PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
PERSONS & FAMILY
CIVIL CODE REVIEWER
REFERENCES:
-
CIVIL CODE
STA. MARIA, PARAS, RABUYA, KATGAW
REVIEWER, TIU REVIEWER
-Before, Official Gazette was necessary to officially
promulgate laws. However, it caused problems, due
to erratic release & limited readership of the
Gazette.
-The reason for the law is that newspapers could
better perform the function of communicating the
laws to the ppl as they are easily available, have a
wider readership & come out regularly. (Tanada v
Tuvera)
-As amended by EO 200: Laws must be published
EITHER;
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
-
-
-
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 386: AN ACT TO ORDAIN
& INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
EFFECTIVITY DATE: AUG 30, 1950
Main draft of the civil code was prepared by
the Roxas Code Commission via EO No 48 of
March 20, 1947 by Manuel Roxas.
Passed on Congress on Jan. 26, 1949
CHAPTER 1: EFFECT & APPLICATION OF LAWS
ARTICLE 1: This act shall be known as the “Civil
Code of the Philippines” (n)
See Art 18: In matters w/c are governed by the Code
of Commerce & special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this code (16a)
*RULE- In case of conflict, the special law prevails
over the Civil Code, w/c is general in nature.
e.g- The rules on contracts under the CIvil Code may
be applied to insurance contracts in view of the
absence of any provision in the insurance Act relative
to the manner by which a contract is perfected
(Insular v Sunlife)
ARTICLE 2: Laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in newspapers of
general circulation in the PH, unless it is
otherwise provided. (As amended by E.O No.
200)
Executive Order (EO) 200:
“PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS
EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PH
AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY”
1) in the Official Gazette OR
2) in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country.
-EO issued on June 18, 1987 by Pres. Cory Aquino.
-Took immediately after publication in the Gazette.
-Sec 2 of Art 2 of R.A No. 386, and all other laws
inconsistent with this EO are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Note: Newspaper of general circulation
requisites according to SC are:
1) Regular release
2) Bonafide subscription list
3) No specific audience or patronage
4) For the Public
5) Not devoted to private interest
ex. Abante, New record, guardian, Nueva Era or
Bulgar
EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE
RULE: Laws all have effect only after the expiration
of the 15 day period following the completion of
Official Gazette & Newspaper of Gen. circulation
-
The code took effect one year after its
publication in the Official Gazette.
The one yr should be counted from the date
of actual release and not the date of issue
(Lara v. Del Rosario)
Requisites:
1) Publication in the Official Gazette or in
newspapers of general circulation in the PH.
2) After expiration of the 15-day period (period
can be altered if the statute provides it)
3) Publication must be in full
Except:
When the statute provides for the manner of its
effectivity or has an “IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVITY”
clause which is expressly provided to take effect.
➔ In this case, it takes effect on the date it is
expressly provided to take effect
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
“unless otherwise provided” clause
-
refers to the 15-day period (date of the
effectivity) & not the publication
Period can be shorter or longer, as provided
by law; what the law says will prevail.
The law can also say “shall take effect
immediately”
-
CAN THE PUBLICATION BE MADE ONLINE?
(in relation to e-commerce law)
-NO. Publication through electronic
mediums is UNACCEPTABLE. The ecommerce
law
only
contemplates
evidentiary matters.
When counting, the first day is excluded and the
last day is included. The counting of the day
begins after the statute is
Example — July 4, 2002; or “upon approval’’ (i.e., by
the President or by Congress over the veto of the
President)
●
●
The law may provide for another manner of
publication, provided it is reasonable
- e.g Read over the television or the
radio
Exceptionally, both the Civil Code and Family
Code have 1 year periods after publication
for effectivity
“Publication must be in full or it is not
publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of its contents (Tanada
case)
➢ Case: GARCILLANO V HOR, 2008
Art 6, Sec 21 of the Consti - “Senate or the HOR, or
any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance w/ its duly
unpublished rules of procedure”
○
○
○
Laws- includes statutes, local & private laws.
-The law may provide for another manner of
publication, provided it is reasonable (e.g read over
the television or the radio)
●
If a law is signed on the last hour of June 16,
and the law itself says it becomes effective
upon approval, was it already effective
even during the first hour of June 16?
YES, otherwise we would be
confronted with a situation where
the fixing of the date of effectivity
would depend on the unreliable
memory of man. (Republic of the
Phil. v. Encarnacion 1950)
○
○
ABSENCE OF PUBLICATION
○
Rule: Publication is an indispensable requisite, the
absence of w/c will render the law ineffective
(Mandatory)
Rationale (GARCIA v HOR)
-
-
requirement of publication is part of
due process clause
injustice to punish a citizen for the
transgression of a law w/c he had no
notice (Tanada v Tuvera)
15 day period is intended to enable
the ppl to become familiar w/ the
statute
PART OF THE LAW THAT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED:
-
full text of the law
Requisite publication is intended to
satisfy the basic reqs of due process.
What constitutes a publication is set
forth in Art 2 of Civil Code
The absence of any amendment to
the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear & unambiguous
language of Sec 21 of Art 6 Consti.-that does not make any distinction
whether
these
rules
have
undergone
amendments
or
revisions.
Consti mandate to publish the said
rules prevails over any custom,
practice or tradition followed by the
Senate
The publication of Rules of
Procedure in the website of the
Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is NOT
SUFFICIENT under Tanada v Tuvera
ruling.
The Rules of Procedure even provide
that the rules `` shall take effect 7
days after publication in 2
newspapers of gen. circulation”
Note: Publication in accordance w/ Tanada &
Tuvera ruling is mandatory to comply w/ the due
process requirement- because it puts a person’s
liberty at risk (Since a person who violates the rules
of Procedure could be arrested & detained by the
Senate).
●
RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000- considers an electronic data message
or electronic document as for evidentiary
purpose
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
MEANINGthe
law
merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence
(original)
of
electronic
data
messages/documents. It doesn't make the
internet medium for publishing laws, rules &
regulations.
COVERED IN THE RULE:
>>look whether the issuance concerns public interest
or affects substantive rights, even if it concerns the
citizenship of 1 person or the change of the name of
a street.
1) PD & EO promulgated by the Pres. in the
exercise of legislative powers
- Included are PDs that name a public
place after a favored individual or
exempt
him
from
certain
prohibitions or requirements .
2) Circulars issued by the Monetary Board that
“fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act
3) Administrative rules and regulations, if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to valid delegation.
4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national
territory & directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place.
“Municipal ordinances are not
covered by this rule but by the LGU Code
(Tanada v Tuvera)”
5) Statutes enacted by Congress
6) Law which is punitive in character (Askay v.
Casalan; Balbuna v. Sec of Educ)
7) Circulars w/ prescribe penalty for their
violation (Ppl v. Que po Lay)
8) PROCLAMATIONS- (announcements of
important things/events)
9) SEC Memorandum Circulars w/c regulate &
affect the public at large (SEC v GMA
Network)
construed (Victorias Milling Co. v. Social
Security Commission, 1962)
4) Internal rules of certain offices
5) Municipal ordinances are not covered by
this rule but by the Local Government Code
(Tañada v. Tuvera)
6) Court decisions need NOT be published.
There is no law that requires the publication
of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is
the bounden duty of a lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA),
the Supreme Court Advanced Decisions
(SCAD) and law journals. (Roy vs. CA 1988)
ARTICLE 3: Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith (2)
“Ignorantia legis non excusat”
-applies to only Mandatory & Prohibitory Laws
Important/ related articles;
●
●
●
●
NOT COVERED IN THE RULE
1) Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature
- Regulating only the personnel or the
administrative agency and not the
public.
2) Letters
of
instruction
issued
by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
[General rule: those that are general in application &
more or less permanent must be published]
3) Circulars which are mere statements of
general policy as to how the law should be
Article 526. Mistake upon a doubtful or
difficult question of law may be the basis
of good faith.
Article 1334. Mutual error as to the legal
effect of an agreemen t when the real
purpose of the parties is frustrated, may
vitiate consent. (n)
Article 2154. If something is received when
there is no right to demand it, and it was
unduly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises. (1895)
Article 2155. Payment by reason of a
mistake in the construction or application
of a doubtful or difficult question of law
may come within the scope of the
preceding article. (n)
NO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; EFFECT OF
PUBLICATION
Rule: After the accomplishment of the publication
requirement, the people are conclusively
presumed to know the law and notified thereof.
‣ Once published the people are presumed to have
knowledge of the law, even if they have not read it.
Presumptive knowledge is sufficient. Actual
knowledge is not necessary for as long as the
people comply with it as a rule of conduct.
●
“Ignorance of the law refers not only to the
literal words of the law itself, but also to the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
meaning or interpretation given to said law
by our courts of justice. (Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee)”
RATIONALE —
- If ignorance of the law is a valid defense, then,
anyone can evade criminal and civil liability by
claiming that he does not know the law. It would
create a chaotic society. It would invite deception,
promote criminality. The reason is founded on public
policy.
- This rule of law is based upon the assumption that
evasion of the law would be facilitated and the
successful administration of justice defeated if
persons accused of crimes could successfully plead
ignorance of the illegality of their acts.
LAWS COVERED
1) Philippine mandatory or prohibitive laws
(not to permissive or suppletory laws, nor
foreign laws)
● Ignorance of foreign law is not ignorance of
the law, but ignorance of the fact because
foreign laws must be alleged and proved as
matters of fact, there being no judicial notice
of said foreign laws. (Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee)
if the law involved is comparatively difficult to
comprehend, and as such he is entitled to
reimbursement for useful improvements he had
introduced on the land before he was deprived of the
land. (Kasilag v. Rodriguez)
2. As the basis for vitiation of consent, in case of
mutual mistake of the parties to a contract where
their real purpose is frustrated (Art. 1334)
3. As justification for the return of a thing
wrongfully paid, due to a mistake on a doubtful or
difficult question of law (Art. 2154, 2155)
If something is received when there is no right to
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises, this
includes payment by reason of a mistake in the
construction or application of a doubtful or difficult
question of law (Art. 2154, 2155)-- pertains to solutio
indebiti
SOLUTIO INDEBITI (ART 2163 CIVIL CODE)
-It is presumed that there was a mistake in the
payment if something w/c had never been due or
had already been paid was delivered; but he from
whom the return is claimed may prove that the
delivery was made out of liberality or for any other
just cause.
IGNORANCE OF LAW v. IGNORANCE OF FACT
Rule: While ignorance of the law is no excuse,
ignorance of the fact eliminates criminal intent as
long as there is no negligence.
-
Mistake of Fact is an absolutory cause in
criminal law (Ppl v. Ah chong)
Ex: A man who marries a 2nd wife upon the
reasonable belief after due search that his wife,
missing for 10 yrs, is dead, does not incur criminal
responsibility (U.S v Enriquez) even if it turns out that
the 1st wife is still alive— This is merely ignorance of
the fact.
EXCEPTIONS; EXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF LAW
‣ In these cases, ignorance of the law may be an
excuse, in a limited extent;
1. As the basis of good faith, in case of mistake on a
doubtful or difficult question of law (Art. 526)
-Not excused because of such ignorance. He is still
liable, but his liability shall be mitigated,
(ex. while he will still be considered as a debtor, he
will be a debtor in good faith.)
One who possesses land by virtue of a void
contract can be considered a possessor in good faith
ARTICLE 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided (3)
RULE: Laws are PROSPECTIVE, not retroactive.
“Lex de futuro judex de preterito”- the law
provides for the future, the judge for the past.
*If the laws were retroactive--grave injustice would
occur for these laws would punish individuals for
violations of laws not yet enacted.
RETROACTIVITY- law that looks backward or
contemplates the past (one w/c creates new
obligation & imposes a new duty or attaches a new
disability w/ respect to transactions or
considerations already past).
-
It doesn't apply to laws & applies to
executive issuances & doctrines established
by the SC
BUT, when a doctrine laid down by the SC is
overruled & a diff. view adopted– then new doctrine
should be applied prospectively.
It is true in the construction & application of criminal
laws where it is necessary that the punishability of an
act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society (Ppl. Jabinal 1974)
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
RETROACTIVITY IS
ALLOWED
1. Laws is
retroactivity
(provided)
2. Remedial or
Procedural
Laws
3. Emergency
Laws
4. Curative
Laws
5. Laws
creating
new
substantial
rights
6. interpretati
ve laws
entered into prior to said date (Testate
Estate of Jacobo Fajardo 1957)
RETROACTIVITY IS NOT
ALLOWED
1. Substantive laws
not providing for
retroactivity
2. ex post facto law
3. Substantive laws
impairing oblicon
4. substantive laws
impairing vested
rights
5. Penal laws
unfavorable to
accused/ convict
6. Penal laws
favorable to the
accused or the
convict who is
habitual
delinquent or
recidivist
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF
LAWS
1) Laws that were RETROACTIVE
● cases that should have no
retroactivity;
a) Ex post facto laws- makes
criminal
&
punishable
before it is passed (innocent
when done)
b) Impairs the obligations of
contracts
c) Impairs vested rights(whether substantive or
procedural)
VESTED RIGHTS- right or interest in property that
become fixed & established that it’s no longer
open to controversy (Balbao v. Farales)
-right when it has been perfected that nothing
remains to be done by the party asserting it
(Dones v. Director 1956)
-What constitutes a vested or acquired right will
be determined by the Courts as each particular
issue is submitted to them
3) PENAL LAWS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED OR
THE CONVICT
Except: the accused/ convict is a habitual delinquent
-
4) EMERGENCY LAWS
-
-
No vested rights in rules of procedure
gen. rule in art 4 only applies to substantive
laws
new rules of court on procedure can apply to
pending actions (Ppl. v Sumilang)
The Arbitration Law (RA 876)- procedural in
character & may be applied retroactively to
an agreement to submit to arbitration
laws are of an emergency nature & are
authorized by the police power of the govt.
(Santos v. Alvarez)
5) CURATIVE LAWS
-
necessarily retroactive for the precise
purpose- to cure errors or irregularities.
This kind of law to be valid, must not impair
vested rights nor affect final judgments
“A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a
prior law or to validate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public authorities w/c should
otherwise be void for want of conformity w/ certain
existing legal requirements (Erectors Inc. v. NLRC
1996)”
“intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities &
curb certain evils. ..(Narzoles v. NLRC 2000)
6) LAWS CREATING NEW SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
Ex. Spurious child- whose filiation has been
either judicially declared or voluntarily admitted by
the parent, ws not entitled to any legitimate under
old Civil COde, but is now entitled under the new Civil
Code, provided that the parent dies after the new civil
Code became effective.
-
-
-
2)REMEDIAL OR PROCEDURAL LAWS
-
Such as statutes w/c lighten the penalty or
completely extinguish the liability
This is an example of a new right granted for
the first time: to get his right, the spurious
child must as already stated have been
recognized voluntarily or by judicial decree.
If the parent died under the Old Code, the
spurious child cannot get any legitime, since
this would now impair the vested rights of
the other heirs.
This is so even if the inheritance has not yet
been distributed, because succession accrues
from the moment of death & not from the
moment of distribution of the inheritance
(Art 777) [the law distinctly provides that
successional rights are vested upon the
death of the decedent.
7) INTERPRETATIVE LAWS
●
NO VESTED RIGHTS IN PUBLIC OFFICES ( See
Comelec v. cruz 2009)
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
-
-
SK membership is not a property
right protected by the COnsti
because it is a mere statutory right
conferred by law. [Congress may
amend at any time the law to change
or even withdraw the statutory
right]
Public Office is not a property right
“Public Office is a public trust”-- no
one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an
expectancy of holding a public
office.
MANDATORY & PROHIBITORY LAWS
ARTICLE 5- Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity
(4a)
RULE: Acts executed against the provisions
of mandatory or prohibitory laws are void.
●
MANDATORY OR OBLIGATORY LAWS
- when the law commands something
be done.
ex. Art 804- Every will must be in writing and
executed in a language or dialect known to
the testator.
●
PROHIBITORY LAWS
- w/c contain positive prohibitions &
are couched in the negative terms
importing that the act required shall
not be done otherwise than
designated.
- if the law commands that something
should not be done.
- “CANNOT” “NO”
ex. Art 818- 2 or more persons cannot make
a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person.
●
DIRECTORY/ PERMISSIVE LAWS
- if the law commands what it permits
to be done should be tolerated or
respected.
- such kinds of law merely supplies
what is lacking in the absence of
stipulation by the parties.
DETERMINING IF A LAW IS MANDATORY OR MERELY
PERMISSIVE
➔ Mandatory/Obligatory Laws uses words
such as “shall” or “must”.
◆ commands & leaves no discretion in
the matter.
➔ Permissive Law- w/c is statutorily expressed
& worded by the use of the word “may”
➔ Difference bet. mandatory & directory
provision is determined on the ground of
expediency– the reason being that less
injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
law (Marcelino v. Cruz)
TOLENTINO
-
-
“No well-defined rule by w/c a mandatory or
prohibitory be distinguished from directory,
suppletory, or permissive- the prime object
is to ascertain the legislative intention.”
matter of conveniency is directory
matters of substance (affect substantial
rights) is mandatory
EXCEPT: WHEN THE LAW ITSELF AUTHORIZES THEIR
VALIDITY
-
If the law expressly provides for the validity
of acts committed in violation of a
mandatory or prohibitory provision of a
statute, such act shall be considered valid
and enforceable.
Such as:
1. [VOIDABLE not VOID] When the law makes
the act not void but merely voidable (valid,
unless annulled) at the instance of the
victim.
‣ Example — a marriage celebrated
through violence or intimidation or
fraud is valid until it is annulled by a
competent court.
2. When the law makes the act valid, but
subjects the wrongdoer to criminal
responsibility.
‣ Example — A widow who
remarries before the lapse of 300
days after the death of her husband
is liable to criminal prosecution but
the marriage is valid. (But note that
premature marriage in the RPC has
already been decriminalized)
3. When the law makes the act itself void, but
recognizes some legal effects flowing
therefrom.
‣ Example — in a void marriage
under Articles 36 and 53 of the
Family Code, the children born
thereto are considered legitimate.
4. When the law itself makes certain acts valid
although generally they would have been
void.
Example — Lotto and sweepstakes
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
2. Personal rights (jus in personam, jus ad
rem) — enforceable against a particular
individual (relative rights).
ARTICLE 6: Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person w/ a right recognized by law (4a)
‣ It is the power belonging to one
person to demand of another, as a
definite passive subject, the
fulfillment of a prestation to give, to
do or not to do.
RIGHTS IN GENERAL
●
RIGHT
- power or privilege given to 1 person
& as a rule demandable of another,
as the right to recover a debt justly
due.
- Denotes an interest or title in an
object or property.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
‣ RULE — RIGHTS MAY BE EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY
WAIVED
WAIVER
-
Elements of a right:
-
1.Subjects- persons for rights exist only in favor of
persons.
-
a. Active subject- one who is entitled to
demand the enforcement of the
right
b. Passive subject- one who is dutybound to suffer its enforcement
‣ EXCEPT— A RIGHT CANNOT BE WAIVED IF IT IS —
1. Contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs
2. Objects — Things and services constitute the
object of rights.
3. Efficient cause — the fact that gives rise to the
legal relation.
2. Prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law
REQUISITES OF A VALID WAIVER
KINDS OF RIGHTS IN GENERAL
1. The person waiving must actually have the
right which he is renouncing
1. Political rights — are those referring to the
participation of persons in the government of the
State
‣ Example — a person cannot waive
future inheritance (Art. 2263)
2. Civil rights — civil rights include all other rights
other than political rights.
-
-
2. The person waiving must be capacitated
to make the waiver.
‣ A minor cannot waive his rights by
himself
It may be further classified into the rights of
personality (sometimes called human
rights), family rights and patrimonial rights.
The rights to personality and family rights
are not subject to waiver; but patrimonial
rights can generally be waived.
KINDS OF PATRIMONIAL
ENFORCEABILITY
RIGHTS
AS
3. He must have knowledge, actual or
constructive of such right
-
TO
1. Real rights (jus in re, jus in rem) —
enforceable against the whole world
(absolute rights)
‣ It is the power belonging to a
person over a specific thing, without
a passive subject individually
determined against whom such right
may be personally exercised; it is
enforceable against the whole world
It is the intentional or voluntary
relinquishment of a known right,
warrants an inference of the relinquishment
of such right.
act of understanding that presupposes that
a party has knowledge of its rights, but
chooses not to assert them. (Consunji v.
Court of Appeals 2001)
party claiming a waiver that the
person against whom the waiver is
asserted had at the time knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the
existence of the party’s rights or of
all material facts upon which they
depended.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no
basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
●
Ignorance of material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
-
A person makes a knowing and
intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to
make an intelligent decision. Waiver
requires a knowledge of the facts
basic to the exercised of the right
waived, with an awareness of its
consequences.
That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on
the record or by evidence (Consunji
v. Court of Appeals 2001)
4. The waiver must be made in a clear and
unequivocal manner.
‣ The waiver must be made clearly, but not
necessarily express. It must be clearly and
convincingly shown, either by
express stipulation or acts admitting no other
reasonable explanation
RIGHTS WHICH CANNOT BE WAIVED
●
CONTRARY TO LAW
a. Waiver of future inheritance (Art
905, 2263)
b. A contract of sale with right to
repurchase with prohibition against
selling the property to any other
person except the heirs of the
vendor a retro. (Leal vs. IAC 1986)
c. Waiver of the protection of pactum
commissorium is not allowed
PACTUM COMMISSORIUM- stipulation in
a contract w/c provides that creditor or
pledgee will automatically appropriate the
thing mortgaged or pledged as security for
a principal obligation when the debtor or
pledgor did not pay within the stipulated
period (ART 2088)
●
ALLEGED RIGHTS WHICH REALLY DO NOT YET
EXIST
- Future inheritance cannot be
renounced, since no right is vested
till the death of the decedent. This is
also contrary to law.
- This is especially so if the waiver or
repudiation is intended to prejudice
creditors.(Art. 2263)
● RENUNCIATION OF WHICH WOULD
INFRINGE UPON PUBLIC POLICY
- right to be heard in court
- waiver of the legal right to
repurchase a homestead
- waiver of employment benefits in
advance & right to the minimum
wage is not allowed
- waiver in advance of the 1-month
separation pay
- waiver of the tenants right to live
(maniego v. castelo)
- waiver of the 10 yr period for suing
on a written contract (Macias &
china Fire Insurance Co)
- stipulation to waive the scholarship
grant of the recipient (Cui v. arrelano
Univ)
- Political rights
WAIVER IS PREJUDICIAL TO A THIRD PERSON WITH
A RIGHT RECOGNIZED BY LAW
●
Waiver of inheritance to prejudice creditors
— While an heir may renounce present
inheritance (in inheritance that has already
accrued by virtue of the decedent’s death),
still if the waiver will prejudice existing
creditors, the latter can accept the
inheritance in the name of the heir, but only
to the extent sufficient to cover the amount
of their credits. (Art. 1052)
WAIVER
-
renunciation of some rule which invalidates
the contract.
RATIFICATION
●
d. A will may be revoked by the
testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of
this right is void.(Art. 828)
NATURAL RIGHTS
● if a person requests another to kill
him, the killer would still be
criminally liable.
● The right to be supported (present
or future support) cannot be
renounced, for support is vital to the
life of the recipient. (Art. 301)
-
-
form of waiver, it is a waiver of certain
defects which may result in invalidity or
unenforceability.
adoption of a contract made on one’s behalf
by some one whom he did not authorize,
which relates back to the execution of the
contract and renders it obligatory from the
outset.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
CASE DIGEST: TANADA V. TUVERA
L- 63915, 29 December 1986, 146
SCRA 446
PETITIONERS:LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM
F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI)
RESPONDENTS:HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL.,
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
EFFECTIVITY OF STATUTES
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.” w/c provides that laws shall
take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication of all presidential issuances “of
a public nature” or of “general applicability" as
mandated by the law. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons
such as administrative and EOs need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
FACTS:
An order of mandamus is sought by the
petitioners to compel the respondents(public
officials) to publish and/or cause the publication
of various Presidential Decrees (PD’s, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders in the Official Gazette..
Petitioners invoked that a law shall be valid and
enforceable, must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.
They added that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette
The officials argued that while the publication was
necessary as a rule ,it was not so when it was
“otherwise provided” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
In 1985, The SC affirmed the necessity of the
publication of the presidential issuances w/c are
of general application. Petitioners then moved
for reconsideration/clarification asserting that
the clause “it is otherwise provided” meant that
the publication required therein was not always
imperative.
ISSUE/S:
WHO the publication is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the presidential
issuances?
RULING:
YES. The publication of presidential issuances at
bar is an essential requirement for their
effectiveness, regardless of the date on which
they are to take effect.
The Court agrees that the publication must be in
full or there is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of
the presidential decree, the title of such decree,
its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"),
the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy
the publication requirement.
“WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws
as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code. ”
CASE DIGEST:DE ROY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80718, 29 January
1988
PETITIONERS:FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO
RAMOS
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL,
JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR.,
FACTS:
Feliza De Roy, was the respondent in a civil
cases for damages filed by luis bernal.
In the civil case, the RTC found De Roy grossly
negligent and awarded damages to Bernal for
the injuries he sustained and for the death of
his daughter caused by the collapse of a
burned-out building’s firewall owned by De
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Roy. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. On
the last day of the 15-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
The CA denied the motion by applying the rule
laid down in the Habaluyas Enterprises v
Japzon that said the period cannot be
extended. Petitioners contend that the rule
enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not
be made to apply to the case at bar owing to
the non-publicaion of the decision in the
Official Gazette when the CA decision was
promulgated.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in
theHabaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the nonpublication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G.R.s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and
law journals
ISSUE/S: WHO IS PUBLICATION IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE REQUIRED BEFORE SC
DECISIONS CAN BECOME BINDING AND
EFFECTIVE?
RULING:
NO, publication is not required
This Court likewise finds that the Court of
Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
There is no law requiring the publication of SC
decisions in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the SC particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of SC decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.
In this case, petitioner’s contention that the
SC decision was not binding and effective
because it lacks publication is without merit.
Since publication is not required, the SC
decision is binding and effective even without
being published in the Official Gazette.
CASE DIGEST: PPL V. QUE PO LAY
G.R NO# 6791
MARCH 29, 1954
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: PPL OF THE PH
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: QUE PO LAY
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
PENAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPOSING
PENALTIES, NEED BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE IT MAY BECOME
EFFECTIVE. — Circulars and regulations,
especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank which prescribes a penalty for its
violation, should be published before
becoming effective. Before the public may be
bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.||
FACTS:
The defendant-appellant (Que Po Lay) is
appealed from the decision of the CFI of
Manila w/c found him guilty of violating the
Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection
with Sec 34 of RA No. 265 & sentencing him to
suffer 6 months of imprisonment and pay a
fine of P1000 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The charge was that Que Po Lay who
was in possession of US dollar, US checks and
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
US money orders amounting to about $7,000
failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents w/in the one day following
the receipt of such foreign exchange (as
required by the circular #20).
This appeal was based on the claim
that the circular #20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act or omission
imputed to the appellant, and that the said
circular said has nor force and effect.
-It
is
contended
that
the
Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 both
require said circular to be published in the
Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of
general applicability.
The Solicitor General said the
Commonwealth act 638 and 2930 do not
require the publication in the Official Gazette
of said circular issued for the implementation
of a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE/S: Whether Circular No. 20 shuld be
published in the official gazette before it may
become effective?
RULING:
THE COURT SAID THAT “as a rule, circulars and
regulations especially like the Circular No. 20
of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on
the general principle and theory that before
the public is bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of
said contents and its penalties.”
“It is clear that said Circular, particularly its
penal provision, did not have any legal effect
and bound no one until its publication in the
Official Gazette or after November 1951. In
other words, appellant could not be held
liable for its violation, for it was not binding at
the time he was found to have failed to sell
the foreign exchange in his possession within
one day following his taking possession
thereof
“In view of the foregoing, we reverse the
decision appealed from and acquit the
appellant, with costs de oficio”
___________________________
ARTICLE 7: Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice
to the contrary. When the courts declared a law
to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
REVISED ADMNISTRATIVE CODE
Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.When a law which expressly repeals a prior law
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
thereby revived unless expressly so provided.
Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be
revived, unless the repealing law provides
otherwise.
SOURCES OF LAW; HIERARCHY
In general, the sources of law are given by Art. 7,
and in the following order of preference:
1. Constitution
2. Laws (or presidential decrees)
3. Administrative or executive acts, orders, and
regulations.
TERMINATION OF LAWS
Who can terminate the effectivity of a law?
1. Congress — by repeal or amendment
2. Supreme Court — by declaration of
unconstitutionality
Can lower courts declare a law as
unconstitutional?
YES. But it only affects the parties to the case.
ARTICLE 8: Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
(n)
JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT ARE
AUTHORITATIVE AND PRECEDENT-SETTING WHILE
THOSE OF THE INFERIOR COURTS AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS ARE MERELY PERSUASIVE.
Indeed, it is the duty of judges to apply the law as
interpreted by the Supreme Court (Secretary of
Justice v. Catolico)
Only the decisions of the Supreme Court establish
jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.
(Miranda vs Imperial)
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
The
application or interpretation placed by the Supreme
Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of
its enactment since the Court’s application or
interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect.
(Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corp 1985)
The decisions of subordinate courts are only
persuasive in nature, and can have no mandatory
effect. However, this rule does not militate against
the fact that a conclusion or pronouncement of the
Court of Appeals which covers a point of law still
undecided in the Philippines may still serve as a
judicial guide to the inferior courts..
ARTICLE 9: No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
NO JUDGE OR COURT SHALL DECLINE TO RENDER
JUDGMENT BY REASON OF THE SILENCE,
OBSCURITY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE LAWS.
Judges are tasked with the dispensation of justice in
accordance with the constitutional precept that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and
property without due process of law. Judges must
not evade performance of this responsibility just
because of an apparent non-existence of any law
governing a particular legal dispute or because the
law involved is vague or inadequate. He must
always be guided by equity, fairness, and a sense of
justice in these situations. Where the conclusions of
a judge in his decision are not without logic or
reason, he cannot be said to have been
incompetent (Corpus v. Cabaluna)
A judge must give a decision, whether he knows
what law to apply or not. Thus, even if a judge does
not know the rules of cockfighting, he must still
decide the case. (Chua Jan v. Bernas)
Article 9 of the Civil Code is applicable to criminal
prosecutions. The judge may not decline to render a
judgment. Instead, the judge must dismiss the
criminal action. Applying the rule “nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege” (there is no crime when
there is no law punishing it) the judge must dismiss
the case if somebody is accused of a non-existent
crime.
ARTICLE 10: In case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. (n)
REVISED ADMNISTRATIVE CODE
Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and
Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation
of a law or administrative issuance promulgated
in all the official languages, the English text shall
control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In
case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other
texts may be consulted.
IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION OR
APPLICATION OF LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE
LAWMAKING BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE
TO PREVAIL
“We should interpret not by the letter that killeth,
but by the spirit that giveth life.”
The Supreme Court has time and again cautioned
against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat
the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is
of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes
so as to avoid such deplorable result (of injustice or
absurdity) and that, therefore, a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust
or lead to absurd results (Bello v. Court of Appeals)
But equity, which has been described as “justice
outside legality,” is applied only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure.
ARTICLE 11: Customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. (n)
ARTICLE 12: A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence. (n)
CUSTOMS MUST NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, PUBLIC
ORDER OR PUBLIC POLICY, OTHERWISE, THEY ARE
VOID.
A law is superior to a custom as a source of right.
While the courts take cognizance of local laws,
there can be no judicial notice of customs, even if
local.
Note that customs may suppletory to law if the
latter is silent, obscure or insufficient (Art. 9)
ARTICLE 13: When the laws speak of years,
months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days
each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If
months are designated by their name, they shall
be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have. In computing a period, the first
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
(7a)
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be
understood to be twelve calendar months;
"month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; "day," to a day of
twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to
sunrise.
ARTICLE 14: Penal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international
law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
CITIZENS AND FOREIGNERS WHO LIVE OR
SOJOURN IN PHILIPPINE TERRITORY ARE SUBJECT
TO ALL PENAL LAWS AND ALL OTHER LAWS
DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY AND
SAFETY.
The liability for any violation of the said laws will
even attach regardless of whether or not a
foreigner is merely sojourning in Philippine
territory.
Thus, even if an American citizen is a mere tourist in
the Philippines, he is liable for a crime if he commits
one on Philippine territory.
Territoriality of Criminal Laws
We adhere in the Philippines to that
doctrine in criminal law known as the theory of
territoriality; i.e., any offense committed within our
territory offends the state. Therefore any person,
whether citizen or alien, can be punished for
committing a crime here. Thus, the technical term
generality came into being; it means that even
aliens, male or female come under our territorial
jurisdiction. This is because aliens owe some sort of
allegiance even if it be temporary.
NOTE — Criminal laws are generally
territorial unlike civil laws
Generality of Criminal Laws
Article 14 of the Civil Code embodies one of
the three main characteristics of our Criminal Law –
– which is Generality. As a rule, our criminal law is
binding on all persons who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory.
ARTICLE 15: Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
ARTICLE 16: Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated. However, intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by
the law of the nation of the decedent. (n)
Article 1753. The law of the country to which the
goods are to be transported shall govern the
liability of the common carrier for their loss,
destruction or deterioration.
ARTICLE 17: The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed. When the acts referred
to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
(11a)
THE FORMS AND SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS,
WILLS, AND OTHER PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS SHALL
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY IN
WHICH THEY ARE EXECUTED. (LEX LOCI
CELEBRATIONIS)
The forms and solemnities pertain to the “extrinsic
validity”
The first paragraph of the Article lays down the rule
of lex loci celebrationis insofar as extrinsic validity is
concerned.
Example — A contract entered into by a Filipino in
Japan will be governed by Japanese law insofar as
form and solemnities of the contract are concerned.
Thus also, if a power of attorney is executed in
Germany, German laws and not our Civil Code
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
should determine its formal validity. (Germann and
Co. v. Donaldson, Sim and Co)
CASE DIGEST: NPC V PINATUBO
COMMERCIAL
G.R NO# 6791
MARCH 29, 1954
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: PPL OF THE PH
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: QUE PO LAY
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
PENAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPOSING
PENALTIES, NEED BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE IT MAY BECOME
EFFECTIVE. — Circulars and regulations,
especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank which prescribes a penalty for its
violation, should be published before
becoming effective. Before the public may be
bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.||
FACTS:
The defendant-appellant (Que Po Lay) is
appealed from the decision of the CFI of
Manila w/c found him guilty of violating the
Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection
with Sec 34 of RA No. 265 & sentencing him to
suffer 6 months of imprisonment and pay a
fine of P1000 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The charge was that Que Po Lay who
was in possession of US dollar, US checks and
US money orders amounting to about $7,000
failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents w/in the one day following
the receipt of such foreign exchange (as
required by the circular #20).
This appeal was based on the claim
that the circular #20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act or omission
imputed to the appellant, and that the said
circular said has nor force and effect.
-It
is
contended
that
the
Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 both
require said circular to be published in the
Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of
general applicability.
The Solicitor General said the
Commonwealth act 638 and 2930 do not
require the publication in the Official Gazette
of said circular issued for the implementation
of a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE/S: Whether Circular No. 20 shuld be
published in the official gazette before it may
become effective?
RULING:
THE COURT SAID THAT “as a rule, circulars and
regulations especially like the Circular No. 20
of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on
the general principle and theory that before
the public is bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of
said contents and its penalties.”
“It is clear that said Circular, particularly its
penal provision, did not have any legal effect
and bound no one until its publication in the
Official Gazette or after November 1951. In
other words, appellant could not be held
liable for its violation, for it was not binding at
the time he was found to have failed to sell
the foreign exchange in his possession within
one day following his taking possession
thereof
“In view of the foregoing, we reverse the
decision appealed from and acquit the
appellant, with costs de oficio”
CASE DIGEST: Neri vs. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers
G.R NO# 180643
March 25, 2008
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
The phrase "duly published rules of
procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for
one-half of the Senate's membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by
the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem,
fit. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate,
are therefore, procedurally infirm.
FACTS:
On September 26, 2007, Neri testified
regarding the National Broadband Project
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
(NBN Project) for 11 hours. COMELEC
chairman Abolos offered him 200 million
pesos in exchange for his approval of the
project. Neri informed President Arroyo of the
bribery. She then instructed him not to accept
it.
On November 20, 2007, the
respondent committee required him to testify
once more. The executive secretary wrote to
the respondent and requested to dispense
Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. The respondent committee issued a
show-cause letter requiring him to defend
himself and why he shouldn’t be cited in
contempt. Neri manifested his willingness to
appear and testify regarding other questions
not on different matters and manifested his
intention to ignore the senate hearing and
that the only remaining questions were
covered by executive privilege. On January 30,
2008, the respondent cited the petitioner in
contempt of the respondent committee and
ordered his arrest and detention.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the senate have to
republish its rules.
RULING:
Yes. For inquiries in aid of legislation to be
valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly
published rules of procedure and that the
rights of the persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries be respected. The
respondent Committees violated Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that
the inquiry should be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure."
OSG's explanation: “The phrase 'duly
published rules of procedure' requires the
Senate of every Congress to publish its rules
of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct
from the one before it or after it. Since
Senatorial elections are held every three (3)
years for one-half of the Senate's
membership, the composition of the Senate
also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules
as it may deem fit. Not having published its
Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid
of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate,
are therefore, procedurally infirm.”
CASE DIGEST: Garcillano V. House of
Representatives
G.R NO# 170338
December 23, 2008
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING
INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION MUST BE
PUBLISHED DESPITE ABSENCE OF ANY
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES
PUBLICATION OF SENATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID
OF LEGISLATION IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FORM
OF PUBLICATION
FACTS:
On June 8, 2005, Senator Francis G. Escudero
delivered a privileged speech entitled, “Tale
of Two Tapes and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly conducted
by the Committees on Public Information,
Public Order and Safety, National Defense and
Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees.
Several versions of the wiretapped
conversations emerged. The recordings
contain
conversations
regarding
the
manipulation of the 2004 presidential
election results in favor of Macapagal-Arroyo.
On July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo
Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of
former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong
submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape
recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation. Intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex
Sagge, a member of ISAFP, alleges violation of
his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation.
ISSUE/S: Whether the publication of the Rules
of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation through the Senate’s website and
pamphlets, satisfies the due process
requirement of law.
RULING:
No. According to Article 2 of the New Civil
Code (NCC), laws shall take effect after 15
days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. In
the case at bar, the Senate did not comply
with the publication requirements as stated in
Tanada vs Tuvera.
The Senate claims that they have the Rules of
Procedure available both online and as a
pamphlet, but their invocation of R.A. No.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim
of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary
purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It
does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
The Court also ruled that by not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally
infirm. That is because the Senate that
published the Rules of Procedure in 1995 and
2006 are different from the current Senate.
CASE DIGEST: PIMENTEL V. SENATE
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
G.R NO# 187714
MARCH 08, 2011
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
The Constitution does not require
publication of the internal rules of the House
or Senate. Since rules of the House or the
Senate that affect only their members are
internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published, unless such rules
expressly provide for their publication
before the rules can take effect.
FACTS:
Senator Panfilo Lacson delivered a privilege
speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"
In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called
attention to the congressional insertion in the
2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly
the ₱200 million appropriated for the
construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia
Avenue Extension including the Right-of-Way,
and another ₱200 million appropriated for
the extension of C-5 road including said right
of way.
Respondent, Senate Committee of the Whole
conducted two hearings. At both hearings,
petitioners objected to the application of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the whole.
Petitioners particularly contended that the
Senate Committee on the Whole violated the
due process clause of the Constitution when
it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole, despite its own
provision, requiring publication for its
effectivity.
Respondent argues that the published Rules
of the Ethics Committee governs both the
Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee
of the Whole; thus, there is no consequent
need to publish the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.
ISSUE/S: Is publication of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole required for
their effectivity?
RULING:
Yes, the publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is necessary to be
effective. The Constitution does not require
publication of the internal rules of the House
or Senate. Since rules of the House or the
Senate that affect only their members are
internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published, unless such rules
expressly provide for their publication before
the rules can take effect. Hence, the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the whole itself
provide that the Rules must be published
before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if
publication is not required under the
Constitution, publication of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their
publication. The majority of the members of
the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the whole, and the publication
requirement which they adopted should be
considered as the will of the majority.
The respondent cannot dispense with the
publication requirement just because the
Rules of the Ethics Committee had already
been published in the Official Gazette. To
reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole expressly require publication
before the Rules can take effect. To comply
with due process requirements, the Senate
must follow its own internal rules if the rights
of its own members are Affected.
VALEROSO V. PEOPLE
Petitioner: Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso
Respondent: People of the Philippines
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Facts: Upon receiving the search warrant for the
arrest of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso for the
charge of Kidnapping with Ransom, 3 policemen
from INP Central Station of Culiat, QC, who were
under the orders of the Central Police District
Command were able to arrest the petitioner as he
was about to board a tricycle, on July 10, 1996 at
9:30 am. During this occasion, the policemen
found that the petitioner had a gun with live
ammunition tucked around his waist, which
therefore resulted in him being charged with
violating PD no. 1866 for possessing an illegal
firearm and ammunition, which was later on
amended to RA 8294 on July 6, 1997. In his trial,
the lower court sentenced Valeroso to suffer the
penalty of prision correccional, which dictates
either a sentence of 4 years/2 months/and 1 day
as minimum and a maximum of 6 years; under the
provisions of RA 8294. The petitioner then filed for
a motion for consideration which was denied, and
upon appeal to the CA, the appellate court merely
modified the sentence from 4 years and 2 months
as minimum to 6 years as maximum. Hence, this
present petition.
Village Inc. However, upon the lots being
mortgaged in favor of the petitioner Philippine
National Bank (PNB), setting aside the previous
purchase agreements such as that of the private
respondents’, caused trouble on the end of the
latter as they continued to comply with their
obligations as buyers and even constructed a
house in their lot without knowledge of the
mortgage between the subdivision developer and
PNB as the petitioner had now become the owner
of the lots once the mortgage was foreclosed. The
private respondents then filed suits against the
petitioner regarding this issue to which the HLURB
Office of Appeals of Adjudication and Legal Affairs
rendered a decision on October 28 1988 that
petitioner PNB may only collect the remaining
amortization in accordance with the previous land
purchase agreements made by the previous
subdivision developer and cannot compel the
private respondents to pay the total amount as it
started. Such was affirmed both by the Office of
the President and the House and Land Regulatory
Board. Hence, the petitioner bank raised issues to
the Court.
Issue/s: Whether PD no. 1866 should take
retroactive effect in the case at bar due to the
circumstances of the crime having occurred before
the enactment of RA 8294.
Issue/s: Whether PD no 957 can be applied
retroactively to real estate mortgages executed
prior to its enactment.
Ruling: Yes, the Court found that PD no. 1866
should take retroactive effect in this case due to
the circumstances of it having acquired a character
as an ex-post facto law. Though penal laws
generally do not have the privilege of having
the option to have retroactive application nor does
it serve as a plain advantage to the accused but
rather to be more in their favor as per stated in the
RPC. In light of Chief Justice Araullo’s statement,
“it is not a right of the offender, but is rather
founded on the very principles on which the right
of the State to punish and the combination of the
penalty are based, and regards it not as an
exception based on political considerations, but as
a rule founded on principles of strict justice.".
__________
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
Ruling: Yes, the Court ruled that PD no 957 can be
applied retroactively, therefore denied the
petition. Though PD no 957’s provisions did not
express specific requisites wherein the law could
be applied retroactively, it did imply that its intent
was to protect innocent lot buyers from
subdivision developers due to the understatement
of the relationship wherein there is a hegemonic
presence that is to say the developer’s financial
prowess in comparison to the ordinary individual
buyer. Hence, as the law emanates, it shall favor
the weak. In line with the case, the petitioner bank
could not have known that a property has already
been built on the lot by small lot buyers who were
powerless with the advances of PNB who were
already instigating to hypothecate their property.
Such is the very purpose of PD no 957; to elevate
the level of small lot buyers that enables them to
protect themselves from the schemes of
subdivision and condominium owners alike.
Wherefore, PD no 957 was applied retroactively.
Petitioner: Philippine National Bank (PNB)
Respondent: Office of the President
Facts: The private respondents, the couple
Antonio and Susana Astudillo, bought an
installment of subdivision lots from Marikina
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Petitioner: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR)
Respondent: Philippine Healthcare Providers
Doctrine: In accordance with Sec. 246 (NonRetroactivity of Rulings) of the Philippine Tax Code
which essentially states that any revocation,
modification or reversal of any of the rules and
regulations of the Commissioner shall not be given
retroactive application for such will be prejudicial
to the taxpayers.
Sec. 102 of the amended National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977 (Exempt Transactions)
provides that a 10% of VAT shall be levied from
gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange
of services including the use or lease of properties.
Sec. 103 of the amended National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977 (Exempt Transactions)
provides that medical, dental, hospital and
veterinary services except those rendered by
professionals are exempted from VAT.
CIR vs Seagate Technology (Philippines): Defined
text exemption as goods or services that are
specifically listed in and expressly exempted from
VAT under the Tax Code. Such a decision was
reiterated in CIR vs Toshiba Information
Equipment (Phils.) Inc.
Facts: On 25 July 1987, President Corazon Aquino
issued Executive Order no. 273 which amends the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 by
imposing Value-Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of
goods and services; thereafter taking effect on 1
January 1988. Respondent Philippine Health Care
Providers Inc. wrote an inquiry to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) on 10
December 1987, on whether or not the
respondent, being a provider of medical services,
would be exempted from VAT. On 8 June 1988, the
CIR replied through the VAT Review Committee of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, wherein the
petitioner stated that the respondent is exempted
from the payment of VAT. Upon the effectivity of
R.A. 7716 (E-VAT Law) and thereafter R.A. no 8424
(National Internal Revenue Code of 1997),
however, the BIR then pursued four (4)
Preliminary Assessment Notices against the
respondent for its payment of VAT and
documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable years
1996 and 1997. Despite its previous claim, the
petitioner demanded payment from the
respondent for a deficiency in VAT and the DST for
a total of Php 224,702,641.18 in said taxable years
to which the respondent filed a petition of inquiry
regarding the notices to no avail. Hence,
respondent filed a petition for review which was
PARTIALLY granted by the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) on 5 April 2002. The respondent on the
other-hand filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the previous judgment which
was granted on 23 March 2003; accordingly, the
issued VAT assessment was withdrawn. The CTA
granted the petitioner’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration under the provisions of Sec. 246
of the Tax Code. In that premise, prejudice will be
caused to the petitioner if the revocation of VAT
would be retroactively applied in this case to the
benefit of the respondent; wherein the petitioner
exercised good faith in the initial ruling upon the
approval of Regional Director 8 Umali and the
claim of the respondent that it is a producer of
‘medical services’. The petitioner filed for motion
for reconsideration in the CA but was denied.
Thus, its instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
- Whether or not the respondent has VAT
liabilities for the taxable years of 1996 and
1997.
- Whether or not VAT ruling 231-88
exempts the respondent from payment of
VAT upon retroactive application.
Ruling: The CTA ruled that the respondent has VAT
liabilities for the taxable years of 1996 and 1997
and that the initial VAT ruling of 231-88 shall not
apply retroactively for the respondent does not
provide medical services but rather as a health
maintenance organization which acts as a conduit
between
its
enrolled
members
and
accredited/recognized medical institutions as
means for the former to avail invested healthcare
services for a specific period of time. Hence,
making the respondent subject to the payment of
VAT unlike entities who directly provide medical
services. However, the respondent did not act in
bad faith by not identifying itself as a ‘health
maintenance organization’. More so under the
doctrine of ABS-CBN vs CTA, the CA ruled that the
CIR is precluded from adopting a position contrary
to its previous stance wherein it may cause
injustice to the taxpayer. Thereby denying the
instant petition for review on certiorari and
affirming the decision and resolution made by the
CA.
D.M. CONSUNJI V. CA
Petitioner: D.M. Consunji
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Respondent: Court of Appeals (CA)
Facts: Under the accounts of PO3 Rogelio
Villanueva’s investigation, on 2 Nov 1990, at
around 1:30 in the afternoon, D.M. Consunji Inc.
construction worker Jose Juego was walking on a
platform board made of channel beam with a
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to each
corner; the structure was merely hooked by a 5
ton chain block, when a chain got loose causing it
and Juego to fall 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City, to his death. He was rushed to
the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig but was
unfortunately pronounced dead on arrival at 2:15
pm by Dr. Errol de Yzo. Hence, it is presumed that
Juego died due to the lack of a safety lock of the
platform whilst performing his duties. Thereafter,
Maria, Juego’s widow, filed for a complaint for
damages against D.M. Consunji Inc on 9 May 1991
at RTC Pasig wherein the trial court rendered
judgment ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the following costs: P50k - death of Jose
Juego; P10k - actual and compensatory damages;
P464k - loss of Jose’s earning capacity; P100k moral damages; and P20k - attorney’s fees and
costs of suit. The defendant filed an appeal to the
CA yet the latter affirmed RTC’s decision in
application of the Floresca Ruling. Hence, the
defendant’s petition seeking for the reversal of the
CA decision.
Issue/s: Whether the CA erred in holding that the
petitioner is presumed to be negligent under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the petitioner’s
ignorance regarding which damages she can
receive from the death of her husband be it from
awards from the Employees’ Compensation
Commission as per the Labor Code which she had
already received upon filing a criminal complaint
of ‘Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide’ or
from the Civil Code which fits the case as it is civil
in nature, cannot be held against her due to the
application of the Floresca Ruling which exempts
similar cases upon the instance of a mistake of
fact. Furthermore, Floresca implies that
circumstances of such cases yields a need for an
election between inconsistent remedies which
waives the right to receive solely the awards of
one recovery in favor of it rather than the other/s.
Hence, the case was remanded back to the RTC of
Pasay City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC
and if the payments made to the private
respondent in pursuant to the labor code should
be deducted if the awards is greater than that of
the ECC.
CUI V. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
Plaintiff-Appellant: Ernesto Cui
Defendant-Appellee: Arellano University
Facts: After taking up a preparatory law course in
the defendant-appellee University, the plaintiffappellant continued to pursue his postgraduate
studies in the defendant-appellee University’s
College of Law wherein his uncle, Atty. Francisco
Capistrano, worked as a dean. Given this, the
plaintiff-appellant was offered a scholarship grant
wherein he would receive a tuition fee discount
per semester provided that he would finish his
studies in the said university. However, the
plaintiff-appellant did not complete his studies in
Arellano University and instead transferred to
Abad Santos University to do so upon his uncle’s
transfer to the latter University due to an offer of
deanship and chancellorship which Atty.
Capistrano accepted. This resulted to issues in his
application for the bar examination as he needed
to acquire necessary transcripts from Arellano
University which refused to do so until he paid
back the P1,033.87 he owed in total from the first
semester of his first year up until the first semester
of his fourth year due to violating the contract that
waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the University the
equivalent of his scholarship cash, which the
plaintiff-appellant did begrudgingly out of
necessity. The plaintiff-appellant then asked the
Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon an issue
which upholds his right to secure his transcript of
records without having to pay the refunded sum in
accordance with Bureau of Private Schools
Memorandum No. 38. The bureau agreed with the
plaintiff-appellant;
the
defendant-appellee
University claimed the memorandum is null and
void because it violates the contract between the
Cui and Arellano University, wherein Cui agreed to
waive his rights to the provisions. Nonetheless, the
trial court held that the memorandum is advisory
rather than mandatory, as well as contrary to
public policy; hence ruling in favor of the
petitioner.
Issue/s: Whether the contract between the
plaintiff and defendant is binding and valid.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the contract
is null and void. Therefore, sentencing the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
defendant to pay back the sum of P1,033.87 back
to the plaintiff with interest along with other costs.
Such is due to the fact that the contract between
Cui and Arellano University is against public policy
as per the jurisdiction of Zegel v Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank, the American court has essentially
stated that public policies of the state are limited
only by the determination of the courts in
consideration of the Constitution, judicial
decisions, statues, and practice of government
officers. Moreover, as per the American judicial
system, courts of justice shall not recognize
transactions prejudicial to public welfare, to
provide civic honesty, and overall establish good
morals. In the case at bar, Arellano University was
expected to understand and uphold Bureau of
Private Schools Memorandum No. 38, and
therefore knew that it should have not entered a
contract of waiver with Cui as it is inconsistent with
sound policy and good morals.
Article 17 - 18 Civil Code
CASE DIGEST: Mecano v. COA, G.R. No.
103982, 11 December 1992
PETITIONERS: ANTONIO A. MECANO
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON AUDIT
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that
repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know
the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
FACTS:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari,
seeks to nullify the decision COA embodied in its 7th
Indorsement, denying his claim for reimbursement
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended, in the total amount of
P40,831.00. Petitioner is a Director II of the NBI. He
was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26,
1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he
incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the
total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI
Director Lim, he requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the RAC. However, then
Under secretary of J Bello III denied his claim to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987. Petitioner then re-
submitted his claim to Director Lim,. The request was
approved by the Department of Justice and
forwarded to the Commission on Audit. COA
Chairman Domingo denied petitioner's claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely
for the reason that the same section was not restated
nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987.
He commented, however, that the claim may be filed
with the Employees' Compensation Commission,
considering that the illness of Director Mecano
occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the Administrative Code of 1987 has
repeal or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
RULING:
No, the Administrative Code of 1987 did not repeal or
abrogate Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code. In the case of the two Administrative Codes in
question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was
the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code
with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of
the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision
is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of
the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads: Sec. 27.
Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. It is certainly not an express repealing
clause because it fails to identify or designate the act
or acts that are intended to be repealed. It is a clause
which predicates the intended repeal under the
condition that substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of
the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under
the category of an implied repeal. Implied repeal by
irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the
two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are
so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each
other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized;
and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law
cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new
Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found
in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Section 699, and still others. Hence, Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code remains operative.
CASE DIGEST: People v. Licera G.R. No. L39990, July 2, 1975
PETITIONERS: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: RAFAEL LICERA
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction's legal system.
FACTS:
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de
Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint charging
Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester
rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the
municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera
guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging - five years and one
day to six years and eight months of imprisonment.
Licera filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals claiming
that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and,
thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang, was
exempt from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges
that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case
of People vs. Mapa which held that section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the court interpretation of the law
has also the effect of the law.
RULING:
Yes, court interpretation of the law has also the
effect of the law. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of
this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions,
although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence
of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part
of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said
law since the Court's application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect.
CASE DIGEST: Chu Jan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631
(1916)
PETITIONERS: CHU JAN
RESPONDENTS: LUCIO BERNAS
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Article 6 (2) of the Civil Code provides that, the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law.
FACTS:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held
in the cockpit of the municipality of Tabaco, Albay,
between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to
the defendant respectively. As the referee of the
cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner
in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant asking that his own rooster be declared
the winner. The said Court of First Instance rendered
judgment dismissing the appeal without special
finding as to costs. The grounds for the dismissal
pronounced by the lower court in the judgment
appealed from ere that the court has always
dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar
with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of
referees thereof; that he does not know where to find
the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of
no law whatever that governs the rights to the
plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning
cockfights.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the court is correct in its dismissal of
the case due to lack of knowledge of an applicable
law to the case at bar.
RULING:
No, the court is incorrect. The ignorance of the court
or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable
to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that
the court does not know the rules applicable to a
certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which
must be decided by him and his not knowing where
to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons
that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the
issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because,
foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law
would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law.
CASE DIGEST: People vs. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L42050-66, L-46229-32, L46313-16, L-46997, 20
November 1978
PETITIONERS: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P.
PURISIMA et al.,
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Article 7 of the Civil COde provides that:
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
FACTS:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed
by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila,
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined
by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one
Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to
quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them — the details of which will be recounted
below — an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the
crime.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the mere carrying of deadly weapons
constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for
short) No. 9
RULING:
No, it is not the intention of PD No. 9 to punish the
mere carrying of deadly weapons. We hold that the
offense carries two elements: first, the carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act
of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of,
or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder. It is the second element
which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon,
if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or
the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words,
a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described
in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in
itself. We do not agree with petitioner that the
above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are
deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). P. D. 9(3) does not
contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal
by implication is not favored. This principle holds
true with greater force with regards to penal statutes
which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the
state and liberally in favor of the accused. In fact,
Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation
or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
CASE DIGEST: Toyo v. Toyo, G.R. No.
213198, Jul. 1, 2019
PETITIONERS: GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA, A.K.A.
"GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO”
RESPONDENTS: TETSUSHI TOYO, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
ARTICLE 26 of the Family Code Provides that:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
FACTS:
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and
Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were
married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they
named Keiichi Toyo. After 19 years of marriage, the
two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement,
which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan.
On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry. In support of her Petition, Genevieve
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate,
Tetsushi's Family Register, the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce,and an
English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, among
others. On February 14, 2014, the Regional Trial Court
rendered a Judgment denying Genevieve's Petition. It
decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented
by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement
was accepted by the local government of Japan, she
nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan's law.
The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the
Civil Code of Japan and its English translation
submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated
by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign
Affairs. Aggrieved, Genevieve filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Regional
Trial Court's June 11, 2014 Resolution. Thus,
Genevieve filed before this Court the present Petition
for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner argues that the
trial court erred in not treating the English translation
of the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication in
accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules
of Court. That it is an official publication, she points
out, makes it a self-authenticating evidence of
Japan's law under Rule 132, Section 25 of the Rules of
Court.
resolve an absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse even after their
marital bond had been severed by the divorce decree
obtained abroad. Through this provision, Philippine
courts are given the authority "to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage." It bestowed upon the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage considered dissolved, granting him or her
the capacity to remarry. Nonetheless, settled is the
rule that in actions involving the recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the
petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment
granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's
national law. Philippine courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. They must be
proven as fact under our rules on evidence. A divorce
decree obtained abroad is deemed a foreign
judgment, hence the indispensable need to have it
pleaded and proved before its legal effects may be
extended to the Filipino spouse.
ISSUE/S:
PETITIONERS: PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY
RESPONDENTS: ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ AND
VERNON R. RAZON
Whether or Not the Regional Trial Court erred in
denying the petitioner’s petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry.
RULING:
Yes, RTC is correct in denying the petitioner’s
petition. When a Filipino and an alien get married,
and the alien spouse later acquires a valid divorce
abroad, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to
remarry provided that the divorce obtained by the
foreign spouse enables him or her to remarry. Article
26 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied). The second
paragraph was introduced as a corrective measure to
CASE DIGEST: PLDT v. Alvarez, G.R. No.
179408, Mar. 5, 2014
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
FACTS:
During a test call placed at the PLDT Alternative
Calling Patterns Detection Division office, the
receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone number
(2–8243285) as the calling number used, as if the call
was originating from a local telephone in Metro
Manila. Upon verification with the PLDT’s Integrated
Customer Management (billing) System, the ACPDD
learned that the subscriber of the reflected
telephone number is Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with
address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound,
Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City. It further
learned that several lines are installed at this address
with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon (respondents),
among others, as subscribers. In the cards they
tested, however, once the caller enters the access
and pin numbers, the respondents would route the
call via the internet to a local telephone number (in
this case, a PLDT telephone number) which would
connect the call to the receiving phone. Since calls
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
through the internet never pass the toll center of the
PLDT’s IGF, users of these prepaid cards can place a
call to any point in the Philippines (provided the local
line is NDD–capable) without the call appearing as
coming from abroad. On November 6, 2003 and
November 19, 2003, Mr. Narciso of the PLDT’s Quality
Control Division, together with the operatives of the
PNP, conducted an ocular inspection and discovered
that PLDT telephone lines were connected to several
pieces of equipment December 3, 2003, a
consolidated application for a search warrant was
filed before Judge Mendiola of the RTC, for the crimes
of theft and violation of PD No. 401 – granted.
Accordingly, four search warrants were issued for
violations of Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of
the RPC ( SW A–1 and SW A–2 ) and of PD No. 401, as
amended ( SW B–1 and SW B–2) for the ISR activities
On December 10, 2003, a return was made with a
complete inventory of the items seized. On January
14, 2004, the PLDT and the PNP filed with the
Department of Justice a joint complaint–affidavit for
theft and for violation of PD No. 401 against the
respondents. On February 18, 2004, the respondents
filed with the RTC a motion to quash the search
warrants essentially on the following grounds:
First, the RTC had no authority to issue search
warrants which were enforced in Parañaque City;
second , the enumeration of the items to be searched
and seized lacked particularity; and third, there was
no probable cause for the crime of theft – denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not “telecommunication or telephone
services” be considered as personal property and
susceptible of appropriation under the provisions of
Article 308 of RPC.
RULING:
Yes. On January 13, 2009 the Court En Banc
unanimously
granted
PLDT’s
motion
for
reconsideration. In Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, the Court
ruled that even prior to the passage of the RPC,
jurisprudence is settled that “any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal,
capable of appropriation can be the object of theft.”
This jurisprudence, in turn, applied the prevailing
legal meaning of the term “personal property” under
the old Civil Code as “anything susceptible of
appropriation and not included in the foregoing
chapter (not real property).” PLDT’s telephone
service or its business of providing this was
appropriable personal property and was, in fact, the
subject of appropriation in an ISR operation,
facilitated by means of the unlawful use of PLDT’s
facilities.
It is the use of these communications facilities
without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the
crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the
telephone services and business. Therefore, the
business of providing telecommunication and the
telephone service are personal property under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code , and the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized
under said article.
CASE DIGEST: Ayala Corp. v. Rosa-Diana
Realty, G.R. No. 134284, Dec.
1, 2000
PETITIONERS: AYALA CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
FACTS:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (herein-after referred to
as Ayala) was the registration owner of a parcel of
land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati
City with an area of 840 square meters, more or less
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. On April 20,
1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to
Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The
Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers
contained Special conditions of sale and Deed
Restrictions. Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to
construct the building in violation of the Special
Conditions of Sale. Notwithstanding the violation,
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng, in April 1989, were able
to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
Rosa-Diana) with Ayala’s approval. While the first set
of building plans complied with the deed restrictions,
the latter set seceded the same. During the
construction of Rosa-Diana’s condominium project,
Ayala filed an action with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati. Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to
the building official of Makati another set of building
plans
Anaban v. Anaban-Alfiler, G.R. No. 249011, Mar.
15, 2021
DOCTRINE: Art 17 of NCC. The Court can decide if
a marriage is valid even if the suit wasn't started to
question the marriage's validity if it's necessary to
decide the case. Customs that violate the law,
public policy, or public order are not recognized or
rendered valid by the law.
Whether or Not Rosana-Diana acted in bad faith in
submitting two sets of building plans resulting in a
breach of contract?
FACTS: Virginia Erasmo and Pedrito Anaban got
married in 1942 following the customs of their
tribe, the Ibaloi, which they were both a part of.
They had three children: respondents Betty
Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo
Anaban. However, in 1947, the tribe's elders took
notice of Virginia's insanity and authorized the
couple's divorce and permitted Pedrito to remarry.
Still following the rules of his group, Pedrito
married Pepang, another lbaloi, in 1952. Eight (8)
children were born to them. When Pedrito died
without a will, his children and grandchildren sued
for a quick settlement or a court order to divide his
assets. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that
they are the legitimate children of their father
Pedrito with their mother Pepang. Since the
celebration of marriage pursuant to a tribe’s
customs was recognized under the Old Civil Code
of the Philippines, then its dissolution in
accordance with that tribe’s customs must also be
recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the
subsequent divorce between Pedrito and Virginia
are valid.
RULING:
The decision of the lower courts are as follows:
ISSUE/S:
Yes.
Article 1159 of the New Civil Code
provides:"Obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith." The fact alone
that respondent Rosa-Diana conveniently prepared
two sets of building plans –with one set which fully
conformed to the Deed Restrictions and another in
gross violation of the same – should have cautioned
the trial court to conclude that respondent RoseDiana was under the erroneous impression that the
Deed Restrictions were no longer enforceable and
that it never intended to be bound by the
Undertaking signed by its President and Chairman.
We reiterate that contractual obligations have the
force of law between parties and unless the same is
contrary to public policy morals and good customs,
they must be complied by the parties in good faith.
MCTC: First marriage between Virginia and Pedrito
was validly dissolved, and second marriage was
validly entered. Thus, Petitioners are legitimate
children.
RTC: Declared that the second marriage of Pedrito
to Pepang was bigamous.
CA: Art 78 of the old Civil Code was unequivocal in
that it only referred to the celebration of marriage,
it did not include divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pedrito Anaban’ s divorce
from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been
decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi tribe’s
customs be recognized under our laws.
RULING: NO. The divorce between Virginia and
Pedring is not valid. Since there was no legal and
valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and
Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were still
married, and their marriage was not dissolved to
permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito’s subsequent
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
marriage to petitioners’ mother Pepang,
therefore, is void for being bigamous. The case is
about dividing up Pedrito's property. When
deciding who should get the estate, the court may
look at whether or not Pedrito and Pepang's
second marriage was legal. In De Castro, a
marriage does not need to be declared null and
void unless the couple wants to get married again.
Because it is necessary to decide the case, the
court may rule on the validity of a marriage even if
it wasn't directly brought up to question it. This
includes, but isn't limited to, figuring out who the
heir is, whether a child is legitimate or not, settling
an estate, ending a property regime, or even a
criminal case. The old Civil Code wasn't in place
when Pedrito and Virginia got married or when
they were said to have split later. It became law on
June 18, 1949, which is two years after the Ibaloi
Council of Elders is said to have issued the divorce
order.
Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79 (1910)
DOCTRINE: Article 12 of CCP
FACTS: On 11th day of September 1908, Plaintiff,
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a
carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, City of
Manila. Along the left-hand side of the street as
she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging
to the defendant, Van Burskirk used for the
purpose of transportation of fodder and to which
was attached a pair of horses, came along the
street in the opposite direction. There upon the
driver of the said plaintiff’s carromata, observing
that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at a great speed, crowded close to the
sidewalk and stopped, in order to give defendant’s
delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by but
instead of passing by the defendant’s wagon and
horses ran into the carromata occupied by said
plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
wounding plaintiff and also injuring the carromata
itself and the harness upon the horse which was
drawing it. The defendant contends that the
cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time of the accident, was a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also
claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some
forage at Calle Herran and for that purpose the
defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for
the purpose of unloading the forage to be
delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver
and made noises that frightened the horses,
causing them to run. The employee failed to stop
the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of
negligence and ordered to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P442.50 with interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Van Burskirk is liable for the
negligence of his cochero.
RULING: No. Van Burskirk is liable for the
negligence of his cochero. t is provided under
Article 12 of the Civil Code “A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence” In which it is proven to the court that a
custom which is to leave the horses in the manner
in which they were left at the time of the accident
does exist The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's ruling. Based on the facts, the SC found the
cochero not negligent in leaving the horses. The
horses that caused damage were gentle and
tractable, the cochero was experienced and
capable, he had driven one of the horses for
several years and the other for five or six months,
and he had always left them in the same condition
as when they were left on the day of the accident.
They had never run away before and had never
caused an accident. The Supreme Court also said
that every cochero who delivered goods like the
defendant's on the day of the accident left their
horses and helped unload the goods in the way
that was described. This was expected of them by
their employers and was done by all the cochero
who delivered goods like that on that day. In
abandoning the horses as shown, the defendant's
driver was not reckless. Acts that have not been
harmful and have been accepted by society for so
long that they have become customary are not
illogical or imprudent. The SC ruled that res ipsa
loquitur (the matter speaks for itself) does not
apply. This is the custom in all cities. The public,
finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years.
Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. 55960,
November 24, 1988
DOCTRINE: ARTICLE 12
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January
17, 1977, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth more or
less Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy
filed a petition alleging that they are the children
of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However,
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat
on Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with
Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage
through evidence like Yao Kee‘s and Gan Ching‘s
testimony, Sy Kiat‘s Master Card of Registration
stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the
certificate by the Embassy of the People‘s Republic
of China affirming the fact of the marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and
Yao Kee was valid in accordance with the
Philippine Law
Ruling: No. The marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is
not valid in accordance with article 12 of NCC. The
petitioners have submitted evidence of marriage,
but this is insufficient to demonstrate the legality
of the marriage under Chinese law or custom.
When foreign law is absent, it is necessary to apply
the doctrine of processual presumption. The
Supreme Court subsequently ruled that foreign
law must be presumed identical to domestic law in
its absence. A valid marriage in the Philippines
requires the presence of a solemnizing officer;
thus, Sy Kiat and Yao Kee's union was deemed null
and invalid. They require the same level of
allegation and proof as any other fact. Article 71 of
the Civil Code provides that the existence of a
foreign marriage is necessary to substantiate its
validity. The foreign law in question must be
proven as a matter of fact, and the purported
foreign marriage must be substantiated with
compelling evidence. If you want to prove that a
marriage is legal, you must show that foreign law
exists as a matter of fact and that the marriage
happened. When it comes to this case, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China
cannot be accepted by Philippine courts because
the foreign law or custom that led to the marriage
was not proven.
CIR vs. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007
DOCTRINE: Article 13. COMPUTATION OF TIME
Facts: On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property
Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. Gilbert
Yap, vice chairman of Primetown Property Group,
Inc., submitted an application on March 11, 1999,
seeking a refund or tax credit for income tax paid
in 1997. However, no action was taken in
response. Therefore, Primetown submitted a
petition for review; however, it was denied by the
Court of Tax Appeals on the grounds that it had
been lodged after the two-year mandatory period
stipulated in section 229 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. The Court of Tax Appeals
additionally contended that the Supreme Court
ruled in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson that
the duration of a year is equivalent to 365 days,
irrespective of whether it is a standard or leap year
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in
referring to Article 13 of the NCC as the basis in the
correct computation of time.
Ruling: NO. Article 13 of the NCC should not be
the basis for the computation of time, for it should
be Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Court of Appeals
is right that the petition was made within the
required time frame, however the NCC shouldn't
have been used as its basis. In Article 13 of the Civil
Code, it says that when the law talks about a year,
it means 365 days. The Administrative Code of
1987, or EO 292, was passed in 1987. It says in
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I: 31. Legal Time
Frames. — What is meant by "year"? It means
twelve calendar months; "month" means thirty
days, unless it's talking about a particular month,
in which case it means the number of days that
month has; "day" means twenty-four hours; and
"night" means from sunrise to sunset.
A calendar month is "a month marked on the
calendar, regardless of how many days it may
have." In this case, it means "the time from the
start of a certain numbered day until, but not
including, the corresponding numbered day of the
next month, or until and including the last day of
that month if there aren't enough days in the next
month." So, from December 31, 2007, one month
will be January 1, 2008, to January 31, 2008, and
from January 31, 2008, one month will be February
1, 2008, to February 29, 2008
Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
both talk about how to figure out appropriate
amounts of time. This law says that a year is the
same as 365 days, no matter if it is a normal year
or a leap year. However, the Administrative Code
of 1987 says that a year is made up of 12 regular
months. It goes without saying that the number of
days doesn't matter under the Administrative
Code of 1987. But being the more recent law,
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more
recent law and having impliedly repealed in its
repealing clause all laws inconsistent therewith,
controls the computation of legal periods. Lex post
factum derogat prima.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
DOCTRINE: Article 15
DOCTRINE: Article 15
Facts:Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a Filipino
citizen, and Richard Upton is an American citizen.
In 1972, they got married in Hong Kong. They split
up in Nevada, USA, in 1982. Alice Reyes Van Dorn
got married again in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn. In 1983, private respondent sued
petitioner in the RTC of Pasay City, saying that
petitioner Alice's business in Ermita, Manila, called
the Galleon Shop, was their shared property and
that private respondent should be given the power
to run the shared property.
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7,
1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived
together in Malate, Manila and had a child named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Unfortunately, after about
three and a half years of marriage such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce
proceedings against Imelda in Germany. He
claimed that there was a failure of their marriage
and that they had been living apart since April
1982.
The petitioner asked for the case to be thrown out
because the reason for the action was already
barred by an earlier judgment in the divorce case
in Nevada, where the respondent admitted that he
and petitioner did not share any property. The
lower court turned down the Motion to Dismiss
because the property in question is in the
Philippines, which means that the divorce decree
has nothing to do with the case. Petitioner claims
that respondent is barred from claiming the
supposed conjugal property as a result of his
representation in the divorce proceedings.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the
divorce is neither legitimate nor binding in this
jurisdiction because it violates local law and public
policy.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by
Alice and Richard in Nevada valid in the
Philippines?
Ruling: Richard Upton, the respondent, said that
the divorce decree only applies in the US and not
in the Philippines because absolute divorce is not
allowed. This makes it so that Alice is legally
divorced from Richard in the US but still married to
him in the Philippines. There is no way this could
happen because Alice would be treated badly in
her own country. The divorce order from Nevada
freed Richard from the marriage according to
American law, which says that divorce ends a
marriage. So, according to the law in his country,
Richard is no longer Alice's husband. As a result, he
couldn't sue in this case and say that he is still the
husband.
The SC held that the RTC's denial of the Motion to
Dismiss is overturned. Because of this, the
Supreme Court told RTC Pasay to throw out
Richard's case against Alice.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for
legal separation before a trial court in Manila on
January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the grounds
of failure of marriage of the spouses. Custody of
the child was granted to the petitioner. More than
five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while
still married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the
cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her
arraignment and to suspend further proceedings.
Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution
directing the dismissal of the complaints against
the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Geiling
can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband
and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
RULING: The law provides that in prosecution for
adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared
that the private respondent is the offended
spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus,
under the same consideration and rationale, the
private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029,
February 6, 2007
DOCTRINE: Article 15-16
FACTS: The case is about how to settle the estate
of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who used to
be governor of the province of Laguna. Felicisimo
got married three times during his career. He
married Virginia Sulit for the first time on March
17, 1942. They had six children together: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, and Manuel. Virginia
died on August 11, 1963, before Felicisimo. After
five years, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin. They had a son named Tobias
together. On October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed for divorce in the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.). On December 14, 1973,
the court released a decree granting absolute
divorce and awarding child custody. Respondent
Felicidad San Luis, whose last name at the time
was Sagalongos, married Felicisimo on June 20,
1974, in front of Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister
of the United Presbyterian Church, at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, USA. They were
married and lived together for 18 years, until he
died on December 18, 1992. They did not have any
children together.
Respondent asked for letters of administration in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, but
petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, who is one of
Felicisimo's children from his first marriage, asked
for the case to be thrown out because it was filed
in the wrong court and didn't have a cause of
action. The people who said that the plea for
letters of administration should have been sent to
the Province of Laguna said that Felicisimo lived
there before he died. He also said that respondent
doesn't have the legal right to file the case because
she was only Felicisimo's mistress and Felicisimo
was still married to Merry Lee at the time of his
death. In the end, Rodolfo's brothers joined the
action. Reconsiderations were made after the
motions to dismiss were turned down.
At the time of his death, the trial court said that
Felicisimo was fully voted as governor and lived in
the Province of Laguna. So, the petition should not
have been made in Makati City but in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. The court also said that respondent did
not have the legal right to file the case for letters
of administration because her marriage to
Felicisimo was not legal from the start because she
was married to someone else. Because Felicisimo
was a Filipino citizen, the court decision that
ended his marriage to Merry Lee was not legal in
the Philippines and did not bind him. It also said
that line 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be applied to the past because it would hurt the
rights of Felicisimo's real children. What the lower
court said was overturned and thrown out by the
Court of Appeals. Edgar and Rodolfo say that the
questionable location of the petition for letters of
administration was set in the wrong place and that
the respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was
invalid and immoral.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code.
2.
Whether San Luis has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
1.
YES. In resolving this issue, the Court need
not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
them to rule in the affirmative.
Art. 26 of Civil Code provides: All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. Paragraph 2 of Article 26
traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse
is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As
such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
2.
YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was
not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, the Court found that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-­owner of Felicisimo as regards
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
the properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation. In the
instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce
and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-­owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-­ownership.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the
validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
Therefore, Felicidad’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-­owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
This Article stresses:
●
●
●
Acting with justice
The giving to everyone his due
The observance of honesty and good
faith
EXAMPLE:
An attorney who deliberately neglects the trial of his
cases, fails in his duty to prepare for trial with
diligence and deliberate speed. And should he
present frivolous and dilatory appeal to appellate
courts , TREBLE COSTS may be assessed against his
client, said costs to be PAID by the ATTORNEY.
NOTE: While it is true that a person who is
aggrieved may have recourse against the person or
entity responsible, still if a person has not been
damaged in any way by another’s act, the former
has no cause of action against the latter.
a. Acting with Justice and Giving Another His
Due.
This is elaborated in the following articles:
CHAPTER 2: HUMAN RELATIONS (ART. 19-36)
●
-
-
A chapter on Human Relations was
formulated to present some basic principles
that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and the
stability of the social order.
The lawmaker makes it imperative that
everyone duly respect the rights of others.
NOTE: The new provisions in this Chapter can be
given retroactive effect. These articles have been
applied to condemn the defendant to pay damages
even though the acts, basis of the action, took place
before the Civil Code became effective on Aug. 30,
1950.
Article 20 - indemnification of another due
to illegal acts
● Article 21 - indemnification due to immoral
acts
● Article 24 - unfair competition
● Article 22 - unjust enrichment
b. Observance of Honesty and Good Faith
Honesty - careful regard for other’s rights
and property.
Good faith - honest intention to avoid taking
undue advantage of another.
This is elaborated in the following articles:
●
●
●
Article 26 - respect for the
personality and dignity of others
Article 25 - restraint of undue
extravagance.
Article 31- independent civil actions.
The elements of abuse of right are the following:
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
●
●
●
the existence of a legal right or duty
which is exercised in bad faith
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
NOTES FROM CLASS
●
●
●
Article 19 talks about exercises of rights
(being regulated)
passive subject is liable, active subject
exercises the right
Article 19 does not state the consequence;
they are found in Article 20 and 21
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
NOTE: Acts not in violation of law but on good moral,
custom, and public policy (e.g. violation of the right
to choose whether to marry or not).
●
Article 21 was intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide in the statues.
Article 21 distinguished from Article 20
●
In Art. 21 - the act is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy.
in Art. 20 - the act is contrary to law.
NOTE: Article 20 is used if a law does not provide a
specific consequence.
Willful or Negligent Acts
●
The article punishes illegal acts whether
done wilfully or negligently.
●
In Art. 21 - the act is done wilfully; “wilful
may mean not merely voluntary but with a
bad purpose.
in Art. 20 - the act is done either wilfully or
negligently.
Torts - Article 20 introduces a broader concept of
torts in our country, for it embraces:
EXAMPLES:
●
●
The Spanish Tort 0 based on negligence
The American Tort - based on malice.
When no action for damages would prosper
●
If someone is damaged, he does not
necessarily have the right to be indemnified.
it is essential that some right of his be
impaired.
When Judiciary can interfere in decisions of
Religious Tribunals
●
●
CIvil Courts according to the Highest
Tribunal, have jurisdiction to inquire into the
jurisdiction of religious tribunals and the
regularity of their procedure; and may even
subject their decisions to the test of fairness
or to the test furnished by the Constitution
and laws of the Church.
However, civil courts cannot pass upon the
abandonment of faith by a member of the
church nor upon restatement of articles of
religion since these are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters, which are outside the
province of civil courts.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in manner that is contrary to
a. A student wilfully humiliates a professor,
causing her to have a nervous breakdown.
This would be contrary to good customs and
morals, and the professor can sue for
damages.
b. A seduces the 19-year-old daughter of X. A’s
promise of marriage either has not been
made or cannot be proved. the girl becomes
pregnant. Under Art. 21, she and her parents
would have the right to bring an action for
damages against A.
● Can there be an action for Breach of
Promise to Marry?
- For the recovery of actual
damages, yes.
- Thus, if a teacher resigns
from her position because
of a man’s promise to marry
her, she can recover
indemnity for damages if
later on the promise wasn’t
fulfilled.
- HOWEVER, the supreme
court held that MORAL
damages
cannot
be
recovered for a breach of
promise to marry unless
there was seduction.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
QUERY: in an action based on a breach of promise to
marry, what rights may the aggrieved party in cases:
a. when there has been carnal knowledge
- ask the other party to recognize the
child, should there be one, and give
support to said child.
- sue for moral damages, if there be
criminal or moral seduction, but not
if the intercourse was due to mutual
lust.
- sue for actual damages, should
there be any, such as the expenses
for the wedding preparations
b. when there has been no carnal knowledge
- there may be an action for moral
and actual damages under certain
conditions, as when there has been
deliberate desire to inflict injury or
loss, or when there has been an
evident abuse of right.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
Duty to return what was acquired unjustly or
illegally.
●
●
Nemo cum alterius detrimento protest
- No person shall enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of another.
Nemo ex alterius incommode debet
lecupletari
- No man ought to be made rich out of
another’s injury.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing
damage to another's property was not due to the
fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or
event he was benefited.
Notes from class:
-
-
Duty to indemnify because of benefit received
●
Unless there is a duty to indemnify, unjust
enrichment will occur.
EXAMPLE: Without A’s knowledge, a flood drives his
cattle to the cultivated highland of B. A’s cattle are
saved, but B’s crops are destroyed. True, A was not
at fault, but he was benefitted. It is but right and
equitable that he should indemnify B.
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age
or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
his protection.
Notes from class:
-
Essential requisites of an "Accion in Rem Verso”
a. One party must be enriched and the other
made poorer
b. There must be a casual relation between the
two
c. The enrichment must not be justifiable (so if
the law itself allows the enrichment, or if the
enrichment results from a contract or from
the impoverished person’s own negligence,
there can be no recovery).
d. There must be no other way to recover (so if,
for example,a tort action or a quasi-contract
action is proper, it is not necessary to file a
claim in rem verso).
e. The indemnity cannot exceed the loss or
enrichment, whichever is less.
Act or omission resulting in a destruction to
a property or another or injury to another.
There is obligation because of an advantage
that benefitted a party resulting in an injury
of another.
Basis: rule against unjust enrichment.
The courts must be vigilant in making
decisions by making sure that the
disadvantaged person understands the
contract being entered into.
Reason for the Court’s protection of the underdog
●
●
●
The law takes great interest in the welfare of
the weak and the handicapped. Thus, we
have “parens patriae” which means “father
or parent of his country”.
The phrase refers to the sovereign power of
the state in safeguarding the rights of
persons under disability, such as the insane
and the incompetent.
The State as parens patriae is under the
obligation to minimize the risk to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable
to take care of themselves fully.
“Vigilant for His Protection”
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
●
●
The phrase in general means that in case of
doubt, the doubt must be in favor of the
underdog.
Contracts of Adhesion - where almost all
provisions of the contracts have been
drafted only by one party, usually the
corporation. The only participation of the
other party is the signing of his signature or
his “adhesion” thereto.
Inadmissibility of confessions obtained through
coercion
●
A confession obtained through coercion,
whether physical, mental, or emotional is
inadmissible. What is essential for a
confession’s validity is that it proceeds from
the free will of the person confessing.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
1. Prying into the privacy of another's
residence;
2. Meddling with or disturbing the private
life or family relations of another;
3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated
from his friends;
4. Vexing or humiliating another on account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.
Notes from class:
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses
for pleasure or display during a period of acute
public want or emergency may be stopped by
order of the courts at the instance of any
government or private charitable institution
Notes from class:
-
It
is
considered
a
“thoughtless
extravagance” considering the circumstance
it is in such as flood, drought, fire, etc.
Reason for curtailing thoughtless extravagance
●
Thoughtless
Extravagance
during
emergencies may incite the passions of
those who cannot afford to spend.
Who can bring the Action?
●
●
Only a charitable institution (whether
government or private) may bring the
action.
The City Mayor, should he desire to stop an
alleged display of extravagance by a social
organization, cannot summarily order the
stopping all by himself or take the law into
his own hands no matter how noble or
sincere his motive may be. He has to ask for
a court order.
1.
2.
3.
4.
The importance of Art. 26 is to respect the
privacy of their neighbor.
May maninilip sa bahay or eavesdropping
Posting/ Having a relationship with a
married man
“Marites” / Gossip with the intent to alienate
a person from his friends
“Kanchawan” = bullying
Duty to respect Dignity and Privacy
●
This article enhances human dignity and
personality. Social Equity is not sought, but
due regard for decency and propriety.
Remedies
a. An action for damages
b. An action for prevention
c. Any other relief
Note: A civil action may be instituted even if no crime
is involved, and moral damages may be obtained.
SCOPE
a. Prying into the privacy of another’s
residence
- includes by implication respect for
another’s name, picture, or
personality except insofar as is
needed
for
publication
or
information
and
picture
of
legitimate news value.
b. Meddling with or disturbing the private life
or family relations of another
- includes alienation of the affections
of the husband or the wife
- Thus, a girl who makes love to a
married man, even if there be no
carnal relations, disturbs his family
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
life, and damages may therefore be
asked of her.
- Intriguing against another’s honor
(gossiping) is also included
c. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated
from his friends.
- includes gossiping, and reliance on
hearsay
d. Vexing or humiliating
- includes criticism of one’s health or
features without justifiable legal
cause.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee refuses
or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken.
Refusal or Neglect in the performance of official
duty
●
●
the article refers to a public servant or
employee
its purpose is to end the “pabagsak” or
bribery system, where the public official for
some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the
performance of his duty until he gets some
kind of “pabagsak”
In a sense, it may be said that the are three
kinds of bribes:
1. the pabagsak - the gift given s that
an illegal thing may be dine
2. the pampadulas - the gift given to
facilitate or expedite the doing of a
legal thing.
3. the pampasalamat - the gift given in
appreciation of a thing already done.
Elements to be convicted
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. Who requested or received a gift, a present,
a share, a percentage, or a benefit;
c. On behalf of the offender or any other
person;
d. In connection with a contract or transaction
with the government
e. In which the public officer, in an official
capacity under the law, has the right to
intervene
Direct bribery
-
involves, inter alia, the act of a public officer
in accepting an offer or promises or receiving
a gift, by himself or another, with a view to
perform a crime or an unjust act to commit
an omission, which is connected to his
official duties.
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Reason for preventing unfair competition
●
●
●
●
The above provision is necessary in a system
of free enterprise.
democracy becomes a veritable mockery if
any person or group of persons by any unjust
or high-handed method may deprive others
of fair chance to engage in business or to
earn a living
This article is intended to lay down a general
principle outlawing unfair competition, both
among enterprises and among laborers.
Unfair competition must be expressly
denounced in this chapter because the same
tends to undermine free enterprise. While
competition is necessary in a free enterprise,
it must not be unfair.
SCOPE
The article speaks of unfair competition in:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Agricultural enterprises
Commercial enterprises
Industrial enterprises
Labor
Thus, the following acts, among others, are not
allowed:
a. A strike prematurely declared
b. A strike for trivial, unjust, or unreasonable
cause
c. A strike carried out through force,
intimidation, or other unlawful means.
d. A strike in order to circumvent valid
obligations entered into a collective
bargaining contract
e. Cutthroat competition (where one is ready
to lose is only to drive somebody else of of
business)
f. The making of any false statement in the
course of trade to discredit the goods,
business, or services or another.
g. The making of goods so as to deceive
purchasers (NOTE: there can be unfair
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
competition even if
the competing
trademark is registered)
h. Selling goods above the maximum prices set
by the Senate
Test of Unfair Competition
-
The test of unfair competition is whether
certain goods have been intentionally
clothed with an appearance which is likely to
deceive the ordinary purchasers exercising
ordinary care.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act
or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages
in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
Note: An acquittal on the ground that the guilt if the
defendant “has not been satisfactorily establishedL
is equivalent to one on reasonable doubt, and does
not preclude or prevent a civil suit under Art. 29. The
same article does not speak on an independent civil
action.
Criminal and Civil Liabilities
●
Under Art. 100 of the RPC, a person
criminally liable is also civilly liable
Criminal
Civil
affects social order
affects
rights
private
punishment
or reparation
of
correction of the damages suffered
offender
by the aggrieved
party.
●
Criminal liability is harder to prove than civil
liability because the former demands proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the other,
mere preponderance of evidence,
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought
to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of
●
This article does not
independent civil action.
speak
of
an
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
Meaning of “Independent Civil Action”
●
●
An independent civil action is one that is
brought distinctly and separately from a
criminal case allowed for considerations of
public policy, because the proof needed for
civil cases is LESS than that required from
criminal cases
It should be noted that the bringing of the
independent civil action is PERMISSIVE, not
compulsory.
SCOPE
●
Article 31 contemplates a case where the
obligation does not arise from a crime, but
from some other act – like a contract or a
legal duty.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
●
Thus, even if the accused is acquitted
because of the crime, he is released only
from criminal responsibility, not civil liability.
Reason for Article 29
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
(6) The right against deprivation of property
without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the
same;
(11) The privacy
correspondence;
of
communication
and
The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code
or other penal statute.
Implementation of Constitution Civil Liberties
●
Additional Rights
●
(12) The right to become a member of associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly
to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary
servitude in any form;
●
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and
unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed
or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has
not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party
has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the
latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
In addition to the Bill of RIghts provisions,
Art.32 refers to:
a. Freedom of Suffrage
b. Freedom from being forced
(coerced) to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a state witness.
Scope:
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
The
civil liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution need implementation, hence
the necessity for Art. 32
It should be noted that the following can be
made liable:
a. Any public officer or employee
b. Any private individual even if he be
in good faith; the precise purpose of
the Article is to eliminate the
defense of good faith, otherwise the
main reason for this Article would be
lost.
Remedies
●
●
This article allows an independent civil
action, whether or not a crime has been
committed, with indemnification for moral
and exemplary damages in addition to other
damages.
In the case of exemplary damages, award
thereof is discretionary with the Court.
Reason for the creation of an independent civil
action under article 32
a. Sometimes the fiscal (prosecutor) is afraid to
prosecute fellow public officials, and the
citizens may be left without redress
b. Even when the fiscal (prosecutor) files a
criminal case, still said case requires proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a
requirement much harder to comply with
than mere preponderance of evidence.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
c. There are many unconstitutional acts which
are not yet made crimes. The remedy for this
is clearly a civil action.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Independent civil action for the liability of city or
municipal police force
a. Primary liability is assessed against the
member of the police force who refuses or
fails to render aid or protection
b. Subsidiary liability is imposed on the city or
municipality concerned in case of insolvency.
Notes:
Notes from class:
●
●
In short, these are exceptions of Article 29
An independent civil action can be filed
when a criminal action or procedure has not
yet been completed
Independent Civil Action for defamation, defraud,
and physical injuries
●
Article 3 speaks of:
a. Defamation (or libel or slander or
intrigue against honor)
b. Fraud (or estafa or swindling)
c. Physical
injuries
including
consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide.
New Concept of Tort
●
By virtue of this article, torts in the
Philippines are now of two kinds, namely:
a. The American concept of tort (which
is done maliciously or intentionally).
b. The Spanish Concept of tort (culpa
aquilana or quasi-delict, which is
based on negligence).
For whose benefit, restrictions
●
Article 33 of the Civil Code is more for the
benefit of claimant or victim than anybody
else. Nevertheless, if he files a civil case
under Art. 33, the victim can no longer
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal
case.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life
or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of
any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.
a.
By virtue of this article, the city or municipal
government concerned can be sued for its
subsidiary liability. Incidentally, this article
does not grant to the government the
defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the policemen.
b. This article does not apply to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Force and to the
NAtional Government as it only speaks
merely of a city or municipal police force.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured
by a criminal offense, charges another with the
same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the
justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime has been committed, or the
prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute
criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a
civil action for damages against the alleged
offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's
motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal
proceedings.
-
This article applies to cases when there is no
independent civil action such as when
liability sought to be recovered arises from a
crime); and not to a tortious action such as
that provided for under Art. 33
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be
decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by
rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with
the provisions of this Code.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
“Prejudicial Question”
a. Definition
● One which must be decided first
before a criminal action may be
instituted or may proceed because a
decision therein is vital to be the
judgement in the criminal case.
● Elements:
- The prejudicial question
must be determinative of
the case before the Court.
- Jurisdiction to try the
question must be lodged in
another tribunal
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
. . ..
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 41;
Ongpin claimed that, after he married Mercado,
he found that Mantaring was still a Filipino citizen
when she obtained the divorce decree, and as
such, his marriage to her was still valid and
subsisting at the time of his second marriage. On
the other hand, Mercado argued that their
marriage was valid under Article 26 of the Family
Code and not prohibited by Article 35(4), because
she was a United States citizen at the time.
Requisites
1. The civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution
would be based
2. In the Resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil actions, the
guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
3. Jurisdiction to try, said question
must be lodged in another tribunal.
CASE DIGEST: Mercado v. Ongpin, G.R. 207324,
September 30, 2020
PETITIONER: MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO
RESPONDENT: RENE V. ONGPIN
DOCTRINE RELATED TO SUBJECT: Article 19
To sustain an action for damages based on Article
19 of the Civil Code, malice or bad faith must be
proved. Bad faith involves a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity and requires a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act. The
person claiming moral damages must prove the
existence of bad faith by clear and convincing
evidence.
FACTS:
On February 5, 1972, Ongpin married Alma D.
Mantaring (Mantaring) in Quezon City. Later,
Mantaring obtained a divorce decree from the
District Court of Clark County, Nevada, United
States of America. Believing he was divorced from
Mantaring, Ongpin married Mercado in
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America.
Years later, the two separated.
Ongpin subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his marriage to
Mantaring, which was then followed by his filing
of a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Mercado before the Bacoor, Cavite
Regional Trial Court. The petition was based on
ISSUE: whether or not Mary Elizabeth Mercado is
entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
HELD: No, Mary Elizabeth Mercado is not entitled
to moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.
Petitioner has not been able to prove that, at the
time she and respondent married, respondent
knew that his divorce from his first spouse was
invalid. There is no proof that, upon the first
spouse's confirmation of her Philippine
citizenship at the time she obtained the divorce
decree, respondent concealed this knowledge
from petitioner or allowed her to continue
believing that their marriage was valid. The
malice or bad faith necessary to sustain an action
based on Article 19 of the Civil Code has not been
shown in this case.
Moreover, petitioner has not established that she
has sustained an injury in law due to respondent's
acts.
A review of the records shows that petitioner had
known that there was some sort of anomaly in
the dissolution of respondent's first marriage as
early as 1992.
Petitioner does not dispute any of these findings
made by the trial court.67 She knew, or should
have known, that there existed some issue
regarding respondent's first marriage which
might adversely affect the validity of her marriage
to him. Yet, she did not initiate any actions of her
own to protect her civil status, and appeared
complacent with the uncertainty that hovered
over the validity of her marriage with respondent.
Therefore, the court ruled that petitioner
Mercado has no entitlement to moral damages as
well as be awarded of exemplary damages.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
CASE DIGEST: Uypitching vs. Quiamco, G.R. No.
146322, December 6, 2006
PETITIONER: ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and
RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC.
RESPONDENT: ERNESTO QUIAMCO
DOCTRINE RELATE TO SUBJECT:
ART. 19 - Every person must in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give every one his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached
by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to amicably
settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for
robbery filed by Quiamco against them. The
motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to
Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons,
Inc., a family-­owned corporation managed by
petitioner. To secure its payment, the motorcycle
was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.When
Gabutero could no longer pay the installments,
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued
the payments. However, Davalan stopped paying
the remaining installments and told petitioner
corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had
allegedly been “taken by respondent’s men.”
Thereafter, the petitioner was accompanied by
policemen to recover the motorcycle. The leader
of the police team talked to the clerk in charge
and asked for a respondent. While the police
team leader and the clerk were talking, the
petitioner paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering “Quiamco is a thief of a
motorcycle.”
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and/or violation of the Anti-­Fencing Law
against respondent. Respondent moved for
dismissal because the complaint did not charge
an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought
the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint. Respondent filed an
action for damages against petitioners. He sought
to hold the petitioners liable for acts that
humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and
injured his reputation and integrity.
The RTC ruled that petitioner was motivated with
malice and ill will when he called respondent a
thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner
and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft
and/or violation of the Anti-­Fencing Law.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ acts violated the law
as well as public morals, and transgressed the
proper norms of human relations
RULING:
Yes, petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as
public morals, and transgressed the proper norms
of human relations
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through
its co-­petitioner Uypitching, blatantly
disregarded the lawful procedure for the
enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
respondent. The basic principle of human
relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give every one his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the “principle of abuse
of right,” prescribes that a person should not use
his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good
faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It
seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to
use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust
ends. There is an abuse of right when it is
exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance
with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh;; there
must be no intention to harm another.
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach.
Petitioners themselves in fact described their
action as a “precipitate act.” Petitioners were
bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this
connection, we quote with approval the following
findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:
There was malice or ill-­will in filing the complain
because petitioner Atty. Uypitching knew or
ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there
was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity
against respondent. Petitioner had no personal
knowledge that respondent stole the motorcycle
in question. He was merely told by his bill
collector that Dabalan will no longer pay the
remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle
because the motorcycle was taken by the men of
respondent. The absence of probable cause
necessarily signifies the presence of malice
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle
was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement,
petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and
injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint
could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right
to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
totality of petitioners’ actions showed a
calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in
an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully
caused damage to respondent. Hence, they
should indemnify him.
WASSMER V. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
FACTS:
On the 23rd of August 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and
Francisco Velez applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends, and acquaintances The bride-tobe’s trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for
the important occasion were purchased. Dresses
for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given, and gifts
received. And then, two days before the wedding,
the defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply
left a note for the plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone the wedding — My mother opposes it . .
." He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and
the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
the plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
Wassmer sued Velez for damages, and he failed to
answer and was declared in default. On April 29,
1955, judgment was rendered ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the
costs.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend
the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held
civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such
an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against
him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Francisco be held liable to pay
Beatriz damages for breach of promise to marry.
RULING:
Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21
of the Civil Code, which provides: "Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21. The
circumstances of this case show that Velez, in
breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in
wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this
warrants the imposition of exemplary damages
against him.
CASE NOTE:
1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY;
WHEN ACTIONABLE WRONG.
Ø Ordinarily, a mere breach of
promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally
set a wedding and go through all
the necessary preparations and
publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs, for
which the erring promisor must be
held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 of the
New Civil Code.
2. MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
MAY BE AWARDED IN AN ACTIONABLE
BREACH OF PROMISE SUIT.
Ø When a breach of promise to
marry is actionable under Article
21 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be awarded under
Article 2219 (10) of the said Code.
Exemplary damages may also be
awarded under Article 2232 of
said Code where it is proven that
the defendant clearly acted in a
wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
3. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; AFFIDAVIT
OF MERITS IN PETITION FOR BELIEF MUST
STATE FACTS CONSTITUTING DEFENSE. —
Ø
An affidavit of merits
supporting a petition for relief
from judgment must state facts
constituting a valid defense.
Where such an affidavit merely
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
states conclusions or opinions, it is
not valid.
4. TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER; CLERK OF COURT
MAY BE VALIDLY DESIGNATED.
Ø The procedure of designating
the clerk of court as commissioner
to receive evidence is sanctioned
by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the
Rules of Court.
5.
DEFENDANT’S
CONSENT
TO
DESIGNATION OF COMMISSIONER NOT
NECESSARY WHERE HE IS IN DEFAULT.
Ø The defendant’s consent to the
designation of the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence
is not necessary where he was
declared in default and thus had
no standing in court.
6. AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT; MUST CONTAIN FACTS
AND NOT CONCLUSIONS OF FACT.
Ø Affidavits of merit to be valid
must contain facts and not mere
conclusions of facts.
7. WHEN CONCLUSION OF FACT, NOT A FACT,
DEEMED CONTAINED IN AFFIDAVIT.
Ø An affidavit of merit stating no
facts, but merely an inference that
defendant’s failure was due to
fortuitous
events
and/or
circumstances beyond his control,
is held to contain a conclusion of
fact, not a fact.
to break up with him after he had done so. The
breakup prompted Banach to sue Guevarra and
her parents for damages before the Regional Trial
Court. Banach anchored his cause of action on the
human relations provisions in the Civil Code,
particularly Articles 20, 21, and 22. He alleged that
Guevarra had repeatedly expressed her love and
willingness to marry him so that he would send her
money, only to break up with him after he had
done so. He claimed that these acts amounted to
fraud, or at the very least, unjust enrichment.
Banach likewise claimed moral damages for the
alleged "moral suffering, anguish, anxiety, and
sleepless nights" he suffered from Guevarra. He
also prayed for attorney's fees for having been
constrained to litigate to protect his rights.
On the other hand, Guevarra called off the
engagement after she had discovered Banach’s
actions were tainted with fraud and deceit; he did
not have the purest intentions in marrying her. He
lied about his marital status as he told her that he
was a divorced man even if he was still married to
his third wife. Banach even hid his true name from
Guevarra. Finding out that one’s betrothed is still
married to another person, and that he is not who
he says he is, are reasons enough to justify the
wedding’s cancellation. Guevarra also argued that
the money Banach sent her "was a gift, the return
of which was not actionable”.
The Regional Trial Court found Guevarra and her
parents liable to Banach for actual damages. It also
awarded moral damages and attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its January 29,
2007, Decision, similarly ordered Guevarra and her
parents to return the P500,000.00 to Banach
under the principle of unjust enrichment.
However, it deleted the awards of moral damages
and attorney's fees, ruling that Banach's actions
were tainted with fraud and deceit, and that he did
not have the purest intentions in expressing his
desire to marry Guevarra. Hence this present
petition
ISSUE:
Guevarra, et al., v. Banach
G.R. No, 214016, November 24, 2021
A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong, as long as it is not of such
extent as would palpably and unjustifiably
contradict good customs. In any case, the party
seeking to recover damages must have acted in
good faith.
FACTS:
Banach, a German, alleged that Guevarra had
repeatedly expressed her love and willingness to
marry him so that he would send her money, only
Whether or not the order to return the
P500,000.00 is proper upon the breach of the
promise marriage.
RULING:
NO. Under our laws, a breach of promise to marry
is not actionable. as long as it is not of such extent
as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict
good customs. In any case, the party seeking to
recover damages must have acted in good faith.
This case is different. Here, petitioner called off
the engagement after she had discovered
respondent's lies and deception. He lied about his
marital status, and even hid his true name from
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
petitioner. These acts suffice to justify the
wedding's cancellation. Finding out that one's
betrothed is still married to another person, and
that they are not who they say they are, are
reasons enough to conclude bad faith.
Since respondent himself did not act in good faith,
he cannot claim damages under the New Civil
Code. The unjust enrichment principle under
Article 2250 only applies if the property is acquired
without legal grounds. Here, respondent gave
petitioner P500,000.00 as a gift to help her and her
family with their possible eviction from their
home. The money being a gift, petitioner is correct
to say that she cannot be compelled to return the
P500,000.00 given to her.
went to a corner to eat and requested him to
leave, but when she turned around, Reyes began
making a big scene. Filart, on the other hand,
stated that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party and that it was Reyes who volunteered to
carry the basket as he was also going to take the
elevator, but he was going to a different floor.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA
reversed the same. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to the doctrine
of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made
liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave for being a gate­crasher.
ISSUE:
An individual has the autonomy to choose whom
to marry, or whether to marry at all. Marriage is a
social institution that creates a permanent bond
between individuals, and the law grants them
rights and obligations unique to married couples.
The choice of whether to marry-and necessarily,
whom to marry-is a personal decision that a
person makes for themself. This individual choice
must be made, as much as possible, completely
free from any external pressures. After all,
marriage can and will change a person's life.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Roberto Reyes (AKA Amay Bisaya), filed an action
for damages under Arts. 19 and 21 against
petitioners. He alleged that at around 6:00 in the
evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having
coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted
by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs. Filart invited
him to join her in a birthday party of the hotel’s
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she
will vouch for him. He then carried Filart’s present
(basket of fruits) to the party. However, while
lining up at the buffet table, Reyes was stopped by
Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko) and
in a loud voice, was told to leave the party. Filart
was within hearing distance but completely
ignored him when he said that he was invited by
Filart. Thereafter, he was escorted out by a Makati
policeman.
Ms. Lim said that she approached the captain
waiter, Dr. Filart’s sister (Ms. Fruto), and Capt.
Batung regarding his presence, and requested
Fruto & Batung to tell Reyes to leave. Because he
still lingered, she then approached Reyes when he
WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto
Reyes to leave the party.
RULING:
NO. We find more credible the lower court's
findings of fact. We are dealing with a formal party
in a posh, five-­star hotel, for-­invitation-­only,
thrown for the hotel’s former Manager. To
unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr.
Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s
ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to
invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s
personnel. In the absence of any proof of motive
on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and
expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly
unlikely that she would shout at him from a very
close distance.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to
plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave
the party was made such that they nearly kissed
each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention
on her part to cause embarrassment to him.
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s
version of the story is that it is unsupported.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not
a panacea for all human hurts and social
grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. hen Article 19 is violated,
an action for damages is proper under Articles 20
or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a violation of law which does
not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and
has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals,
good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3)
it is done with intent to injure.
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed,
Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven
by animosity against him. These two people did
not know each other personally before the
evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had
nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s
alleged abusive conduct except the statement that
Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a very
strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes)
possibly influenced by her associates in her work
at the hotel with foreign businessmen. The
lameness of this argument need not be belabored.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim
asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable
and humane under the circumstances. Not being
liable for both actual and moral damages, neither
can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Private respondent is a 22-year-old Filipino citizen
residing in Dagupan City. Petitioner is an Iranian
medical exchange student at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Petitioner
allegedly courted and proposed to marry her.
Thereafter, private respondent began living with
him. She allegedly was a virgin before such
arrangement.
A week before the filing of private respondent’s
complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her
started to change; he maltreated and threatened
to kill her. As a result, she sustained injuries.
Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement
and asked not to live with her anymore.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting
her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable. Petitioner denied the claims of
private respondent. Accordingly, he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with
the private respondent nor he forced her to live
with him.
The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
Code, rendered a decision favoring the private
respondent. The CA affirmed in toto the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is
actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However,
where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention
of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award
of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy.
Petitioner’s profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile, and deceive the poor
woman into believing that indeed, he loved her
and would want her to be his life’s partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by
a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting
his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of
morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even
be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of
the Civil Code which directs every person to act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.
Pe vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA
176 SCRA 778
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of
one Lolita Pe, who is 24 years old and unmarried.
Defendant, Alfonso Pe, on the other hand, is a
married man. Because of the similarity in their
family name, defendant became close to the
plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their
family. Defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in
love with each other and conducted clandestine
love affairs. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents,
defendant was forbidden from going to their
house and even from seeing Lolita. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita
until she disappeared from the parental home.
Plaintiffs then brought an action to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective
damages. They based their action on Article 21 of
the New Civil Code, which provides that “Any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner which is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.” Defendant set up as a
defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true,
do not constitute a valid cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant commit injury to
Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
RULING:
YES. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the Civil
Code. The wrong caused by Alfonso is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man.
The defendant took advantage of the trust of the
plaintiffs and even used the praying of rosary as a
reason to get close with Lolita. The defendant tried
to win Lolita’s affection through an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced Lolita to the extent of
making her fall in love with him. No other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events
than that the defendant not only deliberately, but
through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning
the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her.
FACTS:
Private respondent Tobias was an employee of
petitioner GLOBE MACKAY as its purchasing agent
and administrative assistant. Anomalies in the
petitioner’s company were later allegedly
discovered by Tobias regarding fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions.
Hendry, Executive Vice-­President and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY, confronted Tobias
stating the latter as the number one suspect and
ordered a one week forced leave.
When Tobias reported for work after the forced
leave, petitioner Hendry called him a “crook” and
a “swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie­detector test and the specimen of his
handwriting, signature, and initials for
examination by the police investigators to
determine his complicity in the anomalies. The
police investigators, however, cleared private
respondent from the said anomalies. Later,
petitioners filed criminal complaints for estafa
which were all dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias was
also terminated by petitioners from his
employment.
Tobias sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that
Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to
dishonesty. Eventually, private respondent Tobias
filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts
of petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages
to private respondent under the Civil Code.
RULING:
YES. Petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Art. 19 of the Civil Code commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due;; and to observe honesty and good faith.
The Court said that when a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Thus, generally, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper
In the present case, petitioner Hendry showed
belligerence and told the private respondent that
he was the number one suspect and to take a 1week vacation leave, not to communicate with the
office, and to leave his keys to said defendant
(petitioner Hendry). Moreover, the imputation of
guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19
of the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioners were ordered to pay actual,
moral, and exemplary damages to private
respondent.
CASE DIGEST: University of the East V. Jader
G.R NO# 132344
DATE: February 12, 2000
PETITIONERS: University of the East
RESPONDENTS: Romeo A. Jader
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code states that every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith and every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
FACTS: Romeo Jader attended the University of the
East College of Law from 1984 to 1988. During the
first semester of his final year in the academic year
1987-1988, he did not take the regular final
examination for Practice Court I, resulting in an
incomplete grade. To address this, he re-enrolled as
a fourth-year law student for the second semester
and, on February 1, 1988, submitted an application
to have the incomplete grade removed, which Dean
Celedonio Tiongson approved after the required fee
was paid. Romeo eventually took the examination
on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor
Carlos Ortega assigned him a grade of five.
Meanwhile, the Dean and Faculty Members of the
College of Law convened to determine which fourthyear students were eligible for graduation. Romeo's
name appeared on the Tentative List of Candidates
for the Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree for the
Second Semester of 1987-1988. He attended the
investiture ceremonies at the F. Dela Cruz
Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, where he walked
onstage when his name was called. He was
accompanied by his mother and elder brother, who
assisted in draping him with the Hood, and his Tassel
was ceremoniously moved from left to right. Dean
Celedonio then presented him with a rolled white
sheet symbolizing the Law Diploma. Subsequently,
Romeo prepared for the bar examination. To do so,
he took an unpaid leave of absence from his job
from April 20, 1988, to September 30, 1988, and
enrolled in a pre-bar review class at Far Eastern
University. Upon discovering a deficiency, he
discontinued his review class and, unfortunately,
could not participate in the 1988 bar examinations.
As a result, he filed a lawsuit against University of
the East, alleging that the latter's negligence had
caused him moral shock, mental anguish, severe
anxiety, damage to his reputation, emotional
distress, and sleepless nights due to missing the
1988 bar examinations. He sought compensation for
moral and exemplary damages, lost income,
attorney's fees, and legal costs.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not University of the East be
held liable for damages for misleading a student into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the
case.
RULING: Yes, it may be held liable. University of the
East, in belatedly informing Mr. Jader of the result of
the removal examination, particularly at a time
when he had already commenced preparing for the
bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good
faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence
of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious.
Considering further, that the institution of learning
involved herein is a university which is engaged in
legal education, it should have practiced what it
inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 19. Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform
the students of their academic status and not wait
for the latter to inquire from the former. Petitioner
ought to have known that time was of the essence
in the performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance
that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar
exams since that is precisely the immediate concern
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. However, while petitioner was guilty of
negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages. At
the very least, it behooved on the respondent to
verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations.
CASE DIGEST: Tenchavez V. Escano
G.R NO# L-19671
DATE: November 29, 1965
PETITIONERS: PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ
RESPONDENTS: VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL.
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 17 of the Civil
Code: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
FACTS: Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32
years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises
Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said
city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil
register.The planned elopement following their
marriage fell through when Vicenta returned to her
classes, and her mother, who learned of the
intended nuptials, was waiting for her at the college.
Vicenta admitted her marriage to Pastor, which
surprised and disgusted her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, due to the scandal it would cause. The
next day, the Escaño couple sought advice from
Father Reynes, who suggested a re-celebration to
validate what he saw as an invalid Church marriage.
However, this re-celebration never occurred. On
February 26, 1948, Mamerto Escaño received a
letter allegedly from San Carlos college students,
revealing a romantic relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel. Vicenta translated the
letter to her father, leading her to reject a new
marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day at Mrs.
Pilar Mendezona's house. Vicenta continued living
with her parents, while Pastor returned to work in
Manila. In June 1948, the newlyweds' relationship
had already deteriorated. Vicenta had fled to
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape the scandal
caused by her marriage in Cebu society. During this
time, a lawyer filed a marriage annulment petition
on her behalf, which had been drafted by thenSenator Emmanuel Pelaez. However, Vicenta never
signed this petition, and the case was ultimately
dismissed without prejudice due to her absence at
the hearing. On June 24, 1950, without informing
her husband, Vicenta applied for a passport,
indicating that she was single, planning to study, and
domiciled in Cebu City. She also stated her intention
to return after two years. This passport application
was approved, and she left for the United States. On
August 22, 1950, Vicenta filed a verified divorce
complaint against her husband in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada, citing "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character" as the grounds.
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce,
considered "final and absolute," was issued in open
court by the Nevada court. In 1951, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño submitted a petition to the Archbishop
of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor.
On September 10, 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation for her marriage. On September 13,
1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo
Moran, in Nevada. She currently resides with him in
California, and they have children together. Vicenta
acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and
her parents, alleging that they discouraged Vicenta
from reuniting with her husband.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the divorce pursued by
Escano holds legal validity and is enforceable in
Philippine courts.
RULING: No, it does not. The Civil Code of the
Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does
not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce
on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of
the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation
(Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1). For
the Philippine courts to recognize and give
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens could be a patent
violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17
of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant
Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy
of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a nonresident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where
the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Phil. 579). From the preceding facts and
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not
entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous
union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be
existent and undissolved.
CASE DIGEST: St. Louis Realty V. CA
G.R NO# L-46061
DATE: November 14, 1984
PETITIONERS: ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO
J. ARAMIL
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 26 of the Civil
Code: "every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons".
FACTS: St. Louis Realty, with the consent of Arcadio
S. Arcadio (but without the approval of Doctor
Aramil), had an advertisement published in the
Sunday Times issue dated December 15, 1968,
under the title "WHERE THE HEART IS." The ad
featured a photograph of Doctor Aramil's residence
with the Arcadio family, accompanied by text that
praised Brookside Hills as their new home. This
same advertisement reappeared in the Sunday
Times issue of January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil, a
neuropsychiatrist and a faculty member at U.E.
Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the
error and promptly sent a letter to St. Louis Realty
on the same day. The letter was received by Ernesto
Magtoto, an officer at St. Louis Realty responsible
for advertising, who immediately halted the
advertisement's publication. Magtoto also reached
out to Doctor Aramil to apologize for the mistake.
However, no correction or apology was issued
publicly. On February 20, 1969, Doctor Aramil's
attorney demanded P110,000 in actual, moral, and
exemplary damages from St. Louis Realty. In their
response dated March 10, St. Louis Realty asserted
that the error was an honest mistake and offered to
publish a rectification in the Manila Times if Doctor
Aramil wished. In the Manila Times issue of March
18, 1969, St. Louis Realty published a new
advertisement featuring the Arcadio family and their
actual house. However, no public apology to Doctor
Aramil or an explanation of the mistake was
included. On March 29, Doctor Aramil filed his
complaint for damages. Subsequently, in the Manila
Times issue of April 15, 1969, St. Louis Realty issued
a "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a small 4 by 3-inch
space.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the case at bar has a
violation in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code.
RULING: Yes, there is. St. Louis Realty's employee
was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication
like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never
made any written apology and explanation of the
mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ". Persons, who know the residence of
Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted,
lingering impression that he was renting his
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it
from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution
of income and mental anguish.
CASE DIGEST: Gregorio V. CA
G.R NO# 179799
DATE: September 11, 2009
PETITIONERS: ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO
PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUIN
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 26 of the Civil
Code: "every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons".
FACTS: The case originated from the submission of
an Affidavit of Complaint filed by Emma J. Datuin,
who acted as the Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts
Receivables Department, authorized by Sansio
Philippines, Inc. (Sansio). This complaint accused
Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and Vito Belarmino,
proprietors of Alvi Marketing, of violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22, commonly known as
the Bouncing Checks Law. The allegation was that
Alvi Marketing had issued insufficiently funded bank
checks as payment for numerous appliances
purchased from Sansio. Due to an incorrect address
provided in the complaint, Gregorio was unable to
refute the charges against her. Consequently, she
faced three counts of violating B.P. Blg. 22, under
Criminal Case Nos. 236544, 236545, and 236546,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
3, Manila. On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a
damages complaint against Sansio and Datuin in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay.
Sansio and Datuin responded by filing a Motion to
Dismiss, contending that the complaint, which
stemmed from alleged malicious prosecution, did
not sufficiently state a valid legal claim. Gregorio
opposed this motion, and the legal parties
exchanged further arguments. On October 10, 2000,
the RTC issued an order rejecting the Motion to
Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but this was also denied by the RTC
in an order dated January 5, 2001. Subsequently,
Sansio and Datuin took the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari,
invoking Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They alleged
that the presiding judge of the RTC had gravely
abused his discretion in refusing their motions to
dismiss and reconsider. Following the unfavorable
decision issued on March 20, 2003, Sansio and
Datuin appealed to the CA, and this appeal remains
pending. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a
Decision in the certiorari case, granting the petition
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
and directing the dismissal of Gregorio's damage
suit. Gregorio sought reconsideration of this
Decision, but the CA denied it in a Resolution dated
September 12, 2007. Consequently, this petition has
been filed.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not Gregorio's damages
lawsuit is grounded in quasi-delict.
RULING: Yes, it is on the grounds of quasi-delict.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an
action is determined by the material averments in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Gregorio's civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a
complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176,
in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than
on malicious prosecution. In every tort case filed
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has
to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence
of the defendant or some other person to whose act
he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no pre
existing contractual relation between the parties. On
the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a
cause of action for damages, prevention, and other
relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily
constituting a criminal offense, of the following
rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to
personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4)
right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and
(6) right to peace of mind. It appears that Gregorio’s
rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy,
and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and
Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in determining the identity of the person
they should be rightfully accused of tendering
insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the
correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of
the opportunity to contest the charges, because she
was not given proper notice.
CASE DIGEST: Pulido V. People
G.R NO# 220149
DATE: July 27, 2021
PETITIONERS: LUISITO G. PULIDO
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): The Court held that
a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not
necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and
subsequent marriages in a bigamy case.
Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of the first and/or second marriages
presented by the accused in the prosecution for
bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time
within which they are secured.
FACTS: Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda (referred to as
Baleda) faced charges of bigamy before the RTC. The
petitioner, Pulido, entered a plea of not guilty to the
alleged crime. Subsequently, a trial on the merits
took place. According to the records, on September
5, 1983, Pulido, who was then 16 years old, married
Nora S. Arcon (Arcon), his teacher, who was 22 years
old at the time. They had a civil ceremony at the
Rosario Municipal Hall in Cavite, officiated by Mayor
Calixto D. Enriquez. The couple had a child together
in 1984 and lived as husband and wife until 2007
when Pulido ceased returning home. When
confronted by Arcon, Pulido admitted to an affair
with Baleda. Arcon also discovered that Pulido and
Baleda had entered into another marriage on July
31, 1995, solemnized by Reverend Conrado P.
Ramos. The Marriage Certificate listed Pulido as
single. Hurt by this betrayal, Arcon filed bigamy
charges against Pulido and Baleda on December 4,
2007. In his defense, Pulido argued that he could not
be criminally liable for bigamy because both of his
marriages were null and void. He contended that his
marriage to Arcon in 1983 was null and void due to
the absence of a valid marriage license, while his
marriage to Baleda was null and void because no
marriage ceremony had taken place. Baleda claimed
that she only learned about Pulido's previous
marriage to Arcon in April 2007. She alleged that
even before the bigamy case was filed, she had
initiated a Petition to Annul her marriage to Pulido
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, documented as Civil
Case No. 1586-07. In a decision dated October 25,
2007, the RTC declared her marriage with Pulido null
and void due to its bigamous nature. This ruling
became final, as no appeal was filed against it.
ISSUE/S: 1.) Whether or Not Article 40 of the Family
Code have retroactive application? 2.) Whether or
Not judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void ab
initio marriage in a bigamy prosecution?
RULING: 1.) Yes, Article 40 of the Family Code
applies retroactively on marriages celebrated before
the Family Code in so far as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights. Thus, a judicial
declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages
contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code,
but only for purposes of remarriage. In this case,
Pulido's marriage with Arcon was celebrated when
the Civil Code was in effect while his subsequent
marriage with Baleda was contracted during the
effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, Pulido is
required to obtain a judicial decree of absolute
nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage but only
for purposes of remarriage. As regards the bigamy
case, however, Pulido may raise the defense of a
void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity.
2.) No, juridicial declaration of absolute nullity is not
necessary. After a careful scrutiny of the records and
rigorous reexamination of the applicable law and
jurisprudence, we find that there is enough basis to
abandon our earlier pronouncement and now hold
that a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity.Consequently, a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the
first and second marriages obtained by the accused
is considered a valid defense in bigamy. When both
the prior and subsequent marriages were contracted
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, a void ab
initio marriage can be raised as a defense in a
bigamy case even without a judicial declaration of its
nullity. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that an
action for nullity of the second marriage is a
prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
CASE DIGEST: San Miguel Properties Inc. V. Perez
G.R NO# 166836
DATE: September 4, 2013
PETITIONERS: San Miguel Properties Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Sec. Hernando B. Perez, Albert C.
Aguirre, Teodoro B. Arcenas, Jr., Maxy S. Abad,
James G. Barbers, Stephen N. Sarino, Enrique N.
Zalamea, Jr., Mariano M. Martin, Orlando O.
Samson, Catherine R. Aguirre, and Antonio V.
Agcaoili
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 36 of the Civil
Code which provides that Pre-judicial questions
which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall
be governed by rules of court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code.
FACTS: San Miguel Properties (SMP) acquired 130
residential lots in the BF Homes Parañaque
subdivision from BF Homes Inc., represented by
Atty. Orendain, who was duly authorized as its
rehabilitation receiver. However, BF Homes
withheld the delivery of 20 Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) out of the total 40 because Atty.
Orendain was no longer its rehabilitation receiver at
the time of these transactions. Despite SMP's
demands, BF Homes refused to hand over the TCTs.
Consequently, SMP filed a complaint-affidavit with
the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) in Las Pinas
against the directors and officers of BF Homes,
alleging non-delivery of titles in violation of Section
25 in relation to Section 29 of PD No. 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective
Decree). Concurrently, SMP initiated a lawsuit
against BF Homes for specific performance at the
HLURB, seeking to compel BF Homes to release the
20 TCTs to SMP.
The OCP dismissed SMP's criminal complaint for
violating PD No. 957, citing, among other reasons,
the existence of a prejudicial question. This
necessitated the suspension of the criminal
proceeding until the matter of BF Homes' liability
was determined either by the SEC en banc or by the
HLURB. SMP appealed this resolution to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which denied the
appeal. SMP then elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) through a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus, focusing on the issue of whether the
HLURB Case posed a prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the criminal action for
violating PD No. 957. The CA dismissed SMP's
petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the HLURB administrative
case for specific performance can serve as a basis to
halt the progress of the criminal complaint for the
violation of PD No. 957, citing the presence of a
prejudicial question.
RULING: YES, an action for specific performance,
even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative
agency, raises a prejudicial question that must first
be determined before the criminal case for violation
of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 could be resolved.
Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case,
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in the criminal case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but is so intimately
connected with the crime that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid conflicting decisions. Here, the action for
specific performance in the HLURB would determine
whether or not SMP was legally entitled to demand
the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF
Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable
for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the
former (admin case) must obviously precede that of
the latter, for should the HLURB hold SMP to be not
entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF
Homes in the sale due to his receivership having
been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the
criminal liability for the violation of Sec. 25 of PD No.
957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to
proceed with the criminal case.
CHAPTER 3: PERSONS (ART. 37-51)
CIVIL PERSONALITY (ART.37)
Civil Personality
● It Is the aptitude of being the subject, active
or passive, of rights and obligations.
Person
● A person is any being susceptible to rights
and obligations.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
●
It is every physical or moral, real or juridical and
legal being susceptible of rights and obligations
or being the subject of legal relations.
NOTE/s:
One is a person, while one has a personality.
Two Kinds of Persons
1. Natural or physical persons
- human beings
2. Juridical or artificial persons
- artificial beings susceptible to rights and
obligations, or of being subject to legal relations.
Juridical Capacity or Personality
● acquired upon birth of a person and
terminated only upon death.
● fitness to be the subject of legal relations.
Capacity to Act
● not inherent in a person and can only be
attained or conferred.
● power to do acts with legal effect.
CASE DIGEST:Quimiguing v. Icao
G.R. No. L-26795
DATE: July 31, 1970
Facts:
Carmen Quisumbing filed a complaint for support
against defendant Icao. In her complaint, she
alleged that they were neighbors and had close
and confidential relations. Despite Icao being
married, he succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent and as
a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and
drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to
stop studying. Hence, she claimed support per
month, damages and attorneys fees. After trial on
the merits, the trial judge dismissed the complaint
upon motion of defendant for lack of cause of
action, that is, the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born. Thereafter, plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given
birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment
was allowable, since the original complaint
averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
Issue: : Does an unborn child have a right to
receive support?
Ruling: Yes. A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of
its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from it progenitors, particularly of
the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is
deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de
sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet
unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code, and it's being
ignored by the parent in his testament may result
in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the
institution of the testamentary heir, even if such
child should be born after the death of the testator
(Article 854, Civil Code). It is thus clear that the
lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil
Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn,"
violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing
that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for ail purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e.,
that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso,
however, is not a condition precedent to the right
of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part
of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective. Plaintiff had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and
the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause
of action was doubly in error.
CASE DIGEST: Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439
DATE: , July 20, 1961
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari bringing up
for review the question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from the physician who
caused the same. Nita Villanueva became
pregnant with her present husband, Oscar Lazo
before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from her parents, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her
marriage with Lazo, she again became pregnant.
As she was then employed in the COMELEC and
her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had
herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than two
years later, she again became pregnant and again
aborted a two month old foetus, employing the
services of petitioner Geluz. All throughout this
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
time, Lazo was in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial
board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent to,
the abortion. When Geluz learned of the third and
last abortion, he filed a complaint against Geluz for
damages on behalf of the unborn child on account
of the injuries it received. The trial court granted
the complaint and awarded damages.
ISSUE: Can damages be recovered by the parents
on behalf of an unborn child who was aborted on
account of the injuries it suffered?
HELD: No, no transmission to anyone can take
place as the child lacked juridical personality due
to its pre-natal death. Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury
or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is
easy to see that if no action for such damages
could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place
from one that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity
to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article". In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead
when separated from its mother's womb. The
prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same
effect; and is generally held that recovery cannot
be had for the death of an unborn child. This is
not to say that the parents are not entitled to
collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased, his right to life and
physical integrity. They would normally be limited
to moral damages i.e. on account of distress and
anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations
and exemplary damages. But in the case before
NOTE/s:
Juridical Capacity is one, indivisible, irreducible
and essentially the same always and for all men.
Capacity to Act does not exist in all men nor
does it exist to the same extent.
NOTE/s:
Union of both kinds of capacity meant Full Civil
Capacity
CASE DIGEST: Limjoco vs. Estate of Pedro
Fragante
G.R NO# L-770
DATE: April 27, 1948
PETITIONER: Angel Limjoco
RESPONDENT: Intestate Estate of Pedro
Fragrante, deceased
DOCTRINE:
Under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be
considered as an artificial juridical person for the
purpose of settlement and distribution of his
properties.” Fragante has rights and fulfillment of
obligation which survived even after his death.
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain, and operate an ice
plant in San Juan, Rizal. The Public Service Commission
approved the application and held that evidence
showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner by the
authorization of the operation of another ice-­plant.
Fragante was a Filipino Citizen, and remained to be
even after his death and that his intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
The Commission ordered that a certificate of public
convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante.
However, Petitioner contends that the Commission
erred in allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro Fragante for the
latter as party applicant, and in subsequently granting
to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to
be in contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Pedro Fragrante is a
“person”.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
RULING:
Yes. The Court cited the ruling of the SC of Indiana
which held that “The estate of the decedent is a person
in legal contemplation. The word “person” in its legal
signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as
well as natural persons.” It said in another work that
‘persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A
natural person is a human being. Artificial persons
include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons
forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights
and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is
recognized only to a limited extent in our law.”
Under the present legal system, such rights and
obligations as survive after death have to be exercised
and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if
the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would
be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the
executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and
to fulfill those obligations of the deceased.
The estate of the deceased person is considered a
“person” in the avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal
rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction
is indulged.
Moreover, the citizenship of Fragrante is also extended.
The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by
the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of
personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the
injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors, and heirs,
solely by reason of his death to the loss of the
investment amounting to P35,000, which he has
already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding from
the Public Service Commission of this Court.
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE (ART.48-51)
Citizenship
● It is the status of being a citizen, or of owing
allegiance to a state for the privilege of being
under its protection.
● Article IV of the 1987 Constitution governs
the rule on citizenship.
● Citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law (Sec.3).
Who are citizens of the Philippines?
1. Citizens at the time of adoption of the 1987
Constitution.
2. Those whose father and mother are citizens
of the Philippines.
3. Those mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
4. Naturalized in accordance with law.
5. Those born in the Philippines of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of the
Constitution, had been elected to public
office. *
Natural-born citizens (Art. 4, Sec.2 of 1987
Constitution)
● Those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth, without having to be naturalized.
Citizens who marry an alien (Art. 4, Sec.3 of 1987
Constitution)
● They shall retain their citizenship, unless, by
their act or omission, renounces it.
Dual allegiance (Art. 4, Sec.5 of 1987 Constitution)
● Is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law.
Common Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
1. By Birth
● Jus Sanguinis- citizenship by blood
● Jus Soli- citizenship by place of birth
2. By Naturalization
● Artificial means (judicial or administrative)
by which a state adopts an alien and gives
him imprint and endowment of a citizen of
that country.
Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship
Grounds for loss:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation of citizenship
3. Oath of allegiance to support the
constitution of a foreign country (except
when Ph is at war)
4. Render service, or accept commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country (except
when consented by Republic of the
Philippines)
5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization
6. Declared a deserter of Philippine armed
forces in time of a war (except in grant of
amnesty)
7. When a woman marries an alien and by force
of laws in the alien spouse’s country,
acquires his nationality
Grounds for reacquisition:
1. By
naturalization,
provided
no
disqualifications
2. Repatriation of deserters of the army, navy,
or air corps.
3. By direct act of the Congress of the
Philippines
CASE DIGEST: Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. CID
G.R NO# L-21289
DATE: October 4, 1971
PETITIONERS: Moy Ya Lim Yao (Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim) and Lau Yuen Yeung
RESPONDENT: The Commissioner of Immigration
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
DOCTRINE:
RULING:
An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen,
becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that
she does not possess all of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473.
Yes. The Court held that it is in the best interest of all
concerned that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she
is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law.
FACTS:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a
passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non­immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection
with her application for a temporary visitor’s visa to
enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to
take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great
(grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on
March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period
of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On
the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in
the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others
that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from
the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the
period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might
properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines
up to February 13, 1962.
On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy
Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen.
After which, with the action of respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming
under it, doubtless there will be instances where
unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of
this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious
marriages or mala fide matrimonies.
CASE DIGEST: Republic vs. Batuigas
G.R NO# 183110
DATE: October 7, 2013
PETITIONERs: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Azucena Saavedra Batuigas
DOCTRINE:
It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the
privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens, could have had no other objective than to
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of
the family.
Solicitor General opposes the ground that the marriage
of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically
confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. During the
hearing, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a
few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with
a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-­in-­law, or sisters-in-­law.
Hence, she does not possess all the qualifications
required for an applicant for naturalization (CA 473),
even though she has proven that she possesses none of
the disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung had become a
naturalized Filipino citizen, upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
FACTS:
RULING:
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the
RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. She stated that she intends
in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and
to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to China; and that she will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition
up to the time of her naturalization.
Yes. The Court cited the case of Moy Ya Lim that under
existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under
CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000”).
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed
to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or
in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained
that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to
engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG
likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real
property because aliens are precluded from owning
lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by
the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied
Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28,
1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed
the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English,
Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education were taken in
Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education,
she then practiced her teaching profession in several
different schools in Mindanao. In 1968, at the age of 26,
Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a
natural-born Filipino citizen. They have five children, all
of whom studied in Philippine public and private
schools and are all professionals. After her stint as a
teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal
partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on
in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of
their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax
returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from
2004-2005. During their marital union, the Batuigas
spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog,
Margosatubig.
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA,
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that granted the
Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena
Batuigas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Batuigas has validly complied
with the citizenship requirement as required by law to
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is
available to alien women married to Filipino husbands
is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides
that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines.” Under this provision, foreign
women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither
necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980,
Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation
of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her
application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside
the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence
that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their
marriage certificate was presented to establish his
citizenship. As the records before this Court show,
Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately
proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted
his birth certificate indicating that he and his parents
are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration,
land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of
which are public records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main
objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus the Court held that: "It is not
congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity
and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the
wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one
should be different from that of the other." Azucena has
clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is
qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court
will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly
Filipino family.
CASE DIGEST: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
G.R NO# 120295
DATE: June 28, 1996
PETITIONER: Juan Frivaldo
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections and
Raul Lee
DOCTRINE:
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
FACTS:
●
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the
province of Sorsogon in the 1995 elections, and
assumed office in due time.
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground
that he was not a Filipino citizen after revoking it during
Marcos regime and having been naturalized in the
United States.
The law attributes to a person independently
of his own intention or actual residence,
ordinarily resulting from legal domestic
relations, as that of the wife arising from
marriage, or the relation of a parent and a
child.
Residence V. Domicile
Residence
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as an American citizen only to protect
himself against President Marcos during the Martial
Law era.
Indicates a place of
abode, whether
permanent or
temporary.
Denotes a fixed
permanent residence,
which when absent,
one has the intention of
returning.
One can have several
places of residence.
There can only be one
place of domicile.
No length of residence
without intention of
remaining.
It is residence coupled
with intention to
remain for an unlimited
time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship
by virtue of valid repatriation, and by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the
United States of America.
However, the Court stated that the alleged forfeiture
was between him and the US. If he really wanted to
drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
Domicile
●
For the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is the place of their habitual
residence. (Art. 50 CC)
Elements of Domicile:
1. Physical Presence in a fixed place.
2. Intention to remain permanently in said
place.
Kinds of Domicile:
Domicile
Residence in Civil Law VS. Political Law
●
●
Civil Code: If it involves affecting the rights
and obligations of husband and wife - the
term residence should only be interpreted to
mean "actual residence.”
Election Cases: domicile is synonymous with
residence, which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
'Domicile' denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to
return.
CASE DIGEST: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
G.R NO# 119976
DATE: September 18, 1995
PETITIONER: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections and
Cirilo Roy Montejo
DOCTRINE:
1. Domicile of Origin
● Acquired by every person at birth. It is usually
the place where the child’s parents reside
and continues-until the same is abandoned
by acquisition of a new domicile.
2. Domicile of Choice
● Chosen by a person as his permanent home;
that to which, whenever he is absent, he
intends to return.
3. Domicile by Operation of Law (Constructive
Domicile)
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place
for various purposes. The absence from legal residence
or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995,
providing that her residence in the place was seven (7)
months.
Then incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo, who is also a candidate for
the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as
she did not comply with the constitutional requirement
for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the
petitioner changed seven months to since childhood
under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Upon her petition for reconsideration, COMELEC issued
a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes
in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte.
However, COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner
be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.
MARRIAGE (ART. 1-26)
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
Two Aspects of Marriage
●
●
It is a SPECIAL CONTRACT
It is a STATUS or a RELATION or an
INSTITUTION
Some Principles
●
●
●
●
●
●
Union - physical and spiritual mating
Of one man with one woman - monogamy
Reciprocal blessings - 50-50 proposition (the
wife must not henpeck the husband, vice
versa)
Birth - purposes of marriage is the
procreation of children
Rearing - care of BOTH parents
Education of Children - natural right of
parents to educate their children
Difference between Marriage from an Ordinary
Contract
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos
claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Marriage
Ordinary Contract
1. both a contract AND
a social institution
1. merely a contract
ISSUE:
2. generally,
2. stipulations are
stipulations are fixed by generally fixed by
law - not by marriage
parties
parties
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the
First District of Leyte to satisfy the one-year residency
requirement to be eligible to run as representative.
RULING:
Yes. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is indeed a resident
and possesses the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte.
The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person's intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; if
his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence.
3. can be dissolved only
by death or annulment
not by mutual
agreement
3. can be ended by
mutual agreement and
by other legal causes
Common Law Marriage
●
●
●
generally, common-law marriages in the
Philippines are not recognized
aka live in relationship
Is common law marriage valid in the
Philippines of between foreigners and if the
relationship began abroad?
○ YES. It is valid according to the
personal law of the parties and
according to the place where the
relationship began.
Marriage by Proxy
●
●
represented by a delegate or friend
Rules:
○ Performed in the Philippines – the
marriage is VOID. Physical Presence
is a MUST. (Art. 6 of Family Code)
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
○
Performed Abroad – Art. 26 of the
Family Code would be controlling
■ How? If the marriage by
proxy is valid as such where
celebrated, it should be
considered in the
Philippines
Effect If One Party is Not Asked
●
The marriage certificate shall govern.
○ i.e. so long as the groom signed
Marriage Counseling Now a Requirement (Art. 16)
●
done by a priest, inam or minister or a duly
accredited marriage counselor
Required Ten Day Publication (Art. 17)
●
by way of notice in the bulletin board
(outside of the office of the local civil
registrar) conspicuously located and
accessible to the public — (Sign: “To notify
the public”)
Notice to the Civil Registrar of Any Impediment To
Marriage (Art. 18)
●
●
shall not prevent the issuance of the
marriage after the ten day publication
unless otherwise ordered by a competent
court
“Kahit may nalalaman ang registrar ukol sa
magiging kasal na di kaaya-aya,
kinakailangan ang korte ang kukuwestyon”
Life of a Marriage License
●
●
120 days from date of issue with the expiry
date in bold character on the face of every
license
Penalty: See Art. 350 of RPC, for officers
who solemnize a marriage whereas the
license has expired
Marriage Certificate
●
●
the best documentary evidence of marriage
an oral solemnization of the marriage is
sufficient
Difference of Marriage Certificate from License
●
●
Marriage license is a REQUISITE
Marriage certificate is the PROOF a
ceremony or marriage was celebrated.
Now, how can marriage be proven?
●
●
●
Testimony of witness
People who attended the ceremony
certificates of title to land
What will happen to the marriage if there are not
enough witnesses as the prescribed two?
●
It is NOT VOID. There is simply an
IRREGULARITY.
Copies of the Marriage Certificate
●
●
●
●
One for the contracting parties
Two for the local registrar (within 15 days
after the marriage celebration)
One for the person solemnizing
Note: Even if no one receives a copy, the
marriage is still valid.
Marriages Exempt from License (Art. 27-34)
Article 27
●
even if the party survives, marriage is still
legal
Article 28
●
●
●
Rule if both parties are articulo mortis
○ must be conscious
Signature of Dying Party
○ another person should so sign;
marriage is still valid
Who can solemnize?
○ justice, judge, etc.
Article 29
●
●
purpose of proving the basis of exemption
from the marriage license
failure on the part of the solemnizing officer
to execute the necessary affidavit —
IRREGULARITY ONLY
Article 30
●
Civil Registrar is given the original of the
affidavit
Article 31
●
the marriage may be solemnized during
stopovers
Article 32
●
Re: Military Commander
○ Must be a commissioned officer
○ Marriage may be between civilians,
in articulo mortis
Article 33
●
●
No Judicial Notice
○ They must be alleged and proved in
court.
Consistency with the Constitution
○ See Art. XIV, Sec. 17, 1987 Philippine
Constitution
Article 34
●
Requisites
○ lived together husband and wife for
AT LEAST FIVE YEARS
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
●
○ NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENT
Why is this article published?
○ The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage
such persons from legalizing their
status
■ Sign: Illegitimate family,
children, etc.
CASE DIGEST: Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088
DATE March 14, 2000
PETITIONERS: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO
RESPONDENT: JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
●
Article 7(1) of the Family Code states
“Marriage can be solemnized by any
incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court’s jurisdiction.”
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, the respondent judge
performed a marriage ceremony of Sumaylo and Del
Rosario. However, it was solemnized in Dapa,
respondent judge’s residence, which is not covered
by his jurisdiction. Respondent contends that Article
7 was not violated and that Article 8 applies to the
case in question
ISSUE/S:
W/N solemnization of the marriage was within the
jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO. Where a judge solemnize a marriage outside his
court’s jurisdiction there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.
CASE DIGEST: Kho v. Republic
G.R. No. 187462
DATE June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO,
RESPONDENTS
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
●
Article 4 of the Family Code indicates “The
absence of any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)
FACTS:
Petition Raquel filed a petition for his marriage with
Respondent Veronica to be declared null and void
due to the lack of marriage license. Petitioner
presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar that no copy or record of marriage license
was issued. Respondent opposed, however, no
evidence was presented. RTC granted the petition.
CA reversed the RTC’s decision, holding tere is a
presumption of a marriage license.
ISSUE/S:
W/N marriage should be null & void
RULING:
YES. Respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show
that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion
that can be reached is that no valid marriage was in
fact issued. The fact remains that respondent failed
to prove that the subject marriage license was issued
and the law is clear that a marriage which is
performed w/o the corresponding marriage license is
null and void.
CASE DIGEST: Diaz-Salgado v. Anson
G.R. No. 204494
DATE July 27, 2016
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR.
GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners, v. LUIS G.
ANSON, Respondent.
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
● Article 4 of the Family Code indicates “The
absence of any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)
FACTS:
On September 5, 2003, respondent filed a suit
against petitioner seeking for the annulment of
three unilateral deeds of sale and deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. Respondent claims he
is the surviving spouse of Severina Anson. Jo-Ann is
a child of the deceased (Severina Anson) from a
previous relationship. Severina transferred 3
Unilateral deeds of sale in favor of Jo-Ann. Maria
Luisa, after Severina’s demise, adjudicated herself as
Severina’s dole heir. Luis claimed he was of his
lawful share. More so, petitioner contended nullity
of marriage between Luis & Severina which took
effect prior the family code.
ISSUE/S:
Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the
Family Code valid in the absence of a marriage
license
RULING:
NO. A cursory examination of the marriage contract
of Luis & Severina reveals that no marriage license
number was indicated therein. It also appears therein
that no marriage license was exhibited to the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
solemnizing officer with Article 77 of RA 386 (Civil
Code) being cited as the reason therefor.
CASE DIGEST: Niñal V. Bayadog
G.R NO# 133778
DATE March 14, 2000
PETITIONERS: Engrace Niñal for herself and as
Guardian ad Litem of the minors Babyline Niñal,
Ingrid Niñal, Archie Niñal & Pepito Niñal, Jr.
RESPONDENT: Norma Bayadog
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
● Cohabitation as an exception to marriage
license must be without legal impediments.
● The validity of a void marriage may be
questioned even after the death of either of
the parties.
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Teodulfa was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on
December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license.
They executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, thus, they are exempted
from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners, children of
Pepito in the first marriage, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code.
The lower court dismissed the petition of the Niñals
on the ground that Annulment/Voidable must be a
direct attack.
A void marriage is subject to collateral attack: (1) Case
can be filed by interested parties or heirs even after
the lifetime of the parties. (2) Can also be raised in an
estate proceeding involving property.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the marriage between
Pepito and Norma is valid.
RULING: No. The 5-year common law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage should be a period of legal
union. Pepito and Teodulfa’s marriage was still
subsisting 5 years prior to Pepito and Norma’s
marriage. 2nd marriage is void ab initio.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
CASE DIGEST: Republic of the Philippines V. Dayot
G.R NOs # 175581 and 179474
DATE March 28, 2008
G.R. NO. 175581
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Jose A. Dayot
G.R. NO. 179474
PETITIONER: Felisa Tecson-Dayot
RESPONDENT: Jose A. Dayot
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Article 34 of the Civil Code provides that “No license
shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal
impediments to marry each other”.
FACTS:
These are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No.
175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot
(Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void
ab initio.
On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married
in Pasay City through the execution of a sworn
affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then
on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham,
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for the ground that the testimonies and
evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an
appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court
of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were
not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have
been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the marriage between Jose
and Felisa was void ab initio.
RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the
beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid
marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa
executed is merely a scrap of paper because they
started living together five months before the
celebration of their marriage. That according to the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage for a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediments to marry each
other… “ it means that a five year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of a marriage. It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license
is a clear violation of the law and could lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Court of
Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration
and REVERSED itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose
A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
CASE DIGEST: Ado-an Morimoto V. Morimoto
G.R NO# 247576
DATE March 15, 2021
PETITIONER: Rosario D. Ado-an-Morimoto
RESPONDENTS: Yoshio Morimoto and the Republic
of the Philippines
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
A simulated marriage used as a front for illicitly
obtaining benefits is totally inexistent, as the parties
to it have no genuine intent to enter into marital
relations. Courts must recognize such a marriage as
void.To insist on its validity is to enable a greater
affront to the institution of marriage than the
perceived dangerous tendency of readily declaring it
null.
FACTS:
Sometime before December 2007, Rosario was
introduced to Yoshio as one with whom she can
simulate a marriage for her to acquire a Japanese
Visa. On December 5, 2007, they met at the Manila
City Hall and signed a blank marriage certificate. They
were assured by the S.O. that such certificates will
never be registered in the Civil Registry.
Eventually, when she was about to secure a
Certificate of No Marriage, she found out that a
Certificate of Marriage was registered that she
married Yoshio on December 5, 2007, in a ceremony
officiated by a certain Reverend Roberto Espiritu.
There was also a marriage license that appeared on
record that was issued by the Office of the Civil
Registry of San Juan.
On October 5, 2009, Rosario filed a Petition for
Declaration of nullity of Marriage before the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court. She claimed that the
marriage did not actually happen and that there was
no application for a marriage license at all.
As proof, she provided as evidence a certification
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, NSO, stating
that “said office mistakenly stated that a marriage
was solemnized between Rosario and Yoshio.” She
also provided as evidence a Certificate issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City, which
states that "no record of Marriage License No.
6120159 was issued to the parties.” The RTC denied
her petition and the CA also denied her appeal.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the registered marriage
between petitioner Rosario D. Ado-An-Morimoto
and respondent Yoshio Morimoto should be
declared null and void.
RULING: Yes, the marriage should be declared null
and void for having been simulated and lacking in the
essential and formal requisites of marriage. This
Court takes petitioner's assertions to be
corresponding with the truth, or otherwise
"afford[ing] the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute." They are convincing proof that no marriage
between her and respondent Yoshio ever took place.
In any case, petitioner's assertions do not stand by
their lonesome. They are bolstered by the Assistant
City Prosecutor's Report indicating that there is no
collusion between petitioner and respondent Yoshio
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
to obtain a favorable ruling from the Regional Trial
Court. This works to thwart any claim that
respondent Yoshio's not having directly contradicted
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity, or otherwise
insisting on the subsistence of their supposed
marriage, indicates duplicity on petitioner's part.
More importantly, a Certification was issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, Philippine Statistics
Authority, stating that "said office mistakenly
certified that a marriage was solemnized between
[petitioner and respondent Yoshio.]" This categorical
turnaround should, once and for all, negate any
lingering doubt on whether the supposed marriage
between petitioner and respondent Yoshio actually
transpired. It could even render this case moot.
The marriage between petitioner and respondent
Yoshio is decidedly a fake. It was a ruse that reduced
marriage to an artifice for acquiring a visa. The
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals fail to
see that to insist on this marriage's validity would be
to unwittingly lend judicial approbation to
transactional marriages used as fronts for illicitly
obtaining benefits, or for potentially more nefarious
ends. This Court most certainly does not condone the
petitioner's ruse. But it will cause greater damage to
society and its institutions if courts would let
themselves be used as unsuspecting endorsers of
duplicitous designs.
The original, underlying fraud here is the stratagem
effected by petitioner and respondent Yoshio in
simulating marriage. It is a fraud admitted by the
petitioner, and a fraud through which this Court sees.
Petitioner and respondent Yoshio never truly meant
to be husband and wife, their registered marriage is
a nullity.
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they are solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5), and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (n) (As amended by
Executive Order Number 227, July 17, 1987)
Valid Provision. The Family Code expressly provides
that, except for marriages prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37 and 38, marriages
solemnized abroad and which are valid there as such
are recognized as valid here.
As a general rule, the Philippines follows the:
lex loci celebrationis rule
-
Literally translated as the law of the place of
the ceremony. It means that the validity of a
contract is governed by the place where it is
made, executed, or to be performed. This is
adhered to by Philippine law.
-
This is a conflict of law principle that comes
into play when there are substantive issues
relating to a contract that is celebrated
elsewhere than the place of citizenship of its
parties. Philippine courts apply the same,
not only with respect to marriage but to
other contracts, in order to determine the
law that is to be applied in resolving disputes
that arise as a result thereof.
Except:
-
-
-
-
If either or both contracting parties are
Filipinos and they are below 18 years of age.
Bigamous and polygamous marriages.
Marriage abroad where there is a mistake of
identity of the other contracting party.
If a spouse fails to record the judicial decree
of their annulled/null or void marriage
abroad with the local civil registrar.
A marriage of a Filipino to a person who is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations abroad.
Marriages between ascendants and
descendants of any degree (i.e., full or halfblood). They are considered to be
incestuous.
Marriages declared void under Philippine
laws for being against public policy.(See Art.
38 of the Family Code)
CASE DIGEST: Ambrose V. Suque-Ambrose
G.R NO#
DATE
PETITIONER: Paul Ambrose
RESPONDENT: Louella Suque-Ambrose
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
The validity of a marriage is governed by the law of
the place where it is celebrated. Philippine laws apply
to marriages celebrated in the Philippines, and all
matters relating to the validity of the marriage,
including its incidents and consequences, are to be
judged in relation to Philippine law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Paul Ambrose (petitioner), a citizen of the
United States, married respondent Louella SuqueAmbrose (respondent) on March 13, 2005 in Manila,
Philippines.
On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent
on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as
amended.
The petition was amended on May 15, 2007.
Thereafter, the respondent filed her Answer with
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Counterclaim. After pre-trial, trial ensued. Only the
petitioner presented evidence as the respondent
failed to appear and participate during the hearing on
the merits. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioner lacks the legal capacity to
sue.
According to the RTC, under the nationality principle
provided for under Article 15 of the Civil Code, the
petitioner, an American Citizen, is not covered by our
laws on family rights and duties, status and legal
capacity.
On April 3, 2013, the petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal but the same was denied due course by the
RTC in its Order dated April 8, 2013, on account of the
petitioner's failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration as required by Section 20(1) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages. This prompted the petitioner to
file the instant petition for review on certiorari,
alleging in support thereof that:
a) The lower court committed a patently null
and void decision and order contrary to Art.
36 of the Family Code and Section 2(a) of the
Rule when it ruled that petitioner has no legal
personality to file the petition for being a
foreigner pursuant to Art. 15 of the Civil
Code;
b) The Supreme Court may suspend Section 20
(1) of the Rule and allow petitioner to avail of
Rule 45 in the interest of procedural due
process and afford him his last chance for
obtaining full appellate review of the
patently null and void decision and order of
the lower court solely on the legal question
raised as allowed by the Court in several
cases.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Article 15 of the Civil Code
does not apply, as "the legal capacity to get married
and its consequences, including the nullification of
void marriage is governed by the law of the place
where the marriage was entered into and not by the
nationality principle."
Applied to this controversy, the marriage between
the parties having been celebrated in the Philippines,
is governed by Philippine laws. The same laws hold
true with its incidents and consequences. Thus, all
matters relating to the validity of the contract of
marriage, such as the presence or absence of
requisites, forms, or solemnities are to be judged in
relation to the law in which it has been celebrated or
performed.
It is also clear that the petitioner has both the legal
capacity and personality to sue. His legal personality
proceeds from the fact that it is his marriage to the
respondent, which, in turn, relates to his civil status,
that stands to be affected by the petition for nullity
that he instituted. He has legal personality in the
action as he has personal and material interest in the
result of the action.
In view of the foregoing, therefore, the RTC should
not have dismissed the case in the absence of the
petitioner's legal capacity to sue. By doing so, it failed
to resolve factual issues necessary to resolve whether
or not the marriage between the parties should be
nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Considering that a petition for review on certiorari is
limited to questions of law and the Court is not a trier
of facts, the remand of this case to the RTC for the
proper resolution of this case on the merits is most
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
Are common-law marriages obtained abroad by
Filipinos valid in the Philippines?
➔ Art. 26 does not specifically include
common-law marriages as one of the
exceptions to the general rule. However, it
shall NOT be recognized here.
- Art. 26 clearly uses the term “solemnized”
and not “contracted” or “performed”.
SOLEMNIZATION
-
RULING: The Court agrees.
Lex loci celebrationis is adhered to by Philippine law,
as enunciated under the first paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code. Otherwise stated, a marriage
formally valid in the place it is celebrated is valid in
the Philippines.
Lex loci celebrationis is a conflict of law principle that
comes into play when there are substantive issues
relating to a contract that is celebrated elsewhere
than the place of citizenship of its parties. Philippine
courts apply the same, not only with respect to
marriage but to other contracts, in order to
determine the law that is to be applied in resolving
disputes that arise as a result thereof.
-
The performance of the formal act or
ceremony by which a man and a woman
contract marriage and assume the status of
husband and wife – Ballantines Law
Dictionary, 3rd. ed.
refers to or implies a ceremonial marriage
and not one which was “contracted” or
merely performed by way of a mere
agreement of the parties (i.e., Common-law
marriages)
“Solemnized” and “Contracted” are not entirely the
same. The formality inherent in a ceremonial
marriage is what primarily distinguishes it from a
common-law marriage.
The term “performed” under the Civil code was
changed to “solemnized”; the change signifies the
intent of the framers to limit the scope of the
provision not to include common-law marriages.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
NOTE/s:
- The marriage in question here must be a
MIXED MARRIAGE.
- The second paragraph of Art. 26 is to
prevent absurdity.
Are same sex marriages of Filipinos abroad valid
here in the country?
NO. Public policy in the Philippines mandates only a
man and a woman can marry each other. (See Art. 1)
– HETEROGENEOUS IN NATURE
➔ This is a public policy matter which cannot be
rendered ineffective by any foreign law.
NOTE/s:
Same sex marriages can be allowed ONLY if the
Supreme
Court
renders
unconstitutional
heterosexual marriages as against the equal
protection clause and if the legislature comes up
with a law allowing said marriage that the
President can sign, assuming that the SC allows it
as not inconsistent with the Constitution.
PROOF OF FOREIGN MARRIAGE
-
Prove the foreign law as a question of fact
Prove the celebration of marriage pursuant
thereto by convincing evidence
➔ The burden of proof to show the fact of
marriage and the foreign marital law is upon
the one who asserts the validity of the
marriage celebrated abroad.
ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
Generally, absolute divorce between two citizens of
the Philippines is NOT recognized in the country.
➔ They can only sever their relationship as
husband and wife if one of them has a cause
of action to declare the marriage void or to
annul the marriage.
➔ Divorce initiated in the country is NOT
provided as a remedy under the Family Code
and the Rules of Court.
NOTE/s:
States recognize divorces of aliens obtained in
other states as a matter of international comity.
Said divorces obtained by aliens are recognized
here, provided, they are valid according to their
national law.
- FOREIGN MARITAL LAW and DIVORCE
DECREE must be duly proven and cannot
be taken judicial notice of.
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
For a foreign divorce decree obtained by a Filipino or
a foreigner to be recognized, a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment must be filed in the
Philippines.
➔ An absent valid recognition of the divorce
decree follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines.
Is a joint petition for divorce allowed?
YES. A joint petition for divorce filed by a Filipino and
a foreigner in a foreign country where divorce is
allowed shall be recognized in
the country provided a court decision recognizing
such divorce is issued by a Philippine court.
➔ This is true even if such a petition is based on
mutual agreement of the parties.
On Divorce Reports
There are certain countries where divorce is granted
not by a court but by another organ of government
(i.e., a divorce report issued by the Office of the
Mayor in Fukuyama City in Hiroshima, Japan –
Divorce between Minuro Takahashi and Juliet
Morana) may likewise be recognized in the country.
➔ “Divorce report” is clearly equivalent of the
“Divorce decree” in these cases
VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
In the event that a Filipino contracts a foreign
marriage which is null and void under the laws of the
state where it has been solemnized, such marriage
shall likewise be null and void in the Philippines (See
Paragraph 1 of this Article).
➔ If the marriage is not valid in the country
where it has been solemnized, it is likewise
not valid in the Philippines.
➔ In this regard, a civil case can be filed in the
Philippines to nullify a foreign marriage using
as basis the legal grounds for nullity
provided by marriage laws of the state
where the marriage was celebrated.
➔ Art. 26(1) also recognizes that a Filipino’s
foreign marriage, which is invalid under the
laws where such marriage has been
solemnized but which would have been valid
had such marriage been celebrated in the
Philippines, is likewise invalid in the
Philippines.
(i.e., If a Filipino contracts marriage
solemnized in the residence of the
solemnizing judge in a country where the
law provides that it isn’t allowed other than
the chambers of the solemnizing judge and
would consider the marriage void, such
marriage shall also be considered void in the
Philippines even if it’s actually valid had the
celebration occurred here)
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
CASE DIGEST: Garcia V. Recio
G.R NO# 138322
DATE October 2, 2002
PETITIONER: Grace J. Garcia a.k.a. Grace J. GarciaRecio
RESPONDENT: Rederick A. Recio
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15
[Nationality Principle] and 17 of the Civil Code. On the
other hand, the concept of "limited divorce" is akin to
legal separation under the Family Code, which allows
the spouses to live separately and separate their
properties but does not sever the marriage bond. In
a legal separation, the spouses remain married under
the eyes of the law.
FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In
1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of
divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992,
the respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In
1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein
petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
marriage license, the respondent was declared as
“single” and “Filipino”.
Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in
1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy, claiming that she learned of the
respondent’s former marriage only in November. On
the other hand, the respondent claims that he told
the petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before
they were married. Respondent also contended that
his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The
trial court declared that the first marriage was
dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in
Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines.
Hence, this petition was forwarded before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was
proven.
2. Whether or not the respondent has legal
capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
RULING:
1. No. The Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce
obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can
recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the
respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although,
appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the
rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must
be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on
account of petitioner’s failure to object properly
because he objected to the fact that it was not
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City, not to its admissibility.
2. No. There is absolutely no evidence that proves the
respondent's legal capacity to marry the petitioner.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law. However, there are two types
of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage
and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage.
In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the
respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a
party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute commits the offense of
bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the
respondent might have been restricted. Respondent
also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the
foreign law governing his status. Together with other
evidence submitted, they don’t absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged
foreign law.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court
a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as
above discussed.
Can both foreigner and Filipino file foreign
divorce?
YES. The second paragraph of this article provides
the recognition in the country of a particular
absolute divorce obtained in another country.
➔ The Filipino can likewise obtain the foreign
divorce decree which can be recognized
here.
➔ The foreigner may be a former Filipino who
at the time of the divorce is not a Filipino
anymore (See Republic V. Orbecido III
below).
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
CASE DIGEST: Republic of the Philippines V.
Cirpiano Orbecido III
G.R NO# 154380
DATE October 5, 2005
PETITIONERS: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Cipriano Orbecido III
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad.
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City. In 1986, Lady
Myros left for the United States, bringing one of
their children with her. A few years later, Cirpriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen, and sometime in 2000, he learned
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and was
remarried to Innocent Stanley.
Because of this, Cipriano filed a petition for
authority to remarry, invoking Article 26, paragraph
2 of the Family Code of the Philippines which states:
“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”
The Office of the Solicitor General contended that
the said provision cannot be applicable in this case
since Article 26 talks about mixed marriages, i.e.,
that of a Filipino to a foreigner. However, this was
not the case in Cipriano and Lady Myros’ marriage
since both were Filipinos at the time of the
marriage.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies in this case.
2. Whether or not Cipriano can remarry.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court looked at the legal intent of the
provision and found out that the Civil Code Revision
Committee’s intent in including Article 26 is to avoid
the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse is
deemed to remain married to the foreigner when,
after obtaining the divorce, the foreigner is no
longer married to the Filipino. The Court then set
the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
2, Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The Court made it clear that the reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. Hence,
since Lady Myros was already an American citizen at
the time she obtained the divorce abroad, Article 26
may be applied to the case.
2. Yes. As stated earlier, Lady Myros obtained the
divorce in the United States at the time when she
was already an American citizen. This makes her
divorce valid and has in fact incapacitated her to
remarry. Cipriano, then, can also remarry as
provided in Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED.
CASE DIGEST: Republic of the Philippines V.
Manalo
GR No. 221029
24 April 2018
PETITIONERS: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: MARELYN TANEDO MANALO
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision (art. 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code) should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouse are severed by operation of the latter’s
national law.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
by virtue of a judgement of divorce rendered
by a Japanese court. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) entered its appearance for the
petitioner. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that, based
on the allegations therein, the proper action
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgement. As a
result, Manalo oved to admit an Amended
Petition, which the court granted.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied
the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the
CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code) is applicable even if it was
Manalo who files for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married
to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine law
after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad
and obtaining a favorable judgement against
his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry.
RULING:
Yes, A Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry. Hence, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. According to the Supreme
Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2
of the Family Code requires only that there be
a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not
discriminate as to who should file the divorce,
i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the
foreign spouse. Therefore, the court ruled, a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgement against his or her alien spouse who
is capacitated to remarry.
CASE DIGEST: Rivera v. Republic of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 238259
February 17, 2021
PETITIONERS: Irene Diaz Rivera
RESPONDENT: Republic of the Philippines
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
FACTS:
On January 16, 2014, Irene Diaz Rivera
(petitioner), a Filipino citizen, filed a verified
Petition in the RTC for recognition of divorce
granted in Japan. She claimed to have been
married to one Sadao Hida, a Japanese
national, on January 16, 1996 in Caloocan City
as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage
issued by the National Statistics Office and
Authentication Certificate issued by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
Petitioner alleged that her marriage ended in
divorce on June 28, 2013 based on the Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Yoshihisa Joto of
the Embassy of Japan, Pasay City on
November 13, 2013. The Divorce Certificate
was filed and recorded in the City Civil Registry
Office of Manila as certified by City Civil
Registrar Maria Josefa Encarnacion A. Ocampo
on November 25, 2013 and duly authenticated
by the DFA per Certification No. S.N. 11A1897836 dated November 25, 2013. Petitioner
thus prayed for recognition of the decree of
divorce which was validly obtained in Japan to
be as valid and effective under Philippine laws.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
its Notice of Appearance and Letter of
Deputation to the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Caloocan City on March 4, 2014.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the divorce of the parties
granted in Japan is recognized in the
Philippines law.
RULING:
Yes. Philippine law recognizes the divorce of
the parties granted in Japan.
Accordingly, the two (2) elements required in
the application of Art. 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, viz.: ( 1) that
there is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and (2) that a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, were both
present.
Applying the definition to the case, the
Regional Trial Court concluded that since
petitioner and Sadao Hida had obtained a valid
divorce in Japan, they are "freed from the
bond of marriage and they are no longer
husband and wife in all legal intents and
purposes under the laws of Japan."
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Thus, the petition of divorce of the parties
granted in Japan to be recognized in the
Philippine were granted.
divorce as required by Article 26(2) of the
Family Code. The Court emphasized that
Article 26(2) does not specify that the foreign
judgment should be solely obtained by the
foreign spouse. The joint filing of the divorce
decree does not contravene public policy or
violate the principles of lex nationali.
Therefore, the Regional Trial Court's dismissal
of the petition for recognition of the foreign
judgment was reversed and set aside.
CASE DIGEST: Abel v. Rule
CASE DIGEST: Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr. et al.
G.R. No. 234457
May 12, 2021
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
PETITIONERS: RAEMARK S. ABEL
RESPONDENT: MINDY P. RULE
PETITIONERS: ALICE REYES VAN DORN
RESPONDENT: HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
FACTS:
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
FACTS:
Raemark S. Abel, a Filipino citizen, and Mindy
P. Rule, a citizen of the United States of
America, got married in Los Angeles,
California, on December 18, 2005. They jointly
sought the summary dissolution of their
marriage before the Los Angeles Superior
Court on November 18, 2008, and their
marriage was dissolved on July 31, 2009. Abel
reacquired his Filipino citizenship on
December 3, 2008, while Rule became a U.S.
citizen on September 21, 2012. A copy of the
judgment of dissolution was received by Abel
on August 7, 2009. On January 10, 2017, the
judgment was recorded with the City Registry
Office of Manila. Abel filed a petition for the
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
before the Regional Trial Court.
Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen, and Upton, US
citizen, were married in Hong Kong. They
established their residence in the Philippines
and begot two children. After some years, the
parties divorced in Nevada, United States. Van
Dorn has re-married to Theodore Van Dorn.
A suit then was instituted by Upton stating
that petitioner’s business is a conjugal
property with Upton and prayed that Van
Dorn be ordered to render accounting of the
business and he be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Van Dorn
moved to dismiss the case as the cause of
action is barred by the judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
Upton acknowledged that he and Van Dorn
had “no community property.”
Lower Court denied the motion to dismiss
stating that the property is located in the
Philippines, and that the Divorce decree from
Nevada Court cannot prevail over prohibitive
laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the joint filing of a divorce decree
by a Filipino citizen and an alien spouse is
contrary to public policy and is not in
compliance with Article 26(2) of the Family
Code.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Abel and
recognized the validity of the foreign divorce
decree. The Court held that it is immaterial
which spouse initiated the divorce
proceedings abroad, as the fundamental
equality of women and men before the law
should be upheld. Once a divorce decree is
issued by a competent foreign court, the alien
spouse is deemed to have obtained the
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the foreign divorce is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
RULING:
Yes. The divorce obtained by Alice and
Romillio in Nevada is valid in the Philippines.
As to Upton, the divorce is binding as an
American citizen. Owing to nationality
principle enshrined in Article 15 of the NCC,
only Filipinos are covered by the policy of
absolute divorces as it is considered contrary to
the concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released Upton from the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no
longer the husband of Van Dorn. He would
have no standing to sue in the case as Van
Dorn’s husband.
As to Van Dorn, she should not be obliged to
live together with observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to Upton. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country. To
maintain that Van Dorn is still considered
married to Upton is unjust and the ends of
justice cannot be served.
CASE DIGEST: Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No.196049
June 26, 2013
PETITIONERS: MINORU FUJIKI
RESPONDENT: MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
FACTS:
Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married
Maria Marinay in the Philippines in 2004.
However, they eventually lost contact with
each other. In 2008, Marinay married Shinichi
Maekara, another Japanese, without her prior
marriage with Fujiki being dissolved. Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara and so she left the latter and
reestablished her relationship with Fujiki.
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
for being bigamous. Subsequently, Fujiki filed
a petition before the RTC titled “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)” and prayed that
the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized in the Philippines and the
subsequent marriage of Fujiki to Maekera be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4)
and 41 of the Family Code.
The RTC denied the petition stating that the
petition was in gross violation of Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (AM No. 02-11-10-SC). It took the
view that only “the husband or the wife”, in
this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not AM No. 02-11-10-SC is
applicable in this case.
(2) Whether or not Fujiki, a husband of a prior
marriage, can file a petition to recognize a
foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between Marinay and Maekera on the ground
of bigamy.
RULING:
No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered.
Yes. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.
In this case, there is therefore no reason to
disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. The Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
RULING:
CASE DIGEST: Edna S. Kondo, represented by
Attorney-in-fact, Luzviminda S. Pineda Vs.
Civil Registrar General
G.R. No. 223628
March 4, 2020
PETITIONERS: EDNA S. KONDO
RESPONDENT: LUZVIMINDA S. PINEDA
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
FACTS:
Edna S. Kondo, a Filipino citizen, and Katsuhiro
Kondo, a Japanese national, got married in
Japan on March 15, 1991. After around nine
years of marriage, they obtained a divorce by
agreement in Japan on July 3, 2000. Edna filed
a petition for judicial recognition of the
divorce decree in the Philippines, citing Article
26(2) of the Family Code. She sought the
annotation of the divorce decree in her
Marriage Certificate. The case was filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 4,
Manila and was opposed by the Republic of
the Philippines through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
During the trial, Edna presented evidence,
including the Report of Divorce and
authenticated records from Japan. She
established the jurisdiction of the trial court
over her petition. The Republic did not present
its own evidence. The trial court, in its
decision, denied the petition, stating that the
foreign divorce should have been obtained by
the alien spouse and not by mutual
agreement. It also found that the provisions of
the Japanese Civil Code did not indicate that
Katsuhiro was allowed to remarry upon
obtaining a divorce.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Edna and
reversed the decision of the trial court. The
Court held that the trial court's interpretation
of Article 26(2) of the Family Code was
incorrect. The provision does not require that
the foreign divorce be obtained solely by the
alien spouse. As long as a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse,
capacitating them to remarry, the Filipino
spouse is also capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Regarding the Motion for New Trial, the Court
found that Edna presented newly discovered
evidence that could potentially alter the
outcome of the case. The trial court erred in
denying the motion based on procedural
grounds without considering the substance of
the evidence. The Court remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings and
directed the admission of the second Report
of Divorce to establish whether Katsuhiro
contracted a subsequent marriage.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court granted the
petition, set aside the trial court's decision,
and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with the ruling.
CASE DIGEST: Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
G.R. No.186571
August 11, 2010
PETITIONERS: GERBERT R. CORPUZ
RESPONDENT: DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Edna filed a Motion for New Trial, claiming
newly discovered evidence showing that
Katsuhiro had already remarried. However,
the motion was denied by the trial court for
failure
to
comply with
procedural
requirements.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the trial court erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree and in denying the Motion for
New Trial.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
FACTS:
RULING:
Petitioner Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a
former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work
and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to thePhilippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Gerbert returned to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce which was granted
by the Canadian Supreme Court on December
8, 2005 and took effect a month later.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has found
another Filipina to marry. Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered
the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official
of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for
judicial recognition offoreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City (RTC).
However, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition
concluding that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
No. The alien spouse can claim no right under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. As
the RTC correctly stated, the provision was
included to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse, who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree.
Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of
the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
MODULE 2: VOID MARRIAGES (ARTICLES 35-44)
ARTICLE 35: THE FOLLOWING MARRIAGE
SHALL BE VOID FROM THE BEGINNING:
1. Those contracted by any party below
18 years of age even with the consent
of parents or guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without a license,
except those covered by the preceding
chapter;
4. Those bigamous or polygamous
marriages not falling under Article 41;
5. Those contracted through mistake of
one contracting party as to the identity
of the other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that are
void under Article 53.
VOID MARRIAGES
A void marriage is that which is not valid
from its inception
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
-
-
any absence of the requirements found in
Articles 2 and 3 makes a marriage void
- Exceptions: Articles 27, 28, 31, 32,
33, 34, and 35(2)
Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in
relation to Article 52 enumerate marriages
which are void
Only marriages declared void by the
legislature should be treated as such. There can be
no other void marriages outside of those specifically
provided by law.
The grounds for a void marriage may coexist in one case. For example: a person may claim
their marriage is void because he or she got married
at 17, the marriage was contracted without a valid
marriage license with a person who has a subsisting
marriage who is his or her collateral blood relative
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity.
A petition may contain many grounds for
nullity of marriage but it has only one cause of
action: nullity of the marriage
VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
A void marriage is different from a voidable
or annullable marriage under Article 45 of the
Family Code.
BAD FAITH OR GOOD FAITH
Good faith and bad faith are immaterial in
determining whether a marriage is null and void.
Example:
A woman believed in good faith that the
man she married is not related to him but in truth,
he was her long-lost brother. Her good faith will not
cure the infirmity even if she willingly cohabited.
She can still nullify such marriage because it is
incestuous.
Two exceptions:
1. Article 35(2) - if either of the contracting
parties is in good faith that a solemnizing
officer has authority but turns out to have
none, the marriage will be considered valid
2. Article 41 - referring to a person spouse
who disappears for four years or two years
in the proper cases, the present spouse may
remarry again validly if he or she: has a
well-founded belief that his or her spouse is
dead, procures a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, at the time of the
subsequent marriage ceremony, both are in
good faith
In those exceptions, either one of the spouses shall
make the marriage valid (good faith). To be coid,
both parties must be in bad faith.
In Niñal v Bayadog:
VOID MARRIAGE
the infirmity. A void marriage is invalid from the
beginning. It cannot be validated directly or
indirectly.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
BAD FAITH AS AFFECTING PROPERTY DISPOSITION
considered having never
to have taken place and
cannot be the source of
rights
valid until otherwise
declared by the Court
can be attacked
collaterally
cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a
direct proceeding
action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible
the action prescribes
any proper interested
party may assail
only parties involve
can assail
partnerships are
provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43
and 44, as well as
Articles 51, 53, and 54
property regime:
conjugal partnership
and the children
conceived before
annulment is
legitimate
Void marriages can never be ratified or
cured by any act of any of the contracting parties,
not even estoppel or acquiescence apply to remedy
In the disposition of the co-ownership at
the time of liquidation, whether one of the parties
is in bad faith is a basic consideration. In case of
default of, or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
shares shall belong to an innocent party.
if a person, whose existing marriage is void,
remarries another without obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity, the subsequent marriage is
void.
Paragraph (2) of Article 43 provides that,
upon the termination of the marriage, the absolute
community of property or the conjugal partnership,
as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net
profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage
or, in default of children, the innocent spouse.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
COLLATERAL AND DIRECT ATTACK.
ii.
As a general rule, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked. This means that the nullity of
a marriage can be asserted even if it is not the
main or principal issue of a case
In an inheritance case, it is important to
show that certain children should get less
inheritance because they are illegitimate due to
the void marriage of the decedent
it is not mandatory to show that, prior to
the death of the decedent, either the decedent or
the mother filed a civil case precisely and mainly
for the purpose of judicially declaring the marriage
void.
Three cases where a direct attack, not a collateral
attack, on the nullity of a marriage must first be
undertaken so that the proper effects provided by
law can appropriately apply:
a. only the husband or the wife can file a case
for declaration of nullity
i.
Article 40 - if a person has a void
marriage and he or she wants to
remarry, he or she must first file a
civil case precisely to obtain a
judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage before he or she
can remarry
b. when it said that for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial declaration of nullity
is necessary
i.
for other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of the child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of
a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question
ii.
The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous
marriage void’’ in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be
obtained only for the purpose of
remarriage.
c. The third case where a direct attack is
required is provided in Articles 50 in
relation to Article 43(3) and in Article 86(1)
of the Family Code.
i.
If a donor desires to revoke a
donation propter nuptias (in
consideration of marriage) given to
one or both of the married couple
on the ground that the marriage is
void, it is important that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the
marriage must first be obtained. It
is not enough that the marriage is
void pursuant to law
The existence of a valid judicial
declaration of nullity will give the
donor the cause of action to revoke
the donation (Article 86[1]) or to
consider the donation as revoked
by operation of law (Article 50 in
relation to Article 43[3]), as the
case may be
BELOW EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE
An individual below eighteen years of age is
declared by law as not possessing the legal capacity
to contract marriage. Under the Spanish Civil Code,
the marrying ages were 14 years old for male and
12 years old for female as these ages were
considered to be the minimum ages when a male
and a female can effectively procreate. That duty,
different in recognizable degree than the other
mutual duties of marriage, is sufficient reason to
require males to be older and generally more suited
to their duty before they may independently decide
to marry
The above justification, in fact, has been
abandoned in many states of the United States
which declared statutes with age discrepancy
between male and female as constitutionally infirm
for being discriminatory
NON-AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZER
If a person is not among those enumerated
under Article 7, or if he or she is among those
enumerated but does not comply with the specific
requirements for his or her authority to vest on him
or her as also provided by law, or he or she is not
the mayor or, at least, a person empowered by law
to act as mayor when the latter cannot perform his
or her duties, he or she has no authority to
solemnize a marriage.
GOOD FAITH MARRIAGE
If the marriage were contracted with either
or both parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so
when in fact he or she has none, then the marriage
shall be considered valid. The good faith is clearly
addressed to the contracting parties and not to the
solemnizing officer.
The term “putative marriage” is applied to a
matrimonial union which has been solemnized in
due form and good faith on the part of one or of
both of the parties but which by reason of some
legal infirmity is either void or voidable.
Like a putative marriage, the good-faith
marriage under Article 35(2) is not founded on the
actual marriage or the ceremonial marriage, but on
the reasonable belief by one or both of the parties
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
that
they were honestly married (Succession of
Marinoni, 183 La. 776) and that the solemnizing
officer had authority when, in fact, he had none.
The term “good faith,” when used in
connection with putative marriage, means an
honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was
valid at its inception, and that no legal impediment
exists to impair its validity; he or she was innocent
of fraud or wrongdoing in inducing or entering into
the marriage.
EXPLANATIONS OF JUSTICES RICARDO PUNO AND
EDUARDO CAGUIOA
“That the old rule should be brought back,
in keeping with the remarks of Judge Claraval that
this general rule is that the marriage should be
protected. Sometimes, it is not really their fault.
Sometimes the misrepresentation is made so well —
signatures are forged with greater facility, it seems,
these days”
However, Dr. Arturo Tolentino has a
different view. He distinguishes between “ignorance
of the law” and “mistake of fact.” If the contracting
parties go before a person not specifically
mentioned by law as having any authority to
solemnize a marriage, then the good faith or bad
faith of the parties is immaterial; that
MISTAKE IN IDENTITY
A mistake in identity is an instance of fraud
which makes the marriage annullable. The oft-given
example of mistake in identity is when one of the
contracting parties marries the twin of the other
party, believing that such twin is his or her lover
There is complete absence of consent,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio.
Mistake in identity as a ground for nullity covers
only those situations in which there has been a
mistake on the part of the party seeking the
nullification of marriage as to the actual physical
identity of the other party. It does not include
mistakes in the name, the character of the person,
or in his or her attributes, his or her age, religion,
social standing, pedigree, pecuniary means,
temperaments, acquirements, condition in life, or
previous habits.
Also, it has been held that mistake as to
identity is not applicable in a situation where the
husband had been led to believe that he was
marrying a virtuous woman, when in fact she had
previously led an immoral life.
VOID UNDER ARTICLE 53
ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. Hence, the marriage will still
be void.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
A marriage license is a formal requisite the
absence of which makes a marriage void.
In order to validly marry again, they must undertake
the liquidation, partition and distribution of their
properties, if any, and, only in proper cases, the
delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes and
thereafter all these requirements, including the
decree of annulment or nullity, should be recorded
in the appropriate civil registry and the registries of
property. Non-compliance with these requirements
will render any subsequent marriage void.
BIGAMOUS OR POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE
Except those allowed under special laws
such as the Muslim Code or under Article 41 of the
Family Code, the law prohibits a married man or
woman from contracting another bond of union as
long as the consort is alive
In a bigamous marriage, the first marriage
must have been valid. If the first marriage is in itself
void and a subsequent marriage is contracted
without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage, the subsequent marriage is also void
because it violates Article 40 in relation to Articles
52 and 53 of the Family Code.
Article 40 states that a judicial declaration
of nullity must first be obtained before any of the
contracting parties is to remarry and, in accordance
with Article 52, such judicial declaration of nullity
must be recorded with the local civil registrar also
before any subsequent marriage.
ARTICLE 36: A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
(n) (As amended by Executive Order Number 227
dated July 17, 1987)
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
The law does not define what psychological
incapacity is and therefore, the determination is left
solely with the courts on a case-to-case basis.
Determination of psychological incapacity
“depends on the facts of the case. Each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts”
This ground must be taken in its proper
context and should not be equated with insanity or
a total mental inability to function in all aspects of
human life. The ground is restricted to psychological
incapacity “to comply with the essential marital
obligations.”
The malady or mental disposition of one or
both of the spouses must be such as to seriously
and effectively prevent them from having a
functional and normal marital life clearly conducive
to bringing up a healthy personal inter-marital
relationship within the family which is necessary for
its growth.
It involves a senseless, protracted, and
constant refusal to comply with the essential
marital obligations by one or both of the spouses
According to Justice Caguioa:
Psychological incapacity solely refers to the
“lack of appreciation of one’s marital obligation”;
“psychological
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert testimonies of a psychologist or
psychiatrist evaluating the behavioral pattern of the
person alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
are not a requirement of law or evidence to be
mandatorily submitted.
“The personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for
a declaration of psychological incapacity”, it is not
“a condition sine qua non for such declaration”
(Marcos v Marcos, G.R. No. 136490)
If an expert witness, however, is submitted,
the Court may or may not accept the testimony of
the psychologist or psychiatrist because the
decision must be based on the totality of the
evidence.
The mere fact that a psychiatrist
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage”
personally examined the subject person is not an
assurance that his or her findings would be
sustained.
Psychological incapacity, to perform the
essential marital obligations, must be present at the
time of the marriage ceremony, but can be
manifested later on during the marriage. It is
considered a ground to nullify a marriage.
A marriage contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated party is also treated as void even if
the incapacity becomes manifest only after the
marriage was celebrated.
DAMAGES
Justice Puno: even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that the
psychological incapacity has been cured.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATION
Sections 1 and 2 of Article 15 of the
Constitution: These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
It remains the province of the legislature to
define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe
the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based
on whatever socio-political influences it deems
proper, and subject of course to the qualification
that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
If circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2
of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving
a petition for declaration of nullity.
Given the avowed State interest in
In a case involving psychological incapacity,
the Supreme Court in Buenaventura v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358/127449, March 31, 2005,
454 SCRA 261 disallowed the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
on the ground that the very nature of psychological
incapacity which is non-cognizance of one’s
essential marital obligation at the time of the
marriage ceremony, negates bad faith. No award of
exemplary damages and attorneys fees can also be
made in the absence of a showing of bad faith.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MOLINA
G.R. No. 220149
July 27, 2021
FACTS:
In a petition filed by Roridel Molina, she and
Reynaldo got married in 1985 in Manila and had a
son. After a year of being married, Reynaldo showed
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
signs
of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a father and
a husband, having more time with his peers and
spending lavishly while depending on his parents for
aid and assistance. Reynaldo left and abandoned
Roridel and their child in 1987 and had shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with
the essential marital obligations. Reynaldo, in his
answer, admitted that they could no longer live
together as husband and wife because (1) of her
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage, (2) she
failed to perform marital duties like cooking meals,
and (3) her failure to run household and finances.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring their
marriage void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court defined and interpreted
incorrectly “psychological incapacity” and applied it
incorrectly to the facts of the case.
RULING:
condemned as grossly indecent, immoral, and
inimical to the purity and happiness of the family
and the welfare of future generations.
In the first place, they are abhorrent to the
nature, not only of civilized men, but of barbarous
and semi-civilized peoples and, in the second place,
tend to the confusion of rights and duties incident
to family relations
A child of an incestuous union creates a
special problem of social placement, because its
status is so confused, as is that of its parents; status
discrepancies arise.
The genetic reason for advising against the
marriage of related persons is, of course, to prevent
the coming together in their offspring of any
deleterious recessive genes; the increased
probability of homozygosity in the first generation
of offspring may have tragic consequences
The theory of the relation of incest to the
nuclear family is consistent with Freudian
psychology, which posits interfamily sexual
attraction as one of the basic facts of mental life
and attributes much psychic disturbance to failure
of the personality to resolve the internal conflict
between such desires and societal repression of
them.
Yes. The court ruled that there is no clear showing
that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity and appears more of a “difficulty” if not
outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. There is no showing that
his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.
ARTICLE 37: Marriages between the following
are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether the relationship between the parties
be legitimate or illegitimate:
1. Between ascendants and descendants
of any degree; and
2. Between brothers and sisters, whether
of the full or half-blood. (81a)
REASONS FOR PROHIBITION OF INCESTUOUS
MARRIAGE
Incestuous marriages have been universally
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
ARTICLE 38: Article 38. The following marriages
shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:
1. Between collateral blood relatives,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, up
to the fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and stepchildren;
3. Between parents-in-law and childrenin-law;
4. Between the adopting parent and the
adopted child;
5. Between the surviving spouse of the
adopting parents and the adopted
child;
6. Between the surviving spouse of the
adopted child and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child and a
legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between the adopted children of the
same adopter;
9. Between the parties where one, with
the intention to marry the other, killed
that other person’s spouse or his or her
own spouse.
BLOOD-RELATION DIAGRAM
Let us consider the blood-relation diagram
of a person whom we shall designate Juan Junior
and determine the relationship of Juan Junior to
some other persons within his blood relationship.
Juan Junior is related to the following:
REASONS FOR THE PROHIBITION OF VOID
MARRIAGES
It is the policy of the state to foster a
normal, peaceful, and wholesome integral nuclear
family unit which would constitute the very
foundation of society. The marriages described in
Article 38 will not serve the fundamental objective
of nurturing a stable family unit that can effectively
be the foundation of society.
The enumeration in Article 38 is exclusive.
COLLATERAL BLOOD RELATIVES BY
CONSANGUINITY
Marriage between collateral blood relatives
up to the fourth civil degree may disturb the policy
of the state as it may likely result though not of the
same gravity, in the dangers and confusion
attendant in incestuous marriages under Article 37.
The probability of this event is determined
by the coefficient of inbreeding, e.g., 0.125 for an
uncle-niece mating, 0.0625 for the mating of first
cousins, and 0.0156 in union of second cousins.
Relationship by consanguinity is in itself not capable
of dissolution.
1. Anita is a first cousin of Juan Junior and is
related to him by blood in the 4th collateral
civil degree. To connect the blood
relationship of Juan Junior and Anita, there
are four immediate relatives (Juan Sr., to
Lolo Carding, to Pedro, to Anita). Juan
Junior and Anita cannot marry each other.
2. Jane is a collateral relative by blood in the
3rd civil degree. Juan Junior and Jane
cannot therefore validly marry each other.
3. Roberta is a collateral relative by blood in
the 4th civil degree. The immediate and
nearest common ascendant of Roberta and
Juan Junior is Victoria. Juan Junior and
Roberta cannot therefore validly marry
each other.
4. Dolores is a collateral relative by blood in
the 5th civil degree. Juan Junior can
therefore validly marry Dolores because she
is not a collateral blood relative up to the
4th civil degree.
5. Leonor is a relative by blood in the 5th civil
degree but in the direct ascending line. Juan
Junior therefore cannot marry her pursuant
to Article 37(1) which provides that a
marriage between an ascendant and a
descendant of any degree is void.
COLLATERAL HALF-BLOOD RELATIVES BY
CONSANGUINITY
Under the Family Code, the prohibition
extends to the collateral blood relatives up to the
fourth civil degree which include one’s uncle, aunt,
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
niece, nephew, and first cousins.
However, it is interesting to point out that
the law does not provide that marriages between
collateral blood relatives by the half-blood are
prohibited.
law to marry their children-in-law because it is more
in keeping with Philippine customs and traditions
that parents-in-law treat children-in-law just like
their own children and vice-versa
Step-brother and step-sister can, however,
marry each other as this relationship by affinity is
not included in the prohibition.
EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE ON THE
“AFFINITY PROHIBITION”
In the illustration, Xeres is the son of Diana
and Angel. Lea is the daughter of Yolanda who, in
turn, is the daughter of Angel and Bea. Angel is the
nearest and immediate common ascendant of Xeres
and Lea. Lea and Xeres are relatives by
consanguinity in the 3rd civil degree. However, they
are only related in the half-blood because Lea
comes from the line of Bea and Angel, while Xeres
comes from the line of Diana and Angel. Lea and
Xeres are therefore related only through Angel
because they have different mothers. Xeres
therefore is the half-blood uncle of Lea.
Incestuous and void marriages were limited
to marriages between an ancestor and a
descendant and a brother and a sister of either the
whole or half-blood
Marriage between uncle and niece by the
half blood is not incestuous and void. The court’s
reason was that such a marriage is not specifically
included by law as a void marriage and, therefore,
cannot be considered as such.
In the event that the marriage is annulled or
nullified in accordance with law, relationship by
affinity is terminated.
The said persons become strangers to each
other. This will allow them there- fore to marry
each other legally.
CIVIL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW
In case a marriage is
terminated by the
death of one of the
spouses, there are
conflicting views:
Affinity relation
subsists even after the
death of the spouse
regardless of the
existence or nonexistence of children
The relationship by
affinity is dissolved
(those have no living
issues w/ children)
The relationship by
affinity is continued (w/
living issues w/
children)
RELATIONSHIP BY AFFINITY
ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIP
The doctrine of affinity grew out of the
canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and
wife one. The husband has the relation, by affinity,
to his wife’s blood relatives as she has to them by
consanguinity and vice versa.
The relationship created in adoption is
merely limited to one of parent and child. - Article
37(4), (5), (6), (7) and (8)
Affinity arises from marriage, by which each party
becomes related to all the consanguinei of the
other party to the marriage, but in such case these
respective consanguinei do not become related by
affinity to each other
The only marriages by affinity prohibited in
the Family Code are marriages between stepparents and step-children as well as parents-in-law
and children-in-law.
It is believed that these kinds of marital
relationships, if allowed, can most likely destroy the
peace- fulness of the family relations and also cause
disturbance within the family circle (extended
family ties); it would be scandalous for parents-in-
The adopter cannot marry the adopted and
the surviving spouse of the adopted. The adopted
cannot marry any of the following: the adopter, the
surviving spouse of the adopter, the legitimate child
of the adopter, and the other adopted children of
the adopter.
The law seeks to duplicate, insofar as
possible, the structure of the natural family and to
ensure that the “artificial” family will mirror a
natural family not only in terms of legal
relationships but also in the emotional content
and the social significance of such a relationship.
An adopted can validly marry the following:
the parents, illegitimate child, and other relatives,
whether by consanguinity or affinity, of the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
adopter.
If the marriage of the adopter and his or her
spouse is judicially nullified or annulled and barring
any other ground to make the marriage void, the
adopted can validly marry the previous spouse of
the adopter because such spouse is not a surviving
spouse as contemplated by law but a former spouse
who, after the finality of the nullity or annulment
decree, has become a complete stranger to the
adopter. Likewise and under the same condition,
the adopter can marry the spouse of the adopted if
the marriage of the adopted and his or her spouse
is severed by a final judicial nullity or annulment
decree.
INTENTIONAL KILLING OF SPOUSE
It must be emphasized that, in killing his or
her spouse, the guilty party must be animated by an
intention to marry another person; destructive not
only of the family but the whole society itself.
If a wife kills her husband because he was
an incorrigible philanderer and thereafter marries
her lawyer who has been defending her in the
criminal case, the marriage is valid. The reason for
killing the husband was obviously not for the
purpose of marrying the lawyer.
No prior criminal conviction by the court for
the killing is required by the law.
ARTICLE 39: The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe. (n) (Amended by Executive
Order Num- ber 227 dated July 17, 1987 and
further amended by Republic Act No. 8533
dated February 23, 1998)
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
The time within which to file an action for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage or to invoke
such nullity as a defense, whether in a direct or
collateral manner, does not prescribe.
There is no prescriptive period to nullify a
marriage under Article 36 even if the marriage were
celebrated before August 3, 1988. All void
marriages under the Family Code do not prescribe.
Any of the parties in a void marriage can file
a nullity case even though such party is the
wrongdoer. In declaring a marriage void, the State
expresses that it does not consider such a union as
serving the fundamental purpose of the state in
fostering and nurturing a family which is the
foundation of society.
“A petition for absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband and the wife — it
refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage” (Fujiki v Marinay, G.R. No. 196049)
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
March 4, 2003
This is the proposed rule on declaring
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages. (This is a simple summary of
what can be found in the Sections)
Section 1: This is the scope which can be found under
Chapter 3 of the Family Code of the Philippines, Void
and Voidable Marriage; Section 2: The guide in filing
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriages – Who may file, Where to file,
Imprescriptibility of action or defense and What to
allege; Section 3: The guide in filing a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages; Section 4: Where
can the petition be filed – the Family Court where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least 6 months prior to the date of filing; Section 5:
What should be the contents and form of the
petition; Section 6: The Court may summon
according to Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; Section 7:
Provides the court’s motion to dismiss; Section 8 to
Section 10 (respectively): Found here is the filing of
an answer of the respondent, when can an
investigation report of public officer commence, the
court may require a social worker to conduct a case
study; Section 11 to Section 15 (respectively):
Provides for the pre-trial (pre-trial mandatory and
notice of pre-trial), the pre-trial brief content, the
consequence in failure to appear at the pre-trial, the
pre-trial conference, and the pre-trial order; Section
16: Under circumstances that the court may prohibit
PARTIES
While the Family Code is silent as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage (Ninal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122), only the
husband or the wife can file a court case declaring
the marriage void.
circumstances; Section 17: Provides the trial; Section
18: The memoranda which the court may require in
support of the claims; Section 19: Provides the
decision; Section 20: Includes the appeal – the precondition and notice of appeal; Section 21: The
Family Court may proceed with the liquidation,
partition, distribution of the spouses which includes
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
custody and support; Section 22: The issuance of
decree of declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage; Section 23: The registration
and publication of the decree; Section 24: the duty
of the Family Court or the appellate court in the case
of the death of one of the parties; Section 25:
Effectivity.
ARTICLE 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declar- ing such previous marriage
void. (n)
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY
If a marriage between two contracting
parties is void ab initio, any one of them cannot
contract a subsequent valid marriage without a
previous judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous void marriage.
Though the first marriage is judicially
declared void, any subsequent marriage may still be
declared void because of the failure to comply with
Articles 52 and 53.
Nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction. An opportunity should be
given, when the evidence is obtainable and the
parties living, to have the proof of invalidity of such
marriage presented in the form of a judicial record,
so that it cannot be disputed or denied.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NEED FOR A
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY
Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the rule on the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage for purposes of
remarriage changed from time to time.
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Thus, by statute, the rule now is that there is a need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
only for purposes of remarriage.
As a consequence of these changing rules,
the status of a subsequent marriage depends upon
the time of the solemnization of the said
subsequent marriage.
“Article 40 should be given a retroactive effect”
(Jarillo v People, G.R. No. 164435)
The Supreme Court, in the case of Domingo
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 44 SCAD 955, 226 SCRA
572, had the occasion to discuss the reason for the
need to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity for
purposes of remarriage and the proper
interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code:
1. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as
a cause of action or a ground for defense.
2. parties to a marriage should not be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
Significantly, Article 40 of the Family Code,
which is a rule of procedure (Atienza v. Brillantes,
Jr., 60 SCAD 119, 243 SCRA 32), in effect states that
the only acceptable proof of the nullity of a first
marriage for purposes of remarriage is a judicial
declaration of nullity
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON PROVISIONAL ORDERS
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC
March 4, 2003
This is the proposed rule on Provisional
Orders to which the Court approved the same.
Section 1: those who can file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal
separation, the court may issue provisional orders
and protection orders with or without a hearing;
Section 2: the rules of determining of spousal
support; Section 3: the support of the children of the
spouses; Section 4: the right party or person who can
be granted the custody of the child who can provide
for the paramount consideration and moral welfare
of the child; Section 5: the appropriate visitation
rights to the parent who is not awarded provisional
custody unless disqualified by the court; Section 6:
that no child of the parties shall be brought out of
the country without prior order from the court if the
resolution of the petition is pending; Section 7: order
of protection which may be issued by the court;
Section 8: the court may issue a provisional order
appointing the applicant or a third person as receiver
or sole administrator of the common property
subject to such precautionary conditions it may
impose; Section 9: effectivity
ARTICLE 40 AND BIGAMY
If the first marriage is void and a party to that
first marriage subsequently remarries without
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, there is no doubt that the subsequent
marriage is likewise void.
ARTICLE 40 AND CRIMINAL BIGAMY
The crime of bigamy under our laws is
committed by any person who shall contract a
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceeding (Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code).
The crime of bigamy therefore contemplates a
situation where the first marriage is valid or at least
annullable and not void from the beginning.
However in the case of Mercado v. Mercado,
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122, the
Supreme Court held that the criminal offense of
bigamy is committed for as long as a subsequent
marriage was contracted by a person without him or
her obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of his or
her first marriage pursuant to Article 40 of the Family
Code.
When the criminal law on bigamy referred to
a “legally dissolved’’ marriage, it clearly
contemplates a marriage which is at least annullable
or voidable but not void.
Article 40 merely aims to put certainty as to
the void status of the subsequent marriage and is not
aimed as a provision to define bigamy under the
Family Code or criminal bigamy under the Revised
Penal Code.
PULIDO v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 220149
July 27, 2021
FACTS:
Luisito G. Pulido (petitioner) got married to Nora S.
Arcon when he was 16 and the latter, 22 years old in
1983. In 2007, after a couple of years of living
together, Pulido stopped coming home and when
confronted, he admitted his affair with Baleda. Arcon
filed a bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda in that
same year. The petitioner contends that he cannot
be held criminally liable for bigamy because of both
marriages being null and void: the first one lacks a
valid marriage license, and the second lacks a
marriage ceremony. On the other hand, Baleda said
she only knew of the first marriage sometime in 2007
and that she even filed a petition for annulment
before the bigamy case. In October of the same year,
the marriage of Pulido and Baleda was declared null
and void. The RTC acquitted Baleda and convicted
Pulido of bigamy. The CA affirmed the decision as the
declaration nullity of his marriage with Baleda would
not exonerate him from criminal liability. After a few
years in 2015, his marriage with Arcon was also
declared as void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage as provided under Article 40 of the
Family Code may be invoked as a defense in bigamy
cases.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity is not required to prove a void ab
initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy
case. Being inexistent from the beginning, the void
first marriage does not satisfy elements of bigamy
such as: requires the existence of a prior valid
marriage and requires that the former marriage has
not been legally annulled since, logically speaking,
there’s no marriage in the first place. The Court as
well clarifies that the requirement under Article 40
need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2015 Decision and
August 18, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 33008 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Luisito G. Pulido is ACQUITTED.
ARTICLE 41: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebra- tion of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purposes of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided for in this Code for the
decla- ration of presumptive death of the
absentee, with- out prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
ARTICLE 42: The subsequent marriage referred
to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of re- appearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or de- claring it void ab
initio.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in
the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of
any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance
being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (n)
LIQUIDATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE
The judicial declaration of presumptive
death should be issued for the purpose of
contracting the subsequent marriage.
After the issuance of this judicial
declaration, the properties of the first marriage
should be liquidated using by analogy the provisions
of Articles 103 and 130 of the Family Code if the
marriage to be liquidated is in itself valid.
BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF OF DEATH
Even if the first marriage is annullable or
voidable, any subsequent marriage celebrated
without such prior annullable or voidable marriage
being in fact annulled, is bigamous and therefore
void ab initio.
Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is a need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to remarry.
BIGAMY AND PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENT
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
As a general rule, no judicial declaration of
presumptive death is required as such presumption
arises from the law. It is only in Article 41 of the
Family Code that a judicial declaration of
presumptive death is mandatorily required by law
to be obtained by the present spouse only for the
purpose of capacitating the present spouse to
remarry.
EXCEPTION
A “bigamous” marriage may be considered
valid if, prior to the subsequent marriage and
without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance
of the other spouse, the present spouse obtains a
judicial declaration of presumptive death via a
summary proceeding in a court of competent
jurisdiction. It must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well founded belief that the
absent spouse is dead.
If the four-year period is applicable the missing
spouse is presumed dead after the lapse of the four
year-period.
The judicial declaration is merely a
statement to the effect that the prior spouse is
merely presumed dead. The declared presumption
will still be only prima facie, and can be overthrown
by evidence.
TERMINATION OF THE SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
The recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage pursuant to Article 42.
Such judicial declaration of presumptive
death is the best evidence of the “well-founded
belief” on the part of the present spouse that the
absent spouse is dead.
SWORN STATEMENT OF REAPPEARANCE
If the absent spouse reappears, such spouse
can easily terminate the subsequent marriage by
executing a sworn statement or affidavit of the fact
and circumstance of such reappearance and
recording the same with due notice to the spouses
of the subsequent marriage.
If a person, claiming to be the reappearing
spouse files such sworn statement and later it is
judicially determined that such alleged reappearing
spouse is actually an impostor, the automatic
termination will be rendered ineffectual.
Not being the real absent spouse or an
interested party, he or she is not qualified by law to
file such a sworn statement of reappearance.
Hence, the subsequent marriage will continue to
subsist.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
If he or she does not do so, then he or she
cannot just cause a disturbance in the subsequent
marriage without following the requirements of the
law.
5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate
and in- testate succession. (n)
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
If the judicial declaration of presumptive
death has already become final but the procedure
for notification was not followed and the
respondent was in fact not missing, the remedy of
annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals
must be availed of to declare the judicial
declaration of presumptive death null and void.
ARTICLE 44: If both spouses of the subsequent
marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law. (n)
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
STATUS OF CHILDREN
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceeding.
Under Article 43, children conceived during
the subsequent marriage contemplated in Article 41
in cases of presumptive death of one of the spouses
and before termination of the same shall be
considered legitimate because the children have
been conceived either inside a valid bigamous
marriage or inside a valid marriage despite the nonobservance of Articles 40, 52 and 53.
EFFECT OF TERMINATION ON THE PROPERTY
REGIME
ARTICLE 43: The termination of the subsequent
marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall produce the following effects:
1) The children of the subsequent marriage
conceived prior to its termination shall be
considered legitimate and their custody and
support in case of dispute shall be decided by
the court in a proper proceeding;
2) The absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith,
his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeit- ed in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previ- ous
marriage or in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted
the marriage in bad faith, such donations
made to said donee are revoked by operation
of law;
4) The innocent spouse may revoke the
designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated
as irrevocable; and
The spouses shall divide the property
equally or in accordance with the sharing stipulated
in a valid marriage settlement, unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of share by either of the
spouses upon the judicial separation of the
property.
If either of the spouses acted in bad faith,
the guilty spouse shall not get his share in the net
profits of the property regime.
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
Donations are essentially gratuitous. Hence,
if both parties are in good faith, the donation by
reason of marriage shall be valid even in the event
that the subsequent marriage has been terminated.
It shall also be valid even if the donor acted in bad
faith in contracting the marriage.
If the donee acted in bad faith in
contracting the marriage, the donation by reason of
marriage ipso jure is terminated by operation of
law. This rule applies with more reason if both
parties acted in bad faith considering that in such a
case, the marriage is void in accordance with Article
44 and therefore, the principal consideration for
such donation does not exist.
If the present spouse, after obtaining the
judicial declaration of presumptive death and
before celebration of the subsequent marriage, is
able to talk to the reappearing spouse, thereby
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
knowing that he or she is alive, such present spouse
is already in bad faith.
Article 44, however, provides that, where
both parties are in bad faith, testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law.
DESIGNATION AS BENEFICIARY IN INSURANCE
POLICY
The innocent spouse has the choice of
revoking or maintaining as beneficiary in an
insurance policy the other spouse who acted in bad
faith. If the innocent spouse opts to revoke, he can
do so even if the designation as beneficiary is
irrevocable.
DISQUALIFICATION AS TO INHERITANCE
The spouse who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession.
If both parties in the subsequent marriage
are in bad faith, such marriage is void and,
according to Article 44, testamentary dis- positions
made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. If a marriage is void, the
contracting parties cannot likewise inherit by
intestate succession because no legal relation binds
them.
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED IN BAD FAITH
If the subsequent marriage in cases under
Article 41 were contracted where only one of the
parties, whether the present spouse or the new
spouse, to the subsequent marriage was in bad
faith, the said marriage is still valid.
If the present spouse were able to
personally know that the absent spouse was in fact
alive prior to the issuance of any judicial declaration
of presumptive death, such present spouse should
not be issued such a judicial declaration.
It is important to note that the good faith of
the present spouse must be present up to the time
of the celebration of the subsequent marriage. In
other words, the present spouse must not be in bad
faith up to the time of the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage.
Article 44 clearly provides that the
subsequent marriage shall be considered void only
if both spouses in the said subsequent marriage are
in bad faith.
CASE DIGEST: Ngo Te v. Yu-Te
G.R. No. 161793
February 13, 2009
PETITIONER: Edward Kenneth Ngo Te
RESPONDENT: Rowena Ong Guterrez Yu-Te
DOCTRINE: In the ruling of Marcos v. Marcos, it
was held that there is no requirement that the
person be declared psychologically incapacitated
be personally be examined by a physician if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met the
respondent, Rowena Yu-Te during their college
years. The petitioner decided to court the
respondent when he had no chance to be the
boyfriend of the respondent’s close friend.
Since they can relate with each other’s family
issues, they became close and became
sweethearts. They decided to elope but the
petitioner’s savings was not enough to sustain
them for more than a month and they could not
find a job, so they decided to go back to their
family.
However, the respondent threatened the
petitioner that she would commit suicide if he will
not stay with her. With that, the petitioner agreed
and stayed with the respondent together with the
respondent’s uncle. They eventually decided to
get married and stay with the respondent’s uncle.
During his stay, he was treated like a prisoner and
the respondent’s uncle threatened him by
showing his gun and warned him not to leave the
respondent.
After a month, the petitioner was able to escape
and went back to his parents. His parents hide him
from the respondent whenever she’s looking for
him.
When he got reconnected to the respondent, the
respondent decided that it was better for them to
live separately.
After almost 4 years, the petitioner filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with the respondent
on the basis of the latter’s psychological
incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the parties
is null and void based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the parties is null and
void on the grounds of psychological incapacity
since jurisprudence provides the following
guidelines in the interpretation of Article 36:
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution.
2. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity should be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The marital obligations must be embraced
by Articles 68-71 and 220, 221, and 225 of
the Family Code.
7. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church of the Philippines should
be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state.
However, it must be noted that the
aforementioned guidelines should be treated
differently and apply it on a case-to-case basis. In
the ruling of Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that
there is no requirement that the person be
declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally be examined by a physician if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of
dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding
and concomitant compliance with one’s essential
marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not
a medical illness that has been medically or
clinically identified; hence expert opinion is not
required.
In the case at bar, the seriousness of the diagnosis
and the gravity of both parties cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect, and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for the petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by other persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has
no sense of his identity as a person, and has no
goals and clear direction of life. As for the
respondent, the findings show that she is
impulsive and domineering she had no qualms in
manipulating the petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide. Thus, their
marriage is declared as null and void on the
grounds of psychological incapacity.
The petitioner filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage, claiming that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations to
her.
CASE DIGEST: Tan-Andal v. Andal
G.R. No. 196359
May 11, 2021
PETITIONER: Rosanna l. Tan-Andal
RESPONDENT: Mario Victor M. Andal
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent met through
the Legion of Mary at the Saints Peter and Paul
Parish in Makati. They lost contact with each other
but reconnected through their childhood friends.
The respondent pursued the petitioner during his
two-month vacation from his work in Italy. Before
he left, the petitioner agreed to have dinner with
him. They eventually became a couple and decided
to get married.
The respondent left his job in Italy and stayed with
the petitioner. They only have one daughter.
During their marriage, the petitioner noticed that
the respondent had a difficulty in managing his
finances, and that he is emotionally immature,
irresponsible, irritable, and has a psychological
imbalance. Not being able to stand this, the
petitioner confronted the respondent. The
respondent admittedly that he uses marijuana and
refused to get rehabilitated despite the effort of
the petitioner.
After 4 years of marriage, they separated and the
petitioner has kept the sole custody of their child.
With that, the respondent filed a petition for the
custody of their child praying that he will be
allowed to exercise parental authority over his
daughter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Mario and
Rosanna is void due to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between Mario and Rosanna is
void due to psychological incapacity since
jurisprudence provides that the restrictive
interpretation resulting from the application of the
Molina guidelines, the court pronounced in the
case of Ngo Te v. Yu-Te that jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective
by which psychological incapacity should be
viewed, a view that is totally inconsistent with the
way the concept was formulated.
In the basis of the second Molina guideline, the
parties need to present evidence of the root cause
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
of the psychological incapacity and the root cause
should be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts. However, the Code
Committee made it clear that psychological
incapacity is not a mental incapacity nor a
personality disorder that must be proven through
expert opinion. What is needed is proof of the
durable or enduring aspects of a person’s
personality, called “personality structure” which
make it impossible for him or her to understand
and comply with his or her marital obligations. This
proof can be proven by ordinary witnesses who
have been present in the life of the spouses before
they
contracted
marriage.Furthermore,
psychological incapacity is not an illness in a
medical sense and it is incurable in a legal sense,
meaning, the incapacity is so enduring and
persistent with respect to a specific partner, and
contemplates a situation where couple’s
respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result
of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of marriage.
In this case, it is clear and convincing that the
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations and
that it is rooted primarily through his childhood
and adult experiences before he married Rosanna.
The totality of evidence presented by the
petitioner clearly convincingly proved that the
respondent’s drug abuse was of sufficient
durability that antedates the marriage due to
failure to render mutual help and support to his
wife, failing to find gainful employment and even
driving to bankruptcy the construction firm
founded by wife for his drug use. Thus, the court
ruled that the marriage between the contracting is
void ab initio due to psychological incapacity.
CASE DIGEST: Marcos v. Marcos
G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000
PETITIONER:
Brenda
B.
RESPONDENT: Wilson G. Marcos
between the two, to the point that the respondent
will physically harm the petitioner as well as their
children.
Not being able to withstand this, the petitioner
filed a petition to declare their marriage void since
the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case – including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner’s sister and the social worker – was
enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
RULING:
No, the totality of the evidence in the present case
was not enough to sustain a finding that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated
since the law provides that the psychological
incapacity should be present at the time the
contracting parties have celebrated their
marriage. In this case, there is absolutely no
showing that his defects were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable.
Instead, the behavior of the respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than 6 years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the
family home. Furthermore, the court also ruled
that his condition is not incurable since he was
able now to get a job as a tax driver. Thus, the
court ruled that the psychological illness is not
present during the inception of the marriage
making it not a ground to declare their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
CASE DIGEST: Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente
G.R. No. 188400
March 8, 2017
Marcos
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity should be present during
the inception of marriage.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent met when they
were assigned to work at the Malacanang Palace.
They became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts. After their marriage, the respondent
left the military service and engaged in different
business ventures but did not prosper. The
petitioner then encouraged the respondent to
look for work so that their children will see him as
a good provider. However, the respondent was
not able to get a job which often caused a quarrel
PETITIONER: Maria Teresa B. Tani-De La Fuente
RESPONDENT: Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity should be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent met and
became lovers when they were students at the
University of Sto. Tomas.
The petitioner was able to finish her college
degree and was able to find work in their Alma
Mater. On the other hand, the respondent was not
able to finish his college degree and continue to
work in their family’s printing press business.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Even before contracting into a marriage, the
petitioner already noticed that the respondent
was introvert and prone to jealousy. This attitude
worsened when they got married to the point that
he got jealous of his cousin and poked a gun at
him. The petitioner also said that he was treated
like a sex slave.
The petitioner sought the advice of a doctor, a
lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person that she
thought could help them. However, the
respondent refused.
Eventually, the petitioner decided to file a petition
for declaration of nullity due to psychological
incapacity of the respondent when they had
quarreled due to the jealousy of the respondent to
the point that he poked a gun at the petitioner’s
head.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage because the evidence of the petitioner
was insufficient to prove that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital
obligation.
RULING:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
since jurisprudence provides that psychological
incapacity should be characterized by gravity,
juridical
antecedence,
and
incurability.
Furthermore, non-examination of one of the
parties will not automatically render as hearsay or
invalidate the findings of the examining expert,
since marriage involves only two persons. It was
also emphasized that in the Molina ruling, it does
not require a physician to examine a person and
declare
him/her
to
be
psychologically
incapacitated. WHat matters is that the totality of
evidence presented establishes the party’s
psychological condition.
In this case, the testimony of the psychologist, as
corroborated by the petitioner, sufficiently proved
that the respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity. The respondent’s paranoid personality
made him distrustful and prone to extreme
jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him
to fully comprehend and assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It was also found that the
root cause was hereditary in nature as his own
father suffered from a similar disorder which also
established the juridical antecedence of the
respondent’s psychological incapacity showing
that it happens even before their marriage. Lastly,
the incurability and severity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was proven since the
respondent refused to admit that he needs to be
treated, which is a clear sign of paranoid
personality disorder. Given all these, the marriage
of the petitioner and the respondent is declared
null and void.
CASE DIGEST: Matudan v. Republic of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 203284
November 14, 2016
PETITIONER:
Nicolas
S.
Matudan
RESPONDENT: Republic of the Philippines and
Marilyn B. Matudan
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family code must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent were married
in Samar and had four children. When the
respondent went abroad, the petitioner never
heard anything back from her. After 23 years, the
petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage contending that before, during, and
after his marriage to the respondent, the latter
was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her
obligations as a wife and mother which is
supported by the evaluation of a Clinical
Psychologist claiming that the respondent’s
psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and
incurable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was able to prove
the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No, the petitioner was not able to prove the
respondent’s psychological incapacity since
jurisprudence provides that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family code
must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. Thus, the incapacity
must be grave or serious that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage, and that it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage.
In this case, the petitioner’s judicial affidavit and
testimony during trial failed to show gravity and
juridical antecedence by providing contradicting
claims. The petitioner complained that the
respondent lacked a sense of guilt and was
involved in activities defying social and moral
ethics. However, the petitioner contradicted these
claims by testifying that they were happily married
and never had a fight. and the only reason for
seeking nullity in their marriage was because of
the complete abandonment of the respondent of
the marriage and family. Furthermore, the
testimony of the daughter cannot be of help since
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
she was only two years old when the respondent
left the family, making it impossible for her to have
any idea of her mother’s claimed psychological
incapacity, including nature, history, and gravity.
Thus, the court denied the petition of declaring
nullity of the marriage between the petitioner and
the respondent due to psychological incapacity of
the latter.
CASE DIGEST: Castillo v. Republic of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 214064
February 6, 2017
PETITIONER:
Mirasol
Castillo
RESPONDENT: Republic of the Philippines and
Felipe Impas
DOCTRINE:
The courts must treat expert’s opinions as decisive
but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. The trial court must always
base its decision solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of proceedings.
regarding the psychological temperament of
parties in order to determine the aforementioned
characteristics of psychological incapacity.
However, the courts must treat expert’s opinions
as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. The trial
court must always base its decision solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course
of proceedings.
In the case at bar, the court ruled that the totality
of the evidence presented failed to establish the
respondent’s psychological incapacity since there
was no factual findings which can serve as bases
for the expert’s conclusion of the respondent’s
psychological incapacity as she evaluated the
respondent’s psychological condition indirectly
from the information gathered from the petitioner
and her witness. The lack of corroborative witness
and evidence regarding Felipe’s upbringing and
family history renders the expert’s opinion on the
root cause of his psychological incapacity
conjecture or speculative. Thus, the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent was
not declared as null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent became friends
since their parents were good friends and business
partners. They eventually became sweethearts.
During their courtship, the petitioner discovered
that the respondent had an affair with his former
girlfriend. They were able to resolve this issue with
the intervention of their parents.
They got married and blessed with 2 children.
However, after 27 years of being married, the
petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity which is manifested by his husband’s
irresponsible acts like cohabitating with another
woman, not communicating with her, and not
supporting their children without any reason.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented
warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration
of nullity of the marriage of the petitioner and the
respondent on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
No, the totality of evidence presented was not
able to warrant the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of the petitioner and the respondent on
the ground of psychological incapacity since
jurisprudence provides that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. In line with
this, it is logical and understandable to give weight
to the expert opinions furnished by experts
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
MODULE 3: LEGAL SEPARATION
Reference/s:
Sta. Maria
Rabuya
Tiu Note: check the material of TIU for the
associated sections and rules to the assigned
provisions.
Article 45 to 54
CASES:
CASE DIGEST: Aquino v Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853
July 27, 1960
PETITIONERS: FERNANDO AQUINO
RESPONDENTS: CONCHITA DELIZO
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the annulment of the marriage
between parties can persist on the ground of
fraud.
RULING:
Yes. Concealment of pregnancy at the time of
marriage constitutes fraud as ground for
annulment. The evidence presented, Affidavit of
Cesar Aquino who admitted as the father of the
defendant’s first born and the plaintiff’s brother,
Affidavit of the defendant who admitted the
concealment of her pregnancy from the plaintiff
and the birth certificate of the child were found to
be sufficient to constitute fraud alleged by the
plaintiff. A new trial was ordered, the decision was
set aside, and the case remanded to trial court for
hearing evidence.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against the defendant for
the alleged concealment from her husband, the
plaintiff that she was pregnant by another man at
the date of their marriage on December 27, 1954.
Four months after their marriage, the defendant
gave birth to a child sometime in April 1955. The
defendant answered that the child was conceived
between her and the plaintiff. The complaint filed
was based on the grounds of fraud for the
annulment of their marriage.
At the trial, only the marriage certificate of both
parties was presented. Without the birth
certificate of the child born after the marriage, the
trial court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff
filed a “petition to reopen for reception of
additional evidence” to present the birth
certificate but it was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court
affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the
claim of the plaintiff to not have noticed the
pregnancy when he married her was found to be
unbelievable. The plaintiff then filed a motion for
reconsideration for a new trial. The court then
denied the motion for it “does not believe the
veracity of the contents of the motion and its
annexes”. Thus, a petition for certiorari to review
was filed.
CASE DIGEST: Anaya v Palaroan
G.R. No. L-15853
July 27, 1960
PETITIONERS: AURORA A. ANAYA
RESPONDENTS: FERNANDO O. PALAROAN
FACTS:
On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to
Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a
complaint to annul it on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint
and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the
amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando allegedly divulged that several months
prior to the marriage, he had premarital
relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya
filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover
moral damages.
Fernando denied having had a pre-marital
relationship with a close relative and having
committed any fraud against Aurora. He did not
pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its
dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral
damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
had no intention of performing his marital duties
and obligations since the marriage was contracted
as a means for him to escape marrying the close
relative that was intimated above. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's
allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to
invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.
ISSUE/S:
Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his
pre-marital relationship with another woman a
ground for annulment of marriage?
RULING:
No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital
relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute
a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded
by the last paragraph of the article, providing that
"no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ...
chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. While a woman may detest such nondisclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having
been thereby cheated into giving her consent to
the marriage, nevertheless the law does not
assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly
given, for upon marriage she entered an
institution in which society, and not herself alone,
is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain,
the Court's duty is to give effect to the same,
whether it agrees with the rule or not.
CASE DIGEST: Sarao v Guevarra
40 OG 11 Supp 263
May 31, 1940
PETITIONERS: FELIX SARAO
RESPONDENTS: PILAR GUEVARRA
FACTS:
On June 3, 1936, Felix Sarao and Pilar Guevara
were married in Manila and on the same day, the
two had sexual intercourse. Although he found her
vagina to be of adequate size, Pilar complained of
feeling pains when they had sex. He likewise
noticed purulent material from Pilar’s vagina
which was offensive to his smell. On August 7,
1936, Pilar underwent surgery to remove her
uterus and ovaries because they were found to be
infected by a tumor. According to the physician,
the operation rendered Pilar incapable of
procreation, but it did not incapacitate her for
copulation. After the said operation, Felix declared
that he has lost interest to have sex with his wife.
This prompted him to file for the annulment of
their marriage. Even after claiming impotency as
grounds for annulment, the Court of First Instance
of Laguna dismissed Felix’s petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the phrase “physically incapable of
entering into a married state” of Sec 30 of Act No.
3613 refers to incapacity to procreate.
RULING:
No. Sec. 30 of the Act No. 3613 states that
marriage can be annulled if “either party was, at
the time of marriage, physically incapable of
entering into the married state, and such
incapacity continues and is incurable.”
Since the country’s marriage law at that time was
of American origin, said provisions were
interpreted following American decisions.
According to Keezer, the test of impotency does
not refer to the ability to procreate, but the ability
to copulate. Moreover, it was cited that such
impotency must be permanent and lasting.
It should also be noted that Pilar was not impotent
when she married. It was the surgery which
rendered her sterile, but she was still capable of
intercourse. It was Felix’s disgust of Pilar’s sexual
organ during their honeymoon which made him
not willing to copulate with her from then on out.
Felix’s claim that his consent to marry was
fraudulent because he was unaware of Pilar’s
disease is untenable. This was not alleged in the
filed complaint, and it has not been proven in trial.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
CASE DIGEST: Sarao v Guevarra
40 OG 11 Supp 263
May 31, 1940
PETITIONERS: FELIX SARAO
It should also be noted that Pilar was not impotent
when she married. It was the surgery which
rendered her sterile, but she was still capable of
intercourse. It was Felix’s disgust of Pilar’s sexual
organ during their honeymoon which made him
not willing to copulate with her from then on out.
Felix’s claim that his consent to marry was
fraudulent because he was unaware of Pilar’s
disease is untenable. This was not alleged in the
filed complaint, and it has not been proven in trial.
RESPONDENTS: PILAR GUEVARRA
FACTS:
On June 3, 1936, Felix Sarao and Pilar Guevara
were married in Manila and on the same day, the
two had sexual intercourse. Although he found her
vagina to be of adequate size, Pilar complained of
feeling pains when they had sex. He likewise
noticed purulent material from Pilar’s vagina
which was offensive to his smell. On August 7,
1936, Pilar underwent surgery to remove her
uterus and ovaries because they were found to be
infected by a tumor. According to the physician,
the operation rendered Pilar incapable of
procreation, but it did not incapacitate her for
copulation. After the said operation, Felix declared
that he has lost interest to have sex with his wife.
This prompted him to file for the annulment of
their marriage. Even after claiming impotency as
grounds for annulment, the Court of First Instance
of Laguna dismissed Felix’s petition.
CASE DIGEST: Republic v Villacorta
GR No. 249953
June 23, 2021
PETITIONERS: FELIX VILLACORTA
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the phrase “physically incapable of
entering into a married state” of Sec 30 of Act No.
3613 refers to incapacity to procreate.
RULING:
No. Sec. 30 of the Act No. 3613 states that
marriage can be annulled if “either party was, at
the time of marriage, physically incapable of
entering into the married state, and such
incapacity continues and is incurable.”
Since the country’s marriage law at that time was
of American origin, said provisions were
interpreted following American decisions.
According to Keezer, the test of impotency does
not refer to the ability to procreate, but the ability
to copulate. Moreover, it was cited that such
impotency must be permanent and lasting.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
FACTS:
Melvin and Janufi met in March of 1996 while they
were both studying at Southwestern University,
Cebu City. They became sweethearts but ended
their relationship in 2000. Thereafter, Melvin
heard that Janufi began dating someone who was
working near the establishment where she was
then employed.
In April of 2001, Melvin learned that Janufi was
pregnant. Melvin was "surprised" and "doubtful"
to learn Janufi was already one month pregnant
because they had sexual intercourse only in March
of 2001. Although Melvin doubted the paternity of
the child, Janufi supposedly assured him that he
was the only person she had sexual intercourse
with. This put his doubts to rest.
The Republic argues that the RTC decision
annulling the marriage is not in accord with law
and jurisprudence because the Family Code
expressly provides that a marriage may be
annulled based on fraud through concealment
only if "x x x at the time of the marriage, the wife
was pregnant, and she concealed the fact that
such pregnancy was by a man other than her
husband." In the case at bar, Mejan Dia was
already almost three years old when Melvin and
Janufi got married on August 4, 2004. Evidently,
Janufi was not pregnant at the time of her
marriage and Article 46(2) cannot apply.
On December 1, 2001, Janufi gave birth to a baby
girl named Mejan Dia and she and Melvin then
began living together. After almost three years on
August 14, 2004, Melvin and Janufi finally got
married. On October 18, 2004, Janufi gave birth to
a second child named Javen Mel.
During their marriage, the couple quarreled about
ordinary things. Often, however, the paternity of
Mejan Dia would become an issue. During a dinner
party in 2010, Melvin and Janufi quarreled, and the
issue of Mejan Dia's paternity was brought up in
the presence of their relatives. This drove Melvin
to finally take a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
Parentage Examination (DNA test) at Hi-Precision
Diagnostics. In November of 2010, the results of
the DNA test were released, which revealed that
there was a 0.0% probability that Melvin was the
father of Mejan Dia.
On January 12, 2011, Melvin received a text
message from Janufi stating that she had no
intention to deceive Melvin into acknowledging
paternity, but it only happened once while she was
drunk, and that she never thought her one-time
"sin" would "bear fruit." The message also stated
that Janufi was shocked at the result of the DNA
test and could not believe that Melvin was not the
father of Mejan Dia. On March 6, 2011, Melvin
received another text message purportedly sent
by Janufi admitting to telling white lies because
she did not want to hurt Melvin. Nevertheless,
Melvin filed a petition for annulment of marriage
before the RTC on March 15, 2011. On May 11,
2011, Janufi filed her answer with prayer for
support pendente lite.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the concealment of Janufi about
the truth of her pregnancy is ground for
annulment even if the child was already 3 years old
at the time of their marriage
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Layug
RULING:
No. Marriage to Janufi Sol P. Villacorta (Janufi) on
the ground of fraud under Article 45(3)8 in relation
to Article 46(2)9 of the Family Code is ground for
annulment but it must be construed that the
concealed pregnancy at the time of marriage did
not took place as the child was already born.
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Teresita
Masauding
DOCTRINE (Related to Subject):
In this regard, the OSG correctly argues that the
concealed pregnancy, which vitiates consent, must
have existed at the time of the marriage. Justice
Eduardo Caguioa explains that "[t]he essence of
the fraud in this case is the non-disclosure of the
present pregnancy of the wife x x x the pregnancy
must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, thus, if the wife had previous relations
with other men and as a consequence of which she
became pregnant or bore a child previously, the
concealment thereof will not be a ground for
annulling the marriage if at the time the marriage
was celebrated the wife was not pregnant.” It is
the concealment of the fact of pregnancy by
another man at the time of marriage that
constitutes fraud as a ground for annulment. "No
other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage."
In the instant case, the facts readily reveal that
Mejan Dia was already almost three years old
when Melvin and Janufi got married on August 4,
2004.63 As Janufi was not pregnant at the time of
the marriage, any purported fraud she may have
committed to induce Melvin to marry her cannot
be considered the fraudulent concealment
contemplated under Article 46(2).
ART 363 of the Civil Code & Art. 213 of the
Family Code:
G.R NO# 115640
DATE: March 15, 1995
PETITIONERS: Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma
Article 363 (Civil Code). In all
questions on the care, custody,
education and property of
children the latter's welfare shall
be paramount. No mother shall
be separated from her child
under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.
-
Art. 213 (Family Code). In case of
separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The
Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit.
-
If a child is under seven years of
age, Article 363 of the Civil Code
presumes that the mother is the
best custodian. The presumption
is strong but it is non-conclusive.
It can be overcome by
“compelling reasons”. If a child is
over seven, his choice is
paramount, but again, the court
is not bound by that choice. In its
discretion, the court may find the
chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, even
to a third party as it deems fit
under the circumstances (Article
213, Family Code).
FACTS:
-
CASE DIGEST: _Espiritu____ V. __CA__
-
The petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and the
private respondent Teresita Masauding
met each other in 1976 at Iligan City.
Teresita went abroad and soon enough
Reynaldo - followed, the two cohabited
with each other and in 1986 they had
their first child Rosalind Therese.
Sometime in 1987, they got married in
the Philippines and after going back to
the US they had their second child,
Reginald Vince in 1988.The marriage
became sour and they separated Teresita
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
left her family and went to California in
1990. Reynaldo went back to the
Philippines with the children, however,
due to his job he had to leave the
children with her sister the co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and went back to the US.
Teresita went back to the Philippines in
1992 and filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. In 1993 the trial court
dismissed the aforesaid petition awarding
the custody of the children to the
petitioner Reynaldo. In 1994 the Court of
Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices
de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring,
reversed the trial court’s decision. It gave
custody to Teresita and visitation rights
on weekends to Reynaldo. Reynaldo
assailed the aforementioned decision and
brought the matter to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE/S:
-
Whether or not the custody of the two
children should be awarded to the
mother
RULING:
- No. In questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the
latter’s welfare shall be paramount, and that
for compelling reasons, even a child under
seven may be ordered separated from the
mother. The judgment was rendered at the
time the 2 children were both over 7 years of
age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is
evident in the records and expert testimonies
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his
father or aunt. She was found suffering from
emotional shock caused by her mother’s
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in
the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit
well in fact he has been trying his best to give
the children the kind of attention and care
which their mother is not in the position to
extend. On the other hand, the mother’s
conviction for the crime of bigamy and her
illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality
conflicts at least with the daughter.
CONCLUSION:
- Hence, petition was granted. Custody of
the minors was reinstated to their father.
CASE DIGEST: __Lim-Lua_______ V. _Lua___
G.R NO# 175279-80
DATE: June 5, 2013
PETITIONERS: Susan Lim-Lua
RESPONDENTS: Danilo Y. Lua
DOCTRINE (Related to Subject):
- Section 1. When Issued (A.M. No. 02-1112-SC). Upon receipt of a verified petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or for annulment of voidable
marriage, or for legal separation, and at any
time during the proceeding, the court, motu
proprio or upon verified application of any of
the parties, guardian or designated custodian,
may temporarily grant support pendente lite
prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a
court does not need to delve fully into the
merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is
tasked to do is determine the kind and
amount of evidence which may suffice to
enable it to justly resolve the application. It is
enough that the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.
- A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC (Proposed Rule on
Provisional Orders
FACTS:
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the
RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite for
herself and her two children, petitioner sought
the amount of Php500,000 as monthly support,
citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries
and dividends in several companies and
businesses here and abroad. After due hearing,
RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code,
stating that support is demandable from the
time plaintiff needed the said support but is
payable only from the date of judicial demand,
and thus also granted support pendente lite of
P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months
that lapsed). Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not
entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
from their children and respondent has continued
to support the family for their sustenance and
well-being in accordance with family’s social and
financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted
by the trial court as monthly support pendente
lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive
support, respondent found it unconscionable
and beyond the intendment of the law for
not having considered the needs of the
respondent. The Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. His second motion also having been
denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari
in the CA.CA nullified RTC’s ruling and changed
the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court
said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by
respondent consisting of the purchase and
maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition
fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry goods and
books, which certainly inured to the benefit not
only of the two children, but their mother
(petitioner) as well, and thus ordered the
deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80
from the current total support in arrears of
Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their
two children. It also noted the lack of
contribution from the petitioner in the joint
obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE/S:
- Whether certain expenses already
incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to
petitioner and her children.
RULING:
- SC declared that the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED.
- As a matter of law, the amount of
support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give
each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the
needs of the recipient. Such support
comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Upon receipt of a verified petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or for annulment of voidable
marriage, or for legal separation, and at any
time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified application
of any of the parties, guardian or
designated custodian, may temporarily
grant support pendent lite prior to the
rendition of the judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court
does not need to delve fully into the merits of
the case before it can settle an application for
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is
determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly
resolve the application. It is enough that
affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record establish the facts. In
this case, the amount of monthly support
pendente lite for petitioner and her two
children was determined after due hearing
and submission of documentary evidence by
the parties. Although the amount fixed by the
trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear
that the monthly support pendente lite of
Php115,000.000 ordered by the CA was
intended primarily for the sustenance of
petitioner and her children, e.g., food,
clothing, salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the
cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
medicine.
- As to financial capacity of the respondent,
it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide
for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his.
- The Family Court may direct the
deduction of the provisional support from the
salary of the parent. Since the amount of the
monthly support pendent lite as fixed by the
CA was not appealed by either party, there is
no controversy as to its sufficiency and
reasonableness. The dispute concerns the
deductions made by respondent in settling
the support in arrears. The amounts already
extended to the two children; being a
commendable act of petitioner, should be
continued by him considering the vast
financial resources at his disposal.
ART 199. “Family Code” — laws
CASE DIGEST: _Mangonon_ V. _CA__
G.R NO# 125041
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
DATE: June 30, 2006
PETITIONERS: Ma. Belen B. Mangonon, for and in
behalf of her minor children Rebecca Angela
Delgado and Regina Isabel Delgado
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon.
Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge,
RTC-Makati, Branch 149, Federico C. Delgado and
Francisco C. Delgado
DOCTRINE (Related to Subject):
- As stipulated in Article 199 of the Family
Code, respondent Francisco, as a direct family
member of Rica and Rina, holds the
responsibility to offer assistance to his
granddaughters when their parent are unable
to do so, and it is supported by the
petitioner’s evidence that Francisco
possesses the financial capability to support
his granddaughters' education. As to the
amount of support pendente lite, we take our
bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be
proportionate to the resources or means of
the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
With this, we determine that respondent
Francisco is accountable for half of Rica and
Rina’s educational expenses incurred as
support pendente lite, while also
acknowledging the potential completion of
their education before the promulgation of
the decision and thus granting support
pendente lite in arrears, from the time they
entered college to the culmination of their
studies.
- Article. 199. Whenever two or more
persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree;
and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
FACTS:
- On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen
B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then
minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with
application for support pendente lite with the
RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged
that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and
respondent Federico Delgado were civilly
married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio
Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time,
petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old.
As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent per Article 85 of the New
Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975
by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
- On 25 March 1976, or within seven
months after the annulment of their
marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica
and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with
the assistance of her second husband Danny
Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as
private respondents had totally abandoned
them. At the time of the institution of the
petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter
college in the United States of America
(USA)where petitioner, together with her
daughters and second husband, had moved
to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to
the University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
while Rina was accepted by the Long Island
University and Western New England College.
Despite their admissions to said universities,
Rica and Rina were, however, financially
incapable of pursuing collegiate education
because of the following: i) The average
annual cost for college education in the US is
about US$22,000/year, broken down as
follows: Tuition Fees US$13,000.00 Room &
Board 5,000.00 Books 1,000.00 Yearly
Transportation & Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00 Or a total of
US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and
Rina.
ISSUE/S:
- Whether or not Federico is obliged to
provide support.
RULING:
-
Yes. In this case, this Court believes that
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
respondent Francisco could not avail himself
of the second option. From the records, we
gleaned that prior to the commencement of
this action, the relationship between
respondent Francisco, on one hand, and
petitioner and her twin daughters, on the
other, was indeed quite pleasant. The
correspondences exchanged among them
expressed profound feelings of
thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s
well-being. The photographs presented by
petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a
seemingly typical family celebrating kinship.
All of these, however, are now things of the
past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the
parties, the relationships among the parties
had certainly been affected. Particularly
difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact
that those who they had considered and
claimed as family denied having any familial
relationship with them. Given all these, we
could not see Rica and Rina moving back here
in the Philippines in the company of those
who have disowned them.
- Finally, as to the amount of support
pendente lite, we take our bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount
of support to be proportionate to the sources
or means of the giver and to the necessities
of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we
hold respondent Francisco liable for half of
the amount of school expenses incurred by
Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As
established by petitioner, respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to pay
this amount given his various business
endeavors.
ART 40. “Family Code” — laws
CASE DIGEST: ___Domingo___ V. __CA____
G.R NO# 104818
DATE: September 17, 1993
PETITIONERS: Roberto Domingo
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Delia
Soledad Avera represented by her Attorney-inFact Moises R. Avera
DOCTRINE (Related to Subject):
- Article 40. The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void
- The Declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Art. 40 may be resorted to even for a
purpose other than remarriage. A person can
conceive of other instances other than
remarriages, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution, and
separation of property between the spouses,
as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes.
- Marriage is an "inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;" as
such, it "shall be protected by the State. As a
matter of policy, there should be a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, and a
party should not declare for himself or herself
whether or not the marriage is void.
FACTS:
- Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad
in 1976 while being married with Emerlina
dela Paz. He has been unemployed and
completely dependent upon Delia, who has
been working in Saudi Arabia, for support and
subsistence. Delia only found out about the
prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for
bigamy in 1983. In 1989, she found out that
Roberto was cohabiting with another woman
and he was disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge and
consent. In May 1991, Delia filed a petition
for judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Roberto and separation of
property.
ISSUE/S:
- Whether or not a petition for judicial
declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If
in affirmative, whether the same should be
filed only for purpose of remarriage.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
RULING:
- Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purpose
of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
- The requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that
his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy
- Article 40 as finally formulated included
the significant clause denotes that final
judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes
of remarriage. A person can conceive of other
instances other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property
between the spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common
children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
however, one is required by law to show
proof that the previous one was an absolute
nullity.
- Marriage is an “inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;”
as such, it “shall be protected by the State. As
a matter of policy, there should be a final
judgment declaring the marriage void and a
party should not declare for himself or herself
whether or not the marriage is void.
ART 48 & 60: “__Family Code_____” --- laws
CASE DIGEST: __Tuason_______ V. ____CA____
G.R NO# 116607
DATE April 10, 1996
PETITIONERS: Emilio R. Tuason
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Maria
Victoria L. Tuason
DOCTRINE (Related to Subject):
- (Article 48) A grant of annulment of
marriage or legal separation by default is
fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence,
in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the state for the purpose
of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant spouse feels to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or
her in default but instead, should order the
prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting
attorney or fiscal may opposed the
application for legal separation or annulment
through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced
is dubious and fabricated.
- (Article 60) The role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage
and legal separation proceedings is to
determine whether collusion exist between
the parties and to take care that the evidence
is not suppress or fabricated. Petitioners
vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There
is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any
of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is
not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
the trial court.
FACTS:
- Private respondent Maria Victoria Tuason
was married to petitioner Emilio Tuason on
June 3, 1972 and had two children. However,
at the time of the marriage, Emilio
manifested psychological incapacity to
comply with his marital obligations and
resulted to violent fights between husband
and wife. Due to the series of physical abuse
against the respondent, the petitioner’s use
of prohibited drugs, cohabiting with three
women, leaving the conjugal home and giving
minimal child support, abuse of conjugal
property use and incurring of bank debts
without the respondent’s consent, she filed a
petition for annulment or declaration of
nullity of their marriage in 1989 before the
RTC Makati on the ground of psychological
incapacity and prayed for powers of
administration to save conjugal properties
from further dissipation.
- Emilio filed his Opposition to private
respondent’s petition for appointment as
administratix of the conjugal properties of
gains on April 18, 1990. The trial court
scheduled the reception of petitioner’s
evidence on May 11, 1990. A counsel for
petitioner moved for a postponement on the
ground that the principal counsel was out of
the country and due to return on the first
week of June, thus granted the motion and
reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.
- However, on June 8, 1990, petitioner
failed to appear. On oral motion of private
respondent, the court declared petitioner to
have waived his right to present evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision on
the basis of the evidence presented.
- On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondent’s marriage to petitioner and
awarding custody of the children to private
respondent.
- Counsel for petitioner received a copy of
this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal
was taken from the decision.
- On September 24, 1990, private
respondent filed a “Motion for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties” and was opposed by the
petitioner on October 17, 1990.
- Also on the same day, October 17, 1990,
petitioner, through new counsel, filed with
the trial court a petition for relief from
judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision. The
trial court denied the petition on August 8,
1991 which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on July 1994. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
- Whether or not that in the absence of the
petitioner in the hearing, the court should
have ordered a prosecuting officer to
intervene under Article 48 of the Family
Code.
RULING:
- No. In the case at bar, the decision
annulling petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent had already become final and
executory when petitioner failed to appeal
during the reglementary period. Petitioner
however claimed that the decision of the trial
court was null and void for violation of his
right to due process. He contended that he
was denied due process when, after failing to
appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
court deemed him to have waived his right to
present evidence and rendered judgment on
the basis of the evidence for private
respondent. Petitioner justified his absence at
the hearings on the ground that he was then
“confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reason.”
- Petitioner also insisted that he had a valid
and meritorious defense. He cited Article 48
of the Family Code which provides that in
actions for annulment of marriage or legal
separation, the prosecuting officer should
intervene for the state because the law
“looks with disfavor upon the haphazard
declaration of annulment of marriages by
default.” He contended that when he failed
to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial
court should have ordered the prosecuting
officer to intervene for the state and inquire
as to the reason for his non-appearance.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
- However, the failure of the counsel to
inform petitioner of adverse judgment to
enable him to appeal is an inexcusable
negligence and not a ground for setting aside
a judgment valid and regular on its face.
Similarly inexcusable is the counsel’s failure
to notify the court of petitioner’s
confinement. Petitioner cannot claim he was
deprived of due process by the Court.
ART 36 & 48: “_Family Code______” --- laws
that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the
public prosecutor to appear for the State at
the pre-trial. (Emphasis and italics in the
original)
- Article 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
- Section 2. (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) Petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.
CASE DIGEST: __Puyat____ V. __Puyat____
G.R NO# 181614
DATE June 30, 2021
PETITIONERS: Gil Miguel Wenceslao T. Puyat
RESPONDENTS: Ma. Teresa Jacqueline R. Puyat
DOCTRINE (Related to Subject):
- Article 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
- Sec. 9. (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Investigation report of public prosecutor. –
(1) Within one month after receipt of the
court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of
Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether
the parties are in collusion and serve copies
thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.(2) If the public prosecutor
finds that collusion exists, he shall state the
basis thereof in his report. The parties shall
file their respective comments on the finding
of collusion within ten days from receipt of a
copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition. (3) If the public prosecutor reports
FACTS:
-
Gil and Ma. Teresa Puyat were married
when they were 16 and 17 year-olds,
respectively. However, petitioner Gil
obtained a divorce decree in California
due to conflicts between him and his wife
brought by their immaturity. He then
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Philippines on the ground
of psychological incapacity, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals, ruling
that there had been collusion between
the parties.
ISSUE/S:
- Was there collusion between the parties
to justify the dismissal of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
- No. Article 48 of the Family Code and the
Rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under Section 9 of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC mandates the participation of the
public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages through the submission of an
investigation report to determine whether
there is collusion exists between the parties.
- In this case, the existence of collusion was
not proven. Respondent Ma. Teresa’s alleged
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
failure to testify when she did not appear
during her scheduled presentation of
evidence should not be automatically
equated to the presumption of collusion
between the parties. Collusion is also negated
by the fact that the animosity between the
parties was apparent and persisted based on
their submissions and reliefs prayed for.
- While the SC affirmed the finding of
psychological incapacity on petitioner, it also
held that despite being declared as the
psychologically incapacitated spouse,
petitioner is not barred from initiating an
action to declare his marriage to Ma. Teresa
null and void. Section 2 of the said A.M.
Circular does not distinguish who between
the spouses may file the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. Even the psychologically
incapacitated can file the petition. Ultimately,
the petition was granted and the parties’
marriage were declared null and void.
ART 45: “__Family Code_____” --- laws
CASE DIGEST: ___Villanueva______ V.
___CA_____
G.R NO# 132955
DATE October 27, 2006
PETITIONERS: Orlando Villanueva
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals and Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva
DOCTRINE (Related to Subject):
- Article 45. A marriage may be annulled
for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
- The Court is not convinced that
appellant’s apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him
of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of
marriage. It is not disputed that at the time
he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given
his employment at that time, it is reasonable
to assume that appellant knew the rudiments
of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harm’s
way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats
were indeed made to bear upon appellant,
what with the fact that he never sought the
assistance of the security personnel of his
school nor the police regarding the activities
of those who were threatening him. And
neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their
marriage.
(1) That the party in whose behalf it
is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen years of
age or over but below twentyone, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent
of the parents, guardian or
person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one, such party
freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound
mind, unless such party after
coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party
was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such
party thereafter freely cohabited
with the other as husband and
wife;
(5) That either party was physically
incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable.
- Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a
ground to annul a marriage. The failure to
cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as
lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence.
FACTS:
- Orlando filed with the trial court a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Lilia
alleging that threats of violence and duress
forced him into marrying her who was already
pregnant. He cited several incidents that
created on his mind a reasonable and wellgrounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the
harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers
as well as the unwanted visits by three men at
the premises of the University of the East after
his classes thereat, and the threatening
presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed
member of the New People’s Army whom
appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia
and who accompanied him in going to her
home province of Palawan to marry her.
Orlando also alleged that he never cohabited
with Lilia after the marriage.
- Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married her; that petitioner stayed with her in
Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her
after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and
that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being
born prematurely.
- The trial court dismissed the petition which
was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S:
- 1. May the subject marriage be annulled on
the ground of vitiated consent?
RULING:
- 1. No. Orlando’s allegation of fear was not
concretely established. The Court is not
convinced that appellant’s apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to
a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that
at the time he was allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank.
Given his employment at that time, it is
reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least,
the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s
way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats
were indeed made to bear upon appellant,
what with the fact that he never sought the
assistance of the security personnel of his
school nor the police regarding the activities of
those who were threatening him. And neither
did he inform the judge about his predicament
prior to solemnizing their marriage.
2. No. Appellant cannot claim that his
marriage should be annulled due to the
absence of cohabitation between him and his
wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a
ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the
validity of a marriage will depend upon the will
of the spouses who can terminate the marital
union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to
cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as
lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since
the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.
Assigned part:
ARTICLES 55 TO 67, FAMILY CODE
GANDIONCO V. PEÑARANDA
SOMOSA-RAMOS V. VAMENTA JR.
- 2. Should the marriage be annulled due to
the absence of cohabitation between the
parties?
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
ARTICLE 55: A petition for legal separation may be
filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel
the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
- Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry
- Cause giving rise to LS exists only after the
celebration of marriage
- Involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation
- The death of one party to the action of LS causes
the death of the action itself.
There are two kinds of divorce namely:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii;
dissolves the marriage tie and the divorcees are free
to marry again
(2) relative divorce, or a mensa et thoro., does not
dissolve the marriage bond; they are only entitled to
live apart from bed and board. The latter one is that
which is adopted in the Philippines and is otherwise
known as legal separation.
Grounds for Legal Separation
1. Infliction of Physical Violence
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
respondent;
(6) Lesbianism
respondent;
or
homosexuality
of
the
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent
without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall
include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)
- Repeatedly resorted to by the respondent
- If a form of violence is against the life of a partner,
the same is a ground under par. 9 and it need not be
repeated for it to be a ground
- Psychological and sexual violence and repeated
verbal abuse may qualify as grounds for LS
- Grossly abusive conduct
Note: (Sta. Maria) Physical violence here is measured
not by the severity but by the frequency. However if
it is not repeated or is not physical violence it may be
considered as grossly abusive conduct.
Grossly abusive conduct need not be repeated but
more of a serious act: rely on proportionality and
abusive conduct to what was committed.
GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT
This is conduct other than physical violence which is
included under the first ground
Grossly abusive conduct includes the following forms
of violence a. Psychological
b. Sexual violence
c. Repeated verbal abuse
• Legal separation is a legal remedy available to
parties in a VALID BUT FAILED MARRIAGE for the
purpose of obtaining a decree from the court
entitling him/her to certain reliefs such as right to
live separately (without affecting the marital bonds
that exists between them), dissolution and
liquidation of property regime and child custody.
Exception:
-
Does not include a ground for legal
separation when the respondent-spouse
inflicts violence on his/her own child from a
previous marriage but may cause to suspend
or terminate parental authority.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
-
Art. 231 (1): Parental authority can be
suspended when the parent treats the child
with excessive harshness or cruelty.
- If present at the time of marriage but concealed
from the other party, there is fraud which constitutes
a ground for annulment.
‣ Must the ground for legal separation exist or arise
only after the celebration of the marriage (and NOT
before)? RABUYA — YES. The cause giving rise to
legal separation must necessarily exist only after the
celebration of the marriage. This is unlike nullity or
annulment, the grounds of which must necessarily
exist at the time of the marriage.
- If there is no concealment and it is known to the
other party at the time of marriage, there is no
ground to annul the marriage.
2. Moral Pressure
- If resorted to in order to compel the petitioner to
change his/her religious or political affiliation.
Exception: If it is directed against a common child or
a child of the petitioner to compel said child to
change religious or political affiliation, there is no
ground for legal separation.
3. Promotion of Prostitution
- Under VAWC, it is also punished as a crime if the
same is directed against the wife or a child of the
wife.
Note: (Sta. Maria)
- The children here may or may not be emancipated.
- Must exist only AFTER the celebration of marriage
Note: The extent and nature of such is the same, as
those in annulment cases but such grounds may
exist even after the marriage ceremony unlike
annulment.
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of respondent
- Considered as a form of cruelty or mental anguish
- Must engage in homosexual acts
7. Contracting of subsequent bigamous marriage
- Contracting a subsequent bigamous marriage is a
ground to declare subsequent marriage void but it
does not affect the validity of the prior marriage
- Remedy of the aggrieved party in the prior marriage
is LS.
Note:
- The corrupt act here refers to prostitution only, a
mere attempt is enough the respondent need not
be successful at the corruption or inducement.
- Illegally contracting a marriage despite full
knowledge that the first marriage still validly exists
or without obtaining a judicial declaration of
presumptive death.
- There is no cause of action when the child involved
is that of the respondent from another marriage.
- Whether the marriage was done in the Philippines
or abroad is immaterial.
Exception: Other forms of corruption can fall under
grave abuse of conduct.
8. Sexual Infidelity
4. Final judgement of more than 6 years
imprisonment
- Ground for LS even if respondent is pardoned and
regardless of the nature of the crime for which the
respondent is convicted
- If convicted prior to marriage, it is a ground for
annulment if the crime involves moral turpitude and
it is not disclosed to the other party
- For LS, the conviction occurs only AFTER the
celebration of marriage.
Note:
- The crime need not be against the other spouse.
It can be against anyone.
- The fact that the crime had been pardoned doesn’t
matter as long as there is a final judgment.
5. Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism
or homosexuality
- It is no longer required that the sexual infidelity be
in the form of adultery or concubinage before it may
constitute as ground for LS
- Any sexual act short of the actual sexual intercourse
may fall under “sexual infidelity
Note:
- Other acts of sexual infidelity short of concubinage
and adultery are enough as long as they constitute
a clear betrayal of trust.
- Sexual perversion can be done to ones own wife.
Exception: If the wife condones sexual perversion
with her husband then it cannot be a ground for legal
separation.
9. Attempt on the life of the Spouse
- There must be intent to kill. The law requires the
intention to kill, so that if it resulted merely in
physical injuries on the aggrieved spouse, that would
not constitute a ground for legal separation. if the act
producing physical injuries can be proven to
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
constitute repeated physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct directed against the aggrieved
spouse, a common child or a child of the plaintiff, the
same can be a ground for legal separation. The latter
rule may arise when there are repeated acts of one
spouse beating the other without intent to kill but
merely resulting in physical injuries. The aggrieved
spouse may file an action for legal separation. In fact,
such repeated acts of violence are not limited to the
other spouse, but even to children.
- If the act of attempting to kill the spouse is wholly
justified or excused, as in the case of legitimate selfdefense, the same is not ground for legal
justification.
- Attempt to kill is sufficient. There is no need for
conviction. However, if there was a mere reckless or
imprudent act, where there is no intent to kill, as
when one spouse accidentally hit the other while
driving their car, the act does not constitute a ground
for legal separation. This is so because of the use of
the word “attempt” which presupposes the
existence of intent.
under Act 2710 when absolute divorce was allowed and had fo
legal separation under the NCC, with the requirement, under
defendant spouse had to be established by final judgment in a cr
not been reproduced in the New Civil Code. In fact, such ground
A criminal action is not needed. Likewise, support pendente lit
legal separation and is granted at the discretion of the judge.
Phil. 709). If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente l
always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Article 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on
any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or
act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the
commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for le
separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain
the decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Note:
- Must come from an evil design or unlawful cause
- No nee for any criminal conviction, preponderance
of evidence is enough. (If there is a criminal
conviction, the other spouse can be disinherited
even if there is no legal separation case filed)
Exception: when it is for self-defense (or some other
justifiable reason)
Exception: Spouse caught the other in flagrante
delicto.
1. Where the aggrieved party has condoned the
offense or act complained of
-
-
-
10. Abandonment
- A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other
when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without
intention of returning(Art. 128 FC)
- The term abandonment has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court to include the act of rejecting a
spouse or totally preventing a spouse from going
back to the conjugal dwelling.
Note: *If there is an unjustifiable reason for leaving
then it is not considered abandonment.
-
Conditional forgiveness or remission, by
husband or wife, of a matrimonial offense
which the other had committed.
It blots out the imputed offense so as to
restore the offending party to the same
position he/she occupied before the offense
was committed.
It is presumed that any cohabitation with the
guilty party and with knowledge or belief on
the part of the injured party of its
commission is condonation.
Not looking for an erring wife after she
commits an offense does not mean
forgiveness.
Exception: if after the condonation the guilty spouse
repeats the offense then can still file for legal
separation.
2. Where the aggrieved party has consented to the
commission of the offense or act complained of
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child- byItnature
or by in
adoption.
is given
advance or prior to the
commission of the act which would be a
ground for LS, whereas in condonation, the
forgiveness of the matrimonial offence is
given after commission.
Is conviction necessary before action for legal separation may prosper?
- Either spouse agreed or did not object to the
BEFORE
it was27,
committed.
No, said the Supreme Court in Gandionco vs. Hon. Peñaranda, et al.,offense
L-72984,
November
1987.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may issue upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceedings or conviction
is necessary. The case of Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil. 42, is not controlling because it was decided
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
3.
Where there is connivance between the parties in
the commission of the offense or act constituting
the ground for legal separation
-
-
-
-
Implies an agreement, express or implied, by
BOTH spouses, unlike in consent, it is
unilateral
It involves criminality on the part of the
individual who connives, while condonation
may take place without imputing the
slightest blame to the party who forgives the
injury
- It is an act of the mind before the offense
has been committed
Where the spouses agree that one spouse
will commit the offense to give grounds for
legal separation.
Where one of the parties employed a 3rd
party to induce the other spouse to commit
the offense to give grounds.
Article 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of th
petition.
-
-
4. Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation
-
When two persons acted in bad faith, they
should be considered as having acted in
good faith.
5. Where there is collusion between the parties to
obtain decree of legal separation
-
-
Agreement between husband and wife for
one of them to commit, or to appear to
commit, or to be represented in court as
having committed a matrimonial offense, or
to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for
the purpose of enabling the other to obtain
divorce or LS.
It may not be inferred from the mere fact
that the guilty party confesses to the offense
and thus enables the other party to procure
evidence necessary to prove it.
The defendant is required to answer the
petition 15 days from the date of the receipt
of the complaint. However, whether or not
the defendant files an answer or not there
should be no hearing on the merits by the
court until after a 6-month cooling-off
period is terminated.
The basic purpose of the law in suspending
the trial of an action for legal separation until
after the lapse of 6 months since its filing is
to give the parties an elbow room to
reconcile. (Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil.
709; Somosa-Ramos vs. Vamenta, Jr., et al.,
46 SCRA 110). For, if there is reconciliation
prior to the trial, the court can dismiss the
action. In fact, even after a judgment has
been rendered, if the parties manifest that
they have already reconciled, the Court in
the same proceedings can still set aside the
decree of legal separation. It was likewise
ruled in Pacete vs. Carriaga, 49 SCAD 673,
231 SCRA 321, that legal separation must not
be tried before 6 months have elapsed since
the filing of the petition.
*Failure to observe the 6- month cooling off period is a ground to
separation.
*Other incidents may be heard during the 6-month period such
Art. 59: No legal separation may be decreed unless the Co
reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite su
highly improbable.
6. Where the action is barred by prescription
-
-
An action for legal separation must be filed
within 5 years from the occurrence of the
cause.
From the time the act occurred not the
discovery of the cause of action.
-
The court must try to salvage the marriage
by taking steps towards reconciliation.
* However even if there is no trial the
couple may choose not to live together.
They cannot be forced to live together.
Art. 60: No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a st
of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecutin
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
- For LS to prosper, it must be claimed only by the innocent spouse
fabricated or suppressed.
- Where both spouses are offenders, LS cannot be claimed by either of them
Recrimination (mutual guilt)
Article 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within
five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
If the defending party fails to answer he or
she cannot be defaulted and the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether there is collusion or not
between the parties.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
-
Even if the party answers the fiscal is still
mandated to make sure there is no collusion
and that the evidence is genuine.
* If the case is vehemently opposed and
contested and it is clear that the litigation is
a no-holds barred contest and not collusion
the non- intervention of the prosecuting
attorney is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings.
-
The law makes cross-reference to Article 49
of the Family Code which mandates that
during the pendency of an action for
annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage, the court shall provide for the
support of the spouses, and the custody and
support of the common children.
- The court shall also give paramount
consideration to the moral and material
welfare of the children and their choice of
No decree of legal separation can be issued on the basis of stipulation
of facts
or confession
the parent
with
whom theyof
wish to remain.
judgment. In fact, even under Article 2035 of the Civil Code, the parties
cannot
compromise
on
All these
measures
are applicable
in cases of
the ground for legal separation. Such a stipulation or confession may
be separation.
evidence of connivance,
legal
or collusion between the parties. However, if aside from confession
of judgment,
there is is the welfare
- The paramount
consideration
evidence aliunde to prove a ground for legal separation, still, it canofbe
granted.
the
children. If there is a child below the
age of seven (7), he cannot be separated
from the mother as a rule because no one in
- No default in an action for legal separation.
the world can answer for the needs of a child
Under the law, if the defendant in an action
below the age of seven years. But because of
for annulment of marriage or for legal
her adultery, then the child can be
separation fails to answer, the court shall
separated. (Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640,
order the prosecuting attorney to
March 15, 1995, 59 SCAD 631). The court
investigate whether or not a collision
then may award custody to the father. Or,
between the parties exists, and if there is
even if there is a choice of a child seven years
no collusion, to intervene for the State in
old or above, still the court may not respect
order to see to it that the evidence
the same if it is to the best interest of the
submitted is notfa bricated. (Rule 9, Rules
child that the choice be not respected or
of Court). The law does not allow default in
recognized. The court is not always bound by
legal separation. The special proscriptions
such a choice. In its discretion, the court may
on actions that can put the integrity of
find the chosen parent unfit and award the
marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled
custody to the other parent, or even to a
by no less than the State’s interest in the
third person as it deems fit under the
marital relation and its avowed intention
circumstances. (Espiritu vs. CA, et al., supra.)
not to have the matter within the exclusive
domain and the vagaries of the parties to
Art. 63: The decree of legal separation shall have the following e
alone dictate. (Pacete vs. Cariaga, Jr., 231
1. The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each ot
SCRA 321; Macias vs. Judge Ochotorena,
not be severed;
July 30, 2004).
2. The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall b
Art. 61: After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the ne
separately from each other
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited
43(2);
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between of
theArticle
spouses,
shall designate either of
them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property.
3. The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
guardian under the Rules of Court.
4. The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from
- In the absence of a written agreement
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spou
between the spouses, the court shall
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
designate who shall administer the
properties (it can be a third person).
* Death of the plaintiff before the final
decree in an action for legal separation
terminates the case.
- Though the spouses are entitled to live separately
the marriage bond shall not be severed. They are still
married to each other.
- The property
shall be of
liquidated,
Article 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation,
the provisions
Article 49the offending
no share
right to the profits
shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and thespouse
custodyshall
andhave
support
of the or
common
earned
and
shall
be
forfeited
in
favor
of the common
children. (105a)
children if none the children of the guilty spouse if
none then to the innocent spouse.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
- The
innocent spouse shall generally have custody of the
children however the major consideration is always
the paramount interest of the children.
- The offending spouse shall be disqualified from
inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession, furthermore provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
recording of the complaint for revocation are
registered in the registries of property shall be
respected.
Art. 65: If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint ma
by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for
- If the case is still pending then it shall be
terminated, if the decree has been issued then it
shall be set aside.
No children below 7 years old shall be separated from the mother
unless the
finds compelling
- Separation
of court
properties
will still subsist, but the
reasons to order otherwise (Tender Years Doctrine)
parties can enter into an agreement to revive the
prior property regime.
* The creditors should be informed of the changes
to the
property
etc. the
Art. 64: After the finality of the decree of legal separation,with
the regard
innocent
spouse
may revoke
donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the
Art. 66: be
The
reconciliation
referred to in the preceding A
latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation
stipulated
as irrevocable.
consequences:
The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries
of property in the places where
the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances
registered
in good faith
before theif still pending, shall thereby
1. The
legal separation
proceedings,
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries and
of property shall be respected. The
revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon
2. The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but th
written notification thereof to the insured
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already affected sha
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be
within
five property
years from
the
to brought
revive their
former
regime.
time the decree of legal separation become final.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in t
-
-
The law gives the option to innocent party
whether to revoke or not the donation of the
guilty party in an insurance.
The revocation must be made within 5 years
from the time the decree of legal separation
has become final.
* The revocation of or change in the designation of
insurance beneficiary shall take effect after written
notification to the insurer not the insured since it
makes more sense however the law states
notification should be given to the insured thus that
should be followed.
Illustration:
A, prior to his marriage to B, donated real property
to the latter. It was registered later under her name,
but 10 years after their marriage, B gave rise to a
cause for legal separation. A sued for legal
separation and it was granted, pronouncing B as the
guilty spouse. A revoked the donation but the
revocation was not recorded in the registry of
property. In the meantime, or after the revocation, B
sold the property to C, a buyer in good faith and for
value, and obtained a title. The revocation is not
effective as against C, the buyer in good faith and for
value because of the protection given by the Torrens
System to a buyer in good faith and for value. For C
need not even look beyond the title of B to
determine if there is a defect therein. In fact, Article
64 of the Code says that alienations, liens and
encumbrances registered in good faith before the
Art. 67: The agreement to revive the former property regime r
shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
1. The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regim
2. Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse;
3. The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and th
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall b
proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to
due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measures to protec
order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall n
or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate
claim.
- Generally the law provides that one can only fix the
property regime before the marriage celebration but
the rules now set forth that the adoption of another
property regime can be made aside from that which
they had previously existed during their marriage.
EFFECT OF REVIVAL:
1. If creditors are notified they should file opposition
on properties if they have debts that should be paid
by either spouse.
2. If creditors are notified but they don’t file they
cannot get from the properties that will be placed in
co-ownership in the revival.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
3. If
creditors are not notified then they can collect from
properties co-owned.
4. If creditors are not notified but there are separate
properties they can’t get from co- owned properties.
CASE DIGEST: SOMOSA-RAMOS V. VAMENTA JR.
G.R NO# L-34132
DATE: July 29, 1972
PETITIONERS: LUCY SAMOSA-RAMOS
RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presid
Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMEN G. RAMOS,
CASE DIGEST: GANDIONCO V. PENARANDA
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): An action for legal separation shal
G.R NO# 79284
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition” (now Ar
DATE: NOVEMBER 27, 1987
PETITIONERS:FROILAN C. GANDIONCO
RESPONDENTS: HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
FACTS:on
June 18, 1971, petitioner filed filed a case for legal separ
Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA
S. GANDIONCO
ground of concubinage and an attempt by him against her life. Sh
a writ
of preliminary
mandatory
injunction for the return to her
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):There would be no more of
legal
obstacle
to a decree
of legal
paraphernal
and
exclusive
property,
separation at the instance of an offended wife, based on an act of infidelity for which the guilty then under the adminis
Clemente.
Clemente husband
opposed so
thelong
motion based on Article 103 of
husband has been convicted of adultery upon the complaint
of his paramour's
"An
action
for
legal
separation
shall
in no case be tried before six m
as such act may also constitute concubinage and can be proven in the legal separation
the filing of the petition” (now Art 58, Family Code). He manifested
proceedings.
the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become e
granted the motion of Clemente and suspended the hearing of the p
FACTS:On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the
preliminary injunction. Thus, Lucy filed a petition for certiorari.
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on
the ground of concubinage and also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a
ISSUE/S: WON
103petitioner
of the CiviltoCode prohibiting the hearing o
criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage. Respondent
judgeArticle
ordered
the child,
lapse and
of six(2)
months
fromofthe filing
pay support pendente lite to private respondent (his wife)before
and their
the Order
RULING:No.
Article
103
(Civil
Code)
is evidently intended as a cooli
the same respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend
reconciliation
betweenasthe
spouses.
hearings in the action for legal separation filed against himaby
private respondent
well
as his However, this does not have
other
provisions
such
as
the
determination
of the custody of the c
motion to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing and trying the case.
support pendente lite according to the circumstance the ques
respective property need not be left unresolved even during such s
ISSUE/S: WON all proceedings related to legal separation administrator
will have to be
suspended
to await for the management of the
may
even be appointed
conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case partnership.
RULING:No. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon
proof by preponderance of evidence in the action. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary. In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil
action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with,
a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse, among others.
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong,
G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
Provision: Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family
Code.
Petitioner: William Ong
Respondent: Lucita Ong
Case: Legal separation; Conjugal properties
FACTS
William Ong and Lucita Ong were
married on July 13, 1975. They have
Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton. Lucita
filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under
Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code 4
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, alleging that she suffered
from physical violence, threats, intimidation,
and grossly abusive conduct.
William denied that he inflicted
physical harm on his wife. He admitted that
they quarreled but he claimed that he left
the house and went to his condominium and
only went back to their house to work in
their office.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
The RTC rendered its Decision
decreeing legal separation. William
appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto
the RTC decision. The CA found that the
testimonies for Lucita were straightforward
and credible and the ground for legal
separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family
Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct directed against Lucita,
were adequately proven. William argued
that since Lucita herself has given ground for
legal separation by abandoning the family
simply because of a quarrel and refusing to
return thereto unless the conjugal
properties were placed in the administration
of Lucita’s in-laws, no decree of legal
separation should be issued in her favor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in disregarding the evidence for legal
separation.
RULING
No, the Court of Appeals did not err
in disregarding the evidence for legal
separation. Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family
Code provides that legal separation shall be
denied when both parties have given ground
for legal separation. The abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year. As it was established
that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said
provision. Applying the provision to this
case, the Supreme Court held that as Lucita
has adequately proven the presence of a
ground for legal separation, the Court has no
reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC
and the CA, and grant her the relief she is
entitled to under the law. WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
FELIX, J
Doctrine: Article 100 old Civil Code
Plaintiff-appellant:
Defendant-appellee:
Case: Legal separation; Infidelity
FACTS
Benjamin Bugayong was married to
Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at
Asingan, Pangasinan. After their marriage,
they lived in the house of Bugayong’s sisters.
After some time, Ginez sent a letter to her
husband informing him that she would
reside with her mother in Dagupan City.
Bugayong began receiving letters from his
sister and from anonymous writers about
the alleged infidelity of Ginez.
Bugayong sought for his wife in
Pangasinan and they lived as husband and
wife in the house of his cousin. When
Bugayong confronted her about the alleged
infidelity, instead of answering, she left,
which he took as a confirmation of the acts
of infidelity imputed on her. Bugayong filed
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
complaint for legal separation against his
wife. Counsel for the defendant orally
moved for the dismissal of the complaint, on
the ground that the acts charged have been
condoned by the Bugayong. The trial court
ordered the dismissal of the action. The case
was taken up for review to the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not legal separation can be
claimed by Bugayong.
RULING
No, legal separation cannot be
claimed by Bugayong. The Civil Code
provides in Article 100, which reads thus:
The legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both
spouses are offenders a legal separation
cannot be claimed by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the
petition. Applying the provision to this case,
the Court of Appeals held that the act of the
latter in persuading her to come along with
him, and the fact that she went with him and
consented to be brought to the house of his
cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they
slept there as husband and wife for one day
and one night, and the further fact that in
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
the second night they again slept together in
their house likewise as husband and wife —
all these facts have no other meaning in the
opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected
and that there was a condonation of the wife
by the husband. Therefore, legal separation
cannot be claimed by Bugayong.
Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 196842, October 9, 2013
PEREZ, J
Doctrine: Legal separation
Petitioner: Alfredo Busuego
Respondent: Office of the Ombudsman
Case: Concubinage; Legal Separation
FACTS
Rosa S. Busuego and Alfredo
Busuego were married at the Assumption
Church, in Davao City. They have two sons,
Alfred and Robert. Rosa discovered
photographs and love letters from other
women which Alfredo claimed innocence of
any wrongdoing. Their marriage turned sour
and when Rosa had the opportunity to work
in the US, she acted up to her plan and left
for the US.
Rosa learned of Alfredo’s extramarital relationships. Robert called his
mother Rosa to complain of his father
Alfredo's illicit affairs and shabby treatment
of him. Rosa contended that aside from
marital infidelity, Alfredo physically and
verbally abused her and her family. Alfredo
denied all accusations against him and
alleged that it was highly improbable that he
committed acts of concubinage because he
is very busy working at the Hospital of the
Davao Regional Hospital in Tagum City. To
dispose of that issue, the Ombudsman
scheduled a clarificatory hearing. The
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
only Alfredo and Sia of Concubinage and
directed the filing of an Information against
them in the appropriate court. Alfredo
pointed out that from Rosa's own
allegations, she had condoned or pardoned
Alfredo's supposed concubinage.
ISSUE
Whether or not condonation is a
ground for legal separation.
RULING
No, condonation is not a ground for
legal separation. Condonation is the
forgiveness of a marital offense constituting
a ground for legal separation or, as stated in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 585,
condonation is the 'conditional forgiveness
or remission, by a husband or wife of a
matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed.' In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, it
has been held that 'condonation is implied
from sexual intercourse after knowledge of
the other infidelity. Such acts necessarily
implied
forgiveness.
Applying
the
jurisprudence to this case, the Court held
that although the foregoing speaks of
condonation of concubinage as a ground for
legal separation, the holding therein applies
with equal force in a prosecution for
concubinage as a felony. Indeed, Rosa's
admission was that she believed her
husband had stopped womanizing, not that
she had knowledge of Alfredo's specific acts
of concubinage with Sia and de Leon,
specifically keeping them in the conjugal
dwelling. Their continued cohabitation as
husband and wife construed from Rosa's
annual visits to Davao City is not
acquiescence to Alfredo's relations with his
concubines. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Sy v. Eufemio,
G.R. No. L30977, January 31, 1972
Doctine: Legal separation
Petitioner-appellant: Carmen Lapuz Sy
Respondent-appellee: Eufemio Sy Uy
Case: Death can abate legal proceedings;
Legal Separation
FACTS
Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufemio claiming
that her husband, Eufemio, abandoned her;
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
that they had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that
she discovered her husband cohabiting with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or
about March 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation,
which, among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
Before the trial could be completed.
Lapuz died in a car accident. Eufemio moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that the death of Lapuz abated the action for
legal separation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of a party abates
the proceedings of legal separation.
RULING
Yes, the death of a party abates the
proceedings of legal separation. Actio
personalis moritur cum persona or the death
of one party to the action causes the death
of the action itself. When one of the spouses
is dead, there is no need for divorce, because
the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot
even continue the suit if the death of the
spouse takes place during the course of the
suit. Applying the principles to this case, the
Court held that if death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and definitive separation, and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn. It is apparent
that such action became moot and academic
upon the death of the Lapuz, and there could
be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, which automatically
dissolved
the
questioned
union.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of
the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations is hereby affirmed.
Siochi v. Gozon,
G.R. No. 169900, 169977, March 18, 2010
CARPIO, J
Doctine: Legal separation
Petitioner-appellant: Mario Siochi
Respondent-appellee: Alfredo Gozon
Case: Conjugal property; share of the net
profits
FACTS
Alfredo Gozon is married to Elvira
Gozon. Elvira filed with the RTC a petition for
legal separation against her husband
Alfredo. While the legal separation case was
still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell
the property of Alfredo and Elvira, the
30,000 sq.m. parcel of land for the price of
P18 million. After paying the P5 million
earnest money as partial payment of the
purchase price, Mario took possession of the
property. Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the
Cavite RTC rendered a decision: “…The
conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses
is hereby declared DISSOLVED and
LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse,
the respondent is deprived of his share in
the net profits and the same is awarded to
their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody
is awarded to petitioner. ”
After some time, Alfredo executed a
Deed of Donation over the property in favor
of his daughter, Winifred Gozon. By virtue of
Special Power of Attorney, Alfredo sold the
property to Inter-Dimensional Realty Inc.,
for 18 million. Mario then filed with the RTC
a complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale.
The RTC rendered a decision
affirming the buy and sell of Alfredo and
Mario excluding the undivided one-half
share of Elvira in the conjugal property and
nullifying the Deed of Donation to Winifred
and the Deed of Absolute Sale to IDRI. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with
modification: “...Alfredo Gozon's one-half
(1/2) undivided share has been forfeited in
favor of his daughter, defendant Winifred
Gozon, by virtue of the decision in the legal
separation case.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the undivided share
of Alfredo has been forfeited in favor of his
daughter based on the ruling of the RTC.
RULING
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
No, the undivided share of Alfredo
has not been forfeited in favor of his
daughter based on the ruling of the RTC. The
Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of
the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the
offending spouse, is deprived of his share in
the net profits and the same is awarded to
Winifred. Under Article 63 of the Family
Code, the decree of legal separation shall
have the following effects… (2) The absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of Article
43(2); Art. 43. The termination of the
subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following
effects: “…his or her share of the net profits
of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children.” Under
Article 102, the said (net) profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution.
Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred
is not Alfredo's share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net
profits of the conjugal partnership property.
Maquilan v. Maquilan,
G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007
During the pre-trial, Virgilio and Dita entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT (partial
settlement
dividing
their
conjugal
properties).
The trial court approved the
Compromise Agreement. Virgilio filed an
Omnibus Motion to reject the Compromise
Agreement because he alleged that he was
not informed by his counsel of the
consequences
of
the
Compromise
Agreement. But, his petition was denied.
Virgilio appealed but CA dismissed it for lack
of merit. The CA held that although adultery
is a ground for legal separation, nonetheless,
Article 63 cannot be applied in the instant
case because the spouses voluntarily
separated their property through the
Compromise Agreement. The claim of
Virgilio that he was not informed of the
consequences of the agreement is
untenable because the mistake or
negligence of his counsel bounds his client
unless it was done through gross negligence
or deprivation of due process.
Virgilio contended that the
Compromise Agreement was void because it
circumvented the law that prohibits the
guilty spouse, who was convicted of either
adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the
conjugal property. Since Dita was convicted
of adultery, Virgilio argued that Dita’s share
should be forfeited in favor of the common
child under Articles 43 (2) and 63 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE
Doctine: Legal separation
Petitioner-appellant: Virgilio Maquilan
Respondent-appellee: Dita Maquilan
Case: Adultery;
Whether or not Articles 43 and 63 of the
Family Code apply to this case.
FACTS
No, Articles 43 and 63 of the Family
Code do not apply to this case. Article 43 of
the Family Code refers to Article 42 which
pertains to a case where a subsequent
marriage is terminated because of the
reappearance of an absent spouse; while
Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree
of legal separation. The Court held that the
Compromise Agreement partially divided
the properties of the conjugal partnership of
gains between the parties and did not deal
Virgilio and Dita are spouses and
they had a son. However, Dita was having an
illicit relationship which led Virgilio to file a
case of adultery to Dita and her paramour.
Both were convicted of the crime of
adultery. Thereafter, Virgilio filed in the RTC
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution, and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages.
RULING
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
with the validity of a marriage or legal
separation. WHEREFORE, the Petition is
DENIED.
REMEDIES— a. In case of abandonment — the
aggrieved spouse may file a petition for any of
the following —
i. Receivership
ii. Judicial separation of property
iii. Authority to be the sole administrator of the
absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership property b. In case of
abandonment of more than one year — the
aggrieved spouse may file a petition for legal
separation c. Deserted spouse cannot likewise
be obliged to give support to the other spouse
who refuses to live with him or her without just
cause.
NOTE — The husband and wife shall fix the
family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide. 2.
MUTUAL LOVE, RESPECT, FIDELITY HELP ‣
Sexual infidelity is a ground for legal
separation. (Art. 55)
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
Adultery and Concubinage is a ground for
render mutual help and support. (109a)
criminal prosecution.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family
SEXUAL RELATIONS
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
Procreation is also an essential marital
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
obligation considering that such obligation
other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
springs from the universal principle that
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
of children through sexual
However, such exemption shall not apply if the sameprocreation
is
cooperation is the basic end of marriage (Chi
not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Ming Tsoi vs. CA)
REMEDY — File for judicial declaration nullity
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her
under psychological incapacity. (Art. 36)
duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend
SUPPORT
to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the
family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for
Spouses are legally obliged to support each
relief. (116a)
other ‣ Such obligation to support one’s
spouse attaches at the inception of the
marriage and ordinarily continues as long as
1. COHABITATION
the relationship of husband and wife exists.
Hence, once the marriage is terminated, the
EXCEPT — In the following instances, the court
obligation to give support ceases.
may exempt one spouse from living with the
other — a. If the spouse lives abroad b. Other
REMEDY — File an action for support
valid and compelling reasons
EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION — If the living
separately is not compatible with the solidarity
of the family ‣ While the spouses are obliged
to live together, the court is powerless to
enforce such obligation.
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the
support of the family. The expenses for such support and
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the
community property and, in the absence thereof, from
the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case
of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
support his wife. This obligation is founded
not so much on the express or implied
properties. (111a)
terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the
such vital concern to the state itself that the
right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such
laws will not permit him to terminate it by
management shall be paid in accordance with the
his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to
provisions of Article 70. (115a)
seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not
due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
sense of the term, but rather a judgment
profession, occupation, business or activity without the
calling for the performance of a duty made
consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid,
specific by the mandate of the sovereign.
serious, and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide whether or not: (1) The objection This
is is done from necessity and with a view
to preserve the public peace and the purity
proper, and (2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to
of the wife; as where the husband makes so
the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior
base demands upon his wife and indulges in
to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto
enforced against the community property. If the benefit
separation resulting from a decree for
accrued thereafter, such obligation shall be enforced
separate support is not an impeachment of
against the separate property of the spouse who has not
that public policy by which marriage is
obtained consent. The foregoing provisions shall not
regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its
prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith
nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so
(117a) (As amended by RA 10572, May 24, 2013)
far only as such separation is tolerated as a
means of preserving the public peace and
morals may be considered, it does not in
any respect whatever impair the marriage
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252 1916
contract or for any purpose place the wife
in the situation of a feme sole.
FACTS: The parties were legally married in
Manila and immediately thereafter
established their residence at 115 Calle San
Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo 42 Phil 54
Marcelino, where they lived together for
1912
about a month, when the plaintiff returned
to the home of her parents. A month into
their marriage, defendant demanded from
FACTS: Mariano and Dolores had been
the plaintiff that she perform unchaste and
married for ten years when Dolores decided
lascivious acts on his genital organs. The
to leave their domicile home with the intent
plaintiff spurned the obscene, continued
to leave separately from her husband.
demands of the defendant and refused to
Mariano initiated an action to compel
perform any act other than legal and valid
Dolores to return home and live with him as
cohabitation. The defendant became
a dutiful wife. According to Dolores, she
frustrated with plaintiff wife and thus
had been compelled to leave their
resorted to maltreat her by word and deed.
matrimonial home because of her cruel
The maltreatment of the defendant
treatment of Mariano. She also prayed for a
husband became too much for the plaintiff
decree of separation, a liquidation of the
wife that she had no choice but to leave the
conjugal partnership, and an allowance for
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home
counsel fees and separate permanent
of her parents.
maintenance.
ISSUE: May the wife compel her husband
for support outside of the conjugal
domicile?
RULING: Yes. Article 152 of the Civil Code
gives the instances when the obligation to
give support shall cease. The failure of the
wife to live with her husband is not one of
them. The mere act of marriage creates an
obligation on the part of the husband to
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the court can
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with
each other.
2. Whether or not Dolores is entitled to
alimony and indemnity fees.
RULING: 1. No. The court cannot compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with the
other.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
2. No. Dolores is not entitled to alimony.
According to Article 68 of the Family Code,
“The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, and
fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. (109a)” While it is true that the
husband and wife are obliged to live
together, cohabitation by the parties
cannot be imposed by the law or the courts.
If the wife refuses to live with the husband,
the latter cannot compel the former by
securing a judicial writ ordering her to live
with him. The only sanction is to refuse to
support her.
And while it is true that the husband and
wife are obliged to render mutual help and
support, in this case, the wife refuses to live
with the husband without justifiable
reasons, so she cannot order him to pay her
alimony and indemnity for damages.
Ilosorio v. Bildner G.R. No. 139789 &
139808 May 12, 2000
FACTS: After being contracted by
matrimony and lived together for 30 years,
Erlinda and Potenciano separated from bed
and board for undisclosed reasons. Erlinda
lived at Antipolo City while Potenciano lived
at Urdaneta Condominium in Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio
Penthouse at Baguio Country Club when he
was in Baguio City. Out of their marriage,
they’ve been blessed with six children,
namely: Ramon Ilusirio, Erlinda Ilosorio
Bildner, Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Sheeran. Upon Potenciano’s arrival from
the US, he stayed at Antipolo City where
Erlinda currently resides, for about five
months. Sylvia and Erlinda alleged their
mother gave her husband a wrong dose of
drug prescribed by the doctor of
Potenciano in New York resulting in
deterioration of his health. On February 25,
1998, Erlinda filed a petition for
guardianship over the person and the
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the
latter's advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight, and impaired judgement. On
1998, After Potenciano attended a
corporate meeting in Baguio City, he did
not return to Antipolo City and instead lived
in Cleveland Condominium in Makati.
Because of such event, Erlinda filed a
petition with the CA for habeas corpus to
have the custody of Potenciano Ilusorio, she
alleged that respondent refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo City. Hence, CA denied such
petition.
ISSUE: May a wife severe a writ of habeas
corpus to compel her husband to live with
her?
RULING: No. Marital rights including
coverture and living in conjugal dwelling
may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary
writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas
corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. It is available
where a person continuous unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedom. It is devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restrainment, as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled
with the right choice may not be the subject
of visitation rights against free choice. The
CA exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas
corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for
such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial
authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by the sheriffs or by any other
mesne process.
Tenchavez v. Escaño G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965
FACTS: Vicenta Escaño was married to
Pastor Tenchavez before a Catholic
Chaplain without knowledge of her parents.
The marriage was discovered by Dr.
Mamerto and Mena Escano, her parents,
and were against that it was celebrated
contrary to tradition. Her parents proposed
a re-celebration of the marriage before the
church. The spouses became estranged
when Vicenta learned from Mamerto that
Tenchavez is having an affair with another
woman. Vicenta left for United States
without informing her husband. She filed a
verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez on the ground of "extreme
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
cruelty, entirely mental in character" in the
State of Nevada and decree of divorce,
“final and absolute” was issued. After
obtaining divorce decree, she remarried to
Russell Leo Moran, an American citizen.
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom
he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and
asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their
daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for
moral damages.
Juanite, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicted Melecia Pana of murder, leading
to a civil liability. The RTC ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution, which
resulted in the levy of properties owned by
Melecia and her husband, Efren Pana. Efren
and Melecia contested, asserting that their
properties were conjugal assets and that
they were married under the conjugal
partnership of gains, without a prenuptial
agreement.
ISSUE: May a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in the Philippines?
RULING: The Family Code cannot
retroactively change the property relation
of spouses married before its enactment in
1988. Efren and Melecia, married under the
Civil Code, were presumed to have a
conjugal partnership of gains, given the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Article
76 of the Family Code stipulates that any
modification in marriage settlements must
occur before the wedding. Conjugal
partnership of gains, established by Article
142 of the Civil Code, allows spouses to
maintain ownership rights over their
separate properties.
RULING: Yes. The marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño is clearly
remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine Law even if Vicenta sought a
decree of absolute divorce in State of
Nevada. At the time the divorce decree was
issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband,
was still a Filipino citizen. She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic
Act. No. 386), already in force at the time,
expressly provided: "Laws relating to family
rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of person are binding
upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad."
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal
properties of Efren and Melecia could be
seized to satisfy Melecia's civil liability in
the murder case.
The conjugal properties could be used to
settle Melecia's civil liability, as per Article
122 of the Family Code, which permits
payment of personal debts and fines from
partnership assets. Article 121 allows
payment of criminal indemnities from these
assets even before liquidation, with the
offending spouse eventually being
accountable for these payments during the
partnership's dissolution. The Court applied
the Family Code provisions in this case,
ensuring the enforcement of Melecia's civil
liability from their conjugal assets.
VALENCIA V. LOCQUIAO
FACTS:
ARTICLES 68 TO 73, FAMILY CODE
ISSUE:
RULING:
ARTICLES 74 TO 87, FAMILY CODE
PANA V. HEIRS OF JUANITE SR.
FACTS: In the case of Efren Pana vs. Heirs of
MATABUENA V. CERVANTES
FACTS:
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
ISSUE:
RULING:
ARCABA V. VDA DE BATOCAEL
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
PEREZ JR. V. PEREZ-SENERPIDA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Articles 37-44
1. Malibon vs. Alcantara (insert digest
here)
CASE DIGEST: Republic V. Olaybar
G.R NO# 189538
DATE: February 10, 2014
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Merlinda L. Olaybar
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage. However, the Court cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where
all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the
parties had already been admitted and examined.
Allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
FACTS: When Respondent requested a Certificate of
No Marriage, she discovered that she was already
married to Ye Son Sune, a Korean national.
Respondent filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries
in the Marriage Contract impleading the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City and her alleged husband as
parties to the case. She denied having contracted the
said marriage; claimed that she did not know the
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing
officer; and her signature in the marriage certificate
was forged.
During trial, respondent explained that she could not
have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the
supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the
marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was
then in Makati working as a medical distributor in
Hansao Pharma. Respondent presented as witness a
certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC,
Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son
Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but
claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent.
Lastly, a document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was
forged. RTC granted the petition directed the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all entries in the
wife portion of the marriage contract.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
claims that there are no errors in the entries sought
to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries
made in the certificate of marriage are the ones
provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are,
in fact, the latter's personal circumstances. In
directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife
portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in
effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the
guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the cancellation of entries
in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies
the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding.
RULING: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry.The Supreme Court said that a
petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, and other related laws. In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, in the case at bar, the respondent showed
by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence"
of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While the Supreme Court maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, the Court cannot nullify the proceedings
before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all
the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by
the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
canceling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did
not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of. The RTC decision was
affirmed and the petition was denied for lack of
merit.
CASE DIGEST: Garcia-Quiazon V. Belen
G.R NO# 189121
DATE: July 31, 2013
PETITIONER: AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH
QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON
RESPONDENTS: MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in
behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and
it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.
FACTS: Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon, represented by
her mother Ma. Lourdes Belen, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas
City after her father, Eliseo, died intestate. In her
Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of
Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time
when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other.
Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo's marriage to
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of Amelia's marriage with one Filipito
Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by
Eliseo as her father. Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father's estate. Petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo's estate.
RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in
declaring that Amelia was not legally married to
Eliseo due to a pre-existing marriage.
RULING: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that
Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the
time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for
judicial partition of properties against Amelia before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground
that their marriage is void for being bigamous.
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners' contention
that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia's
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage,
it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it
cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A
void marriage can be questioned even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was
the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable four-square to
the case at hand. It was emphasized in Niñal that in a
void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.
There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father's marriage
to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by
raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse,
such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either
party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than
the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of
Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the
Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac.
The inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage
is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. Petition is
denied for lack of merit. CA decision is affirmed in
toto.
CASE DIGEST: Domingo V. Court of Appeals
G.R NO# 104818
DATE: September 17, 1993
PETITIONER: ROBERTO DOMINGO
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA
SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-inFact MOISES R. AVERA
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and, no judicial decree is required to establish their
nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the
provision of Article 40 of the Family Code, providing
that "the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void;"
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code in case a party thereto was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36,
Family Code), where an action or defense for the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after
the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code);
otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the
Family Code.
FACTS: Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed the petition entitled “Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property” against
Roberto Domingo. The petition, which was filed
before Pasig RTC, alleged that Delia and Domingo
married on November 29, 1976. Delia later found out
that Domingo had a previous marriage with Emerina
de la Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and
still existing. Delia came to know of the prior marriage
only sometime in 1983 when Emerina sued them for
bigamy.
Since 1979, respondent Delia has been working in
Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in the Philippines
when she would avail of the one-month annual
vacation leave granted by her employer. Meanwhile,
Roberto has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon her for support and subsistence. Her
personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are
under the possession of Roberto, who disposed some
of the said properties without her knowledge and
consent. While Delia was on her vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the declaration of their marriage, which is void
ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further
suggested that private respondent should have filed
an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the
properties alleged to have been acquired by their
union. RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner’s motion
for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not a petition for judicial
declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only
for purposes of remarriage.
RULING: Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception
of both parties or of one that their union is defective.
Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very
shaky foundation. On the other hand, the clause “on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Code denotes that
such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void is not only for purpose of remarriage.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be
obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latter's
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence
needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party
who has previously contracted a marriage which
remains subsisting desires to enter into another
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required
by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
CASE DIGEST: Castillo v. De Leon Castillo
G.R NO# 189607
DATE: April 18, 2016
PETITIONER: RENATO A. CASTILLO
RESPONDENTS: LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): As the Supreme
Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of
nullity does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born
while the Civil Code was in force.
FACTS: On May 25, 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon
Castillo married Benjamin Bautista. On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato
A. Castillo. Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of his marriage to Lea due to
her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to
Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on
6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower
court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not
obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume
the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC
stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists,
the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also
said that even if respondent eventually had her first
marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains
that the first and second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea
failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her
first marriage to Bautista before contracting her
second marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and
Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. CA said that since Lea's marriages were
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the
Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in
effect at the time the marriages were celebrated,
and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled
that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not judicial declaration is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.
RULING: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.
The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea
to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first
marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil
Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the
RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be
determined in accordance with the law in effect at
the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in
force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was
the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also
born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979,
1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this
case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void
marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83
(first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages
are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a
voidable marriage. One of which is that "in a void
marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity
is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must
be a judicial decree.Emphasizing from this difference,
this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza,
People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the
Civil Code contains no express provision on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the
Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages
celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly
required where the nullity of a previous marriage is
invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to the
issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus
considered bigamous and void.
CASE DIGEST: Pulido V. People
G.R NO# 220149
DATE: July 27, 2021
PETITIONER: LUISITO G. PULIDO
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 40 of the
Family Code applies retroactively on marriages
celebrated before the Family Code insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.
Thus, a judicial declaration of nullity is required for
prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of
the Family Code but only for purposes of remarriage.
FACTS: Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda were charged
with bigamy. Pulido married his teacher Nora S.
Arcon in 1983 and had a child in 1984. In 2007, Pulido
stopped going home and admitted to having an affair
with Baleda. They got married in 1995 and indicated
Pulido’s civil status as single. Arcon charged them
with bigamy in 2007. Pulido claimed both marriages
were null and void, while Baleda claimed she only
knew of Pulido’s prior marriage in April 2007 and filed
a petition to annul her marriage with Pulido. The RTC
declared their marriage null and void for being
bigamous. The trial court convicted Pulido of bigamy
and acquitted Baleda. The RTC dismissed Pulido’s
claim that both his marriages are void and upheld the
validity of his marriage with Arcon.
Pulido appealed his conviction to the appellate court
on the ground that his first marriage to Arcon was
void for lack of a marriage license and his marriage
with Baleda was also void since there was no
marriage ceremony performed. The appellate court
sustained Pulido’s conviction but modified the
penalty. The CA found that all elements of bigamy
were present and was not convinced that Pulido’s
first marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The Certification issued by the Civil Registrar did not
attest that no marriage license was issued to Pulido
and Arcon. The appellate court ruled that even if the
first marriage was void for lack of a marriage license,
one may still be held liable for bigamy if he/she enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.
Bigamy was consummated when Pulido entered into
the second marriage without his marriage with Arcon
being first judicially declared null and void.
The subsequent declaration of nullity of Pulido’s
second marriage with Baleda would not exonerate
him from criminal liability. The subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
Pulido for the crime of bigamy. One may still be
charged with bigamy even if the second marriage is
subsequently declared null and void so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting during the
celebration of the second marriage. The CA
ultimately affirmed the June 22, 2009 Decision of the
RTC but with modification as to the penalty imposed.
ISSUE/S: Whether Article 40 has retroactive
application on marriages contracted prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code
RULING: Yes. Article 40 has retroactive application on
marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code but only for the purpose of remarriage,
as the parties are not permitted to judge for
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
themselves the nullity of their marriage. In other
words, in order to remarry, a judicial declaration of
nullity is required for prior marriages contracted
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Without a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first
marriage having been obtained, the second marriage
is rendered void ab initio even though the first
marriage is also considered void ab initio. The only
basis for establishing the validity of the second
marriage is the judicial decree of nullity of the first
marriage.
However, in a criminal prosecution for bigamy, the
parties may still raise the defense of a void ab initio
marriage even without obtaining a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity if the first marriage
was celebrated before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Such is still governed by the rulings in
Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat which are more in line
with the rule that procedural rules are only given
retroactive effect insofar as they do not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights.
In this case, Pulido’s marriage with Arcon was
celebrated when the Civil Code was in effect while
his subsequent marriage with Baleda was contracted
during the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence,
Pulido is required to obtain a judicial decree of
absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage
but only for purposes of remarriage. As regards the
bigamy case, however, Pulido may raise the defense
of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity.
CASE DIGEST: Cariño V. Cariño
G.R NO# 132529
DATE: February 2, 2001
PETITIONER: SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO
RESPONDENTS: SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage
of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Cariño, contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had
two children and the second was on November 10,
1992, with Susan Yee Cariño, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation.
In 1992, Santiago died under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for his
monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. The first wife, petitioner was able to
collect a total of 146,000 while Susan Yee received a
total of 21,000. Respondent Susan Yee filed the
instant case for collection of sum of money against
the petitioner and ordered to return her at least
one-half of the “death benefits” which she received.
Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of, the marriage between the petitioner and
the deceased. She also contended that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Susan Yee can claim half
the amount acquired by Susan Nicdao.
RULING: No. Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by
the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled
to the properties acquired with the deceased through
their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and
the decease
d, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no
right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the
legal wife, is not one of them.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage
license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity
of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the
Court held that such a certification is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent
any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case,
the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
the petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue
and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition,
however, that since the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death
benefits" under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40
of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Petition is granted. CA ruling affirming the RTC
decision in favor of Susan Yee ordering Susan Nicdao
to pay 73,000, or half of the amount which was paid
to her in the form of death benefits arising from the
death of Santiago is reversed and set aside.
CASE DIGEST: Vitangcol v. People
G.R. No. 207406
January 13, 2016
PETITIONERS: NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
A Second Marriage is bigamous if it is contracted
without the Judicial Declaration of Nullity of the
First Marriage
FACTS:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G.
Eduardo. Born into their union were three
children.
After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that
her husband was previously married to another
woman". She eventually discovered that Norberto
was previously married to a certain Gina Gaerlan
on July 17, 1987 as evidenced by a marriage
contract registered with the National Statistics
Office.
On the other hand, Norberto argues that the first
element of bigamy is absent in this case. He
presents as evidence a Certification from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states that the Office has no record of the
marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and
his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof
of existence of an essential requisite of
marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution
fails to establish the legality of his first marriage.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a person who subsequently
contracts a second marriage without a marriage
license of previous marriage guilty of bigamy?
RULING:
YES. Persons intending to contract a second
marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of their first marriage.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the
prosecution must prove all of the following
elements: [first,] that the offender has been
legally married; [second,] that the first marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and [lastly,] that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first
marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy.
Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially
declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code. The second element of the crime of bigamy
is, therefore, present in this case.
WHEREFORE, Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum.
CASE DIGEST: Republic v. Ponce-Pilapil
G.R. No. 219185
November 25, 2020
PETITIONERS: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: JOSEPHINE PONCE-PILAPIL
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
The requirement of a "well-founded belief" for
presumptive death under Article 41 should
constitute efforts
FACTS:
Josephine Ponce-Pilapil was married to Agapito S.
Pilapil on June 5, 2000. A few months after the
marriage, in November 2000, Agapito left without
information where he was going.
Josephine, after Agapito's disappearance, tried to
look for him from Lydia Bueno Pilapil, Agapito's
only surviving relative. She also inquired from
their friends if they saw or heard from Agapito,
but all answered in the negative.
Thus, the private respondent arrived at the
conclusion that her husband Agapito is already
dead considering that more than six (6) years have
lapsed without any information on his
whereabouts.
On the basis of the evidence presented by
Josephine, the RTC declared Agapito as
presumptively dead, pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code, in relation to Article 253 of the Civil
Code. However, the CA ruled against the Republic.
The Republic maintains that Josephine failed to
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
prove that she had a well-founded belief that
Agapito was already dead, and that she exerted
the required amount of diligence in searching for
her missing husband.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Josephine failed to prove the
death of her husband?
RULING:
YES. The respondent failed to demonstrate full
compliance with article 41 of the Family Code.
Jurisprudence sets out four requisites for a grant
of a petition for declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code: first, the
absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391 of the Civil Code; second, the present
spouse wishes to remarry; third, the present
spouse has a well founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and fourth, the present spouse
files for a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee.
The third requirement of a "well-founded belief"
proves most difficult to establish in seeking to
declare an absent spouse presumptively dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even
beyond the period required by law), lack of any
news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere
failure to communicate, or general presumption
of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
The particular circumstances of the present case,
unfortunately, pale in comparison to and prove no
better than those of the foregoing. Josephine's
efforts to search for Agapito only consisted of
inquiries not even done personally but by mere
letter-correspondence facilitated by another
person.
CASE DIGEST: Republic v. Quiñonez
G.R. No. 237412
January 6, 2020
PETITIONERS: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: REMAR A. QUIÑONEZ
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
The requirement of a "well-founded belief" for
presumptive death under Article 41 should
constitute efforts
FACTS:
Petitioner Remar A. Quinonez and his wife Lovelyn
got married on August 16, 1997 and had two
children. To support his family, Remar started
working as a security guard where he was later on
transferred to Cebu.
Sometime in 2001, Lovelyn had a three-month
vacation in Manila to visit some relatives. During
the first three months, Lovelyn constantly
communicated with Remar through a cell phone.
It was also at this time that Remar resigned from
his work in Cebu City and transferred to Surigao
City, where he worked as a security guard at the
Surigao City Hall of Justice. However, the calls and
text messages tapered off until the
communication between the spouses ceased
altogether.
However, someone informed him that his wife
was then already cohabiting with another man
and would no longer be coming back out of
shame.
Remar filed for an emergency leave of absence
from his work and left for BisligCity to look for and
talk to her wife in various cities but was not able
to find her. After almost ten years of trying to find
his wife, he filed Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Remar's efforts in locating his wife
Lovelyn were sufficient to give rise to a "wellfounded belief' that she is dead?
RULING:
YES. But the Court cannot uphold the issuance of
a declaration of presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage where there appears to be
no well-founded belief of the absentee spouse's
death, but only the likelihood that the absentee
spouse does not want to be found.
Unfortunately, Remar failed to allege, much less
prove, the extent of the search he had conducted
in the places where he claims to have gone. Remar
also failed to identify which of Lovelyn's relatives
he had communicated with, and disclose what he
learned from these communications. Moreover, ,
Remar never sought the help of the authorities to
locate Lovelyn.
The law did not define what is meant by '"wellfounded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-tocase basis. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead.
It requires exertion of active effort.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
CASE DIGEST: Tadeo-Matias v. Republic
G.R. No. 230751
April 25, 2018
PETITIONERS: ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS
RESPONDENTS: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER
ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE MUST BE FOR
THE PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE
FACTS:
On January 7, 1968, Estrellita Tadeo-Matias
married Wilfredo N. Matias, a member of the
Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in
Arayat, Pampanga.
Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines and
on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the
Philippine Constabulary. However, he never came
back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga
since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with Estrellita.
After three decades, it is now necessary for
petitioner to request for the benefits that
rightfully belong to her in order to survive.
Thus, in order to claim for the benefit under P.D.
No. 1638, petitioner files a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband
before the RTC. The RTC granted the petition,
while the CA moved to question it.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not r the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code the
proper remedy in order to claim for the benefits
under P.D. No. 1638?
RULING:
NO. Petition for declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is not the
proper remedy.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article
41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to
remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows
that the presumption of death established therein
is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
Given that her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death was not filed for the purpose
of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on
the presumption of death under either Article 390
or 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely
seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the petition should
have been dismissed outright.
CASE DIGEST: Santos v. Santos
G.R. No. 187061
Oct. 8, 2014
PETITIONERS: CELERINA J. SANTOS
RESPONDENTS: RICARDO T. SANTOS
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER
ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE MUST BE FOR
THE PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac
City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
presumably died after her husband, respondent
Ricardo T. Santos.
In his petition for declaration of absence or
presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that due to
the failure of their business, Celerina convinced
him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong.She allegedly applied in an
employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in
February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after
and was never heard from again.
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to
locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know
their daughter's whereabouts. While Celerina
claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition
only sometime in October 2008 when she could
no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.
Celerina claimed that nothing of Ricardo’s
allegations were true. It was he who left the
conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with
another woman. Thus, she filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
Her petition, however, was denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong remedy for a
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death?
RULING:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when
the Regional Trial Court's judgment,order, or
resolution has become final, and the remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds
for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina does not admit to having been absent.
She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
its effects. She contends that reappearance is not
a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate
the subsequent marriage but not nullify the
effects of the declaration of her presumptive
death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed
subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the
Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in
valid marriages."
MODULE 5: CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
GAINS
ARTICLES 116 to 133, Family Code
Art. 116. All property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
CASE DIGEST: Villanueva v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 143286
April 14, 2004
PETITIONERS: Procopio Villanueva, Nicolas
Retuya, and Pacita Villanueva
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and the Heirs of
Eusebia Napisa Retuya
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): The Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the
property relations of spouses even if they were
married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
FACTS:
On October 13, 1988, Eusebia filed a complaint
before the trial court against her husband Nicolas,
Pacita, and their son Procopio. Eusebia claims that
several properties are her conjugal properties
with Nicolas and asks for its reconveyance.
Eusebia is the legal wife of Nicolas, having been
married in 1926, and having borne five children.
During their marriage, they have acquired real
properties, Nicolas having inherited some from his
parents as well as purchased hereditary shares of
parcels of lands in Mandaue City.
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate
family and was instead cohabiting with Pacita and
their illegitimate son Procopio who, after Nicolas
suffered a stroke, has been receiving income on
his father’s properties. The Trial Court ruled in
favor of Eusebia, applying article 116 of the Family
Code and found that the proof presented by
petitioners were not enough to maintain that the
properties were paraphernal properties of
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Nicolas. Eusebia died which is why she is
substituted by her heirs.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the court erred in applying the
presumption that properties acquired during the
existence of the marriage of Nicolas Retuya and
Eusebia Reuya are conjugal.
RULING:
No, the court did not err in the decision that the
properties acquired during Nicolas and Eusebia’s
marriage are conjugal. Article 105 of the Family
Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code
shall apply to conjugal partnerships established
before the Family Code without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code,
if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they
are not conjugal.Nicolas and Eusebia were
married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita
started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married
on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves
admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4
October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No.
152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia. Since the subject properties, including
Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are
conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
the amount of Php20,150.00 to which defendant
Posadas charged with inheritance tax because the
policy has Adolphe as a beneficiary.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not life insurance policy are conjugal
partnership properties
RULING:
(1) The proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable
to the insured's estate, on which the premiums
were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute
community property, and belong one-half to the
husband and the other half to the wife,
exclusively; (2) if the premiums were paid partly
with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the
proceeds are likewise in like proportion
paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)
that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy
payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary,
if delivered to the testamentary administrator of
the former as part of the assets of said estate
under probate administration, are subject to the
inheritance tax according to the law on the
matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively,
and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled
in these Islands or outside.
CASE DIGEST: Jocson v. Court of Appeals
GR No. L-55322
February 16, 1989
PETITIONERS: Moises Jocson
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals, Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
CASE DIGEST: BPI v. Posadas, Jr.
56 Phil 215
October 22, 1931
PETITIONERS: The Bank of the Philippine Islands,
administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe
Oscar Schuetze, plaintiff-appellant
RESPONDENTS: Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of
Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
FACTS:
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary
named in the life-insurance policy issued by the
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada on
January 14, 1913 in which the insured paid the
premiums at the Manila branch of the company
and was transferred to the London branch in
1918. Records show that the deceased Adolphe
Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant
Rosario Gelano on January 16, 1914 and that the
premiums was paid by the conjugal property until
it was fully paid. When Adolphe died, BPI Manila
was assigned as administrator of his estate and
upon his death, Sunlife of Canada paid to his wife
FACTS:
Petitioner Jocson and respondent Agustina are
the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent
Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agsutina.
Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband
without her intestate estate being settled.
Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on
April 1, 1972.
The present controversy concerns the validity of
three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly
conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez
what apparently covers almost all of his
properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in
the estate of his wife. Petitioner assails these
documents and prays that they be declared null
and void and the properties subject matter
therein be partitioned between him and Agustina
as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
Further, petitioner claimed that the properties
mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
validly sell. The trial court sustained the foregoing
contentions of the petitioner and declared the
properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, because they were registered in the
name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete"
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not property registered under
“Emilion Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is
conjugal property
RULING:
Yes. The registration of the property in the name
of only one spouse does not negate the possibility
of it being conjugal. Petitioner Jocson presented
sufficient proof that show that the disputed
properties were acquired during his parents’
coverture.
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid
partly from exclusive funds of either or both
spouses and partly from conjugal funds
belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership
was vested before the marriage and to the
conjugal partnership if such ownership was
vested during the marriage. In either case, any
amount advanced by the partnership or by
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by
the owner or owners upon liquidation of the
partnership.
Annette claims that the said property is conjugal
property for her marriage (second marriage) due
to the fact that the deed of absolute sale was
dated during their marriage.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the property is conjugal property
of the second marriage
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that the property belongs to
the second marriage, however, reimbursements
should be made to the children of the first
marriage as per Art. 118 of the Family Code. The
deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by
Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract
between the parties, only after full payment of the
rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of
absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel
Jovellanos. As early as 1967, he was already
married to Annette H. Jovellanos; this property
necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership
with his said second wife.
CASE DIGEST: CASTILLO JR. V. PASCO
G.R NO#: L-16857
DATE: May 29, 1964
CASE DIGEST: Jovellanos v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 100728
June 18, 1992
PETITIONERS: Wilhelmina Jovellanos, Mercy
Jovellanos-Martinez, and Jose Hermilo Jovellanos
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, and Annette H.
Jovellanos, for and on her behalf, and in
representation of her two minor daughters as
natural guardian, Ana Maria and Ma. Jennette,
both surnamed Jovellanos.
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
FACTS:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life
Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a
Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement for a
property. At the time of the agreement, Daniel
was married to his late wife, Leonor, with whom
he had three children. Daniel remarried Annette
in 1967. Mercy, a child from his first marriage, and
her husband built an extension to the property on
December 18, 1971. On January 8, 1975, the lease
was paid and Philamlife executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale to Daniel. The next day, Daniel
donated the property to his children from his first
marriage. Daniel passed away on September 8,
1985.
PETITIONERS: Marcelo Castillo Et Al.
RESPONDENTS: Macaria Pasco
DOCTRINE
Property purchased partly with paraphernal
funds and partly with conjugal funds
belongs to both patrimonies in common, in
proportion to the contributions of each.
FACTS
In October 1931, Marcelo Castillo,
being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a
widow On December 22, 1932, Gabriel
Gonzales, as co-owners of the litigated
fishpond, executed a deed of sale, conveying
said property to the spouses Marcelo
Castillo and Macaria Pasco for the sum of
P6,000, payable in three installments. On
April 3, 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died. The
two installments, totaling P5,000, of the
price of the fishpond were paid with
conjugal funds, unlike the first installment of
P1,000 that was paid exclusively with money
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
belonging to the wife Macaria Pasco. Against
the contention of petitioners-appellants that
the fishpond thus bought should be
considered conjugal for its having been
acquired during coverture, the Court of
Appeals declared it to be paraphernal,
because it was purchased with exclusive
funds of the wife, Macaria Pasco.
DOCTRINE
If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.
ISSUE
FACTS
Whether or not the property should be
deemed conjugal
The petitioner Epifania et al. claimed
to be the common children of Martin
Lacerna and his wife Estaquia Pichan who
died in 1953. Petitioners asserted that they
had a right to one-half of the land located in
Davao Del Sur, as their mother’s share in her
conjugal
partnership
with
Martin.
Defendant denied and asserts that he is not
married with Eustaquia, though they lived
together and abandoned him. He stated that
the two children (petitioners) are the
children of other men. Trial court denied, as
he was in fact married to Eustaquia. A
petition to sinks the
RULING
It’s
partly
conjugal,
partly
paraphernal. Since the wife, under Article
1418, cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the consent of the husband, her
private transactions are presumed to be for
her own account, and not for the account of
the partnership. The finding of the Court of
Appeals is that Gabriel Gonzales owed this
indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in
the absence of proof that the husband
authorized her to use community funds
therefor, the appellate Court's finding
cannot be disturbed by us. Since the wife
does not have the management or
representation of the conjugal partnership
where the husband is qualified therefor, the
loan to her constituted a transaction that did
not involve the community, and the creditor
could seek repayment exclusively from her
properties. Logically, as this Court then held,
the money loaned to the wife, as well as the
property acquired thereby, should be
deemed to be the wife's exclusive property.
However, In the case at bar, the two
installments, totaling P5,000, of the price of
the fishpond were paid with conjugal funds,
unlike the first installment of P1,000 that
was paid exclusively with money belonging
to the wife Macaria Pasco, appellee herein.
CASE DIGEST: MAGALLON V. MONTEJO
G.R NO#: G.R. No. 73733
DATE: December 16, 1986
PETITIONER: Epifania Magallon
ISSUES
Whether or not petitioners can claim the
land as conjujal property of Martin and
Eustaquia.
RULING
NO. No marriage contract was
presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage
to the petitioner either before or after the
death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is clear
that the petitioner cannot assert any claim
to the land other than by virtue of her
supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere
mistress, she cannot pretend to any right
thereto. The phrase "married to Epifania
Magallon written after the name of Martin
Lacerna in said certificate of title is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Martin
Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not
necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal"
property of Lacerna and petitioner herein.
The ruling in Maramba vs. Lozano, that the
presumption does not operate where there
is no showing as to when property alleged to
be conjugal was acquired applies with even
greater force here.
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Rosalina L. Montejo
CASE DIGEST: VDA DE PADILLA V. VDA DE
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
PADILLA
G.R NO#: L-48137
DATE: October 4, 1943
WIDOW-APPELLEE: Narciso A. Padilla,
Concepcion Paterno Vda. De Padilla
EXECTRIX-APPELANT: Isabel Bibby Vda. De
Padilla
DOCTRINE
The ownership of the land is retained by the
wife until she is paid the value of the lot,
because of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
FACTS
The widow Conception Paterno
Vda. de Padilla, commenced the instant
proceedings by filing a petition wherein she
prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal
property be segregated from the
inventoried estate and delivered to her
together
with
the
corresponding
reimbursements and indemnities, thus be
given one-half of the conjugal partnership
property, and that her usufructuary right
over one-half of the portion pertaining to
the heir instituted in the will be recognized.
This case is an incident of the settlement of
the testate estate of the late Narciso A.
Padilla. In order that his property may be
divided according to his last will and
testament, it is necessary first to liquidate
the conjugal partnership. The Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered judgment
declaring certain pieces of real estate and
jewelry as well as certain sums of money to
be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be
delivered to the widow (appellee herein).
Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, appealed.
ISSUES
1.) Whether or petitioner is entitled to
reimbursements and indemnities.
2.) Whether or not Certification of Title
under Torrens system be turned into an
instrument for deprivation of ownership.
RULING
rents of her paraphernal property to
help bear the expenses of the family.
When the husband contracts any debt in
his own name, it is chargeable against
the conjugal partnership as a general
rule (article 1408,par. 1) because it is
presumed that the debt is beneficial to
the family. But when such a debt is
enforced against the fruits of the
paraphernal
property,
such
presumption no longer applies,
considering article 1386.
2.) No. We are of the opinion that an
exception should in no wise be made when
the property is registered in the names of
both spouses. In such instances, the
property may be shown to be really of either
spouse, though recorded in the names of
both. The underlying reason is the same in
all cases, which is the confidential relation
between husband and wife. Because of the
feelings of trust existing between the
spouses, certificates of title are often
secured in the name of both, or of either,
regardless of the true ownership of the
property, and regardless of the source of the
purchase money. It is thus but fair that on
liquidation of the partnership, the trust
should be recognized and enforced, so that
the real ownership of the property may be
established. Certificate of title under the
Torrens system should not be turned into an
instrument for deprivation of ownership.
CASE DIGEST: LILIUS V. MANILA
G.R NO#: L-39587
DATE: March 24, 1934
PLAINTIFFS-APPELANTS: Aleko E. Lilius, et
al.
DEFENDANT:APPELANT: The Manila
Railroad Company
DOCTRINE:
It is necessary for the party claiming
indemnity for the loss of services to prove
that the person obliged to render them had
done so before he was injured and that he
would be willing to continue rendering them
had he not been prevented from so doing.
1.) Yes. There are just and sound
reasons for article 1386. The wife
contributes the fruits, interests, and
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
FACTS
Plaintiff Aleko Lilius, his wife Sonja
Maria Lilius, and daughter Brita Marianne
Lilius, left Manila for a sight-seeing trip in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Before reaching the
crossing in question, there was nothing to
indicate its existence and in as much as there
were many houses, shrubs and trees along
the road, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight
meters from the crossing, Lilius saw an
autotruck parked on the left side of the road.
Several people, who seemed to have
alighted from the said truck, were walking
on the opposite side. He slowed down and
sounded his horn for the people to get out
of the way. With his attention thus occupied,
he did not see the crossing but he heard two
short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he
saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him,
which turned out to be locomotive No. 713
of the Manila Railroad Company’s train. The
train struck the plaintiff’s car right in the
center causing injury to the three victims.
whistle of the locomotive immediately
preceding the collision and when the
accident had already become inevitable.
2.) No. In the case under consideration,
apart from the services of his wife Sonja
Maria Lilius as translator and secretary, the
value of which has not been proven, the
plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has not presented any
evidence showing the existence of domestic
services and their nature, rendered by her
prior to the accident, in order that it may
serve as a basis in estimating their value. In
order that a husband may recover damages
for deprivation of his wife's assistance
during her illness from an accident, it is
necessary for him to prove the existence of
such assistance and his wife's willingness to
continue rendering it had she not been
prevented from so doing by her illness
CASE DIGEST: VILLANUEVA C.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R NO#: G.R. No. 74577
ISSUES
1.) Whether or not Manila Railroad
Company is liable for damages.
2.) Whether or not claiming indemnity
for the loss of plaintiff’s wife services is
proper.
DATE: December 4, 1990
PETITIONER: Consolacion Villanueva
RESPONDENTS: The Intermediate Appellate
Court Et Al.
DOCTRINE
RULING
1.) Yes. Manila Railroad Company was
liable for the accident by reason of its
own negligence and that of its
employees, for not having employed the
diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision of the said employees in
the discharge of their duties. Plaintiffappellant Aleko E. Lilius took all
precautions which his skill. He warned
them of his approach and request them
to get out of the way. If he failed to stop,
look and listen before going over the
crossing, in spite of the fact that he was
driving at 12 miles per hour after having
been free from obstacles, it was
because, his attention having been
occupied in attempting to go ahead, he
did not see the crossing in question, nor
anything, nor anybody indicating its
existence, as he knew nothing about it
beforehand. The first and only warning,
which he received of the impending
danger, was two short blows from the
To claim for the improvements thereon,
proof is needful of the time of the making or
construction of the improvements and the
source of the funds used therefor in order to
determine
the
character
of
the
improvements as belonging to the conjugal
partnership or to one spouse separately.
FACTS
Modesto and Frederico Aranas inherited Lot
13 from their parents, Graciano Aranas and
Nicolasa Bunsa. Said lot was divided into a
northern and southern portion (Lot 13-C)
and was distributed between Frederico and
Modesto, respectively. Modesto had two
illegitimate children names Dorothea Aranas
Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These two
loaned from Jesus Bernas. A Loan
Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage was
executed between the siblings and Bernas
wherein they described themselves as
absolute co-owners of Lot 13. Raymundo
Aranas and Consolacion Villanueva signed
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
the document as witnesses. About a month
later, Villanueva and Aranas filed a
complaint against Bernas alleging that they
be declared co-owners of the land based on
the will of Victoria Comorro. Victoria
Comorro’s will allegedly bequeathed to
Consolacion and Raymundo, and to
Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas, in equal
shares pro indiviso,
ISSUE
Whether or not Consolacion Villanueva has
any right over the property in seeking that
the improvement is conjugal.
PETITIONERS: BA FINANCE CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court Of Appeals et al.
DOCTRINE
A conjugal partnership is liable only for such
"debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." There must be the requisite
showing then of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the
spouses.
FACTS
RULING
No. Consolacion Villanueva does not
bear any right over lot 13-c and the
improvements thereon. Lot 13-C was not
part of the conjugal partnership property of
Comorro and Aranas. It was the latter’s
exclusive, private property, which he had
inherited from his parents and registered
solely in his name. The fact that Comorro
died 2 years ahead of Aranas clearly signifies
that she never inherited anything from her
husband. To claim for the improvements
thereon, proof is needful of the time of the
making or construction of the improvements
and the source of the funds used therefor in
order to determine the character of the
improvements as belonging to the conjugal
partnership or to one spouse separately. No
such proof was presented by Villanueva.
What is certain is that the land on which the
improvements stand was the exclusive
property of Modesto Aranas and that where,
as here, property is registered in the name
of one spouse only and there is no showing
of when precisely the property was
acquired, the presumption is that it belongs
exclusively to said spouse.It is not therefore
possible to declare the improvements to be
conjugal in character.
On July 1, 1975, private respondent
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the
petitioner. Respondent Yulo presented an
alleged special power of attorney executed
by his wife Lily Yulo, respondent Lily Yulo.
About two months prior to the loan,
however, Augusto Yulo had already left Lily
Yulo and their children and had abandoned
their conjugal home. When the obligation
became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo
failed to pay the same. Petitioner filed its
amended complaint against the spouses on
the basis of the promissory note. Alleging
that the said spouses were guilty of fraud.
Respondent stated that they were already
separated when the promissory note was
executed and that her signature in the
special power of attorney was forged. Trial
Court dismissed the complaint. Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES
1.) Whether or not respondents were
guilty of fraud.
2.) Whether or not Lily Yulo can be held
liable for the obligations contracted by
her husband.1
RULING
CASE DIGEST: BA FINANCE CORPORATION
V. CA
G.R NO#: L-61464
DATE: May 28,1988
1.) No. Petitioner failed to state in the
acknowledgment portion of Exhibit B-1
that
the
appellee
Lily
Yulo
acknowledged the said document to be
her own voluntary act and deed, is a very
strong and commanding circumstance
to show that she did not appear
personally before the said Notary Public
and did not sign the document.
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
Additionally, the Notary Public did not
recognized or tell which of the two
signatures appearing therein, was the
signature of this June Enriquez. The
appellee Lily Yulo, to back up her claim
of forgery of her signature in Exhibit B-1,
presented in court a handwriting expert
witness. The signatures of the appellee
Lily Yulo, in the disputed document in
question were all forgeries, and not her
genuine signature.
2.) No. There is no dispute that A & L
Industries was established during the
marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and
therefore the same is presumed
conjugal and the fact that it was
registered in the name of only one of the
spouses does not destroy its conjugal
nature. However, for the said property
to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership under Article 161 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, the obligation
which the petitioner is seeking to
enforce against the conjugal property
managed by the private respondent Lily
Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by
Augusto Yulo for his own benefit
because at the time he incurred the
obligation he had already abandoned his
family and had left their conjugal home.
Worse, he made it appear that he was
duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A
& L Industries, to procure such loan from
the petitioner.
NOTES: ARTICLES 116-120 - FAMILY
CODE
Section 3. Conjugal partnership property
Article 116. All property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered
in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.
Presumption of CPG applies only after it has
been proved that the property in
controversy was acquired during the
marriage. For as long as acquisition is proven
to be during the marriage, the presumption
will apply even when the manner in which
the properties were acquired does not
appear. The presumption applies even if the
spouses are living separately. During the
marriage, presumption is always in favor of
conjugality. Jocson vs CA
If presumption is overcome, trust is
created. However, the circumstances may
disprove conjugality even if the registration
shows otherwise because oftentimes, the
properties are registered in the names of
both spouses even if acquired only by one
spouse. This is because of the trust and
confidence between them. It is only but fair
that upon liquidation, such trust be
recognized and enforced and the real
ownership be established.
When presumption does not apply
1. There is no showing when it was acquired
and the title is in the wife’s name alone.
2. Inscription of the phrase “married to A” is
only descriptive of the civil status and does
not prove conjugality.
3. Registration is not proof of acquisition
during the marriage because it could have
been acquired at a different time
Article 117. The following are conjugal
partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during
the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry,
work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due
or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden
treasure which the law awards to the finder
or owner of the property where the treasure
is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such
as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution
of the partnership in excess of the number
of each kind brought to the marriage by
either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance,
such as winnings from gambling or betting.
However, losses therefrom shall be borne
exclusively by the loser-spouse.
O.L.F.T.O.L.C
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
#1. Acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense
concerning minerals and mineral lands are
governed by special laws.
of the common fund.
#5. Those acquired through occupation
such as fishing or hunting. This was
separated from #2 because in the case of
industry or work, one is sure to earn. In
fishing and hunting, there is the element of
chance.
·
Damages granted by the courts for
contracts solely financed by the conjugal
partnership and unduly breached by a
third person belongs to the CPG. Zulueta
vs Pan American
o But damages awarded to
one of the spouses as a result of physical
injuries
inflicted by a third party, such
damages belong exclusively to the injured
spouse. Lilius vs Manila Railroad.
·
Damages arising out of illegal
detention of the exclusive property of
the spouse belongs to the CPG if the
detention deprived the partnership of
the use and earnings thereof. Bismorte
vs Aldecoa
#2. Those obtained from the labor,
industry, work or profession of either or
both of the spouses.
#3. Fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or
received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits
from the exclusive property of each spouse
a. Fruits of the common property belong to
the CPG
b. Net fruits of the exclusive property belong
to the CPG.
o The fruits of the exclusive property
shall first be used to satisfy the expenses of
administration of the separate property; the
balance is CPG.
#4. The share of either spouse in the hidden
treasure which thelaw awards to the finder
or owner of the property where the
treasure is found.
·
Hidden treasure contemplates
artifacts or objects which have
undergone transformation from their
original raw state(earrings, necklaces,
bracelets)
·
For legal purposes, it is any hidden
and unknown deposit of money, jewelry,
or other precious object, the lawful
ownership of it does not appear. Article
439, CC
o However, gold nuggets, precious
stones in their raw state, oil, and the like are
not
treasures
because
matters
#6. Livestock existing upon the dissolution
of the partnership in excess of the number
of each kind brought to the marriage by
either spouse. If the spouse contributed 40
cows and as a result of the marriage it
becomes 60, 20 shall be conjugal property.
In this case, the partnership is the debtor
and the owner-spouse is the creditor. The
debtor cannot offer the worst cow, while the
creditor cannot demand the best.
#7. Those which are acquired by chance,
such as winnings from gambling or betting.
However, losses therefrom shall be borne
exclusively by the loser-spouse Scenario. A
stranger, without any consideration, gave
the wife a sweepstakes ticket. Later, the
ticket won P100B. To whom do the winnings
belong? Exclusive property of wife. The
ticket was given gratuitously to the wife,
therefore, it is exclusive property. The
winnings are income, which under Article
117, is conjugal
Article 118. Property bought on
installments paid partly from exclusive
funds of either or both spouses and partly
from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or
buyers if full ownership was vested before
the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested
during the marriage. In either case, any
amount advanced by the partnership or by
either or both spouses shall be reimbursed
by the owner or owners upon liquidation of
the partnership.
Applicability. This provision applies when
the installment was initiated prior to the
marriage, but ended during the marriage.
Installment purchases. The ownership of
the property is determined at the time
when the title is vested.
a. Vested before marriage. It forms part of
the exclusive property of the buyer under
Article 109. If part of the installments were
paid out of conjugal funds, the property
remains to be exclusive but the conjugal
partnership
shall
be
entitled
to
reimbursement.
b. Vested after marriage. It forms part of
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
1F CLASS REVIEWER (S.Y ’23-24)
conjugal property. In this case, the spouse
who contracted the marriage shall be
entitled to reimbursement from the conjugal
partnership.
Article 119. Whenever an amount or credit
payable within a period of time belongs to
one of the spouses, the sums which may be
collected during the marriage in partial
payments or by installments on the principal
shall be the exclusive property of the spouse.
However, interests falling due during the
marriage on the principal shall belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Principal collected during marriage;
exclusive. Payments made for the principal
debt shall be exclusive property of the
spouse in whose favor the debt is paid. This
is consistent with Article 109 which states
that property brought into the marriage is
exclusive.
Interest collected during marriage; CPG.
Interest payments are considered fruits, and
therefore part of conjugal property. This is
consistent with Article 117.
Article
120.
The
ownership
of
improvements, whether for utility or
adornment, made on the separate property
of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses shall pertain to the
conjugal partnership, or to the original
owner-spouse, subject to the following
rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by
the conjugal partnership and any resulting
increase in value are more than the value of
the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of
the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of
the value of the property of the ownerspouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire
property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the
time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
property due to the
improvement.
3. Compute the value of the property at the
time of improvement
4. Compute 1+2
5. Compare #1 and #4
If #4 is greater than #1, the entire property
shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
The owner-spouse shall be entitled to
reimbursement equal to the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of
the improvement. DUH siya nagbayad
originally eh. Edi unjust enrichment if no
reimbursement�
If #1 is greater than #4, the said property
shall be retained by the owner-spouse. The
CPG shall be entitled to reimbursement
equal to the cost of the improvement made.
Note that the increase in value is not
reimbursed by the owner-spouse. The
reason for this is because prior to
liquidation, such spouse retains ownership.
And as owner he or she is entitled to all risks
and rewards.
Note: This does not give rise to a cause of
action against third persons like subsequent
buyers of the property. This only allows
claims from the husband or wife if he or she
is still the owner of the property upon
liquidation. Ferrer vs Ferrer
Usufructuary. The conjugal partnership may
use both the land and the improvement, but
not as owner but in the exercise of a
usufruct. The ownership remains with the
owner-spouse until the value of the land is
paid. There is no automatic conveyance of
ownership to the conjugal
partnership. Therefore, such separate
property cannot be levied upon to satisfy a
conjugal debt prior to liquidation, during
which ownership is vested accordingly.
Exception: If the conjugal funds are
insufficient to pay the conjugal
debts, the separate property can be held
solidarily liable.
Procedure:
1.Compute the value of the improvement
2. Compute the increase in the value of the
*This is a compiled reviewer of Class 1F (’23-24), this a consolidation of notes from class lectures, books, digests & other reviewers.
Unauthorized copying, reproduction, modification, or distribution of any of the contents of the reviewer is prohibited.