Communication Theory ISSN 1050–3293
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Drew B. Margolin
Department of Communication, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA
This article derives a theory of informative fictions (TIF). Common forms of misinformation—
fake news, rumors, and conspiracy theories—while dysfunctional for communicating
property information—information about the state and operation of things—can
actually be valuable for communicating character information—information about
the motivations of social agents. It is argued that narratives containing “false facts”
can effectively portray a speaker’s theory of another individual’s character. Thus, such
narratives are useful for gathering information about leaders and other important
individuals who are evaluated in the community. After deriving the theory, TIF is used
to derive propositions predicting the empirical conditions under which misinformation
will be accepted, tolerated or promoted. The implications of the theory for addressing the
normative problem of misinformation are also discussed.
Keywords: Misinformation, False News, Rumors, Theory of Mind, Narrative, Embodied
Cognition
doi:10.1093/ct/qtaa002
Misinformation—including fake news, rumors, and conspiracy theories—has been
studied and theorized by social scientists for over a century (Garrett, 2011; Guess,
Nagler, & Tucker, 2019; Knapp, 1944; Sherover, 1915; Uscinski, 2017). This body
of research indicates that misinformation is often “preferred” to true information.
For example, false rumors are readily created (Knapp, 1944), false news is often
shared more than true news (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018), and individuals retain
false beliefs even after being corrected (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, &
Cook, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Thorson, 2016). Despite these tendencies, misinformation is not always preferred. Rather, it appears to be a contingent form of
dysfunction. For example, individuals are often aware that misinformation is actually
false (Bullock, Gerber, Hill, & Huber, 2015) and will abandon it when corrected by
Corresponding author: Drew B. Margolin; e-mail: dm658@cornell.edu
714
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press
on behalf of International Communication Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:
journals.permissions@oup.com
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
The Theory of Informative Fictions: A
Character-Based Approach to False News and
other Misinformation
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
715
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
friends or provided with related stories (Bode & Vraga, 2015; Margolin, Hannak, &
Weber, 2018).
This raises the question: what are the boundary conditions for the preference for
misinformation? Why is it tolerated, accepted, and promoted in some situations, or
by certain individuals, and not others? While current theories identify many causes of
misinformation acceptance: the presence of particular emotions (Allport & Postman,
1947; Weeks, 2015), the use of particular thinking styles (Pennycook & Rand, 2019;
Schwarz, Newman, & Leach, 2016), prior biases (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017;
Lewandowsky et al., 2012), and individual predispositions (Bessi et al., 2015; Garrett
& Weeks, 2017; Grinberg, Joseph, Friedland, Swire-Thompson, & Lazer, 2019; Guess
et al., 2019), these theories approach misinformation as an anomaly to be explained,
rather than as a derivable outcome of a general communication theoretic problem.
As such, they tend to provide useful proximate explanations for the prevalence of
misinformation, but are limited in their ability to articulate conditions that would
alter this prevalence.
One approach to understanding misinformation’s contingent preference is that, in
certain circumstances, its function may outweigh its destructive impact. For example,
if there were more than one kind of valuable information, such that individuals would
always face a communication trade-off in having to decide which was more important
to convey, then “misinformation”—inaccurate information of one form—would be an
expected outcome of situations where communicating the other form was prioritized.
The preference for this kind of misinformation would then be predictable from the
conditions that heighten the value or necessity of this other kind of information.
This article proposes one such theory, the theory of informative fictions (TIF).
TIF argues that individuals gather and communicate two valuable yet distinct kinds
of information: property information, which describes events, states, and mechanisms
that pertain to “objects,” that is, entities that they perceive lack agency, and character
information, which describes the motivations and perspectives of “agents,” that is,
entities individuals perceive to be capable of making choices. TIF argues that different
communicative forms more effectively facilitate the communication of each kind
of information. Property information is more effectively communicated through
propositions and arguments; character information is more effectively communicated through stories. Because of this distinction, individuals can use inaccurate
property misinformation (e.g., describe fictitious events) to more effectively narrate
stories that communicate accurate character information. Thus, in conditions where
individuals prioritize character information they may construct or tolerate narratives
that rely on false claims.
TIF does not justify the use of misinformation, as the spread and acceptance
of inaccurate property information remains dangerous irrespective of the benefits
these narratives may provide. Nor does TIF purport to explain all incidences of
misinformation. Rather, TIF provides a theoretical framework that synthesizes many
findings about misinformation while pointing to additional, testable predictions
(Rosenbaum, 2017).
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
Theoretical foundation—assumptions, definitions, and outline
Assumptions
Key concepts and definitions
The TIF begins with a distinction between two kinds of entities: objects and agents.
Toulmin describes the distinction as follows:
There is one kind of knowledge that we typically arrive at on the basis of our
reciprocal dealings with our fellow human agents ( . . . ) and there is another
kind of knowledge that we typically arrive at on the basis of our dealings with
“insensate” physical objects, with which our relations go only one way. (Toulmin,
1982, p. 241)
As Toulmin suggests, when individuals perceive they are in a relationship with an
entity, they think about it differently (Burgoon & Hale, 1984). Individuals act on
objects and agents, but agents also act back on individuals. Agents have a mind
of their own that includes goals, motivations, and the ability to strategically and
creatively plan actions, including the manipulation of other agents, to achieve those
goals (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Reiss, 2004).
TIF does not insist that individuals make sharp, distinct classifications of objects
vs. agents. Rather, it suggests that the extent to which they perceive an entity has
agency—the ability to make choices based on motivations and plans—influences the
decisions they make and the information they seek in reference to it. To the extent to
which an individual believes they are interacting with an object, they will be described
as facing execution decisions for which they seek property information (“What is this
thing? How does it behave?”). Examples of execution decisions include deciding
what to eat, what to wear based on the weather, how to repair a machine. To the
extent to which an individual believes they are interacting with an agent, they will
be described as facing relational decisions for which they seek character information
(“Who is this agent? How do they behave?”). Examples include deciding whether to
trust another individual to fulfill an exchange, commit to a friendship, rely on another
for information, or empower a political leader.
Accurately gathering both kinds of information and appropriately making both
kinds of decisions is essential as individuals must successfully interact with both
716
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
TIF rests on two premises that are not justified within the theory itself. The first is that
the communication is functional, meaning that individuals try to gather the kind of
information that would be beneficial to improving decisions. The assumption is not
that individuals are perfect maximizers, only that they possess a sufficiently functional inclination to gather and communicate information they believe is valuable.
The theory also assumes that individuals both seek information relevant to their
own decisions and communicate information they believe will help others make
effective decisions. This communication can be self-interested, such as sharing information to influence political decisions that impact the individual, or altruistic, such as
advising a friend (Kümpel, Karnowski, & Keyling, 2015; Yuan, Fulk, & Monge, 2007).
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Theory of informative fictions
The thesis of TIF is that message construction inherently creates a competition
between property information and character information. I will demonstrate that
this competition is logically possible and functionally likely through the following argument: (a) to be functionally effective, character information is gathered
and processed differently from property information, (b) character information
is communicated differently from property information, and (c) because of these
differences, inaccurate property claims can be used to enhance the communication
of accurate character portrayals.
The gathering and processing of character information
This section will demonstrate that the kind of information needed to make effective
relational decisions (character information) differs from the kind needed to make
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
717
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
the physical and social worlds (Campbell, 1965; Tetlock, 2002). The assessment of
any particular object or agent is subjective, however, meaning what is an execution
decision for some can be a relational decision for others (Garrett & Weeks, 2017).
For example, some see the economy as an autonomous system (an object), while
others view it as orchestrated by agents (Leiser, Duani, & Wagner-Egger, 2017).
Some see decisions about climate change to be purely executional—"what to do
about physical properties (rising temperature) of the world?” Others appear to see
them as relational—"do I trust the motives of the agents who seek the power to
address climate change?” (Feine, 2012; Jones, 2010). These subjective differences
result from a number of differences, including life experience, culture, as well as
social systems that delineate specialization and delegation of expertise (Yuan et al.,
2007) and responsibility (Fox & Shotts, 2009).
Real world decisions also often contain a mixture of both aspects. When the
American public was asked its opinion on whether to invade Iraq in 2003, the decision
had executional aspects, such as: “would the invasion neutralize Iraq’s military
capability?”; “would many American soldiers die?”; as well as relational aspects,
such as “would President Bush use his authority judiciously?”; “would Saddam
Hussein become more (or less) aggressive if war were declared?” Similarly, the U.K.’s
2016 Brexit referendum included executional aspects: “will new trade arrangements
increase the price of goods?”; and relational aspects: “what kind of policies will EU
leaders choose to impose on Britain in the future?”
To maintain clarity, this article will refer to assertions of property information as
claims. The statement “Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)”
is a claim. Verified claims will be called facts. Assertions about of character information will be called portrayals. The statement “Saddam Hussein wants WMDs” is a
portrayal. A summary of these terms, as well as definitions and examples of related
concepts from the main argument, are provided in Table 1.
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Information required
Entity type
Definition: Information about the choice-making
tendencies of agents
Assumption: Behavior is Governed by Mind, Body
Dynamics
Definition: Information about events, states, and behavior
of objects
Assumption: Behavior is Law-Like
Continued
Character Information
Property Information
Definition: Entity perceived to possess strategic, creative
intelligence
Definition: Entity perceived to lack strategic, creative
intelligence
Theoretical Importance: Must account for possibility of
manipulation
Examples:
Trusting an information source about a
tool/technology/treatment
Hiring a colleague/employee
Electing a representative
Theoretical Importance: Does not account for possibility of
manipulation
Examples:
Use of physical tools/technology
Use of medical treatment
Setting a department policy
Setting a tax or tariff
Agent
Explanation: Whether to trust and expose oneself to
decisions of social agents
Explanation: How to interact with objects
Object
Relational decisions
Decision Type
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
718
Execution decisions
Table 1 Theory of Informative Fictions: Summary of Concepts
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
Means of Communication: Evoking
Justification: Through transportation, identification and
empathy, narratives enable evocation of character’s mind
and body state in the mind and body of listener for
evaluation
Means of Communication: Encoding
Justification: Rigid and precise rules of language and
inference mimic law-like mechanisms that govern objects,
enabling inferences from individual observations statements
to general theories
Definition: Statements that entail implications via logical
Definition: Presentations of characters and events that
combinations of rules for: (a) applying terms, (b) connecting describe: (a) characters’ choices, (b) characters’ motives
terms
and perspectives when facing these events and making
these choices
Narratives/Stories
Operational Definition:
Accurate (Inaccurate) Portrayals
Operational Definition:
True (False) Claims
Propositions/Arguments
Relational decisions
Execution decisions
Decision Type
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Functional messaging
Table 1 Continued
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
719
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
720
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
effective execution decisions (property information), or, in other words, that it is
neither typical nor functional for individuals to build knowledge of agents using the
typical and functional methods used to build knowledge of objects.
Recall that objects are defined as entities perceived to lack the ability to make
choices. Thus if the behavior of an object is to be predicted, it must have stable (if not
yet known) properties that make its behavior consistent across time and space within
definable conditions (Popper, 2003). In formal science, this assumption is articulated
as search for “laws” (Popper, 2003). Consistent with this assumption, inferences to
the properties of objects are based on rigid rules. Observations should be encoded
in defined vocabulary that enable logical connections to constructs and principles
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Though scientists and others gathering property
information do not always follow it, this process describes an ideal (Kuhn, 1996).
For gathering information about agents, however, this ideal does not apply. First,
by definition, agents are believed to be capable of choices. Motives of agents can
be conditional on the agent’s (unobservable) internal state (Reiss, 2004). Agents
can also reach goals through strategic planning, creating instrumental motives to
induce particular conclusions (Ellison, Heino, & Gibbs, 2006; Reiss, 2004). Thus,
assuming that an agent will follow discoverable rules leaves an individual vulnerable
to exploitation, as the agent can produce patterns that logically compel inferences
that support their advantage (Corter & Gluck, 1992). For example, a politician
could create a fact pattern that shows that they have always supported a specific
constituency, inductively compelling that constituency’s loyalty only to exploit it later
(Fiske & Durante, 2014). Thus, the best practices for gathering property information
can lead individuals astray when gathering character information.
Consistent with this claim, research shows that individuals typically deviate from
scientific inference strategies when assessing other agents. First, they use inputs
that are not classifiable into well-defined constructs that enable logical connections. Instead, they rely substantially on paralinguistic cues and other forms of
relational signals that are difficult to describe in well-defined terms (Burgoon & Hale,
1984; Pfau, 2002). Individuals believe paralinguistic cues such as body language,
facial expression, and tone of voice reflect intentions (Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014;
Lewkowicz, Delevoye-Turrell, Bailly, Andry, & Gaussier, 2013). Paralinguistic signals
are also difficult to advantageously curate because they are hard to control (Walther,
Van Der Heide, Hamel, & Shulman, 2009).
Second, there is evidence that the cognitive process through which these inferences take place is imaginative rather than logical. Cognitive theorists argue that
individuals predict the behavior of agents using a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985), meaning they “impute mental states to [themselves] and others”
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515). Individuals build theories of (agents) minds
using imagination and perspective taking, particularly through simulations (Hurley,
2008). According to this research, “people employ imagination, mental pretense, or
perspective taking (‘putting oneself in the other person’s shoes’) to determine others’
mental states” (Shanton & Goldman, 2010, p. 1).
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Communicating character information
This section will demonstrate that the most effective forms for communicating
character information are distinct from the most effective forms for communicating
property information. Specifically, it will demonstrate that while property information is functionally communicated through logical arguments, character information
is functionally communicated through evocative narratives.
As described above, property information is the basis for predicting the behavior
of entities believed to be behave according to discoverable rules or “laws.” Thus,
when an individual (a speaker) wishes to communicate their predictions to another
(an audience) they can most effectively do so by demonstrating the rule-based
relationship between observations and mechanisms. This process is facilitated by
encoding observations and higher order principles into propositions using welldefined vocabulary that can be connected via logic (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Popper,
2003). For example, the economic implications of Brexit can be predicted from
economic theory, but such predictions are contingent on defining what “Brexit”
means in legal and policy terms.
Logical arguments are not as well suited to communicating character information,
however. First, the speaker’s imagination of the target agent’s character may have
been built from a variety of inputs, such as paralinguistic cues or empathic reactions
that cannot be accurately encoded into defined vocabulary. For example, Cramer
(2016) reports on rural Wisconsites comparing their impressions of Barack Obama
and Hillary Clinton during the 2008 presidential primary. One individual says “he’s
[Obama] more down to earth ( . . . ) Hillary is up here, she’s a multimillionaire.”
Another interviewee concurs “She’s got that air around her. That aura. That ‘I’m
better than you are.’ She doesn’t seem genuine.” (Cramer, 2016, p. 183). These terms
(“air around,” “aura”) convey information, but are difficult to define and confirm.
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
721
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
This imaginative process conjectures the future behavior of others through simulations that include vivid images or acutely felt mental or bodily states but which
do not require logical deduction (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009). For example, sensing
that an agent is irritated could lead to the inference that they will become impatient
with social interaction. This inference can be built from gathering paralinguistic
cues, imagining the agent’s state of mind, and then imagining one’s own response
in that state of mind. This state of mind does not need to be categorized so that a
logical principle (“irritation → impatience”) can be called on. This flexibility permits
imagination to gather information through empathy (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989),
making it possible to draw conclusions from observing agents’ reactions to unique
situations (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009).
Taken together, these arguments indicate that requiring individuals to understand
agents using property inference rules would be neither easy, as it not typical, nor
functional, as it requires restricting inputs for the sake of a process (logical inference)
that is not well suited to the task.
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
722
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
For example, what facts could arbitrate a test as to whether there is an “air around”
Clinton?
More broadly, even if such claims could be proven, deriving predictions from
them follows more easily from imagining what Clinton is thinking than from logical
deductions derived from the category. The individual makes a leap here, from “I’m
better” to “not genuine,” an inference that is difficult to arrive at logically. However,
the former statement (“I’m better”) may portray Clinton as having motives that, in the
context of seeking power, suggest the latter (“not genuine”) (Fiske & Durante, 2014;
Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011).
If a speaker wishes to communicate their predictive model of the agent’s behavior,
they must communicate their imagination of who the agent is, that is, their theory of
the agent’s mind. Communicating this imagination is not dependent on sharing rules
for applying vocabulary, but rather on conveying images, perspectives, emotions and
other aspects that contribute to each individual’s simulation of the agent’s character.
Thus, for a speaker to communicate the ability to predict an agent’s behavior, they
must find a way to “evoke” their theory of the agent’s mind in the imagination of the
audience (Mar, Oatley, Djikic, & Mullin, 2011).
How can this evocation—imbuing the audience’s imagination with the speaker’s
theory—be achieved? One way is via impersonation. In impersonation, the speaker
performs paralinguistic cues and situational reactions that induce the audience into
the appropriate imaginative state, essentially proclaiming “I imagine/simulate the
agent like this,” a technique common in satire of important personages (Baumgartner,
Morris, & Walth, 2012). However, these direct evocations depend on speakers and
audiences having visual and/or auditory access to one another placing limitations
on scale.
Another effective and more scale-able method of communicating theories of
mind is narrated stories. The usefulness of narratives for communicating character
information is documented in disparate literatures (Boyd, 2018; Fisher, 1984; Smith
et al., 2017). Across cultures, storytelling is a preferred genre for communicating
gossip (Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Dunbar, 2004; Kniffin & Wilson, 2005).
That is, when individuals wish to convey information to construct the reputation of
other human agents, they tell stories about them. There is also evidence that attending
to stories improves the ability to make character inferences, as those who read literary
fiction have enhanced abilities for imagining the minds of others (Bal & Veltkamp,
2013; Oatley, 2016).
What gives stories an advantage in communicating character information? First,
narratives stimulate the audience’s imagination, creating vivid images and senses of
situations, thus directly engaging the relevant process for predicting agent behavior
(Mar et al., 2011; Oatley, 2012, 2016) Second, while there is no single, dominant
definition of narrative, the concept is generally agreed to encompass an event
(or series of events) that require choices by characters (Fisher, 1984; Mar et al.,
2011). Thus, narratives target the critical component of character information
(choices).
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Accuracy of character information vs. accuracy of property information
If character information is more effectively communicated through evocative stories,
there is a possibility that the most evocative stories, in terms of their ability to
reproduce the sense of character imagined by the speaker in the mind of the audience,
are not the most factual stories, in terms of their reference to real events and properties
of the world. For example, during the Brexit campaign a highly shared story was
entitled “Major leak from Brussels reveals NHS will be KILLED OFF if Britain
remains in the EU” (Chadwick, Vaccari, & Loughlin, 2018). As a prediction about
the future of the NHS, this claim may have limited predictive value. As a story that
evokes a model of the EU’s motives regarding Britain, however, it is precise and vivid.
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
723
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Audiences’ processing of stories also focuses on the perspectives and motives
of these characters. Audiences identify with characters, sharing their perspective
(Cohen, 1998; Murphy, Frank, Chatterjee, & Baezconde-Garbanati, 2013). They are
often also “transported” into the action where it is experienced as partly real (Mar
et al., 2011; Shapiro & Kim, 2012), increasing their ability to take the perspective of
the characters, experiencing the action as though it were happening to them.
Finally, narratives can convey precise information without requiring precise
vocabulary (Fisher, 1984). For example, as Mar et al. describe “Having already evoked
sadness in a reader, a writer need only describe a character looking off in the distance
for the reader to infer a sense of forlornness” (p. 828). The speaker and audience
do not need to share a precise vocabulary (e.g., the word “forlorn,” which may itself
be insufficient) from which to build logical inferences. Rather, they must share the
appropriate images and feelings to conduct similar simulations.
For these reasons, a narrative should be better than a proposition or argument at
conveying a speaker’s model for predicting an agent’s behavior. Whereas an argument
must convert all of the paralinguistic information and imagined senses of the speaker
into a defined vocabulary ready for logical connection, the narrative can directly
evoke, in the mind and body of the audience, the motives and perspectives necessary
to predict the agent’s behavior.
For example, Lepore (2018) recounts a campaign biography’s telling of how Abraham Lincoln used to “walk for miles” to the Illinois legislature (p. 288). This story
evokes a rich, predictive sense of his character, in many way foreshadowing Lincoln’s
leadership during the Civil War. This character could be described in propositional
terms: “Lincoln is humble, has endurance, is committed to democracy.” However,
these broad characterizations do not seem to capture the unique qualities that predict
Lincoln’s conduct.
As these arguments and examples illustrate, there is a trade-off between communicating for logical deduction and communicating for imaginative simulation. Whereas
the former demands arguments comprised of defined terms with logical connections,
the latter demands evocative images and scenarios that portray motivations and
perspectives related to choices (Shapiro & Chock, 2003) and transport the audience
into the situation (Mar et al., 2011).
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
724
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
It evokes the image of the European Commission as a ruthless entity that “wants” or
“seeks” to undo British government programs. Can the latter be true even though the
former is false?
To reiterate, within TIF the goal is prediction of future behavior (of objects, of
agents). For property inferences, false claims undermine predictive accuracy. This
is because inference via logical deduction assumes that the true properties of the
world are all consistent with one another (Popper, 2003). Lincoln himself denied the
story cited above, that he used to walk to the legislature, writing in the margin of the
biography “no harm, if true; but, in fact, not true. L.” (Lepore, 2018, p. 288). Thus,
historians who took the claims in this story to be true could be misled about the
historical properties of mid-19th -century Illinois or Lincoln’s early life (e.g., how far
he lived from the legislature).
When an agent’s behavior is predicted from imagination, however, there is no
need for logical consistency with the true properties of the outside world. Fisher
(1984) argues that a story need not be true but simply be realistic, that is, have
narrative fidelity, meaning that it evokes an imagined world the audience recognizes
is consistent with their own experience. The story about Lincoln is a claim about
his mind, only, and what is relevant is only that it could plausibly be true. Even
contradictory stories can be reconciled with plausible states of mind, as individuals
can have conflicted motivations (Reiss, 2004).
If an audience is interested in predicting Lincoln’s behavior as an agent, the
accuracy of the story depends on whether it evokes a theory of Lincoln’s mind that
leads their imagination to accurately predict his behavior, not whether the property
claims in the story are true. This does not mean that all stories are accurate portrayals
of character, or that facts are irrelevant to judging character. The point is only that
the claims in the story can be false without distorting the accuracy of the character
portrayal. The fiction that Lincoln walked to the legislature can be true in predicting
his behavior—who Lincoln is—even if it is false in fact—what he actually did.
Consistent with this, studies of narrative show that individuals can learn from
stories they know not to be true. Individuals can learn to make more precise and
accurate assessments of real people and relational decisions from reading fictional
literature (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Carroll, 2018; Oatley, 2012, 2016). For example,
Jasinski (1993) shows how the fictional film The Big Chill reveals truths about the
social world.
It is difficult to identify stories about real agents where the truth value of both
character portrayals and property claims can be assessed. Character portrayals do
not afford logical deductions and so are not testable in a formal sense (Popper,
2003). Nonetheless, Kapferer’s (1989) study of the “leaflet of Villejuif ” provides a
useful, detailed example where both character and property information have been
substantially corroborated. The leaflet was a document that claimed to show the
results of secret tests of major corporate food products, conducted at the Hospital of
Villejuif (in France), which revealed that these products are carcinogenic. This story
was fake. No such tests were run, and the results were fictional. However, the portrayal
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
725
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
of the food companies’ character, as evoked by the story, as places that conduct and
hide the results of “secret” tests, was basically accurate. In particular, Kapferer shows
that many of the companies did not wish to dispute the memo’s veracity in public
for fear that it would call attention to other ways their products were unhealthy, “the
Coca-Cola Corporation decided to stay mute for fear of seeing a more important
question being raised: the case of sugar” (Kapferer, 1989, p. 479).
This tendency of food producers to manipulate publicly available information
about properties of the world has subsequently been documented by Oreskes and
Conway (2011). The story of the memo thus accurately portrays the industry’s perspective and motives—it would rather the public be misinformed than learn the truth
about the unhealthiness of its products—through a narrative that includes false
claims.
As this example illustrates, the character information provided by the leaflet
can be corroborated. However, the relevant facts are not necessarily those used
to communicate this information. The facts that logically support this character
inference were missing from the story for two reasons. First, the facts were hard to
find, requiring substantial investigation (Oreskes & Conway, 2011). Second, the facts
are hard to vividly imagine without technical expertise (Fisher, 1984). They involve
subtle decisions in specialized contexts, such the incentives given to scientists. The
leaflet of Villejuif story portrays these decisions in a context that is more evocative
(secret results) and leads to clear character inferences (intention to manipulate for
private gain).
Stories about U.S. government malfeasance during the Vietnam War provide
another illustration. After the Vietnam War, there was speculation that the U.S.
government abandoned prisoners of war (POWs) as part of a secret deal with the
Vietnamese government, a portrayal communicated in popular entertainment such
as the Rambo films (Sweeney, 1999). These stories mislead with respect to property
inferences—there is no evidence U.S. POWs in Vietnam (United States Senate, 1993).
Yet the character of the U.S. government portrayed by these stories—as making secret
deals and callous, disloyal choices—is substantially corroborated by evidence such as
provided by the Pentagon Papers (Kahin, 1975; Sweeney, 1999). In other words, both
the fictional POW stories and the true Pentagon Papers story portray substantially
the same character, only with different events. The Pentagon Papers are true in
properties, but hard to imagine, while the POW stories are false in properties, but
highly evocative, and thus superior in communicating this character information.
Mundane examples can also illustrate the point. A faculty department might
express a strong consensus to endorse a norm or idea. This consensus might be more
evocatively described as “the faculty took a vote” even if no vote was literally taken.
Discrete events indicating that a spouse forgets special occasions might be assembled
into more dramatic, composite story about a singular, embarrassing failure and so
forth. In each case, the audience walks away with an accurate sense of the agent, if
not of the real events, that occurred.
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
Of course, not all character portrayals are accurate. The accuracy of the character
portrayal is based on the accuracy of the speaker’s theory of the character’s mind,
as well as their intent. Trusting portrayals offered by speakers who are poor judges of
character, or whose goal is to mislead or persuade to achieve a goal, will lead audiences
to make poor predictions as to the target agent’s behavior. Assessing these factors
involves assessing the speaker, not the events in the story per se, however. The relevant
warrant for the audience accepting the portrayal is in the speaker’s own character, the
theory of mind the audience holds for that speaker (Walther et al., 2009). The warrant
is not logical—e.g., “you should trust/not trust this agent because they did XYZ”—but
rather relational—e.g., “you should trust/not trust this agent because I imagine they
would do XYZ” (Burgoon & Hale, 1984; Hovland & Weiss, 1951) and so does not
necessarily follow from the accuracy of the facts in the story.
In addition, these arguments do not downplay the costs of telling a false story, but
only demonstrate that there can be a counter-balancing benefit that requires assessing
a trade-off. Ideally, the vivid, evocative claims needed to convey character portrayals
would be supplied by available facts, allowing individuals to communicate accurate
character information with no loss of or distortion in property information. Under
conditions when this is not the case, however, the preceding arguments suggest that
functionally motivated speakers will have to choose.
Summary
This section has illustrated the rationale of the TIF. A summary of this rationale is
presented in Figure 1.
726
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Figure 1 Theoretical model of theory of informative fictions
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Testable predictions of the theory of informative fictions
Importance of character information
Perhaps the simplest indicator of what is valued in a message is the topic of the message itself. All else being equal, messages about agents should carry more character
information, and thus signal the importance of this information, at least in the mind
of the speaker. Thus, when messages focus on agents audiences may be more tolerant
of them containing misleading property information. For example, a false statistic
should be more acceptable in a story portraying the motivations of a politician rather
than the predicted outcomes of a policy.
Proposition 1: The greater quantity of character information a message conveys,
such as through the description of choices, motives, and perspectives of an agent,
the more individuals will tolerate/accept/promote false claims within it.
Similarly, the value of the character information obtained depends substantially on
the vulnerability the individual faces when relating to the agent. This vulnerability
can be decomposed into two parts. First, there is the importance of the agent—
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
727
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
The primary claim of TIF is that narratives constructed from false claims can be of
functional value because they can evoke, and thus communicate, accurate character
information. How can this argument be tested?
TIF makes many predictions that are consistent with existing theories of misinformation. First, prevailing theories emphasize the impact of existing beliefs and
worldviews on the acceptance of misinformation (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan
& Reifler, 2010). TIF makes similar predictions. Both Fisher’s (1984) idea of narrative
fidelity as well as the tenets of simulation theory suggest that individuals will reject
narrative/simulations that they cannot reconcile with their existing imagination of
the world. Second, TIF predicts that messages with misinformation will be accepted
if they evoke strong, vivid and arousing imaginations, a finding consistent with observations of misinformation (Horne & Adali, 2017; Vosoughi et al., 2018). Work on
the theory of rumors (Allport & Postman, 1947) suggests that rumors are embraced
when there is substantial anxiety and/or a loss of confidence in authority. This finding
also follows from TIF, which suggests these contexts create a demand for character
information in order to re-assess leadership or to shift attention to interpersonal
relationships as formal institutions break down (Weick, 1995).
TIF is thus consistent with these existing approaches. An advantage of TIF,
however, is that it also makes additional predictions about the conditions under
which false claims will be accepted, tolerated or promoted. Specifically, TIF implies
that the acceptance, tolerance, and promotion of false claims will vary with two broad
conditions: (a) conditions in which character information is more valuable than property information, and (b) conditions in which character assessments diverge from
available facts. These conditions can be used to derive specific, empirically testable
propositions that do not follow from other theories explaining misinformation.
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
their power. Individuals should be more willing to accept/tolerate/promote misinformation about important people or institutions than about unimportant people or
institutions. Targeted individuals might have formal power, or be in influential social
positions within a local context, such as having a central position in a social network
(Monge & Contractor, 2003).
A second condition is the decision-type. If individuals believe they are making
execution decisions—that is, in relation to entities they perceive to be objects—then
they should apply logical, propositional reasoning and should reject false claims
(Pennycook & Rand, 2019). By contrast, when individuals believe they are making
relational decisions—that is, in relation to entities they perceive are choice-making
agents—they should value character information.
Perceptions of whether a decision is one of execution or relational are subjective
and depend substantially on the decision-maker’s social role and position. Much
human decision-making is situated in a specialized social environment in which
individuals are delegated responsibility for expertise and decision-making (Fox &
Shotts, 2009; Yuan et al., 2007). For those treated as experts or assigned to make
execution decisions, accurate property information is paramount. However, for those
who rely on others, accurate character information is more important.
This rationale can be extended to consider the influence that individuals believe
they have over decision-makers. The more an individual believes they have a voice
in influencing a decision-maker, the more they should perceive they are making
execution decisions and thus seek property information. For those who have less
direct influence, character information is more relevant, because their decisions end
with empowering others to make decisions on their behalf.
For example, Cramer (2016) documents how citizens of rural Wisconsin perceive
most policy proposals as really being decisions about whether to entrust more
resources to state employees in “Madison” (where the state capitol is). That is, they
perceive their political decisions as more relational—who do we entrust with power—
than executional—what should the government do?
Thus, depending on an individual’s social role relative to a decision or their sense
of influence over the decision, the relevant information may be property or character:
Proposition 3: The more individuals perceive communication to be in relation to
a relationship decision, as opposed to an execution decision, the more they will
tolerate/promote false claims.
Divergence between available fact and character
The preceding propositions focus on the information that individuals prefer
or “demand.” The following propositions hold constant this demand for information and emphasize the “supply” of materials, specifically facts, available for
communication.
728
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Proposition 2: The more important the agent targeted by a message the more
individuals will tolerate/accept/promote false claims.
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Proposition 4: The greater the cost of searching for/acquiring facts relative to
important agents, the greater the use of false claims in narratives about those
agents.
Communities can also differ in the extent to which they normatively insist that
decisions be based on facts and logic (Bessi et al., 2015; Margolin et al., 2018).
When individuals wish to communicate character information, norms demanding
that communication be logical and factual could encourage individuals to invent
facts to portray relevant characters. Importantly, while such norms can be useful in
precluding the communication of false property information, they do not necessarily
improve accuracy of character portrayals.
For example, Cramer accepted the portrayal of Hillary Clinton in ambiguous
terms: “up here,” “that air around her.” If she had required these individuals to
justify these impressions, using facts and logic, they might not be able to do so. This
inability would not bear on the accuracy of their imagination of Clinton’s character.
Nonetheless, to communicate this impression, they might feel motivated to invent
a story that portrayed it in an evocative manner. Thus, demands that individuals
factually justify their impressions of agents can press them to invent facts:
Proposition 5: The greater the expectation that decisions about agents be based on
fact and logic, the greater the use of false claims in narratives about those agents.
These propositions are summarized in Figure 2.
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
729
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
False claims are damaging because they mislead execution decisions. Thus, from a
functional point of view, all else equal, individuals should prefer to convey character
information with true stories based on facts. However, the availability of such facts is
a variable within an individual’s information environment. Some communities have
individuals (e.g., professional journalists) with the dedicated function of identifying
relevant facts while others lack such access (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006). In communities with easy access to a rich set of facts about a target agent, it may be easy to find
true stories that portray how they imagine the agent’s character. In communities with
less access, however, such searches may be difficult or cost-prohibitive. Individuals
whose access to facts is more limited must either search longer and harder for
facts, construct narratives using fictions, or refrain from communicating character
information.
This means that the extent to which individuals must search to find facts that,
when presented in narratives, evoke the character impressions they wish to portray
is important in determining whether they will invent “facts” to convey character
information. Conspiracy theories, defined as concrete, secretive plans by elites to
abuse their power (Uscinski, 2017), can be viewed as an example of this phenomenon.
Within TIF, conspiracy theories would not assert conjectures of fact, but rather
convey character information—a suspicious portrayal of elite motives—in contexts
where elite behavior is not transparent and thus facts are hard to come by (Fiske &
Durante, 2014; Uscinski, 2017):
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
Discussion
This article presents a communication-centered theory for predicting the tolerance and promotion of misinformation. The theory models the communication
of misinformation—false property claims—as the result of a decision to prioritize
the communication of another kind of information—character portrayals. The TIF
does not purport to explain all instances or preferences for misinformation, and is
consistent with many existing theories, however, it also provides an additional set
of specific empirical predictions. It thus consistent with available evidence while
having more elaborate empirical content, a criterion of a good theory (Popper, 2003;
Rosenbaum, 2017).
Having presented the theory, it is now useful to briefly articulate how it might be
used to advance the normative goal of reducing the spread of misinformation.
Practical implications
As stated at the outset, though TIF argues that the acceptance of misinformation can
have functional motivations, the theory is not a defense of misinformation. The damage done via the spread of property misinformation can be substantial. Moreover, TIF
makes no claim that character information is necessarily accurate. In fact, intentional
misinformation campaigns appear to be motivated by attempts to influence relational
decisions (such as voting), and so can be expected to mislead about character.
The practical contribution of TIF is in emphasizing that the portrayal of character
is central to many misinformation messages. Most plainly, this means that correcting
730
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Figure 2 Propositions
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Conclusion
Misinformation is a complex phenomenon unlikely to be explicable through a single
theory. This article contributes to the theoretical conversation by focusing on the
uniqueness of character information—the ways in which individuals conceive of
and share what they know about one another. Future work may support the specific
claims of this approach. More broadly, it is hoped that these arguments stimulate
further investigation into the different kinds of information, and the challenges in
communicating them, that may foster the spread of misinformation.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported in part by a grant from the Cornell Institute for Social
Sciences. The author thanks Dr. Sahara Byrne for her helpful feedback on this
manuscript.
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
731
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
misinformation by simply providing facts, that is, more property information, is
unlikely to be successful (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). More
broadly this recognition suggests two alternative strategies for correction. First, TIF
suggests that misinformation be countered with relevant character information. For
example, many individuals have lost confidence not only in specific facts, but in institutions that produce facts, such as journalists, scientists, and governments (Cramer,
2016; Fiske & Durante, 2014; Iyengar & Massey, 2018; Tsetsura & Kruckeberg,
2017). TIF suggests this loss of confidence is directly related to the way that (these
mistrusting) individuals imagine the motivations of the agents that inhabit these
institutions. Addressing the problem thus requires addressing these imaginations.
Unlike claims, imaginations cannot be proven “right” or “wrong.” However, inviting
individuals into the motivations and perspectives of these characters can alter their
views. This could be done directly, by the relevant agents making themselves available
via dialogues that enable the observation of paralinguistic cues, or, more scale-ably,
through the presentation of narratives that 1) highlight the beneficent motives of
these agents; and 2) resonate with audiences’ life experience.
Second, TIF suggests there may be times when it is beneficial to de-couple character portrayals from false property claims thereby allowing individuals to communicate their imagination of agents without relying on property misinformation. One
way would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of portrayals that do not fit with available
facts before correcting property misinformation. For example, a story may convey
distrust in professional medicine by suggesting that vaccines are dangerous. This
story could be countered with “vaccines are safe and important, but your suspicions
are valid and worthy of investigation.” Another way would be to offer alternative
(true) property claims to replace the false ones within the story. For example, stories
about pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of opioids might replace stories about
the danger of vaccines.
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
References
732
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Allport, G. W., & Postman, L. (1947). The psychology of rumor. Oxford, England: Henry Holt.
Bal, P. M., & Veltkamp, M. (2013). How does fiction reading influence empathy? An experimental investigation on the role of emotional transportation. PLoS ONE, 8(1), e55341. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0055341
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of
mind”? Cognition, 21, 37–46. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8
Baumeister, R. F., Zhang, L., & Vohs, K. D. (2004). Gossip as cultural learning. Review of
General Psychology, 8(2), 111–121. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.8.2.111
Baumgartner, J. C., Morris, J. S., & Walth, N. L. (2012). The fey effect: Young adults, political
humor, and perceptions of Sarah Palin in the 2008 presidential election campaign. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 76(1), 95–104. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfr060
Bessi, A., Coletto, M., Davidescu, G. A., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., & Quattrociocchi, W. (2015).
Science vs conspiracy: Collective narratives in the age of misinformation. PLOS ONE,
10(2), e0118093. doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118093
Bode, L., & Vraga, E. K. (2015). In related news, that was wrong: The correction of misinformation through related stories functionality in social media. Journal of Communication,
65(4), 619–638. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12166
Boyd, B. (2018). The evolution of stories: From mimesis to language, from fact to fiction: The
evolution of stories. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 9(1), e1444. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1444
Bullock, J. G., Gerber, A. S., Hill, S. J., & Huber, G. A. (2015). Partisan bias in factual beliefs
about politics. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 10, 519–578. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1561/100.00014074_app
Burgoon, J. K., & Hale, J. L. (1984). The fundamental topoi of relational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 194–214. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758409390195
Campbell, D. T. (1965). Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. In H.
R. Barringer, G. I. Blanksten & R. W. Mack (Eds.), Social change in developing areas: A
reinterpretation of evolutionary theory (pp. 19–48). Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.
Carroll, J. (2018). Minds and meaning in fictional narratives: An evolutionary perspective.
Review of General Psychology, 22(2), 135–146. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000104
Chadwick, A., Vaccari, C., & Loughlin, B. (2018). Do tabloids poison the well of social media?
Explaining democratically dysfunctional news sharing. New Media & Society, 20(11),
4255–4274. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818769689
Chandler, M., Fritz, A. S., & Hala, S. (1989). Small-scale deceit: Deception as a marker of two-,
three-, and four-year-olds’ early theories of mind. Child Development, 60(6), 1263–1277.
doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/1130919
Cohen, J. R. (1998). Communication criticism: Developing your critical powers. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Corter, J. E., & Gluck, M. A. (1992). Explaining basic categories: Feature
predictability and information. Psychological Bulletin, 111(2), 291–303. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.111.2.291
Cramer, K. J. (2016). The politics of resentment: Rural consciousness in Wisconsin and the rise
of Scott Walker. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological
Bulletin, 52(4), 281–302. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040957
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
733
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2004). Gossip in evolutionary perspective. Review of General Psychology,
8(2), 100–110. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.8.2.100
Ellison, N., Heino, R., & Gibbs, J. (2006). Managing impressions online: Self-presentation processes in the online dating environment. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication,
11(2), 415–441. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2006.00020.x
Feine, P. (2012). Green on the outside, red on the inside. Reason.Com. Retrieved from https://
reason.com/archives/2011/11/20/green-on-the-outside-red-on-the-inside
Fisher, W. R. (1984). Narration as a human communication paradigm: The case of public
moral argument. Communication Monographs, 51(1), 1–22. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/
03637758409390180
Fiske, S. T., & Durante, F. (2014). Never trust a politician? Collective distrust, relational
accountability, and voter response. In J.-W. van Prooijen & P. A. M. van Lange (Eds.),
Power, politics, and paranoia: Why people are suspicious of their leaders (pp. 91–105).
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Flynn, D. J., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2017). The nature and origins of misperceptions:
Understanding false and unsupported beliefs about politics: Nature and origins of misperceptions. Political Psychology, 38, 127–150. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12394
Fox, J., & Shotts, K. W. (2009). Delegates or trustees? A theory of political accountability. The
Journal of Politics, 71(4), 1225–1237. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990260
Franco, Z. E., Blau, K., & Zimbardo, P. G. (2011). Heroism: A conceptual analysis and
differentiation between heroic action and altruism. Review of General Psychology, 15(2),
99–113. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022672
Garrett, R. K. (2011). Troubling consequences of online political rumoring. Human Communication Research, 37(2), 255–274. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2010.01401.x
Garrett, R. K., & Weeks, B. E. (2017). Epistemic beliefs’ role in promoting
misperceptions and conspiracist ideation. PLOS ONE, 12(9), e0184733. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184733
Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2009). Why the brain talks to itself: Sources of error in
emotional prediction. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 364(1521). Retrieved
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40485902
Grèzes, J., & Dezecache, G. (2014). How do shared-representations and emotional processes cooperate in response to social threat signals? Neuropsychologia, 55, 105–114. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.09.019
Grinberg, N., Joseph, K., Friedland, L., Swire-Thompson, B., & Lazer, D. (2019). Fake news
on Twitter during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Science, 363(6425), 374–378. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aau2706
Guess, A., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J. (2019). Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook. Science Advances, 5(1), eaau4586. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586
Horne, B. D., & Adali, S. (2017). This just in: Fake news packs a lot in title, uses simpler,
repetitive content in text body, more similar to satire than real news. ArXiv Preprint ArXiv,
1703, 09398. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09398
Hovland, C. I., & Weiss, W. (1951). The influence of source credibility on communication effectiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly, 15(4), 635–650. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/266350
Hurley, S. (2008). The shared circuits model (SCM): How control, mirroring, and simulation
can enable imitation, deliberation, and mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31(1),
1–58. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X07003123
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
734
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Iyengar, S., & Massey, D. S. (2018). Scientific communication in a post-truth society. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 201805868. doi: https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1805868115
Jasinski, J. (1993). (Re)constituting community through narrative argument: Eros
and Philia in The Big Chill. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 79(4), 467–486. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1080/00335639309384047
Jones, J. M. (2010, March 11). Conservatives’ doubts about global warming grow.
Retrieved May 30, 2016, from Gallup.com website: http://www.gallup.com/poll/126563/
Conservatives-Doubts-Global-Warming-Grow.aspx
Kahin, G. M. (1975). The Pentagon Papers: A critical evaluation. The American Political Science
Review, 69(2), 675–684. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/1959096
Kapferer, J. N. (1989). A mass poisoning rumor in Europe. Public Opinion Quarterly, 53(4),
467–481. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/269167
Kim, Y. C., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (2006). Community storytelling network, neighborhood
context, and civic engagement: A multilevel approach. Human Communication Research,
32(4), 411–439. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2006.00282.x
Knapp, R. H. (1944). A psychology of rumor. Public Opinion Quarterly, 8(1), 22–37.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/265665
Kniffin, K. M., & Wilson, D. S. (2005). Utilities of gossip across organizational levels. Human
Nature, 16(3), 278–292. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-005-1011-6
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago.
Kümpel, A. S., Karnowski, V., & Keyling, T. (2015). News sharing in social media: A review
of current research on news sharing users, content, and networks. Social Media + Society,
1(2). doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305115610141
Leiser, D., Duani, N., & Wagner-Egger, P. (2017). The conspiratorial style in lay economic
thinking. PLOS ONE, 12(3), e0171238. doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0171238
Lepore, J. (2018). These truths: A history of the United States. New York: WW Norton &
Company.
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012). Misinformation and its correction: Continued influence and successful Debiasing. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 13(3), 106–131. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/152910
0612451018.
Lewkowicz, D., Delevoye-Turrell, Y., Bailly, D., Andry, P., & Gaussier, P. (2013). Reading motor intention through mental imagery. Adaptive Behavior, 21(5), 315–327. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712313501347
Mar, R. A., Oatley, K., Djikic, M., & Mullin, J. (2011). Emotion and narrative fiction: Interactive
influences before, during, and after reading. Cognition and Emotion, 25(5), 818–833. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2010.515151
Margolin, D. B., Hannak, A., & Weber, I. (2018). Political fact-checking on Twitter:
When do corrections have an effect? Political Communication, 35(2), 196–219. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2017.1334018
Monge, P., & Contractor, N. (2003). Theories of communication networks. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Murphy, S. T., Frank, L. B., Chatterjee, J. S., & Baezconde-Garbanati, L. (2013). Narrative versus nonnarrative: The role of identification, transportation, and emo-
D. B. Margolin
Informative Fictions
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
735
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
tion in reducing health disparities. Journal of Communication, 63(1), 116–137. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12007
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010). When corrections fail: The persistence of political misperceptions. Political Behavior, 32(2), 303–330. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2
Oatley, K. (2012). The cognitive science of fiction: The cognitive science of
fiction. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 3(4), 425–430. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1185
Oatley, K. (2016). Fiction: Simulation of social worlds. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(8),
618–628. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.06.002
Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2011). Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists
obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. New York: Bloomsbury
Publishing USA.
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is
better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. Cognition, 188, 39–50.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011
Pfau, M. (2002). The subtle nature of presidential debate influence. Argumentation and
Advocacy, 38(4), 251–261. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.2002.11821571.
Popper, K. R. (2003). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Routledge
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 1(04), 515–526. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512
Reiss, S. (2004). Multifaceted nature of intrinsic motivation: The theory of 16 basic
desires. Review of General Psychology, 8(3), 179–193. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/10892680.8.3.179
Rosenbaum, P. R. (2017). Observation and experiment: An introduction to causal inference.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schwarz, N., Newman, E., & Leach, W. (2016). Making the truth stick & the myths
fade: Lessons from cognitive psychology. Behavioral Science & Policy, 2(1), 85–95. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1353/bsp.2016.0009
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental
designs for generalized causal inference. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Shanton, K., & Goldman, A. (2010). Simulation theory. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews:
Cognitive Science, 1(4), 527–538. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.33
Shapiro, M. A., & Chock, T. M. (2003). Psychological processes in perceiving reality. Media
Psychology, 5(2), 163–198. doi: https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532785XMEP0502_3
Shapiro, M. A., & Kim, H. (2012). Realism judgments and mental resources: A Cue
processing model of media narrative realism. Media Psychology, 15(1), 93–119. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2011.649666
Sherover, M. (1915). Fakes in American Journalism (2nd ed.). Brooklyn, NY: Free Press League.
Smith, D., Schlaepfer, P., Major, K., Dyble, M., Page, A. E., Thompson, J., & Migliano, A. B.
(2017). Cooperation and the evolution of hunter-gatherer storytelling. Nature Communications, 8(1), 1–9. doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02036-8
Sweeney, F. (1999). “What mean expendable?”: Myth, ideology, and meaning in
First Blood and Rambo. The Journal of American Culture, 22(3), 63–69. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-734X.1999.2203_63.x
Tetlock, P. E. (2002). Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: Intuitive
politicians, theologians, and prosecutors. Psychological Review, 109(3), 451–471. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.109.3.451
Informative Fictions
D. B. Margolin
736
Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023
Thorson, E. (2016). Belief echoes: The persistent effects of corrected misinformation. Political
Communication, 33(3), 460–480. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2015.1102187
Toulmin, S. E. (1982). The return to cosmology: Postmodern science and the theology of nature.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Tsetsura, K., & Kruckeberg, D. (2017). Transparency, public relations and the mass media:
Combating the hidden influences in news coverage worldwide. New York: Routledge.
United States Senate (1993). Executive summary (Senate Report No103–1). Washington, DC.
Uscinski, J. E. (2017). The study of conspiracy theories. Argumenta, 2, 1–13. doi:
https://doi.org/10.23811/53.arg2017.usc
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science,
359(6380), 1146–1151. doi: 10.1126/science.aap9559
Walther, J. B., Van Der Heide, B., Hamel, L. M., & Shulman, H. C. (2009). Self-generated versus
other-generated statements and impressions in computer-mediated communication: A
test of warranting theory using Facebook. Communication Research, 36(2), 229–253. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650208330251
Weeks, B. E. (2015). Emotions, partisanship, and misperceptions: How anger and anxiety
moderate the effect of partisan bias on susceptibility to political misinformation. Journal
of Communication, 65(4), 699–719. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12164
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Yuan, Y. C., Fulk, J., & Monge, P. R. (2007). Access to information in connective and
communal transactive memory systems. Communication Research, 34(2), 131–155. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650206298067