NATO and the Decline of European Military Power
Mark J. Kilbane
Prepared for the American Political Science Association/International Studies Association
International Security and Arms Control/International Security Studies Section (ISAC-ISSS)
conference, October 4–6 Washington, DC, 2013.
ABSTRACT
The transatlantic financial crisis and a natural downsizing after the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan
have pressured NATO and European governments to slash expenditures for defense. Europeans have
reduced military budgets 10–15 percent. Spain spends less than one percent of GDP on defense. There
are three possible negative consequences of this decline: (1). capability shortfalls will enfeeble the NATO
Alliance such that it cannot achieve its stated “level of ambition,” (2). burden-sharing tensions will
fracture the NATO alliance, and (3). Europe will be reduced to military—and international—irrelevancy
in a global power shift. No amount of initiatives to maintain capability in this environment, such as
various international agreements and “pooling and sharing,” will suffice to avoid one or more negative
consequences if cuts continue and deepen. For the time being, NATO remains a robust—and Europe’s
singular—credible force. The Alliance has successfully weathered such pressures in the past, and the
United States has too strong a vested and historical interest in NATO to unilaterally withdraw.
NATO 3.0?
On July 31, 2013, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution commemorating the 10-year anniversary of
NATO’s Allied Command Transformation. This headquarters—the only NATO organization based in the
continental United States—is deemed so important to the Alliance that it shares hierarchical
equivalency with NATO’s integrated military headquarters. These two strategic headquarters sit just
below NATO’s political leadership, embodied in the North Atlantic Council. Upon its creation in 2003,
then-Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, proclaimed that Allied Command Transformation
would be “both the symbol of the new NATO, and the architect that will shape its future.” 1
The new headquarters conducted explicit and proactive overtures for the Alliance to stay relevant after
the Cold War. Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, observed
that “in 1994, NATO had 16 members and no partners. It had never conducted a military operation. At
the end of 2005, the Alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously and had 26 members
and partnership relationships with another 20 countries around the world.” 2 NATO now looks to its
mission after the 2014 Afghanistan drawdown, which NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen calls “NATO
3.0,” after the Alliance’s previous Cold War and Iraq/Afghanistan iterations. 3 This new strategic
framework was delineated in Lisbon in 2010 and includes a generalized concept of NATO’s “level of
ambition.” 4
Yet the Alliance now faces a stumbling block to the realization of NATO 3.0—an era of transatlantic
retrenchment and fiscal austerity measures. Europeans have slashed military budgets 10-15 percent
since 2008. 5 Britain’s navy is but a shadow of its 1970s fleet, which was ill-prepared even then for the
Falklands conflict in 1982. Spain spends less than one percent of GDP on defense. 6 In a February 18,
2013, Financial Times piece “Disarmed Europe Will Face the World Alone,” Gideon Rachman asserts that
the United States—with its own harsh defense cuts—may no longer be there if Europe dials 112. “One
day, perhaps soon, the Europeans may wake up and find that the US military is simply not there,” says
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Rachman. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave a speech in 2011 chastising NATO allies
for not holding their own. Gates dropped not-even-thinly veiled hints that the United States was
prepared to unilaterally withdraw, claiming that NATO’s future was “dim, if not dismal.” 7
The 2011 NATO mission in Libya laid bare shortfalls in capability, such as strategic airlift and air-to-air
refueling. Gates remarked in his speech that “many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not
because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities simply
aren’t there.” 8 Rasmussen proclaimed during the crisis that with the “current pace of cuts, it is hard to
see how Europe could maintain enough military capabilities to sustain similar operations in the future.” 9
The 2013 French Opération Serval in Mali further spotlighted Europe’s lack of airlift. Defense writer Chris
Pocock mentioned that the deficit wasn’t only the number of aircraft, but also their capability “in terms
of the size of the airplanes.” * Pocock mentioned that France’s Transall C–160s, introduced in the 1960s,
are “even smaller than the C–130 Hercules.” 10 Domestic pressure on U.S. President Barack Obama may
have spurred his decision to charge France $20 million for the use of American strategic airlift in the
Mali mission. Washington quickly backpedalled and offered the planes gratis after vociferous French
opposition. 11
As Europeans and Americans turn their attention inward toward domestic economic issues, this navalgazing comes at a global strategic opportunity cost. The crisis in Syria highlights a Middle East in turmoil.
Putin has stepped forward in Syria and leads a renascent Russian bear in international relations. In 2012,
China’s military spending increased 7.8 percent in real terms, and spending has increased 175 percent
since 2003. 12 The U.S. strategic pivot (or “rebalance”) to Asia will shift priorities away from Europe. This
*
“Capability” and “capacity” are not coterminous, though they are sometimes used interchangeably. For this work,
“capability” equals the ability to do something: deploy a brigade halfway around the world, hide a submarine from
detection, fire cruise missiles onto a target. It also encompasses firepower and what types of actions can be done
with an individual platform such as a ship, plane, or tank. “Capacity” refers to numbers of things: troops, shipment
containers, strategic lift aircraft.
Both are necessary for military success. A navy can have the newest, tricked-out surface craft with immense
lethality (capability), but the ocean is a big place. If you only have two or three, it won’t get you very far (capacity).
The two words sometimes have a conditional relationship when using the word “capability” in the sense of “being
able to accomplish a mission.” You might need a large number of tanks (capacity) to invade a country successfully
(capability). This is not always the case, as in the Bin Laden raid, where a highly capable force with a small amount
of capacity accomplished a mission with strategic implications.
3
portends a global power restructuring, with Europeans left behind, having deselected themselves from
international influence.
DECLINE
Step One: Acknowledge the problem. Yes, it begins with “Hi, my name is NATO and I have a defense
spending and political leadership problem.”
— Heather Conley and Maren Leed, CSIS.
With anemic economic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, nation-states on both sides of the
Atlantic implemented sweeping budget cuts as a response. Economic pressures are further layered onto
war weariness after over a decade of military ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense spending is a
target of opportunity in this milieu, but reasons for cutting defense spending should not be taken as
a priori. For example, Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe declared in a September 2013 New York Times
article that Europeans are becoming more “cautious, inward looking and reluctant to use force.” She
concluded that “Europe as a whole is becoming more skeptical of the military.” 13 Yet she is
extrapolating a single data point—European opposition to intervention in Syria—to an overall trend.
Surveys in the UK, for instance, demonstrate that the situation is a bit more complex. A 2012 British
Social Attitudes Survey revealed that “only five per cent say they have formed a lower opinion of the
military in recent years.” 14 In 2013, a Ministry of Defence (MoD) survey showed that 62 percent of
respondents “strongly agree” that “the UK needs strong armed forces.” And 73 percent either strongly
or “tend to” agree that the “UK armed forces give the taxpayer value for the money.” 15
In Rachman’s Financial Times piece, he asserts that European politicians are “responding to public
demand” that the military be cut rather than damage “the continent’s vaunted social model.” 16 In
European surveys, however, including the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends, a majority of
respondents supported spending on the military. 17 Referring to results of a European Gallup poll, Hans
Binnendijk and Richard Kugler of the U.S. National Defense University remarked that “the pressure to
cut defence spending is not coming from public opinion.” 18
Guns-or-butter decisions are invariably politicized, therefore if spending cuts are on the agenda, it is
fairly safe to assume that political actors can maximize personal outcomes more readily by shaving off
A400 Airbus purchases than by turning off a constituent’s government food subsidy. The question of
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whether defense or social programs get hacked is more properly suited to public choice theory. The
question of why defense cuts are occurring: leaders’ personal preferences, economic pressures, public
opinion backlash from Iraq and Afghanistan, a natural drawdown after a major armed conflict, etc., is a
topic for another paper. This work concentrates on “what”: positive analysis of cuts in European defense
spending, and possible consequences of that fiscal policy.
Irrespective of why, the cuts have come: “In 2012, European NATO members’ defence spending was, in
real terms, around 11% lower than in 2006,” remarks the Military Balance, a flagship annual of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “This reduction continues to shape military
capabilities, and especially in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain which account for
almost 70% of European spending,” the report concludes. 19 Secretary Gates called European defense
budgets “chronically starved” for financing. “Despite the demands of the mission in Afghanistan...total
European defense spending declined, by one estimate, by nearly 15 percent in the decade following
9/11,” said Gates. 20
Considering European defense spending as a whole, expenditures declined “from 263.1 billion euros in
2001 to 220.0 billion euros in 2011, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of −1.8 percent,”
according to a report from Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Cuts were
reported across all defense spending categories, with the smallest cuts in Operation and Maintenance,
followed by equipment. 21 The 2013 IISS Military Balance reported real defense spending reductions in
60 percent of European states in 2012. Overall European spending on defense fell 1.63 percent in 2012,
which followed a 2.52 percent reduction the previous year. “In the context of existing regional European
budgets, this is a more severe contraction than North America’s,” IISS authors report. 22
Regarding NATO countries, in 2012 only 4 of 28 member states reached NATO’s targeted 2 percent of
GDP spending on defense: the United States, Estonia, the U.K., and Greece. “France fell below the 2
percent mark in 2011, and there is concern that the U.K. will do so after 2015,” writes Luke Coffey of the
Heritage Foundation. 23 “Here too the trend is a downward one,” CSIS report authors observe, “with five
countries meeting the NATO benchmark in 2008, four in 2009, and three in 2010.” 24 Overall NATO
European countries’ defense expenditures declined as a percentage of GDP from 1.93 percent in 2001 to
1.58 percent in 2010. Real-term reductions in European NATO spending shrank $16 billion from 2009–
2011. 25
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Smaller EU states have been cut even deeper, with rates over 20 percent, according to Christian Mölling
of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP):
Latvia notably reduced military spending by 21 percent in 2009. Lithuania cut 36 percent in
2010. The majority of middle-sized countries have implemented military spending cuts of 10 to
15 percent, on average. For example, the Czech Republic and Ireland reduced their defense
budget by 10 percent in 2011 and 2010 respectively. Portugal cut 11 percent in 2010. Greek
military spending dropped by 18 percent in 2010 and a further 19 percent in 2011. Romania
introduced cuts of 13 percent in 2010. 26
Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann, Sneha Raghavan, et al., “European Defense Trends 2012:
Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base,” CSIS, December 2012, Used with permission.
6
This Wall Street Journal graphic provides a snapshot of trends in European defense spending from 2008–
2011. Cuts have since deepened in the UK and France, as will be examined below.
"Europeans retreat on defense spending," Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2011. Copyright 2011 Dow Jones &
Company. Used with permission for the ISAC-ISSS conference. Used here under Section 107 U.S. copyright
law “fair use” doctrine for educational purposes.
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Military budget-slashing also affects the European Union’s defense scheme, the Common Security and
Defense Policy. Since NATO and the EU have 71 percent of their member states in common, what affects
the EU affects NATO. The European Defence Industrial Policy, created to bolster diminishing capacity,
states that “cuts in defence budgets and fragmented European defence markets threaten Europe’s
ability to sustain effective defence capabilities.... This state of affairs also jeopardises Europe’s capacity
to meet new security challenges autonomously and effectively.” 27
Not only is there concern about the overall numbers, but the quality of European defense spending.
Binnendijk and Kugler observe that out of Europe’s overall €210 billion spending on defense, “only
about €45bn of that is available for investment—well below the amount needed to transform European
militaries for new missions.” 28 A European Defense Agency comparison of U.S. and European defense
budgets from 2006–2010 revealed that Europeans spent half of their defense budgets on personnel,
compared to less than one third for the United States. 29 This led one wag to call the Belgian armed
forces an “unusually well-armed pension fund.” 30 The amount of red in this CSIS graphic demonstrates
at a glance the high percentage devoted to personnel across Europe (particularly in Iberia and Italy)
especially compared to the United States.
Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann, Sneha Raghavan, et al., “European Defense Trends 2012:
Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base,” CSIS, December 2012, Used with permission.
8
France and the UK have long been the heavy hitters in European defense, accounting for over half of
European spending on defense, as well as almost two-thirds in Research and Development, according to
Benoît Gomis, researcher in international security at Chatham House. The two countries share an
expeditionary history, albeit with different qualities, hence “they are the most willing countries in
Europe to deploy military capabilities abroad,” said Gomis. 31 These facts merit a closer look at these two
European powers.
UK
Today’s defence budget crisis is no minor event.
—Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, National Defense University.
In their book A Question of Security: The British Defence Review in an Age of Austerity, Michael Clarke
and Michael Codner of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) characterize the United Kingdom as a
“medium power with global expeditionary aspirations and presumptions of world influence, that is
nonetheless short of money, and with an electorate bemused by the purpose of a war they are funding
and fighting.” 32
The UK economy took a beating after the U.S. housing bubble burst in 2008. Debt-to-GDP ratio soared
from 52.2 percent in 2008 to 74.9 percent in 2010. 33 Faced with this economic crisis, the government
launched a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010. The SDSR “resulted in a 20–
30% reduction in UK armed forces’ operational ambition and deployable capability,” according to the
IISS 2012 Military Balance. Andrew Dorman, Professor of International Security at King’s College and
associate fellow at Chatham House, agrees with the IISS authors, suggesting cuts go far deeper than the
7.5 percent real-term decrease in military spending. “In reality defense spending has dropped by nearly
25 percent,” says Dorman. He explains that Prime Minister David Cameron’s coalition government
required the £15–20 billion necessary for the replacement of Britain’s nuclear submarines to come not
from Treasury, as originally envisaged by the previous government, but from MoD. Furthermore, the
coalition decided that MoD should balance its budget, and that some £38 billion in unfunded liabilities
would be funded from within existing resources.” 34
The UK’s level of ambition set out in the SDSR is to be able to conduct an enduring operation with
approximately a brigade-level force (with naval and air support) while simultaneously conducting two
short-term operations: one complex (up to 2000 personnel) and one simple intervention (1000
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personnel). If no forces are committed to a long-term operation, then forces should be able to complete
either three short-term operations or one single combined maximal effort of short duration with three
brigades, including air and maritime support. 35 That level of ambition was to be realized by the concept
Future Force 2020. The National Security Strategy also debuted in October 2010, containing a threat
analysis and—perhaps following the lead of U.S. capstone strategy documents—a list of national
security tasks.
United Kingdom politicians and media have criticized the 2010 generation of the SDSR and the National
Security Strategy as “rushed,” says the 2012 Military Balance. Public comments from senior military
leaders and leaked documents suggest “the SDSR is already out of date.” And unless the British
economy turns around after 2015, “Future Force 2020 as described by the SDSR is unachievable,” the
IISS authors conclude. 36 The extent of the cuts—driven by the 2010 SDSR—is significant, as seen in the
government table below.
Figure from Malcolm Chalmers, “The Squeeze Continues—UK Defence Spending and the 2013 Budget,”
Royal United Services Institute, RUSI.org, March 25, 2013. Used with permission.
10
Defence takes a walloping £249 million reduction in the 2013 budget. “As with the previous round of
cuts...these reductions are bigger (in absolute terms) than those for any other single government
department,” writes Malcolm Chalmers, director of UK defense policy at RUSI. 37
Clarke and Codner report the loss of the Harrier jump jet, which served the Royal Air Force and Navy
since 1969. Furthermore, the stealth RQ-170 Sentinel reconnaissance drone program was canned, and
“the Nimrod MR4 maritime surveillance aircraft programme has also been cancelled.” 38 The SDSR
reduced Britain’s carrier fleet to one operational flat-top, though construction will continue on two
Queen Elizabeth-class carriers. Air operations are slated to start in 2018 for the HMS Queen Elizabeth,
but the fate of the second carrier, the HMS Prince of Wales, is yet to be decided. 39
The carrier program has been plagued with difficulty. The 2010 SDSR decided to equip the carriers with
F–35C carrier planes, then the government later reversed that decision, going with the F–35B STOVL
version—the switch costing taxpayers £74 million. 40 The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee has
been a ruthless critic of the program, remarking in 2010 that the total overrun of £1.6 billion in costs
created a “new benchmark in poor corporate decision making.” 41 The government is currently
attempting to renegotiate contracts for the carrier program. 42
The UK Army has suffered blistering cuts, losing five battalions, 17 “major units,” and 20,000 soldiers, as
announced by defence secretary Phillip Hammond. This represents the largest overhaul of UK forces in
decades, 43 and is the result of what Secretary Hammond labeled the “black hole in the MoD budget.” 44
Hammond admitted Army morale was “fragile” in light of the redundancies. 45 UK military personnel
have been steadily declining ever since a World War II high of 5 million. A twenty-year stretch from
1970–1990 saw the slowest decreases, beginning in 1970 with 373,000 and ending in 1990 with 305.8
thousand men and women in uniform. 46
Dorman reported that the Army will lose “Challenger main battle tanks (118 to go),” as well as AS90 selfpropelled 155mm howitzers. 47 It has been said that a single U.S. Marine Corps Aviation Wing has more
11
aircraft than the Royal Air Force, and that the UK Navy has more admirals than ships. The latter
expression, though catchy, hasn’t much significance since the United States is a member of that club. †
The decline of the UK defense posture is most striking when examining the long-term trend. As pointed
out by BBC diplomatic and defence editor Mark Urban, the Royal Navy now has only 19 frigates and
destroyers, compared to 69 in 1977. “There were 76,200 serving in the Senior Service [Royal Navy]
whereas today it is 34,000,” reports Urban. He also highlights the RAF’s reductions to a quarter of the
size it was in 1977, while there are only a third the number of the tanks in the Army. Urban summarizes
the UK’s lack of ability to defend the homeland itself:
The UK has no defence against missile attack (unlike Japan, several Gulf states and Israel); no
long range anti-aircraft missiles (they went 30 years ago); no diesel submarines able to protect
the home islands (these were scrapped in the 1990s); only enough minesweepers to keep one of
its major ports open; no long range maritime patrol aircraft (binned in the SDSR); there is
frequently no frigate or destroyer available for home defence; and the number of RAF
interceptors that are fully operational is barely adequate. 48
FRANCE
We are moving toward a Europe that is a combination of the unable and the unwilling.
—Camille Grand, La Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
With rock-bottom polls, a disheveled economy in torpor, and a fractious political scene, President
François Hollande’s first year in office was best summed up by a May 2013 Le Monde headline:
“Hollande, l’année terrible.” 49 Despite the problematic domestic scene, France was one of the last
European countries to stave off reductions to defense spending as an austerity measure.
There are several reasons for this. As mentioned above, France has a long history of expeditionary
military power projection and “strategic affairs and defence are deeply embedded into the power of the
French State,” writes Yves Boyer, Deputy Director of La Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. The
French system is “highly centralised,” says Boyer, and is “built around the preeminence of the president
†
However, possibly due to complaints about releasing sailors while keeping or expanding flags, the U.S. Navy
recently announced plans to eliminate 35 flag officer billets. “Navy Announces Plan to Reduce Flag Officer
Structure,” Navy.mil, August 20, 2013, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=76067
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of the Republic, commander in chief.” 50 This autonomous strain has been reflected in France’s
tumultuous relationship with NATO. In the mid-1990s, former president of France Jacques Chirac had a
rapprochement with NATO, and “the French military presence in NATO grew from 117 liaison officers in
1992 to some 290 personnel in 2008, including 110 serving in some of the key posts of the ‘integrated’
structures so disliked by de Gaulle,” remarks Gomis. 51
Martial Foucault of Institut français des relations internationals observes that the French public is oddly
isolated from military affairs. Commendable military performance in Libya and Mali gave little boost to
presidential polls in either case. 52 “Defense policy has...been largely ignored from the public debate,”
says Foucault. He remarks that the presidential candidates for the 2012 election remained “discreet”
during the campaign, “rendering defense an invisible issue.” Foucault observes that the defense budget
in France was long considered “ring-fenced,” but that has now changed. “Defense today is one of the
most vulnerable ministries to budget cuts,” Foucault observes. 53
An April 2013 French white paper (Livre Blanc) on defense proposes force restructuring and 34,000
personnel cuts. 54 Defense spending “will fall from 1.9% to 1.76% of the country’s GDP, which means that
€364bn have been allocated for 2014–2025, including €179bn for 2014–2019,” according to Gomis. 55 A
Financial Times article by Hugh Carnegy observes that “the Rafale fighter... [is] reduced to 26 from a
previously planned 66...with the total combat air force set to be trimmed to 225 by 2025, from a
previous target of 300. Lesser delays are also built in for the supply of new attack submarines and
frigates.”
Total military and defense staff will shrink “242,000 in 2019, from 324,000 in 2008. Some 10,000 of the
new cuts will be operational troops,” says Carnegy. 56 Camille Grand of La Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratégique observes that there have been several rounds of personnel reductions since the
professionalization of the force began in the mid-1990s “leading to a fall of military personnel of more
than 50 percent in 15 years.” 57 France’s cutbacks to defense represent “a significant shift away from the
NATO defence spending target of 2 per cent of GDP.” This shows that France is “willing to face the
disapproval of its foreign defence partners in order to get its public spending under control,” writes
Gomis.
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France’s defense reductions, however, are of a different quality and severity than the cuts made in the
United Kingdom. President Hollande and Defence Minister Yves le Drian set out to protect defense from
being scapegoated into a budgetary lever to restore the economy. “That will not be the case—as it is in
the US,” le Drian said. 58 Grand observes that “in recent years, French defense spending has fared well in
comparison to most European countries.” 59 And Gomis remarks that the Livre Blanc was a “cautious
compromise,” and that the cuts “are not as significant as many expected.” 60
“With a budget of €40 billion (pensions included), France has continued to devote significant resources
to its defense,” writes Grand. “Spending between €48 billion and €55 billion a year, the country has
continuously ranked in the world top five spenders.” Furthermore, in real terms France is “by far the
largest collaborative R&T spender with an annual average of 130.7 million euros,” according to a CSIS
report. 61 France also has a long tradition of maintaining a robust force and “surprisingly, in real terms
the defence budget voted in 2010 (32.19 billion euros, 2010) is more or less the same as the budget
adopted in 1981,” says Foucault. 62
Unlike the 2010 British SDSR, the 2013 Livre Blanc did not set out to reduce France’s level of ambition,
but rather to maintain full operational capability. While the UK government has eliminated its carrier air
force and maritime patrol aircraft, the French government has decided not to eliminate any major line
items. “The French have pointedly decided they are not going to make such crunchy choices,” said
François Heisbourg, special adviser at La Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. 63
CONSEQUENCES
There are three primary negative outcomes possible from the decline in NATO European military
spending outlined above, which will be addressed in sequence below.
1. Capability shortfalls will enfeeble the NATO Alliance such that it cannot achieve its stated “level
of ambition.”
2. Burden-sharing tensions will fracture the NATO alliance.
3. Europe will be reduced to military—and international—irrelevancy in a global power shift.
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1. CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS.
NATO’S LEVEL OF AMBITION:
Bullet 39 of NATO’s Strategic Concept announced in Lisbon 2010 declares that “instability or conflict
beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security....” 64 In light of this statement, NATO has
three identified core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. 65 To
achieve these goals, NATO has set a level of ambition to “manage two major joint operations and six
small joint operations, if required.” 66
In a press conference after the 2010 Lisbon summit, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen declared that
managing the impact of the financial crisis would be one of the “defining issues” both for his tenure, and
for NATO governments. Rasmussen offered three points of guidance: that cuts must “preserve our
ability to deter attacks against us,” that “salami slicing” by cutting a percent of everything “would end
up hollowing everything out,” and finally that a coherent approach across the Alliance was necessary. 67
NATO AND EU MEASURES TO ENHANCE CAPABILITY:
Over the last several years, European NATO countries, the European Union, and individual European
governments have established compacts, structures, and procedures to streamline efforts, enhance
efficiency and cooperation, and compensate for an overall reduction in defense financing.
As mentioned above, NATO and the EU share 71 percent of their member states. Under the 2003 “Berlin
Plus Agreement” between NATO and the EU, the EU has access to NATO planning, a NATO headquarters
is made available for an EU-led operation, and the EU is provided access to NATO assets. 68 In addition to
NATO overtures, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has established initiatives to maintain European
military capability. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton stated that “on capabilities in particular,
whether labelled Pooling & Sharing or Smart Defence, we have achieved an unprecedented level of
cooperation.” 69
—NATO SMART DEFENCE
A June 2013 NATO backgrounder explains that “Smart Defence represents a renewed emphasis
on multinational cooperation in order to provide cost-effective security in a period of economic
austerity.” There are 29 multinational projects that promise “improved operational
effectiveness, economies of scale and connectivity between national forces.” 70 The program
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lists three principles: prioritization, specialization, and cooperation. At the 2012 Chicago
Summit, NATO leaders “agreed to embrace Smart Defence” in order to maintain capabilities and
achieve goals toward its announced “NATO Forces 2020.” The framework “NATO Forces 2020”
envisages “modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised and commanded so
that they can operate together and with partners in any environment.” 71
—NATO CONNECTED FORCES INITIATIVE
Still on the drawing board, NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative sets out to achieve goals of NATO
Force 2020: maintaining NATO capability after the 2014 Afghanistan drawdown. NATO’s primary
mission will shift from one of active engagement to a preparatory role. The three core tenets of
the program are expanded education and training, increased exercises, and better use of
technology. NATO also maintains a host of separate initiatives tailored to individual capabilities
such as aviation modernization; Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; cyber; air
command and control; missile defense; collective logistics contracts; stabilization and
reconstruction; counter-IED; air- and sealift; and reforming NATO’s structures. 72
—EU POOLING AND SHARING
In September 2012, EU ministers “welcomed the European Defence Agency’s proposal to
develop a voluntary code of conduct on pooling and sharing,” according to an EU press release.
In December 2012, EU defence ministers adopted the proposal, agreeing to “systematically
consider cooperation in their national defence planning.” The voluntary code seeks to use the
EDA as a platform for EU member states to consider cooperation—from the drawing board
through fielding the equipment. Also, the program aims to protect pooling and sharing projects
from financial cuts, share information and expertise to avoid gaps, and deliver an annual state of
play for pooling and sharing initiatives. 73 Some early pooling and sharing initiatives have been
modest, including cooperation on cyber, counter IED technology, spare parts for the NH90
helicopter, developing the submarine maritime landscaping exercise, and establishing the
European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course.
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—EDA CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
The European Defence Agency was created in 2004 to enhance European defense capabilities to
support the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The EDA’s Capability
Development Plan—last updated in 2011—“remains the Agency’s ‘overall strategic tool,’ driving
Research & Technology investment, Armaments collaborations and Defence Industry & Market
activities,” according to an EU newsbrief. 74 The EDA has specific strategies in place for
armaments, research and technology, and technology and industry.
—EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Ahead of a scheduled December 2013 European conference on defense, the European
Commission issued a publication titled A New Deal for European Defence: Towards a More
Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector. The communication targets a fragmented
European defense market, supports investment in Research and Technology Development,
supports small- and medium-sized enterprises, and bolsters cooperation between European
military and civil programs.” 75
—PESCO
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was introduced in 2008 as device to enhance
capability development for “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher
criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a
view to the most demanding missions.” 76 The idea behind Permanent Structured Cooperation
was to allow those countries that were willing and able to actually commit and deploy forces in
a crisis to work together by sharing resources, development, and technology. The EDA would be
the annual oversight body to ensure capabilities were met by PESCO member states.
PESCO’s explicit objective was to be a stick, rather than a carrot, to prod an unwilling and
lethargic European defense scheme to action. EU nations would be enticed to improve
capabilities or be left out of a security apparatus if they did not pony up the resources. Sven
Biscop, Director of the Security and Global Governance Programme at Egmont (Royal Institute
for International Relations) writes that “the Convention’s initial proposals had an exclusive
flavour to them, as some sought to create a small avant-garde of those Member States spending
the most on defence and launching the most sophisticated armaments programmes, with the
17
others being relegated to a secondary role.” Biscop exhorts the EU to adopt an accommodating
role for PESCO, and to use it as a tool for cooperation and capability generation. To date, PESCO
has not been implemented due to conflicts over the joining criteria and the overall goals of the
program. 77
—BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
In the absence of credible European cooperation in defense, several bilateral agreements have
arisen to enhance regional military capability. In September 2010, Norway and Poland (one of
the outlier European countries that is increasing defense spending) concluded “an agreement
concerning increased cooperation on defence equipment,” according to a Norwegian Defence
news bulletin. 78 In November 2010, Germany and Sweden proposed an initiative on pooling and
sharing. 79 The UK and Norway executed a Memorandum of Understanding on defense
cooperation in March 2012. The Visegrad Countries—Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia—have agreed to form a joint military force of approximately 10,000 personnel capable
of deploying by 2016. 80 In June 2012, a Franco-German agreement was signed to “deepen
military cooperation in areas ranging from satellites and missile defence to arms procurement,
aiming to extract maximum value from shrinking defence budgets,” according to a Reuters
report. 81
The most significant European bilateral agreement is between Europe’s defense leaders France
and the UK. They are the only nuclear powers in Europe and the only European members of the
United Nations Security Council. 82 In November 2010, they executed the Lancaster House
Treaties to strengthen security cooperation, nuclear stockpiles, operational, and industry and
armaments matters. 83 There are indications France and the UK are moving closer toward a
common agenda vice an EU one. Colonel Michel Goya of L’institut de Recherche Stratégique de
l’Ecole Militaire said that “if you have to react quickly to events, it’s better to do it at a national
or bi-national level.” 84
—OCCAR
In 1996, France, Germany, Italy and the UK—frustrated with defense cooperation efforts—
established OCCAR: the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (or Organisation
Conjointe de Cooperation en matiere d’ARmement). Belgium and Spain have subsequently
18
joined, and OCCAR has one or more program arrangements with Finland, Sweden, Poland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The goal of the international organization, which has
the mandate of international treaty, is to manage the through-life of collaborative defense
equipment programs. 85 OCCAR’s stated objective, in Article V of its convention, is “to enable a
strengthening of the competitiveness of European defence technological and the industrial
base....” 86
Tim Rowntree is director of OCCAR’s Executive Agency. He explains that “the organisation aims
at improving the cost-effectiveness of the management of collaborative programmes...by
consolidating a competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).”
OCCAR states that it rejects the idea of juste retour (or work share = cost share) in favor of a
principle known as “global balance.” 87 The treaty’s principles establish standards and protocols
for procurement, injecting professionalism and standardization into the process. Rowntree is
thankful for what he characterizes as the “brave” work of his predecessors in forming the
organization in order to combat the “sort of clumsy mechanics that tries to make international
collaboration work.” He states that OCCAR is attracting high-quality talent from its member
states and that “the fact that our programs get delivered on time and up to performance is no
accident.” 88 OCCAR was instrumental in the development of the recently launched A400 Airbus
platform. They have fingers in—and formal cooperation documents signed with—EDA’s
initiatives listed above. OCCAR manages COBRA systems, TIGER helicopters, BOXER armored
vehicles, the first deliveries of Future Surface-to-Air Family of missiles (FSAF) systems, and
Frégate multi-mission (FREMM) frigates. 89
ANALYSIS:
It takes real spending, and not words in a treaty, to achieve real military capability.
—Luke Coffey, Heritage Foundation
There is no lack of negative criticism of either NATO’s or the EU’s capability-enhancing initiatives. Some
observers, such as Antonin Tisseron of the Thomas More Institute, appear to have thrown in the towel:
“It is as if the very idea of Europe has broken down and been diluted within a structure lacking any
geopolitical coherence and unable to do any more than dress the most serious wounds,” says Tisseron. 90
Indicative of the complexity inherent in coordinating goals among 28 EU nation-states with diverse
19
histories, there are European nations such as France and Germany calling for more EU defense
cooperation and activity, and those—notably the UK—who do not or cannot support it. 91
Tisseron is also severe in critiquing the European Defence Agency: “Without a budget of its own or any
basic skills...[it] has become an orphan of its age, unable to influence the community’s destiny on
account of its lack of power.” 92 In a CSIS article by Heather Conley and Maren Leed titled “NATO in the
Land of Pretend,” the authors take a swing at NATO’s Smart Defence: “While we can continually rebrand
NATO’s declining capabilities as ‘smart defense,’ only to become ‘smart-er defense’ at the next summit,
it doesn’t stop the decline.” 93 The 2013 IISS Military Balance is succinct: “While doing more with less is a
challenge, sometimes numbers count.” 94
Mölling observes that “At NATO Summit and EU Councils alike states praise pooling and sharing (P&S) as
a kind of technocratic miracle cure for their impending inability to act militarily.” He adds that its
inability to overcome sovereignty issues is problematic, and that P&S “does not replace...investments
needed to procure lacking military capabilities.” 95 Erik Brattberg of World Politics Review claims that
“simple collaboration and small-scale pooling are positive steps but fall far short of what is needed to
rectify the inability of separate but cooperative European forces to be sufficiently expeditionary and
effective.” 96
It is unsurprising that 28 European nations cannot agree on defense matters. Mölling and Hilmar
Linnenkamp explain two flaws in Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy: “first, assuming a
consensus over priorities that does not exist, and, second, evading painful decisions in the present by
debating how a bright future might look.” 97 Gomis mentions that “France is now trying to revive
Europe-wide efforts, which is proving to be difficult given German reluctance, British Euroscepticism,
differences in perceptions throughout the continent and institutional obstacles.” 98 Emblematic of
European discord was the failed merger of British defense giant BAE with Franco-German EADS, a
venture that would have formed an entity with combined revenues of $90 billion that might have
created thousands of jobs. 99 Der Spiegel called it a “wasted chance for Europe,” 100 and the Guardian
commented that the “lack of a manufacturing strategy has never looked more painful.” 101 Coffey
believes that a European defense scheme comes at the expense of NATO. “Far from improving the
military capabilities of European countries, the CSDP decouples the U.S. from European security and will
ultimately weaken the NATO alliance,” writes Coffey. 102
20
The proliferation of bilateral agreements and international structures such as OCCAR may be the way
forward for Europe. Tisseron laments that “European defence has made so little progress.” He suggests
that bilateral agreements may be “a means of continuing the process of integration whilst sidestepping
national preferences.” 103
Setting aside the question of European defense, which up till now has only been modestly employed,
the big question remains: Can NATO maintain its level of ambition in light of declining defense budgets
in Europe? The IISS 2012 Military Balance reports that “Germany and the UK...have adjusted
their national levels of ambition downwards.” 104 This is perhaps the most serious and immediate effect
of declining European capability.
The future is also bleak. Chalmers announced that “UK defence spending was further squeezed in the
2013 Budget announcement. It is likely to face additional cuts for 2015/16 in the 2015 Spending
Review.” 105 As Mölling stated flatly, “It will not be feasible for most NATO allies to increase their military
spending in the years to come.” 106 Up till now, officials cornered to explain drastic European defense
cuts could run back to the comforting statistic that European combined defense spending was the
second largest in the world after the United States. But in 2012, for the first time, Asian countries’
defense expenditures exceeded those of Europe. 107
Yet examining matters from the 30,000-foot level shows that the situation is not yet disastrous. A look at
Europe in its entirety—including Eastern Europe—shows that overall spending has actually increased
since 2001, likely due to Poland’s increases in spending, as well as modest German increases.
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Europe
362
374
380
383
387
397
408
419
428
419
411
419
($bn)
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Military Expense by Region in Constant US
Dollars, 1988–2012” Used with permission.
Europe still has significant military capability. Furthermore, there is more to capability than just dollars
spent. Leadership, morale, training, battle experience, command structure, logistic trains, deployability,
readiness, and more all factor into capability. “Rather than ‘mechanically’ linking a country’s
international ‘posture’ with its defense budget,” writes Foucault, “it is more relevant to look at budget
decisions for each spending item for each of the services in the longer term.” 108
21
Force generation for NATO is somewhat complex. As a NATO officer remarked, “A lot of oiling is needed,
especially at the SHAPE level, to get nations to deliver—even at the eleventh hour.” NATO is at its heart
a political organization, and decisions to employ the force are made at the capitals, not at the North
Atlantic Council table.
One of NATO’s greatest assets is its experienced integrated military staff. Administrative procedures and
command and control protocols are mature and tested in combat. Today, NATO has a returning cadre of
experienced officers in its component-level militaries, its integrated military staff and senior Military
Committee, as well as seasoned ambassadors and political officers on its civilian International Staff. In
the event of a crisis, especially one with a clear international mandate from the United Nations, member
states would release forces and NATO would achieve its level of ambition. If budgets continue to
decline, however, and politics become more fractious, then the United States will be stuck bearing an
ever-increasing share of NATO’s burden.
2. BURDEN-SHARING TENSIONS.
The United States accounts for 75 percent of the total NATO defense budget, up from 50 percent during
the Cold War. 109 In Secretary Gates’s 2011 Brussels speech, he proclaimed the “blunt reality is that there
will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ
large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to
devote the necessary resources.…” Gates further remonstrated NATO’s devolution into a two-tiered
alliance: between those who specialize in soft power such as peacekeeping and humanitarian missions,
and those who undertake the hard-power combat missions. “We are there today. And it is
unacceptable,” said Gates. 110
In addition to this transatlantic tension, IISS authors of the 2013 Strategic Survey observe that financial
pressures are creating an intra-European gap, “with only a small number of European Allies able to
acquire modern deployable capabilities.” 111 Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer express skepticism that
bilateral arrangements and ad hoc coalitions, such as that formed during the Libya crisis, will suffice as a
future paradigm. “It is doubtful whether such ‘European coalitions of the willing’ organized around
France and Britain can provide a real transatlantic burden-sharing model for the future.” 112
22
Will these burden-sharing issues increase to the point where they endanger the Alliance? Much has
been written about NATO’s future after the Cold War, and whether the Alliance is superfluous. Major
Seth Johnston, PhD., of the United States Military Academy, did his Oxford thesis on NATO history. He
reminds us to take the long view: “Not only is this dynamic about Europe spending a lot less on defense
than the United States not new, it’s been remarkably consistent ever since 1950,” says Johnston. He
makes a distinction in NATO between the foreign policy and political aspect of the Alliance—the “O” in
NATO—and the institutionalized structure of NATO, embodied in international agreements, a
headquarters, and an integrated military staff. Johnston mentions that even since the 1952 Lisbon Force
Goals, which established the structure of NATO, there has been “an initially ambitious political
commitment to invest in military capability that ultimately never came to be.” 113
Regarding the U.S. pivot to Asia, Gomis remarks that “there is certainly concern in Europe that the US is
shifting away, rather than with, Europe towards Asia.” 114 Yet Johnston explains that this, too, is nothing
new. “The reason the Europeans were so concerned in the 1950s was that the United States did an Asia
pivot during the Korean War.” 115
NATO provides a great deal of utility for the U.S. government. Militarily, it helps provide or justify
European basing for force staging and logistics, and NATO serves as a combat multiplier on many levels.
It is the only credible Europe-wide military entity. But the Alliance may serve even more as a political
outlet for the United States. Any U.S.-led NATO operation derives international legitimacy from its 27
other member states in consensus-driven decision-making.
Adam Grissom, Senior Political Scientist at RAND, sums up the U.S. position:
For those interested in understanding the likely long-term trajectory of the American security
role in Europe, the most important indicators are not to be found in the current defense budget
projections, foreign policy statements, or parsing of the word “pivot.” The American military
commitment to Europe is sufficiently cost-effective that withdrawal from Europe would make
sense only in the context of a much more fundamental decision to cease being a global power
altogether. 116
23
3. EUROPE WILL BE REDUCED TO IRRELEVANCY.
Even back in 2010, before far worse defense spending cuts, Binnendijk and Kugler warned that “unless
checked, a widening gap could emerge between the United States and Europe on core security missions,
leading to loss of NATO’s cohesion, and thus declining European influence around the world.” 117 Sam
Perlo-Freeman, Director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, commented
that we are at the start of a “shift in the balance of world military spending from the rich Western
countries to emerging regions, as austerity policies and the drawdown in Afghanistan reduce spending in
the former, while economic growth funds continuing increases elsewhere.” 118
China, the world’s number two spender on defense after the United States, is not even waiting for
nature’s vacuum to abhor. China asserts a presence in developing nations and engages in international
power games over islands in the East and South China Seas. The November 2012 launch of a J–15 fighter
off her single carrier Liaoning caused a psychological—though not exactly operational—boon to the
Chinese Navy. 119 The 2013 IISS Military Balance revealed that “the increase in Asian spending has been
so rapid, and the defense austerity pursued by European states so severe, that in 2012 nominal Asian
spending ($287.4 billion) exceeded total official defense spending not just in NATO Europe, but across all
of Europe.” 120 China would undoubtedly be more than pleased if Europe were to continue to cede
international influence. Yet Europe might regret Chinese domination of international sea lanes,
chokepoints, and canals. Or when China controls energy markets and can set prices. But by then it will
be too late for Europe.
Regarding Britain’s decline, Max Hastings calls the UK’s notion of a special relationship with the United
States “a rather pathetic British conceit.” When a possible Syria operation was on the table, Hastings
stated that “if we’re part of the mission, Royal Navy ships will fire one or two missiles to America’s
24
hundred. If we’re not there, the U.S. navy will fire them all. They’ve got more than enough. Strategically,
we’re beside the point.” 121
Foucault and Frédéric Mérand observe that one of the problems with burden-sharing is the definition of
a public good, which is a variable dependent upon the worldview of the actor. Political leaders don’t
employ the abstract terminology of the economist such as “non-excludable,” and “non-rival” goods, but
rather it is “being fair” that they discuss. “They speak the normative language of justice rather than the
utilitarian language of economics.” 122 It must be noted, therefore, that cutting defense budgets and
retreating from the world stage are political decisions, often having nothing to do with popular opinion.
Leaders matter: a change of political administration may quickly swing the direction of fiscal policy.
There is one sure-fire way to bolster European military capability, and that is for the global economy to
bounce. Indeed, a study by Foucault summarizes findings that “Between 1960 and 2008, the impact of
French GDP growth on military spending is greater than the impact of military spending on economic
growth.” 123 For the UK, Chalmers puts it into perspective: “Could anything mitigate what appears to be
a rather gloomy prognosis for the MoD’s budget? A return to pre-financial crisis rates of economic
growth would clearly help.” 124
Binnendijk and Kugler claim that NATO’s current trajectory of decline is “dangerous” but not
“inevitable.” They recall, as did Johnston above, that “NATO has faced troubled times before and has
always surmounted them by gathering the political willpower and military resources needed to renew
itself.” 125
25
Notes (all internet sites accessed October 1, 2013)
1
George Islay MacNeill Robertson, “Remarks by the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson at the ceremony
to the Commission of the New Allied Command Transformation,” NATO online library, June 19, 2003,
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030619a.htm.
2
Daniel Fried, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, U.S. Department of
State archive, June 22, 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/87096.htm.
3
“The time has now come for NATO 3.0. An Alliance which can defend the 900 million citizens of NATO countries
against the threats we face today, and will face in the coming decade. The Strategic Concept is the blueprint for
that new NATO,” NATO Secretary General Rasmussen outlines NATO strategic concept draft at GMF, German
Marshall Fund Web site, October 8, 2010 (download transcript), http://www.gmfus.org/archives/nato-secretarygeneral-rasmussen-outlines-nato-strategic-concept-draft-at-gmf/.
4
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010), http://www.nato.int/strategicconcept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.
5
“IISS: Defense Spending Increasing Worldwide, but Declining in Europe, US,” Defense Update, March 17, 2013,
http://defense-update.com/20130317_iiss-defense-spending-increasing-worldwide-but-declining-in-europe-andthe-us.html.
6
“Military expenditure (% of GDP),” World Bank,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.
7
Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO)” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Defense.gov, June 10, 2011,
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581.
8
Gates.
9
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO After Libya—The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times,” NATO Web site, June 29,
2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75836.htm.
10
Catherine Cheney, “Europe’s Strategic Airlift Suffering From Cold War Underinvestment,” World Politics Review,
January 28, 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/12671/europe-s-strategic-airlift-sufferingfrom-cold-war-underinvestment.
11
David Gauthier-Villars, “After French Criticism, Washington Drops Payment Demand,” Wall Street Journal,
January 20, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323301104578253824061131556.html.
12
Sam Perlo-Freeman, et al., “Trends In World Military Expenditure, 2012,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2013,
http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf.
13
Judy Dempsey, “Survey Hints Europeans Are Turning Inward,” New York Times, September 16, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/europe/survey-hints-europeans-are-turning-inward.html?_r=0.
14
NatCen Social Research, 29th British Social Attitudes Survey, 2012, http://www.bsa29.natcen.ac.uk/media/11241/annotated_questionnaire_2011.pdf.
15
GfK NOP, “MOD and Armed Forces Reputation Survey Spring 2013: Topline Findings,”
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/230255/MOD_external_opinion
_survey_Spring_2013_top_lines.pdf.
16
Gideon Rachman, “Disarmed Europe Will Face the World Alone,” Financial Times, February 18, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b4c057d0-79be-11e2-9015-00144feabdc0.html.
17
Q 25.1. Do you think [COUNTRY]’s government should increase, maintain, or decrease spending on the following
TOTAL
Increase
spending
EU
5
100
%
(50
05)
12
EU
7
100
%
(70
05)
14
EU
9
100
%
(90
05)
13
EU
10
100
%
(100
47)
13
EU
11
100
%
(110
47)
14
US
A
100
%
(10
00)
25
TR
FR
100
%
(10
02)
50
100
%
(10
05)
11
GE
R
100
%
(10
00)
5
IT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SK
SP
UK
100
%
(10
00)
13
100
%
(10
00)
9
100
%
(10
00)
22
100
%
(10
00)
11
100
%
(10
42)
22
100
%
(10
00)
29
100
%
(10
00)
5
100
%
(10
00)
6
100
%
(10
00)
28
26
Maintain
current
levels of
spending
Decrease
spending
[DK]/[RE
FUSAL]
45
47
46
46
46
46
32
57
47
29
50
52
41
46
45
45
37
53
41
37
39
39
38
26
15
31
47
53
40
19
46
29
23
48
56
18
2
2
2
2
2
3
4
1
1
5
1
6
2
3
3
2
1
2
Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2013, German Marshall Fund, http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/09/TTTOPLINE-DATA.pdf.
18
Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, “A Plan to Blunt the Impact on NATO of European Defence Cuts,” Atlantic
Council, November 18, 2010, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-plan-to-blunt-the-impact-onnato-of-european-defence-cuts.
19
Defense Update.
20
Gates.
21
David J. Berteau, et al., European Defense Trends 2012: Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial
Base, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2012), iv.
22
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013, (London: Routledge, 2013), 6.
23
Luke Coffey, “Withdrawing U.S. Forces from Europe Weakens America,” Issue Brief #3947 on National Security
and Defense, Heritage Foundation, May 23, 2013,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/05/withdrawing-us-forces-from-europe-weakensamerica#_ftnref2.
24
Berteau, et al., 1.
25
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, (London: Routledge, 2012), 75.
26
Clara Marina O’Donnell, et al., “The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members,”
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, July 2012), 6,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/07/military-spending-nato-odonnell.
27
European Commission, “Citizens’ Summary: Reforming the Defence and Security Sector,” July 24, 2013,
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/citizen-summary/citizen-summary_en.pdf.
28
Binnendijk and Kugler.
29
European Defence Agency, “EU and US government Defence spending,” January 25, 2012,
http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/news/12-01-25/EU_and_US_government_Defence_spending.
30
Rachman.
31
Benoît Gomis, personal communication.
32
Michael Clarke and Michael Codner, eds., A Question of Security: The British Defence Review in an Age of
Austerity (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2011), 3.
33
“Major Advanced Economies (G7), Select Countries: United Kingdom, Select Subjects: General government gross
debt (Percent of GDP), Select Date Range: 2008–2010, Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” International
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012.
34
O’Donnell, 10.
35
Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (London: The Stationery
Office, October 2010), 19,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_1916
34.pdf.
36
The Military Balance 2012, 81.
37
Malcolm Chalmers, “The Squeeze Continues—UK Defence Spending and the 2013 Budget,”
Royal United Services Institute, RUSI.org, March 25, 2013,
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C51506B24A254C.
38
Clarke and Codner, 1.
39
“But will they both be in service on rota or will one be ‘mothballed’ in reserve? A decision is still awaited in the
2015 review,” “Progress Being Made but Uncertainties Remain,” Royal Institution of Naval Architects, July/August
2013, http://www.rina.org.uk/article1258.html.
27
40
Andrew Chuter, “UK Trying To Renegotiate Aircraft Carrier Contract, Report Says,” Defense News, September 2,
2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130902/DEFREG01/309020019/UK-Trying-Renegotiate-AircraftCarrier-Contract-Report-Says.
41
“The Major Projects Report 2010,” House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (London: The Stationery
Office, 2010), 3, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/687/687.pdf.
42
Chuter.
43
“Army Cuts Announced by Defence Secretary—video,” the Guardian, July 5, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/video/2012/jul/05/army-cuts-defence-video?guni=Article:in%20body%20link.
44
“Philip Hammond: Defence Cuts are ‘in Response to Black Hole in MoD Budget’—video,” the Guardian (at 00:11),
January 22, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2013/jan/22/philip-hammond-defence-cuts-modbudget-video.
45
Nick Hopkins, “Army to Lose 17 Units in Cuts, Defence Secretary Announces,” the Guardian, July 5, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/05/army-lose-17-units-cuts.
46
Simon Rogers and Ami Sedghi, “Army Cuts: How Have UK Armed Forces Personnel Numbers Changed Over
Time?” Data Blog, the Guardian, July 5, 2012, DATA: Download the full spreadsheet: “Total UK Service Personnel—
Annual Totals 1900–2011,”
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdEFXQk5yX3lHYlpud3NyS0U3WkJlMFE&hl=en_US#
gid=1.
47
O’Donnell, 12.
48
Mark Urban, “Jubilees Show UK’s Declining Ability To Protect Itself,” BBC News UK, June 12, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18416646.
49
IISS Strategic Survey, Europe 113:1 (2013): 114, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597230.2013.830457.
50
Yves Boyer, “French Defence Policy In A Time Of Uncertainties,” note nº 04/13, Fondation pour
la Recherche Stratégique, January 2013,
http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/2013/201304.pdf.
51
Gomis, personal communication.
52
“Even less clear is whether a more authoritative image will transform Mr Hollande’s poor poll ratings. The link is
not automatic. Nicolas Sarkozy, his predecessor, got no ratings jump from the war in Libya,” “The Bamako Effect,”
the Economist, February 9, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21571450-will-frances-interventionmali-make-fran%C3%A7ois-hollande-popular-home-bamako-effect.
53
Martial Foucault, “The Defense Budget in France: Between Denial and Decline,” Focus Stratégique nº 36 bis,
(Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 2012), 7, www.ifri.org/downloads/fs36bisfoucault.pdf.
54
Livre Blanc Défense Et Sécurité Nationale—2013, (Paris: Direction de l’information légale et administrative,
2013), 97, http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/livre-blanc-2013-de-la-defense-et-de-la-securitenationale#.
55
Gomis, personal communication.
56
Hugh Carnegy, “France Cuts Armed Forces as Budget Squeeze Hits Military,” Financial Times, August 2, 2013,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/142760ec-fb56-11e2-a641-00144feabdc0.html.
57
O’Donnell, 19.
58
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28
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29
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30
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124
Chalmers.
125
Binnendijk and Kugler.
31