ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta. Cruz, Manila.
issued in the name of the following co-owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez,
1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding was instituted to settle his
estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned property. his last will
and testament, he bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the
free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to
probate.
The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator.
on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners sold her undivided 1/6
share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00.
On the same day Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands informing it of
the above-mentioned sale.
Butte’s counsel received such on Dec 15. Appellant received such on Dec 19.
January 15, 1959, Butte, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check offering to redeem
the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez.
This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the
corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the
reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive, plaintiff
prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
the rtc dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that she has no right to redeem the property and
that, if ever she had any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal
redemptions provided by the Civil Code.
Issue: whether or not plaintiff-appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate
of Jose V. Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie
Garnier Vda. de Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final
distribution of her share in the testate proceedings
Yes. Appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the otherco-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)
As testamentary heir of the estate she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided one-sixth
(1/6) share owned by her predecessor.
By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment
of his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive the
decedent.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
(657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from the
death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be
computed as of the same moment(Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivos
(Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and
outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935),and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed
to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
A co-owner of an undivided share is necessarily a co-owner of the whole.
this right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was perfected,
eight (8) years after the death of Jose V. Ramirez, and formed no part of his estate.
the fact would remain that so long as that undivided share remains in the estate, the heirs of Jose V.
Ramirez own it, as the deceased did own it before his demise, so that his heirs are now as much coowners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V. Ramirez was himself a co-owner thereof during his lifetime.
notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer. seller of an undivided interest is in the best
position to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale.
date of December 11, 1958, attorney-in-fact of the vendor Marie Garnier wrote that her principal's onesixth (1/6) share had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. Bank received this notice on December 15
same day endorsed it to Mrs. Butte.
Mrs. Butte tendered redemption on January 15, 1959. the redemption was made in due time.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
On June 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of
land in San Pedro, Laguna. Margarita had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado and Francisca Herrera.
Beatriz predeceased Margarita and left heirs.
On October 1971, Margarita passed away.
On August 1974, Francisca executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is sole surviving
daughter of Margarita and her exclusive heir. The Deed was based on a Sinumpaang Salayay dated
October 1960 executed by Margarita conveying the subject portions of land to Francisca upon her
death. It turned out that the subject land was paid by Francisca with the LTA.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of the Deed. The rtc declared the Deed null and
void.
However, during the trial, Francisca filed an application with the Petitioner (NHA) to purchase the
subject land by submitting the Deed. The NHA granted the application on the basis that the Sinumpaang
Salaysay proved that Margarita waived or transferred all her rights to Francisca.
Private Respondent Seguna Almeida (heir of Beatriz) appealed to the Office of the President only to
affirm the decision of the NHA.
When Francisca died, her heirs executed for the settlement of her estate which was approved by the
NHA. The NHA issued deeds of sale in favor of Francisca’s heirs.
Aggrieved, the Private Respondent filed for the cancellation of the titles in favor of Francisca’s heirs with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laguna. The RTC later on ruled in favor of Private Respondent, setting
aside the decision of the NHA and the Office of the President. It ruled that the Sinumpaang Salaysay was
not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death.
After their motion for considerations were denied, both NHA and Francisca’s heirs appealed before the
Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the RTC decision by ruling that the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Margarita
was a will and not an assignment of rights. The NHA acted arbitrarily when it awarded the subject land
to Francisca’s heir when the RTC upheld that the Sinumpaang Salaysay involved a disposition of property
which shall take effect upon death.
Hence, the NHA filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not arbitrarily in awarding the subject land to Francisca’s heir.
Yes. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity
of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument. ; in her words
"sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person
should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her
heirs
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera
had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract
to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next
"person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. NHA therefore
acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
rule of administrative res judicata "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of
courts having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of
persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the
Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
judicata."
quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial power—that which is held by the courts.
However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense.
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its
agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
ESTATE OF K.H. HEMADY, deceased,
vs.
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant and appellant.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. (Luzon) was a surety to some 20 indemnity agreements. KH Hemedy executed
counterbonds in favor of Luzon whereby he was made a surety solidary guarantor in all of the indemnity
agreements entered into by the latter. This means that Hemedy will indemnify Luzon in case the latter
was made to pay. Hemedy died.
Luzon filed a claims against the estate of Hemedy, pertaining to contingent claims for the value of the 20
bonds.
The lower court dismissed the claim on the ground that upon Hemady’s death, his obligation as a surety
was terminated. It justified such ruling by essentially saying that the obligation of a guarantor is strictly
personal. Hence, terminated upon the death of said guarantor and not transmitted to his heirs.
The SC reversed this decision saying that the liability of a surety or guarantor is not strictly personal.
Hence, transmitted to his heirs upon his death. The contingent claims against the estate were therefore
allowed.
ISSUE: May the obligations of a decedent as a surety or guarantor be transmitted to his heirs?
YES.
The heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations (Arts. 774 and 776
NCC).
— Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law (Art. 1257 NCC). When a party enters into a contract, he is deemed to
have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns.
— The binding effect of the contract upon the heirs is not altered by the requirements under the Rules
of Court (Rule 89) saying that money claims against the estate shall be settled first before distribution of
the same to the heirs may be made. The reason is that, the payment for those claims against the estate
were ultimately payments made by the heirs since the amounts so paid constitute diminution or
reduction in the eventual share of the heirs in the estate.
The obligation of a surety or guarantor does not fall in any of the exceptions provided for under Art.
1257.
— As to the nature of the obligation. The obligation of a Hemady is to reimburse sum of money paid by
Luzon. It is an obligation to give. It is not relevant whether the payment was made by Hemady himself or
by another person so long as the payment was made.
— As to the stipulation of the parties. Failure to expressly provide in the contract that the obligations
arising therefrom shall transmit to the heirs upon the death of Hemady does not show of the intent of
the parties to have such obligation termination upon Hemady’s death. In fine, such need not be
provided for as the law already expressly provided for the same.
— As to the provision of law. The provisions of the civil code regulating guaranty and suretyship do not
provide that the obligation shall of a surety or guarantor shall be extinguished upon his death.
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision granting
the application of Pedro O. Fragante, a Filipino citizen, for a certificate of public convenience to install,
maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.
The certificate was issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant.
Petitioner Limjoco opposed saying the Commisioner’s decision is not in accordance with the law. It was
error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and
in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for.
Commissioner argued that the estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The
aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its
nature did not lapse through his death. The certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule,
should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to
acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his
lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
Issue: Whether Fragante’s rights for the certificate of public convenience were extinguished by his
death.
Held: NO.
“…unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights (emphasis
supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be
instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the
right.”
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and
parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor
or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the
creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to
consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.
The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person", is a generic term,
and includes artificial as well as natural persons. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons
include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of
property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The estate of a deceased
person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs.
Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should
be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his
estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights
and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the
one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,
consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion.
The application of the same fiction to his citizenship was as likewise extended for the purposes of the
unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. Such is grounded upon the same principle,
and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death
to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not
counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission
of this Court.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
Efraim Santibanez obtained a loan First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC; Unionbank is its
successor) in two instances.
This is for the payment of [2] tractors that he purchased. He executed loan agreements and promissory
notes (PNs). Edmund, his son, was co-maker in the PNs. Efraim eventually died without having these
obligation being fully paid. He left a holographic will which was then probated before the court.
Subsequently, Edmund and his sister Florence (heirs of Efraim) executed a Joint Agreement (allegedly
required by Unionbank) whereby they distributed to themselves certain properties, including the
tractors that were financed by the subject loans. The Agreement also provides that the heirs agree to
assume the indebtedness pertaining to the properties allotted to them.
Unionbank then sent demand letters to Edmund and Florence for the payment of the balance of the
obligations but these remained unpaid. The summons as to Edmund was not served as he was in the US
at the time. Hence, Unionbank filed a collection case against Florence.
Florence argued that:
— Unionbank should have filed its claim before the probate court in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court; and
— The Joint Agreement executed by her and her brother were null and void since there can be no
distribution of the estate of the deceased until the will was probated first, and that at the time of the
execution of the agreement, the proceedings for the probate of her father’s will was already underway,
and finally, that Unionbank was aware of the pendency of said proceedings.
The RTC dismissed the Unionbank’s complaint. The CA affirmed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and held that Unionbank’s money claim should have been
filed before the probate court.
ISSUES: May a creditor of a deceased for a money claim collect directly from the heir on the ground that
obligations of the deceased transmit to said heirs from the moment of death of the decedent?
NO.
1. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
In the SC case, This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. ‘The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay
off its debts and distribute the residue.
2. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. At most,
Unionbank may go after Edmund, but it may not go after Florence.
Maria Gervacio Blas v. Rosalina Santos
G.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961
Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898. They had three
children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas, one of the plaintiffs,
Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died in 1950, and is
survived by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel Gervacio Blas, Leoncio
Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the
following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this
second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made.
Three of the properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does not appear
to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before his death on January 9, 1937, Simeon Blas executed a
last will and testament. In the said testament Simeon Blas gave to Maxima Santos de Blas one half of all
her properties. MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS on the other hand made a document giving one half of all her
inheritance to the children of maximo in the first marriage, labelled as exhibit “A”. The court below held
that said Exhibit “A” has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs which can serve as basis for the
complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and enforceable contract for lack of consideration
and because it deals with future inheritance.
The court also declared that Exhibit “A” is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for
the execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation, etc.
Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief, argue that the heirs of Simeon Blas
and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired
during said first marriage, because the same were already included in the mass of properties
constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will,
and that the action to recover the same has prescribed.
ISSUE:
W/N the heirs of Simeon Blas should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima Santos
contained in Exhibit “A”
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the promise is valid and enforceable upon Maxima’s death. Though it is
not a will, as it lacks the formality, nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was
actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate).  The Court declare that by
Exhibit "A", a compromise to avoid litigation, Maxima Santos promised to devise to the heirs and
legatees of her husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in the
conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, which share is specified in the project of partition
submitted by herself on March 14, 1939 in the settlement of the estate of her husband and that she
failed to comply with her aforementioned obligation.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the
conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated.
It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal
properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties
in the will of the husband.
The defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver
one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties to the
heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.
MILAGROS DE BELEN VDA. DE CABALU, MELITON CABALU, SPS. ANGELA CABALU and RODOLFO
TALAVERA, and PATRICIO ABUS, Petitioners, v.
SPS. RENATO DOLORES TABU and LAXAMANA, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tarlac City, Branch II,
Respondents.
Faustina Maslum (Faustina) was the original owner of a parcel of land. The land had a total area of
140,211 square meters.
On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, assigning and
distributing her property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not
probated.
Benjamin Laxamana was one of Faustinas heirs. He died in 1960. He had two heirs: his wife and his son,
Domingo Laxamana (Domingo). On March 5, 1975, Domingo executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
Laureano Cabalu covering 9k square meters of the land inherited by his father from Faustina.
On August 1, 1994, the legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with
Partition. The said deed imparted 9,000 square meters of the land covered to Domingo.
Thereafter, Domingo sold 4,500 square meters of the 9,000 square meters of the land to his nephew,
Eleazar Tabamo. The remaining portion was registered in Domingos name under TCT No. 281353.
On August 4, 1996, Domingo died. On October 8, 1996, or two (2) months after Domingos death,
Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Sale of TCT No. 281353 in favor of Renato Tabu (Tabu). Tabu
and his wife Dolores Laxamana subdivided the lot into two
Consequently, petitioners Milagros de Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Spouses Angela Cabalu
and Rodolfo Talavera, and Patricio Abus filed a complaint before the RTC seeking to declare TCT Nos.
291338 and 291339 as null and void. They averred that they were the lawful owners of the subject
property because it was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated March 5, 1975.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000 square meter
property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is valid?
The CA did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale null and void.
Thus, and as correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975
could not yet validly dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the
sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980.
Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law."
Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The
law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the
object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the
object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not yet probated; the object of the
contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the
estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein.
Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot
was adjudicated to him.
Bonilla vs. Barcena, G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976
1975, Fortunato Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla
instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
Fortunata died on July 9, 1975.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Fortunata was dead and
therefore has no legal capacity to sue. When the motion was heard, counsel for plaintiff asked for the
substitution by her minor child and her husband, but the court dismissed the case on the ground that a
dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
ISSUE: Whether the deceased Fortunata can be substituted by her heirs in the instant case?
HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case until completion. The records show that Fortunata died on July 9, 1975 while the
complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975, Fortunata was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under
Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or legal representatives. This duty was complied with by the plaintiff’s counsel.
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent.” Hence, from the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and
they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment
of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right is pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them
even before any judicial declaration of heirship in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata
died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished by her death but was
transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
“after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased." The question as to
whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
for. The causes of action which survive affect primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while causes of action which do not survive are those
where the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental. This case being an action to quiet title affects property and property rights primarily and
therefore is one that survives death. Hence, substitution is proper.
Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido
M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila;
she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by appellee and the latter's wife in
their names by virtue of a Deed of Sale; that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery,
misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void; that she, with the help of her husband's
relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem; that despite repeated pleas and demands, appellee
refused to reconvey to her the said property; that she filed a complaint against appellee before the
office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the subject property; and that since the matter was
unsettled, the barangay issued a certification to file [an] action in court.
Cruz v. Cruz
Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido
M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila;
she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by appellee and the latter's wife in
their names by virtue of a Deed of Sale; that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery,
misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void; that she, with the help of her husband's
relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem; that despite repeated pleas and demands, appellee
refused to reconvey to her the said property; that she filed a complaint against appellee before the
office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the subject property; and that since the matter was
unsettled, the barangay issued a certification to file [an] action in court.
Memoracion died on October 30, 1996. Through a Manifestation, Memoracion's counsel, Atty. Roberto
T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate
thereof.
Appellee filed an MR but was dismissed.
Memoracion's son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial court that he is retaining the services of
Atty. Neri for the plaintiff. Simultaneously, Atty. Neri filed an MR but was also denied.
Edgardo Cruz filed a notice of appeal but was dismissed.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz's Petition for Annulment
of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action which did not survive her death.
Held:
Yes. In the case of Bonilla v. Barcena:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights
of property affected being incidental.
In the instant case, petitioner (plaintiff) Memoracion Z. Cruz died on 30 October 1996. Her counsel,
Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court of such death on 13 January 1997, through a Manifestation.
The Court considers such Manifestation, signed by Memoracion's heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty.
Neri's services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz. It
also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz, although also an heir of Memoracion, should be excluded as a
legal representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.
Salvador vs. Sta. Maria
Ramirez vs. Baltazar
FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case.
Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the
intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez
are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that
Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a
foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer against the
petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the
sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings,
alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants
contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.
ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?
HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs
from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition
to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances,
protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In
Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the
commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the
administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."
Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc.
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On
March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a
complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the
deceased with the latter‘s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to
the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that
respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it
entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to
the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
Issue: Whether or not Joselito Musni Puno as an heir is automatically entitled for the stocks upon the
death of a shareholder.
Held: Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The
stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be
recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer
shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the
executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock. Until
a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is
entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
De Borja vs. Vda. de Borja
Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa, filed for the probate of her will. When the will was
probated, Francisco was appointed as executor and administrator and herein appellee, Jose de Borja,
their son was appointed as co-administrator.
Subsequently, Francisco took upon himself, a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco (Vda. De Borja). Even
before the estate of Josefa was settled, Francisco died. Tasiana instituted testate proceedings wherein
she was appointed special Administratrix.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and the second wife, Tasiana had been
plagued with numerous suits and counter-suits and in order to put an end to all these litigation, a
compromise agreement was entered into between Jose, in his personal capacity and as administrator of
the Testate Estate of Josefa, and by Tasiana, as the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to pay Tasiana the amount
of Php800,000.00 as ‘”full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of
the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa, and to any properties bequeathed or devised
in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.”
When Jose submitted the compromise agreement for Court approval with the CFI of Rizal (probate of
will of fi rst wife) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija (probate of will of Francisco), Tasiana opposed in both
instances. She claims among others, that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without
first probating the will of Francisco de Borja.
ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement is valid?
HELD: Yes. In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies on this Court’s decision in Guevara v.
Guevara wherein the Court held the view that presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that
the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. However, the doctrine in said case is not applicable to the case at bar.
There was here no attempt to settle or to distribute the estate of Francisco among the heirs thereto
before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of
any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
Since a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment
of the death of such predecessor in interest, there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed
limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.