2. [ G.R. No. 227147. July 30, 2018 ]
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ALFONSO O.
PINEDA, JR., AND JOSEPHINE C. PINEDA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 (RTC), through a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the Amended Order[1] dated July 21, 2016 and the Order[2] dated September
1, 2016 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM which dismissed petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.'s
(petitioner) complaint for sum of money against respondents Alfonso O. Pineda, Jr. and Josephine C. Pineda
(respondents) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
In its Complaint[3] dated October 12, 2015, petitioner alleged that on October 23, 2014, it extended a loan to
respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note,[4] in the amount of P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal monthly
installments of P23,242.00, which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage [5] constituted on a vehicle owned by
respondents. Notably, the Promissory Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this
Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital Judicial Region or in any place
where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole option." [6] Due to respondents' default,
petitioner demanded payment of the whole remaining balance of the loan, which stood at P510,132.00 as of June 8,
2015, excluding penalty charges. As the demand went unheeded, petitioner filed the instant suit for sum of money
and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC, further alleging that it has a branch in San
Mateo, Rizal.[7]
The RTC Proceedings
In an Order[8] dated March 28, 2016, the RTC issued a Writ of Replevin, due to respondents' continued failure to pay
their monetary obligations to petitioner and/or surrender their vehicle subject of the Chattel Mortgage.
However, in an Amended Order[9] dated July 21, 2016, the RTC recalled the Writ of Replevin and ordered the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that since: (a) petitioner's
principal place of business is in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila; and (b) respondents' residence is in Porac,
Pampanga, it has no jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants, warranting the dismissal of the complaint. [10]
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] which was, however, denied in an Order[12] dated September 1,
2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
"Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In addition to being
conferred by the· Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of
the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted." [13] This is
markedly different from the concept of venue, which only pertains to the place or geographical location where a case
is filed. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc., [14] the Court exhaustively differentiated
these concepts, to wit:
Petitioner confuses the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. In City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority:
On the one hand, jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the court or
tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought. Objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived and
may be brought at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a court which has no
jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.
On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at the
earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the objection shall be deemed waived.
When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.
Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive
law, while venue is a matter ofprocedurallaw.[15]
In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for, inter alia, sum of money involving the amount of P510,132.00. Pursuant
to Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,[16] as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7691,[17] the RTC irrefragably has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. Thus, it erred in dismissing petitioner's
complaint on the ground of its purported lack of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue which, as already discussed, are not synonymous
with each other. Even assuming arguendo that the RTC correctly pertained to venue, it still committed grave error in
dismissing petitioner's complaint, as will be explained hereunder.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Venue of real actions. – Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. – If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
In Briones v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court succinctly discussed the rule on venue, including the import of restrictive
stipulations on venue:
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court
which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception,
jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. [(581 Phil. 381, 386 [2008])] instructs that the parties, thru a written
instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict
the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of
the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only
in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place
agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment
of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such
stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this
purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or
words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place.[19] (Emphases and underscoring in the original)
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject Promissory Note – which reads "[a]ny action to enforce
payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital
Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, a[t] its sole
option"[20] – is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising
therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any place where petitioner has a
branch/office. In light of petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue
has been properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on.
Finally, even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu
proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Without any objection at the earliest opportunity, as in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived. [21] The Court's ruling in Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.
v. Nolasco[22] is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the Courts of First Instance (now RTC),
may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to
dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a
decision to be rendered, be cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the
wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly
said to have been improperlv laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically
wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules onvenue had been devised. The
trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case.[23] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In sum, the RTC erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's complaint before it. As such, the complaint must be
reinstated, and thereafter, remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Order dated July 21, 2016 and the Order dated September
1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM is REINSTATED and REMANDED to
the RTC for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 180064
September 16, 2013
JOSE U. PUA and BENJAMIN HANBEN U. PUA, Petitioners, vs. CITIBANK, N. A., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 21, 2007 and
Resolution3 dated October 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79297, which
reversed and set aside the Orders dated May 14, 20034 and July 16, 20035 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 19 (RTC), dismissing petitioners Jose(Jose) and Benjamin
Hanben U. Pua's (petitioners) complaint against respondent Citibank, N. A. (respondent).
The Facts
On December 2, 2002, petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint6 for declaration of nullity of
contract and sums of money with damages against respondent,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 191159.8 In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they had been depositors of Citibank Binondo
Branch (Citibank Binondo) since 1996. Sometime in 1999, Guada Ang, Citibank Binondo’s Branch
Manager, invited Jose to a dinner party at the Manila Hotel where he was introduced to several
officers and employees of Citibank Hongkong Branch (Citibank Hongkong).9 A few months after,
Chingyee Yau (Yau), Vice-President of Citibank Hongkong, came to the Philippines to sell securities
to Jose. They averred that Yau required Jose to open an account with Citibank Hongkong as it is
one of the conditions for the sale of the aforementioned securities.10 After opening such account,
Yau offered and sold to petitioners numerous securities11 issued by various public limited companies
established in Jersey, Channel I sands. The offer, sale, and signing of the subscription agreements
of said securities were all made and perfected at Citibank Binondo in the presence of its officers and
employees.12 Later on, petitioners discovered that the securities sold to them were not registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)and that the terms and conditions covering the
subscription were not likewise submitted to the SEC for evaluation, approval, and
registration.13 Asserting that respondent’s actions are in violation of Republic Act No.8799, entitled
the "Securities Regulation Code" (SRC), they assailed the validity of the subscription agreements
and the terms and conditions thereof for being contrary to law and/or public policy.14
For its part, respondent filed a motion to dismiss15 alleging, inter alia, that petitioners’ complaint
should be dismissed outright for violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It pointed out that the
merits of the case would largely depend on the issue of whether or not there was a violation of the
SRC, in particular, whether or not there was a sale of unregistered securities. In this regard,
respondent contended that the SRC conferred upon the SEC jurisdiction to investigate compliance
with its provisions and thus, petitioners’ complaint should be first filed with the SEC and not directly
before the RTC.16
Petitioners opposed17 respondent’s motion to dismiss, maintaining that the RTC has jurisdiction over
their complaint. They asserted that Section 63of the SRC expressly provides that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all suits to recover damages pursuant to Sections 56 to 61
of the same law.18
The RTC Ruling
In an Order19 dated May 14, 2003, the RTC denied respondent’s motion to dismiss. It noted that
petitioners’ complaint is for declaration of nullity of contract and sums of money with damages and,
as such, it has jurisdiction to hear and decide upon the case even if it involves the alleged sale of
securities. It ratiocinated that the legal questions or issues arising from petitioners’ causes of action
against respondent are more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to
resolve.20
Respondent filed an omnibus motion21 praying, among others, for there consideration of the
aforesaid ruling, which petitioners, in turn, opposed.22 In an Order23 dated July 16, 2003, the RTC
denied respondent’s omnibus motion with respect to its prayer for reconsideration. Dissatisfied,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.24
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated May 21, 2007, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s Orders and dismissed
petitioners’ complaint for violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The CA agreed with
respondent’s contention that since the case would largely depend on the issue of whether or not the
latter violated the provisions of the SRC, the matter is within the special competence or knowledge
of the SEC. Citing the case of Baviera v. Paglinawan26 (Baviera), the CA opined that all complaints
involving violations of the SRC should be first filed before the SEC.27
Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution29 dated October 16, 2007.Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not petitioners’ action falls within the primary
jurisdiction of the SEC.
Petitioners reiterate their original position that the SRC itself provides that civil cases for damages
arising from violations of the same law fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts.30
On the contrary, respondent maintains that since petitioners’ complaint would necessarily touch on
the issue of whether or not the former violated certain provisions of the SRC, then the said complaint
should have been first filed with the SEC which has the technical competence to resolve such
dispute.31
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court observes that respondent erroneously relied on the Baviera ruling to support
its position that all complaints involving purported violations of the SRC should be first referred to the
SEC. A careful reading of the Baviera case would reveal that the same involves a criminal
prosecution of a purported violator of the SRC, and not a civil suit such as the case at bar. The
pertinent portions of the Baviera ruling thus read:
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it
must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a
special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC.
Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should
be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint
to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he
filed his criminal complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be
ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.32 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Records show that petitioners’ complaint constitutes a civil suit for declaration of nullity of contract
and sums of money with damages, which stemmed from respondent’s alleged sale of unregistered
securities, in violation of the various provisions of the SRC and not a criminal case such as that
involved in Baviera.
In this light, when the Court ruled in Baviera that "all complaints for any violation of the [SRC] x x x
should be filed with the SEC,"33 it should be construed as to apply only to criminal and not to civil
suits such as petitioners’ complaint.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule in procedural law that jurisdiction is conferred by law;34 it cannot
be inferred but must be explicitly stated therein. Thus, when Congress confers exclusive jurisdiction
to a judicial or quasi-judicial entity over certain matters by law, this, absent any other indication to the
contrary, evinces its intent to exclude other bodies from exercising the same.
It is apparent that the SRC provisions governing criminal suits are separate and distinct from those
which pertain to civil suits. On the one hand, Section 53 of the SRC governs criminal suits involving
violations of the said law, viz.:
SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses. –
53.1. The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary to
determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Code, any rule,
regulation or order thereunder, or any rule of an Exchange, registered securities association,
clearing agency, other self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person to file with
it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts
and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission may publish
information concerning any such violations, and to investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter
which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this Code, in
the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing information to serve as a basis for
recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this Code relates: Provided,
however, That any person requested or subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any
investigation shall simultaneously be notified in writing of the purpose of such investigation:
Provided, further, That all criminal complaints for violations of this Code, and the implementing rules
and regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be referred to the Department of
Justice for preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court:
Provided, furthermore, That in instances where the law allows independent civil or criminal
proceedings of violations arising from the same act, the Commission shall take appropriate action to
implement the same: Provided, finally, That the investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases
shall be given priority.
On the other hand, Sections 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 of the SRC pertain to civil suits
involving violations of the same law. Among these, the applicable provisions to this case are
Sections 57.1 and 63.1 of the SRC which provide:
SEC. 57. Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection With Prospectus, Communications and Reports.
– 57.1. Any person who:
(a) Offers to sell or sells a security in violation of Chapter III;
or
(b) Offers to sell or sells a security, whether or not exempted by the provisions of this Code,
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication, by means of a
prospectus or other written or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall fail in the burden of proof that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security.
xxxx
SEC. 63. Amount of Damages to be Awarded. – 63.1. All suits to recover damages pursuant to
Sections 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61 shall be brought before the Regional Trial Court which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide such suits. The Court is hereby authorized to award
damages in an amount not exceeding triple the amount of the transaction plus actual damages.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57of the SRC, which pertain to
civil liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as
well as other civil suits under Sections 56, 58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought
before the regional trial courts. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the term "shall" is
a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and
it is generally imperative or mandatory.35 Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of
similar import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that
criminal cases arising from violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.
1âwphi 1
Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC
are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first
filed before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction.
All told, petitioners' filing of a civil suit against respondent for purported violations of the SRC was
properly filed directly before the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated May 21,
2007 and Resolution dated October 16,2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79297 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let Civil Case No. 19-1159 be REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 19 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendantappellant.
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant Manila Surety
and Fidelity Company, Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No.
R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a
writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some
admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim.
This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after
the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against
which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under
the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for
execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein
bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this
motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the
Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the
counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's
counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to
file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without
the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the
Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and
from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed
as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the
ones covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by
holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance
with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the
herein bonding company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution
filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent motion for
reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction,
neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided
the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion
asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a
pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a
month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had
already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand
does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the
Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963
the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.
Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify
the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of
money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the
complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect,
depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one which
merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case
therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse
decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of
consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia
de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs.
Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano,
et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein
the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants
submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking
it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over
"all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this
case to the Supreme Court.
1äw phï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the
record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an
amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was
commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth —
We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour
for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy
spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond
for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 1519). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the
pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin,
46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a
written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief —
that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its
opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety
appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This
motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss
mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining
the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subjectmatter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that
it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter
to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court
of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of
a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al.,
G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb.
26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the
law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case
since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary
once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection
of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The
attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the
filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs
moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the
surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was "no showing that a demand had
been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under
the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the
judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion
dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of
hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion
and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel
asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued
in open court, as follows:
1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his
answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957
of the plaintiffs, after which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
6.
G.R. No. 189626. August 20, 2018 ]
GREGORIO AMOGUIS TITO AMOGUIS, PETITIONERS, VS. CONCEPCION
BALLADO AND MARY GRACE BALLADO LEDESMA, AND ST. JOSEPH REALTY,
LTD. RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint is conferred by law. It cannot be lost through waiver or estoppel. It
can be raised at any time in the proceedings, whether during trial or on appeal. [1] The edict in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy[2] is not an exception to the rule on jurisdiction. A court that does not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case will not acquire jurisdiction because of estoppel.[3] Rather, the edict in Tijam must be appreciated as
a waiver of a party's right to raise jurisdiction based on the doctrine of equity. It is only when the circumstances
in Tijam are present that a waiver or an estoppel in questioning jurisdiction is appreciated.[4]
The unique circumstances in Tijam are present in this case. Indeed, as the petitioners in this case belatedly argue,
the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. However, under the
doctrine in Tijam, petitioners cannot now raise lack of jurisdiction as they have waived their right to do so. Estoppel by
laches has set in. Petitioners did not question the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court during trial and on appeal. It
is only before this Court, 22 long years after the Complaint was filed, that petitioners raised the Regional Trial Court's
lack of jurisdiction.
On November 24, 1969, Francisco Ballado (Francisco) and Concepcion Ballado (Concepcion) (collectively, the
Ballado Spouses) entered into Contract Nos. 5(M)[5] and 6(M)[6] with owner and developer St. Joseph Realty, Ltd. (St.
Joseph Realty) to buy on installment parcels of land, which were designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and were located in
Block No. 1, Dadiangas Heights Subdivision, General Santos City. Lot No. 1 had an area of 411 square meters, and
Lot No. 2 covered 402 square meters.[7] The Ballado Spouses initially paid a total of P500.00 for the lots, and had to
pay P107.13[8] and P97.15[9] per month for Lot Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, both for 180 months starting on December
30, 1969.[10]
St. Joseph Realty characterized the contracts as contracts to sell[11] and provided for automatic rescission and
cancellation, thus:
3) This contract shall be considered automatically rescinded and cancelled and no further force and effect, upon
failure of the VENDEE to pay when due, three (3) consecutive monthly installments or to comply with any of the terms
and conditions hereof, in which case the VENDORS shall have the right to resell the said parcel of land to any person
or purchaser, as if this contract has never been entered into. In such a case[,] as cancellation of this contract, all the
amounts paid in accordance with the agreement together with all the improvements made on the premises shall be
considered as rents paid for the use and occupation of the above mentioned premises and as payment for the
damages suffered for the failure of the VENDEE to fulfill his/her part of this agreement and the buyer hereby
renounces his/her right to demand or reclaim the return of the same and obliges himself/herself to peacefully vacate
the premises and deliver the same to the VENDORS.[12]
The Ballado Spouses amortized until 1979 when Crisanto Pinili (Pinili), St. Joseph Realty's collector, refused to
receive their payments. They erected a small house made of light materials for their caretaker. Pinili informed them
that it was an eyesore and was against the rules of the subdivision. He advised to suspend the payment for the lots,
and directed the Ballado Spouses to remove the small house before payments could continue. He also promised to
return and collect after he had put their records in order, but he never did. Francisco informed St. Joseph Realty that
the small house had already been taken down, but Pinili still did not come to collect.[13]
On February 17, 1987, the Ballado Spouses discovered that St. Joseph Realty rescinded their contracts. [14] They
found out that St. Joseph Realty had sent written demands to pay to the address of Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and not to their
residence as declared in the contracts.[15] They were only able to receive the last letter dated December 31, 1986 in
January 1987 as it had their home address handwritten beside the typewritten address of the lots. [16]
Concepcion immediately wrote St. Joseph Realty to ask for reconsideration. She enclosed a check for their remaining
balance worth P30,000.00. She was the payee of the check issued by her employer, P. I. Enterprises. She borrowed
money from P. I. Enterprises and indorsed the check in favor of St. Joseph Realty. After six (6) months, St. Joseph
Realty returned the check to the Ballado Spouses. St. Joseph Realty claimed that it only inadvertently received the
check.[17]
Meanwhile, on February 9, 1987, St. Joseph Realty sold Lot Nos. 1 and 2 to Epifanio Amoguis (Epifanio),[18] father of
Gregorio Amoguis (Gregorio) and Tito Amoguis (Tito) (collectively, the Amoguis Brothers). [19] Epifanio paid
P56,280.00 for one lot and P52,650.00 for the other.[20] The Amoguis Brothers then occupied the lots.[21] On August
18, 1987, titles were issued in the Amoguis Brothers' names. [22]
Francisco confronted the Amoguis Brothers when he saw that the barbed fences, which he had installed around the
lots, were taken down. Epifanio told him that he bought the lots from St. Joseph Realty. Thereafter, the Amoguis
Brothers took down Francisco's mango and chico trees.[23]
Compelled by these events, the Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for damages, injunction with writ of preliminary
injunction, mandatory injunction, cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney's fees on December 23,
1987.[24] They also prayed for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Amoguis Brothers from erecting walls
around the lots.[25]
St. Joseph Realty filed its Answer.[26] It was its affirmative defense that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to
hear the case, and that jurisdiction was properly vested in the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. [27] The
Amoguis Brothers, on the other hand, filed their Answer with Cross-Claim against St. Joseph Realty, and
Counterclaim against the Ballado Spouses.[28] The parties did not reach an amicable settlement. The case was
archived in 1989 without prejudice, pending the submission of a settlement by the parties. Five (5) years later, on
April 8, 1994, the case was revived upon motion by the Ballado Spouses. [29]
After numerous postponements, on February 7, 1996, the Ballado Spouses were finally able to present their evidence
in chief.[30] They testified and presented their evidence, among which were receipts to prove payments of
installments, original copies of the contracts, the transmittal letter of the P30,000.00 check to St. Joseph Realty, and
the check. They also presented St. Joseph Realty's rescission letter with its envelope, addressed to the lots and not
to their residence, bearing "first attempt, cannot be located," "second attempt, cannot be located," and "third attempt,
cannot be located" written on it.[31]
Finally, they presented as evidence Concepcion's February 21, 1987 reply letter asking for her remaining
payables,[32] St. Joseph Realty's letter acknowledging receipt of Concepcion's February 21, 1987 letter, documents of
sale of the lands from St. Joseph Realty to the Amoguis Brothers, and Concepcion's September 12, 1987 letter to St.
Joseph Realty, proving that she did not know that the lands had already been sold to and titled under the names of
the Amoguis Brothers in August 1987.[33]
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado Spouses, and against St. Joseph Realty and the Amoguis
Brothers:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs, ordering 1. Defendant St. Joseph to receive the sum of P30,000.00 from plaintiffs to fully pay the two residential lots;
2. To execute registrable deeds of sale in favor of plaintiffs over the two parcels of land;
3. To pay plaintiffs a. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
b. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P30,000.00 in concept of attorney's fees;
d. and the cost of suit.
4. Declaring Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25862 and T-29295 in the names of Gregorio Amoguis and Tito
Amoguis, respectively, NULL and VOID, and ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel Sciid titles;
5. Ordering St. Joseph to refund the Amoguises the total sum of P108,730.00 with interest at 6% per annum from
February 1987 until fully paid; and
6. Ordering the Amoguises to remove all their improvements from the land, to vacate the same and deliver
possession thereof to plaintiffs upon presentation of new certificates of title in their names.
SO ORDERED.[34]
Based on the preponderance of evidence, the Regional Trial Court concluded that the Ballado Spouses proved their
desire to complete their payment, and that it was Pinili who refused to receive their payment because of the small
house erected on the lands for their caretaker. It also ruled that based on evidence, St. Joseph Realty never made
attempts to collect from them. St. Joseph Realty's notices of rescission were deliberately sent to the wrong address of
the lands involved, and not to the Ballado Spouses' home address. [35]
The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to St. Joseph Realty's allegation that it only inadvertently received the
check for P30,000.00. It was clear that St. Joseph Realty was already negotiating the sale of the lands to Epifanio
when it received Concepcion's check. When St. Joseph Realty saw that it could sell the lots for higher prices, it
returned the check to Concepcion. As regards the Amoguis Brothers, the Regional Trial Court ruled that they were in
bad faith when they bought the lots. Epifanio did not deny that Francisco informed him that they were in the process
of completing payment. Despite this, Epifanio still cut down Francisco's trees and set up his own fence.[36]
Finally, the Regional Trial Court noted that the Ballado Spouses failed to file a formal offer of evidence. Flowever, this
was not detrimental to their case as some of these documents were admitted by St. Joseph Realty, including the
contracts to sell and the letters that it sent to the Ballado Spouses through the wrong address. [37]
Only the Amoguis Brothers timely filed their appeal brief. Since St. Joseph Realty failed to file its appeal brief, the
Court of Appeals considered it to have abandoned its appeal.[38]
The Amoguis Brothers argued that the Regional Trial Court should have considered valid the rescission or
cancellation of the contract to sell, and that they should not have been declared as buyers in bad faith. They
contended that the evidence presented by the Ballado Spouses should not have been considered as it was not
formally offered. They averred that in case there was no valid rescission or cancellation of contract, St. Joseph Realty
should have been ordered to pay them the cost of their improvements, attorney's fees, litigation expense, and moral
and exemplary damages.[39] They did not raise the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction.
On September 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, [40] affirming the Regional Trial Court February
28, 2001 Decision[41] with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. We uphold the
findings of the court a quo nullifying the certificates of title issued to the Amoguises. The award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees plus cost of the suit in favor
of the Ballados is likewise affirmed with the modification that such should be paid solely by St. Joseph. St. Joseph
and the Ballados are likewise ordered to execute an absolute deed of sale upon full payment by the Ballados of the
deficiency in the purchase price of the subdivision lots. The amount adjudged to be paid by St. Joseph to the
Amoguises should however, be modified as the same should only be P108,930.00. The Amoguises' other monetary
claims are denied for want of basis.
SO ORDERED.[42]
Though not raised, the Court of Appeals discussed at the outset the issue of jurisdiction. Since the Ballado Spouses
wanted St. Joseph Realty to comply with the provisions of the contracts to sell, the Complaint was for specific
performance. The subject matter of the case involved subdivision lots. Therefore, jurisdiction was lodged with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board:
Such being the case, the court a quo should not have taken cognizance of the case as it is the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB, for brevity) which exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over such matters pursuant
to Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957 entitled "Regulating the sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums,
providing penalties for violations thereof. The provision states:
SECTION 3. National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
This jurisdiction was later delineated and clarified by Presidential Decree No. 1344 which provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A.
Unsound real estate business practices;
B.
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C.
Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Moreover, the prefatory statement of Presidential Decree No. 957 which Presidential Decree No. 1344 sought to
expand states:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators and/or sellers
have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and another similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and
safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver
titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent
sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value[.]
We may likewise add that litigants with cases cognizable by the HLURB cannot directly resort to judicial review as
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 additionally states:
SECTION 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days from the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the Philippines and in the event
the appeal is filed and the decision is not reversed and/or amended within a period of thirty (30) days, the
decision is deemed affirmed. Proof of the appeal of the decision must be furnished the National Housing
Authority.[43] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that since neither St. Joseph Realty nor the Amoguis Brothers raised the issue
of jurisdiction before the Regional Trial Court, they must be considered estopped from raising it on appeal. [44]
On the issue that the Ballado Spouses did not formally offer their evidence, the Court of Appeals cited Vda. De Oñate
v. Court of Appeals,[45] That case ruled that evidence not formally offered may still be appreciated by a trial court
provided that "first, [it] must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, [it] must have been
incorporated in the records of the case."[46] The Court of Appeals cited People of the Philippines v. Alicante,[47] where
this Court ruled that when a party fails to offer the purpose of a witness' testimony, the opposing party has the duty to
immediately object "at the time when the victim was called to the witness stand, without proper explanation thereof or
at anytime before the prosecution rested its case." [48] In this case, St. Joseph Realty and the Amoguis Brothers failed
to timely enter their objection.
As to the admissibility of documentary evidence over which no formal offer of evidence was made, the Court of
Appeals reviewed the transcript of stenographic notes and noted that of the documents which Concepcion identified,
only the contracts to sell were attached. The Regional Trial Court should have considered only these documents as
documentary evidence for the Ballado Spouses.[49]
As to the rescission of contracts to sell, the Court of Appeals sustained that it was improperly and unlawfully done by
St. Joseph Realty. It cited Palay Inc. v. Clave,[50] where this Court ruled that while the suspensive condition of full
payment of purchase price has not been complied with, there must, at the very least, be a notice to the defaulting
buyer of the rescission. With the passage of Republic Act No. 6552, also known as the Maceda Law, the manner to
rescind or cancel a contract to sell or a contract of sale has been codified. Rescission or cancellation shall take place
30 days from receipt of the buyer of a notarized notice of cancellation or demand for rescission.[51] The buyer must
also be paid the full cash surrender value.[52] The Court of Appeals likewise cited Siska Development Corporation v.
Office of the President,[53] which provided that the Maceda Law shall apply to contracts entered into before its
effectivity. Thus, even if the Maceda Law was passed close to three (3) years after the contracts to sell were
executed, it still must apply to them.[54]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court. St. Joseph Realty presented a
notarized demand of rescission during trial. However, the Ballado Spouses had always insisted that they never
received any notice of rescission from St. Joseph Realty. Furthermore, St. Joseph Realty did not offer to pay the cash
surrender value of the payments they had made. Thus, the requirements for a valid rescission under the Maceda Law
were not met.[55]
The Court of Appeals stated that since St. Joseph Realty did not validly rescind the contracts to sell, it had no legal
basis to sell the properties to the Amoguis Brothers. It should make a refund of the purchase price to them, with a 6%
per annum interest rate reckoned from February 1988 until fully paid. [56]
Finally, the Court of Appeals reconsidered the Regional Trial Court's finding of bad faith on the part of the Amoguis
Brothers, who merely relied on the misrepresentation of St. Joseph Realty that the properties were already
abandoned by the Ballado Spouses. The Amoguis Brothers only discovered the Ballado Spouses' subsisting claim
after they had already purchased the properties. The Court of Appeals ordered that only St. Joseph Realty should
pay damages to the Ballado Spouses.[57]
The Amoguis Brothers filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its August
7, 2009 Resolution.[58]
Hence, the Amoguis Brothers filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
a reversal of the Court of Appeals September 26, 2008 Decision and August 7, 2009 Resolution.[59]
The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:
First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction was lost by waiver or estoppel;
Second, whether or not testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence which are not formally offered may be
appreciated by a trial court; and
Finally, whether or not petitioners Gregorio Amoguis and Tito Amoguis are buyers in good faith and have preferential
right to Lot Nos. 1 and 2.
I
Petitioners argue that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was timely raised by St. Joseph Realty in its Answer
with Counterclaims. Even assuming that it was never raised, jurisdiction is a question of law that cannot be lost
through waiver or estoppel, and may be raised at any time, even during appeal. Further, if there was a remedy under
the law, that remedy must be exhausted first before the parties come to court. The administrative remedy should
have been sought before the Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board, and then appealed to the Office of the
President.[60] The Ballado Spouses counter that St. Joseph Realty never moved that its affirmative defense of lack of
jurisdiction be heard; instead, it actively participated in the proceedings together with the Amoguis Brothers.[61]
Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Laches had already set
in.
As the Court of Appeals discussed motu proprio, Presidential Decree No. 957 instituted the National Housing
Authority as the administrative body with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the trade and business of subdivision and
condominium developments. It provided for mechanisms where entities can apply for licenses to develop and sell
subdivision lots or condominiums with the intent of curbing fraud instigated on purchasers of real estate. A
performance bond is also required of these entities to guarantee their undertaking under the subdivision and
condominium plans. For greater transparency, their subdivision and condominium plans must likewise be registered.
The following transactions, however, were beyond the administrative body's regulatory supervision, and were exempt
from license and performance bond requirements:
(a) Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the partition of land among co-owners and co-heirs.
(b) Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the original purchaser thereof and any subsequent sale of the same lot.
(c) Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for the account of a mortgagee in the ordinary course of
business when necessary to liquidate a bona fide debt. [62]
Presidential Decree No. 1344[63] was later on enacted to add to the National Housing Authority's jurisdiction. It was no
longer just a licensing body for subdivision and condominium developers. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344
gave authority to the National Housing Authority to hear and decide cases:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 provided that appeals from decisions of the National Housing Authority
shall be made to the President of the Philippines within 15 days from receipt.
In between the approval of Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1344, the Maceda Law was approved. [64]
Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's or tribunal's power to hear and determine cases of a general class or type
relating to specific subject matters.[65] This jurisdiction is conferred by law.[66] To determine a court's or an
administrative body's jurisdiction over a subject matter, allegations in the complaint must be examined. [67] The nature
of the action, as reflected in the allegations in the complaint, and the reliefs sought determine jurisdiction over the
subject matter.[68] It is immaterial whether the claimant has a right to the relief sought. [69]
Presidential Decree No. 957 was approved on July 12, 1976, 11 years before the Ballado Spouses filed their
complaint. This means that the law mandating the jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority, which later on
became the House and Land Use Regulatory Board,[70] had long been in effect when petitioners filed their Answer
and participated in trial court proceedings. It behooved them to raise the issue of jurisdiction then, especially since St.
Joseph Realty, their co-respondent, raised it in its Answer albeit superficially and without any discussion.
In their Complaint, the Ballado Spouses alleged that the properties already sold to them by St. Joseph Realty were
sold to the Amoguis Brothers for a better price. They sought the cancellation of the titles issued to petitioners as a
result of their subsisting contracts to sell, which were neither rescinded nor annulled. They argued that when St.
Joseph Realty received their check for P30,000.00, they had fully paid the purchase price. As against St. Joseph
Realty, they sought damages and specific performance. They based their claim of full payment when St. Joseph
Realty accepted the check for P30,000.00. Upon St. Joseph Realty's acceptance, the Ballado Spouses were able to
fully comply with the terms of the contracts to sell. Without any valid rescission, St. Joseph Realty was bound to carry
out its obligations under the contracts. As against petitioners, the Ballado Spouses sought injunction and the
cancellation of titles issued under their names. The Amoguis Brothers were beneficiaries of St. Joseph Realty's
breach of the contracts to sell. They had no authority under the law to occupy the properties and have them titled
under their names.
According to Presidential Decree No. 1344, exclusive original jurisdiction for specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman is lodged with the National Housing Authority.
In Antipolo Realty v. National Housing Authority,[71] this Court ruled that the National Housing Authority, and not the
regular courts, have initial jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of the subdivision developer and of the
buyer under a contract to sell.
Solid Homes v. Payawal[72] stressed that the jurisdiction of National Housing Authority excluded that of the regular
courts even in a concurrent capacity. The respondent in that case, Teresita Payawal, argued that regular courts had
jurisdiction based on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[73] a law passed after Presidential Decree No. 1344. This Court ruled
otherwise:
The language of [Section 1, Presidential Decree 1344], especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt
that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the
Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority.
....
It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.
The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted,
is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and
the Board over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred
or merely implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve to the aggrieved party such other
remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under the Revised Penal
Code.[74] (Citation omitted)
Solid Homes cemented the National Housing Authority's jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for damages and
attorney's fees incidental to unsound business practices, claims for refund, and for specific performance against
subdivision lot or condominium unit owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen. This Court ruled that the
qualifier "and any other claims" in Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1344 meant so. In Solid Homes, this Court
also ruled that as an administrative body, the National Housing Authority possessed specialized competence and
experience to determine these allied matters.[75]
In the years that followed, this Court tackled the issue of whether the Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board's
jurisdiction included the cancellation of land titles issued to third parties due to the subdivision developer's or owner's
unsound business practices. Fajardo v. Hon. Bautista[76] ruled that it did. Apart from unsound business practices, the
cancellation of titles issued to third parties also involved claims for specific performance against subdivision
developers and owners. In Fajardo, the claimants sought that the developer perform its obligations under the contract
to sell, and the cancellation of titles were but incidental.
These doctrines have been observed by this Court even in recent cases. Presently, jurisprudence still dictates that
when a buyer wants to compel a developer to conform with the terms of the contract it executed, jurisdiction lies with
the Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board.[77]
The Ballado Spouses' rights and interests lie not just as buyers of any property, but buyers of subdivision lots from a
subdivision developer. From the circumstances between St. Joseph Realty and the Ballado Spouses, there is no
doubt that the then National Housing Authority had jurisdiction to determine the parties' obligations under the
contracts to sell and the damages that may have arisen from their breach. The Ballado Spouses' Complaint should
have been filed before it. The National Housing Authority also had jurisdiction over the injunction and annulment of
titles sought against petitioners as these were incidental to St. Joseph Realty's unsound business practices.
Where there is no jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment has
absolutely no legal effect, "by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds
nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void."[78] Because there is in
effect no judgment, res judicata does not apply to commencing another action despite previous adjudications already
made.[79]
II
However, this Court has discussed with great nuance the legal principle enunciated in Tijam. Estoppel by laches bars
a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction in an unjustly belated manner especially when it actively participated during
trial.
Estoppel by laches has its origins in equity. It prevents a party from presenting his or her claim "when, by reason of
abandonment and negligence, he [or she] allowed a long time to elapse without presenting [it]." [80] It is further
elaborated by this Court in Regalado v. Go,[81] thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it."[82] (Citation omitted)
In estoppel by laches, a claimant has a right that he or she could otherwise exercise if not for his or her delay in
asserting it. This delay in the exercise of the right unjustly misleads the court and the opposing party of its waiver.
Thus, to claim it belatedly given the specific circumstances of the case would be unjust.
In Tijam, the spouses Serafm Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog (the Tijam Spouses) filed a collection case against the
spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio (the Sibonghanoy Spouses). The Court of First Instance of Cebu
issued a writ of attachment over the Sibonghanoy Spouses' properties. It was dissolved afterwards as the
Sibonghanoy Spouses and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Manila Surety), their surety, filed a counterbond.
The decision on the collection case became final and executory. As collection could not be made against the
Sibonghanoy Spouses, the Tijam Spouses tried to satisfy the judgment against the surety's bond. Manila Surety
opposed and argued that no demand was made on it. The Court of First Instance ruled in the surety's favor. However,
demand on the surety was eventually made, and the Court of First Instance issued a writ of execution. Again, Manila
Surety opposed and tried to quash the writ of execution. It argued that a summary hearing was required before the
writ should issue. Upon the Court of First Instance's denial to quash, Manila Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals.
It assigned errors committed by the Court of First Instance in the issuance of the writ of execution but did not raise
the issue of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of First Instance's orders to execute. After Manila
Surety received a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, it asked for additional time to file its motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted an extension. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, the surety
filed a motion to dismiss raising, for the first time, the Court of First Instance's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. As the amount involved was only P1,908.00, inferior courts, and not the Court of First Instance,
had exclusive original jurisdiction over the collection case. This was mandated by Republic Act No. 296, the Judiciary
Act of 1948, which came into effect a month after the Tijam Spouses filed their complaint before the Court of First
Instance.[83]
This Court ruled that the surety could no longer question the Court of First Instance's jurisdiction over the subject
matter due to estoppel by laches. It premised that since Manila Surety actively participated during trial and prevailed;
invoking the Court of First Instance's lack of jurisdiction was a last ditch effort to absolve itself from the effects of an
unfavorable judgment on appeal. On the 15-year delay before the issue on jurisdiction was raised, this Court ruled
that it could have and should have been raised earlier. The surety's failure to do so was negligence on its part,
"warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it."[84] Tijam set a precedent to stop legal machinations where jurisdiction was raised at the very last minute when the
parties have already gone through long years of litigation. It was not so much an issue of time than it was an issue of
fairness. Though conferred by law, fairness and equity must temper the parties' bravado to raise jurisdiction when
they have participated in proceedings in the lower courts or when an unfavorable judgment against them has been
rendered.
The following circumstances were present in Tijam: first, there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant. Manila
Surety had the right to question the Court of First Instance's jurisdiction because it was the inferior courts that had
authority to try cases that involved the amount claimed. Second, the statutory right was not invoked. Manila Surety
participated in the trial and execution stages. It even sought relief from the Court of Appeals without questioning the
Court of First Instance's jurisdiction. Third, an unreasonable length of time had lapsed before the claimant raised the
issue of jurisdiction. It was only after the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of First Instance's order of execution did
Manila Surety pursue the issue of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over collections for the amount involved was already
determined by law a month before the case was filed. Fifteen years had lapsed before the surety pointed this
out. Fourth, the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without
jurisdiction. The unreasonable length of time was, therefore, inexcusable as the claimant was apprised of the
prevailing law, as well as all stages of the proceeding.
Calimlim v. Hon. Ramirez[85] unequivocally ruled that it is only when the exceptional instances in Tijam are present
should estoppel by laches apply over delayed claims:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[86]
Calimlim clarified the additional requirement that for estoppel by laches to be appreciated against a claim for
jurisdiction, there must be an ostensible showing that the claimant had "knowledge or consciousness of the facts
upon which it is based."[87]
Figueroa v. People of the Philippines[88] framed the exceptional character of Tijam:
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the
general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should,
however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court's
absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop
him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and
not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any
harm.[89] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Thus, Tijam will only apply when given the circumstances of a case, allowing the belated objection to the jurisdiction
of the court will additionally cause irreparable damages, and therefore, injustice to the other party that relied on the
forum and the implicit waiver.
In Tijam, this Court ruled that long delay in raising lack of jurisdiction is unfair to the party pleading laches because he
or she was misled into believing that this defense would no longer be pursued. A delay of 15 years in raising
questions on subject matter jurisdiction was appreciated by this Court as estoppel by laches.
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,[90] this Court recognized the unfairness in allowing a party who sought
affirmative relief from a tribunal and invoked its jurisdiction to later disavow the same jurisdiction upon passage of an
adverse ruling. It ruled that raising lack of jurisdiction over a subject matter a little under a year since a complaint is
filed does not amount to laches.
In Figueroa, this Court observed the injustice caused to the party pleading laches. Restoration of and reparation
towards the party may no longer be accomplished due to the changes in his or her circumstances. Laches, however,
was not appreciated as it was a mere four (4) years since trial began that the petitioner in that case raised the issue
of jurisdiction on appeal.
In Bernardo v. Heirs of Villegas,[91] this Court identified the propensity of litigants who, to exhaust the time and
resources of their opponents, will plead lack of jurisdiction only when an unfavorable decision is obtained in order to
re-litigate the case. The delay of 10 years in raising jurisdictional issues in that case was appreciated as laches.
In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:
(1)
there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;
(2)
the statutory right was not invoked;
(3)
an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction;
(4)
the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without
jurisdiction;
(5)
the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject matter
jurisdiction;
(6)
irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the claimant's
implicit waiver.
Tijam applies in this case. The allegations, determinative of subject matter jurisdiction, were apparent on the face of
the Complaint. The law that determines jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority had been in place for more than
a decade when the Complaint was filed. St. Joseph Realty raised lack of jurisdiction in its Answer. Petitioners sought
affirmative relief from the Regional Trial Court and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings. Therefore,
there was no valid reason for petitioners to raise the issue of jurisdiction only now before this Court.
III
On the issue of the admissibility of the Ballado Spouses' testimonial and documentary evidence, the Amoguis
Brothers argue that it was unfair to fault them for not objecting when the former's counsel started his direct
examination without offering the purpose of the witnesses' testimonies. Had they done so, it would alert the Ballado
Spouses' counsel of the defect. Rule 132, Sections 34 and 35 of the Rules of Court are mandatory, regardless if an
opposing party timely objected. The jurisprudence relied upon by the Court of Appeals is not applicable in this case
as People of the Philippines v. Alicante[92] was a rape case and it was the 13-year-old victim's testimony that was not
offered. Meanwhile, this is a civil case. In Alicante, there was already a sworn statement made by the victim before
she took the stand; in this case, only Francisco verified the Complaint, while Concepcion identified the documents
and testified on their claims. The Regional Trial Court judge could not have known the purpose of Concepcion's
testimony.[93] The Ballado Spouses, on the other hand, reiterated that timely objections should have been made.[94]
Rule 132, Sections 34 to 36 of the Rules of Court govern the manner of offering and objecting to evidence:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Section 35. When to make offer. — As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer
shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
Section 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different
period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Following these provisions, a witness' testimony must be offered at the start, when he or she takes the stand for the
first time and before questions are propounded to him or her. Documentary or object evidence, on the other hand,
must be orally offered after the presentation of a party's witnesses unless the court orders or allows that a written
formal offer is filed.
All evidence must be formally offered. Otherwise, the court cannot consider them.[95] This rule ensures that judges will
carry out their constitutional mandate to render decisions that clearly state the facts of cases and the applicable
laws.[96] Judgments must be based "only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit." [97] This rule
also affords parties their right to due process by examining the evidence presented by their opponent, and to object to
its presentation when warranted.[98]
However, testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely objected to by an opposing party may be still be
considered by the court. The purpose of offering a witness' testimony is for the court to expertly assess whether
questions propounded are relevant and material, and if the witness is competent to answer. It is to aid the court in
ruling over objections made by opposing counsel. Catuira v. Court of Appeals[99] was instructive:
The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court to
rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. As a general rule, the proponent must
show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the
adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is a mere privilege
which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is
opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of objections.
Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private respondent was called
to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the
ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify without any
prior offer having been made by the proponent. Most apt is the observation of the appellate court:
While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in evidence the testimony of the complaining witness upon calling
her to testify and that it was only after her testimony and after the petitioner moved that it be stricken that the offer
was made, the respondent Court did not gravely err in not dismissing the case against the petitioner on the ground
invoked. For, she should have objected to the testimony of the complaining witness when it was not first offered upon
calling her and should not have waited in ambush after she had already finished testifying. By so doing she did not
save the time of the Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all according to her was inadmissible. And
for her failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was
waived.[100] (Citations omitted)
Catuira also discussed that litigation is not a game of surprises. Rules of procedure and evidence are in place to
ensure the smooth and speedy dispensation of cases. Where the opposing party belatedly raises the technicality that
the witnesses' testimonies were not formally offered to "ambush" [101] the party presenting them, the court may not
expunge or strike them out.
Under the rules, a timely objection is a remedy available to petitioners. They waived their right to this remedy when
they waited until the case was submitted for resolution to do so.
The rules on examination of witnesses and objecting to them are not separate for civil and criminal cases. A witness,
whether in a criminal or civil case, is presented to support and prove the allegations made by the party presenting him
or her. The witness must be competent, and his or her testimony must be relevant and material. Whether the case is
civil or criminal, objection or failure to offer the testimony of a witness must be made immediately.[102]
As to the Ballado Spouses' documentary evidence, the Court of Appeals was correct to consider only the contracts to
sell. These were the only documents attached to the written formal offer of evidence that they filed. Hence, these
documents should be considered as the only documentary evidence formally offered. When a party fails to formally
offer his or her documentary or object evidence within a considerable period after the presentation of witnesses, he or
she is deemed to have waived the opportunity to do so. [103] The party, therefore, as in this case, runs the risk of
weakening his or her claim or defense.
IV
Petitioners argue that they are buyers in good faith, as determined by the Court of Appeals. As innocent purchasers,
reconveyance is no longer a feasible option against them especially since they have introduced a multitude of
improvements on the properties. They have occupied the land since 1987. [104] According to the Ballado Spouses, the
Amoguis Brothers never denied that they were buyers in bad faith. They testified that they told Epifanio that they had
bought the lands as the latter was destroying the fences they had put up and cut down the trees they had planted.
Despite protests from the Ballado Spouses, petitioners continued introducing improvements over the properties.[105]
In their Reply, petitioners argued that the finding of good faith by the Court of Appeals can no longer be disturbed by
the Ballado Spouses as they did not appeal the Court of Appeals September 26, 2008 Decision.[106]
A buyer in good faith is one who purchases and pays fair price for a property without notice that another has an
interest over or right to it.[107] If a land is registered and is covered by a certificate of title, any person may rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title, and he or she is not obliged to go beyond the four (4) corners of the certificate to
determine the condition of the property.[108] This rule does not apply, however,
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient
facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. [109] (Citation
omitted)
The Regional Trial Court ruled that petitioners were in bad faith because they did not deny Francisco's testimony that
he had informed them of his ownership when they occupied the properties. Despite this, petitioners continued to
make improvements on the lands.[110] The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, made a conflicting finding. It ruled
that it was St. Joseph Realty that made representations to the Amoguis Brothers and assured them that the previous
buyers had abandoned their purchase of the properties. It appreciated that the Amoguis Brothers found out about the
Ballado Spouses' claim only after they had bought them.[111] Due to these conflicting findings, this Court is compelled
to review whether respondents were bad faith purchasers.[112]
It is incumbent upon a buyer to prove good faith should he or she assert this status. This burden cannot be
discharged by merely invoking the legal presumption of good faith. [113] This Court rules that based on the evidence on
record, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Though they were informed by Francisco on his claim to the
properties only after their purchase, it is undisputed from the records that mango and chico trees were planted on the
properties, and that they were cordoned off by barbed wires. St. Joseph Realty also informed them that there were
previous buyers, who allegedly abandoned their purchase. To merely claim that they were buyers in good faith,
absent any proof, does not make the case for them.
The Regional Trial Court found that petitioners were in bad faith. However, it did not order their solidary liability with
St. Joseph Realty. It ordered damages, attorney's fees, and the cost of suit to be borne by St. Joseph Realty alone.
The modification in this regard made by the Court of Appeals was, therefore, superfluous.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' September 26, 2008 Decision and August
7, 2009 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 73758-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
7. [ G.R. No. 213287. December 06, 2021 ]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
ATTY. FRANCIS N. TOLENTINO, PETITIONER, VS. HIGH DESERT STOP OVERS, INC.
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the July 31, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125286 which dismissed petitioner's Petition for Annulment of Judgment3 and
the June 6, 2014 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration5 of the assailed
Decision. Further, petitioner prays that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin respondent, the appellate court, and the trial court from implementing
the assailed Orders, including the July 2, 2010 Judgment,6 which approved the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) dated June 16, 2010 between the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
and High Desert Stop Overs, Inc. (HDSOI), and the Orders dated April 25, 20117 and October 28,
2011,8 which granted the issuance of the writ of execution and denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration9 dated May 10, 2011, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents:
MMDA, then known as Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA), entered into three agreements with
HDSOI for the construction of new public passenger stations: (1) Memorandum of Agreement10 dated
April 13, 1992; (2) Memorandum of Agreement11 dated January 18, 1994; and (3) Supplemental
Agreement12 dated September 12, 1996. In the said agreements, MMDA granted HDSOI authority to
construct, finance, operate, and maintain passenger stations under Republic Act (RA.) No.
695713 otherwise known as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law. The agreements also authorized
HDSOI to charge facility user's fees, rentals, and/or charges to cover operating and maintenance
expenses, as well as to enter into advertising agreements with private advertisers.
However, in a Letter14 dated August 8, 2006, MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando terminated the
aforementioned agreements and directed HDSOI to remove all their installed waiting sheds and
commercial advertisements pursuant to "MMDA's objective to clear investors corridors' route of all
kinds of obstructions, and in compliance with the provisions of the National Building Code, existing
rules and regulations prohibiting the installation/display of commercial advertisements along road
rights-of-way, and in accord with the Supreme Court pronouncement that 'sidewalks are beyond the
commerce of men'".15
Thus, on October 1, 2006, HDSOI filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,16 which the trial
court acted on favorably. While the case was pending, or on May 27, 2010, the Metro Manila Council
(MMC) authorized the MMDA Chairman under MMDA Resolution No. 10-10, Series of 201017 to enter
into an amicable settlement with HDSOI in connection with the civil case filed by the latter. On June
16, 2010, MMDA, through its then Chairman Judge Oscar Inocentes, and HDSOI entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement18 (MOA) or a compromise agreement for and in consideration of
dropping all pending suits against MMDA. As culled from the Decision of the CA, the pertinent portions
of the MOA are as follows:
1. MMDA granted HDSOI authority to (1) undertake and finance the improvement and
maintenance of all existing MMDA owned passenger stations in all major streets in all cities and
municipalities in Metro Manila; and (2) upgrade the streetscapes of Metro Manila cities and
Municipalities thru renovation, construction, operation and maintenance of the passenger stations and
such additional passenger stations as the parties shall agree;
2. HDSOI, in turn, obligates itself to repair worn-out passenger stations, maintain said passenger
stations, install lighting facilities and improve and replace existing passenger stations to conform to
the uniform design agreed upon;
3. MMDA grants HDSOI sole and exclusive right to install, operate and maintain advertising
displays on all passenger stations and to charge fees therefor for HDSOI's sole benefit;
4. The parties recognize that the MOA is being entered into to settle the case between the parties
and recompense HDSOI for its losses brought about by MMDA's pre-termination of its previous
agreements and the dismantling of the passenger stations;
5. HDSOI shall pay MMDA a monthly rental fee of Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (PhP
2,500.00) per passenger station being used by HDSOI for advertising purposes subject to a yearly
increase of five percent (5%);
6. MMDA commits that regardless of any changes on administration or Government, it shall
respect the provisions of the MOA;
7. That the MOA shall take effect immediately upon its signing and to take effect for a period of
ten (10) years. The MOA shall be automatically renewed for an additional five (5) years provided that
the rental of the passenger stations shall automatically increase by twenty percent (20%). HDSOI shall
refurbish all existing passenger stations at the end of the tenth year of the MOA prior to its renewal
provided that the rental on the twelfth year until the fifteenth year of the MOA shall be subject to a
yearly increase of five percent (5%). At the end of the fifteenth year of the MOA, MMDA shall be the
sole and exclusive owner of all existing passenger stations;
8. At the end of the automatic five (5) year term renewal, the MOA shall be extended upon the
consent of both parties. MMDA obligates to give HDSOI the right of first refusal to build, operate, and
maintain the passenger stations to other participants;
9. The MMDA warrants and undertakes that it has been authorized by its governing body to enter
into this MOA and comply with the terms thereof and deliver a certified copy of its Council Resolution
to this effect.19
In a Joint Motion to Approve Attached Compromise Agreement (Memorandum of
Agreement)20 dated June 16, 2010, MMDA and HDSOI submitted the MOA to the trial court for
approval. In its Order21 dated July 2, 2010, the trial court approved the compromise agreement and
dismissed the complaint filed by HDSOI, including the counterclaims of MMDA. There being no motion
for reconsideration or notice of appeal having been filed, the Judgment22 dated July 2, 2010 became
final and executory on August 12, 2010.23 However, on November 23, 2010, then MMDA Chairman
Francis Tolentino wrote a letter addressed to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and sought
their opinion as to the enforceability of the compromise agreement. The OSG alleged that it was only
upon receipt of the said letter that it learned of the compromise agreement between MMDA and
HDSOI.
Thereafter, HDSOI moved for the execution of the Judgment dated July 2, 2010. MMDA, through
the OSG , filed its Opposition dated February 25, 2011 arguing that (1) the compromise agreement
was entered into without the prior notice, consultation, and approval of the OSG before it was
submitted for the trial court's approval; and (2) the compromise agreement failed to specify the factors
for setting P2,500.00 as a just and reasonable rental fee to prove that it was not disadvantageous to
the government. Thus, it prayed that HDSOI's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution be denied.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
In its Order24 dated April 25, 2011, the trial court granted the issuance of a writ of execution. It
held that a copy of the Judgment dated July 2, 2010 together with other Orders issued by the trial court
were personally served to the OSG on November 10, 2010 as evidenced by the Return Card. Thus,
the OSG was duly notified that a judgment based on a compromise agreement between MMDA and
HDSOI was rendered by the trial court, yet it did not move for its reconsideration or file a notice of
appeal. In effect, the trial court ruled that the assailed judgment is binding on the Government.
Furthermore, the trial court noted that the MMC, through the MMDA Resolution No. 10-10 Series of
2010, authorized MMDA to enter into the MOA with HDSOI. Hence, the MOA was sanctioned by
law.25
The MMDA, through the OSG, asked for reconsideration26 but was denied by the trial court in its
Order27 dated October 28, 2011 for failing to state new or compelling reasons that would warrant the
reconsideration of the assailed Order.
On June 22, 2012, the MMDA, through the OSG, filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment28 before the appellate court averring that (1) the trial court acted without jurisdiction in
approving the MOA between MMDA and HDSOI that was null and void for having been entered into
without the imprimatur or approval of the OSG; and (2) the terms and conditions of the MOA failed to
protect the interests of the Republic.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The CA, in its assailed July 31, 2013 Decision,29 dismissed the petition for lack of merit and found
that the allegations of the petitioner do not establish lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to
justify the annulment of the assailed Judgment. It held that, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the trial
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim and over the person of the defending party.30
The appellate court ruled that by arguing that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in approving
the MOA entered into without its imprimatur or prior approval, the OSG did not attack the absence of
jurisdiction. Such argument merely attacks the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, it is not a proper
ground to annul the trial court's judgment approving the MOA.31 Nevertheless, the MMDA's failure to
submit the MOA to the OSG for approval did not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction. The CA also
noted that there is nothing in RA No. 7924,32 or the law creating the MMDA, that requires the approval
of the OSG to validly enter into compromise agreements on matters over which it has authority to do
so. Neither is there any indication in the Deputization Letter that the lack of OSG approval shall nullify
compromise agreements.
Moreover, the appellate court held that even assuming the trial court lacks jurisdiction, MMDA is
already estopped from assailing its jurisdiction for not raising the argument of lack of jurisdiction in
their Answer or in a Motion to Dismiss, nor in their Opposition to HDSOI's Motion for the Issuance of
a Writ of Execution filed through the OSG. Thus, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal.33
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration34 but it was denied in the appellate court's Resolution
dated June 6, 2014.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari35 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court raising the following issues:
(A) WHETHER THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE
MMDA AND HDSOI WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE OSG IS NULL AND
VOID.
(B) WHETHER A JUDGMENT BASED ON THE VOID COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
(C) WHETHER A JUDGMENT EMANATING FROM A VOID COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT IS IMPUGNABLE VIA A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE GROUND
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RENDER THE SAME.
Thus, the main issue is whether the Compromise Agreement between MMDA and HDSOI is void
for the lack of participation and approval of the OSG.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement entered into by MMDA and HDSOI without the
participation of the OSG is null and void. It claims that the Solicitor General represents the
Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities in any litigation, investigation, or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer.36 It avers that by virtue of the Deputation Letter issued on July 2, 2010, deputized
counsels Attys. Ruth B. Castelo and Gilbert G. Kintanar should submit to the Solicitor General for
review, approval, and signature all important pleadings and motions pertaining to the case, as well as
compromise agreements.37 Since the Compromise Agreement was not reviewed, approved, and
signed by the OSG, petitioner contends that it is void ab initio. Petitioner adds that notwithstanding the
authority granted by MMC over former MMDA Chairman Inocentes to enter into a compromise
agreement with HDSOI, the same shall be approved by MMC before its submission to the trial court
for approval.38 In view thereof, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in approving the said
Compromise Agreement.39
Petitioner also points out that the CA failed to address their argument that the Compromise
Agreement should have been declared null and void for being grossly disadvantageous to the
government.40 Said argument averred that the agreement failed to state with particularity the factors
considered in determining the rental rate of the passenger stations built by HDSOI and that the amount
of P2,500.00 rental fee per passenger station is insufficient.41 It adds that former MMDA Chairman
Inocentes and HDSOI managed to extend the agreements which were about to expire at the time for
another fifteen (15) years in the form of the Compromise Agreement without the approval of the OSG.
In view of the attendant circumstances, petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
render a judgment approving a void compromise agreement.42
Republic v. Fetalvero43 discussed the role of a deputized counsel in relation to the OSG, and the
effect of the lack of approval of the OSG in a compromise agreement:
The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist it in representing the government is well settled. The Administrative Code of 1987
explicitly states that the OSG shall have the power to "deputize legal officers of government
departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent
the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise
supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases." But it is likewise settled
that the OSG's deputized counsel is "no more than the 'surrogate' of the Solicitor General in any
particular proceeding" and the latter remains the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all
court orders, notices, and decisions. . . . The appearance of the deputized counsel did not divest the
OSG of control over the case and did not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of record.
xxxx
Nonetheless, despite the lack of the Solicitor General's approval, this Court holds that the
government is still bound by the Compromise Agreement due to laches.
The Solicitor General is assumed to have known of the Compromise Agreement since, as
principal counsel, she was furnished a copy of the trial court's June 27, 2008 Order, which
referred the case to mediation. Even if she did not know that Atty. Lorea signed a Compromise
Agreement, she was later informed of it through the copy of the trial court's October 17, 2008
Order, which approved the Compromise Agreement. The Solicitor General received the
October 17, 2008 Order on November 6, 2008; yet, she filed no appeal or motion to contest the
Order or the Compromise Agreement's validity.
Thus, based on the deputation letter, which stated that "only notices of orders, resolutions, and
decisions served on [the Office of the Solicitor General] will bind the [g]overnment, the entity, agency[,]
and/or official represented[,]" and the Notice of Appearance, which stated that "only notices of orders,
resolutions, and decisions served on [the Office of the Solicitor General] will bind the party
represented[,]" the Solicitor General's receipt of the October 17, 2008 Order bound petitioner to
the trial court's judgment.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court,45 the government failed to oppose
the petition for reconstitution. This is despite receiving copies of the petition and its annexes through
the Registrar of Deeds, Director of Lands, Solicitor General, and the Provincial Fiscal, and even after
judgment on the compromise agreement.46 This Court held:
Thereafter, when judgment was rendered based on the compromise agreement
without awaiting the report and recommendation of the Land Registration
Administration and the verification of the Registrar of Deeds concerned, its failure to
file a motion to set aside the judgment of the court after due notice likewise
proves that no interest of the government was prejudiced by such
judgment.47 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case before Us, the Government is bound by the MOA due to estoppel. The OSG is
assumed to have known about the existence of the MOA as petitioner's principal counsel. At the very
least, even if the OSG had no prior knowledge of the MOA, it was duly notified on November 10, 2010
when it received a copy of the assailed Judgment dated July 2, 2010 together with other Orders issued
by the trial court which approved the MOA. Notwithstanding such knowledge, the OSG failed to file an
appeal or resort to other remedies to contest the validity of the MOA.
This Court also agrees with the appellate court's ruling that the action for annulment of judgment
is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.48 An action to annul a final judgment is an
extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the court.49 It shall be availed of
when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.50
According to the appellate court, the petitioner must show absolute lack of jurisdiction, not merely
an abuse of jurisdictional discretion since these are two entirely different concepts.51 Lack of
jurisdiction means that the trial court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint or petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In the case at bar, the CA is correct when it ruled that what is being assailed is not the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction but only the exercise thereof - which is not a ground for Annulment of Judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.52 Indubitably, as a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint for injunction and damages and over the person
of MMDA.53
While jurisprudence dictates that the lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the
proceedings, even for the first time in appeal, it is not an absolute rule. It admits of an exception as
when the defendant actively participated in the proceedings and invoked the court's jurisdiction.
Therefore, as correctly held by the appellate court, there is no basis for the argument of lack of
jurisdiction considering MMDA's active participation in the proceedings because it even jointly moved
for the trial court's approval of the MOA.54
Lastly, this Court finds it unnecessary to belabor itself as to the propriety of the terms and
conditions of the MOA for the same reason stated above that petitioner did not resort to available
remedies at that time to contest the same. That being so, an action for annulment of judgment is an
improper remedy to belatedly question the rental rate of the passenger stations built by HDSOI under
the MOA. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party.55 Whether through inadvertence or negligence of its deputized counsel or the OSG itself, the
decision has already become final and executory.56 Besides, there would be no end to litigation if the
parties who have failed to avail of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault or
inadvertence could have unfavorable decisions annulled by simply bringing an action for annulment
of judgment.57
Considering the foregoing, the MOA entered into by MMDA and HDSOI without the OSG's prior
approval is valid.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for failure to
establish any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed July
31, 2013 Decision and June 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 125286 are hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
8. [
G.R. No. 213054. June 15, 2016 ]
TERESITA TAN, PETITIONER, VS. JOVENCIO F. CINCO, SIMON LORI
HOLDINGS, INC., PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, FORTUNATO
G. PE, RAYMUNDO G. PE, JOSE REVILLA REYES, JR., AND DEPUTY SHERIFF
ROMMEL IGNACIO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated January 22, 2013 and the
Resolution[3] dated June 11, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122492, which reversed
and set aside the Orders dated August 5, 2011[4] and October 17, 2011[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, Branch 257 (Parañaque RTC) and directed the allowance and approval of respondents' Notice of Appeal [6] filed
on June 17, 2011.
The Facts
In 2001, respondents Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F. Cinco, and
Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr. (individual lenders) extended a loan to one Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount of
P50,000,000.00. The loan was facilitated by PentaCapital Investment Corporation (PentaCapital) and was secured by
Dante's shares in Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC).[7] When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity
and despite demands, he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to
SLHI, the individual lenders, and PentaCapital (respondents). [8]
However, when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his
obligations unpaid.[9] Hence, respondents filed an action for sum of money against him before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 146 (Makati RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-357 (collection case).[10] After due
proceedings, the Makati RTC rendered judgment[11] on May 21, 2002 ordering Dante to pay respondents the sum of
P100,100,000.00 with legal interest from June 26, 2000 until the principal amount is fully paid, plus attorney's fees
and costs. Dante's attempts to reverse the decision on appeal proved futile, thus, a Writ of Execution [12] (writ) was
issued on February 16, 2005.
In order to enforce the writ, Deputy Sheriff Rommel Ignacio (Sheriff Ignacio) levied on a property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 126981[13] registered in Dante's name (subject property). An auction sale was then
conducted on March 29, 2005.[14] Consequently, Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit
executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita Tan (Teresita) attesting to the conjugal nature of the subject property.
Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject property lapsed without redemption having been made; hence, a
Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale[15] was issued in favor of respondents.[16]
Undeterred, Dante filed an Omnibus Motion[17] alleging that the subject property was a family home and therefore,
exempt from execution, and that being a conjugal property, it cannot be made to answer for his personal obligations
without any showing that it had redounded to the benefit of the family. [18] The Makati RTC denied[19] Dante's Omnibus
Motion, ruling that Dante had belatedly raised the issues respecting the conjugal nature of the subject property, and
besides, the issue on whether the subject property was a family home had already been previously
resolved.[20] Moreover, he had contracted the obligation while engaged in his business; hence, it can be presumed
that the conjugal partnership was benefited.[21] Finally, the Makati RTC held that attachment and levy on the subject
property had been validly done.[22] Consequently, it directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
respondents and ordered Dante and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the subject property. [23] Dante's
motion for reconsideration was denied, and there being no appeal taken therefrom, the Makati RTC's disposition of
the case became final.[24]
On May 2, 2007, Teresita - Dante's wife - filed before the Parañaque RTC a complaint[25] against respondents,
respondent Sheriff Ignacio, and the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0134, for
the nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale issued in favor of respondents
(nullification case).[26]
The Proceedings Before the Parañaque RTC
After due proceedings, the Parañaque RTC initially dismissed[27] the nullification case on the ground of res judicata,
ruling that the issues raised therein had already been passed upon by the Makati RTC with Teresita's active and
voluntary participation.[28] However, upon Teresita's motion for reconsideration,[29] the Parañaque RTC, in an
Order[30] dated January 6, 2011, reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale, the certificate of
sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents. [31] It held that Teresita was considered a third party in the
collection case before the Makati RTC, not having been impleaded therein together with her husband Dante, and that
the submission of her Affidavit before the Makati RTC did not make her a party to the said case. [32] Moreover, she
had not waived her right to institute a separate action to recover the subject property, and the nullification case was
not, after all, barred by res judicata.[33]
Respondents' motion for reconsideration[34] was denied in an Order[35] dated April 27, 2011, which they received on
May 23, 2011.[36] Intending to file a petition for certiorari before the CA, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time [37] on
June 2, 2011. Eventually realizing their error, and apparently unaware that the CA had already denied their motion for
extension in an Order dated June 13, 2011, respondents withdrew their motion for extension before the CA on June
17, 2011 and instead, simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal[38] before the Parañaque RTC. Unfortunately, it was
filed ten (10) days late.[39]
In an Order[40] dated August 5, 2011, the Parañaque RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed out of
time. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order[41] dated October 17,
2011.[42] Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari[43] before the CA, arguing, inter alia, that the Parañaque
RTC had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a co-equal court.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[44] dated January 22, 2013, the CA granted the petition and directed the Parañaque RTC to allow
respondents' Notice of Appeal. While conceding that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is
mandatory and jurisdictional, the CA nonetheless found meritorious and sound reasons for the exceptional allowance
of respondents' appeal.[45] It held that it was a more prudent course of action for the Parañaque RTC to excuse
respondents' technical lapse in order to afford the parties a review of the case on appeal instead of disposing the
case based on technicality.[46] Citing the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court, it found that the affirmance of the Parañaque RTC's assailed issuances would allow
Teresita's husband, Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was already finally adjudicated by the Makati
RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to take cognizance of the controversy, on the basis of technicality.[47]
Teresita's motion for reconsideration was denied in the Resolution [48] dated June 11, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
At the core of the issues advanced for the Court's resolution is the question of whether or not the Parañaque RTC
violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the nullification case filed by Teresita and declared
as null and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
In Barroso v. Omelio,[49] the Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows:
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders
of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The
rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts,
for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending,
so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution
has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its
own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of
incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
xxxx
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of
execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the
resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is
precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which
this Court has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Emphases
supplied; citations omitted)
To summarize, the various branches of the regional trial courts of a province or city, having as they do the same or
equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would
obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.[50]
In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance
of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated falls within the
jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of
jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the subject property that was
legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court. In fact, the Parañaque RTC was already on
the right track when it initially dismissed the nullification case in its Decision [51] dated July 8, 2010. However, it
changed its stance and reconsidered its disposition upon Teresita's motion for reconsideration, thereby committing
reversible error. To reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in the execution of a
judgment was valid properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of
execution.[52]
Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of the
doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution
thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of
concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is
not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or
issued.[53] Consequently, the Parañaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings therein,
as well as the Decision and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights
and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of
a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.[54]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated January 6, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 257 in Civil Case No. 07-0134, the proceedings therein, as well as all orders issued
thereafter are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
9. [
G.R. No. 208224. November 22, 2017 ]EQUITY JURISDICTION
DR. JOSEPH L. MALIXI, DR. EMELITA Q. FIRMACION, MARIETTA MENDOZA,
AURORA AGUSTIN, NORA AGUILAR, MA. THERESA M. BEFETEL, AND MYRNA
NISAY, PETITIONERS, VS. DR. GLORY V. BALTAZAR, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the
January 22, 2013[2] and July 16, 2013[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 127252 and the
October 17, 2011 Decision[4] and July 17, 2012 Resolution[5] of the Civil Service Commission be reversed and set
aside.[6] The Civil Service Commission dismissed the administrative complaint of herein petitioners Dr. Jose L. Malixi
(Dr. Malixi), Dr. Emelita Q. Firmacion (Dr. Firmacion), Marietta Mendoza (Mendoza), Aurora Agustin (Agustin), Nora
Aguilar (Aguilar), Ma. Theresa M. Befetel (Befetel), and Myrna Nisay (Nisay) against herein respondent Dr. Glory V.
Baltazar (Baltazar) for violating the rule on forum shopping.[7] The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari filed by petitioners on procedural grounds. [8]
In their Complaint[9] dated December 15, 2010, petitioners prayed before the Civil Service Commission that
respondent Dr. Baltazar be held administratively liable for gross misconduct and that she be dismissed from
service.[10]
Petitioners were employees of Bataan General Hospital holding the following positions: Dr. Malixi was the Vice
President of the Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Bataan General Hospital, Dr. Firmacion was a Medical Specialist II,
Mendoza and Agustin were both Nurse III, Aguilar and Befetel were both Nurse II, and Nisay was a Nursing
Attendant II. Meanwhile, Dr. Baltazar was the Officer-in-Charge Chief of Bataan General Hospital.[11]
Petitioners alleged that sometime in May 2008, the Department of Health and the Province of Bataan entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement regarding the construction of Bataan General Hospital's three (3)-storey building. While
this Memorandum was in effect, the Department of Health, through then Secretary Francisco T. Duque (Duque),
issued Department Personnel Order No. 2008-1452, appointing Dr. Baltazar as the hospital's Officer-in-Charge.[12]
According to petitioners, the Department of Health and the Province of Bataan entered into a Supplemental
Memorandum.[13] One (1) of the provisions stated that the parties agreed to give the supervision of the hospital to the
Secretary of Health or "his duly authorized representative with a minimum rank of Assistant Secretary[.]" [14] A third
Memorandum of Agreement was executed by the parties on June 16, 2009, but the Department of Health refused to
renew the agreement "due to a complaint already filed before the Honorable Congresswoman Herminia Roman, and
before the Department of Health."[15]
In their Complaint, petitioners questioned the validity of Dr. Baltazar's appointment and qualifications. [16] They alleged
that her appointment was "without any basis, experience[,] or expertise[.]"[17] They claimed that she was appointed
only by virtue of an endorsement of the Bataan Governor and without the prescribed Career Service Executive Board
qualifications.[18] Thus, her appointment violated Sections 8(1)(c), 8(2), 21(1), and 22 of Book V of the Administrative
Code which provide:
SECTION 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in the career service appointment
to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:
....
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.
(2) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance to the first two levels shall be through competitive examinations,
which shall be open to those inside and outside the service who meet the minimum qualification requirements.
Entrance to a higher level does not require previous qualification in the lower level. Entrance to the third level shall
be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.
....
SECTION 21. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. — (1) Opportunity for government employment shall be open
to all qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the
service. Employees shall be selected on the basis of fitness to perform the duties and assume the
responsibilities of the positions.
....
SECTION 22. Qualification Standards. — (1) A qualification standard expresses the minimum requirements for a
class of positions in terms of education, training and experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness, and other
qualities required for successful performance. The degree of qualifications of an officer or employee shall be
determined by the appointing authority on the basis of the qualification standard for the particular position.
Qualification standards shall be used as basis for civil service examinations for positions in the career
service, as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in the adjudication of protested
appointments, in determining training needs, and as aid in the inspection and audit of the agencies'
personnel work programs.
It shall be administered in such manner as to continually provide incentives to officers and employees towards
professional growth and foster the career system in the government service.
(2) The establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards shall be the responsibility of the
department or agency, with the assistance and approval of the Civil Service Commission and in consultation with the
Wage and Position Classification Office.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Petitioners pointed out that Dr. Baltazar's appointment was by virtue of a secondment pursuant to the Memorandum
of Agreement. Her third year as Officer-in-Charge via secondment already violated the law for failing to comply with
the required qualification standards.[20] Granting that there was compliance, secondment that exceeds one (1) year is
subject to the Civil Service Commission's approval under Section 9(a),[21] Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Department of Health Administrative Order No. 46, series of
2001. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999 likewise provides that the contract of
secondment should be submitted to the Commission within 30 days from its execution. A year after Dr. Baltazar's
secondment, the Commission did not issue any authority for her to continue to hold office as Officer-in-Charge of the
hospital. Hence, her assumption without the required authority was deemed illegal. [22]
Petitioners averred that the non-renewal of the Memorandum of Agreement by the Department of Health rendered
her appointment ineffective. Her holding of the position after this non-renewal was already illegal.[23]
In addition to Dr. Baltazar's alleged invalid appointment and lack of qualifications, petitioners contended that she
committed several abusive and malevolent acts detrimental to Bataan General Hospital's officers and
employees.[24] She authorized the collection of fees for the insertion and removal of intravenous fluids and fees for the
Nurse Station without any legal basis.[25] She also caused the removal from payroll of an employee, who, up to the
filing of the Complaint, had yet to receive remuneration, hazard pay, subsistence, and other allowances. [26]
Petitioners likewise alleged that Dr. Baltazar manipulated the creation of the Selection and Promotion Board to give
her control over the personnel's employment and promotion. She also disregarded the next-in-line rule when it comes
to appointment and promotion of employees.[27]
Furthermore, Dr. Baltazar allegedly employed two (2) doctors as contractual employees who were paid P20,000.00
but worked only half the time rendered by an employee-doctor of Bataan General Hospital. Lastly, petitioners claimed
that Dr. Baltazar allowed her doctor siblings to accommodate private patients while expressly prohibiting other
doctors to do the same.[28]
On October 17, 2011, the Civil Service Commission rendered a Decision[29] dismissing the Complaint on the ground
of forum shopping. The Civil Service Commission found that all elements of forum shopping were present in the case
and that petitioners' letter dated September 7, 2010 filed with the Department of Health contained the same
allegations against Dr. Baltazar and sought for the same relief Finally, the judgment by the Department of Health
would result to res judicata in the case before the Civil Service Commission. It also noted that another case was
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman in relation to the alleged removal of an employee in the hospital's
payroll.[30]
Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission resolved the issue of Dr. Baltazar's appointment "[f]or clarificatory
purposes[.]"[31] It held that Dr. Baltazar was not appointed as Officer-in-Charge of Bataan General Hospital but was
merely seconded to the position. Section 6 of the Civil Service Commission Circular No. 40, series of 1998, only
requires that seconded employees occupy a "professional, technical and scientific position[.]" [32]
The Civil Service Commission added that the approval requirement for secondments that exceed one (1) year was
already amended by Civil Service Commission Circular No. 06-1165.[33] The new circular merely required that the
Memorandum of Agreement or the secondment contract be submitted to the Commission "for records
purposes[.]"[34] Failure to submit within 30 days from the execution of the agreement or contract will only make the
secondment in effect 30 days before the submission date. [35]
On the alleged violation of the next-in-line rule, the Civil Service Commission held that "[e]mployees holding positions
next-in-rank to the vacated position do not enjoy any vested right thereto for purposes of promotion." [36] Seniority will
only be considered if the candidates possess the same qualifications. [37]
The dispositive portion of the Civil Service Commission Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the complaint of Dr. Joseph L. Malixi, Dr. Emelita Q. Firmacion, Marietta Mendoza, Aurora Agustin,
Nora Aguilar, Ma. Theresa M. Befetel and Myrna Nisay against Dr. Glory V. Baltazar for Dishonesty; Misconduct;
Oppression; Violation of Existing Civil Service Law and Rules or Reasonable Office Regulations; and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Being Notoriously Undesirable is hereby DISMISSED for violation of
the rule against forum-shopping.[38] (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners moved for reconsideration and argued that the letter before the Department of Health was simply a
request to meet the Secretary, and not a Complaint. Furthermore, the letter before the Department of Health and the
Complaint before the Civil Service Commission did not contain the same parties or seek the same relief.[39]
On July 17, 2012, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a Resolution [40] denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
It held that it was the Department of Health that considered petitioners' letter as their complaint, and not the Civil
Service Commission. Moreover, the Department of Health already exercised jurisdiction over the case when it
required Dr. Baltazar to comment on the letter-complaint.[41]
Petitioners elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.
On January 22, 2013, the Court of Appeals issued a Minute Resolution, [42] dismissing the appeal:
The petition is DISMISSED in view of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for Reconsideration] thereto was filed are
not indicated;
the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere photocopies;
petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance is not indicated; and
there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities.[43]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its July 16, 2013 Minute
Resolution.[44]
On September 4, 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Review[45] against Dr. Baltazar before this Court. They pray for
the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals and of the Decision and Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission.[46]
Petitioners maintain that they indicated the important dates in their appeal before the Court of Appeals and that they
attached certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. [47] However, they admit that they failed to
indicate the date of their counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance and to provide proof of
"competent evidence of identities."[48]
Petitioners also deny that they committed forum shopping. The alleged Complaint sent to the Department of Health
was a mere letter stating the employees' grievances and objections to the illegalities and violations committed by
respondent. It was a mere request for the Department of Health Secretary to tackle the issues and investigate the
concerns in the hospital's management. This letter was not intended to serve as a formal Complaint. They request
that this Court set aside the issue on forum shopping and that the case be resolved on its merits. [49]
On January 14, 2014, respondent filed her Comment[50] and prayed for the dismissal of the petition. She argues that
the procedural infirmities of petitioners' appeal are fatal to their case.[51]
On February 27, 2014, petitioners filed their Reply.[52] They reiterated their request for the relaxation of procedural
rules and the resolution of the case based on its merits. They also disclosed that Civil Service Commission Chairman
Duque, who signed the October 17, 2011 Decision, was formerly the Department of Health Secretary who seconded
respondent as Bataan General Hospital's Officer-in-Charge. Lastly, petitioners added that their letter to the
Department of Health was not a Complaint since it was not assigned a case number.[53]
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition based
on procedural grounds.
I
Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice. The importance of procedural rules in the adjudication
of disputes has been reiterated in numerous cases.[54] In Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.:[55]
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a
party. Adjective law is important in insuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed,
to provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time
in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. The other alternative is the settlement
of their conflict through the barrel of a gun.[56]
Moreover, in Le Soleil Int'l. Logistics Co., Inc,. et al. v. Sanchez, et al.: [57]
Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules
were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system. [58]
In this case, the Court of Appeals pointed out four (4) procedural infirmities:
1.
2.
3.
4.
the dates when the assailed Decision was received and when [a Motion for Reconsideration] thereto was filed are
not indicated;
the attached October 17, 2011 Decision and July 17, 2012 Resolution are mere photocopies;
petitioner's counsel's [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education] date of compliance is not indicated; and
there are no proofs of competent evidence of identities. [59]
Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants from pursuing their case nor are they
fabricated out of thin air. Every section in the Rules of Court and every issuance of this Court with respect to
procedural rules are promulgated with the objective of a more efficient judicial system.
On the first procedural rule that petitioners allegedly failed to comply with, this Court explained the rationale of the
requisite material dates in Lapid v. Judge Laurea:[60]
There are three material dates that must he stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or
for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received . . . As explicitly
stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As stated in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, the requirement is for purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, thus:
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of
determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41)
days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in
any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was
filed on time since the material dates were not stated . . .
Moreover, as reiterated in Mabuhay vs. NLRC, . . . "As a rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment
final and executory."[61] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
On the second procedural rule, this Court discussed the necessity of certified true copies in Pinakamasarap
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:[62]
There is a sound reason behind this policy and it is to ensure that the copy of the judgment or order sought to be
reviewed is a faithful reproduction of the original so that the reviewing court would have a definitive basis in its
determination of whether the court, body or tribunal which rendered the assailed judgment or order committed grave
abuse of discretion.[63] (Citation omitted)
On the third procedural rule, this Court clarified the importance of complying with the required MCLE information
in Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari:[64]
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized
mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession[,] and
enhanc[ing] the standards of the practice of law." [65]
Lastly, proofs of competent evidence of identities are required to ensure "that the allegations are true and correct and
not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith."[66]
II
Time and again, this Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice. [67]
In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo,[68] the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Petition for Review for failure to state the date he
received the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the date he filed his Motion for
Reconsideration.[69] This Court held:
[F]ailure to state the material dates is not fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of his receipt, i.e., 9 May
2006, of the RTC Resolution dated 18 April 2006 denying his Motion for Reconsideration is duly alleged in his
Petition. In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, we held that "the failure to
comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from
the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial
court's order denying the motion for reconsideration. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the
case if reasonably evident.
....
Accordingly, the parties are now given the amplest opportunity to fully ventilate their claims and defenses brushing
aside technicalities in order to truly ascertain the merits of this case. Indeed, judicial cases do not come and go
through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case.
In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
The court has [the] discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court,
not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors
technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is
not a game of technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant
must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where
the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial
justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and
cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[70] (Citations omitted)
In Barroga v. Data Center College of the Philippines, et al.,[71] petitioner likewise failed to state in his Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals the date he received the assailed Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission and the date he filed his Partial Motion for Reconsideration. [72] This Court held that "this omission is not
at all fatal because these material dates are reflected in petitioner's Partial Motion for Reconsideration[.]"[73] This
Court, citing Acaylar, further held:
In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, we held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if the same are
evident from the records of the case. It was further ruled by this Court that the more important material date which
must be duly alleged in the petition is the date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
In the case at bar, petitioner has duly complied with this rule.
....
The Court has time and again upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure and not to
override substantial justice. These are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of cases, hence, their strict
and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must be avoided. The CA thus should not have outrightly dismissed petitioner's petition based on these procedural
lapses.[74] (Citations omitted)
In Paras v. Judge Baldado,[75] the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' Petition for Certiorari on purely procedural
grounds. It found that petitioners failed to attach the required certified true copy of the assailed Regional Trial Court
Order in their petition.[76] This Court set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals and held:
[T]he records reveal that duplicate original copies of the said RTC orders were in fact attached to one of the seven
copies of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals; moreover, copies of the same orders, this time accomplished by
the clerk of court, were submitted by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Court finds that there
was substantial compliance with the requirement and the Court of Appeals should have given the petition due course.
"Cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be
served better."[77] (Citations omitted)
In Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan,[78] petitioner also failed to attach certified true copies of the assailed
decisions of the Labor Arbiter and of the National Labor Relations Commission in their petition before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on procedural grounds; but this Court, upon review, decided the
case on its merits.[79] This Court held:
[I]n the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved
on its merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply
the Rules liberally to resolve substantial issues raised by the parties.
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be determined on the
merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely
on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends.
Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in
court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice must be avoided.[80] (Citations omitted)
In Manila Electric Company v. Gala,[81] respondent sought for the denial of petitioner's Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court for allegedly violating procedural rules. Among the grounds that respondent relied upon
was the failure of petitioner's counsels to state in the petition their updated MCLE certificate numbers. [82] This Court
brushed aside the technical infirmity and held:
We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall
use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process is duly observed. In keeping with this policy and in the
interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper to give due course to the petition, especially in view of the conflict
between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other. As we said in
S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, "the application of technical rules of procedure in
labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice." [83] (Citations omitted)
In Doble, Jr. v. ABB, Inc.,[84] this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari due to the failure of petitioner's counsel to provide information regarding his MCLE
compliance.[85] Citing People v. Arrojado,[86] this Court held:
On point is People v. Arrojado where it was held that the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the
number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the
case:
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in
his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued
an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate
penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or
her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the
dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the
lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
Granted that the Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA on October 29, 2013 even before the effectivity of En
Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922, it bears to stress that petitioner's counsel
later submitted Receipts of Attendance in the MCLE Lecture Series for his MCLE Compliance IV on March 3, 2014
and the Certificate of Compliance albeit on January 26, 2015. Hence, the CA erred in issuing the assailed November
28, 2014 Resolution denying Doble's motion for reconsideration, there being no more reason not to reinstate the
petition for certiorari based on procedural defects which have already been corrected. Needless to state, liberal
construction of procedural rules is the norm to effect substantial justice, and litigations should, as much as possible,
be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.[87] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Zaulda,[88] one (1) of the grounds cited by the Court of Appeals to support its dismissal of
the Petition for Review was petitioners' failure to provide competent evidence of identities on the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping.[89] On this point, this Court held:
As regards the competent identity of the affiant in the Verification and Certification, records show that he proved his
identity before the notary public through the presentation of his Office of the Senior Citizen (OSCA) identification card.
Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires a party to the instrument to present competent
evidence of identity. Sec. 12, as amended, provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of
an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of
the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver's license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, PhilHealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government office ID, certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13SC dated February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a senior citizen card is one of the competent identification cards
recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. For said reason, there was compliance with the requirement.
Contrary to the perception of the CA, attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document is not
required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent
on it Thus, the CA's dismissal of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the affiant's identity on the attached
verification and certification against forum shopping was without clear basis.
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-attachment thereof
would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held that verification is merely a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not
render the pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to provide an assurance that the allegations are true and
correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The
court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may act on the pleading although it
may not have been verified, where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that
the ends of justice may be served . . .
....
Again, granting arguendo that there was non-compliance with the verification requirement, the rule is that courts
should not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really impair the proper administration of justice. After
all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected.
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must
be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities.
In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De La Cruz, where the verification was marred only by a glitch in the evidence of the identity
of the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that, in the interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked
and should not defeat the petition.
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not
preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the
cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on
technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.[90] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club,[91] respondent prayed for this Court's outright denial of the Petition for
Review due to petitioner's failure to provide competent evidence of identity in the verification page. [92] This Court
brushed aside this technicality and held:
Contrary to Uniwide's claim, the records of the case show that the petition's verification page contains Trajano's
competent evidence of identity, specifically, Passport No. XX041470. Trajano's failure to furnish Uniwide a copy of
the petition containing his competent evidence of identity is a minor error that this Court may and chooses to brush
aside in the interest of substantial justice. This Court has, in proper instances, relaxed the application of the Rules of
Procedure when the party has shown substantial compliance with it. In these cases, we have held that the rules of
procedure should not be applied in a very technical sense when it defeats the purpose for which it had been
enacted, i.e., to ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases. We maintain this ruling in this procedural
aspect of this case.[93] (Citations omitted)
Despite the number of cases wherein this Court relaxed the application of procedural rules, this Court has repeatedly
reminded litigants that:
[T]he bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this
Court to suspend procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed." The Court
reiterates that rules of procedure . . . "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. . . . The reason for rules of this nature is because the
dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing
practice . . . . Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions."
Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious
cases."[94] (Citations omitted)
Circumstances that may merit the relaxation of procedural rules are enumerated in Barnes v. Hon. Quijano
Padilla,[95] citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals:[96]
In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to resist a
strict adherence to procedure, enumerating the elements for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of
procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. [97]
In Republic v. Dagondon,[98] the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to timely file a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court decision.[99] The Court of Appeals held that the trial court decision "could no longer
be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments."[100] This Court relaxed its application of
the doctrine on immutability of judgment and held:
The mandatory character, however, of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not designed to be an inflexible
tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness,
and substantial justice.
....
[A] departure from the doctrine is warranted since its strict application would, in effect, circumvent and undermine the
stability of the Torrens System of land registration adopted in this jurisdiction. Relatedly, it bears stressing that the
subject matter of the instant controversy, i.e., Lot 84, is a sizeable parcel of real property. More importantly, petitioner
had adequately presented a strong and meritorious case.
Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Court deems it apt to exercise its prerogative to suspend procedural
rules and to resolve the present controversy according to its merits. [101] (Citations omitted)
In People v. Layag,[102] this Court likewise relaxed the rule on immutability of judgment due to a special or compelling
circumstance. This Court held that the death of accused-appellant is a compelling circumstance that warrants a reexamination of the criminal case.[103]
In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Yeung,[104] petitioner belatedly filed its Motion for Reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals.[105] Nonetheless, this Court gave due course to the Petition for Review and held:
[W]e find the delay of 7 days, due to the withdrawal of the petitioner's counsel during the reglementary period of filing
an MR, excusable in light of the merits of the case. Records show that the petitioner immediately engaged the
services of a new lawyer to replace its former counsel and petitioned the CA to extend the period of filing an MR due
to lack of material time to review the case. There is no showing that the withdrawal of its counsel was a contrived
reason or an orchestrated act to delay the proceedings; the failure to file an MR within the reglementary period of 15
days was also not entirely the petitioner's fault, as it was not in control of its former counsel's acts.
Moreover, after a review of the contentions and the submissions of the parties, we agree that suspension of the
technical rules of procedure is warranted in this case in view of the CA's erroneous application of legal principles and
the substantial merits of the case. If the petition would be dismissed on technical grounds and without due
consideration of its merits, the registered owner of the property shall, in effect, be barred from taking possession, thus
allowing the absurd and unfair situation where the owner cannot exercise its right of ownership. This, the Court
should not allow. In order to prevent the resulting inequity that might arise from the outright denial of this recourse –
that is, the virtual affirmance of the writ's denial to the detriment of the petitioner's right of ownership – we give due
course to this petition despite the late filing of the petitioner's MR before the CA.[106] (Emphasis in the original)
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[107] petitioner failed to file its appellant's brief within the
extended period granted by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. [108] This
Court reversed the dismissal and held:
Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If petitioner's appeal is denied due course, a government
institution could lose a great deal of money ever a mere technicality. Obviously, such an appeal is far from being
merely frivolous or dilatory.
....
Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate
the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the rules' primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should
never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. [109] (Citations
omitted)
In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[110] respondents prayed for the denial of the petition on the
ground that petitioner failed to file 12 copies of its brief, in violation of Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court.[111] This Court dismissed the technical defect and held:
We have ruled that when non-compliance with the Rules was not intended for delay or did not result in prejudice to
the adverse party, dismissal of appeal on mere technicalities — in cases where appeal is a matter of right — may be
stayed, in the exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. It does not appear that respondents were unduly prejudiced
by petitioner's nonfeasance. Neither has it been shown that such failure was intentional. [112] (Citation omitted)
III
Due to compelling circumstances in this case, this Court opts for a liberal application of procedural rules. First,
Department Personnel Order No. 2008-1452,[113] which designated respondent as Officer-in-Charge of Bataan
General Hospital, was signed by then Department of Health Secretary Duque. Duque was also the signatory in the
2008 Memorandum of Agreement,[114] the undated Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement,[115] and the June 16,
2009 Memorandum of Agreement,[116] which were the bases of respondent's secondment. Duque was later appointed
as Civil Service Commission Chairman and signed the October 17, 2011 Decision and the July 17, 2012 Resolution
of the Civil Service Commission, dismissing the complaint against respondent. Clearly, a conflict of interest existed
when the public officer authorizing the secondment of respondent was also the same person dismissing the complaint
questioning respondent's secondment.
Second, resolving the merits of the case would "give more efficacy to the constitutional mandate on the accountability
of public officers and employees[.]"[117] In Executive Judge Paredes v. Moreno,[118] this Court found respondent "guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" [119] for his continued absence of almost three (3)
months.[120] This Court held:
His misconduct is prejudicial to the service. Although a mere employee/laborer in the City Court of Manila,
respondent is as much duty-bound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
as all other public officers and employees . . . We find respondent's shortcomings to warrant a sanction to serve as
deterrent not only to him but also to other court employees who shall commit the same or any and all forms of official
misconduct which undermine the people's faith in their fitness for public service.[121]
Furthermore, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court of Appeals should avoid dismissal of cases based merely
on technical grounds. Judicial economy requires the prosecution of cases "with the least cost to the parties"[122] and to
the courts' time, effort, and resources.[123]
IV
On a final note, this Court clarifies the concept of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is generally judicial. It exists:
[W]henever a party "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court." It
has also been defined as "an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition." Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects the
efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources
of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial processes.[124] (Citations omitted)
The test to determine whether or not forum shopping was committed was explained in Dy, et al. v. Yu, et al.:[125]
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether
the clement of litis pendentia is present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. Otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res
judicata arises by virtue of a party's commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already exists (either
pending or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed. [126] (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted)
In Ligtas v. People,[127] this Court reiterated that res judicata may also be applied to "decisions rendered by agencies
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings[.]" [128] In Salazar v. De
Leon,[129] this Court further held;
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts.
But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of
a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers. . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with
power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or
a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already
mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is
to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.[130] (Citations omitted)
Thus, forum shopping, in the concept of res judicata, is applicable to judgments or decisions of administrative
agencies performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 22, 2013 and July 16, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 127252 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court
of Appeals for a resolution on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
10. [ G.R. No. 207074. January 17, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction, including the allocation of rights and
determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's name.
The name through which one is known is generally, however, not chosen by the individual who bears it. Rather, it is
chosen by one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a product of the exercise of autonomy of the
individual to whom it refers.
In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's identity, the law requires that these labels be registered.
Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other aspects of one's identity that pertain to one's name
are not reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of Live Birth filed with the civil registrar.
Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of two (2) motives. The first, as an exercise of one's
autonomy, is to change the appellation that one was given for various reasons. The other is not an exercise to
change the label that was given to a person; it is simply to correct the data as it was recorded in the Civil Registry.
This is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the Republic of the Philippines' appeal [3] from the Regional Trial Court December
7, 2010 Order[4] granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her
Certificate of Live Birth.
Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always been female. Her parents, married on May
23, 1981, have never changed their names. For her, in her petition before the Regional Trial Court, her Certificate of
Live Birth contained errors, which should be corrected. For her, she was not changing the name that was given to
her; she was merely correcting its entry.
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City,
Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155[5] for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological
sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108[6] of the Rules of Court.[7]
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her
father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as
these were not recorded.[8]
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of records, medical
certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate.[9]
The Regional Trial Court, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a hearing on August 2,
2010. It also ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela. [10]
The Office of the Solicitor General authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear on its behalf. [11] Trial
then ensued.
During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's certification, and transcript
indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who examined her also certified that she was
female.[12] On cross-examination, Gallo explained that she never undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and
that she filed the petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport. [13]
The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 2010 Order, granted the petition.[14] It lent credence to the documents
Gallo presented and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous." [15] It concluded that there
was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and applied Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court,[16] citing Republic v. Cagandahan.[17] Thus:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, an order is hereby issued directing the Civil Registrar General, NSO
through the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the entries in the Birth Certificate of the petitioner as
well as in the National Statistics Office Authenticated copy particularly her first name "MICHAEL" to "MICHELLE",
gender from "MALE" to "FEMALE", middle name of petitioner to be entered as "SORIANO", middle names of
petitioner's parents to be properly supplied as "ANGANGAN" for the mother and "BALINGAO" for the father, as well
as date of marriage of petitioner's parents to be recorded as "MAY 23, 1981", after payment of legal fees if there be
any.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court for Petitions for Change of Name.[19] It argued that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements
under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael
Gallo."[20] Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the cause of the change of name. [21]
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal. [22] It
found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and
innocuous.[23] It further clarified that Rule 108 is limited to the implementation of Article 412 of the Civil Code [24] and
that the proceedings which stem from it can "either be summary, if the correction sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if
[it] affects . . . civil status, citizenship or nationality . . . which are deemed substantial corrections."[25]
The Court of Appeals discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs the proceeding for changing the given or
proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register." [26]
Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name, to wit: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change
is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. [27]
The Court of Appeals also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the matter, classifies a change in
the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as clerical error that may be corrected without a judicial order." [28] It
applied this ruling on the inclusion of Gallo's middle name, her parents' middle names, and the latter's date of
marriage, as they do not involve substantial corrections. [29]
As the petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held that a summary proceeding
would have sufficed. With this determination, the Regional Trial Court's more rigid and stringent adversarial
proceeding was more than enough to satisfy the procedural requirements under Rule 108. [30]
However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For it, Gallo wants to change
the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Petition raises procedural errors made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in finding for
Gallo.[31]
Citing Republic v. Mercadera,[32] petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule 108.[33] Thus, the correction must only
be for a patently misspelled name.[34] As "Michael" could not have been the result of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner
contends that the case should fall under Rule 103 for it contemplates a substantial change. [35]
Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule. [36] It also argues that the use of a different name is
not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103.[37]
Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction[38] as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first name, superseding the civil
registrar's jurisdiction over the matter.[39]
To support its claim, it cited Silverio v. Republic, [40] which held that "[t]he intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 . . . and 108 . . . of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied." [41]
Respondent Gallo, in her Comment,[42] counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned corrections are
innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. [43] In
any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence, the applicable rule is Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with
the requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly satisfied.[44] Lastly, she contends that petitioner has waived its
right to invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file
a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues before this Court. [45]
Petitioner filed its Reply.[46] The case was then submitted for resolution after the parties filed their respective
Memoranda.[47]
The issues for this Court's resolution are:
First, whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the change sought by
Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error;
Second, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors; and
Finally, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
This Court finds for the respondent. Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil Registry.
I
In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere correction of error, petitioner
raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition, which should only raise questions of law.
Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions do not include weighing and
analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over again.
In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.[48]:
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under
Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to
once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.
Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question of fact:
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal
pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of
"law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can
resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of
fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn
from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each
other, the issue is factual.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as determining whether or not
the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change requires looking into the party's records,
supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.
On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048, is helpful in identifying
the nature of the determination sought.
Republic Act No. 10172[50] defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which is visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding." Thus:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name
or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference
to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
or status of the petitioner.[51]
Likewise, Republic Act No. 9048[52] states:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name
or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. [53]
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to and evaluation of
existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the understanding," even
if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used.
This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of Appeals, that this case
involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this Court is bound by the lower courts' findings.
II.A
In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the entry of Gallo's
biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all other
corrections sought.
Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons,"[54] which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there.[55]
Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage, judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments of natural children,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation, voluntary
emancipation of a minor, and changes of name.[56]
As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic
Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes or corrections of name were Articles 376 and
412 of the Civil Code.
Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name. [57] On the other hand,
Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry in the civil register may be changed or
corrected.[58]
Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given
name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized by law, or Rule 108 for corrections of
clerical errors.
This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, who may be affected
by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these proceedings bind the whole world. [59]
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article
376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the
status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known." When granted, a person's identity and
interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent
fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to
afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not
only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might
make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations or in the rights and
duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. However, "there could be instances
where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the
applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties
might be erroneously impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is
not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced . . . . mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant . .
."[60] (Citations omitted)
Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must file a petition
under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a hearing date and directing the
order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation. [61] After finding that there is proper and reasonable cause to
change his or her name, the Regional Trial Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civil register. [62]
On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous mistakes in his or
her documents with the civil register.[63] It also governs the correction of substantial errors in the entry of the
information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule[64] and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a
person.[65] The proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or
adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors.[66]
As explained in Republic v. Mercadera:[67]
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial errors
or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue
an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the
civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to
the contrary admitted ...." "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but
only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution."[68] (Emphasis in the original)
Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court. The
trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.[69] After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the
Civil Registrar.[70]
Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108, thus:
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule
108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a
request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked
therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be
raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a
patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are
confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil
registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for
allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108
provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths
about the facts recorded therein."[71] (Citations omitted)
However, Republic Act No. 9048[72] amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing clerical
errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the jurisdiction of the civil
register.[73]
In Silverio v. Republic:[74]
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of
name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376
of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .
....
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. [75] (Citations omitted)
In Republic v. Cagandahan:[76]
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. [77] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In Republic v. Sali:[78]
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been habitually
and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in the community.
The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is
only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the
appropriate petition with the proper court.[79] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical
mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames. [80]
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. [81]
Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name through
administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been filed and later
denied.
In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172. [82]
In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may now be changed
without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these changes may now be administratively
corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical or typographical mistake in the entry. It may be changed by
filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record
being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.[83]
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.— No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently
clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.[84] (Emphasis supplied)
However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on August 15, 2012—
more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. [85] Hence, Republic Act
No. 9048 governs.
II.B
As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the nature of the correction
sought by Gallo.
Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent contends that it is Rule
108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of clerical errors.
Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of clerical
errors.
A clerical or typographical error pertains to a
[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil
register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the , and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records[.] [86]
However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered clerical or
typographical.[87]
Jurisprudence is replete with cases determining what constitutes a clerical or typographical error in names with the
civil register.
In Republic v. Mercadera,[88] Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) sought to correct her name from "Marilyn" to
"Merlyn."[89] She alleged that "she had been known as MERLYN ever since" and she prayed that the trial court correct
her recorded given name "Marilyn" "to conform to the one she grew up to." [90] The Office of the Solicitor General
argued that this change was substantial which must comply with the procedure under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.[91] However, this Court ruled that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition merely sought to correct a
misspelled given name:
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears as
"Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn'' is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between
"Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up that blemished Mercadera's Certificate of Live Birth until her
adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.
The [Court of Appeals] did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her
misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember. [92]
Mercadera also cited similar cases in which this Court determined what constitutes harmless errors that need not go
through the proceedings under Rule 103:
Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize the same a
harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely involves the substitution
of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In LabayoRowe v. Republic, it was held that the change of petitioner's name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to
"Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters
"ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this
Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the
name of the child from 'Midael C. Mazon' to 'Michael C. Mazon' cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both
names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).[93] (Citations
omitted)
Likewise, in Republic v. Sali,[94] Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali) sought to correct her Certificate of Live Birth, alleging that
her first name was erroneously entered as "Dorothy" instead of "Lorena," and her date of birth as "June 24, 1968"
instead of "April 24, 1968." She alleged that she had been using the name "Lorena" and the birth date "April 24,
1968" ever since. She also averred that she had always been known as "Lorena" in her community. She claimed that
the petition was just to correct the error and not to evade any criminal or civil liability, or to affect any succession of
another person.[95]
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, argued against Sali's claim, alleging that
the petition was for a change of name under Rule 103 and not for the correction of a simple clerical error. It averred
that there must be a valid ground for the name change, and the applicant's names and aliases must be stated in the
title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing. It also contended that assuming Rule 108 was the proper
remedy, Sali failed to exhaust her remedies when she did not file an affidavit under Republic Act No. 9048. [96]
In Sali, this Court held that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition was not for a change of name, but a petition
for correction of errors in the recording of Sali's name and birth date. Sali had been using the name "Lorena" since
birth, and she merely sought to have her records conform to the name she had been using as her true name. She
had no intention of changing her name altogether. Thus, her prayer for the correction of her misspelled name is not
contemplated by Rule 103.[97]
In the case at bar, petitioner, raising the same arguments as that in Sali, claims that the change sought by Gallo is
substantial, covered by Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly entirely different from each other. It argues
that "Michael" could not have been the result of a misspelling of "Michelle."[98]
On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108, with the requirements of
an adversarial proceeding properly complied.[99]
Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which she is
commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing the petition to
change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name.
Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.[100]
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her given name.
"Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are
exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle."
"Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or intonations
of different people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have
determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her
records to conform to her true given name.
However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. [101] The current law, Republic Act No.
10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012. [102]
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048. [103]
To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction of clerical or
typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of
any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first name or nickname. Thus:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. [104]
Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional Trial Court. Only if
her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the Regional Trial Court take cognizance of
her case. In Republic v. Sali,[105]
Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for correction of entries
under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were committed in the recording of her
name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103
and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that,
since birth, she has been using the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change
her name. What she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the
same to conform to the name she grew up with.
Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect . . .
....
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been habitually
and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in the community.
The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is
only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the
appropriate petition with the proper court . . .
....
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the RTC's primary
jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the
local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the
petition to correct Sali’s first name.[106]
Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as Angangan for her
mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage as May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or
typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.
Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name
or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. [107]
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it involves any change in
Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.
Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" [108] fall within the coverage of clerical mistakes
not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance
in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be made.
Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before filing a petition under
Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a substantial
change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048.[109]
This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan:[110]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.[111] (Citation omitted)
It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to biological sex
may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical error.[112]
However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a substantive
matter.
In Cagandahan,[113] this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex in his or her
Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under Rule 108. [114] In that case, it
was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of an error in recording but a petition for a change of
records because the sex change was initiated by the petitioner. [115]
IV
Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before proceeding to the courts,
petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9048.[116]
On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these doctrines because it failed
to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these Issues before this Court. [117]
This Court rules in favor of Gallo.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative processes
available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be given every
opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the
party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a
case in court.[118]
However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's
jurisdiction.[119] Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:[120]
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non compliance with this rule is that it
will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. [121] (Citation
omitted)
Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction over a
controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true
when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.[122]
In Republic v. Lacap: [123]
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. [124] (Citation omitted)
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take cognizance of a
case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived.
However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to raise the
issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a
subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches. [125]
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy:[126]
True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as
the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall
forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this
late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation ...
....
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction ... In the case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice cannot be tolerated— obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court ... And in Littleton vs. Burgess, ...
the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. [127] (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised only as an
afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from doing so.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively
small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application
may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings . . .[128] (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was only raised in this Court.
Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court, it is estopped from invoking these
doctrines as grounds for dismissal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 96358 is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle
Soriano Gallo is GRANTED. This Court directs that the Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo be corrected
as follows:
1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";
2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";
3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";
4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";
5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and
6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."
SO ORDERED.
11. G.R. Nos. 105965-70
August 9, 1999
GEORGE UY, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., Special Prosecution
Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution1 of the
Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's motion to quash the six (6) informations charging him with
violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and to permanently enjoin the respondents
from proceeding with the criminal cases insofar as petitioner is involved.
At times material hereto, petitioner was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was
designated by his immediate supervisor, Captain Luisito F. Fernandez, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff
for Comptrollership, to act on the latter's behalf, during his absence, on matters relating to the
activities of the Fiscal Control Branch, O/NG. This included the authority to sign disbursement
vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the Philippine Navy.
1âwphi 1.nêt
On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official documents and one (1)
information for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner and nineteen (19) co-accused, namely: (Ret.) Bgen. Mario S.
Espina (then Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics, Department of National Defense),
(Ret.) Rear Admiral Simeon M. Alejandro (then Flag Officer in Command, Philippine Navy), CDR
Rodolfo Guanzon, CDR Erlindo A. Erolin, CAPT. Manual Ison (then Commander of the Naval Supply
Center, Philippine Navy), CAPT. Andres Andres, LCDR Gilmer B. Batestil, LCDR Jose Alberto I.
Velasco, Jr., LTSG Edgar L. Abogado, LT. Teddy O. Pan, LT. Ronald O. Sison, Reynaldo Paderna
(Chief Accountant), Antonio Guda (Supply Accountable Officer, Fort San Felipe, Cavite, Philippine
Navy), Loida T. Del Rosario (Typist), Marissa Bantigue (owner of MAR GEN Enterprise), Avelina
Avila (owner of Avelina Avila General Merchandise), Jenis B. Bantigue (owner of JAB GEN
Merchandise), Maria M. Capule (owner of MM Capule Enterprise) and Andrea C. Antonio (owner of
AC Antonio Enterprise).
On September 20, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order2 directing a comprehensive reinvestigation of the cases against all the twenty (20) accused.
After conducting the re-investigation, the Special Prosecutor issued an Order3 dated November 14,
1991 recommending that the informations for estafa through falsification of official documents be
withdrawn and in lieu thereof, informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended, be filed against eleven (11) accused,4 which included the petitioner.
In a Memorandum5 dated December 5, 1991, Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto reduced the
number of those to be charged under R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to five (5),6 including petitioner.
Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the five (5) remaining accused, the Special
Prosecutor issued an Order7 dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2) more names8 from the five
(5) officers recommended for prosecution, and recommending that six (6) separate informations for
violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, as amended, be filed against the petitioner, LCMDR. Rodolfo
Guanzon and LT. Teddy Pan. Except for the variance in the Purchase Order numbers involved and
the Payees,9 the six (6) amended informations10 filed by Special Prosecutor Officer III Roger C.
Berbano, Sr. recite identical allegations, viz:
That on or about November 1985, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, CDR. Rodolfo Guanzon, being then the Procurement Officer, Philippine Navy,
LCDR. George Uy, being then the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Comptrollership, Philippine
Navy and Lt. Teddy O. Pan, being then the Naval Group Inspector, Philippine Navy, all public
officials, and committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, cause
undue injury to the Government, and in the exercise of their separate official functions, to wit:
accused Guanzon initiated/prepared the Abstract of Canvass and Recommendation of
Awards, Certificate of Emergency Purchase and Reasonableness of Price, signed the PO,
DV, validated PO No. . . ., accused Uy signed the DV in behalf of the Assistant Chief of
Naval Comptrollership, accused Pan as N6 conducted the pre-audit and affixed his signature
on the same P.O., the Sales Invoice and Technical Inspection Report — which documents
said accused had the duty to check/verify/examined, thereby "acting or omitting to act" in a
situation where there is a duty to act, in that only 100 seal rings were ordered at a unit price
of P98.70, yet 1,000 pieces appear to have been sold with total price of P98,700.00, hence
there was gross error in multiplication as shown on the face of the aforesaid PO and other
supporting documents, resulting to an overpayment of P88,930.00 to . . ., thereby depriving
the Government/Philippine Navy of the use thereof until its remittance/return to the
Government/Philippine Navy by . . . in December, 1991.
On April 21, 1992, the petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash11 the informations
on the following grounds:
1. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused.
2. The officer who has filed the informations had no authority to do so.
3. The facts charged do not constitute an offense.
4. More than one (1) offense is charged.
On June 10, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued the now-assailed Resolution denying petitioner's
motion to quash for lack of merit. It passed upon the grounds set forth by petitioner in this wise:
On the first issue raised by accused-movant, we are not inclined to rule that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the person of accused-movant or over the offenses charged herewith. As
intimated by the prosecution, this Court has several cases pending before it involving crimes
committed by military officers in relation to their office. Unless and until the Highest Tribunal
rules otherwise, this Court has no judicious recourse but to entertain and try the various
criminal cases filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor involving military officers and men
accused of committing crimes "in relation to their office," and those involving violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Be that as it may, being prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, as amended,
accused-movant axiomatically is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
We cannot likewise sustain accused-movant's stance that the officer who has filed the
informations in the cases at bar had no authority to do so. Both the offense charged and the
person of accused-movant being within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, it stands to
reason that the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the instant criminal charges
belong to, and are the exclusive prerogatives of, the Office of the Ombudsman, as provided
for in Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770.
Neither are we impressed with the asseveration that the acts charged in the amended
informations at bar do not constitute an offense. Such a claim cannot stand in the face of
unequivocal rulings of the Supreme Court, thus:
The fundamental rule in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the
averments of the information are not sufficient to constitute the offense charged is
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential
elements of the offense, as defined in the law. (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162).
As a general proposition, too, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in
the information do not constitute the offense charged, or of any offense for that
matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and
veracity are hypothetically admitted. (People v. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516).
The general rule is that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or
information, the facts alleged therein should be taken as they are. This is especially
so if the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute offense, but he court may consider additional facts which the fiscal admits
to be true. (People v. Navarro, supra).
In consonance with the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements, the quashal of the informations
at bar cannot be sustained since they are sufficient in form and substance to charge
indictable offenses. Parenthetically, some of the arguments relied upon by accused-movant
refer more to evidentiary matters, the determination of which are not yet legally feasible at
this juncture and should only be raised during the trial on the merits.
Finally, We find no merit in the argument that more than one offense is charged in the
criminal informations at bar. Precisely, the prosecution split the original information into six
(6) distinct amended informations pertaining to six (6) criminal violations of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. 3019, as amended. Such is but proper under the premises considering that the acts
subject of the criminal cases at bar were allegedly committed on six (6) different purchase
orders and there is no showing that they were committed on similar dates or singular
occasion.
In the instant petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the
person of the petitioner;
2) Whether or not the respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor have the authority
to file the questioned amended information;
3) Whether or not the act or omission charged constitutes an offense.
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner and the Solicitor General submit that it is the court-martial, not
the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner. Emphasizing the fundamental doctrine
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action, they claim that at the time the amended informations were filed on July 2, 1991, the
controlling law on the jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is P.D. 1850,
"Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further
defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines"
(which took effect on October 4, 1982), as amended by P. D. 1952 (which took effect in September
of 1984), more particularly Section 1(b) thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed
Forces. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, (a) uniformed members of
the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts
shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all
persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit
any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of
under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the
case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial
jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act
Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused
military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their
separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand
unless otherwise provided by law: Provided, further, that the President may, in the interest of
Justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the
appropriate civil court.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to
police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards. (emphasis ours).
Since petitioner is a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he falls squarely under
Article 2 of the Articles of War (C.A. 408, as amended) mentioned in the aforecited Section 1(b) of
P.D. 1850. Article 2 reads:
Art. 2: Persons subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these Articles
and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or
"person subject to military law; whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular
Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty
and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instruction; and all
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the
said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order
to obey the same; . . . .
Petitioner and the Solicitor General concede the subsequent passage of Republic Act No. 7055, "An
Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction
over certain offenses involving members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, other persons
subject to military law, and the members of the Philippine National Police, repealing for the purpose
certain presidential decrees" (which took effect on July 13, 1991) which expressly repealed P.D.
1850. Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 reads:
Sec. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military
law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit
crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal law, or local
government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties which may be natural or judicial persons, shall be tried by the proper civil
court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That
the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time
before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws,
or local government ordinances.
They nonetheless argue that petitioner's case falls within the exception provided for in said Section 1
of R. A. No. 7055, and, therefore, still cognizable by courts-martial, since the alleged commission of
the offense for which petitioner is charged with is "service-connected ."
We rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the time of the filing of the
informations, and as now prescribed by law.
Republic Act No. 8249,12 the latest amendment to P. D. 160613 creating the Sandiganbayan
(otherwise known as the "Sandiganbayan Law"), provides the prevailing scope of the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law read:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d.) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
xxx
xxx
xxx
It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the offense and the position
occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take
cognizance of the case.
In the instant case, while petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended, which is an offense covered by Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, his position as
Lieutenant Commander (LCMDR.) of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than "naval captains and all
officer of higher rank" as prescribed under sub-paragraph (d) of Section 4. Under the Promotions
System in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the hierarchy in the position/rank of the officers of
the Philippine Navy is as follows:
1. Admiral
2. Vice-Admiral
3. Rear Admiral
4. Commodore
5. Captain
6. Commander
7. Lieutenant Commander
8. Lieutenant Senior Grade
9. Lieutenant Junior Grade
10. Ensign
Thus, not falling within the "rank" requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over
petitioner is vested in the regular courts pursuant to the provision of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan
Law, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that "In cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Consequently, it is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged. Under
Section 9 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, the commission of any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less
than SIX YEARS AND ONE MONTH or FIFTEEN YEARS. The indictment against petitioner cannot
fall within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit
trial courts because under Republic Act No. 7691 which amended certain provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by expanding the jurisdiction of said inferior courts, they "exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof . . . ." This draws the case into the domain of the regional trial courts
which, under Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now
falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be
exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter."
It is not correct that under R. A. No. 7055, the courts-martial retain jurisdiction over petitioner's case
since the offense for which he is charged is "service-connected." The second paragraph of Section 1
of R. A. No. 7055 limits the nature of "service-connected crimes or offenses" to those defined only in
Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92 and 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,14 to wit:
Fraudulent enlistment, making Unlawful Enlistment, False Muster, False Returns, Desertion,
Advising or Aiding Another to Desert, Entertaining a Deserter, Absence Without Leave, Disrespect
towards the President, Vice-President and National Assembly, Disrespect towards Superior Officer,
Mutiny or Sedition, Failure to Suppress Mutiny of Sedition, Quarrels; Frays; Disorders, Breaking an
Arrest or Escaping from Confinement, Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners, Failure to make a
Report of Prisoners Received, Releasing prisoners without proper authority, Failure to Deliver
offenders to Civil Authorities, Misbehavior Before the Enemy, Subordinates Compelling Commander
to Surrender, Improper Use of Countersign, Forcing a Safeguard, Neglect or Wrongful Appropriation
of Captured Property, Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property, Relieving, Corresponding with,
or Aiding the Enemy, Spies, Damage/Wrongful Disposition of Military Property, Waste or Unlawful
Disposition of Military Property, Drunk on Duty, Misbehavior of Sentinel, Personal Interest in Sale of
Provisions, Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions, Good Order to be Maintained and Wrong
Redressed, Provoking Speeches or Gestures, Dueling, Fraud against the Government Affecting
Matters and Equipment, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman, and All Disorders and
Neglects to the Prejudice of Good Order and Military Discipline and All Conduct of a Nature of Bring
Discredit Upon the Military Services. None of these offenses relates to acts or omissions constituting
a violation of Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, as amended which reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.15
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 10, 1992 in Criminal Cases Nos.
16905-16910, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Sandiganbayan is ordered
to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 16905-16910, and to inform this Court of the action taken hereon
within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision.
1âw phi 1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.