NWP 3-32
NAVY WARFARE PUBLICATION
MARITIME OPERATIONS AT
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
OF WAR
NWP 3-32
EDITION OCTOBER 2008
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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NWP 3-32
ERRATUM TO NWP 3-32, MARITIME OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
November 2008
This Erratum is issued to correct editorial errors to NWP 3-32, MARITIME OPERATIONS AT THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL.
1. Page 3-8, Table 3-1.
2. Page 7-9, Paragraph 1.c.
3. Page 7-18, Paragraph 7.3.
After entry of this Erratum, destroy this page without report.
Erratum to OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
October 2008
PUBLICATION NOTICE
ROUTING
1. NWP 3-32 (OCT 2008), MARITIME OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
OF WAR, is available in the Navy Warfare Library. It is effective upon receipt.
2. Summary. NWP 3-32 (OCT 2008) recaptures the many lessons of previous major operations
and campaigns that Navy commanders recorded about command at the operational level. It
updates these lessons with current joint doctrine lexicon and appropriate lessons from
today’s operational environment.
Navy Warfare Library Custodian
Navy Warfare Library publications must be made
readily available to all users and other interested
personnel within the U.S. Navy.
Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian
This notice should be duplicated for routing to cognizant personnel to keep them informed of changes to this
publication.
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NWP 3-32
CONTENTS
Page
No.
CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION
1.1
SCOPE.......................................................................................................................................... 1-1
1.2
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................... 1-2
The Maritime Domain .................................................................................................................. 1-4
Operational Level of Command ................................................................................................... 1-6
Navy Command ............................................................................................................................ 1-7
Unique Aspects of the Naval Operational Command................................................................... 1-7
CHAPTER 2 — LEVELS OF WAR
2.1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 2-1
2.2
COMMAND AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL ....................................................................... 2-2
2.3
STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR .................................................................................................. 2-3
2.4
OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR ............................................................................................ 2-5
2.5
TACTICAL LEVEL..................................................................................................................... 2-6
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
MARITIME OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ........... 2-7
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence ...................................................... 2-7
Crisis Response or Limited Contingency Operation .................................................................... 2-8
Major Operations or Campaigns Involving Large-Scale Combat ................................................ 2-8
CHAPTER 3 — LEVELS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY
3.1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 3-1
3.2
COMMAND AUTHORITY......................................................................................................... 3-2
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.5
3.3.6
3.3.7
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS DEFINED IN JOINT DOCTRINE................................... 3-2
Combatant Command (Command Authority) ............................................................................. 3-2
Operational Control ..................................................................................................................... 3-3
Tactical Control ........................................................................................................................... 3-3
Support.......................................................................................................................................... 3-4
Coordinating Authority................................................................................................................. 3-4
Administrative Control ................................................................................................................ 3-5
Direct Liaison Authorized ........................................................................................................... 3-5
3.4
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS DEFINED IN ALLIED MULTINATIONAL MARITIME .
TACTICAL PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................ 3-5
Operational Command ................................................................................................................. 3-6
Operational Control ..................................................................................................................... 3-6
Tactical Command ....................................................................................................................... 3-6
Tactical Control ........................................................................................................................... 3-7
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.4.3
3.4.4
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3.5
IMPACT OF LEVEL OF AUTHORITY ON COMMAND AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL ....... 3-7
CHAPTER 4 — LEVELS OF MARITIME COMMAND
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.1.5
JOINT FORCE COMPONENTS ................................................................................................. 4-1
Joint Force Commander................................................................................................................ 4-3
Service Component Commander .................................................................................................. 4-6
Service Component with Operational Control.............................................................................. 4-8
Functional Component Commander............................................................................................. 4-9
Multinational Organization......................................................................................................... 4-10
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION.............................................................................. 4-10
Navy Organization ..................................................................................................................... 4-11
Naval Expeditionary Forces ....................................................................................................... 4-19
Marine Corps Organization ........................................................................................................ 4-19
4.3
ESTABLISHMENT OF OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMMANDS.......................... 4-24
CHAPTER 5 — OPERATIONAL DESIGN
5.1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 5-1
5.2
OPERATIONAL ART ................................................................................................................ 5-1
5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
OPERATIONAL DESIGN........................................................................................................... 5-3
Inputs to Operational Design ........................................................................................................ 5-5
Elements of Operational Design ................................................................................................... 5-5
An estimate of the situation .......................................................................................................... 5-6
5.4
THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER............... 5-13
5.5
5.5.1
5.5.2
5.5.3
5.5.4
OPERATIONAL DECISIONMAKING AND PLANNING .................................................... 5-14
Estimate of Situation................................................................................................................... 5-15
Development of the Plan ............................................................................................................ 5-15
The Directive .............................................................................................................................. 5-17
Supervision of the Operation ...................................................................................................... 5-18
CHAPTER 6 — OPERATIONAL COMMAND
6.1
6.1.1
OPERATIONAL COMMAND .................................................................................................... 6-1
Notional Relationship of Command Level to Level of War......................................................... 6-3
6.2
ROLE OF OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IN C2................................................................... 6-3
6.3
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
6.3.4
6.3.5
COMMANDER’S DECISION CYCLE....................................................................................... 6-8
Assess ......................................................................................................................................... 6-11
Plan ............................................................................................................................................. 6-13
Direct .......................................................................................................................................... 6-15
Monitor ....................................................................................................................................... 6-16
Communications ......................................................................................................................... 6-17
6.4
COMMAND, CONTROL, TIME HORIZONS, COMMANDER’S DECISION CYCLE........ 6-17
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CHAPTER 7 — MARITIME OPERATIONAL-LEVEL COMMAND ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.1.3
MARITIME HEADQUARTERS ................................................................................................ 7-1
Command Structure of the Maritime Headquarters...................................................................... 7-3
Fleet Management Structure of Maritime Headquarters .............................................................. 7-4
Maritime Operations Structure .................................................................................................. 7-14
7.2
MARITIME HEADQUARTERS WITH MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTER .................... 7-17
7.3
7.3.1
7.3.2
7.3.3
7.3.4
7.3.5
7.3.6
OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS ................................................................................................. 7-18
Command and Control................................................................................................................ 7-18
Fires ............................................................................................................................................ 7-19
Intelligence ................................................................................................................................. 7-20
Movement and Maneuver ........................................................................................................... 7-20
Protection.................................................................................................................................... 7-21
Sustainment................................................................................................................................. 7-22
7.4
BATTLE RHYTHM................................................................................................................... 7-22
APPENDIX A — FUNCTIONAL AREA UJTL TASKS
A.1.
COMMAND AND CONTROL................................................................................................... A-2
A.2.
FIRES .......................................................................................................................................... A-3
A.3.
INTELLIGENCE......................................................................................................................... A-4
A.4.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER ............................................................................................. A-5
A.5.
PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................ A-6
A.6.
SUSTAINMENT ......................................................................................................................... A-7
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
No.
CHAPTER 2 — LEVELS OF WAR
Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-3.
Levels of War Boundary Overlap............................................................................................. 2-1
Admiral Ernest King’s CINCLANT Serial 053 of January 21, 1941 ...................................... 2-4
Unified Action.......................................................................................................................... 2-6
CHAPTER 3 — LEVELS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY
Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-3.
Two Distinct Branches of Command ....................................................................................... 3-1
U.S. Joint Doctrine Command Relationships........................................................................... 3-3
Allied/Multinational Maritime Command Relationships ......................................................... 3-6
CHAPTER 4 — LEVELS OF MARITIME COMMAND
Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-2.
Figure 4-3.
Figure 4-4.
Figure 4-5.
Figure 4-6.
Figure 4-7.
Figure 4-8.
Figure 4-9.
Figure 4-10.
Figure 4-11.
Possible Components in a Joint Force...................................................................................... 4-3
Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities........................................................ 4-4
Secretary of Navy Title 10 Responsibilities............................................................................. 4-5
Administrative Control............................................................................................................. 4-8
Principle Navy Department Organization .............................................................................. 4-11
Navy Operating Force Dual Chain of Command ................................................................... 4-12
Task Organization Levels of Command................................................................................. 4-15
Task Organization Numerical Representation........................................................................ 4-15
Notional Navy Task Organization.......................................................................................... 4-16
Marine Corps Operating Force Dual Chain of Command ..................................................... 4-20
MAGTF Elements .................................................................................................................. 4-22
CHAPTER 5 — OPERATIONAL DESIGN
Figure 5-1.
Figure 5-2.
Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-4.
Figure 5-5.
Figure 5-6.
Principles of Joint Operations .................................................................................................. 5-3
Operational Art and Design...................................................................................................... 5-5
Relationships Between Critical Capabilities/Requirements/Vulnerabilities .......................... 5-10
Factors to Be Considered When Developing the Operational Idea........................................ 5-12
Changing Focus of Operational Commander and Staff as a Military Problem Is Solved...... 5-15
Navy Planning Process........................................................................................................... 5-16
CHAPTER 6 — OPERATIONAL COMMAND
Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-3.
Figure 6-4.
Figure 6-5.
Figure 6-6.
Figure 6-7.
Figure 6-8.
OCT 2008
Inherent Relationships between Levels of War........................................................................ 6-2
Information Requirements Categories...................................................................................... 6-5
Commander’s Decision Cycle.................................................................................................. 6-8
Three Time Horizons................................................................................................................ 6-9
Decision Cycle, Event Horizon, Echelon Interaction............................................................. 6-10
Assessment ............................................................................................................................. 6-12
Focused CCIRs from Planning Processes .............................................................................. 6-15
Six Fundamentals of C2 Laid on Top of Commander’s Decision Cycle ............................... 6-18
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CHAPTER 7 — MARITIME OPERATIONAL-LEVEL COMMAND ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
Figure 7-1.
Figure 7-2.
Figure 7-3.
Figure 7-4.
Figure 7-5.
Figure 7-6.
Figure 7-7.
Figure 7-8.
Figure 7-9.
Modules of Maritime Headquarters at the Operational Level.................................................. 7-2
MHQ Fleet Management.......................................................................................................... 7-4
MHQ Maritime Operations .................................................................................................... 7-14
MOC B2C2WG Staffing ........................................................................................................ 7-15
The Seven-Minute Drill to Vet Proposed New B2C2WG to MOC ....................................... 7-16
MHQ with MOC .................................................................................................................... 7-17
Notional Battle Rhythm for a JFMCC.................................................................................... 7-25
Notional Battle Rhythm with CJTF and JFMCC Events Included ........................................ 7-26
Sample JTF Headquarters Battle Rhythm .............................................................................. 7-27
APPENDIX A — FUNCTIONAL AREA UJTL TASKS
Figure A-1.
Figure A-2.
Figure A-3.
Figure A-4.
Figure A-5.
Figure A-6.
C2 Tasks across the Levels of War ......................................................................................... A-2
Fires Tasks across the Levels of War ..................................................................................... A-3
Intelligence Tasks across the Levels of War .......................................................................... A-4
Movement and Maneuver Tasks across the Levels of War .................................................... A-5
Protection Tasks across the Levels of War ............................................................................. A-6
Sustainment Tasks across the Levels of War ......................................................................... A-7
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LIST OF TABLES
Page
No.
CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION
Table 1-1.
Example U.S. Navy Activities across the Range of Military Operations................................. 1-3
CHAPTER 3 — LEVELS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY
Table 3-1
Joint Doctrine Allied Maritime Command Authority Comparison.......................................... 3-8
CHAPTER 4 — LEVELS OF MARITIME COMMAND
Table 4-1.
Table 4-2.
Table 4-3.
Table 4-4.
Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands as of June 2008....................................... 4-1
Numbered Fleet Commanders’ Location of Area Operations................................................ 4-13
Considerations for Support Situation Selection ..................................................................... 4-18
Likely Commands/Components an Establishing Authority Is Likely to Designate............... 4-24
CHAPTER 6 — OPERATIONAL COMMAND
Table 6-1.
Table 6-2.
Notional Relationship of Command Level to Level of War .................................................... 6-3
C2 Knowledge Used and Shared by Time Horizon .............................................................. 6-19
CHAPTER 7 — MARITIME OPERATIONAL-LEVEL COMMAND ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
Table 7-1.
OCT 2008
Fleet Management Directorate Responsibility ......................................................................... 7-5
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NWP 3-32
PREFACE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War (NWP 3-32) recaptures the many lessons of previous major
operations and campaigns that Navy commanders recorded about command at the operational level. It updates
these lessons with current joint doctrine lexicon and appropriate lessons from today’s operational environment.
Each chapter in this publication is designed to stand alone. The reader is cautioned that to fully understand the
basics of maritime operations at the operational level all chapters will need to be studied. Furthermore, the reader
is encouraged to explore other publications on this subject to better clarify and understand employment of
maritime forces at the operational level. Because each chapter is designed to stand alone, the first use of an
acronym in a chapter is defined. A brief discussion of each chapter follows:
 Chapter 1 (Introduction). This chapter provides the reader situational awareness (SA) on the domain and
cultural environment within which a Navy commander at the operational level will command. Included is
a discussion of Navy command and control (C2), and how today’s multimission ships challenge the
operational commander.
 Chapter 2 (Levels of War). The three levels of war are clearly defined in joint doctrine. This chapter
provides an overview of the commander’s focus at each level of war, the levels’ interrelationships, and the
institutional boundaries that exist between each level. With this knowledge the commander and staff can
establish unique relationships required to successfully execute a specific campaign or operation.
 Chapter 3 (Levels of Command Authority). Command authorities establish command relationships. Joint
doctrine defines four command relationships that can exist between commanders. Allied and multinational
maritime tactical instructions and procedures define five command relationships that can exist between
maritime commands. Fundamental to success at the operational level is understanding the relationship the
commander has with forces assigned and attached, and the relationship, if any, to forces assigned or
attached to another commander.
 Chapter 4 (Levels of Maritime Command). Navy commanders have two chains of command:
administrative and operational. This chapter provides an understanding of these chains of command, the
typical command relationships between levels in these organizations, and the alignment of levels in the
organizations and levels of war and potential role the commander may play.
 Chapter 5 (Operational Design). The Navy leaders of World War II were practitioners of operational art
and design long before these terms were adopted in joint doctrine. While technology has provided today’s
Navy leaders with a vast array of capabilities, the fundamental underpinnings of operational planning and
operational decision making have not changed since admirals Halsey and Spruance were fleet
commanders. This chapter provides an overview of operational art and operational design as these terms
are currently defined in joint doctrine and academic/professional journals. The chapter then shows how
operational art and operational design fold into today’s Navy operational planning and operational
decisionmaking processes, which have evolved from the ideas and concepts that were learned on the
battlefields during World War II.
 Chapter 6 (Operational Command). This chapter provides doctrinal guidance on operational command and
control for a Navy commander at the operational level. Currently, this guidance is distributed among
several Navy and joint doctrinal publications and professional literature. In addition to capturing this
guidance, the chapter highlights best practices identified in numerous fleet and joint exercises. It provides
an overview of operational command and control, highlighting the critical role the operational commander
has in these endeavors.
EX-1
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
 Chapter 7 (Maritime Operational-Level Command Organization and Functions). This chapter discusses the
maritime headquarters with maritime operations center (MHQ with MOC) organization. Navy operationallevel commands utilize this organizational structure to meet the demands of today’s operational
environment. This chapter provides only a very brief overview and is intended as a precursor to the
detailed discussions contained within NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center.
OCT 2008
EX-2
NWP 3-32
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 SCOPE
Navy doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs, warfighting principles, and terminology that
describes and guides the proper use of the Navy in maritime operations. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps
focus and build doctrine for the execution of missions on or above land. With its focus on land operations joint
doctrine tacitly reflects the fact that the job of gaining and maintaining maritime superiority or supremacy — of
engaging and winning battles in the maritime domain — falls almost exclusively to the Navy.
maritime superiority — That degree of dominance of one force over another that
permits the conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land,
maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
by the opposing force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)
maritime supremacy — That degree of maritime superiority wherein the opposing
force is incapable of effective interference. (JP 1-02)
Joint doctrine is authoritative guidance and takes precedence over individual Service doctrine, which must be
consistent with joint doctrine. As a body of best practices or norms, Navy doctrine “is authoritative but requires
judgment in application.” Doctrine is not an impediment to a commander’s exercise of imagination. Rather,
doctrine is a framework of fundamental principles, practices, techniques, procedures, and terms that guides a
commander in employing his force to accomplish the mission. The principles discussed within doctrine are
enduring, yet they evolve based on policy and strategy, in light of new technology or organizations, from lessons
gained from experience, and insights derived from operational analysis. Navy doctrine standardizes terminology,
training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes. Its focus is on how to think about operations, not what to
think about operations. Doctrine provides a basis for analysis of the mission and its objectives and tasks, and
developing the commander’s intent and associated planning guidance. It provides a foundation for training and
education. Doctrine is distinct from concepts in that it describes operations with extant capabilities and is subject
to policy, treaty, and legal constraints, while concepts, whether near-term or futuristic in nature, can explore new
methods, structures, and systems employment without the same restrictions.
This publication outlines the Navy operational-level fundamentals, command, control, and organization. It is also
a bridge between the theory of operational art and the practical specific guidance that Navy commanders and
staffs require to accomplish their mission. It is prepared to complement existing joint and Navy doctrine and
provides a general guide to the application of command at the operational level of war1 and the staff organization
and functionality required to support the operational commander. This publication was designed to bridge the gap
between Joint Publications (JP) 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters; JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint
Maritime Operations; and Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual.
1
For brevity and convenience, throughout this publication operational level of war shall be abbreviated to operational level.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
1.2 BACKGROUND
Naval forces (and more specifically, navies2) have a rich culture of operational freedom dating back to the days of
sail, when simple mission-type orders, such as “go forth and do the king’s work,” focused on the Crown’s intent.
Ships “enjoyed” independence with long voyages and no further communications with their senior headquarters
until their return months and years later from deployment. The success of the mission relied heavily upon the
tactical commander’s ability to interpret the intentions of the senior headquarters and then translate it into tactical
actions. The senior headquarters exercised decentralized command, providing broad guidance to the tactical
commanders and then relying upon these commanders’ initiative to take advantage of opportunities for mission
success. This decentralized command was not a choice but rather an acknowledgment of the inability to
communicate with ships once they had gone out of sight.
Soon after the Navy’s transition from sail to steam came the advent of over-the-horizon communications. These
communications were neither reliable nor had the ability to pass large amounts of data. Accordingly, the
decentralized command style from the era of sail continued for maritime forces throughout World Wars I and II.
Communications have since evolved to produce high data rate, long range, and reliable networks. No longer is the
senior headquarters unable to communicate with the tactical commander. These networks link sensors and
systems to provide senior headquarters and tactical commanders greater understanding of the operational
environment. While impressive, these advances in information systems for the Navy are constrained by the laws
of physics, which limit the amount and types of information that can be passed, given the bandwidth limitations of
afloat commands. Therefore, senior maritime headquarters (MHQ) still exercise decentralized command, albeit
using a much enhanced awareness of the operational environment.
Society’s move from the industrial age to the information age not only signaled a change to the maritime
commander’s understanding of the operational environment, but also resulted in Navy organizational change.
Prior to the Civil War, the Navy rarely had ships operating together as a single organized group. The introduction
of steam propulsion, armored hulls, and increased fire power during the Civil War brought about Navy
organizational changes. By 1907 the Navy was assigning vessels to the Pacific and Atlantic fleets. In 1913 the
Navy recognized that in order to maintain span of control/command, the fleets needed to be subdivided. The Navy
elected to subdivide the fleet into forces, which were defined as “all the vessels of the fleet that are of the same
type or class or that are assigned to the same duty.”3 It followed that a vessel was assigned an administrative force
commander and an operational force commander. This arrangement of dual chains of command remains in effect
today.
During World War I, the Navy organization evolved into the three dimensions of surface, subsurface, and the air.
In World War II, maritime operations within the operational environment expanded to include not only
dominance on the high seas, but also the establishment of sea control in the littorals and amphibious landings of
Army and Marine forces. Today’s maritime operations have further expanded to include a spectrum of activities
from peacetime operations to high-intensity conflict, commonly referred to as the range of military operations
(Table 1-1). Success in the modern maritime operational environment requires working with elements of the joint
force, multinational partners, and maritime commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
The Navy has a rich tradition of interservice cooperation with an aim toward accomplishing joint objectives at the
strategic and operational levels of war. Sea control has been a central element in many of our nation’s conflicts.
The dispatch of maritime forces to confront the Barbary pirates at the beginning of the nineteenth century is
illustrative of the role of maritime power in securing strategic lines of communications (LOCs). In the War of
1812, British maritime forces demonstrated the strategic value of sea control as American trade atrophied and
British land forces were offered operational flexibility with little fear of losing vital sea lines of communications
(SLOCs). American victories in the Great Lakes in 1813 provided an early glimpse of U.S. maritime power’s role
in operational sea denial. The Mexican War and the American Civil War cemented the requirement for close
relationships between ground and maritime forces operations. Whether the operational objective was in support of
the introduction of ground forces deep into an enemy’s heartland or the strangling of an enemy’s economic
2
3
A naval force comprises Navy and Marines. Navy represents the U.S. Navy service.
U.S. Navy Regulations, 1913; Chapter 3, Section 1, Article 226.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
Table 1-1. Example U.S. Navy Activities across the Range of Military Operation
Military Engagement, Security
Cooperation, and Deterrence
• Homeland Defense
• Protection of U.S.
Economic Interests
• Enforcement of Maritime
Treaties
• Support of Foreign Policy
• Support of Military
(Theater) Strategy
• Support of Peace
Operations
Crisis Response and Limited
Contingency Operations
• Support of Insurgency
• Support of
Counterinsurgency
• Support of
Counterterrorism
• Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance
• Civil Support
Major Operations and
Campaigns
• Regional War
• Global War
arteries, the joint campaigns contained major maritime and land operations that were inexorably linked to a
common objective and operational design.
During World War II commanders used the factors of time, space, and forces to exercise control of Navy, Marine,
Army, and Army Air Forces in the maritime domain. In the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz was a master of helping set
the conditions for his subordinate commanders and sequencing operations to provide his commanders the
opportunity to execute their tasking. He assigned forces to his subordinates and organized his commands (i.e.,
assigned or attached forces to subordinate commanders) to best support his assigned missions. Then, through his
skillful issuance of mission-type orders and clear commander’s intent, he allowed his subordinates to combine
their initiative with their tactical skills to execute the mission. By managing the risk to forces and the mission, he
gave his commanders the freedom and flexibility they required to adapt their planning, thereby taking advantage
of opportunities presented to them in the fog of war.
The Cold War naval planning focused on the blue-water campaign to defeat the Soviet threats by attrition.
Following the Cold War, the focus of maritime operations within the operational environment evolved. Today’s
threat may not be clearly defined and may very easily be asymmetric in nature. Cyberspace has created another
dimension to the operational environment. Although the traditional military-on-military force threat remains,
today’s commanders must deal with these potentially complex missions with a more holistic approach.
Operating in today’s maritime operations requires a command and control (C2) system and processes that support
planning and execution from the strategic, through operational, to tactical levels. The tactical level accomplishes
missions in support of tasks that produce tactical and operational impacts toward operational and strategic
objectives in support of strategic and national goals.
There has been little opportunity for the Navy to plan and execute a major operation or campaign (sequence of
major operations) since World War II. As a result, the operational art and C2 capabilities associated with
command at the maritime operational level have not had the opportunities to evolve and adapt to the modern
operational environment. The maritime headquarters with maritime operations center (MHQ with MOC) is
focused on defining and developing operational-level headquarters around the globe with some degree of baseline
commonality. See NTTP 3-32.1.
The MHQ with MOC provides a framework from which Navy commanders at the operational level exercise C2.
C2 entails processes (planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations) and systems
(personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by commander) as they relate to the
exercise of authority and direction over assigned or attached forces and organizations. MHQ with MOC
organization (NTTP 3-32.1) does not mimic the World War II headquarters of ADM Nimitz. Similarly, the C2
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model from World War II cannot be replicated for today’s environment of multimission naval platforms operating
in a very technologically advanced environment.
1.2.1 The Maritime Domain
Unlike the other components of the joint force, the maritime component routinely conducts operations across all
of the domains, described in JP 3-0 as air, land, maritime, space, and the information environment. The maritime
domain is defined in JP 3-32 as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above
these, including the littorals.” This joint definition has fundamental implications for the Navy’s role in joint
operations. The Navy is the principal warfighting organization that conducts operations over, on, under, and
adjacent to the seas: overlying airspaces, surfaces, subsurfaces, and the ocean bottom, as well as the shoreline
infrastructures that affect maritime operations.
The maritime domain also contains social, economic, political, military, and legal components. About 70 percent
of the world’s surface is covered by the oceans and seas. Naval forces operate from the deep waters of the open
ocean to the generally shallower waters fronting the coastlines of the continental land mass and large offshore
islands. In the event of regional conflict, small coastal navies operating in the proximity of these straits can pose
serious problems for the operations of larger navies. There are several thousand straits in the world’s ocean, but
only about 200 have some international importance. These straits are the hubs and the most vulnerable segments
of sea communications linking “narrow seas” with other seas or open ocean areas. They can also be used to
effectively block the exit or entry of hostile naval forces or the transit of an enemy’s merchant ships.
The seas/oceans are extremely important to the economic prosperity of many countries. Maritime trade is the
principal means of transporting raw materials and manufactured goods. About 96 percent of the entire world’s
trade by weight is still carried by ships. The sea remains the primary, and by far the most cost-effective, means for
the movement of international trade. The importance of the world’s oceans and seas to the economic well-being
and security of all nations has perhaps never been greater than it is today. Approximately 80 percent of all
countries border the sea, and nearly 95 percent of the world’s population lives within 600 miles of it. About 60
percent of the politically significant urban areas around the world are located within some 60 miles of the coast,
and 70 percent are within 300 miles. Approximately 40 percent of all the world’s cities with populations of
500,000 or more are located on a coast. By 2025, it is projected 60 percent of the world’s population will live in
cities, most of which will be in littoral areas. The littorals are economically significant because all seaborne trade
originates and ends there.
About 50,000 large ships carry approximately 80 percent of the world’s trade. Each year 1.9 billion tons of
petroleum, or some 60 percent of all oil produced, are shipped by sea. The economic importance of the maritime
domain has increased considerably in the last several decades because of the exploitation of rather large oil/gas
reserves within the continental shelf in many parts of the world’s ocean. Some 75 percent of the world’s maritime
trade and 50 percent of its daily oil consumption pass through a handful of international straits. There are some
4,000 ports involved in maritime trade, including 30 so-called megaports.
One area of growing economic concern among seagoing nations is the issue of overfishing. Fish provide
approximately 25 percent of the world’s supply of protein, with most of the fish catch taken within countries’
200-mile-wide economic exclusion zone (EEZ). For some countries, fishing represents a substantial proportion of
their economic activity. However, fish stocks are declining because fishing fleets are becoming more efficient. As
a result, overfishing and scarcity of fish are increasingly becoming potential sources of disputes among maritime
countries.
Diplomatic and political concerns related to the maritime domain have also increased. Many maritime nations, but
especially the smaller ones, have tried to extend their claims over offshore resources in order to obtain additional
economic benefits. These claims have led in turn to numerous disputes over the exact extent of maritime borders
and EEZs. This is highlighted in diplomatic and legal tension over some archipelagic waters and international
straits, since a country’s naval forces face certain constraints and restrictions when operating in internal waters,
territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelves claimed by coastal states. International law
provides free and legal access for ships up to the territorial seas, and right of innocent passage for either transiting
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territorial waters without entering internal waters or proceeding in either direction between the high seas and
internal waters. In 1982, the United Nations (UN) adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). The United States has not ratified UNCLOS; it considers the navigation and overflight provisions
therein reflective of customary international law and thus acts in accordance with the 1982 LOS Convention,
except for the deep seabed mining provisions. For a more detailed discussion of this and an overview of the rules
of law governing naval operations refer to NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations.
The United States currently recognizes approximately 150 navies in the world, which are categorized by size.
Small navies are mainly used for policing duties in their nation states’ territorial waters and EEZs. Medium-size
navies have significant capabilities for challenging a much stronger opponent even beyond the EEZ. Larger navies
have the capability to project power in many littoral areas of the world’s ocean. The great majority of the world’s
navies are small and capable of operating only in their respective littoral waters. Only a few navies, such as the
U.S. Navy, are capable of sustained employment far from their country’s shore. In addition, most maritime
nations also maintain air forces capable of conducting operations over the adjacent sea/ocean areas. The combat
capabilities of the navies worldwide have been steadily increasing due to the rapid and significant advances in
naval technologies over the past two decades and growing awareness of the economic impacts provided by
unfettered access to the world’s oceans.
The U.S. Navy is manned, trained, and equipped to execute maritime operations. At its core, maritime operations
are focused on the application of sea power to achieve sea control (see text box). However, sea power is not
exclusively synonymous with naval warfare. It is a much broader concept that entails at least four elements: the
control of international trade and commerce; the usage and control of ocean resources; the operations of navies in
war; and the use of navies and maritime economic power as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and political
influence in time of peace. Unlike the concepts of land power or air power, terms traditionally framed in a
military-only context, the meaning and use of “sea power” spans military and geo-economic dimensions.4
sea control operations are the employment of naval forces, supported by land and air
forces as appropriate, in order to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such
operations include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea
commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority
in areas of naval operations. (JP 1-02)
The U.S. Navy’s culture has evolved to meet the uniqueness of operations in the maritime domain. With missiontailored and multimission platforms, the U.S. Navy is capable of attaining maritime superiority or supremacy. The
design and tactical employment of its forces have evolved over 225 years of naval history and experience. By
necessity, modern naval platforms are multimission, each with a wide range of capabilities specifically designed
to counter threats in the maritime domain and to project power throughout all domains. Navy platforms operate in
a very dynamic environment that includes ships and aircraft from potential adversaries and neutral parties. These
ships and aircraft are constantly in motion, thereby presenting the operational commander with an added
challenge of gaining and maintaining situational awareness (SA). Employing these uniquely adapted platforms
within the highly fluid, multidimensional maritime domain (consisting of undersea, surface, air, land, space, and
the information environment) is the purview of the maritime commander. This commander wields sea power in
support of his commander’s objectives.
Throughout history our nation’s practice and policy have been to apply sea power forward. Forward-deployed
Navy forces (NAVFOR) shape the operational environment as a matter of routine. Through port visits and
multinational exercises they assist in shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of adversaries and allies,
developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving
4
Globalization and Maritime Power, edited by Sam J. Tangredi, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, December 2002.
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information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.
Navy forces demonstrate the nation’s resolve and intentions from international waters.
Our long-standing national policy for employing sea power forward has advantages and disadvantages. Forwarddeployed NAVFOR routinely share international waters with other nations’ navies. Under ideal conditions this
builds mutual trust and understanding. When tensions are high, this intermingling of forces may provide points of
friction that can escalate and have strategic implications. Should tensions become hostilities and one side choose
to initiate conflict, it may do so without warning.
Forward-deployed Navy forces are oftentimes the nation’s first responders to events requiring military response
outside the homeland. When adversarial action occurs beyond our borders, Navy forces will be the responding
joint force’s vanguard. As a key element of the joint force that is readily capable of employing credible combat
power forward, Navy forces are oftentimes the first on-scene force to exercise the deterrence phase of a joint
operation or campaign. Forward-deployed Navy forces have experience and knowledge concerning the
operational environment in addition to established, long-standing relationships with allied forces in and near the
joint operations area (JOA).
Air and land forces will normally arrive in the JOA using a combination of air and sea lift. The primary means to
transport supplies to sustain these forces is normally sea lift; a successful sea-lift operation requires the Navy to
achieve and maintain maritime superiority within the JOA’s maritime domain. The land and air components of the
joint force can contribute to attaining maritime superiority; however, the preponderance of effort lies with the
maritime component. The Navy also achieves and maintains sea control over the SLOCs to and from the maritime
domain of the JOA.
The Navy is not limited to the maritime domain. It has capabilities that can project fires overland through
employment of naval surface fires support (NSFS), Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), expeditionary
forces, and strike/fighter aircraft in support of other components in the joint force. Support of another component
in the joint force requires the joint force commander (JFC) to establish a support or other command relationship
between the components. Typically, the maritime component supports other joint components when prosecuting
targets deep inland, but it may be in a supported role for certain operations (e.g., amphibious
operations/noncombat evacuation) in the littorals.
1.2.2 Operational Level of Command
Defining operational level of command (OLC) is best done through comparison with the tactical and strategic
levels of command. One of the primary differences between the three levels is the objectives. Objectives at the
operational level of command are more encompassing than those at the tactical level, yet more focused than those
at the strategic level. Their time horizons also help to differentiate between the three levels, with the operationallevel commander having a longer-range vision than the tactical commander but a shorter-term vision than that of
the strategic commander. The tempo of operations at the operational level also tends to be relatively slower than
at the tactical level, yet more rapid than at the strategic level. Additionally, the complexity of operations can be
more challenging than at the tactical level due the larger force size, wider perspective, and greater complexity of
responsibilities.
The OLC is focused on translating strategic objectives into subordinate tasks/missions by specifying the “what,
when, where, who, and why” and leaving the “how” to the subordinates. It links the various operations together
into a campaign plan and coordinates the six operational functions of fires, C2, intelligence, movement and
maneuver, protection, and sustainment. For the Navy, it is also the level at which administrative and operational
command authorities are frequently dual-hatted.
The OLC is also the level at which maritime capabilities are integrated with other component capabilities.
Working with the other component commanders through the command relationships designated by the JFC, Navy
forces are optimized to achieve operational success.
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It is a common misperception of “operators” entrusted with the important business of planning and executing the
tactical level of war5 to mistakenly assume they are “operating” at the operational level. Navy component
commanders (NCCs) and numbered fleet commanders and their staffs operate principally at the operational level.
Commands/staffs below the numbered fleet level (e.g., task force commanders and their staffs) are involved in
operational-level planning and coordination, but their principal focus is command at the tactical level.
OLCs focus on learning about an unfamiliar problem(s) and exploit that understanding to create a broad approach
to problem solving. This OLC focus creates a design from which the tactical-level commander can follow
established planning procedures to create a detailed plan of action.
1.2.3 Navy Command
Navy command is unique and reflects its operational environment, traditions, and culture. Despite the change in
today’s environment, the Navy has retained unique characteristics in the capabilities it provides, as well as the
way it functions compared to the other services/components. Unlike land and air forces, Navy forces do not
undergo a lengthy period of transition from garrison to deployed and operational status. Navy forces are
operational as soon as they “take in all lines.” The Navy operates around the globe and around the clock, year
round.
Navy forces also enjoy a high degree of mobility and flexibility. Being essentially self-deploying, they are able to
operate in support of strategic objectives without impacting another nation’s sovereignty and do not necessarily
require host-nation permission for their presence. As such, they provide a unique characteristic of persistent
military capabilities to the combatant commander (CCDR) that is essentially immediately available.
Navy tactical commanders are expected to take initiative using the operational-level commander’s guidance,
which defines what needs to be done but not how to do it. It is important to note that the Navy’s C2 methodology
is unlike those used by other components. Although all components espouse “centralized planning/decentralized
execution,” the Navy’s execution can be seen as more decentralized than the others. An example of Navy
decentralized execution is the concept of “command by negation” (which is unique to the Navy), which provides
an added degree of freedom for the subordinate commanders to use their initiative in executing tasking.
1.2.4 Unique Aspects of the Naval Operational Command
Today, the Navy provides Navy operational commanders unique, multimission platforms that have numerous
capabilities within a single platform. For example, the Aegis destroyer is capable of providing antisubmarine
capability via towed sensors and active/passive sonar, deploying an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capable
helicopter, and employing torpedoes by ship or helicopter. Additionally, this same ship has a robust antisurface
capability that encompasses various electronic sensors for targeting missiles and large-caliber guns. It has a robust
air-defense/counterair capability with its Aegis radar system, missiles, and guns, and might be capable of
providing antiballistic missile defense. It may also be a platform with TLAM capability and NSFS. As such, the
tactical forces of the Navy operational commander are multimission platforms, which provide a unique challenge
to the Navy operational commander when apportioning forces to subordinate commanders.
The Navy operational commander exercises those operational authorities delegated by higher authority. With the
command authority of operational control (OPCON) the commander can organize forces using the task force (TF)
construct. The Navy operational commander has a hierarchical chain of command that extends from the
commander to his TF subordinate commanders to their subordinate task groups (TGs), further to task units (TUs),
and ultimately to task elements (TEs). As such, the commander can form his task organization to suit the mission
assigned. This TF command architecture gives the Navy the ability to assemble its forces as required to support
various missions in a seamless manner. Consequently, multimission platforms are relatively easily reassigned, or
retasked, to provide their capabilities to subordinate commanders.
5
For brevity and convenience throughout this publication, tactical level of war shall be abbreviated to tactical level.
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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CHAPTER 2
Levels of War
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives to clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions.
The three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three
helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Actions within the
three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component
type. Instead, actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their impact or contribution to
achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.
There are no finite limits or boundaries among the three levels. National assets such as intelligence and
communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, today are also significant
resources for tactical operations. Commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate
communications, any single action may have consequences at all levels.
The operational level is the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and
sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas (OAs). Activities at the
operational level:
1. Link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives.
2. Sequence events to achieve the operational objectives.
3. Initiate actions and apply resources to bring about and sustain these events.
The operational level lies between the tactical and strategic levels of war. The boundaries between the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of war overlap and are displayed as three circles with sides overlapping each
other (see Figure 2-1). The overlap represents shared activities. Depending on the mission, these shared activities
may be many or few.
Figure 2-1. Levels of War Boundary Overlap
2-1
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2.2 COMMAND AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
A key tenet of command at the operational level is centralized planning with decentralized execution. The
maritime domain, with its great distances and historically poor communication, has facilitated a proud tradition of
command at the operational level within the Navy. Navy operational commanders routinely have provided tactical
forces direction and guidance through a clear statement of commander’s intent that defines the “who” and “what,”
explains the “why,” and establishes the boundary conditions for “when” and “where” tactical action shall occur.
These Navy operational commanders rely on the initiative of their subordinate commanders to define “how” the
action will occur. It is expected that subordinate commanders will exercise initiative and act in a manner that does
not depart unnecessarily from standard procedures, practices, or instructions (i.e., doctrine) and satisfies the fleet
commander’s stated intent while ensuring coordination with other elements of the force.
The revolution in information systems and the rise of networked, globally connected forces has changed the
command and control (C2) of forces in the traditional maritime domain. No longer is the maritime operational
commander disconnected from tactical forces at sea. This new ability to reliably share information with tactical
forces after they have commenced acting on operational tasking opens new opportunities for the operational
commander to define acceptable risk and to better integrate and synchronize force action in a maritime control
area, area of operations (AO), OA, joint operations area (JOA), or theater of operations.
maritime control area — An area generally similar to a defensive sea area in purpose
except that it may be established anyplace on the high seas. Maritime control areas are
normally established only in time of war. (JP 1-02)
area of operations — An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and
maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of
the joint force commander but should be large enough for component commanders to
accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
operational area — An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for
geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but
are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of
operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area,
and area of operations. Also called OA. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
joint operations area — An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic
combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force
commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to
accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
theater of operations — An operational area defined by the geographic combatant
commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of
operations normally will be geographically separate and focused on different missions.
Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and
over extended periods of time. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
Advances in technology in today’s information systems provide operational commanders and their staff insights
into tactical actions that were historically not available. If properly used this insight facilitates acceleration of the
commander’s decision cycle, allowing for rapid modifications to the major operation or campaign. Operational
command staffs are organized to utilize today’s improved informational infrastructures to assist the commander in
exercising command. However, this is a double-edged sword: if used improperly, it may result in
micromanagement of subordinate forces that are in a better position to understand the tactical situation and
appropriate responses.
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Operational commanders and their staffs need to continually assess actions to ensure they are maintaining
operational perspective. Operational perspective involves the production of carefully articulated orders
(collectively called the campaign/major operation plan (OPLAN)) that direct harmonized tactical action from
general and imprecise strategic guidance. An operational perspective focuses on an AO in which the operational
commander synchronizes multiple tactical actions over a significant period of time.
Command at the operational level involves coordinating and synchronizing activities across the range of military
operations. They are likely to have forces that are conducting “normal and routine” operations (military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence) while other forces are conducting either crisis response/limited
contingency and/or major combat operations. As reflected in Admiral Ernest King’s CINCLANT Serial 053 of
January 21, 1941 (Figure 2-2), the concepts of providing tactical forces direction and guidance that address the
“who,” “what,” “why,” and to the extent necessary the “when” and “where,” but not “how,” is neither new nor
revolutionary. The operational commander uses operational art and operational design to create an OPLAN or
campaign plan to achieve unified action by the tactical military forces, interagency partners, and supporting
nongovernmental organizations. Unified action allows a joint force commander (JFC) to apply apportioned
military elements of national power in coordination with diplomatic, informational, and economic elements to
achieve national strategic objectives. The integration and synchronization of subordinate force actions to achieve
operational objectives constitute the foundational underpinnings of the operational-level commander’s operation
or campaign PLAN to achieve strategic objectives.
2.3 STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR6
The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines
national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national
instruments of power to achieve these objectives. The President establishes policy, which the Secretary of State
(SECSTATE) and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) translate into national strategic objectives that facilitate theaterstrategic planning. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) usually participate in strategic discussions with the
President and SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and with allies and coalition
partners. Thus, the CCDR strategy is an element that relates to U.S. national strategy and operational activities
within the theater. Derived from national strategy and policy and shaped by doctrine, military strategy provides a
framework for conducting operations.
Strategic military objectives define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives.
For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major
combat operations), the President and SecDef typically establish a set of national strategic objectives. The
supported CCDR often will have a role in achieving more than one national objective. Some national objectives
will be the primary responsibility of the CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments
of national power with the CCDR in support of other government agencies. Achievement of these objectives
should result in attainment of the national strategic end state — the broadly expressed conditions that should exist
at the end of a campaign or operation. Once established, the national strategic objectives enable the supported
commander to develop the military end state, recommended termination criteria, and supporting military strategic
objectives.
Commanders at the strategic level define the military end state using military strategic objectives and the
conditions that can support achievement of each objective. The strategic commander defines the time and space
along with his military strategic objectives and conditions in his guidance to the operational commander.
objective — 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every
operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain
feature; the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan; or an enemy
force or capability without regard to terrain features). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
6
For brevity and convenience, throughout this publication strategic level of war shall be abbreviated to strategic level.
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CINCLANT Serial 053 of January 21, 1941
Subject: Exercise of Command — Excess of Detail in Orders and Instructions
1. I have been concerned for many years over the increasing tendency — now grown almost to “standard practice” — of flag officers and
other group commanders to issue orders and instructions in which their subordinates are told “how” as well as “what” to do to such an
extent and in such detail that the “custom of the service” has virtually become the antithesis of that essential element of command —
“initiative of the subordinate.”
2. We are preparing for — and are now close to — those active operations (commonly called war), which require the exercise and
utilization of the full powers and capabilities of every officer in command status. . . . There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more
than prescribe the several tasks of the several subordinates (to say “what,” perhaps “when” and “where” and usually for their intelligent
cooperation, “why”); leaving to them — expecting and requiring of them — the capacity to perform the assigned tasks (to do the “how”).
3. If subordinates are deprived — as they now are — of that training and experience which will enable them to act “on their own” — if
they do not know, by constant practice, how to exercise “initiative of the subordinates” — if they are reluctant (afraid) to act because they
are accustomed to detailed orders and instructions — if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves in
their several echelons of command — we shall be in sorry case when the time of “active operations” arrives.
4. The reasons for the current state of affairs — how did we get this way? — are many but among them are four which need mention;
first the “anxiety” of seniors that everything in their commands shall be conducted so correctly and so smoothly, that none may comment
unfavorably; second, those energetic activities of staffs which lead to infringement of (not to say interference with) the function for which
the lower echelons exist; third the consequent “anxiety” of subordinates least their exercise of initiative, even in their legitimate spheres,
should result in their doing something which may prejudice their selection for promotion; fourth, the habit on the one hand and
expectations on the other of “nursing” and “being nursed” which lead respectively to that violation of command principles known as
“orders to obey orders” and that admission of incapacity or confusion evidenced by “request instructions.”
5. Let us consider certain facts; first submarines operating submerged are constantly confronted with situations requiring the correct
exercise of judgment, decision and action; second, planes, whether operating singly or in company, are even more often called upon to
act correctly; third, surface ships entering or leaving port, make a landfall, steaming in thick weather, etc., can and do meet such
situations while “acting singly” and as well, the problems involved in maneuvering in formations and dispositions. . . . Yet these same
people — proven competent to do these things without benefit of “advice” from higher up — are, when grown in years and experience to
be echelon commanders, all too often not made full use of conducting the affairs (administrative and operative) of their several echelons
— echelons which exist of the purpose of facilitating command.
6. It is essential to extend the knowledge and the practice of “initiative of the subordinate” in principle and in application until they are
universal in the exercise of command throughout all echelons of command. . . . Henceforth, we must all see to it that full use is made of
the echelons of command — whether administrative (type) or operative (task) — by habitually framing orders and instructions to echelon
commanders so as to tell the “what to do” but not “how to do it” unless the particular circumstances so demand.
7. The corollaries of paragraph 6 are:
(a) adopt the premise that the echelon commanders are competent in their several command echelons unless and until they themselves
prove otherwise;
(b) teach them that they are not only expected to be competent for their several command echelons but that it is required of them that
they be competent;
(c) train them — by guidance and supervision — to exercise foresight, to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves;
(d) stop “nursing” them;
(e) Finally, train ourselves to be satisfied with “acceptable solutions:” even though they are not “staff solutions” or other particular
solutions that we ourselves prefer.
Ernest J. King
Figure 2-2. Fleet Admiral Ernest King’s CINCLANT Serial 053 of January 21, 1941
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2.4 OPERATIONAL LEVEL
The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives. The
focus at this level is on the design and conduct of operations using operational art, which is defined in JP 1-02,
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “the application of creative imagination by commanders
and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major
operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the
levels of war.”
JFCs and their component commanders use operational art to determine when, where, and for what purpose major
forces will be employed and to influence the adversary disposition before combat. Operational art governs the
deployment of those forces, and their commitment to or withdrawal from battle. Operational art also governs the
planning of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
Commanders at the operational level build campaign/major OPLANs to achieve the military strategic/operational
objectives. A campaign plan is defined in JP 1-02 as a joint OPLAN for a series of related major operations aimed
at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. When building and executing the
military campaign/major operation plan, commanders at the operational level must ensure military actions are
synchronized with those of other government and nongovernmental agencies and organizations, together with
international partners, in order to achieve national strategic objectives.
Operational success often depends on unified action. Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates
joint, single-service, and multinational operations with the operations of other U.S. Government agencies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g., United Nations (UN)),
and the private sector to achieve unity of effort (see Figure 2-3). Unity of command within the military instrument
of national power supports national strategic direction through close coordination with the other instruments of
national power.
At the heart of the campaign/major OPLAN are operational objectives and associated conditions and tasks for
each tactical action contained in the plan. The campaign/major OPLAN evolves from the assessment and planning
phases of the commander’s decision process and provides the operational-level commander’s direction to the
tactical commanders. Until the plan is provided to tactical-level commanders, the operational-level commander
monitors the operational environment, makes assessments on observations, and replans and updates the
campaign/major OPLAN as needed. Once the campaign/major OPLAN is provided to tactical-level commanders
for execution, the operational-level commander monitors its execution and controls force actions as required.
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Military Operations
Operations with US
Government
agencies
Multinational
Operations
OperationalLevel
Commander
Operations with
nongovernmental
organizations
Operations with
nongovernmental
organizations
The construct of unified action highlights the integrated and synchronized activities of
military forces and nonmilitary organizations, agencies, and the private sector to achieve
common objectives, though in common parlance joint operations increasingly has this
connotation. Unified actions are planned and conducted by joint force commanders in
accordance with guidance and direction received from the President, Secretary of Defense,
and combatant commanders.
Figure 2-3. Unified Action (Source: JP 1)
2.5 TACTICAL LEVEL
Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The tactical level focuses
on planning and executing battles, engagements, and activities to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical
units or Navy task forces (TFs), task groups (TGs), task units (TUs), and task elements (TEs). An engagement
normally is of short duration and includes a wide variety of actions between opposing forces. A battle consists of
a set of related engagements, which typically last longer than engagements involving larger forces, such as fleets,
armies, and air forces; and normally affect the course of a campaign. Forces at this level generally employ various
tactics to achieve their military objectives.
task force — 1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the
purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. A semipermanent organization of
units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific
task. 3. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher
authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. (JP 1-02)
Commanders at the tactical level derive tasking from orders guided by the campaign/major OPLAN. This tasking
will include tactical objectives. Tactical objectives often are associated with the specific “target” of an action and
are associated with the enemy’s centers of gravity (COGs), critical vulnerabilities, and decisive points (DPs). In
this context, an objective could be a terrain feature, such as attainment of maritime superiority in a decisive area,
the seizing or defending of which is essential to the commander’s plan. The objective also could be an enemy
force or capability, the destruction of which creates a vulnerability for the adversary.
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2.6 MARITIME OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
Expanding webs of political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems provides
opportunities for regional powers to compete on a broader scale and emerge on the global landscape with
considerable influence. Littoral and urban environments and other complex terrain will increasingly characterize
areas of operation that may include humanitarian crisis conditions and combat operations. Adaptive adversaries
continually will seek new capabilities and new employment methods to counter the United States and its allies. As
new capabilities, or new methods of employing capabilities, are developed and become more accessible to more
players, the conduct of warfare and crisis resolution will change. The nature of war will remain a violent clash of
wills between states or armed groups pursuing advantageous political ends. The conduct of warfare will include
combinations of conventional and unconventional, kinetic and nonkinetic, and military and nonmilitary actions
and operations, all of which add to the increasing complexity of the operational environment.
Future adversaries may lack the ability or choose not to oppose the United States through traditional military
action. These adversaries will challenge the United States and its multinational partners by adopting and
employing asymmetric methods across selected air, land, maritime, and space domains as well as the information
environment against areas of perceived U.S. vulnerability. Many will act and operate without regard for the
customary law of war.
Navy and joint forces must maintain an unsurpassed ability to fight and win our nation’s wars. Sea power with its
concurrent military and geo-economic focus supports national security goals through operations that do not
necessarily include either adversaries or combat. Examples include peacekeeping, humanitarian relief operations,
and support to civil authorities, foreign and domestic. These operations can contribute to preventing conflict and
may require different types of capabilities or different methods of employing those capabilities than traditionally
used to fight wars.
Regardless of the type of operation, the Navy and joint forces will require capabilities and processes to respond in
the most efficient manner and to minimize the use of military force to that necessary to achieve the overarching
strategic objective. This includes the need for engagement before and after conflict/crisis response, the need for
integrated involvement with interagency and multinational partners, and the need for multipurpose capabilities
that can be applied across the range of military operations.
A common thread throughout the range of military operations is the involvement of a large number of agencies
and organizations — many with indispensable practical competencies and significant legal responsibilities and
authorities — that interact with the Navy and our multinational partners. The Navy commander at the operational
level develops campaign/major OPLANs that integrate and synchronize maneuver and direct tactical force
commanders’ actions in conjunction with the actions of other government and nongovernmental agencies to
achieve unified action.
2.6.1 Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence shape the operational environment and help keep the
day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining U.S.
global influence. These activities improve relations with potential allies and coalition partners. These ongoing and
specialized activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil
authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to
protect U.S. interests at home and abroad.
By virtue of their being forward deployed, Navy forces (NAVFOR) have the ability to support accomplishment of
national strategic objectives without impacting a country’s sovereignty, and routinely are used to conduct military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities that help “shape” the operational environment.
Operational command of these activities is complicated by their continuous nature, fluid strategic priorities in
response to world events, and complex identification of measures (goals) from which to access achievement of
strategic and operational objectives. Naval commanders at the operational level develop a type of campaign/major
OPLAN called a theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) to ensure Navy force actions are correctly prioritized,
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sequenced, and timed to support achievement of CCDR engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence
strategic objectives. These campaign/major OPLANs, unlike ones developed for other types of military
operations, are being executed continuously. Force availability, changes to geographic combatant commander
(GCC) priorities, and world events all impact these campaign/major OPLANs. Achievement of strategic
objectives may take decades. Conditions (measures for assessment of strategic objective achievement) will evolve
as the plan progresses.
2.6.2 Crisis Response or Limited Contingency Operation
Crisis response or limited contingency operations can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a
significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and
operational objectives are to protect U.S. interests and prevent surprise attack or further conflict. The level of
complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Many of these operations involve a
combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with other government agencies (OGAs),
IGOs, and NGOs. A crisis may prompt the conduct of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil support (CS),
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace operations (PO), strikes, raids, or recovery operations.
2.6.3 Major Operations or Campaigns Involving Large-Scale Combat
Major operations or campaigns involving large-scale combat place the United States in a wartime state. In such
cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish
conditions favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.
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CHAPTER 3
Levels of Command Authority
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through two
distinct branches of command, operational and administrative. The operational branch includes the combatant
commanders (CCDRs) for missions and forces assigned or attached to their commands. The administrative branch
is used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned or attached to the CCDRs. Operationallevel Navy commanders are responsible and accountable to both branches (see Figure 3-1). Chapter 7 describes
how the Navy operational-level commanders organize their staffs to simultaneously support operational direction
from the CCDRs and requirements levied by the Navy Secretary in support of the Secretary’s U.S. Code (USC)
Title 10 responsibilities.
Navy commanders at the operational level prepare for and execute major operations and campaigns. A campaign
is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time
and space. A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat
forces of a single or several services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives
in an operational area (OA). Navy operational-level commanders will be assigned or attached units or personnel
to conduct the campaign/major operation. Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States, discusses in detail the authorized command relationships and authority for the military commander and
provides guidance for the exercise of that military authority. Commanders and their staffs must understand the
different levels of authority and the impact each has on the commander’s ability to control assigned and attached
forces.
This chapter provides a brief overview of command authorities and other levels of authority, with a focus on the
differences between those authorities contained in U.S. joint doctrine and allied/multinational maritime tactical
instructions and procedures. A detailed discussion of U.S. command authorities is contained in JP 1. A detailed
Figure 3-1. Two Distinct Branches of Command
3-1
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NWP 3-32
discussion of allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures is contained in ATP 1/MTP 1
series.
3.2 COMMAND AUTHORITY
Command is the authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue
of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available
resources, and for planning the employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces
for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and
discipline of assigned personnel.
Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including
authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although commanders may
delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the
accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute. The extent of authority is specified by the
establishing authority, directives, and law.
Unity of command (one of the principles of war7) means all forces operate under a single commander with the
requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. However, unity of effort requires
coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not
necessarily part of the same command structure.
Command relationships define the interrelated responsibilities between and among commanders, as well as the
operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command. Defining command relationships
between subordinate commanders who are at a common organizational echelon is a critical aspect of operational
command and control. Equally important are the development and maintenance of professional relationships with
commanders at all echelons, interagency representatives, plus multinational partners to build trust and confidence
among all elements of the force.
3.3 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS DEFINED IN JOINT DOCTRINE
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, defines four types of command relationships: combatant
command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and
support. The specific command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) will define the level of
authority a commander has over assigned or attached forces. An overview of joint doctrine command
relationships is shown in Figure 3-2. Joint doctrine also defines three other types of authority outside those
command authorities mentioned above: administrative control (ADCON), coordinating authority, and direct
liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH).
3.3.1 Combatant Command (Command Authority)
COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands
by Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan
(UCP), and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of
command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing command of forces, assigning tasks,
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or,
in the case of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), training of assigned forces), and
logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Except as noted in Title 10, USC,
section 162, all forces are assigned to CCDRs by the SecDef’s “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum,
which is contained within the Secretary’s Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG).
7
See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for a complete discussion on the principles of war.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
Combatant Command (Command Authority)
(Unique to Combatant Commander)
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process Input
Assignment of Subordinate Commanders
Relations with Department of Defense Agencies
Directive Authority for Logistics
Authoritative Direction for All Military Operations and
Joint Training
When
OPERATIONAL
CONTROL
is delegated
Organize and Employ Commands and Forces
Assign Command Functions to Subordinates
Establish Plans and Requirements for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Activities
Suspend Subordinate Commanders from Duty
When
TACTICAL
CONTROL
is delegated
Local direction and
control of movements or
maneuvers to accomplish
mission
When
SUPPORT
relationship
is delegated
Aid, assist, protect,
or sustain another
organization
Figure 3-2. U.S. Joint Doctrine Command Relationships (Source: JP 1)
3.3.2 Operational Control
OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the command authority over assigned or attached forces. OPCON is the
authority of a commander to perform those functions over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing
commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission.
OPCON may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCDR and can be delegated
within the command. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint
training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force
commanders (JFCs) and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON provides authority to
organize commands and forces and employ those forces necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not
include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operations areas of
subordinate JFCs.
3.3.3 Tactical Control
TACON is inherent in OPCON and is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or
military capability or forces made available for tasking. It is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the OA necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.
TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCDR.
Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use
of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.
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3.3.4 Support
Support is a command authority with four categories: general, mutual, direct, and close. A support relationship is
established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid,
protect, complement, or sustain another force.
Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCDR. The designation of a
support relationship is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs planning or executing joint
operations. The support command relationship is a flexible arrangement. The establishing authority is responsible
for ensuring that the supported and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority granted the
supported commander. An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support
relationship, the desired results, and the action to be taken.
The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The
supporting commander provides the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander’s existing
capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported
commander, the establishing authority is notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The
establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.
General support is support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
Mutual support is support units render each other against an adversary. Because of their assigned tasks this is
based on their position relative to each other, the adversary, and their inherent capabilities. Direct support is a
mission requiring a force to support another specific unit. This authorizes the supporting unit to answer directly to
the supported force’s request for assistance. Close support is action of the supporting force against targets or
objectives that are sufficiently close to the supported force. This requires detailed integration or coordination of
the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.
The JFC may also establish support relationships8 between functional component commanders and other
component commanders to facilitate operations. The type of support provided by the supporting commander
(general, mutual, direct, or close) would be specified by the JFC in the establishing directive. The joint force
maritime component commander (JFMCC) may use the support command relationship as a means to optimize
utilization of multimission platforms between subordinate maritime task force (TF) commanders.
Note
“Support situations,” which describe the degree, manner, and duration of the action of
a maritime TF or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any
other maritime task force, are not related to the command relationship of support. See
paragraph 4.2.1.5 for further discussion of support situations.
3.3.5 Coordinating Authority
Coordinating authority is delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and
activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or
more forces of the same service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between
the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement
cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a
8
supported commander — In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from
another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands
the assistance required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
supporting commander — In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects,
complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the
supported commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
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NWP 3-32
consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is
more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1)
3.3.6 Administrative Control
ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to
administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment,
personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization,
discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.
This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and
support.
3.3.7 Direct Liaison Authorized
DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (at any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or
coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison
authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping
the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination
relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.
Note
Joint doctrine and allied/multinational maritime instructions and procedures define the command
relationships of OPCON and TACON differently. Unity of effort/unity of command can only be
achieved if all commanders are fully cognizant of which definitions are being used when operating
with allied/multinational forces.
Note
The allied maritime tactical instructions and procedures definition of the command authority
“OPCOM” is not in the U.S. joint doctrine lexicon. Use of this term with U.S. forces will/may result in
confusion and impact unity of effort.
Note
The maritime instructions and procedures definition of the command authority
“TACOM” is not in the U.S. joint doctrine lexicon. TACOM is used by Navy tactical
forces. Use of this term with non-Navy U.S. forces may result in confusion and impact
unity of effort.
3.4 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS DEFINED IN ALLIED MULTINATIONAL MARITIME
TACTICAL PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS
Allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures9 define five types of command relationships:
full command, operational command (OPCOM), OPCON, tactical command (TACOM), and TACON. Nations
only assign forces to allied/multinational commanders utilizing OPCOM or OPCON. Full command, which
covers every aspect of military operations and administration, exists only within national services and, therefore,
is always retained by national commanders. The specific allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and
procedures command relationship (OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM, and TACON) defines the level of authority an
allied/multinational commander has over assigned or attached forces. An overview of allied doctrine command
relationships is shown in Figure 3-3.
9
See ATP-1 (Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures), MTP-1 (Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions
and Procedures).
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Full Command (National Command Authority)
National military commander who has national authority to attach forces to an
allied/multinational commander using either OPCOM or OPCON
Logistics responsibility
Administrative command
Operational Command (OPCOM)
Operational Command (OPCON)
Assign missions or tasks
Reassign forces
Deploy units
Retain/delegate OPCON
Retain/delegate TACOM/TACON
Tactical Command (TACOM)
Direct forces to accomplish specific
mission or task
Deploy units
Retain/delegate TACOM/TACON
Tactical Control (TACON)
Assign and conduct tasks pertaining
to mission
General safety of assigned units
Retain/delegate TACON
Detailed and usually local direction
and control of movements or
maneuvers necessary to accomplish
missions or assigned tasks
Figure 3-3. Allied/Multinational Maritime Command Relationships
3.4.1 Operational Command
OPCOM is the command authority granted to an Allied/multinational maritime commander by a national
commander with full command to assign missions or tasks to subordinated commanders, to deploy units, to
reassign forces, and to retain or delegate OPCON, TACOM, or TACON as may be deemed necessary. It does not
in itself include administrative command or logistical responsibility.
OPCOM is a unique authority for allied/multinational forces.
3.4.2 Operational Control
The definition for OPCON used in allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures is different
from that used in joint doctrine. As defined in allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures,
OPCON is subordinate to OPCOM. OPCON is a command authority granted to an allied/multinational maritime
commander by a national commander with full command or an allied/multinational maritime commander with
OPCOM to direct forces assigned so that the commander can accomplish specific missions or tasks that are
usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical command
and/or control of those units. It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of the units
concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative command or logistic responsibility.
3.4.3 Tactical Command
As defined in allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures, TACOM is subordinate to
OPCOM and OPCON. It is a command authority granted to an Allied/multinational maritime commander by an
Allied/multinational maritime commander with either OPCOM or OPCON. TACOM is authority delegated to an
Allied/multinational commander to assign subordinate forces for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by
higher authority. It involves the responsibility for the conduct of the tasks pertaining to the mission(s), i.e., issuing
OCT 2008
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detailed orders and ensuring their correct execution. It also involves responsibility for the general safety of
attached units, although ultimate responsibility remains with the commanding officers. Tactical command of units
temporarily attached does not include the authority to give them tasks inconsistent with the mission previously
allocated to them. TACOM is a unique authority for maritime forces.
3.4.4 Tactical Control
As defined in allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures, TACON is subordinate to
TACOM. TACON is a command authority granted to an allied/multinational maritime commander by an
allied/multinational maritime commander with OPCOM, OPCON, or TACOM command authority. TACON is
the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions
or assigned tasks. TACON is granted to a commander to assume some function concerning direction,
coordination, or control of movements, maneuvers, and actions relative to a specific task. The officer exercising
tactical control is also responsible for the safety of subordinate units. TACON is usually assigned for a limited
period of time to conduct a specific mission or task. The allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and
procedures definition of TACON closely replicates the joint doctrine definition. Therefore, use of TACON with
U.S., allied, and multinational joint forces will most likely support unity of effort through unity of command.
3.5 IMPACT OF LEVEL OF AUTHORITY ON COMMAND AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Navy commanders at the operational level may be delegated any level of authority (except COCOM) for assigned
or attached forces. Normally Navy commanders at the operational level will have OPCON over assigned and
attached forces. Unlike the other Services, the Navy has a long tradition of exercising TACOM as defined in
allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures. This provides the Navy operational-level
commander flexibility when specifying a tactical commander’s command authority over tactical forces.
Navy commanders at the operational level organize or assign tactical forces to maintain the span of control they
desire. Each Navy tactical force established typically has a designated officer in tactical command (OTC).
Normally the senior task force commander is the OTC. The operational commander will always consider the
mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and command and control (C2) capabilities when
selecting the OTC. The operational-level commander designates the OTC’s command authority over assigned
forces. The operational-level commander can designate OPCON, TACOM (inherent in OPCON), or TACON
(inherent in TACOM). Typically, the OTC is assigned TACOM over forces made available by the operationallevel commander.
With TACOM the OTC can organize the force but does not have the broad authorities of OPCON. OTCs can
organize assigned and attached forces to accomplish missions or tasks. Each subordinate commander is assigned
either TACOM or TACON command authority over forces made available by the OTC. Typically OTCs will
assign TACON command authority to subordinate commanders (e.g., composite warfare commander (CWC),
sector CWC, or warfare commander). The operational-level commander also can designate a support command
authority between two or more OTCs. An OTC who has OPCON can designate a support command authority
between two or more subordinate force commanders.
The Navy’s concurrent use of command authorities from U.S. joint doctrine and allied/multinational maritime
tactical instructions and procedures can cause confusion. Operational-level commanders and staffs need to ensure
all commanders in the force understand their delegated command authorities over forces made available and the
applicable governing reference(s). Table 3-1 provides a snapshot of duties and responsibilities and the command
authority(ies) with which they are associated. An example of the difference between joint doctrine and
allied/multinational maritime tactical instructions and procedures is the authority to retain or delegate OPCON. In
joint doctrine this is a responsibility associated with COCOM, whereas in allied/multinational maritime tactical
procedures and instructions it is associated with OPCOM.
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Table 3-1. Joint Doctrine Allied Maritime Command Authority Comparison
ERR
TACON
TACOM
OPCON
OPCOM
Full
Command
Allied/Multinational Tactical
Instructions and Procedures
Support
TACON
OPCON
Duty/Responsibility*
Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of process
input
Assignment of subordinate commanders
Relations with DOD agencies
Directive Authority for Logistics
Direction for military operations
Direction for joint training
Organize and employ commands and forces
Assign command functions to subordinates
Establish plans and requirements for intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) activities
Suspend subordinates from duty
Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to
accomplish mission
Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another force
Attach forces to an allied/multinational commander
Assign missions
Assign tasks
Reassign forces
Deploy forces
Retain/delegate OPCON
Retain/delegate TACOM
Retain/delegate TACON
Direct forces to accomplish specific mission
Direct forces to accomplish specific task
Assign and conduct tasks pertaining to mission
General safety of assigned units
COCOM
U.S. Joint
Doctrine
* Navy tactical force commanders exercise OPCON, TACOM, TACON, and support.
To achieve unity of effort, operational commanders must ensure subordinates clearly understand the command
authority that is being granted to them, and that the forces assigned understand what this authority allows. When
planning, the commander needs to know what he can expect, and the amount of control that can be exercised
during execution. Key to all levels of authority is communication — principally, before operations commence,
and between different operational-level commanders and tactical forces. This communication will ensure
direction by the operational-level Navy commander is appropriate for the given level of authority.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
CHAPTER 4
Levels of Maritime Command
4.1 JOINT FORCE COMPONENTS
Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task
forces (JTFs). A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions. The President, through the
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS), establishes combatant commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force
structure of such commands. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) are categorized as either geographic or functional.
Table 4-1 lists the geographic and functional combatant commands as of June 2008.
Geographic Combatant Commands
U.S. Africa Command
U.S. Central Command
U.S. European Command
U.S. Northern Command
U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. Southern Command
Functional Combatant Commands
U.S. Joint Forces Command
U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Strategic Command
U.S. Transportation Command
Table 4-1. Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands as of June 2008
When authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS, CCDRs may establish subordinate unified commands (also
called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth
for combatant commands.10 CCDRs exercise COCOM over assigned forces. Forces are assigned in accordance
with guidance contained within the SecDef “Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum” contained within the
SedDef’s Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). Forces are allocated for crisis action
planning (CAP) or execution through the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) crisis action
procedures specified in CJSM 3122.01A, JOPES Volume 1. CCDRs may assign or attach assigned forces to
subordinate commanders. The CCDR may designate operational control (OPCON) and/or tactical control
(TACON) command authority for subordinate commanders to exercise over assigned or attached forces.
The CCDR, commander subunified command, and JTF commander are joint force commanders (JFCs) who
normally exercise OPCON over assigned (and normally over attached) forces. For attached forces, the JFC’s
authority will be designated in the establishing directive. OPCON allows the JFC to organize forces to best
accomplish the assigned mission. JTFs can be established by the SecDef, a CCDR, or an existing JTF
commander. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate
appropriate command relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders.
Forces, not command authority, are transferred between commands. Forces are assigned to a joint force when the
transfer will be permanent, or for an unknown but long period of time. Forces are attached to a joint force when
the transfer will be temporary. Included in the directive that transfers forces is the command authority of the
gaining command.
10
For example, U.S. Forces Korea.
4-1
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
The terms assigned, apportioned, and allocated are defined in the “Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum”
contained within the SecDef’s GFMIG as follows:
1. Assigned: Those forces and resources that have been placed under the COCOM of a unified commander
by direction of the SecDef in the “Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum.”
2. Apportioned: Those forces and resources assumed to be available for contingency planning as of a
specified date. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those
programmed. Apportionment tables are included in part IV of the GFMIG.
3. Allocated: Those forces and resources provided by the President and SecDef for CAP or execution. Forces
are allocated through the JOPES crisis action planning procedures specified in CJCSM 3122.01 JOPES
Volume 1 and section III of the GFMIG.
The term “attached” is defined in JP 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as the placement of
units and personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary.
The term “made available” refers to those forces assigned and/or attached to a JFC, service, or functional
component commander.
The CCDR may conduct operations through the Service component commanders; subordinate JFCs may conduct
operations through Service force commanders, e.g., Navy TF commanders. This relationship is appropriate when
stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and the scope of operations dictate organizational
integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.
JFCs may conduct operations through functional component commanders. This relationship is appropriate when
forces from two or more military departments must operate within the same mission area or geographic domain,
or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the mission.
Figure 4-1 diagrams the possible components in a joint force. In this figure, levels of command in the joint force
that naval commanders routinely occupy are shaded. These roles are JFC, Navy component commander (NCC),
Marine component commander (MCC), and joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). Each of these
levels of command will be briefly discussed below.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
Joint Force Commander
Army
Component
Air Force
Component
Army
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Air Force
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Navy
Component
Marine Corps
Component
Navy
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Coast Guard
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Marine Corps
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Joint Force
Special Operations
Component
Joint Force
Land
Component
Joint Force
Air
Component
Joint Force
Maritime
Component
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Forces/Capability
Made Available
Forces/Capability
Made Available
NOTES:
LEGEND:
(1) A joint force contains Service components (because of logistic
and training responsibilities), even when operations are conducted
through functional components.
(2) All Service and functional components are depicted; any mix of
the above components can constitute a joint force.
(3) There may also be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.
Operational Control
(OPCON)
Command Relationship
Determined by JFC
Figure 4-1. Possible Components in a Joint Force
4.1.1 Joint Force Commander
A commander, joint task force (CJTF) is a joint force commander (JFC). Navy commanders may be designated a
JFC by the SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing CJTF. CJTFs normally are
operational-level commanders. The authority that establishes the joint command will state the forces that are made
available and also include the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed military operations. JP 333, Joint Task Force Headquarters, outlines the JTF establishing authority responsibilities, which are replicated in
Figure 4-2.
4-3
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
Figure 4-2. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities (Source: JP 3-33)
The CJTF will organize those forces over which OPCON is exercised to ensure sufficient flexibility to meet the
planned phases of the contemplated operation and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The
CJTF should allow service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed. The
intent is to meet the CJTF’s needs while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the service
OCT 2008
4-4
NWP 3-32
organizations. The CJTF assesses tasking, develops plans, and then directs and monitors plan execution. This
cycle of assess, plan, direct, and monitor continues until the CJTF mission is complete.
While assigned CJTF responsibilities, the Navy commander’s staff will be augmented to include representatives
from each service with significant forces assigned to the joint command. The Navy commander will retain service
responsibilities (e.g., support the SECNAV’s execution of United States Code (USC) Title 10 responsibilities,
Figure 4-3) held before being designated a JFC. The commander must clearly define staff roles and
responsibilities to ensure fleet management and joint command responsibilities are executed correctly and
efficiently.
U.S. Code Title 10 Chapter 503 Section 5013
The Secretary of the Navy is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all
affairs of the Department of the Navy, including the following functions:
(1) Recruiting.
(2) Organizing.
(3) Supplying.
(4) Equipping (including research and development).
(5) Training.
(6) Servicing.
(7) Mobilizing.
(8) Demobilizing.
(9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
(10) Maintaining.
(11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
(12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and
the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the
responsibilities specified in this section.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Navy is also responsible to the Secretary of Defense for —
(1) the functioning and efficiency of the Department of the Navy;
(2) the formulation of policies and programs by the Department of the Navy that are fully
consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President or
the Secretary of Defense;
(3) the effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and
instructions of the President or Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of the
Department of the Navy;
(4) carrying out the functions of the Department of the Navy so as to fulfill the current and
future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands;
(5) effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Navy and the
other military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for
more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication;
(6) the presentation and justification of the positions of the Department of the Navy on
the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense; and
(7) the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Department of
the Navy.
The Secretary of the Navy is also responsible for such other activities as may be prescribed
by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
Figure 4-3. Secretary of Navy Title 10 Responsibilities
4-5
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
Normally, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with
operational responsibilities. The CJTF may elect to retain some or all component commander responsibilities;
however, care must be exercised when a single commander executes multiple roles in the joint force.
4.1.2 Service Component Commander
All joint forces include Service components. Service component commanders have administrative and logistic
support responsibilities for their Service forces that are part of the overall joint force. Service forces may be
assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a respective Service component
command of that joint force. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders
or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity,
economy, ease of long-range planning, and the scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service
forces for conducting operations.
A Navy component command assigned to a CCDR consists of the NCC and the Navy forces (NAVFOR) (such as
individuals, units, detachments, and organizations, including the support forces) that have been assigned to that
CCDR. A Marine component command assigned to a CCDR consists of the MCC and the Marine forces (such as
individuals, units, detachments, and organizations, including the support forces) that have been assigned to that
CCDR. When a command is designated as the NCC or MCC to multiple CCDRs, the NCC/MCC and only that
portion of the NCC/MCC’s assets assigned to a particular CCDR are under the command authority of that
particular CCDR.
The JFC may provide NCCs and MCCs command authority over Navy and Marine forces assigned or attached to
the JFC. In addition to fulfilling any designated command authorities, Service component commanders have
responsibilities that derive from their Services’ support function. NCCs/MCCs are always responsible for the
following Navy/Marine Corps–specific functions.
1. Makes recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the Navy/Marine Corps forces.
2. Accomplishes such operational missions as may be assigned.
3. Selects and nominates specific units of the Navy/Marine Corps component for attachment to other
subordinate commands. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the NCC/MCC’s control when
such subordinate commands are dissolved.
4. Conducts joint training, including, as directed, the training of components of other Services in joint
operations for which the NCC/MCC has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the
Navy/Marine Corps component’s facilities and capabilities are suitable.
5. Informs their JFC (and their CCDR, if affected) of planning for changes in logistic support that would
significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for
the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation. If the CCDR does not approve
the proposal and discrepancies cannot be resolved between the CCDR and the NCC/MCC, the CCDR
will forward the issue through the CJCS to the SecDef for resolution. Under crisis action or wartime
conditions, and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary,
NCC/MCCs will implement directives issued by the CCDR.
6. Develops program and budget requests that comply with CCDR guidance on warfighting requirements
and priorities. The NCC/MCC will provide to the CCDR a copy of the program submission prior to
forwarding it to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)/Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). The
NCC/MCC will keep the CCDR informed of the status of CCDR requirements while Navy/Marine
programs are under development.
OCT 2008
4-6
NWP 3-32
7. Informs the CCDR (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions that may affect joint
operation planning. The NCC/MCC will inform the CCDR of such decisions and of program and budget
changes in a timely manner during the process in order to permit the CCDR to express the command’s
views before a final decision. The NCC/MCC will include in this information Navy/Marine Corps
rationale for nonsupport of the CCDR’s requirements.
8. As requested, provides supporting joint operation and exercise plans with necessary force data to support
missions that may be assigned by the CCDR.
NCC/MCC or other Navy/Marine Corps commanders assigned to a CCDR are responsible to the CNO/CMC for
the following:
1. Internal administration and discipline
2. Training in joint doctrine and Navy/Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures
3. Logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority
4. Navy/Marine Corps intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with
the laws, policies, and directives.
Unless otherwise directed by the CCDR, the NCC/MCC will communicate through the combatant command on
those matters over which the CCDR exercises COCOM. On Navy-specific matters, such as personnel,
administration, and unit training, the NCC will normally communicate directly with the CNO, informing the
CCDR as the CCDR directs. On Marine Corps–specific matters, such as personnel, administration, and unit
training, the MCC will normally communicate directly with the CMC, informing the CCDR as the CCDR directs.
Subject to the directive authority of the CCDR, the NCC/MCC will retain and exercise the operating details of the
naval logistic support system in accordance with instructions of the Navy Department. Joint force transportation
policies will comply with the guidelines established in the Defense Transportation System.
As shown in Figure 4-4, the Navy administrative control (ADCON) authority always exists from the CNO to the
NCC and from the NCC to subordinate COMNAVFORs. Likewise, ADCON authority always exists from the
CMC to the MCC and from the MCC to subordinate COMMARFORs.
4-7
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
CCDR
CNO
COCOM
Joint
Task Force
Functional
Component
Commands
OPCON/TACON
OPCON/TACON
Service Components
NCC
ASCC
AFCC
Forces Capabilities
Made Available
Service Force /
Functional
Component
Commands
CMC
MCC
Chain of Command
Navy ADCON
Subordinate
Unified Command
USMC ADCON
OPCON
Functional Component
Commands
OPCON/TACON
Forces Capabilities
Made Available
Service Forces
COMNAVFOR
COMARFOR
COMAFFOR
COMMARFOR
Joint
Task Force
OPCON/TACON
Service /
Functional
Components
Figure 4-4. Administrative Control
4.1.3 Service Component with Operational Control
The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force
commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning,
and the scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations. When this
is applicable, the JFC will normally establish an OPCON command authority between some or all Navy and
Coast Guard forces assigned to the JFC and the NCC or Navy force commanders. Those Navy and Coast Guard
forces not under the OPCON of the NCC will remain under the OPCON of the CCDR or be assigned to either a
subunified commander, JTF commander, or functional component commander.
Typically, the Service component will conduct a low-end range of military operations; i.e., military engagement,
security cooperation, and deterrence. These activities shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day
tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining U.S. global
influence. These ongoing and specialized activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other
nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The fluid and long-term
nature of these operations, as well as the impact unplanned events can have on force availability, complicates the
operational assessment, planning, direction, and monitoring tasks of the NCC/Navy force commanders. In
addition, the NCC/Navy force commander must ensure maritime actions are synchronized with those of other
services that are also supporting the JFC’s low-end range of military operations missions. When authorized by the
JFC, the NCC/Navy force commander should also coordinate with other government agencies (DOS) where
appropriate to ensure unity of action.
OCT 2008
4-8
NWP 3-32
4.1.4 Functional Component Commander
The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may challenge the JFC’s span of control and ability to oversee
and influence each task. Functional components allow control of joint forces and capabilities on a functional level
and enhance component interaction. JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate
planning, reduce span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of
effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver.
The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional commands are the joint
force air component commander (JFACC), joint force land component commander (JFLCC), joint force special
operations component commander (JFSOCC), and JFMCC. Functional component commands are appropriate
when forces from two or more military departments must operate within the same mission area or geographic
domain, or when there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission.
Note
Functional component commanders are component commanders of a joint force and
do not constitute a “joint force command” with the authorities and responsibilities a
JFC, even when employing forces from two or more military departments.
The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally,
the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to command and
control those forces will be designated as the functional component commander. However, the JFC will always
consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting
a commander.
The JFMCC is the JFC’s maritime functional component commander. The JFMCC’s forces/capabilities may
consist of subordinate commanders and forces from any Service and may include multinational forces. The
JFMCC’s subordinate commanders use the JFMCC’s operational-level plans to develop their specific maritime
tactical plans. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, provides detailed descriptions of the
JFMCC’s authority, functions, and staff organization. JP 3-32 lists the JFMCC responsibilities as follows:
1. Develop a joint maritime operations plan to best support joint forces.
2. Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/capabilities made available.
3. Request forces of other component commanders when necessary for the accomplishment of the maritime
mission.
4. Make maritime apportionment recommendations to the JFC.
5. Provide maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with JFC maritime
apportionment decisions.
6. Control the operational-level synchronization and execution of joint maritime operations, as specified by
the JFC to include adjusting targets and tasks for available joint capabilities/forces. The JFC and affected
component commanders will be notified, as appropriate, if the JFMCC changes the planned joint
maritime operations during execution.
7. Act as supported commander within the assigned area of operations (AO).
8. Assign and coordinate target priorities within the assigned AO by synchronizing and integrating
maneuver, mobility and movement, fires, and interdiction. If the JFMCC cannot service targets within the
maritime AO with organic maritime forces, the JFMCC may nominate those targets to the joint targeting
process that may potentially require action by another component commander’s assigned forces.
4-9
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NWP 3-32
9. Evaluate results of maritime operations and forward combat assessments to the JFC in support of the
overall effort.
10. Support JFC information operations (IO) with assigned assets, when directed.
11. Function as supported and/or supporting commander as directed by the JFC.
12. Perform other functions as directed by the JFC.
4.1.5 Multinational Organization
Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible
arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO), such as the UN or the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other commonly used terms for multinational operations
include Allied, bilateral, combined, coalition, or multilateral, as appropriate. An alliance is a relationship that
results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the
common interests of the members, such as a treaty. A bilateral agreement exists between two nations. Operations
conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to as combined operations. A JTF comprising units from
two or more allies is called a combined joint task force. A JFMCC with a similar force is called a combined force
maritime component commander. A coalition is a short-term alliance for combined action. A multilateral
agreement involves more than two nations.
4.2 NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
The Department of the Navy has three principal components (Figure 4-5):
1. The Navy Department, consisting of executive offices mostly in Washington, D.C.
2. The operating forces, including the Marine Corps, and the reserve components; and, in time of war, the
U.S. Coast Guard (in peace, a component of the Department of Homeland Security)
3. The shore/support establishment.
OCT 2008
4-10
NWP 3-32
Secretary
of the
Navy
Chief of
Naval
Operations
Shore
Establishment
Coast Guard
in Time of War
Executive Offices
Commandant
of the
Marine Corps
Operating
Forces
Operating
Forces
Navy
Reserves
Marine
Reserves
Shore/Support Establishment
Shore
Establishment
Operating Forces
Figure 4-5. Principal Navy Department Organization
4.2.1 Navy Organization
Navy shore and operating force commands are assigned to an echelon level. The echelon level together with the
standard Navy distribution list (SNDL)11 serves to identify each command’s Navy administrative chain of
command. There are six echelon levels. The CNO is echelon 1, commanders that administratively report directly
to the CNO are assigned to echelon 2, and commanders that administratively report to echelon 2 commanders are
assigned to echelon 3. This pattern repeats to echelon 6. Destroyers and frigates are typically echelon 6 level
commands. Echelon level implies neither command authority nor seniority. Commands of identical composition
may be in different echelons depending on their administrative chain of command.
The operating force commanders, i.e., numbered fleet commanders, have a dual chain of command (Figure 4-6).
Operationally, they typically report to the NCC, which reports directly to the CCDR. Administratively, they report
to the NCC, who is normally an echelon 2 commander and reports to the CNO, which is responsible to provide
trained and equipped naval forces to the CCDR.
11
OPNAVNOTE 5400.
4-11
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
CCDR
(Operational Commander)
Operating Force
and Fleet Commanders
Navy Department
(Administrative Control)
U.S. Africa Command
U.S. Naval Forces Europe
U.S. European Command
U.S. Central Command
6th Fleet
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
th
5 Fleet
U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. Pacific Fleet
rd
3 Fleet
U.S. Northern Command
U.S. Joint Forces Command
th
7 Fleet
Chief of Naval
Operations
U.S. Fleet Forces Command
U.S. Strategic Command
nd
2 Fleet
COCOM
U.S. Transportation Command
Military Sealift Command
U.S. Southern Command
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command
ADCON
Support
th
4 Fleet
U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command
Historic Representation
Consult the current Secretary of Defense Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) for current chain of command
Figure 4-6. Navy Operating Force Dual Chain of Command
CCDRs use one of two models for exercising OPCON of assigned Navy forces:
1. CCDRs retain OPCON of assigned Navy forces and, as needed, delegate OPCON/TACON to Service
components, functional components, and JTF commanders. The NCC remains under the COCOM of the
CCDR but only has an ADCON authority for the CCDRs assigned naval forces.
2. CCDRs delegate OPCON of assigned Navy forces to the NCC and, as needed, direct the NCC to transfer
OPCON to other Service components, functional components, and JTF commanders. NCCs with OPCON
normally further assign OPCON to numbered fleet commanders, who then typically pass OPCON to TF
and task group commanders.
The standing numbered fleet commanders and their associated location for area operations12 are listed in Table
4-2. Numbered fleet commanders use task organizations to assign forces to commanders and provide the means
with which to accomplish their assigned tasks in any planned action.
12
See Chapter 2 for area definitions.
OCT 2008
4-12
NWP 3-32
Table 4-2. Numbered Fleet Commanders’ Location of Area Operations
Numbered Fleet
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Location of Area Operations
Northwestern Atlantic Ocean/Gulf of Mexico
Eastern Pacific Ocean
Southern Command Maritime Operations Area
Central Command Maritime Operations Area
Mediterranean Sea/Northeastern Atlantic/Gulf of Guinea/Black Sea
Western Pacific and Indian Oceans
4.2.1.1 Fleets
The Forces for Memorandum contained within the GFMIG specifies the NCC and numbered fleet (if any)
assignments to each CCDR. The Navy has major and numbered fleets. Major fleets are Navy components for
CCDRs that have assigned Navy numbered fleet(s). Typically the Navy numbered fleet commander reports
operationally and administratively to the major fleet commander, who reports operationally to the CCDR and
administratively to the CNO. Commanders of major fleets operate at the operational level supporting CCDR
strategic objectives.
JP1-02 defines a numbered fleet as “a major tactical unit of the Navy, immediately subordinate to a major fleet
command and comprising various TFs, elements, groups, and units for the purpose of prosecuting specific naval
operations.” Numbered fleet commanders command tactical forces but routinely operate at the operational level as
either JTF commanders or JFMCCs. In addition, numbered fleet commanders normally are the Navy force
commanders (COMNAVFORs) for subunified commanders and JTF commanders.
4.2.1.2 Principal Headquarters
Navy principal headquarters are defined as those Navy commands, other than Navy component commands and
numbered fleet commands, that have operational responsibilities and report directly to a CCDR. This includes
Naval Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM) and some submarine task force commands. Principal
headquarters operate at the operational level supporting the CCDR with functional area expertise.
4.2.1.3 Navy Tactical Headquarters
Navy fleet commanders task organize their tactical platforms to create force packages able to execute various
maritime missions. These force packages are assigned a task force identifier. Within each tactical organization
there is an officer in tactical command (OTC). Navy OTCs promulgate an operations general (OPGENs) directive
providing detailed organizational guidance to subordinate tactical forces.
Navy task force commanders are the Navy’s primary tactical warfighting commanders; they are also typically
commanders of Navy strike groups. Navy strike group commands are normally associated with an aircraft carrier,
large amphibious ship, or major surface combatant. With appropriate augmentation, a Navy strike group
command can be the JTF or Navy force command headquarters for small contingencies.
A Navy strike group force package may include any mix of ships, aircraft, submarines, detachments, other units,
and personnel. OPNAVINST 3501.316A describes three notional types of strike groups from which Navy tactical
headquarters operate. There are carrier strike groups (CSGs), expeditionary strike groups (ESGs), and surface
strike groups (SSGs). The Navy also deploys other force packages based on CCDR requirements (request for
forces).
The CSG provides the full range of operational capabilities for sustained maritime power projection and combat
survivability. It is a flexible, heavy strike group that can operate in any threat environment, in the littorals or open
ocean. CSG capabilities support initial crisis response missions and the ability to operate in nonpermissive
environments characterized by multiple threats, including, but not limited to, antiship missiles, ballistic missiles,
4-13
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
fighter/attack aircraft, electromagnetic jammers, cruise missile–equipped surface combatants, submarines (nuclear
and diesel), and terrorist threats.
Currently, the ESG has organic air defense (provided through the air defense–capable surface combatant ships),
expeditionary warfare capability (provided through amphibious shipping and Marine expeditionary unit (MEU)
(special operations capable), when so equipped), and strike capability (provided through cruise missile land
attack–capable ships and submarines) required for operating independently in low-to-medium threat
environments. An ESG is a flexible strike group that can operate in the littorals or open ocean. ESG capabilities
support initial crisis response missions that may be undertaken in limited nonpermissive environments
characterized by multiple threats, including, but not limited to, antiship missiles, ballistic missiles, fighter/attack
aircraft, electromagnetic jammers, cruise missile–equipped surface combatants, submarines (nuclear and diesel),
and terrorist threats.
The SSG provides combat effectiveness by providing fire support to allies and joint forces ashore. It is a surface
group that can operate independently or in conjunction with other maritime forces. SSGs support crisis response
missions or sustained missions and may be employed in limited nonpermissive environments characterized by
multiple threats. These Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM)/standard missile-equipped surface support groups
provide deterrence and immediate contingency response while maintaining the ability to conduct maritime
interception and other tasks. SSGs are primarily designed to be an independent, sea-based, mobile group that can
provide sea control and strike power to support joint and allied forces afloat and ashore. SSG capabilities include
passive surveillance and tracking, passive defense and early warning, strike operations, and sea control, as well as
the multiwarfare platform capabilities inherent within the SSG.
These strike groups have many other group commands that support their operations. Logistics, maritime patrol
aircraft, maritime civil affairs, mine warfare, and submarine groups are examples of Navy group commands that
support the tactical headquarters/strike groups. The command relationship of these supporting groups with the
strike group commander is determined by the common higher authority.
When an operational commander combines the capabilities of more than one strike group, the tactical
organization is designated an expeditionary strike force. An expeditionary strike force has increased striking
power, enhanced flexibility, and improved responsiveness to permit operations in any threat environment. In
large-scale conflicts or nonpermissive environments, carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, surface
strike groups, and other forces could combine to form an expeditionary strike force that provides the necessary
maritime power projection and combat capability for a wide range of military operations.
4.2.1.4 Navy Forces
Navy groups are composed of Navy forces. Navy forces are designed to be multimission and work above, on, and
below the world’s oceans. They are the basic building blocks of the Navy’s tactical construct.
4.2.1.5 Task Organization
The operational campaign/major operation plan (OPLAN) synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates forces at the
tactical level. The Navy operational-level commander commands forces at the tactical level organized from
individual platforms. Task organizing enables the operational-level commander to exercise a more reasonable
span of control. Individual platforms are assigned and/or attached to a task force (TF). Each TF is assigned a
commander, and only the commander reports to the operational commander. TFs also allow an operational
commander to subdivide subordinate forces and delegate authority and responsibility to plan and execute based on
mission, platform capability, geography, or other issues and challenges. The commander, task force (CTF) further
subdivides the TF into task groups, units and elements to ensure span of control at the tactical level is maintained.
These subdivisions may be organized based on capabilities, missions, geography, or a hybrid of all three; they
produce tactical and operational results to accomplish operational and strategic objectives to satisfy strategic goals
toward fulfillment of national policy (Figure 4-7).
OCT 2008
4-14
NWP 3-32
President /
Secretary of Defense
Strategic Level
CCDR
Operational Level
NCC
CJTF
#Flt CDR
JFACC
JFLCC
JFMCC JFSOCC
Tactical Level
Task Force
Task Force
Task Force
Task Group
Task Force
Task Group
Task Unit
Warfare Commanders
On-Scene Commanders
Task Unit
Task Element
Task Element
Figure 4-7. Task Organization Levels of Command
A numerical representation is used to designate the command level of the task organization scheme; see Figure
4-8. The first numeral gives the TF its identity. Allied communication publication (ACP) 113 specifies the TF
identities that countries can use for their forces. As of June 2008, the United States was allocated TF designations
of 0–199, 201–299, and 800–824. Typically, task force identifiers for U.S. forces are designated with two or
fewer digits. On occasion, the force component will utilize three digits to indicate a joint force assignment. Each
task command is composed of forces from the higher task command and has a commander with command
authority of OPCON, TACOM, TACON, or support. Only a commander with OPCON or TACOM can assign or
attach units to subcomponents in the task organization structure.
Figure 4-8. Task Organization Numerical Representation
Typically, TFs designated by the numbered fleet commanders utilize two-digit identifiers, with the first digit
corresponding to the fleet number and the second indicating the forces’ purpose. For execution of campaign/major
OPLANs and major operations, fleet commanders typically create a TF with a three-digit identifier. The CTF will
define the TF’s task groups (TGs).
4-15
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
Each TG within a TF corresponds to a subset of the force that has developed, exercised, and practiced tailored
operating procedures to accomplish one or all of the missions expected from the TF, to achieve success in
assigned operational tasks. These procedures are cataloged by warfare area and promulgated in operation task
(OPTASK) directives.
Normally, the TGs in three-digit TFs will evolve from ones in a two-digit task organization, thereby retaining a
common operating baseline. TGs normally maintain their task group identifier in the three-digit task organization
(i.e., TG X5.3 would become TG XX5.3). TG assignments are promulgated by the TF commander in the OPGEN
directive.
Figure 4-9 presents a notional Navy task organization. Normally, tactical-level forces will be OPCON to one of
two Navy operational-level commanders, either the numbered fleet commander or a JFMCC. The Navy
operational-level commander shall identify those missions specifically assigned to each TF. Operational-level
commanders should limit mission assignment to individual TFs. When establishing TFs, Navy operational-level
commanders should consider span of control/command.
The Navy operational-level commander serves as the Navy coordinator for intelligence, network operations,
establishment/maintenance of knowledge repositories, and the establishment and maintenance of a common
operational picture (COP). These activities are required by the operational-level commander and must be shared
with all of the TFs in order to help them execute their missions. Having the maritime commander at the
operational level responsible for these activities ensures that they are common across the maritime force.
When operations require two or more TFs or their subordinates to occupy the same maritime AO and/or have the
same/complementary focus, either the CTFs or the common superior will establish the relationship to ensure unity
of effort.
Strategic Level
CCDR
Intelligence Support Operations
Network Operations
Information Operations
COP/Knowledge Management Tools
Other operations deemed overarching
Operational Level
NCC
CJTF
#Flt CDR
JFMCC
JFACC
Task Forces
TF X1
JFLCC
JFSOCC
Tactical Level
TF X2
TF X3
TF X4
Task Groups
Task Units
Task Elements
Task Groups
Task Units
Task Elements
Task Groups
Task Units
Task Elements
Task Groups
Task Units
Task Elements
Based on capabilities,
missions, geography,
or a hybrid of all three
Based on capabilities,
missions, geography,
or a hybrid of all three
Based on capabilities,
missions, geography,
or a hybrid of all three
Based on capabilities,
missions, geography,
or a hybrid of all three
Figure 4-9. Notional Navy Task Organization
OCT 2008
4-16
NWP 3-32
Establishment of TFs ensures unity of command and unity of effort across the multimission platforms assigned
for an operational mission or tasking. TF categories (Logistics, Navy Special Warfare, etc.) are established by
doctrine. Fleet or other operational commanders (i.e., JFC/JFMCC) are not required to assign or attach forces to
all TF categories. Fleet and other commanders who may assign or attach forces to a TF should consider the
following before establishment of a TF:
1. Need: Is a TF needed? The purpose of task organizing is to produce tactical and operational results that
enable accomplishment of operational and strategic objectives. What missions does the current operational
effort require? Task forces execute discrete groups of missions that when coupled will accomplish a
tactical or operational result. Can a discrete task or set of tasks that is not applicable to the entire maritime
force be identified? Do the scale, scope, complexity, and duration of expected operations necessitate the
creation of multiple TFs? Are there missions that all TFs will be required to execute? If yes, can the
mission be executed by the establishing command or should a separate TF be created?
2. Mission: What operational and tactical effects will the missions expected of each TF accomplish? Are all
missions expected to be performed by the maritime force assigned to TFs? Are the units assigned to TFs
capable of accomplishing missions assigned to the TF? Who has the preponderance of forces necessary,
the ability to characterize the operational environment, and the ability to command and control the forces
assigned to achieve success?
3. Span of Control/Command. There are limits as to how many subordinates a commander can effectively
control. At some point, managing the incoming information will exceed the abilities of the commander and
staff. Some studies suggest that humans are able to manage up to seven separate subordinate entities.
However, given the fluid nature of events at the operational level, and the volume of information in
today’s operational environment, even not considering “the fog of war,” it is even less likely that one
commander can effectively oversee this number. Expanding beyond this threshold taxes the cognitive
abilities and may cause a loss of proper focus or, in extreme instances, lead to organizational paralysis.
One can reduce the number of subordinate commands by narrowing the span of control. This approach
deepens the fighting organization by adding intermediate command echelons. It may increase the number
of individual staffs and the amount of time for information to flow to the top — that is, it may reduce
speed of command. Flattening increases speed of vertical dissemination and may increase tempo, but
requires widening the span of control. This approach places a premium on lateral coordination among
subordinate units, demands clear lines of responsibility, and may compel an increase in staff size and
mandate superior communication architectures to synchronize forces effectively. Trade-offs exist between
organizational width (number of TFs) and depth (fewer TFs, with each having multiple subordinate
commanders) depending on the complexity of the operation, ability of the commander, staff capacities and
expertise, capabilities of forces and communication networks, expanse of the operating area, the volume of
information, and the skills of subordinate commanders and their staffs.
4. TF Relationships: What will be the relationship between TFs operating concurrently in the maritime AO?
With multimission ships it is expected that ships in one TF have capabilities applicable to mission(s)
assigned to another TF. Navy doctrine (NWP 3-56 (Rev. A), Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual)
and allied/multinational instructions and procedures identify three “support situations” (SUPSITs) to
describe the action of a force or portion thereof that aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other
force.
Note
Support situations have no relationship with the command authority of support. The
command relationship between the TF commanders is established by their common
superior. Support situations are classified as A, B, and C, which are defined as follows:
4-17
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
a. Situation A. The support force is to join and integrate with the other force. The senior officer present
or the officer to whom he has delegated tactical command is to become the OTC of the combined
force.
b. Situation B. The support force does not integrate. Unless otherwise ordered, the senior OTC of the
two forces is to coordinate the tactical operations of the two forces.
c. Situation C. The support force commander has discretion how to best provide support.
Table 4-3 lists some of the advantages and disadvantages for each support situation.
5. Flagship: TFs typically require a flagship or shore headquarters facility with sufficient communications
and computer networks to effectively provide situational awareness (SA) to the operational commander,
other TF commanders, and subordinate forces. Without this ability, the TF commander cannot effectively
communicate, coordinate, and collaborate up, down, and across the force and may unintentionally disrupt
the effective control of subordinate tactical forces.
Table 4-3. Considerations for Support Situation Selection
Support Situation
(SUPSIT)
ALPHA
Two or more forces
join into one force.
ADVANTAGES
Unity of command, effort, and focus
Integrated planning and synchronized
execution
Massed forces for mission execution
Less duplication of effort, better
conservation of assets
Enhanced coordination of asset
apportionment
DISADVANTAGES
Requires merger of two separate
organizations
Increased level of effort/C2 requirements
for the OTC and staff
Potential loss of focus/tempo of operations
while transitioning to the new command
structure
Better resolution of competing tasks and
priorities assigned to multimission
platforms
BRAVO
Two or more forces
remain separate:
Single officer in
tactical command
(OTC) directs actions
of all forces.
Coordinated tactical operations between
nonjoined forces
Increased level of effort/C2 requirements
for the OTC and staff
Centralized planning, decentralized
execution
Harder to coordinate to prevent mutual
interference or eliminate redundant efforts
than SUPSIT Alpha
More difficult to develop shared situational
awareness between strike groups than
SUPSIT Alpha
Potential slower decisionmaking processes
than SUPSIT Alpha
CHARLIE
Two or more OTCs
coordinate actions.
OCT 2008
No change in command structure or C2
required
OTCs continue to focus on their
respective mission(s)/task(s).
4-18
Harder to coordinate to prevent mutual
interference or eliminate redundant efforts
than SUPSIT Alpha or Bravo
NWP 3-32
4.2.1.6 Officer in Tactical Command/Composite Warfare Commander
Navy tactical forces composed of one or more units will be designated a task organization component and have an
OTC. For task components comprising ships, a composite warfare commander (CWC) may be established. While
acknowledged in joint doctrine, the OTC and CWC are unique Navy constructs. The OTC is the senior officer
present eligible to assume command, or the officer to whom the senior officer has delegated tactical command.
The OTC’s command authority for assigned and attached commands can be OPCON, TACOM, TACON, or
support. The OTC is responsible to the operational commander for the tactical force deployment and action. The
OTC is responsible for accomplishing operational tasking, with task components executing five principal areas of
warfare: air defense (AD), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), IO, strike warfare (STW), and surface warfare (SUW).
The OTC can delegate responsibility for the conduct of these warfare areas to commanders in the task component
and assign a CWC to coordinate warfare commander actions as they wage combat operations countering threats to
the force and maintain tactical sea control.
Note
The OTC controls CWC and warfare commanders’ actions through “Command by
Negation.” Allied maritime procedures and instructions use the term “Command by
Veto.” ATP 1/MTP 1.
Command by negation and command by veto acknowledge that in many aspects of
maritime warfare, it is necessary to preplan the actions of a force to an assessed threat
and to delegate some command functions to a subordinate. Once such functions are
delegated, the subordinate is to take the required action without delay, always keeping
the OTC informed of the situation. The OTC and/or delegated commander retains the
power to negate any particular action. Neither command by negation nor command
by veto is recognized by other Services.
The OTC is normally the CWC; however, the officer in tactical command can designate a commander to be the
CWC. The CWC wages combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with
assets assigned, while the OTC retains close control of power projection and strategic sea control operations. The
OTC may, but is not required to, use task organization components to indicate which forces are TACON to
specific warfare commanders, with the warfare commander being designated a TG, TU, or TE commander. For
example, an OTC, who is designated a TG commander, could designate the CWC and warfare commanders as TU
commanders. To operate effectively, each unit and command must know in detail its obligation to the OTC,
CWC, warfare commanders, and other units. To achieve this, it is essential that the OTC clearly specify the chain
of command. Although control of different force weapons systems in a single unit may be delegated to different
warfare commanders, only one commander may exercise TACON for its movements.
4.2.2 Naval Expeditionary Forces
Naval expeditionary forces offer the CCDR a flexible range of options to support achievement of national
strategic objectives across the range of military operations. They combine the complementary but distinct
capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps. Through attack aircraft, surface fire support, sea-launched cruise
missiles, and special-warfare forces, Navy forces provide the capability to attack targets in the littorals, and they
provide the capability to deploy, land, and sustain expeditionary forces ashore. Navy forces contribute the
seaward element of naval expeditionary power projection. Marine forces contribute landing forces, the landward
extension of naval expeditionary power. Landing forces include not only ground combat forces but also Marine
aviation and logistics elements that can operate from expeditionary land as well as from sea bases.
4.2.3 Marine Corps Organization
As with the Navy, Marine Corps operating force commanders have a dual chain of command (Figure 4-10).
Operationally, they are the Service component and report to the appropriate CCDR. Administratively, they report
to the MCC, which reports to the CMC, who is responsible to provide trained and equipped Marine Corps forces
to the CCDR.
4-19
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
CCDR
(Operational Commander)
Operating Force
Commanders
Navy Department
(Administrative Control)
U.S. Africa Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe
U.S. European Command
U.S. Central Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command
U.S. Pacific Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific
I MEF
III MEF
U.S. Northern Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces North
U.S. Joint Forces Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command
II MEF
Commandant of the
Marine Corps
COCOM
ADCON
U.S. Strategic Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic
U.S. Southern Command
U.S. Marine Corps Forces South
U.S. Special Operations Command
Support
U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command
Historic Representation
Consult the current Secretary of Defense Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) for current chain of command.
Figure 4-10. Marine Corps Operating Force Dual Chain of Command
4.2.3.1 Marine Corps Forces Commands
Each CCDR has a maritime force (MARFOR) component commander assigned; however, only two have Marine
forces assigned — Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM) and Marine Forces, Pacific
(MARFORPAC) serve as the Service component commanders for United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
and United States Pacific Command (PACOM), respectively, as indicated in Figure 4-10. MARFOR commanders
are part of the Service or administrative chain of command and are responsible to the CMC for equipping,
training, administering, and sustaining their forces. These forces include:
1. Marine expeditionary force (MEF) based in southern California and Arizona assigned to MARFORPAC
2. Marine Expeditionary Force based in North and South Carolina assigned to MARFORCOM
3. Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and Hawaii assigned to MARFORPAC.
The Marine Corps Reserve is closely integrated with the active duty Marine Corps Forces. Within the Service
chain of command, the commander of Marine Corps Forces Reserve provides Selected Marine Corps Reserve
units and individual Marines to active duty Marine Forces when directed by the President/SecDef. When
activated, reserve units are assigned to USJFCOM and administratively to MARFORCOM.
OCT 2008
4-20
NWP 3-32
4.2.3.2 Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is the Marine Corps’ principal organization for all missions across
the range of military operations. The MAGTF provides the operational commander with a versatile expeditionary
force for responding to a broad range of crises and conflict situations. MAGTFs are balanced, combined arms
forces with organic command, ground, aviation, and sustainment elements.
MAGTFs are organized, trained, and equipped to perform forward-presence, crisis-response, and full-scale
combat missions, including forcible entry by amphibious assault. With the exception of special-purpose
MAGTFs, MAGTFs are general-purpose air-ground-logistics forces that can be tailored to the requirements of a
specific situation.
MAGTFs can operate from sea or expeditionary bases, or both. Depending on the requirements of the situation,
they can present minimal presence ashore or a highly visible presence. They can project combat power ashore in
measured degrees as needed and can provide secure staging areas ashore for follow-on forces.
4.2.3.3 The Structure of the MAGTF
While MAGTFs are task organized, each MAGTF, regardless of size or mission, has the same basic structure.
Each MAGTF has four core elements: a command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat
element (ACE), and logistics combat element (LCE). The MAGTF’s combat forces reside within these four
elements. (See Figure 4-11.)
The CE provides the C2 necessary for the effective planning and execution of all military operations. It is
normally a permanent headquarters. It also includes units that provide intelligence, communications, and
administrative support in general support of the MAGTF.
The GCE is task organized to conduct ground operations in support of the MAGTF mission. It may have any
composition required by the mission, although normally it is built around an infantry unit reinforced with artillery,
reconnaissance, armor, engineer, and other forces as needed. The GCE may range from a light, air-transportable
unit to one that is more motorized and mechanized.
The ACE is task organized to support the MAGTF mission by performing some or all of the six functions of
Marine aviation: anti-air warfare, assault support, offensive air support, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft
and missiles. The ACE is normally built around an aircraft organization augmented with appropriate air command
and control, combat, combat support, and logistics combat units. The ACE can operate effectively from ships,
expeditionary airfields, or austere forward-operating sites and can readily and routinely transit between sea bases
and expeditionary airfields without loss of capability. The ACE can range in size and composition from an
aviation detachment with specific capabilities to one or more Marine aircraft wings.
The LCE is task organized to provide a full range of support functions from sea bases aboard naval platforms or
from expeditionary bases ashore. The LCE provides sustainment for the MAGTF. It can also provide logistical
support external to the MAGTF, as in disaster relief operations. MAGTFs can augment this organic sustainability
by external support from the Navy, other Services, and host-nation support (HNS) organizations.
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OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
Figure 4-11. MAGTF Elements (Source: MCDP 3 as modified by MARADMIN 562/06)
One of the key features of Marine expeditionary organization is expandability. Because of the frequent need for
rapid response, the initial force at the scene of a developing crisis may not be the decisive force. Crisis response
requires the ability to expand the expeditionary force after its introduction in theater without sacrificing the
continuity of operational capability. The MAGTF’s modular structure lends itself to rapidly and easily expanding
into a larger force as a situation demands by simply adding forces as needed to the core units of each existing
element. This flexibility includes expanding into a joint or combined force, since the generic MAGTF structure
parallels the structure of a multidimensional joint force.
4.2.3.4 The Marine Expeditionary Force
The MEF is the principal Marine Corps warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It
is capable of executing missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and
sustained operations ashore in any environment. Each MEF consists of a permanent CE and one Marine division,
Marine aircraft wing, and Marine logistics group. Each forward-deploys MEUs on a continual basis.
The size and composition of a deployed MEF can vary greatly depending on the requirements of the mission. A
MEF can deploy with not only its own units, but also units from the other standing Marine expeditionary forces,
the Marine Corps Reserve, or other Services. A MEF typically deploys with 60 days of sustainment.
4.2.3.5 The Marine Expeditionary Brigade
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite
Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The MEB, commanded by a general officer, is task
organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead
echelon of a MEF, or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a MEU but smaller than a MEF.
The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the full range of military operations. A MEB typically deploys
with 30 days of sustainment.
4.2.3.6 The Marine Expeditionary Unit
The MEU is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary organization. Though each MEU is task
organized and special operations–capable, a typical Marine expeditionary unit includes:
1. A standing CE
2. An infantry battalion reinforced with artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, armor, and assault amphibian
units
OCT 2008
4-22
NWP 3-32
3. A reinforced helicopter squadron with transport, utility, and attack helicopters, MV-22s transition wing
aircraft, a detachment of vertical/short takeoff and landing fixed-wing attack aircraft, and other
detachments, as required
4. A task-organized LCE
5. Sustainment for 15 days.
Marine expeditionary units undergo intensive predeployment training and are augmented with selected personnel
and equipment to provide enhanced capabilities, such as specialized demolition operations, clandestine
reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, and in-extremis hostage recovery.
MARFORCOM and MARFORPAC maintain forward-deployed MEUs in the Mediterranean Sea, the western
Pacific, the Indian Ocean, or Persian Gulf region. The MEU can be thought of as a self-contained operating force
capable of missions of limited scope and duration and as a forward-deployed extension of the MEF.
4.2.3.7 The Special-Purpose MAGTF
A special-purpose Marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF) may be formed to conduct a specific mission that is
limited in scope and focus and often in duration. A SPMAGTF may be any size, but normally it is a relatively
small force — the size of a Marine expeditionary unit or smaller — with narrowly focused capabilities chosen to
accomplish a limited mission. Common missions of a SPMAGTF include raids, peacekeeping, noncombatant
evacuation (NEO), disaster relief, theater security cooperation, and humanitarian assistance.
A SPMAGTF may be task organized deliberately from the assets of a standing MEF and deployed from its home
base for a particular mission. Or it may be formed on a contingency basis from an already-deployed MAGTF to
perform an independent, rapid-response mission of usually limited scope and duration.
4.2.3.8 Maritime Prepositioning Forces
Maritime prepositioning forces are a key element of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary capability. The rapid
deployment of expeditionary forces to practically any part of the globe is made possible through the linkup of
personnel from the operating forces with prepositioned equipment and supplies. A maritime prepositioning force
consists of two basic building blocks:
1. Prepositioned shipping carrying equipment and supplies.
2. Marines and sailors, with selected items of equipment, flown into the objective area by strategic airlift to
link up with the equipment. Depending on the mission, the fly-in echelon can include some 120 selfdeploying aircraft.
There are three maritime prepositioning ship squadrons. Each squadron consists of four or five multipurpose
vessels. These squadrons are maintained at strategic locations around the globe that allow at least one of them to
steam to any part of the world within a matter of days. The equipment on a single maritime prepositioning ship
squadron is the equivalent of more than 3,000 airlift sorties.
Each maritime prepositioning ship squadron contains equipment and 30 days of sustainment for nearly 15,000
Marines and sailors from one of the standing MEFs, task-organized around a MEB. These forces, along with a
Navy support element, fly into the theater using 250 strategic airlift sorties and link up with the equipment
unloaded from the prepositioning ships. Within a few days, any CCDR can have the lead echelon of an MEF
ready for employment.
The ultimate usefulness of maritime prepositioning forces is their enormous flexibility. Through a building-block
approach, they provide CCDRs a cost-effective, rapid, sustainable global crisis response capability that can be
employed across a wide range of expeditionary operations.
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OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
4.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL COMMANDS
An establishing authority issues an establishing directive to organize forces. For joint forces the establishing
authority is the higher joint commander — it may be a CCDR, a subunified commander, a JTF commander, or
even at the SecDef level — who organizes, assigns, and attaches forces to the joint command. For Navy task
organizations the establishing authority for TFs is either a numbered fleet commander or a JFMCC. A TF
commander with OPCON over forces assigned and/or attached to the TF will designate which units in the TF
belong in which TGs. Table 4-4 shows the establishing authorities on the left column and the
commands/components that the establishing authority is likely to designate.
The establishing authority assigns or attaches forces to subordinate commanders and defines their command
authority over these forces. When identifying a supported and supporting command authority the establishing
authority defines the support command relationships, the respective degree of authority, and overall priorities —
especially where there are limited resources supporting numerous operations; special forces and air are good
examples of limited resources. The establishing authority is also the referee, the tie breaker, when subordinates
cannot work out the necessary balance of apportioned forces. Some establishing authority best practices:
1. Highlight the strategic and, if known, operational objectives and goals of the force.
2. Provide clear direction to subordinates in terms of priorities and intent to allow subordinates to work
horizontally with each other in accomplishing tasks.
3. Set conditions for and demand horizontal and vertical coordination amongst supported and supporting
commanders to build and reinforce the necessary horizontal personal relationships, trust, and confidence.
4. Challenge subordinates to “self-regulate” their apportionment of capabilities to one another through
horizontal crosstalk. This crosstalk among components will allow them to arrive at the optimal
apportionment of capabilities to accomplish their assigned tasks and support the designated supported
commanders.
Sound organization provides for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. While
normally associated with forces, organization also applies to designation of geographic responsibilities for the JTF
commander and functional components.
The title of the geographic operating areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. A JFC
assigned a geographic area is considered an area commander.
Establishing
Authorities
Table 4-4. Likely Commands/Components an Establishing Authority Is Likely to Designate
SecDef
CCDR
CJTF
Numbered Flt
Commander
JFMCC
CTF
Commands/Components Establishing Authority Likely to Designate
Service
Functional
Component
Component
Task
Task
CCDR CJTF Commander
Commander
Forces
Groups
X
X*
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
*Doctrinally allowed; however, not normally practiced
OCT 2008
4-24
NWP 3-32
Note
Only commanders of geographic combatant commands are assigned areas of
responsibility (AORs). Subordinate JFCs normally are assigned other joint operations
areas (JOAs). Functional component commanders may also be assigned an AO by the
JFC to provide unity of command and unity of effort to meet operational objectives
within that area. When assigned an AO, the functional commander integrates and
synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction within the functional component
commander’s AO.
The JFC should consider the following before creating a JFMCC:
1. Scope of operations. Geographically concentrated operations may require direction by a JFMCC.
Dispersed objectives might better be addressed by other organizational options.
2. Level of operations. A JFMCC can provide the linkage when the scope of the operation requires an
operational-level command to directly link maritime operations to campaign or strategic objectives.
3. Planning. The formation of a JFMCC integrates planning, beneath the level of the JFC for maritime
domain operations. While this integrated planning is focused on employment, the JFMCC may also
integrate planning of deployment, transition, and redeployment.
4. Duration. Duration of operations must be long enough to warrant the establishment of a single maritime
force commander. The duration of operations must be worth the costs in terms of lead time, personnel and
staff training, communications systems architecture, and impact on flexibility.
5. Experience. Formation of a JFMCC may enhance the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of
operations required by the joint force headquarters.
6. Span of control. The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may exceed the JFC’s span of control.
Establishing a JFMCC allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level. The JFC has
other responsibilities in the JOA that may require greater focus.
7. Multinational operations. In multinational operations, maritime forces may be provided by a variety of
national components. When proper authority grants organizing subordinate multinational units, the
formation of a multinational force maritime component commander is subject to the same considerations
as in U.S. joint force operations.
Frequently joint force establishing authorities elect to dual-hat the Services’ component or Services’ force
commanders as functional component commanders. The JFC could be a functional component commander
and/or, at echelons below the CCDR, a Service component commander. Another option would be to dual-hat the
functional and Service component commanders (e.g., the JFMCC would also be the NCC/MCC).
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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CHAPTER 5
Operational Design
After World War II, Admiral Raymond Spruance became the President of the Naval War College and Fleet
Admiral Chester Nimitz became the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The admirals wanted to ensure that the
operational-level planning processes developed by the Navy during the war were documented correctly and that
the proper operational-level lessons learned were retained. The admirals believed that the planning process
developed prior to the war had become overly complicated and too mechanical. The results of this thinking are
articulated clearly in the 1948 edition of the Naval Manual of Operational Planning, which Admiral Spruance
developed for the CNO. The manual began very simply:
“In many ways the solution of a military problem is similar to the solution of the problems of
everyday life. When one is faced with a problem, he studies the situation from all angles and
decides what must be done. He then determines how it should be done — and proceeds to act,
governing his actions according to the development of the situation. Hundreds of such problems
are solved by everyone. Great majorities of them are not committed to writing, nor are they
consciously solved in phases. They are solved by the natural, logical thought process normally
pursued by the human mind.
In military problems the situation is much more complex, and the stakes are much higher. In
order to ensure a logical thought process, to guard against the oversight of important details, and
to form a readily available record, military problems are usually solved in written form.
…
In war there is no second prize; there is seldom a second chance.”
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The Navy leaders of World War II were practitioners of operational art and design long before these
terms were adopted in joint doctrine. While technology has provided today’s Navy leaders with a vast
array of capabilities, the fundamental underpinnings of operational planning and operational
decisionmaking have not changed since Halsey and Spruance were fleet commanders.
This chapter shall provide an overview of operational art and operational design as these terms are currently
defined in joint doctrine and academic/professional journals. The chapter shall then show how operational art,
operational design, and operational planning fold into today’s Navy operational decisionmaking processes, which
have evolved from the ideas and concepts that were learned on the high seas and littorals during World War II.
5.2 OPERATIONAL ART
Achievement of objectives does not lend itself to mechanistic, deterministic, scientific models or simple linear
processes — developing a solution requires study of the interplay of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of
independent variables. In other words, developing a solution for strategic objectives is more of an art than a
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science. Operational art13 serves as a bridge and as an interface between maritime strategy and naval tactics. It is
the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and
experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and to organize and employ military forces.
Operational art is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ
military capabilities to accomplish their mission.
In applying operational art, the operational commander draws on judgment, perception, experience, education,
intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the conditions necessary for success before committing forces.
Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to monitor, assess, plan, and direct. It
helps commanders and their staffs order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory. Without
operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected tactical actions.
The operational commander uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces, but also
their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. This includes fundamental
methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities. Operational art helps the
operational commanders overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment. It
governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement
of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic military objectives. Among the many
considerations, it requires commanders to answer the following questions:
1. What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends)
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)
3. What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)
Strategic objectives/goals and the 12 principles of joint operations (Figure 5-1) bound the commander’s
operational art, which guides war fighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and is derived
from experience across the range of military operations. A more detailed treatment of the principles of joint
operations is found in Appendix A of JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
13
operational art — The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs, supported by their skill, knowledge,
and experience, to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational
art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (Source: JP 3-0)
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Figure 5-1. Principles of Joint Operations (Source: JP 1)
In generic terms, operational art at sea is that component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of
planning, preparing, and conducting major operations and maritime campaigns aimed at accomplishing
operational or strategic objectives in a given part of a maritime operations area. Only by applying tenets of
operational art is it possible to accomplish objectives determined by national strategy and policy in the most
decisive manner and with the fewest losses in personnel and material by friendly forces. The main role of
operational art is to properly prioritize, sequence, and synchronize or orchestrate the use of all available military
and nonmilitary sources of one’s power.
5.3 OPERATIONAL DESIGN
Operational design14 provides a deep understanding of the problem to be solved and sets the conditions for tactical
success. Operational planning — particularly for extensive operations that require a campaign — uses various
elements of operational design to help commanders and staffs visualize the arrangement of force capabilities in
time, space, and purpose to accomplish the mission. Operational design is the conception and construction of the
framework that underpins an operational plan and its subsequent execution. While operational art is the
manifestation of informed vision and creativity, operational design is the practical extension of the creative
process. Together they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical and logical
process of design. Operational design must include:
14
operational design — The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation
plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
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1. Understanding the strategic guidance
2. Identifying the enemy’s critical strengths and weaknesses
3. Developing an operational concept that will achieve strategic and operational objectives.
These three key considerations become the framework for planning a campaign or major operation, identifying
the enemy's centers of gravity and critical factors, and developing an operational concept to achieve strategic
objectives. It is intrinsic in the Navy planning process (NPP). The NPP is aligned with joint planning guidelines
and with planning procedures of JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Thus, Navy commands following the process
can effectively integrate into and operate as part of a joint force. NPP, described in NWP 5-01, Navy Planning,
provides a logical set of planning steps through which the commander and staff interact. It supports operational
design by establishing design elements to assist the commander and staff in visualization and shaping of the
operation to accomplish strategic objectives. These elements of operational design comprise a tool that is
particularly helpful in visualizing what the campaign should look like, shaping the commander’s intent, and
determining courses of action (COA). These provide a basis for selecting a COA and developing the detailed
concept of operations (CONOPS).
During execution, commanders and planners continue to consider design elements and adjust current operations
and future plans to capitalize on tactical and operational successes as the operation unfolds. The design and
implementation of leverage and the ability to know how and when to terminate operations are part of operational
design.
Success for the operational commander and staff is directly related to execution of operational art and design.
Throughout these efforts, the following five principles are highlighted as keys for successful operational design:
1. Determine what needs to be done and why, but not the tactical specifics of how (see Chapter 2 for
additional discussion on this topic).
2. Organize subordinate commanders to take best advantage of all of the military force capabilities.
3. Articulate the geometry of the operational environment to provide sufficient control measures in terms of
boundaries and fire control measures without overcontrolling the fight.
4. Establish command relationships that promote interdependence among the components, instill a “one
team, one fight” mentality, provide command authority commensurate with responsibilities, and build
trust and confidence.
5. Decentralize authorities to empower subordinates to operate within the commander’s intent and take
advantage of unforeseen opportunities.
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5.3.1 Inputs to Operational Design
Operational commanders and their staffs apply operational art — supported by their skill, knowledge, and
expertise — to design campaigns and operations, and organize and employ military forces. The NPP discussed in
NWP 5-01 provides the foundation for Navy planning at the operational level. In addition to doctrine and tactical
expertise, operational commanders and their staffs need to have a clear understanding of the strategic end state
and a systems perspective of the operational environment.15
5.3.2 Elements of Operational Design
Operational art encompasses operational design — the process of developing the intellectual framework that will
underpin all plans and their subsequent execution. The elements of operational design (see Figure 5-2) are tools to
help support operational commanders and their staffs visualize what the campaign should look like and to shape
the commander’s intent. These elements also provide the foundation for changes to the campaign/major operation
plan (OPLAN) during the execution phase of the campaign. The emphasis applied to an operational design’s
elements varies with the strategic commander’s objectives. The operational environment is not the only factor that
affects operational design. Other factors, such as the availability of host-nation support (HNS), diplomatic
permission to overfly nations and access en route air bases, the allocation of strategic mobility assets, the state of
the operations area infrastructure, and forces and resources made available for planning all have an impact on the
operational design. In the final analysis, the goals of a sound operational design are to ensure a clear focus on the
ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic centers of gravity (COGs), and provide for sound
prioritization, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all available military and nonmilitary instruments
of power to that end.
DESIGN
ELEMENTS
Operatio
nal
Ar t
Navy Planning Process
Systems Perspective of the
Operational
Environment
l Art
Operationa
Simultaneity and Depth
Timing and Tempo
Forces and Functions
Leverage
Balance
Anticipation
Synergy
Culmination
Arranging Operations
Risk Tolerance
Operatio
nal
Ar t
CONOPS
Phases
Branches & Sequels
Mission Statement
Campaign
Strategic End State
End State and Objectives
Effects
Center of Gravity
Decisive Points
Direct versus Indirect
Lines of Operations
Operational Reach
Commander’s Intent
l Art
Operationa
Figure 5-2. Operational Art and Design
15
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a detailed discussion on “systems perspective of the operational environment” and
“effects.”
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5.3.3 An Estimate of the Situation
The commander and staff use the tenets of operational art and design to define the mission (what the commander
has been told to do and the reason for it) and assemble/examine information relating to the mission. This
information constitutes the initial estimate of the situation. Using this information the staff conducts a mission
analysis and the commander formulates an operational idea. The operational idea is provided to the staff as the
commander’s planning guidance for the development of courses of action. Also critical for follow-on plan
development, the initial estimate of the situation provides a loose collection of diverse references that the
operational commander and staff can consider in the development of the basic plan and continuous estimate-ofthe-situation refinement. Information collected from exercising operational art and design is cataloged as follows:
1. Determination of specified, implied, and essential tasks
2. Ultimate and intermediate objectives
3. Force requirements
4. Balancing of operational factors against the objectives
5. Identification of the enemy and friendly operational centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and
decisive points (DPs)
6. Initial lines of operations (LOOs)
7. Direction (axis)
8. The operational idea
9. Operational sustainment.
A full, detailed, step-by-step guide for conducting a commander’s estimate of the situation is found in NWP 5-01.
5.3.3.1 Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks
Every mission consists of two elements: the tasks to be accomplished by one’s own forces and the purpose of
those tasks. Before going further, it is necessary to illustrate how tasks, operations, and missions are related. If a
mission or operation has multiple tasks, then the priority of each task should be clearly expressed. Using
information provided by higher headquarters and the commander’s initial guidance, the planning team identifies
specified and implied tasks. Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by higher headquarters. Specified
tasks are derived primarily from the execution paragraphs of the operation order (OPORD), but they may be
found elsewhere, such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, or annexes. Implied tasks are not
specifically stated in the higher headquarters order but must be performed in order to accomplish specified tasks.
Implied tasks emerge from analysis of the order, the commander’s guidance, and the enemy. Routine, inherent, or
SOP tasks are not included in the list of tasks.
Those tasks that most contribute to mission success are deemed essential, and they become the central focus for
operations planning. Essential tasks are those that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole.
Essential tasks can come from either specified or implied tasks. If a task must be successfully completed for the
commander to accomplish his purpose, it is an essential task. Only essential tasks are included in the proposed
mission statement. The following example shows the three types of tasks that a commander may experience.
Though not elaborated in this example, the planning team also must determine the follow-on tasks that may be
required at a later time due to the impacts of the operation, the situation in the operational environment, the
enemy’s actions, and the dynamic nature of the operational environment. These tasks, commonly seen in a
directive or guidance as “be prepared to” or “BPT,” shape the planning team’s efforts as well as the specified,
implied, and essential tasks.
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5.3.3.2 Ultimate and Intermediate Objectives
The first and the most important step in designing a major operation is to properly determine and articulate its
ultimate and intermediate objectives. The ultimate objective defines operational success. For example, during
World War II, the ultimate objective for Operation Galvanic, the amphibious assaults on Makin, Tarawa, and
Apamama Islands, was to “gain control of the Gilbert Islands and prepare for operations against the Marshalls16.”
Intermediate objectives support the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. The intermediate objectives for the
assault force of Operation Galvanic was to “capture and occupy Makin, Tarawa and Apamama. Destroy inferior
enemy surface forces attempting to interfere with the landing operations at each objective. Initiate the
establishment of advance bases and the construction of airfields. Return assault shipping required for Marshall
operations to Pearl and San Diego areas as early as practicable.” In addition, the Galvanic operations order
contains intermediate objectives for the carrier force, relief carrier group, defense forces, and shore-based air.
In general, determination of the achievable military objective seems a simple and straightforward process.
However, a number of factors must be correctly evaluated by the operational commander and the planners in
order to determine militarily achievable objectives. Among other things, the operational commander must
properly assess the enemy’s factors of space, time, and force from the enemy’s perspective. In general, the larger
the scale of the objective to be accomplished, the larger these factors are and the more difficult it is to properly
evaluate them. The operational commander needs to evaluate the physical sizes and operational features of a
given sea/ocean and adjacent land areas, the distance from the given physical objective to the staging/deployment
area of friendly maritime forces, and the time required for the enemy’s forces to be deployed, concentrated, and
reinforced. The process of determining the objective in a littoral area would also require considering some
nonmilitary aspects of the situation.
Normally, the ultimate objective of a major operation cannot be achieved with a single action. Hence, each
objective should be divided into the tasks that collectively should accomplish a given ultimate objective. These, in
turn, are transformed into the corresponding objectives to be accomplished by subordinate commanders. The
operational commander and his planners use a “regressive” or “backward” planning process in determining a
number of intermediate objectives. In designing a major operation, several intermediate, usually major tactical
and some minor tactical, objectives have to be determined. A balanced approach is needed when establishing the
number of intermediate objectives.
In selecting intermediate objectives, operational commanders and their staffs should avoid being either too rigid
or too predictable. Either would make it easier for the enemy to take a timely counteraction. Too many
intermediate objectives may result in slowing down the tempo of a major operation and wasting sorely needed
time and resources. On the other hand, too few objectives may entail a risk of trying to accomplish too much
initially and reaching a culmination point.17 Hence, the planners must find a way to avoid either extreme.
The number and sequence in which intermediate objectives should be accomplished should not be rigidly laid out.
Among other things, the degree of the enemy resistance or new intelligence on the enemy force may require
change in the number and/or scale of intermediate objectives; some of them might be replaced with new ones or
might be bypassed. Also, intermediate objectives might require neutralization instead of destruction or capture.
The number and scale of the intermediate objectives affect considerably the forces’ size/mix, the time required for
accomplishing a given ultimate objective, and hence the tempo and length of a major operation.
5.3.3.3 Force Requirements
An important element of operational design is calculation of the overall size and force mix for the entire campaign
or major operation. The principal factors in this process are the type of operation, combat potential of friendly and
enemy forces, the number and scale of intermediate objectives and their sequencing, the distances between the
base of operations and the prospective operating area, and meteorological conditions. In addition, available
intelligence and logistics play a significant role in determining the size and composition of one’s forces in a major
16
United States Pacific Fleet Central Force, Pearl Harbor, T. H., 25 October 1943. Signed by Vice Admiral R. A. Spruance.
Available on microfilm, Special Collections, Naval War College Library, Naval War College, Newport, RI.
17
culminating point — The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense, or
defense. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
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operation. This process is an art rather than a science (although quantifiable methods can play a significant role).
The operational commander’s judgment and experience are often the decisive factor in making the final
determination on the size and composition of one’s forces to take part in a major operation. Another factor is force
availability. However, to gain the element of surprise, the commander may be willing to forgo additional forces.
In general, the more capable one’s forces, the fewer maritime forces will be required to accomplish a given
objective. The employment of multiservice forces asymmetrically would generally require fewer forces, as would
good intelligence, deception, and surprise. The timeline for a major operation can be considerably shortened if the
intermediate objectives are accomplished simultaneously or nearly simultaneously. However, in this event,
availability of forces must be greater than if the same objectives are accomplished in sequence.
5.3.3.4 Balancing of Operational Factors Against the Objectives
The operational commander and the planners must also properly balance friendly factors of space, time, and force,
first against the ultimate objective and then against each intermediate objective. The operational commander
should assess friendly factors of space, time, forces, and degree of risk tolerance individually and then balance
them in combination against the respective ultimate or intermediate objective. The balancing of operational
factors versus objective in a major operation is determined by the framework of a maritime or land campaign.
Any serious disconnect or mismatch between the ultimate or intermediate objective and the corresponding spacetime-force factors might greatly complicate and possibly endanger the success of the entire operation. If the
imbalance cannot be resolved, then one’s objective should be changed or scaled down and brought into harmony
with the operational factors. This process is complicated and time consuming. It is more an art than a science. In
practice, operational factors will rarely be completely, or even approximately, in harmony with one another or
with the assigned ultimate or intermediate objective.
In harmonizing friendly operational factors against the respective objective, all considerations, when possible,
should start with quantifiable factors — that is, space and time (i.e., operational reach). The factor of time is more
dynamic and changeable than the factor of space. Over the years, the factor of time has been gradually
compressed, while the factor of space has steadily expanded. Normally, the factors of space and time can be
calculated with a high degree of confidence. On the other hand, the factor of force is often difficult to evaluate
properly because of the presence of many elements that are hard or impossible to quantify. A significant change in
any of these factors will invariably disturb the overall balance and require a reassessment of all the factors. Hence,
the process remains dynamic and the commander must remain alert to detect changes that require reassessment.
In the course of the execution of a major operation, the operational commander should periodically balance the
operational factors against his objective. The higher the intensity of combat, the more often the situation will
change, and that, in turn, will require rebalancing one’s operational factors with one’s objective. Also, any change
in one’s objective will require quick reevaluation of the pertinent operational factors and their balancing with the
newly determined objective. Operational commanders should also fully take into account the impact of
information on the factors of space, time, and force, individually and then collectively.
The factors of space and force in a maritime area of operations (AO) can be balanced by reducing the number
and/or scale of the military objectives to be accomplished. For example, limiting efforts to obtain sea control to a
much smaller sea/ocean area or to a single or two physical media (e.g., surface and air but not subsurface, or
surface and subsurface but not air); increasing the number and/or combat potential of one’s Navy forces
(NAVFOR); or reducing the number of ships/aircraft deployed in the secondary AO of effort. Among other
things, the factors of space and time can be brought into balance by operating from shorter LOOs; employing
highly mobile forces; deploying one’s maritime forces closer to the scene of potential conflict; prepositioning
weapons/equipment and logistical supplies; reducing the size of the operating area; limiting efforts to obtaining
temporary instead of permanent sea control in a given sea/ocean area; achieving operational surprise; conducting
operational and/or strategic deception; or reducing the forces assigned for operational protection.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
5.3.3.5 Identification of the Enemy and Friendly Operational Centers of Gravity
After determining the appropriate objective of a major operation, the operational commander and his planners
must determine corresponding enemy and friendly operational centers of gravity, the source of strength —
physical or moral — required to achieve the objective. The determination of the proper centers of gravity is one of
the most important factors for establishing clarity of purpose and enabling correct planning, thereby applying the
principle of economy of effort in the process of planning for and accomplishing the assigned ultimate or
intermediate objective of a major operation.
Note
Determination of enemy objectives, enemy courses of actions (COA), critical
vulnerabilities, and decisive points is completed as part of the intelligence preparation
of the operational environment (IPOE) process before friendly mission analysis and
COA development are conducted.
A sound plan for a major operation should be clearly focused on destroying or neutralizing an enemy’s COG. At
the same time, the friendly centers of gravity must be adequately protected. Therefore, a commander must be
concerned with protecting one’s own centers of gravity as well as defeating an enemy center of gravity; however,
balance is required. Focusing only upon attacking the enemy center of gravity or focusing only upon protecting
the friendly center of gravity leads to one-sidedness that may require far more time and resources than available;
furthermore, it could lead to a failed effort. Consequently, a great deal of analysis and discussion between the
operational commander and the planners should take place before the enemy and friendly centers of gravity are
identified.
The center of gravity is always a critical strength, and in conventional Navy warfare, this critical strength is often
a military force — for example, a task force or task forces located at fleet bases. Centers of gravity are often
confused with critical capabilities18 or critical requirements (CRs).19 Careful analysis is required to ensure the
distinction between the “source of strength,” the COG, and the COG’s enablers — critical capabilities. Once a
COG has been determined, the planning staff then turns its attention to the COG’s critical capabilities. If the COG
is a military force, one may find the operational functions, as detailed in joint doctrine, a useful starting point for
the discovery of a force’s critical capabilities:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Command organization
Fires
Intelligence
Movement and maneuver
Protection
Sustainment.
While these operational functions are a useful starting point for initiating analysis of critical capabilities, a
planning staff must also broaden its examination to include other tangible or intangible factors that might be
critical capabilities for a COG. In addition, if the enemy and its corresponding objective are found in a less
conventional environment, such as an insurgency, the COG and related critical capabilities will likely reflect more
intangibles, such as the support of the local populace, information control, and others of such ilk.
Each critical capability (CC) has a number of associated critical requirements. For example, a CC of sustainment
has critical requirements for bases, logistics ships, fuel, ammunition, food, etc. A critical requirement for
operational protection may lead to critical requirements for screening ships, combat air patrol aircraft, computer
network protection, operations security (OPSEC), land-based patrol aircraft, a submarine devoted to protecting
the center of gravity, etc. A critical requirement for operational fires may lead to the requirement for long-range
18
critical capability — A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and essential to
the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
19
critical requirement — An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. (JP 1-02.
Source: JP 3-0)
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strike aircraft, long-range strike missiles, special operations forces, etc. The CC for operational command
organizations leads to critical requirements for an understanding of command relationships and functions, for the
hardware, software, and networks that support the commander’s ability to receive and send information.
A critical requirement may support more than one CC. For example, establishing a sea base is a critical
requirement that supports multiple critical capabilities. Additionally, a submarine may be a critical requirement
for a strike group because it offers support to the critical capabilities of operational protection, operational
intelligence, or operational fires. Understanding the overlapping relationships between critical requirements and
critical capabilities is why an operational staff must comprise experts from divergent tactical backgrounds.
Deficiencies in critical requirements are critical weaknesses. These critical weaknesses, if closely related to a
COG, may prove to be valuable paths for one to attack a COG. Critical weaknesses that can be exploited by an
opposing force are critical vulnerabilities.20 (See Figure 5-3.) However, not all critical vulnerabilities are
weaknesses. A force may choose to attack a critical requirement that is a strength if the commander deems the
added risk or expenditure is outweighed by the decisive impact on an enemy COG (an example would be
attacking an integrated air defense system that is protecting a COG). The goal of the planning process is to find
and exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities that leave the enemy center of gravity open to attack and at the same
time find potential critical weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in friendly forces that need to be alleviated.
Understanding one’s own critical weaknesses assists the commander in evaluating risks.
Sometimes, what may have constituted a proper center of gravity at the beginning of an operation or during a
particular phase of it may change due to the cumulative impact of the actions of one’s forces. Normally, in a fleetversus-fleet operation, the enemy center of gravity is the part of the fleet with the highest combat power. On the
other hand, the center of gravity can shift as the major operation enters into a new phase. This is usually the case
in the execution of a major amphibious operation. During the transit at sea, the operational center of gravity is the
force of distant cover and close escort. However, once the amphibious landing begins, the operational center of
gravity is that part of the landing force that has the highest combat potential, usually armor and/or mechanized
forces.
In modern warfare, the Navy must be prepared for all types of missions across the range of operations. In
operations that are down the scale from conventional force-on-force operations, centers of gravity are less tangible
and more difficult to determine. This leads to greater difficulty in determining which critical capabilities and
critical requirements may have critical weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities to be exploited or protected.
CC
CC
CC
COG
CC
COG – Center of Gravity
CC – Critical Capability
CR – Critical Requirement
CV – Critical Vulnerability
CC
CC
CC
CR
CV
CR
CR
CR
CV
Figure 5-3. Relationships Between Critical Capabilities/Requirements/Vulnerabilities
20
critical vulnerability — An aspect of a critical requirement that is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack and
will create decisive or significant effects. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
5.3.3.5.1 Center of Gravity and the Objective
As discussed in NWP 5-01, an enemy’s center of gravity is inextricably linked to its objective, just as the friendly
center of gravity is linked to its own objectives. This is a critical aspect to determining an enemy’s center of
gravity. An enemy’s interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure
(PMESII) system is meaningless if one does not first correctly assess an enemy’s probable end state and
objectives. One must remember that the justification for a center of gravity is to accomplish an objective.
Destroy or defeat an enemy’s center of gravity and you have severely inhibited an enemy’s ability to achieve his
objective (unless another source of power assumes the role of center of gravity). In a theoretical construct, one
should see an enemy center of gravity as something that stands between the friendly center of gravity and the
friendly objective(s). Thus, an operation is invariably focused upon an enemy’s center of gravity in order to
achieve friendly objectives. Incorrect identification of an enemy’s center of gravity can result in operations that
result in tactical success but operational failure. For example, if the center of gravity is an adversary’s will to
fight, destruction of the adversary’s military forces may not impact the center of gravity.
It is also important to remember that even if opposing naval forces are among organizations involved in a conflict,
if the objective places the naval forces in a supporting role, the respective enemy and friendly COGs may not be
maritime in nature, and the naval forces will likely find themselves fulfilling responsibilities within the COG’s
critical capabilities.
5.3.3.6 Initial Lines of Operations
Physical LOOs may be either interior or exterior. Interior LOOs originate from a central position. One’s force
moving on interior lines can be interposed between two or more parts of the enemy force, and a part of the enemy
force can possibly be contained in a secondary sector. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations
converge on the adversary. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force but
offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.
A major operation conducted along exterior lines consists of converging movement of diverse force elements
from several directions toward a common physical objective. One of the requirements for successful use of
exterior lines is that one’s forces move at a higher speed than the opposing forces. Optimally, they should be kept
within mutually supporting distances to avoid being defeated in detail. The movement of one’s forces along
exterior lines also requires sound synchronization of movement and actions. This is not easy to do, especially if
the distance between one’s base of operations and the physical objective is too long. Operations from the exterior
position also demand that the operational commander act with initiative.
5.3.3.7 Direction (Axis)
An important element of a design for a maritime offensive campaign or major offensive operation aimed to seize
control of a part of the coast, large island, or archipelago is a direction or axis, a swath of land, and the sea/ocean
area and airspace above it extending from one’s base of operations to the ultimate physical objective via selected
intermediate objectives. Tactical, operational, and strategic directions or axes can be differentiated, according to
the scale of the ultimate objective.
Depending on the extent of the base of operations for friendly forces, a maritime campaign aimed to capture
successive island positions or archipelagoes can be conducted along a single strategic or several operational axes.
A strategic axis extends from one’s base of operations via several intermediate, usually operationally significant,
positions to the last intermediate objective in a projected maritime offensive campaign. A strategic axis contains
several operational axes, and each of these in turn consists of several tactical axes.
One of the advantages of using a single strategic axis of advance is that it makes it easier to synchronize logistics
and operations. By capturing successive island positions, one’s operational reach is extended. This, in turn, allows
for consolidation of operational successes and timely preparation for seizing the next objective. A disadvantage is
that the enemy can easily discern the path of advance toward the ultimate objective, therefore gaining the
opportunity to prepare and carry out timely counteractions.
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5.3.3.8 The Operational Idea
The operational idea (or scheme) is the very core of a design for a major operation. It is the framework upon
which a CONOPS is built. The operational idea should be developed in a rudimentary form during the initial
estimate of the situation. Many of the factors to be considered when developing the operational idea are shown in
Figure 5-4. Main features of an operational idea are:
1. Full use of deception
2. Speed of execution
3. Multiple options
4. No discernible patterns
5. Creative and novel.
In a campaign, an overarching operational idea provides the framework for each operational idea of every major
operation that is part of the campaign. By their very nature campaigns are inherently joint. As a subordinate
commander to the joint force commander (JFC), a subordinate Navy commander or joint force maritime
component commander (JFMCC) envisions the operational idea pertaining to the employment of Navy forces. In
the case where a major maritime operation will require substantial participation of air force and/or land forces in
the littorals, the Navy/joint maritime operational commander must consider fully the employment of these forces
in the operational idea. The goal of the operational commander is to ensure that the operational idea employs
forces and forces in support in the most effective and efficient way. Operational ideas are normally captured
graphically using operational vice tactical symbols and:
Figure 5-4. Factors to Be Considered When Developing the Operational Idea
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1. Describe in broad terms what friendly forces have to do, where, and when.
2. Express in broad and succinct terms the type of actions by all forces in the AO.
3. Present the sequence of accomplishing a given strategic or operational objective.
The operational idea for a major Navy operation encompasses direct and/or indirect methods aimed at destroying
or neutralizing the enemy’s COG at the operational level. The operational idea for a major maritime operation
should also clearly highlight a sector of main effort and sectors of secondary efforts. The sector of main effort
(thrust) is a part of the maritime AO where a major part of one’s Navy forces and assets are deployed and
employed to accomplish the primary objective(s) of a major Navy operation. Forces deployed in the main sector
of effort are main or principal forces.
A sector of secondary effort (thrust) is a part of the maritime AO whose importance is subsidiary or ancillary to
the sector of main effort. Depending on the size of the sea or ocean area, there could be one or several sectors of
secondary efforts. Forces deployed in the secondary sector are supporting forces.
The operational idea for a major operation also must address the problem of potential culmination before the
assigned operational objective is reached or accomplished. Higher-than-anticipated attrition, inadequate logistics,
extension of lines of communications (LOCs), poor or inadequate intelligence, and the commander’s
overconfidence or lack of realistic assessment of the capabilities of one’s own and the enemy’s forces are perhaps
among the most common causes of culmination in a major operation.
5.3.3.9 Operational Sustainment
How forces will be sustained and how the military effort will be maintained is an integral part of operational
design. Though sustainment is related to the operational function of sustainment, sustainment carries a greater
degree of emphasis in the design phase because of time. Operational sustainment applies from the very beginning
of an operation until the objective is achieved; furthermore, sustainment applies to providing support for the
forces even after the objective has been achieved. The need for sustainment in a major operation cannot be wished
away.
5.3.3.10 Decisive Points
Identification of decisive points (DPs) remains an important feature of the COG analysis and its subsequent defeat
or neutralization. Joint doctrine defines decisive point as “a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or
function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute
materially to achieving success.” The value of a DP is directly related to its relationship to a COG and its
objective. A DP is neutral in nature. By definition, it is as important to enemy and friendly commanders. If, for
example, an seaport of debarkation (SPOD) complex is a DP for a friendly commander, enabling that commander
to project the COG through it on the way to the objective, then the enemy commander will also assess the
complex as a threat to the enemy COG and should attempt to deny the friendly force commander control of the
DP. In either case, this DP, if within the capability of the force, will undoubtedly become an objective or task
assigned enemy and friendly subordinate commands. Failure to do so makes it an identified risk to one’s COG.
5.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING TO THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER
“Planning for the conduct of active war operations ought to be done by the people who are going out to conduct
those operations. Because the time factor is often so short this means concurrent planning by the different
echelons. The people in the forward areas must be given considerable voice in the objectives and in the timing. At
least in so far as the Navy was concerned, there was often considerable discussion as to the objectives that were to
be captured. The best solution was usually obtained only after a considerable exchange of views between all of us.
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This freedom to exchange ideas back and forth I consider most important to success in war planning.” —Admiral
Raymond Spruance21
The planning process, as defined in NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, focuses the attention of operational commanders
and their staffs on warfighting. It also enhances the operational commander’s knowledge and understanding of the
situation. Planning serves as a guide for the preparation of subordinate forces. Proficiency in planning
considerably improves the ability of the operational commanders and their staffs to prepare and execute plans on
short notice when necessary. It also greatly reduces the time between decisions and actions during execution.
Sound planning for a campaign or major operation requires that commanders and their staffs think operationally.
This means they must think far ahead to identify changes in the situation and then determine what decision to
make to positively influence events before they occur. It mentally prepares the commander to identify potential
decision points and focus his thoughts on potential branches and sequels.
As a general rule, higher-level commands have larger staffs. The sheer size of the staffs can easily lead to
bureaucratization of the entire planning process. Collaboration and exchange of ideas between echelons of
command are imperative in the planning process. Continuous vertical and horizontal coordination is essential.
Another potential problem in planning is trying to anticipate events too far into the future; then the resulting plans
might be based on unrealistic assumptions. Delaying completion of the plans and orders to gain more detailed
information should be avoided. It is better to have a good plan ready to execute than to wait for the best possible
plan. Other pitfalls include planning in too much detail, using planning as a scripting process, and applying rigid
planning procedures and techniques. Clearly, if the orders are too detailed, the important things are lost among the
unimportant things and the commanders at all levels are not able to take initiative or seize unanticipated
advantages that arise.
The results of Navy tactical actions are useful only when linked together as part of a larger design framed by
strategy and orchestrated by operational art. By themselves, technological advances, numerical superiority, and
brilliant tactical performance are inadequate to achieve ultimate success in war. Done properly, the sequencing of
these military operations, along with their integration with diplomatic, information, military, and economic
(DIME) elements of national power, will result in unified action and achieve the desired change in the adversary’s
PMESII systems. The correct sequencing of military operations is a key aspect of operational design.
5.5 OPERATIONAL DECISIONMAKING AND PLANNING
Today’s operational decisionmaking and planning processes are defined by the Joint Operational Planning and
Execution System (JOPES) and its primary policy document, CJSM 3122.01A, also known as JOPES Volume 1.
The primary Navy publication that supports operational planning within the framework of JOPES is NWP 5-01,
Navy Planning. These publications reinforce the concepts outlined by Admiral Spruance in the 1948 Naval
Manual of Operational Planning. Admiral Spruance identified four activities an operational commander executes
when solving a military problem.
1. An estimate of the situation
2. The development of the plan
3. The directive
4. The supervision of the operation.
The focus of the operational commander and staff changes during each of these activities. As shown in Figure
5-5, upon receipt of an order from a superior commander the operational commander immediately starts
development of an estimate of the situation, followed by plan development and drafting of the plan directive, and,
if/when the operation is executed, the commander and staff will exercise the commander’s decision cycle of
monitor, assess, plan, and direct.
21
Buell, Thomas B. The Quiet Warrior, 1974, page 197.
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Estimate of
Situation
Plan Development
e
tiv
c
re
Di
Supervision of
Operation
Level of Effort
Assess
Monitor
Direct
Plan
Design
Time
Figure 5-5. Changing Focus of Operational Commander and Staff as a Military Problem Is Solved
5.5.1 Estimate of Situation
During this activity the commander and staff are primarily utilizing operational art and design to develop the
building blocks needed to develop the plan. With design efforts well underway, the commander and staff
concurrently commence the initial mission analysis as defined in the planning processes. The development of
commander’s planning guidance,22 which captures the operational idea, signals the commencement of the plan
development activity.
5.5.2 Development of the Plan
The operational planning process is conducted continuously in peacetime and in conflict or war. It encompasses
the entire range of military operations in which U.S. military forces could be employed to accomplish national or
multinational strategy objectives. At all command echelons, a thorough approach to planning in peacetime is a
prerequisite for success in wartime.
Operational planning represents the synthesis of all the aspects of operational theory and practice. Without sound
and detailed plans for campaigns or major operations, the objectives set by strategy and the campaign plan cannot
be accomplished.
For Navy commanders, NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, describes planning processes based on the basic planning
principles of relevance, clarity, timeliness, flexibility, participation, economy of resources, security, coordination,
and military planning logic. These planning processes provide for orderly and coordinated actions of Navy/joint
maritime forces. NWP 5-01 defines the process the commander and his staff follow to solve problems and make
decisions to achieve objective(s) in a campaign environment of dynamic problem framing and campaign design.
22
commander’s planning guidance — the commander’s vision of decisive and shaping actions. Assists the planning team in
determining the main effort, phases of the operation, location of critical events, and other aspects of the operation the
commander deems pertinent to COA development.
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Six principles are highlighted as keys for successful operational planning:
1. Determine what needs to be done and why, but not the tactical specifics of how (see Chapter 2 for
additional discussion on this topic).
2. Organize operational environment owners and functional task forces (TFs) to take best advantage of all of
the military force capabilities.
3. Articulate the geometry of the operational environment to provide sufficient control measures in terms of
boundaries and fire control measures without overcontrolling the fight.
4. Establish command relationships that promote interdependence among the components; instill a “one
team, one fight” mentality; provide command authorities commensurate with responsibilities; and build
trust and confidence.
5. Decentralize authorities to empower subordinates to operate within commander’s intent and take
advantage of unforeseen opportunities.
6. Maintain an operational perspective to ensure operational-level thinking supplants the tactical perspective
that has brought the staff and commander previous success and confidence but is detrimental to success at
the operational level.
Plans are developed using one of two joint operational planning processes: contingency (non–time sensitive) or
crisis action (time sensitive). The NPP addresses contingency and crisis action planning (CAP). Contingency
planning is conducted in anticipation of an event to develop joint OPLANs for contingencies identified in
strategic planning documents. CAP addresses events occurring in near–real time. CAP follows procedures that
parallel deliberate planning, but it is more flexible and responsive to changing events.
The NPP assists commanders and their staffs in analyzing the operational environment and distilling planning
information in order to provide the commander a coherent framework to support decisions. The process is
thorough and helps apply clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional expertise. Shown in Figure 5-6, the
NPP organizes these procedures into six steps, which provide commanders and their staffs a means to organize
planning activities, transmit plans to tactical forces, and share a critical common understanding of the mission.
Interactions among various planning steps allow a concurrent, coordinated effort that ensures flexibility, makes
efficient use of available time, and facilitates continuous information sharing.
1. Mission Analysis
6. Transition
2. Course of Action
Development
5. Plans and Orders
Development
3. Course of Action
Analysis
(Wargaming)
4. Course of Action
Comparison and Decision
Figure 5-6. Navy Planning Process (Source: NWP 5-01)
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The operational commander needs to synchronize military planning and operations with those of other
government and nongovernmental agencies and organizations, together with international partners to achieve
objectives.
5.5.3 The Directive
The directive is communication from the operational commander that starts or governs action.
In issuing a directive the commander has certain definite responsibilities; these are:
1. To ensure that subordinates understand the situation by giving them pertinent available information.
2. To set forth clearly the task to be achieved by the entire force, as well as the task to be accomplished by
each primary subdivision of that force.
3. To provide each TF with adequate means to accomplish the assigned task.
4. To allow subordinates appropriate discretion within the limits of their assigned spheres of actions.
Necessary coordination is never sacrificed to accomplish this. The personality and ability of each
subordinate are a consideration in determining the degree of discretion that can be entrusted.
The directive itself will be more easily understood, and will better convey the will and intent of the commander, if
it is clear, brief, and positive.
1. Clarity demands the use of precise expressions. A precise expression can have only one interpretation.
Normally, the affirmative form is preferable to the negative. The importance of clarity has been summed
up in the saying that “an order that can be misunderstood will be misunderstood.” If misunderstandings
arise, the chief fault lies with the one who issued the order.
2. Brevity calls for the omission of unnecessary and unnecessarily detailed instructions. Terse sentences are
preferable when they convey the meaning clearly. However, clarity is never sacrificed for brevity.
3. Positiveness of expression suggests the senior’s fixity of purpose, with consequent inspiration to
subordinates to prosecute their task with determination. The use of indefinite expressions leads to
suspicion of vacillation and indecision. They tend to impose upon subordinates responsibilities fully
accepted by a resolute commander.
Experience has shown that military directives are usually most effective if cast in a standard form well known to
originator and recipient alike. Such a form tends to ensure against the omission of relevant features and minimizes
possibilities of error and chances of misunderstanding. Operational commanders typically communicate direction
using either a concept plan (CONPLAN), OPLAN, or operation order (OPORD). Development of these directives
utilizes the processes described in JOPES and NWP 5-01. To execute these processes, the framework/structure
necessary for detailed implementation planning is established through operational design.
1. CONPLAN. An OPLAN in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration
to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the combatant commander’s (CCDR’s)
strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CCDR to complete
planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and time-phased force and
deployment data (TPFDD) files are not prepared. (CJCSM 3122.01A, JOPES Vol. I).
2. OPLAN. A plan that identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CCDR’s strategic concept
and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are
identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared
with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the JOPES manuals
containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. (CJCSM 3122.01A, JOPES Vol. I).
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3. OPORD. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the
coordinated execution of an operation. (CJCSM 3122.01A, JOPES Vol. I).
These directives most frequently use the standard five-paragraph format briefly described below. See NWP 5-01
and CJSM 3122.03A, JOPES Vol. II, for further amplification. In complex operations, much of the information
required in the directive is contained or amplified in the appropriate appendixes and annexes. The five basic
paragraphs for all plans and orders are:
1. Paragraph 1: Situation. This paragraph, the commander’s summary of the general situation, ensures that
subordinates understand the background for planned operations. It often contains subparagraphs
describing enemy forces, friendly forces, and task organization, as well as higher headquarters guidance.
2. Paragraph 2: Mission. The commander inserts his own restated mission developed during mission
analysis. This is derived from the mission analysis step and contains those tasks deemed essential to
accomplish the mission.
3. Paragraph 3: Execution. This paragraph expresses the commander’s intent for the operation, enabling
subordinate commanders to better exercise initiative while keeping their actions aligned with the
operation’s overall purpose. It also specifies the objectives, tasks, and assignments for subordinate
commanders. It should articulate not only the objective or task to be accomplished but also its purpose, so
that subordinate commanders understand how their tasks and objectives contribute to the overall
CONOPS. The execution paragraph can be written in phases to convey the flow of the operation in an
easier-to-understand, more logical progression.
4. Paragraph 4: Administration and Logistics. This paragraph describes the concepts of support, logistics,
personnel, public affairs, civil affairs, and medical services. The paragraph also addresses the levels of
supply (Appendix D) as they apply to the operation.
5. Paragraph 5: Command and Control (C2). This paragraph specifies command relationships, succession of
command, and the overall plan for communications and control.
5.5.4 Supervision of the Operation
Chapter 6, Operational Command, addresses how the operational commander and staff supervise the operation.
As captured in the quote below from the 1948 edition of the Naval Manual of Operational Planning, fundamental
to successful planning and execution is maintenance of an open mind and willingness to change.
“Throughout the entire planning phase and during the execution phase a military situation remains fluid — never
static. Open-mindedness on the part of military planners is therefore indispensable. Changing conditions will
often require reversal or revision of previous decisions. Instead of striving to justify questionable decisions, the
successful commander must be quick to recognize and correct their weaknesses.”
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CHAPTER 6
Operational Command
This chapter captures doctrinal guidance on operational command for a Navy commander at the operational level.
Currently, this guidance is distributed among several Navy and joint doctrinal publications and in other
professional literature. In addition to capturing this guidance, the chapter will highlight best practices identified in
numerous fleet and joint exercises. It provides an overview of operational command and control (C2),
highlighting the critical role the operational commander has in these endeavors. The chapter concludes with a
discussion on the commander’s decision cycle.
6.1 OPERATIONAL COMMAND
Operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels are conducted concurrently. Tactical commanders fight
engagements and battles understanding their relevance to operational objectives and goals. Operational
commanders utilize operational art and design to set conditions for battles within a major operation or campaign
to achieve military strategic and operational objectives. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) integrate theater
strategy and operational art while remaining acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the
inherent interrelationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only with events
at their respective echelon, but must also understand how their actions contribute to the military end state.
Today’s information systems allow for the rapid exchange of information between commanders at the various
levels of war. Strategic- and operational-level commanders are now provided insight into the operational
environment that was not historically possible. This insight allows these commanders to provide situational
awareness (SA) and apply resources not previously available at the tactical level to the tactical problem. Similarly,
the enhanced information systems provide the tactical commander means to influence strategic and operational
assessments of the operational environment, Figure 6-1. It is important that while various echelons may be aware
of events at other levels, the commanders and their staffs must focus on the appropriate level of war.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the operational level exists between the tactical and strategic levels of war. Paragraph
2.1 discusses the attributes that distinguish the operational level from the strategic and tactical levels of war.
Activity at the operational level must contribute directly to the military strategic aim. Broadly set, such aims
demand that the operational commander has wide-ranging independence to exercise creativity and originality.
Such freedom allows the operational-level commander to gain and retain the initiative and adapt to the developing
situation. Navy commanders at the operational level exercise operational art and design in support of the CCDR’s
strategic objectives. The operational commander is tasked with interpreting a given CCDR’s strategic
objectives/end state into a series of major operations as a single campaign. This campaign normally requires the
sequenced and synchronized employment of military and nonmilitary sources of national power. The proper
sequencing and synchronization of the military forces in the accomplishment of the military mission falls to the
operational-level military commander. The strategic commander uses his knowledge of the operational-level
commander’s intentions to ensure military action is properly synchronized and sequenced with actions of
diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power. In addition, the strategic commander
ensures deconfliction with other theater campaigns. Tactical forces are responsible exclusively for the physical
elements of combat operations. The primary responsibility of the operational commander is to execute those
operational-level functions, i.e., C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment,
which the tactical force requires to succeed in the designated operations area. These functional areas provide the
basis from which tactical units derive their freedom of action to engage in physical combat. These functional areas
are mutually supporting, i.e., increased intelligence increases protection, which increases the ability for fires, etc.
Conversely, the lapse of any of these functional areas adversely affects the others, and subsequently affects the
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tactical forces’ combat efficiency. The complementary and coordinated application of all the instruments of
national power, when synergized consistent with operational art and design, provide the joint force capability
required to achieve joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives and the strategic end state.
Figure 6-1. Inherent Relationships between Levels of War
Careful maintenance of an operational perspective ensures operational-level thinking supplants the tactical
perspective that has brought the staff and commander previous success and comfort, but is detrimental to success
at the operational level. Other keys to operational command success include:
1. Recognition of the value gained by harmonizing and synchronizing military actions with the actions of
other instruments of national and international power. Operational commanders need to recognize the
reality of their multinational partners’ different perspectives and goals and strive to arrive at a set of
common desired results to promote unity of effort.
2. Awareness that there is value in sequential and simultaneous operations to achieve desired results.
3. Achievement of interdependence with other commanders at the operational level through horizontal
integration. Interdependence is more than interoperability — the technical ability to work together. It is
the recognition that the Armed Forces fight as one team of joint, interagency, and multinational partners
and depend on access to each other’s capabilities to succeed.
4. Establishment of mission-approval processes that allow the operational commander and subordinates to
retain agility and speed of action. This likely entails decentralization. Mission type orders,23 specifying a
result but leaving open the methods of attaining that result, allow the decentralization necessary for local
rapid response.
5. Maintain operational-level focus; delegate authority to subordinates to fight the tactical fight.
6. Establishment of trust and confidence with joint, interagency, and multinational partners through personal
relationships. Two great commanders in naval history, admirals Horatio Nelson and Arleigh Burke, rarely
issued detailed instructions to their subordinate commanders. Instead, they frequently gathered their
captains to discuss a variety of tactical problems. Because of these informal discussions, the captains
23
mission type order — Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished.
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became aware of what their commanders expected to accomplish and how they planned to accomplish it
in various situations. Thus prepared, they later were able to act independently and follow their
commander’s intent, even though formal orders either were brief or nonexistent.
7. Allow commanders to rely on instinct and intuition. Avoid staff tendency to “overcontrol” the fight. The
operational commander works with and through subordinate commanders to anticipate and seize
opportunity.
6.1.1 Notional Relationship of Command Level to Level of War
Chapter 4 discusses the levels of command. Joint doctrine does not establish explicit linkage between command
levels and levels of war. Table 6-1 outlines a notional relationship between command level and level of war. This
notional relationship was developed by reading joint/Navy doctrine and reviewing historical records. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the boundaries between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war overlap and frequently
are pictorially displayed as three circles with sides overlapping. Similarly, while Table 6-1 shows notional
relationships between command level and level of war, depending on the mission, reality may, and often does,
result in a command level operating at a level either above or below the one at which it normally operates.
Table 6-1. Notional Relationship of Command Level to Level of War*
Commander
Strategic Operational Tactical
Combatant Commander
*
Subunified Commander
*
JTF Commander (CJTF)
*
Navy Component Commander (NCC)
*
Major Fleet Commander
*
Commander, Navy forces (COMNAVFOR)
*
Joint force maritime component commander (i.e., JFMCC)
*
Numbered Fleet Commander
*
Principal Headquarters Commander
*
Commander, Task Force (i.e., CTF)
*
*See Chapter 2 for discussion on levels of war
6.2 ROLE OF OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IN C2
C2 is one of the six core warfighting functions of operational command discussed in Chapter 1. The other core
functions are fires, intelligence, movement, maneuver, protection, and sustainment. C2 ties together all the
operational functions and tasks and applies to all levels of war and echelons of command across the range of
military operations.
Command and control — The exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities,
and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of
the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
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C2 is the means by which an operational commander synchronizes and/or integrates force activities in order to
achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized execution
of centralized, overarching plans. Unity of effort is strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets:
clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships; information management (IM); implicit communication,
timely decision making, coordination mechanisms, battle rhythm discipline; responsive, dependable, interoperable
support systems; SA; and mutual trust.
The operational commander’s activities are central to operational command C2. The commander directs and
assists the staff in planning, i.e., supervises staff and subordinate operational and tactical commanders in their
preparation for operations and directs the staff conduct of operations and supervises the conduct of operations by
subordinate commanders. In all these tasks, the operational commander leverages experience and judgment to
guide the command through the fog and friction of war to accomplish the strategic objectives/goals.
During planning, the commander’s vision of an operation is translated into orders and actions. It is communicated
by employing these three important mechanisms: commander’s intent, commander’s planning guidance, and
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). To the greatest extent possible, orders, intent, guidance,
and CCIRs should be in a machine-readable format. These mechanisms assist the commander and staff in
establishing an effective dialogue to enable planning. Later, during preparation activities and operations, these
mechanisms assist the entire force in remaining focused on the commander’s original vision of the operation and
its outcome.
1. Commander’s intent. A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may
also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent framed from the
adversary’s perspective, and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation.
It assists in communicating the commander’s vision to the commander’s staff and subordinate and
supporting commands during the planning and conduct of operations. It provides focus to the staff and
helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state without further
orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned.
2. Commander’s planning guidance. Commander’s planning guidance normally follows mission analysis and
sets the conditions for successful course of action (COA) development. It provides the staff insight into
how the commander wants to conduct the operation and how the commander wants to plan for the
operation. As the staff continues to plan, the commander provides additional guidance such as refining
COAs, identifying items requiring further analysis, or modifying parts of the draft operation order
(OPORD).
For more information on the commander’s guidance, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
3. Commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR). An information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. The two key elements are friendly
force information requirements (FFIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). CCIRs are a key IM
tool for the commander and help the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision
points throughout the conduct of operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander.
a. There are two categories of CCIRs: PIRs and FFIRs. PIRs focus on the adversary and the environment
and drive intelligence collection and production requirements. FFIRs focus on the friendly force and
supporting capabilities and drive reporting requirements and information requests (see Figure 6-2).
b. The commander’s staff proposes PIRs and FFIRs to the commander, but not all proposed PIRs and
FFIRs are selected as CCIRs. Those PIRs not selected are downgraded to information requirements.
c. CCIRs result from the analysis of information requirements in the context of a mission, commander’s
intent, and the concept of operation. Commanders designate CCIRs to let their staffs and subordinates
know what information they deem necessary for decision making. CCIRs drive collection efforts. In
all cases, the fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources.
CCIRs are not static. Commanders add, delete, adjust, and update them throughout an operation based
on the information they need for decision making.
OCT 2008
6-4
NWP 3-32
PIRs
FFIRs
Adversary
Environment
Friendly
Intelligence
collection
addressing
facets of the
adversary
Civil-military
collection
addressing
economic,
political,
meteorological,
and
infrastructure
Reported
information
addressing
assigned and
attached forces
Effective
Decisions
PIR: Priority Intelligence Requirement
FFIR: Friendly Force Information Requirement
Figure 6-2. Information Requirements Categories (Source: JP 3-0)
d. Assessment of information collected for FFIRs is used for verification that the force is doing what it
planned to accomplish (i.e., “Are we doing what we said we would do?”). Assessment of information
collected for PIRs is used for validation that force action is resulting in the desired impacts to the
adversary’s political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems
(i.e., “Are we accomplishing what we wanted to accomplish?”).
Planning never stops during a campaign/major operation. Once forces start operations in support of the
operational commander’s synchronized and integrated operational order, the operational commander needs to
ensure branch and sequel planning continues. However, once the force movement and maneuver commences the
commander also needs to exercise control of the force. Fundamental to the commander exercising control is the
IM plan developed during the planning phase of OPORD development. Operators, not technicians, direct IM. It
supports decision making and is too important to be relegated only to technical or communications personnel. IM
refers to the processes a command uses to receive, obtain, control, and process data into useful information. IM is
one of the greatest challenges for the operational commander and staff. Today’s forces have unprecedented ability
to transmit and receive data, which is growing exponentially, in speed, volume, and timeliness. Five key decisions
shape how data is exchanged and information is managed:
1. Determining the classification level at which most planning and execution will occur (e.g., Unclassified,
Secret Noforn, Secret Releasable to certain audiences, Top Secret, or special access program (SAP)
level). This decision will be based on several factors: what higher headquarters policy is on this type of
plan/operation, what applicable DOD and DON security guide or other policy determinations have been
made on this topic, etc. The need for sharing with multinational partners should be considered and
requests for releaseability, when necessary, should be forwarded to the appropriate officials as early as
possible in the planning stage.
6-5
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
2. Directing the primary means to share information, collaborate, and plan (e.g., over Nonsecure Internet
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), Combined
Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS), physical means such as hardcopy, meetings, etc.). This has significant
ramifications in the multinational and interagency environment, the complexity and scope of the required
networks, and the means to transfer information between networks.
3. Defining of the processes and tools to store, manage, collaborate, and share information. There is a
plethora of tools available to the operational commander. The challenge is in determining which tools to
use, realizing that using too many systems often unnecessarily complicate and decrease information
sharing.
4. Directing the plan and means to disseminate information to multinational partners. If “U.S. Only”
information exchange systems are utilized, processes need to be developed and agreed upon to move
those information items that are releasable to multinational partners to information exchange systems that
they can access.
5. Defining of data-tagging methodology. Rapid retrieval of data from information repositories can only
occur if a logical data-tagging methodology is developed well before the operation commences. Once
developed, the tagging methodology has to be strictly enforced and utilized by all elements of the force.
The level of control exercised by the operational commander on the tactical force will depend on the nature of the
campaign/major operation, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated comfort level of the commander.
Currently, technology and information systems provide the operational commander enhanced SA into the tactical
level. The operational commander and staff’s ability to exercise operational art and design will be adversely
impacted if the C2 tenet of decentralized execution is ignored because of this enhanced SA.
The OPLAN is the operational commander’s primary means to control the tactical force. It provides the “what,”
“where,” “when,” and “why” information for the various tactical commanders to prioritize, synchronize, and
integrate tactical action for achievement of strategic/operational objectives. As the forces move into position and
the operational environment’s definition is clarified, the operational commander may need to modify the
operation plan (OPLAN)/concept of operations (CONOPS). This modification is promulgated to the tactical force
using a fragmentary order (FRAGORD). As the OPLAN is executed, the operational commander and staff should
guide the operations by minimizing control actions, as they are likely to disrupt the continuity of the plan being
executed. Execution control actions may simply be alerting the tactical commander of information not held by the
tactical commander or, for an unplanned deviation, determining intent or, if necessary, preempting actions or
directing new ones. Operational commanders and staffs need to be vigilant of the impact that control actions have
on the continuity of the plan being executed. Generally, the less control exercised by the operational commander
and staff during execution, the better. Key to minimizing control actions during execution is a well-developed
OPLAN with supporting branches and sequels, which provide the tactical commander’s guidance before the
operation commences.
The basis for an operational commander exercising control should be better insight into what is required to
achieve operational objectives, rather than what is evidenced by the tactical level commander’s actions. The
commander’s sources of insight include knowledge of strategic goals, operational objectives, overall awareness of
the tactical situation, knowledge of the tactical plan, familiarity with tactical procedures, awareness of enemy
force actions, and status of own forces. The operational-level commander must stay fully informed by every
means possible, so that control actions help and do not hinder. Advances in information systems and
communications may enhance the operational commander and staff’s SA and understanding of the tactical
environment. Once focused solely on operational decision making, these technical advances increase the potential
for superiors to assert themselves at the tactical level. While this will be their prerogative, decentralized execution
remains a basic C2 tenet of maritime operations. Decentralized execution exploits the ability of force
commanders, warfare commanders, ship commanding officers, and other frontline commanders to make on-scene
decisions during complex, rapidly unfolding operations. The level of control used by the operational commander
will depend on the nature of the operation or task and the priority of its success and the associated comfort level
of the operational commander.
OCT 2008
6-6
NWP 3-32
measure of performance — A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to
measuring task accomplishment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
measure of effectiveness — A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior,
capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end
state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
Navy operational-level commanders and staffs monitor tactical actions and utilize measures of performance
(MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to assess these actions. During mission analysis the commander
and staff develop MOPs and MOEs. These MOPs and MOEs will be used to assess progress toward
accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Commanders adjust operations based on their
assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. MOEs answer the question “Are
we doing the right things?” MOPs answer the question, “Are we doing things right?”
Navy operational commanders control staff and subordinate actions. Commander’s control actions are binned into
the following categories, commonly called control areas. The commander’s up-to-date and in-depth knowledge of
factors that impact each of these areas is crucial to guiding the operation effectively.
1. Maintain alignment. The operational commander’s task is to ensure that all execution decisions and
apportionment requests remain aligned with the operation’s mission statement and commander’s intent
(purpose, sequence, end state, and priorities). There must be a direct correlation between the higher
headquarters commander’s intent and goals and the operational commander’s guidance and the plan
formulated to accomplish the mission. All direction during plan development and execution should
support the mission statement and commander’s intent.
2. Provide SA. The operational commander must assess the status of plan execution constantly. Using the
available common operational picture (COP) and communications and intelligence, the operational
commander must determine whether friendly force disposition is in accordance with the plan, whether
enemy force disposition is in accordance with expectations, and whether forces are executing according
to the plan and procedures.
3. Advance the plan. The operational commander must monitor all aspects of the plan execution against the
timeline. This infers detailed knowledge of all elements of the plan (enemy and own force disposition,
branches, and sequels). Rarely are plans executed without deviation. When an unanticipated condition is
encountered, the tactical or on-scene commander must adjust the plan correspondingly. The goal is to
have every decision and every direction move the plan forward on the time line, toward the desired end
state. The operational commander is responsible for attaining this goal.
4. Comply with procedure. In monitoring execution, the commander oversees compliance with doctrinal
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), operation general matter (OPGEN), operation tasks
(OPTASKs), special instructions, standard operating procedures (SOPs), operational tasking, and
intentions to avoid blue-on-blue engagements and achieve efficiencies in plan execution. As an example
of a procedure, the commander and staff must have an in-depth knowledge of the rules of engagement
(ROE), and when the need exists for requesting supplemental ROE in order to properly execute the plan,
the commander and staff need to know the procedure for making this request.
5. Counter the enemy. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) and knowledge of
enemy capabilities result in assumptions regarding probable enemy objectives and courses of action. The
operational commander must be responsive to emerging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
information that differs significantly from expectations and be prepared to adjust the plan in execution.
Knowing what the enemy is doing at all times and being quick to countermove on receipt of reliable
information is perhaps the number-one goal in C2.
6. Adjust apportionment. Ground forces; ships; aircraft; air space; command, control, communications;
computer infrastructure; and time all are apportioned. Any changes in asset availability, attrition, on-scene
6-7
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
requirements, priorities, enemy disposition, or enemy tactics may trigger a need for reapportionment. The
operational commander must monitor for these changes, anticipate requests, and be prepared to adjust, as
necessary, to advance the plan. Of all the apportionment factors, the one most frequently adjusted is time.
It is almost inevitable that the operational commander will be faced with several decisions regarding
allotting more time to accomplish the plan. Very often the operational commander, who knows what is
occurring across all forces and can judge the consequence of a change in timing in one force, is in the best
position to make the call.
The operational commander’s level of knowledge is the basis for operational control (OPCON) actions. A
knowledge deficit in any area will cause control actions for that area to be suspect. Maintaining comprehensive
knowledge in all six control areas is challenging. This challenge is magnified when the campaign/major OPLAN,
with its multiple integrated and synchronized tactical actions, is being executed. Operational commanders must
organize their operations centers to prepare and execute campaign/major OPLANs, while exerting appropriate
level of control over the tactical force.
6.3 COMMANDER’S DECISION CYCLE
The commander’s decision cycle provides a mechanism for focusing the operational staff to support critical
decisions and actions as the operational commander controls campaign/major OPLAN preparation and execution.
The cycle is discussed in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. The commander’s decision cycle is a process
that depicts how command and staff elements determine required actions, codify them in directives, execute them,
and monitor their results. The commander’s decision cycle has four phases as shown in Figure 6-3.
The decision cycle assists the commander in understanding the operational environment and executing operational
design during campaign preparation and execution. Operational commands assess how they are doing, conduct
planning based on this assessment, direct forces as needed to execute the plan, and monitor force execution and its
impacts on the adversary’s PMESII systems. Outputs of monitoring provide the inputs for the next round of
assessment. They communicate throughout this cycle, within the headquarters and with higher, adjacent, and
subordinate commands. Operational commanders establish far-, mid-, and near-time horizons to focus staff
preparation and execution of the campaign/major operation plan, as shown in Figure 6-4.
Direct
Monitor
Communicate
Plan
Assess
Figure 6-3. Commander’s Decision Cycle
OCT 2008
6-8
NWP 3-32
The window for each time horizon is mission dependent. The far-, mid- and near-time horizons are commonly
linked to the future plans, future operations, and current operations elements of the staff, respectively. Each time
horizon has a unique commander’s decision cycle associated with it. The speed each decision cycle moves (spins)
is unique to each time horizon. As a rule, the near-time horizon decision cycle spins faster than mid-time horizon
decision cycle, which spins faster than far-time horizon decision cycle. Key aspects of each time horizon’s
decision cycle are identified in the battle rhythm.
1. Near. Commonly associated with the cross-functional boards, bureaus, cells, centers, elements, groups,
offices, planning teams, and working groups (B2C2WG) current operations elements of the staff, the near
time horizon focuses on the “what is,” and can rapidly progress through the decision cycle — sometimes
in minutes for quick-breaking events. Current operations elements of the staff produce a large volume of
orders including administrative FRAGORDs and small tactical FRAGORDs (e.g., change in priorities).
These kinds of activities generally do not require full staff integration. They do, however, require some
limited planning capability.
Note
Current usage of the abbreviation B2C2WG includes elements, groups, offices, and
planning teams.
2. Mid. Commonly associated with the cross-functional B2C2WG future operations elements of the staff,
the mid-time horizon focuses on the “what if,” and normally moves slower with more deliberate
assessment and planning activities, resulting in such things as major FRAGORDs directing major tactical
MONITOR
Smaller circles
revolve faster...
DIRECT
ASSESS
NEAR
MID
FAR
FAR
Operational focus is on “what’s
next.” Typically responsible for
planning the next phase of
operations (sequels), assessing
campaign/plan progress,
validating plan assumptions
PLAN
MID
Operational focus is on “what
if.” Typically responsible for
branch planning. Validates,
refines, redirects future
operations based on effects
assessment and task execution.
Prepares future operations warning orders (WARNORDSs)
NEAR
Operational focus is on
execution of current operations,
“what is.” Evaluates task
accomplishment. Directs
execution of branches and
sequels - fragmentary
orders (FRAGOs)
Figure 6-4. Three Time Horizons
6-9
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
actions (e.g., named operations) and TF movements within theater (e.g., movement of a carrier TF from
one carrier operations area to another). It generally requires full staff integration.
3. Far. Commonly associated with the cross-functional B2C2WG future plans elements of the staff, the fartime horizon is focused on the “what’s next,” interacts heavily with higher headquarters planning efforts,
and moves very deliberately through the decision cycle. It focuses on activities such as development of
OPLANs and FRAGORDs to campaign/major OPLAN and policy directives or major force rotations.
These kinds of activities normally require full staff integration.
The commander’s decision cycle nests with other echelon headquarters’ decision cycles across all three event
horizons as depicted in Figure 6-5. It is continually interfacing with the higher headquarters’ decision cycle
(which is normally more deliberate and slower moving), with contemporary headquarters, and with subordinate
unit decision cycles (which will likely be moving more rapidly).
MONITOR
Smaller circles
revolve faster.
DIRECT
ASSESS
NEAR
MID
FAR
PLAN
Combatant Commander
Communicate
MONITOR
DIRECT
FAR
ASSESS
NEAR
MID
PLAN
CJTF
MONITOR
DIRECT
FAR
MID
MONITOR
ASSESS
NEAR
PLAN
DIRECT
MID
FAR
MONITOR
ASSESS
NEAR
PLAN
JFACC
DIRECT
FAR
JFMCC
MID
ASSESS
NEAR
PLAN
JFLCC
MONITOR
DIRECT
FAR
ASSESS
NEAR
MID
PLAN
Communicate
CTF
Legend
CJTF - commander joint task force
CTF - task force commander
JFACC - joint force air component commander
JFLCC - joint force land component commander
JFMCC - joint force maritime component commander
MONITOR
DIRECT
FAR
MID
ASSESS
NEAR
PLAN
War fare Commander
Figure 6-5. Decision Cycle, Event Horizon, Echelon Interaction
OCT 2008
6-10
NWP 3-32
6.3.1 Assess
Assessment —
1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities
during military operations.
2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an
objective.
3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity.
4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or
“agents.”
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
Within the commander’s decision cycle, assessment is the determination of the effect of operations as they relate
to overall mission accomplishment. Fundamental to assessment are judgments about progress in designated
mission areas as measured against the expected progress in those same mission areas. These judgments allow the
commander and the staff to determine where adjustments must be made to operations and serve as a catalyst for
planning. Ultimately, assessment allows the commander and staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving
situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.
The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff develop MOPs and MOEs.
These MOPs and MOEs will be used to assess progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a result avoiding
creation of an undesired result, or achieving an objective. Commanders adjust operations based on their
assessment to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. The assessment process is
continuous and is tied directly to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of
operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of
operations and by providing the commander timely information needed for decisions.
Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Outputs of the tactical force
assessment are inputs to operational command assessment. Similarly the outputs of the operational level
assessment are inputs to strategic command assessment. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels
typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses MOEs that support strategic and
operational mission accomplishment. Strategic and operational level assessment efforts concentrate on broader
tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state. Continuous assessment helps operational
commanders determine if the joint force is “doing the right things” to achieve objectives, not just “doing things
right.”
As shown in Figure 6-6, operational assessment measures how the campaign is doing in terms of tasks (CONOPS
execution), effects, and campaign (end state); and then provides recommendations to adjust the plan or actions by
components, tactical force, or outside actors (following the commander’s guidance and intent) to achieve desired
results.
6-11
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
Task Assessment
Are we doing things right?
Effects Assessment
Are we doing the right things?
Campaign Assessment
Are we accomplishing the mission?
y/ y
nc tivel es
e
g
c
s
er a t a ha
Int onen all p
mp in
co lved
o
inv
Assess:
What happened? (Analysis)
So what? (Assessment)
What do we need to do?
– Continue
– Reprioritize
– Redirect
CDR’s Assessment
Guidance/Intent
Planning:
Drawn from effects
Synchronized through CONOPS
Resourcing: appropriate to the
desired effect
Components / Outside
Actors:
Orders vs. requests
Supporting/supported
relationships
Figure 6-6. Assessment
Assessment best practices include:
1. Avoid overengineering assessment. A balance is needed between a quantitative and qualitative approach to
assessment. Assessment, especially task and campaign objective assessment, is difficult and, in many
cases, subjective. Because of the difficulty in measuring progress on attainment of task or campaign
objectives, some staffs overengineer assessment, building massive quantifiable briefings that do not
always logically or clearly support a commander’s assessment requirement.
2. The operational commander is a critical component of assessment. Commanders counter the staff tendency
toward “science of war” solutions by limiting the amount of time and effort their staffs put into
quantifying assessments, and by recognizing that proper assessment can only occur by applying their
experience, intuition, and own observations in an “art of war” approach to assessment.
3. Developing and making recommendations to the commander on “what needs to be done” based on
assessments. Staffs cannot expend all efforts on developing the “what happened” and the “so what” of
assessment and then not have time or energy to recommend “what needs to be done.”
4. Always provide recommendations at all levels of assessment — task, effects, and campaign.
OCT 2008
6-12
NWP 3-32
5. Match frequency of formal assessments to the pace of campaign/major operation planning and execution.
a. Task assessments occur fairly frequently and are a focus area within the current operations staff area.
b. Effects assessments are a focus area within the future operations staff area and are conducted at times
to meet the commander’s needs. They are often conducted less frequently than task assessments.
c. Campaign assessments during execution are a focus area within the future operations staff area and are
conducted to meet the commander’s needs. Campaign assessments of plans under review are a focus
area within the future plans staff area.
6. Conduct task (OPLAN execution) assessments answering “Are we doing things right?”
7. Conduct effects assessments answering “Are we doing the right things” to achieve our desired effects?
8. Conduct campaign assessment answering “Are we accomplishing the mission?” (achieving end
state/objectives).
9. Diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power perspectives enrich
the assessments. In many cases, DIME leadership and personnel traditionally have not conducted these
types of assessments, may not always understand the benefits and may be leery of “committing” to a
position. But upon recognizing the value of involvement in the assessment process, they share their
perspectives and enrich (and influence) the process.
10. Periodically revalidate developed objectives, effects, MOE, and MOP. Review basis for operations,
assumptions, and systems perspective. Revalidation of the objectives (end state) occurs at the level at
which they were developed — normally, the theater-strategic or above level. Review of the desired and
undesired effects primarily occurs at the operational level, while review of MOE and MOP to determine if
the commander and staff are measuring the correct trends and actions and using the correct metrics occur
at the operational and tactical level. These reviews/revalidations keep the units on course by taking into
account higher level direction, adversary actions, and other changes in the operational environment.
6.3.2 Plan
Planning is based on assessment and resultant commander’s guidance. During campaign preparation the
operational commander and staff develop plans whose focus is successful completion of the mission. During
campaign/major operation plan execution the commander and staff make adjustments to the current plan or
develop new plans to successfully achieve the strategic commander’s goals/objectives.
The primary difference between planning for single-Service employment and for joint maritime operations is
synchronizing the unique capabilities and limitations of each Service to achieve unity of effort. It is essential that
staffs from each Service assigned to the joint force/functional component participate in the joint operation
planning process/Navy planning process. This ensures that all Service-specific capabilities are considered. A key
to maximizing capabilities of the joint maritime force is understanding the requirements and capabilities of each
assigned command. One example is a joint sea surveillance operation where the joint force maritime component
commander (JFMCC) is the supported commander and the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is the
supporting commander. This operation will require coordination with the, JFACC, the airspace control authority
(ACA), and maritime force’s area air defense commander (AADC). The inherent mobility of the joint maritime
force must also be preserved in deconfliction plans worked out between components.
Planning best practices include:
1. Bring DIME elements of national power into operational command planning from the very beginning of
mission analysis, through COA development to orders development. Extensive consultation with DIME
leadership in visualizing the operational environment, development of guidance and intent, and decisions
on courses of action assist development of optimal plans and subsequent success in achieving objectives.
6-13
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
2. Develop initial MOEs during mission analysis and continually refine those MOEs throughout the planning
process.
3. Develop MOPs concurrently with COA development and selection and finalize upon COA selection and
orders development.
4. A broader viewpoint enabled by a systems perspective enhances the traditional IPOE process. Staffs and
commanders, together with DIME leadership and personnel, continually refine desired and undesired
effects as they better understand the operational environment provided by this systems understanding.
5. An IPOE assists in the determination of key nodes and links (COGs, critical vulnerabilities, decisive points
(DPs)) which likely will be the focus for actions by the military and other DIME elements of national
power. Courses of action normally address the arrangement of actions against these key nodes and link to
attain desired effects.
6. Develop CCIRs during the planning processes, which may be supported by MOEs and MOPs (Figure 6-7).
Often these CCIRs will support commander decision requirements to either stay the course or change the
plan (in terms of a branch). Often these CCIRs will be answered in assessment.
7. Ensure end state defines accomplishment of the commander’s purpose in observable terms.
8. Ensure alignment of mission/purpose from higher headquarters mission statement and commander’s intent.
9. Utilization of liaison elements to provide their respective commander’s perspectives and ideas to enhance
planning outputs.
10. Communication and coordination with commands at the same echelon. The JFMCC has to communicate
with the JFACC and joint force land component commander (JFLCC) the operational idea for the
maritime AO and encourage their active participation in its evolution. Likewise the JFMCC has to
communicate with the JFACC and JFLCC to ensure understanding of their operational ideas and ensure
maritime force capabilities are properly understood and utilized.
OCT 2008
6-14
NWP 3-32
Figure 6-7. Focused CCIRs from Planning Processes
6.3.3 Direct
Directing operations begins with receipt of a mission order from higher headquarters to initiate the planning
process and continues through completion of the campaign; when directing in a multinational environment, the
commander and staff must remain aware of the individual national government ROEs advantages and limitations.
The operational command directs actions to ensure that current orders and directives are completed as intended.
This direction is done with the broader purpose of achieving the overall mission. Directing converts the
commander’s decisions into effective action by subordinate forces. The commander generates effective action by
directing forces, synchronizing operational functions, and, within authority and capability, integrating other
instruments of national power. The operational commander directs operations by:
1. Guiding the command toward mission accomplishment
2. Assigning missions
3. Prioritizing and allocating resources
4. Assessing, taking and mitigating risks
5. Assessing the situation and deciding when and how to make adjustments
6. Directing, integrating, synchronizing, and controlling intelligence efforts
7. Organizing assigned forces
8. Synchronizing/deconflicting the actions of subordinate commanders.
Three key activities occur during the direction phase of the commander’s decision cycle:
6-15
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
1. The commander provides mission type orders to subordinates specifying objectives and desired/undesired
effects, the arrangement of required actions, required assets, and command relationships that will enable
mission accomplishment. The commander and staff need to ensure that these are documented and stored in
a common repository that all subordinate commanders can access — a Navy message satisfies this
requirement. A video teleconference and telecommunication does not.
2. The commander requests necessary support (in terms of capabilities) from other DIME elements of
national power necessary for the attainment of desired effects. These actions should have been developed
earlier in conjunction with the DIME personnel through continuous collaboration during the assessment
and planning phases of the decision cycle and come as no surprise to DIME leadership assigned to support
the command.
3. The commander issues a collection plan that supports assessment activities, recognizing that adjustments
will be required as further understanding of the complex operational environment is achieved.
6.3.4 Monitor
Monitoring involves observing ongoing activities that may impact the operational commander’s operational area
(OA) or impact the forces’ ongoing or future operations. The baseline for this observation of the situation is the
current plan or plans. This baseline allows the staff to observe the current situation against the one envisioned in
the plan. This allows the commander and staff to identify where the current situation deviates from the one
envisioned in the plan. Staff sections monitor their individual staff functions to maintain current staff estimates.
Monitoring occurs continuously in conjunction with assessment. Operational commanders and staffs monitor the
environment of friendly, adversary, and nonaligned actors to gain information for assessment, and provide
feedback to higher command and subordinates in terms of necessary mission-approval requirements and branch or
sequel tasking. The operational staff typically monitors:
1. CCIRs and request for information (RFI)
2. Operational situation
3. Critical subordinate unit actions
4. Critical supporting force actions
5. Protection information throughout the force (threat levels and threat warnings)
6. Unit strength, current and projected
7. Adversary actions and reactions
8. Logistics status
9. Status of national, theater, and organic intelligence and intelligence-related assets.
Monitoring best practices include:
1. Establishing a mind-set that includes collection of data from all DIME elements. Liaison with DIME
leadership and personnel is vital for this to occur. This mind-set assists ensuring a broader monitoring
function.
2. Preventing liaison elements from becoming conduits for subordinate unit reporting. Supporting activity
reporting should go from subordinate commander to higher headquarters commander.
3. Proactively maintaining current operations personnel awareness of CCIRs, MOPs, and MOEs.
OCT 2008
6-16
NWP 3-32
4. Drilling likely contingencies (identified during war-gaming of the planning processes) with operations
center personnel to minimize confusion during actual events.
Note
Wargaming occurs during planning.
6.3.5 Communications
Communications, within the operational command staff, externally with other commands and DIME elements of
national power, are key to the commander’s decision cycle. Command-level attention to communication “pipes,”
systems, tools, and processes are fundamental to successful implementation of the commander’s decision cycle.
As it relates to the commander’s decision cycle, communications encompasses not only the exchange of
information, but also the management of that information. Communications are the catalyst that facilitates the
commander’s decision cycle. The internal and external operational communications system must support an
overall command climate and organizational design. A correctly implemented communications infrastructure
encourages:
1. Timely, effective, and accurate flow of information and guidance within the force, interagency, and
multinational environments in which the force operates.
2. Effective linkage of all higher, supported, supporting, and subordinate organizations (vertical and
horizontal coordination).
3. Rapid, reliable, secure flow of data processing to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the
force, from the earliest stages of planning through redeployment.
Communication activities should be fully integrated in command operational planning and execution processes,
so that there is consistency in intent and effect between command actions and information disseminated about
those actions.
6.4 COMMAND CONTROL, TIME HORIZONS, COMMANDER’S DECISION CYCLE
The commander’s decision cycle is a process that depicts how command and staff elements determine required
actions, codify them in directives, execute them, and monitor their results. The commander’s decision cycle has
four phases: monitor, assess, plan, and direct, that are interconnected by communications. The decision cycle
provides framework for commanders to control forces. Operational commanders control staff and subordinate
actions by maintaining alignment, providing SA, focusing efforts to advance the plan, ensuring compliance with
procedures, responding to adversary actions, and adjusting force apportionment. Figure 6-8 shows these
controlling actions integrated with the commander’s decision cycle.
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Figure 6-8. Six Fundamentals of C2 Laid on Top of Commander’s Decision Cycle
There is not one decision cycle. Within the headquarters, decision cycles are executed simultaneously for the far-,
mid- and near-time horizons and the control action products are different depending on the time horizon. Table 62 outlines how the knowledge used and shared for each controlling action changes depending on the time-horizon
decision cycle over which it is applied. Operational commanders and staffs identify triggers to shift between time
horizons which can be based on time, events, or other activities.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
Table 6-2. C2 Knowledge Used and Shared by Time Horizon
Time Horizon
Far
Mid
Near
Products
Campaign/major operation
plans, OPLANS; FRAGORDs
to plans and policy directives
Major FRAGORDs directing
major tactical action and force
movement
Orders, including administrative and
small/limited tactical FRAGORDs
Staff Focus Area
Future Plans
Future Operations
Current Operations
Maintain
Alignment
Validate operation’s mission
statement and commander’s
intent. Synchronize with higher
headquarters commander’s
intent and goals.
Allocation requests remain
aligned with the operation’s
mission statement and
commander’s intent (purpose,
sequence, end state, and
priorities).
Execution decisions remain aligned
with the operation’s mission
statement and commander’s intent
(purpose, sequence, end state, and
priorities).
Provide
Situational
Awareness
Utilize historic data trends to
build assumptions of friendly
force, adversary and operational
environmental dispositions.
Analyze and forecast friendly
force, adversary, and
operational environmental
dispositions to determine if
branch plans are still valid.
Observe friendly force disposition to
determine if in accordance with the
plan, whether adversary’s force
disposition is in accordance with
expectations, and whether forces are
executing according to the plan and
procedures.
Advance the
Plan
Specify anticipated conditions.
Periodically review and update
standing plans against current
situational awareness.
When unanticipated
conditions are forecast,
modify time line and plan
branches.
Monitor all aspects of the plan
execution against the time line.
When unanticipated conditions are
encountered adjust plan.
Comply with
Procedure
Establish baseline TTP in
campaign/major operation plan.
Develop standing standard
operating procedures,
operational taskings.
Publish intentions, modify
baseline, standing procedures
to account for forecast
operational environment.
Oversee compliance with
procedures.
Counter the
Enemy
Develop/maintain
campaign/major operation plan
based on IPOE to modify
adversary’s PMESII structures
to achieve higher headquarters
objectives.
Modify time line of branch
plans in response to emerging
intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance information
that differ significantly from
expectations.
Countermove (ideally with a branch
plan) adversary’s actions upon
receipt of reliable information.
Adjust
Apportionment
Maintain campaign/major
operation plan currency upon
notification of a change in
apportioned forces.
Modify time line of branch
plans in response to changes
in apportioned, allocated, or
made available forces.
Reapportion forces due to changes in
asset availability, attrition, on-scene
requirements, priorities, enemy
disposition, or enemy tactics.
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
CHAPTER 7
Maritime Operational-Level Command
Organization and Functions
This chapter will discuss the maritime headquarters with maritime operations center (MHQ with MOC)
organization structure and the functions it supports. It will briefly examine the methodology utilized to coordinate
the simultaneous actions the maritime operational level command staff may execute to support the commander.
7.1 MARITIME HEADQUARTERS
The staff of an operational maritime command and its associated support infrastructure is collectively known as a
MHQ. Today’s Navy operational level staffs must continuously balance operational and fleet management (Title
10), routine administrative Navy administrative control (ADCON), responsibilities. Accordingly, the MHQ
organization must address fleet management and operational responsibilities. Navy and joint operational
organizational constructs are different.
1. The Navy organizational construct is based upon a hierarchical command structure (pyramid) with
established communication paths from subordinate to senior officers/commands. Each level in the Navy
structure is expected to review information, determine its relevance with respect to other information, and
provide interpretation and recommendation to higher levels within the organization. This organizational
construct is commonly referred to as a Napoleonic organizational construct.
2. The joint operational construct (see JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters) is matrix based, with the
traditional Napoleonic organizations providing resources to product teams, thereby accelerating the
commander’s decision processes. Product teams are categorized as boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and
working groups (B2C2WGs), depending on the product being provided to the headquarters and the
duration that the team will exist.
Adherence to guidance contained herein and MHQ with MOC tactics, techniques, and procedures (NTTP 3-32.1)
will ensure standardized staff functions and processes that enable interoperability with the joint community and
commonality across all fleet and principal headquarters. To continually address fleet management and operational
responsibilities the MHQ with MOC organization must be:
1. Flexible — capable of adjusting to changing priorities, whether fleet management or operational
2. Tailorable — capable of smoothly transitioning as the commander is assigned different roles
3. Scalable — capable of integrating additional capacity or capabilities in response to new missions.
Each MHQ with MOC organizational structure has the same three basic organizational structures: command, fleet
management, and maritime operations (see Figure 7-1). Each of these structures is briefly described below, and
will be discussed in greater detail in follow-on paragraphs. The commander retains the authority to modify his
staff structure as necessary to accomplish the mission. The mission determines what tasks the command is
expected to accomplish. These tasks determine how the commander organizes or adapts his staff to support
mission accomplishment. The basic staff structure provides the flexibility to make such modifications, while
simultaneously maintaining a structure that individuals outside the command can easily understand and access for
interoperability and that allows for transition to support various roles assigned the MHQ commanders — joint
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force maritime component commander (JFMCC), joint force commander (JFC), Navy force commander
(COMNAVFOR), or fleet commander.
1. The command structure consists of the MHQ commander, deputy commander (if assigned), chief of staff
(COS) and the commander’s personal staff. It is supported by the MOC and fleet management directors. It
is the focal point of all staff work to collect and process information in order that the commander can make
timely, accurate decisions that:
a. Support successful actions at the operational level.
b. Support Secretary of the Navy’s (SECNAV) Title 10 responsibilities (Figure 4-5).
2. The fleet management structure provides the commander the information needed to make decisions to
execute support of SECNAV’s Title 10 responsibilities (Figure 4-5). These efforts ensure that the Navy is
ready (manned, trained, and equipped) today and in the future to successfully execute joint maritime
operations. This structure also constitutes the resource pool that is used to man the maritime operations
structure with subject-matter experts. Therefore, the MHQ staff can and frequently are required to execute
tasks in support of fleet management and maritime operations structures.
3. The maritime operations structure provides the commander with the command and control (C2)
organization needed to properly assess, plan, direct, and monitor maritime operations from an
operational-level perspective.
Command
M
m
iti
r
a
e
r
pe
O
ns
it o
a
Fl
ee
t
M
an
ag
e
m
en
t
Maritime Headquarters (MHQ)
MHQ = Command + Fleet Management + Maritime Ops
Figure 7-1. Modules of Maritime Headquarters at the Operational Level
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
7.1.1 Command Structure of the Maritime Headquarters
The command structure consists of the commander, deputy commander (if assigned), the COS, and the
commander’s personal staff.
The commander exercises command across the breadth of the operational maritime force using the C2 processes
discussed in Chapter 6. Supporting the commander is a carefully designed C2 infrastructure that obtains, analyzes,
and submits information to the commander to assist in decision making and manage the execution of the
commander’s decisions.
The COS is the commander’s lead staff officer. The commander normally delegates authority to the COS for the
executive management of the entire staff. The COS directs staff tasks, conducts staff coordination, and ensures
efficient and prompt staff response. The COS does not normally oversee the commander’s personal staff. In major
fleet commands, the commander may designate deputy chiefs of staff (DCOS)/directors to direct, coordinate, and
supervise the actions of fleet management directorates and/or a MOC director to do the same with the maritime
operations components. The COS performs the following functions:
1. Keeps the commander informed of current and developing situations.
2. Receives the commander’s decisions and ensures the staff takes appropriate actions to implement those
decisions.
3. Supervises the actions of special assistants, DCOS/directors, and the MOC director.
4. Serves as the chief information officer.
5. Monitors the currency, accuracy, and status of commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
6. Directs and supervises the planning and execution process.
7. Monitors development of plans, orders, and instructions.
8. Obtains the commander’s approval of and promulgates plans, orders, and instructions.
9. Monitors, with assistance of the staff, the execution of plans, orders, and instructions.
10. Organizes, plans, and supervises staff training.
11. Ensures proper coordination of staff activities internally, vertically (with higher headquarters and
subordinate units), and horizontally (with adjacent headquarters).
12. Ensures proper staff support to subordinate commanders and staffs.
13. Prioritizes efforts of fleet management, operations, and shared support.
The commander and COS are supported by the commander’s personal staff and fleet management staffs. The
commander’s personal staff works directly for the commander. The personal staff is normally composed of aides,
the command master chief, and personnel secretaries. Specific duties and responsibilities of the personal staff are
specified by the commander. The fleet management staff is composed of special assistants and directors who are
responsible to the commander and are coordinated and directed by the COS. Directors are responsible for a broad
functional area (a directorate) and help the commander coordinate and supervise the execution of plans,
operations, and activities in that area. Directors exercise broad coordinating responsibilities over staff sections
within their assigned functional area. These responsibilities are intended to facilitate coordination within related
areas of staff functioning and to ensure the systematic channeling of information and documents.
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Staff officers are accountable for the commander’s entire field of responsibilities, except for any areas that the
commander may elect to control personally. A staff officer’s authority is limited to advising, planning, and
coordinating actions within his or her functional area. The commander might also give a staff officer added
authority to act on specific matters related to his or her functional area.
Staff officers are responsible for acquiring information and analyzing its implications to provide timely and
accurate recommendations to the commander. Staff officers must often request and receive information from staff
sections not under their cognizance. For example, the staff judge advocate (SJA) must request, receive, and
coordinate information from other staff sections, specifically intelligence and operations, for the purposes of
developing and refining rules of engagement (ROE). A clear definition of staff responsibilities is necessary to
ensure coordination and eliminate conflict. The command’s standard organization and regulation manual (SORM)
and standard operating procedures (SOPs) should clearly delineate staff primary responsibilities and requirements
for support and coordination.
7.1.2 Fleet Management Structure of Maritime Headquarters
The fleet management structure of the MHQ (see Figure 7-2) includes the special assistants to the commander
plus the N1 (personnel), N2 (intelligence), N3 (operations), N4 (logistics), N5 (plans and policy), N6
(communications information systems), N7 (training), and N8 (programs) directorates. Based on mission
requirements and the nature of the operational environment, the commander commonly establishes additional
staff directorates. For instance, an N9 directorate may be responsible for civil-military issues, concept
development, and experimentation, or another area that requires the command’s attention. The focus of the fleet
management module is the readiness of the assigned and attached Navy forces (NAVFOR). This focus covers the
operational near-, mid-, and far-time horizons and long-term input to the Navy service as a whole. It requires
knowledge of today’s operational environment and the projected environment, plus Navy polices and procedures
for the manning, equipping, and training of Navy forces.
a
M
Spec
Asst
im
rit
e
ra
pe
O
N1
Pers
Command
ns
o
ti
N2
Intel
N3
Ops
N4
Log
N5
P&P
Fl
ee
t
N6
CIS
M
Provide current
and future
combat-ready
Navy forces in
support of joint
force
commanders
an
ag
em
en
t
N7
Trn
N8
Prg
N9
TBD
Maritime Headquarters (MHQ)
MHQ = Command + Fleet Management + Maritime Ops
Figure 7-2. MHQ Fleet Management
OCT 2008
7-4
NWP 3-32
The fleet management module is organized based on the “Napoleonic Structure,” with the staff organized into
directorates with each directorate having a specific responsibility (Table 7-1). In the Navy, directorates are
prefaced with the letter “N”; the Marines preface directorate numbers with the letter “G” on staffs whose
commander is a general officer. Otherwise, Marine directorate numbers are prefaced with an “S” (regiment level
and below). The use of standard directorate assignments enhances external headquarters’ communication with the
MHQ.
Table 7-1. Fleet Management Directorate Responsibility
Directorate
N0
N1
N2
N3
N4
N5
N6
N7
N8
N9
Responsibility
Special Assistants to the Commander
Personnel
Intelligence
Operations
Logistics
Plans and Policy
Communications Information Systems
Training
Programs
TBD
7.1.2.1 Special Assistants to the Commander
The number of special assistants to the commander varies among commands. A maritime command at the
operational level will typically have the following special assistants: a chaplain, SJA, knowledge management
officer (KMO), public affairs officer (PAO), and surgeon. NCCs typically also include an inspector general and
political advisor (POLAD). Normally, special assistants to the commander report to the commander in matters
related to their functional area. They report to the chief staff officer on matters related to the administration of
their staff. Special assistants ensure policies and directives related to their functional area are adhered to by other
members of the staff and, as applicable, subordinate commands.
1. Chaplain. The chaplain serves as primary advisor to the MHQ commander on religious, moral, and morale
matters. The chaplain performs the following functions:
a. Plans and coordinates the provision of all religious support within the force.
b. Provides or performs direct personal religious support, to include advising the MHQ on moral and
ethical decision making.
c. Advises the commander and staff on the religious dynamics of the indigenous population in the OA.
d. Liaises with welfare organizations such as the Navy/Marine Corps Relief Society and American Red
Cross.
e. Represents the command in contacts with community religious and ecclesiastical bodies or authorities.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ chaplain, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations;
NWP 1-05, Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy, and the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32
(series), SORM.
2. Staff Judge Advocate. The SJA serves as primary advisor to the MHQ commander on legal matters
including ROE, rules for the use of force (RUF), law of armed conflict, law of the sea, domestic, foreign,
and admiralty law, status of forces agreements, etc. In concert with the operations director, the SJA is also
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NWP 3-32
responsible for assisting in the development of recommended ROEs. To support the fleet management and
maritime operations modules of the MHQ, the SJA must be conversant not only with the law, but also the
assigned mission, the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS), identified courses of
action, and MHQ processes and procedures. The SJA performs the following functions:
a. Provides legal advice and support to the commander and staff on operational law, military justice,
claims, legal assistance, administrative law, and rule of law operations.
b. Serves as single point of contact for subordinate SJAs regarding legal matters affecting forces
assigned or attached to command.
c. Reviews all plans, targets, ROE, RUF, policies, and directives to ensure consistency with DOD law of
armed conflict (law of war) program, domestic, and international law.
d. Participates in operation plan (OPLAN) development.
For further details concerning SJA functions, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters and JP 1-04, Legal
Support to Military Operation; CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for U.S. Forces; NWP 1-14M, Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations; and the
command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), SORM.
3. Knowledge Management Officer. The KMO works across functional area boundaries to optimize
applications and data structures, eliminate redundancies, facilitate collaboration, and generally serve as the
command’s information referee, to ensure the integration of relevant and meaningful content into the
command’s knowledge repositories. The KMO performs the following functions:
a. Designs and installs techniques and processes to create, protect, and use known knowledge.
b. Designs and creates environments and activities to discover and release knowledge that is not known
or tacit knowledge.
c. Articulates, in the command’s knowledge management plan, the purpose and nature of managing
knowledge as a resource and embodying it in other initiatives and programs.
d. Identifies critical organizational processes that support the commander’s decision making cycles.
e. Develops effective and efficient common operational picture (COP) management processes.
For more detailed discussion of KMO functions, refer to the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32
(series), SORM, or MHQ with MOC SOP.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
4. Public Affairs Officer. The PAO assists the commander and COS officer in carrying out the public affairs
program of the MHQ. Public affairs operations communicate truthful information, good and bad, to
internal and external audiences. They produce global deterrence, public trust and support, and morale and
readiness of forces. The PAO performs the following functions:
a. Informs the commander, COS, other special assistants, and directors of public affairs of trends,
policies, and potentialities, including directives on security and release of information for publication.
b. Supervises the preparation of material for public release from the command following guidance from
the chain of command.
c. Supervises compliance with public affairs directives with respect to releases or proposed releases
concerning unit and personal achievement, serious accident/incident, and unit participation in
community-relations activities.
d. Assists the commander in interviews with the press.
e. Prepares briefing material and information pamphlets for embarked guests.
f. Maintains liaison with higher echelon and subordinate public affairs offices.
g. Ensures common themes maintained for all information released from the command.
For more detailed discussion of PAO functions, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs; Department of Navy Public
Affairs Regulations SECNAVINST 5720.44 (series); and the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32
(series), SORM.
5. Surgeon. The surgeon serves as primary advisor to the MHQ commander on health matters and
employment of medical personnel and equipment within the tactical force. The surgeon must be
conversant with health service support (HSS) and force health protection (FHP) policies to protect the
force from health threats, ensure the fielding of a healthy and fit force, and to ensure an operational
environment that prevents injuries and illness. The surgeon, supported by the headquarters medical staff,
performs the following functions:
a. Establishes conditions that allow HSS providers to deploy capabilities of care that include first
response, en route care, forward resuscitative care, and theater hospitalization.
b. Plans and coordinates FHP measures taken by commanders, leaders, individual Service members, and
the operational forces’ health system to promote and conserve the mental and physical well being of
Service members across the range of military operations.
c. Maintains liaison with higher headquarters and subordinate command surgeons and medical
department heads.
d. Manages patient flow.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ surgeon, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; JP 4-02, Health Service
Support; NWP 4-02 Series; and the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), SORM.
6. Inspector General. The inspector general serves as the MHQ commander’s personal advisor and
representative to investigate, inspect, assess, and inquire into all matters concerning the command and
subordinate activities throughout the commander’s area of responsibility, with particular emphasis on
readiness including, but not limited to: effectiveness, efficiency, discipline, morale, economy, ethics and
integrity; environmental protection; safety and occupational health; medical and dental matters; physical
security; information systems management; personnel support services and other issues affecting quality of
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NWP 3-32
service; command relationships and organizational structures. The inspector general, an extension of the
eyes, ears, voice, and conscience of the commander, provides the commander with a sounding board for
sensitive issues, and is a trusted agent in the command. All Navy component command inspectors general
serve additional duty to the Naval Inspector General in accordance with Navy policy. The inspector
general performs the following functions:
a. Provides candid, objective, and uninhibited internal analysis and advice.
b. Conducts fair, impartial, and timely inspections, investigations, and assessments or audits as directed
by the commander.
c. Serves as the commander’s liaison with external oversight organizations.
d. Provides oversight and investigation of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.
e. Advocates quality of service for military members, civilian employees, and their families.
f. Maintains a working relationship with the Navy component command and joint task force (JTF)
inspectors general to provide support and coordinate inspector general activities.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ inspector general refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters
Annex E to Appendix A; SECNAVINST 5430.57G, Mission and Functions of the Naval Inspector General; and
the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), SORM.
7. Political Advisor. The POLAD is a senior State Department officer, detailed as personal advisor to the
MHQ commander, tasked with providing policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of
the commander’s military responsibilities. To accomplish this tasking, the POLAD must be firmly
embedded in all activities of the MHQ which may have diplomatic or political impacts. The POLAD
performs the following duties:
a. Provides advice to the commander and staff on the political-military aspects of planned and ongoing
operations.
b. Analyzes the regional and global political-military environment and the potential impact of planned
and ongoing operations.
c. Participates in major command policy and planning activities ensuring political-military issues are
fully aired and considered during decision making.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ POLAD refer to the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST
3120.32 (series), SORM.
7.1.2.2 N1 (Manpower and Personnel) Director
At the Echelon II level, the MHQ N1 is the director for total fleet force manpower and personnel readiness. Some
MHQ with MOC Echelon II N1s may also include “personnel services” that typically fall under the Echelon III
level to align with Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Pub 1-0 (Personnel Support to Joint Operations). As
such, N1, in coordination with Commander, Naval Installations Command, becomes the focal point for “all”
personnel “services and support” actions and synchronization of personnel support during all phases of an
operation.
Specific duties and responsibilities of the N1 are discussed in the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST
3120.32 (series), SORM. Specific duties and responsibilities of the N1 are discussed in the command’s
supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), SORM. Typically, MHQ N1 performs the following functions:
OCT 2008
7-8
NWP 3-32
1. At the Echelon II level, N1 provides:
a. “Total” fleet force manpower management throughout CCDR’s area of responsibility (AOR), which
includes active duty, reserve, civilian, and contractor personnel. Determines requirements, allocates
resources, manages personnel acquisition and distribution, strength reporting, as well as development
and retention of the Pacific Fleet’s total force.
b. Personnel augmentation support in support of operations as tasked by the Global Force Manager,
United States Fleet Forces (USFF) Command.
c. Personnel accountability (PA) management for the Navy component command, ensuring full muster
and accountability of Navy personnel and family members in the CCDR’s AOR.
2. At the Echelon III level and below, N1 provides:
a. Responsibility for fleet manpower and personnel
b. Personnel services/support, i.e., personnel pay and entitlements; postal operations; and morale, welfare,
and recreation (MWR) in coordination with supporting Region under Commander, naval installations
command
c. Management responsibility for casualty reporting, to include personnel casualty reports (PCRs),
casualty assistance calls officer (CACO) messages, etc.
d. Personnel administration such as performance evaluations, awards and decorations, correspondence,
and other personnel services
e. Support and assistance to the office of primary responsibility with regard to reserve component (RC)
call-up, as well as stop-loss
f. “Personnel support” for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and noncombatant repatriation;
personnel recovery (PR); and detainee operations when operating jointly with other service components
in task force operations.
3. The N1 at Echelon II and III levels must be fully involved in all phases of contingency and crisis action
planning (CAP) to support effective planning for personnel manpower and manning support to joint
operations and collaborate with other staff directors in the preparation of the commander’s estimate and
plan development. N1 must also coordinate with supported combatant/JTF Command J1 on personnel
manning and augmentation. N1 maintains a dialogue with other staff directorates, Service components,
and outside military and civilian agencies while also keeping subordinate commanders informed of
personnel manning issues.
7.1.2.3 N2 (Intelligence) Director
The MHQ N2 is the director responsible for intelligence and intelligence operations. The N2 conducts all-source,
multidiscipline intelligence operations and ensures full access to an uninhibited flow of information from all
sources, in accordance with DOD and Director of National Intelligence–approved procedures. The N2 is
responsible for executing intelligence responsibilities under USC, Title 10 and Title 50. The MHQ N2 will ensure
intelligence unity of effort across the maritime force and MHQ staff. Additionally, the N2 will ensure the
embedded intelligence capability is leveraged and optimized for maritime operations and that quality intelligence
is integrated into assessments, planning, and direction efforts.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ N2, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters; JP 2-0,
Intelligence; JP 3-32, C2 for Maritime Operations; CJCSM 3500.3A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces
of the United States; and NWP 2-01, Intelligence Support to Operations Afloat. Specific duties and
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OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
responsibilities of the N2 are discussed in the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), SORM.
Typically, MHQ N2 performs the following functions:
1. Plans, directs, integrates, and supervises organic multidiscipline maritime force and supporting
intelligence operations.
2. Coordinates all-source intelligence, counterintelligence, and other reconnaissance plans of the maritime
force.
3. Submits and coordinates all-source collection, production, and capability of the maritime force through
higher headquarters, theater, or national intelligence support.
4. Ensures intelligence architecture is in place to provide timely sharing, processing, and analysis of
relevant data and effective dissemination as appropriate to U.S., multinational, and interagency partners.
5. Identifies deficiencies in intelligence, counterintelligence, and reconnaissance personnel and equipment
resources.
6. Incorporates exercise intelligence in training exercises to improve individual, collective, and unit
readiness.
7. Facilitates understanding and use of intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations.
8. Coordinates with SJA for ROE development.
9. Safeguards all MHQ special security information.
7.1.2.4 N3 (Operations) Director
The MHQ N3 is the director responsible for operations. The N3 assists the commander in the discharge of
assigned responsibility for the direction and control of operations, beginning with mid- and near-time horizon
planning through completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the N3 plans, coordinates, and integrates
operations.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ N3, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-33, Joint Task Force
Headquarters, and CJCSM 3500.3A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States. Specific
duties and responsibilities of the N3 are discussed in the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32
(series), SORM. Typically, MHQ N3 performs the following functions:
1. Serves as principal advisor to the commander on operational matters for assigned, attached, and
supporting forces.
2. Assists the commander in the direction and control of operations.
3. Plans (mid- and near-time horizons), coordinates, and integrates military operations.
4. Develops guidance and tasks for subordinate forces.
5. Coordinates with operations directors at higher headquarters and adjacent commands.
6. Manages the MHQ assessment process.
7. Supervises meteorological and oceanographic support.
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
8. Establishes interfaces with interagency, multinational agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other organizations to synchronize MHQ efforts with these
organizations.
9. Recommends task organization for the maritime force to the commander.
10. Coordinates with SJA for ROE development.
7.1.2.5 N4 (Logistics) Director
The MHQ N4 is the director for all logistics matters. The N4 plans, coordinates, and supervises activities and
tasks necessary to sustain all aspects of operating forces at all levels of war in the areas of logistics: supply,
maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health service support, engineering, logistic services, and
operational contracting support. The N4 must coordinate with the chaplain and surgeon to delineate specific roles
and responsibilities for the planning and conduct of religious and medical services.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ N4 refer to CJCSM 3500.3A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed
Forces of the United States. Specific duties and responsibilities of the N4 are discussed in the command’s
supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), SORM. Typically, MHQ N4 performs the following functions:
1. Provides supply and logistics expertise to other directorates to support event or operational planning.
2. Develops supply and logistics policy and procedures that are utilized by or in support of other directorates
in the execution of their duties, responsibilities, and functions.
3. Develops supply and logistics automation tools that are utilized by or in support of other directorates in the
execution of their duties, responsibilities, and functions.
4. Coordinates with national logistics product and service providers on policy and procedures matters.
5. Provides overall management and oversight of fleet supply programs and service activities.
6. Exercises general supervision over development of plans and policies for fleet supply matters.
7.1.2.6 N5 (Plans and Policy) Director
The MHQ N5 is the director responsible for long-range and contingency planning. The focus of the N5 is
development of future plans, orders, and policy directives. Future planning processes and products generally
require significant coordination by the N5 with entities internal and external to the MHQ. When the MHQ does
not have an N5 directorate the planning duties of the N5 are assumed by the N3.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ N5 refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters; JP 5-0, Joint
Operation Planning; and CJCSM 3500.3A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.
Specific duties and responsibilities of the N5 are discussed in the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST
3120.32 (series), SORM. Typically, MHQ N5 performs the following responsibilities:
1. Develops, revises, and coordinates required plans and orders in support of assigned missions.
2. Coordinates planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, multinational headquarters, and the
interagency, IGOs, and NGOs, as required.
7-11
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
3. Determines the forces required and available, and coordinates deployment planning.
4. Assists the MHQ N3 in preparation of orders.
5. Coordinates with the MHQ N3 to ensure the political-military activities, such as NEOs, civil-military
operations (CMO), and civil affairs operations are properly addressed with the appropriate U.S.
embassies and host-nation governments.
6. Coordinates and incorporates planning with representatives of other nations, the interagency, NGOs,
IGOs, and other interested non-U.S. parties concerning the overall force mission.
7. Forms and supervises future planning teams/groups.
8. Maintains foreign-country expertise to support theater security cooperation planning.
7.1.2.7 N6 (Communications Information Systems) Director
The MHQ N6 is the director responsible for communications infrastructure, communications-computer
networking, communications electronics, information assurance, tactical communications, and interoperability.
This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the
MHQ’s operational and strategic requirements. It also includes policy and guidance for implementation and
integration of interoperable communications system support to exercise command in the execution of the mission.
The N6 provides a communications system that facilitates the proper integration and employment of force
operational capabilities through effective C2. A role of the communications system is to ensure connectivity
throughout the operational environment, thus providing the MHQ with the capability to effectively plan, conduct,
and sustain maritime operations. A second role is to provide MHQs the principal tool to collect, transport,
process, protect, and disseminate data and information.
For more detailed responsibilities of the MHQ N6 refer to CJCSM 3500.3A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed
Forces of the United States. Specific duties and responsibilities of the N6 are discussed in the command’s
supplement to OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), SORM. Typically, MHQ N6 performs the following
responsibilities:
1. Provides overall management and protection of all communications systems not within joint or Serviceprovided network operations supporting the MHQ.
2. Ensures a compatible, adequate, and effective communications system that allows reliable, nearcontinuous access to enterprise information and services are available to support MHQ C2 infrastructure.
3. Publishes communications system plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned
mission and coordinate plans prepared by subordinate commands.
4. Adjudicates or assigns subordinate commands the responsibility to provide communications systems
support based on the operational environment.
7.1.2.8 N7 (Training) Director
The MHQ N7 is the director responsible for training. At Echelon II commands, the N7 coordinates and supervises
resources, activities, and tasks in support of fleet training. At the numbered fleet level and below, planning,
coordination, and supervision of activities and tasks to ensure the MHQ and subordinate forces are ready for
operations across the range of military operations falls to N7. The N7 is responsible for support of fleet exercises
in support of MHQ readiness and accreditation. When the MHQ does not have an N7, the duties of the N7 are
normally assumed by the N3 (Operations).
OCT 2008
7-12
NWP 3-32
Specific duties and responsibilities of the N7 are discussed in the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST
3120.32 (series), SORM. Typically, MHQ N7 performs the following functions:
1. At the Echelon II level:
a. Provides training resources in support of fleet training requirements.
b. Provides oversight and management of training resources for Echelon III and below commands as
appropriate (numbered fleets, type commands, etc.) to ensure that COCOM training requirements are
met.
2. At the Echelon III level and below:
a. Evaluates maritime force training and exercise program for units and personnel.
b. Develops and implements training and theater indoctrination programs for units rotating into the
theater.
c. Develops and implements training and theater indoctrination programs for personnel augmenting the
MHQ staff.
d. Establishes, reviews, and strengthens training programs for MHQ.
e. Prioritizes training, where required, and training needs to incorporate all parts of the MHQ and
subordinate forces.
f. Provides input to Echelon II command N7 (or N3 as applicable) for training requirements.
7.1.2.9 N8 (Programs) Director
The MHQ N8 is the director responsible for requirements. The N8 analyzes MHQ and subordinate force inputs to
provide input to the Deputy CNO for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, whose office is charged with
optimizing Navy investments through centralized coordination of Navy warfighting and warfighting support
analysis and assessments, Navy capability development and integration, joint and Navy requirements
development, and resource programming. This tasking can only occur with field input from the MHQ N8. The N8
must be familiar with how operations are conducted today in order to conduct analysis of possible future systems
and programs. When the MHQ does not have an N8, the duties of the N8 are assumed by the COS.
Specific duties and responsibilities of the N8 are discussed in the command’s supplement to OPNAVINST
3120.32 (series), SORM. Typically, MHQ N8’s responsibilities include:
1. Executes the CNO’s integrated program planning system.
2. Provides MHQ commander with cross-functional analyses of Navy warfare, support, and force-level
capabilities to support programmatics.
3. Develops, coordinates, and maintains an integrated system of fiscal management to ensure effective
management control of the funds and resources assigned to support the MHQ.
4. Determines naval oceanography and navigation requirements and provides resources to support the needs
of the MHQ and subordinate forces.
7-13
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
5. Determines force levels, shipboard and related support requirements; and major characteristics of
programs involving aircraft carrier, amphibious, cruiser, destroyer, frigate, littoral combat, and logistic
ships.
6. Coordinates overall MHQ policy for submarine force planning, programming, and budgeting.
7. Establishes overall MHQ policy for aviation program requirements including strike programs, Naval Air
Reserve mobilization planning, support facilities, aviation acquisition, and budget development.
7.1.3 Maritime Operations Structure
The maritime operations structure of the MHQ (Figure 7-3), consists of the maritime operations center (MOC).
Today’s information systems, complex operational environment, and need for accelerated decision cycles are not
supported by the fleet management hierarchical Napoleonic structure. The fleet management organization with
knowledge stovepipes does not facilitate the horizontal and vertical coordination needed to rapidly step through
the commander’s decision cycle. Therefore, the MOC consists of B2C2WGs in order to facilitate this requirement
for rapid decisionmaking.
The flattened vice hierarchical MOC B2C2WG organizational structure facilitates the ability to accelerate the
commander’s decision cycle (see Figure 7-4). Standard procedures make staff coordination more routine, increase
cross-functional integration, facilitate monitoring, assessment, and planning, provide venues for command
decisions, and allow for the management of current operations, future operations, and future plans. The
B2C2WGs are staffed with subject-matter experts from the fleet management directorates, thereby providing the
cross-directorate knowledge required to address today’s complex operational environment. The B2C2WG
integrating structure provides the mechanism for bringing together the various expertise of the staff members
focused on specific problem sets to provide coherent staff recommendations to the commander.
Plan, direct,
Monitor, and
assess
operations
itim
r
a
M
e
pe
O
ra
Command
ns
tio
Fl
ee
tM
an
ag
Maritime Operations Center
Provide current
and future
combat-ready
Navy forces in
support of joint
force
commanders
em
en
t
Subject-Matter Experts
Spec
Asst
N1
Pers
N2
Intel
N3
Ops
N4
Log
N5
P&P
N6
CIS
N7
Trn
N8
Prg
N9
TBD
Maritime Headquarters (MHQ)
MHQ = Command + Fleet Management + Maritime Ops
Figure 7-3. MHQ Maritime Operations
OCT 2008
7-14
NWP 3-32
MOC B2C2WG Staffing
Command
MOC
Director
Spec N1
Asst Pers
N2
Intel
N3
Ops
N4
Log
N5
P&P
N6
CIS
N7
Trn
N8
Prg
N9
TBD
Boards
Bureaus
Centers
Cells
Working Groups
Figure 7-4. MOC B2C2WG Staffing
The MOC’s B2C2WG structure, organization, and staffing will vary depending upon the mission assigned, the
operational environment, the makeup of existing and potential adversaries or nature of the crisis (e.g., combat
operations, tsunami, cyclone, earthquake), and the time available to reach the desired end state. Each B2C2WG
activated for a mission will have principal oversight by a directorate. These B2C2WGs may be physical venues
but also support virtual collaboration and participation with other government agencies (OGAs), IGOs, NGOs,
and other military headquarters.
A continuing challenge for commanders when defining the MOC B2C2WG structure is balancing the potentially
large number of B2C2WGs necessary for full staff analysis and integration with the limited number of full-time
personnel on the staff, time available, and other competing scheduling requirements for the principals and leaders.
One of the means to force discipline on the numbers of B2C2WGs is to require the staff proponent of a B2C2WG
to defend its need in terms of what it brings to the decision cycle, e.g., specific inputs, outputs, and recipients of
that information. The “seven-minute drill,” outlined in Figure 7-5, is a tool to vet B2C2WGs. It is a way the staff
proponent summarizes the purpose for the appropriate B2C2WG, its linkage to other B2C2WGs, and its support
to decisionmaking requirements.
7-15
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
Figure 7-5. The Seven-Minute Drill to Vet Proposed New B2C2WG to MOC
Other publications that may assist the user in understanding the many facets of a B2C2WG organization and its
functions include: JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations; JP 333, Joint Task Force Headquarters; and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
Each MOC will have a director to ensure one individual is focused entirely on the mission and operational tasks,
as well as guaranteeing the MOC, as a whole, is functioning as required, ensuring successful fulfillment of the
mission and operational tasks. The MOC commander designates the MOC director, who is the officer in charge of
accomplishing the main processes of strategy development, combat planning, combat operations, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), air and sea mobility, and operational sustainability. The MOC director is
charged with running the MOC effectively, based on the commander’s guidance, and will report directly to the
commander in that role. At each MHQ the individual assigned to this position will depend upon the talent and
experience resident in the command and upon the type of operation being conducted. Options for filling the MOC
director position might include assignment of a senior officer on a full-time basis or collateral-duty assignment of
the DCOS, N3, N5, or other appropriately qualified individual.
A typical MOC is likely to have three centers: maritime intelligence operations, operations, and logistics
readiness. Supporting these centers are cells and working groups. NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center,
provides additional guidance for the formation and functioning of a MOC as a key structure of an MHQ. It provides
fundamentals and a generic template to organize the MOC to conduct operations in support of the commander. This
organizational template will better facilitate the execution of internal and external (MOC-to-MOC as well as interechelon) processes. It recognizes there are different MOCs, such as tailored MOCs, and that the mission being executed
may well dictate organization and process requirements. It is a step toward organizational and process standardization,
not a constraint.
OCT 2008
7-16
NWP 3-32
7.2 MARITIME HEADQUARTERS WITH MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTER
The MHQ with MOC ensures Navy operational commanders are able to execute at the operational level (see
Figure 7-6). Maintaining the fleet management Napoleonic structure provides the deliberate staffing environment
required to properly man, equip, and train Navy forces. Additionally, it provides an organizational structure that
external commands understand, allowing staff quick access to expertise to promote interoperability. Organizing
the MOC following the B2C2WG flattened organizational construct to plan and execute assigned missions greatly
speeds planning and decisionmaking by aligning with the JTF staff model. Additionally, by following this
standard model, coordination with other component commanders and transforming to the various joint roles that
may be assigned will be made easier. Reachback, or support from or to other similarly organized MOCs, will be
facilitated and the utility of schoolhouse training programs maximized through standardization.
Plan, direct,
monitor and
assess
operations
a
M
e
m
i
t
ri
ns
o
i
at
r
pe
O
Bureaus
Command
Provide current
and future
combat-ready
Navy forces in
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force
commanders
Fl
ee
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an
ag
em
Maritime Operations Center
en
Working Groups
Boards Centers
Cells
t
Subject Matter Experts
Spec
Asst
N1
Pers
N2
Intel
N3
Ops
N4
Log
N5
P&P
N6
CIS
N7
Trn
N8
Prg
N9
TBD
Maritime Headquarters (MHQ)
MHQ = Command + Fleet Management + Maritime Ops
Figure 7-6. MHQ with MOC
MHQ’s staffing has not been increased to facilitate maritime operations. Each staff will require a personnel
transition plan that provides the necessary scalability and organizational flexibility by augmenting the
organization with personnel and equipment, as necessary. Each MHQ will maintain a baseline capability for fleet
management and maritime operations that will support the operations tempo required to meet the typical Phase 0
daily demands of the theater, area of operations (AO), or function. As the tempo and complexity of operations
increases across the range of military operations, the MHQ must be able to transition from baseline capabilities to
the increased capabilities demanded by the situation. Personnel transition plans should include predesignated
active and reserve joint, multinational and other Service personnel who will augment the headquarters staff to
meet the increased demand. This augmentation can occur incrementally as operations increase in complexity,
scale, or tempo. Exercising the personnel transition plan will identify potential issues.
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OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
7.3 OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS
ERR
Functions are related capabilities and activities that, grouped together, help operational commanders integrate,
synchronize, and direct joint operations. Joint doctrine identifies six basic groups of functions that are common to
operations at all levels of war: C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.
Some functions, such as C2 and intelligence, apply to all operations. For each level of war the Joint Staff has
identified tasks24 for each functional group and published these tasks in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL),
online at the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Web Portal (CJCSI
3500.02 series and CJCSM 3500.04 series). The UJTL provides a common lexicon for describing tasks in the
joint community and increasingly with interagency partners. Appendix A provides a graphic representation for
each functional area of the tasks identified by the UJTL for each level of war. Within the UJTL, each of these
tasks has several associated supporting tasks. The UJTL tasks and subtasks identify “what” is to be performed;
they do not address “how” or “why” a task is performed (found in joint doctrine or other governing criteria, such
as a command SOP), or “who” performs the task (found in the commander’s CONOPS and joint doctrine).
Each operational level headquarters, e.g., MHQ with MOC, utilizes the UJTL to clarify “what” the command will
do by identifying a tailored list of UJTL tasks for the command that will result in successful accomplishment of
the mission. For each tailored task the reason “why” the task is required should be identified. This provides a
means to conduct a postmission analysis and refine future tailored task lists. With an understanding of the “what”
and “why” of tasks the command needs to accomplish, the command then can define processes and procedures
that define “how” and “who” will be executing the task. Critical in the development of these processes and
procedures is identification of their inputs from strategic-level tasks and other operational-level tasks and
recipients of their outputs (other operational level tasks or tactical level tasks). This same process is followed by
TF commanders using tactical UJTL tasks and subtasks to define processes and procedures that need to be
developed.
For each subtask applicable to the command, the staff identifies for each time horizon where in the commander’s
decision cycle the task will be executed, the inputs required to execute the task, the outputs from the task, and the
processes and procedures to generate these outputs.
7.3.1 Command and Control
The role of the commander in the C2 functional area is discussed in Chapter 6. C2 ties together all the operational
functions and tasks and applies to all levels of war and echelons of command across the range of military
operations.
C2 is the means by which an operational commander synchronizes and integrates force activities in order to
achieve unity of command. Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized
execution of centralized, overarching plans. Unity of command is strengthened through adherence to the
following C2 tenets:
1. Clearly defined authorities
2. Roles and relationships
3. Information management (IM)
4. Explicit and implicit communication
5. Timely decision making
6. Coordination mechanisms
24
task — An action or activity (derived from an analysis of the mission and concept of operations) assigned to an individual
or organization to provide a capability. (CJCSM 3500.04D 1 August 2005 Change 1 Universal Joint Task List (UJTL))
OCT 2008
7-18
NWP 3-32
7. Battle-rhythm discipline
8. Responsive, dependable, and interoperable support systems; SA
9. Mutual trust.
7.3.2 Fires25
Operational firepower employs kinetic and nonkinetic means to defeat adversary forces or to maintain freedom of
movement. By its nature, operational firepower is primarily a joint/multinational task. Firepower refers to the
delivery of all types of ordnance to include bombs, rockets, missiles, artillery, and naval gunfire, as well as other
lethal means against enemy targets.
The two broad categories of targets are deliberate and dynamic. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets.
These are targets that are known to exist in the operational environment with engagement actions scheduled
against them to create the results desired to support achievement of JFC objectives. Dynamic targeting prosecutes
targets of opportunity that are identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate
targeting but, when detected or located, meet criteria specific to achieving objectives. Dynamic targets are often
referred to as targets of opportunity. Deliberate and dynamic targeting processes are discussed in JP 3-60, Joint
Targeting.
There are three types of deliberate targeting processes described in JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
1. The joint targeting process
2. Six-stage air targeting and tasking process: Air component
3. Four-phase targeting process: Land and maritime components.
Land and maritime force commanders normally use a four-phase targeting process known as the decide, detect,
deliver, and assess (D3A) for fires planning and execution and to interface with the joint targeting cycle. D3A
incorporates the same fundamental functions of the joint target cycle. The D3A methodology facilitates
synchronizing maneuver, intelligence, and fire support. D3A is a more responsive deliberate targeting cycle and is
not constrained by the 72-hour cycle. Components may strike any target within their AO with organic capabilities
that support their objectives and desired results. The AO may include: above, on, and beneath the sea, the land
that affects the maritime missions, and the information dimension. If the maritime force has insufficient organic
assets to strike a target within the maritime AO, or if a maritime target is outside the maritime AO, the targets can
be nominated for joint targeting and prosecution by another component’s assigned forces. Likewise, the maritime
force can offer strike assets not needed for maritime missions as excess sorties for use in joint missions required
by another component. As part of the deliberate targeting process, the maritime operational commander will
coordinate target nominations for the joint target list, no strike list, restricted target list, maritime prioritized target
list for organic strikes in the maritime AO, and maritime target nomination list for joint missions. Using
responsive organic capabilities can help to ensure the maritime operational commander’s decision cycle is inside
the adversary’s.
Dynamic targets are usually fleeting with very small windows for weapon engagement. Commanders and their
staffs, in coordination with joint components and other agencies, develop dynamic targeting guidance, which
should include: time-sensitive target (TST) type and description; TST prioritization; desired result; approval
authority; and acceptable risk. The commander should articulate risk tolerance sufficiently to let on-scene
commanders understand his intent when dynamic targeting requires accelerated coordination. The maritime
commander and staff at the operational level must ensure the dynamic targeting processes are understood and
25
fires — The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
7-19
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
rehearsed. Components will nominate candidate TSTs, high-payoff targets, and high-value targets during the
deliberate targeting process. These targets will be managed by the CCDR-directed dynamic targeting manager.
7.3.3 Intelligence26
Operational intelligence focuses on adversary military capabilities and intentions. Operational intelligence helps
the JFC and component commanders keep abreast of events within their areas of interest. It also helps
commanders determine when, where, and in what strength the adversary might stage and conduct campaigns and
major operations. During counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, operational intelligence is
increasingly concerned with stability operations and has a greater focus on political, economic, and social factors.
Within the OA, operational intelligence addresses the full range of military operations, facilitates the
accomplishment of theater strategic objectives, and supports the planning and conduct of joint campaigns and
subordinate operations. Operational intelligence focuses on providing the commander information required to
identify adversary centers of gravity (COGs), critical vulnerabilities and decisive points (DPs), and provides
relevant, timely, and accurate intelligence and assessments. Operational intelligence also includes monitoring
terrorist incidents and natural or man-made disasters and catastrophes.
The senior intelligence officers of the maritime commander at the operational level must know not only their
command’s intelligence and information requirements, but also must be aware of the priority intelligence
requirements (PIRs) of the higher, adjacent, and supporting and subordinate commands, as well as national-level
intelligence requirements.
A critical commander’s decision cycle assessment phase tool for all event horizons is the intelligence preparation
of the operational environment (IPOE) process. IPOE discussed in Chapter 6 is used to define the operational
environment, describe the impact of the operational environment on adversary and friendly forces, evaluate the
capabilities of adversary forces operating in the operational environment, and determine and describe potential
adversary objectives, COG, CVs, DPs, and COAs and civilian activities that might impact military operations.
Analysts use the IPOE process to analyze, correlate, and fuse information pertaining to all relevant aspects of the
operational environment (e.g., military, economic, political, and social, information and infrastructure systems).
The process is also used to analyze adversary capabilities, identify potential adversary COAs, and assess the most
likely and most dangerous adversary COAs. The process can be applied to the full range of joint military
operations (to include civil considerations) and to each level of war.
The IPOE process is described in detail in JP 2-01.3 series.
7.3.4 Movement and Maneuver
Operational movement and maneuver focuses on the disposition of joint and/or multinational forces, to impact the
conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing positional advantages before battle is joined or
exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results. This activity includes moving or deploying
forces for operational advantage within a joint operations area (JOA) and conducting maneuver to operational
depths for offensive or defensive purposes. It also includes enhancing the mobility of friendly forces and
controlling the operational environment on land, on and under the sea, in the air, or in space.
Maneuver is defined as the employment of forces in the OA through movement in combination with fires to
achieve a position of advantage in respect to the adversary in order to accomplish the mission. At the operational
level, maneuver is a means by which operational commanders set the terms of battle by time and location, decline
battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to
an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. The objective for operational maneuver is
usually a COG, CV, or DP. Movement and maneuver gains and maintains maritime and air superiority.
26
operational intelligence — Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to
accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)
OCT 2008
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NWP 3-32
The JFMCC directs subordinate commanders in the execution of force-level operational tasks, advises the JFC of
its movement, and coordinates with other functional/Service components and other agencies in supporting
JFMCC missions. Operational, and tactical-level maneuver and movement of maritime forces are integral in
defense-planning considerations, such as JFMCC support to, or execution of, assigned airspace control authority
(ACA) or area air defense commander (AADC) responsibilities. As described in JP 3-0, Joint Operations,
maneuver must be synchronized with fires and interdiction. Such synchronization provides one of the most
dynamic tools available to the JFC.
Movement and maneuver encompasses organizing for and disposing forces to conduct campaigns, major
operations, and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat operations commence and
by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
7.3.5 Protection27
The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in four primary ways:
1. Active defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure,
and lines of communications (LOCs) from an adversary’s attack.
2. Passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and
destroy.
3. Applying technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide.
4. Emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) attack, accidents, health threats, and
natural disasters. As the mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond force protection to
encompass protection of U.S. noncombatants, the forces, systems, and civil population.
There are protection considerations that affect planning in every operation. The greatest risk to the total force —
and therefore the greatest need for protection — occurs during campaigns and major operations that involve largescale combat against a capable enemy. Typically, these will require the full range of protection tasks, thereby
complicating planning and execution. Although the OA and joint force may be smaller for a crisis response or
limited contingency operation, the mission can still be complex and dangerous, with a variety of protection
considerations. Permissive operating environments associated with military engagement, security cooperation,
and deterrence still require that planners consider protection measures commensurate with potential risks. These
risks may include a wide range of threats such as terrorism, criminal enterprises, environmental threats/hazards,
and computer hackers. Thus, continuous research and access to accurate, detailed information about the
operational environment, along with realistic training, can enhance protection activities.
27
protection — Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel,
equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given
operational area. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
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NWP 3-32
7.3.6 Sustainment
The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of sustainment function as a coordinated whole, rather than as
separate entities. Sustainment is the provision of logistics28 and personnel services29 necessary to maintain and
prolong operations until mission accomplishment. The focus of sustainment in joint operations is to provide the
JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and extend operational reach. Effective
sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force is able to conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC
to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. It is a Service responsibility to provide logistics support to forces
assigned to a JFC/JFMCC.
Operational logistics links tactical requirements to strategic capabilities to accomplish operational and tactical
objectives. Operational logistics normally supports campaigns and major theater operations by providing theaterwide logistic support. Operational logisticians coordinate the apportionment, allocation, and distribution of
resources within theater. They coordinate closely with tactical operators to identify theater shortfalls and
communicate these shortfalls to the appropriate theater or strategic source and/or ration supplies to support
operational priorities. Operational logisticians coordinate the flow of strategic capabilities into a theater based on
the commander’s priorities. The concerns of the logistician and the operator are interrelated. The
NCC/commander, Navy forces (COMNAVFOR) is responsible for planning, coordinating, and supervising
operational logistics. The NCC/COMNAVFOR may designate a logistics group to be a Navy logistics
command/coordinator (NLC) to coordinate the execution of operational logistics.
Operational-level logistics includes deployment, sustainment, resource prioritization and allocation, and
requirements identification activities to sustain the force in a campaign or major operation. These fundamental
decisions concerning force deployment and sustainment are key for the commander to provide successful
logistical support.
At tactical and operational levels, commanders and their staffs forecast the drain on resources associated with
conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at
the right times and places to enable achievement of military strategic and operational objectives before reaching
culmination. If the commanders cannot generate the resources, then the plan is not supportable and needs to be
revised.
7.4 BATTLE RHYTHM
Battle rhythm is defined as the deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and, unit activities intended to
synchronize current and future operations/plans. The battle rhythm serves to optimize the commander’s
decisionmaking planning and ability to command forces by enabling coordination, and collaboration and
accomplishing necessary de-confliction. It is described as the sequencing and execution of actions and events
within the operational commander’s staff as required by the flow and sharing of information necessary to support
the three event horizon commander’s decision cycles. A staff battle rhythm supports the commander’s battle
rhythm. It is synchronized with higher headquarters and peer components, as well as setting a cycle to which
subordinate commands can link. The synchronization is calibrated to optimize the most efficient and timely flow
of orders, intent, guidance, and information up, down, and between the various levels of headquarters. Battle
rhythms are scalable in time cycles based on the pace of operations that range from the normal and routine, which
is normally a weekly and monthly cycle, to major combat operations, which is a 24-hour cycle. The battle rhythm
is also modulated by components for particular operational circumstances and requirements. The appropriate
28
(U) logistics — (DOD) Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military
operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation,
and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction,
maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Source: JP 4-0)
29
personnel services.—Those sustainment functions provided to personnel. Personnel services complement logistics by
planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel so that the JFC may be optimally prepared to
accomplish the mission. Examples of personnel services are human resources support, religious ministry support, financial
management, and legal support. (Source JP 3-0)
OCT 2008
7-22
NWP 3-32
B2C2WGs are selected for inclusion, which can be done using the seven-minute drill format described in Figure
7-5.
A challenge for every staff is orchestrating the battle rhythm events for each time horizon ensuring that they also
support pertinent information requirements of the other time horizons. Many headquarters minimize the total
number of meetings by organizing battle rhythm events by function (e.g., an assessment, planning, or information
operations (IO) meeting), and then further setting the agenda of that meeting to satisfy any needed actions for all
three time horizons. This reduces the requirement for the leadership to attend three separate meetings, and reduces
the time demands on the supporting staff officers.
A battle rhythm is a routine cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize the far-, mid-, and
near-time horizons to support the commander’s planning and execution of an assigned mission. The battle rhythm
establishes the time, frequency, and type of meetings, working groups, boards, report/product requirements, and
other MOC activities. These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly requirements. Typically, the
MOC battle rhythm is managed by the COS. There are several critical functions for a battle rhythm that include,
but are not limited to, the following:
1. Making staff interaction and coordination within the MHQ routine.
2. Making commander and staff interaction routine (in so much as it can be).
3. Synchronizing centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, work groups, and planning team
activities.
4. Facilitating planning by the staff and decision making by the commander.
Many factors influence the establishment of a battle rhythm. These include (but are not limited to) the following:
1. The higher headquarters battle rhythm and reporting requirements.
2. Adjacent headquarters battle rhythm and reporting requirements.
3. The subordinate headquarters battle rhythm requirements.
4. The duration of the operation.
5. The intensity of the operation.
6. The planning requirements within the headquarters, (e.g., future plans, future operations, and current
operations).
7. Other factors (e.g., operation phase).
The commander is charged with effectively managing operations and establishing the commander’s battle rhythm.
The commander develops and directs processes to assess, plan, direct, monitor, and coordinate operations in the
AO based on the superior commander’s intent. Once battle rhythm is ongoing, there are typically five sets of these
products being worked at any given time:
7-23
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
1. One undergoing assessment (yesterday’s plan)
2. One in execution (today’s plan)
3. One in production (tomorrow’s plan)
4. One in final planning, to include considerations like detailed targeting and deconfliction (the following
day’s plan)
5. One in strategy for development (next phase).
Like all other processes, the commander’s battle rhythm must be managed and requires deliberate planning,
monitoring during execution, and continuous internal assessment. Battle rhythm management ensures that the
commander is responsive to the needs of higher headquarters, the MOC staff, and subordinate commanders. A
cell within the MOC typically is the lead to ensure new requirements are incorporated into the battle rhythm, and
should establish and manage daily staff battle rhythm, to include daily briefings and meetings. Planning the battle
rhythm includes the integration of processes and synchronization of events across the MOC to ensure alignment
internally and externally, vertically (higher headquarters and subordinates) and horizontally (joint components,
allies, coalition partners, interagency organizations). The battle rhythm of a JFMCC must be synchronized with
the battle rhythm of the JFC. Figures 7-7, 7-8, and 7-9 display pictorially sample battle rhythms for a JFMCC,
Commander, joint task force (CJTF) and JFMCC and a JFC, events included, and a JTF, respectively.
OCT 2008
7-24
C/JFMCC MECB
FOPS, MPG
Refine 96–120 hrs Concepts
Based on CJTF Guidance
Refine 96–120 hrs Targeting
2400
Release C/JFMCC
Intentions Msg
Watch Turnover
1800
0600
Watch Turnover
7-25
CJTF VTC
C/JFMCC Targeting
Guidance to CTFs
Update 96–120 hr Opns,
Key Decisions, CCIR, and Deep Ops
Receive CJTF Guidance
Review 24–72 hrs Targets
Refine 72–96 hrs Targets
Receive Future Targeting Guidance
FOPS Brief to C/JFMCC
& Draft Intentions Msg
C/JFMCC SITREP &
JPERSTAT Due
1200
FOPS, MPG
Develop 96–120 hrs Concepts
Based on CJTF Guidance
Plan 96–120 hrs Targeting
C/JFMCC Daily VTC
w/CTFs
NWP 3-32
OCT 2008
Figure 7-7. Notional Battle Rhythm for a JFMCC
C/JFMCC MAT
Approve CJTF
Brief Inputs
Target Noms
Due to C/JFMCC
2100
IO WG
1800
7-26
C/JFMCC
CIS Center
Release
CDR
Intentions
JECB
C/JFMCC Watch Turnover
1700
JRC
C/JFMCC IO Report
0600
Watch Turnover
0700
CJTF Brief w/
CCs
IO WG
Log Coord Board
JNCC
FOPS Brief to C/JFMCC
& Draft Intentions Msg
C/JFMCC Watch Turnover
0500
Release CDR
SITREP
CJTF
C/JFMCC Target Noms
Due to TET
0400
CJTF (pm) Brief
Effects WG
C/JFMCC IO Report
LOGSITREP Input
0300
CJTF Brief Inputs
JISE
C/JFMCC Targeting
Guidance to CTFs
C/JFMCC Inputs to
CDRs Brief Due
0200
ESG
1900
C/JFMCC BDA
Report Due
0100
Log Coord Board
2000
Watch Turnover
METOC Cell
2400
2300
2200
Release C/JFMCC
Intentions Msg
C/JFMCC SITREP &
JPERSTAT Due
CTF BDA
Reports Due
FOPS, JPG
1600
0800
FOPS, JPG, TPFDD
1500
JCMB
0900
JECC
ESG
1400
1300
METOC Cell
CTF SITREPs
Due to C/JFMCC
ROE
Cell
Internal C/JFMCC Events
CJTF/CC/ESG
1000
C/JFMCC ESG
1100
1200
C/JFMCC Daily
VTC w/CTFs
CTF Events
Targeting
Effects Team
C/JFMCC
N2 CMB
C/JFMCC Products
COS VTC
Preview
CJTF Events
Legend
Figure 7-8.
CTF’s Input for
C/JFMCC VTC Due
Notional Battle Rhythm with CJTF and JFMCC Events Included
NWP 3-32
OCT 2008
C/JFMCC MECB
NWP 3-32
Figure 7-9. Sample JTF Headquarters Battle Rhythm
7-27
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
OCT 2008
7-28
NWP 3-32
APPENDIX A
Functional Area UJTL Tasks
The Universal Joint Task List ((UJTL) — CJCSI 3500.02 series and CJCSM 3500.04 series) provides a
framework for operational-level commands to understand the relationship of tasks accomplished by the command
with tasks being executed by commands at the strategic and tactical levels of war. With this understanding the
command can develop processes and procedures for accomplishment of the command’s mission. Each
operational-level command is different and not all UJTL tasks identified for the operational level are applicable
for the command or the mission assigned to the command.
Each operational-level headquarters (e.g., maritime headquarters with maritime operations center (MHQ with
MOC)) utilizes the UJTL to clarify “what” the command will do by identifying a tailored list of UJTL tasks for
the command that together will result in successful accomplishment of the mission. For each tailored task the
reason “why” the task is required should be identified. This provides means to provide postanalysis and better
tailor tasks lists in the future. With an understanding of “what” and “why” tasks are necessary for the command to
accomplish, the command can then define processes and procedures that define “how” and “who” will be
executing the task. Critical in the development of these processes and procedures is identification of the inputs
from strategic-level tasks and other operational-level tasks and recipients of products (other operational-level
tasks or tactical level tasks) developed by the process/procedure.
The below diagrams provide for each functional area the tasks associated with each level of war. Information
contained in these diagrams was collected from Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information
System (JDEIS) on 22 September 2008. CJCSI 3500.02 series eliminates the written version of UJTL tasks in
CJCSM 3500.04 and directs that the online version of those UJTL tasks available in JDEIS is the only
authoritative source of UJTL tasks.
A-1
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
A.1 COMMAND AND CONTROL
Each level of war has a corresponding level of C2 with a distinct set of tasks. Figure A-1 lists the C2 tasks for the
levels of war.
Command and Control
Strategic
ƒ Operate and manage global communications
and information systems
ƒAssess worldwide and regional strategic
environment
ƒDetermine national military strategic direction
ƒProvide strategic direction to forces worldwide
ƒCoordinate worldw ide information operations
ƒProvide public affairs (PA) worldwide
ƒManage DOD resources
ƒOperate and manage theater command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence
environment
ƒAssess theater strategic environment
ƒDetermine strategic direction
ƒProvide strategic direction to theater forces
ƒConduct theater-wide information operations (IO)
ƒProvide public affairs in theater
Operational
Tactical
ƒAcquire and communicate operational level
information and maintain status
ƒAssess operational situation
ƒPrepare plans and orders
ƒCommand subordinate operational forces
ƒEstablish, organize, and operate a joint
force headquarters
ƒCoordinate operational information
operations (IO)
ƒCoordinate and integrate joint /
multinational and interagency support
ƒProvide public affairs in the joint operations
area
ƒEstablish, operate, and maintain
baseline information exchange
ƒConduct force link-up
ƒEmploy tactical information operations
ƒConduct civil administration
ƒConduct official ceremonial, musical,
public, and special events
Historical:
Reflects contents of :
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ujtl_demo/ujtlBrowse.jsp
on 23 Sep 2008
Figure A-1. C2 Tasks across the Levels of War
OCT 2008
A-2
NWP 3-32
A.2 FIRES
Each level of war has a corresponding level of fires with a distinct set of tasks. Figure A-2 lists the fires tasks for
the levels of war.
Employment of Forces
Strategic
Operational
ƒ Coordinate forward presence of forces in
theaters
ƒManage national firepower
ƒEmploy national strategic firepower
ƒProvide strategic forces and means
ƒProvide space capabilities
ƒConduct survivable mobile command center
(SMCC) operations and planning functions
ƒProvide forces
ƒProcess theater strategic targets
ƒAttack theater strategic targets/target systems
ƒCoordinate precision engagement counter
countermeasure operations
ƒCoordinate counterinsurgency operations
Tactical
ƒConduct joint force targeting
ƒAttack operational targets
ƒConduct peace operations in the joint
operations area
ƒConduct precision engagement counter
countermeasure operations
ƒConduct joint fires
ƒCoordinate battlespace maneuver
and integrate with firepower
ƒConduct detainee operations
Historical:
Reflects contents of :
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ujtl_demo/ujtlBrowse.jsp
on 23 Sep 2008
Figure A-2. Fires Tasks across the Levels of War
A-3
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
A.3 INTELLIGENCE
Each level of war has a corresponding level of intelligence with a distinct set of tasks. Figure A-3 lists the
intelligence tasks for the levels of war.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
Strategic
ƒ Plan and direct strategic intelligence activities
ƒCollect strategic information
ƒProcess and exploit collected strategic
information
ƒProduce strategic information
ƒDisseminate and integrate national strategic
intelligence
ƒEvaluate intelligence activities
ƒProvide personnel security
ƒManage theater strategic intelligence activities
ƒCollect theater strategic information
ƒProcess and exploit collected theater strategic
information
ƒAnalyze and produce theater strategic
intelligence and prepare intelligence products
ƒDisseminate and integrate theater strategic
intelligence
ƒEvaluate intelligence activities in theater
Operational
Tactical
ƒEstablish the joint force intelligence
enterprise
ƒConduct intelligence staff operations
ƒConduct joint intelligence support element
(JISE) operations
ƒConduct joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment (JIPOE)
ƒGain and maintain situational
understanding (SU)
ƒProvide intelligence support to plans
ƒProvide intelligence support to operations
ƒProvide intelligence support to fires
ƒDisseminate tactical warning
information and attack assessment
Historical:
Reflects contents of :
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ujtl_demo/ujtlBrowse.jsp
on 23 Sep 2008
Figure A-3. Intelligence Tasks across the Levels of War
OCT 2008
A-4
NWP 3-32
A.4 MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
Each level of war has a corresponding level of movement and maneuver with a distinct set of tasks. Figure A-4
lists the movement and maneuver tasks for the levels of war.
Deployment and Redeployment
Strategic
ƒ Determine transportation infrastructure
resources
ƒConduct deployment and redeployment
ƒConduct intratheater strategic deployment
ƒAssemble forces
ƒConduct theater strategic maneuver and force
positioning
ƒEnhance strategic mobility
ƒConduct strategic countermobility
ƒControl or dominate strategically significant
area(s)
Operational
Tactical
ƒConduct operational movement
ƒConduct operational maneuver and force
positioning
ƒProvide operational mobility
ƒProvide operational countermobility
ƒControl operationally significant areas
ƒConduct patient evacuation
ƒConduct passage of lines
ƒConduct countermine operations
ƒConduct mine operations
ƒOperate from afloat forward staging
base (AFSB)
Historical:
Reflects contents of :
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ujtl_demo/ujtlBrowse.jsp
on 23 Sep 2008
Figure A-4. Movement and Maneuver Tasks across the Levels of War
A-5
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
A.5 PROTECTION
Each level of war has a corresponding level of protection with a distinct set of tasks. Figure A-5 lists the
protection tasks for the levels of war.
Mobilization/Force Protection
Strategic
ƒ Prepare for mobilization
ƒAlert forces for mobilization
ƒMobilize at home station
ƒMove to mobilization station
ƒPrepare units and individuals at mobilization
station or continental United States (CONUS)
replacement center (CRC) for deployment
ƒMobilize CONUS sustaining base
ƒProvide command and control over mobilized
forces
ƒProvide theater aerospace and missile defense
ƒCoordinate protection for theater forces and
means
ƒSecure theater systems and capabilities
ƒConduct deception in support of theater strategy
and campaigns
ƒCoordinate defensive countermeasure
operations
ƒPerform mission assurance
Operational
Tactical
ƒProvide operational air, space, and missile
defense
ƒProvide protection for operational forces,
means, and noncombatants
ƒProtect systems and capabilities in the joint
operations area
ƒConduct military deception in support of
subordinate campaigns and major
operations
ƒProvide security for operational forces and
means
ƒConduct defensive countermeasure
operations
ƒConduct defense critical infrastructure
protection program
ƒProvide explosives ordnance disposal
(EOD) support
ƒExecute personnel recovery
operations
ƒConduct rear area security
ƒConduct noncombatant evacuation
ƒProvide for combat identification
ƒConduct defensive countermeasure
operations
ƒConduct counter improvised explosive
device (IED) operations
Historical:
Reflects contents of :
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ujtl_demo/ujtlBrowse.jsp
on 23 Sep 2008
Figure A-5. Protection Tasks across the Levels of War
OCT 2008
A-6
NWP 3-32
A.6 SUSTAINMENT
Each level of war has a corresponding level of sustainment with a distinct set of tasks. Figure A-6 lists the
sustainment tasks for the levels of war
Sustainment
Strategic
ƒProcure and distribute personnel
ƒProvide for base support and services
ƒProvide for personnel support
ƒReconstitute national forces and means
ƒSet sustainment priorities
ƒAcquire materiel
ƒAcquire, manage, and distribute funds
ƒCoordinate the Fixing and Maintaining of
Equipment
ƒCoordinate Support for Forces in Theater
ƒDirect theater distribution operations
ƒDevelop and maintain sustainment bases
ƒMinimize safety risks
Operational
Tactical
ƒCoordinate supply of arms, munitions, and
equipment in the joint operations area
ƒSynchronize supply of fuel in the joint
operations area
ƒProvide for maintenance of equipment in
the joint operations area
ƒCoordinate support of forces in the joint
operations area
ƒManage logistics support in the joint
operations area
ƒBuild and maintain sustainment bases in
the joint operations area
ƒProvide politico-military support to other
nations, groups and government agencies
ƒAcquire, manage and distribute funds
ƒProvide sustainment
ƒConduct joint logistics over-the-shore
operations (JLOTS)
Historical:
Reflects contents of :
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ujtl_demo/ujtlBrowse.jsp
on 23 Sep 2008
Figure A-6. Sustainment Tasks across the Levels of War
A-7
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
OCT 2008
A-8
NWP 3-32
REFERENCES
Admiral Ernest King’s CINCLANT Serial 053
ATP-1D, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures
CJCSI 3500.02 series
CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces
CJCSM 3122.01 JOPES Volume 1
CJCSM 3500.3A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States
CJCSM 3500.04
Globalization and Maritime Power
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operation
JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations
JP 2-0, Intelligence
JP 2-01 series
JP 3-0, Joint Operations
JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations
JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting
JP 3-61, Public Affairs
JP 4-0, Joint Logistics
JP 4-02, Health Service Support
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning
MTP-1(D), Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures
NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center
NWP 1-05, Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy
Reference-1
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
NWP 1-14M., The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
NWP 2-01, Intelligence Support to Operations Afloat
NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual
NWP 5-01, Navy Planning
OPNAVINST 3120.32 (series), Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM)
OPNAVINST 3501.316A
SECNAVINST 5430.57G, Mission and Functions of the Naval Inspector General
Secretary’s U.S. Code (USC) Title 10
The Quiet Warrior, 1974
United States Navy Regulations, 1913; Chapter 3, Section 1, Article 226
United States Pacific Fleet Central Force, Pearl Harbor, T. H., 25 October 1943
OCT 2008
Reference-2
NWP 3-32
GLOSSARY
administrative control (ADCON). Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations
in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and
equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization,
demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other
organizations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
area of operations (AO). An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime
forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander,
but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP
1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force
capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an
effect, or achieving an objective. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
attach. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. (JP
1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
battle rhythm. A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current
and future operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-33)
carrier strike group (CSG). The combining of Navy, naval, and perhaps other maritime capabilities that
provides the full range of operational capabilities for sustained maritime power projection and combat
survivability. The baseline organization consists of a carrier strike group command element/staff, a destroyer
squadron command element/staff, one aircraft carrier, one carrier air wing, five surface combatant ships, one
cruise missile land attack/undersea warfare submarine (SSN), one or two multi-product logistic support ship, and
one logistics helicopter detachment. (OPNAVINST 3501.316A)
close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the
supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement,
or other actions of the supported force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-31)
combatant command (command authority) (COCOM). Nontransferable command authority established
by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or
specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant
command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform
those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations,
joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command
(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this
authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component
commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ
commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
command and control (C2). The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed
Glossary-1
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment
of the mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational
authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command
authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR). An information requirement identified by the
commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force
information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
commander, Navy forces (COMNAVFOR). The senior Navy commander assigned to a joint task force
which does not have the navy component commander assigned to it. (NWP 3-32)
composite warfare commander (CWC). The officer in tactical command is normally the composite warfare
commander. However the composite warfare commander concept allows an officer in tactical command to
delegate tactical command to the composite warfare commander. The composite warfare commander wages
combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned; while
the officer in tactical command retains close control of power projection and strategic sea control operations. (JP
1-02. Source: JP 3-02)
coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions
or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or
more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between
the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement
cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a
consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is
more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
critical capability. A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is
essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
critical requirement. An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully
operational. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
critical vulnerability. An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect
attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
culminating point — The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations,
offense or defense. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)
decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that when acted upon, allows
commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 102. Source: JP 3-0)
direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate
to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.
Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement
of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination
relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
direct support (DS). A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer
directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-09.1)
OCT 2008
Glossary-2
NWP 3-32
expeditionary strike group (ESG). The combining of Navy, naval, and perhaps other maritime capabilities
that provides the organic air defense, expeditionary warfare capability, and strike capability required for operating
independently in low-to-medium threat environments. The baseline organization consists of a expeditionary strike
group command element (when required), one amphibious squadron command element/staff, three amphibious
ships, one Marine expeditionary unit or Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable), three surface
combatant ships, and one cruise missile land attack/undersea warfare submarine (SSN) (when required).
(OPNAVINST 3501.316A)
fires. The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 30)
fleet. An organization of ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities all under the command of
a commander who may exercise operational as well as administrative control. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
friendly force information requirement (FFIR). Information the commander and staff need to understand
the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
full command. The command authority which covers every aspect of military operations and administration
exists only within national services and, therefore, is always retained by national commanders. (NWP 3-32)
general support (GS). That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular
subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
joint force air component commander (JFACC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate
unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on
the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and
coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air
component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the
establishing commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
joint force commander (JFC). A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or
joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational
control over a joint force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
joint force land component commander (JFLCC). The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making
recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces;
planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The
joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks
assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making
recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime
forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as
may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
joint operations area (JOA). An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant
commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force
commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
joint task force (JTF). A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a
combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP
1)
Glossary-3
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
leverage. In the context of joint operation planning, a relative advantage in combat power and/or other
circumstances against the adversary across one or more domains (air, land, maritime, and space) and/or the
information environment sufficient to exploit that advantage. Leverage is an element of operational design. (JP 102. Source: JP 5-0)
line of operations (LOO). 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in
time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the
force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to
an objective(s). (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
logistics. Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military
operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,
evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition
or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 4-0)
made available. Forces assigned and/or attached to a joint force service or functional component commander.
(NWP 3-32)
major fleet. A principal, permanent subdivision of the operating forces of the Navy with certain supporting
shore activities. Presently there are two such fleets: the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet. See also fleet. (JP 102. Source: N/A)
Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The Marine Corps principal organization for all missions across the
range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding
rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)
are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground
combat element, and a combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not
formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine
Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the
organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB). A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around a reinforced
infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary
brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific
situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF),
or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a MEF.
The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the full range of military operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 318)
Marine expeditionary force (MEF). The largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the Marine
Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized
around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft
wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the
range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It
can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). A Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is constructed around an
infantry battalion reinforced, a helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combat service support
element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary
unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. (JP
1-02. Source: N/A)
maritime domain . The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these,
including the littorals. (JP 1-02 Source: JP 3-32)
OCT 2008
Glossary-4
NWP 3-32
maritime headquarters (MHQ). A naval headquarters at the operational level supporting operational and
administrative chains of command. (NWP 3-32)
maritime operations center (MOC). 1. The collective name for the boards, bureaus, cells, centers and
working groups that execute the maritime headquarters maritime operations functions. 2. A physical space in the
maritime headquarters that is principally used for the monitoring, assessing, planning and direction of current
operations. (NWP 3-32)
maritime superiority. That degree of dominance of one force over another that permits the conduct of
maritime operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32 CH 1)
measure of effectiveness (MOE). A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or
operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or
creation of an effect. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
measure of performance (MOP). A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
mission type order. An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-50)
mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks,
their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
numbered fleet. A major tactical unit of the Navy immediately subordinate to a major fleet command and
comprising various task forces, elements, groups, and units for the purpose of prosecuting specific naval
operations. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
officer in tactical command (OTC). In maritime usage, the senior officer present eligible to assume
command, or the officer to whom the senior officer has delegated tactical command. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
operational art. The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill,
knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ
military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 30)
operational command (OPCOM). A command authority granted to an allied/multinational maritime
commander by a national commander with full command to assign missions or tasks to subordinated
commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command or
tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not in itself include administrative command or logistical
responsibility. (NWP 3-32)
operational control (OPCON). 1. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at
or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command
authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those
functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training
necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force
commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full
authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction
for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
Glossary-5
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
2. A command authority granted to an allied/multinational maritime commander by a national commander with
full command or an allied/multinational maritime commander with operational command to direct forces assigned
so that the commander can accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or
location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical command and/or control of those units. It does
not include the authority to assign separate employment of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include
administrative command or logistic responsibility. Subordinate to operational command. (NWP 3-32)
operational design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major
operation plan and its subsequent execution. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
operational intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major
operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)
operational level of war (OLW). The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned,
conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at
this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives,
sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about
and sustain these events. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
operational reach. The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
personnel services. Those sustainment functions provided to personnel. Personnel services complement
logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel so that the joint force
commander may be optimally prepared to accomplish the mission. (NWP 3-32)
priority intelligence requirement (PIR). An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence
support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. (JP 1-02.
Source: JP 5-0)
protection: Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary
personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the
boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
risk tolerance. As specified by the commander, the risk to which friendly forces may be subjected from the
effects of adversary action(s); acceptable degrees of risk under differing tactical conditions are high, moderate,
and negligible. (NWP 3-32)
sea denial. Prevention of the use of the sea by the enemy. Implies sufficient force is not available to ensure the
use by one’s own forces, but force is available to deny use to the enemy. (NWP 5-01)
situational awareness. Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes timely,
relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy, and other operations within the battlespace in order to
facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspective and skill that foster an ability to determine quickly the
context and relevance of events that are unfolding. (NTTP 3-02.3M)
strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines
national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses
national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military
objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of
national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces
and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
OCT 2008
Glossary-6
NWP 3-32
support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a
directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists,
protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)
supported commander. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives
assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the
supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
supporting commander. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids,
protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the
assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
surface strike group (SSG). The combining of Navy, and perhaps other maritime capabilities that provides
combat effectiveness by providing fire support to allies and joint forces ashore in support to crisis response
missions or sustained missions and may be employed in limited non-permissive environments characterized by
multiple threats. The baseline organization consists of three surface ships based on mission and availability of
assets. (OPNAVINST 3501.316A)
tactical command (TACOM). It is a command authority granted to an allied/multinational maritime
commander by an allied/multinational maritime commander with either OPCOM or OPCON. TACOM is
authority delegated to an Allied/multinational commander to assign subordinate forces for the accomplishment of
the mission assigned by higher authority. It involves the responsibility for the conduct of the tasks pertaining to
the mission(s), i.e., issuing detailed orders and ensuring their correct execution. It also involves responsibility for
the general safety of attached units, although ultimate responsibility remains with the commander Officers.
Tactical command of units temporarily attached does not include the authority to give them tasks inconsistent
with the mission previously allocated to them. (ATP 1/MTP 1)
tactical control (TACON). Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military
capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements
or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is
inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the
level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the
application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. (JP 1-02, Source:
JP 1)
tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve
military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat
objectives. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
task element (TE). A component of a naval task unit organized by the commander of a task unit or higher
authority. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
task force (TF). A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a
specific operation or mission. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
task group (TG). A component of a naval task force organized by the commander of a task force or higher
authority. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
task unit (TU). A component of a naval task group organized by the commander of a task group or higher
authority. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
theater of operations (TO). An operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the
conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of operations normally will be geographically
Glossary-7
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
separate and focused on different missions. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for
operations in depth and over extended periods of time. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
time horizon. The specified period established by the commander to focus current operations, future operations
and future plans activities for a given operational task. (NWP 3-32)
unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02. Source: N/A)
Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). A menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions
and standards, i.e., the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission.
Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission
essential task list. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-33)
OCT 2008
Glossary-8
NWP 3-32
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AADC
area air defense commander
ACA
airspace control authority
ACE
aviation combat element
ACP
Allied communication publication
AD
air defense
ADCON
administrative control
AO
area of operations
AOR
area of responsibility
ASW
antisubmarine warfare
B2C2WG
boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups
C/JFMCC
combined/joint force maritime component commander
C/JTF
combined/joint task force
C2
command and control
CACO
casualty assistance calls officer
CAP
crisis action planning
CATF
commander, amphibious task force
CBRNE
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CC
critical capability
CCDR
combatant commander
CCIR
commander’s critical information requirement
CE
command element
CENTRIXS
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CF
critical factor
CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
LOAA-1
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
CJTF
Commander, joint task force
CLF
commander, landing force
CMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMO
civil-military operations
CNO
Chief of Naval Operations
COA
course of action
COCOM
combatant command (command authority)
COG
center of gravity
COMNAVFOR
commander, Navy forces
CONOPS
concept of operations
CONPLAN
concept plan
COP
common operational picture
COS
chief of staff
CR
critical requirement
CS
civil support
CSG
carrier strike group
CTF
commander, task force
CV
critical vulnerability
CWC
composite warfare commander
D3A
decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DCOS
deputy chief of staff
DIME
diplomatic, information, military, and economic
DIRLAUTH
direct liaison authorized
DOD
Department of Defense
DON
Department of the Navy
DP
decisive point
EEZ
exclusive economic zone
ESG
expeditionary strike group
OCT 2008
LOAA-2
NWP 3-32
FFIR
friendly force information requirement
FHA
foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP
force health protection
FRAGORD
fragmentary order
GCC
geographic combatant commander
GCE
ground combat element
GFMIG
Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
HNS
host-nation support
HSS
health service support
IGO
intergovernmental organization
IM
information management
IO
information operations
IPOE
intelligence preparation of the operational environment
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JDEIS
Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System
JFACC
joint force air component commander
JFC
joint force commander
JFLCC
joint force land component commander
JFMCC
joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC
joint force special operations component commander
JNCC
joint network operations control center
JOA
joint operations area
JOPES
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP
joint publication
JTF
joint task force
JWICS
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
KMO
knowledge management officer
LCE
logistics combat element
LOAA-3
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
LOC
line of communications
LOO
line of operations
MAGTF
Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR
Marine forces
MARFORCOM
Marine Corps Forces Command
MARFORPAC
Marine Forces, Pacific
MCC
Marine component commander
MCDP
Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MEB
Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF
Marine expeditionary force
MEU
Marine expeditionary unit
MHQ
maritime headquarters
MOC
maritime operations center
MOE
measure of effectiveness
MOP
measure of performance
MWR
morale, welfare, and recreation
NAVFOR
Navy forces
NAVNETWARCOM
Naval Network Warfare Command
NCC
Navy component commander
NEO
noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO
nongovernmental organization
NIPRNET
Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
NLC
Navy logistics command; Navy logistics coordinator
NPP
Navy planning process
NSFS
naval surface fire support
NWP
Navy warfare publication
OA
operational area
OGA
other government agency
OCT 2008
LOAA-4
NWP 3-32
OLC
operational level of command
OPCOM
operational command
OPCON
operational control
OPGEN
operation general matter
OPLAN
operation plan
OPORD
operation order
OPSEC
operations security
OPTASK
operation task
OTC
officer in tactical command
PA
personnel accountability
PAO
public affairs officer
PCR
personnel casualty report
PIR
priority intelligence requirement
PMESII
political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PO
peace operations
POLAD
political advisor
PR
personnel recovery
RC
reserve component
RFI
request for information
ROE
rules of engagement
RUF
rules for the use of force
SA
situational awareness
SAP
special access program
SCC
Service component commander
SecDef
Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE
Secretary of State
SIPRNET
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA
staff judge advocate
LOAA-5
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
SLOC
sea line of communications
SNDL
standard Navy distribution list
SOP
standard operating procedure
SORM
standard organization and regulation manual
SPMAGTF
special purpose Marine air-ground task force
SPOD
seaport of debarkation
SSG
surface strike group
STW
strike warfare
SUPSIT
support situation
SUW
surface warfare
TACOM
tactical command
TACON
tactical control
TE
task element
TF
task force
TG
task group
TPFDD
time-phased force and deployment data
TSCP
theater security cooperation plan
TST
time-sensitive target
TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
TU
task unit
UCP
Unified Command Plan
UJTL
Universal Joint Task List
UN
United Nations
UNCLOS
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US
United States
USC
United States Code
USFF
United States Fleet Forces
USJFCOM
United States Joint Forces Command
OCT 2008
LOAA-6
NWP 3-32
USPACOM
United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM
United States Special Operations Command
WARNORD
warning order
LOAA-7
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
OCT 2008
LOAA-8
NWP 3-32
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Effective Pages
Page Numbers
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1 thru 16
EX-1, EX-2
1-1 thru 1-8
2-1 thru 2-8
3-1 thru 3-8
4-1 thru 4-26
5-1 thru 5-18
6-1 thru 6-20
7-1 thru 7-28
A-1 thru A-8
Reference-1, Reference-2
Glossary-1 thru Glossary-8
LOAA-1 thru LOAA-8
LEP-1, LEP-2
LEP-1
OCT 2008
NWP 3-32
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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LEP-2
NWP 3-32
OCT 2008