WASSMER V. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089
December 26, 1964
FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends, and acquaintances. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given, and gifts received. And then, two days before the wedding, the defendant, who
was then 28 years old, simply left a note for the plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone the wedding — My mother opposes it . . ." He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired the plaintiff:
"Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never
heard from again.
Wassmer sued Velez for damages, and he failed to answer and was declared in
default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff for damages and attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable
for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which
such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and
moral damages against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of
promise to marry.
RULING:
Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides:
"Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 21. The circumstances of this case show that
Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against
him.
Guevarra, et al., v. Banach
G.R. No, 214016, November 24, 2021
A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is not
of such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs. In any
case, the party seeking to recover damages must have acted in good faith.
FACTS:
Banach, a German, alleged that Guevarra had repeatedly expressed her love and
willingness to marry him so that he would send her money, only to break up with
him after he had done so. The breakup prompted Banach to sue Guevarra and her
parents for damages before the Regional Trial Court. Banach anchored his cause of
action on the human relations provisions in the Civil Code, particularly Articles 20,
21, and 22. He alleged that Guevarra had repeatedly expressed her love and
willingness to marry him so that he would send her money, only to break up with
him after he had done so. He claimed that these acts amounted to fraud, or at the
very least, unjust enrichment. Banach likewise claimed moral damages for the
alleged "moral suffering, anguish, anxiety, and sleepless nights" he suffered from
Guevarra. He also prayed for attorney's fees for having been constrained to litigate
to protect his rights.
On the other hand, Guevarra called off the engagement after she had discovered
Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit; he did not have the purest
intentions in marrying her. He lied about his marital status as he told her that he was
a divorced man even if he was still married to his third wife. Banach even hid his true
name from Guevarra. Finding out that one’s betrothed is still married to another
person, and that he is not who he says he is, are reasons enough to justify the
wedding’s cancellation. Guevarra also argued that the money Banach sent her "was
a gift, the return of which was not actionable”.
The Regional Trial Court found Guevarra and her parents liable to Banach for actual
damages. It also awarded moral damages and attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its January 29, 2007, Decision, similarly ordered
Guevarra and her parents to return the P500,000.00 to Banach under the principle
of unjust enrichment. However, it deleted the awards of moral damages and
attorney's fees, ruling that Banach's actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and
that he did not have the purest intentions in expressing his desire to marry Guevarra.
Hence this present petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order to return the P500,000.00 is proper upon the breach of
the promise marriage.
RULING:
NO. Under our laws, a breach of promise to marry is not actionable. as long as it is
not of such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs. In
any case, the party seeking to recover damages must have acted in good faith.Acts
suffice to justify the wedding's cancellation. Finding out that one's betrothed is still
married to another person, and that they are not who they say they are, are reasons
enough to conclude bad faith.
Since respondent himself did not act in good faith, he cannot claim damages under
the New Civil Code. The unjust enrichment principle under Article 2250 only applies
if the property is acquired without legal grounds. Here, respondent gave petitioner
P500,000.00 as a gift to help her and her family with their possible eviction from
their home. The money being a gift, petitioner is correct to say that she cannot be
compelled to return the P500,000.00 given to her.
An individual has the autonomy to choose whom to marry, or whether to marry at
all. Marriage is a social institution that creates a permanent bond between
individuals, and the law grants them rights and obligations unique to married
couples. The choice of whether to marry-and necessarily, whom to marry-is a
personal decision that a person makes for themself. This individual choice must be
made, as much as possible, completely free from any external pressures. After all,
marriage can and will change a person's life.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Roberto Reyes (AKA Amay Bisaya), filed an action for damages under Arts. 19 and
21 against petitioners. He alleged that at around 6:00 in the evening of 13 October
1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his
friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a birthday party of the
hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she will vouch for him. He then
carried Filart’s present (basket of fruits) to the party. However, while lining up at the
buffet table, Reyes was stopped by Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko)
and in a loud voice, was told to leave the party. Filart was within hearing distance
but completely ignored him when he said that he was invited by Filart. Thereafter,
he was escorted out by a Makati policeman.
Ms. Lim said that she approached the captain waiter, Dr. Filart’s sister (Ms. Fruto),
and Capt. Batung regarding his presence, and requested Fruto & Batung to tell Reyes
to leave. Because he still lingered, she then approached Reyes when he went to a
corner to eat and requested him to leave, but when she turned around, Reyes began
making a big scene. Filart, on the other hand, stated that she never invited Mr. Reyes
to the party and that it was Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket as he was also
going to take the elevator, but he was going to a different floor.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA reversed the same. Hence, this petition
for review. Petitioners contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria,
they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave for being a gate-­crasher.
ISSUE:
WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party.
RULING:
NO. We find more credible the lower court's findings of fact.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the
latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request
was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her
part to cause embarrassment to him. Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s
version of the story is that it is unsupported.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.
Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These
two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October
1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged
abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had
a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her
associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen. The lameness of this
argument need not be belabored.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Not being liable for both actual
and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Private respondent is a 22-year-old Filipino citizen residing in Dagupan City.
Petitioner is an Iranian medical exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City. Petitioner allegedly courted and proposed to marry her.
Thereafter, private respondent began living with him. She allegedly was a virgin
before such arrangement.
A week before the filing of private respondent’s complaint, petitioner’s attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her. As a result,
she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked
not to live with her anymore.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such
other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. Petitioner denied the claims
of private respondent. Accordingly, he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent nor he forced her to live with him.
The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring
the private respondent. The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
RULING:
Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. However, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Petitioner’s profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile, and deceive the poor woman into believing
that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life’s partner. His was nothing
but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a
life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality
and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his obligations.
Pe vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe, who is 24 years old
and unmarried. Defendant, Alfonso Pe, on the other hand, is a married man. Because
of the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who
regarded him as a member of their family. Defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. When
the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant
was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home.
Plaintiffs then brought an action to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and
corrective damages. They based their action on Article 21 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.” Defendant set up as a defense that the facts alleged
therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant commit injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New
Civil Code.
RULING:
YES. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the Civil Code. The
wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man.
The defendant took advantage of the trust of the plaintiffs and even used the praying
of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The defendant tried to win Lolita’s
affection through an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced Lolita to the extent of
making her fall in love with him. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain
of events than that the defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her.
Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA
176 SCRA 778
FACTS:
Private respondent Tobias was an employee of petitioner GLOBE MACKAY as its
purchasing agent and administrative assistant. Anomalies in the petitioner’s
company were later allegedly discovered by Tobias regarding fictitious purchases
and other fraudulent transactions. Hendry, Executive Vice-­President and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY, confronted Tobias stating the latter as the number
one suspect and ordered a one week forced leave.
When Tobias reported for work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry called him
a “crook” and a “swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie-­detector test and the
specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. The police investigators,
however, cleared private respondent from the said anomalies. Later, petitioners filed
criminal complaints for estafa which were all dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias was also
terminated by petitioners from his employment.
Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the
latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Eventually, private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the
Civil Code.
RULING:
YES. Petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the provisions
of the Civil Code.
Art. 19 of the Civil Code sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The Court
said that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Thus,
generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper
In the present case, petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and told the private
respondent that he was the number one suspect and to take a 1-week vacation leave,
not to communicate with the office, and to leave his keys to said defendant
(petitioner Hendry). Moreover, the imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioners were ordered to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages to
private respondent.
CASE DIGEST: University of the East V. Jader
G.R NO# 132344
DATE: February 12, 2000
PETITIONERS: University of the East
RESPONDENTS: Romeo A. Jader
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code states
that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith
and every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
FACTS: Romeo Jader attended the University of the East College of Law from
1984 to 1988. Professor Carlos Ortega assigned him a grade of five.
Meanwhile, the Dean and Faculty Members of the College of Law convened to
determine which fourth-year students were eligible for graduation. Romeo's
name appeared on the Tentative List of Candidates for the Bachelor of Laws
(LL.B) degree for the Second Semester of 1987-1988. He attended the investiture
ceremonies. Dean Celedonio then presented him with a rolled white sheet
symbolizing the Law Diploma. Subsequently, Romeo prepared for the bar
examination.
To do so, he took an unpaid leave of absence from his job from April 20, 1988, to
September 30, 1988, and enrolled in a pre-bar review class at Far Eastern
University. Upon discovering a deficiency, he discontinued his review class and,
unfortunately, could not participate in the 1988 bar examinations. As a result, he
filed a lawsuit against University of the East, alleging that the latter's negligence
had caused him moral shock, mental anguish, severe anxiety, damage to his
reputation, emotional distress, and sleepless nights due to missing the 1988 bar
examinations. He sought compensation for moral and exemplary damages, lost
income, attorney's fees, and legal costs.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not University of the East be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case.
RULING: Yes, it may be held liable. University of the East, in belatedly
informing Mr. Jader of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a
time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be
said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse
of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the
forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university
which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in
its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic
status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. Petitioner ought to
have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to
inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern
after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. However, while
petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's
actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. At the very least, it behooved on the respondent to verify for himself
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations.
CASE DIGEST: Tenchavez V. Escano
G.R NO# L-19671
DATE: November 29, 1965
PETITIONERS: PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ
RESPONDENTS: VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL.
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 17 of the Civil Code: Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
FACTS: Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished
stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt.
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
On June 24, 1950, without informing her husband, Vicenta applied for a passport,
indicating that she was single, planning to study, and domiciled in Cebu City. She
also stated her intention to return after two years. This passport application was
approved, and she left for the United States. On August 22, 1950, Vicenta filed a
verified divorce complaint against her husband in the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada, citing "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character"
as the grounds. On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, considered "final and
absolute," was issued in open court by the Nevada court. In 1951, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño submitted a petition to the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor. On September 10, 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation for her marriage. On September 13, 1954, Vicenta married an
American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She currently resides with him in
California, and they have children together. Vicenta acquired American
citizenship on August 8, 1958. The petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta
and her parents, alleging that they discouraged Vicenta from reuniting with her
husband.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the divorce pursued by Escano holds legal validity and
is enforceable in Philippine courts.
RULING: No, it does not. The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does
not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even
use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast
to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to
108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall
not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1). For the Philippine courts to recognize and
give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should
have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our
law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.);
and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil.
579). From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved.
CASE DIGEST: St. Louis Realty V. CA
G.R NO# L-46061
DATE: November 14, 1984
PETITIONERS: ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 26 of the Civil Code: "every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons".
FACTS: St. Louis Realty, with the consent of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without the
approval of Doctor Aramil), had an advertisement published in the Sunday Times
issue dated December 15, 1968, under the title "WHERE THE HEART IS." The ad
featured a photograph of Doctor Aramil's residence with the Arcadio family,
accompanied by text that praised Brookside Hills as their new home. This same
advertisement reappeared in the Sunday Times issue of January 5, 1969. Doctor
Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and a faculty member at U.E. Ramon Magsaysay
Memorial Hospital, noticed the error and promptly sent a letter to St. Louis Realty
on the same day. The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer at St.
Louis Realty responsible for advertising, who immediately halted the
advertisement's publication. Magtoto also reached out to Doctor Aramil to
apologize for the mistake. However, no correction or apology was issued publicly.
On February 20, 1969, Doctor Aramil's attorney demanded P110,000 in actual,
moral, and exemplary damages from St. Louis Realty. In their response dated
March 10, St. Louis Realty asserted that the error was an honest mistake and
offered to publish a rectification in the Manila Times if Doctor Aramil wished. In
the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969, St. Louis Realty published a new
advertisement featuring the Arcadio family and their actual house. However, no
public apology to Doctor Aramil or an explanation of the mistake was included.
On March 29, Doctor Aramil filed his complaint for damages. Subsequently, in the
Manila Times issue of April 15, 1969, St. Louis Realty issued a "NOTICE OF
RECTIFICATION" in a small 4 by 3-inch space.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the case at bar has a violation in relation to Article 26
of the Civil Code.
RULING: Yes, there is. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in
mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication
like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or
that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly
and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental
anguish.
CASE DIGEST: Gregorio V. CA
G.R NO# 179799
DATE: September 11, 2009
PETITIONERS: ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC.,
and EMMA J. DATUIN
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 26 of the Civil Code: "every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons".
FACTS: The case originated from the submission of an Affidavit of Complaint
filed by Emma J. Datuin, who acted as the Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts
Receivables Department, authorized by Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio). This
complaint accused Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and Vito Belarmino,
proprietors of Alvi Marketing, of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22,
commonly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The allegation was that Alvi
Marketing had issued insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for numerous
appliances purchased from Sansio. Due to an incorrect address provided in the
complaint, Gregorio was unable to refute the charges against her. Consequently,
she faced three counts of violating B.P. Blg. 22, under Criminal Case Nos. 236544,
236545, and 236546, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3,
Manila. On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a damages complaint against Sansio
and Datuin in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Sansio and
Datuin responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the complaint,
which stemmed from alleged malicious prosecution, did not sufficiently state a
valid legal claim. Gregorio opposed this motion, and the legal parties exchanged
further arguments.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC issued an order rejecting the Motion to Dismiss.
Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was also
denied by the RTC in an order dated January 5, 2001. Subsequently, Sansio and
Datuin took the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari,
invoking Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the presiding judge of the
RTC had gravely abused his discretion in refusing their motions to dismiss and
reconsider. Following the unfavorable decision issued on March 20, 2003, Sansio
and Datuin appealed to the CA, and this appeal remains pending. On January 31,
2007, the CA rendered a Decision in the certiorari case, granting the petition and
directing the dismissal of Gregorio's damage suit. Gregorio sought reconsideration
of this Decision, but the CA denied it in a Resolution dated September 12, 2007.
Consequently, this petition has been filed.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not Gregorio's damages lawsuit is grounded in quasidelict.
RULING: Yes, it is on the grounds of quasi-delict. Basic is the legal principle that
the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. Gregorio's civil complaint, read in its
entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to
Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. In every tort
case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond;
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no pre existing contractual relation
between the parties.
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for
damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily
constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal
dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to
social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind. It appears
that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of
mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the
requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should be
rightfully accused of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus
depriving her of the opportunity to contest the charges, because she was not given
proper notice.
CASE DIGEST: Pulido V. People
G.R NO# 220149
DATE: July 27, 2021
PETITIONERS: LUISITO G. PULIDO
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): The Court held that a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent
marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution
for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are
secured.
FACTS: Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda (referred to as Baleda) faced charges of
bigamy before the RTC. The petitioner, Pulido, entered a plea of not guilty to the
alleged crime. Subsequently, a trial on the merits took place. According to the
records, on September 5, 1983, Pulido, who was then 16 years old, married Nora S.
Arcon (Arcon), his teacher, who was 22 years old at the time. They had a civil
ceremony at the Rosario Municipal Hall in Cavite, officiated by Mayor Calixto D.
Enriquez. The couple had a child together in 1984 and lived as husband and wife
until 2007 when Pulido ceased returning home. When confronted by Arcon, Pulido
admitted to an affair with Baleda. Arcon also discovered that Pulido and Baleda
had entered into another marriage on July 31, 1995, solemnized by Reverend
Conrado P. Ramos. The Marriage Certificate listed Pulido as single.
Hurt by this betrayal, Arcon filed bigamy charges against Pulido and Baleda on
December 4, 2007. In his defense, Pulido argued that he could not be criminally
liable for bigamy because both of his marriages were null and void. He contended
that his marriage to Arcon in 1983 was null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license, while his marriage to Baleda was null and void because no
marriage ceremony had taken place. Baleda claimed that she only learned about
Pulido's previous marriage to Arcon in April 2007. She alleged that even before the
bigamy case was filed, she had initiated a Petition to Annul her marriage to Pulido
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, documented as Civil Case No. 1586-07. In a
decision dated October 25, 2007, the RTC declared her marriage with Pulido null
and void due to its bigamous nature. This ruling became final, as no appeal was
filed against it.
ISSUE/S: 1.) Whether or Not Article 40 of the Family Code have retroactive
application? 2.) Whether or Not judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void ab initio marriage in a bigamy
prosecution?
RULING: 1.) Yes, Article 40 of the Family Code applies retroactively on marriages
celebrated before the Family Code in so far as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights. Thus, a judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior
marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code, but only for
purposes of remarriage. In this case, Pulido's marriage with Arcon was celebrated
when the Civil Code was in effect while his subsequent marriage with Baleda was
contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, Pulido is required to
obtain a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage but
only for purposes of remarriage. As regards the bigamy case, however, Pulido may
raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity.
2.) No, juridicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary. After a careful
scrutiny of the records and rigorous reexamination of the applicable law and
jurisprudence, we find that there is enough basis to abandon our earlier
pronouncement and now hold that a void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in
the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity.Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and
second marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy.
When both the prior and subsequent marriages were contracted prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, a void ab initio marriage can be raised as a defense
in a bigamy case even without a judicial declaration of its nullity. Nonetheless, the
Court recognized that an action for nullity of the second marriage is a prejudicial
question to the criminal prosecution for bigamy.
CASE DIGEST: San Miguel Properties Inc. V. Perez
G.R NO# 166836
DATE: September 4, 2013
PETITIONERS: San Miguel Properties Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Sec. Hernando B. Perez, Albert C. Aguirre, Teodoro B.
Arcenas, Jr., Maxy S. Abad, James G. Barbers, Stephen N. Sarino,
Enrique N. Zalamea, Jr., Mariano M. Martin, Orlando O. Samson,
Catherine R. Aguirre, and Antonio V. Agcaoili
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject): Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides
that Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the
Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of this Code.
FACTS: San Miguel Properties (SMP) acquired 130 residential lots in the BF
Homes Parañaque subdivision from BF Homes Inc., represented by Atty. Orendain,
who was duly authorized as its rehabilitation receiver. However, BF Homes
withheld the delivery of 20 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) out of the total 40
because Atty. Orendain was no longer its rehabilitation receiver at the time of these
transactions. Despite SMP's demands, BF Homes refused to hand over the TCTs.
Consequently, SMP filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Prosecutor
(OCP) in Las Pinas against the directors and officers of BF Homes, alleging nondelivery of titles in violation of Section 25 in relation to Section 29 of PD No. 957
(The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree). Concurrently, SMP
initiated a lawsuit against BF Homes for specific performance at the HLURB,
seeking to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs to SMP.
The OCP dismissed SMP's criminal complaint for violating PD No. 957, citing,
among other reasons, the existence of a prejudicial question. This necessitated the
suspension of the criminal proceeding until the matter of BF Homes' liability was
determined either by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB. SMP appealed this
resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which denied the appeal. SMP then
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus, focusing on the issue of whether the HLURB Case posed a prejudicial
question that warranted the suspension of the criminal action for violating PD No.
957. The CA dismissed SMP's petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the HLURB administrative case for specific performance
can serve as a basis to halt the progress of the criminal complaint for the violation
of PD No. 957, citing the presence of a prejudicial question.
RULING: YES, an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB,
an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question that must first be
determined before the criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 could be
resolved. Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but
the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected
with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting
decisions.
Here, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether
or not SMP was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs,
while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and
officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the
former (admin case) must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold SMP to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability
for the violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the
need to proceed with the criminal case.
CASE DIGEST:Quimiguing v. Icao
G.R. No. L-26795
DATE: July 31, 1970
Facts:
Carmen Quisumbing filed a complaint for support against defendant Icao. In her
complaint, she alleged that they were neighbors and had close and confidential
relations. Despite Icao being married, he succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent and
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant,
and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support per month, damages
and attorneys fees. After trial on the merits, the trial judge dismissed the complaint
upon motion of defendant for lack of cause of action, that is, the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth
to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
Issue: : Does an unborn child have a right to receive support?
Ruling: Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child
is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and it's being
ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that
annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born
after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides
imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that
Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for ail
purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the fetus be alive at the time it
is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Plaintiff had a cause of
action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for
failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
CASE DIGEST: Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439
DATE: , July 20, 1961
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari bringing up for review the question whether
the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same. Nita Villanueva became pregnant
with her present husband, Oscar Lazo before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from her parents, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she
had herself aborted by the petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage with Lazo,
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant and again aborted a two month old
fetus, employing the services of petitioner Geluz. All throughout this time, Lazo was
in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he
did not know of, nor gave his consent to, the abortion. When Geluz learned of the
third and last abortion, he filed a complaint against Geluz for damages on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received. The trial court granted the
complaint and awarded damages.
ISSUE: Can damages be recovered by the parents on behalf of an unborn child
who was aborted on account of the injuries it suffered?
HELD: No, no transmission to anyone can take place as the child lacked juridical
personality due to its pre-natal death. Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy
to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It
is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus
pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article".
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated
from its mother's womb. The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same
effect; and is generally held that recovery cannot be had for the death of an unborn
child. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished
from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and
physical integrity. They would normally be limited to moral damages i.e. on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations and exemplary damages. But in the case before
NOTE/s:
Juridical Capacity is one, indivisible, irreducible and essentially the same
always and for all men.
Capacity to Act does not exist in all men nor does it exist to the same extent.
NOTE/s:
Union of both kinds of capacity meant Full Civil Capacity
CASE DIGEST: Limjoco vs. Estate of Pedro Fragante
G.R NO# L-770
DATE: April 27, 1948
PETITIONER: Angel Limjoco
RESPONDENT: Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragrante, deceased
DOCTRINE:
Under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as an artificial
juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.”
Fragante has rights and fulfillment of obligation which survived even after his death.
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The Public Service Commission approved the
application and held that evidence showed that the public interest and convenience will
be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by the authorization of the operation of
another ice-­plant.
Fragante was a Filipino Citizen, and remained to be even after his death and that his
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Commission ordered that a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante.
However, Petitioner contends that the Commission erred in allowing the substitution
of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro Fragante for the latter as party
applicant, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which
is said to be in contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Pedro Fragrante is a “person”.
RULING:
Yes. The Court cited the ruling of the SC of Indiana which held that “The estate of the
decedent is a person in legal contemplation. The word “person” in its legal signification,
is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons.” It said in another
work that ‘persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human
being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons
forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized
only to a limited extent in our law.”
Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have
to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal
fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented
by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations
of the deceased.
The estate of the deceased person is considered a “person” in the avoidance of injustice
or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling
such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged.
Moreover, the citizenship of Fragrante is also extended. The fiction of such extension
of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same
reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to
avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors, and heirs, solely by reason of his
death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made
in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding
from the Public Service Commission of this Court.
1.
CASE DIGEST: Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. CID
G.R NO# L-21289
DATE: October 4, 1971
PETITIONERS: Moy Ya Lim Yao (Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim) and Lau
Yuen Yeung
RESPONDENT: The Commissioner of Immigration
DOCTRINE:
An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized
ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated
in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473.
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non­immigrant. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and
was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country
or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962.
On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
After which, with the action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest
and immediate deportation after the expiration of her authorized stay, she claims
herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Solicitor General opposes the ground that the marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen
does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. During the hearing,
it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did
not know the names of her brothers-­in-­law, or sisters-in-­law.
Hence, she does not possess all the qualifications required for an applicant for
naturalization (CA 473), even though she has proven that she possesses none of the
disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung had become a naturalized Filipino citizen, upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that it is in the best interest of all concerned that under Section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will
be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this
provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide
matrimonies.
CASE DIGEST: Republic vs. Batuigas
G.R NO# 183110
DATE: October 7, 2013
PETITIONERs: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Azucena Saavedra Batuigas
DOCTRINE:
It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an
alien wife of one of its citizens, could have had no other objective than to maintain
a unity of allegiance among the members of the family.
FACTS:
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
She stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and
to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to China; and that she
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition
up to the time of her naturalization. Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by
the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents,
Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English,
Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education
were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she then
practiced her teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao. In 1968,
at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision
of the RTC that granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena
Batuigas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Batuigas has validly complied with the citizenship
requirement as required by law to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The Court cited the case of Moy Ya Lim that under existing laws, an alien may
acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473
or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). Another option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.” Under this provision,
foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto
Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have
to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth
certificate indicating that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s
registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus the Court held that: "It is not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the
wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that
of the other." Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is
qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
CASE DIGEST: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
G.R NO# 120295
DATE: June 28, 1996
PETITIONER: Juan Frivaldo
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections and Raul Lee
DOCTRINE:
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation.
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon in the 1995
elections, and assumed office in due time.
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment
of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen after revoking it during
Marcos regime and having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he was naturalized as an American citizen only to protect himself against
President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must
be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid
repatriation, and by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America.
However, the Court stated that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US.
If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance
with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
CASE DIGEST: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
G.R NO# 119976
DATE: September 18, 1995
PETITIONER: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo
DOCTRINE:
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue
a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her
residence in the place was seven (7) months.
Then incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo,
who is also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven
months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Upon her petition for reconsideration, COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner’s proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in
the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte.
However, COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that
the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy
the one-year residency requirement to be eligible to run as representative.
RULING:
Yes. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is indeed a resident and possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health.
If a person's intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
CASE DIGEST: Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088
DATE March 14, 2000
PETITIONERS: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO
RESPONDENT: JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
● Article 7(1) of the Family Code states “Marriage can be solemnized by any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, the respondent judge performed a marriage ceremony of
Sumaylo and Del Rosario. However, it was solemnized in Dapa, respondent
judge’s residence, which is not covered by his jurisdiction. Respondent contends
that Article 7 was not violated and that Article 8 applies to the case in question
ISSUE/S:
W/N solemnization of the marriage was within the jurisdiction.
RULING:
NO. Where a judge solemnize a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
CASE DIGEST: Kho v. Republic
G.R. No. 187462
DATE June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND VERONICA B. KHO, RESPONDENTS
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
● Article 4 of the Family Code indicates “The absence of any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)
FACTS:
Petition Raquel filed a petition for his marriage with Respondent Veronica to be
declared null and void due to the lack of marriage license. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar that no copy or record of marriage
license was issued. Respondent opposed, however, no evidence was presented.
RTC granted the petition. CA reversed the RTC’s decision, holding tere is a
presumption of a marriage license.
ISSUE/S:
W/N marriage should be null & void
RULING:
YES. Respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of
any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage was in fact issued. The fact remains that
respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law
is clear that a marriage which is performed w/o the corresponding marriage license
is null and void.
CASE DIGEST: Diaz-Salgado v. Anson
G.R. No. 204494
DATE July 27, 2016
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO,
Petitioners, v. LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent.
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
● Article 4 of the Family Code indicates “The absence of any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)
FACTS:
On September 5, 2003, respondent filed a suit against petitioner seeking for the
annulment of three unilateral deeds of sale and deed of extra-judicial settlement of
estate. Respondent claims he is the surviving spouse of Severina Anson. Jo-Ann is
a child of the deceased (Severina Anson) from a previous relationship. Severina
transferred 3 Unilateral deeds of sale in favor of Jo-Ann. Maria Luisa, after
Severina’s demise, adjudicated herself as Severina’s dole heir. Luis claimed he was
of his lawful share. More so, petitioner contended nullity of marriage between Luis
& Severina which took effect prior the family code.
ISSUE/S:
Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the Family Code valid in the
absence of a marriage license
RULING:
NO. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis & Severina reveals that
no marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of RA 386
(Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor.
CASE DIGEST: Niñal V. Bayadog
G.R NO# 133778
DATE March 14, 2000
PETITIONERS: Engrace Niñal for herself and as Guardian ad Litem of
the minors Babyline Niñal, Ingrid Niñal, Archie Niñal & Pepito Niñal,
Jr.
RESPONDENT: Norma Bayadog
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
● Cohabitation as an exception to marriage license must be without legal
impediments.
● The validity of a void marriage may be questioned even after the death of
either of the parties.
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Teodulfa was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter or on
December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, thus, they are
exempted from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death,
petitioners, children of Pepito in the first marriage, filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
The lower court dismissed the petition of the Niñals on the ground that
Annulment/Voidable must be a direct attack.
A void marriage is subject to collateral attack: (1) Case can be filed by interested
parties or heirs even after the lifetime of the parties. (2) Can also be raised in an
estate proceeding involving property.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the marriage between Pepito and Norma is
valid.
RULING: No. The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage should be a period of legal union. Pepito
and Teodulfa’s marriage was still subsisting 5 years prior to Pepito and Norma’s
marriage. 2nd marriage is void ab initio.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
CASE DIGEST: Republic of the Philippines V. Dayot
G.R NOs # 175581 and 179474
DATE March 28, 2008
G.R. NO. 175581
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Jose A. Dayot
G.R. NO. 179474
PETITIONER: Felisa Tecson-Dayot
RESPONDENT: Jose A. Dayot
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
Article 34 of the Civil Code provides that “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other”.
FACTS:
On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of
maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on
August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating
that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that the
testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court
of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the
requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under
Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited
the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
void ab initio.
RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the
requirements of valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is
merely a scrap of paper because they started living together five months before the
celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage
for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five
year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the
years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity,
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity
that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and could lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals granted Jose's
Motion for Reconsideration and REVERSED itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson
is void ab initio.
CASE DIGEST: Ado-an Morimoto V. Morimoto
G.R NO# 247576
DATE March 15, 2021
PETITIONER: Rosario D. Ado-an-Morimoto
RESPONDENTS: Yoshio Morimoto and the Republic of the Philippines
DOCTRINE(Related to Subject):
A simulated marriage used as a front for illicitly obtaining benefits is totally
inexistent, as the parties to it have no genuine intent to enter into marital relations.
Courts must recognize such a marriage as void.To insist on its validity is to enable
a greater affront to the institution of marriage than the perceived dangerous
tendency of readily declaring it null.
FACTS:
Sometime before December 2007, Rosario was introduced to Yoshio as one with
whom she can simulate a marriage for her to acquire a Japanese Visa. On December
5, 2007, they met at the Manila City Hall and signed a blank marriage certificate.
They were assured by the S.O. that such certificates will never be registered in the
Civil Registry.
Eventually, when she was about to secure a Certificate of No Marriage, she found
out that a Certificate of Marriage was registered that she married Yoshio on
December 5, 2007, in a ceremony officiated by a certain Reverend Roberto Espiritu.
There was also a marriage license that appeared on record that was issued by the
Office of the Civil Registry of San Juan.
On October 5, 2009, Rosario filed a Petition for Declaration of nullity of Marriage
before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. She claimed that the marriage did not
actually happen and that there was no application for a marriage license at all.
As proof, she provided as evidence a certification issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar, NSO, stating that “said office mistakenly stated that a marriage was
solemnized between Rosario and Yoshio.” She also provided as evidence a
Certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City, which states
that "no record of Marriage License No. 6120159 was issued to the parties.” The
RTC denied her petition and the CA also denied her appeal.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the registered marriage between petitioner
Rosario D. Ado-An-Morimoto and respondent Yoshio Morimoto should
be declared null and void.
RULING: Yes, the marriage should be declared null and void for having been
simulated and lacking in the essential and formal requisites of marriage. This Court
takes petitioner's assertions to be corresponding with the truth, or otherwise
"afford[ing] the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute." They are convincing proof
that no marriage between her and respondent Yoshio ever took place.
In any case, petitioner's assertions do not stand by their lonesome. They are
bolstered by the Assistant City Prosecutor's Report indicating that there is no
collusion between petitioner and respondent Yoshio to obtain a favorable ruling
from the Regional Trial Court. This works to thwart any claim that respondent
Yoshio's not having directly contradicted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity, or
otherwise insisting on the subsistence of their supposed marriage, indicates
duplicity on petitioner's part.
More importantly, a Certification was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
Philippine Statistics Authority, stating that "said office mistakenly certified that a
marriage was solemnized between [petitioner and respondent Yoshio.]" This
categorical turnaround should, once and for all, negate any lingering doubt on
whether the supposed marriage between petitioner and respondent Yoshio actually
transpired. It could even render this case moot.
The marriage between petitioner and respondent Yoshio is decidedly a fake. It was
a ruse that reduced marriage to an artifice for acquiring a visa. The Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals fail to see that to insist on this marriage's validity
would be to unwittingly lend judicial approbation to transactional marriages used
as fronts for illicitly obtaining benefits, or for potentially more nefarious ends. This
Court most certainly does not condone the petitioner's ruse. But it will cause greater
damage to society and its institutions if courts would let themselves be used as
unsuspecting endorsers of duplicitous designs.
The original, underlying fraud here is the stratagem effected by petitioner and
respondent Yoshio in simulating marriage. It is a fraud admitted by the petitioner,
and a fraud through which this Court sees. Petitioner and respondent Yoshio never
truly meant to be husband and wife, their registered marriage is a nullity.