Awami League along with six others. On January 23, Ghulam Rasul, Vice-President of the Sibi
District (Baluchistan) Branch of the PPP also joined it. In addition Mujib was successful in
securing the support of at least 30 to 35 newly elected members of the National Assembly of
Sind, North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.
Negotiations with Mujib to share power
From January 12, 1971 to January 30, Bhutto and Yahya Khan met Mujib several times to
frustrate the implementation of the Six-Points programme and to convince Mujib to share power
with Pakistan People's Party leader Bhutto. Yahya reached Dhaka on January 10 and had
meetings with Mujib on the 12 and 13. On January 13 Mujib tried to impress upon Yahya the
urgency of convening the National Assembly.
Yahya expressed concern as to whether the Six-Points, programme would be acceptable to
Bhutto and other West Pakistani Leaders.Mujib assured Yahya that his Six-Points programme
would be supported by the smaller provinces of Pakistan and the future constitution would be
such that it would keep Pakistan united. Prior to his departure for Karachi on the 14, Yahya
stated that Sheikh Mujib was going to be the future Prime Minister of Pakistan and that the
National Assembly would be convened soon.
On January 16 Yahya went to Larkana for talks with Bhutto. Bhutto had in the meantime
strengthened his position by securing the support of Punjabi generals like Hamid, Umar, Tikka
Khan and Pirzada. Bhutto informed Yahya that he was the leader of the whole of West Pakistan
and would never accept a position under Sheikh Mujib in the administration of the country. He
however agreed to meet Mujib in an effort to settle the impasse.
Bhutto arrived in Dhaka on January 27 and left on the 30th. During the course of his meetings
with Mujib he stated that taking both the Six-Points program and the 11-Points program of the
student community, 12 of those 17 points were acceptable to him and 5 points of the Six-Points
were not. Of the 12 points only one of the six points in the Six-Points program that being point
No. 1 was acceptable and that too if it implied a genuine federation. The five points which were
not acceptable were matters relating to the transfer of provincial and central subjects, currencies,
taxation, foreign trade and development of a militia or paramilitary force in East Pakistan. Bhutto
thus excluded the five points which dealt with provincial autonomy and a constitution on the
basis of Six-Points programme. Bhutto noted that legally speaking Awami League with its
absolute majority was in a position to frame a constitution. But he continued, since, "our
geographical, position is peculiar, the majority adopting the constitution should include a
consensus." Bhutto, like Yahya said he needed time to discuss the matter with other leaders of
West Pakistan. However neither Yahya nor Bhutto suggested any amendment to the Six-Points
programme nor gave any alternative proposal.
On February 13, Yahya Khan announced that the National Assembly will meet on March 3, in
the Provincial Assembly building in Dhaka to frame a constitution for the country, The
constitution drafting committee of the Awami League was asked to finalize the draft constitution.
But on February 15, Bhutto threatened to boycott the session of the National Assembly unless it
was made clear that there would be some amount of reciprocity from the majority party i.e. the
Awami League. He said," We can't go there only to endorse the constitution already prepared by
a party and to return humiliated."% Bhutto said that his party had accepted the first and the last
points of the Awami League's Six-Points ie. those relating to the basis of representation and the
existence of people's militia in the provinces, but he neither could neither accept a "two-subject
Centre" nor the point relating to currency. "I am not without hope about foreign trade and
taxation" he added. He also stated that his party had also accepted 10 out of the 11 points of the
students. It would not accept the points which said that there should be a sub-federation in the
West Wing, He went on to say that a constitution based on the Six-Points could not provide a
"viable future for the country." He said dictation or imposition of a constitution on West Pakistan
would not be accepted. When informed that leaders of other parties of West Pakistan would
attend the National Assembly session, Bhutto said they might go, but they would also need to
return.
While negotiation was going on between Bhutto and Mujib an incident centering around a
hijacking of a plane gave Bhutto a carte blanche to turn the table on Mujib. On January 30, 1971
an Indian plane hijacked by two Kashmiri youths belonging to the Kashmir National Liberation
Front landed at Lahore. Bhutto praised the hijackers and proclaimed them national heroes. This,
and blowing up of the Indian plane created tension between India and Pakistan. As a
consequence, India banned the flight of all Pakistani planes over its territory. Tension reached a
new height when Pakistan refused to hand over the hijackers to India. Mujib sensed an ulterior
motive behind Pakistan's response to the hijacked plane. He felt that the incident was being used
to create a political situation that would give Bhutto and others, excuse to prevent the peaceful
transfer of power to Awami League. In a statement on February 3, 1971 Sheikh Mujib said,
"People should be fully alert to resist all attempts by the vested interests to exploit this
occurrence in order to create abnormal conditions with the ulterior purpose of sabotaging
peaceful transfer of power to the people."
Mujib's apprehension turned out to be true. In February 1971, Yahya taking advantage of the
growing tension between India and Pakistan began massive deployment of troops and military
hardware in East Pakistan. On February 17 Dhaka airport was fortified with antiaircraft guns. A
few days later a ship loaded with arms and ammunition left Karachi for Chittagong. The civilian
council of Ministers of Pakistan was dissolved on February 23. By the end of February, almost
all the district headquarters in East Pakistan had military garrisons. Dhaka and Chittagong were
fortified and restrictions were imposed at the airport, sea port, jetties and cantonments.? Next
Yahya Khan in an attempt to discredit and vilify Sheikh Mujib appointed a judicial commission
to enquire into the hijacking incident. Such an inquiry demanded earlier by Mulib was turned
down. The commission reported that the hijacking of the plane was arranged by India itself and
that Awami League was conspiring with India to separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan.
On February 24 Sheikh Mujib issued a statement to the press in which he accused that, "An
artificial crisis is being deliberately fabricated in order to sabotage the making of a constitution
by the elected representatives of the people and the transfer of power to them." At a gathering on
February 28, Bhutto gave three alternatives to resolve the deadlock. One was to dissolve the
National Assembly. That would mean the continuance of the Martial Law indefinitely, a
situation he pointed out would not be acceptable to any party. The second was the postponement
of the Assembly session scheduled to be held on March 3. The postponement would give him
time to discuss the constitutional issues with the Awami League and he would then readily go to
East Pakistan. The third was the removal of the time limit of 120 days for framing the
constitution. Bhutto said this would give his party time to debate the constitutional issues. If that
was done Bhutto said he would rush to Dhaka the next day. Thus Bhutto was willing to attend
the National Assembly session if the date of the session was postponed or the time limit of 120
days was removed. If either was not accepted, Bhutto said it would mean the end of democracy
in Pakistan. He threatened that if the session of the National Assembly was not postponed his
party, the PPP would organise a hartal (total shut down of economic activities and transportation)
from Khyber Pass to Karachi. Any member of the National Assembly from West Pakistan who
was willing to go to East Pakistan to attend the session of the National Assembly would, he
threatened, be liquidated.
Yahya Khan Postpones the National Assembly Session
On March 1, 1971 President Yahya Khan announced the postponement of the date for the first
session of the rewly elected National Assembly. In his statement he gave three reasons. One, the
major political parties - the PPP and the Awami League could not arrive at a consensus.
Secondly, the Pakistan People's Party, as well as certain other political parties had declared their
intention not to attend the National Assembly session on March 3. Thirdly, the tension created by
India over the hijacking of the plane had further complicated the whole situation. Yahya stated,
"a constitution is not an ordinary piece of legislation ... It was therefore, imperative to give more
time to the political leaders to arrive at a reasonable understanding on the issue of constitution
making."
Reaction in East Pakistan to the postponement of the session of the National Assembly sine die
and Mujib's call for non-violent and non-cooperation movement
Following Yahya Khan's announcement on March 1 to postpone the National Assembly,
spontaneous outbursts of protests took place all over the country. People poured out onto the
streets, burnt the national flag of Pakistan, and demanded the independence of Bangladesh.
Sheikh Mujib, who was at the time of Yahya's announcement, at a meeting of the Awami League
Parliamentary Party met the press and declared that a united fight had to be put up to end the
colonial treatment to which the Bengalis had been subjected to for the last 23 years. He said
"only for the sake of a minority party's disagreement the democratic process of constitution
making has been obstructed and the National Assembly session has been postponed sine die.
This is most unfortunate as far as we are concerned. We are the representatives of the majority
people and we cannot allow it to go unchallenged." However Mujib at this stage was not
prepared to declare Bangladesh independent. He announced a programme for the next six days.
That included a complete hartal on March 1, in Dhaka, country-wide hartal on March 3 and a
public meeting on March 7.
Next day on March 2, a rally was held in the compound of the Faculty of Arts, University of
Dhaka under the leadership of A. S. M. A. Rab and Shalijahan Siraj. A resolution was passed for
independence of Bangladesh and the flag of independent Bangladesh was hoisted, On that day,
near the Farm Gate police opened fire and killed two or three students. Firing later took place in
Chittagong and other places as well. Mujib in a Press statement declared "... firing upon unarmed
masses amounts to genocide and is a crime against humanity." In the lengthy statement he said,
"In the circumstances, there is no justification for the continuation of Martial Law or military
rule a single day. I therefore, urge the immediate withdrawal of Martial Law, an immediate end
to the confrontation and the removal of obstacles to the exercise by the people's representatives
of the power that is rightfully theirs." Mujib declared that province wide hartal was to be
observed from March 3 to March 6, from 6 am to 2 pm in all spheres including government
offices secretariat and High Court. March 3, the day of the commencement of the session of the
National Assembly, was to be observed as a day of national mourning. On March 7 Mujib would
address a rally at the Race Course Maidan, when further programmes would be announced. He
concluded by saying, "I would urge our people to continue with our common struggle in a
peaceful and disciplined manner, I would remind them that any breach of discipline would be
against the interest of our movement and will serve the interest of agent provocateurs and the
anti-people forces." He said that it should be remembered that everyone living in Bangladesh, no
matter where he originated from or what language he spoke was, "for us a Bengali and their
person, property and honour are our sacred trust and those must be protected." Mujib thus gave a
call for non-violent, and non-co-operation movement. The response to this call was beyond the
expectations of everyone. All government employees, including the judges of the High Court
abstained from work.
On March 3, a massive public meeting was organized by the student’s league. At the meeting
Mujeeb urged the authorities to withdraw the army from the city and hand over power to the
elected representatives of the people. Sensing the situation was going out of control Yahya came
on March 3, called an old party conference in Dhaka to be held on March 10. Sheikh Mujeeb
rejected the invitation as a cruel joke and an invitation given at gunpoint he declared in the wake
of white spread killing of the unarmed civilian population with the military buildup, continuing
with harsh language of what weapons still ringing in our ears the invitation to such a conference
is in effect being made at gun point. The stern mood of the people in general and the refusal of
other political leaders to attend, led to the cancellation of the conference called by Yahya Khan.
On March 6, Yahya in an attempt to appease the butt Bengalis, issued a statement, announcing
March 25, 1971, as the rescheduled date for the meeting of the National Assembly.
According to politicians and historians, the escalating events tom March 1 onwards led to the
creation of tremendous political pressure on Mujib to declare the independence of Bangladesh
and to cut off all links with West Pakistan. Army officers and the civilian population all gathered
around Sheikh Mujib and declared their support. So did the leaders of other political parties. The
student body formed the Swadhin Bangladesh Kendrio Chattra Sungrom Parished (Central
Students Action Committee of Independent Bangladesh). Moulana Bhashani was also in favour
of declaration of independences Henceforth all Bengalis irrespective of party affiliation
unequivocally gave solemn pledge to struggle for their just cause under the leadership of Sheikh
Mujib. Mujb, became the undisputed supreme leader of the Bengali people:
Sheikh Mujib, a man who believed in non-violence and constitutional means had two options
before him. One was to declare independence. That he feared would lead to heavy bloodshed.
Second was to settle the whole issue through negotiations. On March 7, after a two-day closeddoor meeting of the Working Committee of the Awami League a statement was issued by Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman. In it he suggested a seven-point formula for immediate adoption if the
President sincerely desired that the National Assembly, as the sovereign body of the elected
representative of the people should function. The points were:
1. Immediate withdrawal of Martial Law.
2. Transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.
3. Immediate withdrawal of all military personnel to the barracks.
4. Immediate cessation of the military build-up and the heavy inflow of military personnel
from the Western Wing.
5. Immediate cessation of firing upon civilians so that not a single bullet is fired with
immediate effect.
6. Non-interference by the military authorities in the different branches of the Government
in Bangladesh and direction to desist from victimisation of Government officers and
employees.
7. Maintenance of law and order to be left exclusively to the police and Bengali EPR,
assisted, wherever necessary, by Awami League volunteers.
The same day on March 7, 1971 at the Ramna Race Course Maidan (Now Suhrawardy Uddhan)
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman addressed a mammoth public meeting. He said it is a tragedy that,
"today the streets of Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi, and Rangpur are smeared red with the
blood of our brothers. Today the people of Bangla want freedom, today the people of Bangla
want to live, today the people of Bangla want their rights. What wrong have we done. We
wanted the National Assembly to sit, we wanted democracy to work, we wanted the people of
this country to have economic, political and cultural emancipation." Mujib, continued he would
not attend any Round Table conference. He would consider participating in the National
Assembly session only if his four-point demands were accepted. The demands were:
1. Withdrawal of Martial Law.
2. Sending the troops back to the barracks.
3. Inquiry into the killings and
4. Transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.
Sheikh Mujib went on to state that he did not want to become the Prime Minister. He wanted to
secure the rights of the people of East Pakistan. To the people of East Pakistan he gave the
following directives.
1. The secretariat, goverment and semi-government offices, Supreme Court, High Court,
District Courts and WAPDA would be closed sine die. Appropriate exemptions would be
announced from time to time.
2. All educational institutions would be closed sine die.
3. Till East Pakistan was free, payment of all taxes would be stopped.
4. Radio, television and newspapers were to cover complete versions of statements and
should not suppress news about the people's movements, otherwise Bengalis working in
those establishments should not co-operate.
5. Only local and inter-district telegraph and telephone communication would function in
East Pakistan.
6. Railway and ports would function, but railway workers and port workers should not cooperate if railways or ports were used for the mobilization of forces for the purpose of
carrying out repression against the people.
7. Rickshaws and bullock carts would remain outside the purview of hartal.
8. Banks should not affect remittances to West Pakistan. To enable the people to draw their
salary banks would remain open for two hours every day.
9. Factory workers who had participated in the hartal should be given their salary by their
employers.
10. To help those who were wounded or the families of those who had died people were
asked, to donate, whatever little they could to the relief committee.
11. A Sangram Parishad (Council of Action) should be organised in each union, mahallah,
thana, sub-division and district under the leadership of the local Awami League units.
In his long address Sheikh Mujib called the people to convert every home into a fort and to
confront the enemy with whatever they had, if power was not transferred to the elected
representatives of the people. He made it clear that the struggle for freedom and independence
should continue even it, the people did not find him in their midst. He concluded by saying,
"remember when we have giver blood, we shall give more. Inshah Allah, I will liberate the
people of this country (East Pakistan) our movement this time is for emancipation. Our
movement this time is for freedom. Joy Bangla,"* Yahya Khan understood that the mood of the
people was changing very fast and things were not going his way. On March 9, he announced
that he would be going to Dhaka to settle the political crisis which however did not take place till
March 15.
Yahya Khan makes preparations for a military crack down
While the political movement in East Pakistan was gaining momentum by leaps and bounds
every day from March 1, Yahya Khan on his part was making preparations for a military
crackdown on the people of East Pakistan. The general election results had prompted the ruling
Punjabi junta to take measures to protect their narrow selfish interests. As noted earlier, soon
after the results were out, troops in civilian clothes were flown into East Pakistan. Two weeks
prior to March 1, the airport was put under heavy armed guard. The 9th and 16th divisions as
well as two brigades of the Pakistan Army were flown into East Pakistan. From March 2 DhakaKarachi flights were stopped for civilians. On the other hand there were 11 to 15 flights a day for
transportation of troops. Families of senor army officers and big businessmen were gradually
evacuated on those flights. Bengali pilots were grounded and 1400 Bengali employees lost their
jobs. Mujib was informed that the banks, all of which except for two small banks which had their
head offices in West Pakistan had transferred two-third of their current deposit which amounted
to rupees 1 billion to West Pakistan. He was further told that the army was quietly distributing
arms in different non-Bengali areas of East Paskistan. In Dhaka arms were distributed in Mirpur
and Mohammadpur, in Chittagong, in Pahartali, in Rangpur, and in Syedpur. After the
annoucement of March 1, Governor S. M. Ahsan was replaced by General Yakub Khan.
However, "Yakub Khan thought that the course of events was leading toward military
intervention, which in his opinion, would have to be disastrous consequences, and he submitted
his resignation on March 5." Yahya Khan either decided or was forced to appoint hard line
generals to handle the deteriorating situation. Lieutenant General Tikka Khan known as the
Butcher of Balüchistan, and one of the most ruthless officers in the Pakistan army was appointed
as Governor and Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan. Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah
Khan Niazi was appointed Commander Eastern Command. Earlier, in the last week of February
Yahya dismissed his cabinet to tighten the hold of the army over the administration. The only
two retained as advisers were Cornelius and Choudhury. To reinforce the Eastern Command men
and materials were rushed in. In February the army's contingency plan, in case of military action
and suspension of political activities, called “Operation Blitz,” was updated and cleared with HQ
CMLA i.e. Chief Martial Law Administrator and communicated to all the formation
commanders, to By mid-March the operation plans for the internal security of. East Pakistan
were quickly revised. A new plan called “Operation Searchlight" was brought into force.
According to it "the Awami League had widespread support even amongst the E. P. (East
Pakistan) elements in the Army." The operation, therefore, "has to be with great cunningness,
surprise, deception, and speed combined with shock action," By the time Yahya decided to go to
Dhaka in mid-March. to hold political negotiations, the army had reached an advanced stage of
preparation to regain control of East Pakistan if called upon to do so.
Reaction in the army in East Pakistan.
The political developments in the country did not go unnoticed by the army personnel and police
force in East Pakistan. There was about one and a half division of the Pakistan army in East
Pakistan on March 1 when the postponement of the session of the National Assembly was
announced. Of this total about four and a half battalions were of the East Bengal Regiment
(EBR). The EBR was mainly manned by Bengali officers and jawans. The four battalions were
located in Jessore, Joydevpur, Rangpur and Comilla. In Chittagong there was half a battalion. It
is estimated that the total strength of EBR was 4,000. The number of troops from Wast Pakistan
on the other hand was about 28,000 to 29,000. The East Pakistan Rifles (EPR was composed
mainly of Bengalis. Its number was about 15,000. There were about 40,000 Bengalis in the
police force.
The Bengalis in the EBR and EPR fully supported Awami League's demand for autonomy. From
middle of February it became clear to them, that the intention of the ruling junta was not benign.
The Bengali jawans and the soldiers were restless. Some of the mid-level officers of the EBR
and EPR together with Group Captain A. K. Khandker of the Pakistan Air Force, informed
Mujib of the developments and their concern. Mujib asked them to meet Colonel (Rtd.) Ataul
Ghani Osmany who was at that time elected as a member of the National Assembly and was the
security advisor to Sheikh Mujib. It is believed that Colonel Osmany was not in favour of an
armed confrontation at that stage. A decision was taken that if the West Pakistan army attacked,
the EBR and EPR would then take defensive measures,
The final negotiations and genocide
Yahya Khan reached Dhaka on March 15, and negotiations between him and Sheikh Mujib
began on March 16. The advisors of Mujib and Yahya met on March 19. On March 21 Bhutto
flew to Dhaka.
The other leaders of West Pakistan also reached Dhaka by the 23. The negotiations which lasted
from March 16 to 24 centered mainly around the mode of transfer of power to the elected
representatives and modalities of making an interim arrangement to facilitate the transfer of
power.
On March 16, Yahya offered that Mujib should form a coalition government with Bhutto. This
however did not work out. On March 17 and 18 the aides of Yahya held that till the constitution
was framed the legislative powers of the national and provincial assemblies should remain as
under the 1962 Constitution. They also stressed that the transfer of power should be made under
a Martial Law Regulation.
Awami League opposed both. On March 19 Yahya however after meeting Mujib, agreed to lift
the Martial Law and transfer power under a proclamation. It was also agreed that based on the
Six-Points, East Pakistan would retain sufficient legislative powers. However the draft
proclamation prepared by the President's aid after Mujib-Yahya meeting of March 21
disappointed the Awami League leaders. As far as the powers of the President was concerned
and as far as the powers and functions of the central and provincial legislatures were concerned
they were the same as under the 1962 Constitution. Moreover the working paper took East
Pakistan almost back to the position of 1956. It read, "The central legislature shall have exclusive
power to make laws in relation to matters referred to in the Third Schedule to the late
Constitution (1962) subject to certain limitations and modifications to be agreed upon with
respect to the province of East Pakistan"
Bhutto arrived in Dhaka on March 21 and on March 22 Mujib, Yahya and Bhutto had a tripartite
meeting. Bhutto made it clear that:
1. No constitution would be accepted without the approval of the PPP.
2. He demanded that West Pakistan should be considered as one unit both
for the transfer of power and constitution making. This would have made him the leaders of
West Pakistan as well as prevent Mujib from getting support from other provinces of West
Pakistan for framing any constitution based on the Six-Points programme. Mujib, to end the
impasse agreed to split the National Assembly between the two wings of Pakistan, thus giving
Bhutto his leadership over West Pakistan. To Mujib the split of the National Assembly was of no
significance, as being the leader of the majority party he had the right to frame the constitution
whenever it sat as a single body. He however wanted constitutional guarantee of adequate
autonomy. In this meeting it was also decided to postpone the National Assembly session which
was due to be held on March 25. After the meeting Bhutto is said to have said that the meeting
was "fruitful and satisfactory" and the public was given the impression that a settlement was in
the offing, I Discussion between the aides of Yahya and Mujib continued through March 23 and
24. On March 23, 1971 the Awami League submitted a draft proclamation for the interim period.
The draft covered the legislative powers of East Pakistan and granted it autonomy on the basis of
Six-Points. It was also stated that Martial Law should stand revoked from the date the provincial
governors took oath of office or at the expiry of seven days from the date of the proclamation.
The draft was not accepted by the President and his aides. It was pointed out that Awami League
draft proclamation aimed at the creation of a confederation of two independent states as it had
split the National Assembly of Pakistan into National Assemblies of West Pakistan and East
Pakistan, which it was pointed out, was in conflict with the Legal Framework Order and the SixPoints of Awami League. Bhutto was opposed to giving East Pakistan any additional autonomy
during the interim period, and to the exclusion made in the Draft Proclamation of foreign aid and
foreign trade from the federal list. He was also against the lifting of the Martial Law as he felt
that then it would be difficult to prevent East Pakistan from declaring independence.
On March 24 the aides of Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujib met for the last time. The discussion
centred on the question of autonomy to be granted to East Pakistan. However as events were to
show the whole exercise was an eye-wash to buy time. While the negotiations were going on,
preparations for a military crack-down that were going on in full swing, reached the final stage.
Peerzada said, "During the hectic period of March 15 to 25 March Yahya was not only holding
political negotiations, in between he was visiting army installations and meeting army officers in
the cantonment. Like other times after every visit ... he came back with a more aggressive
attitude towards political settlement and with an over-simplified view of the army's capability to
control affairs. He was heavily influenced by the top brass that he need not or should not concede
too much to the politicians." After the meeting on 24 March, the West Pakistani officials who
were in Dhaka for talks were asked to leave the next day. On March 25 Peerzada the head of
CMLA HQ and Yahya left, apparently for a party. Everything in the President's House was kept
in place as if the President was staying. At about 11 or 11.30 p.m. a lieutenant-colonel entered
and took over the President House premises and is said to have said that the army action would
start at 12 mid-night.At about 10.30 p.m. the army took over the radio and television stations.
Full scale army assault on unarmed civilians was launched around 11.30 p.m. and the savage
episode of genocide was unleashed by the Punjabi military junta.
Awami League taken by surprise
On the evening of March 25 Sheikh Mujib was informed that Yahya Khan had left Dhaka. The
Awami League leaders were taken by surprise as there was no breakdown in their talks with
Yahya, neither did Yahya and his team issue any ultimatum to the Awami League. The East
Pakistani leaders were waiting for the final drafting session of the proclamation on March 25
which never took place. Instead a reign of terror was unleashed. On hearing that the army was
making preparations for a crackdown and that Yahya Khan had left Dhaka,.
Sheikh Mujib asked the Awami League leaders and political workers to go underground. General
M. A. G. Osmany wrote that before he left Sheikh Mujib that evening on the 25, Mujib had told
him that he had made arrangements for the declaration of independence of Bangladesh. Although
Mujib had asked others to take cover he however stayed on in his house. He showed great
courage and strong determination by staying in his own house in Dhanmondi Rd 32, unarmed
and unprotected. The supreme leader of the people proved once again the great qualities of his
historic leadership. The captain of the ship decided to stay on board, come what may. 99 per cent
people of East Pakistan stayed with their great leader and faced the barbaric genocide which
began on the night of March 25, 1971. On March 26, M. A. Hannan, the General Secretary of the
District Awami League declared the independence of Bangladesh in the name of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman via the transmitting station in Kalurghat.
The Liberation War, Mujibnagar Government and birth of Bangladesh
The terrible news of Pakistan army's barbaric onslaught on the night of March 25, and two days
of savage genocide perpetrated on men and women spread like wild fire all over East Pakistan.
The diabolical Punjabi Generals let loose their marauding troops with tanks and machine guns on
peaceful and unarmed Bengalis. Instantaneous popular resistance sprang up in every nook and
corner of Bangladesh. Every Bangladeshi home became a veritable fortress and every
Bangladeshi - man and woman irrespective of party affiliations solidly stood as one. However,
there were very small and marginal political groups which collaborated with the Pakistani
occupation army. The people fought back with whatever weapons they had at their disposal. It
was a historic war for democracy and freedom. It was a war for survival with faith and dignity
for the people of Bangladesh. It was the war of liberation.
East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), the paramilitary force and the police and the ansars, the law
enforcing agencies, were the first to open camps in their respective areas of control and to resist
the Pakistani army. There were several battalions of East Bengal Regiment (EBR) stationed in •
Bangladesh at that time. All those battalions transferred their loyalty to Bangladesh but in a
rather uncoordinated way. Major Ziaur Rahman a senior officer in the EBR battalion stationed in
Chittagong played a major role during the liberation war in Chittagong.
Ziaur Rahman
Ziaur Rahman (later President of Bangladesh and the founder of the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party, BNP) was born on January 19, 1936 at Bagbari in Bogra district. His father Mohammad
Mansur Rahman was a government chemist. Zia began his schooling in Calcutta. After the
partition of British India in 1947, he went to Karachi where he continued his education. He was
enrolled in D. J. College in Karachi in 1953, before joining the Pakistan Military Academy at
Kabul the same year as an officer cadet. After receiving the commission he started his military
career as an infantry officer. From 1954 to 1964 he received training as an army intelligence
officer. During 1965 war with India, Zia was 29 and was a company commander of East Bengal
Regiment located in Khemkaran sector of West Pakistan. Zia was decorated for gallantry during
the 1965 war. On March 25, 1971, Major Zia was posted in Chittagong.
Tension that was brewing between Bengalis and non-Bengalis reached a climax ever since the
SW Swat reached Chittagong port with arm's and ammunitions on March 18. Thousands of
people surrounded the port area to prevent the off-loading of those arms and ammunitions. On
March 24, Brigadier General Majumdar, the senior most Bengali officer stationed in Chittagong,
was removed from Chittagong. The next senior Bengali officer Col. M. R. Choudhury was shot
dead on the night of March 25 by the Pakistani troops. During the day of March 25, the
Regimental Centre of East Bengal Regiment was destroyed by Pakistani troops. Major Ziaur
Rahman, the next senior most army officer was asked by the Commanding officer of Pakistan
Army Brigade in Chittagong to go to the port where the people were resisting the unloading of
the arms. Ziaur Rahman aware of the plot to kill him once he had reached the port, returned to
his battalion headquarters and after consultation with other Bengali officers decided to sever
links with Pakistan at around 2 in the morning of March 26. "This decision by the armed
elements to revolt, writes Muhith, "changed the course of history in Bangladesh." He further
added "The movement for autonomy for Bangladesh in the Federation of Pakistan was converted
into a struggle for liberation with the revolt of East Pakistan Rifles and Bengal Regiments of the
Pakistan Army in Chittagong.
Soon after Zia's decision to take up arms for Bangladesh, troops along with the Awami League
volunteers occupied the radio-station and the city of Chittagong. In his broadcast over the radio,
Major Ziaur Rahman on March 27 declared the independence of Bangladesh and announced
himself as the Head of State of Independent Bangladesh. He also called upon the people to resist
the Pakistan army in every comer of Bangladesh. Later on, on March 30 Zia declared that he was
proclaiming independence on behalf of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, This second
broadcast was very widely heard all over Bangladesh. In recognition of Ziaur Rahman's patriotic
services Tajuddin Ahmed in his first broadcast over Swadhin Bangladesh Betar Kendra on April
11, 1971 as Prime Minister of Bangladesh had said, "In Chittagong and Noakhali we have
commissioned Major Ziaur Rahman of the Bengal Regiment to take full command of operations.
His heroic defense of Chittagong City against overwhelming odds, which included attacks from
the air and sea, will take its place with the defense of Stalingrad in the annals of warfare. Today,
thanks to his resistance Chittagong is still not secure in the hands of the enemy, whilst the whole
of Chittagong and Noakhali districts, outside limited pockets of Chittagong town are liberated
areas" Besides Chittagong, resistance against Pakistani army sprang up spontaneously in Dhaka,
Mymensingh, Rajshahi, Sylhet, and other places in East Pakistan. the people were in arms and
from that point there was no looking back.
The Mujibnagar Government
The sudden ruthless attack and genocide by the West Pakistani army took politicians, the Bengal
army and' civilians completely by surprise. On the evening of March 25 when Sheikh Mujib had
asked his colleagues and followers to go underground many went across the border to India.
Among the top leaders it is belleved that Tajuddin Ahmed was the first to cross over and to get in
touch with the top officials of the government of India. Syed Nazrul Islam, Captain Mansur Ali,
A. H. M. Qumruzzaman, Khandaker Mostaque Ahmed, Col. M. A. G. Osmany and others soon
crossed the border and went over to India. The genocide also led to a massive exodus of civilian
population mainly women, children and the elderly. The vast majority of the population
including Sheikh Mujib however did not leave their motherland, they stayed back to fight with
all they had. Furthermore indiscriminate killing of intellectuals, bureaucrats and common people
continued. However, the killings only strengthened the resolve and determination of the people
of Bangladesh to liberate themselves. Without the help of these fighting forces that stayed back
in East Pakistan it would not have been easy for the government formed in Mujibnagar to
achieve the goal of liberation.
Tajuddin Ahmed reached India most probably on April 1 or 2. He met Prime Minister Indira
Ghandi but could achieve little as he had no credentials that he was the spokesman of the people
of East Pakistan. Tajuddin therefore took a momentous step. He formed the Bangladesh
government in exile declaring himself as the Prime Minister and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the
President. By this time other serior Awami league leaders were in Agartala. Tajuddin Ahmed
met them there of April 10 and it was decided that a cabinet of ministers would be formed. The
leaders were, apart from Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed Nazrul Islam, Captain
Mansur Ali, A. H. M. Qamruzzaman and Khandker Mostaque Ahmed. In the absence of Sheikh
Mujib who by that time was known to have been taken to Pakistan, Syed Nazrul Islam was made
the Acting President. Mustaque Ahmed was in charge of Foreign, Law and Parliamentary
Affairs. Qamruzzaman was in charge of Interior, Supply, Relief and Rehabilitation and Mansur
Ali that of Finance, Commerce and Industries. Col. (Rtd.) Mohammad Ataul Ghani Osmany was
made Chief of Staff of the Liberation Forces with the rank of a cabinet minister and Col (Rtd)
Abdur Rab Chowdhury the Deputy Chief. On April 17, at Meherpur, which was still free from
the occupation of the Pakistan army, the cabinet was formally installed. Meherpur was hence
forth known as Mujibnagar. Though theoretically Mujibnagar was the seat of Bangladesh
government in exile it was actually in Calcutta where the cabinet ministers and the other top
leaders were located during the war of liberation.
The Proclamation of Independence Order
On April 17, 1971 a Proclamation of Independence Order (PIO) was issued. It was back dated to
April 10 naming Mujibnagar as the place of issue. It was further stated that the Proclamation
would be deemed to have come into effect from March 26, 1971. The Proclamation declared that
in the elections held in Bangladesh from December 7, 1970 to January 17, 1971 the people
elected 167 out of 169 representatives belonging to the Awami League. General Yahya Khan for
the purpose of framing a constitution summoned the elected representatives of the people to meet
on March 3, 1971 however, "the Assembly so summoned was arbitrarily and illegally postponed
for indefinite period, and instead of fulfilling their promise and while still conferring with the
representatives of people of BanglaDesh, Pakistan authorities declared an unjust and treacherous
war." The PIO went on to state, "Bangabandhu Sheikh Muiibur Rahman .... duly made
declaration of independence at Dacca on March 26, 1971, ........ and whereas the Pakistan
Government by levying an unjust war and committing genocide and by other repressive
measures made it impossible for the elected representatives of the people of BanglaDesh to meet
and frame a Constitution, and give to themselves a goverment and whereas the people of Bangla
Desh by their heroism, bravery and revolutionary fervour have established effective control over
the territories of Bangla Desh, we the elected representatives of the people of Bangla Desh ...
duly constituted ourself into a Constituent Assembly ... declare and constitute BanglaDesh to be
sovereign People's Republic and thereby confirm the declaration of independence already made
by Banga Bandhu Sheikh Muibur Rahman", and "Do hereby confirm and resolve that till such
time as a constitution is framed, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shall be the President of
the Republic and that Syed Nazral Islam shall be the Vice-President of the Republic and that the
President, shall be the Supreme Commander of all the armed forces of the Republic, shall
exercise all the executive and legislative powers of the Republic." It was further resolved that the
elected representatives would undertake to observe and give effect to all duties and obligations
devolved upon them as a member of the family of nations and by the Charter of the United
Nations.
Significance of the Proclamation of Independence Order
The Proclamation of Independence Order declared Bangladesh as a de jure state to the world.
The Proclamation gave legitimacy and legality to the Bangladesh Government in exile and to the
liberation war.
The Proclamation formed a Presidential system of government giving the President of
Bangladesh absolute power till the constitution was framed.
Even though Sheikh Mujib was arrested and taken to Pakistan, the declaration of Muiib as the
President of Bangladesh acted as a great unifying force. It brought all the different groups of
Mukti Bakini (Liberation forces) under the banner of the Awami League, thus giving the
liberation war a patriotic inspiration and a noble goal.
The Proclamation to abide by the Charter of the United Nation secured for the new government
in exile the much-needed support of the world community.
It provided the basis for eventual de juro recognition of Bangladesh by India and signing of
Peace and Friendship Treaty with Bangladesh which provided the legal rationale for India's war
against Pakistan in support of Bangladesh.
Colonel (General) M A G Osmany and the Mukti Bahiri
Colonel Mohammad Ataul Ghani Osmany was born in Sunamganj, Sylhet on September 1, 1918.
His father was Khan Bahadur Mofizur Rahman, who joined Assam Civil Service in 1898 and
retired as the Director of Land Records, Government of Assam. Col. Osmany graduated from
Aligharh Muslim University in 1938 and joined the British Indian Army the same year. He
fought in the Second World War with high distinction and became the youngest Major in British
Army in 1940. When the war ended he was a Lieutenant Colonel. In the Pakistan Army he was
given only one promotion and made a Colonel and retired in 1967. His well-deserved legitimate
promotions were denied by the Punjabi dominated army of Pakistan as he was a staunch
advocate of the Bengali men and officers and their rightful cause.
Col. Osmany joined Awami League in 1969 and became a Member of Parliament in 1970. He
was one of the key associates of Bangabandhu during the political negotiations for a
constitutional solution to the problem caused by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's refusal to participate in the
first session of the parliament in March 1971. On the fateful night of March 25, 1971, till about
10 p.m. Col. Osmany was with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at his Dhamondi residence in Dhaka.
Mujib advised the top Awami League leaders including Col. Osmany to protect themselves and
to escape the drag-net of Pakistani army. For reasons of personal security from March 4 till a few
days before the 25, Col. Osmany was staying with Mufleh R. Osmany, his first cousin and
husband of the author. Mulfeh Osmany or his brother Mustafizur Rahman used to take Col.
Osmany to the residence of Sheikh Mujib every day. After his work, Col. Osmany used to go to
the residence of Justice K. M. Hasan, father of the author. On the fateful night of March 25, Col.
Osmany was taken to the residence of Sheikh Mujib by Mustafizur Rahman Osmany. Sheikh
Mujib took Mustafizur Rahman Osmany to a room and told him in private that Col. Osmany
should be taken to a safe place and no one should about it as Col. Osmany will have to lead the
war of liberation, should Pakistanis impose a war on Bangladesh.
From March 26 till the morning of March 28, Pakistani army imposed total curfew in Dhaka to
carry out the first phase of barbaric atrocities and genocide. On the morning of March 28, after
the curfew was lifted, Mufleh R. Osmany met Archer K. Blood, the American Consul General in
Dhaka seeking political asylum for Col. Osmany. The following morning Archer K. Blood
appraised Mufleh Osmarty that the American Goverriment had declined to offer political asylum
to Col. Osmany. Mufleh Osmany informed Col. Osmany about the situation and advised him to
leave Dhaka immediately. After shaving off his famous handlebar moustache and dressed like a
pir and carrying only a Quran, Cal. Osmany left Dhaka. Mufleh Osmany took Col. Osmany in
his Volkswagen car to Swarighat in old Dhaka. From there they crossed the river Buriganga in a
ferry boat. Mufleh Osmany hired a boat from Zinjira Ghat for Col. Osmany to go to Daudkandhi
in Comilla. The mahi (boatman) was told that Col. Osmany was a pir (holy man) and was
leaving Dhaka as he was much disturbed by all the killings. Col. Osmany reached Daudkandi
after two gruelling days. Towards the end of the journey he was taken captive by some Muktt
Bahini who mistook him to be a Punjabi spy in disguise. But soon, a local Awami League leader
recognised him and helped him to cross over to Agartala, India.
From the example of Col. Osmany's harrowing tale of escape to India, once can appreaciate the
level of preparations Awami League leaders had for their personal safety and exit from Dhaka.
Most Awami League. leaders left Dhaka under their personal impromptu arrangements. Since
they were strong believers in constitutional and civilised settlement of the political crisis they
were not at all prepared for the barbaric military solution sought by the Punjabi generals, who
were holding the levers of state power in Pakistan ever since Ayub Khan's military coup in 1958.
After crossing over to India and after being appointed the Chief of Staff, Col. Osmany was faced
with the formidable challenge of organising the disparate elements of Mukti Bahini into a single
fighting force with usual structure of discipline, command, control and leadership. The Mukti
Bahini or liberation force included the followings:
1. Totally untrained civilians - students, other young people, peasants and political activists
etc.
2. Police and ansars, not well trained in the use of arms.
3. Para-military elements, East Pakistan Rifles.
4. Units of East Bengal Regiment - the regular military force.
Hence planning, organisation and training were the initial challenges that confronted Col.
Osmany. His skill and passion for military planning and organisation was his forte. The military
genius of Col. Osmany prevailed over these historic challenges. The theatre of war was divided
into sectors. The sector commanders were Bengali military officers, mostly of the rank of Major.
The other elements i.e. para military police and civilians etc. were grouped under respective
sector commanders but in a kind of less rigid structure of discipline, command and control. This
nebulous structure had to be opted for, for the reason of lack of training, skill and problems of
enforcement of command and discipline inherent in a peoples' war. Disparate groups of people
who had to fight together, armed only with high sense of patriotism and the spirit of do or die,
kill or be killed, wrest freedom or remain enslaved, came voluntarily under the command of Col.
Osmany. Everyone fought with their back to the wall. Survival instinct galvanised them together.
Combining guerrilla warfare with regular army operations was a highly innovative strategy
devised by special command unit attached to the Head Quarters of the Mukti Bahini. Some
guerrilla units operated totally independently inside occupied territories of Bangladesh and
without much coordination with the central command of the Mukti Bahini. The strategic
objectives were to immobilise, decimate, terrorise and demoralise the occupation army of
Pakistan to the point of surrender. Supply lines and lines of communication of the Pakistan army
were the principal target of sabotage and destruction. The guerrillas were highly successful in the
tactics of hit and run operations. The regular forces as a part of the strategy did not normally
engage the Pakistan army in a conventional encounter till about the final assault. The sector
commanders enjoyed a degree of decentralised systern of command, planning and operations, for
obvious problems of logistics and central command associated with normal military operations.
Major General Lachhman Singh, while commenting about the Mukti Bahini wrote "Osmani
managed to develop this force from an amorphous organisation into a reasonable compact and
organised body which had freedom fighters as its infiltrating, spearhead, backed by sector troops
who were organised into companies" The inspiring leadership of Col. Osmany and the
operational role he played during the War of Liberation can be fully appreciated from the
narration of Captain later, Major General Azizur Rahman Bir Uttam. On April 9, 1971 Captain
Azizur Rahman commanding a unit of the Bangladesh Forces was in a tight spot near the Keane
Bridge, Sylhet, when his jeep was fired upon by the Pakistani army and fell into the Surma river.
As a young captain with no battle experience he tried to maintain the morale of his troop. In an
interview captain Aziz said, "we fought fruitlessly against formidable adversary only to be
violently repulsed ... Amidst the confusing and deafening sounds, a voice suddenly spoke behind
me: 'Young man, What's happening? It was the C-in-C himself, I could never imagine that a
person of the stature of Colonel Osmany (I had never seen him before would have the guts and
curiosity to be on the battlefield. Finding me at a puzzling loss, the C-in-C rescued me. He
advised me to reorganise, break contact with the enemy and withdraw to a better defensive
position (he suggested the next position) ... He further cautioned me to not allow the Pakistan
army to pursue my troops. The towering personality of Col. Osmany galvanised the Mukti
Bahini into a formidable fighting force. The occupation army of Pakistan was practically
immobilised and completely demoralised by early December 1971.
The Liberation War
The Liberation War which thus began on March 26, 1971 continued for 9 months. India's
response to the help sought by the Bangladesh government in exile was to give shelter and food
to the thousands of refugees who were crossing over the border from occupied territory of
Bangladesh. In this India received generous support and aid from the United Nations and
individual countries. Mukhti Bahini was given training and weapons to carry on with the
liberation war. India also mobilised global support for the cause of Bangladesh. India signed the
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Soviet Union in Delhi on August
9, 1971. By doing this India enlisted the political and military support of Soviet Union in case
war broke out with Pakistan on Bangladesh issue.
Bangladesh Liberation War was strategic, ideological and political dreams come true for India.
India could not have asked for a more propitious opportunity to advance her self-interest in
South-Asian strategic equation. Taking advantage of this historic opportunity, India achieved a
number of obiectives including the followings:
1. In the bipolar world of the time, India was strategically much closer to USSR (now
Russian Federation) while Pakistan was a strategic partner of USA and China.
Dismemberment of Pakistan, forced on by the Punjabi junta, presented India with a
golden -opportunity to redefine the strategic framework of South Asia and to enhance her
strategic stadning in the global context. India futher strengthened her military partnership
with Soviet Union by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation in Auguest 1971. By hastening the end of the War of Liberation, India
denied regional options to China for shoring up the pro-Chinese elements in Mukti
Bahini. Bangladesh was also perceived by India as a promising ally in dealing with the
restive north-eastern states of India. Possible sercurity threats from the east was by and
large neutralized by India for good.
2. In diplomatic and political terms India gained a friendly or at least manageable neighbour
in the region by helping Bangladesh to establish itself as an independent and democratic
state To that extent the political and diplomatic clout of Pakistan in South Asia stood
substantially neutralised.
3. The ideological basis of Pakistan stood fully deburked with the emergence of secular and
socialist Bangladesh. India thus gained a significant advantage over the ideologically
bankrupt Islamic Republican of Pakistan, which was neither Islamic nor republican.
Hindu ideology and culture in the garb of secularism hoped to gain ideological and
cultural hegemony over the nascent polity of Bangladesh.
4. Through the abject defeat and unconditional swrender of Pakistani army, India emerged
as by far the strongest military power in South Asia This significant military gain helped
India to scotch Pakistan's ambitions of military rivalry in South Asia. Pakistani military
was cut to size.
5. Economically, India sought to gain a good market for her capital goods and services.
Pakistan killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. The economic objective of India was
no more important than the other objectives
It was not till December 3, 1971 that India got directly involved in war with Pakistan. On that
date Pakistan Air Force attacked the airfields in norther India. In response on December 4, the
Indian Army launched attacks on Pakistani forces in Bangladesh from three fronts - from West
Bengal in the west and Assam and Tripura in the east. On December 4 the United States called
for an urgent session of the UN Security Council, which voted 11 to 2 for an immediate cease
fire. The Soviet Union however vetoed that one and as well as a second resolution soon after,
moreover the Soviet Union "blocked international action until the capture of East Pakistan was
fait accompli ... No cease- fire was agreed to until December 17." in the meantime the Indian
forces pushed their way towards Dhaka. At least three brigades of the Mukti Bahini fought along
with the Indian Army, the rest of the Mukti Bahini carried on their guerrilla attacks.12 The
Pakistani Army was forced to surrender on December 16. Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora, the
Indian commander of the combined Indian and Mukti Bakini forces, accepted the surrender of
Lieutenant General Nazi. The long struggle against economic, cultural and political domination
by the Purjabis thus came to an end. Well fought and hard-earned victory was achieved by the
Mukti Bahini and Mitro-Bahini (i.e. Indian Forces). Bangladesh became a free and liberated
country. The people of Bangladesh are free once again to define their life, liberty and destiny in
the democratic polity of Bangladesh.
Ziaur Rahman Addendum
such as Major Shafiullah, Major Khalid Mosharraf, Major Abu Osman Chowdhury, Major Abu
Osman Chowdhury, Major C. R. Datta, Major Meer Shaukat Ali, Major Najmul Huq, Major M.
A. Taher, Major A. Muttalib, Captain Nawajesh, Captain Rafiqul Islam, and Captain M. A. Jalil
had already begun the liberation war on different fronts, many having revolted on the 25th
evening well before Zia's decision to revolt. But none of them happened to be near an operating
radio station and this could not announce on air their armed support to the resistance. Major Zia's
broadcast certainly helped as unarmed people were assured the Bengali armed units were with
the people in their resistance against the Pakistani maruders. Major Zia later became one of the
eleven sector commanders of the Bangladesh Liberation Force and in July he was heading the Z
Force Brigade, the first of three brigades raised by the Bangladesh government. But it was by
chance that Zia, revolting after midnight of 25 March against his Pakistani command, came to
Kalurghat on 27 March to find a safe exit route to India.
On 27 March most foreign newspapers had already reported the declaration of independence by
Sheikh Mujib. In Britain, The Times, Financial Times, The Manchester Guardian and The Daily
Telegraph printed similar accounts of the declaration and the consequent heavy fighting or civil
war. In the United States, The New York Times, Washington Post and Baltimore Sun of 27
March carried the news of Sheikh Mwib's declaration of independence. A headline in The Times
(London) was "Heavy fighting as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declares E Pakistan independence."
Similarly, a Baltimore Sun headline read, "Mujib proclaims Bengal republic; battles reported."
At the time what both Bangladesh and the world were anxiously awaiting was the formation of a
government or leadership structure by the Bengalis to crown their resistance with success.