Persons and Family Relations
II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
1 Pesigan v, Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984
TITLE
Pesigan v, Angeles
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-64279
DATE
PONENTE
April 30, 1984
AQUINO, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelino L. Pesigan are carabao dealers
from Sipocot, Camarines Sur who are transporting 26 carabaos
and a calf to Padre Garcia, Batangas on the evening of April 2,
1982.
● They have in their possession the following:
(1) a health certificate from the provincial
veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the
Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree
No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974;
(2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under
the authority of the provincial commander; and
(3) three certificates of inspection, one from the
Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos
were not included in the list of lost, stolen and
questionable animals; one from the livestock
inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
● In spite of the permit to transport and other papers, the
carabaos were confiscated in Basud, Camarines Norte
while they are passing.
● The said confiscation was facilitated by Lieutenant Arnulfo
V. Zenarosa, the town’s police station commander, and by
Doctor Bella S. Miranda, the provincial veterinarian.
● The said confiscation was based on on the aforementioned
Executive Order No. 626-A which provides “that henceforth,
no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
●
●
●
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported
in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to
be distributed x xx to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos”
Doctor Miranda then proceed to distribute the carabaos
among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from
the Vinzons municipal nursery.
The petitioners have filed against Zenarosa and Doctor
Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the
carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of
P92,000. The action was then dismissed on April 25, 1983,
Judge Domingo Medina Angeles for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
+
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Executive Order No. 626-A was already
effective at the time when the confiscation of the carabaos of the
Pensigans on the evening of April 2, 1982?
RULING(S)
Executive Order No. 626-A is not yet effective at that
time. The court holds that the said executive order should not
be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982, because it is
a penal regulation published more than two months later in the
Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code
and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
WHEREFORE, the trial court’s order of dismissal and the
confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set
aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore
the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who
as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to
dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
2.People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523, October 12, 1984
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
People of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Regino
Veridiano II., as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and Benito Go Bio Jr.
L-62243
1984-10-12
PONENTE
Relova
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Petition for certiorari, Art. 2 of NCC, When Laws Take Effect
FACTS
- On or about and during the 2nd week of May 1979, private
respondent Benito Go Bio issued a BPI check amounting to
P200,000 to Filipinas Tan, which was dishonored for the reason
of insufficient funds. He was charged with violation of Batasang
Pambansa 22, also known as Bouncing Checks Law at the CFI
Zambales presided by the respondent judge.
- Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash, pointing out that
at the time of issuing the check, BP 22 has not yet taken effect.
- The prosecution opposed, contending that the date of the
dishonor of the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the
date of the commission of the offense. BP 22 took effect on
June 29, 1979.
- Go Bio submits that what BP 22 penalizes is not the dishonor
of the check, but its issuance without sufficient funds.
- Respondent judge resolved the motion, saying that BP 22
cannot be given retroactive effect, that Go Bio cannot be held
liable for bouncing checks prior to its effectivity.
- Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioner
contending that BP 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue
of the Official Gazette, which 15 days therefrom would be April
24, 1979, days before Go Bio issued the check.
- Respondent Go Bio argues that while it was published on April
9, it was only released on June 14, 1979.
ISSUE(S)
W/N BP 22 is in effect at the time of issuing a check by the
defendant.
RULING(S)
NO. Even though BP 22 was printed on the April 9, 1979 issue
of the Official Gazette, it was only officially released for
circulation on June 14, 1979. BP 22’s effectivity clause states
that, “This Act shall take effect 15 days after the publication in
the Official Gazette.” Hence, it took effect on June 29, 1979.
The order of the respondent judge is affirmed.
3.Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 , April 24, 1985
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
L-63915
April 24, 1985
ESCOLIN
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
PETITION to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to
the President.
FACTS
Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this
case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in
question said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not
being “aggrieved parties”.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as
to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
Court’s construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,
this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date— for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication—but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
RULING(S)
Publication in the Official Gazette is a sine qua non (a
description of a requisite or condition that is indispensable)
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity date.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have
no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether
the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit: “The
courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing
no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is “an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that “publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.” The cogency
of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that “the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication,
even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.”
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.
4.MRCA v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 344 , December 19, 1989 _ ANTONA
TITLE
GR NUMBER
MRCA, INC., petitioner, vs.
HO N. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Judge,
Regional Trial court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 168, Pasig, M.M., SPOUSES DOMINGO
SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA TIOSECO
SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION P. TIOSECO, respondents.
G.R. No. 86675
DIVISION
FIRST DIVISION
DATE
December 19, 1989
PONENTE
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS
The petitioner prays to set aside the CA decision dismissing the
complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees for
failure to specify the amounts of moral & exemplary, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered, and left
them "to the discretion of the Court" or "to be proven during
the trial."
Invoking the case of Manchester Development
Corporation vs. CA, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court in
dismissing the complaint, hence, this petition. Petitioner argues
that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published
in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling
therein was ineffective; may not be given retroactive effect
because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the
dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it
should not apply to the present case because the petitioner
herein had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the
proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case where
enormous amounts were claimed in the body of the complaint,
but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees.
Important Dates:
Manchester case’ promulgation - May 7,1987,
Complaint in this case
– March 24, 1988
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., vs. Asuncion - February
13, 1989, a case that was already
pending before Manchester was promulgated.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the publication in the Official Gazette is a prerequisite for
the effectivity of a court ruling laying down a new rule of
procedure?
RULING(S)
No. Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for
the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of
procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the
procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become
effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested
rights." (Aguillon vs. Director of Lands).
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in
that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1,
1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases
pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be
invoked in and applied to cases in which the decision had become
final before said resolution became effective.
Manchester should apply except for the fact that it
was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where the court may
allow payment of the proper filing fee "within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or
reglementary period." We quote:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
The petitioner might not have computed its damages
yet, or probably did not have the evidence to prove them at the
time it filed its complaint. In accordance with our ruling in
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may amend its
complaint for the purpose of specifying how much it claims as
damages, and to pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided
its right of action has not yet prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.
5.Yaokasin v. Commissioner, 180 SCRA 591 , December 22, 1989
TITLE
GR NUMBER
JIMMY O. YAOKASIN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS, SALVADOR M. MISON and the DISTRICT
COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF TACLOBAN, VICENTE D.
YUTANGCO, respondents.
G.R No. 84111
DATE
December 22, 1989
PONENTE
Grino-Aquino, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Publication of law; general application principle
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
Facts:
On May 27, 1988 the Philippine Coast Guard confiscated 9000
bags/sacks of refined sugar from petitioner and turned it over to
to the Bureau of Customs. Petitioner contend that the sugar was
purchased in the Philippines, having sales invoice from Jordan
Tradin of Iloilo as proof.
The District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the sugar
on June 7, 1988 but on June 14, 1988 following the transmission
of the case to the Commissioner of Customs, the former ordered
to seal the warehouse where the sugar was stored.
Petitioner then secured a writ of replevin from the RTC of Leyte.
Subsequently the respondents filed a petition to annul the grant
of replevin.
On July 15, 1988 the Collector of Customs rendered a decision
finding that the 9000 bags/sacks of sugar in question are of
foreign origin hence it was declare forfeited in favor of the
government.
Petitioner claim that the release of sugar in the decision issued
on June 7, 1988 must be upheld. Defendants of the other hand
averred that pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-87 dated
May 1987, cases involving seizures and protest should go directly
to the Commission of Customs for Automatic Review.
Petitioner contends that Section 12 of PLAN and CMO No. 20-37
had not been published hence it is not demandable and
enforceable at the time the confiscation happened.
Whether or not the publication of CMO-20-37 being an
administrative order is required to be published in the Official
Gazette before it can take effect
NO. As a general rule, administrative orders and proclamations
need not be published in the Official Gazette except in cases
where it has general applicability. The assailed CMO is an
issuance addressed to only the Customs Collectors.
6.Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR
OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners, - versus - HYPERMIX
FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
179579
February 1, 2012
PONENTE
SERENO
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Retroactivity, equal protection clause
FACTS
●
●
●
●
●
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
issued CMO (Customs Memorandum Order) 27-2003.
Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was
classified according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge.
Either as food grade or feed grade.
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19
December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the RTC of Las Piñas City.
Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued
without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice,
and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
Respondent alleged that the regulation adjudged it to be a
feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment
and examination; thus, despite having imported food
grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff,
forcing them to pay 133% more
Respondent claimed that the equal protection clause was
violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers
differently from flour millers for no reason at all and
asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation
was confiscatory in nature.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the
requirements for the Revised Administrative Code? Whether or
not the content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement of the
equal protection clause of the constitution?
RULING(S)
No. The petitioners violated respondents’ right to due process
in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the
requirements under the Administrative Code which are:
Sec 3. Filing (1) Every agency shall file with the University
of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of
every rule adopted by it.
Sec 9. Public Participation (1) An agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views
prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published
in a newspaper of general circulation at least 2 weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
·
CMO 27-2003 is unconstitutional because it failed to
meet the equal protection clause. We do not see how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is
discharged or which country it came from.
·
For a classification to be reasonable, it must be
shown that a) it rests on substantial distinctions; b) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; c) it is not limited to
existing conditions only; and d) it applies equally to all
members of the same class.
·
Petitioners violated respondents right to equal protection
of laws when they provided for unreasonable classification in
the application of the regulation.
7.Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG. SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.,
Petitioner
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
Respondent
G. R. No. 187587
2013-06-05
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
When do laws take Effect
FACTS
Facts:
In 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued proclamation No.
423 to reserve parcels of land in the municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a
military reservation known now as Fort Bonifacio.
In 1967, President E. Marcos issued proclamation 208 to
amend proclamation 423 which excluded a certain area of Fort
Bonifacio and reserve it for a national shrine which is now
known as Libingan ng mga Bayani.
In 1986, President Marcos issue proclamation No. 2476 to
amend the proclamation No. 423 by excluding certain
barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village
from forming part of the military reservation. At the bottom of
the proclamation, President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum which reads “P.S- This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand Marcos”. The said proclamation was
published in the Official Gazette without the indicating the
handwritten addendum.
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued proclamation No.
172 which reiterated proclamation No. 2476, as published but
this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan and
declared the said lots open for disposition.
In 1999, members of Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig
Inc. filed a petition with the comimission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) to convert the areas they were occupying
in Western Bicutan from public land to alienable land pursuant
to proclamation No. 2476. COSLAP granted the request, ruling
that despite the lack of publication of the addendum, the
intention of President Marcos could not be defeated by the
negligece or inadvertence of others.
The court of appeals (CA) reversed the decision of COSLAP. On
appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the decision of CA since
the court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part
of proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication,
the note never had any legal force and effect.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the unpublished hand written addendum of
president has effect of law?
RULING(S)
·
No, due to the following reasons:
o The claims of the petitioner were anchored on the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation
No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to
include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of
Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a
notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No.
2476. However, it is undisputed that the handwritten
addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette. The Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476
as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal
force and effect. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides: Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.
o Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, the publication of any law, resolution or
other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima
facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President
Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words appearing in the law. The Court cannot rule that a
word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none.
B. Ignorance of the law
8.Kasilag v. Rodriques, 69 Phil 217
TITLE
Kasilag v. Rodriguez
GR NUMBER
46623
DATE
December 7, 1939
PONENTE
IMPERIAL, J:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
· Respondents seek to recover from the petitioner a parcel of
land in the province of Bataan together with its improvements.
· Under Act. No. 496, Section 122, the said property was granted
by way of homestead to the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio whose
children and heirs are the respondents.
· Respondents further request that petitioner pays them P650
for the approximate value of the fruits he received from the land.
· On May 16, 1932, while Emiliana Ambrosio was still alive, she
entered to a mortgage contract with Marcial Kasilag. The content
of such contract pertains to the improvements on the parcel of
land aiming to secure payment on the loan of P1000 with 12%
per annum interest payable to the latter within 4 ½ years.
· In Article V, the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was
to pay, within four and a half years, or until November 16, 1936.
· However, after one year, Emiliana failed to pay the stipulated
interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements.
Therefore, Article VIII of the mortgage contract took effect which
instructs Ambrosio to execute an absolute deed of sale of the land
(in favor of the mortgagee) upon her failure to redeem the
mortgage within the stipulated period.
· Ambrosio and Kasilag entered into another verbal contract
whereby she conveyed to Kasilag the possession of the land on
condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by
the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements
thereon.
· By virtue of this verbal contract, Kasilag entered upon the
possession of the land. Thus, the parties entered into a contract
of antichresis. Such contract is illegal and void because it is
condemned by section 116 of Act No. 2874.
The Court of Appeals held that the mortgage deed was actually
an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and
declared that the deed, including the subsequent verbal contract,
was void and without any legal effect. However, the CA
ordered the respondents to pay petitioner the loan of P1,000 with
legal interest at 6% per annum from the date of the decision.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the petitioner should be deemed a possessor
in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or
in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated?
2. Whether or not good faith may be premised upon ignorance of
the law?
RULING(S)
The appealed decision is reversed.
Yes. Gross and inexeusable ignorance of the law may not be the
basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be
such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with
the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage
of the improvements, he proceeded on the well-grounded belief
that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation
of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that
the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by section 116. Thus, the petitioner's ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith.
Yes. By acting in good faith, the Court ordered that the
respondents shall recover the improvements and plants upon
indemnifying the petitioner the value of P3,000; or they may
elect to compel the petitioner to posses the land by paying its
market value as fixed by the court of origin.
ilapil
C. Retroactivity
9.Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530
TITLE
Uson v. Del Rosario
GR NUMBER
L-4963
DATE
1953-01-29
PONENTE
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
·
This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the municipality
of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan.
·
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who
upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation.
Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945, his common- law wife Maria del Rosario took possession
illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
·
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that
on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late
Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they
agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of
their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her husband
upon his death.
·
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands
litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that
Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law wife of the late
Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate
children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of
the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that
when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his
death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657,
old Civil Code). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested.
ISSUE(S)
WON – the illegitimate children can inherit the said lands
before the new civil code.
RULING(S)
No, the illegitimate children cannot inherit under the new civil
code. Since, it will impair the VESTED RIGHT of the lawful
spouse, Maria Uson. The Retroactive Effect of the NCC can only
be applied when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or
acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides
that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code,
it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred
under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the
same origin."
10.Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 , January 31, 1989
TITLE
Puzon v. Abellera
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 75082
DATE
1989-01-31
PONENTE
PARAS, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Ignorance of the law; Retroactivity - NCC 4, NCC 2252- 2269
Revised Penal Code (RPC) 22
FACTS
Facts:
● Petitioner Jose F. Puzon filed a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the then First Civil Cases Division
of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
●
On October 10, 1977, petitioner acquired through
auction one of the lands owned by oppositor-appellee
Alejandra Abellera, now deceased and substituted by her
only child Tomasa Domondon, because of oppositorappellee’s failure to pay real property taxes for the years
1971 – 1977. To confirm said sale, petitioner filed a suit to
consolidate his ownership over the property.
●
The lot in question was reverted to the public
domain, which theoppositor-appellee acquired through
●
●
Republic Act No. 931, when Presidential Decree No. 1271
took effect on December 22, 1977, with the title "An act
nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of title
covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case
No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211 pursuant to Republic Act No.
931, as amended, but considering as valid certain titles of
such lands that are alienable and disposable under certain
conditions and for other purposes."
While trying to avail of the provisions of PD 1271,
oppositor-appellee found out that the two lands he owned
had been auctioned off. She then filed her opposition to
petitioner Puzon's petition for consolidation to which the
lower court ruled in favor of, declaring null and void the
aforesaid auction sale and illegal the assessment made
regarding the taxes.
Hence this present petition where petitioner in
concluding that the assessments made for the years 1971
to 1977 were legal contended that that PD 1271 is curative
in nature and that titles so issued are validated upon
compliance with certain requirements and subject to realty
tax.
ISSUE
1. WON P.D. 1271 should be applied retroactively?
2. WON the retroactive application of P.D. 1271 made the titles
issued under Republic Act No. 931 valid and subject to realty tax,
making the auction sale valid?
RULING(S)
Yes. P.D. 1271 should be applied retroactively because it
falls under the exceptions provided by Art. 4 of the New Civil
Code where the retroactive application of laws are allowed when
expressly provided therein.
In citing the case of Nilo v. Court of Appeals, the
court held that "a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made
manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by
necessary implications."
Considering the second issue, however, the court
held that during the years 1971-1977 the land in question was
still part of the public domain, the oppositor-appellee could not,
in those years, obviously be held liable for real property taxes
over the land in question. Since the validity of her title would take
effect retroactively only after having complied with the conditions
set in PD 1271, only then could she be held liable for taxes for
the period starting 1971 to 1977. Also, the validity of the auction
sale was prematurely held, hence, null and void. The oppositorappellee should have first been given the opportunity to settle
the taxes assessed for the years 1971-1977 after having
complied with PD 1271.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decisions is hereby
MODIFIED accordingly, that is the land should really be
considered owned by the respondent and her title thereto must
not be disturbed BUT she must pay the real property taxes
thereon for the years 1971-1977. As to the other matters raised,
We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower court
and, thus, AFFIRM the same.
11.Acosta v. Plan, 169 SCRA 591 , January 30, 1989 5.
TITLE
Acosta v. Plan
GR NUMBER
L-44466
DATE
January 30, 1989
PONENTE
Gringo Aquino
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Retroactive Effect of Procedural Acts, an exception of Article 3:
Prospectivity of laws.
FACTS
Facts:
● On January 8, 1962, Petitioner Acosta filed an action
publiciana with the CFI of Isabela against respondent
Maglay. The complaint was amended on August 25, 1971 to
implead the Dept. of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Bureau of Lands
●
On October 3, 1975, the complaint was dismissed. A motion
for reconsideration (MR) was filed thereafter.
●
On December 12, 1975, the MR was denied
● On December 22, 1975, a motion for leave to appeal as
paupers was filed and was granted by the Trial Court.
● Believing that as pauper litigants, they did not have to
submit a record on appeal, they waited for the Trial Court
to elevate the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals as provided in Sec 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
● On June 16, 1976, the Judge dismissed the appeal for the
failure to file a record on appeal. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the petition of
certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not BP 29, being procedural in nature, providing that
a record of appeal is not needed to perfect an appeal shall be
given retroactive effect.
RULING(S)
Yes. As held in People v. Sumilang, BP 29, being procedural
in nature, providing that a record of appeal is not needed to
perfect an appeal shall be given retroactive effect for the benefit
of the petitioners as appellants. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending undertime at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
12.MRCA v. CA, supra
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
MRCA INC
G.R. No. 86675.
December 19, 1989
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. / First Division
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a complaint against private
respondents spouses Domingo Sebastian (who were
defendants in said civil case). Said case was dismissed by the
trial court due to the non-payment of proper filing fees when
petitioner failed to include in the complain the amount of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses sought to be recovered.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling, hence the
petitioner comes to SC by petition for review. Petitioner
contends that the Manchester ruling does not apply to the case
since said court decision was not published in the Official
Gazette. It should be noted that petitioner filed said complaint
ten months after the promulgation of the Manchester ruling.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the said Manchester ruling may be given a
Retroactive effect.
RULING(S)
Yes. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to
that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the
mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at
the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and
applied to the present case in which the decision had become
final before said resolution became effective. In this case, the
motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on
July 17,1944, and a second motion for re-hearing or
consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the
period of fifteen days from promulgation of the order or
judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been
pending in this Court (Section 1, Rule 54); for said period had
already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October
1, 1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the
petitioner to file any pleading or motion in the present case.
In accordance with the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the
petitioner may be allowed to amend its complaint for the
purpose of specifying in terms of pesos, how much it claims as
damages, and to pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided
its right of action has not yet prescribed. This the petitioner is
ready to do.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The Order
of the Regional Trial Court is set aside. The complaint in Civil
Case (MRCA, Inc. vs. Domingo Sebastian, Jr. and Lilia Tioseco
Sebastian) is reinstated and the petitioner is allowed to amend
the same by specifying the amounts of damages it seeks to
recover from the defendants (private respondents) and to pay
the proper filing fees therefor as computed by the Clerk of
Court.
13.Spouses Dacudao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013
TITLE
Spouses Dacudao v. Gonzales
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 188056
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
January 8, 2013
Bersamin, J. [EN BANC]
RETROACTIVITY; Article 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.
Nautre of Action: Petition for Certoriari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus.
Facts of the Case:
On February 6, 2009, the petitioners, Spouses Dacudao,
initiated charges of syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr.,
et al in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao as a result of
having been defrauded through the latter’s “buy back
agreement”. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional
State Prosecutors, Provincial, and City Prosecutors to forward all
cases filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al to the Secretariat of
the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action - with the
exception of cases already filed against the same persons, Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al., in Cagayan de Oro, pursuant to a DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009. As such, complaints of
petitioners were then sent to the Secretariat of the Special Panel
of the DOJ.
Contention of Parties:
These turn of events, prompted the petitioners to file a
petition certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the
Supreme Court against the Secretary of Justice, Gonzales
(respondent), assailing him of grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the Department Order and Memorandum. The former
(DO No. 182) was opined as an obstruction of justice, violating
their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law,
right to speedy disposition of the cases, and the rule against the
enactment of laws with retroactive effect, while the latter
(Memorandum dated March 2, 2009) was challenged as
unconstitutional for violating their right to equal protection under
the constitution.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the Gonzales (respondent), maintains the validity
of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and
prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the assailed issuance of Department Order
No. 182 by the DOJ can be given retroactive effect and thus be
applied to pending cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et. al.
RULING(S)
Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.
However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a
law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial
statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure
does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of
already existing rights.
A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of its passage, such as the case the bar.
Thus, the retroactive application is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested
right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.
Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
D. Acts executed against mandatory or prohibitory laws
14.BPI v. IAC 164 SCRA 630 , August 19, 1988
E. Waiver of rights
15.De Borja v. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577
16. Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation vs. Spouses Cesario Gravador and Norma
de Vera,et. al, G.R. No. 186550 July 5, 2010 (Llovit)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION VS.
SPOUSES CESARIO GRAVADOR AND NORMA DE VERA, ET AL
G.R. NO. 186550
JULY 5, 2010
NACHURA, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Certiorari/Waiver Of Rights/Second Division
On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asain Cathay Finance and Leasing
Corporation (ACFLC) extended a loan of ₱800,000.00 to respondent
Cesario Gravador, with respondents Norma de Vera and Emma
Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers.
The loan was payable in 60 monthly installments of ₱24,000.00
each. To secure the loan, respondent Cesario executed real estate
mortgage over his property in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Respondents
paid the initial installment due in November, 1999. However, they
were unable to pay the subsequent ones.
Consequently, on February 1, 2000, respondents received a letter
demanding payment of ₱ 1,871,480.00 within five (5) days from
receipt thereof. Respondents requested for an additional period to
settle their account, but ACFLC denied the request. Petitioner filed
a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage with the Office
of the Deputy Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan.
The respondents filed a suit before the Regional Trial Court Branch
9 of Bulacan for annulment of real estate mortgage and promissory
note, and alleged that they were deceived into signing the loan
documents which do not have the maturity date of the loan, the
interest rate, and the mode of payment; and that it illegally
imposed liquidated damages.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. It stated
that respondents are well-educated persons who are familiar with
the execution of loan documents. Thus, they cannot be deceived
into signing a document containing provisions that they are not
amenable to and held that the alleged defects in the promissory
note and in the deed of real estate mortgage are too insubstantial
to warrant the nullification of the mortgage.
The respondents appealed to Court of Appeals. The latter set aside
the decisions of RTC and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE(S)
W/N CA erred in invalidating the respondent’s waiver of the right
of redemption and the interest rates imposed on the latter’s loan.
RULING(S)
No, CA’s decision to invalidate the respondent’s waiver of the right
of redemption and the interest rates imposed on his loan were
affirmed by SC.
Waiver of Rights
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it
must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a
right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
The supposed waiver by the mortgagors was contained in a
statement made in the form and language prepared by [petitioner]
ACFLC while the [respondents] merely affixed their signatures or
adhesion thereto.
It is settled that doubts in the interpretation of stipulations in
contracts of adhesion should be resolved against the party that
prepared them.
This principle especially holds true with regard to waivers, which
are not presumed, but which must be clearly and convincingly
shown.
Unfortunately, ACFLC failed to convince the court that respondents
waived their right of redemption voluntarily.
In fine, when the redemptioner chooses to exercise his right of
redemption, it is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat
his right.
Interest Rates on Loans
It is true that Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982,
suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest rate. However, interest
rates, whenever unconscionable, may be equitably reduced or even
invalidated.
Nothing in said circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to
raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.
In three months, respondents’ obligation ballooned by more than
P1,000,000.00. ACFLC failed to show any computation on how
much interest was imposed and on the penalties charged.
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money
debt, even if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and
unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous
deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It
has no support on law, in principles of justice, or in the human
conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify
such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained
within the sphere of public or private morals.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these contracts are inexistent
and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the right
to set up their illegality as a defense be waived.
The nullity of the stipulation on the usurious interest does not,
however, affect the lender’s right to recover the principal of the
loan nor the terms of the mortgage.
The debt due is to be considered without the stipulation of the
excessive interest. A legal interest of 12% per annum will be added
in place of the excessive interest formerly imposed.
F. Repeal of laws
17. Guingona v. Carague,. 196 SCRA 221 , April 22, 1991
TITLE
GUINGONA vs. CARAGUE
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 94571
DATE
1991-04-22
PONENTE
GANCAYCO, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
IMPLIED REPEAL
FACTS
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question
the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1990.
The 1990 budget total was P233.5 Billion, with P86.8 Billion in
automatic appropriation for debt service. In comparison, the
appropriation for the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports was only P27 Billion.
The petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967, which
authorize the automatic appropriation for debt service. They
assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness
in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President who determines in advance the
amount appropriated for the debt service
The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt
service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondent contends that the petition involves a political
question as the repeal or amendment of laws is addressed to the
judgment and wisdom of the legislative body and not the courts.
ISSUE(S)
WON the subject laws were impliedly repealed upon the passage
of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING(S)
NO, subject laws were not impliedly repealed. Well-known is the
rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon.
Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the
Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete
in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards
are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed
should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic
of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other
normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness
incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without
the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as
the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the
government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all
loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
H. Applicability of custom
18. Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79 , December 27, 1910
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendantappellant
G.R. No. L-5691
1910-12-27
PONENTE
MORELAND, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Applicability of custom
FACTS
The plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a
carromata on Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon belonging to
the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by
the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came
along the street and that thereupon the driver of the said
plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the
defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the
sidewalk and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon
an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the
defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by
said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding
said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also
injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented
evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the
delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage and that for the
purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as
defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the
wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered;
that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of
it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a
whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses
attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver
was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear
upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the
horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision
with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de
Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in
question. Upon these facts the court below found the defendant
guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50,
with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the
17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The
case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
W/N the driver is negligent in leaving the horses unattended to
help their passenger unload their goods
The judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the
evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is
the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the
kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the
manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all
cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The
public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection.
I. Legal periods
19. Armigos v. Ca 179, SCRA 1 , November 6, 1989
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V,
respondents.
50654
1989-11-06
PADILLA, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Legal Periods
The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against
the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao
del Sur, for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent.
A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June
1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of
appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he
completed the other requirements for the perfection of an
appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment
of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the case was
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Davao Del Sur for the
consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled
that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period;
consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
Petitioner’s contention that when he received a copy of the
decision of the municipal court on June 8, 1977, he perfected
his appeal on June 24, 1977 which is only fifteen (15) days had
elapsed so the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao
del Sur in dismissing his appeal, for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The
petitioner contended that the computation of the period to
appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the
decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24
hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock
p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m.
of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
ISSUE(S)
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's computation of the time
when to submit the appeal is acceptable.
RULING(S)
NO. The Court considered the day as synonymous with the
date. Consequently, the 5th day shall be the 15 days after the
appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted.
The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise
specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law
to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and
including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it
shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by
order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of
the act, event or default after which the designated period of time
begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so
computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal
holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next
day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday."
Lastly, the Court stressed that human memory is frail. Human
memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary one for a person, there is no reasonable certainty
of its correctness. What more for the exact hour when a
pleading, order or decision is received by a party? The period
laid down by the law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
20. Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70 , August 27, 1969
TITLE
NAMARCO vs. Tecson
GR NUMBER
29 SCRA 70
DATE
August 27, 1969
PONENTE
Concepcion; CJ
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Prescription, Computing a period
FACTS
November 14, 1955: the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 20520 ent itl ed “Price
Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc.” o Defendants will jointly and severally
pay plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest
plus P500.00 for attorney’s fees , and plus costs.
Defendant Miguel Tecson must indemnify Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.
November 21, 1955: A copy of the decision was served upon the
defendants.
December 21, 1965: National Marketing Corporation, the
successor of Price Stabilization Corporation, filed a complaint,
Civil Case No. 63701, against the same defendants for the revival
of the judgment rendered in Case No. 20520.
Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint based
on the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and
prescription of action.
February 14, 1966: Court issued an order reading which stated
that:
Lack of jurisdiction: the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted.
Prescription: Plaintiff admits that court decision became final on
December 21, 1955.
The case was filed December 21, 1965. The Plaintiff forgot the
1960 and 1964 were leap years and so, more than 10 years have
passed. A year having 365 days each (Art 13, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
The complaint made by Namarco was dismissed as having been
prescribed.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the complaint of Namarco should be dismissed
due to lack of jurisdiction and prescription.
RULING(S)
Judgment affirmed. There is prescription as years are to be
understood as 365 days; hence, 1960 and 1964 being leap
years, so that ten years of 365 days each or an aggregate of
3,650 days from December 21, 1955 expired on December 19,
1965.
J. Binding effect
21. Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 , March 7, 1933
TITLE
BARRETO GONZALES v. GONZALES
GR NUMBER
37048
DATE
March 7, 1933
PONENTE
Hull, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Absolute Divorce
FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine and at
present residents of the City of Manila. They were married
in the City of Manila in 1919, and lived together as man and
wife in the Philippine Islands until the Spring of 1926. They
voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived
together as man and wife.
Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8, and
6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being
represented by attorneys, continued for several months,
whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her
support and that of her children, P500 monthly; this amount to
be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain
properties to be put in her name.
Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook
himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an
absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree
was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant
moved to California and returned to these Islands in August
1928, where he has since remained.
On the same date that he secured the divorce in Nevada he went
through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these
Islands and now has three children as a result of that
marriage. Defendant, after his departure from these Islands,
reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the
support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the
payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the CFI of Manila
requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and
ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State of
Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property
as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the
bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with
regard to the spouse who, having legitimate children has not
delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by the
court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of what
would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse
had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the
community of property.
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the
guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to
their children as their legal portion from the respective estates
had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927.
It is also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff
and defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be
ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her
share of the community property, that the defendant be ordered
to pay the plaintiff alimony at the rate of P500 per month, that
the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the
sum of P5,000, and that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff
the expenses incurred in educating the three minor sons. The CFI
of Manila found against the defendant.
ISSUE(S)
WON the divorce obtained by the husband in Reno, Nevada is
binding upon them.
RULING(S)
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial
matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this
jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On
the record here presented this can not be done. The public
policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set
forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court:
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation
until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all
prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly
indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine
Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change
of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our
law.
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been
within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the
State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a
divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the court of that State to dissolve the bonds of
matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to
recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been
expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not
overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these
Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon
Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
Litigants by mutual agreement cannot compel the courts to
approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of
the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign
courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary
to public order and good morals. Holding the above views it
becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional
question presented by appellant in his assignment of error.
The judgment of the CFI of Manila must therefore be reversed
and defendant absolved from the demands made against him in
this action.
22. Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 , November, 29, 1965
TITLE
TENCHAVES V. ESCANO
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-19671
DATE
November 29, 1965
PONENTE
REYES
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
ART.15 OF NCC (Nationality Rule) - Laws relating to family rights
and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of person
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
FACTS
On February 24, 1948, without the knowledge of her parents,
Vicenta Escaño, a 27 year old exchange marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an ex-army officer and engineer,
before a Catholic army chaplain (Lt. Moises Lavares) in Cebu City.
The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
Upon discovery of the marriage, parents of Vicenta sought priestly
advice and recommended to them a re-celebration of the marriage
due to lack of authority of the officiating chaplain. Vicenta did not
agree to the re-celebration after subsequently learning of Pastor’s
supposed amorous relationship with their common friend Pacita
Noel. The couple became estranged and lived separately after that.
Thereafter, she initiated a suit for annulment against pastor in the
Misamis Court but this was eventually dismissed for failure to
prosecute.
After some time Vicenta left for the United States. In 1950, she
applied for and was granted a decree of divorce by the court of
Nevada against Pastor Tenchavez on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character".
On September 1954, Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, and eventually had children by him. On August 1958,
she was granted US citizenship.
On July 30 1955, Pastor filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on May 31, 1956 for legal
separation against Vicenta and damages against her parents on the
ground of alienation of affection.
The defendant claimed a valid divorce from the plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Ruselle Leo Mora;
while her parents denied they had influenced their daughter’s acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The lower court did no decree the legal separation, but freed the
plaintiff in supporting his wife and to acquire property to the
exclusion of his wife.
Hence, a direct appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu was petitioned by the plaintiff.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the decree of absolute divorce obtained from the court of
Nevada should apply to the marriage of Tenchavez and Escaño?
RULING(S)
No. The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
Law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the
wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character". At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act. No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of person are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad."
[WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows; Neither party to recover costs. in the light of the foregoing
disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED]
Nationality Rule:
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in
the country. The spouses were then subject to Philippine law
pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code. Philippine laws do not
recognize divorce.
23. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985
TITLE
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL
ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-68470
DATE
October 8, 1985
PONENTE
Melencio-Herrera
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
BINDING EFFECT
FACTS
1. Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States,
were married on 1972 at Hongkong.
2. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the
petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
3. On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property.
4. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce
proceeding
before
Nevada
Court
where
respondent
acknowledged that they had no community property.
5. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
6. Respondent assert that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each
of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on
conjugal properties.
RULING(S)
1. As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still
considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
2. The private respondent, as he is bound by the decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, has no legal
standing in the Philippine court as husband of the petitioner, as
the divorce legally dissolved their marriage, to sue Alice Van Dorn
to exercise control over conjugal assets. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.
To maintain the petitioner to still be legally obligated to the
divorced husband is a discrimination against her in her own
country. Hence, it is only just that the petition be granted. The
civil case against petitioner with the RTC was dismissed.
24. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989
TITLE
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
GR NUMBER
GR NO. 80116
DATE
JUNE 30, 1989
PONENTE
REGALADO
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
BINDING EFFECT
FACTS
●
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay
Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, marries the private respondent,
Erich Ekkehard Geiling who is a German national at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. Three
●
●
years after their marriage, the private respondent initiated
a divorce proceeding which was promulgated on January 15,
1986 against the petitioner due to failure of their marriage.
Five months after its issuance, the private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery against the petitioner alleging
that while they were married, petitioner had an affair with
two men (William Chia and Jesus Chua).
Pilapil moved unsuccessfully to have the criminal case
dismissed. The main petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio since the complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing of adultery complaint.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not adultery can still be charge to the petitioner given
the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
RULING(S)
NO. The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery
and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse. In this case, the fact that the
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in relation to his nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus, under the
same consideration and rationale, the private respondent is no
longer the husband of the petitioner, therefore, has no legal
standing commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit.
K. Human Relations
25. People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 March 5, 1991
TITLE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 88582
DATE
March 5, 1991
PONENTE
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Criminal Law; Statutory Rape; Evidence;
FACTS
On October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Ritter brought
Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room in
Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the accused told them to
take a bath. When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was
told to remove her clothes by the accused and to join him in bed.
Accused started fingering Rosario. At that time, Jessie was
already sleepy but Rosario touched him to call his attention.
Jessie saw the accused placing his penis against the vagina of
Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate but it would not fit.
After seeing what happened, he didn’t bother to look and he fell
asleep.
The following morning the accused left after paying the children.
Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted something in
her vagina. Sometime the following day, Jessie asked Rosario
whether the object was already removed from her body and
Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie claimed that on the evening
of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of
pain in her vagina and when he asked her, she said that the
foreign object was not yet removed.
Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital with
bloodied skirt, unconscious and foul smelling. There was an
operation to remove a portion of a sexual vibrator in her vagina.
The following day, Rosario got serious and was pronounced dead.
A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter.
The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo declared him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt citing the rationale of Art 4 of the Revised Penal
“He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused”.
Ritter appealed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City.
The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of the lower
court and acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE(S)
1. WON THE TESTIMONIES THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT IS 12
YEARS OLD WHEN THE ACT WAS COMMITTED ARE VALID.
2. WON RITTER IS GUILTY OF RAPE.
3. WON RITTER IS GUILTY OF HOMICIDE.
4. WON the acquittal of Ritter from the criminal charge due to
lack of evidence release him from incurring civil liability.
RULING(S)
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages
to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him
thereafter with prejudice to reentry into the country.
1. NO. BECAUSE ALL THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED ARE NOT
ADEQUATE TO ESTABLISH THE EXACT DATE OF BIRTH OF
ROSARIO.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of
age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to
prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that
there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. We agree with the defense that there was no
proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that
Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant.
In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid
P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez
was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The
environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies and
evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that
Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her
tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced
her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances
do not come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to
convict for rape.
2. NO. There are no clear facts to prove that Ritter committed
rape.
3. NO. There was no clear evidence that the Vibrator which
caused the health problem resulting to death of Rosario was
owned by Ritter.
4. No. Ritter’s corruption of herein minors is contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy (Article 21 NCC) and thus he is
liable to compensate the parents of Rosario for damages. Article
29 of the Civil Code provides that even when the accused is
acquitted, a preponderance of evidence for the same act or
omission is sufficient to demand civil liability from the offended
party.
26. Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide, G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
CASE: JOYCE V. ARDIENTE v. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA.
THERESA PASTORFIDE
G.R. NO. 161921
July 17, 2013
Peralta, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
NATURE OF ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Humamrcan Relations
FACTS
FACTS: Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente
own a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City
and on June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in favor of Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit
at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00.
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the
name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed until
on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma.
Theresa was cut off.
Petitioner requested for the water disconnection. Petitioner claims
that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of
COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the
Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's
account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name.
ISSUE(S)
ISSUE: Whether petitioners abuse their rights as enshrined in
Article 19 of the Civil Code resulting to awarding of damages?
RULING(S)
HELD: Yes. Petitioners abuse their rights and they are liable to pay
damages.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require
the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account
with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to
cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In the present
case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when
she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water
supply without warning or informing the latter of such request.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the
Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Generally,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
be proper.
L. Prejudicial Question
27. Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441, April 15, 1988 21.
TITLE
Donato v. Luna
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
28.Landicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA 731
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Rolando Landicho, petitioner, vs. Hon. Lorenzo Relova, in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch I, and the People of the Philippines, respondents
L-22579
1968-02-23
Fernando
Petition for Preliminary Injunction, Certiorari, Art. 36 of NCC,
Prejudicial Question
- On Feb. 1963, petitioner Landicho was charged before the CFI
of Batangas, presided by the respondent judge, with the offense
of bigamy by Elvira Makatangkay, his wife. Said petitioner
contracted second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.
- On March 1963, Fe Lourdes Pasia filed an action seeking to declare
her marriage with petitioner null and void ab initio on grounds of
his bigamous character and use of force, threats, and intimidation.
- On June 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case filed a thirdparty complaint against third-party defendant Makatangkay, the
first spouse, seeking to declare their marriage null and void on the
grounds of force, threats, and intimidation, and that she compelled
him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of
the Peace in Makati.
- Thereafter, on Oct 1963 petitioner moved to suspend the hearing
of the criminal case while the civil suits on the nullity of two
marriages involved are pending, raising prejudicial question as a
defense.
- Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Landicho
filed a motion for reconsideration, but was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition with a preliminary injunction to restrain the judge from
further proceeding with the bigamy case. A petition for certiorari
was also filed to include the People of the Philippines as another
respondent.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage
of the second wife against petitioner, and the petitioner filing a
civil suit for the annulment of marriage with the first spouse,
constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending criminal suit of
bigamy against him.
RULING(S)
NO. The court ruled that even assuming that even the first
marriage was declared null and void, it is not material to the
outcome of the criminal case. There is no prejudicial question
since situations in cases are different. At the time the petitioner
was indicted bigamy on Feb 1963, he had already contracted
two marriages. Then on March 1963, it was the second spouse,
not the petitioner who filed an action for nullity. It was also
sometime later on June 1963 that petitioner sought for the
nullity of his first marriage. Respondent judge answered that
only competent courts have authority to declare marriages null,
and not the parties to a marriage. A person who contracts a
second marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. Hence, the respondent judge did not abuse his
discretion in failing to suspend the motion sought by the
petitioner. The petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of
preliminary injunction is dissolved.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Prejudicial question – one raised in a criminal case by the accused
which if decided favorably in a civil case, will cause the supposed
crime to disappear. The prejudicial question must be determinative
if the case before the court, and, that jurisdiction to try said
questions must be lodged in another tribunal. For this reason, the
criminal case must be suspended until the determination of such
question in a civil proceeding.
III. CIVIL PERSONALITY
29. Roe v. Wade (US) January 22, 1973
TITLE
ROE vs. WADE, 410 US 113
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
January 22, 1973
Justice Blackmun
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas,
which granted the declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff
who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal
abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against
enforcement of such statutes.
In 1970, Normal L McCorvey (pseudonym - Jane Roe) was
pregnant (allegedly a result of rape) and unmarried, yet she
was unable to receive a legal abortion in Texas by a licensed
physician because her life was not threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy and she was unable to travel
somewhere else to have a legal abortion.
She filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry
Wade questioning Texas State Laws, which proscribe procuring
or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the
purpose of saving the mother’s life.
She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that
they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed and
protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on
behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated;”
thereby becoming a class suit.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, alleged that
statues were vague and uncertain, for he had been previously
arrested for violations of the Texas abortion statute. He
described conditions of patients who came to him seeking
abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a
physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or
outside the exception recognized by Article 1196
John and Mary Doe was a childless couple. Mary was suffering
from "neural-chemical" and physician advised her to avoid
pregnancy until her condition improved She discontinued using
birth control pills because of her condition but if she should
become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy
by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician
under safe, clinical conditions.
The actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly
convened three-judge district court. Roe and Dr. Hallford had
standing, the Does do not. The District Court held that the
"fundamental right of single women and married persons to
choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth
Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the
Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because
they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an
overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment
rights.
Court dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion
statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief.
Note:
The court declined to address the question of when life begins.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the
constitution includes the right to abort her child.
RULING(S)
Yes. The “right of privacy x x x is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal
privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.”
“A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that
exempts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf
of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without
recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests),
is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but
the right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.
Dissent.
Justice Rehnquist: The right to an abortion is not universally
accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently
involved in this case.
Discussion.
The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all
abortions except in the case of a lifesaving procedure on behalf
of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to
privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription
of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a
compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or
the viable fetus. The court declined to address the question
of when life begins.
Other Issue: Whether a plaintiff still has standing to bring a
case based on her pregnancy once she has given birth.
Holding: Yes. The mootness doctrine does not bar her case
from being heard, even though this individual plaintiff's position
would no longer be affected, and she did not have an actual
case or controversy. This situation fits within the exception to
the mootness rule that covers wrongs that are capable of
repetition yet evading review. Most cases are not heard through
to appeal in a period shorter than a pregnancy, so strictly
applying the mootness doctrine would prevent these issues
from ever being resolved.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/410/113/#F22
30. Geluz v. CA, . 2 SCRA 801 July 20, 1961 _ANTONA
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DIVISION
DATE
PONENTE
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
G.R. No. L-16439
EN BANC
July 20, 1961
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
FACTS
Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner Dr.
Antonio Geluz through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950, Nita
became pregnant by her present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her
parents, and on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted
by the Dr. Geluz. After her marriage with the respondent Oscar
Lazo, she was then employed in COMELEC and her second
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by the defendant in 1953. Less than two year later, she
again became pregnant.
On February 21, 1955, Nita, again aborted a 2month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of 50 pesos. Lazo
was at this time in Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know, nor did he give consent to the
abortion. It is at the third instance of abortion that constitutes
Lazo's filing this action and award for damages.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff
Lazo, and predicated the award for damages upon Art 2206. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE(S)
W/N an action for pecuniary damages for the death of a person
covers an unborn fetus not endowed with personality and whether
such right accrued to its parents?
RULING(S)
No. An action for pecuniary damages for the death of a person
does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed
with personality being incapable of having rights and
obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account
of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child under Art. 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive. In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from the maternal womb.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb. The prevailing
American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally
held that recovery cannot be had for the death of an unborn
child. In the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife. The lower courts have found that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are, that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken
no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even
after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem
to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been
directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment
for an "indemnity” claim.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint
ordered dismissed. Without costs.
31. Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13 , July 31, 1970
TITLE
CARMEN QUIMIGUING vs. FELIX ICAO
GR NUMBER
G.R No. L-26795
DATE
July 31, 1970
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
REYES, J
Provisional Personality of conceived child; Donations;
Petitioner and Defendant had a confidential relation with each
other. The latter, through force and intimidation, had several
intercourse with the former and eventually became pregnant. She
prayed to the court to compel Felix Icao for support at 120pesos
per month, damages, and attorney’s fees.
In the trial court, defendant objected claiming that the complaint
did not allege that the child had been born. Subsequently,
petitioner gave birth to a baby girl and a moved to amend the
complaint but was dismissed by reason of the original complaint
had no cause of action. Hence this case.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the conceived child has personality and thus has
the right to support from the defendant
RULING(S)
YES. The child is given provisional personality. Article 40 of the Civil
Code provides that a conceived child, although unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
to it. In effect, the child may receive donations under Article 742
of the Civil Code. At the time of the first complaint, petitioner has
cause of action for damages hence the lower court erred in its
ruling.
Petitioner is also entitled for compensation under Article 21 and
Article 2219 of the same code.
32. De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 863 November 28, 1933
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR
SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
L-39110
November 28, 1933
STREET
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
●
●
·
Caesar Syquia, was an umarried man and a scion
of a prominent family in Manila, frequented a barbershop
where Antonia Loanco worked as a cashier. He soon
developed emotions for Antonia, which led to a relationship
between them where Antonia became impregnated with
defendant’s child.
During the time of pregnancy, defendant frequented the
petitioner’s house and even wrote a letter to a padre
stating:
●
●
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
"The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name
to be given to it.”
Caesar then left for Japan, asking Antonia to take care of
‘junior’. After the baby was born, Caesar and Antonia lived
together for a year, which Syquia paid for all expenses.
When Antonia exhibited signs of a second pregnancy,
Caesar left and got married to another woman soon after.
Antonia filed an action in court against Cesar Syquia
demanding (a) damages for breach of promise to marry;
(b) recognition of their two children, Ismael and Pacita;
and (c) maintenance of five hundred pesos per month. The
trial court decided in favor of Antonia, ordering Caesar to
pay support and recognize the child as his own.
Whether or not the unborn child has rights under this case;
A child, being conceived bears legal rights and is considered as
a living person. The fact that it is as yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. Under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, the child shall be born for all purposes
favorable to it, provided it be born according to the following
article.
In the case at hand, the child is presumed to be born, since
recognition is for a purpose favorable to the child, along with the
support which comes with it. It is then considered to be a living
person, with legal rights.
33. Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 April 27, 1948
TITLE
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante
GR NUMBER
80 Phil. 776
DATE
April 27, 1948
PONENTE
Ponente: HILADO, J.
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Termination of Personality, NCC 42
FACTS
Pedro Fragrante applied for a certificate of public convenience to
install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. However, while
his application was pending, he died. He was considered a Filipino
Citizen at the time of death.
If he had not died, there can be no question that he would have
had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to
its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. He
would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate
said plant if had he not died.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special
or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a
daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said
plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable
of maintaining the proposed service.
Petitioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party
applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the estate of Fragante be extended as an
artificial judicial personality.
RULING(S)
Yes.
o
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial
judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has not changed except for his death, and the
economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately
operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same
that it received from the decedent himself.
o It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the
mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this
legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is
considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived
after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Hence, the Court
held that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate
of Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical
person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of
his estate which include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death.
34. Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, 70 SCRA 472 April 30, 1976
TITLE
Dumlao v. Quality Plastics
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-27956
DATE
April 30, 1976
PONENTE
AQUINO, J:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
·
On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. filed a
case Against Pedro Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbog, and Juana Darang.
·
On June 24, 1960, Vicente Soliven received and signed
the summons and copies of the complaint in his behalf and his
co-defendants.
·
On February 18, 1962, CFI ordered the defendants to
pay Quality Plastic Products Inc the amount of P3,667.03 plus
the legal rate of interest from November, 1958 to avoid
foreclosure of their surety bonds.
·
Dead at that time (Died on April 23, 1959), Oria failed to
pay the said amount. The lower court ordered the foreclosure of
his surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land given
as a security for the bond.
·
On September 24, 1962, Oria’s land was sold through
auction by the sheriff.
·
On the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the deceased Oria, his testamentary heirs sued Quality Plastic
Products and prayed for the annulment of the judgment against
him and the sale of his land. Quality Plastics did not know about
Oria’s death.
·
The Lower Court held that Soliven acted in bad faith
because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. He
had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the
judgment was valid as to him.
·
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not there is jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased Oria and the judgment against him and the sale of his
land be enforced even after his death?
RULING(S)
The lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
judgment against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land is also void.
No. Oria, upon his death, had no more civil personality and his
juridical capacity which made him capable of legal relations was
lost through death. In the first place, he was not, and he could
not have been, validly served with summons. (Arts. 37 and 42,
Civil Code).
However, Dumlaos (heirs) are not entitled to claim the
attorney’s fee from the corporation due to the fact that Quality
Plastic Products Inc. acted in good faith and was unaware of
Oria's death.
35. Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 May 17, 1990
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez
85140
1990-05-17
PADILLA, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
·
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana
Vargas her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private
respondents – the Vargases, filed on 27 September 1988, a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in
his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her
desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty
without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it
was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and
living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
·
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September
1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana
(who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff,
reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had
already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc.
(PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the
Supreme President and Founder.
·
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988.
As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody
of her body.
·
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings)
filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming
lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under
sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner
argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live
person.
·
The respondents claimed that there was no existing marital
legal relationship between Eugenio and Vitaliana and therefore
they have the custody over the body of the latter.
·
The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse or
children of Vitaliana and that petitioner was merely a common
law spouse , her brothers and sisters have the custody. Also, it
was held that Eugenio was legally married to another woman.
ISSUE(S)
WON - the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to
her full blood brothers and sisters or her common law spouse.
RULING(S)
The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. Under
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption
from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. That the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. The
Petitioner was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her, since he
was legally married to another woman, which bars him from
being legally capacitated to contract marriages. Hence,
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to
her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103
of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
"(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child,
and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest
of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines
and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary
expenses."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both
petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
36. Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 May 29, 1953
TITLE
Joaquin v. Navarro
GR NUMBER
G.R. Nos. L-5426-28
DATE
1953-05-29
PONENTE
TUASON, J.:
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Commencement and termination of personality; Natural Persons
FACTS
The case at hand is a petition for review on the decision of the
Court of Appeals which modified that of the Court of First Instance
regarding the summary settlement of the estates of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased, particularly the
sequence of their deaths. The Court of Appeals, compelled to fall
back to statutory presumption, declared Joaquin Navarro, Jr. to
have survived his mother, applying Rule 123, section 69(ii) of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The decision of the CA radically affected the right of
succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child
of the deceased spouses, and of Antonio C. Navarro, respondent,
son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
ISSUE(S)
WON the Court of Appeals was correct in applying Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court instead of Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 on
the assumption that there is total lack of evidence?
RULING(S)
No. The Supreme Court held that neither of the two provisions
was applicable because where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls and for the reasons to be presently set forth.
Both provisions, Rule 123, section 69(ii) of the Revised
Rules of Court and Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889, now article
43 of the New Civil Code, as their language plainly implies, are
intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be available
when there are facts. The SC held that the preceding testimony
by a survivor contained facts quite adequate to solve the problem
of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
and keep the statutory presumption out of the case.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son
cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility was
entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction
from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., according to the testimony, was killed while running,
in front of, and 15 meters from, the burning German Club where
Mrs. Angela Navarro was left behind, alive and unhurt. Still in the
prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five
seconds or less, and so died within that interval from the time he
dashed out of the building. The testimony also provided that the
collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after
Joaquin Navarro Jr. was shot in the head and dropped dead, and
that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. Gauged
by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases
are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
The particular circumstances from which the parties and
the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen,
undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or
incorrectness of those conclusions raised a question of law, not
of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. The
question of whether upon given facts the operation of the
statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
Thus, the Supreme Court was constrained to reverse the
decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the
decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put
forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's
death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
37. Smith Bell v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 September 17, 1919
TITLE
Smith Bell v. Natividad
GR NUMBER
15574
DATE
September 17, 1919
PONENTE
J. Malcolm
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Juridical Persons, Corporation having majority of alien
stockholders
FACTS
●
●
●
●
●
●
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
A majority of its stockholders are British subjects.
It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for
it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons
gross.
The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the
purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between
ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the
home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a
certificate of Philippine registry.
The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands.
Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the
corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of
corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their
stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the
corporation of its property without due process of law because by the
passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every
beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked
title to a boat it could not use
Whether or not whether the Government of the Philippine
Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel
in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.
Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:
Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for
a certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the
collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel
that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and
that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in
section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code. Certificate of
Philippine register.
Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of
more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall
be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen
tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register
shall be optional with the owner. While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a
corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection
afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws
clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of
the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith,
Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines
coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class
legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within
authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police
power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
38. Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41 November 24, 1906
TITLE
Barlin v. Ramirez,
GR NUMBER
Promulgation: No. 2832
DATE
November 25, 1906
PONENTE
J. Willard
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Petitioner Rev Jorge Barlin as apostolic administrator of
Bishopric and legal representative of the general interests of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva
Caceres filed an appeal against Priest Vicente Ramirez from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines.
Defendant, Priest (Father) Vicente Ramirez was appointed
parish priest and took possession of the church on the 5th of
July 1901 wherein he administered until 14th day of November
1902. When his successor, Father Agripino Pisino was
appointed, Father Pisino demanded for the delivery of the
church, convent, and cemetery and the sacred ornaments,
books, jewels, money and other property which the Defendant
declined. Ramirez replied by a written document of that date,
refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of
Lagonoy, in conjunction with the parish priest of thereof, has
seen fit to sever connection with the Pope at Rome and his
representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church,
the head of which is at Manila.
In 1/4, the plaintiff brought this action against defendant
alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic
Church was the owner of the church building, the convent,
cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging
thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof
and that the defendant render an account of the property which
he had received and which was retained by him, and for other
relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not that the subject property wherein the said
church situated were own by the government or by the Catholic
Church having the capacity as Juridical Personality
RULING(S)
The court decided to hold its decision in favor of the Catholic
Church because of its Juridical Personality here in the
Philippines. The Church belongs to God and therefore the use of
the church should be to glorify God which is the Catholic Church
used to do. The public properties are the Roads and other
properties wherein the public should have. The ownership of the
Churches in the Philippines is not covered by the treaty of Paris
which were contracted between US and Spain.
It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church
has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This
suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates
by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe,
and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in
Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of
Mecca," does not require serious consideration
NOTES: Catholic Church has the capacity to own properties.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT
A. General rule : presumption of capacity
39. Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil. 363 July 25, 1911
TITLE
Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas
GR NUMBER
19 Phil. 363 (G.R. No. 5921)
DATE
July 25, 1911
PONENTE
Arellano, C.J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Article 38: Restriction on Capacity to Act: Minority, insanity or
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations,
such as easements. (32a)
Monomania; Insanity; Restrictions on Capacity to Act
FACTS
Petitioners: The Standard Oil Company of New York (STANDARD
OIL)
Defendants: Juan Codina Arenas, et. al. (ARENAS)
Appellant: Vicente Sixto Villanueva (VILLANUEVA)
Facts of the Case:
1. December 1908, Villanueva and Siy Ho, as sureties,
assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the
corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the
sum of P3,305. 76, with interest.
2. Said sureties-debtors failed to pay their obligations thus
Standard Oil sued them.
3. August 1909- CFI of the City of Manila sentenced all the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff
company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest
4. Thereafter, Villanueva’s wife petitioned that his husband be
relieved from the judgment/sentence and to reopen the trial
for the introduction of evidence because according to her,
on July 1909 his husband Villanueva was declared to be
insane by the CFI of Manila.
a. Whereas due to the said insanity, she was appointed
as Villanueva’s guardian.
b. As his guardian, however, she was not aware of the
proceedings (i.e. her husband giving the bond).
c. More so, when her husband gave the bond, he was
already in the state of permanent insanity, including
when summoned and in the course of litigation to
which he neither appeared nor defended himself.
5. Court granted petition, however, did not relieve Vicente
Villanueva from judgment because when he executed in
December 1908 the bond in question, he understood
perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act
performed by him and that the consent that was given by
him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and, thus valid.
6. Wife appealed to the Supreme Court saying that the lower
court erred in ruling that the monomania of great wealth,
suffered by the defendant Villanueva, does not imply
incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein
concerned.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
Whether or not the Villanueva’s (Appellant)’s state of monomania
imply incapacity on his part to execute the bond in the case at bar?
No. SC agrees with Trial Court in saying that that a person's
believing himself to be what he is not is not a positive proof of
insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Capacity to
act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not
previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved. And this has not been proved in this case. It is very
evident that on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva
subscribed the obligation now contested, he possessed the
necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect
to the bond which he freely executed.
·
Medico-legal doctrine:
o Supported the conclusion that such monomania
of wealth does not necessarily imply the result
that the defendant Villanueva was not a person
capable of executing a contract of bond.
·
No proof to the claim alleged by the wife.
o
It was not shown whether monomania was
habitual and constituted a truthful mental
perturbation in the patient; that the bond
executed by the defendant Villanueva was the
result of such monomania, and not the effect of
any other cause; and that the monomania
existed on the date when the bond was executed.
·
Bond was executed December 1908, and his incapacity
was not declared until July 24, 1909 (a year after executing the
bond).
●
Testimonies given by physicians and CFI Judge
○ Testified to the sanity of Villanueva particularly
during the time of the execution of the bond.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
B. Restrictions on capacity to act - NCC 38-39
40. Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215 December 1, 1917
41. Young v. Tecson, 39 O.G. 953
42. Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil. 417 January 30, 1928 (Llovit)
TITLE
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO VS. GERMAN MARAMBA AND
GENOVEVA MUERONG
GR NUMBER
51 PHIL. 417
DATE
JANUARY 30, 1928
PONENTE
ROMUALDEZ, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Appeal from Judgment/Restrictions On Capacity To Act;
Minority/En Banc
FACTS
Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura was the sole heir of the deceased
Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura and thus was the owner of the land
which was allegedly purchased by Genoveva Muerong.
The petitioner contended that he signed the transfer document
(Exhibit 1) dated July 17, 1922, as a minor and by intimidation
made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Muerong who
threatened Prado with imprisonment.
The petitioner's mother and her second husband Vicente Lagera
received P200 in 1915 by loan from Muerong as shown in Exhibit
3, but according to Prado's testimony was only P150
Muerong having learned that the land had a Torrens title issued in
favor of the plaintiff's father caused the plaintiff to sign a
conveyance of the land.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the sale of the land was valid considering that the seller was
a minor and the sale was unregistered
RULING(S)
No. The land was not sold to the defendant by the plaintiff because
the latter was a minor and the sale was unregistered
Minority
The contract of purchase and sale of real property executed by a
minor is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards said minor.
The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs.
Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped
from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be of
age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff
did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the
purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the
plaintiff's first cedula to be used in the acknowledgment of the
document.
Registration
A contract of purchase and sale of real property registered in
accordance with the Torrens system, does not bind the property if
it is not registered and is only valid between the parties and as
authority for the register of deeds to make the proper registration.
Therefore, the purchaser, by virtue of the deed of sale alone, does
not acquire any right to the property sold and much less if the
vendor is a minor.
Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1
alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold and much less,
if it is taken into consideration that, according to the evidence in
the record, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff,
was a minor.
Purchase
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to
have given the plaintiff and her son in 1922 as the price of the land,
the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given to
the alleged vendors in said year.
The sum of P663.40 is arrived at, approximately, by taking the
P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding
thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent per annum.
43. Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil. 669 March 4, 1950
TITLE
SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. RAMON ALCANTARA
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-1720
DATE
MARCH 4, 1950
PONENTE
PARAS, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Minority
FACTS
·
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino
Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara
conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land in Laguna. Ramon
Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old.
·
On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan)
received a letter from Atty. Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara,
informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and
accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by
Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit
ratifying the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara
received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500.
·
In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas
Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
·
On August 8, 1940, Ramon Alcantara filed an action in the
RTC for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his
undivided share in the two parcels of land. The trial court
absolved all the defendants but the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against
Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its
execution.
·
Hence, this petition by Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Ramon Alcantara’s minority at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale can be used as valid ground to
invalidate the Contract?
RULING(S)
NO, the respondent cannot use minority at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale as valid ground to invalidate the
Contract.The circumstance that, about one month after the date
of the conveyance, the respondent informed the petitioners of his
minority, is of no moment, because respondent's previous
misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the
contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference
that the petitioners in fact did not know that he was a minor on
the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes his bad faith,
when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said
information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from
the petitioners the sum of P500.
As held in Mercado v. Espiritu, “The courts, in their interpretation
of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they
are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse
themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by
them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of
law; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and
absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does
not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor
the juridical rules established in consonance therewith.
44. De Braganza v. De Villa- Abrille, 105 Phil 456 April 13, 1959
TITLE
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. FERNANDO
F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-12471
DATE
PONENTE
April 13, 1959
BENGZON, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
Minority as limitation on capacity to act
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille,
as a loan, on October 30, 1944, P70,000 in Japanese war notes
and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him
P10,000 "in legal currency of the Philippine Islands two years
after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as
International Exchange has been established in the Philippines",
plus 2 % per annum. Because payment had not been made, Villa
Abrille sued them in March 1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance,
defendants claimed to have received P40,000 only — instead of
P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note. After
hearing the parties and their evidence, said court rendered
judgment, which the appellate court affirmed.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs.
Rosario L. Braganza because the minority of her consigners note
release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the
minors. It is not denied that at the time of signing, Guillermo and
Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However,
the Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following
reasoning:
. . . . Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed
money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note,
without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo
and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case, pretended to be
of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et
al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215).
W/N Guillermo and Rodolfo had the capacity to act when they
signed the promissory note
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure
to disclose their minority in the same promissory note they
signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition that they will not
be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to
disclose their inability.
The Mercado case cited in the decision under review is different
because the document signed therein by the minor specifically
stated he was of age; here the promissory note contained no such
statement. In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was
guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the
minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or
constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing
sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the application of the
Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the very minority
which incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them
from the results of misrepresentation. Accordingly, the appealed
decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza
shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.33 plus 2% interest from
October 1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly
to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest
beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No costs
in this instance
45. US v. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88 March 13, 1914
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EVARISTO
VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
9471 / 9472
1914-03-13
PONENTE
TRENT, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Insanity
FACTS
Evaristo Vaquilar was charged in two separate information with
parricide for the killing of his wife and of his daughter. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment, indemnify the heirs, to the
accessory penalties and to the payment of the costs in each
case.
Several witnesses were introduced on his behalf testifying that
he appeared to be insane when committed the crime. They
testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and
stomach prior to the killing.
Martin Agustin testified that his uncle that the appellant had
“felt pains in his head and stomach” and that his “eyes were
very big and red and his sight penetrating”.
Diego Agustin, witness, testified that he looks like a madman;
crazy because he would cut everybody at random without
paying attention to who it was.”
ISSUE(S)
Issue: Whether or not appellant Vaquilar was suffering
from insanity when he killed his wife and his daughter?
RULING(S)
Court said that there is a difference between an insane person
and one who has worked himself such frenzy of anger that he
fails to use reason or good judgment. A person acts crazay is
not conclusive that he is insane. Crazy is not synonymous with
the legal terms “insane” idiot or lunatic. It is not at all
unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife
and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those
who attempt to capture him.
Citing People vs Mortimer: Those who have not lost control of
their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their
tempers and restrain their passions and are liable to law if they
do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as
to make them reckless…”
Court also cited US v Carmona that a night of the crime the
defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind wounding his
wife and other members of the family without any motives.
However, US Supreme Court that in the absence of proof that
defendant lost his reason or became demented during the
crime, it is presumed that he was in normal condition... unless
his insanity and absence of will are proven.
The Court held that appellants conduct is consistent with the
acts of an enraged criminal and not having been satisfactorily
shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed
the crime.
46. Standard Oil v. Arenas, supra
TITLE
Standard Oil vs. Arenas
GR NUMBER
19 Phil. 363
DATE
July 25, 1911
PONENTE
Arellano, CJ
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Monomania, Capacity to Act
FACTS
December 15, 1908 - Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara
del Pino, as principals, and Aipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva
and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as surities sign a bond in favor of
plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of Php 3,305.76,
three months from date, with interest of Php 1.00 per month.
April 5, 1909 - The plaintiff sued the debtors regarding the bond
sign and they were summoned. The record shows that Villanueva
received his summons.
May 12, 1909 - Villanueva did not appear and was declared in
default.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa
Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her
husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct.
11, she was authorized by the court as guardian to institute the
proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds
given by her husband while in a state of insanity
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth
necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not
have capacity to act.
2. Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into
contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15,
1908
RULING(S)
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who
has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity
is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved,
that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable,
crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this
court, has not been proved in this case
The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva
possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no
evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a
person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and
therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a
contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente
has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property
of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as
the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that
at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the
appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The
witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane
periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but none
at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15,
1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to
legally deprive her husband management over his estate knowing
full well that he was insane.
47. People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65 November 21, 1991
TITLE
PEOPLE v. RAFANAN
GR NUMBER
54135
DATE
November 21, 1991
PONENTE
Feliciano, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Insanity
FACTS
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then CFI
of Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape of
complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount P10,000 by way
of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
In 1976, complainant Ronaya who was then only fourteen was
hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines
Rafanan alias 'Baket Ines' with a salary of P30 a month.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya
was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store which
was located in front of their house about 6 meters away.
Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00
o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help
him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and
went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the
store and said, 'Come, let us have sexual intercourse,' to which
Estelita replied, 'I do not like,' and struggled to free herself and
cried.
The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the
handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant
threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced
her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after
unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of the
complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her
inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual
intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report
the matter to her mother or to anybody in the house, otherwise
he would kill her.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the
accused learned what happened the night before in the store
between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among
them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When
Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went
home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried
and cried. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the
mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the
house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina.
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of
her mother whose testimonies he contends are contradictory. It
is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on
direct examination that she immediately went home after the
rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross
examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of
appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that she
left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have
contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went
to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita
home.
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering
from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when
he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of
his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered
appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. Appellant was
admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there
until 26 June 1978.
ISSUE(S)
WON Rafanan is insane at the time of the commission of the
crime.
RULING(S)
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval. Where the imbecile or an insane person
has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of
the same court.
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the
insanity defense, it was only in People vs. Formigones that the
Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this
exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be a complete absence of the power to discern,
or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the
time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, became mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita
with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by
him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was
aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault.
The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last 2
answers above, that a person suffering from schizophrenia
sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also
deprivation of the power of self-control. We do not believe that
Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the
truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it
is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the
exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of
a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative
allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear
and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held
that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to
the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the 2
physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not
purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical
period of time.
They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or
immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies
consisted of broad statements based on general
behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.
Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and
examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental
Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.
V. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
48. Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991
TITLE
ABELLA VS. COMELEC
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 100710
DATE
Septmeber 3, 1991
PONENTE
GUTIERREZ, JR.
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
ART.50 OF NCC - For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment
of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of
their habitual residence.
FACTS
In the local elections of February 1, 1988, Adelina Larrazabal was
proclaimed as the duly elected governor of the province of Leyte and
petitioner Benjamin Abella who obtained the second highest number
of votes for the said position.
Silvestre De la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City then filed a
disqualification case before the Supreme Court, which issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining the provincial board of
canvassers of Leyte 'from proclaiming Larrazabal as the winning
candidate for Governor, in the event that she obtains the winning
margin of votes (Disqualification Case). Abella likewise raised
objections during the canvass of the election returns and elevated
them to the Comelec (Pre-proclamation Case).
The pre-proclamation and disqualification cases were consolidated
before the Comelec, which unanimously upheld virtually all the
challenged rulings of the provincial board of canvassers and ordered
the proclamation of the winner after completion of the canvass. The
disqualification case was also dismissed.
The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court (SC) which affirmed
the ruling on the pre-proclamation but reversed the dismissal on the
Disqualification Case and ordered the Comelec to
proceed with the hearing.
The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was that respondent
Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga,
Leyte as she claimed but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc
City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of
the province thereby disqualifying her for the position of governor of
Leyte.
On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that she was
a resident and a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. She, too
presented testimonial as well as documentary evidence to prove her
stand.
Eventually, the Comelec Second Division rendered its decision
declaring the disqualification of Larrazabal. The Comelec En Banc
affirmed the disqualification. In the same resolution, the Comelec En
Banc disallowed Abella's proclamation as governor of Leyte. Hence,
these
petitions.
Meanwhile, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo Petilla,
took his oath as Provincial Governor of Leyte and assumed the
governorship.
Hence this petition seeks to review the decision and resolution of the
Commission on Elections.
ISSUE(S)
W/N Larrazabal lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for
the position of governor of Leyte?
RULING(S)
Yes. The COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the
required residence on the evidence of record to the effect that
despite protestations to the contrary made by the petitioner, she has
established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the present
and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly change her
residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga,
Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province
of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident
of Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise,
the reliance on the provisions of the Family Code was proper and in
consonance with human experience. The petitioner did not present
evidence to show that she and her husband maintain separate
residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City.
For the purpose of running for public office, the residence
requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any
place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to
time.
The Civil Code is clear that for the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the
place of their habitual residence.
There is no evidence to prove that Larrazabal temporarily left her
residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession
or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in
Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident
therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her
residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is not present. The fact that
she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not
signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common
among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided
specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein although
for intents and purposes we have already transferred our residence
to
other
places.
Significantly, the Comelec likewise determined that Larrazabal was
not a registered voter in Precinct No. 17, Brgy. Mahawan, Kananga,
Leyte, and, that she and her husband Emeterio Larrazabal continued
to be registered voters in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City." The Court is
bound by these factual findings as they are supported by substantial
evidence.
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside
the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in
grave abuse of discretion.
[WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the second division of the Commission on
Elections dated February 14,1991 and the questioned Resolution en
banc of the Commission dated July 18,1991 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on August 1,1991 is LIFTED.]
VII. MARRIAGE
A. Concept and nature
49. Cabague v. Auxillo, 92 Phil. 294 November 26, 1952
TITLE
FELIPE CABAGUE, petitioner, v. MATIAS AUXILIO,
respondent
GR NUMBER
GR No. L-5028 / 92 Phil. 294
DATE
Nov 26, 1952
PONENTE
Bengzon
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Breach of Promise to Marry
FACTS
1. In the court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his
son Geronimo sued the respondents Matias Auxilio and his
daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from respondents’'
refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between
Socorro and Geronimo.
2. The complaint alleged, in short;
(a) that respondents promised such marriage to the petitioners,
provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud
and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride;
(b) that relying upon such promises, the petitioners made the
improvement and spent P700; and
(c) that without cause, the respondents refused to honor their
pledged word
3. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
the contract is just an oral agreement and there’s no written
agreement that was executed.
**Under the former rules of procedure: Rule 123, Sec 21 states
that “Oral evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement made
upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to
marry”
4. The court dismissed the case. It should be observed preliminarily
that when the complaint did not state whether the contract sued on
was in writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no ground for
the respondent.
***Under the new Rules "defendant may now present a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if
such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact
may be proved by him."
5. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the petitioners
reproduced their complaint and the respondents reiterated their
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not breach of promise to marry may be proven in
the court even not in writing
RULING(S)
(1) Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such
damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their
mutual matrimonial promises. The evidence of such mutual
promise is admissible.
Extra:
ISSUE:
Who can sue using the “breach of promise to marry”?
RULING:
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the
defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement.
One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another,
the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to
marry".
For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue
Socorro for damages. However Felipe Cabague's action may not
prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this
action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to
marry"and neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against
Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
50. Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 February 8, 1916
TITLE
DOMALAGAN V BOLIFER
GR NUMBER
GR NO. 8166
DATE
02-08-1916
PONENTE
JOHNSON
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
FACTS
●
On November 1909, plaintiff Jorge Domalagan alleged that
he and the defendant, Carlos Bolifer entered into a contract
upon the marriage of their son and daughter in which he
was to pay the defendant the sum of P500.
●
●
And so, the defendant completed his obligation under the
said contract and together paid the sum of P16 as “hansel
or token of future marriage”. That notwithstanding said
agreement, the daughter of Bolifer, Bonifacia, was joined in
lawful wedlock to another man (Laureano Sisi).
Domagan filed an action and demanded of the defendant to
return the sum of P516 which he has given together with
the interest and damage.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.
RULING(S)
YES. The court ruled that a contract such as the one relied upon
by the plaintiff in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing.
Paragraph 3 Section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil
Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be
valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable
to prove it. Said section provides that the contract shall not be
enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note
or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by
which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does
not declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not been
reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph
5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid
contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If
it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot
be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to
evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it
does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause,
make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be
proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding
upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
51. Hermosisima v CA 109 Phil 629
TITLE
GR NUMBER
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
No. L-14628
DATE
September 30, 1960
PONENTE
CONCEPCIÓN, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT
ACTIONABLE. — It is the clear and manifest intent of
Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry.
2. SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL CODE.—The "seduction"
contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code as one
of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is
the crime punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code.
3. WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST.—Where a woman,
who was an insurance agent and former high school
teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10
years older than the man, "overwhelmed by her love" for a
man approximately 10 years younger than her, had
intimate relations with him, because she "wanted to bind"
him "by having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said that he is
morally guilty of seduction.
FACTS:
● Complainant Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School and later on she became a life
insurance underwriter in Cebu. The petitioner was almost
ten (10) years younger than she. They used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
● One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies,
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot.
● In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954. Referring now to
the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain (Articles 43 and 44) permitted the recovery
of damages for breach of promise to marry.
● On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court
of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner,
●
●
●
●
as well as for support of said child and moral damages for
alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the later, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.
The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay,
by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was,
on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual
and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral
damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees
CA affirmed this decision.except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
Francisco filed a petition for review by Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE(S)
Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
RULING(S)
Ruling: 1. NO. Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
52. Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 December 26, 1964
TITLE
Title: Wassmer v. Velez
GR NUMBER
GR.No. L-20089
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
December 26, 1964
Bengzon J.P.
Breach of promise to marry
FACTS
FACTS: On August 23, 1954 Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P.
Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage. Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances.The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He went to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.
ISSUE(S)
ISSUE: Is Francisco Velez liable to pay damages after his
breach of promise to marry Beatriz Wassmer?
RULING(S)
HELD: Yes. A mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
Defendant urges that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be
totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends
that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that
"the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
53.. Estremos v. Ephan, (CA) 83 OG 4022 No. 35
●
●
Guy sorry copy-paste lang na digest to, hindi ko
talaga mahanap ung full text.
- Adlawan
TITLE
Estremos v. Ephan
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
ART. 21 of the Civil Code
FACTS
Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos were college sweethearts. They
engaged in consensual sex several times, resulting in Erlinda getting
pregnant. When the parents of both parties found out, they arranged
for them to get married. Virgilio didn’t want to go through with it but
his father insisted. So Erlinda, her mother Estrella , Virgilio, and his
father Gonzalo, went to the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a
marriage license.
Later on, however, Virgilio disappeared, but first coursing a letter
through a pedicab driver explaining his actions.
●
“now is not the right moment for me to marry… I want to
marry when I am already prepared…”
●
“… I can already work if I want to work but do not have yet
money for capital in a small business, this is one thing that
stop me from getting married.”
●
“… I would not like to ask money from my parents after I get
married, and every person has a different principle and this
is my principle.”
●
They had planned to get the baby aborted by a “Hilot” but
since Erlinda was already 4 months on the way, he did not
continue because he “did not want to add more to [his] sins.”
Erlinda’s parents are now suing Virgilio’s parents for damages. They
had already bought Erlinda a wedding gown and sandals, and
prepared some animals for slaughter. The CFI ruled in favor of the
Sps. Ephan, awarding them P20,000 in moral damages P10,000 in
exemplary damages, P1,000 in attorney’s fees, and P400 in wedding
reparations. Hence present appeal.
ISSUE(S)
WON the Ephan’s are liable for the breach of promise to marry?
RULING(S)
No, the Ephan’s are not liable.
As a general rule, a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. The Supreme Court, however laid down a certain
exceptions, as in the case of Wassmer v Valdez. Under Art. 21 of
the Civil Code, the SC found that “to formally set a wedding and go
through the preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different from a mere
breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be answerable
for damages in accordance with Art. 21.
The Court differentiated the present case from Wassmer in that the
parents of both contracting parties connived Virgilio into marrying
Erlinda. In Wassmer, the contracting parties themselves entered into
the agreement to marry.
The Court then opined that Erlinda should suffer for her libertarian
conduct. She entered into it with “eyes wide open and with mutual
passion.” Virgilio shouldn’t suffer alone. If Virgilio felt that he was
not prepared for marriage in the first place then he should not go
through with it. It will only make him a bitter husband and
consequently an inept father, which do not make for a good family
life.
VII. MARRIAGE
A. Concept and nature
49. Cabague v. Auxillo, 92 Phil. 294 November 26, 1952
TITLE
FELIPE CABAGUE, petitioner, v. MATIAS AUXILIO,
respondent
GR NUMBER
GR No. L-5028 / 92 Phil. 294
DATE
Nov 26, 1952
PONENTE
Bengzon
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Breach of Promise to Marry
FACTS
1. In the court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his
son Geronimo sued the respondents Matias Auxilio and his
daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from respondents’'
refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between
Socorro and Geronimo.
2. The complaint alleged, in short;
(a) that respondents promised such marriage to the petitioners,
provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud
and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride;
(b) that relying upon such promises, the petitioners made the
improvement and spent P700; and
(c) that without cause, the respondents refused to honor their
pledged word
3. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
the contract is just an oral agreement and there’s no written
agreement that was executed.
**Under the former rules of procedure: Rule 123, Sec 21 states
that “Oral evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement made
upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to
marry”
4. The court dismissed the case. It should be observed preliminarily
that when the complaint did not state whether the contract sued on
was in writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no ground for
the respondent.
***Under the new Rules "defendant may now present a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if
such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact
may be proved by him."
5. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the petitioners
reproduced their complaint and the respondents reiterated their
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether or not breach of promise to marry may be proven in
the court even not in writing
RULING(S)
(1) Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such
damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their
mutual matrimonial promises. The evidence of such mutual
promise is admissible.
Extra:
ISSUE:
Who can sue using the “breach of promise to marry”?
RULING:
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the
defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement.
One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another,
the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to
marry".
For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue
Socorro for damages. However Felipe Cabague's action may not
prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this
action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to
marry"and neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against
Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
50. Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 February 8, 1916
TITLE
DOMALAGAN V BOLIFER
GR NUMBER
GR NO. 8166
DATE
02-08-1916
PONENTE
JOHNSON
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
FACTS
●
On November 1909, plaintiff Jorge Domalagan alleged that
he and the defendant, Carlos Bolifer entered into a contract
upon the marriage of their son and daughter in which he
was to pay the defendant the sum of P500.
●
●
And so, the defendant completed his obligation under the
said contract and together paid the sum of P16 as “hansel
or token of future marriage”. That notwithstanding said
agreement, the daughter of Bolifer, Bonifacia, was joined in
lawful wedlock to another man (Laureano Sisi).
Domagan filed an action and demanded of the defendant to
return the sum of P516 which he has given together with
the interest and damage.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.
RULING(S)
YES. The court ruled that a contract such as the one relied upon
by the plaintiff in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing.
Paragraph 3 Section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil
Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be
valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable
to prove it. Said section provides that the contract shall not be
enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced by some note
or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by
which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does
not declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not been
reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph
5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid
contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If
it is not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot
be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to
evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it
does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause,
make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support
contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be
proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding
upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
51. Hermosisima v CA 109 Phil 629
TITLE
GR NUMBER
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
No. L-14628
DATE
September 30, 1960
PONENTE
CONCEPCIÓN, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
4. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT
ACTIONABLE. — It is the clear and manifest intent of
Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry.
5. SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL CODE.—The "seduction"
contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code as one
of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is
the crime punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code.
6. WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST.—Where a woman,
who was an insurance agent and former high school
teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10
years older than the man, "overwhelmed by her love" for a
man approximately 10 years younger than her, had
intimate relations with him, because she "wanted to bind"
him "by having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said that he is
morally guilty of seduction.
FACTS:
● Complainant Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School and later on she became a life
insurance underwriter in Cebu. The petitioner was almost
ten (10) years younger than she. They used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
● One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies,
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot.
● In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954. Referring now to
the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain (Articles 43 and 44) permitted the recovery
of damages for breach of promise to marry.
● On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court
of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner,
●
●
●
●
as well as for support of said child and moral damages for
alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the later, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.
The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay,
by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was,
on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual
and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral
damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees
CA affirmed this decision.except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
Francisco filed a petition for review by Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE(S)
Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
RULING(S)
Ruling: 1. NO. Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
52. Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 December 26, 1964
TITLE
Title: Wassmer v. Velez
GR NUMBER
GR.No. L-20089
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
December 26, 1964
Bengzon J.P.
Breach of promise to marry
FACTS
FACTS: On August 23, 1954 Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P.
Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage. Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances.The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He went to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
54. Tanjanco v. CA, 18 SCRA 994 December 17, 1966
TITLE
Apolonio Tanjanco, petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and
Araceli Santos, respondents
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-18630
DATE
December 17, 1966
PONENTE
Reyes
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Art. 19-21 of NCC, Breach of Promise to Marry
- From Dec 1957, petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted
respondent Araceli Santos, who in due time reciprocated his
feelings. Petitioner promised to marry respondent, and the
latter consented carnal access regularly until December 1959.
- Respondent eventually conceived a child, and as a result, she
resigned her job as a secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation. Being unable to support herself
and her baby, and petitioner’s refusal to marry, respondent
Santos suffered mental anguish, wounded feelings, and such.
She then filed an action for support and damages, compelling
the petitioner to recognize the unborn child and to pay her not
less than P430.00 a month for her support and her baby, plus
fees for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
- The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which decreed
that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, as
prescribed on Art. 21 of the Civil Code, which states that, “Any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
- The CA therefore, directed the court of origin to proceed with
the case.
- The petitioner in turn appealed to the Court, pleading that
actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in
this jurisdiction, and invoking prior rulings of the court in
previous cases.
ISSUE(S)
W/N moral and exemplary damages may be sought for a
breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. 21 of the Civil
code of the Philippines.
RULING(S)
- NO. The Court looked into the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature to support the draft of the
Civil Code, and found out that Art. 21 of the Civil Code connotes
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded, that the essential feature is seduction, and not just
mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry.
- Examining Santos’ complaint, the Court concluded that such
conducts of the respondent, being a woman of an adult age, is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
voluntariness and mutual passion in her acts. Hence, no case is
made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code. No error was committed
by the CFI in dismissing the complaint.
ADDITIONAL NOTE:
The promise to marry has no obligatory force; therefore, as a
rule, its breach cannot give rise to liability for damages.
(Tolentino, under Art. 19 of the NCC)
55. Baksh v. CA, G.R. 97326 Feb. 19, 1993
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
97336
February 19, 1993
DAVIDE, JR.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
APPEAL by certiorari to review and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City,
Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem
Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who
was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate.
On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to
marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced
Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to
get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for
animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment
where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their
relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. It
was revealed that Baksh would tie Marilou’s hands and feet
while he went to school, and gave her medicine at 4am that
made her sleep the whole day until the following day.
As a result of this live-in relationship, Marilou became pregnant,
but Baksh gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
Marilou continued to live with him and kept reminding him of his
promise to marry her. Gashem eventually revoked his promise
of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married
to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later
sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in
moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to
Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino
customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not
familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in imposing
Gashem payment of damages to Marilou as a consequence of
his breach of his promise to marry the latter.
RULING(S)
Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou
not really because of his breach of promise to marry her but
based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides: “Any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se.
In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that
constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His
promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her
into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was
not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met
Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem
had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant
disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the
reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of
our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to
study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act
contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to
expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to
cover situations such as this case where the breach complained
of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law
penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if
the promise to marry was made and there was carnal
knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be
recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if
there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the
promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may
be recovered.
56. Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367 September 9, 1933_ ANTONA
TITLE
JOSE R. PAÑGANIBAN, complainant,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent
GR NUMBER
58 Phil. 367
DATE
September 9, 1933
PONENTE
MALCOLM, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent
This is a proceeding looking to the disbarment of the Elias
Borromeo for professional malpractice. The respondent admits
that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized a document
which contains provisions contrary to law, morals and good
customs, but by way of defense disclaims any previous
knowledge of the illegal character of the document.
In 1931, a couple, subscribed a contract before
Borromeo. The contract had been prepared by the municipal
secretary. Attorney Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the
document and had, at least, some knowledge of its contents,
although he may not have been fully informed because of a
difference in dialect. The contract in substance purported to
formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife which
permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the
wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without
opposition from either one of them.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose?- YES
W/N a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public?
- YES
RULING(S)
YES! The contract was executed when the Spanish Penal Code
was in force. However, more liberal provisions RPC should be
given application, it is provided that the consent by the offended
party constitutes a bar to prosecution for adultery or
concubinage. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of
the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still
remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be
instituted if the offended party consented to the act of the
offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not matter
for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the
contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and public
order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
There can be no question as to the right of the court
to discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as notary public, has
been guilty of misconduct. The notary public exercise duties
calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for the notary to
inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and to
take part in no illegal enterprise. We are led to hold that a
member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a
disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the
court even to the extent of disbarment.
As mitigating circumstances, (1) that the attorney
may not have realized the full purport of the document to which
he took acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification of facts was
attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent as a
notary public has been revoked. Accordingly, we exercise
clemency and to confine our discipline of the respondent to
severe censure.
57. In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 June 21, 1940
TITLE
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO
GR NUMBER
A.C. No. 932
DATE
June 21, 1940
PONENTE
LAUREL, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Contract of separation between spouses; legal malpractice
FACTS
Spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares were living
separately for 9 consecutive years. Baniquit who is inclined to
contract another marriage with Trinidad Aurelio, sought the
advice of herein defendant, Atty Roque Santiago who was
practicing law and a notary public.
Santiago then assured Baniquit that the former can secure a
separation from Colares and in effect allow the latter’s marriage
to Trinidad Aurelio. Atty Santiago asked both parties to bring his
legal wife (Colares) in his office and on the afternoon of May 29,
1939, the executed a document stating “ that the contracting
parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to
marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever
right of action one might have against the party so marrying.”
Ernesto Baniquit said, “would there be no trouble?” and upon
hearing this, the defendant stood up and points at his diploma
and said “I would tear that off if this document turns out not to
be valid." Subsequently, Ernesto Baniquit contracted a second
marriage with Trinidad Aurelio.
Defendant did not deny the preparation of the document but
claims that at the time of the execution he had the idea that
seven years of separation of the contracting parties entitled them
the right to contract a second marriage. However, when he knew
about his error, he asked the parties to return to his office and to
sign a deed of cancellation of the document in question.
ISSUE(S)
ISSUE:
Whether or not a married couple may terminate their marriage
through a contract of separation
Whether or not the defendant’s act of executing a contract of
separation of marriage valid and if not, the said act may
constitute as malpractice of law
RULING(S)
1. NO. The law specially provides for its invalidity.
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or
of annulment of marriage;
2. No. The advice and document execute by him is contrary to
law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the
family. Malpractice through recklessness and sheer ignorance
justifies the disbarment. However, majority of the court followed
the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero
Rodas, to suspend him from practice for one year.
58. Selanova v. Mendoza, 64 SCRA 69 May 19, 1975
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
SATURNINO SELANOVA, complainant, vs. ALEJANDRO E.
MENDOZA, City Judge of Mandaue City, respondent.
A.M. No. 804-CJ
May 19, 1975
Aquino
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
●
●
●
Saturnino filed a complaint against Judge Alejandro
Mendoza for gross ignorance of the law due to his act of
preparing and ratifying a document which had
extrajudicially liquidated the conjugal partnership of the
petitioner and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.
Under the document, the following were stipulated:
1. Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery
or concubinage which each had filed against the other
and;
2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for whatever
acts of infidelity either one would commit against the
other;
Pertaining to Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code, respondent judge
believes that, “the husband and the wife may agree upon
●
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval." This was his
defense.
The judge then proceeded to divide the property amongst
complainant and his wife; to the complainant a thirteenhectare Riceland and to the wife the residential house and
lot. The last paragraph of the acknowledged instrument,
licensed any of the spouses to then commit an act of
infidelity, which then ratifies their separation. The
agreement becomes void because it is contrary to the
provisions of the Civil Code.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void;
RULING(S)
It is void. Under Article 221 of the Civil Code:
The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;
In the present case, the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership ratified by respondent judge falls under this provision
which makes such act void. His unawareness if the legal
prohibition led him to prepare said void agreement and
acknowledge such.
However, given the circumstance that the judge in good faith,
intended to resolve the marital conflict between complainant and
his wife, a drastic penalty should not be imposed upon him. But,
he is still censured for such acts.
59. Lichauco-De Leon v. CA, 186 SCRA 345, June 6, 1990
TITLE
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MACARIA DE LEON AND JOSE
VICENTE DE LEON, respondents
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 80965
DATE
1990-06-06
PONENTE
Ponente: MEDIALDEA, J.
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Marriage- Not subject to stipulation NCC 221
FACTS
·
In 1969, Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united to Jose Vicente
De Leon in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor. On August 28,
1971, a child named Susana L. De Leon was born from this union.
·
In 1972, due to irreconcilable marital differences, a de facto
separation between the spouses occurred.
·
In 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained
American citizenship. Sylvia filed with a petition for dissolution of
marriage against Jose Vicente at the Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco. Along with this, Sylvia also filed claims for
support and distribution of properties.
·
In 1977, Sylvia had a Letter-Agreement with her mother-inlaw, private respondent Macaria De Leon. After hearings, it was
declared that the conjugal partnership of the Spouses dissolved and
both can enjoy his or her separate estate, without the consent of
the other.
·
In 1980, Sylvia moved for the execution of the order.
However, Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration alleging that
Sylvia made a verbal reformation as there was no such agreement
for the payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to commence from
the alleged date of separation, and he was not notified that Sylvia
would attempt verbal reformation of the agreement contained in
the joint petition.
·
While the motion for Reconsideration was pending, Macaria
De Leon filed with the trial court the motion for leave to intervene
as she claimed to be the owner of the properties stated in the
Letter-Agreement. The motion was granted.
·
In October 1980, Macaria and her husband filed her complaint
in intervention. She assailed the validity and legality of the LetterAgreement which for its purpose the termination of marital
relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente. However, the case
was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig before the case
started.
·
The judge favored the intervenor, and ordered Sylvia to
restore to intervenor the amount of P380,000.00
·
Sylvia filed an appeal in the COA but the motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
·
The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement reads, "In
consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations
between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose
Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:"
·
The use of the word “relations” is ambiguous and therefore
subject to interpretation. Sylvia insisted that the “relations” in the
Letter-Argument was of property relations while Macaria and Jose
Vicente argued that it was merely marital relations.
·
It was made to appear that the said properties are conjugal
in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the questioned
properties are owned by her, and neither Sylvia nor Jose Vicente
countered it.
·
Macaria also claimed that Sylvia intimidated her by
threatening Jose Vicente with adultery suits
·
Macaria also raised the defenses that she signed the LetterAgreement because of her fear that Slyvia would take her
inheritance rights.
·
Such condition was but an incident of the consideration
thereof which the termination of marital relations. In the ultimate
analysis, therefore, both parties acted in violation of the laws.
·
The pari delicto rule, which refuses remedy to either party
to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are, does not
apply in this case. Instead, Article 1414 0f the Civil Code, an
exception to the pari delicto rule, is suited to be applied.
·
"When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal
purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the parties
before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage
has been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if
the public interest will thus be subserved, allow the party
repudiating the contract to recover the money or property."
·
The Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose
has been accomplished, so justice would be served by allowing
Macaria to be placed in the position in which she was before the
transaction was entered into.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the Letter-Agreement was valid.
RULING(S)
No. The letter-Agreement is invalid because it contravenes the
following provisions of the civil code:
Article 221. The flowing shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife.
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife.
B. Law Governing Validity
60. Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114, October 5, 2005
TITLE
Republic v. Orbecido III
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 154380
DATE
October 5, 2005
PONENTE
QUISUMBING, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
·
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City, Philippines. They had a son
and a daughter.
·
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer.
·
In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife, who had been
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree
in the USA, and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived
in California since then.
·
Cipriano thereafter filed with the Philippine trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Article 26, Paragraph 2
of the Family Code. The court found merit in the petition and
granted it.
·
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
files a petition for review assailing the decision.
·
Petitioner contends that Article 26, Paragraph 2 does not
apply to Cipriano since it only applies to a valid marriage between
a Filipino citizen and an alien. The petitioner stated that the
proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation. Furthermore, the OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation.
·
On the other hand, the respondent insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law.
ISSUE(S)
WON where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Article
26 of the Family Code?
RULING(S)
Yes. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, the court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Yet there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record
regarding the respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, allowing the respondent
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
61. Garcia-Recio v. Garcia, 366 SCRA 437, October 2, 2001
TITLE
Garcia-Recio v. Garcia
GR NUMBER
138322
DATE
PONENTE
October 2, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
·
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
·
On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
·
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government.
·
The Petitioner, a Filipina and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.
·
Not long after, however, the couple was living separately
in Australia without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
·
In 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Rederick on the ground of bigamy
for he allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her in 1994. She claimed that she learned of his marriage
to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
·
Rederick contended that his first marriage to Editha
Samson had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989, thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner in 1994.
·
While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending,
Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree in Australia
because the "marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
Consequently, he prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.
ISSUE(S)
WON – Whether or not the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven.
WON - the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is
admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to remarry.
RULING(S)
1st Issue:
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
First, a divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country: (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
2nd issue:
No, since according to Australian divorce decree it contains a
restriction that reads:
“A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.”
This provision bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce
ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.
*WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
62. Republic v. Manalo, GR No. 221029, April 24, 2018
63. Sison v. Te Lay Ti (CA)
TITLE
Sison v. Te Lay Ti (CA)
GR NUMBER
No 7037
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
May 7, 1952
J. JBL Reyes
Marriage effected through force and Intimidation, Cohabitation
Petition:
Appeal from a decision of CFI Davao declaring the two
marriages celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949 null
and void on the ground of plaintiff’s consent was obtained
through force and intimidation employed upon her by her father
Facts:
On April 28, 1949, two marriages of Juanita Sison and Te Lay Li
were celebrated: a civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of
MC of Davao in the morning, and remarried in accordance with
rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T. Mih in office
in Davao City in the afternoon.
The plaintiff’s testimony:
1. Defendant never wooed her
2. Wedding was arranged by her father, who often whipped
her as she opposed the marriage
3. She ran away from home but was found by her father and
promised not to force her again with the marriage
4. She was locked in the house and her father handed a knife
telling her to choose between her life or his and because of
fear that her father might kill her she agreed to the
marriage
5. Her testimony was corroborated by mother
6. She lived with her husband in his parent’s home but
considered him a stranger since she doesn’t love him
7. She was kept a prisoner in the house; she never occupied
the same bed with husband
8. Never had sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949
forced by husband using a knife—she mustered courage to
escape from her husband’s home
Defendant’s claim:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Marriages were regular and legal
Entered into marriage freely and voluntarily
Plaintiff not kept a prisoner
Plaintiff would everyday ask her father in law to give her
and her husband their own house and business
5. She slapped her—only when she ran away with P1200 and
when asked where she came from she
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the marriage effected through force and
intimidation is valid
2. Whether or not consent was ratified by cohabitation
RULING(S)
1. No. Notwithstanding that the formalities indicating consent
have been complied with, there is no valid marriage where
the parties do no intend to enter into the marriage.
The testimony of Juanita being compelled by her father to
marry a man she did not like was corroborated by the
testimonies of her mother and the officiating Judge. The
respondent also did not deny that Juanita was induced to
marry him only through fear and compulsion.
2. No. While a consent in marriage obtained by force and
intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation,
such cohabitation must be voluntary. It is clear from
Juanita’s testimony that there was no voluntary
cohabitation on her part and she never acquiesced to the
status of wife
64. Vilar v. Paraiso, 96 Phil 659 March 14, 1955
TITLE
Vilar v. Paraiso
GR NUMBER
96 Phil 659
DATE
PONENTE
March 14, 1955
Justice Bautista Angelo
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Election contests, Ecclesiastic ineligible to hold municipal office
FACTS
1. During the election held in November 13, 1951, Pedro
Vilar the petitioner along with the respondent, Gaudencio
Paraiso ran for the office of the Mayor of Rizal Nueva Ecija and
wherein the respondent declared winner with 41 plurality.
Petitioner, Pedro Vilar contended that Paraiso is ineligible to
hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was
disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Vilar instituted a quo warranto
proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be
declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly
elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent
Paraiso.
2. Paraiso claimed that he resigned as minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21m 1951 and
that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church,
August 27, 1951. And also contended that even if he is not
eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected
to take his place.
ISSUE(S)
* Whether or not Gaudencio Paraiso being ecclesiastic is
ineligible to hold position as Mayor of Nueva Ecija under section
2175 of the Revised administrative Code
*Whether or not he actually resigned as minister before
the date of elections.
*Whether being ineligible, the petitioner can be declared
elected, having obtained second place in the elections.
RULING(S)
1. Court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of
mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and consequently, it delared his
proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from
declaring petitioner as mayor elect for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so.
2. As Respondent, failing to file his resignation to the
Bureau of Public Libraries being a minister and having a
license to solemnize marriages constitutes that his license has
never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church
nor respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that
respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United
Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of
candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister. Having
said all this, the respondent as an ecclesiastic is ineligible to
hold a municipal office under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code. All these lead the court to believe with
the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and acceptance
were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the
respondent.
3. As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible,
petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second
place in the elections As to the question whether, respondent
being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having
obtained second place in the elections. when the person
elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the
candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even
if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration
of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality
of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy.
"Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised
Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is
declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it
may be gathered that the law contemplates no such result,
because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered
candidate irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next
highest place or the lowest in the election Returns.
65. Aranes V. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, April 11, 2002
TITLE
Aranes V. Occiano
GR NUMBER
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
DATE
April 11, 2002
PONENTE
Puno, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Formal Requisites of Marriage; Authority of Solemnizing Officer;
Marriage License
Petitioner/s: Mercedita Mata Aranes (ARANES)
Respondent/s: Judge Salvador M. Occiano (OCCIANO)
Nature of Action: Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn LetterComplaint
Facts:
Mercedita Aranes (Petitioner) charged Judge Occiano
(Respondent), Presiding Judge of the MTC of Balatan, Camarines
Sur, with Gross Ignorance of the Law for solemnizing Aranes’
marriage to her late groom, Dominador Orobia (1) outside his
territorial jurisdiction at Nabua, Camarines Sur and (2) without
marriage license. As a result, the marriage was a nullity and her
right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not
recognized and she was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions
of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Thereafter, the Office of the Court Administrator required
respondent judge to comment to which he averred:
1. He was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the
marriage of the parties and having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala.
2. The groom, however, had difficulty walking and could not
travel so he agreed to solemnize the marriage in Nabua,
which was outside of his jurisdiction.
3. He also refused to solemnize the marriage upon discovering
that the parties did not have the marriage license, BUT due
to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the
occasion, he proceeded out of human compassion as he
feared that resetting the wedding might aggravate the
physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke.
4. After the solemnization he reiterated the necessity for the
license and its absence would render the marriage void to
which the parties had assured that they would give him the
license in the afternoon of the same day but failed to do
so despite his follow ups.
5. Thus, he attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and
negligence.
Petitioner Arañes, after reading the respondent judge’s
comment, filed her Affidavit of Desistance attesting to the facts said
by the judge. She confessed that the administrative case was file
out of rage, and after realizing her own shortcomings, she is now
bothered by her conscience.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
1. WON Judge Occiano (Respondent) can be held subject to
administrative liabilities upon solemnizing a marriage outside
his territorial jurisdiction and without a duly issued marriage
license?
2.
WON Judge Occiano (Respondent) can be exculpated
upon the filing of the Affidavit of Desistance by Mercedita
Aranes (Petitioner)?
1.
Yes. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, or B.P.129, the authority of RTC judges and judges of
inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the SC.
a.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur and his act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur is contrary to
law and subjects him to administrative liability.
Although his act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage. (Note: Precedent Case Navarro v. Domagtoy)
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license.
b. A marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner.
Thus, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law. (Note: Precedent Case – People v.
Lara)
.
2. No. Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the
Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
a. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
purely private or personal matters. They can not
be made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound
by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
which involves the Court's constitutional power to
discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be
put to naught, undermine the trust character of
a public office and impair the integrity and dignity
of this Court as a disciplining authority.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
68. Macua V. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014 (Llovit)
TITLE
Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido V. Tecla Hoybia Avenido
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 173540
DATE
January 22, 2014
PONENTE
Perez, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Certiorari/Formal Requisites; Marriage Certificate/Second
Division
FACTS
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to
have been validly married to the same man now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido instituted on 11 November 1998,
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina
Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla),
is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30
September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish
Priest of the said town.
The fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate
recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol, which was destroyed due to World War II.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot
four children. In 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio
got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being
bigamous — an action she sought to protect the rights of her
children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer with counterclaim,
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who
died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having
been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence, including
the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol,
that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to
1944.
On 25 March 2003, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Davao City
Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first
marriage.
On 31 Aug. 2005, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Tecla and
declared Eustaquio's second marriage bigamous and thus null and
void.
It also ruled that the RTC committed a reversible error when it
disregarded:
(1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO a
witnessed to the wedding celebration of her older brother to
Tecla, [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father and
[Tecla] herself
(2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset.
Peregrina filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA's
decision.
ISSUE(S)
1. W/N secondary evidence may be considered with the
unavailability of the original marriage certificate
2. W/N Tecla is the legal wife of Eustaquio
RULING(S)
1. Yes. In Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,
"While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence
of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may
be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents."
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage
certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted has been
aptly delineated in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, thus: It
should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown
by the very evidence they have disregarded.
The Court has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by anyone who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.”
Due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial
and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
2. Yes. The starting point is the presumption of marriage. In
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was
completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted fact of the birth within the cohabitation of Tecla and
Eustaquio of four (4) children coupled with the certificates of the
children’s birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage
issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
The decision of CA was affirmed which declared the marriage of
Tecla and Eustaquio valid and the marriage between Peregrina
and Eustaquio null and void.
69.
ABBAS vs. ABBAS, 2013-01-30, G.R. No.183896
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
ABBAS vs. ABBAS
183896
2013-01-30
PONENTE
VELASCO, JR., J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Lack of a Marriage License
FACTS
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed
Abbas (“Syed”) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo-Abbas (“Gloria”) with the RTC on account of the
alleged absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article
4 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the
annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
Syed, Pakistan citizen, and Gloria, Filipino, met in Taiwan in 1992
where they were married. Upon arriving in the Philippines, he was
asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome
him to the Philippines. He said he did not know that the ceremony
was actually his marriage with Gloria.
Later on, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Syed, alleging that
he married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura, during the
existence of their marriage. And to avoid the bigamy case, Syed
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria, testified that Syed
is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing
their signatures as proof. She and her mother sought the help of
Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to
be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for
them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who
gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that
she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.
Syed in return, presented a certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its
number, indicated in their marriage contract was never issued to
them but to someone else.
The RTC held that given the lack of a valid marriage license, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed was void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the RTC. The CA held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could
not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance
with all the requisites laid down by law.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not valid marriage license has been issued to the
parties.
RULING(S)
No valid marriage license had been issued. The Supreme
Court upheld the RTC’s decision that no valid marriage license
had been issued. The pertinent provisions that would apply to
this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which provides
for the formal requisites of marriage, effects of the absence of
the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
In proving the validity of their marriage, Gloria failed to present
the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. On the other hand, to prove
that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence
of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to
34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.
70. Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, March 8, 2001
TITLE
GR NUMBER
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan,
respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
2001-03-08
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Marriages exempt from license requirement
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent
Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn ComplaintAffidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22
March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage,
he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims he did not
know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
that the two had been living together as husband and wife
for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he
(Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Judge Sanchez filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for
the dismissal of the complaint where he presented two
separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which
were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married
and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the marriage of Manzano and Payao can be exempted
from license requirement under the Article 34 of the Family
Code.
RULING(S)
NO. Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at
bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were "separated." The fact that
Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have
obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from
each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve
the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation
is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
72. Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
TITLE
Republic vs Albios
GR NUMBER
198780
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
October 16, 2013
Mendoza, J
Requisite of Marriage, Voudable Marriage
1)
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married before a judge in Mandaluyong City.
2)
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio.
3)
Albios contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage only
to enable her to acquire American citizenship and in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000. After the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways but she did not pay him the $2,000
because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and inexistent.
RULING(S)
No. Respondent’s marriage is not void because the consent
given by the parties are valid and there’s no law that declares
a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares.
Ratio:
1)
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. For consent to be valid,
it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage.
2)
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.
3)
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable
consequences
of
their
act.
Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
4)
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial
and
inconvenient
consequences
of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
5)
Their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their
conscious
purpose
of
acquiring
American
citizenship through marriage.
6)
A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such
as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, as
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
7) Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage
of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse
it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
73. Perido v. Perido, G.R. No. L-28248, March 12, 1975
TITLE
Perido v. Perido
GR NUMBER
L-28248
DATE
March 12, 1975
PONENTE
Makalintal, C. J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Presumption of marriage, Legitimate children, Exclusive and
Conjugal properties
FACTS
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married
twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,
with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita.
After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom
he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo.
Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the 3 children belonging to the first marriage only
Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix
Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio,
Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido.
Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but
is survived by 2 sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by
his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and
Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but
survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's 5 children by his second wife, two are already
dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his
children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina
Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is
survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first
and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots
Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of
the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of
Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition, praying for
the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots
mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone.
They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by
the defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that
the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional
rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The
defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
The lower court rendered its decision, annulling the "Declaration
of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order
the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively
in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with
his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the
lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of
Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court
erred in declaring (1) the 5 children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat to be legitimate; (2) that Lucio Perido was the exclusive
owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and in not
declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of
Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.
ISSUE(S)
1.
2.
WON the children of the 2nd marriage were illegitimate. NO
Were the 1st 7 lots the exclusive property of Lucio? YES
3.
RULING(S)
Was the 8th lot a property of the 2nd marriage? YES (11/12)
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of
Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that
said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three
were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's
first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were
not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In
support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in
1905, after the first three children were born, that as late as 1923
Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the
certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido
married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as
allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora
Perido.
CA found that there was evidence to show that Benita Talorong,
died during the Spanish regime. This finding is conclusive upon
us. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment
to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in
1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the
certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the CA correctly held that
the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually
married to Marcelina Baliguat.
In view of the foregoing the CA did not err in concluding that the
five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born
during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of
whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and
808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing
of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court
that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from
his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish
through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime.
Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves
appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the CA,
the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the
CA sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458
was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that
they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal
property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong,
and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came
from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido
and his three children of the first marriage. As in the second
assignment
of
error,
the
issue
raised
here
also
involves
appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the
appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners.
74. Fiel v. Banawa, No. 56284-R| March 26, 1979
TITLE
DOMINGA FIEL V. JULIO BANAWA, ET AL.
GR NUMBER
No. 56284-R
DATE
March 26, 1979
PONENTE
GUTIERREZ, H.E., J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Presumption of marriage
FACTS
Dominga Fiel lived in a common law relationship for 25 years with
Natalio Banawa, a widower and with no children, the said
relationship started during the early part of the year 1945 up to
his death on June 29, 1970. Upon the death of Natalio Banawa,
he was survived by his brothers and nephews, the respondents
herein. Natalio Banawa died, a victim of robbery and murder.
Dominga Fiel herself admitted in open court that she was legally
married to another man who was still alive when Banawa was
robbed and killed and who is apparently alive until the present.
Emiliano Cuering, one of the nephews of the late Natalio Banawa,
brought Atty. Percival Catane to the house of Banawa and Fiel to
draw the document of partition of properties. Because of the
advice of Atty. Catane to Dominga Fiel, the later signed the
partition and was not given a copy.
A few months after, Dominga Fiel realized that her share in a
partition was very much less than what she ought to received.
She went to Atty. Percival B. Catane to secure the copy of the
partition. On March 3, 1971 a complaint was filed by Dominga
Fiel.
The lower court rendered its decision ordering the plaintiff and
the defendants to divide the properties which the Court found to
be owned in common by Dominga Fiel and Natalio Banawa, one
half to Dominga Fiel and the other half to the heir of Natalio
Banawa.
The defendants in their appeal raised that the lower court erred
in not giving force and effect to the deed of partition executed by
the parties, not declaring null and void the donations made by
Natalo Banawa to Dominga Fiel, not finding that there was no
informal civil partnership between Natalio Banawa and Dominga
Fiel and in not dismissing the compliant.
According to Dominga Fiel when she signed the document of
partition, she was still in, a state of shock, fear, mental anguish,
and hysteria because she and Natalio Banawa were the victims
of a robbery which resulted in the death of her common-law
husband
Hence, Dominga Fiel filed a complaint for the annulment of a
partition of the properties allegedly owned in common by her and
Natalio Banawa.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
1. W/N the common-law relationship between Natalo Banawa and
Domingo Fiel,who co-habit for many years and represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife maybe
considered legally "married"?
2. W/N the donation made between Natalo Banawa to
Domingo Fiel during their common-law relationship was valid?
1. No. Philippine law does not recognized common-law
marriages. A man and woman not legally married who co-habit
for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife in the community where they
live maybe considered legally "married" in common law
jurisdiction but not in the Philippines. At the same time, our law
cannot brush aside the fact that such relationship are present
in our society, and that they produce a community of properties
which must be governed by law. For want of a better term, we
call the relationship as "common-law relationships" or even
"common-law marriages" erroneous through the latter term
maybe.
Note: Dominga Fiel herself admitted in open court that she
was legally married to another man who was still alive when
Banawa was robbed and killed and who is apparently alive
until the present.
2. No. because Natalio Banawa could not validly make a
donation to Dominga Fiel while they were living together.The
Supreme Court held not to include the following property in the
partition.
The lower Court excluded and donated properties from the
partition and identified them as Paragraph 1 of the partition
recites that Natalio Banawa donated a parcel of land, portion
of Lot No. 5197, Case 5, located at Labinay, Ozamis City, in
favor of Dominga Fiel (Exhibit C) March 15, 1945.
Paragraph 3, Lot of 640 square meters located at Baga,
Tangaub City, and the house therein situated, together with
the furnitures enumerated in the deed of donation dated
September 4, 1963, Doc. No. 47, Page No. 8, Book No. 1,
series of 1963, (Exhibit F) were donated to plaintiff Dominga
Fiel by the late Natalio Banawa.
Article 739 of the Civil Code expressly provides that donations
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at that
time of donation are void. Not merely voidable but void. There is
no question that Dominga Fiel was living in adultery with Natalio
Banawa when the latter donated the two lots to her. She herself
admitted in open court that she was legally married to another man
who was still alive when Banawa was robbed and killed and who is
apparently alive until the present. The lower Court erred that "final
conviction of the donee or donor is required as a condition
precedent before a donation of this nature can be declared void."
We find the donation upon which the donee (plaintiff)
premises his cause of action not only unauthenticated, but
null and void as contrary to the public policy. The donation
are, therefore, null and void not only because of Article
739 but also because they are contrary to public policy.
[WHEREFORE, the judgement of the lower Court is hereby
modified to conclude the portion of Lot No. 5197, C-5
mentioned in Paragraph One and the lot and house
mentioned in Paragraph three of the agreement of partition
among he properties owned in co-ownership by Dominga
Fiel and Natalio Banawa. in all,other respects, the
judgement appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.]
75. People v Mendoza 95 PHIL 845 September 28, 1954
TITLE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. ARTURO
MENDOZA, respondent
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-5877
DATE
September 28, 1954
PONENTE
PARAS, C.J
NATURE/KEYWORDS
BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE, ILLEGAL MARRIAGE
FACTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ISSUE(S)
On August 5, 1936, Jovita de Asis and Arturo Mendoza got
married in Marikina, Rizal.
On May 14, 1941, during their marriage, Arturo was marred
to Olga Lema in Manila.
When Jovita died on February 2, 1943, Arturo contracted
another marriage with Carmencita Panlillio in Laguna. This
last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction
of the crime of bigamy.
Arturo contends that his marriage with Lema is null and void,
therefore non-existent at the time he married Jovita and his
marriage with Panlillio was valid because it occurred after
the death of Jovita and cannot be the basis of a charge for
bigamy.
Solicitor General argues that, even assuming that Arturo's
marriage to Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal
liability in the absence of judicial annulment of said
bigamous marriage.
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding
him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months
and 1 day to 6 years, with costs and the same judgement
has been rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Whether or not judicial annulment is needed to render a bigamous
marriage illegal and void?
RULING(S)
it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de
Asis.
Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the
appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by
a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.
If appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the
belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for
seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead will render
said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent
court.
Also, the cited People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, invoked by the
Solicitor General is essentially different, because the defendant in
the case, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for
lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his
factual contention to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendantappellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
76. People v. Aragon
TITLE
PEOPLE V. ARAGON
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-10016
DATE
1957-02-28
PONENTE
LABRADOR, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Marriage ; Void Marriage ; Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages
●
●
●
The accused, Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with
Maria Gorrea on September 28, 1965. While his marriage
with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the
name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage
with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita
church in Iloilo City.
After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol
established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a
traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his
first wife, Maria Gorrea.
When Gorrea died, the accused brought Faicol to Cebu
where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on
suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical
maltreatment of Proceso and was sent to Iloilo to undergo
treatment.
While she was in Iloilo, Proceso Rosima
contracted a third marriage with certain Jesusa Magsalang
in Cebu.
ISSUE(S)
●
Whether or not the third marriage entered into is null and
void?
RULING(S)
●
No. It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon
complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the
appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife
and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the
last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution
for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
"The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law of
Act 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted
●
by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its validity, as distinguished from
mere annuable marriages. There is here no pretense that
appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted
in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been
absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered
as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared
null and void by a subsequent court."
77. Tolentino v. Paras
TITLE
SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN,
respondents
GR NUMBER
L-43905,
DATE
May 30, 1983
PONENTE
MELENCIO-HERRERA. J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Civil Law; Family Relations; Correction of entry in death
certificate; Publication; Publication, not absolutely necessary
when no other parties are involved; Purpose
of publication; Bigamy; Presumption;
FACTS
On July 31, 1943, Amado Tolentino was married to Serafia
Tolentino and this was still subsisting when the
former contracted a second marriage with Maria Clemente on
November 1, 1948. Petitioner charged
Amado with Bigamy and with his plea of guilty, he was
sentenced to suffer the corresponding penalty. After
he served prison sentence, he continued to live with Maria
Clemente until his death. Indicated in his death
certificate is the “Name of Surviving Spouse - Maria Clemente”.
Petitioner sought to correct the name from Maria Clemente to
Serafia G. Tolentino. The lower court
dismissed the petition for the correction of entry under the
Special Proceedings No. 1587-M due to lack of
the proper requisites under the law.
Petitioner then filed the case against private respondent and the
LCR of Paombong Bulacan for her
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of
the death certificate of Amado. It was
dismissed because the correction of entry in the LCR is not the
proper remedy because the issue involved
is marital relationship, a publication is needed in a case like this
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
and there was none, and the subject matter of this case has
been discussed in the first case, Special
proceedings 1587-M, which the Court has already dismissed.
Tolentino filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE(S)
WON
THE
MARRIAGE
BETWEEN
MARIA
CLEMENTE
(RESPONDENT) AND AMADO TOLENTINO IS
VALID.
2. WON SERAFIA TOLENTINO SHOULD BE LAWFUL SURVIVING
SPOUSE IN THE DEATH CERTIFICATE
OF AMADO.
RULING(S)
WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent
Court is hereby set aside and petitioner,
Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of
the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the
corresponding correction be made in the latter’s death
certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar
of Paombong, Bulacan.
1. NO. The marriage between Maria Clemente and Amado
Tolentino during the lifetime of his spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect.
Amado, under his own plea, was
convicted for Bigamy. The sentence provides the necessary
proof of the existence of marriage
between Serafia and the deceased. There is no better proof of
marriage than the admission by the
accused of the existence of such marriage.
2. YES, since the marriage of Maria and Amado is null and void
from beginning and of no force and
effect. Serafia should be the lawful surviving spouse. The
following reasons was addressed:
● The suit was also a proper remedy because it is an adversary character
as contracted to a mere summary proceeding and a claim of right is
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it.
● The publication required pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
absolutely not necessary for
no other parties are involved and it was the court that was
called upon to order publication.
● The court ruled for the petitioner for the merits. Amado, upon his own
plea, was convicted for
bigamy. There is no better proof than the admission by the
accused of the existence of such
marriage which makes the second marriage with the private
respondent invalid.
78. Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 August 19, 1986
TITLE
GR NUMBER
Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499
L-53703
DATE
August 19, 1986
PONENTE
Paras, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS
Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage celebrated in July 1978 in Makati with Lilia Olivia Wiegel
on the ground that Lilia has previous existing marriage with
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on
June 25, 1972 in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted the existence of the said prior subsisting marriage
but claimed that it’s null and void as it was vitiated by force and
that the first husband was already married to someone else.
Petitioner wanted to present evidence of her alleged first void
marriage but was denied at the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City; hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S)
What’s the status of the first marriage and the second marriage?
RULING(S)
The first marriage is not void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil
Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has
yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she
was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent(second marriage) is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. Accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.
80. Terre v. Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992
TITLE
Dorothy B. Terre v. Atty. Jordan Terre
GR NUMBER
A.M. No. 2349
DATE
PONENTE
July 3, 1992
Per Curiam
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
"grossly immoral conduct", Procedure in action for declaration
of nullity, requisite for valid remarriage
FACTS
- on Dec. 1981, petitioner Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
"grossly immoral conduct" due to contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman whilst their marriage
- the Court required the respondent to answer the complaint, but
he moved from one place to another so that he could not be
found in his residence or place of employment
- after 3 yrs and a half, the Court resolved to suspend respondent
until he appears or files his answer to the complaint
- on Sept. 1985, respondent finally filed an answer with a motion
to set aside and/or lift suspension order, denying petitioner's
allegations; the petitioner denied respondent's reply as well
- the Court denied respondent's motion and referred the
complaint to the OSG for investigation
- the OSG reported the ff. facts: that petitioner met respondent
as 4th yr high school classmates in Cadiz City High School while
she was married w/ Merlito Barcenilla; that respondent was aware
of her marital status; that he courted her continuously until they
moved to Manila to pursue their education, and even resorting to
convincing her that her marriage was void ab initio since she and
her husband were 1st cousins; that she agreed to marry him, and
despite her objection, he wrote "single" as her status explaining
that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to
go to court to declare it as such; that Jason Terre was born out of
their union; that she supported him financially until he
disappeared; and that she found out that he married a certain
Vilma Malicdem
- Jordan claimed that he had believed in good faith that his
marriage with Dorothy was null & void ab initio and that no action
for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
W/N a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of
respondent Jordan Terre to petitioner Dorothy Terre is
necessary before entering into a subsequent marriage with
Vilma Malicdem.
YES. Under Art. 40 of the Family Code, it says that, "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." Even if the 1st marriage
is void, there is still a need for a summary proceeding declaring
such marriage void ab initio. Thus, if a 2nd marriage is
contracted without first securing the declaration of nullity with
regard to the 1st marriage, then the 2nd marriage is also void.
Plus, bigamy is also committed.
Respondent was thus disbarred for his "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for his actions.
82. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA FE CANTOR_ ANTONA
TITLE
Republic vs. Cantor
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 184621
DATE
December 10, 2013
PONENTE
BRION, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Petition of Declaration of Presumptive Death
FACTS
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20,
1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal
dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel
brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach
"sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate
moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling
and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything
from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from
the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the
RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive
death.
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the
respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It
concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had
passed without the former receiving any news about the latter or
his whereabouts.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the respondent had a well-founded belief that her
husband is already dead?
RULING(S)
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four
(4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all
the requisites are present. Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief "
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. The law did
not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." Its
determination depends upon the circumstances on a case-tocase basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one). In the present case, efforts of the respondent fell
short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence. Also, it has not escaped this Court's
attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by
the lower courts.
82. Republic vs. Granada, 672 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 187512_Agoncillo
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
Republic vs. Granada
187512
June 13, 2012
SERENO,
J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals.
FACTS
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda)
met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) where both were then working, and
eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on March 1993,
resulting in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio
Granada.
When the company where they’re both working closed down in
1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment and since
then, Yolanda had not received any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have
Cyrus declared presumptively dead and on February 2005, the
RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration contending that Yolanda had failed
to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove
her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in
an Order in June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death based under Art.
41, Family Code was a summary judicial proceedings in which
the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.
The CA granted the motion in January 2009 on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and ruled that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was
likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 3, 2009.
ISSUE(S)
1. Whether or not the filed petition for presumption of Death of
husband is proper.
2. Whether or not the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s
grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent presented.
RULING(S)
1. Whether or not the filed petition for presumption of Death of
husband is proper.
In the assailed Resolution dated January 23, 2009, the CA
dismissed the Petition assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
We affirm the CA ruling. Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”
(Underscoring supplied.)
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the Republic likewise appealed
the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s
gran t of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by
Article 41 of the Family Code.
Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco, United States v. Biasbas
and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro as authorities on
the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s
affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British
subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving
birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel
working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of
the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to
establish his “well-founded belief that the absentee is already
dead,” as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling
thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more
stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no
news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code. In comparison,
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
The Family Code provision prescribes a “well-founded belief”
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As
noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as
follows:
1.
That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2.
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3.
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4.
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to
prove the existence of a “well-founded belief” that the absent
spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited
United States v. Biasbas, which it found to be instructive as to
the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to
exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his
first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a
suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that
suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner
Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the
RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the
respondent therein had not been able to prove a “well-founded
belief” that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed
the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria
for determining the existence of a “well-founded belief” under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
“For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what
is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales.”
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper
and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent
of the inquiries made by present spouse.” (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner
points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent
search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In
short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have
sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this
end, but she
did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions. The
Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law
than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
NOTES.
No appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
(Republic vs. Tango, 594 SCRA 560 [2009])
The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final
and executory decisions—since the present cases may involve a
modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or
principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division
may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become
final; A decision rendered by a Division of the Supreme Court in
violation of Section 4(3), Art. VIII of the Constitution would be
in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid—any entry of
judgment may thus be said to be “inefficacious” since the
decision is void for being unconstitutional. (Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr.,
643 SCRA 23 [2011])
83. Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 March 6, 1937
TITLE
In re Intestate of the deceased Marciana Escano. ANGELITA
JONES, petitioner-appellant and appellee, vs. FELIX
HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositorappellant and appellee.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 43701
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
March 6, 1937
CONCEPTION, J
Absentee spouse; Effects
FACTS
Marciana Escano was married to Arthur W. Jones and had a child
named Angelita Jones. The husband, after 4 years secured a
passport to go abroad and since then, nothing was heard from him.
Marciana then instituted on October 1919 in the Court of First
Instance of Maasin, Leyte to have her husband judicially declared
an absentee. On October 25 the declared jones as an absentee.
After satisfaction of having the declaration published in the Official
Gazette and newspaper “El Ideal” from the months of December
1919, January to June 1920, as provided in Article 186 of the Civil
Code, the court, issued another order for the taking effect of the
declaration of absence. Subsequently, on May 6, 1927, Mariciana
Escano married Felix Hortiguela.
The Marciana died instestate thereby having Felix as the
administrator of the entire estate. The latter presented an
inventory of properties of the deceased and partitioned the
intestate estate as well as his usufructuary right and the remaining
property given to Angelita Jones (a minor, hence represented by
her guardian, Paz Escano de Corominas).
Angelita Jones married Ernesto Lardizabal and fied a motion which
averred that the marriage between Marciana and Felix is void and
that Angelita is the only heir of the deceased and that because she
was a minor during the partition, she was only represented by her
guardian and not by a counsel.
Angelita contended that the declaration of absence must be
understood to have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919
but in April 23, 1921 to May 6,1927 – only 6 years and 14 days
elapsed thus violative of the requirement of 7 years to have the
person declared as an absentee (Sec III par 2, General Orders No.
68)
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the requirements for the declaration of absence
of Arthur Jones was satisfied and in effect making the marriage
between Marciana Escano and Felix Hortiguela valid
RULING(S)
Yes. In contrary, the absence of Arthur Jones should be
counted from January 10, 1918 (the date on which the last
news concerning him was received) until May 6, 1927, the day
of the second marriage, which is more than nine (9) years has
elapsed. Therefore, said marriage is valid and lawful.
Principle:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For
the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III,
paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
85. Republic v. CA and Molina
TITLE
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR NUMBER
240 SCRA 198
DATE
February 13, 1997
PONENTE
Panganiban J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Psychological Incapacity
FACTS
Facts:
•
A year after their marriage in 1985, Reynaldo Molino was
not anymore completely fulfilling his responsibility as a husband
to his wife Roridel Molina and a father to his children which are
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility.
•
Reynaldo and Roridel's relationship was strained after an
intense argument. This led to Roridel quitting her job and living
in Baguio City with her parents a year after. A few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child.
•
Reynaldo was deemed psychologically incapable because
he spent more time and money with his friends rather than his
family, his parents still provided him with financial assistance,
and he was not honest in providing Roridel with information
about his spending.
•
Reynaldo contended that their frequent quarrels were due
to Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends, her refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals and her failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
•
The CA affirmed his marriage void in the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
•
Solicitor General insists that CA made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case.
•
The petitioner argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a
defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
No. – The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
and remains valid.
Reynaldo and Roridel's marriage remains valid because Reynaldo's
actions at the time of the marriage did not constitute as
psychological incapacity. There were mere differences and
conflicting personalities between Reynaldo and Roridel, which both
do not satisfy the definition of psychological incapacity. Roridel's
presented evidence showed that she and her husband were
incompatible at worst. Furthermore, the expert testimony of Dr.
Sison presented that incompatibility is not considered a
psychological incapacity and neither is it incurable.
86. Choa v. Choa
TITLE
Choa v. Choa
GR NUMBER
143376
DATE
November 26, 2002
PONENTE
Panganiban, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Void Marriages - Psychological Incapacity
Family Code, Article 36
FACTS
FACTS:
· On March 15, 1981, Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa were married
and then bore two children, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.
· Respondent (husband) filed before the RTC of Negros Occidental
a complaint for the annulment their marriage.
· On November 8, 1993, he filed an Amended Complaint for the
nullity of their marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity.
· After the respondent submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits
petitioner (wife) filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)
· RTC denied the petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
the respondent established a quantum of evidence that the
petitioner must controvert.
· Likewise, her Motion for Reconsideration was denied leading her
to elevate the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari.
· CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory
and that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.
· Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
to the SC
ISSUE(S)
WON Alfonso Choa presented quantum evidence for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity?
RULING(S)
[WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer
to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of
petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.]
No. The court is convinced that the evidence against Leni Choa
is insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity
that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Respondent basically complains about the petitioner’s (1) lack of
attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an
intention of procreative sexuality. None of these three constitutes
psychological incapacity.
[Santos v. CA] the Court explained that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely
shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other.
The totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely
insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.
87. Barcelona v CA and Tadeo
TITLE
GR NUMBER
Barcelona v CA and Tadeo
No. 130087
DATE
September 24, 2003
PONENTE
Carpio, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Psychological Incapacity
· The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana
were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a
whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached
to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon
City. The union begot five children.
· But, on 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
Diana M. Barcelona. This was the “first petition” before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. But, On 9 May
1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
· On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This was the
"second petition" before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second
petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state
a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
The petition alleged that Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their
marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
Since, during their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to
their varied upbringing. Ms. Barcelona, coming from a rich family,
was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the
house. She would go to her sister's house or would play tennis
the whole day
· When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages
suffered and the sickness of a child, Ms. Barcelona, withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
· On November 1977, Ms. Barcelona, who was five months
pregnant and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with
the respondent, requested the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling.
· Since, Diana at the time of the celebration of their marriage
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and
until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in
the psychological examination conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the respondent.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the allegations of the second petition for
Annulment of Marriage sufficiently state a cause of action.
RULING(S)
· RTC – through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued the Order
("first order") deferring resolution of the Motion until the
parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing.
· Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration.
However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna
Pison, issued the Order ("second order") denying the motion.
· YES. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison
explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint's
failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such
fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary
to petitioner Diana's claim, a perusal of the allegations in the
petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent
Tadeo's right, thus giving rise to a cause of action.
· CA - Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals
assailing the trial court's first order deferring action on the
Motion and the second order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
· YES. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
allegations in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
· SC – YES. A cause of action is an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff (Mr.
Tadeo). We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a
cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity
of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
“Shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either
or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration. Since, the petition
stated the legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana,
and her act or omission as seen in facts. And furthermore, the
new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the
petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Hence, the
petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. Thus, the
second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to
dismiss on these grounds.
*WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision
dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August
1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
89. Republican v. Encelan- De Los Reyes
TITLE
Republican v. Encelan
GR NUMBER
170022
DATE
January 9, 2013
PONENTE
Arturo Brion
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Psychological
Incapacity, Legal Separation
FACTS
FACTS:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita. To support his
family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15,
1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia,
learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with
Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since
then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16,
1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolita’s psychological incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin and insisted
that she is not psychologically incapacitated and she left
their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.
Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified
that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and
their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with
Alvin. Also, he presented the psychological evaluation
report on Lolita and found that Lolita was "not suffering
from any form of major psychiatric illness, but had been
"unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a
good and lasting marital relationship.
The RTC ruled and declared in its June 5, 2002 decision,
Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed to the CA. The CA originally set aside the
RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of
personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely
refused to comply with her marital obligations which she
was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration and thereafter the CA set
aside its original decision and entered another, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision, the
CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious
psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her
marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not sexual infidelity, refusal to perform marital
obligation and abandonment of conjugal dwelling constitute
psychological incapacity, as such, a ground of declaration
of nullity of marriage.
RULING(S)
NO. Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds
for legal separation.
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support
Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment
were manifestations of any psychological illness.
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s
alleged psychological incapacity as he merely mentioned
Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling. Also, the psychological evaluation
report on Lolita established that Lolita did not suffer from
any major psychiatric illness. Her interpersonal problems
with co-workers cannot be equated to a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse since workplace
obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their
marital counterparts.
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological
incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
Psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.
WHEREFORE, SC GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE
the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, respondent
Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan is DISMISSED
90. Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz
TITLE
Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz
GR NUMBER
| G.R. No. 201988
DATE
2017-10-11
PONENTE
Justice Del Castillo
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Psychological Incapacity,
Legal Separation
FACTS
·
Petitioner, Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi)
and respondent Nilo Cruz are married sometime in October
21, 1986 and this marriage produced 2 sons. On July 7, 2005,
Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity which she averred that it was
medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate
personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated
with unresolved oedipal
·
complex, while she herself was found to be suffering
from a personality disorder of the mixed type, Histrionic,
Narcissistic with immaturity
·
In his answer, Nilo claimed that he was madly in love
with Marivi; that at the start of their relationship, both he and
Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which they
overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were
suffering from psychological incapacity; and that he was not
singularly responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He
stressed that Marivi also contributed to the deterioration of
their union. In October 13, 2008 the RTC denied the petition.
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution
of a double psychological incapacity to Marivi's nature of being
a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal complex."
·
The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself
from her father as her standard of an ideal husband when she
married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and his then being
already very focused on his job. Marivi's need for assurance
that she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her father as her
standard, was not by itself sufficient to declare her
psychologically incapacitated.
·
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of
"oedipal complex;" the RTC held that prioritizing his work over
the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of his
psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his
family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in
Marivi a case of psychological incapacity, for this was a result
of his being turned off by Marivi's unabated naggings and her
revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies. CA
Affirmed.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
·
Whether or Not the Article 36 of the Family Code is
applicable in this case
No, Article 36 is not applicable in this case.
· The court ruled that when there a psychological
incapacity-, "that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability
(i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)."
The showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity." “Nor does failure of the parties to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons"
amount to psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations
and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
The Court found that the conclusions reached by these expert
witnesses (Clinical Psychologists and Doctors) do not irresistibly
point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the
spouses antedated the marriage; that these personality
disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that these personality
disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their
marital duties. What can be inferred from the totality of
evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality
disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or
permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be
reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.
SC overturned the findings of the RTC and the CA.
Furthermore the evidence on record do not square with the
existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated by law
and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the
breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily
attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be
imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human
failings. The court believes that the protagonists in this case are
in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s
personality differences, and have thus becomeoverwhelmed by
feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one
another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not and
void marriage.
91. Garlet v. Garlet, G.R. No. 193544, August 2, 2017
TITLE
Garlet v. Garlet
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 193544
DATE
August 2, 2017
PONENTE
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity
FACTS
Petitioners: Yolanda E. Garlet
Respondent: Vencidor T. Garlet
Nature of Action: Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage
Facts:
Yolanda Garlet (petitioner) and Vencidor Garlet
(respondent) became intimately involved upon partying and
drinking liquor which resulted to the latter getting pregnant.
Vencidor doubted if he fathered the child, refused to provide
support, and even urged Yolanda to have an abortion.
Disagreeing with the proposed abortion, she gave birth to
(Michael) out of wedlock and worked in Japan as a cultural
dancer to support their son. Sometime in 1992, Yolanda
instructed Vencidor to scout for a real property for
investment to which a 210-square meter lot was bought in
Morong, Rizal. The title, however, was registered under
Vencidor’s name. He also sold a 69-square meter portion of
the same property to his in-laws without consent and
mortgaged the property, forcing Yolanda to redeem it for
50,000 php.
Despite these, the two still got married on March 4,
1994, ending up with a second child (Michelle). During the
marriage, however, the family relied on Yolanda as the
breadwinner, forcing her to go back to Japan to work upon
the exhaustion of her savings. She also found out that
Vencidor squandered her hard-earned money, pawned her
jewelry, incurred debts in her name, and even allowed a
male friend to sleep in the master’s bedroom upon returning
to the Philippines. Issues of gambling, drinking, and
womanizing were also raised. Such prompted Yolanda to file
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of Vencidor's psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential
marital obligations to Yolanda and their children, which Ms.
De Guzman assessed to have stemmed from Vencidor’s
Narcissistic Personality Disorder in her Psychological Report.
The RTC declared the marriage of Yolanda and
Vencidor null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity of respondent in accordance with Art. 36 of the
Family Code.
o The property relation between the petitioner
and respondent under Article 147 of the
Family Code was dissolved
o
o
o
Custody of the children, Michael and
Michelle, awarded to the petitioner subject
to visitorial right of the respondent once a
week at the most convenient time of the
said children.
Support of 3, 000 php a month and at least
one-half of the cost of their education were
also directed
The petitioner also shall revert to the use of
her maiden name.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the RTC
judgment, finding that the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the
incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained.
o Presumption is always in favor of the validity
of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration which the CA
denied for being filed out of time. Hence, the filing of instant
petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
WON Vencidor Garlet’s (Respondent) negative character
traits and vices (alleged drinking, gambling, womanizing,
and refusal to find a job) constitute psychological capacity
and hence be a valid ground for the nullity of his marriage
with Yolanda Garlet (Petitioner)?
No. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish
respondent's psychological incapacity. Yolanda imputes
almost every imaginable negative character trait against
Vencidor, but not only do they not satisfactorily constitute
manifestations of psychological incapacity as contemplated in
the Family Code, but are also riddled with inconsistencies that
are sometimes contradicted by her own evidence.
-
It appears that Vencidor took on several jobs
(refusal to look for a job per se is not indicative
of a psychological defect).
-
Vencidor’s alleged drinking and gambling vices
were based on hearsay evidence and thus, no
probative value.
-
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal
to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity.
-
Utter lack of factual basis for 'Vencidor's
purported sexual infidelity. (sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that a spouse is
suffering
from
psychological
incapacity,
Navales v. Navales).
-
Verbal exchange between the parties in the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos, reveals that Vencidor
only hid Yolanda's money and jewelry as a
desperate attempt to stop Yolanda from leaving
him, taking with her the children. In fact,
Vencidor repeatedly expressed concern about
saving their marriage, offering to return the
money and jewelry back to Yolanda as long as
they stay together. It was Yolanda who
categorically stated that she no longer wanted
to live with Vencidor, offering to the latter
P300,000 cash, the Pila property, the jeepney
and the tricycle, just for Vencidor to leave their
marital home.
The court also held that Ms. De Guzman's sources and
methodology is' severely lacking the requisite depth and
comprehensiveness to judicially establish respondent's
psychological incapacity. She merely relied on the
information given by petitioner. To put it simply, Ms. De
Guzman is saying that Vencidor was a spoiled child, and
while it can be said that Vencidor has grown up to be a selfcentered and self-indulgent adult, it still falls short of
establishing his psychological incapacity characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, so as to
render Vencidor's marriage to Yolanda void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution dated August 24,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142
are AFFIRMED.
94. Fujiki V. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 (Llovit)
TITLE
Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara,
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and The Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of The National Statistics Office
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 196049
DATE
June 26, 2013
PONENTE
Carpio, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Certiorari/Who can invoke nullity/Second Division
FACTS
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for “Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).” Fujiki prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC dismissed the petition based on improper venue and the lack
of personality of petitioner. RTC ruled that the petition was in “gross
violation” of the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). RTC took the view that only “the husband
or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines
on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.
It was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity. To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would
be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to
sue.
Fujiki argued further that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court which provides
that entries in the civil registry relating to “marriages,” “judgments
of annulments of marriage” and “judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning” are subject to cancellation or correction,
is applicable.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition and argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void.
Fujiki filed for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE(S)
1. W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy
RULING(S)
1. Yes. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is
also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated,
the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse
“is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse.”
Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine Foreign
Service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the
proceedings.
95. GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN, 2013-07-31 , G.R. No. 189121
TITLE
GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN
GR NUMBER
189121
DATE
2013-07-31
PONENTE
PONENTE: PEREZ., J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Void Marriage
FACTS
·
A Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents Elise
Quiazon & Ma. Lourdes Belen who are Eliseo’s daughter and
common-law wife. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon
(Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
·
Elise claimed that she is a natural child of Eliseo having
conceived at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Filiation was proven by her Birth Certificate
signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and
Lourdes, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it was bigamous.
·
Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration
asserting that the venue of the petition was improperly laid.
However, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Elise. On
appeal, the decision was affirmed.
·
Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising the
argument that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for
letters of administration and that the CA erred in declaring that
Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because Elise has no
cause of action on it.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage despite the death of his father, hence cannot
be deemed as an interested party.
RULING(S)
Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a
void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of right, such that any interested party may attach the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt impugn
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father.
The said marriage may be questioned by filing an action attaching
its validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse. As a
compulsory heir, Elise has a cause of action for the declaration of
nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate is deemed to be an interested part. An interested
part is one who would be benefited in the estate. Having a vested
right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party.
96. Republicv. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 189538
2014-02-10
PERALTA, J.
Procedure in action for declaration of Nullity
FACTS
Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as
one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend
of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she
was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing
officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially
the entries in the wife portion thereof.
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of Olaybar.
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court
found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her
record and rectify the terrible mistake.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and
held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Considering that respondent’s
identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible
for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages
under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for
Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order
based on the petitioner’s grounds.
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries
sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries
made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented her personal
circumstances
ISSUE(S)
W/N cancellation of the wife portion in a marriage contract
nullifies the marriage through a Rule 108 proceeding.
RULING(S)
YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements
set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. More importantly,
trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified.
Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial
court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued
identification cards. The court thus made a categorical
conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly,
it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no
such marriage was celebrated.
The Court still maintained their decision in Fujiki v Marinay
where a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the
civil registry, but stated that in allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
98. Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 July 3, 1992
TITLE
Terre vs Terre
GR NUMBER
211 SCRA 6
DATE
July 3, 1992
PONENTE
Per curiam
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Bigamy, Requisite of Marriage, Voidable Marriage
FACTS
●
Dorothy Terre first met Jordan Terre when they were 4th year high
school classmates in Cadiz City High School. She was then married to
Merlito Bercenilla.
●
Jordan courted her and this continued when they moved to
Manila to pursue their education. Jordan, then a freshman law
student, told Dorothy that her marriage with Bercenilla was void
ab initio because they are first cousins.
●
Believing in Jordan and with the consent of her mother and
ex-in-laws, she married Jordan on June 14, 1977. Jordan wrote
“single” as Dorothy’s civil status despite latter’s protests.
Jordan said it didn’t matter because marriage was void to begin
with.
●
After their marriage, Dorothy supported Jordan because he
was still studying then. They had a son, Jason, who was born
on June 25, 1981. Shortly after she gave birth, Jordan
disappeared.
●
She learned that he married Vilma Malicdem. Dorothy filed
charges for abandonment of minor, bigamy and grossly
immoral conduct.
●
Jordan was already a member of the Bar then. Jordan
claimed that he was unaware of Dorothy’s first marriage and
that she sent her out of the house when he confronted her
about it.
●
He contracted the second marriage, believing that his
marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio because of her prior
subsisting marriage.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to
enter into a subsequent marriage
RULING(S)
Yes, a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a
subsequent marriage. The Court considered the claim of Jordan
Terre as spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not
rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic fact which
underscores that former was in bad faith. In the second place,
the pretended defense is the same argument by which he
inveigled complainant into believing that the complainant’s prior
marriage on Merlito Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab
initio, she was free to contract a second marriage with the
respondent. Applying Article 40 of the Family Code “the
absolute nullity of previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. Since respondent Jordan
Terre is a lawyer he is bound to know that the aforementioned
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the Supreme
Court. In this case, before entering to a subsequent marriage,
judicial declaration of nullity must be obtain in accordance with
Article 40 of the Family Code.
99. Morigo v. People, 422 SCRA 376, February 6, 2004
TITLE
Morigo v. People
GR NUMBER
145226
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
February 6, 2004
Quisumbing, J.
Requisites of a valid marriage, Marriage ceremony
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates
at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City for a period of
4 years. After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was
surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore,
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991,
Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992,
appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the RTC. The complaint seek
among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in
an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran.
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion
for reconsideration by the prosecution.
Trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage between
Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision,
which then became final and executory.
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate
court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage
was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy
case.
The CA also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by
Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity
in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction.
Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a
foreign jurisdiction.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to
the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
Whether petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
NO. Lucio did not commit bigamy as his first marriage was
declared void ab initio or legally inexistent. Under the eyes
of the law, Lucio was never married to Lucia. His defense of
good faith is now moot and academic.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused
must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no
first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and
the validity of the first marriage being an essential element
of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for
said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted
of the instant charge.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present
case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which
is now moot and academic.
100. Tenebro, v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 150758 | February 18, 2004
TITLE
Tenebro, v. Court of Appeals
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 150758
DATE
February 18, 2004
PONENTE
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Judicial Declaration of Nullity (Article 40, Family Code); Effect of
Absence or Defect in the Essential and Formal Requisites
FACTS
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in
1990. They lived together continuously until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to Villareyes in 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
In 1993, Tenebro contracted a third marriage with Nilda Villegas,
before Judge Lee, Jr. of Branch 15, RTC of Cebu City. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to Tenebro. In
a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that Tenebro, was
indeed her
husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
Tenebro.
For his first defense, Tenebro admitted to co-habiting with
Villareyes but he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other since no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office
in connection with his work as a seaman. He presented a
certifications issued by the NSO and the City Civil Registry of
Manila attesting that the respective issuing offices have no record
of a marriage celebrated
between Tenebro and Villareyes
For his second defense, Tenebro argues that the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage to Ancajas on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding that Tenebro
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this instant petition for review was filed by Tenebro.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
1.W/N the validity of marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes was
sufficiently proved by presentation of marriage contract?
2.W/N there is a valid marriage between Tenebro and Ancajas?
1. Yes. The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a
public officer in custody thereof, is admissible as the best
evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates
that a marriage was celebrated between Tenebro and Villareyes
on and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given
to public documents.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record
of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely
no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present.
2. No. A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy.
Note: Entering into a subsequent marriage without complying
with Article 40 makes the second marriage bigamous. Rule 148
governs the property regime of the second void marriage.
[WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy
and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. Whether or not
the decision of the RTC declaring the second marriage
null and void ab initio, is erroneous is beside the point.
Neither the private respondent nor the State, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the decision of the
court. Entry of judgment was made of record before the
court a quo rendered its decision. Hence, both the State and
the private respondent are bound by said decision.]
Other Discussion/s: Bigamy – Revised Penal Laws (Reference only)
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family
Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar
as the State's penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner's valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner's psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
101. Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
TITLE
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 183805
DATE
July 3, 2013
PONENTE
PERALTA, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
ELEMENTS OF BIGAMY
FACTS
1. In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But
then, just three months later in December 1999, he married
another woman named Shirley Tismo.
2. In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity
of the second marriage between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004,
Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
3. Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action
filed by Karla Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage with
Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage
between Medina and Capili.
4. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case.
He alleged that since the second marriage was already declared
void ab initio that marriage never took place and that therefore,
there is no bigamy to speak of.
5. The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy
case.
6. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and
remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy
RULING(S)
When Capili married Tismo, all the elements of bigamy are
present. The crime of bigamy was already consummated. It is
already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, like in the
case of Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void.
The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no
bearing to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the
bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
The Supreme Court notes that even if a party has reason to
believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a
second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially
declared as void. The parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists.
CONCLUSION
102. People v. Odtuhan
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
TITLE
People v. Odtuhan
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 191566
DATE
2013-07-17
PONENTE
PERALTA, J
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Information of Bigamy ; Motion to Quash Information
●
●
●
●
●
ISSUE(S)
●
On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan, married
Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993, respondent
married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). He later filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared
his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In
the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn
Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage
with Modina, thus, filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging
respondent with Bigamy.
The respondent moved to quash the information on two
grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy;and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished.
The RTC held that there was a valid marriage between
respondent and Modina and without such marriage having
been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage
with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy.
The trial court further held that neither can the information
be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal
liability.
Respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari
before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash
the information despite the fact that his first marriage with
Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing
of the bigamy case.
Whether or not the respondent is proper to raise the motion
to quash information
RULING(S)
●
A motion to quash information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the information.”
●
An examination of the information filed against respondent,
however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to
constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained the following
allegations: 1) that respondent is legally married to
Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been
legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second
marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that
his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning
because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that
alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was
subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage.
This should not be considered at all, because matters of
defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is not
proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset
without the benefit of a full blown trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution
dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further
proceedings.
103. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
TITLE
GR NUMBER
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 201061.
DATE
July 3, 2013
PONENTE
CARPIO, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS
Documentary Evidence; Void Marriages; Marriage License;
Bigamy; Marriages; Property Relations; Land Registration;
FACTS
On September 10, 1973, Benjamin Bangayan married
Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City. They had 3 children. In 1979,
Benjamin had a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan.
In 1982, Azucena left for US. In 1982, Benjamin and Sally
lived together as husband and wife. On March 7, 1982, Sally and
Benjamin signed a purported marriage contract to appease her
father who was against the relationship. Sally assured Benjamin
that it would not be registered because of the latter’s marital
status. The relationship between Sally and Benjamin ended in
1994 when the former went to Canada with their children.
Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of
public documents against Benjamin, using the simulated
marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage or declaration of nullity
of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage
to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to
a valid marriage.
Benjamin asked the Trial court for the partition of
properties acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of
the Family Code, for him to be the administrator of the properties
and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 properties became the subject of partition.
Benjamin presented his evidences, Sally filed a demurrer to
evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a Motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied.
In a Decision dated March 26, 2009, the trial court ruled
in favor of Benjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated July 21, 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar that the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was
not issued to Benjamin and Sally. The trial court ruled that the
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due
to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of
Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case.
The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because
she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied
support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and
did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally
could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as
part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court
ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the
37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s
parents who gave the properties to their children, including
Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The trial court ruled that these
properties was owned by Benjamin without monetary
contribution from Sally even if some properties were registered
with Sally as a co-owner.
The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena,
without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state
with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith
because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited
Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656
and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s
share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support
and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children. No other relief
granted.
The Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction.
ISSUE(S)
1. WON the marriage between Sally and Benjamin which was
solemnized without a license shall be void.
2. WON the Benjamin is liable for Bigamy.
3. WON the properties acquired by Sally and Benjamin
during their cohabitation should be acquired by them in
common proportion.
RULING(S)
CONCLUSION
1. YES. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued
to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35
which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts
under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
and non-existent.
2. NO. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in
this case. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case,
there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and
Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
3. YES. According to Article 148, the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
But Sally failed to prove that she has monetary
contribution in most of the properties. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can
be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively
owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as [CCT]
Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared
equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall
accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage
while the share of respondent appellant shall accrue to
her. The rest of the decision stands.
104. Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 February 10, 1968
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
GLORIA G. JOCSON v. RICARDO R. ROBLES
L-23433
February 10, 1968
PONENTE
REYES J.B.L.,
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles on the ground
that it was bigamous. It was alleged in the amended complaint
that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958,
defendant Robles had contracted a first marriage with Josefina
Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against
the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that
during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical
maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth
of their first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the
marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that
marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a
married man.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on
the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved in the case.
It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his consent to
the marriage was secured by force and intimidation employed
upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly
supported by the joint affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother,
dated October 28, 1963, attached to the motion. Plaintiff, on
the other hand, submitted the case for judgment on the
pleadings. On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for
summary judgment was denied.
ISSUE(S)
Can a judgment in annulling a marriage be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment?
RULING(S)
No. The court rule that before it can pass upon plaintiff's
prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted
marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and
subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary requirement to
establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the
motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his
marriage declared as having been brought about by force and
intimidation, was also denied, the court finding indications of
collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the
nullification of said marriage.
The court is satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations
correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in view of the
first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
105. Tolentino v Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1 March 15, 1974
TITLE
Tolentino v Villanueva
GR NUMBER
No. L-23264
DATE
March 15, 1974
PONENTE
MAKASIAR, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
Romulo Tolentino (petitioner) was married to Helen Villanueva
(private respondent) under the solemnization of Quezon City Judge
Mariano Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Romulo on April 26,
1962, filed a petition for the annulment of the said marriage
alleging his consent was obtained through fraud and that he
discovered his wife was pregnant even though they had no sexual
relations prior to the said marriage and that they didn't live as
husband and wife immediately. He also stated that his wife left his
house and that he only learned of her whereabouts in January of
1962.
Helen, even after the serving of the subpoena and the copy of the
complaint did not submit a response with regards to the suit. Due
to that fact, with the motion of Romulo, the court has declared the
respondent in default and have referred to the City Fiscal office to
conduct an investigation within 60 days in order to know if there is
a collusion between parties in accordance with Art. 88 and 101 of
the new civil code.
Romulo only filed a copy of the complaint to the fiscal office and
refused to submit himself to interrogation even after the City Fiscal
have already summoned him thru subpoena. Due to his noncompliance to such, the respondent Judge on November 6, 1962,
denied his filed motion to set the date for the reception of his
evidence in the light of the failure of the City Fiscal to submit a
report of his findings despite the lapse of 60 days from July 10,
1962.
The court ordered on July 29, 1963, to dismissed the said complaint
in the view of the fact that the petitioner is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City fiscal pursuant to the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil
Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having
been denied on July 29, 1963, and on April 11, 1964, petitioner
now files his petition to annul the said order of July 29, 1963, and
to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the non-compliance of the petitioner of the
interrogation by the City Fiscal as part of the investigation to
ascertain if there is a collusion between parties, may be used as a
ground for the dismissal of the Annulment Case?
RULING(S)
The investigation by fiscal is a prerequisite to annulment of
marriage where defendant has defaulted, thus it is sufficient
for the dismissal of the said case. The prohibition against
annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant
stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract
between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails
to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer
to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds.
As stated by the Court, Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for
annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation
of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of nonappearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties
exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus,
Articles 88 and 101 state:
“ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.
“In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions
of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.”
“ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment. Tolentino vs. Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1, No. L-23264
March 15, 1974N
The Supreme Court has thus affirmed the order dated July
29, 1963, and dismissed the petition with costs against the
petitioner.
___________
ART. 88 is now amended by ART. 48 of the Family Code and
it states:
“Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.”
“In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.”
ART. 2035 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
106. Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil 19
TITLE
Buccat v. Buccat
GR NUMBER
GR No. 47101
DATE
April 25, 1941
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
AQUINO, J
Marriage, Validity, Fraud
-
-
Plaintiff Godofredo, a law student, prays for the annulment
of his marriage w/ Luida on the grounds that, by
consenting to the marriage, he did so because the
defendant had assured him that she was virgin
They met in March, were engaged in September, and were
married in November all in year 1938
After 89 days of cohabiting w/ each other, Luida gave birth
to a child of 9 mos. on Feb, 1939
As a result, plaintiff left her
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
CFI Bagiuo ruled in favor of Luida; CFI raised the issue to
the SC since it only raises a pure legal question
The Court affirmed
W/N Lucida’s concealment of her pregnancy constituted as fraud
as a ground for the annulment of a marriage.
No. The Court did not find any proof that she concealed her
pregnancy, if she did so, plaintiff would’ve noticed considering
he is a law student and she is already under very advanced
pregnant condition.
- Marriage is a very sacred institution: it is the foundation on
which society rests. To cancel it, clear and reliable
evidence is necessary. In this case there are no such
proofs.
107. Aquino v. Delizo
TITLE
Aquino vs. Delizo
GR NUMBER
No. L-15853
DATE
July 27, 1960
PONENTE
Gutierrez, David J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS
On December 27, 1954, Fernando Aquino (petitioner) married
Conchita Delizo (respondent).
On said marriage, respondent was already four months
pregnant, a fact that she allegedly concealed from the
petitioner.
In April 1955, about four months after their marriage, the
respondent gave birth and a complaint was filed on the basis of
fraud for the annulment of their marriage.
At the trial, only the marriage certificate was presented. The
court noted that no birth certificate was presented to show that
the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between
the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as
alleged by plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage thus dismissed the complaint .
The petitioner was then was able to secure birth certificate and
petitioned to reopen the case for reception of additional
evidence, which is the birth certificate, however, it was denied.
On an appeal to the CA, the negligence for securing the birth
certificate was excused, except the theory that it was not
possible for them to have sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding
unbelievable that plaintiff’s claim that he did not notice or even
suspect that the defendant was pregnant when he married her,
thus the complaint was denied.
Plaintiff filed another motion, and in support to that, presented
documents that he prays will show proof to his claims. The CA
acting upon the motion, ordered the defendant and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal to answer the MR and deferred action on the
prayer of new trial until after the case is disposed of and as the
both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, the
CA again denied the motion.
Plaintiff brought the case to the supreme court thru a petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the
petitioner constitutes as fraud and is sufficient basis for
annulment of marriage.
The court ruled that the concealment of the respondent of the fact
that she was pregnant at the time of marriage with another man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage.
Since the respondent was naturally plump, the petitioner could not
have known the former was pregnant at the time of marriage.
Based on medical opinion, the enlargement of the woman’s
abdomen only becomes apparent on the sixth month of pregnancy.
Evidences presented are Affidavit of Cesar Aquino who admitted as
father of respondent’s first born and the petitioner’s brother, birth
certificate of the child showing it was born within 180 days after
the date of marriage.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo** for new trial. Without costs.
**court a quo – the court from which an appeal has been taken.
Further discussions
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that
at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the
case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought
to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not
even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in
an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their
marriage.
That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as
alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below
the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower
part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if
noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122.)
If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could
hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she
was pregnant at the time of their marriage, more so because she
must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even
physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who
shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only
claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months and
50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc.
Pregnancy, p. 10.)
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got
married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement,
however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification
in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the
new trial, taken together with what has already been adduced
would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied
the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to
file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal
has been ordered to represent the Government precisely to prevent
such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and
its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing
evidence. In the circumstances, we think that justice would be
better served if a new trial were ordered.
109. Sison vs. Te Lay Li
TITLE
Sison v. Te Lay Ti (CA)
GR NUMBER
No 7037
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
May 7, 1952
J. JBL Reyes
Marriage effected through force and Intimidation, Cohabitation
NO ONLINE RESOURCE AVAILABLE | This is a digest from Civil
Reviewer Compilation, Re-digested and organized by King B.
In accord with the custom of the Chinese, Juanita and respondent
were arranged to be married but this was only brought up to the
former two weeks before the celebration and that Te Lay Li never
wooed (seek and gain the love and support). However, Juanita
(the bride) did not want to get married with the Te. She would
always oppose the impending marriage but her father whips and
threatens her every time she would do so.
Two days before the wedding, Juanita ran away and went to the
office of the Fiscal. Her father convinced her to go back home with
a promise that he will no longer forcer her to marry the
respondent against her will. After such return, she was kept
locked in the house and on the morning of her wedding day, her
father handed her a knife and made her choose between losing
her life or his if she did not marry Te and because of this, Juanita
consented to marry Te Lay Li.
There were two weddings that transpired. The First was
celebrated by Judge Hofilena and the second wedding was
solemnized by the Chinese consul Mih in conformity with the
Chinese rites. Moments before the first wedding, Juanita
approached Judge Hofilena and told him that she was only being
compelled by her father to marry the groom to be. A certain Mr.
Teng also corroborated this testimony that during the marriage
ceremony, he saw that the Judge was irked by the hesitant
attitude displayed by the bride. Mr. Teng also testified that when
they went to get Juanita from the Fiscal’s office, the Juanita’s
Father confessed that Juanita does not want to marry Te.
After the marriage, Juanita always considered her husband to be
a stranger. She was kept a prisoner in their house and they never
shared the same bed (she slept in a chair). They never had sexual
intercourse except when a time when she was forced by her
husband holding a knife to submit to his wishes. Because of this
mustered courage and escaped
ISSUE(S)
W/N The consent to marry given by Juanita was obtained through
force and intimidation
W/N Even supposing that that marriage was void due to lack of
consent, that it was ratified through cohabitation
RULING(S)
HELD:
1. YES. Based on the testimonies given by the petitioner and the
Judge as corroborated by Mr. Teng, it is evident that that Juanita
did not want to marry Te but only did so due to force, threat and
intimidation given by her father. Te Lay Li and Juanita’s father did
not deny nor refute the Juanita’s claim of objection to the marriage
(Father was never presented as witness). Mere words without
any corresponding intention will not create the marriage
relation. Notwithstanding that the formalities indicating
consent have been complied with, there is no valid marriage
where the parties do not intend to enter the marriage.
2.
NO. While a marriage effected by force or intimidation may
be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation, such cohabitation
must be voluntary. It is clear from Juanita’s testimony that there
was no voluntary cohabitation on her part and she was never
acquiesced to the status of wife.
110. Ruiz vs. Atienza
TITLE
JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. PELAGIA ATIENZA,
defendant and appellee.
GR # / date of
promulgation
G.R. No. 5986 | March 18, 1941
Ponente
Bengzon, J.
Nature of Action
the Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force”
or "violence"
Facts
·
Previous to February 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza,
both single, were sweethearts. Loving perhaps too well, she allowed
him, in a moment of weakness, to have his way, with the result that
nine months later she became an unmarried mother.
·
After the baby’s birth, i.e., on November 14, 1938, Pelagia’s
father Jose Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio (her cousin-in-law), and
three other persons visited Jose Ruiz at the boarding house where
he lived, in Oregon street.
·
They requested, and after some discussion, convinced him
to marry Pelagia.
·
With his cousin Alfredo Asuncion, he went with Jose Atienza
and companions to Tanduay Street, where Pelagia was living. From
there, the party, joined by Pelagia and others, went to the Aglipayan
church at Maria Clara Street.
·
Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into wedlock,
Jose Ruiz brought this suit to secure its avoidance.
·
His counsel has dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and
companions, and the “plans” drawn to force Jose Ruiz into the
marriage, Jose’s passive and downcast attitude, all in an effort to
maintain the proposition that Jose Ruiz went with them that
afternoon “convinced” by the following “arguments”
a) The threats of the father supported by his balisong
b) The unveiled intimidation by Atty. Villavicencio that if he would
not marry Pelagia Atienza, he would have difficulty when he would
take the bar examinations because, as he said, many have been
rejected admission to the bar on the ground of immorality; and
c) The promise of Atty. Villavicencio that Ruiz would be physically
“safe” if he would go with them.
Issues
Whether or not Jose Ruiz was intimidated into marrying
Pelagia Atienza?
Rulings
No. When defendant was invited to go with them and marry Pelagia,
he had some fears that he might be subjected to bodily harm in
retaliation for the dishonour inflicted upon her family. Appellant
would make it appear that that afternoon Ruiz was practically
kidnapped by Pelagia's relatives until after the marriage ceremony.
That cannot be true. He had many occasions to escape, as pointed
out in appellee's brief. He had companions in the house whom he
could have asked for help. There was even the policeman.
Considering that the law presumes strongly the validity of marriage
once the formal ceremonies have been completed, we are led to the
conclusion that although plaintiff may not have looked upon the
ceremony as the happy culmination of youthful romance, still the
evidence does not warrant pronouncement that his consent to it
was obtained through force or intimidation. Indeed, we may advert
to the provision of the Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which,
referring to "force” or "violence", does not seem to include mere
intimidation, at least where it does noting legal effect amount to
force or violence. (See article 1267, Civil Code.)
At any rate, it is unnecessary to pass on the effect of this legal
distinction. For even though appellant has presented his case in the
best possible light, yet appellee’s attorney has successfully met the
issues, upholding the judge's conclusion of fact that neither violence
nor duress attended the marriage celebration.
111. Searao Vs. Guevarra
Plaintiff and
Appellant
Felix B. SARAO
Defendant and
Appellee
Pilar GUEVARA
GR # / date of
promulgation
40 OG 15 SUPPL 263 Date: May 31, 1940
Ponente
(State division or
en banc)
Reyes (A.), J.
Nature of Action
Impotence
Facts
In 1936, the plaintiff and defendant got married. The husband
(plaintiff) tried to have carnal knowledge with her wife
(defendant) but she refused. When the night came, the husband
tried again to convince her wife to engage with sexual contact.
During the consummation, the husband discovered that the orifice
of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ. Her wife also
complained of pains in her private parts. Due to the failure of the
coitus, every attempt on husband's part to have a carnal act with
his wife proved a failure and he doesn’t want to make her suffer.
Few months after their marriage, the uterus and the
ovaries of the wife were removed due to tumor on the said parts.
The removal caused of incapability of procreation, but did
not, in the opinion of the surgeon, incapacitate her for
copulation. The husband declared that he lost all desire to have
access with his wife and has not tried to do it since then.
Court of First Instance of Laguna, dismissed the husband’s
complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency.
Issues
Whether or not their marriage can be annulled on the ground of
physical impotence
Rulings
No. The Judgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed.
Under our marriage law, marriage may be annulled if "either party
was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering
into the married state, and such incapacity continues, and
appears to be incurable." The husband construed this law to
annul their marriage on the ground of impotency. In the United
States it is generally held that the test of impotency is not the
ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. As stated by a wellknown authority, "the defect must be one of copulation, not
reproduction”. According to the doctor who operated the wife, the
operation did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. If the
man was not able to consummate the carnal act with his wife, it
was due to his own voluntary desistance. Moreover, the
husband contended that the marriage was procured through
fraud since the wife did not reveal to him that she was afflicted
with a disease in her sex organs. According to the Court, this
contention in untenable since fraud is not alleged in the
complaint and has not been proved at the trial.
112. Jimenez vs. Canizares
TITLE
Jimenez v. Canizares
GR NUMBER
L-12790
DATE
August 31, 1960
PONENTE
PADILLA, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Voidable Marriages, Impotence, FC 45 (5), 47 (5)
FACTS
Pet. - Joel Jimenez
Res. - Remedios Cañizares
Action - Filed a decree annulling the marriage on the grounds of
impotency
· On August 3, 1950 pet. And res. were married before a judge of
the municipal court of Zamboanga City
· Pet. left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
been married bec. he discovered that the office of the res. genitals
was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for
copulation
· According to pet. the condition of her genitals existed at the time
of marriage and continues to exist
· Petitioner filed a decree annulling his marriage with the
respondent on the grounds of impotency on June 7, 1955 at the
CFI of Zamboanga
· The res. was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She
did not file an answer.
· In pursuant to Art. 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the
city attorney to intervene for the State to validate if the pet.’s claim
is true by ordering the res. To:
(1) have a physical examination by a competent lady physician and
(2) submit a medical certificate on the result.
The court also warned that her failure to do so would be deemed
lack of interest in the case and that judgment upon the evidence
presented by her husband would be rendered.
· After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, the Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
· The city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
1. That the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law bec. she had not been
physically examined due to her refusal
2. That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should
have only punished res. for contempt of court and compelled
her to undergo the court’s order
3. That the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the
door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them.
The motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
WON the court can enter a decree to annul the marriage on
the grounds of presumption of impotence in the refusal of
the respondent to take part in the proceeding and in the absence
of an evidence ordered by the court?
No. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must
be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a
marriage. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
to have been satisfactorily established, bec. from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
had abstained from taking part therein. From such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.
FALLO: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.
113. Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 February 10, 1968
Plaintiff and Appellant
Gloria G. Jocson
Defendant and Appellee
Ricardo R. Robles
GR # / date of
promulgation
1968-02-10 | G.R. No. L-23433
Ponente
(State division or en banc)
REYES, J.B.L., J.
Nature of Action
Petition for Annulment and Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Facts
· On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced
in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action
for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R.
Robles on the ground that it was bigamous. It
was alleged in the amended complaint that previous
to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958,
defendant Robles had contracted a first marriage with
Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action
for Bigamy against the same defendant in the Court
of First Instance of Manila.
· Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs,
claiming that during their cohabitation, she was
subjected to physical maltreatment by her
husband, resulting in the premature birth of
their first child, who died three days later.
·Defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage.
But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled
him
by
force,
threat
and
intimidation, to contract that marriage with
her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a
married man; and that said threat and
intimidation allegedly persisted until January,
1963 when he was finally able to get away and
live apart from the plaintiff.
·Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is
involved in the case and was allegedly supported by
the joint affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother.
· Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as
having been brought about by force and
intimidation, was also denied, the court finding
indications of collusion between the parties in
their attempt to secure the nullification of said
marriage.
Issues
W/N the parties can use Art. 47, Para. 4 of the
Family Code as a ground for Annulment?
NO. On the merits, that the Court of Domestic
Relations correctly denied the motion for
summary judgment in view of the first paragraph
of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition
of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition
for summary judgment practically amount to these
methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
FOR THE FOREGOING, this proceeding is hereby
dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the
appellant.
Rulings
114. Tolentino v. Villanueva
TITLE
Tolentino v. Villanueva
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-23264
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
March 15, 1974
MAKASIAR, J
Voidable marriage; Procedure in annulment
Petitioner Romulo Tolentino prays for the nullification of the order
by respondent Judge on November 6, 1962, which denied
petitioner’s suit for the annulment of his marriage unless he
submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the
latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the
parties pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge
dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not
willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal. His
motions for reconsideration were denied, thus present petition to
annul said order and to compel the respondent Judge to receive
his evidence.
ISSUE
WON a stipulation of facts is enough ground for a decision in suits
for annulment of marriage and legal separation?
RULING
No. The court held that Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in
suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that
in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the
plaintiff.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is
predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the
family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the
State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have
vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties
or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a
marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the
fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the
parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear,
the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds (De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107
Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia
de Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs.
Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is
without merit. WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963
IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
115. Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 March 6, 1937
TITLE
In re Intestate of the deceased Marciana Escano
ANGELITA JONES, petitioner-appellant and appellee,
vs. FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir,
oppositor-appellant and appellee.
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
G.R. No. 43701
March 6, 1937
CONCEPTION, J
Subsequent Marriage when Former spouse is absent, Effects
FACTS
1. On December 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur Jones
in Cebu and had a child named Angelita Jones thereafter.
The husband, after 4 years, secured a passport to go abroad
on January 10 1918 and was then never heard of again.
2. On October 1919, proceedings were held to have her
husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th, he
was declared an absentee pursuant to the provisions of
article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said
judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until
six months after its publication in the official newspapers.
3. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication
thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El
Ideal."
4. On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortigüela and Marciana
Escañowere married before the justice of the peace of
Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.
5. Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence
must be understood to have been made not in the order of
October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that
from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the
celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days
elapsed– making marriage null and void
6. She also assigns that one of the errors of the court is having
declared the failure to record said marriage (marriage
contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage
register of the municipality of Malitbog) does not affect
efficacy and validity.
ISSUE(S)
1.
RULING(S)
1. Yes. For the celebration of civil marriage, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage
Whether or not the required minimum 7 years of absence
of former spouse was satisfied to celebrate a valid
subsequent marriage
2. Whether failure to register marriage affects the validity of
marriage
(section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
The absence of Arthur Jones should be counted from
January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning him was received, and from said date to May 6,
1927, more than nine years elapsed.
2. No. Regarding the failure to record marriage in the
register:
"Section VIII of General Orders, No.68, as amended,
provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must
transmit the original of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such
certificate shall be fined not less than twenty-five and not
more than fifty dollars; but it does not provide that
failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal
secretary annuls the marriage.
Decision:
Court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as
it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the
administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving
the final account and the project of partition, and in so far as said
order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new
project of partition; denies the appointment of Angelita Jones'
husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932,
relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make
a finding as to whether or not the properties of this intestate
estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana
Escaño, reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are
paraphernal and which are conjugal properties.
116. Lukban v. Republic, 98 Phil 574 February 29, 1956
Petitioner v.
Lourdes Lukban
Respondents
Republic of the Philippines
GR # / date of
promulgation
February 29, 1956
Ponente
(State division or en
banc)
J. Bautista Angelo
Nature of Action
· Declaration of Civil Status, Presumption of Death
“Juris Tantum”- Petition for Judicial Declaration that
petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead.
· Petition filed for declaration that the petitioner is a
widow
Facts
Petitioner, Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with
spouse Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the
Paco Catholic Church in Manila. On December 27 of the
same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel
and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent
search made by her. She also inquired about him from his
parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his
whereabouts and they have no knowledge if he is still alive.
Petitioner believes he is already dead because he had been
absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to
marry again, she desires that her civil statues be defined in
order that she may be relieved of any liability under the
law.
Petitioner filed in the court of CFI of Rizal for a declaration
that petitioner is a widow of her husband that is presumed
to be dead and so that she has no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage. Sol Gen opposed the
petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by
law. Hence the Court dismissed the petition hence this
appeal.
Appellant claims that the present petition can be
entertained because article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
in defining bigamy, provides that a person commits that
crime if he contracts a second marriage “before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” and, it is
claimed, the present petition comes within the purview of
this legal provision.
Issues
Whether or not the petitioner’s petition of declaration that
the he is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be
dead and has no legal impediment got her to contract
subsequent marriage may be authorized by law.
Rulings
Court believed that the petition comes within the purview of
the decision made in the case of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off.
Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition for
judicial declaration that petitioner’s husband is presumed
dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by
law, and this must be decided with a necessity depends
upon the fact of the death of the husband. This the court
can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that
he is merely presumed to be dead.
It is also held in that case that “A Judicial pronouncement
to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a
prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court
has to pass. It is therefore, clear that a judicial declaration
that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, a subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final.”
Regarding the Petitioner’s argument with the article 349 of
Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, the argument is
untenable for the words “proper proceedings used in said
article can only refer to those authorized by law such as
those which refer to the administration or settlement of
the estate of a deceased person.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement; as to costs.
Judgment Affirmed
117. Gue v. Republic, G.R. No. L-14058, March 24, 1960
Petitioner v.
Angelina L. Gue
Respondents
Republic of the Philippines
GR # / date of
promulgation
G.R. No. L-14058, March 24, 1960
Ponente
(State division or en
banc)
Montemayor, J.
Nature
NATURE OF ACTION: Petition for Declaration of
William Gue presumptively dead
Keywords: PRESUMPTION OF DEATH; PERSON UNHEARD
FROM IN SEVEN YEARS; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH UNNECESSARY.
Topic as per syllabus: Marriage when one spouse is
absent
Facts
Note:
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Ysip, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Virgilio V. David for appellant.
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E. M. Salva for
appellee.
Facts of the Case:
A petition was filed by Angelina L. Gue to declare her
husband, William Gue, presumptively dead, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
before the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1957. They
were married on Oct. 11, 1944 in the City of Manila and
thereafter begot two children, Eugeni and Anthony, although
no properties have been acquired by said spouses
during their union. On January 1946, her husband, a
Chinese citizen, flew to Shanghai to which she had joined
him, August of the same year. 3 years after, petitioner came
back to the Philippines and brought along with her ONLY their
children, clinging to her husband’s promise to follow her.
Despite the letters she had sent him and the inquiries she
made from the Bureau of Immigration in 1955 and 1958
regarding his whereabouts, however, William Gue had not
been heard of, neither had he written to her, nor in anyway
communication with her as to his whereabouts; hence this
petition.
This case, however, had been dismissed by the trial
court in view of the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court
in the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of
Nicolai Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461.
“There is no right being enforced nor is there a
remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final
determination of his right or status as it is clear that
William Gue never left any estate. It merely asks
for a declaration that William Gue (Husband) be
presumed dead because he had been unheard of for
7 years. Even if such declaration is judicially
made, it would not improve Angelina Gue’s
(Petitioner/Wife)
situation
because
such
presumption is already established by law. More
so, a judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption (accepted as correct unless proved
otherwise) only. It cannot be the subject to a
judicial pronouncement, if it is the only question
or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass.”
Issues
Whether or not a judicial declaration of presumption of death
after absence of for seven years is necessary?
Rulings
No. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be
made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. A
judicial declaration that a person unheard from in seven
years; being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proofs, cannot reach the state of finality or become
final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined.
If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively
dead, because he had not been heard from in seven
years, cannot become final and executory even after
the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such a presumption, is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then
a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of not benefit to the
petitioner.
“We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of
the case. The appealed order dismissing the petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs.”
120. Albano v. Gapusan 71 SCRA 26, May 07, 1976 (Llovit)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
Redentor Albano, Complainant, vs. Municipal Judge Patrocinio
C. Gapusan Of Dumalneg, Ilocos Norte, Respondent
Adm. Matter No. 1022-MJ
May 07, 1976
AQUINO, J.
Administrative
Complaint/Agreement
fact/Second Division
to
Separate
in
Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Municipal Judge
Gapusan of Dumalneg and Adams, Ilocos Norte seeking
disciplinary action involving latter’s malpractice with
incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared
and notarized a document providing for the personal
separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation
of their conjugal partnership
In 1941 or 5 years before his appointment to the bench, Judge
Gapusan notarized a document for the separation of spouses
Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and for the
extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership, which
stipulated that if either spouse should commit adultery or
concubinage, then the other should refrain from filing an action
against the other.
Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement and that
the spouses had been separated for a long time when they
signed the separation agreement and that the wife had
begotten children with her paramour. He said that there was a
stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live
together in case of reconciliation and that the separation
agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents
between the spouses.
ISSUE(S)
1.
W/N the document stipulating the agreement to
separate between Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta is
valid?
2.
W/N Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of
notarizing the agreement between the spouses?
RULING(S)
1.
No. There is no question that the covenants contained
in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals
and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the
institutions of marriage and the family. Marriage is not a mere
contract but an inviolable social institution. The family is a
basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects.
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law
considers as void "any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial
agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code).
Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extra-judicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction
was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs.
Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15).
2.
Yes. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of
a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extra-judicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for
notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of
marriage and the family
Respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar should be
censured for having notarized the void separation agreement.
However, his notarization of that document does not warrant
any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge
especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was
screened by the Commission on Appointments.
127. Diego De La Vina vs. Antonio Villareal 41 Phil 13
TITLE
Diego De La Vina vs. Antonio Villareal 41 Phil 13
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-13982
DATE
July 31, 1920
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
JOHNSON, J:
Premiminary Injunction; Husband as the Administrator of Conjugal
Property
FACTS
Narcisa Geopano, a resident of Iloilo, married Diego de la Vina, a
resident of Negros Oriental, in 1888. They produced nine children and
acquired several properties together. In 1917, Narcisa filed a complaint
in the CFI of Iloilo against Diego alleging that since 1913, her husband
had been having an adulterous relationship with Ana Calog, for which
reason, her husband ejected her from their conjugal home and she was
obliged to live in Iloilo.
Upon said allegations Narcisa prayed for (a) a decree of divorce,
(b) the partition of the conjugal property, and (c) alimony pendente lite.
Subsequently, Narcisa filed a motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction against her Diego who she learned was
attempting to alienate or encumber conjugal partnership property, over
which he was an administrator. Diego opposed the motion and demurred
to the complaint upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the cause nor jurisdiction over his person.
The trial court overruled the demurrer and granted the
preliminary injunction. Hence, this certiorari petition by Diego
contending that (1) the CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction for the action
for divorce because the defendant he was a resident of the Negros
Oriental and Narcisa must also be considered a resident of the same
province; and (2) plaintiff was not entitled to the preliminary injunction,
as under the law, the husband is the manager of the conjugal partnership
and, as such, is empowered to alienate and encumber the conjugal
property without the consent of the wife.
ISSUE(S)
W/N Dela Vina, as administrator, is empowered to alienate
and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of
the wife?
RULING(S)
As to the first contention the maxim that the domicile of the wife follows
that of the husband, cannot be applied to oust the court of its jurisdiction.
The domicile of a married woman, when the tacit consent of the husband
and other circumstances justify it, for the purposes of determining
jurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman should be considered
as her domicile where her right may be exercised.
If the wife can acquire a separate residence when her husband
consents or acquiesces, we see no
reason why the law will not allow her to do so when the husband
unlawfully ejects her from the conjugal
home in order that he may freely indulge in his illicit relations with
another woman. Under no other circumstance could a wife be more
justified in establishing a separate residence from that of her husband.
For her to continue living with him, even if he had permitted it, would
have been a condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital
duty.
Yes. In an action for divorce brought by the wife against the
husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed
for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband,
prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the
conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
The law making the husband the sole administrator of the
property of the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and
convenience as well as upon the presumption that, from the very nature
of the relation between husband and wife, the former will promote and
not injure the interests of the latter. So long as this harmonious relation,
as contemplated by law, continues, the wife cannot and should not
interfere with the husband in his judicious administration of the conjugal
property. But when that relation ceases and, in a proper action, the wife
seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it
is but just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife, that
the husband's power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency
of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property
is concerned.
128. Gandionco v Penaranda (TE)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C.
PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and
TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79284
DATE
November 27, 1987
PONENTE
PADILLA, J.
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
Legal Separation on the ground of concubinage
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
1. Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against
the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco with the Regional Trial Court presided
over by respondent judge for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage as a civil case.
2. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her
husband.
3. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of
support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the
respondent judge.
4. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in
view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him.
5. He contends that the 1985 Rules of Court provide that civil cases
are suspended such as legal separation and the incidents attached to
it like support pendente lite pending a criminal case arising from the
same offense until final judgment has been rendered and the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action
thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be
suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
6. The court rendered the decision ordering petitioner to pay his wife
and child support pendente lite. The court also denied his petitioner’s
petition to suspend hearing pending the criminal case filed against him
by his wife for concubinage.
7. Petitioner also claims that the presiding judge was biased and
should no longer preside over the case by reason of his decision and
his denial of petitions to suspend the hearings.
Whether or not a civil action must be suspended pending a criminal
action for the same offense?
RULING(S)
No. The court ruled that a civil action for legal separation can
proceed simultaneously with a criminal case arising from the same
offense.
The court interpreted the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure stating
that: “a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one “to enforce the civil
liability” arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil
action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offspring, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among
others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage,
may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the
action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
The civil action is not suspended because it does not intend to
produce the civil liability arising from offense prosecuted under the
criminal action but rather it intends to obtain the right to live
separately with the legal consequences aforementioned. The
support pendente lite was also found to be correctly granted, and in
case petitioner does not agree with the amount may file a motion in
court for modification or reduction.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
137.
TITLE
LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMENTE G. RAMOS,
respondents.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-34132
DATE
1972-07-29
PONENTE
FERNANDO, J
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
FACTS
Legal Separation; Action for Legal Separation
●
●
●
The petitioner filed in the sala of respondent judge for legal
separation, concubinage as the ground and an attempt by him
against her life being alleged
She likewise sought of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
for the return to her of what she claimed to ber her paraphernal and
exclusive property, then under the administration and management
of respondent Clemente Ramos
Opposition to this hearing invoking Art 103 of the CC—if motion is
heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become
dim. Art 103 dictates that no hearing on an action for legal
separation shall be held before the lapse of six months from filing
of the petition.
CFI: AFFIRMATIVE. Ordered the suspension, upon the plea of the other
respondent, the husband, of the hearing on a motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction filed by petition at the same time the suit for legal
separation was instituted
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Art. 103 bars the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction over properties?
RULING(S)
No. Art. 103 does not bar the court from hearing questions regarding
property management between the spouses. Art. 103 provides that “the
husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but
if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said
property.” This basis is enough for allowing the court to resolve issues
regarding management of property even before the six-month cooling off
period has been lifted.
A suit for legal separation is something else—the hope that the parties
may settle their differences is not all together abandoned-hence the
interposition of a 6-month period before an action for legal separation is
to be tried—the court should remain passive at this time; it is precluded
from hearing the suit. There is a recognition that the question of
management of their respective property need not be left unresolved
even during the 6-month period. There is justification then for the
petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction should
not be ignored by the lower court—to prevent husband for continually
managing her paraphernal properties.
The period of 6 months is evidently intended as a cooling off period—but
this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not
have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination
of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendent lite
according to the circumstances. Thus there can be no more impediment
for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
TITLE
GR NUMBER
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS, defendantsappellants
37720
DATE
1933-03-07
PONENTE
BUTTE, J.:
NATURE/KEYWOR
DS
an appeal of the decision of the CFI Ilocos Norte
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
·
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29,
1919, when they had one child. Shortly after the birth of this child, the
husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he
remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her
anything for the support of herself and their son.
·
But, the Ms. Sensano, the respondent was poor and illiterate,
and without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an
existence for herself and her son until she met the accused Marcelo
Ramos who took her and the child to live with him.
·
However, upon returning in 1925, the husband filed a charge
against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were
sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor.
·
The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the opinion
of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in
his treatment of his wife, having abandoned her as he did."
·
Then, after completing her sentence, the accused left her
paramour. She thereupon appealed to the municipal president and the
justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his
pardon and beg him to take her back.
·
But, Mr. Ventura, refused to accept his wife and stated, she
could go where she wished, and that he would have nothing more to
do with her, and she could do as she pleased.
·
Since, she was abandoned for the second time, she and her
child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos in the year 1924
and they have lived with him ever since.
·
Mr. Ventura knew that her wife and Mr. Ramos were again living
together and he did nothing to assert his rights as the husband. He
left for Hawaii and remained there for seven years abandoning his wife
and child.
·
Upon his returning, he filed again the second charge of adultery
here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to
obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710 and the Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code, para. 1 and 2.
Whether or not the husband, Mr. Ventura has the right to file a
criminal case of adultery against the respondents.
RULING(S)
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a
mere pose when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse,
we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his
conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous
relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not
authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the
seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which
period it was impossible for him to take any action against the
accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for
the husband to take any action against the accused during the said
seven years.
The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.
TITLE
People v. Schneckenberger
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 48183
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORD
S
FACTS
1941-11-10
MORAN, J p
Consent as defense
Accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger and complainant Elena Ramirez
Cartagena agreed to live separately from each other after seven years
of marital life. They executed a document which recites that both parties
agree to live separately from each other for the rest of their lives and
that they will not intervene with the private lives of each other with
complete freedom to act in all concepts.
The accused subsequently secured a decree of divorce
from the civil court of Mexico and contracted another marriage with
his co-accused, Julia Medel. Because of the nullity of the divorce
decreed by the Mexico Court, complainant herein instituted two
actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for
concubinage, and was convicted for the former. On the trial for the
offense of concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double
jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal,
accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
W/N the accused should be convicted of concubinage?
RULING
The court held no. The accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and
the complainant in which they agreed to be "in complete freedom of
action in any act and in all concepts," while illegal for the purpose for
which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the
act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised
Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party
clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other.
As previously ruled by the court in People vs. Guinucod that
the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a criminal
prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly
or impliedly after the crime has been committed. We are now convinced
that this is a narrow view in no way warranted by the language, as well
as the manifest policy, of the law. We, therefore, hold that prior consent
is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.
Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted,
without costs.
TITLE
BROWN v. YAMBAO, 102 Phil. 168 October 18, 1957
GR # / date of
promulgation
No. L-10699. October 18, 1957
Ponente
(State division or en
banc)
J. REYES
Nature of Action
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
Facts
Petitioner filed a suit in the CFI of Manila on July 14, 1955
and alleged under oath that his wife engaged in
adulterous relationship with one Carlos Field and begot a
baby girl while he interned by the Japanese invaders from
1942 to 1945 in UST internment camp. Per the Plaintiff,
he learned of his wife’s misconduct in 1945 upon his
release from internment and thereafter the spouses lived
separately and later agreed by executing a document to
liquidate their conjugal partnership and assigning of
properties. Petitioner prayed for the confirmation of the
liquidation agreement, custody of the children and that
the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the
plaintiff and for other remedy as might be just and
equitable.
The court then subsequently declared the wife in default
for failure to answer in due time, despite service od
summons and later directed the City Fiscal to investigate
(jn accordance with Art 101 of the Civil Code) whether or
not a collusion exists between the parties. Assistant City
Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and crossexamined plaintiff Brown and elicited the fact that Brown
had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten
children by her. The Court then rendered judgment
denying the legal separation on the ground that the
petitioner also had incurred a misconduct of a similar
nature that barred his right of action under Art 100 of the
Civil Code (that the legal separation may only be claimed
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage)
and Art 102 and that there had been consent and
connivance since petitioner only filed an action in 1955
when he take cognizance of his wife’s infidelity in 1945.
Issues
1. Whether or not a collusion exists between the
parties.
2. Whether or not the Fiscal should be allowed to
focus in cross-examining the appellant’s relationship
with another woman.
Rulings
1. Yes, the fact of Brown’s cohabitation with a woman
other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming
legal separation by express provision of Art. 100.
Wherefore, evidence of such misconduct, and the
failure of the wife to set it up by way of defense, were
proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be
considered circumstantial evidence of collusion
between the spouses.
2. Yes, the inquiry of the Fiscal should be allowed to
focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate
whether the proceedings for separation or annulment
are fully justified or not.
The wife has also not interposed prescription as a defense.
The court then can take cognizance thereof, because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment
of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of
our law that no such decree be issued if any legal
obstacles thereto appear upon the record. statutory
grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission of
similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the
action), it becomes unnecessary to delve further into the
case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also
evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it
did not, his situation would not be improved. It is thus
needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Judgment affirmed.
147. Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340 May 30, 1956 (Llovit)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
ROSARIO MATUTE, Petitioner, vs. HON. HIGINIO B.
MACADAEG, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch X, and ARMANDO MEDEL, Respondents.
GR No. L-9325
May 30, 1956
Concepcion, J.
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction/Effect of
Decree of Legal Separation Custody of Children/En Banc
Armando Medel filed legal separation against Rosario Matute,
upon the ground of adultery committed with his brother,
Ernesto Medel docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
the latter, finding Rosario guilty of the charge against her,
decreeing said legal separation, and awarding to Armando the
custody of their four (4) minor children, Florencia, Manuel,
Carmelita and Benito.
Thereafter, Armando went to the United States, leaving the
children in the City of Davao under the care of his sister Pilar
Medel, in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to
be with her offspring.
Armando returned to the Philippines late in 1954. The children
joined their father in Cebu. With his permission, Rosario
brought the children to Manila in April, 1955, to attend the
funeral of her father. Armando alleges that he consented
thereto on condition that she would return the children to him
within two weeks. However, Rosario did not do so.
Instead, she filed, a motion praying for the custody of their
children (three of which are already over ten years of age),
since they do not want to go back to their father because he
was allegedly living with another woman and to order Armando
Medel, to support said children by paying their school fees and
giving them a reasonable allowance not less than P200 a
month.
Armando opposed this motion with a petition to punish Rosario
for contempt of court, in view of her failure and refusal to
restore the custody of their children to him. Hon. Higinio B.
Macadaeg, issued an order, absolving Rosario from the charge
of contempt of court, for having secured Armando's consent,
but denying her motion for their custody and ordering her to
deliver them to Armando within twenty-four (24) hours from
notice.
Rosario instituted, against Armando and Judge Macadaeg
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction upon the
ground that said order had been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE(S)
1.
W/N the children's custody should be awarded to
Rosario?
2.
W/N Judge Macaraeg committed grave abuse of
discretion?
RULING(S)
1.
No. It is conceded that children over ten (10) years of
age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may
choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent
chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by reason of "moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness, in capacity or poverty" (Rule
100, section 6, Rules of Court).
Rosario is without means of livelihood and, according to her
own admission, she lives on the charily of her brothers. She
has no home of her own to offer to her children, but only she
would shelter them under the roof of her brothers.
The lower court impliedly deduced, from these circumstances,
that "poverty", among other causes, rendered petitioner unfit
to take charge of her children or made it unwise to place them
under her care.
2.
No. There is no question but that respondent Judge had
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue raised by petitioner's motion
for custody of the children, and the petition of respondent
Medel, to declare petitioner guilty of contempt of court, to wit:
whether said custody should be retained by respondent Medel
or should be given to petitioner herein.
Whichever alternative taken by respondent Judge would not
vitiate his choice as being "without or in excess" of jurisdiction.
Whatever mistakes, if any, he may have committed in the
appraisal of the situation on which we do not express our view
in determining the best solution to said issue or which one of
the litigants is best qualified or least disqualified to take charge
of the children, would, at best, constitute "merely errors of
judgment." They are not "errors of jurisdiction", but errors in
the exercise of the jurisdiction which the lower court admittedly
had. Such errors do not affect the legality or validity of the
order complained of. They may be reviewed by appeal, not by
writ of certiorari or prohibition.
It is true that, insofar as it refers to the custody of the minor
children, said decision is never final, in the sense that it is
subject to review at any time that the Court may deem it for
the best interest of said minors. It is no less true, however,
that, unless and until reviewed and modified, said award must
stand. No such modification having been made, at yet,
respondent Judge had, not only the authority; but, also, the
duty to execute and implement said award.
Without deciding whether the adultery committed by herein
petitioner with her own brother-in-law involves moral
depravity, it is clear to our mind that the affirmative
assumption implicit in the order complained of cannot be
characterized as an "abuse of discretion", much less a "grave"
one.
155. Ko et al v Arambulo et al (TE)
TITLE
BENJAMIN A. KO petitioner, v. VIRGINIA DY ARAMBURO,
respondents.
GR NUMBER
GR No. 190995
DATE
Aug 09, 2017
PONENTE
TIJAM, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
1. Respondent Virginia Dy Aramburo (Virginia) is Corazon Aramburo
Ko's (Corazon) sister-in-law, the former being the wife of the
latter's brother, Simeon Aramburo (Simeon). Corazon and Simeon
have another sibling, Augusto Aramburo (Augusto), who
predeceased them. Virginia's co respondents are the heirs of
Augusto, while the petitioners in the instant case are the heirs of
Corazon who substituted the latter after she died while the case
was pending before the CA.
2. On November 26, 1993, Virginia, together with her co-respondents,
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership with Declaration of
Nullity and/or Alternatively Reconveyance and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against Corazon
3. Subject of this case are seven parcels of land located in Tabaco
City, Albay
4. The complaint alleged that Virginia and her husband Simeon
(Spouses Simeon and Virginia), together with Corazon and her
husband Felix (Spouses Felix and Corazon), acquired the subject
properties from Spouses Eusebio and Epifania Casaul (Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania) through a Deed of Cession dated April 10,
1970
5. On April 13, 1970, Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix
and Corazon executed a Deed of Cession in favor of Augusto's
heirs, subject of which is the one-third pro-indiviso portion of the
subject properties.
6. However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon
was able to have the entire subject properties transferred
exclusively to her name, depriving her co-owners Virginia and
Augusto's heirs of their pro-indiviso share, as well as in the
produce of the same
7. For her part, Corazon admitted having acquired the subject
properties through cession from their uncle and auntie, Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania. She, however, intimated that although the
said properties were previously registered under Spouses Eusebio
and Epifania's name, the same were, in truth, owned by their
parents, Spouses Juan and Juliana Aramburo (Spouses Juan and
Juliana). Hence, when her parents died, Spouses Eusebio and
Epifania allegedly merely returned the said properties to Spouses
Juan and Juliana by ceding the same to their children, Corazon
and Simeon. She further averred that the said properties were
ceded only to her and Simeon, in that, her husband Felix's name
and Virginia's name appearing in the Deed were merely
descriptive of her and Simeon's civil status, being married to Felix
and Virginia, respectively.
8. Corazon alleged that she and Simeon thought of sharing a third of
the subject properties with the heirs of their brother Augusto who
predeceased them, hence they executed a Deed of Cession on
April 13, 1970 but later on decided to recall and not implement
the same. In fine, thus, Corazon insisted that only she and Simeon
share one-half portion each of the subject properties.
9. Corazon further alleged that on December 14, 1974, Simeon sold
and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned properties
in her favor. Hence, Corazon became the sole owner thereof and
consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the same to her
name. Corazon argued that the subject properties belong to
Simeon's exclusive property, hence, Virginia's conformity to such
sale was not necessary.
10. The CA also correctly observed that the forgery, as found by the
RTC, is evident from the admitted fact of strained marital
relationship between Simeon and Virginia and the fact that at the
time the question Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, Simeon
had been living with Corazon in Tabaco City, Albay, while Virginia
and her children were living in Paco, Manila
11. Accordingly, without Virginia's conformity, the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed on December 14, 1974 between Simeon and
Corazon purportedly covering one-half of the subject properties is
voidable.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not declaring the parties as co-owners of the subject
properties may allow the subject titles to be nullified and transferred to
the parties as to their respective portions?
RULING(S)
The petition is partly meritorious. At the outset, let it be stated that the
law which governs the instant case is the Old Civil Code, not the Family
Code, as the circumstances of this case all occurred before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Proceeding, thus, to the issue of ownership, The Court find no reason to
depart from the RTC's ruling as affirmed by the CA -->
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs:
(1)
Declaring the plaintiffs Virginia Dy-Arambulo and Vicky AramburoLee together with the interested parties the owner of ONE-THIRD (1/3)
portion of the property subject mater of this case; (2)
Declaring the
co-plaintiffs (heirs of Augusto Aramburo) likewise the owners of Onethird (1/3) portion of the property subject matter of this case; (3)
Ordering the Cancellation of [TCT] Nos. T-41187,T-41183, T41184, T-41185, T-41186, T-48918[4] [sic] and T-49819 and another
ones issued upon proper steps taken in the names of the plaintiffs and
interested parties; and the other plaintiffs, Heirs of Augusto Aramburo,
conferring ownership over TWO-THIRDS (2/3) PORTION of the properties
subject matter of this case; (4)
Ordering the defendant to reimburse
the plaintiffs TWO-THIRDS (2/3) of the produce of the properties,
subject matter of this case from the time she appropriated it to herself in
1974 until such time as the 2/3 share are duly delivered to them; and
(5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs by way of damages the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and (6) To
pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.”
A. Augusto's heirs own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject
properties
The courts a quo found that the said deed, ceding a third of the subject
properties to Augusto's heirs, was in fact implemented as evidenced by
Corazon's testimony that she was merely administering the said
properties for Augusto's heirs as her nephews and nieces were still
minors at that time.
We are not convinced of Corazon's bare assertion that the said document
was cancelled merely because she and her brother . Simeon decided not
to implement it anymore. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the
testimony of respondent July Aramburo, one of Augusto's heirs, which
was notably quoted by the petitioners in this petition, it is clear that he,
together with his co-heirs, are co-owners of the subject properties along
with Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix and Corazon, by
virtue of the Deed of Cession executed in their favor. The said testimony
clearly stated that Simeon was also merely administering the subject
properties.
B. Simeon's heirs, which include Virginia, also own one-third pro-indiviso
share in the subject properties
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, petitioners Heirs of Corazon Aramburo Ko, respondents
Virginia Dy Aramburo and all persons claiming under her, as Heirs of
Simeon Aramburo, and respondents Heirs of Augusto Aramburo are
deemed co-owners pro-indiviso of the subject properties in equal onethird (1/3) share. As such, the titles over the subject properties are
ORDERED cancelled insofar as the heirs of Augusto Aramburo's share is
concerned. Virginia Dy Aramburo and all persons claiming under her
have the right to demand for the value of their one-third (1/3) share in a
proper case. SO ORDERED.
TITLE
Veloso v. Martinez
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. 8715
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
1914-10-24
JOHNSON, J.
Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage
FACTS
Plaintiff Mariano Veloso commenced an action to recover of the
defendant, personally and as administratrix of the estate of Domingo
Franco, deceased, the possession of a certain parcel of land together
with the sum of p125 per month. Defendant Lucia Martinez, widow of
Domingo Franco, set up a general denial and a special defense which
consisted of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500 as attorney's fees for
services rendered by the deceased, which was later withdrawn; and,
second, for the recovery of certain jewelry, of the value of P6,000,
particularly described in the answer of the defendant, alleged to be in
the possession of the plaintiff.
ISSUE
W/N the defendant was entitled to recover from the plaintiff the jewelry
described in her answer?
RULING
The court held yes, the defendant was entitled to the possession of said
jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to return the same to her and in case
of the plaintiff's failure to return said jewelry to the defendant, then and
in that case, he shall pay to the defendant, for such failure, the sum of
P6,000. It is admitted that the jewels in question, before the possession
of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant
personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The
record further shows that before the death of Domingo Franco he
borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for
the payment of said sum the jewelry described in the complaint.
The defendant positively denies the plaintiff’s contentions
that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she
promised to redeem the same by paying the amount
due. Said exhibit states that the jewelry was contained in a box. It was
also found that the key was in the possession of the defendant.
In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the
jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from
her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that
they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal
property she exercised dominion over the same, until and unless she
had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public. In absence of
proof that she delivered the same to her husband, she could not be
deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent,
and without compliance.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant is
entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value, amounting to
P6,000.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby
affirmed, with costs.
TITLE
LUIS LIM, administrator, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISABEL GARCIA,
widow of Hilario Lim, defendant-appellee.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-2904
DATE
1907-01-11
PONENTE
CARSON, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS
an appeal from the order of CFI Zamboanga in distributing the estate of
the deceased, Hilario Lim; FC, 109, para. 3.
FACTS
·
Hilario Lim died intestate sometime in the year 1903, leaving a
widow and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000
pesos.
·
The trial court was of opinion that the entire estate as shown in the
inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property, except a
house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000
pesos and the 700 pesos for the purchase price paid for a certain lot, which
it had been brought to the marriage by the said Hilario Lim.
·
Counsel for the administrator, and for the surviving children,
contends that none of the said property should be treated as the property
of the conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario
Lim, brought to the marriage these properties, and his widow, brought
nothing to the conjugal partnership.
·
The setting aside of 700 pesos as the separate property of the
husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the treatment of the
balance of the price received for this lot, together with the buildings
thereon, were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds. Hence, it
is a conjugal property.
·
It is contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were
conveyed to the appellee during the coverture by the said Hilario Lim either
as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either in event such
conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the
Civil Code.
·
It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land
were not acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband, and
that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of
exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's
estate during the coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate
property under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1396.
ISSUE(S)
Whether not the said lot was a separate property of the appellee
RULING(S)
Yes, since, the trial court did not prove that was acquired as a part of her
dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption that it
was and continued to be a part of her separate estate (paraphernalia)
which never acquired the "dotal" character. No error was assigned by
either party touching the amount of the usufructuary interest in the estate
of her husband allowed to the widow by the trial court, and we cannot,
therefore, review the action of the trial court in this connection.
The judgment of the trial court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twelve
days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days
thereafter the record remanded to the court below for proper action. So
ordered.
CONCLUSION
64. Maramba v Lozano (TE)
TITLE
HERMOGENES MARAMBA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NIEVES DE
LOZANO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
GR NUMBER
GR No. 190995
DATE
June 29, 1967
PONENTE
MAKALINTAL., J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
1. On November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant
Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a
sum of money.
2. On June 23, 1959, the court rendered a judgment in favor of Maramba
and ordered Lozanos to pay the total sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos and Seven Centavos (P3,500.07), with legal interest thereon from
date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid.
3. On August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land in the name
of Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction was published in
accordance with law and scheduled for September 16, 1960.
4. On September 16, 1960, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a
partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount P2,000.00, and
requested for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960.
5. On October 17, 1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14,
alleging that on November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case,
defendant Pascual Lozano died. She ruled that the property levied upon
was her paraphernal property, and praying that her liability be fixed at
one-half (½) of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the
resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from
carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960.
6. On October 26, 1960, the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of
Nieves de Lozano which has been levied upon was sold to the judgment
creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the balance
of the judgment debt.
Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds
of the properties sold at public auction in view of the presumption that it
is conjugal in character although in the of only one of the spouses?
RULING(S)
No. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property
acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no
showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence the
fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative.
Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in
question is paraphernal.
However, it has been by this Court that the construction of a house at
conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses doe
not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that meantime the conjugal
partnership may use both in the land and the building, but it does so not
as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The ownership of
the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this
payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership
(Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284; Paterno vs. Bibby Vda. de Padilla, 74
Phil. 377; Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla, G.R.No. L-8748, Dec. 26,
1961). The record does not show that there has already been a
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between the late Pascual Lozano
and Nieves de Lozano. Consequently, the property levied upon, being
the separate property of defendant Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made
to answer for the liability of the other defendant.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing petition of May 18, 1967 alleges facts which occurred after
the perfection of the present appeal and which should therefore be
submitted to and passed upon by the trial court in connection with the
implementation of the order appealed from, which is hereby affirmed,
with costs
91. Gayon v Gayon (TE)
TITLE
PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and
GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-28394
DATE
November 26, 1970
PONENTE
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
1. On July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses
Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging that, on October 1,
1952, said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera,
for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described,
and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province
of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within
five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957
2. The plaintiff contends that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code
require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land
acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order
be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to
the aforementioned property.
3. Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January
6, 1954, that the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not
hers and contends that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever
executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor" a.
4. Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss stating that there is a "necessity
of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record." Presently,
or on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order appealed from,
reading:
“Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit "A"
annexed to the complaint that Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of the
land in question, and considering the fact that Silvestre Gayon is now dead
and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing to do with the land subject
of plaintiff's complaint, as prayed for, this case is hereby dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.”
ISSUE(S)
Is there a need for an earnest effort toward a compromise in this case?
RULING(S)
No. According to Art. 222 of the Civil Code that provides:
“No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035.”
The phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be
construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Genoveva is plaintiff's sister-in-law. "Sisters-in-law" are not listed under
Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Hence,
the case does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's
failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the
same.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or
defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of
Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of
such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre
Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision,
with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
Carmen Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio Sy
L-30977
January 31, 1972
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Legal Separation
FACTS
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in
the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September
1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943
when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child;
that they acquired properties during their marriage; and
that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or
about March 1949.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation
that would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio affirmed the allegations and counter-claimed for
the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with
Carmen O. Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. On May 31, 1968,
Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Counsel for deceased
substituted the deceased Carmen by her father Macario
Lapuz who refused to dismiss the case as filed by Eufemio.
ISSUE(S)
1. Who may file a suit for legal separation?
2.
When an action for legal separation is converted by
the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
RULING(S)
1. An action for legal separation which involves nothing
more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses
(there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is
purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered.
Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for
divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs
cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse
takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead.
2. Yes. The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same
marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication.
They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by
the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid
marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable
marriage as a pre-condition.
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Adil
L-48889
May 11, 1989
Gancayco
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
Charges upon Obligation in CPG, with consent
February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita
Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the
Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of
P2,000.00 as evidenced by a promissory note of said date
where they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay
the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations.
As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even
after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor,
who was by then a member of the Congress of the
Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11,
1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to
pay the same on or before June 15, 1961.
Spouses were not able to pay the obligation on the
specified date, thus, DBP filed a complaint in the Court of
Iloilo City on September 11, 1970. They were ordered to
pay the DBP jointly and severally. Spouses filed an appeal
to CFI and reversed the decision and counter-claim against
the plaintiff. A motion for reconsideration by the plaintiff
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Does the signing of the second promissory note of
respondent Patricio Confessor bind the conjugal
partnership?
Yes: Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such
administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this
case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory
note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the
conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
The petition was granted and the decision of the City Court
of Iloilo City was reinstated.
Modequillo v. Breva
86355
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
May 31, 1990
Gancayco
Family Home
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the
Court of Appeals in the case entitled "Francisco Salinas, et
al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. It has become final and
executory and Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay were
held jointly and severally liable. Thus, the Regional Trial
Court of Davao issued a writ of execution to satisfy the said
judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential
land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur and an
agricultural land located in Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag,
Davao del Sur both registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao
del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution
was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging that the
residential land located at Poblacion, Malalag is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement
of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the
Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155,
and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against
the family home of defendant is not one of those
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the
agricultural land although it is declared in the name of
defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and
the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not
approved by the proper government agency. An opposition
was filed by the plaintiffs.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of
the money judgment aforecited?
RULING(S)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial
court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff
shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the
land.
The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Casimiro Mendoza v. CA and Teopista Toring Tunacao
86302
September 24, 1991
PONENTE
Cruz, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
Filiation; Open and continuous possession of status
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
Teopista Toring Tunaca claimed she was the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her
claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed
him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory
recognition. The appellate court reversed the judgment of
the court below. Hence, this petition on certiorari.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao,
private respondent, alleged that she was born on August
20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and
defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to
Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized
her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized
illegitimate child.
In May 1988, Casimiro Mendoza, then 91 years old, died
and he was substituted by Vincente Toring who claims to be
the sole recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to
lose much inheritance if Teopista’s claim were to be
recognized.
Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her
claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza?
RULING(S)
HELD:
Yes. The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in
Article 283 of the Civil Code and it’s reproduced in Article 172
and 175 of the Family Code. Although Teofista failed to prove
that he was in “continuous” possession of the status necessary
to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements, the
Supreme Court found that the present case satisfies the
requisites as embodied in Rule 130 Section 39 of the Rules of
Court established that status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take
into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish
his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of
his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well
as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Mendoza (witnesses), that Teopista was the daughter of the
defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light
of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as
follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
The requisites in the said provisions were satisfied in the
present case. Hence, the petition was denied. Judgment is
hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be
the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled
to all the rights appurtenant to such status.
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
Title: Feliciano Sanchez v. Francisco Zulueta CA and
Teopista Toring Tunacao
L-45616
May 16, 1939
Avancena, C.J.
Support; Petition for Certiorari
In a civil case no. 3199, plaintiffs, Josefa Diego and Mario
Sanchez claimed for support from Feliciano Sanchez. Josefa
alleged that they are the wife and child of the defendant. She
alleged that the defendant refused and still refuses to give
support since 1932.
In defense, Francisco alleged that Josefa abandoned the
conjugal home on October 7, 1930 without his consent and
that she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez with whom
she had, as a result of that illicit relations a child, Macario
Sanchez.
The following month, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel
the defendant to give them support by way of allowance the
sum of P50.00 monthly. In opposition, Francisco claimed that
Mario is not his legitimate child.
In view of these facts, the defendant filed a petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals against the judge of
the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the
defendant comes to this court on certiorari.
ISSUE: Can Francisco be compelled to give support to
Macario Sanchez?
RULING(S)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWORDS
No. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in
not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the
purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to
overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a
valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs.
Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also
a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in
that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and,
hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this
defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it
would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not
of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it
being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly
resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the
merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.
The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and it
is ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to
present evidence in support of his defense against the
application for support.
Republic v Marcos
L-31065
February 10, 1990
Grino-Aquino, J.
Petition for certiori review the order of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Br. Marcos, J.
FACTS
On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private
respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of
Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen;
that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on January
29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang
Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a
daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 in
the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her
daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary
Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's
father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used
the name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic
School where she studies.
Further, she alleges that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang
Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has
grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz,
as her own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname "De
la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her full
name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la Cruz gave
his conformity to the petition by signing at the bottom of the
pleading; that the petition was not made for the purpose of
concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not
committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she
has never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to
cause damage or prejudice to any third person. She prayed that
her daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias
Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
On February 12, 1969, respondent Judge Pio Marcos of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet granted the petition.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary
to law.
ISSUE(S)
1.
Whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction
over the case; and
2.
Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition
although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce
proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor
"May Sia" alias Manman Huang."
RULING(S)
1.
Yes. In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified
petition dated March 30,1968, and the published order of the
trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA
ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA
QUEN, Petitioner.
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions
of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the
publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various
names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change
to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
In Go Chin Beng vs. Republic, L-29574, August 18, 1972, we
held that all aliases of the applicant must be set forth in the title
of the published petition, for the omission of any of such aliases,
would be fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are
mentioned in the body of the petition.
2. Yes. The second ground for the Government's appeal is the
failure of the petitioner below, Pang Cha Quen, to state a proper
and reasonable cause for changing the name/names of her
daughter.
The following have been considered valid grounds for a change
of name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion ;
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by
a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage; or
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody.
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the
reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter
are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love
and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2) to afford
her daughter a feeling of security and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz
agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the
foot of this pleading"
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The
general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if
it will give a false impression of family relationship to another
where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008,
October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30,
1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla
vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws
do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a
person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname
of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in
confusion of their paternity.
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is
that it was not filed by the proper party as embodied in Sections
1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The petition for change
of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her
name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person
in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang
Cha Quen not by May Sia.
The petition for certiorari is granted.
129. MUŇOZ V. DEL BARRIO
TITLE
GR NUMBER
MUŇOZ V. DEL BARRIO
G.R. NO. 12505 – R
DATE
APRIL 15, 1955
PONENTE
FELIX, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
Grounds for Legal Separation
FACTS
·
Felicidad Muňoz and Jose Del Barrio were married civilly at
the Municipal Court of Manila on September 24, 1942 and again
canonically on October of the same year. Since their marriage,
the couple lived together as husband and wife for the ensuing six
months in the house of the husband’s father at Rizal Avenue,
Manila, and then moved their residence to the municipality of
Bulacan.
·
It seems that during their married life, this couple had
frequent quarrels, on which occasions the husband maltreated
his wife by deed, and because the latter was unable to bear such
punishment, in 1947 they unceremoniously separated.
·
Notwithstanding this separation of dwellings, they met each
other in the City of Manila, and the wife claims that in September
1951, she was again maltreated by her husband. This moved her
to institute the present action alleging in the petition filed on
October 26, 1951, among other things, that the system of
conjugal partnership of gains governs her marriage to the
respondent; that no property has been acquired during the
marriage of the petitioner and respondent except a portion of a
residential land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan, from which no
rentals are derived; that respondent has made several attempts
on the life of the herein petitioner which compelled her to live
separately and apart from the respondent since 1947; and that
respondent has not provided support for petitioner and their
children.
·
Hence, she prays the court: (1) that a decree be entered
for the legal separation of petitioner from respondent (2) that
petitioner be awarded the custody of their children (3) that
respondent be directed to contribute to the support of their
children and (4) that petitioner be granted such further and
complete relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
·
The respondent filed his answer to the petition denying the
averments made in his wife’s pleading and prayed the court that
said petition be denied and dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE(S)
·
Whether or not the maltreatments suffered by the appellant
at the hands of the respondent after their separation of dwelling
furnish ground for the legal separation applied for under
Paragraph 2 of Article 97 of the Civil Code.
RULING(S)
·
In the case at bar the alleged maltreatments to the wife by
the husband occurred before their separation a mensa et thoro
in 1947 must not have amounted to said husband’s attempts on
the life of his wife, since the latter did not institute any action for
the legal separation from him upon the effectivity of the Civil
Code on August 30, 1950, and this case was only brought to court
on October 26, 1951, after the alleged maltreatment of
September 1951 had taken place.
·
Upon the testimonies of the witnesses regarding the alleged
maltreatments, the respondent only used at most his bare fists
or hands and desisted from giving further chastisement after the
first blows were given at the spur of the impulse.
·
It is argued, however, that this is a civil case and that
appellant is only bound to prove her right of action by
preponderance of evidence and not by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt upon which a conviction for attempted parricide
would rest, and though we may, to a certain extent, agree with
counsel for appellant on this yet we cannot help but declare that
in so far as the intent to kill is concerned, it must be established
with clear and convincing evidence, and that in the case at bar
said intent has not been proved by such evidence. Petitionerappellant herself should not have been so sure of her evidence
when instead of the present action she dared not cause the
prosecution of her husband for attempted parricide as a means
of establishing her right to secure the legal separation she applies
for in this case. Wherefore, the decision appealed from, being in
conformity with the law and the evidence of record, is hereby
affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.
130. Contreras vs. Macaraig_TIJAM
TITLE
ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR J.
MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.
GR NUMBER
No, L-29138.
DATE
May 29, 1970
PONENTE
DIZON, J.:
KEYWORDS
Legal separation; One-year period to file action for legal
separation; How computed.
FACTS
On March 16, 1952, Elena Contreras married Cesar Macaraig. Cesar
was employed at MICO Offset owned by Elena’s father, where he
met Lily Ann Alcala. After elections of 1961, Cesar resigned at MICO
to be a special agent at Malacanang. He was rarely home thereafter
due to ―series of confidential missions.
It was on September 1962 when Avelino Lubos, the family driver,
saw Cesar living with Lily Ann. On October 1962, Elena refrained
from verifying Lubos’ report in her desire not to anger Cesar.
On April 1963, rumors that Cesar was seen with a pregnant woman.
On May 1963, Elena again refrained from asking so as not to
precipitate a quarrel and drive Cesar away.
Elena received reports that Lily Ann had already given birth. To
verify the report Elena sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father’s
employee. Felicisima saw Cesar carrying a baby in his arms. She
went to the parish priest and inquired about the child of Cesar and
Lily Ann. Lucilo Macaraig, Cesar’s father, interceded to convince
Cesar to go back to his wife, but to no avail.
Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, Cesar’s older sister, arranged a meeting
between Lily Ann and Elena, and Lily Ann said that she was
willing to give up Cesar but Cesar did not want to give up the
relationship.
On December 1963, Elena with her 2 children went to see Cesar
and to beg him to return to his legitimate family but Cesar said that
he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return.
On December 14, 1963, Elena filed the petition for legal
separation.
CFI dismissed the petition because the 1 year period to file
action has already lapsed
At the time Elena acquired information, which can be
reasonably relied upon as true, that her husband is livingin concubinage with another woman, the 1-year period
should be deemed to have started even if the wife shall
not then be in possession of proof sufficient to establish
the concubinage before a court of law.
Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 00138
dismissing her complaint upon the ground that the same was filed
more than one year from and after the date on which she had
become cognizant of the cause for legal separation.
ISSUE
1. Whether the period of one year provide for in Article 102 of
the Civil Code should be counted from September 1962 or
from December 1963.
2. WON the legal separation case will prosper.
RULING
1. From December 1963 because the only time Elena really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the
early part of December 1963 when she went to see Cesar
and beg for his return. It is only on December 1963 that
Cesar admitted that he was living with Lily Ann and would
not return to his legitimate wife.
2. Yes, the decision of the court is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and
another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled
to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint; and the
case is hereby remanded to the lower court for appropriate
proceedings in accordance with law.
142. BUGAYONG v. GINEZ_ De los Reyes
TITLE
GR NUMBER
BUGAYONG V. GINEZ
Benjamin Bugayong, plaintiff-appellant,
Leonila Ginez, defendant-appellee.
10033
DATE
December 28, 1956
PONENTE
FELIX, J.
KEYWORDS
LEGAL SEPARATION, CONDONATION- A ground for dismissal
FACTS
Benjamin Bugayong, a US Navy serviceman, was married with
Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan and lived thereafter
with the sisters of Bugayong before he went back to duty. The
couple agreed that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later
moved in Manila.
Sometime on July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-inlaw and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to
Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from plaintiff’s sister-inlaw and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced
at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his
wife.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his
wife. They met in the house of the defendant’s godmother.
Thereafter, they both stayed and slept together for 2 nights and
1 day as husband and wife. On the second day, he tried to verify
with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead
of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. Despite such belief, plaintiff
exerted effort to locate her and failing to find her, he went to
Ilocos Norte to soothe his wounded feelings.
On November 18, 1952, He filed a complaint for legal separation
in the Court of First Instance but was dismissed on grounds which
includes the assumed condonation on the act charged. The same
is appealed with the Court of Appeals and then raised to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WON the acts of the plaintiff constitute condonation, hence a
ground for dismissal of the action for legal separation
RULING
Yes. There was condonation because the husband, Benjamin
actively searched for his wife after she left the conjugal home.
The act of Benjamin in persuading Leonila to come along with
him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin and together slept there as
husband and wife and the further fact that in the second night
they slept together in their house as husband and wife
It has been held that a single voluntary act of marital intercourse
between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
It is so ordered.
143. BROWN V. YAMBAO_Fernandez
TITLE
Brown v. Yambao
Petitioner: William H. Brown
Respondent: Juanita Yambao
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-10699
DATE
October 18, 1957
PONENTE
FELIX, J.
KEYWORDS
FACTS
Nature of Action: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance [CFI] of Manila [Tan. J.]
Topic: Legal Separation; Defenses; Recrimination: FC 56 (3)
On July 14, 1955, Petitioner Brown filed suit in the CFI
Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife, Respondent
Yambao. He alleged under oath that his wife engaged in
adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl while he was interned by the Japanese
invaders and as further fact, he had learned of his wife's
misconduct only in 1945. Upon his release, the spouses lived
separately and later executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the
erring wife as her share.
The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage
and that the defendant wife be declared disqualified to succeed
the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Upon the petition of the plaintiff, however, the wife was declared
in default for failure to answer in due time. Such led to the
Assistant Fiscal’s investigation on whether a collusion exists
between the parties in accordance with Art. 101 of the Civil Code.
During the cross-examination, it was elicited by the
Assistant Fiscal, Rafael Jose, that after liberation, Brown had
lived maritally with another woman and had begotten
children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment
denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had
incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his
right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE
(Recrimination is the one assigned; Collusion & Prescription are
discussed by Fajutag & Inaldo):
1. Whether or not the Respondent’s adultery and Petitioner
Brown’s misconduct constitute recrimination and/or mutual
guilt and thus bar his right of action for legal separation?
RULING
Ruling/s (The SC did not discuss recrimination as it was clear in
the facts and judgment of the CFI. The line below is the ONLY thing
uttered by the SC pertinent to recrimination; those written as notes
are my analysis, as per the facts and judgment of CFI):
Yes. Supreme Court has ruled that there are at least two well
established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought
(commission of similar
prescription of the action).
offense
by
petitioner
and
Fallo: The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Notes: Commission of similar offense by petitioner
(Recrimination)
● Recrimination (Mutual Guilt)
○ Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation, the petition for legal separation must be
dismissed. In other words, for legal separation to
prosper, it must be claimed only by the innocent
spouse and where both spouses are offenders,
a legal separation cannot be claimed by either
of them.
● Based on CFI’s judgment (from the facts)
○ Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the
legal separation asked, on the ground that, while
the wife's adultery was established, Brown had
incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that
barred his right of action under Article 100.
○ Legal Basis:
Art. 100. The legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed
by either of them. Collusion between the parties
to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
149. PNB v. Quintos, 46 Phil. 370
TITLE
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
MA RGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A.
ANSALSO, defendants-appellants.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L22383
DATE
October 6, 1924
PONENTE
VILLAMOR, J.:
KEYWORDS
ACTION TO RECOVER SUM OF MONEY
FACTS
In a document dated June 20, 1918, the Philippine National
Bank granted the defendants, Margarita Quintos E Yparraguirre
and Angel A. Ansaldo, a credit to the amount of P31,284, and to
secure the payment thereof, as well as the interest and costs, the
defendants mortgaged and pledged to the bank certain
certificates of one hundred fifty-eight shares of stock of the Bank
of the Philippine Islands of the nominal value of P200 each. Later
on, a certificate of fifty shares and another of forty were
substituted by others of 10 and 30 shares, respectively. Besides
these shares, the defendants delivered to the bank, as additional
securities, fifty shares of stock of the "Compañia Naviera" of the
nominal value of P100 each; eighty shares of stock of the Davao
Agriculture and Commercial Company of P100 each, and 10
second liberty bonds. These bonds were sold by the plaintiff bank
on or before August 19, 1922, having realized the sum of P2,360
from the sale thereof.
On August 21, 1920, the herein defendant, Mr. Angel
Ansaldo, in his answer to a letter of the bank addressed to him
or to his wife, his co-defendant Margarita Q. de Ansaldo, stated,
as may be seen in Exhibit B, that the balance in his current
account in favor of said bank in the sum of P33,558.445 on July
31, 1920, had been examined by him and found correct. This
balance with the interest due from the said date up to September
30, 1922, amounted to P41,212.05 and after deducting the credit
and deposits from August 1, 1920, to September 30, 1922, which
amount to P9,426.09, there remains a balance of P31,785.96,
payment of which is claimed in the complaint.
In said document of loan, it does not clearly appear that the
signers were husband and wife, although there is proof in the
record tending to show their civil status as husband and wife. Nor
does it appear in the said document that the signers have bound
themselves solidarily to pay the debt owing to plaintiff.
ISSUE
Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through
conjugal partnership?
RULING
YES. The aforecited provision negativating solidarity in the
liability of the partners is a consequence of the conclusive rule of
article 1137, of general application to all kinds of obligation, to
the effect that in obligations created by the will of the parties,
solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined in the
title thereof, giving them such a character. Therefore if solidarity
exists only by stipulation, or by law, it is evident that the partner
cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership,
because, as Manresa says, there is no legal provision imposing
such burden upon him, and because the same is not only not
authorized by the contract of partnership, but is contrary to the
nature thereof, for gain being the consideration of the obligation,
the latter cannot be extended beyond the interest that the
partner may have therein which is proportional to his share.
Taking into account that the contract of pledge signed by
the defendants does not show that they have contracted a
solidary obligation, it is our opinion, and so decide, that the
properties given as pledge being insufficient, the properties of
the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt
to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for
the payment thereof.
It being understood that the judgment appealed from is
modified in the sense above stated, the motion of the appellants
is denied. So ordered.
169. MANOTOK REALTY INC v. COURT OF APPEALS_ De los Reyes
TITLE
GR NUMBER
MANOTOK REALTY INC v. COURT OF APPEALS
L-45038
DATE
April 30, 1987
PONENTE
GUTIERREZ JR., J.
KEYWORDS/ACTI
ON
FACTS
Administration of Exclusive Property
Petition for Certiorari
Respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been
occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda
Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from
Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the
understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the lot.
On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died
and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties which
covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed
under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for the
said lot in the sum of P1,500.00 which was received by Vicente
Legarda, husband of the late owner. Thus, a remaining unpaid
balance of P5,700.00 which then were not paid due to unsettled
differences with the heirs of the owner upon her death.
On April 28, 1950, Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a
special administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private
respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
Subsequently, the petitioner became the successful bidder and
vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision consisting of
44 parcels of land spread out in the districts of Tondo and Sta.
Cruz, Manila, pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor
by the Philippine Trust Company on March 13 and 20, 1959, as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de
Legarda, in Special Proceeding No. 10809 of the Manila probate
court. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale.
In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters
and occupants, the petitioner caused the publication of several
notices and sending of circulars to occupants, advising the
occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court
action with damages would follow.
The private respondent was one of the many occupants who
refused to vacate the lots they were occupying, so that on April
26, 1968, the petitioner filed the action below to recover the said
lot.
The trial court dismissed the petitioner's action after finding that
the Identity of the parcel of land described in the complaint had
not been sufficiently established as the very same piece of land
in the material and physical possession of the private respondent.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals found the Identity of
the lot sought to be recovered by the petitioner to be the same
as that in the physical possession of the private respondent and
ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce
the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into
the shoes of its predecessor; and that since the area now in
possession of the petitioner which is that involved in the present
case is only 115 square meters, the balance after deducting the
deposit of P1,500.00 is P2,551.85, and as per order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, the said balance should be paid in 18
equal monthly installments, hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the
paraphernal property?
RULING
NO.
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara
Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be
said that the sale which was entered by the private respondent
and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of
Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on
behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only consummated after her
death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly
disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the
paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda
and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being
neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such
being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification
by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator
of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied
before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court
approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have
been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the
respondent. But Don Vicente Legarda had no effort to comply
with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the
respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the
installments to the court appointed administrator.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondent is ordered to SURRENDER the material and physical
possession of Lot No. 277, Block I to the petitioner and to pay
the latter the rentals as stated above from May, 1950 until he
surrenders the said lot. The petitioner shall reimburse the private
respondent the amount of P1,500.00 with legal interest from
May, 1950 or offset said amount from the rentals due to it. Costs
against the private respondent.
170. Palanca v. Smith-Bell, 9 Phil. 131 _FAJUTAG
TITLE
Alejandra Palanca vs. Smith Bell Co. And Emiliano Boncan
GR # / date of
promulgation
GR No. 3695 / October 26, 1907
Ponente
(State division or en
banc)
J. Johnson
Nature of Action
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila
TOPIC
Encumbrance / disposition of exclusive property
Facts
Respondent, Smith, Bell & Co., obtained a judgment in a
case filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money and later on executed
and levied upon the property known as no. 16 situated in
an alley running toward the old Santa Mesa race track,
upon property belonging to the hacienda of Tuason & Co.
After said execution levied upon the property in question,
the parties herein filed an action in the CFI of Manila
against the defendants herein, praying that said court
dictate a sentence declaring Alejandra (Plaintiff) to be the
only and exclusive owner of the property described in the
complaint with a right to the possession of the same and
that said attachment (levy of the property) be dissolved to
which the lower court denied. From this decision,
complainant appealed to SC and raised assignment of
errors, that the court erred in not allowing as proven the
transfer of property No. 16 made on September 20, 1904,
by Emiliano Boncan Yap in favor of his wife, Alejandra
Palanca de Boncan, and in not finding that she is the sole
and exclusive owner thereof, Emiliano Boncan Yap having
no interest whatever in the property in question.
Issues
Whether or not the property can be levied even though
property was declared solely owned by Alejandra, wife of
the respondent.
Rulings
YES. Even though the evidence brought to the court shows
that Alejandra Palanca was the indeed the owner of the
said property in the city of Manila, which was given by
Emiliano Boncan, and with the consent of Alejandra was
made as a guaranty for the payment of the sum of P14,000
borrowed by Boncan from the International Banking
Corporation. This Php 14,000, borrowed by Emiliano upon
the credit of the property of his wife, became conjugal
property, and when the same was reinvested in the
construction of a house which became a conjugal property
and was liable for the payment of the debts of the
husband.
Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect answer
the assignments of error made by the appellant, and
without discussing the same in detail, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the judgment of the lower court
should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
174. Magallon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282, Dec 16, 1986 (Llovit)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
EPIFANIA MAGALLON, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALINA L.
MONTEJO, in her Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, Branch XXI,
CONCEPCION LACERNA, ELECERIA LACERNA and PURITA
LACERNA, respondents
GR No. 73733
DATE
Dec 16, 1986
PONENTE
Narvasa, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
Petition to Review/What Constitutes Conjugal Partnership of
Gains/First Division
This is a petition which seeks the annulment of a writ of
execution issued by respondent Judge, Hon. Rosalina Montejo
of Davao del Sur Regional Trial Court, in a civil case instituted
by the plaintiffs (private respondents) against Martin Lacerna.
The writ of execution compels the partition of parcel of land in
Barrio Kasuga, Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to
which Lacerna had perfected a claim by homestead. The
plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin
Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, who died, asserted a
right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her
conjugal partnership with Lacerna.
While Lacerna denied contracting marriage with Pichan, but
admitted cohabiting with her until she allegedly abandoned
him. He also denied paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he
claimed, were fathered by other men, the RTC gave his denials
no credence.
RTC, found that Lacerna had been married to Eustaquia, and
that the plaintiffs were his children with her. Said Court further
found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his
right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with
Pichan. Thus, the plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of
the land claimed by them.
Martin Lacerna appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
which affirmed RTC's decision.
While it was being heard in RTC, no certificate of title to the
land had yet been issued to Lacerna. The Original Certificate of
Title was issued only on November 22, 1978, while
Lacerna's appeal was pending in the IAC. That said certificate
of title states that it is issued to "MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino, of
legal age, married to Epifania Magallon", the latter being the
present petitioner.
After the decision of the IAC became final and executory, the
respondent Judge, issued an alias writ of execution
commanding the Provincial Sheriff to order Lacerna to divide
and partition the property, ½ of which is the share of Eustaquia
Pichan in the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's
children are also entitled thereto and deliver portion of 5
hectares of the aforedescribed lot to the plaintiffs as their share
to satisfy the said judgment.
The writ was served to both Lacerna and Magallon. Magallon
filed a Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution alleging
that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of
herself and Lacerna as stated in the land certificate issued in
1978, and that which is valid, binding and legal unless declared
otherwise in an independent proceedings. She also prayed that
her property be excluded from the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Said motion was denied, as also was a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE(S)
1.
W/N Magallon is considered a trustee of the property in
question?
2.
W/N Magallon is bound by final judgment rendered in
an action to which she was not made a party?
3.
W/N the land certificate proves that the property in
question is a conjugal property of Lacerna and Magallon?
4.
W/N the writ of execution should be affirmed by the
Supreme Court?
RULING(S)
1.
Yes, Civil Code provides that "If property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes."
The land in question, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal
partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan, the
plaintiffs’ mother, and should have been titled in the names of
said spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the
names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner herein, Epifania
Magallon. In such a situation, the property should be regarded
as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the
party rightfully entitled thereto.
2.
Yes, it has been held that a judgment against the
husband in an action involving community property, is
conclusive on the wife even if she is not a party, but it has also
been held that a judgment against either husband or wife with
respect to community property in an action to which the other
spouse is not a party does not prevent the other spouse from
subsequently having his or her day in court, although, of
course, a judgment against both husband and wife is binding
on both.
It has been both affirmed and denied that a wife is in such
privity with her husband in respect of property held by them
as an estate in entirety that a judgment for or against him
respecting such property in a suit to which she is not a party is
binding on her.
A judgment affecting a homestead is, according to some
authorities, not binding on a spouse who is not a party to the
action in which it is rendered, unless the homestead is
community property or the homestead claim or interest would
not defeat the action; but, according to other authorities,
where the husband sets up and litigates a claim for the
homestead, an adjudication for or against him is binding on the
wife."
The Court held the petitioner as bound by the judgment against
Lacerna, despite her not having been impleaded in the action
against the latter. This ruling presumes that petitioner is, as
she claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though, as observed by
the IAC, no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to
prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the
death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner
cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of her
supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot
pretend to any right thereto.
3.
No, the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon" written
after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the
registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the land
is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner herein.
Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in
Article 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired during the
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no
proof of her alleged marriage to Lacerna except that which
arises by implication from the aforestated entry in the
certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that
the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been
perfected during Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan,
mother of the private respondents.
4.
No, the writ of execution, must be set aside, though not
for the reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of RTC,
affirmed by IAC merely declared the private respondents
entitled to one-half of the land in question, without specifically
ordering partition and delivery to them of said half portion.
A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the judgment it is
issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not clearly
included in, what is awarded by said judgment. Even if the
judgment in question is construable as authorizing or directing
a partition of the land, the mechanics of an actual partition
should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court which does not contemplate or provide for the
intervention of the sheriff in the manner prescribed in the writ
complained of.
175. People v. Lagrimas, 29 SCRA 153_ANTONA
TITLE
GR NUMBER
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
FR OILAN LAGRIMAS, accused,
HEIRS OF PELAGIO CAGRO, he irsappellants,
MERCEDES AGUIRRE DE LAGRIMAS, movantappellee.
G.R. No. L25355
DATE
August 28, 1969
PONENTE
FERNANDO., J.:
KEYWORDS/ACTI
ON
Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Attachment and Execution
FACTS
An information was filed against the accused, Froilan
Lagrimas, for the murder of Pelagio Cagro. Thereafter, the
heirs of Cagro, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment on the property of the accused,
such motion was granted. The lower court found the
accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the appellants. The judgment became final.
A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity was issued
by the lower court upon motion of appellants. A levy was
had on eleven parcels of land in the province declared for
tax purposes in the name of the accused. The sale thereof
at public auction was scheduled.
The wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas,
filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment as well as
the writ of execution with the allegation that the property
levied upon belonged to the conjugal partnership and,
therefore, could not be held liable for the pecuniary
indemnity the husband was required to pay. The then judge
of the lower court granted such motion. Another judge of
the same lower court set aside the above order. Thereafter,
upon appellee filing a motion for the reconsideration, a
third judge revived the original order declaring the writ of
execution as null and void. This order was appealed to by
the heirs of Cagro.
ISSUE
W/N the conjugal properties of Froilan and Mercedes Lagrimas
could be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the husband is
required to pay.
RULING
YES. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or
wife "may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; ... ." It is quite plain,
therefore, that the period during which such a liability may
be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is
still existing. The law speaks of “partnership assets.” Upon
complying with the responsibilities enumerated in Article
161, the fines and indemnities imposed upon a party of the
conjugal partnership will be satisfied.
If the appealed order were to be upheld, he would be in
effect exempt therefrom, the heirs of the offended party
being made to suffer still further. In doing justice to the
heirs of the murdered victim, no injustice is committed
against the family of the offender.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of August 7, 1965 is set
aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for the
reception of evidence in accordance with this opinion. With
costs against appellee Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas.
197. Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson (Voluntary Separation of Property) _FAJUTAG
ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSELACSON and THE COURT
OF APPEALS
TITLE
GR # / date
promulgation
of
G.R. No. L-23482 / August 30, 1968
Ponente
(State division or en
banc)
J. CASTRO
Topic
Voluntary Separation of Property
Nature of Action
Appeal by Certiorari from a decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals
Facts
The Issue arises from three cases involving the same parties.
Petitioner herein and Respondent Carmen San Jose-Lacson were
married on February 14, 1953 which to them were born 4 children.
On January 9, 1963. Respondent spouse left the conjugal home and
filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for
custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.
However the spouses succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement
respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of
property and on April 27. 1963 they filed a joint petition in the CFI
of Negros Occidental. The amicable settlement indicate that;
Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as required by
Article 191 of the Civil Code subject to particular terms and
conditions, including Carmen’s waiving of rights with the properties,
custody of their 2 elder children to be awarded to Alfonso and the
younger children to carmen and monthly allowance to be paid by
Alfonso to Carmen for the support of children in her custody and
reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of each
other. On April 27, 1963 the CFI approve the foregoing joint petition
to “conformable to law” and incorporating in toto to their
compromise agreement, that the petitioner spouse delivered all the
four children to the respondent house and remitted money for their
support.
Carmen then later on prays for relief from the agreement, arguing
that signing it was the only means through which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children. Alfonso opposed the said
motion and moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of res
judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC issued an order sustaining
Alfonso’s opposition and dismissed the case.
Carmen then filed before the CFI a motion for reconsideration of its
judgment with regard to the custody and visitation rights over her
minor children, praying that she be relieved from the compromise
agreement. Alfonso opposed with a motion for execution. The CFI
denied Carmen’s Motion for Reconsideration, and granted Alfonso’s
motion for execution. It further held that should Carmen fail to
return her two older children to Alfonso at the end of the summer,
she may be held liable for contempt.
Carmen appealed both the HDRC and CFI judgments to the CA. The
CA held that the compromise agreement is null and void insofar as
it pertains to the custody and visitation rights over Enrique and
Maria Teresa. The CA also nullified he order granting Alfonso’s
motion for execution. Alfonso thus appealed to his Court.
Issues
1.
Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid.
Rulings
YES. The compromise agreement and the judgment thereon are
valid insofar as the separation of property and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership. The Law allows the separation of the spouses’
property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, provided
judicial sanction is secured beforehand. The NCC provides:
ART 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
ART 190 (4), The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife,
as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified any petition
for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
In this case, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of the
separation of their property and the dissolution of their conjugal
property.
However, the judgment thereon is not valid insofar as the custody
and support of the spouses’ children. The JDRC was first to acquire
jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support. However, when
Carmen signed the joint petition embodying the compromise
agreement and filed it with the CFI, she in effect abandoned her
action in the JDRC. This this gave Alfonso the right to as for the
dismissal of the action that Carmen filed with the JDRC. The CFI
therefore was correct to dismiss the case for custody and support
based on those grounds. However, the Court agrees with the CA’s
ruling that the CFI erred in depriving Carmen of the custody of the
younger children, who at the time were 6 and 5 years old
respectively. Art 363 of the NCC provided: “No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reasons for such measure. “ A mother and her child
below 7 years of age cannot be separated, unless such separation
is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court is a
mandatory provision. And the CFI’s order granting custody of
children to Alfonso did not state any compelling reason to separate
the 2 children from their mother.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution
dated July 31, 19964 of CA and the orders dated May 28, 1963 and
of the JDRC are affirmed.
Decision affirmed with instruction.
201. Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615, Jun 30, 1970 (Llovit)
TITLE
GR NUMBER
OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late
ISIDRA GOMEZ Y AQUINO, plaintiff appellee, vs. JOAQUIN P.
LIPANA, defendant-appellant
GR No. L-23214
DATE
Jun 30, 1970
PONENTE
Makalintal, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS
Appeal from a decision/Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in
relation to FC 43 (2) and FC 50/En Banc
The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two
marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the
second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the
second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact,
Lipana concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage
acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City,
for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property
was issued on February 1,1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana
married to Isidra Gomez."
On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless,
and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives.
On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her
estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture
of the husband's share in the Cubao property in favor of the
said estate, Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil
Code.
The trial court, ruled that the second marriage was void ab
initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for its
nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his
interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate
of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors
to the trial court.
(1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second
marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio;
and
(2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
ISSUE(S)
1.
W/N the second marriage may be collaterally attacked?
2.
W/N Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code can be
invoked in this case?
RULING(S)
1.
Yes, where the marriage contracted is bigamous and
null and void for being in violation of Section 29 of the Marriage
Law (Act 3613), the marriage is subject to collateral attack in
the intestate proceedings instituted by the judicial
administratrix for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the
conjugal property.
The appellant, relying on Section 30 (b) of Act 3613, maintains
that his marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be
annulled only in an action for that purpose, which in the light
of Section 31 could be filed only by either party thereto, during
the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse.
However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in
this case, particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says
that "any marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance/' This is the general rule, to which the only
exceptions are those mentioned in subsections:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved and
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid
in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
of the same provision.
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930
marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or
dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is
no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in subsection (b).
2.
No, The first paragraph of Article 1417 states two
causes for the termination of the conjugal partnership: (1)
dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity.
Under the 2nd paragraph of Article 1417 it is upon the
termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place. Now then, when did
the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of
the defendant to the deceased Isidra Gomez terminate?
Obviously when the marriage was dissolved by the latter's
death in 1958.
By that time Article 1417 was no longer in force, having been
eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took effect in 1950.
The legal situation arising from these facts is that while in so
far as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in good
faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise, just
the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership wherein
she was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, no action
lies under Article 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband's share
in her favor, much less in favor of her estate, with respect to
which there are after all no children, but only collateral
relatives, who are entitled to succeed.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the
first marriage.
228. Chua Keng Giap v. IAC, 158 SCRA 18, Feb 17, 1988 (Llovit)
TITLE
CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN KING, respondents.
GR NUMBER
GR No. 75377
DATE
Feb 17, 1988
PONENTE
CRUZ, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS
Petition to
Division
FACTS
Chua Keng Giap, the petitioner filed on May 19, 1983, a petition
for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Review/Contrary
Declaration
by
Mother/First
The private respondent Chua Lian King, moved to dismiss for
lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file
the petition. Chua Keng Giap, it was claimed, had been declared
as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao, for
the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The
decision in that case had long become final and executory.
The motion to dismiss the case was denied by the RTC, who
held that the case invoked decided the paternity and not the
maternity of the petitioner.
Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent court
reversed RTC's decision in a petition for certiorari filed by the
private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was denied
for late filing. The petitioner then came to this Court to
challenge these rulings.
The petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao
and that it was an error for the respondent court to reject his
claim. He also says his motion for reconsideration should not
have been denied for tardiness because it was in fact filed on
time under the Habaluyas ruling.
ISSUE(S)
1. W/N an issue of filiation long been settled by the Supreme
Court can still be resurrected?
2. W/N contrary declaration by the alleged mother is sufficient
proof?
RULING(S)
1. No, the issue of his claimed filiation has long been settled,
and with finality, by no less than the Supreme Court. That issue
cannot be resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in
Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals. In that case Sy Kao flatly and
unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's
mother.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled
in a motion to dismiss based on lack of a cause of action is the
sufficiency of the allegation itself and not whether these
allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted. That is correct. He also submits that an order denying
a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore
reversible not in a petition for certiorari but on appeal. That is
also correct.
There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an
examination of the procedural objections to the grant of the
motion to dismiss. In the end, the resolution of the merits
would have to be the same anyway as in the aforesaid case.
The petitioner's claim of filiation would still have to be rejected.
Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for
reconsideration is also unnecessary as the motion would have
been validly denied just the same even if filed on time.
To allow the parties to go on with the trial on the merits would
not only subject the petitioner's to the expense and ordeal of
litigation which might take them another ten years, only to
prove a point already decided, but more importantly, such
would violate the doctrine of res judicata which is expressly
provided for in Section 49, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
2.
Yes, in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, Sy Kao denies that
respondent Chua Keng Giap is her son by the deceased Chua
Bing Guan. Thus, her filed opposition is based principally on the
ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the
deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy.
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap
was really her son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who
could say — as indeed she has said these many years — that
Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
255. Santos v. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344, February 28, 1966 (Llovit)
TITLE
PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners, vs.
GREGORIA
ARANZANSO
and
DEMETRIA
VENTURA,
respondents.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-23828
DATE
February 28, 1966
PONENTE
BENGZON, J.P., J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
Petition for review/ Need for consent/En Banc
FACTS
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos, 17 years old and
Aurora Santos, 8 years old was filed by Simplicio Santos and
Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June
4, 1949. The petition, alleged that the whereabouts of the
minors’ nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were
unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have
been abandoned by their parents; and that for years, since
their infancy, said children have continuously been in
petitioners’ care and custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de
Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian
ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption.
Paulina Santos, being over 14 years of age, likewise gave her
written consent thereto. After due publication and hearing, the
adoption court (CFI) granted the petition for the adoption.
8 years later, Juliana Reyes died, intestate. Simplicio Santos
filed in the CFI of Manila a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate. In said petition he stated that the surviving
heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age,
respectively. He also asked that he be appointed administrator
of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the
deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of
administrator. She asserted that Simplicio Santos’ marriage to
the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that
the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise
void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents,
who were then living and had not abandoned them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin
of the deceased Juliana Reyes and adding that she is the
mother of the Paulina Santos, filed an opposition to the petition
of Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and, moreover,
adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria
Aranzanso.
CFI ruled that the validity of the adoption could not be assailed
collaterally in the intestate proceedings.
While, Court of Appeals reversed CFI's order, finding instead
that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence
of consent by the natural parents of the minor children, which
it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the CA,
Paulina and Aurora Santos appealed to the Supreme Court by
way of petition for review.
ISSUE(S)
1. W/N consent by the parents to the adoption is an absolute
requisite?
2.
W/N a decree of adoption may be collaterally attacked in
a settlement proceeding?
3.
W/N the validity of Simplicio and Juliana's marriage will
affect the right of the adopted children to succeed?
4.
W/N Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura have the
right to succeed Juliana Reyes, as the latter's first cousins?
RULING(S)
1.
No. The Court of Appeals completely relied on American
jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental
consent to the adoption is a jurisdictional requisite. The point
to remember, however, is that under our law on the matter,
consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute
requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their children,
consent to the adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices.
2.
No. First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the
adoption court made no determination of the fact of
abandonment. Abandonment imports “any conduct on the part
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child”.
It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe to their
children.” It can thus readily be seen that although the CFI
judgment does not use the word “abandoned”, its findings
sufficiently contain a set of facts which truly constitutes a
finding of abandonment.
Second, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an
inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact
to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the
tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its
order. It follows, therefore, that CA erred in reviewing, under a
collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that
the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
Third, it is not in point to argue that Simplicio Santos in fact
concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents,
thereby rendering the judgment obtained therein null and void
or being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized
that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not
by way of collateral attack.
3. No, assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married
to Juliana Reyes, Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have
filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is
single, not married. The defect would then lie only as to
Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person
could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition. It being
the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the subject matter of the
settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the
consideration of the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to
succeed as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion
of respondents.
4.
No, Aranzanso and Ventura who claim an interest in the
estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot
intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of
the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted
children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil
Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be—
as in the instant case—considered valid.
Note: In the Motion for Reconsideration of the SC’s decision,
the respondents raised the following arguments:
1.
The adoption court made no finding of abandonment,
that such long absence must be willful and that time is not an
element of abandonment.
2.
Parental ties are too noble and sacred to be lightly
severed in the absence of a written consent of the parents.
3.
If Juliana Reyes was not validly married to Simplicio
Santos their joint petition for adoption would be defective, since
only Simplicio Santos signed ‘the same.
4.
That the SC's decision may be interpreted as foreclosing
respondents’ avenue to a direct action to annul the adoption
decree.
SC's ruling:
1.
Negligent and careless failure to perform the duties of
parenthood is a significant element of abandonment, regardless
of actual intention. And as to the element of time, far from
being immaterial, it is recognized that: “A strong basis for a
finding of the parents’ abandonment of his or her child is found
in the case where the parent has left the child permanently or
indefinitely in the care of others, given it to another, or
surrendered it entirely.”
2.
It cannot be stressed too much that the parental
consent required by the law refers to parents who have not
abandoned their child. And from the findings of the adoption
court, it is rather something remarkable that the natural
parents of the children herein involved paid no heed to the
sanctity and nobility of parental ties for almost twenty years.
3.
Simplicio Santos may likewise be deemed to have
signed in behalf of Julian Reyes, as her representative. Personal
signature by the petitioner of the petition to adopt is not among
the requisites of the law. At any rate, any defect on his has
obviously been cured by Juliana Reyes’ subsequent prosecution
of the adoption case.
4.
The dispositive portion ought to be read together with
relevant discussions in the body of the decision, especially the
last sentence immediately preceding it: “The same holds true
as long as the adoption must be—as in the instant case—
considered valid.” Should respondents, therefore, succeed by a
direct attack in invalidating the adoption, the dispositive portion
of this Court’s decision herein shall not be deemed to hinder
their rights thereunder.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
282. Naldoza v. Republic, G.R. No. L-55538, March 15, 1982 (Llovit)
TITLE
In the Matter of the Change of Names of DIONESIO
DIVINAGRACIA, JR., and BOMBI ROBERTO DIVINAGRACIA to
DIONESIO NALDOZA and BOMBI ROBERTO NALDOZA,
respectively. ZOSIMA NALDOZA, as natural guardian and
guardian ad litem of said minors, petitioner-appellant, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE FERNANDO S. RUIZ
of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, respondentsappellees.
GR NUMBER
G.R. No. L-55538
DATE
March 15, 1982
PONENTE
AQUINO, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS
Petition to Review/Surnames/Second Division
FACTS
Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May
30, 1970. They begot two children named Dionesio, Jr. and
Bombi Roberto.
Zosima’s husband left her after she confronted him with his
previous marriage with another woman. He never returned to
the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Congressman
Maglana in the sum of P50,000.00, one Galagar in the sum of
P10,000.00 also Eloy Gallentes and other persons.
The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly
teased them about their father being a swindler.
Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two minor
children and their scapegrace father, Zosima, filed in the Court
of First Instance of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that
the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia
to Naldoza, her surname. After due publication and hearing,
CFI dismissed the petition.
CFI did not consider as sufficient grounds for change of
surname the circumstances that the children’s father was a
swindler, that he had abandoned them and that his marriage
to Zosima was a second marriage which, however, had not
been annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the
children’s adoption of their mother’s surname would give a false
impression of family relationship.
From that decision, Zosima Naldoza appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE(S)
1.
W/N there is a justification for the two minor children to
drop their father’s surname and use their mother’s surname
only?
RULING(S)
1.
No, the minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are
presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the
surname Divinagracia, their father’s surname (Art. 364, Civil
Code).
To allow them, at their mother’s behest, to bear only their
mother’s surname (which they are entitled to use together with
their father’s surname) and to discard altogether their father’s
surname, thus removing the prima-facie evidence of their
paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which,
ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. The
mother’s desire should not be the sole consideration.
The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and
reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of
Court).
The reasons adduced for eliminating the father’s surname are
not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the
change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors’
parentage and might create the impression that the minors are
illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only.
That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as
indicated in their birth records.
The child should, and in the course of time must, know of his
parentage. If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and
is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his
mother’s surname only and to avoid using his father’s surname,
then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname.
Concurring Opinion:
·
Barredo, J., concur. At the worst, Dionesio Jr. and
Bombito should be considered as natural children by legal
fiction having the same status, rights and obligations of
acknowledged natural children, (Art. 29, Civil Code), among
which is the right to bear the surname of their father. (Art. 28
(1), Civil Code).