UN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
Background
Following the failure of the monitoring mission created as UNOSOM by the United Nations, the United
States offered to lead a substantial intervention force, made up chiefly of American personnel. This was
accepted by the UN and made possible through United Nations Security Council Resolution 794,
authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".[8] The Security Council urged the Secretary-General and
member states to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that
would be involved.[9]
On the evening of 4 December 1992, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed the nation, informing
them that U.S. troops would be sent to Somalia. The U.S. contribution would be known as Operation
Restore Hope, which joined a multinational force and became known as the United Task Force
(UNITAF).[10] The operations of UNOSOM I were suspended. UNITAF was authorized under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter.
The United States intended UNITAF and U.S. control as a transitional action. The mission consisted of
four phases. The first phase was the initial deployment of troops to provide secure harbor and airport
sites in Mogadishu, from where the entire operation would be managed. Second was the expansion of
the security zone to the surrounding regions of southern Somalia. Due to a more lenient environment
than expected and the encouragement from NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations), UNITAF forces
accomplished phase two a couple of weeks ahead of schedule. Third, the forces would expand the
security zone into Kismayo and Bardera and maintain secure land routes for humanitarian operations
throughout the security zone. The fourth and final phase consisted of the US handing over operations to
the United Nations and withdrawing most of the UNITAF forces.[10]
EXPANSION OF MANDATE
On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for
effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF
mission, a secure environment was not yet established. There was still no effective functioning
government or local security/police force.[11] The Secretary-General concluded that, should the
Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the
latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to
establish a secure environment throughout Somalia.[11] UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete
the task begun by UNITAF. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist in rebuilding
their economic, political and social life, so as to recreate a Somali State. Most notably it would also
mandate the disarmament of Somali militias.[12]
The new UN-controlled mission, to be called UNOSOM II, was established by the Security Council in
Resolution 814 (1993) on 26 March 1993. It did not formally take over operations in Somalia until
UNITAF was dissolved on 4 May 1993.
In operation
A U.S. soldier at the main entrance to the Port of Mogadishu points to identify a sniper's possible firing
position (January 1994).
An armoured column of M1A1 Abrams Tanks and M2 Bradley IFVs move down a dirt road outside the
city of Mogadishu, Somalia. (January 1994).
A Saudi Arabian High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) wait for food stores to be offloaded at the Mogadishu seaport. The food will be provided to the Somali people.
A federalist government based on 18 autonomous regions was agreed upon by the leaders of Somalia's
various armed factions. It was the objective of UNOSOM II to support this new system and initiate
nation-building in Somalia. This included disarming the various factions, restoring law and
order,[clarification needed] helping the people to set up a representative government, and restoring
infrastructure.[citation needed]
UNOSOM II had a strength of 28,000 personnel, including 22,000 troops and 8,000 logistic and civilian
staff from Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco,
Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, South Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Zimbabwe.[13] The U.S. provided 1,167 troops for a Quick Reaction Force, which would remain
under US operational control, and would be stationed on US Navy ships off the coast of Somalia (see
Carrier Strike Group 6). This force would respond to emergency threats to UNOSOM II but only if US
Central Command approved.[14]
IN OPERATION
A U.S. soldier at the main entrance to the Port of Mogadishu points to identify a sniper's possible firing
position (January 1994).
An armoured column of M1A1 Abrams Tanks and M2 Bradley IFVs move down a dirt road outside the
city of Mogadishu, Somalia. (January 1994).
A Saudi Arabian High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) wait for food stores to be offloaded at the Mogadishu seaport. The food will be provided to the Somali people.
A federalist government based on 18 autonomous regions was agreed upon by the leaders of Somalia's
various armed factions. It was the objective of UNOSOM II to support this new system and initiate
nation-building in Somalia. This included disarming the various factions, restoring law and
order,[clarification needed] helping the people to set up a representative government, and restoring
infrastructure.[citation needed]
UNOSOM II had a strength of 28,000 personnel, including 22,000 troops and 8,000 logistic and civilian
staff from Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco,
Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, South Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Zimbabwe.[13] The U.S. provided 1,167 troops for a Quick Reaction Force, which would remain
under US operational control, and would be stationed on US Navy ships off the coast of Somalia (see
Carrier Strike Group 6). This force would respond to emergency threats to UNOSOM II but only if US
Central Command approved.[14]
GROWING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN UNOSOM AND THE SNA
Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the
establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political
mandate. In May 1993, relations between the SNA and UNOSOM would rapidly deteriorate following
two significant events.[12]
KISMAYO INCIDENT
While the Addis Ababa conference was in progress in March, pro-Siad Barre forces - vehemently
opposed to Aidid, began to infiltrate weapons into the Somali port city of Kismayo, which was under the
control of UNITAF forces at the time. Gen. Hersi Morgan, commander of the pro-Barre forces, drove out
the Somali National Alliance forces under the command of Col. Omar Jess.[12]
On 7 May, three days after UNOSOM II took control of Kismayo from UNITAF, the SNA made an attempt
to retake the city. During the assault the Belgian peacekeepers stationed in the town intervened,
considering the assault to take Kismayo an attack on their positions and consequently repelled the SNA
forces. The fall of Kismayo to Gen. Morgan infuriated the Somali National Alliance. To the SNA the
incident was viewed as blatant U.N. partiality, as UNITAF had failed to prevent Morgan from seizing the
city and UNOSOM had then fought SNA forces who had tried to retake it.[12]
GALKAYO CONFERENCE
In May, Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front would agree to
hold a peace conference for the central region of Somalia. Gen. Aidid had initiated the consultations
with Col. Yusuf and consequently viewed himself as the convener and chair of the conference who
would be responsible for establishing the agenda. He would invite Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Somalia, Adm. Johnathan Howe to open the conference.[12]
Aidid sought to focus the conference only on Somalia's central regions, and soon ran into conflict with
UNOSOM. The UN sought to broaden participation of the conference to other regions of Somalia and
suspicious of Aidid, sought to replace his chairmanship over the conference with former Somali
President Abdullah Osman, who hated Aidid and had publicly called for his arrest.[12]
The differences between Aidid and the UN proved to be to great, and the conference proceeded
without the United Nations participation. The contention between the Somali National alliance and
UNOSOM from that point forward would begin to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast
from SNA controlled Radio Mogadishu.[12]
RADIO MOGADISHU
Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular broadcast station with the residents of the city, and was a vital
piece of SNA infrastructure that had been captured following a vicious battle with Ali Mahdi's forces.
Following the Kismayo and Galkayo incidents that station began to air anti-UNOSOM propaganda,
incensing high ranking UN personnel. It was feared that the broadcasts would shift the attitudes of the
Somali public towards the United Nations operation, leading UNOSOM officials to resolve to close the
station. In mid-May, the Pakistani contingent was asked to draw up a plan to shut down the station. The
Pakistanis did not possess the technical expertise required for such an operation and requested that the
US supply experts.[12][15]
Importantly, Radio Mogadishu had also been an Authorized Weapons Store Site (AWSS), subject to
UNOSOM inspection. It was decided the American special forces technicians would accompany a
Pakistani weapons inspection team to the site in order to determine how to disable the station. Gen.
Aidid and the upper echelons of the Somali National Alliance, had been made aware of the discussions
to seize or destroy the station.[12]
5 June 1993 inspection
According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry:
Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was
genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu.[16]
On June 5, a Pakistani force was sent to investigate an arms depot belonging to a Somali warlord vying
for the Presidency, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. When the Pakistani force arrived, they encountered angry
Somali protesters. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers inspecting weapons as part of the expanded UN
mandate were killed when "forces believed to be associated with Aidid allegedly launched a fatal attack
on peacekeeping forces."[17]
UNOSOM HUNT FOR AIDID BEGINS
The UN responded the next day with Resolution 837, reaffirming that the secretary-general was
authorized to "take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and to
establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia."[18] This was essentially equivalent
to declaring war on Aidid, a declaration that would lead to numerous confrontations between UNOSOM
II personnel and Aidid's militia. Though UNOSOM II had much fewer war-fighting resources than UNITAF,
but it was much more ambitious and aggressive. On 12 June 1993 U.S. troops began a military offensive
around Mogadishu. On 17 June, a $25,000 warrant was issued by Admiral Jonathan Howe for
information leading to the arrest of Aidid, but he was never captured.[14]
The hunt for Aidid characterised much of the UNOSOM II intervention. The increasing tempo of military
operations carried out in Mogadishu began to cause civilian casualties and affected the relationship
between the foreign troops and the Somali people. The UN troops were portrayed as foreign
interlopers, particularly after incidents of civilian casualties caused by wholesale firing into crowds by
peace keepers.[19][20]
Abdi House Raid and the shift to combat operations
On the 12th of July, a house where a meeting of clan elders was taking place was attacked by US AH-1
Cobra helicopters in what became known to the Somalis as Bloody Monday.[21]
As the Americans became more insular, the warlords began to reassert control of many Mogadishu
districts. With each failure to apprehend Aidid, the militias grew more bold. Serious rifts between
nations contributing to UNOSOM II also began to develop, with Italy in particular being a major critic of
the American methods.[22]
TASK FORCE RANGER DEPLOYED TO FIND AIDID
Somali militias began targeting peacekeepers, causing further casualties. On 8 August, Aidid's militia
detonated a remote controlled bomb against a U.S. military vehicle, first killed four American soldiers
and then, two weeks later, injured seven more.[23] In response, President Bill Clinton approved the
proposal to deploy a special task force composed of 400 US Army Rangers and Delta-force
Commandos.[21]
This unit, named Task Force Ranger, consisted of 160 elite US troops. They flew to Mogadishu and began
a manhunt for Aidid in what became known as Operation Gothic Serpent. On October 3, 1993, Task
Force Ranger raided a hotel in Mogadishu in which Aidid was thought to be hiding. What ensued was the
longest, bloodiest and deadliest battle for US troops in Somalia. In what later became known as the
Battle of Mogadishu, eighteen US soldiers were killed. Images of their dead bodies being dragged
through the streets were broadcast on television stations all over the world, horrifying and infuriating
the American public.
FALLOUT OF THE BATTLE OF MOGADISHU AND THE END OF UNOSOM II
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On October 7, 1993, in a nationwide television address, American President Clinton "effectively ended
the US proactive policy in Somalia" and "called for the withdrawal of all US forces no later than March
31, 1994."[citation needed] Resolution 897, passed on February 4, nevertheless extended the UNOSOM
mandate with one year to be concluded in March 1995.[24]
US soldiers completely withdrew on March 3, 1994, 28 days earlier than expected.[25] Other Western
nations, including Italy, Belgium, France and Sweden, also decided to withdraw at this time. On
November 4, 1994, after peacemaking efforts by the remaining 1,900 UNOSOM II troops failed, the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to withdraw all forces in Resolution 954.
Subsequently, on November 16, the UNSC authorized Resolution 955, placing new emphasis on
peacemaking and reconstruction and returning to a less reactive role. The withdrawal of the remaining
UN military and police troops from Somalia was completed on March 28, 1995, thereby ending
UNOSOM II's mandate.[citation needed]
Various reconciliation talks were carried out over the next few months providing for a ceasefire, the
disarmament of militias and a conference to appoint a new Government. However, preparations for the
conference were repeatedly postponed and many faction leaders simply ignored the agreements at
will.[26]
Somalia participated in talks in December 1997 held in Cairo, Egypt, where Aidid and Mahdi, another
Somali warlord, signed a "Declaration of Principles". The declaration promised to launch reconciliation
conferences in February, 1998 and to prepare a transitional government charter.[27]
RESULTS OF 1994 UN INQUIRY
The month following the Battle of Mogadishu, the United States urged the United Nations to establish
the commission to determine who was responsible for the clashes between UNOSOM II peacekeepers
and Aidid's SNA forces. A three-man UN inquiry commission headed by Matthew Nglube, former chief
justice of Zambia, Gen. Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana and Gen. Gustav Hagglund of Finland was set up by
the Security Council. On 30 November 1993 the commission landed in Mogadishu.[28][12]
The report charged the Gen. Aidid with launching the 5 June 1993, attack which initiated the conflict
between the SNA and UNOSOM. Notably, it also heavily criticized U.N. peacekeeping officials for
embarking on a campaign of forceful disarmament of Somali factions, an effort that antagonized the
Aidid's forces and sharpened tensions. The commission questioned the merit of the aggressive UNOSOM
peacekeeping strategy and argued that the U.N. should not have abandoned its neutral role in
Somalia.[28]
The inquiry criticized the United States for operating under a separate military command and leading
raids against Aidid that were not coordinated with UNOSOM officers. The commission condemned the
use of American combat helicopters over the heavily populated neighborhoods of Mogadishu and
criticized tactics as "incompatible with basic tenets of peacekeeping". Financial reparations for Somali
civilians who became victims of the fighting were recommend by the report.[28][12]
Criticism of UNOSOM II
Excessive force and human rights abuses
UNOSOM II forces were criticized for various instances of human rights abuses, violations of
international law and excessive force by a wide range of academics, foreign correspondents and
humanitarian organizations.[29][30][31][32] Doctors Without Borders,[33] Human Rights Watch[34] and
Amnesty International[35] would all criticize UNOSOM II on these grounds. Africa Rights Watch and
Doctors Without Borders would both publish detailed reports of abuses by UN forces during the summer
of 1993.[32][36] While conceding UN troops were in a difficult position, the Africa Rights Watch report
would conclude that abuses and atrocities carried out by UNOSOM II force were, "...not cases of
undisciplined actions by individual soldiers, but stem from the highest echelons of the command
structure,"[32]
Some of the most widely criticized events that occurred from 5 June to 3-4 October 1993 include:
US forces fired missiles at Digfer Hospital in Mogadishu on the belief that Aidids forces were hiding in
the buildings, resulting in the deaths of nine patients.[37][32] Africa Rights Watch would assert that the
incident represented a prima-facie case that UN command in Mogadishu had violated the Geneva
Convention.[32]
Pakistani forces fired on two large public demonstrations killing over 20 Somalis, many of whom were
women and children.[38]
US Quick Reaction Force launched the 'Abdi House raid' during a meeting of Somali elders, resulting in
the deaths of at least "60 unresisting civilians" according to Amnesty International.[39][36]
Rony Brauman, then president of Doctors Without Borders, would report that the premises of Action
Against Hunger in Mogadishu, which also housed the Doctors Without Borders team, was attacked by
two US AH-1 Cobra helicopters. Despite the visible Red Cross flags and emblems of both humanitarian
organizations the helicopters fired two missiles and then strafed the compound with machine-gun fire.
One aid worker was killed and serval others were wounded. The incident had occurred because a vehicle
belonging to nearby journalists from the television channel France 2 had seemed suspicious to the
attack helicopters.[40]
In mid-September US AH-1 Cobra helicopters killed nearly 100 Somalis who were in the vicinity of a clash
between the SNA and the 10th Mountain Division using TOW missiles and cannon fire.[41] Children
living in the surrounding neighborhood had also been killed by stray helicopter fire.[42]
Over emphasis on military operations
UNOSOM II was criticized for over emphasizing military operations for a mission that was originally
conceived to be a humanitarian operation. Over 90% of the operations $1.6 billion budget was used for
military or security purposes.[43] In July 1993, UN relief head Jan Eliasson publicly admonished
UNOSOM II for spending 10 times as much on military operations in Somalia than it did on aid. At the
time he would caution that the original objective of sending troops to Somalia was being forgotten.[44]
Legacy
UNOSOM II failed to achieve its main objectives.
Walter Clarke, who was Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in Somalia during Operation
Restore Hope, and Jeffrey Herbst, Associate Professor, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University,
conclude that "The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were
saved. But its mismanagement should be an object lesson for peacekeepers...on other such
missions."[45] This figure is disputed by various other academics and organizations. According the
Refugee Policy Group 10,000 to 25,000 lives had been saved by the intervention, and according to
Professor Alex de Waal the true figure may have been even lower.[37] The CIA would estimate 7,000 to
10,000 Somalis had been killed during the U.S. troops in Somalia,[46] consequently UNOSOM II has been
criticized for possibly killing as many as it saved.[47][37]