17. Acts or Omissions Constituting the Offense
Case: a. Malto vs. People, G.R. No.164733, 21 September 2007
Doctrine: The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity
to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the
offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or
an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information
if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. What
controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but
the actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of
facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense,
that determines the crime being charged in the information.
FACTS:
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his
student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him.
Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a “mutual understanding” and
became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioner’s threat to end their
relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse. Upon discovery
of what AAA underwent, BBB, AAA’s mother lodged a complaint in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No.
00-0691. Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court
entered for him a plea of "not guilty." After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the
merits proceeded. The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution
sufficient to sustain petitioner's conviction. On March 7, 2001, it rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty. Petitioner questioned the trial court's
decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30, 2004, the appellate court
affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by
paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It further
observed that the trial court failed to fix the minimum term of indeterminate
sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial court erred in awarding
P75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for
rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was
authorized by law. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it
found that he did not rape AAA. (NO)
RULING:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Pursuant thereto, the complaint or
information against him should be sufficient in form and substance. A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was
committed.
The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or
connected with child prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for
profit. What it charged was that petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed
sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or
seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse
and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year old minor. These allegations
support a charge for violation of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section
5, Article III, RA 7610.
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative
to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by
statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts
alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. What controls is
not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual
facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that
determines the crime being charged in the information. The facts stated in the
amended information against petitioner correctly made out a charge for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. T
Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of
the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the
facts recited in the information and duly proven during trial.
18. Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances
a. People vs. Dadula, G.R. No. 172321, 9 February 2011
Doctrine:
Difference between Qualified and Simple Rape
Rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.[15] The elements of qualified rape are: (1)
sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4)
the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and (5) the
offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
Simple rape is a rape committed when the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual
intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of a victim.
FACTS: A father who raped his daughter is allowed to suffer the lesser penalty
because of the failure of the criminal information to aver his relationship with
the victim. However, the court condemns his crime. The father is now
challenging the CA decision that convicted him of simple rape and acts of
lasciviousness. On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with
rape
and
attempted
rape
through
separate
information.
Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of threats, force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
AAA,2 against her will and consent.3
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1998 in the City of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt
to have carnal knowledge of herein complainant one AAA, thus commencing
the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not perform
all the acts of execution that could have produced the crime of rape by reason
of cause or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The RTC found the accused guilty of rape and attempted rape in Criminal Case
No. 98-2304-MK, imposing the death penalty and ordering him to pay civil
indemnity and moral damages, and imposing indeterminate penalties. CA
affirmed this decision with modification. The CA ruled that the accused was
liable for simple rape in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK and lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK, based on the information not mentioning
qualifying circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly determined the criminal
liabilities in both cases. (YES)
RULING: Yes, the CA correctly determined the criminal liabilities in both
cases. The failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in
the information in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of
qualified rape against the accused. Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
has expressly required that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be
specifically alleged in the information. Due to such requirement being pro
reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even
those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the
date of the effectivity of the 2000 revision of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure that embodied the requirement).
The term "aggravating circumstance" is strictly construed when the
appreciation of the modifying circumstance can lead to the imposition
of the maximum penalty of death. Consequently, the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, even if established during trial, could
not affect the criminal penalty of the accused by virtue of its nonallegation in the information. The accused could not be convicted of
the graver offense of qualified rape, although proven, because
relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily included in the
information.22 Accordingly, the accused was properly convicted by
the CA for simple rape and justly punished with reclusion perpetua.
Hence, the decision of the CA is affirmed with modification in civil liabilities.
18. Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances
b. People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 138364, 15 October 2003
Doctrine: Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 mandates the material allegations
should be stated in the body and not in the preamble or caption of the Information.
Instead, both sections state that as long as the pertinent and significant allegations are
enumerated in the Information it would be deemed sufficient in form and substance.
We hold that it is irrelevant and immaterial whether the qualifying circumstance of the
relationship is mentioned in the opening paragraph of the Information or in the second
paragraph which alleges the acts constituting the crime charged since either paragraph
is an integral part of the Information.
FACTS: The court found appellant Rogelio Villanueva guilty of raping his
fifteen-year-old daughter, Reseilleta Villanueva. Reseilleta was the eldest of
nine children and her parents struggled to afford school due to extreme
poverty. Her mother, Estelita, worked as a laundrywoman-househelper to
support the family. On 12 December 1996, her father dragged her to the living
room and threatened her with a knife. Reseilleta resisted, but was struck twice
and punched in the abdomen. She fainted and was rape when she was
unconscious, and fearing further sexual assault, she fled to her maternal uncle's
house in Jade Valley. Meanwhile, her sister Mary Joy was sexually assaulted by
her father. Reseilleta and Mary Joy later lodged a complaint for sexual assault
against the appellant. The trial court convicted appellant Rogelio Villanueva of
rape qualified by the minority of the victim and her relationship with appellant
as father and daughter, and sentenced him to death under Sec. 11, RA 7659,
amending Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code. Appellant posits that in the
event he is found guilty he should be convicted only of simple rape, and not
qualified rape. He argues that the Information against him failed to allege the
qualifying circumstance of relationship between him and Reseilleta.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Information against the appellant failed to
allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between him and
Reseilleta.
RULING: NO, The qualifying circumstance of relationship of the accused to the
victim being father and daughter is so alleged in the Information. There is no
law or rule prescribing a specific location in the Information where the
qualifying circumstances must "exclusively" be alleged before they could be
appreciated against the accused. Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 do not require
material allegations to be in the body of the Information, but as long as they
are pertinent and significant, it is considered sufficient.
The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere
aggroupment of descriptive words and phrases. It is as much an essential part
of the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble in fact
complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its strength from the
preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms; while the
accusatory portion only provides the necessary details. The preamble and the
accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and
meaning to the indictment. Thus, any circumstance stated in the preamble (i.e.,
minority, relationship) should also be considered as an allegation of such fact.
In this case, the name of the accused is set forth, not in the body of the
Information, but only in the opening paragraph. The name of the accused is a
fundamental element of every Information and is crucial to its validity. If the
preamble can validly contain such an essential element as the name of the
accused, there appears to be no logical reason why it cannot likewise contain
the equally essential allegations on the qualifying circumstances.
Verily, we find no independent evidence on record that could accurately show the age
of the victim. In the absence of adequate proof as to her exact age, the Court will
consider only the qualifying circumstance of relationship between appellant and his
victim. We have held that the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty
and clearness as the crime itself. Failure to sufficiently establish the victim’s age will bar
any finding of rape in its qualified form. While it may be argued that the victim herein,
in any case, was below eighteen (18) of age, nevertheless we give the benefit of the
doubt to the appellant in view of the confusion as to the precise age of Reseilleta.
Accordingly, the Court resolves to impose on appellant the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, subject to the
MODIFICATION that appellant ROGELIO VILLANUEVA is found guilty of simple
rape and is sentences to reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay his
victim Reseilleta Villanueva the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages, with costs against appellant.
19. Cause of the Accusation
a. People vs. Valdez, G.R. No.175602, 18 January 2012
Doctrine: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
Recit-Ready Case Summary: Co-accused Eduardo and Edwin were charged
and convicted with murder. Upon final appeal, the CA downgraded the crimes
committed by Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of
homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of
indeterminate sentences However, the decision did not directly apply to Edwin
since he withdrew from the final appeal In this case, Edwin pleads for the
application of the downgraded judgement promulgated in favor of Eduardo.
The Court grants his plea by virtue of Sec. 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 86. in Quezon City. On January 20 2005 after trial the
RTC convicted them as charged. The two accused then came to the CA on final
appeal but on May 9. 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal
which the Court granted on October 10, 2007 thereby deeming Edwin's appeal
closed and terminated. On January 18 2012, the Court promulgated its
judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdes finding him guilty of three
counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder. Subsequently Edwin
sent to the Court Administrator a self- explanatory letter dated March 12, 2012
where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on
January 18, 2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him
as an accused.
ISSUE: Whether Edwin Valdez should be granted application of the
judgement promulgated by the Court of Appeals, finding his co-accused.
Eduardo Valdez. guilty of homicide instead of murder?
RULING: YES. The Court granted Edwin's plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122
of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused - (a) An appeal taken by
one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter
In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals that
the benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether
they appealed or not. In the other cases decided by the Court, all the accused
appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another,
the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied
to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused.
ACCORDINGLY the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the
application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide and sentencing him
to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay
to the respective tiers of the late Ferdinand Sayson the late Moises Sayson, Jr
and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25.000.00 as temperate damages for each
count.
19. Cause of the Accusation
b. Dela Chica vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144823, 8 December 2003
FACTS: Petitioners Graciano P. Dela Chica and Evan C. Aceveda are challenging
two resolutions issued by the 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 25188. The petitioners are charged for violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan ordered the suspension of the petitioners
for 90 days and denied their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners filed
an opposition to the information, arguing that it was invalid as not all essential
elements of the offense charged were alleged. The Sandiganbayan upheld the
sufficiency of the information and ordered the suspension of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court GRAVELY ERRED in affirming
the validity of the information under which petitioners stand charged.
RULING: Yes, respondent Court GRAVELY ERRED in affirming the validity of the
information under which petitioners stand charged. Jurisprudence held that it
is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be
alleged in the information. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it
does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the
information must state the acts or omissions so complained of as constitutive
of the offense.
It is not enough to allege that the acts were willfully, unlawfully or criminally
caused without stating that the same was done in a manner by which the
accused could be held liable for the specific offense charged.
This Court has ruled that in order that one may be held criminally liable under
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act of the accused which caused undue injury
must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable
negligence. This draws more significance considering that good faith and
regularity are always presumed in the performance of official duties by public
officers. Therefore, manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence must be alleged with particularity in the information sufficiently to
inform the accused of the charge against him and to enable the court properly
to render a decision.
Considering the foregoing, this Court finds the information in the present case
to be fatally defective. Where it is clear that the information does not really
charge an offense, the case against the accused must be dropped immediately.
There is no point in proceeding under a defective information that can never
be the basis of a valid conviction.
21. Date of Commission of the Crime
b. Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 209387, 11 January 2016
Doctrine: Date of the commission of offense is an essential element in
violation of the gun ban during the election period.
FACTS:
Dela Cruz was an OJT of an inter-island vessel, was arrested for illegal
possession of firearms and for violating the Election Gun Ban. According to the
petitioner he was at Cebu Domestic Port buying a ticket to Iloilo on May 11,
2007, while buying a ticket he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter.
He then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the
x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw
firearms Inside Dela Cruz's bag. Petitioner admitted that he was the owner of
the bag and consented to the manual inspection. The bag was then inspected
and the following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance;
seaman's book; other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed
inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper documents for the
firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela Cruz was then arrested and
informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also informed
of his constitutional rights.
Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.
After trial, Branch 12 of the RTC, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed an appeal before CA, but CA affirmed RTC's
decsion, according to petitioner, the firearms were "planted inside his bag by
the porter or anyone who could have accessed his bag while he was buying a
ticket and that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the
illegal firearms within the meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution
No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
RULING: Yes, petitioner is guilty of violating election gun ban. is Section 2(a)
of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, which provides that
Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry firearms outside of
residence or place of business, to bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons in public places including any building, street, park, private
vehicle or public conveyance. For the purpose firearm includes airgun, while
deadly weapons include hand grenades or other explosives, except
pyrotechnics. Jurisprudence enumerated the elements for a violation of the
Gun Ban: "1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other
deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3)
the weapon is carried in a public place." This court also ruled that under the
Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a written
authority to possess a firearm is on the accused.
We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for
violation of the Gun Ban. The firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag.
Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to carry the firearms outside
his residence during the period designated by the Commission on Elections.
He was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public
place.
21. Date of Commission of the Crime
c. US. vs. Dichao, G.R. No. L-8781, 30 March 1914
Doctrine: The purpose of the date of commission of the offense is to
permit the allegation of a date of the commission of the crime as near
to the actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will
permit, and when that has been done by any date may be prove which
does not surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. It is thus
premised on the right of the accused to defend himself.
FACTS: Antonio Javier Dichao is accused of rape, allegedly having sexual
intercourse with and lying to Isabel de la Cruz, a woman under 12 years old,
between October 1910 and August 1912. Dichao, who was the stepfather and
legal guardian of Isabel, was subjected to threats and corporal punishment,
leading to her childbirth on August 5, 1912. This is an appeal from an order of
the Court of First Instance of the Fourteen Judicial District sustaining a
demurrer to a information and dismissing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal complaint is vague and ambiguous
Ruling: Yes, the criminal complaint is vague and ambiguous.
Jurisprudence held that the statement of the time when the crime is alleged to
have been committed is so indefinite and uncertain that it does not give the
accused the information required by law. To allege in an information that the
accused committed rape on a certain girl between October, 1910, and August,
1912, is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his
defense, and that indefiniteness is not curd by setting out the date when a
child was born as a result of such crime. Section 7 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its purpose is to permit the
allegation of a date of the commission of the crime as near to the actual date
as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and when that has
been done by any date may be prove which does not surprise and substantially
prejudice the defense. It does not authorize the total omission of a date of
such an indefinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same
thing.
Moreover, the time of the commission of the crime assumes
importance when it creates serious doubt as to its commission. Thus,
the date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when
the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration
practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
21. Date of Commission of the Crime
d. People vs. Cantomayor, G.R. No.125522, 5 December 2002
Doctrine: The time of the commission of the crime assumes importance
only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape or
the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. The date of
the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy
and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the
date of the commission of the crime.
FACTS: Zosimo Cantomayor y Tahum, is accused of raping his 9-yearold daughter Liezl in 1990. The defendant was convicted beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. She said that
her father assaulted her many times and forced her to undress. Liezl
told her uncle Lolo Aning about her maltreatment in 1995. Liezl was
notified that accused-appellant shot her brother Rey in 1998. When she
returned to the province, she charged him with parricide. Cristina, her
younger sister, soon disclosed that accused-appellant raped her. Thus,
Liezl and Cristina filed two separate cases of rape against their
father. Cristina Cantomayor's case was dismissed because her location
was unkown. The defendant denied the rape but confirmed she lived in
his house in 1990. Cantomayor was convicted of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua in 2000. He must pay P50,000.00 in civil indemnity
and moral damages to Liezl Cantomayor. Accused-appellant
appealed the judgment of convictio.
ISSUE: Whether or not THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO ALLEGE IN THE INFORMATION THE
APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
RULING: No, the Court a quo did not err in convicting the appellant.
The Court held that the time of the commission of the crime assumes
importance only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of
the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction.
The date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when
the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically
hinge on the date of the commission of the crime. The veracity
therefore of the rape charge in the case at bar is not dependent on the
time of the commission of the offense but on the credibility of Liezl and
the truthfulness of her narration as to how she was sexually abused. This
case is evidently one of those instances where the Court properly held
that the failure to specify the exact date or time when rape was
committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its
face.
As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute
accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states
that the crime has been committed at any time as near as
possible to the date of its actual commission.
Therefore, the decision of RTC is affirmed.
24. One Information, One Offense
a. Soriano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 159517-18, 30 June 2009
Doctrine:
A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for
more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
―the same offense.
FACTS: Soriano and Ilagan were the President and General Manager,
respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly,
on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president
and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM.
They falsified the loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear
that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of P15M each, when
in fact they did not. The prosecutor charged Soriano in the RTC with violation
of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337 or the General Banking Act, as amended or
Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules
(DOSRI Rules). An information for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document was also filed against Soriano and Ilagan. Petitioners moved to
quash the informations arguing that the prosecutor charged more than one
offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI rules and
estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing f
ictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information
do not constitute an offense. RTC denied the motion to quash. CA sustained
the denial of petitioners’ separate motions to quash.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner has merit.
RULING: The contention has no merit. In Loney v. People, this Court, in
upholding the filing of multiple charges against the accused, held: ―As early
as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident
might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.
The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for ―the same offense.‖ In People v.
Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are
not ―the same‖— x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other. In this case, however, Soriano
was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with
more than one information, each charging a different offense—violation of
DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification
of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section
3(a), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the
averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined by law.
24. One Information, One Offense (EXCEPTIONS)
24. One Information, One Offense (EXCEPTIONS)
a. Bañares vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-53663, 19 November 1982
b. Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.148468, 28 January 2003
FACTS: Lolita Bañares was accused of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 1772 of the
FACTS: Petitioner Edward Serapio, was a member of the Board of Trustees
and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, nonprofit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of
providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but
deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance
studies of young Muslim educators and scientists. Sometime in April 2000, as
trustee of the Foundation, he received on its behalf a donation in the amount
of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis
Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner
received the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundations
treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundations account with the Equitable
PCI Bank. In the latter part of the year 2000. Gov. Singson publicly accused then
President Joseph E. Estradi and his cohons of engaging in several illegal
activities, including its operation on the illegal mumbers game known as
jueteng This triggered the filming with the Office of the Ombudsman of several
criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner,
together with other persons
Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch III. She misappropriated and
misapplied jewelries worth P92,100.00 on consignment basis in San Enrique,
Negros Occidental, Philippines, with the condition to return them within one
month. Bañares knowingly misappropriated the proceeds, despite having no
deposit with the banks. She issued postdated checks against the banks, which
were dishonored and not paid, causing damage and prejudice to Dolores
Centeno. The Trial Court convicted her of Estafa under Article 315 2(d) after
Revised Penal Code. On appeal, respondent Court modified the lower Court
judgment and convicted her instead of Estafa under Article 315, 1(b) (by
misappropriation or conversion). After denial of her Motions for
Reconsideration, the accused filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was charged with two separate and
distinct offenses of Estafa in the Information.
RULING: NO, the accused was not charged with two separate and distinct
offenses of Estafa in the Information. The Information filed against Lolita
Bañares sufficiently charge Estafa through misappropriation or conversion.
There was no ambiguity in the Informations, and the accused could adequately
prepare for their defense. Petitioners having been adequate informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them, petitioners could be
convicted of the said offenses, the same having been proved. Petioners have
not deprived of any constitutional right.
In this case, although separate sections, Article 315, 2(d) and Article 315,
1(b) are involved.
Jurisprudence held that where an offence may be committed in any of the
different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or
modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the
different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate
sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways of
committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one
offense and the information is not thereby defective on the ground of
multifariousness. Hence, the petition is dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE
THAN ONE OFFENSE.
RULING: NO, the acts alleged in the information are not charged as separate
offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder. The amended
Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including petitioner,
connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit
plunder "through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or
similar schemes or means." And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information,
petitioner and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly
or indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate amount of
P545,000,000.00. This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the
face of the amended Information that petitioner and his co-accused are
charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or
crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute
acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the crime of
plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
24. One Information, One Offense (EXCEPTIONS)
c. People vs. Villaflores, G.R. No.184926, 11 April 2012
Doctrine: The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite
crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more
crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being
the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
FACTS: The accused in this case is Edmundo Villaflores who was also known
as "Batman" in their neighborhood and was known to be a drug-addict. The
victim is a four-year old girl named Marita. On July 2, 1999, Marita was last
seen by her mother Julia to be playing at the rear of their residence, when her
mother noticed that she was missing, she called her husband who rushed
home to find their daughter. At 6:00AM of July 3, 1999, they found Marita's
lifeless body covered with blue and yellow sack five houses away from their
home. The result of the postmortem examination showed that the child was
raped and the cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation.
Upon police investigation, two (2) witnesses who were Aldrin Bautista and Jovy
Stadium pointed Villaflores as the culprit. Both witnesses narrated that at about
10:00AM on July 2, 1999, they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At
noon, the three used shabu for a while, but the witnesses did not see Marita in
the vicinity of Villaflores' house. It was only on 3:00PM that they heard cries of
a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Batman carrying a yellow sack
which appears heavy, the same sack that he saw when they are still inside the
house of Batman. The wife of the accused also gave a supporting testimony
that on the night of July 2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sacks under
their house and then went closer and saw a protruding elbow inside the sack,
when she confronted his husband who was on drugs. Villaflores said it was
nothing. Based from these circumstances, the RTC convicted Villaflores of a
rape with homicide holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other
conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
of Appeals also affirmed the conviction. The accused appealed and argued that
both RTC and CA erred in convicting hm of a composite crime of Rape with
homicide through circumstantial evidence
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of a composite crime
of rape and homicide through circumstantial evidence.
RULING: YES. accused can be convicted of a composite crime of rape and
homicide through circumstantial evidence. In order to convict Villaflores for
the composite crime of rape with homicide, the State must thus prove the
concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal
knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge without
the consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the rape.
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also
known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the
law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a
single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by
law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code.
All the requisites are present in the case. Hence, , the Court AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on February 22, 2007 finding
and pronouncing EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of rape with
homicide.
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a
complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other hand. In a
composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex
or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but
generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary
means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the
specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime,
the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed
in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or
compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.
24. One Information, One Offense (EXEPTIONS)
d. People vs. Larrañaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, 3 February 2004
Doctrine: Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1)
robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious
physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with
homicide.
FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong
failed to come home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman
was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised
up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered
with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman
was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia
surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction
of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar,
Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James
Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following
before the trial court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and
told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga,
James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the
white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline
were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while
Rowen handcuffed them jointly
2) That after stopping by a safe house, the group thereafter headed to the
South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van
driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red
car at the South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot
session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter
raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and
push her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as
an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never
found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer
the penalties of two (2) reclusion perpetua. The appellants assailed the said
decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was
conspiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the
crimes were committed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
RULING:
Yes., the trial court erred in characterizing the crime. The rule is that when the
law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as
a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting
crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the present
case, the victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the
Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case
where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention in the case of Jacqueline.
24. One Information, One Offense (EXEPTIONS)
e. People vs. Manalili, G.R. No. 121671, 14 August 1998.
Doctrine: When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses are charged and proved and impose on him
the penalty for each offense.
FACTS: On February 1, 1990, a passenger bus of Ballesteros Liner bound for
Manila left its terminal at Ballesteros, Cagayan. Four armed men who boarded
a passenger bus at Santiago, Isabela, drew out their guns and announced a
holdup when the bus reached Caquilingan, Cordon at about the same time
that a car suddenly overtook the bus which had to stop. One of the four armed
men in front initially fired a shot. A passenger, supposedly a military man who
was not identified, drew out his gun and exchanged fire with the robbers and
then broke the window of the bus and jumped out. The robbers also left.
There were 4 persons killed. One was their companion who was not
identified. The three others were Agustin who was hit in the back, the driver
Tango who was shot in the abdomen, and the bus helper Quintua who was
shot in the head. It is admitted that these 3 died as a result of the gunshot
wounds they suffered. The trial court found the appellants guilty of attempted
robbery with homicide. The facts established show that on the occasion of
the attempted robbery, four persons were killed and one was injured. It would
seem that the crime is the complex crime of attempted robbery with
homicide under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. But the prosecution
filed three separate information, one for attempted robbery, the other for
multiple frustrated murders and the third for qualified illegal possession of
firearms used in multiple murders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be held liable for an offense
notwithstanding the absence of the proper information.
RULING:
Yes, the accused can be held liable for an offense notwithstanding the
absence of the proper information. The Rules of Court provide that information
charging more than one offense is fatally defective and may be quashed on
the grounds of duplicity of offense. However, when the accused fails, before
arraignment, to move for the quashing of such information and goes to trial
thereunder, he thereby waives the objection and may be found guilty of as
many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during the trial.
In this case, the appellants failed to move for quash before arraignment; thus,
they are deemed to have waived the defect and are considered charged with
the offenses of illegal possession of firearms and multiple murders. Indeed,
they were not deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation against them.
Through their failure to object to the duplicitous charges, the accused effectively waived
their right against multiple offenses in a single information. More important, they had
been informed of the elements of the multiple murder charged against them in the
second case; in fact, they defended themselves form it by attacking the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses and by setting up the defense of alibi, albeit unsuccessfully.
And granting that the appellants were charged with the single crime of illegal
possession of firearms used in the killing of three persons, they could still be convicted
of murder in spite of their acquittal for illegal possession.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 21-1156 (the first case), appellants are found GUILTY as principals
of attempted robbery and are hereby SENTENCED to four months of arresto mayor. 52
2. In Crim. Case No. 21-1157 (the second case), appellants are found GUILTY as
principals of the double murder of Alfredo Tango and Sonny Quintua and are each
SENTENCED to two terms of reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, they are each ORDERED
to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of Alfredo
Tango and another P50,000 also as civil indemnity to the heirs of Sonny Quintua. They
are ACQUITTED of any responsibility for the death of Nestor Agustin, for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. In Crim. Case No. 21-1158 (the third case), appellants are likewise ACQUITTED of any
criminal liability, for failure of the prosecution to prove any crime.
Costs against appellants.
25. Amendment/Substitution
a. Ricarze vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160451, 9 February 2007
RULING:
Doctrine: An amendment to an information which does not change the nature
1. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant
might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as
in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment
had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
FACTS:
Ricarze was a collector-messenger of CSP, a corporation engaged in
messengerial services. He was assigned to collect checks payable to Caltex and
deliver them to the cashier. It was discovered that he opened a bank account
in the name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of Caltex. Ricarze forged
the checks he collected and deposited it in that bank account. Caltex charged
Ricarze of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. In the
information, Caltex was stated as the offended party because the prosecutor
was not informed that PCI Bank credited the checks to Caltex.
After the prosecution rested its case, Caltex moved to amend the information
to substitute PCI Bank as the offended party. Ricarze argued that the
information can no longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned under the original information and that doing so would place him in
double jeopardy. PCI Bank argued that it had re-credited the amount to Caltex
to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the
rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. The RTC granted the
motion. Ricarze assailed the Order. He alleged that the charges against him
should be dismissed because the allegations in the Informations failed to name
PCIB as true offended party.
ISSUE:
1. Is the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint a substantial
amendment?
2. In case of offenses against property, is the designation of the name of the
offended party indispensable?
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not
a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge
in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The
documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same,
and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he
cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
2. In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the
offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act
charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.
25. Amendment/Substitution
b. Kummer vs. People, G.R. No. 174461, 11 September 2013
FACTS:
An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son, Johan,
a minor, for homicide. According to the prosecution's evidence, on June 19,
1988 Jesus Mallo, the victim, accompanied by Amiel Malana went to the house
of Kummer. When Kummer opened the door, her son Johan shot Mallo twice.
Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her
children were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988.
The prosecution filed an information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against
the petitioner and Johan. Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits
accordingly followed.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendment in the date of the
complaint that was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only
one month.
Both RTC and Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Petitioner questioned the
sufficiency of prosecution’s evidence. She claimed that she was not arraigned
on the amended information for which she was convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be arraigned again because of the
amendment in the information?
RULING:
No. The change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity
is not great, is merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment
of a complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court
and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights
of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint
or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the
case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19,
1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that
consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above,
the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal
amendment — it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the
essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the
new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under
the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the
same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to
the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment
was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
26. Amendment/Substitution
c. People vs. Janairo, G.R. No. 129254, 22 July 1999
Doctrine: The Supreme Court sustained the substantial amendment of an
information, downgrading an offense from murder to homicide after accused
had been arraigned, on the ground that it benefitted the accused and the
accused himself sought the amendment.
FACTS:
On November 13, 1992, an Information 2 was filed charging the appellant with
murder for stabbing Bencebeis "Pakay" Aguilar that cause his death.
Upon his arraignment on November 27, 1992, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, Counsel de Parte Perfecto de los Reyes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying for reinvestigation, insisting that the charge should
be changed to homicide. During the pre-trial on January 11, 1992, the lower
court denied this Motion. Subsequently, the assistant city prosecutor filed a
Motion to downgrade the crime charged from murder to homicide.
After the arraignment on November 27, 1992, the Information was amended.
The charge was "down grad[ed]" 19 from murder to homicide, and the phrase
"with treachery and evident premeditation" was crossed out from the
Information: Without questioning the amendment, appellant entered a plea of
not guilty. Under Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, however, only formal
amendments are allowed after the arraignment of the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not substantial amendment in the information may be
allowed after arraignment. (YES)
RULING:
By implication, amendments as to substance are precluded after the accused
has entered a plea. The amendment made here was undoubtedly a matter of
substance, for the nature of the crime was altered from murder to homicide.
Nonetheless, the Court sustains the validity of the proceedings.
Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, does not bar substantial amendments
that are beneficial to the accused. Consistent with the constitutionally
enshrined rights to be informed of the nature of charges and to be accorded
due process, the rule aims to protect the accused from prejudicial
machinations that change the game midstream. In this case, the amendment
benefited the appellant. The amendment did not prejudice him or deprive him
of defenses available before the amendment.
Moreover, appellant not merely consented to the amendment; in fact, he
sought it. Indeed, the defense counsel had filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,
praying that the charge of murder be changed to homicide. "Objection to the
amendment of an information or complaint must be raised at the time the
amendment is made[;] otherwise [appellant's] silence would be deemed
consent on his part to the amendment.
26. Downgrading
People vs. Lacson, G.R. No.149453, 28 May 2002
On May 18, 19951 , at around 4:00 A.M., eleven (11) known members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) figured in a shootout with the police forces
during an operation conducted by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (ABRITG) near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City. All of the 11 perished that fateful day.
Later, two members of the police team alleged that the killing was in reality a
summary execution, or, in popular parlance, a rubout.
Thus began the saga of the infamous Kuratong Baleleng Gang case.
On November 2, 1995,2 the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan eleven
(11) informations for murder against Senator Panfilo Lacson who was, at the
time the alleged murders took place, Chief Superintendent and head of the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). He was charged, along with 25
other accused, for the wrongful killing of the 11 members of the e Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. Upon motion of Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to
the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. Subsequently, his participation in the
crime was downgraded from principal to accessory. He pleaded not guilty
when arraigned. On account of the downgrading of his criminal liability,
Lacson consequently questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
hear the criminal cases against him, considering that, as stated in the
amended information, none of the principal accused was a government
official with a salary grade (SG) of 27 or higher, as required by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7975 which was then in force. Finding Lacson’s contention
meritorious, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional
Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not downgraded participation on the crime may be
allowed in amending information. (YES)
RULING:
Finding Lacson’s contention meritorious, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.4 The Office of the Special
Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the order to transfer. Pending
resolution of the motion, R.A. No. 84295 took effect on February 23, 1997,
amending R.A. No. 79756 , which deleted the word principal from Section 2
of the earlier law. The amendment7 effectively expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan to include all cases where at least one of the accused,
whether charged as principal, accomplice or accessory, is a government
official with SG 27 or higher. The amendment applied to all cases pending in
any court in which the trial is yet to begin as of the new law’s enactment.
27. Exclusion (vs. Discharge as State Witness vs. Discharge re:
Witness Protection Program)
a. Yu vs. Presiding Judge of RTC Tagaytay, G.R. No. 142848, 30 June 200
FACTS:
Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by Pedro Lim, Bonifacio
Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in Cavite where they were both shot to
death. It was alleged that it was a military operation against communist rebels.
An information was then filed against the said perpetrators but after
investigation, the following individuals were included namely, Eugene C. Yu,
and Patricia Lim-Yu as responsible for the commission of the offense. And the
prosecution filed a “Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and Exclude from
the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos which was granted by the
Court but contested by Eugene Yu for lack of evidence supporting such
decision invoking Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is the one applicable despite the provision of Republic Act No. 6981 in the case
at bar.
HELD:
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981
is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be
a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under
Republic Act No. 6981 is granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the
court. On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic Act
No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is required but not the requirement of
Rule 119, Section 17. An amendment of the information made before plea
which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion
by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in
compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. And the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise
of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for
Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power
to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be
granted immunity from prosecution.
28. Substitution
a. Pacoy vs. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September 2007
Doctrine: Substitution requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot
claim double jeopardy.
FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC
against Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy. Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted
by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However,
on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued
another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard
of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered
as having qualified the crime to Murder. Acting upon such Order, the
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word “Homicide” and
instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening paragraph
of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same
as that of the original Information for Homicide. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to
Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an
arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the
charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and
existing jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied the Motion to
Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration. In granting the Motion
for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that “disregard of rank” is merely
a generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and
exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the information from
homicide to murder.
RULING: The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense
charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution.
Under Section 14, Rule 110 - Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information
shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the
opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of
word “Homicide” and its replacement by the word “Murder.” There was no
change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in
the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find that the
amendment made in the caption and preamble from “Homicide” to
“Murder” as purely formal. Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in
allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already
pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of
the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a
defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when
any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint
or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of
the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information
for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of
the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense
of petitioner. While the respondent judge erroneously thought that “disrespect
on account of rank” qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a
generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that he committed any
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information
after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since
the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any
substantial right of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there
being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.
28. Substitution
b. Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, 23 April 2010
FACTS:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of
Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding
as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government.
An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing
undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to
prove the actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation
of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person .
The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on
the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first
information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the
information that would warrant an new preliminary investigation.
RULING:
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by
causing undue injury or by giving private person unwarranted benefit. That
accused may be charged under either mode or under both. Hence a new
preliminary investigation is unnecessary.
30. Exceptions to Territoriality
(b) When an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an
aircraft, or in any other public or private vehicle while in the
course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried
in the court of any municipality or province through which such
train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip.
In the Course of a Trip
a. People vs. Zafra, G.R. No. 110079, 19 October 1994
Doctrine: Despite the accused contention that the killing which
attended the carnapping took place in Muntinlupa, the Supreme
Court upheld Laguna’s court jurisdiction.
FACTS: Accused-appellants, together with Rolando Maranan alias "Boy Camia"
alias "Joel" and John Doe, Peter Doe, Michael Doe, were charged with the crime
of carnapping at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They take, steal and drive
away an Isuzu Passenger type jitney owned by Efren Cardinal and then driven
by Candido Diongco towards Calamba, Laguna, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court and thereafter in pursuance of the commission of the crime,
to ensure success and gain absolute control of the said vehicle accused with
intent to kill, attack, assault, shot and stab Candido Diongco which directly
caused his death and that accused while driving, in control and on board the
said jitney were apprehended, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Candido Diongco and Efren Cardinal, the owner of the said jitney.
Upon reaching the bridge in Turbina, Calamba, appellant Zafra was stopped
by SPO1 Reynaldo Sunan and PO3 Mario Villa of the Calamba Police as the
passenger jeep had no lights and was being driven in an erratic manner. When
asked by the police about his destination, Zafra replied that he was going to
Batangas. Then, as the police approached to search the vehicle which was
unlighted, the three (3) unidentified companions of Zafra ran away. The
passenger jeep and the appellants were then taken into custody.
Accused-appellants contend that the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial
District stationed in Calamba, Laguna has no jurisdiction over the case as the
killing took place in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
ISSUE: WoN the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial District stationed
in Calamba, Laguna has no jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: No, RTC of Laguna has jurisdiction. The contention clearly runs
counter to Paragraph (b), Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court
which
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As accused-appellants were apprehended in Calamba while they
were in the carnapped jeepney, the information was validly filed
in Calamba.
30. Exceptions to Territoriality
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
In the Course of a Voyage
AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018
B. Calme vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.116688, 30 August 1996
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in
Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC and DDD.
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef,
where he acquired permanent resident status in September of
2008.
FACTS:
•
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme and four other persons were
accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by throwing him overboard
the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and
operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing
from Ozamis City to Cebu City.
•
Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTC's jurisdiction over the
offense charged, he asserts that, although the alleged crime
took place while the vessel was in transit, the general rule laid
down in par. (a) of Sec. 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court is the applicable provision in determining the proper
venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) thereof since the
exact location where the alleged crime occurred was known.
•
Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor
because, according to the Marine Protest filed by the vessel's
captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off
Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes)
received the report that "a passenger jumped overboard."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the
offense charged against petitioner.
HELD: Yes. The present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the
proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . . ."
Sec. 15(c) of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that:
“Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course
of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject
to the generally accepted principles of international law.”
This is the applicable provision in the case at bar.
Petition for review is denied.
AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and
only sporadically. There were also allegations of virtual
abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and
physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB
supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman
named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in
Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA
and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during her visit with their kids.
The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge
BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through
his alleged marital infidelity. Accordingly, an Information was
filed against BBB for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.
On November 6, 2013, counsel of accused filed on behalf of BBB
an Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift
Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest. The RTC granted
the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
thereby dismissed the case. The RTC ruled that since BBB’s acts
complained of had occurred in Singapore, said Court enjoys no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A.
No. 9262 may be filed within the Philippines if the illicit
relationship is conducted abroad.
HELD:
YES.
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to
jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides
that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements
was committed at the option of the complainant. While the
psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator
is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally
essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish
which is personal to the complainant.
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the
law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their
children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; x x x
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed.
We say that even if the alleged extra marital affair causing
the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is
committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution
under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of
Philippine courts.
31. Private Offended Party’s Personality in Criminal Actions
a. Lee vs. Lee, G.R. No. 181658, 7 August 2013
FACTS:
Respondent in this case filed a complaint-affidavit
accusing petitioner of perjury. This is in connection to the verified
petition filed by petitioner with the RTC of Manila for the Issuance
of an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
covering a property owned by CHI. The petitioner declared in the
Verification that said TCT was lost, when he knew fully well that
respondent was in possession of the said Owner’s Duplicate
Copy. Later, an information was filed against petitioner for perjury
before the MeTC Manila. However, the petitioner’s counsel
moved that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be
excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a public
offense. The MeTC denied the motion, which was subsequently
affirmed by the Court of Appeals ruling that "the offended party,
who has neither reserved, waived, nor instituted the civil action
may intervene, and such right to intervene exists even when no
civil liability is involved."
ISSUE:
Whether respondent can intervene in the trial of the
criminal action for Perjury.
RULING:
Yes, respondent can intervene in the trial of the criminal
action for Perjury.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, provides that “When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.” For the recovery of civil
liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private
prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110, subject to the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.
31. Private Offended Party’s Personality in Criminal Actions
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x
is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory
that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1)
the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose
law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission
FACTS:
In this case, respondent did not waive the civil action, nor
did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the
civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Also,
the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No.
232238 covering CHI’s property and its loss through inadvertence,
if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent’s
personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful
performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board
Member and Treasurer of CHI.
Therefore, respondent and private prosecutor can
intervene in the trial of the criminal action of Perjury.
b. Heirs of Burgos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169711, 8 February
2010
On 1992 assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma killing Sarah
et.al. Four months after the incident, the police arrested suspects, who pointed
two others and respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing.
After 10 years of hiding, respondent Co surrendered. The prosecution charged
him with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon
arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges. On September 25, 2002
respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail which the RTC granted on
the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same prompting
petitioner to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed without
involving the OSG, in violation of jurisprudence and the law, specifically,
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it for lack of merit. Thus, this
case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to
seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor General’s
intervention, reversal of the trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on
the ground of absence of strong evidence of guilt.
ISSUE:
Do private offended parties have legal standing, without Solicitor General’s
intervention, to seek reversal of trial court’s order granting bail to the accused?
RULING:
No. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Only the
state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority
to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. As a general rule,
the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus it is
patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the
Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the
government in legal proceedings. The Court is firmly convinced that
considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical
interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that it is, indeed,
mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. For the
above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not
initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule summarily dismissed. The Court
denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals.