Investigation of the Degrees of The Extended Mind Thesis
Contemporary philosophy has always held the mind as separate from the physical contents
of the environment. The demarcation between the mind and the environment gave way to a
dualist opinion when Andy Clark and David Chalmers (Clark and Chalmers 1998) presented an
alternate view of the mind, challenging the traditional boundaries of cognition or, as they
argue, ‘the boundaries of skin and skull’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998). By advocating an ‘active
externalism’ where the environment plays an important role in driving cognitive processes, it
was argued that the environment does not act merely as a prop or an external aid to enable
human action, but instead is a part of the cognitive process. Thus, extending cognition from
the conceived spatial bounds of the mind to the environment. The hypothesis of extended
cognition challenges the traditional demarcation but also contests the hypothesis of
embedded cognition (HEMC), which is thus hypothesized as, ‘cognitive processes depend very
heavily, in hitherto unexpected ways, on organismically external props and devices and on
the structure of the external environment in which cognition takes place’ (Mcclamrock 1999).
A core difference between HEMC and HEC that must be set from the outset of the paper is
that HEMC recognises the environment as an aid to cognition while extended cognition
argues that particular environment aids are not merely aids, but constituents of the cognitive
processes.
However, many concepts that enable the mind to interact with the constituents of the
external environment have been integrated with individual consciousness. Since
consciousness is not the focus of the paper, it is essential to draw a distinction between
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individual consciousness and the mind; however, I shall be talking about the conscious
endorsement of information later in the paper. Consciousness necessitates the originality and
the casuality of thought that is unique to every individual for self-realization of one’s own
autonomy in intentionality of thought and cognizance of interaction with the world.
Additionally, I have defined the mind as:
‘‘the realm which constitutes cognitive processes that produce the physical responses in the
body which demonstrate a comprehension of a person/individual’s cognition (or realization)
of the temporal and spatial domain of the world around her’.
As a proponent of the extended mind, the cognitive processes of the mind can further be
enhanced to include that:
‘the said cognitive processes are themselves understood through a flow of external stimuli
and information from the spatial and temporal continuum of the world that are themselves
crucial or non-inconsequential in the processes, resulting in particular cognitive states that
are the end-products of a utilization of the reservoir of stimuli, information and
environmental cognitive aid available to them’.
Based on these notions, I shall analyze the notion that the mind is not merely confined to the
physical boundaries of skull and skin but must rather be viewed without temporal bounds as
an entity that is cognitively inclusive of the environmental constituents that its evolutionary
opportunistic nature takes the advantage of. The primary condition to be tested is whether
the mutually inclusive cognitive system of the mind and the environment behaves
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functionally similar to a comparable model of the equivalent cognitive processes were they
to occur inside the temporal bounds of the said mind. The cognitive processes associated with
the environment, had they been within the traditionally recognized temporal bounds of the
mind, would have been recognized as genuine cognitive processes. Therefore, said processes,
occurring outside the brain must be recognized as functionally adequate as conventionally
accepted cognitive processes. The premise is ‘external encodings of information can play the
same functional role as that played by internal encodings’ (Rupert 2004). Rupert, however,
disagrees with the idea of functionalism as the leading parameter cited by extended mind
theorists
The primary conditions that Clark offers for a system to be a competent cognitive constituent
of an extended mind stem from his example of Otto’s notebook. Clark and Chalmers present
the following conditions for the existence of a coupled system: constancy, seamless access of
information, trust leading to certain endorsement of the information and conscious pastendorsement of the information (Clark and Chalmers 1998). In my view, these conditions are
insufficient and unsophisticated; therefore, I have been unable to individuate a particular
system to analyse the efficacy of these conditions on. Instead, I have identified three types of
external elements, with different degrees of suitability and compatibility, that will be
considered for the candidacy of the extended mind thesis. The first is offloading or unloading
a particular cognitive capacity or state to an external object, which is the premise Clark and
Chalmers build the Otto case on. Further examples that shall be discussed are the usage of
pen and paper for multiplication. The second will aim to directly engage with the
substitutability of using a prop as a receptor for cognition instead of its biological equivalent
such as an artificial taste receptor for a tongue. The third entails the diffusion of cognition or
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cognitive processes between the traditionally recognised temporal bounds of the mind and
an external ecosystem; for example, Stephen Hawking’s communication device ( I shall come
to its flaws later) or even more pertinently, a hypothetical ‘telepathic wheelchair’. The paper
specifically deals with externalist props, objects and environment and aims to identify
whether they can be functionally internalized and if so, to what extent.
Clark and Chalmers reference the dichotomy between Otto and Inga to demonstrate the
similarities in functionality between an external prop comprising an offloaded cognition and
its biological equivalent. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s and carries a notebook along with him
to note down every piece of information he gains and then refers to the notebook to recall
the information when in need. Inga, on the other hand, has a conventional unaltered human
memory. Since Otto’s notebook serves the function for him that Inga’s internal memory does,
it is argued that the notebook and Otto are part of a cohesive and unified cognitive system,
of which the notebook is not just an aid, but a constituent.
While functionalism would dictate that the initiation and outcome of both processes is
identical, I’d argue that Otto’s notebook, although acting as an external prop, does not suffice
enough conditions to be an extended cognitive system. Otto’s notebook hinders the
dynamism of incorporation of mental representations that Inga’s memory offers upon
recalling the same content. The paradigm upon which this is built on is that a change made
to Inga’s beliefs will also alter the concerned mental state with which the belief is associated.
Any modification made to Inga’s intrinsic content will consequently impact her situational
content, or her situational beliefs. For example, Inga’s mind is susceptible to the notion of
influence. If somehow Inga was to believe that ambition is a chief human goal, then it would
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alter any succeeding beliefs that would emanate from the original ambition belief. The
planting of the newer ambition notional content would alter Inga’s associated mental states
and influence her actions accordingly. It is significant to note here that Inga’s existence as a
being, in pursuit of her goals, would be altered as a change in her intrinsic belief would
automatically have an underlying effect on her mental content. However, Otto’s case seems
to be at a stalemate since changing a line in his notebook will not automatically have an effect
on his mental content. To further explore, let’s assume that Otto writes down in his notebook
that ambition is a chief human goal. Will that not influence his mental states and his actions?
It seems not, because Otto’s notebook simply serves as memory in a similar manner as a
repository of data. He derives or re-enforces his beliefs through accessing the notebook to
satisfy the demand of a particular mental state at a time. If he wants to go to the museum,
he will access the address of the museum in his notebook. It can be reasonably inferred that
a particular mental state monopolizes Otto’s thought and action at a time. Due to the
incapability of storing information (owing to Alzheimer’s), I’d argue that Otto’s energy is
streamlined to focus on one mental state at a time, which consequently renders the fluidity
between mental states redundant. This is because the notebook is a non-conscious entity and
is not able to drive intentionality of thought the same way Inga’s mind does, which does not
allow the automatic ripple effect that Inga’s conscious mind does. An introduction of a belief
in Inga’s notional content, i.e. intrinsic content has a knock-on effect on the associated mental
state, because memory is a fundamental cognitive process that subsumes nearly all significant
cognitive functions including the storage of ‘nonoccurent beliefs’ (Rupert 2004). Inga’s
memory derives its intentionality in thought from the consciousness that empowers the
autonomy to ignite related cognitive processes; however, Otto’s memory is housed in the
notebook, which is a non-conscious entity.
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However, the notebook does fulfil the conditions for a coupled system: it is reliable, a
constant in Otto’s life and seamlessly accessible. In light of the opposition presented above
then, does the extended mind thesis of offloading a solitary cognition to an external aid still
hold? I’d argue that Clark and Chalmers present a rather myopic and underdeveloped view of
extended cognition- Otto’s example is what Rupert would refer to as HEMC and dismiss the
HEC theorists’ hypothesis as simply a ‘re-interpretation of results’ (Rupert 2004).I have noted
above that Otto’s notebook fulfils the three conditions that Clark and Chalmers lay out for a
coupled system in support of the extended mind; however, it is the last criterion of conscious
past-endorsement of information that I shall contest here. It is imperative to identify that
conscious past-endorsement of information requires the entity to possess consciousness, and
it has already been established that Otto’s notebook is a non-conscious entity. Therefore, we
can reasonably conclude that the conscious past-endorsement of information is an internalist
process that occurs within the boundaries of skin and skull. So, if a belief requires conscious
past-endorsement of information, which is ultimately an internalist process, it must be
acknowledged that the individual (in this case Otto) is advantaged by internalist processes
after all. The notebook does not play any role in, as a constituent or otherwise, driving the
cognitive processes required for conscious-past endorsement.
Does the dominance of internal processes in this condition mean that this system is devoid of
an extended mind or a coupled system? I won’t dispute the existence of environmental cues
and aids in the system but will limit the role of the external environmental factors to cues or
aids to just be aids or cues. It is evident that the external prop does not play any role in
stimulating or driving (properties of a constituent of any such system) the cognitive processes
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required in the conscious past-endorsement criteria. However, it would be impulsive to deny
the existence of environmental factors or to deny the existence of some sort of system
altogether. I argue that there is surely an influence of external factors in Otto’s memory
cognition; however, the inadequate fulfilment of the last condition makes me fall short of
calling it a coupled system. Certainly, it is an extended mind, but it is an extended mind that
adheres more to HEMC than HEC, as it does rely on particular external environment
structures, but those external structures are not the constituents of the organismically
internal cognitive processes. Clark and Chalmers present a model of an extended mind, and I
argue that their coupled system falls short of satisfying their own conditions; thus, a rejection
of the extremism of their HEC. The HEC theorists seem to fall to the fallacy that Rupert clearly
illustrates ‘whenever a full understanding of A includes some cognizance of its relations to B,
B is a mereological part of A’ (Rupert 2004). For example, if the failed Bay of Pigs invasion was
one of the factors that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis, it does not mean that the failed invasion
was actually a part of the Crisis. Therefore, it is the failure of the condition and the logical
fallacy that Clark and Chalmers fall prey to, that leads me to agree with Rupert that Otto’s
example of a solitary cognition offloaded to an external prop leans more toward HEMC than
HEC, and hence, a ‘casual re-interpretation of results’ (Rupert 2004).
However, this does not mean that there is a conspicuous lack of extended cognition. I agree
that the phenomenon of extended cognition exists but, in Otto’s case, challenges the design
of his prop and the required conditions, which I think are rudimentary. Let’s now consider
another example of offloading a type of cognition to an external prop- the usage of pen and
paper for multiplication. In this case, I’d argue that the cognitive processes of multiplication
occur in the neural networks in the brain which manifest themselves in the form of writing on
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paper. Still, the opportunistic property of the mind is relevant, as the mind adapts to the usage
of paper as a constituent of calculation while the cognition of multiplication occurs within the
neural networks. The cognitive processes associated with multiplication are offloaded on to
the pen and paper that manifests itself in the form of writing. Is this a mere input-output
system or instead an extension of the mind?
I’d argue that this system does act as a unified and whole cognitive, coupled system wherein
the stream of information is internalized in a way that the behavioural competence of the
mind drops significantly if the external props are taken away. In such a case, it could be
reasonably assumed that the mind would alter its pattern of thought. For example, a student,
having used a pen and paper for multiplication ever since she learnt multiplication, asked to
instead perform a mental calculation of the multiplication of two very large numbers would
surely experience a drop in competence or lose cognitive ability, which seems to be in sync
with Clark and Chalmers view that if the external component were to be removed, the
behavioural competence of the system would drop (Clark and Chalmers 1998). It is imperative
to note here that the usage of pen and paper does not generate the same processes that
would have been used otherwise. Since the prop has been internalized, its manipulation
results in an establishment of new or different ‘representations’ and not processes.
Unconsciously, the internalized constituent establishes its unique set of informational flow
between the mind, consequent motor skills and the environment such that removing the
external component forces the individual to abandon that particular unique path of cognition.
Since the only learnt path of cognition is with the external prop, there is no alternative and
the system’s competence will be expected to drop. Why though, one might ask, can an equally
competent alternate path of cognition not be developed by the mind again?
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The ambiguous condition of the conscious past-endorsement of information provides the
answer yet again; however, the case of consciousness is different here. A student believes
she can perform the calculation 2376 x 18948, albeit with difficulty, with the usage of the
external prop. She has engaged in this action in the past and therefore, consciously endorses
this route of cognition that her mind has created with the prop. Since the student’s
opportunistic mind has always developed the cognition in sync with the external prop, she
consciously endorses this path of cognition and is unaware of any other route of cognition
that may have been developed or not. Now, if the external prop is taken away and the student
is asked to perform the calculation of 2376 x 18948 mentally, the most probable answer
would be that she cannot perform the calculation. Due to the fact that the path of cognition
that the mind has always determined is with the external prop, neither has the student
developed nor is she conscious of the cognitive capabilities and processes that mental
calculation requires. The removal of the external prop not only results in a drop in behavioural
competence, but also affects the cognitive state related to the student’s mind. ‘Let’s perform
this calculation’ does not automatically transform to the cognitive state of ‘I am performing
this calculation’ if the calculation is not performed with pen and paper and does not trigger
those unique set of independent processes. This example is, in fact, applicable to the general
population as well who will not consciously endorse the belief that the calculation 2376 x
18948 can be performed mentally; however, if there were to be a universal absence of pen
and paper or any calculative aid, the mind would be adaptive to the mental calculation path
of cognition and though it cannot be quantified with certainty that this calculation would be
as seamlessly performed as it is with the prop, it certainly would be relatively easier.
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There are instances of mathematicians such as Shakuntala Devi outperforming a
supercomputer in the multiplication of two 10-digit numbers (Siddique 2013). While this is an
extreme mastery of mathematical abilities, the key theme that I’d like to highlight is that the
conscious endorsement of past information or, in our case, of a route of cognition drives a
unique set of processes that are exclusive only to that particular system. Therefore, a
hindrance in such a system compels the mind to discard that route of cognition. The removal
of the prop from the extended system does not lead to a drop in behavioural competence,
per se, as much as the lack of an alternative route of cognition does, which is either inchoate
or never has been consciously endorsed in the past. Conversely, this trope does re-iterate the
significance of the externalist prop to the extended system and due to this, I’ll be obliged to
agree with Clark’s phenomenon of an extended mind in this case.
The conscious past-endorsement of information does not hold true in Otto’s case since the
act of endorsement required in Otto is a solely internalist process that agrees more with
HEMC than HEC. I have argued that the pen and paper have been internalized due to the nonconscious access that makes the student resort to this path of cognition without being
conscious of the route of cognition. However, Otto’s case is different since he is always
conscious of the method of access to his information. Inga, conversely, does not require any
awareness of the neural location of her memory from which she sources the address.
Moreover, Otto’s book creates complications in cases of belief changes, as argued earlier.
Therefore, even if the book is easily accessible, the means of accessing the information is
conscious for Otto, which does not let the book qualify as being transparent.
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Having discussed the first system of offloading cognition to an externalist prop, I now turn to
the second system I have identified for the paper- testing the substitutability of a prop as a
receptor for cognition to its biological equivalent for which I shall consider an artificial taste
receptor instead of the tongue. It must be assumed from the outset that the person, say Itta,
has never experienced any taste that has not been relayed to the mind by the taste receptor.
Consequently, Itta’s cognitive, mental and biological states are associated with taste
reception through the taste receptor. Even though the taste receptor may or not work like a
human tongue, there will be no difference in the properties of taste through the taste
receptor and as experienced by a person with a normal human tongue. The receptor as an
aid in the form of the taste receptor seems to be a constituent of taste reception. However,
to ascertain whether the taste receptor is actually a part of a coupled system and satisfies the
conditions for active externalism, it would be prudent to examine the active externalism, if
any, exhibited by its biological component- the tongue. To elucidate the process, I’d like to
adopt the converse view which would state that if the biological component does not exhibit
active externalism, it would be akin to advocating an extremely internalist cognitivist school
of thought wherein the computations occur only in the mind. For this to be true, any stimulus
would simply be an initiation for input for the sensory biological components to relay
consequent impulses to the mind, which are processed only in the mind for it to finally yield
a response. Thus, if the converse hypothesis is to be true, it denotes that the sensory
biological components should not, in any form, influence the cognitive processes or abilities,
which Clark says is reducing such a system to a mere ‘input-output’ system (Clark and
Chalmers 1998).
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However, studies by a group of psychologists have shown that injecting BTX to paralyze
specific face muscles ‘slowed the reading of sentences that described situations that normally
require the paralyzed muscle for expressing the emotions evoked by the sentences’ (Havas,
et al. 2010). The facial muscles may not relay sensory impulses but are actively involved in
forming the response while it is assumed that cognitive processes occur inside the mind. By
associating facial feedback with emotional cognition, Havas et al. have shown that a change
to the physical components consequently affects cognitive processes as well. Therefore, the
physical components cannot be reduced to mere executors and receptors but rather are
constituents of the cognitive processes that justifies a coupled system. Hence, the artificial
taste receptor (that transparently replaces the tongue) as well as the normal human tongue
will be identified as cognitive constituents.
The second system that I have identified is peculiar where an external prop (artificial taste
receptor) is transparent, seamless, reliable, a cognitive constituent and has been consciously
endorsed in the past, yet it is not an extended mind system. While it has been established
that the biological components are constituents of the cognitive processes, it is certainly not
enough to establish an extended mind. This is simply because the cognitive process is
unmoved from its original location, which is the neural location itself. The reason is
straightforward and an exploration of this system lays to rest claims (that extreme HEC
theorists may resort to) of calling, for example, a prosthetic arm an extended mind system. A
prosthetic arm is part of a cognitive response rather than a part of the cognitive process since
the cognitive state of ‘I want to raise my hand’ is distinct from ‘I am raising my hand’. On the
other hand, the cognitive state of ‘I want to taste’ automatically transforms to ‘I am tasting’.
I attribute this difference in compatibility to the degree of intensity of the cognitive
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extensions, but both of these extensions can be said to not be extended mind systems.
Reverting to our original case of the artificial taste receptor, it is intriguing to note that it is a
constituent of the cognitive process and it forms a semblance of a coupled system with the
mind, albeit not a coupled system as Clark uses it. Despite these characteristics, the system
falls well short of being called an extended mind system, as explained above.
So far, the paper has discussed two types of systems as candidates for the extended mindoffloading a unique cognition to an external prop and testing the substitutability of a prop to
its biological equivalent. I now turn to the third type of system I have identified which entails
the diffusion of cognition between an external prop and the mind. This system is the only
system in the paper that has had to be hypothesized, but it presents the most insightful
interpretation of the extended mind hypothesis as the site of cognitive processes does not
remain limited to its physical boundaries. Stephen Hawking’s communication device by Intel
(Hawking n.d.) perhaps comes the closest toward incorporating such a system of an extended
mind; however, it falls short because it merely makes use of sensory technology to relay
Hawking’s words. In other words, the device acts as a facilitator of communication and
therefore, is not a constituent of cognitive processes. Moreover, there is an alternate route
of cognition (that which results in verbal communication), which is only inaccessible due to
Hawking’s diagnosis of motor neurone disease. Since the device entered the system after
Hawking had developed and was proficient in the verbal communication route of cognition,
it cannot be said that the loss of the device would lead to a loss of behavioural competence.
The cognition still occurs but it is only the disease that hinders Hawking from elaborating it
into a response. However, what if such a device- the only form of communication known to
an individual- could read the individual’s neural impulses and channel them into direct
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communication on the screen and in speech? I’d argue that in such a case the device would
be a perfectly coupled system as it would have seamless transfer of information, reliability,
constancy and a conscious past-endorsement of information and the route of cognition. It
can be reasonably construed that a permutation of such conditions in an individual does not
exist.
Therefore, I shall analyse the hypothetical example of a telepathic wheelchair and put it to
the test of substitutability to determine the degree of transparency to which such an
extended mind system can be replaced by its biological counterparts and whether they can
have the same degree of efficiency in the realization of mental structures. Such a wheelchair
would work in a way that a non-vocalized command of ‘right’ would move the wheelchair
right as long as the wheelchair was programmed to identify with the independent set of
processes associated with cognizing the movement rightwards. It is evident that such a
telepathic wheelchair would be the ideal extended mind system as the prop would be
completely internalized due to seamless access of information, constancy and reliability.
However, it is in a scenario in which the person is somehow able to walk again that the true
internalization of the wheelchair with the person stands out. The mind has never
implemented any cognitive process in which the motor skills of the legs are required. The
cognitive state of ‘wanting to move rightward’ was manifested by simply thinking ‘move right’
without any form of conscious contact with the wheelchair. The wheelchair has been
internalized to an extent that the person has no conscious past-endorsement of any cognitive
state related to locomotion via the legs. The cognitive process of a change in spatial location
of the person has been, in part offloaded to the wheelchair, which satisfies all the conditions
to form a perfectly coupled system.
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Having individuated and discussed the three systems I initially laid out, where does that leave
us with the HEC? The first conclusion I’d like to assert is that the paper concedes that there is
a degree of extension of mind into the environment; however, those varying degrees are
precisely the reason I individuated and critiqued upon systems separately. Using the criterion
of conscious past-endorsement of information, the first system of offloading a special
cognition to an external prop yielded varying results. Otto’s case leans more toward HEMC
(environmental cues) than HEC due to the innate internalist nature in conscious pastendorsement of information. Also, offloading memory as a solitary cognition does not bode
well since memory is a fundamental cognitive process that subsumes many other systems.
Therefore, memory incarcerated in a non-conscious entity will not allow the individual
conscious ripple effects when a belief change is introduced. Moreover, Otto’s book had
reduced transparency since he was conscious of the means of access to information. On the
other hand, the second example of the first system generated an intriguing conclusion which
stated that not only is a pen and paper a coupled system, but the drop in behavioural
competence is predominantly due to the lack of conscious past-endorsement of an alternate
route of cognition. Further, the paper even yielded a case where the external prop- artificial
taste receptor- satisfied all the conditions for being part of an extended mind system yet did
not qualify as a coupled system due to the location of the cognition being the neural network.
This perfectly encapsulates my initial statements of calling Clark and Chalmers conditions for
coupling myopic and underdeveloped. Finally, it was a hypothetical example of a telepathic
wheelchair- distribution of cognition between the mind and the external prop- that adhered
to the ideal model of a coupled system or an extended mind system.
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While I may have critiqued Clark and Chalmers in the paper, I still am a proponent of the
mind’s extension into the environment. The HEC theorists may have presented an
underdeveloped set of conditions for a coupled system but this does not defy the extension
of mind into the environment in any way. However, the dominantly observed extension is
HEMC which focuses on environmental cues rather than the environment acting as a
constituent of the cognitive process. A particular case where Clark’s coupled system may be
seen is in a few cases in the system of offloading cognition to an external prop. However, as
depicted in the paper, the ideal coupled system is certainly one where there is a distribution
of cognition.
If Clark’s hypothesis is accepted into popular discourse and universally accepted, it has the
potential to add a new paradigm to our thought process. For example, will active externalism
be applicable even for Artificial Intelligence (AI)? If yes, then with the environment being
integral to an entity’s behavioural competence, won’t the AI be pigeon-holed in a virtual
physical space so as to maintain its competence? I consider this particular question for AI
because unlike humans, AI does not have a physical space to occupy. What exactly is the
environment of the program in which the AI is housed? These are all pertinent questions to
which, I have to concede, I do not have answers yet, but they surely do open up avenues for
new schools of thought.
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Bibliography
Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. 1998. "The Extended Mind." Oxford Journals 58 (1): 7-19.
Mcclamrock, Ron. 1999. "Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World."
Philosphy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 537-541.
Rupert, Robert D. 2004. "Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition." The Journal
of Philosophy 101 (8): 389-428.
Siddique, Ashik. 2013. 'Human Computer' Shakuntala Devi Dies: How Did She Become a
Mathematical Savant? April 24. Accessed December 11, 2019.
https://www.medicaldaily.com/human-computer-shakuntala-devi-dies-how-did-shebecome-mathematical-savant-245252.
Havas, David A., Arthur M. Glenberg, Karol A. Gutowski, Mark J. Lucarelli, and Richard J.
Davidson. 2010. "Cosmetic Use of Botulinum Toxin-A Affects Processing of Emotional
Language." Psychological Science 21 (7): 895-900.
Hawking, Stephen. n.d. My Computer. Accessed December 7, 2019.
http://www.hawking.org.uk/the-computer.html.
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