Futures 153 (2023) 103237
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Futures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
Toward a new stage for the epistemology of futures studies:
Exploring social epistemology
Ali Chaparak
Foresight and Policy Research Department, Niroo Research Institute, Tehran Province, Tehran
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords:
Futures Studies
Epistemology
Social Epistemology
Scientific Community
Testimony
Justification
This article aims to enhance the epistemology of futures studies by utilizing the perspective of
social epistemology. Its objective is to address epistemological questions in futures studies,
including the nature, sources, means of acquisition, and justification of futures knowledge. It
argues that by establishing a robust scientific community, futures studies can be defended as a
science within the framework of social epistemology. The social construction and institutional
structure of epistemological sources for futures knowledge are as crucial as the evidence itself,
and it is necessary to pay more attention to testimony as one of the sources of futures knowledge.
Futures studies requires reliable knowledge production processes to acquire and justify futures
knowledge.
1. Introduction
1.1. The stormy weather: Paving the way for a new era
Enriching epistemological foundations of any scientific field is an inevitable necessity. The field of futures studies is no exception
here. The need to consider its epistemological issues through initiating in-depth discourse with last achievements of humanities and
social science, has been and still is underlined by the scholars of this field (Da Costa et al., 2008; Inayatullah, 2001; Sardar, 2010;
Voros, 2007). Epistemology is a field that is involved with the following four issues; the nature, sources, ways of acquiring and
justifying of futures knowledge (Steup & Neta, 2005). There are several published materials about the epistemology of futures studies
(Aligica, 2003; Aligica & Herritt, 2009; Bell, 1996, 2009; Galtung, 1972; Inayatullah, 1990, 2001; Olick, 1989; Sonk, 2015; Tapio &
Hietanen, 2002; Voros, 2007, 2008); which have made significant contributions to the field. However, it seems there are two issues
that require more exploration;.
1.2. Establishing the scientific nature of futures studies
A crucial area where futures studies struggles is in demonstrating its scientific nature. The challenge arises from trying to reconcile
the traditional epistemology framework with futures studies’ epistemology. Traditional epistemology focuses on individualistic and
experiential approaches to the acquisition of knowledge through perception or introspection - to the acquisition of personal experience
as a prime source of knowledge. Science, as the main type of knowledge, is subject to this rule, and therefore being scientific in
traditional epistemology is based on a kind of empiricism (affirmativism or falsificationism). However, in the philosophy of science,
E-mail address: achaparak@nri.ac.ir.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2023.103237
Received 13 February 2023; Received in revised form 25 June 2023; Accepted 17 August 2023
Available online 19 August 2023
0016-3287/© 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Futures 153 (2023) 103237
A. Chaparak
the three theses of the theory-ladenness of observations (Boyd & Bogen, 2021) the underdetermination of scientific theories by
empirical evidence (Stanford, 2023), and Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis (Kuhn, 1962) have shown that experience does not have
the high status claimed by traditional epistemology; For, according to the theory-ladenness of observations, experiences are based on
theories that claim to test them; or, in a weaker case, based on the underdetermination thesis, an experience can ultimately show that
part of our reasoning is flawed, however, it cannot determine which part of our reasoning or assumptions is false. Therefore, it is the
scientific community that reaches a "consensus" on how to interpret an experience or makes a "decision" on which part of reasoning or
assumptions is responsible for the failure of the experiment. Due to this reason, the project of demarcation of science from non-science
has failed within traditional epistemology, as Loudan discussed the demise of the demarcation problem (Laudan, 1983), and Feyer­
abend argued for the lack of distinction between science and fairy tales (Feyerabend, 1977). Therefore, it becomes challenging to
uphold the scientific nature of futures studies within the framework of traditional epistemology considering the above-mentioned
theses, similar to Bell’s defense of Popperian falsificationism or Fergnani & Chermack from traditional form of scientific theory
(Bell, 2009; Fergnani & Chermack, 2021).
1.3. Connecting futures studies’ epistemology to its values, goals, and praxis
While traditional epistemology regards personal experience as a primary source of knowledge alongside perception, futures studies,
an interdisciplinary field that thrives on the active among participants, placing emphasis on communication with others to acquire
knowledge (Dator, 2019). The discussions regarding futures studies’ epistemology have overlooked testimony as a valuable source of
knowledge. Therefore, futures studies’ epistemological investigations have not been able to find a close connection with its meth­
odological and practical issues. Overcoming this challenge requires recognizing the significance of testimony as an essential
component of futures studies’ epistemology. This better aligns with futures studies values, goals, and aspirations that deeply resonate
among professionals working within the field.
Therefore, futures studies requires an epistemological framework that, firstly, allows for the defense of its scientific nature,
incorporating the latest advances in epistemology, philosophy of science, and social and human sciences in general (Keenan & Barre,
2008). Additionally, testimony should be considered as a vital part of futures studies’ knowledge sources to establish a more consistent
and harmonious relationship with the field’s values, goals, methods, and practices.
1.4. Towards a new paradigm: Embracing social epistemology
The emerging framework for the epistemology of futures studies is rooted in the sociological turn within the field of science studies,
shifting "from science as a system of ideas or beliefs produced by a social institution to a conceptualization of science as a set of
practices… The focus on practices signaled an interest in patterned activities rather than rules, in speech and discourse rather than
language as a structure, in questions about the use of instruments or ideas in a particular location and situation rather than in universal
knowledge, in production and intervention rather than representation, and science as a mode of working and doing things in and to the
world rather than as a system of propositions arranged into theories" (Hackett et al., 2008). Related to epistemology, this sociological
turn encompasses two associated paths that are closely related: the first explores the possibility of avoiding relativism and anarchism
while supporting the goals of traditional epistemology (objectivity, justification, and truth) through a social approach which is "Social
Epistemology" (Haddock et al., 2010). The second path addresses other epistemological goals and explains the means to achieve them,
such as the Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2007).
Social epistemology gets its distinctive character by standing in contrast with what might be dubbed “individual” epistemology.
Epistemology, in general, is concerned with how people should go about the business of trying to determine what is true, or
what are the facts of the matter, on selected topics. In the case of individual epistemology, the person or agent in question who
seeks the truth is a single individual who undertakes the task all by himself/herself, without consulting others. By contrast social
epistemology is, in the first instance, an enterprise concerned with how people can best pursue the truth (whichever truth is in
question) with the help of, or in the face of, others. It is also concerned with truth acquisition by groups, or collective agents (A.
Goldman & O’Connor, 2001).
According to social epistemology, the elusive nature of objectivity, truth, and justification in traditional epistemology drives from
its individualistic and philosophical approaches. Traditional epistemology aims to ensure how individual abstract minds would attain
objectivity and truth through a philosophical approach, often resulting in dead-ends. In contrast, social epistemology argues that
objectivity and truth are accessible to groups through a social approach. An illustrative example of accessing truth collectively through
a social approach is demonstrated in Francis Galton’s experiment on estimating the weight of an ox; Around 800 participants were
invited to estimate the weight of a displayed ox, and while few participants had accurate individual estimates, the average estimate
was 1197 pounds, nearly identical to the true weight of the ox, 1198 pounds.
The mathematical explanation for the ability of a group to arrive at the truth is provided by Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT). The
CJT states that if each voter in an electorate is more likely to individually hold a true opinion in a two-option choice, aligning the group
judgment with the majority judgment increases the group’s likelihood of being correct compared to any individual. As the size of the
electorate increases, the probability of the majority being correct approaches 1.0 as an asymptote (Haddock et al., 2010). However, it is
worth noting that the CJT also considers another aspect; if the independent probability of each participant holding an opinion is less
than 50 %, increasing the number of participants would increase the probability of arriving at a false answer. Social epistemology
offers solutions to enhance the probability of reaching the correct answer up to 50 %, and two solutions have been proposed to
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A. Chaparak
eliminate the possibility of below-50 % participation: (1) assigning weights to participants, although this naturally raises the issue of
"expertize", and (2) adopting a negotiation-oriented and deliberative democratic pattern of participation rather than a representative
one. The key takeaway is to acknowledge the feasibility of acquiring knowledge by embracing a social approach. However, it is crucial
to recognize the distinction between these examples and the central questions of futures studies’ epistemology. These examples serve
as illuminating illustrations to generate initial insights, rather than serving as an ontological foundation for futures studies. Further
exploration in future research is necessary to establish more robust bases.
In essence, the social approach teaches us that science is a social activity conducted within the social institution of science, and the
path to truth, objectivity, and justification is accessible through participatory and deliberative democratic processes. This under­
standing of science and its workings transforms our overall perspective on science and knowledge generation. The significance of social
factors in science, such as the reward and punishment system, the structure of dialog, and democratic patterns within science, becomes
apparent, as they significantly contribute to the quantity and quality of knowledge generation. When we perceive science as a social
institution with democratic goals and methodologies, all democratic elements, including methods of participation, minority rights,
freedom of speech, transparency, power structures, and the reward and punishment system, take on epistemological significance as
they greatly contribute to knowledge acquisition. These social elements represent the values and characteristics of futures studies and
foresight (Dator, 2019).
Social epistemology has the potential to provide fresh insights into futures studies, whether by understanding its internal mech­
anisms through an examination of its epistemological foundations or by exploring its methods of communication with the broader
world and practical application. Furthermore, considering the originality of social epistemology as a scientific field and the trans­
disciplinary potential of futures studies, futures studies can become a trailblazer for democracy in science and serve as a model for
democratic science. The Science and Democracy Network at Harvard University and the perspectives of Jasanoff may be particularly
valuable in this regard (Jasanoff, 2005). It is also conceivable for futures studies to develop a democracy index for science, following in
the footsteps of The Democracy Index (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016), and serve as a model for adherence to such an index.
1.5. The first performance: Futures studies social epistemology
In the realm of futures studies, it is important to establish a framework for social epistemology as the foundation of its own
epistemology. While comprehensive research is needed to answer fundamental epistemological questions in futures studies, such as the
nature of futures studies, its epistemological sources, the generation of knowledge about the futures, and the justification of such
knowledge, initial alternative understandings and potential answers can be offered from the perspective of social epistemology.
2. Nature of futures studies
The nature of futures studies has often been questioned, particularly whether it is considered a science or a non-science. Previous
attempts to answer this question have largely been approached from a philosophical standpoint, attempting to align it with established
paradigms in the philosophy of science and traditional epistemology. However, given the difficulties in defining science and the
subjective nature of such categorizations, these approaches have inherent epistemological flaws, as mentioned above. From the
standpoint of social epistemology, science is determined by the scientific community itself, so whether or not a field is scientific
depends on the existence or non-existence of its scientific community. Therefore, whether futures studies is considered a science or not
becomes a historical, social, and context-dependent question. It can be scientific in one context where a scientific community has
formed around it, while in another context, it may not be considered as such. The scientific nature of futures studies is not an a priori
attribute but rather a posteriori, emerging through efforts to establish a scientific community.
Considering the social nature of futures studies and adopting a democratic perspective, insights can be drawn from well-known
theories in Science and Technology Studies (STS). History has shown that taking a social approach to science leads to the emer­
gence of a techno-science system rather than a pure science system, highlighting the role of technology in science and knowledge.
Within the framework of "technological turns," (Woolgar, 1991) a more relevant question regarding the nature of futures studies
should be posed: Is futures studies a science or a skill? By considering the relationship between "knowing how" and "knowing why,"
(Fantl, 2017) as well as the concepts of "techne" and "episteme," (Parry, 2003) and recognizing the interplay between science and
technology, a more suitable understanding of the nature of futures studies can be developed. This approach moves beyond dichotomies
such as descriptive vs. design science (Niiniluoto, 2001), pure vs. applied science (Dator, 1996), and science vs. art (Bell, 2009).
This social understanding of the nature of futures studies opens up further avenues for research. By associating "knowing how" with
prediction and "knowing why" with explanation, a new perspective on the relationship between explanation and prediction and their
role in futures studies can be explored. There are two distinct models regarding this relationship:
1. The symmetrical model, influenced by Hempel, considers prediction as a form of explanation that pertains to the future (Nell &
Hempel, 1968). An advocate of this reading, Bell maintains: Any scientific explanation can be restated as a prediction (Bell, 2009, p.
177).
2. The asymmetrical model views prediction and explanation as independent from each other. Some sciences, like meteorology, may
possess predictive power without strong explanatory capabilities, while other sciences, like evolutionary biology, may exhibit the
opposite.
As an example of this asymmetric understanding of the relationship between explanation and prediction, Aligica argues that futures
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A. Chaparak
studies can be regarded as a predictive science lacking explanatory power (Aligica, 2003). One popular interpretation of the Delphi
Method, which was developed by Olaf Helmer, is a clear-cut example based on this asymmetric model (Aligica & Herritt, 2009). From
the social epistemological perspective, this symmetrical/asymmetrical dichotomy has been derived from the relationship between
explanation and prediction based on a philosophical understanding of truth and justification in science. It is possible to overcome this
dichotomy and present a more coherent reading by adopting a social approach toward science based on the social understanding of
truth and justification since explanation and prediction are not necessarily essential components of science.
2.1. Knowledge sources of futures studies
In the realm of futures studies, scholars have discussed the epistemological sources that contribute to the field. Different authors
have proposed various sources of knowledge for futures studies. For example, Bell identifies seven epistemological sources, including
people’s images and expectations of the future, beliefs about likely futures, goals, values, present intentions to act, obligations and
commitments to others, knowledge of the past, and knowledge of the present (Bell, 2009). Dator, on the other hand, suggests four
epistemological sources: events, trends, images, and actions (Dator, 2019).
In the broader field of epistemology, five sources of knowledge are typically proposed: perception, introspection, memory, reason,
and testimony (Steup & Neta, 2005). It seems that testimony is a significant source of human knowledge, but it has received less
attention in the epistemology of futures studies. There are important questions to explore regarding the nature of relying on testimony:
Is testimony a reliable source of knowledge? Under what circumstances and through what mechanisms should one trust testimony?
These questions require further research in the field of futures studies.
From the perspective of social epistemology, two other points can be made regarding the epistemological sources of futures studies.
Firstly, the construction of evidence about the futures is as important as the evidence itself; the ways in which evidence is constructed
should be carefully considered (Fuller & Loogma, 2009; Mermet et al., 2009). Secondly, futures studies scholars have given limited
attention to the institutional structure of epistemological sources in the field. This oversight should be addressed and rectified.
2.2. Generation and justification of futures knowledge
Regarding the generation and justification of futures-related knowledge, social epistemology suggests that justification is based on
the reliability of the knowledge production process. If individual beliefs are justified, then the process of generating collective belief
relies on individual beliefs and the structure of the scientific community, including the distribution of power. A knowledge production
process is considered reliable when the ratio of true beliefs to total beliefs is very high (Goldman, 2014; Goldman & O’Connor, 2001).
While a detailed discussion of the justification of futures knowledge from the perspective of social epistemology requires inde­
pendent research, it can be seen that futures studies aligns with the values of being process-oriented and emphasizing diverse
stakeholder participation. From the standpoint of social epistemology, futures studies is on the right track in terms of its epistemology,
as its approaches, values, and goals are compatible with the latest epistemological advancements. However, there is room for
improvement, and futures studies should revise itself within the framework of social epistemology. It should particularly focus on
issues such as creating a reliable knowledge production process for futures knowledge, exploring the epistemology of collective agents,
investigating judgment aggregation, and embracing collective justification.
A common claim in futures studies’ ontology is that "future facts do not exist," which is considered one of the fallacies in futures
studies (Milojević, 2021). While this ontological claim has been challenged by Poli in the philosophical tradition of science by referring
to dispositional properties and challenging the non-existence of future facts (Poli, 2012, 2015), it can be examined from a social
epistemological perspective. The ontological understanding of future facts arises from three philosophical assumptions: (1) a naive
realism perspective that assumes an independent reality, (2) an object/subject-oriented structure of epistemology based on corre­
spondence between subject and object, and (3) the notion that epistemology and ontology can be considered independently. However,
these assumptions can be challenged from a social epistemological perspective, particularly through Latour’s Actor-Network Theory
(ANT). According to social epistemology, the “correspondence model” of science does not provide an accurate understanding of
knowledge acquisition since futures facts are social constructs and not independent of us. In ANT, individuals and their viewpoints are
considered social constructs within a network of relations. Actors, including individuals, groups, social institutions, trends, and events,
are constructed and assume identity through negotiation and translation within the network. In this view, the desired cognitive pattern
is interaction rather than correspondence. Therefore, in ANT-based social epistemology, epistemology and ontology are intertwined
rather than separated (Latour, 1987, 2007).
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, this article highlights the need for improvement in the epistemology of futures studies. Despite the existing works in
the field, the traditional epistemological framework, which focuses on single-individual knowledge acquisition through perception and
introspection, has overshadowed the importance of acquiring knowledge through testimony and group processes. Given that futures
studies is based on participation, dialog, and process, it is argued that social epistemology, with its emphasis on concepts like testi­
mony, peer disagreement, the epistemology of collective agents, judgment aggregation, group justification, and identification of ex­
perts, aligns more closely with the goals, values, and activities of futures studies.
The article also suggests that whether futures studies can be considered a science or not depends on the formation of its scientific
community. As in social epistemology science is determined by what the scientific community recognizes as science, being recognized
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A. Chaparak
as science is a historical, social, and context-dependent question. Futures studies can be regarded as a science in one context where a
scientific community has formed around it, but not in another context. Therefore, being scientific is not an inherent property of a field
but rather something that is created through efforts to establish a scientific community.
Regarding the sources of futures knowledge, the article emphasizes the need for futures studies to pay more attention to testimony
and the social construction of evidence. To acquire and justify knowledge about futures, it is vital to focus on reliable processes of
knowledge production and delve into topics such as the epistemology of collective agents, group justification, and the identification of
experts.
This article serves as an introduction to the futures studies’ social epistemology, which addresses some of its issues, and it also raises
questions that require further research. Questions such as how to determine whose testimony to trust in futures-oriented knowledge,
how to reach consensus in cases of peer disagreement, the characteristics of reliable knowledge production processes in futures studies,
the attribution and justification of group knowledge, and how to reconcile traditional epistemological concepts like truth and ob­
jectivity in futures studies, are all areas that warrant future investigation.
Declaration of Competing Interest
I have no conflicts of interest to disclose.
Data availability
No data was used for the research described in the article.
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