Brexit may jeopardize the peace process in Northern Ireland
Student: David Sexton
Student No: C19352421
Course: DT365/4
Lecturer: Dr. John Hogan
Course Module: Business and Society
Submission Date: 17/11/2023
Declaration of Ownership
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I declare that the work contained in this submission is my work and has not been taken
from the work of others, save and to the extent that such work has been cited and
acknowledged within the text of this submission.
Signed: David Sexton
Date: 17/11/2023
Contents
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1. Introduction
2. Historical Context of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland
3. The Good Friday Agreement
4. Brexit and Its Implications for Northern Ireland
5. Changing Identities and the Rise of the Middle Ground
6. The Role of the European Union in Northern Ireland's Stability
7. Conclusion
1. Introduction
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Cochrane (2020) argues that Brexit is the most significant event in the political history of
Northern Ireland since partition in 1921. The outcome of the vote on 23 June 2016 was
interpreted by Leave voters as taking back control of their country and a return to selfgovernance for the United Kingdom (UK). However, it is worth noting that two regions of
the UK did not vote to Leave: Scotland and Northern Ireland, with 55.8 percent of the
electorate in Northern Ireland voting in favour of the UK remaining in the European
Union (EU) (Gormley‐ Heenan & Aughey, 2017). Indeed, this notion of sovereignty put
forward by advocates of the Leave vote is at odds with the post-sovereign character of
the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). This essay will explore the historical context of the
peace process, the status of the GFA, the challenges Brexit poses for Northern Ireland,
the changing identities of Northern Ireland, and the role of the EU.
2. Historical Context of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland
On May 3, 1921, Northern Ireland was formed through the partition of Ireland, driven by
conflicts between Catholic nationalists, who wanted independence from Britain, and
Protestant unionists, who preferred remaining part of the UK (Flanagan, 2021). This
partition intensified tensions, with many in Northern Ireland supporting a unified Ireland
(Knispel, 2023). Northern Ireland evolved into a Protestant unionist-dominated state,
with discriminatory policies against Catholics in areas like housing, employment, and
education (Knispel, 2023).
The 1960s saw these tensions escalate as Catholic nationalists protested against such
policies, leading to the Troubles, a violent conflict that lasted until the Good Friday
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Agreement (GFA) in 1998 (Roos, 2023). This period was marked by the activities of
groups like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which sought to end British rule through
violence, and its political arm, Sinn Féin, which pursued the same goal legislatively
(Blakemore, 2022). In reaction, unionist paramilitaries like the Ulster Defence
Association and Ulster Volunteer Force gained prominence (Wallenfeldt, 2023).
This era involved bombings, shootings, and civil unrest, resulting in 3,500 deaths and
30,000 injuries, including civilians (Roos, 2023). Efforts to find a political solution were
often hampered by deep mistrust and sporadic increases in violence (Blakemore, 2022).
The GFA, signed on April 10, 1998, ended the Troubles by establishing a power-sharing
framework and making Northern Ireland a devolved entity within the UK (Blakemore,
2022). The Troubles' legacy continues to affect Northern Ireland's political, social, and
cultural fabric, emphasising the importance of the peace achieved by the GFA and
raising serious concerns about the potential impact of Brexit on this delicate peace.
3. The Good Friday Agreement
The GFA resolved the key constitutional issue for Northern Ireland by stipulating that it
would remain part of the UK unless a majority there chose to unite with Ireland, with
consent from North and South of the border. The agreement also established a
governance framework based on three strands. Strand One established democratic
institutions within Northern Ireland, including a power-sharing legislative and executive
between Catholic and Protestant parties. Strand Two fostered cooperation between
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Ireland and Northern Ireland through a North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) for
shared interests. Strand Three enhanced East/West cooperation, establishing a British
Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) and a British-Irish Council (BIC) as forums
for consultation and information exchange between Ireland and all parts of the UK.
(Fabrinni, 2022)
The GFA embodies Lampedusa's paradox: "Everything must change for everything to
remain the same." For Unionists, maintaining the status quo necessitates change (the
preservation of the Union requires sharing executive power with nationalists and
incorporating an all-Ireland aspect). Conversely, for Nationalists in pursuit of change,
continuity must be maintained (To achieve Irish unity, Unionist consent is required,
implying the continued inclusion of Northern Ireland within the Union) (Gormley‐
Heenan & Aughey, 2017).
The implementation of devolved governance in Northern Ireland occurred within the
context of both the UK and Ireland being members of the EU. The common EU
framework reduced the tensions surrounding sovereignty issues, while the European
Union Single Market supported and aligned with the conditions of the agreement
(Hayward & Murphy, 2018).
4. Brexit and Its Implications for Northern Ireland
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Among the major political parties, the DUP was the sole advocate for the UK's
departure from the EU, arguing that it would benefit both the United Kingdom as a
whole and Northern Ireland in particular by reinforcing the UK's sovereignty. In contrast,
the other principal parties in Northern Ireland supported remaining in the EU. This group
included nationalist parties like Sinn Féin and the SDLP, as well as the Alliance Party
and notably the UUP, the second largest Unionist party. However, UUP voters were
split on the issue (Soares, 2016). The region was largely unprepared for the challenges
of Brexit, with the Northern Ireland administration failing to produce a comprehensive
impact assessment or a clear negotiating position due to internal disagreements
(Hayward & Murphy, 2018).
For Unionists, Brexit was a way for Northern Ireland to distance itself politically from the
Republic and to make it more likely to remain one of the nations of the UK (Murphy,
2022). For Nationalists, remaining in the EU facilitated deeper connections with Ireland
through shared European citizenship, allowing them to feel more comfortable within
Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom (Gormley‐ Heenan & Aughey, 2017).
Brexit has heightened unionist anxieties about Northern Ireland's status within the UK.
The implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol has been opposed by Unionists as
it creates regulatory differences between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. The
arrangements under the Protocol raise concerns about democratic deficits, as Northern
Ireland is subject to EU regulations without direct representation in EU decision-making
processes (Murphy & Evershed, 2021).
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The DUP holds an unwavering position that the Protocol, especially the new trade
checks between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, is fundamentally at odds with the
GFA as it undermines the constitutional status of Northern Ireland (Henig, 2022). While
these concerns are legitimate, It is reasonable to argue that the DUP is guilty of
opportunism, using the provisions of an agreement it once opposed to challenge the
new issue it now opposes. (McTague, 2023a)
Nationalists will have their own grievances around Brexit and the GFA, as they argue
that consent is the basic stabilising element of the peace process and that Northern
Ireland has not consented to being ‘removed’ from the EU. Brexit can therefore be
viewed as against not only the spirit of the GFA but it also threatens to undermine the
consent principle (Gormley‐ Heenan & Aughey, 2017).
Brownlow (2023) suggests that although Northern Ireland has historically suffered from
economic underperformance, Brexit has created a unique status where Northern Ireland
straddles the EU and UK markets, which may be advantageous. Additionally, the
changes instituted by the Windsor Framework are seen as offering more economic
opportunities compared to the original Protocol.
5. Changing Identities and the rise of the Middle Ground
In terms of identity, EU membership had “diluted the concept of sovereignty of Ireland
and eased tensions between unionists and nationalists.” (Berbéri, 2017) The Brexit
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process has reignited the ideological divide, with Unionists and Nationalists now holding
polarised views on EU membership and its implications (Hayward & Murphy, 2018).
Canavan & Turkoglu (2022) examined changes in national identity in Northern Ireland
around the Brexit vote. They found a post-Brexit reduction in the number of people
identifying as British, particularly among Protestants who hadn't experienced the
Troubles, with as many as 20% in this group shifting their identity from British to Irish.
Conversely, no significant shift in national identity was noted among individuals who had
experienced the Troubles. This shift by young Protestants can be mainly attributed to
the association of British identity with illiberal attitudes due to the Brexit campaign.
(Canavan & Turkoglu, 2022)
Brexit has led to significant electoral gains for the non-sectarian Alliance Party and
challenges for unionism. The DUP, in particular, has suffered losses, contributing to a
changing political dynamic where the traditional unionist-nationalist divide is being
tested (Murphy, 2022).
The Alliance Party navigated Brexit by advocating for the softest possible form of Brexit,
along with special arrangements for Northern Ireland. This stance, which sought to
separate Brexit from wider constitutional issues, aligned the party with nationalist
groups like SDLP and Sinn Féin. Additionally, their support for the Protocol contrasts
with the strong opposition of the unionist parties (Murphy, 2022).
Brexit and the increasing prominence of the party have facilitated the Alliance Party in
establishing a unique identity, distinct from its unionist heritage. Embracing a stance of
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constitutional neutrality based on the consent principle of the 1998 Agreement, the
Alliance Party engages in discussions about constitutional change, setting it apart from
traditional unionist parties. The Alliance Party also demonstrates a willingness to
engage with the Irish government and participate in all-island dialogues, supporting
North/South structures and addressing a broad array of issues beyond just
constitutional matters. This approach renders the Alliance Party's engagement with the
Irish Unity debate, and potentially Irish unity itself, more open-minded and adaptable
compared to the typical unionist perspective (Murphy, 2022).
It could be interpreted that the three major parties of Northern Ireland all aim to
strengthen ties with different larger entities: The DUP with the UK, Sinn Fein with
Ireland, and The Alliance with the EU. For the Alliance, the primary concern appears to
be maintaining a connection with the EU, while the question of alignment with the UK or
Ireland seems less important.
Should the Alliance party continue to gain support, it could challenge key principles of
the peace agreement. Under the GFA, the votes of Alliance party members in the
Stormont Assembly carry less weight compared to those of the Unionist and Nationalist
parties, as the power-sharing mandate does not allow for unaligned parties. Therefore,
this arrangement may become unsustainable if 20-30% of Northern Ireland’s electorate
vote for parties that fall outside the traditional dichotomy. (McTague, 2023b)
While the Nationalist versus Unionist dichotomy continues to dominate Northern Ireland,
its significance is declining due to the rise of the middle ground, which will have
substantial effect on the future of the region (Colfer & Diamond, 2022).
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6. Impact of EU Membership on Northern Ireland
Although the European Union played a peripheral role in the negotiations of the GFA in
1998, it provided the broader context that enabled the effective implementation of the
Agreement, particularly concerning border issues. The Special EU Programmes Body, a
dedicated North-South entity, was instrumental in executing the EU Programme for
Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, distributing funding of 2.3 billion euros
(Gormley‐ Heenan & Aughey, 2017).
After joining the European Communities together in 1973, the UK and Ireland found
ample opportunity to develop habits of cooperation among their politicians. This
European stage laid the groundwork for building the trust and understanding between
the British and Irish governments, facilitating the eventual negotiations that led to the
GFA (Colfer & Diamond, 2022). The UK and Ireland became co-guarantors in the GFA
and stated in the agreement their intention to increase cooperation further develop their
relationship as neighbours and partners in the EU (Soares, 2016).
That deepening relationship is formally embodied within the second strand of the GFA,
which not only set out the creation of the NSMC, but also specific areas for North-South
cooperation that led to the creation of six implementation bodies. Several of these
cross-border implementation bodies were either directly reliant on common EU
membership, such as the aforementioned Special EU Programmes Body, or have
responsibilities that are supported by compliance with shared EU regulations (Soares,
2016).
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EU funding from various European Structural and Investment Programmes, especially
the PEACE and INTERREG cross-border collaboration initiatives, have played a crucial
role in peace-building efforts in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland received a total of
€1.3 billion in financial support through the PEACE initiative, with the latest iteration of
the programme commencing in 2016 with a total value of €270 million. These
programmes have funded infrastructure, business, political reconciliation and civil
society projects and encouraged collaboration between communities (Berbéri, 2017).
Following the loss of opportunities for formal and informal exchanges between British
and Irish officials through the EU following the UK's withdrawal, there is now an
opportunity to reassess the intergovernmental channels set up in 1998. The GFA
created a series of institutions such as the NSMC, the BIIGC and the BIC, to manage
cross-border cooperation and normalise relations between the UK and Ireland.
However, Kelly & Tannam (2022) argue that many aspects of it have been sparingly
and ineffectively deployed, and that regular and earnest use of the institutions
established by the GFA could help address some of the current challenges in Northern
Ireland and alleviate Unionist concerns around the Protocol. Ultimately, it is imperative
for the UK and Ireland to independently navigate their relations in the post-Brexit
context, necessitating a recommitment to the intergovernmental principles fundamental
to the GFA (Kelly & Tannam, 2022).
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7. Conclusion
In conclusion, the complex history and recent developments in Northern Ireland,
particularly surrounding Brexit, underline the delicate balance of peace and political
stability in the region. The Brexit process has rekindled old divisions and created new
challenges, notably in terms of Unionist anxieties, the implementation of the Northern
Ireland Protocol, and the rise of an unprecedented middle ground. The GFA, while a
cornerstone of peace, faces tests in this new context. But while some aspects of the
GFA may need to be re-examined following Brexit, the principles of North/South and
East/West cooperation and the effective use of the intergovernmental institutions are
more crucial now than ever. This delicate situation calls for a nuanced approach from
both the UK and Ireland, as they strive to maintain the hard-won peace in Northern
Ireland in a post-Brexit era.
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