008)) (e.g., Hartog v Collins
and Shields (1939)) and the second is where the offeree is at fault in failing to note that the
offeror has made a mistake (e.g., Scriven Bros v Hindley (1913)).
However, McKendrick suggests that both of these instances can be accommodated within the
objective test. It is submitted that Mckendricks argument is full of merit and would lead to a
uniformed approach in contract law. Having said that it would be easy to assume that there is
only one objective test which the courts use. However, Howarth, 1984, has stated that there
are three different interpretations of the objective test. The first is that of a detached third
party observer, the second is the standard of how a promise would be reasonably understood
by a promisee. This approach is the one that is most used in contract law. The last is the
standard of a reasonable person making the offer, i.e the promisor.
The courts will therefore decide on whether a contract exists by applying the objective test to
the well traversed principles of an offer and acceptance. The courts will decide whether there is
a valid contract by applying the mirror image rule, i.e. whether a clear and unequivocal offer is
mirrored by an equally clear acceptance. The majority of the court used this approach in Butler
v ExcelO corporation, Lord Denning however, used a more flexible two stage approach (is there
a contract and what are its terms). This two staged test has been criticized for bringing
uncertainty into the law In techdata the traditional mirror image rule in assessing whether a
contract existed was by the court of appeal. This test is likely to be used for the forseable
future.
It is therefore submitted that it is the courts who decide whether a contract exists and what its
terms are. The standard is that of the mirror image rule. The test is an objective one.
The Mirror Image rule
4. Butler v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) (1979) – A good example of the majority of a bench using
the mirror image rule to find out whether a contract existed or not.
5. Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd (2009) – The traditional “mirror image”
approach to assessing whether a contract was in existence was confirmed by the Court of
Appeal recently.
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Past Paper list
2017 A1 – bilateral contract
2017 B1 – bilateral contract
2018 A1 – bilateral contract
2018 B1 – unilateral contract
2019 A1 - unilateral contract
2019 B1 – bilateral contract
2020 A1 – unilateral contract
2020 B1 – bilateral contract (done)
2021 A1 – bilateral contract that with the tender process
2021 B1 – bilateral contract
Every problem question should follow LFC – Legally Flying Cocaine
Issue Law Facts Conclusion
THE OFFER
An offer is an expression of willingness to enter into a contract on stated terms, provided those
terms are accepted by the party to whom the offer is addressed – McKendrick
1. Storer v Manchester City Council (1974) – The Court of Appeal found that there was a binding
contract. The Council had sent Storer a communication they intended would be binding on
acceptance.
2. Gibson v Manchester City Council (1979) – “may be prepared to sell”. The House of Lords
held that the communication was not capable of being an offer.
3. Harris v Nickerson (1873) – a statement of intention (“I intend to sell my home”) is not an
offer.
4. Harvey v Facey (1893) – a supply of information (“I would be willing to sell for $100”) is not
an offer.
5. British Car Auctions Ltd v Wright (1972) – in an auction the offer is made by the bidder which
is accepted when the auctioneer strikes the table with the hammer.
INVITATIONS TO TREAT
An invitation to treat is an expression of willingness to negotiate in the hope that that will lead
to a concluded contract – McKendrick
6. Pharmaceutical Society v Boots (1953) – a display of goods is an invitation to treat.
7. Fisher v Bell (1961) - a display of goods is an invitation to treat.
8. Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking (1971) – where the display/offer is made by a machine, the
display is probably an offer.
9. Chapelton v Barry (1940) – display of deck chairs on the beach was held to be an offer
(exceptional case).
10. Partridge v Crittenden (1968) – an advertisement is an invitation to treat where a bilateral
contract is anticipated.
11. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1893) - an advertisement may be an offer where a
unilateral contract is anticipated.
12. Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada Ltd (1985) – a request for tenders is an
invitation to treat. The tender is the offer. However, where the request for tenders states that it
will accept the highest bid, there is an offer of a unilateral contract to sell to the highest bidder.
In other words the highest bid must be accepted.
13. Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool Borough Council (1990) – a tender may
contain an implied undertaking to consider all conforming tenders (“tenders are to be received
no later than 12.00pm on 12.05.1990”). In such cases there is a unilateral offer to ‘consider’ all
conforming contracts but not to accept them.
14. Harris v Nickerson (1973) – the advertisement of an auction sale is an invitation to treat.
15. Warlow v Harrison (1859) – where the auction is without reserve there is a separate
collateral contract that the auctioneer will accept the highest bid.
16. Barry v Davies (2000) - where the auction is without reserve there is a separate collateral
contract that the auctioneer will accept the highest bid.
17. Scott, 2001 states that once the reserve price is reached, the auctioneer cannot withdraw
the lot from the sale
Questions
1.Food city delivers a leaflet to your house which states that everything is to be sold at 50%
discount on the 4th of August. Has Food City made you an offer which you can accept?
2. A writes to B offering 300 bags of cement at 10 per bag. B writes back to A inquiring whether
the cement is of premium quality. B does not hear back from A and therefore writes to A
stating ‘I accept your offer for premium quality cement at 10 per bag’. Is there a contract? Does
the price include delivery charges?
Answer
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A writes to B offering 300 bags of cement at 10 per bag.
Question arises as to whether this is a valid offer
B writes back to A inquiring whether the cement is of premium quality
Question arises as to whether this amounts to an offer or is a request for information
B writes to A stating that he accepts the offer for premium quality cement at 10 per bag
Questions arise whether this amounts to acceptance- premium quality would amount to
a counter offer- Hyde v Wench
1.Food city delivers a leaflet to your house which states that everything is to be sold at 50%
discount on the 4th of August. Has Food City made you an offer which you can accept?
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Foodcity delivers leaflet to house- leaflet generally amounts to an invitation to treat.
Everything is sold at 50% discount- not necessarily given precise instructions to evoke
the offer unlike the case of Carbolic Smoke Balls
Exam Question
Q1-2017
Adele and Bella are sisters. On 1st February Adele meets her sister for a drink and tells her she is looking
for a new sports car. Bella replies that she wants to sell her red Ferrari as there is now a better model
available and that she is happy to sell it to her sister “on a business basis”. Bella says she wants “about
£100,000” for it. That evening Adele sends an email to Bella saying, “I accept your offer to sell the car for
£100,000 and will transfer the money in a few days.” On 3rd February Bella sends Adele an email that
says: “Don't be stupid I wouldn’t sell the car for that, I want £125,000 for it. To avoid any further
misunderstanding, do not email me again unless you do not want the car at this price.” Adele was so
annoyed on reading the first sentence of Bella’s email that she deleted it without reading further and
did not reply. Three weeks later Bella rang Adele and demanded £125,000, offering to deliver the car.
Advise Adele. How, if at all, would your answer differ if, upon reading Bella’s email on 3 rd February,
Adele decided to purchase the car for £125,000 and Bella now refuses to deliver it?
Answer
--------------1 feb Adelle (A) meets with Bella (B) (sisters)
(about legal relations) (domestic and commercial business relationships)
(domestic presumptions is that there is no intention to create legal relations in a home
context) (commercial presumptions intend to create legal re;ations)
Setting is informal and sisters therefore presumption is to not create legal relationships
The word on a business basis changes this presumption to a commercial relationship
-------------1 evening ‘acceptance’ 100,000
‘about 100,000’ (cases- Storer & Gibson) invitation to treat not an offer- for a laymen it’s an
offer but it’s a counter offer- (Hyde v Wrench)
-------------- 3 Feb 125,000 silent- (entores Case) (Felthouse case)- silence does not amount to
communication. Exception to the felthouse case is Hannah Bluementhal which pointed that silence does
amount to acceptance
--------------Adelle refusal- silence
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Intention to create legal relations
 Issue- The issue is whether Adele (A) and Bella (B) intend to create legal relations
 Law- in a domestic context the presumption is that the parties do not intend to create legal
relations.( Balfour v Balfour). However, this presumption can be rebutted by evidence of a
contrary intention (Meritt v Meritt). The determination of whether or not the parties intended
to create legal relations is based on an objective test. The question is ‘whether or not
reasonable parties to such an agreement possess an intention to create legal
relations’(Edmonds v Lawson)
 F the facts that makes up the presumption that they would not create legal relations are that:
they are sisters, they were having drinks, no price was mentioned. The presumption that rebuts
the above facts is the statement of ‘business basis’ the price of the car-it was a Ferrari
 C therefore it is submitted that Adele and Bella intended to create legal relations.
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The morning of 1st Feb
The issue is whether Bella’s statement of ‘about 100,000’ can be considered an offer. According to
McKendrick an offer is (Definition). According to McKendrick an invitation to treat is… Apply an objective
test to dec (In Gibson v Manchester City Council. The council stated that they may be prepared to sell.
The HOL held that this may only amount to an invitation to treat.
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The transaction on the 3rd Feb
The issue is whether Bella’s email to Adelle amounts to counter offer. Hyde v Wrench
What is a counter offer-effect-Hyde v Wrench
Mirror image rule- Techdata case
Acceptance- McKendrick
Offer was 125,000 but perputated offered 100,000.
Therefore it is submitted that Bellas email to adelle amounts only to a counter offer.
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Can silence amount to acceptance
Whether Adelle could have accepted the offer by remaining silent.
Acceptance must be communicated to the offeror.
Entores case- Lord Denning
Therefore silence can never amount to acceptance.
Conclusion for the Question of Adelle and Bella
The general rule is that acceptance must be communicated to the offeror (Entores v Miles Far East
Corp). In extension therefore, an acceptance of an offer cannot be implied by mere silence on the part
of the offeree. The offeree cannot impose a contractual obligation by stating that unless the offeree
rejects the offer, he will be deemed to have accepted. This rule is not without exception in the case of
the Hannah Bluementhal the HOL held that a contract could be concluded by the silence of both parties
this case was based on exceptional circumstances where the arbitrator did not have the power to
dismiss an arbitration for want of prosecution. The Arbitration Act of 1966 has given arbitrators that
power. Hence the force of the Hannah Blumenthal is submitted to have lessened.
But it is apparent from this case however is that the rule that silence cannot amount to acceptance is
not an absolute one. English law in exceptional cases can recognize acceptance even where there is
silence. Her Lord Steyn in Whitol SA v Norelf Mc Kendrick submits that silence must be implied where
the offeree assumes that his silence is enough to conclude the contract and acts in reliance of it
(Miller,1972). If however, the offeree does not act in reliance of that fact there is a concluded contract
then the general rule in Felthouse must have effect.
Question 1 - 2016- Zone A
The Head of the School of Textiles at Lastchance University thinks students do not take enough exercise.
On Monday he announces over Campus Radio that he will donate a signed copy of his latest book to any
student who cycles from the university to the nearby Museum of Basket Weaving before the weekend.
On Tuesday he regrets his rash offer and puts up posters in the School retracting his offer. On Thursday
he announces the offer is withdrawn over Campus Radio.
Advise the following students.
Time line of events
Monday- Anounces on Campus Radio
A signed copy of his latest copy
Cycles from uni-museum
Before the weekend
Tuesday
Posters (in school)
Thursday
Announces on Campus Radio
Answer
The issue of a Unilateral Offer
The issue is whether the head of the school of textiles announcement over campus radio amounts to an
invitation to treat or an offer. According to Mckendrick an offer is ………….. According to McKendrick an
invitation to treat is…. Usually, an advertisement is considered an invitation to treat (Partridge v
Crittenden). However, the court has held that an offer of a unilateral contract made to the world is
capable of being accepted and thereby creating a contract between the parties. In Carlil v Carbolic
SmokeBall (Insert the facts).
Here the head of the school of textiles has announced over campus radio his intention to donate a
signed copy of his book to any person who fulfils the terms of his announcement. Prime E Facia (n the
first instance) it is possible that this only amounts to an invitation to treat. The mere offering of a reward
to third parties is not sufficient to evidence the fact that the principle actually intended to be bound by
his offer. A good piece of evidence to show such intention would have been the principle stockpiling a
number of signed copies in his office to be given to students who completed the task. There is nothing
here that evidences such of the part of the principle. However, the principles subsequent actions in
attempting to revoke his offer by hanging up posters in school and by campus radio evits the fact that he
thought his announcement was an offer capable of being accepted. The mention of a reward in this
context cannot be discarded lightly. It is therefore submitted that on a balance of probability it is more
likely that the principles announcement in Monday amounts to a he unilateral offer. This offer is capable
of being accepted by the students of last chance university.
A unilateral offer to the world can be directed at a particular class of people only. (Great Nothern
Railway v Witham)
a).Devi who cycled to the Museum on Monday afternoon but was not aware of the offer until she
arrived.
The issue is whether Devi can accept the principals’ offer without knowledge of such. In Gibbons v
Proctor the court held that a person claiming a reward was held to be entitled to it, even though
apparently, he had no knowledge of the offer. Tritel, 2020 states that this reading of Gibbons is wrong in
that a closer examination of the facts of the case shows that the offeree knew of the offer prior to
accepting. English law therefore espouses the rule that an offeree cannot accept an offer without
knowledge of it. This is also the position of other commonwealth jurisdictions (RvClark).
Here, Devi has apparently fulfilled the terms of the offer by riding from Last Chance University to the
museum. This has been done without any knowledge of the offer it is submitted that on an application
of Gibbons as interpreted by Tritel a court would have no option but to hold that Devi is not entitled to
claim her reward on the basis that she lacked knowledge of the offer. therefore, it is submitted that Devi
cannot claim the reward. Academic opinion would however weigh in her favour, according to Hudson
1968, a unilateral offer should be capable of being accepted even without knowledge of the offer.
Homework
b) Ellis who, having heard the offer on campus radio on Monday trained all day Tuesday and cycled to
the museum on Wednesday.
The issue is whether the attempted revocation has been effective. There is no answer that can be found
in English law regarding the terms on how it is possible for the offeror to revoke a unilateral offer prior
to acceptance, however, the principle found in the foreign case of Shuey v USA can be applied.
According to Shuey, the court held that the offer should be revoked in a similar fashion that it was
offered, in this case the offer was made over the radio. Therefore, even though the Head of the School
of Textiles at Lastchance University is unsuccessful initially in trying to revoke his offer by putting up
posters in the School, his announcement of the revocation of his offer over Campus Radio, will be
sufficient.
However, it could be argued that as Ellis, an offeree has begun performance, when she trained all day on
Tuesday and cycled to the Museum on Wednesday, the Head of the School of Textiles cannot revoke the
offer at this time. This fact was highlighted in the case of Dahlia v Four Millbank Nominees where the
court held that until performance, an offeror can revoke the offer he has made at any time and there
would be no binding contract between the two parties. Nevertheless, once the offeree has begun
performance, the offer comes into effect and can no longer be revoked by the offeror. Thereby, it could
be said that as per the above-mentioned facts, Ellis is eligible to win the prize as there has been no
revocation of the offer and she has completed the terms of the offer.
The issue is whether Elis can cliam the reward from the principle of the university. Depite the principla
attempting to revoke the offer by way of posters on Tuesday. Revocation must usually be
communicated in actual fact to an offeree (Byrne v Vanten Howen) that should be done prior to
acceptance (Payne v Cave). Here the principle cannot claim that Elis had notice of the principals
revocation of the offer prior to acceptance this is because elis was nt in university on Tuesday. Hence,
Elis can reasonably claim to hpave not seen or otherwise not have had notice priot ot him cycling
from the university to the Museum of Basket eaving. Upon concluding of performance by the terms of
the offer and without having notice of revocation prior to acceptance elis will be entitled to cliam the
reward from the principal. Therefore submitted that the principal must hand over a copy of his signed
book to Elis.
c) Fred who was told by another student about the withdrawal of the offer just as he was about to set
out on Wednesday. He said ‘they can't do that’ and completed the ride.
The issue here is whether communication of the revocation of the offer via a third party is effective.
Although as pointed out above with the case of Ellis following the principle found in the case of Shuey,
the effective revocation of the offer took place on Thursday when the Head of Textiles announced his
withdrawal of the offer over Campus Radio. Fred was told by another student (a third party) about the
revocation of the offer on Wednesday just before he started performing (cycling). Therefore, it could be
argued that the revocation had been brought to Fred in a timely manner before he had accepted the
offer- he had yet to start cycling and as a result, he is ineligible to win the prize. This was emphasized in
the case of Dickinson v Dodds, where the court held that the offer had been clearly withdrawn before it
was accepted and the fact that the claimant got to know of the withdrawal through a third party was
irrelevant.
On the other hand, it could be said that although revocation of the offer can take place as there has
been no acceptance, the offer could still be kept open for a certain time period had there been
consideration provided, (Routledge v Grant). As this has not been provided, Fred would not be eligible to
win the price of a signed copy of the book.
The issue is whether Fred is entitled to claim his reward from the principal with regard to the
fact that he was informed by a third party of the revocation prior to acceptance. The
revocation must be communicated in actual fact prior to acceptance. However, there is no
requirement for the offeror himself to communicate the revocation of his offer personally to
the offeree, instead a communication of a revocation by a third party is as effective as if the
offeror himself communicated the revocation (Dickinson v Dodds). The court held the offer
had been clearly withdrawn before it was accepted and the
Therefore, it is submitted that there is
d) Gina, who, having heard of the offer on Monday was too drunk on Tuesday and Wednesday to go
to the campus but who set out on her bike on Thursday. She was halfway to the Museum when she
heard the withdrawal over the radio.
The issue here is whether the revocation of the offer taking place once the offeree has begun
performing but has not completed the performance of the stipulated act, can be effective. As Gina has
set out on her bike on Thursday and is halfway to the Museum once she hears the withdrawal over the
radio. Therefore, it could be argued that although Gina, even though has made it halfway to the
Museum she has not completed her journey, therefore has not been successful in completing the
performance of the offer and cannot claim the prize of a signed book copy. This fact was brought into
light in the case of Errington v Errington, where the court held that the father’s promise which was a
unilateral contract could not be revoked once the couple has embarked upon performance provided,
they did not leave performance ‘incomplete and underperformed’.
However, it could be argued that Gina is eligible to win the prize of a signed book copy as stated in the
case of Soulsbury v Soulsbury (2007), where the court held that a unilateral contract cannot be revoked
once the offeree has begun performing the terms of the offer.
The issue is whether Gina can claim a reward from the principal having regard to the fact that the
offer was revoked by the offeror while Gina was performing the terms of the offer. Where a unilateral
contract is concerned the revocation of the offer need not always be communicated in actual fact
although English Law has no definitive case on the matter, guidance can be sought from the case of
Shuey V USA: Revocation is effective when it is purported to be communicated in the same or more
effective manner in which the offer itself was communicated. Even if this method of comm
acceptance is unqualified. In actioning revocation, the rule is that revocation must be communicated
prior to acceptance.
An offer constitutes an implied term that the offeror will not revoke his offer after the offeree has
commenced performing the terms of the offer. Soulsbry v Soulsbury, Errington v Errington. Here Gina
has commenced performing the terms of the offer after which the principal has purported to
communicate revocation by way of campus radio since the offer was also communicated by way of
campus radio this revocation will be effective. However, since the revocation is deemed to be
communicated to Gina whilst she is performing the terms of the offer that revocation itself will have
the effect of breaching the implied term in unilateral contract as provided in cases such as Errington
inter alia. Therefore, it is submitted that the principal is liable for breach of the implied term and that
Gina may claim the reward from the principal.
e) As (d) but the prize offered was £5,000.
The issue is whether there is a breach of contract where a large sum of money is being offered in
relation to a relatively small performance. It could be argued that a prize of 5,000 to be rewarded for
cycling from the University to the nearby Museum of Basket Weaving is unjust and unreasonable. Luxor
v Cooper.
The issue is whether Gina is entitled to the reward based on the fact that the reward is
disproportionately higher than what needs to be done by the way of the offer. The rule in Errington
will not be applicable where the reward offered by the offeror is disproportionately higher than what
is being required to be done by the offeror to obtain the reward, Luxor v Cooper. Here Gina has
commenced performing the terms of the contract however on the variation of the facts presented
there is now no implied term that the offeror will not take steps to revoke the offer once the offeree
has commenced performing the terms of the offer. As such the principal is well within his legal rights
to when he announces over campus radio that the offer is now revoked. That revocation is now
effective, it does not matter that Gina has commenced performing the terms of the offer. It is
therefore submitted that Gina cannot claim the reward from the principal on the basis of the variation
of the facts presented.
Zone A- 2016 Q3The distinction between an invitation to treat and a contractual offer is an elusive one.
The distinction between an invitation to treat and an offer is an elusive one. According to Mc Kendrick,
an offer is ‘’ an expression of willingness to enter into a contract on stated terms, provided those terms
are accepted by the party to whom the offer is addressed. According to Mc Kendrick, an invitation to
treat is ‘an expression of willingness to negotiate in the hope it will lead to a concluded contract. The
distinction between the two is the objectively assessed intention of the offeror there are also additional
criteria in the form of the result making business sense.
The distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat is usually discussed by reference to the cases
of Gibsons V MCC and Storer v the MCC. (Discuss the facts)
However, the matter is too simplistic to be disposed of in this manner the stages of appeal in the case of
Gibson is illustrative of this fact. In Gibson, both the trial judge and the court of appeal held that in the
facts of the case a contract had been concluded. It was only in the HOL it was held that there was no
contract. This shows that even as judges attempt to objectively interpret the facts of the case, they are
able to reach different conclusions on the same facts. Nevertheless, since the promulgation of
judgments like Storer and Gibson the criteria for distinguishing between an offer and an invitation to
treat has become clearer. According to McKendrick this is in no small part due to judges attempting to
lay down rules to be followed in the assessment of statements made in the course of making a contract.
Their decisions are nowadays more often than not based on these rules and not on the objectively
assessed intentions of the parties, however, Treitel 2020 has stated that these rules can be ignored if
the objectively assessed intention of the parties I so strong so as to require the ignoring of these rules.
An example of this is to be seen in the US case of Lefkowitz v Surplus stores where the court held that an
advertisement was not an invitation to treat but an offer.
The uncertainty that arises during the course of deliberations is illustratable by reference to a display of
goods. According to McKendrick there are three different approaches as to how a court will look at a
display of goods. Firstly, a display can be treated as an offer acceptance would happen when the
customer wraps his fingers around the product, this would cause difficulty because now the customer
cannot change his mind without breaching a contract. The second approach is to consider a display of
goods as an offer and that acceptance happens when the goods are placed before the cashier this
approach also leads to problems. In that, the shopkeeper does not have room to negotiate and decide
whether or not to sell goods. The third approach is to consider a display of goods as an invitation to
treat, this is the current approach of the law. This approach is the one that makes the most business
sense, hence, it is the rule in respect of display of goods (Fisher v Bell) (Pharmaceutical Society v Boots
Chemists)
Generally, advertisements are also considered invitations to treat. In Partridge v Crittenden it was held
that where the appellant advertised to sell wild birds, that such did not mount to an offer but was an
invitation to treat. According to Lord Parker CJ the reason why an advertisement is held to be an
invitation to treat is because any other alternative could not make business sense. If it were construed
as an offer an advertiser could possibly be required contractually to sell more items than he actually has.
In certain circumstances an advertisement could be an offer, in Carlil v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, it
was held that the defendants who had advertised that they would pay £100 for anyone who used their
products in the prescribed manner and caught influenza. Their act of depositing £100 in the bank
showed the sincerity of the offer and had been made as an offer to the whole world and were therefore
contractually obliged to pay £100 to whoever accepted their offer.
In respect of auctions, the advertisement of an auction sale is deemed to be an invitation to treat, where
the offer is made by the bidder which said offer. The auctioneer then accepts by striking the hammer on
the table (Harris v Nickerson). It is also possible, however, for the auctioneer to make an offer in the
course of making the invitation to treat. For example, an auctioneer can advertise an auction to be held
without a reserved price, there is a separate collateral contract that the auctioneer will accept the
highest bid (Warlow v Harrison).
Another clear example of an invitation to treat is a request for tenders. This is illustrated in the case of
Spencer v Harding where the court held that the submission of a tender was an offer and not
acceptance. There are, however, exceptions to the general rule: a tender may contain an implied
undertaking to consider all conforming tenders. According to Bingham HJ, a duty is breached if the
defendants opened and examined a tender before the deadline or if they consider a tender received
well after the deadline.
The above-noted instances are areas in which the court has settled the question of an offer and an
invitation to treat. There are other areas where matters are not as clear cut E.g.: the boarding of a bus,
several questions arise in such a scenario. Does a bus timetable amount to an offer or is the offer made
when the bus stops at the halt to pick up a passenger? Or is it when a passenger hands over the money
to the conductor in exchange for a ticket? These questions highlight the complexities involved in
pinpointing whether a scenario amounts to an offer or an invitation to treat. A business sense approach
would require that the bus timetables inter alia be construed as mere invitations to treat.
It is submitted that the definitions provided by McKendrick lay a solid foundation for differentiating
between invitations to treat and offers. The differentiating factor is the intention of the parties making
the statement. While the distinction may present challenges a careful analysis of intention coupled with
what result makes the most business sense will result in a just decision.
Does the postal rule exception have any application in today’s business environment?
Acceptance is final and in order to be valid, has to be a qualified ascent to the terms of an offer. Once an
offer is accepted there is an enforceable contract. Acceptance must be effectively communicated to the
offeror in order to be valid unless the need for communication has been waived (R v Clarke). The postal
rule is an exception to the general rule accordingly acceptance takes place upon the posting of the letter
of acceptance by the offeree Adams v Lindsell. The contract is concluded at the time the letter of
acceptance is posted household fire v grant.
There are several justifications for this rule, the first justification is that the post office is the agent of the
offeror and that when the agent receives the letter it is as if the offeror has received the letter of
acceptance. This justification can be opened up to criticism because if the post office was the actual
agent of the offeror then it would be able to revoke the contract on behalf of the offeror. However, the
post office does not have such a power the second justification for the rule is that where the offeror has
chosen to start negotiating by post the risk of any delay or loss should be borne by him, this appears to
be a valid justification. In the case of Henthorn v Fraser, it was stated that the postal rule applies where
its reasonable to use the post. This appears to be the only reasonable justification in today's context.
However, even today it is unlikely that the post will ever be a reasonable method of communication
having regard to the more expeditious methods available for communication
The third justification is that the offeree should be able to rely on the fact that he has accepted the offer
and not be prejudiced by any action of the offeror to the contrary. According to Gardner 1992, the initial
adoption of this rule may have arisen from the perception that once the letter of acceptance was in the
postal system it was bound to reach its destination therefore the posting of the letter of acceptance was
equal to delivery. However, this justification would not be valid since there are faster methods of
communication with closed systems which can effectively be used to provide instantaneous
communication of the offerees acceptance.
According to McKendrick, the use of postal rule exceptions in today's context can give rise to injustice
there are several discussion points which arose from this statement. The first point is the rule that
where the letter has been properly addressed and stamped then a binding contract will be formed when
the letter of acceptance is dropped in the post box even if that letter is never received by the offeror.
(Household Fore Insurance v Grant)n This appears to be a harsh consequence to digest in today's day
and age. In Scotland, this position has been expressly rejected by lord Shanet in the case of Mason v
Benhar Coal. Even McKendrick agrees with this position and states that no contract should be deemed
to be created when the letter of acceptance is posted but never received by the offeror. English law can
therefore be challenged from a rational viewpoint adopted in Scottish law. Why should the courts
enable a method of communication of times passed when an offeree would be more able to use an
instantaneous method of communicating notice of acceptance in actual fact.
The postal rule also does not sit well with the law relating to the revocation of offers. In Henthorn, an
acceptance taking effect upon posting was held to have precedence over a withdrawal of the same offer
which was posted before but had not reached the offeree at the time the time the letter of acceptance
was posted. In Byrne v Van TienHoven the court expressed dissatisfaction over the application of this
rule. An issue also arises where the offeree posts his acceptance and then sends rejection by a quicker
method so that rejection reaches the offeror before the letter of acceptance does. English law is not
committed to a position in this scenario. Contrary positions have been taken by commonwealth
jurisdictions. In Dunmore v Alexander (Scottish) it was held that if the offeree had initially posted the
letter of acceptance and thereafter had rejected the offer by adopting an instantaneous method, that
rejection took precedence over the letter of acceptance. In Wenkheim v Arndt (New Zealand) and A to Z
v Bazaars v Minister of Agriculture (South African). It was held that when post is a proper method of
communication and the acceptance is duly posted, a contract is immediately created between the
parties. It is thus to be seen that the adverse effects of the postal rule are usually to be borne by the
offeror although there appears to be no reasonable justification for such in todays day and age.
This may be why the courts have attempted to restrain the application of this rule. Firstly, the courts
have done so by holding that it must be reasonable for the offeree to use the post in order for the postal
rule to apply (Henthorn). Secondly, the courts have held that an offeror can avoid the operation of this
rule by stating that he must have actual notice of acceptance. Thirdly, the courts have held that the
exception is not valid when dealing fact to face or where instantaneous methods of communication
have been used. In Tinn v Hoffman it was held that the parties could contract of the postal rule by
determining the method of communicating the offer. Also, courts have held that the postal rule is
inapplicable where it would lead to manifest inconvenience or absurdity ( Hollwell Securities v Hughes)
this case represents the widest restriction of the rule.
In Entores v Miles Far East Corp, Lord Denning drew a distinction between instantaneous and noninstantaneous methods of communication. Instantaneous methods are subject to the receipt rule
(Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl), whereas non-instantaneous methods would still allow for the application
of the postal rule. Telexes (Entores), faxes (JSC Zestafoni Nikoladze Ferroalloy Plant v Romly Holdings)
and emails (Thomas v BPE Solicitors (obiter)) have been noted as modes of communication to which the
postal rule will not apply. There is no UK legislation regarding acceptance when using emails. However,
the Vienna convention on contracts for the international sale of goods and the UNIDROIT principles of
International and Commercial Contracts and European contract law all provide that the receipt rule
applies to emails. In the case of Brinikibon it was made clear that the postal rule will not be expanded to
emails, rather that acceptance will happen then the parties actually receive the email or on the
principles of sound business practice or upon consideration of where the risk should lie.
The postal rule therefore will not be expanded to today's methods of communications, instead it is likely
to be restricted further until it is merely a relic of the law. Even McKendrick is of the opinion that the
postal rule ought to be abolished and replaced with the general rule that acceptance ought to take
effect when acceptance is received by the offeror.
2019 zone b-1
Writes-reference is to post.
a)
Offer
Communication of offer
Acceptance
Communication of
Acceptance
Issue, what is the law
support it by a case. Then
give the facts and the
conclusion. Lastly give
aconclusion.
The issue is whether Severine has communicated acceptance to Gunter despite the letter of acceptance
getting lost in the post. Acceptance must be communicated in actual fact in order to be effective. (Per
Lord Denning-Entores V Miles Far East Corporation). An exception to this rule is the postal rule
exception, here, acceptance is deemed to be communicated to the offeror by the offeree when the
offeree places the letter of acceptance inside the mail box. (Adams v Lindsell) Where the rule is
applicable it would not matter that the letter of acceptance never gets delivered to the offeror in actual
fact. (Household fire Insurance v Grant).
Here Severine has attempted to communicate acceptance by post. Since Gunther has used the post to
communicate the offer in the first instance the postal rule exception will apply as in the circumstances
the post is a proper method of communicating acceptance. As such as soon as Severine places her letter
of acceptance in the mailbox the law deems communication of such to the offeror. It would not matter
that the letter is subsequently never delivered to Gunther, the contract already exists and must be given
effect to. It is therefore, submitted that Gunter will have to sell Ansen on Contract for a 100 pounds to
Severine.
However, in today's day and age it seems unfair that a contract is formed despite the fact that notice of
acceptance is never received by the offeror. In fact, in the Scottish case of Mason v Benhar Coal, Lord
Shanet stated that the postal rule exception should not have any application where the letter of
acceptance never reaches the offeror in actual fact. McKendrick, agrees with that proposition, it is
submitted that where the letter of acceptance is never received by the offeror a contract should not be.
held to be formed but instead a precondition of the application of the postal rule should depend on the
letter of acceptance being received by the offeror at least some time in the future.
b) The issue is whether the postal rule exception is applicable where Evan has forgotten to stamp
his letter of acceptance properly. The postal rule exception means that communication of
acceptance is deemed to be given when the letter of acceptance is dropped in the post box.
However, where the letter of acceptance is not properly addressed then it has been held the
postal rule exception would not be applicable (Korbetis v TransGrain Shipping). By extending the
ration of that case it could be submitted that a letter not stamped properly will also not attract
the postal rule exception. Here the letter of acceptance has not been stamped properly and as
such does not have the characteristics of a letter capable of being delivered to Gunther. It is
unlikely therefore that Gunter would ever receive Evans letter of acceptance as such the postal
rule exception would not be applicable and hence a contract will not be created in the first
place. Therefore, it is submitted that Gunther will not be required to sell a copy of his own book
to Evan.
c) The issue is whether the postal rule application has any applicatio where the offeror has asked
for notice of acceptance in actual fact. The postal rule exception is an exception to the rule
requiring communication of acceptance in actual fact. Where an offeror asks for notice in actual
fact then he negatives the application of the postal rule exception (Holwell Securities v Hughes).
Here Gunter has asked for notice in actual fact of the acceptance of his offer as such the postal
rule exception has no application. Mindy will be required to notify Gunter of her acceptance in
actual fact since she has not done so there is no contract between the parties. It is therefore
submitted that Gunter does not have to sell the book to Mindy.
23/11/23
Consideration
Stilk V Merrick
A general rule in relation to the variation of an existing obligation can be seen in the case of Stilk v
Merrick. It establishes the principle that the performance of an existing contractual obligation can never
be a good consideration for a fresh promise to pay more (discuss the facts of Stilk). McKendrick points
out that in Stilk itself there is little doubt that the master of the ship was benefitted by the promise to
sail the ship back home. McKendrick also points out that the case of Raggow v Scougall which appears to
be flatly inconsistent with Stillk but remained buried in the law reports rarely being cited. Here the
claimant agreed to accept a lower salary whilst being employed for two years because of the war after
some time the claimant brought an action claiming his salary at the old rate. Since the defendants had
not provided consideration for the promise to accept a lower salary. Darling J held that the agreement
was supported by consideration and the action therefore failed. One of the reasons why an alternative
to Stillk was never discussed (except for Raggow) was because the rule worked well with the rule in
Hartley v Ponsonby (discuss Hartley).
Roffey
The general rule in Stillk came under attack in the court of appeal case of Williams v Roffey (discuss
facts). The court of appeal adopted a pragmatic approach, they held the defendants had obtained a
practical benefit. According to Glidewell J the practical benefit obtained was that the plaintiffs continued
to work and did not leave the contract uncompleted. In that sense, very similar benefits could have been
said to be accrued to the captain of the ship in Stillk. It is therefore submitted that prima facise there
appears to be nothing distinguishing the cases of Stillk and Roffey.
Economic Duress.
Stillk’s judgement has been reported twice, the two reports differ in their reasoning. In Epinasse’s law
report, Stillk was unsuccessful on the basis that it was against public policy, i.e. that it would open up
claims from other sailors for higher pay from their masters during the voyage. In Campbell’s report Stillk
failed because he had not provided consideration for his master’s alteration promise. Stillk’s case is
generally regarded as authority in terms of Campbell’s law report. The case of Roffey is a spoke in the
wheel of the coherent scheme of law that existed prior to Roffey. In Roffey the court of appeal was at
pains to state that it had not overruled Stillk but that it had only refined it. It is difficult to see how this
can be the case since even the master of the ship in Stillk obtained a practical benefit, from the sailors’
work. The court of appeal attempted to solve this issue by considering Stillk a duress case. According to
Gilmore (1974) this is problematic there is no evidence of duress in the case if Stillk itself, the only
evidence is in Epinasse’s law report. Epinasse himself is not considered a very able law reporter, the
court of appeal also did not rely on Epinasse’s report when they discussed Stillk in Roffey.
Nevertheless, it s possible to neatly distinguish the two cases by using the doctrine of economic duress.
That approach can be summarized in the following fashion: initially, the courts must be more willing to
find that consideration exists because they know that if there is duress the contract becomes voidable.
Subsequently the doctrine of duress will decide if the contract can be allowed to stand. This approach
has not been given absolute support by all judges in the UK, for example, Hirst J in the case of Anangel v
Ishikawajima- Harima. economic duress has recently been explained in the case of Pakistan International
v Times Travel, the supreme court held that economic duress exists where there was an illegitimate
threat which could even be a threat to breach the existing terms of the contract. Secondly, there must
be a causal link between the threat and the making of a promise to pay more. Finally, there must be a
lack of any reasonable alternative for the person giving in to the threat. If these criteria exist then the
court will hold that there is evidence of economic duress and therefore the contract is voidable.
Conclusion
Stillk and Roffey are indistinguishable unless one applies the doctrine of economic duress. Until the
Supreme Court or parliament provides clarity on the matter it is submitted that the courts will adopt a
two-stage approach: is there evidence of any sort of consideration and secondly is there evidence of
duress which would vitiate the contract voidable.
30/11/2023
Past Consideration
Problem and essay question
Essay Question
Note
Similar to the essay question sir has already given
Problem Question 1
1.Past consideration Exceptions- Pau on Lau young and Part of a big transaction and consideration
comes part court looks at it- case of Maritime and Lion something
The three rules under Pau on Lau young
Distinction is he doing this out of his profession-if so then the rule of sumset does not apply
Problem Question 2
Intention to create legal relations- domestic contracts are not legally binding
Case of White vs Bluet- relied on the promise of the husband and husband has received a benefit
therefore presumption of domestic agreements being not legal binding is rebutted.
When around a table at dinner family members agree to share the lottery money if they win it.
Here also it is also a domestic agreement and so is not legal binding, intention is just a discussion
nothing more.
When around a table same scenario but now there are friends involved.
Same here it is not legal binding.
Parent company overseas sends letter to subsidiary company in home
Here it is a commercial contract however this could be considered as a comfort letter therefore cannot
be relied upon therefore presumption is rebutted.
Rich client sits down with her advisor at an informal meal and the client says that if shares fall next week
I will give you a percentage.
Both parties are on a commercial basis and one is relying on the expertise of the other. The discussion is
on financial advice and there is a commission being discussed therefore they would rely on this.
Therefore, this is legal binding.
Question no.3
Invitation to treat
2 jars of jam advertised on a shops window for 10 p
This amounts to an invitation to treat
Someone send a letter saying he accepts the jam bottles for 10p this amounts to an offer
The letter gets lost in the post
There is an offer, the problem is whether there is now communication of the offer, postal rule does not
apply because this is for communication of acceptance.
Invitation to treat essay- there is an American case- which states that invitation amounts to an offer
Another situation where a guy walks in to the shop and says that he accepts the 2 jam for 15p.
It is an offer because there is an invitation only in the first place and not an offer.
Another situation where a guy comes and says he will buy for 2 jams
Shop owner can decline because it is up to the offeree to reject or accept the offer.
I, L,F,C- highlight the facts of the case.
Question 4- Essay question- similar structure to the economic duress essay sir has given
Is consideration only applicable to the creation of the contract and not the variation.
Styllck v Merick
Prof Atiyah argument on consideration
Williams v Roffey- recent case for consideration- practical benefit was the consideration. Consideration
applies to the original contact and to it variation.
Pakistani International talks about economic duress- if there is economic duress then contract is
voidable.
Part Payment
Part payment of a debt- stated in Pinnel’s case and approved in Foakes v Beer
Foakes v beer rejects the practical benefit argument, another case Re Selectmore also rejects the
practical benefit argument
M W Business Exchange case- Practical benefit can be not a part payment but an emotional one
This case went to the SC- and SC rejected the case of Roffey and Foakes for part payment and practical
benefit. Has not been concluded and we are waiting for the SC to decide or Prliament to step in.
Conclusion- your viewpoint-there should be a Two stage test as the two stage approach found in
consideration for a variation of a contract with regard to economic duress- case is the Japanese case.
Part Payment of a debt
The general approach is that a debtor is contractually obliged to repay the entire debt due to a creditor
and a creditor's promise to accept part payment isn't binding on the creditor unless the debtor agrees
for example to repay the debt at an earlier date. This rule was first established in the case of Pinnell it
was confirmed in the case of Foakes v Beer (discun many ss the facts of Foakes v Beer)
An argument which can be tendered is that in many cases a creditor will as a matter of fact be
benefitted by receipt of a part paynemnt of the debt because he would obtain something in otherwise
circumstance were he would otherwise he would not have obtained nothing at all. This argument
however has expressly rejected by Lord Blackburn in the case of Foakes v Beer itself. The majority of the
HOL held that such practical benefit did not amount to good consideration on the law a different kind of
practical benefit may however be sufficient. In M W Business Exchange v Rock advertising the court held
that a practical benefit which went beyond receiving quick payment of part of the debt could be good
consideration in M W B such practical benefit was obtained by the promisor through the continued
occupation of the promissee of the premises.
In Re Selectmore the Court of Appeal discussed the connection between Foakes v Beer and Williams v
Roffey. Peter Gibson J stated that any relevance of the argument in Roffey would leave Foakes without
any practical application. In Rock advertising v M W B Exchange, the supreme court had a chance of
resolving the issue however they refused to entertain it at that point of time as such the law still
requires some clarification as to whether Roffey will apply to a Foakes v Beer scenario.