T – Body
A. Interpretation – The 1AC must tie their advocacy to some form of an activist
demand for a reform of criminal justice Dr. Reid-Brinkley 08
(Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, Rhetoric PhD and Prof @ Pitt, THE HARSH REALITIES OF "ACTING
BLACK": HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION
THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE)
Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment
associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates
where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters
can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate
simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts
they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through
interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were.
The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call
for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that
establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated
everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” The “objective” stance of
the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable”
forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the
Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary
practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the
discursive practices of policyoriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power
and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather
than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves
in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do
the same.
B. Violation: The affirmative doesn't use ground activism – they merely present a
plan for how the government hypothetical should do so.
C. Voters
1. Presumption – the affirmative does nothing. Voting affirmative in this debate will
not produce the advantages discussed – vote neg on presumption.
2. Limits – There are an infinite amount of potential plans and policy proposals that
the affirmative could fiat, but there are a limited amount of ways the bodies in this
debate
could curtail surveillance
3. Predictability – our interpretation means the negative only has to defend what they
have done not some random impact they construct before the round or tournament.
The government is inherently
unpredictable, body politics are not.
4. Education:
i. Topic specific education – the aff encourages bad debate including conditionality,
PIC's , international fiat, process counterplans and
a host of other bad debates.
ii. Activism good – plan focus debate requires that we invest our advocacy in
bureaucratic institutions as opposed to individuals. This agency displacement
produces bad citizens who are slaves to the state.
5. Fairness:
i. Ground – aff interpretation destroys any disadvantage ground not based on
government and forces us to defend government inaction – they make it
impossible to be negative.
ii. Marginalized voices D/A – requiring a discussion of policy instead of individual
action marginalizes participants whose views are excluded from the
policy making process. The impact is psychological violence and the refusal and
subsequent death of the minority subject in debate. It's NOT what you do, its what
you Justify – the affirmative should have to defend the tradition and style of debate in
which they participate. Debaters choose their style. This means they have to defend
other bad forms of education that clearly exist in the style of debate they are engaging
T - Minor Repair
Interpretation: Substantial reform must be large enough to change the character of the
entire system
U.S. Code 8818 U.S. Code § 1093.Definitions, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1093#8
the term “substantial part” means a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction
or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which
such group is a part.
(Added Pub. L. 100–606, § 2(a), Nov. 4, 1988, 102 Stat. 3046.)
Minor Repair Test (1)
Warnick and Inch, 2001 [Barbara and Edward S, authors, 28 Jun, Critical Thinking and
Communication: The Use of Reason in Argument]
Occasionally, people opposing policy proposals may recognize that the current policy, if left
unaltered, cannot correct the ill or solve the problem. They believe, however, that if minor
flaws such as inadequate funding, lack of information, or improper administration were
corrected, the present policy could be made adequate. The premise of this strategy is that “the
present system is basically fine, but it could be streamlined and improved with minor additions
or changes that don’t involve wholesale systemic changes.” The defense of present policies with minor
repairs strategy offers small changes to existing policies to improve their effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the needs.
Violation: all the aff does is focus on facial recognition they don’t substantial change the
system”. This is an issue of improper administration.
Standards/Voters:
1. Limits – The aff can do basically anything involving some type of justice system.
We give the best limits by preserving neg ground. Err neg on the interpretation
debate due to the resolution’s broad scope and multidirectionality.
2. Topic Education—They shift the debate away from actual meaningful changes to
the status quo which destroys predictability, core topic education, and debates on
specifics of the CJS.
3. Ground – No literature exists to make case negs for minor administrative changes
that makes it possible to create well-prepared negative arguments. Also minor
repairs are neg ground, in the form of CPs.
4. Prefer Competing Interpretations — reasonability is arbitrary and makes judge
intervention inevitable. Competing interpretations is the only objective judging
framework.
5. Predictability—As policymakers on the national circuit we expect to be able to
prepare for given cases. Unpredictability like the 1AC prevents real educational
debate from taking place and also skews fair ballot access. Affs get infinite prep
time, negs get a 3 min CX. minor repair affs = unpredictable affs, which just force
us to randomly speed prep before the round. Look to our roadmap. This moots
education.
T - In the US
Intepretation: The affirmative should operate within the U.S. according to
the resolution
The “United States” geographically refers to the fifty states, Puerto Rico, Guam,
the Virgin Islands, and the Mariana Islands, and “in” means within—Jurisdiction
alone is not enough
IJ 13 – Immigration Judge, Houston
MEMORANDUM AND DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE (abbrev’d “IJ” by the Court) of the US
DOJ Executive Office for Immigration Review Immigration Court at Houston Service Processing Center in
Houston, In the Matter of Jermaine Amani THOMAS, December 2013, via
https://www.cocklelegalbriefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/32159-pdf-Crain.pdf
Respondent argues that his birth in a U.S. military hospital on a U.S. military base to a U.S. citizen father
qualifies as birth in the “United States,” rendering him a United States citizen at birth. Id at 9- 15.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and INA § 301(a) state that a person born in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a national and citizen of the United States. U.S.
Constitution, Amendment XIV; INA § 301(a). According to INA § 101(a)(38), “when used in a
geographical sense, [‘United States’] means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands.” INA § 101(a)(38).
Respondent was born in Germany. Exh 7. Based on a straightforward reading of the statutory
definition of “United States,” Respondent was not born in the United States, and therefore, is not a
United States national or citizen by his location of birth. Moreover, the U.S. Department of State Foreign
Affairs Manual states that military installations are not part of the “United States” within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Despite widespread popular belief, U.S. military installations abroad and U.S. diplomatic or consular
facilities abroad are not part of the United States within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. A child
born on the premises of such a facility is not born in the United States and does not acquire U.S.
citizenship by reason of birth.
Exh. 27 at 63. Respondent asserts that the term “military installation” is a general description, not including military hospitals. Respondent’s Memorandum at 14-15. According to an article submitted by DHS, the term “military installation” is defined to include:
A base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility or any ship, or any other activity under the jurisdiction of the department, agency, or other instrumentality of the Department of Defense, including a leased facility, except that such term shall not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbor projects, or flood control projects.
Exh. 36. Respondent concedes that the hospital in which he was born was staffed by U.S. military personnel, and that the U.S. military exercised control over the hospital. Respondent’s Memorandum at 12. Consequently, the Court finds that the military hospital fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, and that the military hospital is included in the term “military installation” used in the Foreign Affairs Manual. Therefore, Respondent’s birth in a U.S. military hospital on a U.S. military base abroad does not equate
to birth in the United States.
The Court also observes that the U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual discusses the process for certifying the U.S. citizenship of a person born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, a “Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America” (“Report of Birth Abroad”) is a formal document certifying the acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth by a person born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent, and “establishes a ‘prima facie case’ of U.S. citizenship.” Exh. 27 at 71.
A Report of Birth Abroad may be issued App. 39 upon submission of form DS-2029, “Application for Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America,” together with certain evidence, most importantly, “evidence of the U.S. citizen parent(s)’ physical presence or residence in the United States prior to the birth of the child.” Exh. 35. The instructions for the application specifically state that in the case of children born in U.S. military hospitals, the application must be signed before a designated military
official. The Court finds this to be further evidence that children born in U.S. military hospitals abroad do not automatically acquire United States citizenship. Such children must acquire United States citizenship by fulfilling other criteria.
Respondent argues that the submission of a Report of Birth Abroad is not required to confer citizenship at birth, and cites, as an example, to U.S. Senator John McCain, who was born on August 29, 1936, on a U.S. military base in the Panama Canal Zone to U.S. citizen parents. Respondent’s Memorandum at 6-9, 15 n.4. Respondent argues, essentially, that because Senator McCain is a United States citizen despite the fact that his parents did not apply for a Report of Birth Abroad, the absence of this document in
Respondent’s case has no legal consequence. Id at 15.
The Court does not rely on the mere existence of the State Department’s Report of Birth Abroad, a ministerial document, for the proposition that the Report itself grants citizenship or that its absence necessarily indicates a lack of citizenship. Rather, the App. 40 Court considers the instructions accompanying the Report of Birth Abroad as somewhat probative of whether children born in military hospitals abroad are U.S. citizens by virtue of the location of their birth. The Cour t agrees that a foreign-born person may be a citizen
regardless of whether his parents filed an application for a Report of Birth Abroad.
In regard to the analogy to Senator McCain, the Court observes that the legal basis for Senator McCain’s citizenship is different from Respondent’s. Senator McCain was born to two U.S. citizen parents,1 and consequently acquired United States citizenship pursuant to INA § 301(c). Additionally, at the time of Senator McCain’s birth, INA § 303(a) specifically granted citizenship at birth to children born in the Panama Canal Zone to a U.S. citizen parent. Respondent was not born to two U.S. citizen parents and he was not
statutorily granted citizenship at birth by virtue of his birth in Germany.
Respondent also asserts that because the U.S. had sovereign control over the military hospital in
which he was born, the military hospital was part of the U.S., and, therefore, he was automatically a
United States citizen at birth. Respondent’s Memorandum at 11-12. Respondent notes that the hospital is
staffed by U.S. military members. Id. at 12. The Amicus brief further observes that the hospital performed
a circumcision on Respondent, a surgery which the German population allegedly disapproves of, and that
the form explaining the circumcision procedure was written in American English. Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Respondent’s Claim to Citizenship at Birth at 7-8 (Nov. 21, 2013).
In support of his argument that sovereign control of the military hospital renders the military hospital part
of the United States, Respondent cites to Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that
prisoners at the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay have the right to habeas corpus review, in part
because the U.S. exerts de facto sovereignty over the detention facility), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
19 (1957) (holding that U.S. citizen civilians living on military bases abroad are entitled to the
constitutional safeguards of a civil trial, and that the Uniform Code of Military Justice does not apply to
limit the rights of U.S. citizen civilians living on U.S. military bases abroad). Respondent’s Memorandum
at 9-12. However, Boumediene and Reid are not controlling, as they considered entirely different
questions than those present before this Court. Boumediene and Reid involved the right to habeas corpus
review and the right to the procedural safeguards of a civil trial, not citizenship. Furthermore, although the
U.S. did exert some level of control over the military hospital, Germany retained de jure sovereignty,
which, in the immigration context, is App. 42 especially significant. The Court also observes that the Third
Circuit, in an unpublished decision, rejected reliance on Boumediene for the proposition that birth on the
U.S. military installation at Guantanamo Bay confers U.S. citizenship, finding it relevant that Cuba retains
de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. Williams v. Attorney General, 2012 WL 120150 at *152 (3rd
Cir. 2012). Germanely, the Third Circuit also relied on the Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual,
which, again, states that military installations are not part of the United States within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; Exh. 27. Consequently, the Court finds that alleged de facto control over the
military hospital in which Respondent was born does not establish that Respondent was “born” in the
United States.
Violation: The aff’s plan does not act in the u.s.
c/a Standards/Voters:
TOPICALITY IS A VOTER FOR REASONS OF JURISDICTION, EDUCATION,
GROUND, AND FAIRNESS.
FX T
1. Interp: the aff can only garner advantages through the plan itself
2. Violation: they get their mpx based off of the EFFECTS of the plan, not just the
plan. The plan itself doesn’t actually lead to solvency of their impacts. They shift
the Coast Guard to the DOD, and hope that this will create more funding for the
Coast Guard. However, they can NOT ensure that the Coast Guard is going to get
this funding because their plan doesn’t mandate it. All they do is shift, meaning
they can’t access their solvency through just the plan
3. C/A Standards and voters
T-policing
Military police reform is not topical
Conser et al 13James A. Conser Professor Emeritus in Criminal Justice at Youngstown State Univ,
Rebecca Paynich Professor of Criminal Justice at Curry College, Terry E. Gingerich Professor of Criminal
Justice Western Oregon University Law Enforcement in the United States 3rd Edition.
This chapter introduced you to the field of law enforcement. lt described law enforcement as one of the formal processes of social control,
which means that it is one of society's attempts to obtain compliance with the law. The common term "policing"
is defined as one
form of law enforcement that emphasizes the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of
crime, as well as providing numerous other servicesto society. Policing officials are distinguished from other
law enforcement officials by the fact that they are non-military government personnel who are armed and
may use coercive and physical force under certain conditions. Since policing is a form of social control, the dilferences between formal
(government sponsored) and informal control mechanisms have been presented here as well. Of particular concern are the many influences
upon social control, which have been presented as social, economic, and political factors. These factors influence the police function in every
community within the country.
Violation: Coast Guard is part of the military.
C/A standards/voters from above
T-CJ
Criminal justice reform requires constraints on criminalization and punishment—that’s
a prerequisite for effective debates
Mayson, 20--- (Sandra G., professor of law at the University of Georgia School of Law; teaches criminal
law and criminal justice reform ("The Concept of Criminal Law" Criminal Law and Philosophy
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-020-09530-z; PP)
Antony Duff’s The Realm of Criminal Law10 does not explicitly engage these debates. Although Duff’s magisterial exposition addresses a social
problem—overcriminalization— he diagnoses it as a problem of scale and, at a deeper level, of conceptual incoherence. The discussion does
not highlight the distributional race and class concerns that animate so much contemporary debate. Even on its own terms, Duff’s argument for
a thin, formal “master principle” of criminalization seems like a vehicle for piecemeal reform at best. Yet The Realm does bear on existential
reform debates, because it addresses an overlooked first step in any coherent deliberation about the future of the criminal legal system:
defining “criminal law.”What
is the nature of the thing we seek to reform?What—if anything—makes criminal
lawadistinctivekind of law? Duff undertakes this task because one cannot deliberate about what to criminalize without determining what
the criminal law is for; and one cannot deliberate about what the criminal law is for without determining what it is.Thisinitial,definitional
task, though, is necessary to more than criminalization theory. Itis necessary to debatesabout the value and future of
criminal law itself.And notwithstanding the centrality of the question, there appears to be no clear consensus among either scholars or
reformers about what differentiates criminal law from every other kind of law. This Essay contends that Duff gets the answer right.11The
fact that makes criminal law auniqueform of lawis that it operates as a mechanism of collective
condemnation. It is a body of lawand legal practicethat censures particular acts in the polity’s name.This
concept of criminal law makes sense of the bulk of existing criminal-law doctrine and institutions. To my mind, it is the only concept of criminal
law that can. It is not a novel concept of criminal law, and it is consistent with nearly all theories of criminal law and punishment in current
circulation. But nor is it universally recognized. Achieving clarity
about the nature of criminal law is important fortheory
andreformalike.12 For purposes of theory, recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation helps to refine the questions
up for debate, because the conceptlogically entailscertainconstraints on criminalization and punishment. For
purposes of reform, recognizing criminal law as a mechanism of collective condemnation is essential to thinking about whether we want a
criminal legal system at all, and what, in its best form, it should look like.
Violation: the aff doesn’t have anything to do with the criminal justice system. In CX, we
asked, and they said that they control the arctic and regulate the south china sea.
However, this isn’t part of the criminal justice system. That’s just international trade and
global affairs.
C/A standards/voters from above