AERIAL ASSASSINATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE SHOOTDOWN OF ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO
CONTENTS
Disclaimer…………………………………………………………………………………………3
List of Illustrations………………………………………………………………………………...4
List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………...5
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..6
Purpose………………………………………………………………………………...………….7
The Intelligence…………………………………………………………………………………...8
The Mission……………………………………………………………………………………...12
Post Mission………………………………………………………………………………….…..20
Lessons Learned……………………………………………………………………………..…...22
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….23
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..24
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ABBREVIATIONS
AD
Admirals Dispatch
AOB
Air Order of Battle
FRUPAC
Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
FRUMEL
Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne
JN
Japanese Navy
MIA
Missing In Action
ONI
Office of Naval Intelligence
OPSEC
Operational Security
SIGINT
Signals Intelligence
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ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
Page
1.
The Key Players……………………………………………………………………….…..7
2.
Map of the Solomon Islands and the Flight Routes……………………………………...13
3.
A Broad Overview of the Intercept………………………………………………………15
4.
An Illustration of High- and Low-Deflection Gunnery.…………………………………19
5.
Authors Reconstruction of the Yamamoto Shootdown……………………………...…..20
4
Introduction
On the morning of 18 April 1943, 16 P-38F “Lightning” Army Air Force fighter planes
swept in from the southwest of Bougainville in the Solomon Islands at low altitude to intercept 8
Japanese aircraft beginning their approach into Ballale Island. What made this particular
intercept so unique was that Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, Commander-In-Chief of the Japanese
Combined Fleet was aboard one of the two Japanese “Betty” bombers being escorted by six
“Zero” fighter aircraft. Yamamoto was the mastermind behind the 7 December 1941 surprise
attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii – the same attack that forced America into war with the
imperialistic Japanese.
Following the intercept, the debate raged for years as to “who actually killed
Yamamoto?” The number of likely candidates was limited, because of the 16 American aircraft,
four were the designated “killer flight” and consequently it was they who would actually conduct
the “hit.” Of those four aircraft, one pilot was unable to release his external fuel tanks and thus
he and his wingman were drawn away from the fight. Both aircraft flew along parallel to the
flight paths of the Japanese bombers until finally they were able to engage the enemy. However,
by this time, Admiral Yamamoto’s aircraft was aflame in the jungle. The remaining two
American pilots had been able to close with the enemy and fire, limiting the list of potential
assassins candidates to two names: Captain Thomas G. Lanphier Jr. and Lt Rex T. Barber – who
was the true assassin?
5
Fig. 1. The Key Players (from left to right) Lt (Lt. Colonel, as pictured) Rex T. Barber, Captain
Thomas G. Lanphier, and Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to provide a tactician’s insight into the engagement and
reconstruct what actually happened through multiple accounts. It is unfortunate that a good
amount of the source documentation in the books that were referenced to write this case study
are media source “statements” by the aviators involved. Thus, they are subject to the tendency of
the media to “rewrite the facts” for purposes of sensationalism. Further supporting this view is
the fact that Lanphier himself was Journalism major in college and had been known by his fellow
fliers to be able to spin a “good yarn”. Following the war, Lanphier won an essay award from
Reader’s Digest regarding his involvement in the Yamamoto shootdown - this account differs
significantly from his wartime report on the action. However, despite the author’s opinions,
experts in this area disagree:
“Journalistic accounts have also provided credible source materials when such accounts
have been informed by interviews with government officials or other persons who were
knowledgeable about the conduct and effects of the leadership attacks under discussion.”
(Hosmer 2001, 6)
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Given this “delta” in attitude towards journalistic sources, the author has held key events
subject to a complimentary, “two-witness” criterion to lend the reconstruction credibility. In
short, key events must be concurred upon by at least two witnesses.
A significant amount of misinformation has been injected into the historical record over
the years, and consequently the “waters have been muddied.” Some of this “muddiness” is due
to the pride of those involved, some due to the lack of witnesses, and some due to theories that
have over the years become accepted as fact. This is true in particular regarding the engagement
of the second “Betty”. This portion of the engagement (immediately following the crash of
Yamamoto’s bomber) is not analyzed in the reconstruction because it has no bearing on the end
result. Entire books have been written on this subject, and thus another essay recapping other
published works is unnecessary. However, none of these books clearly spells out the intercept in
a logical format. Fortunately, the facts are sufficient to allow viewing of the engagement of
Yamamoto’s aircraft under the light of objectivity (and physics). Thus, the truth of who killed
Yamamoto can be derived from the record.
Furthermore, this paper will investigate critical elements required for the use of airpower
in the targeting of enemy leaders and will pose some “food for thought” for future operations.
Central to these critical elements is the need for precise intelligence and good security, thus
allowing the “shooter” and victim to arrive at a common point in time and space, enabling
assassination.
The Intelligence
As is common in all Special Operations, accurate intelligence is critical to the success of
the mission. The shootdown of Yamamoto was no exception to this rule. The intelligence that
made this mission of assassination possible came in the form of a series of radio signals intercept
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by radio stations in Australia, Washington DC, and Hawaii (Glines p.1). These signals intercepts
provided the specific time and location for an inspection/visit by Admiral Yamamoto to units in
the Solomon Islands. Consequently, the data was accurate enough to provide specific targeting.
The ability to break the Japanese Signals Intelligence or SIGINT on Japanese transmissions had
been gained over the space of several decades, but several key events occurred that made the
gathering and decryption of the Yamamoto itinerary possible.
In 1920, five agents from the Department of the Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) broke into the office of the Japanese consul Washington D.C. It was there that they
photographed the Japanese top-secret naval codebook. These photographed pages became
known as the “Red Book”, named for the red binder in which they were kept. The code
contained therein became known as “…‘JN-1’ because it was the first Japanese navy code
obtained by the Americans.” (Glines 1990, 17). This codebook formed a firm foundation for
subsequent decryption efforts by the Americans.
Another event was the breaking of the Japanese admiral’s dispatch code by “Miss Aggie”
(Agnes Driscoll), a civilian hired to work in a Navy electronic monitoring station. Her
breakthrough work, considered to be the “…crowning achievement of the Navy’s entire
cryptological effort…” was based on the “Red Book” and enabled naval intelligence to decrypt
the “AD” or admiral’s dispatch code, reserved specifically “…for data of the utmost secrecy and
confidence.” (Glines 1990, 17).
An additional coup occurred with the construction of a replica of a Japanese cipher
machine based presumably on blueprints stolen by ONI agents in 1935. This machine, called the
“Red Machine” greatly sped up decryption work by cryptographers. Unfortunately, this machine
became obsolete in 1938 when the Japanese introduced a new cipher system, based on an
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entirely new machine. The army and navy began to share information that they had on the new
machine, but nothing apparently worked until “…a casual remark by a young cryptologist
opened up a possibility that led to the solution and construction of a new crypto machine in a
mere 48 hours.” (Glines 1990, 21). The new machine was called “Purple” and this name
invokes a curious coincidence. The codebook that was used in conjunction with the machine had
a purple cover. Furthermore, the machine was extremely similar in appearance to the machine it
was meant to duplicate in operation. Presumably, more “information” had become available to
the team working on the cipher machine than just a “casual comment.” Had the ONI been up to
its old tricks again? – The answer to this question is unknown.
From this point on, the army and navy cryptologists succeeded in breaking every code the
Japanese had. Admiral Chester Nimitz consequently had a very good intelligence “picture” of
the Japanese forces arrayed against him. However, holes occasionally appeared that required
some clever counter-intelligence methods to fill. Consider the method used by Fleet Radio Unit,
Pacific (FRUPAC) to confirm the Midway invasion. In this case, the radio intercept stations had
determined that a sizable Japanese fleet would be assaulting “AF”. Since the “AF” location
code was unconfirmed (suspected as Midway), a fake message was sent in the clear regarding a
water shortage on Midway. The Japanese snapped up the bait and immediately transmitted a
message to their fleet that there was a water shortage on AF and coordinated water ships to be
included in the invasion force, thus confirming “AF” as Midway.
Another method of deciphering the enemy’s codes is to gain copies of their codebooks.
The American navy actively pursued the acquisition of current codebooks from ships that were
being sunk in the Pacific. Sometimes these efforts proved to be fruitful, other times not:
“…the I-124 had been encircled and sunk off Port Darwin, at dusk on January 20, [1942]
by an American destroyer and three corvettes of the Australian navy. At the site of the
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sinking the sea was only 40 feet deep, with clear waters free from strong tidal currents,
and the U.S. navy immediately sent divers down from a submarine tender to cut open I124’s hull and bring up any important documents found inside. The documents thus
recovered included a number of navy codebooks, among them the merchant vessel
codebook.” (Agawa 1979, 307)
“The code books retrieved from the I-1 that was sunk by the New Zealand corvettes,
Kiwi and Moa, did not contain a current version of JN-25… The JN-25 codebook
retrieved was a superseded version. I was involved in that operation and saw the books
myself.” (Jacobsen 2004, 1)
On 14 April 1943, an intercept was made near simultaneously by Fleet Radio Units
Melbourne (FRUMEL), FRUPAC and Negat (US cryptanalysis unit, Washington D.C.)
concerning Admiral Yamamoto’s itinerary. Specifically, the message detailed a visit from
Rabaul in New Ireland to Ballale Island, departing at 0600 and arriving at 0800, Tokyo time on
18 April. He would be traveling in a medium-attack aircraft, under a six-fighter escort.
Intelligence sources had indicated that Yamamoto was very stringent on maintaining his
timeline. This fact was key to the success of the mission – it alone guaranteed a precise schedule
by which to plan. Furthermore, the “medium-attack plane” specified, had known cruise
parameters and therefore a very precise intercept could be planned and executed. Lanphier
explains:
“… the Admiral would be riding in a fast … bomber and that his flying speed therefore
would average between three and a half and four miles a minute. We estimated his
altitude would be somewhere under 10,000 feet--anything higher than that would have
forced him to wear an oxygen mask, a most uncomfortable gadget even when necessary.”
(Lanphier 1945, 4)
Presumably, the Air Order of Battle (AOB) was known at Rabaul, and therefore
intelligence could assess that “Bettys” would be used. Interestingly, Yamamoto was the head of
the Aeronautics Department when the Betty bomber and Zero fighter were developed (Agawa
1979, 105). These aircraft had been developed from some of his ideas, and perhaps these aircraft
had been selected to honor him.
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One factor that must always be considered when utilizing intelligence is whether or not
the mission is important enough to potentially compromise the future use of that intelligence
source. In the case of Yamamoto, Admiral Nimitz felt that given there was no good replacement
for Yamamoto, the Japanese navy could theoretically be thrown into a state of confusion by his
loss. In the end, he felt the risk was outweighed by the gain, but he felt that all efforts must be
made to make the operation appear fortuitous in nature, preventing the Japanese from becoming
suspicious.
Only one element remained to be filled in the equation – capable shooters. Those
shooters were found in the 339th Fighter Squadron, commanded by Major John W. Mitchell.
The Mission
Once the intelligence required for the intercept was in the hands of Maj. Mitchell, he was
able to plan a workable flight path to the target area. The basic idea behind the route’s selection
was to minimize the chances of detection by coastal watcher stations (known today as visual
observer posts) and radar stations. Consequently, Maj. Mitchell planned a route over water,
mostly beyond visual range of land, at extremely low altitude. This required very precise deadreckoning navigation by Mitchell, aided by a specially installed naval compass in his aircraft and
long-range fuel tanks on all of the flight’s P-38’s.
Mitchell initially planned to have 18 P-38’s perform the intercept, but two aircraft had to
abort for faulty fuel tanks. He decided to proceed with the remaining sixteen aircraft, still having
a reasonable assurance of success. After all, he had a two-to-one numerical superiority over the
target formation, compiled of six Zeros and two Bettys. However, this superiority would
disappear in a flash if the large masses of Zeros scrambled out of Kahili airbase on the eastern
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side of Bougainville Island, just a few minutes away from the planned intercept site. Thus,
Mitchell had to “tread” carefully when approaching the target area to prevent alerting the enemy.
NEW IRELAND
N
RABAUL
NEW BRITAIN
YA
M
AM
OT
O
FL
IG
HT
BOUGAINVILLE
SOLOMON ISLANDS
PA
TH
BUIN
SOLOMON SEA
CHOISEUL
BALALLE IS.
33
9th
FI
GH
TE
R
SQ
UA
DR
ON
FL
IG
HT
TH SANTA ISABEL
E“
SL
OT
”
PA
TH
HENDERSON FIELD
GUADALCANAL
Fig. 2. Map of the Solomon Islands and the Flight Routes.
Once the mission was underway, Mitchell’s navigation was flawless. Just as the P-38’s
were approaching Bougainville on their last navigation leg, 1st Lt. Douglas Canning spotted
“bogey” aircraft at the 11 o’clock position, placing them very nearly to the point where they
should be, given the tight schedule that they were held to by the Admiral. In order to position
the “cover flight” correctly, Maj Mitchell initiated a climb and cleared the “killer flight” in to do
their work. All aircraft in the cover flight punched off their external fuel tanks to both make the
aircraft more maneuverable (lighter), faster (less drag) and safer (no volatile fuel containers
12
hanging outside of the airplane). The killer flight attempted to do the same, but one of the
aircraft, piloted by Lt Besby Holmes was having trouble getting rid of his external fuel tanks.
Consequently, he and his wingman, Lt Raymond Hine broke away from the lead element of
Capt. Lanphier and Lt. Barber while they attempted to rid themselves of the troublesome fuel
tanks. This left two P-38s to destroy the two Betty bombers, while trying to avoid the Zero
fighters.
Given that the intercept geometry was not a perfect “cutoff” course, Capt Lanphier added
power, turned to the right and began to climb in order to achieve a more favorable position to
intercept the Japanese aircraft. Surprisingly, the Japanese aircraft did not see the P-38s stalking
them until it was too late. Warrant Officer Kenji Yanagiya indicated, “…that he and the other
Zero pilots were delayed in seeing the Americans begin their attack because they were
accustomed to looking skyward. They did not think the P-38s would be climbing from a lower
altitude. Aircraft flying over the jungle are harder to spot from above.” (Glines 1990, 97)
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BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND
N
3
BUIN AIRBASE
2
4
5
MOILA POINT
BALALLE
1
Figure 3. A Broad Overview of the Intercept.
Notes:
1. The cover and killer flights split.
2. Lanphier and Barber press in while Holmes and Hine pull away to troubleshoot
Holmes aircraft.
3. Lanphier and Barber engage.
4. Homes and Hine enter the fight and engage the Zeros chasing Barber.
5. Mitchell and three others engage the Zeros chasing Lanphier.
Lanphier realized that he was too far behind to turn behind the bombers (which were
leading the formation) and still have a good shot. Barber, being on his right, was closer and thus
better able to get to the target. The Betty bombers, realizing they were under attack, began to
dive and turn in opposite directions in order to evade the attacking aircraft. Lanphier
courageously turned his aircraft into the face of a diving three-ship element of the cover fighters
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and fired his guns. He did so with the intent of tying them up long enough to allow Barber to
attack the bombers. This is the key event to deducing the outcome of the intercept and is agreed
upon by both Lanphier and Barber. At this moment, Lanphier unknowingly forfeited his chance
to destroy the lead aircraft, which was carrying Yamamoto. The basic reason for this is that he
was now heading away from the target aircraft and slowing down as he climbed to meet the
attacking Japanese Zeros. Lanphier then stated that when he fired his guns at the Zeros, he
destroyed one of them. He then said that he pulled his aircraft over in a loop and dived for the
deck, gaining significant speed. As he was diving, he claims to have seen a Betty bomber
heading south at low altitude and that he fired at it, blowing it’s wing off and causing it to crash
in the jungle. Barber made a statement that encapsulates this dubious testimony:
“We were miles down the track by the time he reached the top of his climb after passing
the Zero. There was no possible way that he could have gotten around and back to that
bomber before it crashed. He was going the other way. The bombers were going as fast
as they could to get away.” (Glines 1990, 204)
No one can validate Lanphier’s claim against the Zero on the American side because no
one else witnessed the event, nor were there gun cameras installed in the P-38’s. Furthermore,
Yanagiya, the last remaining pilot of the Zero cover flight, stated that all of the Zeros survived
the engagement, although the other five pilots were later killed in the war. More damning
evidence is provided when Lanphier later calls over the radio that “he is bracketed by three
Zeros.” This radio call is confirmed by testimony from multiple members of the squadron. As
these are the same three aircraft that originally attacked him, he has unwittingly admitted that he
did not destroy the Zero as claimed and has thus begun to erode his own credibility.
Additionally, his statement about destroying the lead Betty bomber is also false,
especially when considering the previously mentioned kinematics of his aircraft and the lead
aircraft. Other indicators of his false claim exist. Ground parties that visited the crash site later
15
describe the position of the wings as being in close proximity to the fuselage, indicating they
came off only when it hit the ground. The following combat experience of Major Louis J. Kittel
(a member of the cover flight), helps illustrates this hole in Lanphier’s story:
“During my career down there [South Pacific], I had three different occasions to shoot
down Bettys. In each case, I had to close from the rear to point-blank range before an
explosion would occur. On one of those occasions, the Betty was contacted while I was
flying on the deck. It walked up to 320 mph and only because I had altitude to convert to
speed could I gain the speed to overtake it.” (Glines p. 83).
This statement is important for several reasons. First, it implies that the Betty bomber
was difficult to destroy unless the attacking aircraft closed to short ranges and “hammered” it
continuously. Second, it implies that the Betty bomber was relatively fast and as a result, factors
against Lanphier’s account in which he was able to perform a 360-degree turning climb, engage
a Zero, and then perform a diving turn to engage an aircraft that was heading away from him.
Lanphier did take a shot at a passing Betty, but it was the second (staff) aircraft in the flight.
Still, he was not credited with that aircraft because Holmes and Barber eventually destroyed it.
How did Lanphier have the opportunity to shoot at the second aircraft? It had turned to the north
in an attempt to evade the attacking P-38’s, but then eventually turned back south. This dwell
time in the engagement area allowed Lanphier to complete his climbing attack, reverse course
and then take a passing shot at the second aircraft. Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki, chief of staff of
the combined fleet describes this action in his diary:
“My own plane swung sharply into a 90-degree turn…Our plane separated from the lead
bomber [this implies a left hand turn away from the lead aircraft]. For a few moments, I
lost sight of Yamamoto’s plane and finally located the Betty far to the right. [The left
turn away is now validated, placing the lead aircraft aft and right of the second Betty]. I
was horrified to see the airplane flying slowly above the jungle, heading to the south…
four miles away from us…” (Glines 1990. 100)
Biographer Agawa provides the details on what Ugaki did next:
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“Ugaki then ordered air staff officer [Commander] Muroi, who was standing in the
gangway, to keep an eye on the C. in C.’s plane, then turning to the pilot shouted,
“Follow plane No.1! Follow plane No.1!” (Agawa 1979, 351).
If the pilot did so, he would have probably turned right, back toward the aircraft that he
had just turned left/away from. However, the accounts of what the pilot actually did are unclear,
but apparently a series of turns was accomplished. Ugaki then states:
“I caught a last glimpse myself [of Yamamoto’s plane], an eternal farewell to this
beloved officer, before our plane swung sharply over in a steep turn. Tracers flashed by
our wings, and the pilot desperately maneuvered to evade the pursuing fighter plane. I
waited impatiently for the airplane to return to the horizontal position, so I could observe
the admiral’s bomber…Yamamoto’s plane was no longer in sight. Black smoke boiled
from the dense jungle below.” (Glines 1990, 100)
This is important, because it illustrates that while Ugaki’s plane is being fired upon by
another P-38, Yamamoto’s plane crashes. By process of elimination, Lanphier, in the only other
P-38 around, fired at Ugaki’s plane while Yamamoto’s is crashing in the jungle. Ugaki then
states:
“Even as I stared at the funeral pyre of the crashed bomber, our own plane straightened
out from its frantic maneuvering and at full speed, raced toward Moila Point. Shortly we
were over the open sea.” (Glines 1990, 100)
This is an important detail, because by the time Holmes and Barber take a shot at him, he
is over the water and both Barber and Holmes have confirmed this. Therefore, the tracers
mentioned above can only be the fire of Lanphier and consequently he could not have destroyed
the aircraft carrying Yamamoto. Furthermore, he failed to destroy the aircraft carrying Ugaki.
Why did Lanphier miss? High deflection gunshots are notoriously difficult, especially when
rushed because they demand a precise lead of the target aircraft. As Lanphier is actively being
pursued by three Zeros, he is harried in his shooting and elects to break off from the bomber and
“shake” the Zeros at low altitude.
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Fig. 4. An Illustration of High- and Low-Deflection Gunnery.
Notes: The diagram on the left approximates what Lanphier would have seen while diving on
the Betty from above. He would have had to apply significant lead to the target in order to hit it
due to the high crossing rate. The tracers are not appearing to curve because they were fired in a
burst while Lanphier was diving straight ahead. This would explain why the fire as witnessed by
Ugaki was only momentary in nature. The figure on the right represents the relative ease with
which Barber would have had in attacking the lead Betty as it headed south toward the water.
When Lanphier made his courageous break into the descending fighters, Rex Barber
turned right in behind the lead bomber and began to pour fire into the right engine and forward
fuselage of the lead bomber. He lost sight with the second bomber, which turned away from him
to the north. Just as Kittel describes above, Barber closes with the bomber and rakes it with fire
from directly behind. Barber continues to close with the bomber until it snaps left and he nearly
collides with the right wing as it flips over. The Betty pilot struggled to level the aircraft, but
was unable to so satisfactorily and the aircraft crashes in the jungle.
18
6
Figure 5. Author’s Reconstruction of the Yamamoto Shootdown.
Notes:
1. Lanphier breaks into the descending 3-ship of Japanese Zeros.
2. Barber breaks behind the lead bomber and begins to fire. The second aircraft breaks
away to the north.
3. Lanphier claims to destroy one of the Zeros.
4. The second Betty bomber turns back toward the lead aircraft.
5. Lanphier fires at the second Betty bomber after completing his loop while the second
aircraft is heading out to sea, but misses.
6. Lanphier calls “bracketed” by three Zeros.
Post Mission
The remainder of the battle saw the second bomber shot down by Barber and Holmes.
Mitchell hears the call that Lanphier is “bracketed by three Zeros” and turns north to chase them
away. Hines’ aircraft is badly damaged by fire from a Japanese Zero and is never seen again.
19
He is reported as Missing In Action (MIA) and 30 days later is assumed to be dead. Eventually,
all of the remaining 15 aircraft recover safely to Henderson Field.
When Lanphier landed back at Henderson, he immediately claimed he had shot down
Yamamoto. This started a controversy that has survived to this day. Initially, no one knew for
sure that Yamamoto had been in the aircraft shot down in the jungle. No one could confirm that
Yamamoto had even been on the aircraft until a Japanese radio announcer released the message
several weeks later on 7 May 1943. Furthermore, based on the original claims by Barber,
Holmes and Lanphier, it was originally assessed that there were three Betty bombers. As the
historical record clearly shows, there were only two.
Furthermore, no intelligence debriefing was conducted post-mission. If accomplished,
the early reports may have been more accurate and the controversy may have died an early death.
Contrary to the popular opinion of footage vendors on the Internet, no gun-camera footage was
available for debrief because as stated before, no gun cameras were installed on the aircraft.
Unfortunately, Lanphier wrote the post-mission report and thus it is slanted in his favor.
Lanphier also wrote the citations for the Medal of Honor for the killer flight members and
Mitchell, all without consulting them. Talk of the events reached the media before approval was
obtained through public affairs channels. Admiral “Bull” Halsey, in anger over the premature
release of the mission results to the public, later downgraded the flight’s Medals of Honor to
Navy Crosses.
The Japanese doctor’s autopsy on Yamamoto indicated he had been hit twice – once in
the lower left jaw (exit wound at bottom of right eye) and in the center of the left shoulder blade.
These wounds were determined to be immediately fatal and inflicted from behind. These results
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were not known until after the war, but clearly indicate that only Barber could have killed
Yamamoto.
The Japanese began to be suspicious that their codes had been broken. Admiral Kusaka
Jin’ichi, commander in chief of the Southeast Area Fleet, had previously wondered if the codes
had been compromised. He sent a message to the Fourth Division of the Naval General staff –
those who were responsible for the writing and distribution of the naval codes – and urged them
to exercise greater care in their use of the coded materials. Institutional pride probably prevented
them from abandoning their materials in use at the time, and as such, contributed to the eventual
fall of the empire. Ultimately, the event was chalked up to unfortunate circumstance.
Lessons Learned
Several lessons can be drawn from this case study for use in a future application of
airpower to kill enemy leadership.
Quality intelligence is key to the success of the mission. This intelligence is only
acquired the hard way, through a concerted buildup of capability over years if not decades. The
intelligence capability that lent success to this mission had been cultivated for 20 years and had
to be continually cultivated to keep it current. If America is to have such intelligence coups in
the future, more work will have to be accomplished in establishing firm roots of intelligence
capability, then building them into vast networks.
Operational Security (OPSEC) will also be paramount to the success of such missions in
the future. OPSEC can be maintained through a multitude of means, including limiting the
number of personnel involved in the operation, solid encryption methods/practices and short
planning cycles. The short planning cycle is a must because if effectively incorporated, it allows
a friendly force to get inside the decision cycle of an enemy force and thus retain surprise.
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Lastly, the mission must be entrusted to most qualified operators to get it done. In the
case of the Yamamoto mission, once the “brass” got out of the way and allowed the shooters to
plan the hit, the mission concept evolved rapidly. Furthermore, the operators need the
appropriate equipment to complete the task and few questions should be asked if the mission is
important enough to justify additional cost. The P-38 with the larger wing tanks and the special
compass were exactly what was needed to accomplish the Yamamoto shootdown. These
enhancements were made exactly as specified and thus the operators were given the maximum
chance of success.
Conclusion
The Yamamoto shootdown very clearly illustrated what an integrated intelligence and
operator community can accomplish if given all of the conditions for success. The keys to this
operation were precise intelligence, good security and expert planning/execution, and are still
applicable today. Unfortunately, a major detractor to the mission stemmed from Lanphier’s
grossly exaggerated account. His poor judgment prevented Barber from getting the credit he was
due for many years to follow. By nature of the fact that the controversy still lives, Rex Barber
has never received his full measure of recognition. In one instant, Lanphier was a national hero
for pulling up into the approaching Zeros and allowing his wingman to destroy the bombers.
However, this image became tarnished when he decided to falsify his account about the
engagement in hopes of furthering his career.
This essay clearly shows that Lanphier could never have destroyed Yamamoto’s aircraft.
That honor belongs solely to one Rex Barber.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agawa, Hiroyuki. The Reluctant Admiral. Kondansha International, 1979.
Glines, Carroll V. Attack on Yamamoto. Orion Books, 1990.
Hosmer, Stephen T. RAND Report MR-1385-AF, Operations Against Enemy Leaders. RAND
Publishing, 2001. www.rand.org.
Jacobsen, Philip H. Message Board Posting - Six Fiction’s [sic] in the History Channel’s
“Yamamoto”, 27 Mar 2004.
http://boards.historychannel.com/thread.jspa?threadID=300009185&messageID=300101017
Lanphier, Thomas G. Jr, Lt Col., USAAF, six-part article, North American Newspaper Alliance,
12-17 Sept 1945.
Lanphier, Thomas G. Jr, Col. USAF (Ret.), I Shot Down Yamamoto, Reader’s Digest
Association, 1966.
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