CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION LAWYERS LEAGUE V. AQUINO FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government. IN RE:BERMUDEZ Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: “The sixyear term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers to the then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino. After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the winners, Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the infamous People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992. Issue: Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and VicePresident, or the previously elected President and Vice-President. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Held: The petition was hereby dismissed outright for: 1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. 2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and his allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge, and the people have made judgment. DE LEON V. ESGUERRA Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas PambansaBlg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987. Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x xx." Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners invoked the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that for laws to be valid and enforceable, it must be published in the Official Gazette. Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend that petitioners have no legal personality or standing and that the publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for the laws to be effective when the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. ISSUE: Whether or not laws or statutes are required to be published in the Official Gazette before it becomes valid and enforceable. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW RULING: Yes, publication is necessary. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Also, the clear object of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. The very first clause of above provision reads, “there shall be published in the Official Gazette...” The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with RenongBerhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. RULING: Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 5 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibiremedium. PAMATONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR No. 161872 April 13, 2004 FACTS When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC noted that such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political party with national constituency.” Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and his government platform. ISSUES 1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service. HELD 1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service. – NO The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the policies presented. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 6 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run. Note: Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The Court however stated that it is not within their power to make such assessments. TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS 527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324 Facts: 1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general areas of reform: A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; B. Secure funding for priority public health programs; C. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 7 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW H. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation. I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department. Issue: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution? Held: The Court finds the present petition to be without merit. 1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered selfexecuting, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non selfexecuting in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. 2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 8 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court. SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC. G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009 Facts: Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May. Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 9 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit: Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x xx In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00. Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00 Issue: 1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months? 2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract? Held: 1.) Yes.Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional. In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 10 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042. 2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays. By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods. JOSE ANGARA VS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, AND DIONISIO MAYOR September 23, 2011 Facts:In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 11 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. COCOFED V. REPUBLIC Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012 Facts: In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers having the largest membership. When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund: PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil. PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm. In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut and palm oil industry. Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government. Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 12 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from PepingCojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that DandingCojuanco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what DandingConjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares. The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund. While the 64.98% (72.2 % – 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of nonfarmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the agreements. Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares. Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should revert back to the general fund. Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only, and if the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional. Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the coco levy fund was created. Issue 2: W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 13 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and second, it allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined “coconut farmers”, which negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755. Hence, the so-called Farmers’ shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private capacities, but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Petitioner, v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent. FACTS: On 9 October 2000, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a local water utility, opposed TMPC's application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. The NWRB approved TMPC's application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWD's franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. The RTC set aside the NWRB's decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC, stating that "the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee shall be allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate authority of the State." ISSUE: Whether or not a public utility franchise may be exclusive in character 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 14 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW RULING: No. The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchise that are exclusive in character. The President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the Board of Directors of La Trinidad Water District and Local Water Utilities Administration to create franchises that are xclusive in character. Clearly, Section 47 is patently unconstitutional. CASE DIGEST: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,Petitioner,v. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, Respondent. FACTS: Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. The property consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder. When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted. Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Tobias appealed to the DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse. ISSUE: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 15 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition? The appeal has no merit. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required “hard facts and solid evidence” in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial. CSC V RAMONEDA-PITA Facts: On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter 4 informed the CSC of an alleged irregularity in the civil service eligibility of Ramoneda-Pita. The letter stated that the irregularity concerned Ramoneda-Pita’s taking of the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July 26, 1987. The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987 examinations and compared the pictures and signatures of Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) for the exam and her PDS dated October 17, 1990. As the pictures and signatures did not match, the CSC required Ramoneda-Pita to explain why it seemed that another person took the civil service examination on her behalf. Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service examinations in her stead. She averred that she took the civil service examinations on July 30, 1986 and not July 26, 1987. She explained that there were dissimilarities in the pictures in the PSP and the PDS because these were not taken on the same year and might have deteriorated in quality over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for the difference in her signatures to her low educational attainment leading to her nondevelopment and non-maintenance of a usual signature.5 In its Investigation Report6 dated May 3, 1999, the CSC made the following observations and recommendation: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 16 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The person who actually took the Career Service Subprofessional Examination on July 26, 1987 in Cebu City, was the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature were affixed in the Admission Slip/Notice of Admission and in the Picture Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature appear in the Personal Data Sheet dated October 17, 1990 of the real Merle C. Ramoneda. Issue: Should respondent Ramoneda-Pita be dismissed? Ruling: A careful review of the documents submitted before the CSC and a perusal of its investigation reports in the present case, convince us that Ramoneda-Pita was not the one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations conducted on July 26, 1987. Specimen signatures in the various PDS she had submitted over the years to the Court do not resemble the signature which appeared in the seat plan of the CSC. Moreover, no substantive evidence was presented by Ramoneda-Pita to bolster her defense that she was not able to develop a settled signature. Nor did she substantiate her claim that the difference between the pictures in the PSP and the PDS is due to the aging process. This Court cannot stress enough that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of this esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. As we have stated in the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel In this case, Ramoneda-Pita's length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The CSC's discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her PDS when she had been already found guilty of an administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell this Court that Ramoneda-Pita has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. As the Court has previously stated it will not hesitate to rid the ranks of undesirables WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found GUlLTY of dishonesty. She is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudicto reemployment in the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies including government-owned and controlled corporations. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to her records with this Court. JESUS C. GARCIA vs. HON. RAY ALAN T. DRILON G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013 Art. III, Section 1: Equal Protection 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 17 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) and petitioner were married in 2002. They have three children namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17, who is a natural child of the petitioner and adopted by private respondent; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph EduardJ. Garcia, 3 years old. Petitioner is 11 years older than private respondent. Respondent describes petitioner to be dominant, controlling and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He isolated her from her friends and forbade her to pray. He trivialized her ambitions to become a lawyer. He was often jealous because his wife still caught the eye of other men. Things grew worse when he started having an affair with a bank manager in Robinson’s Bank, who is a godmother to one of their boys. The affair started numerous fights wherein petitioner physically hurt respondent. Sometimes, petitioner beat his daughter, Jo-Ann, whohad seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for telling on him. All this brought respondent to emotional despair. She tried to leave once, but Jo-Ann begged her not to. Then she tried to kill herself but she was saved by her son. Petitioner only left when he saw her. After that incident, respondent informed the management of Robinson’s Bank that she will be filing charges against the paramour. Petitioner was enraged at respondent for endangering the job of his paramour. She wanted to leave but she was afraid that he would take the children and cut her off from support. Petitioner controls all three of the family businesses. She receives only a monthly salary of Php20,000.00. On March 23, 2006, private respondent filed, for herself and in behalf of her minorchildren, a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod Cityfor the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against petitioner,pursuant to R.A. 9262 entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes” (VAWC). She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse, emotional, psychological, andeconomic violence. RTC granted the TPO effective for 30 days starting March 24, 2006. On April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-ParteMotion forRenewal of the TPO. Subsequently, he also requested that he be allowed visitation rights to his children. On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended subject to modifications. Petitioner failed to provide for support, as required by the TPOso respondent applied for a TPO Ex-Parte. Petitioner tried to take away the car used by the respondents. Also, he tried to kidnap one of the boys and, on another occasion, allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann,by the arm and threatened her. She filed against her father in violation of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation andDiscrimination Act.) The TPO was granted on August 23, 2006 and was renewed for another 30 days when it was found that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated. Petitioner filed a petition before the CA for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporaryrestraining order (TRO), challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process andthe equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "anunwanted product of an invalid law.” Initially, the CA granted the TRO against the enforcement of the TPO. Subsequently, however, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioner to raise the issue on constitutionality. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 18 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: 1. Whether the court of appeals committed serious error in failing to conclude that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: 1. No. Petitioner contends that limiting the protection given by the law to a specific kind of a gender violates the equal protection clause. Victims and abusers could be either husband or wife. The Court retrieved the Senate deliberations on the bill and has confirmed that it was the legislature’s intent to limit the protection of VAWC to women and children. In line with the separation of powers, the Court cannot comment on whether the decision of the senate was right or wrong. But, it is the Court’s duty to determine if the law violates the Constitution. Equal protection of the laws does not require that all persons be treated alike under a single law. It guarantees that a class of people be treated alike as long as there is a valid classification. In order for there to be a valid classification, the following must concur: (a) it must rest on substantial distinction, (b) it must be germane to the purpose of the law, (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (d) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Given the foregoing requirements, the Court opines that VAWC has a valid classification. Substantial distinction as to men and women are seen in the unequal power relationship between them and in the fact that women are the usual and most likely victims of abuse, and, finally, the widespread gender bias against women. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. Section 2 of VAWC provides that the State values the dignity of women andchildren and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect thefamily and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. With this policy, the State shall exert more efforts to address the violence that violates the fundamental rights of abused women and children. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and applies equally to all members. This law was enacted for as long as safety and security of women and children are endangered. Also, the law applies to all women and children. The kinds of actions punished in the law leaves no room for vagueness. The petitioner’s contention that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simplemarital tiffs is tenuous. The acts described in the law are also found in the U.N.Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Also the contention that VAWC singles out men, husbands, or fathers is without merit because VAWC may also be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had asexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of word "person" who has or had a sexualor dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 19 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Ponente: J. Tinga FACTS: ï‚· Feb 20 1998: Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before theRTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property fromEduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years. ï‚· At the hearing, AristedesVelazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a 22 hectare propertyowned by his great-grandfather, LinoVelazco. Lino had 4 sons– Benedicto, Gregorio,Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his 4 sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sonsfrom their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgiliosucceeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originallybelonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by EduardoVelazco to Malabanan. ï‚· Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine AristedesVelazco. Instead, he manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. ï‚· Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated June 11, 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject propertywas “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March15, 1982.” ï‚· December 3, 2002: the RTC approved the application for registration. The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. ï‚· February 23, 2007: the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan. o Republic v. Herbieto: under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. o Since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. ï‚· Petitioner’s contention: o Republic v. Naguit: with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 20 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUES: 1. WON the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 in order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. – NO. [MAIN] 2. WON a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code [For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree]. – YES. 3. WON petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?– NO under both. HELD: 1. It is sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 2. Public domain lands do not become patrimonial (private) without express declaration. Thus, the period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial CANNOT be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period under Section 14(2). 3. Petitioners are NOT entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names. RATIONALE: # 1MAIN! Contentions: [with respect to Section 14(1) of Property Registration Decree] ï‚· OSG: o Republic v. Herbieto: for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 ï‚· Petitioners: o Reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Republic v. Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision: such classification can occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration. o The preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. The Applicable LAW ï‚· The Public Land Act [Commonwealth Act No. 141] has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. ï‚· May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? YES. o Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization. Section 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 21 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· 48(b) of the Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right: SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of titletherefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. Section 14(1) operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." The difference is that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. o It is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. HOWEVER, Section 47 limits the right granted under Sec 48(b), that is, the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 22 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter… INTERPRETATION of the law ï‚· Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, IT IS NOT ENOUGH that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. o BUT the alienable and disposable character of the property MUST have been declared ALSO as of June 12, 1945. o Following the OSG’s approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit. o All lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. ï‚· Thus, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. o If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. o However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. ï‚· Now, to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. o In the case at bar, respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents’ application. o Furthermore, no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 23 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land. o Private respondents were ALSO able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. #2 Contentions: [with respect to Section 14(2) of Property Registration Decree] ï‚· OSG: o Under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." o It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. o Assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable. ï‚· Petitioners: o Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). o It would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been "converted" into private property through prescription. Framework of Analysis SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: ï‚· (2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 prevent the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? NO. o Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws." o There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. o With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 24 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of [acquisitive] prescription. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription. Article 422 of the Civil Code states that there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. o Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. o This reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government. o Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Prescriptive Period: where to start? ï‚· Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial (private) cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. [not needed in the case, but for notes] Sec 14 (1) Sec 14 (2) mandates registration on the basis of entitles registration on the basis of possession prescription 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 25 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Registration is extended under the aegis of registration is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the the Property Registration Decree and Public Land Act the Civil Code 30 yr period under Section 48(b) of 30 yr period available through Section 14(2) of the Public Land Act, as amended by the Property Registration Decree in relation to Rep. Act No. 1472 Article 1137 of the Civil Code thirty-year period of possession thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription Registration is based on 30 years of registration is founded on extraordinary possession alone without regard to prescription under the Civil Code the Civil Code #3 Doctrines laid down from the discussions above 1. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. a. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. b. The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. 2. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. a. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. b. There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 26 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Application to the case at bar ï‚· The evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. ï‚· Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. DECISION: The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and Resolution are AFFIRMED. ZENON R. PEREZ SANDIGANBAYAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. The following day, the audit team counted the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine. As a result, Mandin prepared a memorandum dated recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner. When the case was filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner retracted his previous statement claiming that he was mentally and physically weak at that time and entered a plea of not guilty. In 2003, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years (14) and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum plus perpetual special disqualification. Issue: WON the penalty is cruel and therefore unconstitutional since petitioner returned the money. Ruling: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 27 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation. An accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation. Also, there is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional. He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail. Due to mitigating circumstances attending the commission, petitioner’s sentence has been lowered to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification. Judicial Review CASE: HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011 Facts: In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrialresidential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 28 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation. Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers. After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA. The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-122 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65. On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution. Issue: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657 Held: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 29 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter. Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657. Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the executive or legislative departments have not been met in this case. II. REASON AND APPLICATION The constitutional validity of the stock distribution option under the CARL was not timely raised and is not the lis mota in this case. Respondent-intervenor FARM questioned the validity of the stock distribution option of a corporate landowner under Section 31 of the CARL on the ground that it is in violation of the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, specifically the distribution of land to the farmers.160 Respondent-intervenor argued that the stock distribution option was not one of the modes intended by the agrarian reform policy in giving "land to the landless." In response, petitioner HLI countered that the issue of the CARL’s constitutionality cannot be collaterally attacked.161 Before the Court can exercise its power to pass upon the issue of constitutionality, the following requisites must be present: 1. There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; 2. The person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; 3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and 4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.162 Although the first two requisites are present, FARM has not shown compliance with the remaining two requisites. With respect to the timeliness of the issue, respondent-intervenor FARM did not raise the constitutional question at the earliest possible time. The petitions filed in the PARC, which precipitated the present case, did not contain any constitutional challenge against the stock distribution option under the CARL. As previous members of private respondent AMBALA, nothing prevented respondent-intervenor FARM from arguing on the purported constitutional infirmity of a stock distribution option as opposed to a direct land transfer, in the AMBALA Petition in the PARC proceedings below. Respondent-intervenor FARM would argue that it raised the constitutionality issue in its position paper at the level of the PARC. 163 However, this is a late attempt on its part to remedy 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 30 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW the situation and comply with the foregoing requisite on timeliness in the exercise of judicial review. Nothing in the initiatory petitions of private respondents Supervisory Group and AMBALA assailed the inherent invalidity of stock distribution options as provided in Section 31 of the CARL. Respondent-intervenor FARM posits that it fully complied with the requirement of timeliness under the doctrine of judicial review since the earliest possible opportunity to raise the issue must be with a court with the competence to resolve the constitutional question, citing as basis Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.164 This case is significantly different from Serrano as to render the latter’s legal conclusions inapplicable to the present situation. In Serrano, the question of the validity of the money claims clause of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995165 was timely raised at the very first instance in a competent court, namely in Antonio Serrano’s petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. 166 In sharp contrast, the question of the constitutionality of the CARL in this case was belatedly included in respondent-intervenor FARM’s supplemental comment 167 after an earlier manifestation and motion had already been filed. Thus, respondent-intervenor’s earliest opportunity to raise the constitutionality of Section 31 of the CARL was in the very first pleading it filed in this Court, and not in a supplemental comment. Even assuming arguendo that the rule requiring the timeliness of the constitutional question can be relaxed, the Court must refrain from making a final determination on the constitutional validity of a stock distribution option at this time because it is not the lis mota of the present controversy and the case can be disposed of on some other ground. The Court will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy. 168 In the seminal case of Garcia v. Executive Secretary, the Court explained the concept of lis mota as a requirement of judicial review in this wise: Lis mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.169 Court’s rule and explanation of the concept A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the parties; when raised, if the record presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, the latter course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises wherein a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. 170 The Court will not shirk its duty of wielding the power of judicial review in the face of gross and blatant acts committed by other branches of government in direct violation of the Constitution; but neither will it be overly eager to brandish it when there are other available grounds that would avoid a constitutional clash. It will be recalled that what the qualified beneficiaries assailed in the PARC proceedings was the failure on the part of petitioner HLI to fulfill its obligations under the SDOA, and what they prayed for was for the lands to be the subject of direct land transfer. The question of constitutionality of a stock distribution option can be avoided simply by limiting the present inquiry on the provisions of the SDOA and its implementation. Whether the PARC committed grave abuse of discretion in recalling or revoking the approval of the SDOA need not involve a declaration of unconstitutionality of the provisions of the CARL on stock distribution. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 31 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW There is no "paramount public interest" that compels this Court to rule on the question of constitutionality. As a legislative act, the CARL enjoys the presumption of constitutionality.171 Absent any glaring constitutional violation or evident proof thereof, the Court must uphold the CARL. Indeed, paramount public interest is better served by precluding a finding on the CARL at this point, since such finding could unfairly impact other corporate landowners and farmer beneficiaries under a stock distribution option in other parts of the country172 who are not parties to the instant case. While we do not rule on the constitutionality of stock distribution option, we also need to state that there appears to be no clear and unequivocal prohibition under the Constitution that expressly disallows stock distribution option under the provisions on agrarian reform: The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. 173 The primary constitutional principle is to allow the tiller to exercise rights of ownership over the lands, but it does not confine this right to absolute direct ownership. Farmworkers are even allowed to simply have a share in the fruits of the land they till for as long as what they receive is just and fair. The framers of the Constitution established the right of landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands they till directly or collectively, but left the identification of the means of ownership to Congress. This was an important decision, considering that Congress has the better facilities and faculties to adjudge the most appropriate and beneficial methods for the exercise of the constitutional right in cases where dividing a small landholding among a multitude of qualified FWBs would result in parceling out patches of land not viable for individual farming. Whether stock distribution is a valid method identified by Congress for lands owned by a corporation, or whether it is a "loophole" in the CARL to evade land distribution in contravention of the intent of the Constitution, is a question that need not be answered now. Decision IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated 22 December 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated 03 May 2006. I dissent from the majority’s position with respect to how they modified the questioned PARC Resolutions. I would direct the modifications of the PARC Resolutions in the following manner. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 14 June 2006, enjoining the implementation of the questioned PARC Resolution and Notices of Coverage, is hereby LIFTED. CASE:GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA V. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et al. G.R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J .) 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 32 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Facts: Petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana, as a taxpayer, wrote to the Commission on Audit (COA) regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. The COA replied to Dela Llana informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299 which provides that whenever the circumstances warrant, the COA may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control measures as necessary and appropriate to protect the funds and property of an agency. Dela Llana filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that the pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not it is the constitutional duty of COA to conduct a pre- audit before the consummation of government transaction HELD: It is not the constitutional duty of the COA to conduct a pre-audit Dela Llana claimed that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct pre-audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are present: (1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose; (3) the proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidence. It could, among others, identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on their face prior to their implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds. Dela Llana’s allegations and no support in the Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a preaudit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court. CASE: CANDARI VS DONASCO Facts: Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Incorporated (DARBCI).They were elected into office on July 12 1998 and their terms ended on July 2000. But they continued to occupy their positions in a holdover capacity. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 33 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioners sought to elect new members of the board of directors through a General assembly. Respondents instituted a civil case to enjoin petitioners from holding the general assembly. The RTC issued a 72- hour TRO to block the planned GA. Despite of this 78% of the members of the cooperative went through with the GA and elected petitioners as new members of the board. Respondents filed an amended complaint seeking to enjoin petitioners from assuming office. The RTC dismissed amended complaint for lack of cause of action, because it had become moot. Respondents thereafter filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Issue: Did CA err in allowing the petition for certiorari? Held: Yes. For the court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy-one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. It is clear that it dismissed the amended complaint because the supervening events (The GA and elections) had rendered the case moot through the voluntary act of the GA-as the highest policy making body of the cooperative- to declare the contested positions vacant and to elect a new set of officers. As a consequence, respondents no longer had the personality or the cause of action to maintain the case against the petitioners. Thus, the RTC committed no error when it dismissed the case. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside. The Order of the RTC to dismiss amended complaint was affirmed and reinstated. Justice Sereno CASE: Galicto vs. Aquino III Facts: Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto filed a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing laws. The Senate conducted an inquiry on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs). After confirming such allegations through its findings, Senate passed Resolution No. 17 urging the President to suspend excessive and unusually large perks of members of the governing board. Thus President Aquino issued EO7 to control grants and order a moratorium on salary increases, bonuses, incentives and other benefits until December 31, 2010. In his capacity as a lawyer and an employee of PhilHealth, petitioner asserts the unconstitutionality of EO 7 which was issued with grave abuse of discretion for having been 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 34 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW issued beyond the powers of the President and claims that he is affected by its implementation. Issues: 1. WON Petitioner has legal standing 2. Mootness of the petition Ruling: We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by subsequent events. Petitioner has no locus standi (legal standing). - Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury resulting from the governmental act being challenged. - As a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when: 1. He can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury; 2. Injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 3. Injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. - Real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. - In the case at bar, petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, the implementation of EO7 curtails the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation. - Respondents have pointed out that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are mere expectancies. Petition has been mooted by supervening events. - Present case has been rendered moot by the following supervening events: 1. The issuance of suspension under Sec. 10 of EO7 dated until December 31, 2010 has lapsed. 2. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 10149 otherwise known as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. - With the present situation, Congress, thru R.A 10149 has expressly empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs and for the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO7 will merely be an academic exercise. CASE: Lamp vs Secretary of DBM 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 35 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision. The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition: PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder ₱8,327,000,000.00 Special Provision 1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreignassisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. LAMP insists that the silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the pork barrel system. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 36 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW function devoid of constitutional sanction,” and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present controversy. Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. ISSUES: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case RULING: A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 37 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW LOCUS STANDI: The essence of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. FUNA VS VILLAR PETITIONER: Dennis A. B. Funa RESPONDENTS: The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar FACTS: Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position. Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the issue is moot and academic. 2.) Whether or not a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution. 3.) Whether or not the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant by the expiration of term of the predecessor is valid. RULING: 1.) A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 38 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW events, so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general rule, it is not within Our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, We acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus: The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David, namely: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the promulgation of principles that will henceforth "guide the bench, the bar and the public" should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future situations would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are resolved straightaway and settled definitely. 2.) Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. 3.) No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor, the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7year term. Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villar’s appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years under the constitutional ban. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. CASE:CHAVEZ VS. JBC FACTS: The petitioner (Francisco Chavez), seeks judicial intervention, in questioning the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)(Respondent). However, respondent claims that the petitioner has no legal standing for filing the petition because he was not included in 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 39 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW the official list of applicants for the post and he also failed to manifest his acceptance of his recommendation to the position. ISSUE: WON the petitioner has legal standing to file for the petition. HELD: The requisite for legal standing (Locus standi) summarized by the court (culled from jurisprudence) are as follows: 1. Cases involving constitutional issues 2. For taxpayers, there must be claim for illegal disbursement of public funds, or an unconstitutional tax measure 3. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest of the election in question 4. For concerned citizens, the issue must be of transcendental importance. 5. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of chief justice of the supreme court. As taxpayer- since JBC is derives financial support from taxes paid, petitioner possess both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the constitution. As nominee- the court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief justice. The legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the judiciary is the very nucleus of the controversy. The court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon lest a constitutional process be plagued with misgiving, doubts, and mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the court, clothed with legal standing and armed with transcendental importance to society. The claim that the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. As concerned citizen- it is not difficult to perceive that determinants (established by jurisprudence) for transcendental importance are present in this case. 1. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case 2. The presence of clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government 3. Lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations in this cases are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government but rather, solid allegations substantiated by facts and , therefore, deserve an evaluation from the court and it cannot be denied that the judicial and bar council is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system. Therefore, the petitioner has legal standing to file for the petition. Additional important infos for facts: *Petitioner alleged that respondent (JBC) is in violation of article 8 section 8 (1) of the constitution: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 40 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. *In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.7 Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.8 At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. *Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from each house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? These are the pivotal questions to be resolved in this original action for prohibition and injunction. *RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. CASE: ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. VS. BANGKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD, ET.AL. FACTS- Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It was incorporated on July 9, 2010,and a month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder and president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen. HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANK’S POWER TO FIX MAX INTEREST RATES 1. R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank on June 15, 1948, empowered the CBMB to set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations. 2. The Usury Law was amended by P.D.1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected gradually and announced in advance. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655 now reads: Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the maximum rate or rate of interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits and to change such rate or rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social conditions: Provided, That changes in such rate or rates may be affected gradually on scheduled dates announced in advance. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 41 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 3. In its Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, effective on January 1, 1983. It removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits: Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected by any person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended. 4. R.A. No. 7653 establishing the BSP replaced the CB: Sec. 135. Repealing Clause. — Except as may be provided for in Sections 46 and 132 of this Act, Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the provisions of any other law, special charters, rule or regulation issued pursuant to said Republic Act No. 265, as amended, or parts thereof, which may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Presidential Decree No. 1792 is likewise repealed. Note: R.A. 7653 – the law that created BSP to replace CB – Note: this law did not retain the same provision as that of Section 109 in RA 265. ISSUES 1) Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D No. 1684, the CB-MB had statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond the limits prescribed in the Usury Law; 2) If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest rates; 3) Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular No. 905. RULLING 1.) CB-MB has the statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the max rates of interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond limits prescribed in the Usury Law both under RA 265 and PD 1684. 2.) The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued BC Circular No. 905. a. The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to P.D. 1684 has long been recognized and upheld in many cases. As the Court explained in the landmark case of Medel vs. CA, citing several cases, CB Circular No. 905 : did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter’s effectivity”. Thus, according to the Court, by lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties’ freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of interest. It cited Art. 1306 of the New Civil Code, under which the contracting parties’ may establish such stipulations. Clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 3.) The BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905 Moreover, the rule is settled that repeals by implication are not favored, because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing pertaining to the subject. An implied repeal is predicted upon the condition that a substancial conflict or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 42 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW old laws. We find no such conflict between the provisions of Act 2655 and RA NO. 7653. The lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipluations charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: The 12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, while the 6% per annum under Art 2209 of the Civil Code applies “when the transactions involves the payment of indemnities in the concepts of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in general with the application of both rates reckoned from the time the complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid. In either instance, the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be subject to the condition that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest.” The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. CASE: FUNA V AGRA GR NO. 191644 FEB 19, 2013 TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW FACTS: Agra, respondent herein, has admitted to holding two offices concurrently in acting or temporary capacities: ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which expressly prohibits the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. Complementing the prohibition is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive official from holding any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position. ISSUE: WON the case at bar is subject for judicial review RULING: YES. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 43 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to assail the validity of the subject act or issuance, that is, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Here, the OSG does not dispute the justiciability and ripeness for consideration and resolution by the Court of the matter raised by the petitioner. Also, the locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has already been settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he brought. To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has "farreaching implications," and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was an issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by reason of its transcendental importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation further calls for the review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In other words, many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed to the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed. CASE:EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents. Facts: Petitioner and respondent were rivals to be members in the Batasang Pambansa during the 1984 elections in Antique. Their rivalry turned sour when several followers of the petitioner were allegedly ambushed and killed by the latter’s men. Petitioner went to the COMELEC to question the canvass of election returns owing to what he claimed to railroad the respondent’s proclamation but was dismissed. Respondent was proclaimed as the winner by the Second Division of the said body. Petitioner thereupon came to the Supreme Court arguing that the proclamation was void because it was made only by a decision by a decision and not by the COMELEC en banc as required by the Constitution. In 1986, petitioner was gunned down. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 44 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The former Solicitor General argued that the preproclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct to elections, not its authority as a sole judge of the election contest. On the other hand, the new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not, the case should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. Ruling: The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office between the petitioner and the private respondent could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. The petition would have been granted were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic. CASE:ABS-CBN, petitioner vs. COMELEC, respondent GR No. 133486 323 SCRA 811 (January 28, 2000) Topic : Functions of Judicial Review Facts : Commission on Elections in its en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998 issued a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups from conducting exit survey. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). ABS-CBN filed for petition for review assailing COMELEC’s resolution. Issue : Whether or not the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with, and there is no longer any actual controversy before us. Ruling : The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implication on the people’s fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 45 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in the future elections. In any event, in Salonga vs. Paño, the court had occasion to reiterate that it “also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees”. Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have to resolve to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. The SC resolved the issue to grant the petitioners motion in symbolic function, because of the important question of constitutionality being raised stating that the election in the Philippines is a continuing democratic process done in every 3 years, there is a need for the courts to lay down the rules or principles which would serve as a guide for the bench and bar for the future elections. CASE: CENTRAL BANK vs BSP Facts: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: xxx xxx xxx (c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 46 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments: a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2 b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law 3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied) c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP; 5 d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'. 7 In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.9 Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management." Issue: Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." Ruling: Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 47 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses. Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. IN RE: JUDGE CARBONELL Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit on March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio A. Carbonell on December 31, 2007. They found out that Branch 27 had a total caseload of 231 cases consisting of 14 7 criminal cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil cases. It was also reported that Judge Carbonell failed to resolve pending motions or incidents in four criminal cases and 12 civil cases. In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA recommended to the Court that a fine of P50, 000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve pending motions and incidents. Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell despite the lapse of the time given, the Court resolved on September 21, 2010 to require him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt. Issue: Whether or not JusgeCarbonell should be penalized with a fine of 50,000 for the failure of deciding the cases. Ruling:Yes, the recommendation of the OCA is well-taken, subject to the modification of the penalty to be imposed. The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases.12 Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay.13 Thus, judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases, which is three months from the filing of thelast pleading, brief or memorandum for lower courts.14 To further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 48 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted such request. Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and to resolve 16 pending motions or incidents within the 90-day reglementary period. He intimated that his poor health affected his pace in deciding the cases. Had such been the case, then he should have explained his predicament to the Court and asked for an extension of time to decide the cases. Unfortunately, he failed to do so. Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell's failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions, 15 like fines. The fines imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, including the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the parties from the delay, the health condition and age of the judge, etc. 16 Thus, in one case, the Court mitigated the liability of a Judge who had been suffering from illnesses and who had later retired due to disability, and imposed upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases. Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to disability, the Comi believes that his poor health condition greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduces the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00. CASE: YNOT VS IAC Facts: - Executive Order No. 626 issued and prohibits interprovincial movement of carabaos and slaughtering of carabaos. Violation of this Executive Order shall be subject to confiscation. Ynot transported carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo through pump boat and was confiscated by the police by the means of violation of EO No. 626 Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC. Petitioner appeals to the constitutionality of said EO. Issues: - Does the lower courts also have power of judicial review and not only the Supreme Court? Is EO No. 626 constitutional? Ruling: Power of Judicial Review Ruling: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 49 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. Justice Laurel's said, “Courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.” Constitutionality: Thee SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. E. All courts can exercise judicial review CASE: Ongsuco (Stall holders) v. Malones(Mayor of Maasin, Iloilo) Facts: Petitioners are stall holders in the Municipal Public Market. Aug. 6, 1998, the Mayor informed the petitioners about a meeting to be held on Aug. 11 about the increase of rentals and imposition of goodwill fees. On Aug. 17 the Municipal Ordinance 98-01 was approved. The ordinance authorized the respondent to enter lease contracts, and incorporated contract of lease for the stall holders. Due to the imposition of the Ordinance, on June 9, 1999, the respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls without lease contracts, the stalls were considered vacant and open for interested applicants. The petitioners filed a case in the RTC, but the trial court dismissed the case on the ground of non-exhaustion of Administrative Remedy. Also, because the petitioners failed to show a legal right to the use of market stalls without paying the goodwill fees. The court of appeals affirmed the prior decision. Issues: Whether or not there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative remedy (main) Whether or not the imposition of goodwill fees is valid (sub issue)(incase mangutana si sir) Held: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 50 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW (1) No, there is no need for the exhaustion of administrative remedy because in this case the issue raised by the petitioner is purely a legal question merely about the validity and enforceability of the Municipal Ordinance, within the competence and jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency to resolve. Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts. (pag refer sa paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the constitution, naa sa pinaka ilalom) (2) No, the imposition of goodwill fees is not valid due to lack of public hearings. There are requisites to enact ordinances imposing charges, there must be a public hearing conducted prior to the enactment. Initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than 10 days from the sending of notices. In the case the respondent sent a notice on Aug, 6, 1998 and the meeting was held on Aug. 11, 1998 only 5 days later instead of 10. This contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published. Decision of the court: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a writ of prohibition is ISSUED commanding the Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from enforcing the said ordinance. Petitioners are also DECLARED as lawful occupants of the market stalls they occupied at the time they filed the Petition for Mandamus/Prohibition docketed as Civil Case No. 25843. In the event that they were deprived of possession of the said market stalls, petitioners are entitled to recover possession of these stalls. NOTES!!!!!! Exhaustion of Administrative remedy – In the rule of administrative law, before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, it is a precondition to exhaust administrative processes for legal and practical reasons. Example in the case: The petitioners failed to question the legality of the ordinance before the Secretary of Justice.) Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 51 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. CASE: DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971 FACTS: Agbayani obtained a loan of P450 from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. On March 10, 1945, Pres. Osmena signed EO No. 32 or the Debt Moratorium Law suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the ravages of war. In 1948, RA No. 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for another eight years. In 1953, the SC declared RA No. 342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter vs. Esteban. On July 13, 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the unpaid loan. Agbayani countered with suit against PNB alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when EO No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the RA No. 342 was declared unconstitutional, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find the contention of PNB to be persuasive and decided the suit in favor of De Agbayani Issue: Whether or not the period of the effectivity of EO No. 32 and RA No. 342 should be counted in the period of prescription? No. It should not be counted. The decision of the SC on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, in this case an executive order which was ruled to be unconstitutional, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive. The period from 1945 when EO No. 32 was issued, to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. CASE: FLORES VS DRILON (223 SCRA 568) 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 52 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,which states that "(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied). Under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office by Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure”. And since the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "the President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts. ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. HELD: The court ruled that Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227 is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID. Because in the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. In addition to that, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 53 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve fulltime with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job.. Hence, respondent Gordon being the incumbent elective official, is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; therefore, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. CASE: Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (HLI) vs Philippine Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) FACTS: In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law1 was passed. One of the case covered by this is Hacienda Luisita, once a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse owned by Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (TABACALERA). It was in 1957, that the Spanish owners of TABACALERA offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as well as their controlling interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), as an indivisible transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), then owned by the Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, was willing to buy. As agreed upon, Tadeco undertook to pay the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita. As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita and Tabacalera’s interest in CAT. In 1980, during Martial Law, the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the government’s case against TADECO by Resolution of May 18, 1988, the CA dismissed the case. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the obtention by TADECO of the PARC’s approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be implemented after such approval have been secured. On August 23, 1988, it organized a spin-off corporation2, HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, TADECO assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock. On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan. On May 11, 1989, the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA), styled as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered into by TADECO. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of the SDP, which would eventually be submitted to the PARC for approval. 1 It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. 2 The creation of an independent company through the sale or distribution of new shares of an existing business or division of a parent company. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 54 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Subsequently, HLI submitted to DAR its SDP, designated as "Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP,” which was substantially based on the SDOA. After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA. Meanwhile, the DAR constituted a Special Task Force to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. Among other duties, the Special Task Force was mandated to review the terms and conditions of the SDOA and PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 relative to HLI’s SDP; evaluate HLI’s compliance reports; evaluate the merits of the petitions for the revocation of the SDP; conduct ocular inspections or field investigations; and recommend appropriate remedial measures for approval of the Secretary. After investigation and evaluation, the Special Task Force submitted its "Terminal Report: Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (HLI) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) Conflict" dated September 22, 2005 (Terminal Report), finding that HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP. Subsequently, Sec. Pangandaman recommended to the PARC Executive Committee (Excom) (a) the recall/revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 approving HLI’s SDP; and (b) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through the compulsory acquisition scheme. Following review, the PARC Validation Committee favorably endorsed the DAR Secretary’s recommendation afore-stated. On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? 2. Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? HELD: 1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. Contrary to the stance of the RES, the operative act doctrine squarely applies to executive acts –in this case- the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distributions well-settled in our jurisprudence. This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 55 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. More importantly, respondents, and even the minority, failed to clearly explain how the option to remain in HLI granted to individual farmers would result in inequity and prejudice. The application of the operative fact doctrine to the FWBs (Farm Worker Beneficiaries) is not iniquitous and prejudicial to their interests but is actually beneficial and fair to them. First, they are granted the right to remain in HLI as stockholders and they acquired said shares without paying their value to the corporation. And second, with the application of the operative fact doctrine, said benefits (homelots and the 3% production share and 3% share from the sale of the 500hectare and SCTEX lots) shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return to HLI by FWBs. The receipt of these things is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored. 2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter. Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC, the lis mota3 of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657. Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the executive or legislative departments have not been met in this case. 3 Means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. CASE:COCOFED VS. REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514 Topic: Operative Fact Doctrine ï‚· Operative Fact Doctrine refers to acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of unconstitutionality. 3 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 56 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· Operative Fact Doctrine- But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this case, it becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification. Facts of the Case: ï‚· 1971: RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, (meaning, the COCOFED would be in-charge for the funds) the national association of coconut producers having the largest membership. ï‚· 1972: When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund: PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil. PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm. ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· 1973: PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut and oil industry. The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 section 2, which permitted the use of the Fund by PCA for the “acquisition of commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it acquired free to the coconut farmers”. Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). (Parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the years.) After EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1 which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the Sadiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB registered in the name of “over a million coconut farmers” held trust by the PCA. The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 2 of PD No. 755 was unconstitutional. The COCOFED representing the “over a million coconut farmers” via Petition for review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among others that the sequestration amounted to the “taking of private property without just compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership”. Issues: ï‚· ï‚· Whether or not the COCO Levy Fund belongs to the government. Whether or not the Operative Fact Doctrine applies to this case. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 57 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Ruling: Coconut levy funds are special public funds of the government. Issue No. 1: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic, the Coconut Levy was imposed in the exercise of the State’s inherent power of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake the nature of Taxes. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose. Issue No. 2: No. Applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose. —It is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose. CASE: BELGICA v OCHOA FACTS: Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal destinations from “Congressional Pork Barrel”, now known as Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation of the Pork Barrel is merged in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). Allocation of the PDAF since 2011: a. 70 Million Php – for each member of the lower house; 40 million for hard projects, 30 million for soft projects b. 200 Million Php- for each senator; 100 million for hard projects, 100 million for soft projects c. 200 Million Php- for the Vice President; 100M for hard projects, 100M for soft projects 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 58 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Certain Cabinet members may realign the funds into their department, provided that the realignment is approved by the legislator concerned. The president also has his own pork barrel (Presidential Pork Barrel), from 2 sources: a. Malampaya funds from the Malampaya Gas Project, b. Presidential Social Fund derived from the earnings of PAGCOR. Probing PDAF Allocation Allegations In July 2013, the NBI began its probe in the corruption allegations regarding the PDAF. It was alleged that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. JLN Corporation (JLN stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos to fund ghost projects using 20 dummy NGOs for a decade. On September 3, 2013 Greco Belgica and several others filed petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Systems. ISSUE: I. II. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. Whether or not the presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. HELD: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional as it violates the following principles: a. Separation of powers- as a rule, Congress has the budgeting power. It regulates the release of funds. Only the executive can implement the law however, under the pork barrel systems, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. b. Principle of checks and balances- Under this principle, the president may deny items on the GAA which he may deem inappropriate. This power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.” 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 59 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation. The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These are sufficient laws, which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869. CASE:ARAULLO VS. AQUINO III FACT: DAP (DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM) was created as a remedy to speed up funding of government projects because there was sluggish growth in the economy. In 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada claimed that he and other Senators received P50M from President for voting in favor of impeachment of Corona. Budget Secretary Abad claimed that money was taken from DAP and was released upon the request of the Senators. Turns out that DAP not only realigned funds within the Executive but also non-Executive projects. According to Araullo, DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Abad argued that DAP is based on certain laws. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the DAP violates the “no money shall be paid out on the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the Executive. 3. Whether or not the DAP realignments are constitutional. 4. Whether or not the sourcing of funds to DAP is constitutional. RULING: 1. No, the DAP did not violate the Constitution because it was just a program by the Executive and is not a fund or an appropriation. The funds, already appropriated for the GAA (General Appropriations Act), were just realigned via DAP. 2. No, there is no Executive impoundment. Impoundment of funds refers to President’s power to refuse to spend the appropriations or retain/deduct appropriations. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 60 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 3. No, the transfers made through DAP were unconstitutional. Although it is true that the President and other heads of the other branches of the government are allowed by the Constitution to make realignments of funds, such transfer or realignments should only be made within their respective offices. But under the DAP, this was violated because the funds appropriated by GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. 4. No, uprogrammed funds from GAA cannot be used as money source of DAP because under the law, funds may only be used if there is certification from the National Treasurer. In this case, no certification was issued before uprogrammed funds were used. Notes: DBM- Department of Budget and Management Unprogrammed funds – excess funds Savings- when estimated expenditures are not spent Power of Augmentation- “President, President of Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives Chief Justice of Supreme Court and heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective approppriations” Operative Fact Doctrine- Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of unconstitutionality. CASE:Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent. FACTS: On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against herein petitioner Velarde with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. The herein petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss before the trial court on the common grounds that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss under certain reasons: 1. The Trial Court said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because “in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.” 2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." However, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 61 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Hence, this Petition for Review. ISSUES: A. Procedural Issues 1. WON the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? 2.WON respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief and 3. WON it stated a cause of action? HOLDING: Procedural Issues: 1. No, it did not raise a justiciable controversy. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is speculative or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim. The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitute a justiciable controversy because: a. It did not state ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter. b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution, c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are prohibited from rendering an advisory opinion. 2. No. SJS has no legal standing in the controversy and has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it. Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. There was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents. Furthermore, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizenstaxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. 3. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 62 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Since a perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect, it can only be concluded that there was no cause of action. The Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. CASE: VINUYA VS. ROMULO G.R. No. 162230 August 13, 2014 Facts: ï‚· During the Second World War, the Japanese military established the comfort women system to appease the sexual appetites of the soldiers and to contain their activities within a regulated environment. ï‚· Daily life for comfort women was “unmitigated” misery as they were forced to endure degradation and humiliation. The military forced them into the system against their wills and placed them into barracks-style stations divided into tiny cubicles where they were forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many as 30 soldiers per day. They suffered physical, emotional, and psychological scarring as a result. ï‚· In the case at bar, the PETs are members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, nonprofit organization established to provide aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. ï‚· PETs claim that since 1998, they have requested the Executive Department, through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, for assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. ï‚· However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist, stating that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. RESPOs also argue that the apologies made by Japan have been satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by the Japanese-established Asian Women’s Fund. ï‚· Dissatisfied, PETs have petitioned for an application for the issuance of a writ of prelimanry mandatory injunction against the office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Issue/s: 1. WoN the petition poses a political question? 2. WoN the RESPOs committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them? 3. WoN the SC can compel the RESPOs to espouse the claims of PETs for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan against the ICJ? Ruling: From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. In Tanada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 63 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE CASE: Collector of Internal Revenue, petitioner vs. Antonio Campus Rueda, respondent Facts: Antonio Campus Rueda-respondent, was the administrator of the estate of the late Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. The deceased, is a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. At the time of her demise, she left intangible personal properties in the Philippines. On September 29, 1955, respondent filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Doña Cerdeira. But the Petitioner—Collector of Internal Revenue denied the request for exemption claimed on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Sec. 122 and alleging that Tangier is a mere principality, not a foreign country within the meaning of the said provision. With that, the petitioner assessed and demanded against the petitioner the sum P161, 874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code? Ruling: No. It was held by the court that the expression "foreign country", used in the last provision of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 64 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the provision of Section 122 of our Tax Code. Section 122: That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country. CASE: NICOLAS VS ROMULO FACTS Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, member of the US Armed Forces, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against Suzette Nicolas (petitioner) in the RTC. The court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City. Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States, accused shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, he is temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail. However, Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreements which states: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila. Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because the VFA is void and unconstitutional since it violates Art. XVlll, Sec. 25 of the constitution which states: Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. ISSUE Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed “under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” HELD Yes. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 65 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Firstly, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policy making agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence “allowed under” the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. CASE: QUA CHEE GAN V. DEPORTATION BOARD, GR L-10280 September 30, 1983 Ponente: J. Barrera Facts: - May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged petitioners before the Deportation Board, having purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, which was then secretly remitted to Hong Kong - Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King attempted to bribe officers of the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase. - A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed a surety bond of P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting them at liberty - Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board for the reason that the same does not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion was denied by the Board on Feb. 9, 1953 - Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. After securing and filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against petitioners pending termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. - The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized agent of the President, it has jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to order their arrest. The Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 66 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - Deportation Board of his power to conduct the investigations. It also sustained the power of the DB to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien’s temporary release pending investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Hence this appeal. Issues: 1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently, 2. WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of Held: 1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 of Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses." While it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these aliens, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President is a clear indication of such power. SC stated petitioners committed the act of profiteering¸ which is a ground for deportation. The President may then order their deportation if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. 2. No. President Quirino’s EO 398 authorizes the DB “to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release.” The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. It is an implied grant of power that would serve as curtailment on the fundamental right of security to life and liberty, which equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. The guarantees of human rights, then, must not rest on such a shaky foundation. EO 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for his temporary release, is therefore declared as illegal. Order of arrest of DB upon petitioners is declared null and void. CASE: TECSON V COMELEC 424 SCRA 277 (2004) - CITIZENSHIP Consolidated Petitions for Disqualification against Fernando Poe, Jr. Facts of the case: ï‚· Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) (Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, born Aug 20, 1939) submits his certificate of candidacy for the office of the President on May 10, 2004 ï‚· Petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., as well as Zoilo Antonio Velez, filed separate petitions, seeking the disqualification of respondent FPJ from the presidential elections on the grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 67 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW o Contention: (1) respondent FPJ is an illegitimate child as he was born out of wedlock, i.e., he was born before the marriage of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelly; (2) as an illegitimate child, he follows the American citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelly; therefore, (3) he is not a natural-born citizen. Petitioners cite the marriage certificate of FPJ’s parents which shows that they were married in 1940, while FPJ was born in 1939. They contend that it does not appear that FPJ has been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents as he had not been acknowledged by his father. The same arguments were advanced by petitioner Velez. ï‚· Petitioner Victorino Fornier also files for the disqualification of FPJ, claiming that his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. ï‚· Petitioner Fornier also provides evidence (1) the alleged birth certificate of Allan Fernando Poe; (2) the alleged marriage certificate between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez; and (3) the alleged bigamy charge filed by Paulita Gomez against Allan Fernando Poe. Respondent FPJ submits Senate Committee Report No. 517, indicating the falsification of said documents. COMELEC later dismisses Fornier’s petition for disqualification for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, so to be allowed to run for the Office of the President. Held: While not conclusively established by evidence, the principle of Jus Sanguinis qualifies Fernando Poe, Jr. as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, recognized as the son of Allan F. Poe, Sr., a citizen of the Philippines. Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines”, where the term "natural-born citizens" is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." At the time of FPJ’s birth, under the regime of the 1935 Constitution, the principle of Jus Sanguinis “confers Filipino citizenship to all children born from Filipino fathers”, without distinction for legitimate or illegitimate children. Allan F. Poe (father) would have been a Filipino citizen at this time, as Lorenzo Pou (grandfather, 1870-1954) was granted Filipino citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902. Additionally: ï‚· SC maintains that Fornier’s petition is denied for lack of merit. The documents presented as evidence appear to be manufactured, and fails to prove that FPJ deliberately misrepresented his status as a natural-born citizen. Fornier’s evidence does show that FPJ has always conducted himself as a Filipino citizen. ï‚· Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a nonissue. ï‚· Petitioner Tecson’s contention which stresses FPJ’s status as an illegitimate child is a nonissue under the 1935 Constitution, and also runs contrary to the trend in civil law equalizing the rights of illegitimate and legitimate children (Convention on the Rights of the Child), referring to FPJ’s right to run for office. CARLOS T. GO, SR. V. LUIS T. RAMOS 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 68 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Luis T. Ramos filed a complaint for deportation against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien presenting the birth certificate of Jimmy which indicates his citizenship as FChinese. He also argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, his citizenship being the only one handwritten. And Jimmy’s acquisition therefore of a Philippine Passport was fraudulent. Jimmy refuted the allegations. He insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino; that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625 as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. Issue: WON the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient. Ruling: After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time. One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. As to whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not. Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 69 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry together with the Oath of Allegiance. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. Further, the exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. CASE: IN RE: CHING 316 SCRA 1 (1999) Topic: Election of Philippine Citizenship FACTS: Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City on July 17, 1998. Vicente Ching is legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese Citizen, and Prescila Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. After he finished his law degree he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar in a condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine Citizenship. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union. The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place). Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. ISSUE: Whether a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority? RULING: Ching validly failed to elect Philippine Citizenship. 1. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Sec 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected the Philippine citizenship. ( Ching has inchoate 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 70 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority.) CA No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election. 2. However, the 1935 Constitution and CA No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. Jurisprudence dictates that this must be done within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority. In the case of Cuenco Vs. Secretary of Justice it was rule that 3 years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has alaways considered himself a Filipino. In this case Cuenco was allowed to elect 7 years after attaining the age of majority. 3. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing “upon reaching the age of majority”. Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. 4. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. 5. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly in this case, Ching has slept his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasped. 6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent. 7. 8. This case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries filed by herein respondent. In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected. 9. 10. During the hearing, respondent claimed that: first, her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo; second, her father’s name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian); third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married and that only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina; fourth, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married. 11. 12. Placida Anto, respondent’s mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter’s father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. Respondent thereby presented a certification 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 71 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present. 13. 14. The Trial Court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Iligan City to make such corrections. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. 15. 16. Issue: 17. WON respondent is a Filipino citizen. 18. 19. Ruling: 20. 21. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. 22. Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. 23. BALGAMELO CABILING MA V. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR. 24. 25. Balgamelo, Felix Jr., Valeriano, Lechi Ann, Arceli, Nicolas, and Isidro, all surnamed Ma are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively. 26. 27. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 72 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines. 28. 29. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that (t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering. 30. 31. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry. It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement. 32. 33. Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim to Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, and for failure to submit any document to support their claim that they are Philippine citizens, respondents concluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano Lechi Ann, Nicolas and Isidro are undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens. 34. 35. 36. Issue: 37. WON petitioner/s is/are undocumented or improperly documented alien/s. 38. 39. Ruling: 40. 41. The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. 42. 43. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. 44. 45. We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. 46. 47. We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 73 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. 48. 49. Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625 that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. CASE: REPUBLIC VS. SAGUN Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) Respondent: Nora Fe Sagun FACTS: -Nora Fe Sagun was the legitimate child of Albert Chan (a Chinese national) and Marta Borromeo (Filipino citizen) and was born on Aug. 8, 1959. - She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. - In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. - This document, however, was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. - Problem arose when in September 2005 Nora Fe applied for a Philippine passport but her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. - So, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate - Respondent’s contentions: Nora Fe contended that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship, and contended that she was raised as a Filipino and was a registered voter. (the RTC granted her petition) - Petitioner’s contentions: Petitioner contended that Nora Fe’s petition before the RTC was improper because (1) law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship and (2) the pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance and its annotation on respondent’s birth certificate are duties of the local civil registrar and they require no court order. ISSUES: (1) Whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanction by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence, (2) Whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law RULING: -The Court held that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. -There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. -Take note, Nora Fe was born on Aug. 8, 1959 and the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 74 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution) –Under this article, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. -The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that “those born before January 17, 1987 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority” are Philippine citizens. -In Nora Fe’s case, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. -Note: Commonwealth Act No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship: 1. A statement of election under oath 2. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines 3. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry - It should be stressed however that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. - Nora Fe failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election - She had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. - The only documentary evidence she presented was her oath of allegiance executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. - And, its execution of the oath was not within reasonable time after the respondent reached the age of majority. - The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. - Petition Granted and Nora Fe’s petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is DISMISSED. - KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG - On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. - Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. - Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. That even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen. - Respondent Ong maintained that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 75 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born. - Issue: - WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. - Ruling: - The Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar. - In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen. - It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer. - It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. - The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. - Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so. - REPUBLIC V. LI CHING CHUNG 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 76 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - G.R. No. 197450; March 20, 2013 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG, Respondent. - FACTS: - On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention to Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG. On March 12, 2008 or almost seven months after filing his declaration of intention, respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization before the RTC. - On June 3, 2009, the RTC granted respondents application for naturalization as a Filipino citizen. The OSG appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The OSG argues that the petition for naturalization should not be granted in view of its patent jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because: 1) it was filed within the one (1) year proscribed period from the filing of declaration of intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is indispensable to the validity of the Declaration of Intention, was attached to the petition; and 3) respondents failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements set under CA 473. - The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA held that although the petition for naturalization was filed less than one (1) year from the time of the declaration of intent before the OSG, this defect was not fatal. Moreover, contrary to the allegation of the OSG that respondent did not present his Certificate of Arrival, the fact of his arrival could be easily confirmed from the Certification, dated August 21, 2007, issued by the Bureau of Immigration, and from the stamp in the passport of respondent indicating his arrival on January 26, 1981. The CA further stated that the Republic participated in every stage of the proceedings below. It was accorded due process which it vigorously exercised from beginning to end. Whatever procedural defects, if at all they existed, did not taint the proceedings, let alone the Republics meaningful exercise of its right to due process. - ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision and denying the appeal by the OSG - HELD: Yes. CA decision reversed and set aside - Political Law - declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization - As held in Tan v. Republic, "the period of one year required therein is the time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and gather evidence thereon. An applicant may then impose upon the courts, as the State would have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may present to contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 77 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW his petition." The period is designed to give the government ample time to screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant and to measure the latter’s good intention and sincerity of purpose. - Stated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the true intentions of those who seek Philippine citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not limited to, those who are merely interested in protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those who have truly come to love the Philippines and its culture and who wish to become genuine partners in nation building. - The law is explicit that the declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. Republic v. Go Bon Leelikewise decreed that substantial compliance with the requirement is inadequate. In that case, Go filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the Philippines on May 23, 1940. After eleven months, he filed his petition for naturalization on April 18, 1941. - The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit: Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized. - Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt individuals that would excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding, respondent’s premature filing of his petition for naturalization before the expiration of the one-year period is fatal. - In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 78 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW all the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process. - Petition granted. CASE: CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA FACTS: Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens. Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction no. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15,1977. On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the following grounds: a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant; Sec. 15: Effects of naturalization on the wife and the children b) LOI 270: Refers to qualified individuals only; c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270; d) Application of the pari material rule of construction is misplaced. ISSUE: Whether or not Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are Filipino citizens on the account of the naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 79 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce or cite in evidence the Certificate of Naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, to entitle them to a Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition: 1) They were born in the Philippines; 2) They are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; 3) Co Boon Peng was conferred Philippine citizenship and had taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; 4) Their father was still a Chinese citizen at their time of birth; 5) The petitioner were minors during their father’s naturalization; 6) The change in nationality is recorded in the Civil Register. Ruling: Yes. Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are Filipino citizens on the account of the naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng. According to Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized there under, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case. The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it behooved the trial court to do its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. REPUBLIC V. LAO ONG G.R. No. 175430; June 18, 2012 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent. FACTS: Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 80 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997. Based on these returns, Ong’s gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ong’s petition. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong's petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law. The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing business or trade. The appellate court dismissed the Republic's appeal. The appellate court denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law? HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: naturalization The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law. Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization." 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 81 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant's qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. A review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "A naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and given special treatment. Unlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a "known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization. Republic won the case. REPUBLIC V BATUIGAS G.R. No. 183110 FACTS: On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said court. Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as in her relations with the constituted Government and with the community in which she is living; that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473); that she is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; that she is not defending or 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 82 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of men's ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization. After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9of CA 473 had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismisson the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena's counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena's evidence. During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice. Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. She has resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur from 19691972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the filing of her Petition. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools, i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955,[14] Margosatubig Academy in 1959,[15] and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963, graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another two years. In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a naturalborn Filipino citizen. They have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel James. All of them studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals, three of whom are now working abroad. After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in milling/ distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000-2002and from 2004-2005. The business name and the business permits issued to the spouses' store, 'Azucena's General Merchandising,' are registered in Santiago's name, and he is also the National Food Authority licensee for their rice and corn business. During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 83 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of Investigation. She also presented her Health Examination Recorddeclaring her as physically and mentally fit. To further support Azucena's Petition, Santiago and witnesses EufemioMiniao and Irineo Alfaro testified. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition. Among these are her lack of a derogatory record, her support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health, that she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their language, that she has never had any transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she has complied with her obligations to the government involving her business operations, and that the business and real properties she and Santiago own provide sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the RTC ruled: In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization Law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted. SO ORDERED. In its Omnibus Motion, the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473, as the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases. Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005 Order, the RTC held that the public has been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free to intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only officers authorized by law to appear on behalf of the State, which represents the public. Thus, when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for the reception of evidence exparte, there was already a sufficient compliance with the requirement of a public hearing. The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not a "lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide for adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena's claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 84 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the commissioner is not a "public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the public in attendance. It claimed that the State was denied its day in court because the RTC, during the May 18, 2004 initial hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample opportunity to be present. Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she had to quit to help in the retail business of her husband, and they were able to send all their children to school. It is highly unlikely that she will become a public charge as she and her spouse have enough savings and could even be given sufficient support by their children. She contended that the definition of "lucrative trade/income" should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife and following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like male applicants for naturalization who are required to have their own "lucrative trade." Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of Court was conducted in the court's session hall. Besides, the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its day in court as notices have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure to attend is not the fault of the RTC. Ruling of the Court of Appeals In dismissing the OSG's appeal, the CA found that Azucena's financial condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the demands of human dignity. It said: Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of living tends to increase rather than decrease, and the low purchasing power of the Philippine currency, petitioner-appellee, together with her Filipino husband, nonetheless, was able to send all her children to college, pursue a lucrative business and maintain a decent existence. The Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted a higher standard in determining whether a petitioner for Philippine citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that would qualify him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to which petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her ability to provide for herself and avoid becoming a public charge or a financial burden to her community. As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had complied with the mandate of the law requiring notice to the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the Petition. Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments it raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA 473. Our Ruling The Petition lacks merit. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 85 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization. Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration: Accordingly, we now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows: Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 030705 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena's husband is a 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 86 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Filipino citizenas only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband's citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings. As the records before this Court show, Santiago's Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter's registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA 473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act. However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of her qualifications and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the evidence presented during the hearings on the Petition, as well as determine, based on Azucena's testimony and deportment during the hearings, that she indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for acquisition of Philippine citizenship. The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a public hearing. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of Philippine 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 87 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who has an interest in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor's office, the proceedings have complied with the public hearing requirement under CA 473. No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen: He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with education, and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife's lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume teaching at any time. Her profession never leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she has known since birth. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus: It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. "Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding." This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473. Azucena has clearly proven, 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 88 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled. SO ORDERED. AASJS VS DATUMANONG G.R. No. 160869; May 11, 2007 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice, Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional? HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. LOPEZ VS COMELEC G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 89 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippinesunless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing thecertificate of candidacy. FACTS: Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolutionand (2) Omnibus Order of theCommission on Elections(COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as BarangayChairman.Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, SanDionisio, IloiloCity in the synchronized Barangay and SangguniangKabataan Elections held on October 29,2007.On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial ElectionSupervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is anAmerican citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,petitioner argued thathe is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225,otherwise known as theCitizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.He returned to the Philippinesand resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for BarangayChairman.After the votes for BarangayChairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.On February 6, 2008,COMELECissued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effectiverenunciation of foreign citizenship. HELD: R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenshipmay run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenshipunder this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities andresponsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (2)Those seeking elective public office in thePhilippines shall meet the qualification for holding suchpublic office as required by theConstitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificateof candidacy,make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before anypublic officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that shouldone seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and allforeign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval theCOMELECobservation on thispoint: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 90 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW While respondent was able to regain his FilipinoCitizenship by virtue of the DualCitizenship Law when he took hisoath of allegiance before the ViceConsul of the PhilippineConsulate General's Office in Los Angeles,California, thesame is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that acandidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenshipbefore any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show thatrespondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent torun for BarangayChairman of Barangay Bagacay.For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who isauthorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he isrenouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failureto renounce hisAmerican citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove thecontrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. Forfailure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, thisCommission holds himdisqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of BarangayChairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutionaland statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. JACOT vs DAL Facts: Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his US citizenship. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of ViceMayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 91 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship. Ruling: Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No.9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC Facts: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 92 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Ruling: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; 2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioner’s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice mayor. SOBEJANA-CONDON vs COMELEC Facts: Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility were filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to executea "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 93 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post. Ruling: Yes. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippinecitizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. Before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was not under oath, contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office. MAQUILING vs COMELEC Facts: Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 94 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as “USA-American.” The COMELEC First Division ruled that the petition for disqualification be granted because he is still using his US passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that the use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to “unrenounce” what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a petition before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc. Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office. Ruling: By renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in C.A. No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. The Court agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such a reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnada represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. Thus, by the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Sec 40(d) of the LGC, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. REPUBLIC vs DELA ROSA Facts: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 95 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila. Judge Dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing. Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order. The hearing proceeded and on February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization. Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date. Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino. Ruling: No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period. GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, Petitioners, vs. ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, Respondent. Facts: The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a naturalized7 Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. The said petitioners, being minors at that time, were also recognized8 as Filipino citizens. Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a Complaint9 dated March 5, 2004 for blacklisting and deportation against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 96 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners having been issued Canadian passports. Acting upon the Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo, Special Prosecutor, Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner, directed the petitioners, through the issuance of a subpoenae,10 to appear before her and to bring pertinent documents relative to their current immigration status, to which the petitioners objected by filing with the Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner a Comment/Opposition with Motion Ad Cautelam to Quash Re: Subpoena11 dated 30 April 2004 (DucesTecum/Ad Testificandum), which was eventually denied by respondent Salcedo in an Order12 dated May 14, 2004. Issue: W/N judicial intervention is allowed amidst deportation proceedings. Ruling:Yes.Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA in its decision, does not apply in the present case because it falls under an exception. Citing Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, petitioners assert that immediate judicial intervention in deportation proceedings is allowed where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In connection therewith, petitioners assail the applicability of Dwikarna v. Domingo in the present case, which the CA relied upon in ruling against the same petitioners In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a respondent in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such claim is correct. In the said case, the proof adduced by the respondent therein was so substantial and conclusive as to his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention. In the present case, there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino citizens. Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether petitioners had lost their Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains, through the evidence adduced and undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos, unless proven otherwise. However, this Court cannot pass upon the issue of petitioners' citizenship as this was not raised as an issue. The issue in this petition is on the matter of jurisdiction, and as discussed above, the trial court has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether petitioners have abandoned their Filipino citizenship or have acquired dual citizenship within the confines of the law. YU, petitioner vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, respondent GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989 FACTS:Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued a Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. Moreover, the Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of the Philippine Consul, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 97 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 1980. Consequently, the CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. Meanwhile, respondents argue that the petitioner was in full knowledge and legal capacity when he applied Philippine citizenship through naturalization. He consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce “absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain true faith and allegiance to the republic of the Philippines.” Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said oath and its succeeding consequences should they be violated. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship? RULING:Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In a related jurisprudence, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Hence it must be stressed that, Philippine Citizenahip is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. AZNAR V. COMELEC Topic: Loss of Citizenship; Express Renunciation or Expatriation Facts: Private respondent Emilio Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the local elections. Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. Private respondent maintained that he is a Filipino citizen alleging that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 98 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Issue: Whether or not Osmeña is disqualified to run as Provincial Governor of Cebu Province for not being a Filipino citizen. Ruling: No. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 which are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country (2) by express renunciation of citizenship (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", Osmeña "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.” Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. There is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When the Supreme Court considers that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied". RENALD F. VILLANDO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, GR 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 Ponente: J. Mendoza Facts: ï‚· Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. ï‚· During the pendency of the case, Limkaichong won over her rival Paras in the election. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 99 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. LimkaichongasailedParas’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong. ï‚· ï‚· Issues: WON Limkaichong is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes, Limkaichong is a citizen of the Philippines. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a naturalborn Filipino citizen. CASE: SOBEJANA-CONDON V COMELEC REPATRIATION G.R. No. 198742 - EXPRESS RENUNCIATION AND Aug 10, 2012 FACTS OF THE CASE: The petitioner (Condon) is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. Condon files for a reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on Dec. 2, 2005, under R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), which was accepted and she took oath on Dec. 5, 2005. Condon files for an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs on Sept. 18, 2006. On Sept 27, 2006, the DIIA certifies that she is no longer and Australian citizen. Condon runs for the position of mayor in Caba, La Union in 2007. She lost her bid, and again ran in 2010, this time as vice mayor, winning by majority and taking oath on May 13, 2010. Afterwards, separate petitions were filed by private respondents questioning her eligibility as a dual citizen. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 100 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioner Condon contends that she ceased to be an Australian citizen in 2007, stating that she complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225. The RTC found that Condon was ineligible and thus disqualified, and this decision was confirmed by the COMELEC. Petitioner contends she was only a Filipino citizen when she first ran for office in 2007, so the “personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her; and that a sworn renunciation was merely a formal requirement, not a mandatory one. ISSUE: Whether or not Condon has successfully renounced her foreign citizenship, so as to be allowed to run for office. HELD: Petitioner Condon failed to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225, rendering her a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office Condon had successfully reacquired her Filipino citizenship in2005, effectively becoming a dual citizen. However, Condon was not under oath while filing for renunciation of her Australian citizenship, as mandated in Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225, which requires that the foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. Petitioner also failed to prove the existence of the Australian Citizenship Act, cited by Condon as the basis for losing her foreign citizenship. The Supreme Court states that there is no ambiguity in the provision of R.A. No. 9225 about the mandatory nature of an explicit and sworn renunciation, as opposed to the formal requirement argued by Condon, which would reduce an oath of allegiance to a merely ceremonial purpose. Petition is dismissed and the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is affirmed in toto. CASE:ZENON R. PEREZ, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT GR 164763 Topic : Facts : Presumption of Constitutionality Zenon Perez, the acting Municipal Treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol was found Guilty by the Sandiganbayan for the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as defined and penalized in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and was hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual special disqualification. He is also likewise ordered to pay a fine equal to the total amount of the funds malversed, which is Seventy-two thousand seven hundred eighty-four pesos and fifty-seven centavos (P72,784.57). In an appeal, the petitioner argued that the sentence imposed is cruel and therefore unconstitutional as it violates Section 19 of Article III or the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Issue : Whether or not the penalty is unconstitutional for it violates Sec 19 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 101 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW of Article III of the constitution. Ruling : The penalty is not unconstitutional. First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation. Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional. He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of Constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail. In the case at bar, the decision of SANDIGANBAYAN was affirmed by SC with the modification that petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prison correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of P72,784.57, the amount equal to the funds malversed. VALLES V COMELEC Facts: The citizenship of private respondent was raised as an issue when she ran for reelection as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 102 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, TelesforoYbasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining that the Lopez is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988. ISSUE: 1. Whether respondent is a Filipino 2. If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport. 3. Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental under Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 HELD: Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, TelesforoYbasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, TelesforoYbasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 103 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of bloodrelationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. 2. No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of citizenship; (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippinearmed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. 3. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: “xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.” 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 104 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship. ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents. Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.” Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 105 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS: Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC declared him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171. OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition should have been dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case. RULING: No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's order was null and void. RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost the Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said oath with the proper civil registry. ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC Facts: -Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 2004 elections. -On January, 2004 respondents Jose Altiche and Vernon Versoza, filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy ofAltarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC, that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 106 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW -Petitioner answered that he did not commit false representation in his COC because he was issued on Dec. 17, 2017 1997 a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization pursuant to RA No. 8171. -Altarejo’s was disqualified by the COMELEC First Division for having failed to prove that he had fully complied with the requirements to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino Citizenship (Registration of repatration with the proper civil registry an B.I.), and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc. -The supplementary pieces of evidence he presented in his motion for reconsideration were belated and should have been introduced earlier. Issue: 1.) Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation? 2.) Whether or not Altejaros is qualified to run for mayor during the 2005? 3.) Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the Comelec, First Division? Held: 1.) Yes. The law is clear under Section 2 of RA No. 8171 that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the RP and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. 2.) In this case petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. In Frivaldo v COmission on elections the court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. Moreover, the court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application. Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997, qualifying him to run for a mayoralty position in the May, 2004 elections. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 107 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 3.) No. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. TABASA V CA (RE: CITIZENSHIP RA8171) Facts: Petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization ,petitioner also acquired American citizenship. The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the respondent’s name, born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines, because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest. In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, ‘81461’ should be ‘86461’], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the alien has expired. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor. Issue: WON Tabasa would qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171 Ruling: Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 108 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation. MERCADO VS MANZANO (DUAL ALLEGIANCE BASED ON ART 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION) Facts: - - Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano are both candidates for being vice mayors in the 1998 elections, Manzano won the election Proclamation of Manzano is suspended due to filing of petition of disqualification against Manzano done by a certain Ernesto Mamaril stating that Manzano is a citizen of the US Mamaril’s petition is granted by the Second Division of COMELEC on the grounds that dual citizens are not allowed to run for public office/elective position. Manzano has ACR certificate on Bureau of Immigration yet he conteded that he is a natural born as his parents are both Filipinos yet he was born on the US which follows the law of jus soli making him a dual citizen. He was born on Sept 14, 1955 making him under the 1935 Constitution that he is a natural born having a Filipino father. Petition for disqualification was granted, later on reversed in motion for consideration, thus making Manzano qualified for vice mayor. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 109 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: W/N Manzano is disqualified for having dual citizenship or dual allegiance? RULING: - - - Manzano and Solicitor General invoked dura lexsedlex contended that through Section 40 of the Local Government Code Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office." Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance are two things that are entirely different. Dual citizenship is acquired involuntarily while dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. - Manzano is qualified as he may be a dual citizen not a citizen that has dual allegiance, he elected his Philippine Citizenship by means of voting for elections, living here in the Philippines majority of his life and the fact that he filed for certificate of candidacy here in the Philippines, thus the law of this country is aware he is a repudiates his American Citizenship. There is already on oath of allegiance in the Certificate of Candidacy it is implied he repudiates his other citizenship as based on the US Law voting in a US citizen shall lose his nationality if he/she votes in a foreign state and participate in the election. ( No need mag renounce if dual citizen nainvolountary act pero if volountary act namaka gain ug dual allegiance kailangannimoirenounce especially katong under RA 9225.) CASE: REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR FACTS: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 110 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., GavinoUnchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued dated June 26, 1969. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several Banks, especially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent. RULING: It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious c4rfd functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of the nonsuability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 111 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC. V. TESDA G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009 Facts: PROVI is an entity engaged in the sale of high technology equipment, information technology products and broadcast devices, including the supply of plastic card printing and security facilities. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to develop and establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed the certification process. On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed a Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance (the Contract Agreement) for the provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards. Under this Contract Agreement, PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system and equipment compliant with the specifications defined in the Technical Proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI the amount of Thirty-Nine Million Four Hundred and Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P39,475,000) within fifteen (15) days after TESDAs acceptance of the contracted goods and services. On August 24, 2000, TESDA and PROVI executed an Addendum to the Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance (Addendum),[8] whose terms bound PROVI to deliver one hundred percent (100%) of the enumerated supplies to TESDA consisting of five hundred thousand (500,000) pieces of security foil; five (5) pieces of security die with TESDA seal; five hundred thousand (500,000) pieces of pre-printed and customized identification cards; one hundred thousand (100,000) pieces of scannable answer sheets; and five hundred thousand (500,000) customized TESDA holographic laminate. In addition, PROVI would install and maintain the following equipment: one (1) unit of Micropoise, two (2) units of card printer, three (3) units of flatbed scanner, one (1) unit of OMR scanner, one (1) unit of Server, and seven (7) units of personal computer. TESDA in turn undertook to pay PROVI thirty percent (30%) of the total cost of the supplies within thirty (30) days after receipt and acceptance of the contracted supplies, with the balance payable within thirty (30) days after the initial payment. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 112 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW According to PROVI, it delivered the following items to TESDA on the dates indicated: Date Particulars Amount 26 April 2000 48,500 pre-printed cards P 2,764,500.00 07 June 2000 330,000 pre-printed cards 18,810,000.00 07 August 2000 121,500 pre-printed cards 6,925,500.00 26 April 2000 100,000 scannable answer sheets 600,000.00 06 June 2000 5 Micro-Poise customized die 375,000.00 13 June 2000 35 boxes @ 15,000 imp/box 10,000,000.00 Custom hologram Foil Total P 39,475,000.00 PROVI further alleged that out of TESDAs liability of P39,475,000.00, TESDA paid PROVI only P3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00, as evidenced by PROVIs Statement of Account. Despite the two demand letters dated March 8 and April 27, 2001 that PROVI sent TESDA, the outstanding balance remained unpaid. On July 11, 2001, PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA. PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment against TESDA. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 68527. In an Order dated July 16, 2001, the RTC granted PROVIs prayer and issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of TESDA not exempt from execution in the amount of P35,000,000.00. TESDA responded on July 24, 2001 by filing a Motion to Discharge/Quash the Writ of Attachment, arguing mainly that public funds cannot be the subject of garnishment. The RTC denied TESDAs motion, and subsequently ordered the manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines to produce TESDAs bank statement for the garnishment of the covered amount. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’ decision after finding that: (a) TESDAs funds are public in nature and, therefore, exempt from garnishment; 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 113 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW and (b) TESDAs purchase of the PVC cards was a necessary incident of its governmental function; consequently, it ruled that there was no legal basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment. Issue:WoN the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVIs claim against TESDA, is valid. Ruling: No, it is not valid. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government governmental functions. undertaking R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA under the declared policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient technical education and skills development in support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities. The measures that the law enables TESDA to carry out are undertaken pursuant to the constitutional command that [T]he State affirms labor as a primary social economic force, and shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare; that [T]he State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all; in order to afford protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Under both constitutional and statutory terms, we do not believe that the role and status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman. As an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it. TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 114 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution. It rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions. TESDAs funds are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment. Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the Treasury, is money belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials. PROVI has not shown that it is entitled to the writ of attachment. Even without the benefit of any immunity from suit, the attachment of TESDA funds should not have been granted, as PROVI failed to prove that TESDA fraudulently misapplied or converted funds allocated under the Certificate as to Availability of Funds. Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, that PROVI relied upon, applies only where money or property has been embezzled or converted by a public officer, an officer of a corporation, or some other person who took advantage of his fiduciary position or who willfully violated his duty. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 115 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW PROVI, in this case, never entrusted any money or property to TESDA. While the Contract Agreement is supported by a Certificate as to Availability of Funds (Certificate) issued by the Chief of TESDAs Accounting Division, this Certificate does not automatically confer ownership over the funds to PROVI. Absent any actual disbursement, these funds form part of TESDAs public funds, and TESDAs failure to pay PROVI the amount stated in the Certificate cannot be construed as an act of fraudulent misapplication or embezzlement. HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN V. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) PETs: PacitaPidacan and Adela Pidacan (heirs of Mateo Pidacan) RESPO: Air Transportation Office (ATO) Ponente: Nachura, J. Principle involved: When a suit is against the state In 1935, petitioners acquired a parcel of land with an area of about 22 hectares, situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (the property). Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 was issued in favor of said spouses. However, in 1948, respondent ATOused a portion of the property as an airport. In 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. They also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airport's runway. Petitioners demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as the rentals for the use thereof but ATO refused. Eventually in 1988, OCT No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160 was issued in favor of petitioners. Despite this development, ATO still refused to pay petitioners. Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC against ATO for payment of the value of the property and rentals due thereon. In 1994, the RTC promulgated a decision, ordering ATO to pay rentals and the value of the land at P89.00 per square meter. In line with this, the petitioners filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC, which was denied by the RTC on the ground that the prosecution, enforcement, or satisfaction of State liability must be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 327,as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445. Hence, this motion for reconsideration by the PETs. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of state non-suability applies. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 116 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Held: No. In the case of EPG Construction Co. v. Hon. Vigilar, the Court held that: “Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective shroud which shields the State from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmark case of Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu that "the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.” Thus, the Court’s Decision that the property be expropriated in favor of ATO, and ordering them to pay the petitioners just compensation is already final and executory. Petitioners have been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property for a considerable length of time. Now that they prevailed before the Court, it would be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular circumstances that payment of just compensation be withheld from them. ATO VS. RAMOS Petitioner: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) Respondents: SPOUSES DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS Ponente:BERSAMIN, J. Topic: When suit is against the state Facts: ï‚· Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner ATO. ï‚· On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in for P778,150. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. ï‚· Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 117 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· ATO asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions. Issue: WON ATO could be sued without the State’s consent. Ruling: ï‚· Yes, ATO can be sued without the State’s consent. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. ï‚· Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. ï‚· The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. ï‚· We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. ï‚· Finally, the issue of WON the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the passage of R.A. No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act (CAAP) of 2008. The obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP. CHINA NATIONAL VS SANTAMARIA Petition: Petition for review on certiorari Petitioner: China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. Respondent: Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et al. Ponencia: Sereno, J. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 118 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW DOCTRINE: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those in the Philippines. Thus, when a foreign GOCC has failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under its national law, it will be presumed to be a GOCC without an original charter which by virtue of the Corporation Code, has the capacity to sue and be sued. FACTS: -In 2002, petitioner CNMEG entered into a memorandum of understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corp. (Northrail) for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway from Manila to La Union (Northrail Project). -In 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM bank) and the Dept. of Finance entered into a memorandum of understanding wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine Government to finance the Northrail project. -The Chinese Ambassador to the PhilipppinesAmb. Wang wrote a letter to DOF Sec. informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail project. -Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Sec. 1 Phase 1 of the Northrail project. a. The Phil. government and EXIM bank entered into a loan agreement in the amount of US$400M to finance the construction of the Northrail project. -Respondents filed a complaint for annulment of contract for being contrary to the Constitution and the Government Procurement Reform Act. ISSUE: 1. W/N CNMEG is entitled to immunity from suit RULING + RATIO: 1. NO. CNMEG is not entitled to immunity from suit CNMEG is engaged in proprietary/commercial activity 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 119 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - - The Philippines adheres to the restrictive application of State immunity, such that: Immunity from suit is restricted to sovereign or governmental activities, and cannot be extended to commercial or private acts. In this case, CNMEG is engaged in proprietary or commercial activity. The content and tenor of the contract agreement and the loan agreement reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the railways in pursuit of a purely commercial activity. Also, it was CNMEG, and not the Chinese government which initiated the Northrail project as confirmed by Amb. Wang in his letter. Even though it is a GOCC, it does not imply that it was acting on behalf of China. CNMEG failed to adduce evidence that it immune from suit under Chinese law. - CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity. Although it is a GOCC, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those in the Philippines. Thus, CNMEG is presumed to be a GOCC without an original charter which by virtue of the Corporation Code, has the capacity to sue and be sued. DOH V PHIL PHARMA (RE: WHEN SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE) Facts: On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products On May 9, 2000 and May 29, 2000, respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and release of the result of respondent‘s request were due on September 2000, the last month of the quarter following the date of its filing. Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract). Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent‘s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 120 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS. Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages. Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court denied petitioners’motion to dismiss. Issue:WON Petitioner may successfully invoke state immunity Ruling: The petition fails. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party. In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them. The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. Shauf v. Court of Appeals elucidates: It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 121 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al., ‗ Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.‘ The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally. VETERANS MANPOWER VS CA – CONSENT TO BE SUED Facts: - Veterans Manpower alleges that RA No. 5487 “Private Security Agency Law” violate the provision of the Constitution against monopolies and unfair competition. - VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. - On May 12 1968, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the monthly contract rate per guard of 8 hours of security service each day. Resulting for PADPAO to find Verterans Manpower Guilty of cut throat competition (pababaaynajudugpresyo) as their standard minimum rates is lower that what is in the MOA. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 122 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW -Veterans Manpower filed a civil case against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security andInvestigation Agencies). - PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case isagainst the State which had not given consent thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not Veterans Manpower’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the Statewithout its consent. Ruling: - - - - Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. CASE: DA VS NLRC FACTS: Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 123 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the vehicles of the DA. The petitioner charged the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case. RULING: In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the instant case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. SAYON V. SINGSON G.R. No. L-30044, December 19, 1973 Facts: The Office of the District Engineer requested various parts for the repair of a bulldozer. In response to this, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza approved the request, and thus a canvass or public bidding was held on May 5, 1967 to determine who will be the supplier. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 124 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Singkier Motor Service, owned by the respondent Singson, was awarded the bid for the sum of Php 43, 530.00. Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the Secretary sent a letterorder to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. In due course, Highway Auditor Singson conducted a pre-audit to determine the reasonableness of the price. After finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His reason for withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor. The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to Singson. However, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action." In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price given by Singson. As a result of this, Singson did not receive the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. He then filed a suit for the collection of the remaining amount at the RTC which was granted. Hence this current appeal by certiorari. Issue:WoN the suit filed against the petitioners was valid. Ruling: No, it is not. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 125 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic. The lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of nonsuability. So, it was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but an ordinary action for specific performance ... Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State ... In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 ... which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed ...." Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him. "Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity." 2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 126 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA) V. HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO PETs: National Housing Authority (NHA) RESPO: âž” Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo (owner of Cadastral Lot No. 1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City) âž” Pascual Y. Abordo (Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City) Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. Principle involved: Express consent - Incorporation of GOCCs Petitioner, on July 16, 2001, filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not afford. The Motion was denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the Partial Judgment, which adopted the recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter, had already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying for the annulment of the Order of the trial court denying its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Reconsideration, which was dismissed by the CA. A Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution was then served to the PET to enforce the Partial Judgment. On May 27, 2002, respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests of petitioner therein.Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and personal properties of petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review, Issue: WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 127 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Held: Yes. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. In the case of petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties are exempt from garnishment has already been resolved squarely against its predecessor, the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), to wit: “The premise that the funds cold be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment.” This was reiterated in the subsequent case of Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board of Liquidators: “Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.” Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution. Note: Garnishment - The seizing of a person's property, credit or salary, on the basis of a law which allows it, and for the purposes of paying off a debt. PTA vs. PGDEI Petitioner: PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (PTA) Respondents: PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.(PGDEI or PHILGOLF) Ponente:CARPIO, J. Topic: Implied Consent-Government enters into Business Contracts Facts: ï‚· PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 128 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects amounting to P57,954,648. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course. The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF. PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA plus interest amounting to P11,820,551 for the construction of the golf course. PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the RTC rendered a judgment of default. Issue: WON PTA is immune from the suit. Ruling: ï‚· No, the PTA is not immune from suit. ï‚· PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. ï‚· The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit. REPUBLIC V. UNIMEX Petition: Appeal Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS Ponencia: CORONA, J. DOCTRINE: The doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties FACTS: -Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and 171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote controllers, parts and accessories to HandywarePhils., Inc. (Handyware). 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 129 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW -The Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the description appearing on the cargo manifest. -Thus, BOC instituted seizure proceedings against Handyware and later issued a warrant of seizure and detention. -Respondent filed a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of Customs (BOC Commissioner) in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). -CTA reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the subject shipment to respondent subject to the payment of customs duties. -BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its warehouses. -The CTA declared that its decision could no longer be executed due to the loss of respondent’s shipment so it ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods. -BOC was ordered to pay the amount of P8,675,200.22 representing the commercial value of the shipment at the time of importation subject. -The BOC Commissioner and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration (MRs) of the above decision. -The CA held that the BOC Commissioner was liable for the value of the subject shipment as the same was lost while in its custody. ISSUES: 1. WON The Bureau of Customs is exempt to pay for damages due to state immunity. PROVISION: Article 16 Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent. RULING + RATIO: 1. No.Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the government, and that, under the political doctrine of "state immunity," it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus imperii), The Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of respondent’s goods. The situation does not allow us to reject respondent’s claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it. DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 130 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBYAN (RE: GOV’T INITIATE A COMPLAIN. OPEN TO COUNTERCLAIM) Facts: On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release clause whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI(Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc.)shares, among other Benedicto’s properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within private respondent Benedicto’s capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession.Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten. In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in accordance with its terms. In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the parties would, from time to time, move for a ruling by the Sandiganbayan on the proper manner of implementing or interpreting a specific provision therein. On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a "Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. Issue:WON the state opened itself for counterclaim in the case at bar Ruling: Petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic’s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 131 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s prayers in the same case. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement. COMMISSIONER VS SAN DIEGO (SCOPE OF CONSENT) ACT NO 3083 Facts: - - - On November 20 1940 the Government of the PH filed a complaint for for eminent domain for the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to a certain Hashim for a public road (EDSA) 14 Pesos per Square meter. Nov 25 1940 government took possession of the land however record and files of expropriation case were destroyed and lost during WW II. The Government took possession of the property upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the sum of P23,413.64 fixed by the Court therein as the provisional value of all the lots needed to construct the road, including Hashim's property. In 1958 Hashim (Deceased) Tomas N. Hashim filed a money claim with the Quezon City Engineer’s Office alleging said amount to be fair market value of the property in question. The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein the Bureau shall pay almost half of the amount claimed. The bureau failed to pay so Hashim filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent judge granted the motion. The sheriff served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment to PNB against the Bureau's funds. Hashim further filed a motion for issuance of an order ordering the release of the amount. It was granted. PNB released the amount. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari with mandatory injunction to reimburse the amount released. ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED Issue: 1. Whether or not the State may invoke its immunity from suit Ruling: - No they cannot invoke immunity from suit as they are obliged to give just compensation in cases of expropriation. Exercise of imminent domain is included in the grounds for suing the government. They are obliged to give 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 132 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW just compensation for the land they took for public purposes. Immunity is not available for the State in this case. - Notes lang: Immunity is used as not to waste resources of the government and the government’s main task is to serve the public not to answer the questions as if it happens significant resources and time would be wasted in answering questions of the public in the works of government. - ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED - Section 1. Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. PNB v. CIR G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978 Facts: The now defunct Court Industrial Relations, through Gilbert P. Lorenzo as its appointed deputy sheriff, served a notice of garnishment. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at the petitioner’s branch in Quezon City. Petitioner moved to quash the notice of garnishment. However, the respondent court denied it. The petitioner then challenged the validity of the denial on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character." The subject of the certiorari proceeding filed by the petitioner is the allegation that the CIR committed a grave abuse of discretion by denying the motion to quash. Issue: WoN the funds which were subject to garnishment were of public character. Ruling: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 133 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW No, they are not. The plea for setting aside the notice of garnishment was promised on the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited with petitioner being "public in character." There was not even a categorical assertion to that effect. It is only the possibility of its being "public in character." The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended." The similarities between the aforesaid case and the present litigation are patent. Petitioner was similarly a government-owned corporation. The principal respondent was the Court of Industrial Relations. The prevailing parties were the employees of petitioner. There was likewise a writ of execution and thereafter notices of garnishment served on several banks. There was an objection to such a move and the ruling was adverse to the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation. Hence the filing of a petition for certiorari. To repeat, the ruling was quite categorical. Garnishment was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government. In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 134 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Side note: (On the issue of the appointment of the sheriff) The other objection raised, namely that respondent Court acted erroneously in having a special sheriff serve to the writ of execution, hardly needs any extensive decision. It is true that in the aforesaid Commissioner of Public Highways opinion, this Court held that there is no authorization in law for the appointment of special sheriffs for the service of writs of execution. The petitioner banked on the provision in Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads: 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' In the order sought to be nullified, the then Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of respondent Court pointed out that under a later Act, the Court of Industrial Relations Act was amended with the proviso that its Clerk of Court was the ex-oficio sheriff. The point raised in the petition that it should be the sheriff of Quezon City that ought to have served the writ of execution would thus clearly appear to be inconclusive. There is to be sure no thought of deviating from the principle announced in the Commissioner of Public Highways case. That is as it ought to be. Even if, however, there is sufficient justification for the infirmity attributed to respondent Court by virtue of such a ruling, still considering all the circumstances of this case, it clearly does not call for the nullification of the order in question. What cannot be denied is that the writ of execution was issued as far back as May 5, 1970 by the then Clerk of Court of respondent Tribunal as the authorized sheriff. It would be, to say the least, unfair and unequitable if, on the assumption that such Clerk of Court lacked such competence, a new writ of execution had to be issued by the proper official. At any rate, what is important is that the judgment be executed. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION PETs: Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) RESPO: âž” National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) âž” Jose C. Magnayi (private respondent) Ponente: Vitug, J. Principle involved: Scope of Consent - Execution 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 135 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 0001-0690-93 for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law.Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"), both with a copy of the complaint. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement"). The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor of Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC. In its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, which stated that the DFA should file a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, if ever it feels that the action of the Labor Arbiter Nieves de Castro constitutes misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance, it filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not ADB is immune from suit Held: Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement outlined below should be able, nay well enough, to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected. Article 50(1) of the Charter provides: “The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.” Under Article 55 thereof - 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 136 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including experts performing missions for the Bank: (1) Shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity. Like provisions are found in the Headquarters Agreement. Thus, its Section 5 reads: "The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of, or in connection with, the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.” And, with respect to certain officials of the bank, Section 44 of the agreement states: Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the President, Vice-President and executive officers as may be agreed upon between the Government and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic of the Philippines in connection with their official duties with the Bank: x xxxxxxxx (b) Immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their official capacity. Additionally, being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. In Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center vs. Acosta, the Court has cited with approval the opinion of the then Minister of Justice; thus "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.(See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states." REPUBLIC VS. HIDALGO 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 137 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondents: HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO Ponente:GARCIA , J. Topic: Scope of Consent-Execution Facts: ï‚· On June 2, 1999, Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession of a 4,924 sq. m. property against the Republic of the Philippines (in whose name the title to the property was transferred and registered). ï‚· Mendoza essentially alleged that she is the owner of the disputed Arlegui property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of. ï‚· The property in question is located at 1440 Arlegui Street, San Miguel, Manila. ï‚· Mendoza prayed for the Republic to pay a reasonable compensation or rental for the use or occupancy of the subject property and other relief, just and equitable under the premises. ï‚· Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default for Mendoza and against the Republic. On August 27, 2003, Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza. A certificate of finality of judgment was issued by the Branch Clerk of Courton November 27, 2003. ï‚· On December 19, 2003, Judge Hidalgo issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. ï‚· Subsequently, the Republic moved for its dismissal, but was denied. ï‚· Denied also was its subsequent plea for reconsideration. ï‚· Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issue:WON the writ of execution can be enforced against the state. Ruling: ï‚· No, the writ of execution cannot be enforced against the state. ï‚· The respondent Judge patently committed two inexcusable procedural errors, the pronouncement of costs against the government and the subsequent issuance of the writ of execution, in violation of settled rules and jurisprudence. ï‚· The Order of the respondent court dated December 19, 2003 for the issuance of a writ of execution and the Writ of Execution dated December 22, 2003 against government funds are hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the presiding judge of the respondent court, the private respondent, their agents and persons acting for and in their behalves are permanently enjoined from enforcing said writ of execution. ï‚· However, consistent with the basic tenets of justice, fairness and equity, petitioner Republic, thru the Office of the President, is hereby strongly enjoined to take the necessary steps, and, with reasonable dispatch, make the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 138 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW appropriate budgetary arrangements to pay private respondent Mendoza or her assigns the amount adjudged due her under this disposition. MERRITT V GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS March 21, 1916 G.R. No. L-11154 TRENT, J. FACTS: RESPO Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by an ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. ISSUE: 1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? 2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance? RULING: 1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. 2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 139 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME April 8, 1991 G.R. No. L-52179; 195 SCRA 692 Petitioner: Municipality Of San Fernando, La Union Respondents: Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme, Juana Rimando-Baniña, IaureanoBaniña, Jr., SorMarietaBaniña, Montano Baniña, OrjaBaniña, And Lydia R. Baniña MEDIALDEA, J.: FACTS: The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of MacarioNieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including LaureanoBaniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. The heirs of Baniña Sr., private respondents, instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of MacarioNieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision. Judge Firme in its decision rendered the Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral damages and attorney’s fees.. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not petitioner was liable. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 140 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 2) Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss. DISCUSSIONS: The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. RULINGS: 1) The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State. The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts and also when the State files a complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.” Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 141 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. 2) Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision, he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY V. DUMDUM March 22, 2010 G.R. No. 168289, 616 SCRA 1 Petitioner: THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, represented by the HON. FELIX V. OPLE, Municipal Mayor, and FELIX V. OPLE, in his personal capacity Respondents: HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT & EXOFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT & EXOFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of BULACAN and his DEPUTIES; and EMILY ROSE GO KO LIM CHAO, doing business under the name and style KD SURPLUS PERALTA, J. FACTS: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 142 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy,Bulacan for collection of sum of money and damages. The complaint alleged that acontract was entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmentalundertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P5,820,000.00. However, despite havingmade several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chao’s claim for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interestand damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment againstthe Municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing thesheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the Municipality.The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the claim on which theaction had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing outthat there was no written contract or document that would evince the supposedagreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking, among others,immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation,it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution andgarnishment. Lim Chao on her part, counters that, Municipality’sclaim of immunityfrom suit is negated by the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporationswith the power to sue and be sued.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. ISSUE WON the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality of Hagonoy is valid? RULING No.The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers —one of them is the power to sue and be sued. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 143 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment. THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT SABILI v. COMELEC April 24, 2012 G.R. No. 193261 Petitioner: Meynardo Sabili Respondents: Commission on Elections and Florencios Librea Sereno, J: FACTS: ï‚· Sabili filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, and stated that he had been a resident of Lipa for 2 years and 8 months. ï‚· Prior to 2010 elections, he had been twice elected in 1995 and in 1998 as Provincial Board Member of the 4th District of Batangas and during the 2007 elections, Sabili also ran for representative of the 4th District of Batangas but lost. (note that 4th district includes Lipa city) ï‚· However, when Sabili filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Brgy. San Jose, Batangas. ï‚· Now, private respondent Librea filed a "Petition to deny due course and to cancel COC and to disqualify Sabili for possessing some grounds for disqualification." ï‚· Respondent Librea asserted that: o Sabili made material misrepresentations of fact in his COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code (Sec. 39. Qualifications - ......a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceeding the day of the election...) o that Sabili falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa for 2 years and 8 months prior to the scheduled May 10, 2010 elections. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 144 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· Comelec issued its Resolution (dated Jan. 26, 2010) disqualifying Sabili from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa and cancelled his COC for his not being a resident of Lipa and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law. Now, Sabili moved for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution during the pendency of which the May 10, 2010 local elections were held. Dawbe, the next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC to reflect this fact. ISSUE: Whether Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective official. RULING: YES. Note that parties here are in agreement that Sabili's domicile of origin was Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas and Sabili claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. Petitioner's actual physical presence in Lipa is established not only by the presence of a place he actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its Brgy.captain. Petitoner Sabili's substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area but also his participation in the community's socio-civic and religious life as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof. EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT PRIVATE Various tax certificates and tax declarations showed that the Lipa 1 property was soley registered in the name of Sabili's common-law-wife, Palomares 2 Certifications regarding the family members of Sabili COURT'S ANSWER This evidence is immaterial for the purpose of determining Sabili's residence. We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. What is of central concern then is that Sabili identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time Note that the issue her is Sabili's residence and not that of his children. In fact, Sec.11 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's occupation, profession, employment in private and public 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 145 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW service, educational activities....in accordance with law is not deemed as loss of residence. It is well-established that property ownership in the locality where one intends to run for local elective post is not requirement of the Constitution There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes the law does not require a person to be in his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to fulfill the residency requirement 3 Property ownership 4 Changing residences 5 Rarely seen in the area And, the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own judgment regarding the qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding, that the issue of his residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections. Sabili has garnered the highest number of votes legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and has consequently proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of Lipa City. In this regard, to successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petition must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles. Court grants Sabili's Petition not only because he sufficiently established his compliance with the one-year residency requirement but court also recognizes that the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount - it is their voice that must prevail. Petiton Granted. ALDOVINO v. COMELEC December 23, 2009 GR No. 184386 Petitioners: Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong Respondents: Commission on Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo FACTS: The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 20042007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 146 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. Comelec ruled in favour of Asilo and reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the preventive suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: WON there was an interruption of term. RULING:NO. Preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160). The Court held that in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is only barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.Thus, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials’ term. Asilos’ candidacy for a fourth term in the 2007 elections therefore was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution which provides: “Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.” 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 147 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. TALAGA V CASTILLO Facts: On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. On December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC. On May 4, 2010 he filed an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation alleging that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray. In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor. Issue: The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ruling: NO 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 148 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. Declaration of Ramon’s disqualificationrendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was nota valid candidate to be properly substituted The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all. We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it: Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution. TALAGA V CASTILLO Facts: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 149 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. On December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC. On May 4, 2010 he filed an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation alleging that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray. In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor. Issue: The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ruling: NO Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 150 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Declaration of Ramon’s disqualificationrendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was nota valid candidate to be properly substituted The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all. We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it: Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution. ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. Facts: - The rule in elections, as people know it, is that an appointed official is deemed automatically resigned from their positions once he/she files the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for any elective position. This rule on automatic resignation does not apply to elected officials. There is now a new rule. Appointed officials are NO longer deemed resigned upon the filing of the CoC. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 151 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678 stating that : Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy. a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. - Two appointive officers of the government who were planning to run in the 2010 elections sought the nullification of Section 4(a) on the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue: Does Resolution No. 8678 of the COMELEC violate RA 9006? Ruling: There used to be a similar provision in the Election Code and R.A. 8436 relating to the automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs, but this was repealed by R.A. 9006, also known as the Fair Election Act. “There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not.” Four (4) requisites of valid classification must be complied with in order that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 152 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one’s highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy. MITRA V. COMELEC G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010 Facts: In the present case, the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation. When PuetroPincesa was reclassified as a highly urbanized city in 2007, it ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The result of this reclassification was that PutroPincesa residents were no longer legible to vote for candidates for elective provincial offices. Because of this, on March 2009, Mitra, a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa and the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan at the time, was prompted to apply for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to SitioMaligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan. Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. They essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008. The respondents petition before the COMELEC claimed that Mitras COC should be cancelled under the following factual premises: (a) Mitra bought, in June 2009, a parcel of land in Aborlan where he began to construct a house, but up to the time of the filing of the petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC, the house had yet to be completed; (b) in the document of sale, Puerto Princesa City was stated as Mitras residence; 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 153 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW (c) Mitra’s Puerto Princesa City residence was similarly stated in his application for a building permit; and (d) Mitra’s community tax certificate states that his residence was Puerto Princesa City. The respondents presented several affidavits attesting to the non-completion of the construction of the house, and asserted that without a fully constructed house, Mitra could not claim residence in Aborlan. Mitra denied the respondents allegations in his Answer. He claimed that the respondents misled the COMELEC by presenting photographs of his unfinished house on the land he purchased from a certain Rexter Temple. He claimed, on the contrary, that his residence is located inside the premises of the MaligayaFeedmill and Farm (MaligayaFeedmill) which the owner, Carme Caspe, leased to him; and that he purchased a farm and presently has an experimental pineapple plantation and a cock farm. The transfer of his residence, he claimed, began in 2008. He submitted the following: (a) the SinumpaangSalaysay of Ricardo Temple; Florame T. Gabrillo, the Punong Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan; Marissa U. Zumarraga, Councilor of Aborlan; Virginia J. Agpao and Elsa M. Dalisay, both Sangguniang Barangay members of Isaub, Aborlan, attesting that Mitra resides in their locality; (b) photographs of the residential portion of the MaligayaFeedmill where he claims to reside, and of his Aborlan experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm; (c) the lease contract over the MaligayaFeedmill; (d) the community tax certificate he claims he himself secured, stating that Aborlan is his residence; and (e) an updated identification card issued by the House of Representatives stating that Aborlan is his residence. The COMELEC’s First Division subsequently ruled in favor of the respondents and cancelled Mitra’sCertiface of Candidacy on the following grounds: a. The photographs of the room Mitra claimed to be his residence appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitras personality such as old family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years. What the supposed residence lacks, in the First Divisions perception, are the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it one’s residence; perhaps, at most, this small room could have served as Mitras resting area whenever he visited the locality, but nothing more than this. b. The room is not the home that a residence is supposed to be because, according to former employees and customers of the MaligayaFeedmill, it is located in an unsavory location c. The fact that Mitra registered as a voter in Aborlan, has a cock farm, a farm, a rest house and an experimental pineapple plantation in MaligayaFeedmill, was occasionally seen staying in Aborlan, and held meetings with Aborlan constituents does not necessarily establish Mitras status as an Aborlan resident, or prove his abandonment of his domicile of origin in Puerto Princesa City. Mere absence from one’s residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice one’s vocation is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of domicile 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 154 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The COMELEC en banc concurred with the First Division’s ruling. Issue: Whether or not Mitra misrepresented that he is a resident of Aborlan. Held: No, he did not. Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections provides that unless all the facts in their COCs are true, their COC’s will be denied or cancelled. SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the BatasangPambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x xxx SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election. The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates’ qualifications for public office. Based on these standards, the Court found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence by using subjective and non-legal standards. The COMELEC, too, failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 155 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office. Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of residence, as its Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a resident of the local government unit where he intends to run for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. In other words, the law itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes only the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of course, as a continuing requirement or qualification, the elected official must remain a resident there for the rest of his term. Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor in light of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following: (1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile On this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the following:(1) hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at MaligayaFeedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion ofhis house. Based on these findings, the Court found that under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan. These were also considered to be the gradual moves he made to establish his new residence there. ASISTIO VS. AGUIRRE Petitioner:LUIS A. ASISTIO Respondents: HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, ENRICO R. ECHIVERRI Ponente:Nachura Topic: Composition, Qualification, and Term of Office-Fair Elections Act R.A. 9006 Facts: ï‚· Echiverri filed against Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City. He alleged that Asistio is not a 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 156 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· ï‚· resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City. Echiverri found out that Asistio's address is non-existent. Judge Aguirre ordered the exclusion of Asistio. Important doctrines: ï‚· Under Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code and Section 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 or R.A. 8189, the residency requirement of a voter is at least 1 year residence in the Philippines and at least 6 months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. ï‚· "Residence", as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile”, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person's acts, activities, and utterances. ï‚· Three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time. ï‚· Domicile is not easily lost.To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. Issue: WONAsistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law. Ruling: ï‚· No, Luis A. Asistio remains a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. ï‚· Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth. His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives. ï‚· In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. ï‚· That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistio's COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 157 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City. SEMA V COMELEC G.R. No. 178628, July 16, 2008 Carpio, J. — En Banc Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act No. 6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989. There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of ShariffKabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified ShariffKabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first legislative district in question as “ShariffKabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).” Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of “ShariffKabunsuan with Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that ShariffKabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress. Issue: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 - delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays - is constitutional. Decision: The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 158 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW However, pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of ShariffKabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.The creation of ShariffKabunsuan is invalid. The creation of local government units (LGUs) is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. There are three conditions that must be complied with in creating any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – to wit: 1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. 2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. 3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is another matter. The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. This is clear under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution (“Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution (“Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 159 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,we held that the power of redistricting x xx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a selfevident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x xx.” ALDABA VS. COMELEC January 25, 2010 G.R. No. 188078; 611 SCRA 137 (2009) CARPIO, J. FACTS: This case is an original act of prohibition to declare unconstitutional RA 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 160 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement]. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. RULING: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides: The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB. The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized. The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 161 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET. AL. VS. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET. AL. An Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment filed by the Movant-Intervenors Petitioners: Rodolfo G. Navaro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina Respondents and Intervenors: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the Senate President; House of Representatives, represented by the House Speaker; Governor Robert Ace S. Barbers, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; Governor Geraldine EcleoVillaroman, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, as respondents; Congressman Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol, as intervenors Ponente: Nachura, J. Date: April 12, 2011 Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) was approved into law by the president. With a mandatory plebiscite by the COMELEC, the creation of the province was ratified under the Local Government Code. The interim set of provincial officials 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 162 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW were appointed by the President. The Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina who were former political leaders of Surigao del Norte filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9355. The court dismissed their petition on technical grounds. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if left unchecked, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and resources from the area. They also argued that the land area and population of Dinagat failed to comply with the requirements of being a “province” as indicated in Section 10, Article 10 of the Constitution and Section 461 of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared RA 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province as outlined in the Constitution and the LGC. It likewise declared null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGCIRR) stating that the land area requirement should not apply were the proposed province is composed of one or more islands. Meanwhile, the SC denied subsequent motions for reconsideration from the respondents and movant-intervenors. With the Supreme Court’s decision deemed final and executory, the movant-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment. Issues: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 163 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW w/nRA 9355 is constitutional on the ground that it creates a province of Dinagat which territory and population fails to comply with Sec 461 of the LGC Held: No, RA 9355 is not unconstitutional. The Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR) explicitly provides the exception to the requirement that the land area of provinces be 2,000 square kilometers at the minimum. This requirement legislated by Congress was present in the creation of municipalities and cities yet non-existent in the section pertaining to the creation of provinces. Thus, it can be said that such exception was inadvertently omitted from Section 461 in the section for provinces. The missing detail was later filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR. The true legislative intent of Congress is one that can be found in the principles of local autonomy (as provided by the Local Government Code of 1991). The Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movant-intervenors is granted. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is considered reconsidered and set aside. RA 9355 is declared valid and constitutional and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared valid. The petition is dismissed. AQUINO III VS COMELEC G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010 Facts: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed R.A. 9716, which reapportioned the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur to create an additional legislative district. The first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 164 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - Sen. Aquino III and Naga Mayor Robredo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by republic act no. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed frst district will end up with a population of less than 250,00 or only 176,383 Section 5(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province shall have at least one representative ISSUES 1. Whether or not R.A. 9716 was unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraph (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and Ruling: No. Section 5(3) of Art VI clearly distinguished a province from a city. Meaning a province is automatically entitled to one representative while a city has to meet the 250,000 population requirement first. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is- based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities- entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district (i.e Local Government Code’s requisite for creating a province not less than Php 20,000.00 annual income, plus at least 2,000 sq. m. or least 250,000 inhabitants). BANAT vs COMELEC FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules: 1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 165 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; 3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC. 4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties. ISSUES: ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is constitutional How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? RULING: ï‚· ï‚· The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 166 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· ï‚· statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 167 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ABAYON V HRET FACTS: Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the AangatTayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. Respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparanalleging that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors Petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto. It was AangatTayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of AangatTayo. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of AangatTayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections. RULING: Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 168 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x xx who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x xx shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the partylist representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states: Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent." It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 169 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against AangatTayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. ANGLADLAD VS COMELEC Facts: - - - Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201. AngLadlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel. Issue: W/N AngLadlad is disqualified by the provision of RA 7941 (Party List System Act of 1995) Sub Issue: Is religion a basis for refusal to accept for party list? Ruling: 1.) Petition is granted.We find that AngLadlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that AngLadlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in AngBagongBayani. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 170 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of AngLadlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability. 2.) Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose. LOKIN V. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010 Facts: The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 171 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer. Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje. The withdrawal of the nominations was done pursuant to Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, which the COMELEC promulgated on January 12, 2007. The said provision provides to wit: Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees. In response, Lokin assailed Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804. He alleged that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. Issues: 1. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act 2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature. Held: The answer to both issues is yes. The authority to make rules and regulations (IRRs)in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 172 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and 4. It must be reasonable. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas PambansaBlg. 881, and the Party-List System Act. Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. This is because Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. Meanwhile, Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 provides four instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee. The Court agrees with him. The enumeration in R.A No. 7941 is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions. LOKIN V. COMELEC G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012 Facts: On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections. The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the party’s vice-president and secretary-general, respectively. Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretarygeneral, when she was not evena member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party and 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 173 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf. In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents’ faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings. Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the party’s Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and 2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list. Held: (Note: The Supreme Court ruled that the fact that the petition was filed beyond the allowed period pursuant to SEC. 3 of Rule 64: Time to file petition. The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, the case ought to be dismissed on the said basis alone. However, it still proceeded to discuss the facts of the case.) 1. Yes, it is. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. 2. No, it did not err in granting the petition. Matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 states: Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than fortyfive (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 174 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. xxxx Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that: The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent, which may include but not limited to the following: a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent; b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the nominee/showing his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations); c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/ organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented sector. The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 175 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Contrary to petitioners’ stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc. The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derla’s alleged authority as acting secretary-general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its Certificate of Nomination. AMORES VS. HRET Petitioner: MILAGROS E. AMORES Respondents: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA Ponente:Carpio Morales Topic:Composition, Qualification, and Term of Office-Party List System Act RA 7941 Facts: ï‚· Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; ï‚· and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941. Important doctrines: ï‚· Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than 1year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election, and is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election. ï‚· In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 176 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ï‚· Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, that if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliationwithin 6 months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. Issue:WON Mr. Villanueva’s assumption of office is legal. Ruling: ï‚· No, the Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections. ï‚· As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941. ï‚· Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. ï‚· What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. ï‚· Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. ï‚· It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent. ï‚· The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007. ATONGPAGLAUM V COMELEC G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 177 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Carpio, J. —En Banc These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 20 November 2012, 27 November 2012, 4 December 2012, 11 December 2012, and 19 February 2013. Facts: Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in cases of AngBagongBayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Issues: 1. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations 2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in AngBagongBayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 178 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Decision: No, The COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. It merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of AngBagongBayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. Political Law- Party-list system Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution." Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution. Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition of parties." Therefore, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 179 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 180 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court. ABANG LINGKOD PARTYLIST V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and fisherfolks, and was registered under the partylist system on December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives. On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which, required previously registered partylist groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in AngBagongBayani OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a partylist group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered edited photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent. Additionally, according to the COMELEC En Banc, under the Partylist System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s registration. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 181 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration, asserting that the COMELEC should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification as a partylist group, pursuant to AtongPaglaum. It claims that there was no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it complied with the sixpoint parameters in screening partylist groups laid down in AtongPaglaum Issues: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group’s track record is no longer required pursuant to the Court’s pronouncement in AtongPaglaum 2. Whether or not the digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD constitutes a ground for disqualification under R.A. No. 7941 Ruling: 1.Yes. After a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against the new parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in AtongPaglaum, the Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system. The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance.As a requirement imposed by AngBagongBayani for groups intending to participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides: Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 182 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Thus, contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. 2. Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration, it is no longer material to its qualification under the party-list system. In this case, ABANG LINGKOD’s submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be considered material to its qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, in part, reads: Sec. 6 Refusal and/or Cancellation o Registration The COMELEC may, motupropio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its continuing qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as already discussed, is no longer a requirement under the new parameters laid down in AtongPaglaum. ALDOVINO vs COMELEC FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit. ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC? RULING: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 183 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160). The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification. “Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. Note: As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years – during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another." Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo. Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials’ service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 184 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept – interruption of a term – on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term. Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the threeterm limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. ABUNDO VS COMELEC G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013 Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and as proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidateand accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004+2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundofiled his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification to run, the corresponding petition, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. ISSUE #1 Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an election protest, considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials? RULING: No. Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold officeof the mayor as a matterof right during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 3, 2006. Neither can heassert title to the same nor serve the functionsof the said elective office. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 185 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW TOLENTINO V COMELEC G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004 Carpio, J. —En Banc This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. Facts: Following Senator Guingona‘s confirmation as Vice-President, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004. Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and 13th, respectively. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Issue: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001. Decision: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 186 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The petition has no merit. Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate “in the manner prescribed by law”. Under RA No. 6645 which implements the provision provides: Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows: Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x xx In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for. While a survey of COMELEC’s resolution reveals that it gave no notice that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term in the Senate simultaneously with the general elections, the election is valid. “Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.” In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 187 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona‘s appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC‘s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. PHILCONSA V. MATHAY Facts: The PHILCONSA, an association whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, questioned the constitutionality of the law RA 4134, implementing the increase of salaries as violative of Art. VI, Sec. 14 of the Constitution which provides: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.” On June 10 1964, Congress passed RA 4134 providing for the increase of the annual salary of the Senate President and of the Speaker of the house; and of Senators and members of the House. Sec. 1 of the Act provides that “the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the constitution” and Section 7 provides “that the increase of the salary increase of the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressman and Senators.” In 1965, RA 4642 implemented the increase pursuant to RA 4134, approved just the preceding year. According to petitioner, the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, will expire only on Dec. 30, 1969, while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of the Act expired on Dec. 300, 1965. Petitioner seeks to permanently enjoin the respondent officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries before Dec. 30, 1969. Issues: (1) WON the term of all the Senators and members of the House who approved the increase must have fully expire before the increase becomes effective. (2) WON the members of the House who were elected after the expiration of term of the members of the House who approved the increase be subject to the payment of the increased compensation, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of the Senator who also participated in the approval of the increase. Held: The court agrees with the petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until Dec. 30, 1969, when the full term of all the members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. As RA 4642 authorizes the disbursement of the increase compensation prior to the date of Dec. 30, 1969, it also violates the Constitution and shall be null and void. The 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 188 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW expiration of terms of ALL the members approving the increase is required before such increase will take effect, despite the difference in the terms of office. LIGOT V. MATHAY Facts: Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelveyear span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary of the members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary increase by virtue of the Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution..” Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity. On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum ofP122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress. Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired on December 30, 1969. On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue of the AuditorGeneral’s adverse decision to Singson’s claim On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligot’s request for reconsideration. Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that at the time of his retirement, the salary for members of Congess “as provided by law” was already P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary increase. ISSUE/S: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 189 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the memberof Congress HELD: The petition was dismissed. There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth Act186, section 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is whether or not he can claim in based on theP32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed. Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.” The ruling of the court was on retirement pay. Even in retirement benefits, you are supposed to receive retirement benefits based on your last salary, not on the salary increased by law during your term. PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 190 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al. FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator. Held: The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x xx with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 191 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x xx Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, petitioner vs. Bartolome Cabngbang, respondent. Facts: Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote an open letter to the president and caused the same to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The letter allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP, including Col. Jimenez, associating them in purported operational plans for a coup d’etat. Petitioners instituted this present action for recovery of damages for libel against Cabangbang. In his defense, Cabangbang invoked parliamentary immunity averring the letter is a privileged communication under Art VI, Sec 15 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the letter in question a privileged communication protected by Art VI, Sec 15 of the Constitution Held: The court ruled in the negative. “Speech or debate therein” used in Art VI Sec 15 of the Constitution, refers to utterances made by Congressman in the performance of their official functions while Congress is in session. Cabangbang made the open letter to the president when Congress was not in session. And in causing the communication to be so published, Cabangbang was not performing his official duty as a Member of Congress. Hence, the communication is not absolutely privileged. SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs.SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 192 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS: Congressman Osmeña took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled ‘A Message to Garcia’ wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President. Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmeña was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behavior by the House of Representatives. Osmeña argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned. ISSUE: Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution. RULING: Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place.” Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” in Congress. LIBAN VS GORDON G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009 593 SCRA 68 CASE: This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads: SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 193 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office. Among others, Respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office and further insists that the PNRC is not a governmentowned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment. ISSUES: 1. W/n petitioners have legal standing. 2. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled corporation; 3. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the senate HELD: We find the petition without merit (1) Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition. A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a publicofficer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayer’s suit, the petition would still fail on the merits. (2) PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 194 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement. The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas. Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society. It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State. To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office. (3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads: SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 195 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. Although PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void. In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982 113 SCRA 31 FACTS:In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by EustaquioAcero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim BatasangPambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 196 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies? HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. Election of Officers SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA 298 SCRA 756 (1998) Facts: During the election of officers of the Senate, Senator Santiago nominated Senator Tatad as Senate President. Senator Ople, on the other hand, nominated Senator Fernan for the same position. Senator Fernan was voted Senate President with a vote of 20-2. Senator Ople was voted president pro tempore while Senator Drilon was voted majority leader. Senator Tatad manifested that, as the only ones who voted for him were himself and Senator Santiago, the two of them comprised the “minority” and that an agreement was entered into between them that he will be the minority leader. The Senate was grouped as follows: 10 members — Laban ngMasang Pilipino (LAMP) 7 members — Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP) 1 member — Liberal Party (LP) 1 member — AksyonDemokrasya 1 member — People's Reform Party (PRP) 1 member — Gabay Bayan 2 members — Independent —— 23 — total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as "independent".) According to Senator Flavier, the members of the Lakas NUCD-UMDP is also a minority since there are only 7 members and that they had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Senator Guingona was thereafter formally recognized by the Senate President as the minority leader. A petition for quo warranto was filed by Senators Tatad and Santiago alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping,unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the Senate President to recognize Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Held: History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members. Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 197 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesserwould be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority. Quorum AVELINO VS CUENCO 83 PHIL 17 (1949) Facts: In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada requested that his right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved. However, on the day of the session, the opening of the session was delayed. He was not given the chance to speak despite his attempts to claim his right to speak. A commotion broke outside the Senate gallery which prompted them to adjourn. Nevertheless, Senator Tanada opposed the motion to adjourn. This led Senate President Avelino and seven of his followers to leave and abandon the session. Theremaining senators continued the session which was then chaired by the Senate President Pro-Tempore. Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 198 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved. With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved. Senator Cuenco took the oath. The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate. Note: Except for Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senator were present. 22 Senators were present at the opening of session. Issue: Whether or not there was quorum? Held: The session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House” does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body beingamenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 199 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt. ARROYO VS DE VENECIA 277 SCRA 258 (1997) Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was assigned into law by President Ramos. Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented isnecessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 200 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008 FACTS: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner VirgilioGarcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. IntervenerSagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law. HELD: The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 201 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." DE LA PAZ VS THE SENATE COMMITTEE G.R. NO.2204 SEPTEMBER 11, 1924 FACTS: In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attendan Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de laPaz is also scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure areafor he was carrying with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amountand this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Pazwas issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation it wasto conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee does nothave jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdictionto investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules).They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued thewarrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondentCommittee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of anyinvestigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter. HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitutionstates:”Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has beentraditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in theformulation, adoption and promulgation of its own 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 202 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks thisCourt to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by theapproval of the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is inaccordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries inAid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general circulation. ALEJANDRINO V. QUEZON 46 PHIL. 83 (1924) FACTS: The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus andinjunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by theGovernor General. to represent the 12th Senatorial District. Thecasus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senatecomposed of the respondent Senators, On February 5,1924,depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, andemoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 havingbeen declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violationof the privileges of the Senate for having treacherouslyassaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases beinguttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding thecredentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner'scomplaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirelyof no effect. ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunctionmay annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compelthe Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position? HELD: The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reasonthat neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lieagainst the legislative body, its members, or its officers, tocompel the performance of duties purely legislative in theircharacter w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functionsand over w/c they have exclusive control.The courts cannotdictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.Precedents have held that where a member has been expelledby the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespectiveof whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue amandate to compel his reinstatement MIRIAM SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001 FACTS: The case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In Oct 1988, Santiago approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 203 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW illegal and was tainted with bad faith. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were also filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago from office who was already a senator by then,.Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution. HELD: The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner. FARIÑAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. 147387 December 10 2003 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 204 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he is still in office. Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act. Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination). The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional. HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional. On Equal Protection The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 205 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court. ABAKADA V PURISIMA Facts: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 206 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies. In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel. Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law. In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies. After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 207 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Issue: WON RA 9335 is constitutional. Ruling: Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives. Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection. The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy. Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 208 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW In United States v. Matthews,the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court said: The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes. In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law: SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. US V PONS Facts: That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt and concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law." Issue: WON the court can take judicial notice of the journals. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 209 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Ruling: While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914. Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." ASTORGA V VILLEGAS Facts: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 210 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065. Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. Issue: WON the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. Ruling: The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows: The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 211 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. t may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 212 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the lawmaking body. GUEVARA V INOCENTES Facts: The petition is predicated on the following grounds: (1) under Article VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution, petitioner's ad interim appointment is valid and permanent and may only become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or upon the adjournment of the regular session of Congress of 1966; (2) here there has been no express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments because the same has never been constituted during the special session called by President Marcos in his Proclamation No. 2, series of 1966; and (3) there has been no adjournment of the Congress as contemplated in the Constitution because (a) the aforesaid special session was suspended by the House on Saturday, January 22, 1966 at 10:55 p.m. to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m.; (b) the resolution approved by the Senate on January 23, 1966 at past 2:00 a.m. for adjournment sine die is not the adjournment contemplated in Article VII, Section 10(a) of our Constitution; (c) the suspension by the House or the adjournment by the Senate to resume the session on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m. meant the end of the special session and the start of the regular session as a continuous session without any interruption; and (d) the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" must be related with the phrase "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments" so that the adjournment contemplated should refer to a regular session during which the Commission on Appointments may be organized and allowed to discharge its functions as such. Respondent, on the other hand, set up the following defenses: (1) petitioner's ad interim appointment lapsed when Congress adjourned its last special session called under Proclamation No. 2 of President Marcos; (2) an ad interim appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress and so petitioner's appointment must have lapsed as early as December 30, 1965; (3) petitioner's ad interim appointment as well as others made under similar conditions, is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and hence null and void; and (4) petitioner's appointment is void in the light of the doctrine laid down in Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Quirino, G.R. No. L-19800 October 28, 1953. Issue:WON the petitioner’s contention regarding “the next adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session only 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 213 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Ruling: It is true that the provision of the Constitution we are now considering in speaking of the mode of termination epitomized in the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" does not make any reference to any specific session of the Congress, — whether regular or special, — but such silence is of no moment, for it is a well-known maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS (Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Company, et al., G. R. No. L-12560, September 30, 1958). Consequently, it is safe to conclude that the framers of our Constitution in employing merely the word adjournment as a mode of terminating an appointment made during the recess of Congress had in mind either the regular or special session, and not simply the regular one as contended by petitioner. REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JESUS L. VICENTE, RESPONDENTS. Facts: Petitioner filed for candidacy on May 14, 2007 elections as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. In his Certificate of Candidacy, he indicated Sta. Rosa, Laguna as his residence. Private respondent sought the cancellation of the petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification on the ground of material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his residence, because in the past elections, he declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address which is the Fourth Legislative District of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained a house in Cabuyao, Laguna which is outside of the First District. The COMELEC dismissed petition for lack of merit. Petitioner won the elections and proclaimed as the Representative of the First District of Laguna. Private respondent filed a petition to declare petitioner’s election and proclamation as null and void on the ground that petitioner lack one-year residency requirement under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. In support of his petition, private respondent argued that petitioner falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence; (2) the period of his residence in the legislative district before May 14, 2007, which he indicated as one year and two months; and (3) his eligibility for the office where he is seeking to be elected. In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa , Laguna beginning at least February 2006, petitioner’s evidence included, among others: (a) original and extended lease contracts for a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification issued by the President of Villa de Toledo Homeowners Association, Inc. that petitioner has been a resident of said subdivision since February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said subdivision since February 2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 214 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW within the said barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioner’s children in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna; and (f) DTI certificates of business issued in the name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own and operate businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003. Issue: Whether or not petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a Member of the House of Representative, as provided in the 1987 Constitution. Ruling: Yes. The SC found the interpretation of HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of the case. Neither does the SC find anything wrong if petitioner sometimes transacted business or received visitors in his Cabuyao house, instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence. The Constitution also does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to Election Day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicum of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional. In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although the ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential properties in that city prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of titles issued in the name of petitioner and his wife. In all, petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement under election laws. JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, respondents. Facts: Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of times: a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to 1988 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 215 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992 c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995 d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998 e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001. In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan. Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Roman’s election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution. Issue: Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the three-¬consecutive term limit fixed by law? Held: No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-¬year term. The law contemplates a continuous full three-¬year term before the proscription can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the three-¬term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three-¬term limit. In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three--year term set by the Constitution. The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same position. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 216 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast HARLIN C. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL A. DAZA, respondents. FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a partylist seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. HELD: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 217 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10 The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. MARIA LOURDES LOCSIN, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA O. LAGDAMEO, respondents. FACTS: ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· Locsin and Lagdameo are candidates for Representative of 1st District of Makati in the 2010 Elections, Lagdameo was proclaimed winner and Locsin came in 2nd. Locsin filed a protest before the HRET assailing the results in all precincts. Locsin and Lagdameo designated precincts for ther respective protest and counter-protest. In the recounts, Lagdameo’s winning margin even increased but HRET still continued revisions to prove her victory. HRET denied Locsin’s petition and motion for reconsideration. Locsin filed present petition on the ground that HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed protest, denied motion for reconsideration, admitted ballots of Lagdameo despite Locsin’s objection and denied the latter’s ballots despite bona fide grounds for admission. ISSUE: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 218 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s election protest. Held: NO. There is no grave abuse of discretion on HRET’s part when it dismissed Locsin’s election protest. Ratio: ï‚· ï‚· On the jurisdiction of SC on this case (despite HRET being the sole judge in election contests): SC has jurisdiction only when it is shown that HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. HRET took pains in reviewing the validity or invalidity of each contested ballot (ballot enumeration). Results were explained sufficiently. It applied meticulously the existing rules and rulings on ballot appreciation for the objected and claimed ballots of the parties. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. LIWAYWAY-VINZONSCHATO, PETITIONER VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RENATO J. UNICO, RESPONDENTS G.R. No. 172131 (April 2, 2007) FACTS : Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner alleged that during the canvassing of the election returns before the Municioal Board of Canvassers of Labo from May 10 to 12, 2004, her counsel raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts of the Municipality of Labo. Chato petitioned to correct/nullify the election returns in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, due to illegality of the proceedings before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo and for manifest errors in the election returns; to declare null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of respondent candidate; and to declare and proclaim petitioner as the candidate with the highest number of votes received for the lone congressional district of te Province of Camarines Norte. The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition on the ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking oath of office had not only divested the Commission 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 219 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns and qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal. The COMELEC en banc through a resolution dated March 17, 2006 denied petitioner Chato’s motion for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. ISSUE : Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the Resolution dated March 17, 2006. HELD : Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualification of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organization registered under the party-list system therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The Court also held, construing the above provision in Pangilinan v. Comelec that: The Senate and the House shall now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members”, thereby divesting the Comelec of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over the election cases pertaining to the election members of the BatasangPambansa (Congress). With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The Court has 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 220 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office, hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over Chato’s petition. The COMELEC En Banc, clearly did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006 holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon respondent Unico’s proclamation and oath-taking as member of the House of Representatives. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, PETITIONER Vs. COMELEC and Joseph Socorro Tan, Respondents GR 207264 (June 25, 2013) FACTS : On October 31, 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan filed before the Comelec a petition to deny due course or to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas; (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband; (3) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either July 8, 1959 or July 3, 1960; (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant of the United States of America; and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact an American citizen. The Comelec First Division issued a resolution on March 27, 2013 cancelling the petitioners COC on the grounds that she is not a Filipino citizen because of her failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 and she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus rendering her ineligible to run as Representative of Marinduque. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 221 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and was denied by the COMELEC en banc for lack of merit on May 14, 2013. Four days thereafter, or on May 18, 2013 petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued with finality declaring the May 14, 2013 resolution final and executory. On the same day, she took her oath of office before the Speaker of the House Feliciano Belmonte. Petitioner has yet to assume office which officially starts on June 30. 2013. Hence, Reyes filed this petition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. ISSUE : Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in cancelling the COC of petitioner Reyes. HELD : The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction. It retains its jurisdiction for the following reasons; First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with the said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action. Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. To be considered as Member of the House of Representatives, the following requisites must occur: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 222 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW In some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualification ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office. More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy, that before the proclamation of petitioner on May 18, 2013, the COMELC en banc had finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution on May 14, 2013. After May 14, 2013, there was no longer any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC en banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC en banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division. The Court dismissed the petition and finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC, affirmed the COMELEC en banc’s decision which upheld the COMELEC First Division’s decision. WIGBERTO R. TAÑADA, JR., PETITIONER VS. COMELEC, ANGELINA TAN, ALVIN JOHN S. TAÑADA, RESPONDENTS GR Nos. 207199-200 (October 22, 2013) FACTS : Petitioner WigbertoTañada (Liberal Party) and respondents Angelina Tan (Nationalist People’s Coalition) and Alvin John S. Tañada were contenders for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in the May 13, 2013 elections. On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two separate petitions: first, to cancel Alvin John’s COC and to declare him as a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC First Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit in a resolution dated January 29, 2013. On Wigberto’s motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 223 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW en banc upheld the COMELEC First Division’s ruling that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate. However, it granted the motion for reconsideration on the first petition and cancelled Alvin John’s COC for having committed false material representation concerning his residency in accordance with Section 78 of the OEC. On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the COMELEC en ban’s ruling on the ground of newly discovered evidence. He alleged that Alvin John’s candidacy was not bona fide because: (a) Alvin John was merely forced by this father to file his COC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia posted in official COMELEC posting areas in several barangays of Gumaca, Quezon Province; (c) he did not even vote during the May 13, 2013 National elections; and (d) his legal representation appeared to have been in collusion with the lawyers of Angelina. Despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s COC due to his material representations, his name was not deleted and remained printed on the ballot prompting Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him instead. The PBOC however denied Wigberto’s motion holding that the votes of Alvin John could not be counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the former’s COC was on the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the same law. Consequently, the PBOC canvassed the votes of all three contenders separately and on May 16, 2013, proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate for the position of Member of House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. However, Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Angelina (Petition to Annul), asseting that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, the votes cast for Alvin John would have been counted in his favor which could have resulted in his victor. While the Petition to Annul was still pending resolution, Wigberto initiated the instance certiorari case against the Comelec en banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate. On July 3. 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the Court that he had cause the filing of an Election Protest Ad Cautelam entitled “Wigberto R. Tañada, jr. v. Angelina “Helen” D. Tan,” before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of public respondent COMELEC, affirmed in its Comment dated August 18, 2013, that an Election Protest Ad Cautelam had been filed by Wigberto against Angelina before the HRET, praying that he be declared the winner in the 2013 congressional race in the 4 th District of Quezon Province. It also alleged that on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution annulling the proclamation of Angelina as Member of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 224 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. The propriety of this ruling is now pending before the COMELEC En Banc. ISSUE : Whether or not COMELEC or the Court has jurisdiction over the pending case. HELD : The petition must fail. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. In the case at bar, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now withoud jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the of the terms “election” and “returns”, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 225 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW TAÑADA V. CUENCO 103 Phil. 1051 (Feb. 28, 1957) FACTS : The Senate chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez, and CiprianoPrimicias as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Sen. Tañada, on behalf of the Citizen’s Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Soon thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Cong. DiosdadoMacapagal instituted the case at bar to declare null and void and in violation of the Constitution the election of respondents Cuenco and Delgado who were not nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate but by Sen. Primicias, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee in Rules. ISSUE : Whether or not the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal valid and lawful? HELD : Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution reads: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 226 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each shall be its Chairman. The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunal is the equal presentation of political parties and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of the said Tribunal. It is true that the choice of the Senators or members of the House as the case may be, to compose the Electoral Tribunals is vested in each House. However, each House does not have full discretionary power or authority because the Constitution prescribes the manner of choosing them. Such manner of the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunal is vital to the role they are called upon to play. Compliance with such procedure is mandatory and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. The Senate may not elect, as members of the SET, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three members to the Electoral Tribunal, that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three Senators who shall sit as members; that neither these three Senators may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado by Sen. Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal are null and void ab initio. ABBAS v. SET 166 SCRA 651 (October 27, 1988) FACTS : On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senatorselect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The respondent Tribunal was at the time compose of three Justices of the Supreme Court and six Senators. The petitioners then filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case as respondents. The petitioners argued that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and proposed to 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 227 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW an amendment of the Tribunal’s rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal. ISSUE : Whether or not the Tribunal can leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members as proposed by the petitioner. HELD : The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution of the Constitution itself which, in Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit of disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interest or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. PIMENTEL V HRET FACTS: During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13 organizations were proclaimed winners. Subsequently, the House of Representatives constituted the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12 members to represent it in the Commission on Appointments. No one from the partylist was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks the inclusion of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution, 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 228 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA based on proportional representation. ISSUES: [1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no partylist representatives in the hret. [2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. RULING: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 229 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW [2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. BONDOC V PINEDA FACTS: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein. RULING: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 230 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another. LIBANAN V HRET FACTS: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 231 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another. ISSUE: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairman’s signature are valid. RULING: A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection. GARCIA V HRET FACTS: Harry Angpin was elected as the representative for the 3rd district of Manila. However, there has been a petition for quo warranto filed before the HRET against Congress man Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives claiming that the latter was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines, which is a constitutional requirement. Upon the petitioner’s filing of their petition, they have paid the required 5,000php filing fee. However, HRET issued a resolution dismissing the petition for failure to pay 5,000 php as deposit. The petitioners then filed the cash deposit and filed for a motion for reconsideration with a receipt attached. However, it was denied. ISSUE:Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners even after the payment of deposit fee RULING: No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The HRET has a judgment call and has the authority to implement its rules. As long as the exercise of such discretion is based on a well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. In view of the delicate nature of the charge against Congressman Angpin, the observance of the HRET Rules of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 232 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to obtain their objective. The petitioners are duty bound to know and are expected to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formally orered to do so. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation. MARTINEZ V HRET FACTS: In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections. On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes. Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with only “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. The HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 233 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. ISSUE: 1. What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections? 2. Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? RULING: 1. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. 2. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. SANDOVAL VS HRET Facts: - 19 May 2007, after the canvass of votes, as evidenced by the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for the Member of the House of Representatives, the Board of Canvassers of the Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas proclaimed protestee Sandoval [herein petitioner] the winning candidate for the Office of the Member of the House of Representatives with Seventy-one Thousand Four Hundred Ninety (71,490) votes as against protestant Lacson-Noel who obtained the second highest number of votes with Seventy Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-One (70,331) votes; or a winning margin of One Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Nine (1,159) votes. Per the Summary Statement of Votes. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 234 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - Refusing to concede defeat, protestant Lacson-Noel filed the instant Petition of Protest on 29 May 2007, and alleged in substance that the results [of the election] do not reflect the true will of the voters as they are but products of various fraudulent and illegal acts, schemes and machinations employed by [protestee] Sandoval, his agents and supporters, with the connivance or conspiracy of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs), which defrauded and deprived [her] of lawful votes cast at the precinct level. Specifically, protestant Lacson-Noel assails the results of election in 623 precincts of the 1,437 total number of precincts in the Lone Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas. - Sandoval filed his Answer wherein he specifically denied the material allegations of the protest regarding the number of contested precincts, grounds for protest, commission of frauds and irregularities, and the necessity of recount and revision, for being self-serving and unsupported by evidence. By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, protestee Sandoval contends that it is protestant Lacson-Noel who is guilty of violating election laws, rules and regulations and which, on the other hand, resulted to (sic) the loss of legal and valid votes in [his] favor. He narrates that during the crucial hours of voting, counting, recording of the votes cast and transmittal of the records of the votes cast, most of his poll watchers were unable to effectively keep an eye on the proceedings and secure his votes because the latter were supposedly prevented from entering the Navotas polling precincts unlike protestant Lacson-Noel's poll watchers who were readily accommodated. As a result of the illegal schemes and machinations employed by protestant Lacson-Noel and her supporters, protestee Sandoval maintains that protestant Lacson-Noel was able to garner a substantial number of illegal and undeserved votes from the Municipality of Navotas. With respect to Malabon City, protestee Sandoval similarly claims that massive fraud and illegal electoral practices were committed all through the election process which tarnished the results of several identified precincts in Malabon City. Issue: W/N HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not admitting petitioner's formal offer of evidence, thereby denying him due process. Ruling: - - It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals’ exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal's denial of his pleas for an additional period of time within which to make his formal offer of evidence. However, a review of the proceedings will reveal that the HRET acted in accordance with its rules of procedure and well within its jurisdiction. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 235 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - - Petitioner commenced presentation of his evidence on September 2, 2008. Further hearings were scheduled for September 15, 18, 23 and 25, 2008. He was able to present evidence on September 15, 18, and 25, 2008, but the hearing set for September 23, 2008 was canceled upon motion of petitioner. On September 29, 2008, the Hearing Commissioner set additional hearings for October 2, 13, 27, 28, 29 and 31, 2008 and November 3, 2008, for reception of petitioner's evidence. However, due to unavailability of petitioner's counsel, no hearings were held on the dates set for the whole month of October. Hearings only resumed on November 3 and 11, 2008 and, on the latter date, petitioner moved that he be allowed more time to present additional witnesses. Despite opposition from respondent Lacson-Noel, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 08-342 dated November 24, 2008, granting petitioner an additional period of ten (10) days within which to present evidence, with the warning that no further extension shall be given. The Hearing Commissioner notified the parties that further hearings will be held on December 10 and 11, 2008. Said hearing dates were utilized by petitioner. Nevertheless, in utter disregard of the Tribunal's warning, petitioner again filed on December 18, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion (with Prayer for Suspension of the Period to File Protestee's Formal Offer of Evidence), praying for more time to present more witnesses, and that he be allowed to file his Formal Offer of Evidence upon completion of presentation of his evidence. Respondent Lacson-Noel opposed said motion, pointing out that the additional period of ten (10) days granted to petitioner lapsed on December 24, 2008. Thus, on January 22, 2009, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 09-009, pointing out that despite the additional period of ten days granted to him and the lapse of more than three (3) months reckoned from September 2, 2008, petitioner had not completed the presentation of his evidence. Since the last day of the extension granted to him was on December 23, 2008 and said period lapsed without petitioner completing presentation of his evidence including formal offer thereof, he was deemed to have waived the same. GUINGONA VS GONZALEZ Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LPPDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 236 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Held: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum. City of Davao Vs RTC FACTS: GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City. On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 237 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax. RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition. ISSUE/S: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC HELD: Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.” However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn. Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 238 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS. Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.” The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 19921994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao. NAZARETH VS VILLAR Facts: - Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is the decision rendered on June 4, 2009 by the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045 entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth, Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology, Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 and LAO-National Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006 on disallowances of subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits in the total amount of P3,591,130.36,2 affirming the issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by the Audit Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City against the payment of benefits to covered officials and employees of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of the DOST. - The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated June 4, 2009 "null and void," and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the benefits for CY2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on the strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April 12, 2000 authorizing the use of the savings for the purpose. Issue: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 239 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 1. Whether or not the "approval" made by the Executive Secretary on April 12, 2000 on the request for authority to use savings of the agency to pay the benefits, was valid; and 2. Whether or not the payments of the benefits made by the agency using its savings for the years 1998 and 1999 based on Section 56 of RA 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998 [GAA]) were legal and valid. Ruling: - - - In Nazareth v. Villar, there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a... benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient. Under these provisions, the authority granted to the President was subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation from the agency's savings would be validly effected. The first required that there must be savings from the authorized appropriation... of the agency. The second demanded that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be transferred for augmentation purposes only. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 240 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ARAULLO VS AQUINO Facts: - - When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP - Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. - This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. Issues: Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). Held: - No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 241 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - - No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. FLORES V. MONTEMAYOR FACTS: Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga. On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a concerned citizen dated January 20, 2003 relating Montemayor’s ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently disproportionate to his income as a public official. The Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the matter and issued subpoenas ducestecum to the responsible personnel of the BIR and the Land Transportation Office (LTO). In compliance with the subpoena, BIR Personnel Division Chief EstelitaDatu submitted to the PAGC a copy of Montemayor’s appointment papers along with a certified true copy of the latters Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year 2002. Meanwhile, the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 242 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla, furnished the PAGC with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor. During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism submitted to the PAGC copies of Montemayor’s SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Chargeagainst Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713due to his failure to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same date, the PAGC issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his counteraffidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him within ten (10) days from the receipt of the Order. On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the deferment of the administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed a petition for certiorari before the CAquestioning the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct the administrative investigation against him. The PAGC denied Montemayor’s motion for lack of merit. Still, no answer was filed. On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation for sixty (60) days. On September 12, 2003, shortly after the expiration of the sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolutionfinding Montemayor administratively liable as charged and recommending to the Office of the President Montemayor’s dismissal from the service. Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision and he argued that he was denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 243 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent elevation to the Supreme Court. The motion was eventually denied. Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for reviewunder Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He made the following assertions: first, that the PAGC exceeded its authority when it recommended that he be dismissed from government service since the power to investigate does not necessarily carry with it the power to impose penalty unless the same was expressly granted; second, that the PAGC grossly violated his right to due process of law when it did not give him the opportunity to present his countervailing evidence to the charges against him; third, that the PAGC cannot validly proceed with the investigation of the charges against him on the basis of an unverified anonymous letter-complaint without any supporting documents attached thereto, contrary to the requirement of Section 4 (c) of Executive Order (EO) No. 12; fourth, that it was an error for the Office of the President to hold him liable for violation of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 and Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713 since the SSAL should reflect assets and liabilities acquired in the preceding year; and fifth, that the assailed PAGC Resolution was not supported by substantial evidence. As aforesaid, the CA in its assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005, ruled in favor of Montemayor. The CA concluded that Montemayor was deprived of an opportunity to present controverting evidence amounting to a brazen denial of his right to due process. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent was deprived of his right to due process when it proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint, and allegedly without an opportunity to present evidence in his defense; 2. Whether or not the PAGC has the authority to recommend respondent’s dismissal from the service; 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 244 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 3. Whether or not the assumption by the office of the ombudsman of its jurisdiction to investigate respondent for the same offense deprived the the PAGC from proceeding with its investigation; and 4. Whether or not the PAGC’s recommendation was supported by substantial evidence. HELD: The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily address the problem on corruption and abuses committed in the government, particularly by officials appointed by the President. Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has the power to investigate and hear administrative complaints provided (1) that the official to be investigated must be a presidential appointee in the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official must be occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank, or higher. Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12, however, states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is probable cause. The clear implication of the said provision is intent to empower the PAGC in line with the Presidents objective of eradicating corruption among a particular line of government officials, i.e., those directly appointed by her. Absent the conjunctive word or, the PAGCs authority to conduct investigations based on anonymous complaints will be very limited. It will decimate the said administrative body into a toothless anti-corruption agency and will inevitably undermine the Chief Executives disciplinary power. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 245 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision to proceed with the investigation process without giving him the opportunity to present controverting evidence. The argument is without merit. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it. Elementary is the rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or an administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction restraining it. For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing prevents the PAGC from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before its office. And even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the PAGC continues to retain jurisdiction over the principal action until the question on jurisdiction is finally determined. In the case at bar, a sixty (60)-day TRO was issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. However, barely a week after the lapse of the TRO, the PAGC issued its resolution finding Montemayor administratively liable and recommending to the Office of the President his dismissal from government service. The CA believes that there has been undue haste and apparent precipitation in the PAGCs investigation proceedings. It notes with disapproval the fact that it was barely eight (8) days after the TRO had lapsed that the PAGC issued the said resolution and explains that respondent should have been given a second chance to present evidence prior to proceeding with the issuance of the said resolution. We beg to disagree with the appellate courts observation. First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed resolution enjoys the presumption of regularity particularly since it was done in the performance 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 246 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW of its official duties. Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against the presumption, if only to provide constancy in the official acts of authorized government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of the issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by itself cannot be used to discredit, much less nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular performance of the PAGCs duties. Second, Montemayor’s argument, as well as the CAs observation that respondent was not afforded a second opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold water. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing Montemayor of the formal charge filed against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to present a counter-affidavit or verified answer. When the said period lapsed without respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day period to file his answer, but the latter chose to await the decision of the CA in his petition for certiorari. During the preliminary conference, Montemayor was again informed that he is given a new ten (10)-day period, or until June 19, 2003 within which to file his memorandum/position paper as well as supporting evidence with a warning that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence on record. Again, the deadline lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense. Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices upon the issuance of the PAGC resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for another opportunity before the Office of the President to present his side particularly since the assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having failed to exercise any of these 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 247 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be allowed to seek recourse before this Court for the consequences of his own shortcomings. Desperately, Montemayor contends that the authority of the PAGC to investigate him administratively, as well as the power of the Office of the President to act on the PAGCs recommendation, had already ceased following the initiation and filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). He points out that the Ombudsman is mandated by Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA No. 6770 to take over the investigation and prosecution of the charges filed against him. We are still not persuaded. The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were initiated after the Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor.More importantly, the proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even prior to the initiation and filing of cases against him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGCs findings and recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the Presidents decision to dismiss Montemayor from government service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office of the President of its concurrent investigatory and prosecutorial power over Montemayor had already been terminated even before the Ombudsman could take cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over a task that is already a fait accompli. As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss Montemayor from government service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in favor of petitioners. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 248 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Montemayor’s argument that he did not deliberately omit to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2001 SSAL and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL fails to persuade us. Even if a motor vehicle was acquired through chattel mortgage, it is a government employees ethical and legal obligation to declare and include the same in his SSAL. Montemayor cannot wiggle his way out of the mess he has himself created since he knows for a fact that every asset acquired by a civil servant must be declared in the SSAL. The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Montemayor, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the 2001 Ford Expedition has not yet passed to him on the basis of a lame excuse that the said vehicle was acquired only on installment basis sometime on July 3, 2001. Montemayor also argues that even if ownership of the said vehicle had been transferred to him upon acquisition, the vehicle was sold to another person on December 15, 2002;hence, there is no need to declare it in his 2001 SSAL. Respondents reasoning is anemic and convoluted. It is evasive of the fact that the said vehicle was not reported in his 2001 SSAL.. Respondent apparently fails to understand that the SSAL is not a mere scrap of paper. The law requires that the SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as detailed and as accurately as possible. The filing thereof not later than the first fifteen (15) days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 249 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Montemayor’s repeated and consistent failure to reflect truthfully and adequately all his assets and liabilities in his SSAL betrays his claim of innocence and good faith. Accordingly, we find that the penalty of dismissal from government service, as sanctioned by Section 11 (a) and (b) of RA No. 6713, meted by the Office of the President against him, is proper. The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84254 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the March 23, 2004 Decision and the May 13, 2004 Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581 are REINSTATEDand UPHELD. Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby DISMISSED from government service. REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA FACTS: • There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees. • President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations). 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 250 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW • Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. • A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED’s coverage to public and private institutions of higher education. • In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI. • Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court. • On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 251 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved torequire the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s.2008. ISSUES: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands theCHED’s jurisdiction; and 2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power. HELD: 1. Yes, it expands CHED’s jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED’s coverage under RA 7722. The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered "programs x xx of higher learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as "education beyond the secondary level” or "education provided by a college or university." Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 252 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning. 2. Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the President’s residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify GMA’s action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law."There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of itsofficials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 253 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rulemaking power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities. GUITIERREZ V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM) FACTS: • These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units as required by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59). • Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation. • Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 254 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW • The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated October 2, 1989, covering all government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The DBM re-issued this circular on February 15, 1999 and published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the payments of honoraria and other allowances which were deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of governmentowned or controlled corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication. • Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001, clarifying that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized. • On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007 questioned the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners in G.R. 173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be paid to the officials and employees of the Insurance Commission. • On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which provided that all Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including COLA, of government employees under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific government-owned or controlled corporations since the consolidated cases covering the national government employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently, the payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA, remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The circular further said that all agency heads and other responsible officials and employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 255 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW benefits already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such payment. ISSUES: Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the COLA into the standardized salary rates. HELD: Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989 covering all governmentowned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions was ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on March 16, 1999, its counterpart, NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 covering the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units should also be regarded as ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. Thus, the COLA should not be deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates from 1989 to 2004. Respondents counter that the fact that NCC 59 was not published should not be considered as an obstacle to the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates. Accordingly, Budget Circular 2001-03, insofar as it reiterates NCC 59, should not be treated as ineffective since it merely reaffirms the fact of consolidation of COLA into the employees’ salary as mandated by Section 12 of R.A. 6758. It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of its contents before their rights and interests are affected by the same. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 256 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW is deemed included in the standardized salary rates of government employees since it falls under the general rule of integration—“all allowances.” More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually integrated into the employees’ salaries. Records show that the government employees were informed by their respective offices of their new position titles and their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with the Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the breakdown of the employee’s gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the composition of his standardized pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was considered part of the employee’s monthly income. In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of the consolidation of COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing in these cases which can be the subject of a back pay since the amount corresponding to COLA was never withheld from petitioners in the first place. Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758. The validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing rules. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC V.HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION FACTS: The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1)importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on these factors, wheat would be classified further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 257 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The regulation also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending the following: (1) the regulation was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation classified them to be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3)the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated the nonflour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all, and(4) the retroactive application of the regulation is confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of the respondent were speculative and premature. On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling in favour of the respondent. It held that, on matters relating to the validity of the regulation, the court held that the regulation is invalid because the basic requirements of hearing and publication were not complied with. The petitioners then appealed to Court of Appeals but it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is valid? HELD: Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws when he provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 258 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW (3) went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles. CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from. Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state. Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat. VIVAS V. MONETARY BOARD OF BSP FACTS: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 259 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution that the corporate life expired on May 2005. Vivas and the new management team conducted internal audit and introduced measures to revitalize the dismal operation of the bank. BSP on December 2006 extended RBFI corporate life for another 50 years and approve the change of its name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI). Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit conference was held on March 27, 2008 at the BSP during which the BSP officials and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said examination. The ECBI submitted its comments on BSP’s consolidated findings and risk asset classification through a letter, dated April 8, 2008. The MB issued Resolution No. 823 on June 2009, approving the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets. It was also prohibited from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership through OSI recommendation. Vivas filed petition for prohibition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 260 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: Whether or not ECBI was entitled to due and prior hearing before its being placed under receivership. HELD: Yes.In the case of BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. AntonioValenzuela, the Court reiterated the doctrine of “close now, hear later,” stating that it was justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus: The “close now, hear later” doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government. In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote that xxx due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community. The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 261 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy. SENATE V ERMITA Facts: Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO. The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP. Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying the President’s order. Issue: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress Held: YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it deprives it of the information in possession of these officials. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 262 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’. It is defined by Schwartz as “the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts and the Congress.” (e.g. state secret privilege, informer’s privilege, generic privilege). The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour) A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinctfunctions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 263 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE VS. MAJADUCON Facts: This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action. The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Held: The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution: The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 264 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it. Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in this case. The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than the legislature. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, withthe intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. GUDANI V SENGA Facts: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer. Issue: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry. Held: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 265 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts. IN RE: SABIO Facts: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Issue: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding. Held: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 266 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.” Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles. Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7). Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis. NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE Facts: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 267 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vsErmita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Issue: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? Held: The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege: 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 268 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 269 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner, JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Facts: Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the “unofficial” quick count as provided under pertinent election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power “to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial determination. Issue: Whether or not Comelec’s promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified. Ruling: The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 270 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been substantially met. Resolution 6712 was null and void. BAYAN V. ZAMORA, G.R. NO. 138570, OCTOBER 10, 2000 BUENA, J.: I. THE FACTS The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” II. THE ISSUE Was the VFA unconstitutional? III. THE RULING [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 271 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. xxx xxx xxx This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. xxx xxx xxx The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 272 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. SUPLICO VS. NEDA, GR 178830, JULY 14, 2008 FACTS: Respondent avers that there is no more justiciable controversy with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project controversy for the Court to resolve. Petitioners contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition, which among others, included the President’s use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness. ISSUE: Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case? RULING: Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 273 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW SUZETTE NICOLAS VS ALBERTO ROMULO 578 SCRA 438 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Ratification of a Treaty – Validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement **This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo FACTS: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA. ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing. HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial. The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions. GARCILLANO VS HR COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – Senate Rules of Procedure In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacson’s motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 274 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci. HELD: Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria MacapagalArroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 275 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an over breadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an over breadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power. ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional. The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 276 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 277 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW CORONA V. SENATE Facts -Former Chief Justice Renato Corona Filed a petition for certiorari and and prohibition with the prayer to issue an immediate temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. (Filed in the Supreme Court)^This is against the impeachment case initiatedby the Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and the trial being conducted by the Senate of the Philippines. -A caucus during which a verified complaintagainst petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice.-On the same day (Dec12, 2011), the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way abovethe one-third vote required by the Constitution. -The next day, the complaint was transmitted tothe Senate(which is convened as the impeachment court)-Dec. 15, 2011. Petitioner received a copy of the complaintcharging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption,allegedly committed as follows: ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT Respondent betrayed the public trust throughhis track record marked by partialityand subservience in cases involving the arroyo administrationfrom the time of his appointment as supreme court justice and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present (ARTICLE I)^Respondent committed culpable violation of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trustwhen he failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worthas required under sec. 17, art. xi of the 1987 constitution“a public officer or employee shall, uponassumption of office and as often thereafter as maybe required by law, submit a declaration under oathof his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the caseof the President, the Vice-President, the Membersof the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, andofficers of the armed forces with general or flagrank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the publicin the manner provided by law.” (ARTICLE II)-It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. - PLUS, he wasaccused of having accumulated illgotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. (ARTICLE III) Issue: 1. WON the Senator Judges are entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial 2. WON the issue of the case became moot and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy Ruling: 1. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 278 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review. 2. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such case, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. MOJICA The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-000-0316, were dismissed. Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules, ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution? RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 279 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT There are two petitions that have been consolidated because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman. 1stcase -> G.R. No. 19623: Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman 2ndcase -> G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. Cause of 1st case: Hostage Drama involving Rolando Mendoza and Hong Kong nationals in a tourist bus. Rolando Mendoza demanded his reinstatement. Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed against him and other police officers. Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 280 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The administrative case against Mendoza was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman They filed a Motion for Reconsideration followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration. The pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service. FRANCISCO V. NMMP, INC. Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 281 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” Issues: Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. Rulings: This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lismota or crux of the controversy. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 282 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. GUTIERREZ v. HR COMMITTEE FACTS:Before the 15th Congress opened for its first session, private respondents known as the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 283 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. Petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. ISSUES: 1. Is petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication? 2. Do the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule? HELD:The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and take initial 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 284 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. ESTRADA V. DISIERTO, 356 SCRA 108 FACTS:On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. Following the termination of the impeachment trial and the resignation of majority of the members of the Cabinet and the defection of the military and the police, around noon of January 20, 2001, Vice President Arroyo has sworn into office as President of the Philippines, while President Estrada and his family left Malacanang. On the same day, however, President Estrada wrote a letter to the Senate stating that he was unable to exercise the powers of the office of the Presidency & the operation of the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is deemed resigned as President as of January 20, 2001 when respondent too her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. RULING: YES. The petitioner resigned as President. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 285 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantialevidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. His actions dispelled all the doubts about his resignation. (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.||| PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. ISSUE:Whether or not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. RULING:No. Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional. 1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution provides that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 286 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law. 2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy. 3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws." It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a governmentcontrolled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 287 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW CRUZ V. PARAS Vicente De La Cruz, et al were club and cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ordinance 84 after due hearing declaring that Ordinance 84 is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ordinance 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD:If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets. TATAD v. SECRETARY FACTS: The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372). Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 288 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. Issues: Whether or not the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional. sub issues: a) Whether or not Section 15 of RA No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power, b) Whether or not the Executive department misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997. HELD/RULING: a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President—he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established. b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws. ABAKADAGURO PARTY LIST V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 168056 (2005) Facts: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 289 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%). Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not. Issues: 1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Ruling: 1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. 2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 290 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. 3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness. ATITIW V. ZAMORA G.R. No. 143374 471 scra 329 (2005) Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organicact for the cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. Thecourt declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) whichincludes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of thewinding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay theseparation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees. Issues: 1.Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional. 2.Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO 220. 3.Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 291 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Ruling: In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations bill covers abroader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. Thetitle of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a titlethat embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations bill mustrelate specifically to some particular appropriations.On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is nosuch thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending or repealingthe E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law.The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual respect.Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds iswithin the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannotcorrect the acts of either the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR. CIR v. CA & YMCA G.R No. 124043 (1998) Facts: In 1980, YMCA earned an income of 676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and 44,259 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an assessment to YMCA for deficiency taxes which included the income from lease of YMCA’s real property. YMCA formally protested the assessment but the CIR denied the claims of YMCA. On appeal, the CTA ruled in favor of YMCA and excluded income from lease to small shop owners and parking fees. However, the CA reversed the CTA but affirmed the CTA upon motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the rental income of YMCA is taxable Ruling: Yes. The exemption claimed by YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of then Section 27 of the NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the same Code. While the income received by the organizations enumerated in Section 26 of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax in respect to income received by them as such, the exemption does not apply to income derived from any of their properties, real or personal or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 292 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW CHAVEZ V. PCGG 299 scra 744 (1998) Facts: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government official asked the court to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard. Chavez assailed the validity of the General and Supplemental Agreement executed by the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs on December 28,1993. Item No. 2 of the General Agreement states that the assets of the PRIVATE PARTY (Marcos heirs) shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the PCGG and the Marcos heirs which committing to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs is valid. Ruling: The petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Construction. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 293 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable." Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay. Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised. LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES V. QUEZON CITY AND CONSTANTINO ROSAS G.R. No. 144104 433 scra 119 (2004) Facts: The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government. Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim. When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity. Issue: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 294 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes. Ruling: The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. (strictissimijuris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to: ï‚· ï‚· income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression uniusest exclusion alterius/expressiumfacitcessaretacitum). EXECUTIVE VS. SOUTHWING Facts: On December 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued executive order 156 entitled “providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines . “The said provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles I the country including the Subic bay Freeport zone, subject to a few exceptions. Consequently, three separate actions for the declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy Industries Incorporated. Praying that judgement be rendered declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive order 156 unconstitutional and illegal. The RTC rendered a summary judgement declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress and that the Proviso is contrary to the mandate of RA 7227 or the Bases conversion and development act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 295 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The petitioner appealed in the Court of appeals but was denied on the ground of lack of statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance is void. Issue: Whether or not Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the President’s quasi-legislative power. Held: Yes. The Supreme court ruled that police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercise by the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of the municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the president quasi-legislative power which maybe defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the following requisites: 1. 2. 3. 4. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure It must be within the scope of authority given by the legislature It must be reasonable In the case at bar, the first requisite was satisfied since EO156 has both constitutional and statutory bases. Anent to the second requisites that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law. To the third and fourth requisite, it was reasonable and it does not violate the constitution or the law in which its implementation are within the scope of the legislatures commands. ALVAREZ VS GUINGONA In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives. In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 296 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR. 2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income. HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rdreading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well). 2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and governmentowned-or-controlled corporations. TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY v. Secretary of Finance Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 297 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. GONZALES VS MACARAIG Facts: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 298 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill. HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power BENGZON VS DRILON FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law. This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. When is it allowed? The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 299 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 3 ways how a bill becomes a law. 1. When the President signs it 2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and 3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him. GARCIA vs. COMELEC FACTS: - In its PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ngMorong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. - On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993. - The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission. - Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. - They started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution. - Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ngMorong, wrote a letter to the COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counterproductivity and futility. - The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayangkapasyahan) and not an ordinance." ISSUE: WONPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 300 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW HELD: YES. - Respondents contend that under Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance,” only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. - The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: o "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." - An act includes a resolution. - The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz: o Sec. 3. Definition of Terms — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean; -  (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.  There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: ï‚· a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. ï‚· a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and ï‚· a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance. (Emphasis ours) There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735, it intended resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 301 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW SBMA vs. COMELEC FACTS: - On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Economic Zone. - RA 7227 likewise created petitioner Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority(SBMA) to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. - In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed PambayangKapasyahanBilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. - On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas,et al. filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993. - The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of RA 7227. - Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power of INITIATIVE under the Local Government Code of 1991. - On July 6, 1993, respondent COMELEC En Banc denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayangkapasyahan) and not an ordinance. - On June 27, 1996, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the REFERENDUM proposing to annul or repeal KapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan" ISSUES: 1. What is the difference between initiative and referendum? 2. Did respondent COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848? HELD: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 302 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 1. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative, and they are as follows: UNDER THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT (RA 6735):  (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.  There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: o a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; o a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and o a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.  (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.  (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: o c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and o c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (RA 7610):  Sec. 120. Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.  Sec. 126. Local Referendum Defined. — Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. THEREFORE: - Initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing.On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 303 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. - In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" of "No" in the ballot. - From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the COMELEC to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. 2. YES. - To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. - In initiative and referendum, the COMELEC exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people; hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. SANTIAGO vs.RAMOS FACTS: - The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. - In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed. - The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 304 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995. HELD:YES. - The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof. - The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. - Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. - Also, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since Santiago has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so. SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC FACTS: - On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”. - The COMELEC then, upon its approval: a. set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b. caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c. instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. - On 18 Dec 1996, Santiago, et al. filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 305 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW - Santiago argues that: 1. the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2. RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. - The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino. ISSUE: WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so,WON the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. HELD: - RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution BUT is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. - Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” - This provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. - Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Conventionstated that “without implementing legislation, Section 2 of ArticleXVII cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on Congressional action.” - Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. - The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its implementation. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 306 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW PCA vs. ENRIQUEZ FACTS: - On December 17, 1993, House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress. - On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663 (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. - No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes. - In their petitions before the Supreme Court, the petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount. ISSUE: WON the veto of the President is valid. HELD: NO. - This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., where the Supreme Court held that: o “The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.” - The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond the executive power to veto, the Sections sought to be vetoed in the instant case were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto power. - The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, said that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 307 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. - It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the amount appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991. - Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item. TECSON VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 161434 | MARCH 3, 2004 FACTS: In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his COC for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. ISSUES: ï‚· ï‚· Whether FPJ is a natural born citizen Whether he made a material misrepresentation in his COC HELD: FPJ’s direct ascendant is his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou whose death certificate identified him to be Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 308 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (date of birth: May 17, 1915), father of respondent FPJ. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. The 1935 Constitution is applicable to determine FPJ’s citizenship. The applicable provision is– “Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution adoption of this Constitution, (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.” The totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. POE VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 454 SCRA 242 | MARCH 29, 2005 FACTS: On June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) as the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained the highest votes, followed by the second-placer, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She then took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 309 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Refusing to concede defeat, Mr. FPJ, filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. Both parties exchanged motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy. Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant on December 14, 2004, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs.Jesusa Sonora Poe. She claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. ISSUE: ï‚· Whether or not the Protestant’s widow could intervene and/or substitute for the deceased party. HELD: “Rule 14. Election Protest: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.” Since in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant, the petition must be dismissed. The court even held in Vda. deDe Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest. AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO G.R. No. 170516 | July 16, 2008 FACTS: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 310 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).” JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO. The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised their very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns. ISSUES: ï‚· ï‚· ï‚· Whether or not the petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress Whether or not this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition. Whether or not the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto. RULINGS: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substantive issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 311 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.” It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that we fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.” CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 194 SCRA 317 | FEBRUARY 22, 1991 FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. ISSUE: ï‚· Whether or not Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, Section 13 of the constitution. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 312 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self-enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IXB that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void. NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 437 SCRA 655 | SEPTEMBER 8, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97038. ISSUE: ï‚· Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members RULING: We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives. In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 313 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office, profession, business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution. The NAC ex officio members’ representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions. The NAC ex officio members’ representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional compensation therefor. BITONIO v. COA 425 SCCRA 437 (2004) FACTS: Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr., petitioner, was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. He was designated by Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the Department of Labor and Employment to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority. Due to his designation, he receives per diems from PEZA for every meeting he attended. #n July 31, 1998, COA, the respondent, disallowed the payment due to the principle established in Civil Liberties case stating that Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensation therefore is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors ‘meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor. RULING: YES. The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by Virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat on behalf of the Secretary. We cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 314 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW PEZA to have a better right than his principal. The contention that R.A. 7916 as a legal basis has no merit since such law was amended by RA 8748where provisions in conflict with the law, specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted. PUBLIC INTEREST V. ELMA 494 SCRA 53 (2006) 517 SCRA 336 (2007) FACTS: This is an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction that seeks to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13,Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC. He took his oath of office as CPLC the following day, but he waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.[5] However, the respondents allege that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. Respondents claim that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in their case. This provision, according to the respondents, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Respondents also alleged that since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow respondent Elm’sas concurrent appointments to both positions. Respondents further add that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice. However, this case was rendered moot due to supervening events. In 2001, the appointees of former President Joseph Estrada were replaced by the appointees of the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 315 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. There no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved. However, this case raises a significant legal question as yet unresolved - whether the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPLC. The resolution of this question requires the exercise of the Courts judicial power, more specifically its exclusive and final authority to interpret laws. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. Issues: (2006 case) 1. Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of Chief Presidential Legal Counsel? Does the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC fall under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution? 2. What is the Standard Compatibility under Section 7, Article IX-B? (2007 case) 3. What is the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality? Did it render the appointments to both positions void? Ruling: 1. No, he cannot hold both offices While the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to thhe PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC, as neityher of them is secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions, it must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent, Elma, he remains covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointmenmts must stillm comply with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down therein; falling which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 316 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 2. Section 7, Article IX-B permits an appointive appointive official to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices is: whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of PCGG Chairman and CPLC, the duties of CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Excutive department. Thus, actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. 3. The earlier ruling did not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989) Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events: 1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders 2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists 3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar 4. Honasan’s failed coup 5. Communist insurgency movements 6. secessionist movements in Mindanao 7. devastated economy because of a. accumulated foreign debt 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 317 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW b. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. Issues: 1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. 2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. Ruling: No to both issues. Petition dismissed. Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 1423). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 45 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 318 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the selfpreservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution. Borja v. COMELEC 295 SCRA 157 (1998) Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor. Issue: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. Ruling: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 319 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit. The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Ople v. Torres 23 SCRA 141 (1998) Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant he petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 320 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Issue: Is the issuance of A.O. No. 308 within the scope of the executive or administrative powers of the President? Ruling: The executive power is vested in the President. It is the power of carrying laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The President is likewise granted administrative power over offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by the proper governmental organs. To this end, he can issue administrative orders. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is: "Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 321 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW KMU vs DIRECTOR GENERAL G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006 FACTS: EO 420 was issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005. EO 420 declared that there was a need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification cards in government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business with government. It directed all government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. KMU alleges that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. ISSUE: WON EO 420 is a usurpation by the President of legislative functions RULING:EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor’s Office, LTO, PRC, and similar government entities. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. 10 This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 322 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services.11 The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power – the President’s constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed. In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420. There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 323 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power. ANGELES vs GAITE G.R. No. 176596 March 23, 2011 FACTS:Sometime in June 1999, Angeles was charged of child abuse by her grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution, respondent Velasco filed a case against Angeles for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610. Angeles filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary who ordered the withdrawal of the Information against petitioner. On July 7, 2000, Angeles filed with the DOJ an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently dismissed. Angeles filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied. Angeles then filed a Petition for Review with the Office of the President (OP) assailing the DOJ’s Resolutions dismissing the administrative complaint she filed against respondent Velasco. The OP asked respondent Velasco to file his comment thereto. In his Comment,respondent Velasco stated that Judge Angeles was having an affair with a lady lawyer and that the lady lawyer was the conduit or connection of those who has pending cases in her sala. It was further stated that Judge Angeles was so insecure and jealous at the time her grandniece MARIA MERCEDES VISTAN was allegedly flirting with boys. On the basis of the statemets made in the Comment of Velasco to the Op, which Angeles claimed to be a direct attack on her character and reputation as a public servant, she filed a Complaintfor four counts of libel against respondent Velasco before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) AdelizaMagno-Gingoyon recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for Libel due to insufficiency of evidence and/or lack of merit. Angeles then filed with the DOJ Secretary a Petition for Reviewassailing the dismissal of her complaint for Libel as well as her motion for reconsideration. The Petition for Review was dismissed by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 324 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Angeles filed a Petition for Review before the OP questioning the DOJ Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP issued an Orderdismissing the Petition for Review filed by petitioner saying: Under Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 dated 29 May 2003, no appeal from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. An appeal or petition not clearly falling within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth above, shall be dismissed outright. Angeles filed with the CA a petition for review under assailing the OP orders. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio v. Executive Secretary20 regarding the power of control of the President over all executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified political agency. We said that under the doctrine, the official acts of a Department Secretary are deemed to be the acts directly of the President herself unless disapproved or reprobated by the latter; that it was the OP’s prerogative to determine whether or not it shall consent to exercise its general appellate jurisdiction in any given case emanating from the Chief Executive’s power of control over all executive officers from Cabinet secretaries to the lowliest ranks. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or overturn the DOJ Secretary’s resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ Secretary, being her alter ego. The CA held that petitioner cannot question the validity of MC No. 58, since it is said to be valid until annulled in proper proceedings and not in the petition filed with it. Angeles then filed a petition before the Supreme Court. She argues that the refusal of the OP to act on her petition could not be justified as falling within the ambit of the doctrine of qualified political agency; that while the DOJ Secretary is the President's alter ego, the President's absolute abandonment of her power of control delegating exclusively to the DOJ Secretary the power to determine the existence of probable cause in complaints where the imposable penalty is less than reclusion perpetua is not justified. Angeles claims that MC No. 58 ties the hands of the Chief Executive in the exercise of her constitutional power of control over all the executive departments as mandated by the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987; hence, an invalid issuance of the OP. She claims that since the validity of MC No. 58 is the principal reason why the OP dismissed her petition, the validity of the circular is a key issue in this petition which must be resolved. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 325 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: WON Memorandum 58 diminishes the power of control of the President? RULING:Angeles argues that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be. It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Angeles cannot second-guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary - his own alter ego. Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to Angeles' position asking this Court to allow her to appeal to the Office of the President, notwithstanding that the crimes for which she charges respondent are not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292), the Department of Justice, under the leadership of the Secretary of Justice, is the government's principal law agency. As such, the Department serves as the government's prosecution arm and administers the government's criminal justice system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the correctional system, which are deep within the realm of its expertise. These are known functions of the Department of Justice, which is under the executive branch and, thus, within the Chief Executive's power of control. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 326 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioner's contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President. MANALANG-DEMEGILLO vs TIDCORP FACTS:On February 12, 1998, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was renamed Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494 entitled An Act Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, As Amended, by Reorganizing And Renaming the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation, Expanding Its Primary Purpose, and for Other Purposes. Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of appointments in accordance with the reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP. Thereafter, in 2002, the Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1365, Series of 2002, on October 22, 2002 to approve a so-called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new organizational structure and staffing pattern, a position classification system, and a new set of qualification standards. During the implementation of the Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan, the LCSD was abolished. Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector (RCMSS). On December 13, 2002, President Valdes issued a memorandum informing all officers and employees of TIDCORP that the Board of Directors had approved on December 11, 2002 the appointments issued pursuant to the newly approved positions under the Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan. Demigillo challenged before the Board of Directors the validity of Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to the RCMSS. She averred that she had been thereby illegally removed from her position of Senior Vice President in the LCSD to which she had been previously assigned during the reorganization of July 1998. She insisted 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 327 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW that the Board of Directors had not been authorized to undertake the reorganization and corporate restructuring. Pending determination of her challenge by the Board of Directors, Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), raising the same issues. TIDCORP furnished to the CSC a copy of Board Decision No. 03-002 dismissing Demigillo’s appeal for its lack of merit, thereby rendering the question about the propriety of Demigillo’s appeal moot and academic. In the meanwhile, President Valdes informed Demigillo of her poor performance rating. Demigillo formally communicated to Atty. Florencio P. Gabriel Jr., Executive Vice President of the Operations Group, appealing the "poor rating" given her by President Valdes. The Board of Directors rendered Decision No. 03-003 dated August 15, 2003 unanimously dropping Demigillo from the rolls. The CSC ruled through Resolution No. 0410928 that the 2002 Organizational Refinements or Restructuring Plan of TIDCORP had been valid for being authorized by Republic Act. No. 6656. The CA, which, albeit affirming the ruling of the CSC, rendered a legal basis different from that given by the CSC, to wit: In numerous cases citing Section 20 and Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative that the President of the Philippines has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. Hence, being the alter ego of the President of the Philippines, the Board of Directors of the private respondent-appellee is authorized by law to have a continuous power to reorganize its agency. Demigillo filed before this Court a petition for review assailing the CA decision, asserting that the CA gravely erred in holding that the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President who had the continuing authority to reorganize TIDCORP. ISSUE: WON the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President and had the continuing authority to reorganize TIDCORP. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 328 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW RULING:TIDCORP argues for the application of the doctrine of qualified political agency, contending that the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP, an attached agency of the Department of Finance whose head, the Secretary of Finance, was an alter ego of the President, were also the acts of the President. TIDCORP’s argument is unfounded. The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior.In said case, the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found him guilty of bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to the President the suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the recommendation, the Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his suspension, asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office because there was no specific law granting such power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was empowered to suspend local government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his suspension, holding that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the Secretary of Interior. Justice Laurel, writing for the Court, opined: After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of the principle of qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for acts of any member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts. The implications, it is said, are serious. Fear, however, is no valid argument against the system once adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with the essential background of the type of Government established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation. With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 329 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President’s bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority." The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office. But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other members of the Board were the three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come from the export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch the application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly inferred. Nonetheless, we uphold the 2002 reorganization and declare it valid for being done in accordance with the exclusive and final authority expressly granted under Republic 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 330 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Act No. 8494, further amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, the law creating TIDCORP itself. BUKLOD vs ZAMORA FACTS: Former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued E.O No. 127 establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the Ministry of Finance. President Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 225, providing, among others, that the EIIB "shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs." Eleven years after, President Joseph Estrada issued E.O No. 191 entitled "Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau." Motivated by the fact that "the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other existing agencies of the government" and that "there is a need to constantly monitor the overlapping of functions" among these agencies, former President Estrada ordered the deactivation of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation. Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 196 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force "Aduana." Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before this Court invoking our power of judicial review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive orders is: (a) a violation of their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 331 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Arguing in behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys the totality of the executive power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he has the authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said executive orders were issued in the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was not "abolished," it was only "deactivated." ISSUES: a) Does the President have the authority to reorganize the executive department? and, b) How should the reorganization be carried out? RULING:Surely, there exists a distinction between the words "deactivate" and "abolish." To "deactivate" means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, while to "abolish" means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently. Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are both reorganization measures. The Solicitor General only invokes the above distinctions on the mistaken assumption that the President has no power to abolish an office. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999 General Appropriations Act), 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 332 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW "Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act." Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), “ the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.” For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President's continuing authority to reorganize. An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the government. The idea is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole set of personnel and facilities. Lastly, we hold that petitioners' right to security of tenure is not violated. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 333 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW SECRETARY vs MABALOT FACTS:DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin, directing the transfer of regional functions of that office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202. Moreover, the organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a concurrent capacity subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office. However, Respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against petitioner and LTFRB Chairman Lantin praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and without effect.” Thereafter, on 29 January 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-1025 stating that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), the DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by virtue of Executive Order No. 220 is hereby established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office. Further, it stated that the budgetary requirement for this purpose shall come from the Department until such time that its appropriate budget is included in the General Appropriations Act. On 03 April 1997, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition assailing the validity of Department Order No. 97-1025. On 31 March 1999, the lower court rendered a decision the decretal portion of which rendered declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-733 and 97-1025 of the DOTC Secretary null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or employment in the Government. ISSUE: the issue of validity of the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 334 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW RULING:Respondent Mabalot principally argues that “a transfer of the powers and functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or the establishment of the latter as an LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional” for being “an undue exercise of legislative power.” We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President - through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB. At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public officers that a public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit, either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law. Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been settled by decisions of the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department. hus, at various times, Congress has vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and redistribute functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be within the authority of the President. In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, through an Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. In the case before us, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the President. Emphatically the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not merely authorize but directed, in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR. To us, Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and unequivocal directive and mandate - no less than from the Chief Executive - ordering the heads of government departments and bureaus to effect the establishment of their respective 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 335 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW regional offices in the CAR. By the Chief Executive’s unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36 ordering his alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, the President, in effect, deemed it fit and proper under the circumstances to act and exercise his authority, albeit through the various Department Secretaries, so as to put into place the organizational structure and set-up in the CAR and so as not to compromise in any significant way the performance of public functions and delivery of basic government services in the Cordillera Administrative Region. Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates: "The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." By definition, control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law. From the purely legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the President since they are merely his alter ego. It is then clear that the lower court’s pronouncement - that the transfer of powers and functions and in effect, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, may not be validly made by the Chief Executive, much less by his mere alter ago and could only be properly effected through a law enacted by Congress -is to say the least, erroneous. DENR V. DENR EMPLOYEES FACTS: DENR Region XII Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Executive Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles. ISSUES: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 336 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same. CONSTANTINO V. CUISA FACTS: During the Aquino regime, the administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 337 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional. Exception: There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy). There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. RUFINO V. ENDRIGA 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 338 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Facts: Petitioners in GR No. 139565, led by Baltazar N. Endriga (the Endriga group),were appointed members of the board of trustees of the Cultural Center of thePhilippines (CCP) by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the qualification thattheir appointments would extend only until December 31, 1998. On December 22,1998, then President Joseph Estrada advised petitioners that they were being replacedby seven new appointees to the CCP board, led by Armita B. Rufino (the Rufinogroup). Having been dislodged from the CCP, Endriga filed quo warranto proceedingsquestioning the President’s authority to appoint new members in the CCP board. It was alleged that under Section 6(b)[1] of Presidential Decree No. 15, vacancies in the board “shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x xx.” The Endriga group claimed that it was only when the board was entirely vacant that the President of the Philippines may fill the vacancies, in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. The members of the group believed that since only one seat was vacant, President Estrada could not appoint a new board. They averred that presidential appointment was unjustified, since the CCP board still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill any vacancy in the board by election. On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the quo warranto Petition. It declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the CCP board. The CA held that Section 6(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) 15 had clearly vested in the remaining members of the board the power to elect new trustees. It ruled that the President could exercise the power to appoint only when the board was entirely vacant. In its appeal before this Court, the Rufino group asserted that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which authorized the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees, should be declared unconstitutional. The provision was allegedly repugnant to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than the appointing power. Issue: The lone issue was whether Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was unconstitutional in the light of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Ruling: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 339 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW At the outset, the Court recognized the occurrence of a supervening event that could have rendered the case moot – the resignation of the Rufino group and the appointment of new CCP trustees by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court, however, deemed it best to pass upon the merits of the case, in order to prevent a repeat of this regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by internecine politics. Moreover, the Court brushed aside procedural barriers, in view of the paramount importance of the constitutional issues involved. By a vote of 10-3,[2] the Court held that Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was irreconcilable with Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. The clear and categorical language of Section 6 (b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. It is only when the board becomes entirely vacant that the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines, acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, Section 6 (b) empowers the remaining trustees of the board to fill the vacancies by electing their fellow trustees. Simply put, this provision authorizes the appointing officer to appoint an officer who will be equal in rank to the former. In its Decision, the Court held that the power of appointment granted in Section 6 (b) of PD 15 transgressed Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.[3] It explained that the power to appoint – vested by Section 16 in the President; or the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards – was restricted only to officers lower in rank. This constitutional provision clearly excluded a situation in which the appointing officers appointed an officer who would be equal to them in rank. This latter situation, however, was present in the CCP, whose trustees were appointing new co-trustees who would be equal in rank to the former. Thus, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, insofar as it violated the constitutional mandate that the head of the board may be authorized to appoint lowerranking officers only. Further, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution authorized Congress to vest specifically in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards – and in no other person – the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. The word “heads” referred to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards, not to their members, for several reasons. First, the 1935, the 1973, and the 1987 Constitutions made a clear distinction whenever the power to appoint lower-ranked officers was granted to the members of or the head of a collegial body. When conferring the power of appointment to the members of that collegial body, our past and present Constitutions used the phrases “in the courts,” “courts,” “the Supreme Court,”“members of the Cabinet,” and “the Constitutional Commissions.” Thus, if the intention was to grant to members of a commission or board the power to appoint lower-ranked officials, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution should have used the phrase “in the commissions or boards.” But in sharp contrast, 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 340 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW this provision vested the power “in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.” Second, the deliberations of the present Constitution revealed that the framers had intended the phrase “in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards” to be an enumeration of offices whose heads may be vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Thus, in the enumeration, what applied to the first office applied also to the succeeding offices mentioned. Third, all commissions or boards had chief executives who were their heads. Since the Constitution spoke of “heads” of office, and all commissions or boards had chief executives or heads, that word could have referred only to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards. Given that the word “heads” referred to the commission or board chairpersons, not members, the Court ruled that the head of the CCP was the chairperson of the CCP board of trustees. This conclusion was further supported by the fact that Section 8 of PD 15 and Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the CCP recognized that its board chairperson – as the head of the CCP – had the power to appoint, remove, and discipline all officers, staff and personnel of the CCP. Pursuant to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, the chairperson of the CCP board, as the head of the CCP, was the only officer who could be vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP. Section 6 (b) of PD 15 could not validly grant this power of appointment to the members of the CCP board, as they were not the head of the CCP. Moreover, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, because it ran afoul of the President’s power of control under Section 17 of Article VII of the Constitution. It was noted that the CCP was an agency that fell under the Executive Branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency “not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department” fell “under the Office of the President.”[12] Since the CCP did not fall under the Legislative or the Judicial Branch of government and was not an independent constitutional or quasi-judicial body or local government unit, then the CCP necessarily fell under the Executive Branch and should be subject to the President’s control. However, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15, by authorizing the trustees of the CCP board to fill its vacancies, insulated the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President. This authority made the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the Chief Executive. Such public office or board could not legally exist under the present Constitution. The legislature could not have validly enacted a law that would put a government office in the Executive Branch outside the control of the President. While the charter of the CCP vested it with autonomy of policy and operation, this charter did not free it from the President’s control. As part of the Executive Branch, the CCP could not be cut off from that control in the guise of insulating the latter from presidential influence. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 341 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW MMDA V VIRON TRANSPORT G.R. NO. 170656 AUGUST 15, 2007 J. Carpio Morales Facts: GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to “decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system.” The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didn’t have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDA’s power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act. Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether (1) the MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality. Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act. MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 342 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons. Issues: 1. Is there a justiciable controversy? 2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional? Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed. Ratio: 1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law. Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.’s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents. 2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private investment in the development of the country’s intermodal transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 343 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. MMDA’s move didn’t satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads. Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive? De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 344 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities. GANZON V. CA FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 345 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension. JOSON V TORRES FACTS: Privaterespondents filed a letter-complaint charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority because they alleged that they were at the provincial capitol for SangguniangPanlalawigan when petitioner barged in, kicked the door and chairs and uttered threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area. Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecijaobtain a loan from the Philippine National Bank. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province. Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his] verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with such documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt." Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence. The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the letter-complaint. For failure to file an answer after three extensions, in which the DILG also informed him that his "failure to submit answer will be considered a waiver and that the plaintiff [shall] be allowed to present his evidence ex-parte," the petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later filed “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation” and prayed that a formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23 and submitted a "Manifestation and Motion" before the DILG reiterating his right to a formal investigation; DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay. ISSUES: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 346 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 1. Whether or not Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that rules of procedure and evidence should not be strictly applied in the Administrative Disciplinary; 2. Whether or not the resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG; RULING: 1. Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office. An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government office. In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the lettercomplaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code. He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that private respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with the Office of the President. To prove his allegations, petitioner submitted: (a) the sworn statement of private respondent attesting to the alleged fact that after the letter-complaint was filed, Vice-Governor Tinio made her and the other members of the SangguniangPanlalawigan sign an additional page which he had later notarized; and (b) the fact that the verification of the letter-complaint and the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not indicate the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the notary public before whom they were made. We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence of the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries may constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in complying with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. They may give grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission. But they do not indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President. Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita C. Santos. Private respondent Santos was one of the signatories to the lettercomplaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that she be dropped as one of the complainants since she had just joined the political party of petitioner Joson. She decided to reveal the intercalation because she was disillusioned with the "dirty tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab power from petitioner Joson. Private respondent Santos cannot in any way be considered an unbiased witness. Her motive and change of heart render her affidavit suspect. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 347 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. The court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served. 2. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority. PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 348 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS:On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372 which is the “ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998.” Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation." ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent is valid; 2. Whether or not Section 4of AO 372, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, is valid; RULING: 1. Valid. The provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1. 2. Invalid. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. The LGUs IRA shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. Sec. 4 of AO 372 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA in the country clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back or withheld, often temporarily.” Hence, the “temporary” nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. Sec. 4 of AO 372 effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. BITO-ONON V FERNANDEZ 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 349 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW FACTS:Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Tacras, Narra Palawan and is the Municipal LigaChapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. Respondent Quejano Jr., on the other hand, is theduly elected Barangay Chairman of Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President ofMagsaysay, Palawan. Both Bito-Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the LigangmgaBarangay Provincial Chapter in the province of Palawan.Bito-Onon was the proclaimed winner prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Boardof Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him. Not satisfied with the decision of BES, Quejano filed a petition for review of the decision of BES. On 1999, Onon filed a petition to dismiss thereview raising the issue of jurisdiction. The latter claimed that RTC has no jurisdiction to review the BES’decision in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Ligangmga Barangay Election ofOfficers and Directors . In his motion to dismiss, Bito-Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the1997 guidelines for the Ligangmga Barangay Election issued by the DILG in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an Ultra Vires actand is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga’s Internal Organization. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the questioned provision in Memorandum Circular 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary in excess of his authority; 2. Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the ligangmga barangay, which is not a local government unit? RULING: 1. Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which were delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992. The Presidents power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution. The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. 2. We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the ligangmga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code[21] defines the ligangmga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.[22] The liga shall 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 350 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Ligangmga Barangay. NATIONAL LIGA V PAREDES FACTS: Manuel A. Rayos, Punong Barangay in Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages against Alex L. David then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Ligangmga Barangay National Chapter, after David allegedly committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Ligangmga Barangay elections in 1997. One of these irregularities was that the deadline of the filig of the Certificate of Candidacy was set on the third day prior to the election day and Rayos failed to meet the deadline because he failed to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed to be a delegate, to vote and be voted for in the Liga election. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975.[5 Respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the SangguniangPanlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.[7] Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion,[11] invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and seeking the following reliefs: The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the DILG Secretary exercises the power of general supervision over all government units by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18 February 1992; (2) the Ligangmga Barangay is a government organization; (3) undue interference by some local elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of the Ligangmga Barangay; (4) improper issuance of confirmations of the elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David and the National LigaBoard; (5) the need for the DILG to provide remedies measured in view of the confusion and chaos sweeping the LigangmgaBarangayand the incapacity of the National Liga Board to address the problems properly. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 351 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176.[15] It cited the reported violations of the Ligangmga Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David and widespread chaos and confusion among local government officials as to who were the qualified ex-officio Liga members in their respective sangunians. [16] Pending the appointment of the DILG as the Interim Caretaker of the Ligangmga Barangay by the court and until the officers and board members of the national Liga Chapter have been elected and have assumed office, the Memorandum Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice mayors, members of the sangguniangpanlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional directors and other concerned officers, ISSUE: Whether or not the Liga is a government organization subject to the DILG Secretary’s power of supervision over local governments as the alter ego of the President; RULING: Yes. The barangay is positioned to influence and direct the development of the entire country. The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this new development approach materialize and produce results. The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city, and provincial levels, automatically become ex-officio members of the Sangguniang Bayan, SangguniangPanlungsod and SangguniangPanlalawigan, respectively. In the Bita-onon case, theDOJ ruled that the Ligangmga Barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league, or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The primary purpose of determining the representation of the Liga in the Sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystalizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. MANALO V SISTOZA FACTS: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before said officers can take their office. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 352 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation; 2. Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional; RULINGS: 1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 353 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 380 SCRA 49 Facts: The COMELEC En Banc appointed petitioner as the “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Sometime after, President Arroyo appointed, ad interim, the respondents herein as Comelec Chairman and Comelec Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments of the respondents for confirmation. However, the commissions did not act on said appointments. Once more, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments for the respondents and made them took their oaths for the second time. Again, the Office transmitted their appointments to the Commission for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on their appointments. Thus, the President renewed against the ad interim appointments of the respondents to the same positions. The Office submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission. They took their oaths of office anew. In his capacity as Comelec Chairman, the respondent issued a memorandum addressed to petitioner to be reassigned to the Law Department. The petitioner asked for a reconsideration of her reassignment but was denied of it. Hence, the petition herein questioning the validity of the appointment of the respondents. Issue: (1) Whether or not the ad interim appointment to the Comelec is a temporary appointment that is prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. (2) Assuming the first ad interim appointment is valid, whether or not the renewal of the ad interim appointments of the respondents is a violation of Section1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution Holding: (1) No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution uses the word “effective only until.” Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. (2) A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 354 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows: "Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission." Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment. SORIANO VS. LISTA 399 S 437 Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA. Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power. Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). PIMENTEL VS ERMITA 472 S 587 Facts: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 355 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty Issue: whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President. Holding: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treatymaking process in this wise: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 356 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties. Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration. If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state. Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them. The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature. Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 357 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense. It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate. QUINTOS-DELES COMMISSIONS 177 S 259 VS THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL Facts: Due to the opposition of some congressmen-member of the Commission on Appointments, the Petitioner and three others were unable to take their seats as Sectoral Representatives, as appointed by the President. Issue: The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 358 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Holding: Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as follows: SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the BERMUDEZ VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES 311 S 733 Facts: The validity and legality of the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit to the post of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac by then President Fidel V. Ramos is assailed in this petition on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit. Holding: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 359 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, reiterated in Flores vs.Drilon, this Court has held: The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power . . Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof. When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all "executive departments, bureaus and offices." Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary," found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA V SALONGA FACTS:On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights. Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and members of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting an independent office, as mandated by the Constitution, the President of the Philippines extended to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment, petitioner Bautista was advised by the President that she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 360 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW of the Commission on Human Rights, requiring her to furnish the office of the President and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her oath of office. On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice of this Court, petitioner Bautista took her oath of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista discharged the functions and duties of the Office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which, as previously stated, she had originally held merely in an acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987. On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission on Appointments' Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her presence at a meeting of the Commission on Appointments Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9 A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City that would deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. 8 On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating, for the reasons therein given, why she considered the Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Notwithstanding that, the Commission on Appointments disapproved petitioner Bautista’s “ad interim appointment” as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner requires the confirmation of the Commission of Appointments; 2. Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner is an ad interim appointment; RULING: 1. No. Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, is to be made without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 361 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by la to appoint.” 2. No. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments. IN RE: WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, 251 SCRA 709, G.R. NO. 122338 DECEMBER 29, 1995 Facts: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres was convicted by final judgement of two counts of estafa some time before 1979. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President on the condition that petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines,” which he accepted. He was released from confinement. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued “by authority of the President” an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife and children of convicted felon, Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, praying for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President’s prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of the pardonee’s right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus meritorious. Held: There is no adequate basis for the Court to oblige the petition. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order “the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 362 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.” It is now a wellentrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise no basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. PEOPLE VS. CASIDO, 269 SCRA 360, G.R. NO. 116512 MARCH 7, 1997 Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accusedappellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for conditional pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC), while their appeals were pending before the Supreme Court. The PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accusedappellants were granted conditional pardon. After their release, they filed for a Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the Supreme Court which the latter denied. The Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants. Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is valid. Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 363 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts in o oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and this case is dismissed with costs de oficio. The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon and of its Secretariat are admonished to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duty to save the President from any embarrassment in the exercise of his power to grant pardon or parole. PEOPLE VS. PARIARCA, JR., 341 SCRA 464, G.R. NO. 135457 SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 Facts: Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC. Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs. Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accusedappellant? Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 364 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder. Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are ordered DISMISSED. MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 673 SCRA 651, G.R. NO. 190793 JUNE 19, 2012 Facts: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO. Issue:Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means? 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 365 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW Held: COMELEC’s Resolutions are sustained. To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC: x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties. x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation." Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist. The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable. DISMISSED BARRIOQUINTO ET AL. VS. FERNANDEZ ET AL., 82 PHIL. 642, NO. L1278 JANUARY 21, 1949 Facts: Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14thAmnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 366 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to them. Issue: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty. Held: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.” Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits. CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR Facts: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 367 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW The CFI of Rizal found respondent Santos guilty of estafa and was confined in the provincial jail for 6 months. However, he continued to be a registered elector in the city of Malabon, Rizal and was seated as the municipal president from 1934 to 1937. On 1938, Commonwealth Act No 357 or the Election Code, was approved by the National Assembly. Section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been “declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property.” In view of this provision, the respondent applied to the President for an absolute pardon. Upon favorable recommendation of the Sec of Justice, the President granted the petition on 1939, restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility. On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Santos from the list of voters in precinct no. 11 of Malabon, Rizal on the ground that the latter is disqualified under par (b) of Sec 94 of the Election Code. After hearing, the court denied the petition for exclusion and declared that the pardon extended in favor of respondent has had the effect pf excluding him from the disqualification created by the Election Code. Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of the court. Issue: Whether or not the pardoning power of the President applies to legislative prohibitions? And consequently, whether or not the pardoning power exercised here would amount to an unlawful exercise of the President of a legislative function? Held: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative of the President: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 368 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In this case, the disability is the result of the conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment, which the law imposes upon those who violates its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such left of the consequences of conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the Election Code, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of his pardoning power not contemplated in the Constitution and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. PELOBELLO V. PALATINO Facts: Respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon. The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights Issue: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office. Held: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the GovGen. The pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 369 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in question. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50 The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Issues: 1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay? 2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment? 3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence? Held: 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 370 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. 2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. 3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. TORRES V. GONZALES Facts: In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 371 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: The SC affirmed the following: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 372 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW LLAMAS V. EXECUTIVE Facts: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases. Issue: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. Held: Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government. 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 373 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision. LANSANG V. GARCIA 42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971 Facts: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites. Issue: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional. Held: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the Supreme Court declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in August 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the Supreme Court unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE 121 SCRA 472 Facts: The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PC/INP raiding team know. It is alleged in the herein petition that the arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since it was effected without any warrant of arrest and further alleged that respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel, averring that the detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention.Hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ 1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN ‘17 - ‘18 374 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW of habeas corpus. Issue:Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid? Held: The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was once again held as discretionary in the president. The Supreme Court again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection. IBP V. ZAMORA G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 Facts: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000(the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of the Philippine marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution, in that no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment is in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution. Issue:Whether or not the President committed grace abuse of discretion in calling