Dispatch No. 489 | 15 November 2021
Africans welcome China’s influence but
maintain democratic aspirations
Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 489 1 | Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny
and Edem Selormey
Summary
Home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies (Mitchell, 2019), Africa has attracted
the attention of leaders and economic strategists everywhere, including China. Over the
past two decades, political and economic relations between China and Africa have grown
rapidly, with trade volumes increasing from about $11 billion in 2000 to $192 billion in 2019
(Amoah, Hodzi, & Castillo, 2020; China Africa Research Initiative, 2018;
Thomas, 2021). While the United States is still the continent’s largest
aid donor, China is the leading provider of financial support for
infrastructure development in Africa (Muchira, 2018; Shepherd &
Blanchard, 2018).
However, China’s investments and dealings with Africa have been a
topic of widespread scrutiny and debate. Because China’s financial
support for Africa is often in the form of long-term loans rather than
grants, it has been criticized as a “debt trap” that China may use to
gain strategic advantages on the continent (Green, 2019). Some argue that African
countries that borrow from China may lose key assets if they are unable to pay back their
loans (Brautigam, 2019; Brautigam & Kidane, 2020; Sun, 2014). Others are concerned that
China is using its influence to promote its political ideas on the continent (Scott, 2021).
How do ordinary Africans perceive China’s engagement with their countries and
economies?
Afrobarometer’s national surveys in 34 African countries in 2019/2021 show that Africans hold
positive views of China’s assistance and influence on the continent, though its perceived
level of influence on African economies has waned over the past five years. Positive views of
China’s influence do not appear to affect Africans’ attitudes toward democracy. China
remains second to the United States as the preferred development model for Africans. And
majorities of those who are aware of Chinese loans and development assistance to their
countries are concerned about being heavily indebted to China.
Afrobarometer surveys
Afrobarometer is a pan-African, nonpartisan survey research network that provides reliable
data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life.
Eight rounds of surveys have been completed in up to 39 countries since 1999. Round 8
surveys (2019/2021) cover 34 countries. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in
the language of the respondent’s choice.
An earlier version of this dispatch, based on data from 18 countries surveyed before the COVID-19 pandemic
forced a pause in Round 8 fieldwork, was published as Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 407.
1
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
1
Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent’s choice
with nationally representative samples that yield country-level results with margins of error of
+/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.
This 34-country analysis is based on 48,084 interviews (see Appendix Table A.1 for a list of
countries and fieldwork dates). The data are weighted to ensure nationally representative
samples. When reporting multi-country averages, all countries are weighted equally (rather
than in proportion to population size). Due to rounding, reported totals may differ by 1
percentage point from the sum of sub-categories.
Key findings


On average across 34 countries, China trails the United States as Africans’ preferred
development model (33% vs. 22%), followed by South Africa (12%) and former
colonial powers (11%).
o
The United States ranks at the top in 23 of 34 surveyed countries, while China is No.
1 in five countries: Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Botswana.
o
While the overall averages have changed little over the past five years, some
countries record substantial changes, including Benin (a 21-percentage-point
increase in preference for China) and Liberia (an 18-point increase in preference
for the United States).
Almost two-thirds (63%) of Africans say the economic and political influence of China
in their country is “somewhat positive” or “very positive,” while only about one in
seven (14%) consider it negative. Views on U.S. influence are almost identical (60% vs.
13%).
o

While a majority (59%) of Africans say China’s economic activities in their country
have “some” or “a lot” of influence on their economy, that proportion has declined
sharply over the past five years (from 71%).
o



On average across 30 countries surveyed in both 2014/2015 and 2019/2021,
positive views of China’s political and economic influence have not changed
significantly.
Perceptions of Chinese influence declined in 24 countries, including huge drops in
Sierra Leone (-37 percentage points), Zimbabwe (-29 points), Botswana (-24
points), Malawi (-21 points), Niger (-21 points), and Mali (-20 points).
Among the 47% of African citizens who are aware of Chinese loans or development
assistance to their country, a majority (57%) say their government has borrowed too
much money from China.
Views on whether China or the United States is preferable as a development model
do not appear to affect Africans’ support for democracy or democratic norms.
Seven in 10 Africans (69%) say English is the most important international language for
young people to learn. Only 3% prefer Chinese.
Best model for development
Afrobarometer asks Africans which country provides the best model for the future
development of their own country. As in the 2014/2015 survey (Lekorwe, Chingwete, Okuru, &
Samson, 2016), China ranks second across 34 countries in 2019/2021, trailing the United States
(22% vs. 33%) (Figure 1). About one in 10 respondents cite South Africa (12%) or their former
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
2
colonial power (Britain, France, Portugal, or Germany) (11%), while 7% say they should follow
their own country’s model.
Figure 1: Best model for development | 34 countries | 2019/2021
United States
33
China
22
South Africa
12
Former colonial power
11
Ethiopia
2
Other countries
4
None of these/There is no role model
2
We should follow our own country’s
model
7
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model?
In 23 of the 34 countries, citizens prefer the U.S. model to China’s, including large gaps in
Liberia (77 percentage points), Sierra Leone (40 points), Morocco (34 points), Angola (28
points), Cabo Verde (27 points), the Gambia (24 points), and Zimbabwe (20 points)
(Figure 2). China outstrips the United States in five of the 34 countries: Benin (by 23
percentage points), Mali (23 points), Burkina Faso (19 points), Niger (4 points), and Botswana
(4 points). Tanzania, Senegal, Tunisia, Eswatini, Malawi, and Mozambique show equal
preference for both models.
Given that China is the newcomer in this global competition, it is notable that younger
Africans are more likely than their elders to favor the U.S. model (36% of those aged 18-25 vs.
26% of those over age 55), while regard for the Chinese model is fairly steady across all age
groups (Figure 3). Men and women are equally likely to prefer the United States, but more
men than women prefer China (25% vs. 19%). Respondents’ education level and experience
with poverty 2 seem to make only a modest difference in their preferred development model.
Afrobarometer’s Lived Poverty Index (LPI) measures respondents’ levels of material deprivation by asking
how often they or their families went without basic necessities (enough food and water, medical care, enough
cooking fuel, and a cash income) during the preceding year. For more on lived poverty, see Mattes (2020).
2
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3
Figure 2: Best model for development: China vs. U.S. | 34 countries | 2019/2021
Benin
47
24
Burkina Faso
40
21
Mali
39
15
Tanzania
35
32
31
Ethiopia
30
29
29
Senegal
Nigeria
29
Côte d'Ivoire
39
26
22
26
Botswana
Guinea
34
25
Niger
21
24
Gabon
32
24
Sudan
35
23
Kenya
23
Cameroon
22
Zambia
42
29
31
22
34-country average
33
22
Uganda
22
24
20
22
20
27
20
Mozambique
Malawi
Lesotho
South Africa
19
19
19
Tunisia
Ghana
16
Mauritius
16
Morocco
37
23
50
40
15
Cabo Verde
41
37
15
Gambia
36
33
26
Togo
45
42
14
Sierra Leone
11
Namibia
10
Angola
38
9
Zimbabwe
29
8
Liberia
54
18
85
6
5
Eswatini
0%
20%
China
40%
60%
80%
100%
United States
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model?
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
4
Figure 3: Best model for development: China vs. U.S. | by socio-demographic group
| 34 countries | 2019/2021
19
Women
25
Men
Rural
22
Urban
23
18-25 years
22
26-35 years
23
36-45 years
23
46-55 years
21
33
33
31
34
36
34
32
31
21
26
56 years and above
22
28
21
33
22
35
25
34
No formal education
Primary
Secondary
Post-secondary
20
No lived poverty
Low lived poverty
23
Moderate lived poverty
23
High lived poverty
23
0%
20%
China
U.S
33
33
32
33
40%
60%
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model?
On average across the 31 countries in which this question was asked in both 2014/2015 and
2019/2021, preferences for China and the United States as the best model for development
remain largely unchanged, though the U.S. advantage increased marginally from 6 to 9
percentage points. A few countries, however, recorded substantial changes. Benin and
Burkina Faso show increases of 21 and 20 percentage points, respectively, in preference for
China, while Cameroon, Eswatini, and Liberia record significant decreases (-25, -17, and -17
percentage points, respectively) (Figure 4).
As for the U.S. model, preference doubled in Lesotho (from 14% to 27%) and increased
sharply in Liberia (by 18 percentage points), Morocco (+16 points), and Sierra Leone (+11
points) while decreasing in nine other countries, including Eswatini (-15 points) and Cabo
Verde (-10 points) (Figure 5).
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
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Figure 4: China as the best model for development | 16 countries | 2014-2021
26
Benin
47
20
Burkina Faso
40
36
39
35
35
Mali
Tanzania
Senegal
Nigeria
Côte d'Ivoire
19
Togo
28
30
25
29
26
29
26
24
26
22
26
28
25
29
24
Botswana
Guinea
Niger
Gabon
Sudan
24
24
23
Kenya
Cameroon
23
25
23
31-country average
Zambia
Uganda
22
19
22
Mozambique
22
36
48
32
36
17
20
18
20
Malawi
Lesotho
2014/2015
2019/2021
26
20
24
19
South Africa
Tunisia
Ghana
Mauritius
Morocco
Cabo Verde
Sierra Leone
Namibia
Zimbabwe
Liberia
Eswatini
6
15
19
13
16
10
16
21
15
18
14
22
11
20
9
25
8
23
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model? (% who say China)
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6
Figure 5: U.S. as the best model for development | 31 countries | 2014-2021
67
Liberia
43
Sierra Leone
34
Morocco
Cabo Verde
42
Kenya
Uganda
33
Togo
South Africa
Nigeria
26
Guinea
Côte d'Ivoire
Gabon
Tanzania
31-country average
23
Zambia
20
Cameroon
Senegal
Zimbabwe
Lesotho
14
Mozambique
15
50
52
49
35
39
34
33
33
30
32
30
32
31
32
31
29
33
29
25
29
27
18
Benin
54
39
37
37
36
37
43
36
Ghana
Sudan
42
41
41
2014/2015
24
24
22
23
Mauritius
Botswana
Malawi
Niger
Burkina Faso
Tunisia
Namibia
Mali
Eswatini
5
0%
85
2019/2021
30
22
24
22
24
21
28
21
21
19
21
18
19
15
20
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best
model for the future development of our country, or is there some other country in Africa or elsewhere
that should be our model? (% who say United States)
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7
External influences
China’s economic and political influence in Africa, like that of the United States, is far more
widely seen as a good than a bad thing. On average, almost two-thirds (63%) of Africans say
China’s influence in their country is “somewhat positive” or “very positive,” while only about
one in seven (14%) consider it negative. Views on U.S. influence are about the same (60% vs.
13%) (Figure 6).
Pluralities welcome the influence of their regional superpower (52%), their former colonial
power (46%), and Russia (35%).
Positive assessments also far outnumber negative views of the influence of United Nations
agencies (57% vs. 11%), regional organizations (57% vs. 12%), and the African Union (53% vs.
14%).
Figure 6: External influences: positive or negative? | 34 countries | 2019/2021
63
China
60
United States
52
Regional super power
28
13
17
29
35
Russia
14
31
46
Former colonial power
23
25
48
17
United Nations agencies
57
32
11
Regional alliance
57
31
12
53
African Union
0%
20%
Somewhat positive/Very positive
33
40%
60%
14
80%
100%
Refused/Don't know/Neither
Somewhat negative/Very negative
Respondents were asked: In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of
the following countries/organizations on [your country] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven’t
you heard enough to say?
Respondents who feel positively about the influence of China are more likely to hold positive
views of U.S. influence as well – i.e. the two views are strongly and positively correlated. This
suggests that for many Africans, U.S.-China “competition” may not be an either-or
proposition, but a win-win.
However, we see differences within countries. In 16 of the 34 countries, China’s influence is
more widely seen as positive than that of the U.S., including a 36-percentage-point gap in
Eswatini (82% positive for China, 46% for the U.S.), a 25-point gap in Mauritius (75% vs. 50%),
and a 19-point gap in Mali (81% vs. 62%) (Figure 7). The U.S. is more widely perceived as
having positive influence than China in 10 countries, but Zimbabwe is the only country with a
two-digit gap (48% for the U.S. vs. 38% for China).
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8
Figure 7: Positive influence: China vs. U.S. | 34 countries | 2019/2021
Benin
88
79
85
85
82
Cabo Verde
Eswatini
46
Mali
81
62
Burkina Faso
80
71
Morocco
80
Liberia
79
Guinea
79
Mauritius
74
75
50
Tanzania
Mozambique
Niger
60
Sudan
56
Cameroon
71
66
68
64
68
66
65
Kenya
56
64
Togo
64
Nigeria
63
63
63
60
60
60
59
34-country average
Zambia
Senegal
53
Botswana
51
Ethiopia
Lesotho
Uganda
Gambia
Malawi
Ghana
Namibia
Angola
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Tunisia
23
0%
20%
30
72
71
59
59
57
Gabon
63
51
55
56
54
58
53
52
51
52
48
56
47
56
44
46
43
46
40
48
38
48
40%
88
75
63
Côte d'Ivoire
85
60%
China
U.S.
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: Do you think that the economic and political influence of each of the
following countries on [your country] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven’t you heard enough
to say? (% who say “somewhat positive” or “very positive”)
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9
On average across 30 countries in which this question was asked in both 2014/2015 and
2019/2021, the perceived positive influence of China has not changed significantly (66% vs.
63%). Seventeen countries record declines, including steep drops in Gabon (-21 percentage
points), Namibia (-19 points), Cameroon (-16 points), and Niger (-16 points). Only six countries
show significant increases in the proportion of citizens who see Chinese influence as positive:
Morocco (+45 percentage points), Benin (+18 points), Ghana (+14 points), Lesotho (+7
points), Cabo Verde (+4 points), and Tanzania (+4 points) (Figure 8).
Despite these declines, majorities in 27 of 34 countries surveyed in 2019/2021 hold positive
views of China’s economic and political influence, reaching 88% in Benin, 85% in Cabo
Verde, 82% in Eswatini, 81% in Mali, and 80% in Burkina Faso and Mali. Positive assessments of
China’s influence are in the minority in seven countries, most strikingly in Tunisia (30%).
Figure 8: Changes in perceived positive influence of China (percentage points)
| 30* countries | 2014-2021
4
3
3
3
3
2
1
-2
-3
-4
-4
-6
-6
-8
-10
-11
-11
-11
-12
-12
-12
-15
-16
-16
-19
-21
-40
-20
0
7
7
18
14
20
Morocco
Benin
Ghana
Lesotho
Cabo Verde
Tanzania
Sudan
Mozambique
Mauritius
Guinea
Burkina Faso
Malawi
Liberia
30-country average
Uganda
Nigeria
Senegal
Côte d'Ivoire
Togo
Zimbabwe
South Africa
Mali
Kenya
Zambia
Tunisia
Sierra Leone
Botswana
Niger
Cameroon
Namibia
Gabon
45
40
60
Figure shows the change, in percentage points, between 2014/2015 and 2019/2021 in the proportion of
respondents who say China’s economic and political influence on their country is “somewhat positive”
or “very positive.” *Question was not asked in Eswatini in 2014/2015.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
10
Positive perceptions of Chinese and U.S. influence follow similar patterns across key sociodemographic groups. For both countries, men and highly educated citizens are somewhat
more likely than women and less educated citizens to see the influence as positive (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Perceived positive influence of China and U.S. | by socio-demographic
group | 34 countries | 2019/2021
59
Women
Men
56
66
63
62
Rural
Urban
58
64
61
58
No formal education
Primary
Secondary
Post-secondary
55
60
57
64
62
69
64
66
No lived poverty
Low lived poverty
Moderate lived poverty
High lived poverty
65
61
61
59
58
63
18-25 years
26-35 years
36-45 years
46-55 years
56 years and above
63
63
62
61
China
U.S.
61
61
61
63
58
59
53
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of
the following countries/organizations on [your country] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven’t
you heard enough to say? (% who say “somewhat positive” or “very positive”)
While views of China’s economic and political influence are largely favorable, assessments of
how much influence China’s economic activities have in African countries have dropped
sharply. On average across 34 countries, 59% say China’s economic activities in their country
have “some” or “a lot” of influence on their economy. But this reflects a major decrease over
the past five years, from 71% to 59% across 30 countries surveyed in both 2014/2015 and
2019/2021.
Perceptions of the influence of China’s economic activities declined in 24 of these 30
countries, including huge drops in Sierra Leone (-37 percentage points), Zimbabwe (-29
points), Botswana (-24 points), Malawi (-21 points), Niger (-21 points), and Mali (-20 points)
(Figure 10). Only Morocco and Mauritius record significant increases in China’s perceived
economic influence.
The proportions who see China’s economic activities as influential still exceed two-thirds in
Morocco (80%), Cabo Verde (77%), Mauritius (75%), Eswatini (74%), Benin (73%), Gabon
(73%), Kenya (72%), Cameroon (72%), Sudan (71%), and Mali (70%). But fewer than half of
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
11
citizens agree in Ethiopia (47%), Uganda (44%), Zimbabwe (39%), Malawi (38%), and Sierra
Leone (21%).
Figure 10: Extent of China’s influence | 34 countries | 2014-2021
49
Morocco
Cabo Verde
Mauritius
Eswatini
Benin
Gabon
Kenya
Cameroon
Sudan
Mali
Tanzania
Guinea
Tunisia
Namibia
Zambia
Liberia
Senegal
Burkina Faso
30-country average
34-country average
Niger
South Africa
Nigeria
Togo
Côte d'Ivoire
Ghana
Botswana
Angola
Gambia
Lesotho
Mozambique
Ethiopia
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Malawi
Sierra Leone
80
78
77
69
75
74
70
73
87
73
75
72
81
72
70
71
64
72
62
74
61
76
61
61
61
75
68
73
60
77
60
71
59
59
59
55
90
70
71
80
69
67
55
71
53
70
53
61
53
76
52
52
2014/2015
51
68
50
47
44
39
38
21
0%
20%
40%
2019/2021
61
50
57
68
59
58
60%
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: How much influence do you think China’s economic activities in [our
country] have on our economy, or haven’t you heard enough to say? (% who say “some” or “a lot”)
Question was not asked in Eswatini in 2014/2015.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
12
Views on development assistance from China
Between 2000 and 2019, China granted loans of about $153 billion to African countries
(Pairault, 2021). In spite of China’s increasing investments and support, fewer than half (47%)
of Africans are aware that China gives loans or development assistance to their countries
(Figure 11). Awareness of such funds varies from more than two-thirds in Kenya (74%),
Mauritius (70%), and Cabo Verde (68%) to fewer than one-third in Sierra Leone (30%),
Morocco (28%), Nigeria (28%), and Tunisia (24%).
Figure 11: Heard of Chinese loans/development assistance | 33* countries
| 2019/2021
Kenya
Mauritius
Cabo Verde
Ghana
Mali
Benin
Liberia
Guinea
Gabon
Zambia
Angola
Namibia
Gambia
Lesotho
Côte d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Sudan
Senegal
33-country average
Malawi
Ethiopia
Togo
Uganda
Burkina Faso
Botswana
Mozambique
South Africa
Niger
Zimbabwe
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Morocco
Nigeria
Tunisia
74
70
68
60
59
58
56
55
55
54
53
53
51
51
51
49
48
47
47
47
46
43
42
41
38
36
36
36
34
31
30
28
28
24
0%
20%
Aware of Chinese loans/aid
40%
25
23
25
37
32
36
39
47
17
24
21
24
15
38
30
29
22
27
18
25
31
13
37
17
35
46
60%
13
10
24
27
26
16
33
28
80%
100%
Not aware of Chinese loans/aid
Respondents were asked: To your knowledge, does China give loans or development assistance to our
country’s government, or haven’t you had a chance to hear about this?
*Question was not asked in Eswatini.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
13
Among citizens who are aware that their countries receive loans or development assistance
from China, a plurality (41%) think China attaches “somewhat fewer” or “far fewer”
conditions to its assistance than other countries. A quarter (24%) think Chinese assistance
comes with more strings attached, while 35% say they “don’t know” or refused to answer the
question (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Conditionalities on loans/assistance | 33* countries | 2019/2021
100%
21
80%
24
60%
40%
14
69
41
20%
21
Côte d'Ivoire
Mali
Benin
Niger
Guinea
Burkina Faso
Tanzania
Togo
Senegal
Gabon
Cameroon
Liberia
Lesotho
Malawi
33-country average
Tunisia
Sudan
Morocco
Gambia
Uganda
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Kenya
Nigeria
Angola
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Cabo Verde
Botswana
Namibia
Ghana
Mauritius
Sierra Leone
0%
Somewhat/Far fewer requirements
About the same number of requirements
Somewhat/Many more requirements
Don't know/Refused
Respondents who said they are aware of Chinese loans or development assistance were asked: When
the government of China gives loans or development assistance to [our country], do you think they put
more requirements or fewer requirements on our government compared to other donor countries, or
haven’t you heard enough to say?
(Note: Respondents who are not aware of Chinese loans or development assistance are excluded.)
*Question was not asked in Eswatini.
About three-quarters (75%) of those who are aware that their countries receive loans or
development assistance from China are also aware that their governments will likely be
required to repay loans (Figure 13). Except for Lesotho, majorities in all surveyed countries are
aware of this obligation, including about nine in 10 citizens in Kenya (92%), Guinea (89%),
Uganda (88%), Ghana (87%), and Zambia (87%).
And a majority (57%) of those aware of China’s assistance say their countries have borrowed
too much from China. Kenyans (87%), Namibians (79%), Zambians (77%), and Angolans (75%)
are particularly concerned about their government’s indebtedness to China, while only three
in 10 Tanzanians (29%), Sierra Leoneans (30%), and Batswana (32%) express such concerns.
This suggests that the U.S. government and other development partners may be meeting
with some success in their efforts to remind Africans that even if money from China and other
non-traditional development partners comes with fewer strings, they are in danger of being
lured into a deepening debt trap.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
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Figure 13: Views on loans/development assistance from China | 33* countries
| 2019/2021
92
87
89
Kenya
Guinea
63
Uganda
88
67
Ghana
87
69
Zambia
87
77
Nigeria
84
57
Togo
83
56
Mali
82
43
Gabon
82
58
Angola
82
75
Mauritius
81
45
Côte d'Ivoire
80
47
Niger
79
59
Ethiopia
79
63
Morocco
78
55
Senegal
77
66
Namibia
Burkina Faso
77
79
77
38
South Africa
76
68
33-country average
75
57
Benin
74
50
Gambia
74
57
Cameroon
62
Malawi
56
Tanzania
Cabo Verde
70
64
67
56
Sierra Leone
30
Mozambique
53
Tunisia
42
Zimbabwe
50
Botswana
32
Liberia
38
Lesotho
0%
20%
40%
48
71
71
29
Sudan
71
65
60
Government is
required to repay
China for loans
Government has
borrowed too
much money from
China
60
58
58
54
48
60%
80%
100%
Respondents who said they are aware of Chinese loans or development assistance were asked:
Do you think that our government is required to repay China for the loans and development
assistance it provides to [our country]?
Do you think our government has borrowed too much money from China?
(Note: Respondents who are not aware of Chinese loans or development assistance are excluded.)
*Question was not asked in Eswatini.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
15
Do views on China affect African attitudes toward democracy?
Views on whether China or the United States is preferable as a development model do not
appear to have any significant effect on Africans’ support for democracy or democratic
norms. Respondents who prefer China as a developmental model are just as likely as those
who prefer the U.S. model to favor democracy over other kinds of governance systems (70%
vs. 72%) (Figure 14).
They are also equally likely to reject one-party rule, endorse presidential term limits, support
elections as the best way to choose their country’s leaders, support multiparty competition,
and prioritize an accountable government over an efficient one.
Figure 14: Support for democratic norms and institutions | by preference for China or
U.S. as development model | 34 countries | 2019/2021
100%
80%
79
80
78
79
75
77
70
72
63
64
60%
60
63
40%
20%
0%
Reject oneparty rule
Support
presidential
term limits
Elections are
best way to
choose
leaders
China as preferred model
Support
democracy
Support
multiparty
competition
Prefer
accountable
governance
U.S. as preferred model
See question texts in the Appendix.
Contrary to concerns that China’s influence in Africa might weaken demand for democracy,
respondents who rate China’s influence as “very positive” are actually more likely than those
who rate it as “very negative” to say they prefer democracy over other forms of governance
(71% vs. 63%) and to support elections as the best way of choosing leaders (77% vs. 69%)
(Figure 15). There are no significant differences when it comes to views on other democratic
norms and institutions.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
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Figure 15: Support for democratic norms and institutions | by perceptions of China’s
influence | 34 countries | 2019/2021
100%
80%
78
77
76
76
69
76
71
63
64
60%
61
61
60
40%
20%
0%
Reject oneparty rule
Elections are
best ways to
choose
leaders
Support
presidential
term limits
China's influence very positive
Support
democracy
Support
multiparty
competition
Prefer
accountable
governance
China's influence very negative
See question texts in the Appendix.
When it comes to how much democracy Africans are getting, we do see modest evidence
that when citizens admire China as a development model, they feel slightly better about
their own country’s democratic governance.
In evaluating the extent of democracy in their countries, citizens who prefer the China model
do not differ from those who prefer the U.S. model (Figure 16). But on measures of election
quality and presidential accountability to Parliament and to the courts, Africans who prefer
the China model evaluate democratic conditions in their own country a bit more positively.
Figure 16: Assessments of supply of democracy | by preference for China or U.S. as
development model | 34 countries | 2019/2021
100%
80%
60%
65
53
53
44
40%
62
62
57
60
55
42
20%
0%
Perceive country
to be a
democracy
Satisfied with
democracy
President is
Elections
mostly/completely accountable to
Parliament
free and fair
China model preferred
President obeys
laws and courts
U.S. model preferred
See question texts in the Appendix.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
17
Best international language for the future
China’s pursuit of cultural “soft power” (Nantulya, 2018), for example via an expanding
network of Confucius Institutes across the continent (BBC, 2019), appears to be making little
progress. Asked which international language they think is most important for young Africans
to learn, seven in 10 respondents (69%) cite English, while only 3% choose Chinese (Figure
17). English is particularly valued by Africans with at least a secondary education (77%-79%).
Figure 17: Most important international language to learn | 34 countries
| 2019/2021
English
69
French
14
Arabic
5
Kiswahili
3
Chinese
3
Portuguese
2
Other languages
1
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Respondents were asked: In thinking about the future of the next generation in our country, which of
these international languages, if any, do you think is most important for young people to learn?
Conclusion
Recent Afrobarometer surveys show that Africans generally hold positive views of both
Chinese and U.S. economic and political influence on the continent. Moreover, attitudes
toward the two countries are positively rather than negatively correlated, i.e. people who
feel positive toward China are also more likely to view the United States positively, and vice
versa. Importantly, Africans’ views on China do not appear to affect their support for
democracy and democratic norms.
China’s perceived influence has decreased over the past five years, and many citizens are
concerned about their government’s indebtedness to China. In the end, Africans still prefer
the United States over China as a development model for their country, and English remains
the international language of choice across much of the continent. But Africans appear to
welcome foreign engagement that meets their priorities, whether it originates in China or the
United States.
Do your own analysis of Afrobarometer data – on any question,
for any country and survey round. It’s easy and free at
www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
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References
Amoah, P. A., Hodzi, O., & Castillo, R. (2020). Africans in China and Chinese in Africa: Inequalities,
social identities, and wellbeing. Asian Ethnicity, 21(4), 457-463.
BBC. (2019). Confucius Institutes: The growth of China’s controversial cultural branch. 6 September.
Brautigam, D. (2019). A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: The rise of a meme. Area
Development and Policy, 5(1), 1-1430 October.
Brautigam, D., & Kidane, W. (2020). China, Africa, and debt distress: Fact and fiction about asset
seizures. China Africa Research Initiative. Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies.
China Africa Research Initiative. (2018). Data: China-Africa trade. Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies.
Green, M. (2019). China’s debt diplomacy. Foreign Policy. 25 April.
Lekorwe, M., Chingwete, A., Okuru, M., & Samson, R. (2016). China’s growing presence in Africa wins
largely positive popular reviews. Afrobarometer dispatch.
Mattes, R. (2020). Lived poverty on the rise: Decade of living-standard gains ends in Africa.
Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 62.
Mitchell, J. (2019). IMF: African economies are the world's fastest growing. FDI Intelligence. 17
October.
Muchira, N. (2018). New $60b US fund to rival Chinese push into Africa. East African. 7 November.
Nantulya, P. (2018). Grand strategy and China’s soft power push in Africa. Africa Center for Strategic
Studies. 30 August.
Pairault, T. (2021). China’s presence in Africa is at heart political. Diplomat. 11 August.
Scott, C. D. (2021). Does China’s involvement in African elections and politics hurt democracy?
Democracy in Africa. 27 September.
Shepherd, C., & Blanchard, B. (2018). China's Xi offers another $60 billion to Africa, but says no to
'vanity' projects. Reuters. 3 September.
Sun, Y. (2014). China’s aid to Africa: Monster or messiah? Brookings. 7 February.
Thomas, D. (2021). What can Africa expect from FOCAC 2021? Africa Business. 6 October.
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
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Appendix
Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 8 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds
Country
Round 8 fieldwork
Previous survey rounds
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Côte d'Ivoire
Eswatini
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Nov.-Dec. 2019
Nov.-Dec. 2020
July-August 2019
Dec. 2019
Dec. 2019
Feb.-March 2021
Nov. 2019
March-April 2021
DDc. 2019-Jan. 2020
Feb. 2020
Feb. 2021
Sept.-Oct. 2019
Nov.-Dec. 2019
August-Sept. 2019
Feb.-March 2020
Oct.-Dec. 2020
Nov.-Dec. 2019
March-April 2020
Nov. 2020
Feb. 2021
May-July 2021
August 2019
Oct.-Nov. 2020
Jan.-Feb. 2020
Dec. 2020-Jan. 2021
March 2020
May-June 2021
Feb.-April 2021
Feb.-March 2021
Dec. 2020-Jan. 2021
Feb.-March 2020
Sept.-Oct. 2019
Nov.-Dec. 2020
April-May 2021
N/A
2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017
1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017
2008, 2012, 2015, 2017
2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017
2013, 2015, 2018
2013, 2014, 2017
2013, 2015, 2018
2013
2015, 2017
2018
1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017
2013, 2015, 2017
2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016
2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017
2008, 2012, 2015, 2018
1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017
2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017
2012, 2014, 2017
2013, 2015, 2018
2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018
1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017
2013, 2015, 2018
2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2017
2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017
2012, 2015, 2018
2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018
2013, 2015, 2018
2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017
2012, 2014, 2017
2013, 2015, 2018
2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017
1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017
1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
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Question texts for Figure 14 and Figure 15 (support for democratic norms and
institutions)
Respondents were asked:
Reject one-party rule
There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the
following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold
office? (% who “disapprove” or “strongly disapprove”)
Support presidential term limits
Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in
office. Statement 2: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can
serve.
(% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 1)
Elections are best way to choose leaders
Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest
elections.
Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other
methods for choosing this country’s leaders.
(% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 1)
Support democracy
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.
(% who choose Statement 1)
Support multiparty competition
Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to
have many political parties in [country].
Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that [citizens] have real choices
in who governs them.
(% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 2)
Prefer accountable governance
Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we
have no influence over what it does.
Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable,
even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.
(% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with Statement 2)
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
21
Question texts for Figure 16 (assessments of supply of democracy)
Respondents were asked:
Perceived country to be a democracy
In your opinion, how much of a democracy is [country] today? (% who say “a full
democracy” or “a democracy with minor problems”)
Satisfied with democracy
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? (% who say “fairly
satisfied” or “very satisfied”)
Elections mostly/completely free and fair
On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last general election, held
in [year]? (% who say “completely free and fair” or “free and fair with minor problems”)
President is accountable to Parliament
In your opinion, how often, in this country does the president ignore the [national legislature]
and just do what s/he wants? (% who say “rarely” or “never”)
President obeys laws and courts
In your opinion, how often, in this country does the president ignore the courts and laws of
this country? (% who say “rarely” or “never”)
Copyright ©Afrobarometer 2021
22
Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny is knowledge translation manager for Afrobarometer.
Email: jappiah@afrobarometer.org.
Edem Selormey is director of research at the Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
Email: edem@cddgh.org.
Afrobarometer, a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in Ghana, is a pan-African, nonpartisan research network. Regional coordination of national partners in about 35 countries is
provided by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for
Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, and the Institute for Development Studies
(IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. Michigan State University (MSU) and the University
of Cape Town (UCT) provide technical support to the network.
Financial support for Afrobarometer Round 8 has been provided by Sweden via the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Open
Society Foundations, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) via the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Donations help Afrobarometer give voice to African citizens. Please consider making a
contribution (at www.afrobarometer.org) or contact Bruno van Dyk
(bruno.v.dyk@afrobarometer.org) to discuss institutional funding.
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Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 489 | 15 November 2021
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23