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General.......................................................................................................................................................... 4
Definitions of the Arctic ........................................................................................................................ 5
No One Definition of the Arctic............................................................................................................. 6
Most Common Definition ..................................................................................................................... 7
How the US Defines the Arctic .............................................................................................................. 8
Environmental Definitions Bad ............................................................................................................. 9
Few People Live in the Arctic .................................................................................................................. 10
Arctic Council .......................................................................................................................................... 11
Presence Includes NATO Coop ............................................................................................................ 12
PRO.............................................................................................................................................................. 13
General Pro ............................................................................................................................................. 14
Ice is Melting ....................................................................................................................................... 15
No infrastructure Now ........................................................................................................................ 17
Need to Increase Presence ................................................................................................................. 18
Melting Ice Risks War .......................................................................................................................... 19
Miscalculation Risks ............................................................................................................................ 20
General Increased Military Presence Solvency ................................................................................... 21
Status Quo Arctic Efforts are Not Enough........................................................................................... 23
US Should Increase Arctic Presence .................................................................................................... 27
NATO Solvency ........................................................................................................................................ 35
Russia Threat ........................................................................................................................................... 39
General Russia Arctic Threat Contention ............................................................................................ 40
Answers to: Ukraine Reduces the Russia Threat ................................................................................ 52
War Risks ............................................................................................................................................. 56
Answers to: Ukraine Destroyed Russia ............................................................................................... 58
China-Russia Coop............................................................................................................................... 59
European Deterrence.............................................................................................................................. 68
China Arctic Threat.................................................................................................................................. 70
Rare Earth Contention ............................................................................................................................ 75
Oil Spills Contention ................................................................................................................................ 84
Hegemony Contention ............................................................................................................................ 85
Asia Deterrence Advantage .................................................................................................................... 86
NATO Advantage ..................................................................................................................................... 87
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Search & Rescue...................................................................................................................................... 89
Icebreakers Pro ....................................................................................................................................... 90
US Behind on Icebreakers Vis-à-vis Russia.......................................................................................... 92
Resources Contention ......................................................................................................................... 94
Not Enough Icebreakers Now ............................................................................................................. 95
Ice breakers are Key Infrastruture ...................................................................................................... 98
Answers to Common Con Arguments ..................................................................................................... 99
Answers to: Military Presence Kills Cooperation/Arctic Council Good ............................................ 101
Answers to: Increased Military Presence Undermines Arctic Science Coop .................................... 104
Answers to: Encircling Russia Bad ..................................................................................................... 107
Answers to: Military Presence  Sexual Assaults ............................................................................ 109
Answers to: Undermines Arms Control ............................................................................................ 110
Answers to: Increased Presence Kills the Environment .................................................................... 111
Answers to: Russian Encirclement .................................................................................................... 112
Answers to: Indigenous Knowledge .................................................................................................. 113
Answers to: Hurts Indigenous People ............................................................................................... 114
A2: Russia Oil DA ............................................................................................................................... 115
CON ........................................................................................................................................................... 116
Status Quo Solves.................................................................................................................................. 117
Answers to: US Doesn’t Have Enough Ice Breakers .......................................................................... 120
Nuclear Lashout/Encirclement Contention .......................................................................................... 121
Increasing Presence Crowds-Out Russia ........................................................................................... 122
Second-Strike Contention – Subs ...................................................................................................... 123
Second Strike Contention -- NATO/Ukraine Loss/Isolationism......................................................... 128
Ukraine Scenario ............................................................................................................................... 130
Military Presence Trade-Off Contention............................................................................................... 131
Russian Isolationism Contention........................................................................................................... 138
Russian Economy Contention ............................................................................................................... 147
Cooperation DA Contention.................................................................................................................. 149
Consult the Natives Contention ............................................................................................................ 150
China Encirclement Contention ............................................................................................................ 151
China Economy Contention .................................................................................................................. 154
Science Cooperation Contention .......................................................................................................... 156
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Climate Cooperation Contention .......................................................................................................... 158
Indigenous People Contention ............................................................................................................. 159
Arctic Cooperation Contention ............................................................................................................. 162
Diplomatic Capital Trade-Off Contention ............................................................................................. 163
Russian Economy Contention ............................................................................................................... 164
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Bad Links ................................................................................................ 167
Answers to Common Contentions ........................................................................................................ 170
Miscalculation Answers .................................................................................................................... 171
Arctic War Answers (General) ........................................................................................................... 172
Answers to: China Arctic Threat........................................................................................................ 174
China-Russia Cooperation Threat Answers ....................................................................................... 180
Answers to: Russia Threat ................................................................................................................. 183
General War Answers ....................................................................................................................... 194
Russia Cyber Threat Answers ............................................................................................................ 206
Oil Security/Dependence Answers ................................................................................................... 207
Cables Answers ..................................................................................................................................... 208
1NC – AT: Cables ............................................................................................................................... 209
A/C --- 1NC ........................................................................................................................................ 210
No Attack --- 1NC .............................................................................................................................. 211
Aff Fails --- 1NC.................................................................................................................................. 213
Aff Fails --- 2NC.................................................................................................................................. 214
SQ Solves --- 1NC ............................................................................................................................... 215
U.S. Naval Dom Inev.......................................................................................................................... 216
Miscalculated War Answers .................................................................................................................. 218
AT: Miscalc---General ........................................................................................................................ 219
---AT: Miscac---US ............................................................................................................................. 226
---AT: Miscalc---China ........................................................................................................................ 228
---AT: Stability/Instability Paradox .................................................................................................... 230
MisIce Breakers Neg ............................................................................................................................. 237
Arguments................................................................................................................................................. 238
Pro ......................................................................................................................................................... 239
Con Contentions ................................................................................................................................... 240
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General
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Definitions of the Arctic
Arctic definition, although it varies
Rosario Rivera, Mexican Center for International Relations, Alí Gómez Villascán, 7-24, 23, Dispute for the
Arctic: China and Russia against the United States, https://cemeri.org/en/art/a-disputa-artico-chinarusia-usa-au
For the purposes of this article, we will define the Arctic as a giant mass of ice located in the wellknown northern hemisphere of planet Earth; It is a geostrategic area with an impact on the world's
energy and trade security, but specifically China and Russia. The definition of the Arctic can vary
depending on who defines it, for example, while Vladimir Putin points out that this space is an area of
traditional Russian interest, since it concentrates all aspects of national security: military, political,
economic, technological, environmental and resources; The European Environment Agency (EEA)
defines the Arctic as an immense region, which occupies one sixth of the earth's surface with more
than 30 million square kilometers and there are 24 time zones.
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No One Definition of the Arctic
There is not one single definition of the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
There are multiple definitions of the Arctic that result in differing descriptions of the land and sea
areas encompassed by the term. Policy discussions of the Arctic can employ varying definitions of the
region, and readers should bear in mind that the definition used in one discussion may differ from that
used in another
Arctic is conceptual
Bremmer, 7-18, 23, Dr. Esther Bremmer is, is the James H. Menger. Senior Fellow in global
governance at the Council of Foreign Relations. Dr. brimer. His work focuses on international
organisations and transatlantic relations. During her time at the council, Dr. Bremmer served as
the project director for the 2017 Council task force report Arctic imperatives, reinforcing us
strategy on America's fourth coast. In addition to posts in academia, the private sector and with
a large nonprofit organisations, Dr. Bremmer, previously served as the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organisation affairs and worked on the Department of State's policy
planning staff. The Arctic is geographical but it's also conceptual. Just as the words Indo Pacific or the
South China Sea connotes strategic concepts, so to the Arctic takes on renewed strategic importance.
The Arctic is America's fourth coast, meaning increased intention needs to be paid,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
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Most Common Definition
Most common definition of the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
The most common and basic definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area north
of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude at about 66o 34’ North).2 For surface locations within this zone,
the sun is generally above the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the summer
solstice) and below the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the winter solstice).
The land and sea area within the Arctic Circle is about 8.14 million square miles, 3 which is about 4.1%
(or between 1/24th and 1/25th) of the Earth’s surface, and more than twice the land area of the United
States, which is about 3.5 million square miles. 1 This section was prepared by Ronald O’Rourke,
Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. 2 Sources differ on the precise
latitude of the Arctic Circle. One source states: “The position of the Arctic Circle is not fixed and
currently runs 66°33′49.4″ north of the Equator. Its latitude depends on the Earth's axial tilt, which
fluctuates within a margin of more than 2° over a 41,000-year period, owing to tidal forces resulting
from the orbit of the Moon. Consequently, the Arctic Circle is currently drifting northwards at a speed of
about 14.5 m (48 ft) per year. (“Arctic Circle,” Wikipedia, updated February 13, 2023, accessed February
15, 2023.) The Arctic Circle definition of the Arctic includes the northernmost third or so of Alaska, as
well as the Chukchi Sea, which separates that part of Alaska from Russia, and U.S. territorial and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters north of Alaska. It does not include the lower two-thirds or so
of Alaska or the Bering Sea, which separates that lower part of the state from Russia. The Arctic
Ocean, which is roughly at the center of the Arctic region, accounts for much of the region’s total area.
By one calculation, the Arctic Ocean has an area of about 6.01 million square miles, which is about 4.3%
of the Earth’s ocean area.4 This figure uses boundaries for the Arctic Ocean that include some waters
south of the Arctic Circle.5 Other sources, using different boundaries for the Arctic Ocean, put the size of
the Arctic Ocean at about 5.4 million square miles
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How the US Defines the Arctic
How the US defines the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July
31, 1984)7 defines the Arctic as follows:
As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic
Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon,
and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort,
Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain. This definition, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 4111,8
includes certain parts of Alaska below the Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Islands and portions of
central and western mainland Alaska, such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta. The U.S.
Coast Guard states that “The U.S. Arctic encompasses some 2,521 miles of shoreline, an international
strait adjacent to the Russian Federation, and 647 miles of land border with Canada above the Arctic
Circle. The U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic contains approximately 889,000 square miles
of ocean.” 9 Figure 1 shows the Arctic area of Alaska as defined by ARPA; Figure 2 shows the entire
Arctic area as defined by ARPA.
Alaska makes the US an Arctic Country
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska,
is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. The seven other Arctic states are
Russia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Norway, Sweden, and Finland. T
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Environmental Definitions Bad
Climate change-based definitions change over time
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Other definitions of the Arctic are based on factors such as average temperature, the northern tree
line,10 the extent of permafrost on land, the extent of sea ice on the ocean, or jurisdictional or
administrative boundaries. A definition based on a climate-related factor could circumscribe differing
areas over time as a result of climate change.
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Few People Live in the Arctic
4-7 million people live in the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
According to one estimate, about 4 million people, or about 0.05% of the world’s population, live in
the Arctic, of which roughly half (roughly 2 million) live in Russia’s part of the Arctic,14 and roughly
500,000 belong to Indigenous peoples.15 Another source states: “Approximately two and a half million
of Russia’s inhabitants live in Arctic territory, accounting for nearly half of the population living in the
Arctic worldwide.” 16 Another source, using a broader definition of the Arctic, concluded that just over
10 million people live in the Arctic, including 7 million in Russia’s Arctic.17
Only 68,000 Americans live in the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
As mentioned earlier, the United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial
political, economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Even so, Alaska is
geographically separated and somewhat distant from the other 49 states, and relatively few
Americans—fewer than 68,000 as of July 1, 2017—live in the Arctic part of Alaska as shown in Figure 2.
19 A March 6, 2020, research paper on the Arctic in U.S. national identity, based on data collected in
online surveys conducted in October-December 2019, stated: “We found that Americans continue to
mildly disagree with the assertion that the United States is an Arctic nation with broad and fundamental
interests in the region.
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Arctic Council
Arctic Council is the key international forum
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to
the Arctic.
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Presence Includes NATO Coop
Increasing US Arctic presence includes working with NATO
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
The US strategy in the Arctic will be moving on the three lines of action. First, it will aim to enhance the
capabilities of the US Coast Guard in the Arctic.57 Therefore, the United States will be using the
International Maritime Organization to adopt international code for ships operating in polar water and
to question Russian maneuvers in the region.58 Second, to strengthen the rules-based order, the
United States will be eager to cooperate with NATO allies in the region.59 It is evident from Biden's
faith in the alliance and the most recent discussion over US-Canadian defense cooperation.60 Yet, it will
be based on adding strategic and operational depth to the regional position of Arctic allies. The Trump
administration debated Greenland’s sovereignty, Denmark's role as a strategic enabler for US interests
in the region, and surveillance of Russian actions.61 Third, the United States will aim to promote
resilience and prosperity in the region. Hence, US promotion of Arctic values is evident from Trump's
approach toward the Arctic Council. Despite the reluctance of Trump's government toward
multilateralism, he was vocal about promoting cooperation among Arctic states through the Arctic
Council.62 However, while conceptualizing Biden's climate policy and his approach toward
multilateralism, his actions will be aiming to use the “Arctic Council to strengthen US relations with
allies.”63
“Military Presence”
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PRO
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General Pro
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Ice is Melting
Despite the June 2006-June 2003 comparison, there is a net decrease in Arctic ice, and
it’s caused by CO2 emissions
Kate Peterson, 7-18, 23, USA Today, June 2006 v. June 2023 Arctic sea ice comparison doesn't disprove
global warming, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2023/07/18/arctic-sea-ice-decliningdespite-june-comparision-fact-check/70385012007/
A June 17 tweet (direct link, archive link) shows Arctic sea ice extent images from June 16, 2006, and
June 16, 2023. The sea ice appears to cover roughly the same area in both images from the National
Snow and Ice Data Center. "Not the narrative: June 2023 Arctic sea ice extent about the same as June
2006, despite ~800 billion tons of emissions representing a 41% increase in industrial era CO2," reads
the caption. "Emissions-driven warming is a hoax." The tweet was shared to Facebook more than 100
times in less than a month, according to Crowdtangle, a social media analytics tool. It was also
retweeted more than 6,000 times. Follow us on Facebook!Like our page to get updates throughout the
day on our latest debunks Our rating: False While Arctic sea ice extent − the area covered by a certain
amount of floating ice − was similar in June 2006 and 2023, Arctic sea ice is decreasing overall due to
global warming. Multiple lines of evidence show that human CO2 emissions are causing global
warming. Arctic sea ice decreasing overall despite variability Arctic sea ice is declining overall due to
climate change, according to the Environmental Protection Agency. About half of the sea ice cover at the
"minimum extent" − the time of year after the summer melt has concluded − has been lost, according to
the United Nations Environment Programme. "We have over 43 years of data now, and the signal of
decreasing sea ice is very clear," Walt Meier, a senior research scientist at National Snow and Ice Data
Center, previously told USA TODAY. Fact check: Humans are responsible for a significant amount of CO2
in the atmosphere However, seasonal weather and short-term climate variations also influence the
size of extent, he told USA TODAY in an email. This means that even though sea ice is declining overall,
it is still possible for a more recent year or month to roughly match the extent of past months or
years. This is the case for June 2006 and June 2023, which had similar extent sizes throughout the
month, according to the National Snow and Ice Data Center Charctic Interactive Sea Ice Graph. However,
the extents in both June 2006 and June 2003 were both lower than June extents between 1979-2004 as
well as some more recent years. Overall, June Arctic sea ice extent has decreased by 3.8% per decade
since the late 1970s, according to National Snow and Ice Data Center. Other parts of the year, such as
the September minimum extent, have sustained much greater losses. Global warming caused by
human greenhouse gas emissions More than a trillion metric tons of CO2 have been released by fossil
fuel burning and land use changes since 1850, according to the 2022 Global Carbon Budget. Multiple
lines of evidence show this CO2 has warmed the planet, Josh Willis, a NASA climate scientist, previously
told USA TODAY. For one, CO2 is a known greenhouse gas, which warms the lower atmosphere by
slowing the escape of heat into space. "The amount of warming we see matches what we expect
based on the increased CO2 we've added," he said. "The timing of the warming matches the timing of
the CO2 increase caused by people." Additionally, the type of carbon found in fossil fuels can be
detected in atmospheric CO2, which confirms the gas was introduced by human behavior. Fact check:
Arctic sea ice declining overall, though level varies by year and season The post's figures for CO2
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emissions since 2006 are in the ballpark, but may be somewhat overstated. Carbon Brief reports that
humans released around 660 billion metric tons of CO2 between 2006-2022 through fossil fuel burning
and land use changes. However, the Carbon Brief data (which is from the Global Carbon Project) also
subtracts some emissions that were absorbed by the concrete manufacturing process. The social media
user who posted the claim did not immediately respond to questions about the source of the CO2
emissions estimate in the post or which types of emissions are included in the estimate.
It's melting
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Arctic sea ice has declined in extent, area, and thickness over recent decades; it has become more
mobile and its spatial distribution has shifted. The record low extents of Arctic sea ice in 2012 and 2007
(Figure 3 and Figure 4), as recorded by U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, increased scientific and
policy attention on climate changes in the high north, and on the implications of projected ice-free59
seasons in the Arctic Ocean within decades. Recent late summer minima may be unprecedented over
the past 1,000 years.60 (Some implications are discussed in sections of this report on Commercial Sea
Transportation; Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration; and others.) The 2021 Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that “human influence is very
likely the main driver of ... the decrease in Arctic sea ice area between 1979–1988 and 2010–2019
(about 40% in September and about 10% in March).”61 Simulations under a wide range of future
climate change scenarios indicate that the Arctic could be ice-free in late summers in the second half
of this century in model simulations of low to very high greenhouse gas scenarios (Figure 4).62 The
first instances of an ice-free Arctic in late summers could occur by mid-century in all scenarios,
although model simulations provide a wide range of results.63 The mean results of model simulations
reach ice-free seasons in the 2070s in the highest and low warming scenarios, and later in the very low
scenarios. In an analysis of the most recent modeling, a selection of those models that “reasonably”
simulate historical sea ice extent indicated that practically ice-free conditions may occur at global
temperature increases of 1.3°C to 2.9°C above preindustrial levels.64 Although sea ice would remain
variable in extent and distribution, modeling of future sea ice conditions indicate opportunities for
transport through the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, extraction of potential oil and
gas resources, and expanded fishing and tourism, though also increasing competition and potential
security risks and of oil spills and maritime accidents.
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No infrastructure Now
No infrastructure plan now
Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, US General Acc ounting Office, Dedember 7, 2022,
ARCTIC MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE Government-wide and Coast Guard Strategies Lack a Means to
Measure Progress, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106411.pdf
In addition, as of December 2022, the Executive Office of the President has partially addressed our April
2020 recommendation to develop a strategy to address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. In October
2022, the White House issued a National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which updated the previous
National Strategy for the Arctic Region, issued by the Obama Administration in May 2013.17 OSTP
officials told GAO that they had participated in this work, which had been led by the National Security
Council (NSC). The updated strategy covers the period from 2022 to 2032, and establishes four “pillars”
to address both domestic and international issues in the U.S. Arctic. They are: (1) security; (2) climate
change and environmental protection; (3) sustainable economic development; and (4) international
cooperation and governance. The strategy identifies needed maritime capability improvements in the
U.S. Arctic, including for enhanced communications, mapping, charting, and navigational capabilities, as
well as the need for a deep draft harbor in Nome, Alaska. However, the current strategy does not
establish goals and measures specifically to addressing Arctic maritime infrastructure as GAO
recommended in April 2020. For example, although the strategy identifies an objective to invest in
infrastructure such as supporting the development of a deep draft harbor, the strategy does not
specify how agencies should prioritize these investments or identify goals and measures to assess
progress. In November 2022, the AESC Executive Director told GAO that the White House—including
OSTP and NSC—is early in the process of developing an implementation plan for the strategy. The
AESC Executive Director noted that for each major action in the strategy, the implementation plan
should identify lead and supporting agencies as well as a way to measure progress and to identify
investment priorities and resources necessary to implement these actions. By completing this plan
and establishing goals and associated performance measures, the federal government would have the
tools to demonstrate the results of its efforts, and decision makers could gauge the extent of progress
in addressing maritime infrastructure gaps.
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Need to Increase Presence
Warming undermining structures that support US forward presence
Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, US General Acc ounting Office, Dedember 7, 2022,
ARCTIC MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE Government-wide and Coast Guard Strategies Lack a Means to
Measure Progress, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106411.pdf
DOD’s September 2021 draft climate adaptation plan states: “In the Arctic, permafrost plays an
important role regarding natural and built infrastructure. For example, it provides stability of large
acreages of wetlands and lakes across the tundra. Permafrost thaw threatens to undermine roads and
structural foundations.”176 An August 2020 press report identifies Eielson Air Force Base southeast of
Fairbanks, Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks, and Clear Space Force Station south of Anderson (previously
known as Clear Air Force Base) as locations where facilities have been impacted by thawing
permafrost.177 A March 2022 press report stated: “The weather along Norway’s Arctic coast... is
becoming increasingly hard to predict as warming trends change the terrain and storms become more
frequent.... The changing conditions mean that U.S. forces will have to adapt how they operate, both for
the safety of their forces and the success of any potential future combat operations in the High North....
In the air, pilots must account for more extreme rainfall and storms.... Avalanches are also a greater risk
now.”178 A May 24, 2023, press report stated: “Climate change is rapidly altering the Arctic
landscape, in particular the permafrost that serves as a foundation for buildings across the region.
Warming temperatures are thawing out the frozen ground, and in the process it is threatening to
unsettle structures that were built decades ago. That’s particularly worrisome for the U.S. military,
which maintains facilities across the Arctic region. And it's one reason [Deputy Defense Secretary
Kathleen] Hicks embarked on a two-day tour of the nation’s northernmost military bases.
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Melting Ice Risks War
Melting ice risks Arctic conflict
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for
Congress, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf A National Intelligence Estimate by the National
Intelligence Council on climate change and international responses that are increasing challenges to
U.S. national security that was released in October 2021 (i.e., a few months before the start of Russia’s
war in Ukraine) states the following about the Arctic (emphasis as in original): Key Judgment 2: The
increasing physical effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate cross-border geopolitical
flashpoints as states take steps to secure their interests. The reduction in sea ice already is amplifying
strategic competition in the Arctic over access to its natural resources.... We assess that Arctic and nonArctic states almost certainly will increase their competitive activities as the region becomes more
accessible because of warming temperatures and reduced ice. Competition will be largely economic
but the risk of miscalculation will increase modestly by 2040 as commercial and military activity grows
and opportunities are more contested. • Diminishing sea ice probably will increase access to shipping
routes that can reduce trade times between Europe and Asia by about 40 percent for some vessels. In
addition, onshore oil and natural gas deposits, as well as an estimated $1 trillion worth of precious
metals and minerals will become more available, but some high-cost offshore oil and gas projects could
become unprofitable if the energy transition speeds up. • Warming ocean temperatures probably will
push Bering Sea fish stocks northward into the Arctic Ocean, according to a NOAA study, which could
increase commercial and illegal fishing activity in the region and exacerbate regional disputes between
Arctic and non-Arctic states over fishing rights. • Coastal erosion and thawing permafrost will damage
critical infrastructure. Massive investment in infrastructure would be needed to maximize the economic
potential of the region, ranging from new ports to mining, offering foreign powers an opportunity to
gain a foothold by investing in new infrastructure and rebuilding and hardening existing infrastructure.
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Miscalculation Risks
Arctic military activity increasing and so are miscalculation risks
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Military activity is likely to increase as Arctic and non-Arctic states seek to protect their investments,
exploit new maritime routes, and gain strategic advantages over rivals. The increased presence of
China and other non-Arctic states very likely will amplify concerns among Arctic states as they
perceive a challenge to their respective security and economic interests. China, France, India, Japan,
South Korea, and the United Kingdom have released Arctic strategies mostly focused on economic
opportunities, but some address security issues, which has prompted Russian policymakers to
repeatedly state since 2018 that non-Arctic countries do not have a military role in the region.
Contested economic and military activities will increase the risk of miscalculation, and deescalating
tensions is likely to require the adaptation of existing or creation of new forums to address bilateral or
multilateral security concerns among Arctic states.
Arctic – S/O PF.
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21
General Increased Military Presence Solvency
The US needs increase presence
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
A national security strategy document released by the Biden Administration in October 2022 includes a
section on the Arctic, entitled “Maintain a Peaceful Arctic,” which states: The United States seeks an
Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative. Climate change is making the Arctic
more accessible than ever, threatening Arctic communities and vital ecosystems, creating new potential
economic opportunities. and intensifying competition to shape the region’s future. Russia has invested
significantly in its presence in the Arctic over the last decade, modernizing its military infrastructure
and increasing the pace of exercises and training operations. Its aggressive behavior has raised
geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, creating new risks of unintended conflict and hindering cooperation.
The PRC has also sought to increase its influence in the Arctic by rapidly increased its Arctic
investments, pursuing new scientific activities, and using these scientific engagements to conduct dualuse research with intelligence or military applications. We will uphold U.S. security in the region by
improving our maritime domain awareness, communications, disaster response capabilities, and
icebreaking capacity to prepare for increased international activity in the region. We will exercise U.S.
Government presence in the region as required, while reducing risk and preventing unnecessary
escalation. Arctic nations have the primary responsibility for addressing regional challenges, and we will
deepen our cooperation with our Arctic allies and partners and work with them to sustain the Arctic
Council and other Arctic institutions despite the challenges to Arctic cooperation posed by Russia’s war
in Ukraine. We will continue to protect freedom of navigation and determine the U.S. extended
continental shelf in accordance with international rules. We must build resilience to and mitigate
climate change in the region, including through agreements to reduce emissions and more cross-Arctic
research collaboration. As economic activity in the Arctic increases, we will invest in infrastructure,
improve livelihoods, and encourage responsible private sector investment by the United States, our
allies, and our partners, including in critical minerals, and improve investment screening for national
security purposes. Across these efforts, we will uphold our commitment to honor Tribal sovereignty
and self-governance through regular, meaningful, and robust consultation and collaboration with
Alaska Native communities.
Multiple areas needed to increase presence
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
The diminishment of Arctic ice is creating new operating areas in the Arctic for Navy surface ships and
Coast Guard cutters.169 The Navy has increased deployments of attack submarines and surface ships to
the Arctic for exercises and other operations. The Coast Guard annually deploys a polar icebreaker,
other cutters, and aircraft into the region to perform various Coast Guard missions and to better
understand the implications of operating such units there. Key points relating to the Navy and Coast
Guard in the Arctic that have emerged over the past 10 to 15 years include the following: • Search and
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
22
rescue (SAR) in the Arctic is a mission of increasing importance, particularly for the Coast Guard, and
one that poses potentially significant operational challenges. • More complete and detailed
information on the Arctic as an operating area is needed to more properly support expanded Navy
and Coast Guard ship and aircraft operations in the region.171 • The Navy and the Coast Guard
currently have limited infrastructure in place in the Arctic to support expanded ship and aircraft
operations in the Arctic.172 • Improved communication abilities are needed, because existing U.S.
military communications systems were designed to support operations in lower latitudes rather than
in the polar regions. Improved capabilities for conducting surveillance and reconnaissance in the
region are needed so as to support improved domain awareness (DMA), meaning real-time or nearreal-time awareness of military and other activities taking place across the region. U.S. military
services are starting to take actions to address the need for improved communications and improved
surveillance and reconnaissance in the Arctic.173
US needs more presence in the Arctic
Bremmer, 7-18, 23, Dr. Esther Bremmer is, is the James H. Menger. Senior Fellow in global
governance at the Council of Foreign Relations. Dr. brimer. His work focuses on international
organisations and transatlantic relations. During her time at the council, Dr. Bremmer served as
the project director for the 2017 Council task force report Arctic imperatives, reinforcing us
strategy on America's fourth coast. In addition to posts in academia, the private sector and with
a large nonprofit organisations, Dr. Bremmer, previously served as the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organisation affairs and worked on the Department of State's policy
planning staff, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the
Arctic
Thank you. I want to with the time we have left Dr. Bremmer, in 2017, there was a bipartisan Task Force
on Arctic imperatives that of course you helped lead, you made it clear. And I want to quote that the US
needs to increase its strategic commitment to the region or risk leaving its interests unprotected. Now,
the task force identified several key goals around the Arctic. How do you think how do you think we are
doing as a country meeting these goals with the remaining time that we have?
Sir, I would say where our grade is only about a c plus at this point. We have made important
developments since that report in that now there is funding for the polar a security cutters, which is
extremely important, as my colleagues have pointed out that the United States is as interested in the
Arctic and the Antarctic, however, we will need increased investment and infrastructure and in
diplomatic support for these new obligations.
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
23
Status Quo Arctic Efforts are Not Enough
Western military posture in the Arctic is inadequate
Gray, 8-7, 2023, Alexander B. Gray is a senior fellow in national security affairs at the American Foreign
Policy Council. He served as a deputy assistant to the president and as the chief of staff of the White
House National Security Council from 2019 to 2021, NATO’s Northern Flank Has Too Many Weak Spots
While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed significant weaknesses in Moscow’s military capacity,
it has also shone an unflattering light on aspects of NATO’s strategic posture. It is incumbent upon the
United States and its NATO allies to take proactive measures to plug these gaps before they are
exploited by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime. Finland’s recent NATO accession and the
expected accession of Sweden have boosted the alliance’s capacity in critical competencies, including
undersea warfare, signals intelligence, and artillery in the Baltic Sea region. Yet troubling deficiencies
remain along NATO’s northern flank, particularly in the Arctic and near-Arctic, that reveal substantial
failings by several key alliance members to uphold their obligations in the face of Moscow’s unflagging
interest in the High North. Russia has successfully exploited several factors to gain maneuver space in
the region. There are multiple Arctic and near-Arctic islands with power-sharing relationships that
leave control of national defense to a larger entity—as in the case of Svalbard (Norway), the Faroe
Islands (Denmark), and Greenland (Denmark)—while permitting local governments a high degree of
autonomy. In each case, Moscow has expanded its influence with far too little resistance by Oslo or
Copenhagen. The Faroe Islands, whose defense is Denmark’s responsibility, have remained host to
numerous Russian fishing vessels throughout the Ukraine conflict, under a treaty between Russia and
the Faroe Islands from the 1970s. Similar Russian vessels have been credibly accused of espionage and
even sabotage, including of undersea cables in the North Sea. Copenhagen’s inability to intervene
effectively in the matter has left its NATO partners across the alliance’s northern flank vulnerable to
asymmetric Russian tactics. Recent Faroese efforts to restrict Russian fishing vessels in the islands’
waters have maintained considerable loopholes permitting Russians to retain access. While the Foreign
Policy Act of 2005 permits the Faroese considerable autonomy in foreign affairs-related to issues solely
within the jurisdiction of their government, a matter of this sensitivity should involve additional input
from Copenhagen and coordination with larger Danish foreign-policy priorities. Greenland has long
been a zone of contention between Denmark and both Moscow and Beijing, which prize its potential
natural resource wealth and strategic location astride the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, the
strategically critical body of water separating the North Atlantic Ocean from the North Sea and
Norwegian Sea. As Greenland’s local autonomy has grown, so has its receptivity to outside influence.
Copenhagen’s decreasing authority has provided ample opportunity for great-power competition on the
world’s largest island. While Greenland’s progress toward increased autonomy seems all but inevitable,
Copenhagen has an opportunity to set the parameters of the foreign-policy relationship for the coming
decades by insisting on greater coordination in areas directly impacting its NATO obligations and
defense prerogatives. As the relationship between Greenland and Denmark evolves, Copenhagen must
draw clear lines in the international realm where its vital interests, and those of its NATO allies, are
clearly at stake. The alliance’s northern flank also suffers from the strategic neglect by Canada under
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government, which is currently spending roughly 1.3 percent of GDP on
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
24
defense—significantly below NATO’s 2 percent requirement. Ottawa’s aging icebreaker fleet has long
been scheduled for replacement, but the government has repeatedly failed to deliver or even specify a
date for such replacement. Despite repeated warnings from within the military that Canada lacks the
capabilities to contest Moscow’s remilitarization of the Arctic, Ottawa has engaged in fanciful
discussions of an Indo-Pacific strategy that leaves the United States and NATO vulnerable in the Western
Hemisphere. These challenges require serious solutions across the alliance, beginning with an
integrated NATO arctic strategy that builds upon the work done by individual members (such as in the
United States’ recent Arctic Strategy) to generate a shared appreciation for the challenge of defending
the High North and allocating sufficient resources to do so effectively. This would likely include a
unified NATO Arctic Command to appropriately funnel resources across warfare domains; coordinate
joint Arctic warfare training; and take appropriate advantage of the capabilities brought to the
alliance by the accession of Helsinki and soon Stockholm, including icebreaking and Arctic warfare
skills. Additionally, the United States must work with its partners in Copenhagen, Oslo, and Ottawa to
encourage a more forward-leaning posture in the High North. Russia cannot be allowed to operate
with near impunity in the Faroe Islands or threaten NATO’s strategic communications through its
influence in Greenland or Svalbard. China, with its Polar Silk Road initiative, is deeply interested in
growing its presence in the region and has preposterously declared itself a “Near Arctic State.” The
United States should work both multilaterally through NATO and bilaterally with the Danes, Norwegians,
and Canadians to provide the intelligence support necessary to prevent ambiguous legal statuses from
threatening the alliance’s northern flank. Many on both sides of the Atlantic are rightly celebrating
NATO’s success in rallying to resist Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine, as well as in the accession of
Sweden and Finland. Yet there remains much work to be done in securing the alliance’s northern flank
and providing the security umbrella envisioned by the North Atlantic Treaty. With NATO’s 75th
anniversary approaching next year, now is an opportune moment to reorganize to meet today’s threats.
Current US Arctic efforts are insufficient, Arctic war draws in the whole world and
goes nuclear
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
Even as the U.S. says it has developed stronger Arctic policies, five prominent Arctic watchers I spoke
with say that the U.S. government and military are taking too narrow a view, seeing the Arctic as
primarily Alaska and an area for natural resource extraction, but not as a key geopolitical and national
security battleground beyond U.S. borders. They say the U.S. is both poorly resourced in the Arctic and
unprepared to deal with the rising climate threat, which will require new kinds of technology, training
and infrastructure the U.S. has little experience with. Several U.S. government officials involved in
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
25
Arctic planning told me in private they also fear a nuclear escalation in the Arctic, which would
threaten to engulf Europe and its allies in a larger conflict.
US lacks Arctic military readiness
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
Across the seas, the Arctic remains a vexatious place for American military planners. America’s Arctic
territory mainly lies in Alaska, which has more than 34,000 miles of coastline and houses five U.S.
military bases. The U.S. only has one other Arctic base, Thule Air Base in Greenland. The experts I
spoke with told me that America’s basic Arctic military and commercial readiness can use a lot of
improvement. America has only two icebreakers, the boats that make it possible for military and
commercial vessels to navigate frozen waterways. The U.S. has plans to build six more, while Canada has
18 and Russia has more than 50. The U.S. does not operate any Arctic deep-water ports — necessary
for stationing larger military and logistics vessels — in Alaska; the only one is at Thule Air Base in
Greenland. And the six Arctic military bases — all “contingency bases,” meant to be staging grounds for
expeditions into the Arctic — are consistently needing repair and intervention because of the effects of
climate change.
US not committed to a regular Arctic presence now
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
The reaction to the report from some Arctic analysts I spoke to was underwhelming, though. The new
strategy, which prioritizes security, lists Russia and China as primary threats and emphasizes the
importance of cooperation with Arctic countries such as Finland and Sweden. At the same time, several
critics told me, the report was vague and lacked a commitment to real action. The first subpoint under
the security pillar was to “improve our understanding of the Arctic operating environment,” placing the
U.S. far behind its stated competition, who are already building more icebreakers and military bases and
planning out ice routes. The report said nothing about ice breakers or the importance of broadening
U.S. reach within the greater Arctic region. And while it did broadly address climate change and
increased regional competition, it didn’t say anything about how those issues would be addressed.
Futhermore, the report said an American presence in the Arctic region will only be “as required,” a
designation that many Arctic experts think is shortsighted.
Arctic – S/O PF.
DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
26
Heather Conley, the president of the German Marshall Fund, told me the nation’s new policy remained
amnesiac and reminiscent of years past. She said it did not reflect the changing geopolitical and
commercial importance of the region. “I see policy that in its isolation is fine,” Conley said. “It’s just
fragmented and doesn’t necessarily have an overarching policy objective that everyone understands. …
And they’re not reflecting these really important geostrategic, whether they’re economic, security shifts,
and how are we adjusting policy.” Conley still thinks the U.S. sees the Arctic more of a domestic issue —
an arena to focus on natural resource extraction in Alaska and policy toward indigenous populations
— than an international one.
US has limited ice breaking ability
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
The situation on Thule Air Base is a good example of the problems the U.S. is facing. The center of any
visible U.S. Arctic strategy would be Thule, located in western Greenland and America’s northernmost
military installation. To the west of Svalbard, 947 miles south of the North Pole, Thule (pronounced toolee) is home to reindeer and Arctic temperatures so cold that Fahrenheit and Celsius often meet as
equals (at -40 degrees). The base, whose tenants are contingents from the U.S. Space Force and visitors
researching Arctic region conditions, serves as a major space surveillance and satellite command
logistics hub and plays a key defense role in providing early warnings against nuclear attack For now, the
base, used for passive monitoring, is virtually defenseless and relies on partner nations for ice
breaking. “It is an issue,” Mark Cancian, a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies’ International Security Program, told me when I asked about the U.S. ice-breaking capability.
Cancian said that capability “is limited and deteriorating.”
US lacks ice breaking abilities needed for ground force movements
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
“NATO capabilities are reasonably strong for surveillance both undersea and in the air,” James Stavridis,
a retired four-star Navy admiral who was the supreme allied commander at NATO from 2009 to 2013,
told me recently, “but not strong in terms of ice-breaking, which is of course crucial, or response to
ground force movements.”
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
27
US Should Increase Arctic Presence
US should increase allied cooperation in the Arctic
Abbie Tingstad is associate director of the Engineering and Applied Sciences Department, codirector of
the Climate Resilience Center, and a senior physical scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation. Scott Savitz is a senior engineer at RAND, 2022, U.S. Military May Need to Invest More in
Arctic Capabilities, U.S. Military May Need to Invest More in Arctic Capabilities | RAND,
https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/02/us-military-may-need-to-invest-more-in-arctic-capabilities.html
Moscow and Washington turned to diplomacy this week amid intensifying Russian military activity in the
vicinity of its near abroad. The buildup of troops along the Ukrainian border and sending of
“peacekeeping” forces to support the Tokayev regime's violent crackdown on protests in Kazakhstan are
not comparable except in their timing. However, they serve as a double reminder of Russia's political
stature and military might.
The Barents Sea region of the Arctic, where Russia meets Norway, is becoming another seam of
tension between NATO and Russia. The region features the headquarters of the Russian Navy's
Northern Fleet in Severomorsk, as well as valuable technology and mining hubs and Indigenous and
other communities. Russia has been intensifying the frequency and scale of exercises in the area. NATO
has also conducted exercises close by in recent years, prompting Russian responses. Moscow also
disputes the maritime limits of Oslo's jurisdiction in the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard, based on its
interpretation of a 1920 treaty.
Despite continued diplomacy to resolve NATO-Russia points of contention within and beyond the
Arctic (including the alliance's relationships with Ukraine and Georgia), Russia's recent military activity
in the Arctic raises questions for the United States as to what types of Arctic military capabilities it
needs as part of an overarching strategy to ensure credibility at the negotiating table and an ability to
deal with crises.
Russia's recent military activity in the Arctic raises questions for the United States as to what types of
Arctic military capabilities it needs.
Part of the challenge is the Arctic's uniqueness. In a crisis, redeployment of forces from other regions
to the Arctic would be hampered by the region's extreme climate, its remoteness, the vast distances
within it, its sparse infrastructure, its limited transportation and medical services, and scarce satellite
coverage. Equipment needs to be tailored for the harsh Arctic environment; similarly, personnel need
prior training within it to be able to operate effectively despite nights that last for months, ionospheric
effects that impede communications, the need to wear bulky clothing that hampers movement, and
manual dexterity and a host of other challenges.
The last decade has seen numerous U.S. national and service-specific Arctic strategy documents aimed
at spurring plans for new capabilities and capacity. The most important recent investment decision has
been to recapitalize the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet. However, two important factors critical to
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
28
effective U.S. preparations for countering Russia in the Arctic (and perhaps China, which in recent
years has become increasingly involved in the region) are often overlooked.
The first is the need for a capability-based, portfolio approach to Arctic investments. The United
States may need to ensure access, mobility, support infrastructure, domain awareness, and
communications across multiple domains in the region. To achieve this, the United States could invest
in many other areas besides icebreakers.
Second, the United States might do well to focus more on U.S. ally and partner capabilities in the
region. The United States relies on alliances, often espousing the benefits of partnership, and indeed
the United States has “friends in high places” in the Arctic, including NATO allies Canada, Denmark,
and Norway, as well as healthy relationships with Sweden and Finland. Other non-Arctic allies, such as
Britain and the Netherlands, also have Arctic military capabilities. It could be critical to expand joint
training and exercises with these nations, as well as to increase emulation of some of their exquisite
Arctic capabilities. Furthermore, being a good partner also requires investment. For the United States in
the Arctic, this could include gaining interoperability and ability to share more in areas where the United
States is historically strong, such as air and subsurface naval power, as well as intelligence.
Operating in the Arctic is inherently expensive: Equipment needs to be designed or modified to
withstand harsh conditions, and the costs associated with building or maintaining infrastructure are
high. Deploying assets, equipment, and personnel there to train also is expensive and discomfiting.
Despite this, it could be critical that the United States make the necessary investments—including in
partnerships—to ensure a robust ability to operate in the Arctic to withstand The US must expand its
military presence in Alaska
Liam Denning, 6-4, 23, Bloomberg, An Army at the Top of the World,
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-opinion-arctic-geopolitics-resources/army-training.html
Rather than necessarily regaining a “dominance“ it never really had — the Cold War Arctic was always
quietly contested — the Army must instead reaffirm its presence there. Besides the external
environment, the US confronts its own propensity to blow hot and cold on the region. To most
Americans, Alaska remains an exotic territory of the mind, associated variously with motifs like polar
bears, oil, ice. The Army was in the vanguard of the state’s absorption; it ran the Department of Alaska
for the first 10 years after its purchase in 1867 from Russia. It must now also lead in reestablishing the
state’s strategic importance if it is to build a credible deterrent. The recent establishment of a
Department of Defense Regional Center — essentially a think tank, and the first such one in over two
decades — outside Anchorage was an important step. The next one should be a commitment to longer
deployments. In a sense, the Army must replant its flag in already-sovereign US territory. Planting
flags, even metaphorical ones on your own land, can nonetheless be a provocative act in this part of the
world. After all, Russia’s literal planting of a flag on the polar seabed and subsequent reopening of Arctic
bases on its own soil is part of the justification for the US pivot northward. This is the geopolitical
feedback loop that can spur narratives of potential conflict writing themselves like some manic AI.
Thankfully, national borders in the Arctic are mostly well-defined. The biggest ongoing dispute,
concerning claims to the seabed, has thus far played out under the auspices of the United Nations’
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. For all the talk of a scramble for resources, echoing
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
29
the jingoism of 19th-century empires, the word “scramble” doesn’t really fit a place seemingly
constructed of only obstacles. If anything, though, this makes the Army’s presence here more vital.
Speak to any military expert about the Arctic, and the phrase “domain awareness” crops up quickly.
Think of that as erasing all those “UNSURVEYEDs.” Blank space has been birthing dragons on maps for
centuries. And while Alaska’s Cold War legacy makes it no stranger to sophisticated surveillance
technology, boots on the ground come with lots of eyes attached, too. A fully acclimated 11th Airborne
should deter any foreign adventurousness while also easing Washington’s more paranoid tendencies.
The Arctic’s brief age of innocence is reverting to something more fraught. Just as the carbon emissions
now warming the region didn’t originate there but do their insidious work regardless, preventing the
wider world’s tensions from crossing 66.5 degrees north is highly improbable. When Russia launched its
opening fusillade against Ukraine, for instance, the other Arctic Council members swiftly, and correctly,
suspended their cooperation. Russia’s long-standing Arctic ambitions are justifiable on their own
geographic merits. But they cannot be isolated from Moscow’s wider anti-Western posture — realized,
they would support Putin’s aggression elsewhere. Meanwhile, China’s designation by Washington as the
country’s “pacing threat,” as well as growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing, makes the notion
of any Chinese involvement in the Arctic inherently fraught for the US today. The week before our visit
to their turf, members of the 11th Airborne flew across the pole to train alongside a force that wrote the
book on winter warfare, the Finns. “They were born in the snow and it’s just the way they roll,” Decker
admires. Yet Finland’s abrupt turn from nonaligned to formal NATO ally captures the Arctic’s
transformation into an extension of our other theaters of confrontation. Finland was compelled by a
conflict raging far from the High North to prepare for the possibility of it spreading that way
nonetheless. The same heightened, if still inchoate, sense of alert informs the methodical hardships of
Black Rapids. There, in a landscape imperiously indifferent to humanity’s squabbles, the wider world’s
rivalries are suddenly naked to the eye.
Three ways the army should increase its presence in the Arctic
Whitfield, 6-3, 23, Ian Whitfield is a graduate student at Georgetown University, in the Security Studies
Program focusing on Energy Security and climate-related security risks. Ian is also an active duty officer
in the U.S. Army, Glacial Gambit: Advancing the Army’s Arctic Strategy,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/06/03/glacial_gambit_advancing_the_armys_arctic_st
rategy_903402.html
Historically, the nations with claims to the Arctic have utilized collaboration and cooperation to solve
competing interests in the region. However, Russia’s recent military actions have changed the dynamic
of international dialogue and have forced American leaders to reevaluate their future strategy. The
United States Army has taken specific steps in identifying the foundations of its Arctic Strategy and
continues to revise its lines of effort. However, the organization must continue adapting its strategic
approach to ensure the safety of the nation and its allies. First, the United States Army should develop
an Arctic-specific doctrine to increase survivability and lethality for its land forces. The U.S. Army has
primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations and training for the past twenty years in our efforts
to establish security in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s doctrine and training should reflect our recent
shift from the Middle East region toward great power competition. Modifying existing training doctrine
for future competition will increase overall unit readiness. This Army should seek input from the Army’s
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DebateUS! – Updated 8-3-23
30
11th Airborne Division, Mountain Warfare School, Marine Rotational Forces-Europe, and the Air Force’s
Arctic Survival School. These organizations and institutions have operational experience in cold-weather
environments and can provide lessons learned for doctrinal publications. Utilizing the experiences of
other branches offers Army leaders an operational and strategic view of how their units can integrate
with broader defense systems and capabilities. United States Army Training Command, commonly called
TRADOC, should first analyze which doctrinal publication requires inputs for cold-weather adaptability
or modification. Next, TRADOC should gather key personnel from the identified resources to develop
policies and procedures to make Army units more capable in cold-weather environments. Second, the
Army should prioritize the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center-Alaska (JPMRC-AK) as a
military training center. Currently, rotational training events are conducted at Fort Polk or Fort Irwin,
both of which offer hot and humid training conditions not representative of the Arctic environment. The
Army should consider exchanging one of these sites for the JPMRC-AK. The Department of Defense
(DoD) should work with and develop rotations with U.S. Army and Air Force National Guard units to
avoid additional strain and overstretch on active duty units. The Army National Guard already utilizes
the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) program, allowing teams to replicate combat training
center environments in alternative locations. Partnering with JPMRC-AK and U.S. Army Alaska would
create opportunities for National Guard. This would also incentivize Guard members to pursue
additional training opportunities like Mountain Warfare School as cold-weather training becomes more
frequent. Using XCTC’s capabilities in conjunction with the terrain offered in the U.S. Army Alaksa’s
training areas will provide a more robust training experience for Soldiers and Airmen in the National
Guard, giving the DoD greater force projection. With this expansion of JPMRC-AK, the Army and other
military branches should work on hosting joint training operations with its NATO partners. In 2022,
the U.S. Army took part in NATO’s Exercise Cold Response with 27 countries hosted in Norway. Next
March, U.S. Forces will take part in the largest joint-cold weather training exercise called Nordic
Response 2024. American soldiers from across all grades and ranks share the desire to work with
NATO allies. However, the Army and broader DoD can provide more training opportunities in the United
States. Creating more multi-national combined arms training programs hosted in the Alaskan winters
would benefit NATO military members. Potential Russian-Chinese expansion into the Arctic affects all
NATO members due to the region’s economic and military importance. The Army should take more of a
prominent role in hosting cold-weather training events for its allies while also sending military units
abroad to represent our nation in similar training events. Finally, the Army should continue evolving its
Search and Rescue (SAR) in coordination with the Personnel Recovery (PR) capabilities of other
branches. According to the U.S. Army’s Arctic Strategy, Russia has invested an estimated $1 Billion to
refurbish airfields, enhance search and rescue capabilities, and upgrade radar technology. NATO
members have recognized the importance of SAR/PR capabilities and have hosted training exercises like
Exercise Dynamic Mercy to promote collaboration in these sectors. However, the Army should consider
implementing innovative technologies and mission-specific training to reinforce its capabilities for these
operations. Using the RQ-11Raven drone to aid in SAR/PR operations and providing cold-weather SAR
training for Army Special Operation units would increase unit readiness and streamline these intense
missions.
Examples of policies
Arctic – S/O PF.
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Greenwood, 2023 (January/February, Cmdr. Jeremy Greenwood is an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard
with more than 20 years of experience at-sea and ashore throughout various policy offices, including
serving as a Coast Guard liaison officer at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs.
He was a Brookings Foreign Policy federal executive fellow from 2021-22, GREAT POWER COMPETITION
AND OVERSEAS BASING IN THE ARCTIC, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2023/02/FP_20230207_arctic_basing_greenwood.pdf
The United States is awakening to this reality, and though its progress toward an increased presence is
slow, the trajectory is sound. The United States’ elevation of the Arctic in the 2022 National Security
Strategy as a strategic priority is a positive development, and the release of an updated National
Strategy for the Arctic only confirms the importance of the region. The effective implementation of
these strategies, however, will be essential to supporting U.S. Arctic policy and having a more solid
footing in the strategic competition for Arctic influence. Movement in the following areas would help
with implementation:
● Foreign policy begins at home, and nowhere is that as true as it is in the Arctic.29 Targeted and
expedited sustainable investments in Alaska are the first steps toward a sound U.S. Arctic policy. There
is a desperate need for deep-water ports, roads, and communications infrastructure; airfields need to
be upgraded; and infrastructure threatened by the ravages of climate change need to be relocated.30
With proper engagement and planning, all of these investments would benefit the Indigenous
communities of Alaska, while providing a dual-use capability for U.S. forces operating in the region.
● Maintaining a peaceful Arctic does not necessarily require the construction of new military bases in
Alaska or throughout NATO countries, but it does require the constant maintenance of existing
infrastructure, upgrades to accommodate new assets, and the proper economic infrastructure to
support temporary deployments of ships and aircraft to the region. The United States will require
significant investment in polar satellite coverage and other long-range communications facilities in
Alaska and allied countries to sustain any future deployments and to ensure that the region remains
attractive for private economic development that can benefit from similar communications
infrastructure.
● Polar ice is melting at a rapid pace, but there will still be a significant amount of ice in the Arctic
Ocean for the foreseeable future. Importantly, normal ships, including naval assets, cannot sustain
contact with any substantial ice. This makes the U.S. Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutters even more
critical to operations. Icebreakers will provide more than just military access; they will drive economic
growth by providing much-needed sea lane access. They will also enable search and rescue efforts, as
well as scientific research that is vital to gaining civilian and military knowledge of a changing planet.
● In addition to its commitment to Alaska and overall infrastructure development, the continued
expansion of access rights and partnerships with NATO Arctic nations will enhance U.S. military
capabilities. The accession of Sweden and Finland to the NATO alliance presents an opportunity for
NATO to revamp its High North strategy, while ensuring that the Arctic does not become a zone of
constant military exercises.31 Demonstrating Arctic military capabilities in a measured fashion, while
fostering a commitment to the military support of logistically difficult and expensive Arctic research, will
pay dividends for the alliance.
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32
While strategic competition with Russia and China may not be the primary reason to implement a sound
U.S. Arctic strategy, engagements and investments should be designed to reinforce the rules-based
international order. This may require a gradual, working-level reengagement with Russia on Arctic
Council matters that benefit all Arctic States and their citizens. Doing so with clear, tangible nonsecurity
policy goals will provide the best hedge against Chinese disruption in the Arctic, while demonstrating to
Russia the benefits that they reap from the current order. This approach will not stop Russia from being
an unpredictable global spoiler, nor will it single-handedly prevent China from dominating trade and
investment in the Arctic, but it could reinforce the distance between the two competitors and
strengthen U.S. leadership in the region at the same time.
The United States’ ability to have a consistent and committed presence in the Arctic will be essential
to its stated objective of seeking “an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and
cooperative.”
Deterrence/Plan
Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
In addition to monitoring Arctic developments for these red flags, the U.S. government and DoD, in
particular, can take some specific steps to maintain and reinforce current factors of resilience, and to
address some of the gaps and uncertainties that remain. Next, we highlight five specific
recommendations for DoD, working in collaboration with interagency and international partners. A first
recommendation is to not only maintain solidarity among U.S. allies and partners in the Arctic, but
also to strengthen it wherever possible. There is a strong consensus among Arctic states to maintain
the governance of Arctic affairs among themselves, and this remains a powerful obstacle to undesirable
Chinese involvement in the region. This recommendation calls for sustaining active multilateral and
bilateral diplomatic activities with Arctic allies and partners. In addition, DoD and the USCG have
important roles to play in maintaining, and in some cases enhancing, engagement with other Arctic
states— minus Russia—through security cooperation activities that range from high-level exchanges to
exercises to joint training to maritime domain awareness and safety activities. DoD and USCG
cooperation with Canadian counterparts, including in the context of NORAD maritime domain
awareness activities, can ensure timely intelligence-sharing on developments in the Arctic and near
Arctic and enhance both government’s Arctic infrastructure, communications, and operational
capabilities.2 So too, security cooperation with Norway—which has played a leading role in shaping
NATO’s policy and strategy concerning the Arctic for many years—and Denmark—given its enduring
security responsibilities in Greenland and military presence in the Arctic—remain critical. The closer
defense and security cooperation that has been taking place since 2016 with Finland and Sweden, in
accordance with two bilateral Statements of Intent and the 2018 Trilateral Statement of Intent, shows
that creating a closer relationship is viable also for countries that are not yet members of NATO.3
Norway, Finland, and Sweden are also deepening their defense cooperation in their Arctic regions
(North Calotte) under a 2020 Statement of Intent on Enhanced Operational Cooperation.4 These
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33
governments have welcomed U.S. and UK engagement in various consultations and exercises, including
the annual Arctic Challenge. ..A fourth recommendation is for the United States to continue to elevate
its engagement in the Arctic. Our TTX participants highlighted the importance of making it clear both to
other Arctic and non-Arctic states that the U.S. commitment to the region is solid. This commitment
should not be solely based on the role that the Arctic plays in strategic competition with Russia and
China, but rather is the continuation, at an ever more sustained level, of the long history of U.S.
diplomacy, stewardship, and scientific research in the region. A fifth recommendation is to curtail
some of China’s appeal and elevate U.S. commitment to those living in the Arctic by working more
closely with indigenous populations. An example that could be replicated is the cooperation between
the Alaska Federation of Natives with DoD, which has resulted in more information-sharing and a closer
partnership overall.15 This could be done through working with the Arctic Council’s Permanent
Participants, four of which (the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in
Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council) represent populations living in Alaska. Such
initiatives could be undertaken as a joint U.S.-Canada effort (with the Arctic Athabaskan Council and
Gwich’in Council International) or as a joint U.S.-CanadaGreenlandic effort, with the Inuit Circumpolar
Council, because indigenous populations live across national boundaries. This would require identifying
issues of overlap between the national security interests of the United States and its Canadian and
Danish allies, and the human security interests of indigenous people living in these states. Working with
indigenous communities to develop secure telecommunications infrastructure in the Arctic, or to
develop sustainable local renewable energy sources, might be some areas where overlap could be
found.
Thule Plan
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
If the U.S. wants to project power abroad and compete with Russia and China, one way would be to
make Thule, based on NATO soil, a linchpin in a strategy that seeks to establish air and sea superiority
along the NATO bases nearest a new sea route which climate scientists, military planners and regional
governors say will be fully opened to transit in the next few decades, as sea ice melts and more
icebreakers are introduced to the region. Thule, once a Cold War hub, could again host strategic
bomber operations and fighter pilot squadrons, as well as static anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic defenses.
It could also serve as a launch point for more surface ship missions above the Arctic Circle, which the
U.S. has rarely done since the end of the Cold War. None of this was mentioned in the Arctic plan
explicitly.
US needs to totally reassess the Arctic
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
Arctic – S/O PF.
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34
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
Experts I spoke with say a shift to the Arctic must mean a fundamental shift in strategy and execution.
For years, the U.S. has relied on quick-response expeditionary forces to fight the Global War on Terror;
less emphasis has been placed on homeland defense. Robust Arctic infrastructure will mean exactly
that, accompanied by capacity building at once-abandoned facilities, addressing issues of military
superiority and climate change at once. “I think U.S. policy preference has been to exclusively focus on
one, try not to concentrate on the other, and the fact is you have to do both,” said Conley, the German
Marshall Fund president. This is something other countries are doing. Denmark, for example, allocated
$245 million toward improving drone surveillance in the Arctic and modernizing air surveillance radar in
the Faroe Islands while emphasizing domestic production of renewable energies over gas and oil
production. Meanwhile, other non-Arctic nations are vying for a foothold in the Arctic. Turkey has
sought to ascended to the Svalbard Treaty, which grants Norway sovereignty over the archipelago but
allows for equal access to signatories. Saudi Arabia is investing in Russian liquid natural gas projects.
China and Moscow have also inked deals to build satellite relays in the Arctic to compete with U.S.owned GPS systems. “Beijing is talking about opening up more globalized international governance and
moving away from the Arctic 5 and the Arctic 8 dominating the region,” said Trym Eiterjord, a research
associate at the Arctic Institute with a focus on China and Asia in the Arctic. “Whether it comes to liquid
natural gas ventures or ship building, the main variable when it comes to China as a threat in the Arctic
is its cooperation with Russia in general.” So far, though, Eiterjord said Russia has remained leery about
opening up the Arctic to Chinese investment and opportunity, hoping to limit further competition.
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35
NATO Solvency
NATO needs table top defense exercises for the Arctic
Stavridis, 7-13, 23, James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. A retired U.S. Navy admiral,
former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the
boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings,
Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the
cybersecurity sector, Washington Post, Sweden and Finland Give NATO an Arctic Opportunity,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/07/13/sweden-finland-give-us-and-nato-arcticdominance-over-russia/acc33394-2134-11ee-8994-4b2d0b694a34_story.html
Before his invasion of Ukraine, Putin was increasing the Arctic capability of Russia’s military. More
troops, bases and ships were added within the Arctic circle. Given the immense losses he has suffered in
Ukraine, this effort will likely slow, giving NATO leverage and an opportunity. The alliance should form a
smaller “Arctic Coalition” within NATO to focus in increasing its defensive capability to the north. This
coalition should include a well-staffed center devoted to study and analysis of defensive activities in
the harsh conditions. Logically and symbolically, this should be based in the territory of one of the two
new allies. The alliance should also develop a detailed defensive plan for responding to Russian
activities in the north. NATO has elaborate defensive plans for dealing with attacks by Russia against the
Baltic nations, Turkey and Black Sea countries — it needs a similar war plan for the High North, to be
rigorously tested in tabletop exercises and real-world operations. NATO can also increase its routine
surveillance and patrol activities in the region. This should include regular under-ice nuclear submarine
patrols by the US and UK; more satellite time devoted to surveilling the polar region; increased
overflight by long-range maritime patrol aircraft operating out of Iceland, Canada and Sweden; and
ground-based, long-dwell radar systems on Greenland and other northern locations. Finally, NATO
should conduct regular, large-scale combat exercises under realistic conditions. Warfighting is very
different at 50 F below freezing. Every relevant NATO combat system — from missiles to rifles to
radars to warships — should be evaluated for its efficacy Arctic conditions.
The US shouldn’t act alone, it should act through NATO
Heather Conley & Sophia Arts, 7-5, 23, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-policy-and-posture-arcticrevisiting-allied-capabilities-and-command-plans, NATO’s Policy and Posture in the Arctic: Revisiting
Allied Capabilities and Command Plans,
On July 11–12, NATO heads of state—including the president of the alliance’s newest member,
Finland—will convene in Vilnius, Lithuania, where they will take steps to align and enhance their
defense posture in the Arctic. The allies are expected to approve updated regional defense plans,
including one for the High North and the Atlantic. In outlining specific needs for troops, capabilities,
and equipment to defend against evolving Russia-China cooperation in the region, the plan presents
an opportunity to create greater Arctic defense coherence and capacity At the upcoming NATO summit
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36
in Vilnius on July 11–12, the war in Ukraine and internal turmoil in Russia will rightfully take center
stage. But as Finland participates in its first leaders’ meeting as NATO’s 31st member, and the alliance
continues to pave the way for Sweden’s accession, it will be important to assess how NATO can best
leverage its enlarged Northern flank to boost capacity and enhance the allies’ defense and deterrence
posture in the Arctic Finland’s accession constitutes a significant force multiplier for capabilities,
structures, and readiness in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. Nordic efforts to expand interoperability,
readiness, and resilience, as well as the formal integration of highly capable Nordic Air Forces under
NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), will strengthen NATO defense planning and
operations. NATO’s Nordic enlargement and the strengthening of its Arctic posture will require strategic
decision-making. The alliance’s planned revisions to its regional plans under the concept for Deterrence
and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), which are part of the package of deliverables expected to
come out of the summit, will provide an opportunity for the United States and its allies to lay the
foundations to align and enhance their defense posture and readiness. Chair of the Military Committee
Admiral Rob Bauer announced on July 3 that NATO will approve three regional plans in Vilnius, including
one led by Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk for the High North and the Atlantic. This will be an
important step toward updating the alliance’s threat analysis, streamlining the command structure, and
creating a more robust NATO posture in the Arctic.
CONTINUES
Allies will also need to adjust their planning and posture to expanding Sino-Russian cooperation in the
Arctic. A series of groundbreaking bilateral agreements this spring have signaled Russia’s growing
willingness to provide Beijing greater access to the Northern Sea Route as it finds itself increasingly
politically and economically isolated. NATO leaders will have to watch these developments closely and
consider their implications for Russian sovereignty over its territorial waters and Chinese influence in the
region. Ultimately, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and changing Sino-Russian relations have
exacerbated a dynamic of heightened tension and rising instability that started in the mid-2000s, and
that most policymakers in Arctic capitals chose to ignore in the face of competing priorities. In turn,
these developments have increased the urgency to address existing gaps in Arctic strategy, posture, and
capabilities for NATO. But the war in Ukraine has also provided insights into Russian tactics and military
capabilities that NATO should assess closely to prepare for future conflict scenarios. Russia’s use of
hypersonic missiles and Ukrainian efforts to intercept attacks through missile defense systems hold
important lessons for Arctic air defense. This warrants a detailed evaluation of the performance of the
US Patriot and German IRIS-T systems, as well as the Iranian drones and ballistic missiles Russia uses.
Moreover, the United States and NATO should monitor military and industry innovation driven by
battlefield requirements in Ukraine that could shape the future of conflict and assess the implications
for the North Atlantic and Arctic region. This review should include a closer look at the use of unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs) and aerial drones in the North, Baltic, Black, and Azov Seas.
Forging the Path Forward
Russian aggression and NATO’s response highlight new pathways for NATO cooperation and provide
an opportunity to build a stronger deterrence posture and an enhanced presence in the Arctic to meet
existing and future challenges from Russia in the near term and China in the medium to long term.
This will require a recalibration of the threat perceptions of the United States, whose Arctic priorities are
shaped by longer-term views toward environmental changes, US-China relations, and strategic
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37
competition, and (Northern) European allies, whose priority is to defend against Russia’s aggressive
behavior and violations of their sovereignty.
Moreover, the United States and Canada must collaborate closely to further integrate and upgrade
NORAD’s capabilities and operations to address severe gaps in coverage and prepare for high-stake
scenarios that demand rapid responses, including those involving drones or hypersonic missiles. Overthe-horizon radar (OTHR), upgrades to the North Warning System, and improvements in integration of
information networks will be essential to the ability of the United States and Canada, and by extension
other NATO allies, to detect and defend against threats from the North.
Using NATO’s Comparative Advantage
NATO’s revisions to its regional plans will allow the United States and its allies to align and enhance their
defense posture and readiness. A key feature of these updates will be new force structure plans that
outline specific needs for troops, capabilities, and equipment to defend against Russia and other threats
across the Euro-Atlantic region. A regional defense plan for the High North that streamlines NATO’s
force posture to support Arctic operations, accompanied by greater defense integration and planning
with the UK, the Baltic States, Poland, and Germany, will provide greater Arctic defense coherence.
NATO will also have to think innovatively about capability development and application and take stock
of existing efforts to avoid duplication. A comprehensive assessment of existing government and
private-sector Arctic-ready capabilities across the alliance would help highlight pathways to adapt
military assets such as UUVs for new applications, while simplifying future military and commercial
procurement choices. Beyond this, the Arctic 7 (Arctic allies, not including Russia), the UK, and Baltic
states should continue to develop and upgrade joint deterrence and defense capabilities. An Arctic
Security Initiative (ASI), modelled after the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), could provide an
avenue to further strengthen public-private cooperation and drive a collaborative approach to R&D and
procurement of capabilities designed for unique Arctic conditions.
Bolstering Posture
A stronger Arctic posture will require enhanced presence. NATO should use its resources strategically
to maximize outputs within budgetary restraints. Exercises including multinational efforts serve to
demonstrate presence, test equipment, and optimize processes. US forces and NATO already
routinely exercise in the Arctic region. However, unity of effort on operational coordination should be
increased to create a persistent NATO presence that will ensure a more credible deterrence posture.
At the same time, enhanced presence will demand greater integration of joint intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) activities and domain awareness capabilities. Stronger
intelligence coordination will not only provide the Arctic 7 a better understanding of Moscow’s regional
intentions, but also potentially deter malign Russian activities. These capabilities will, in addition,
support joint operations in the air, sea, and land domains—for example through improved maritime
surveillance of the GIUK gap and the North Atlantic.
Moreover, NATO allies should continue to utilize, revive, and upgrade existing infrastructure and
increase efforts to improve interoperability, including through defense cooperation agreements.
Investments beyond this should prioritize mobility and agile basing to enable rapid deployment.
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Conclusion
Given the volatile threat landscape and NATO’s strengthened Northern capacity, allies should use the
Vilnius meeting to set in motion ambitious processes that streamline and strengthen NATO’s deterrence
posture and strengthen defenses in the Arctic against security challenges posed by Russia and SinoRussian cooperation. Existing resources must be strategically allocated. Others will require further
investment and research and development. The most important step will be for North American and
European NATO allies to bridge threat assessments, share information, and coordinate activities.
Around these efforts, NATO should initiate a coordinated strategic communications plan to optimize
communications with allies and partners and signal its unity and resolve to secure and protect
international legal norms in the Arctic.
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39
Russia Threat
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General Russia Arctic Threat Contention
Russia is an acute Arctic threat
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
“The [Defense] Department views the Arctic as a potential avenue of approach to the homeland, and
as a potential venue for great power competition,” America’s new deputy assistant secretary of
defense for Arctic and Global Resilience, Iris A. Ferguson, wrote me in an email. Ferguson described
Russia as an “acute threat” and also outlined fears that China, a “pacing threat” was seeking “to
normalize its presence and pursue a larger role in shaping Arctic regional governance and security
affairs.” (China has contributed to liquid natural gas projects and funded a biodiesel plant in Finland as
part of its Belt and Road Initiative now reaching the Arctic.)
There have been moments of tensions in the Arctic over the past few decades, but Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine in February has sent the competition to new highs. Right after the invasion, the seven other
Arctic Council members said they would boycott upcoming talks in Russia. Norway, considered NATO’s
northern listening post, curbed access to its ports for Russian fishing trawlers, but still allowed for
Russian fishing in the Barents Sea. In May, Russia declared a militarization of its fishing fleet and
maritime vessels. Norway moved to heighten alertness at military installations and critical liquid gas and
energy infrastructure across the country, much of which sits in the Arctic and sub-Arctic. Europe, which
severed ties with Russian gas exports, has come to rely on that Arctic energy.
Russia increasing its military presence in the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Over the least 10 to 15 years, Russia has invested in the construction of Arctic ports and search-andrescue facilities, some of which are referred to as dual-use (civilian-military) facilities. Russia also has
reactivated and modernized Arctic military bases that fell into disuse with the end of the Cold War,
assigned upgraded forces to those bases, and increased military exercises and training operations in
the Arctic. Other actions prove Russia is a threat to the Arctic Coffee, 7-18, 23, Mr. Luke Coffey is a
senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. His work focuses on national security issues in Europe,
Eurasia and the Arctic. As a decorated veteran of the United States Army and former senior
special advisor to United Kingdom Defence Secretary Liam Fox. Mr. Coffey brings a unique
perspective to this field. Mr. Coffey previously testified before the subcommittee in his prior role
as director of the Allison Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic Thank
you, Mr. Higgins, as a Arctic power as an Arctic state, as you alluded to Russia has every right in its
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41
Moscow's prerogative to deploy military forces construct military bases, wherever it so chooses to, as
long as it's on the territory internationally recognised as being part of the Russian Federation, where the
concern lies is when you look at what Russia has done in other regions around the world on its
periphery, whether it's in the caucuses, South caucuses, in particular, in Syria, of course, with Ukraine,
that's when there's a concern that Russia might try something in the Arctic, in terms of the idea of just
interjected we concur that that Russian military presence is a threat worldwide was specifically
discussing the Arctic region. And I asked you to stay focused on that because it's a it's a unique it's it's a
unique international challenge. The Arctic region.
Ice melting freeing-up resources and Russia is aiming for them
Author: Eyck Freymann | July 06, 2023, Eyck Freyman, Former Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Arctic
Initiative, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/geopolitics-climate-change-scenarios-andpathways-arctic-2050, The Geopolitics of Climate Change: Scenarios and Pathways for Arctic 2050
Climate change is already transforming the Arctic. Temperatures in the region are rising 3-4 times
faster than the global average. Sea ice is trending down by every relevant metric, especially between
April and September, opening new navigation routes and expanding access to marine resources.
Permafrost thaw is impacting infrastructure across the region, increasing the risk of environmental
accidents. Extreme weather events are on the rise. Sea level rise is accelerating, though its impacts will
be global and longer-term in nature. Under all plausible scenarios, global warming will continue, and
the Arctic will keep warming faster than the global average. By mid-century, the frequency and severity
of heatwaves, extreme precipitation and flooding, wildfires, disruption of marine food webs and
fisheries, sea level rise and coastal inundation, droughts, and potentially climate-refugee flows are all
likely to increase. The impacts on Arctic communities will be especially severe. Some will have to
relocate. Others will have to adapt, at great cost and inconvenience. The rate of change for many
impacts is forecast to increase in roughly linear fashion through mid-century—and to accelerate
thereafter in the higher-emissions scenarios. In short, it is impossible to plan for the Arctic in 2050
without anticipating a future of dramatic climatic and geographic transformation. However, our ability
to forecast the future of climate change is also limited by several kinds of uncertainty. Uncertainty about
the future pathway of global emissions means that there is no single baseline forecast for the extent of
climate change by 2050 or any other year. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s
scenarios range from extremely optimistic to extremely pessimistic. Within each emissions scenario,
models yield different median estimates and levels of uncertainty. The IPCC’s middle emissions
scenarios currently appear most likely, though it is impossible to have certainty. There is no single
“tipping point” of warming for Arctic climate change. In short, the extent of long-term Arctic climate
impacts depends largely on actions we take today, but climate change mitigation and adaptation are
both essential and complementary strategies. The United States can and must invest in both. To build
resilience, policymakers also need an organized framework for thinking about how climate change, and
the steps they take in response to climate change, will interact with geopolitical and economic trends in
the region. Climate change is already affecting geopolitics, and countries are adapting their
geopolitical strategies to take account of anticipated future climate change. Russia is leading in this
regard, explicitly integrating climate change forecasts into its economic and national security
strategies. Vladimir Putin has signaled that he sees the Arctic as an essential resource base and
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42
military stronghold for Russia in the decades ahead. Putin also seems to believe that unexploited
hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic will be crucial for Russia’s economic future post-Ukraine.
Scientists and industry participants are skeptical that this plan will succeed, but the exit of Western
firms has removed pressure on Russian policymakers and firms to guard against Arctic environmental
risks. Russian activity is increasing the probability of Arctic environmental disasters in the years
ahead, including oil spills and radiological leakage. The United States and its Arctic allies and partners
cannot ignore Russia’s actions. As the war in Ukraine still rages, a future military confrontation
between Russia and NATO in the Arctic cannot be ruled out. NATO faces the challenge of how to
strengthen its defense structures and increase the frequency and scope of Arctic exercises without
risking misperceptions and accidents that lead to conflict with Russia. Moscow’s diplomatic isolation and
economic weakness may also force it to grant China a greater role in the development of the Northern
Sea Route. A Chinese military presence in the Arctic is unlikely ever to serve Russian interests, but a
prolonged Ukraine war, in which the Putin regime remains in power, likely points to deeper and broader
Sino-Russian collaboration. The Chinese Communist Party has its own view of the climate-geopolitics
nexus. Chinese experts discuss direct impacts of climate change as a multi-dimensional national security
threat. Across China, climate-induced natural disasters could potentially produce financial stress,
migration, and even social unrest. Overseas, however, Chinese academic and policy literature hints that
climate change is indirectly producing economic and geopolitical opportunities that China could exploit.
The Arctic is seen as the region where climate-related opportunities are most obvious. China’s end-state
vision for the Arctic is unclear—but commentary by Chinese politicians and scholars about the Arctic as
a “new strategic frontier” imply that Beijing’s long-term aspiration is to play a role in rewriting and
reshaping the Arctic’s existing governance rules and institutions. Climate science is an essential early
step in China's longer-term strategy to become a “polar great power” (极地强国). In the short term,
China has attempted to play Russia and the United States against each other as it expands its Arctic
presence, but it has met resistance. China sees scientific collaboration as a pathway to establish a
physical presence in the region without arousing suspicion from Arctic states. China also cites climate
change as the legitimizing reason for its Arctic aspirations. To achieve China’s long-term aspirations, it
needs a “strategic pivot point” (战略支点)—a port in the in the region that it substantially controls, in a
country that would not abandon China in a crisis. Greenland, for several reasons, is the ideal candidate.
The fact that prominent Chinese commentators have explicitly articulated this strategy poses a dilemma
for the United States. China has a legitimate right to pursue peaceful scientific research in the Arctic,
and scientific cooperation on climate-related issues benefits the entire international community.
However, it would not serve U.S. interests if China manifested the rest of its strategy, using Russia or
other regional proxies to insert itself into regional governance and asserting its own interests over those
of circumpolar states and communities.
Russia has military supremacy in the Arctic, conflict could escalate
Perez, 2022, February 25, Christian Perez is a Senior Policy & Quantitative Analyst with FP Analytics,
Foreign Policy’s independent research and analysis division. His work focuses on trade and investment,
emerging technologies, sustainability, and impact analysis. He is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies., Foreign Policy, ow Russia’s Future With NATO Will Impact the Arctic,
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How Russia’s Future With NATO Will Impact the Arctic https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/25/arcticukraine-russia-china-eu-invasion-nato/
Today, the Arctic is the only region where Russia has military and strategic supremacy, and as the
ongoing crisis in Ukraine escalates, it brings with it increased risk for conflict in the Arctic. Since 2014,
Russia has built over 475 new structures across its Arctic military strongholds and has conducted
extensive military exercises, most recently in January 2022. Both Russian and NATO troops are
currently stationed in close proximity throughout the region and have conducted war games in the same
geographic vicinities, such as the Norwegian Sea. As the situation along the Ukrainian border escalates
tensions between NATO allies and Russia, the fallout from a miscalculation across a militarized Arctic
could become severe.
Russia expanding Arctic capabilities
Nick Paton Walsh,, 12-22, 22, Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of
International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of IndoPacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/, Russia’s militarization of the Arctic shows no sign of slowing down
Russia has continued expanding its military bases in the Arctic region despite significant losses in its
war on Ukraine, according to a new series of satellite images obtained by CNN. NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg also told CNN in an exclusive interview on Friday there is now “a significant Russian
military build-up in the high north,” with recent tensions causing the alliance to “double its presence” in
response. The findings also come as a senior Western intelligence official told CNN Russia has withdrawn
as much as three quarters of its land forces from the High North region near the Arctic, sending them to
bolster its faltering invasion of its neighbor, Ukraine. The satellite pictures, obtained by CNN from Maxar
Technologies, show a series of Russian radar bases and runways undergoing improvements over the
past year. The images do not show dramatic development, but rather the continued progress of
fortifying and expanding an area analysts say is of vital importance to Russia’s defensive strategy, at a
time of great strain on Moscow’s resources. According to Maxar, the images demonstrate continued
work on the radar stations at the Olenegorsk site, on the Kola Peninsula in northwest Russia, and at
Vorkuta, just north of the Arctic circle. They also appear to show work moving ahead to complete one of
five Rezonans-N radar systems at Ostrovnoy, a site located by the Barents Sea, near Norway and Finland
in Russia’s west. The Rezonans-N are claimed by Russian officials to be able to detect stealth aircraft and
objects. At Tiksi air defense site, towards the East of Russia's arctic region, satellite imagery shows three
radomes (which protect radar systems) have been built up between this October and last. The remote
Russian military Arctic base is located on the coast of the Laptev Sea. Three new radomes, the
weatherproof enclosures used to protect radar antennas, were completed this year at the Tiksi air
defense site, in the far northeast, according to Maxar’s images and analysis. There are also
improvements to a runway and parking apron at Nagurskoye air base – Russia’s northernmost military
facility – and runway improvements at ‘Temp’ air base, on Kotelny Island, in the northeast of the
country. Russia has been bolstering its defenses in the far north for years, refurbishing a series of old
Soviet bases with modern designs and equipment. Its Arctic region has long been key to its oil and gas
sector, but also to its nuclear defenses, with a significant proportion of its sophisticated nuclear
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weaponry and submarine facilities in that area. On the arctic Kola Peninsula in northwest Russia,
change is visible at the Olenegorsk Radar Station, including a new building compared to the imagery
from June last year. “That deterrence has always been ready,” said a senior Western intelligence official.
“It’s never down to low readiness; it’s a high status all the time,” the official said. At the start of the war
with Ukraine in February some submarines were repositioned to signal “this is a real capability,” the
official added, but they soon returned to standard high readiness. NATO chief Stoltenberg reasoned:
“The shortest way from Russia to North America is over the Arctic North Pole. So the strategic
importance of these areas has not changed because of the war in Ukraine.” “We see Russia reopening
old Soviet bases, military sites,” he said, noting that it is also “testing novel weapons in the Arctic and
the high north.” Build-up continued between August this year and last at the Ostrovnoy site located by
the Barents Sea, near Norway and Finland in Russia's west. One of five new Rezonans-N radars, which
Russia claim can find stealth jets, is located here. SATELLITE IMAGE ©2022 MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES “It
is significant that they have managed to shelter this area from the impact of the Ukrainian war”, said
Malte Humpert of the Arctic Institute, who has written extensively on the development of the Arctic.
“They are prioritising energy resources in the Arctic, but another aspect is to project power. Yet this is
also economic. About 20% of Russia’s GDP comes from the Arctic area, and that may be more in the
future. There is a lot of money involved in the area for them.” The war in Ukraine has led to a major
adjustment in Russia’s troop strengths in the region, the senior Western intelligence official said.
“They’re down to somewhere between 20 and 25% of their original land forces up there. But then the
naval component is totally untouched by the war,” they noted. Following strikes earlier this month on
two key airfields deep inside Russia in Ryazan and Saratov, Russian military jets and bombers have been
dispersed across the country and the Arctic north, the official added. Moscow has blamed the strikes on
Ukraine, while Kyiv has offered no comment on the explosions at the Russian bases.
The US needs to increase its military presence in the Arctic to deter Russia
Vazquez, April 2023, Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations and
senior research analyst at the Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies of the University of Navarre,
2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for NATO & the Future of Great Power Competition in the
Arctic, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2022-russian-maritime-doctrine-implications-nato-futuregreat-power-competition-arctic/
Canada is also turning to the Arctic with clear intentions of strengthening its role in preserving regional
security. Despite Trudeau’s government has shown interest in having more NATO presence across the
region27) it must be remembered the Harper government blocked a NATO move to include the Arctic
in an alliance-level strategic text back in 2007.28) Although that desire to restrain NATO’s involvement in
Arctic affairs was aligned with Canada’s official position at the time, in the longer run it has translated
into a lack of sufficient NATO presence to deter Russian ambitions. In the words of Charles Burton,
from the MacDonald-Laurier Institute, “Canada has long paid lip service to the importance of Canadian
Arctic sovereignty, but the defense of the Arctic has long been a low priority for Canadian military
expenditures.”29) To this end, the development of the Harry DeWolf-class of Arctic/Offshore Patrol
Vessels (AOPVs) intended to strengthen their regional awareness and maritime control, as well as
NATO’s. With three already built, the last one was delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy in early
September 2022,30) and three more are on their way. Yet, the program has faced strong criticism, with
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detractors arguing they are not well suited to fulfill their mission, and that Canada would be better off
with icebreakers for the Arctic, and AOPVs for other regions.31) Certainly, they can’t be compared to
Russia’s Arktika class of nuclear-powered heavy icebreakers; which currently stand as the world’s most
capable cutters.32) Aware of the current situation, other members of the Alliance are increasingly
investing more and turning their sights to the High North, including the United Kingdom and Germany.
The former expressed in its latest UK’s Defence Contribution to the High North its intent to “maintain a
coherent defense posture, presence, and profile in the region, including training, partnering, and
operating from and in the Arctic.”33) The latter, who also published its Germany’s Arctic Policy
Guidelines back in 2018, expressed its concerns on the importance of safeguarding peace and ensuring a
secure exploitation of natural resources. In sum, most national Arctic strategies of NATO allies
acknowledge the importance of maritime routes and natural resources in the region, and support
military presence in order to protect allied interests. It is unlikely, however, any of them will lead an
expansion of military presence in the region; that role will most certainly be for the US. The recent US
National Strategy for the Arctic Region identifies four main pillars of work in its Arctic activity: Security,
Climate Change and Environmental Protection, Sustainable Economic Development, and International
Cooperation and Governance. Regarding the security dimension, the strategy clearly states their
intentions to “enhance and exercise both our military and civilian capabilities in the Arctic as required to
deter threats…”34) The emphasis placed on geopolitical tensions was barely mentioned in the previous
strategy from 2013; evidencing the evolution of the region.
The Way Forward. The End of Exceptionalism In the words of Tyler Cross, “security in the Arctic Ocean
will grow in importance as the polar ice caps shrink. Therefore, the United States, in conjunction with
NATO allies, must develop appropriate security doctrine and measures that confront the dangers of the
High North and Russian militarization in order to provide freedom of navigation in this often-neglected
theater.”35) With the most recent publication of the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic it appears
there will be an increased US military presence. Moreover, the expressed intentions to “enhance and
exercise both our military and civilian capabilities in the Arctic as required to deter threats and to
anticipate, prevent, and respond to both natural and human-made incidents”,36) suggests Arctic
exceptionalism is coming to an end. Russia’s new Maritime Doctrine constitutes another statement of
Russia’s unmistakable intentions towards the Arctic region and its natural resources. The Arctic holds a
central position among the maritime interests of Russia, and will undoubtedly see an increased presence
by both Russia and NATO. Although the doctrine seems to have set some of its ambitions and objectives
somewhat high given how they are performing in Ukraine, Russia’s military posture and activity along its
Arctic coasts and beyond must not be underestimated. The allies have increased their activity in the
region as well, with Norway as the leading ambassador of the Alliance in the region, and growing
presence with bases and military exercises should be expected. But with Beijing strengthening its
position in the region alongside Moscow and the increase of military activity from both sides, achieving
an adequate level of strategic awareness will become a crucial goal. Such awareness could be enhanced
by Finland and Sweden, given their proximity to the Kola Peninsula and the Northern Fleet base in
Severomorsk. Even if it is unlikely that Russia will have the capacity to achieve the goals established in
the new doctrine, its ambitions and current Russian activity must warn the allies and drive them to
increase their presence and strengthen their infrastructures around the High North in order to secure
their interests. Thus, more involvement in the Arctic region by the NATO allies will be necessary to
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counter Russian ambitions and have an enhanced strategic awareness in the region, but such
involvement must increase in a way that doesn’t lead to a rise in geostrategic tensions. The new Russian
Maritime Doctrine depicts in a clear way Moscow’s objectives and aspirations of control, and together
with the likely involvement of China to search for commercial revenues through a “Polar Silk Route”, not
only will presence rise in general terms, but especially in terms of military assets to secure each own’s
territorial waters. For now, it remains to be seen how realistic Russia’s new doctrine is, and how much
energy is NATO willing to devote to the stability of the High North.
Russia threat to the Arctic
Vazquez, April 2023, Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations and
senior research analyst at the Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies of the University of Navarre,
2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for NATO & the Future of Great Power Competition in the
Arctic, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2022-russian-maritime-doctrine-implications-nato-futuregreat-power-competition-arctic/
The new Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, published in July 2022, provides a clear picture of
Moscow’s ambitions at sea. Despite the Russian Navy is currently going through difficult times, its military
activity around the Arctic must nevertheless be carefully watched. The Arctic has grown in geostrategic
importance during the last several decades and has considerable potential to become a theater for
strategic competition1) between Russia, NATO nations and other external actors. The amount of energy
resources and oil reserves lying under its seabed have drawn non-Arctic states to the game as well. China
and India have long been interested in taking part in Arctic affairs, being both observers at the Arctic
Council, and with the former now focused on developing its Polar Silk Road along the Arctic coast.2) With
such a project, Beijing intends to develop emerging maritime shipping corridors, local economic
partnerships and the necessary infrastructure to support all its activity in the region; looking to make it an
Arctic wing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Russia has an advantageous position in the region,
holding more than 50% of the Arctic coastline, and has been modernizing its Soviet-era military
infrastructure for more than a decade now. Considering the Arctic as its northern backyard, Moscow has
resumed its activity in some 50 bases,3) which provides a significant edge over the rest of regional actors
that are now aiming to establish their presence. The region’s geostrategic features and current situation
make it imperative for NATO to pay close attention to what the 2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine develops
regarding this region and Russian objectives for it; as it will lead to a higher political and military
involvement in the region by other Arctic nations (Canada, the United States and Norway), as well as from
their allies from afar. This article reviews the most predominant features of the new doctrine, particularly
the ones related to the Arctic. Then, it is followed with its most relevant implications for the rest of NATO
allies involved in the region and the future of Arctic security. As will be seen, Russian growing ambitions
and capabilities in the High North will require NATO to reformulate its political strategy towards
Moscow, as well as strengthening their deterrence capabilities and military assets to enjoy higher
strategic awareness.
Russia 2022 Maritime Doctrine
The new Maritime Doctrine is straightforward when addressing Russian interests and objectives at sea,
all of which add up to the main aspiration to become “a great maritime power”. At least, that is the goal.
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It also provides a clear definition of what Moscow understands as threats, challenges and risks to its
maritime activity.In this sense, it comes as no surprise that after NATO’s definition of Russia as its main
existential threat in its latest Strategic Concept earlier in the summer of 2022,4) the Alliance and the
United States are now presented as the main threats to Russia’s security.5) Thus, it could be argued we
are now at the initial stages of a time of increased military activity throughout the High North, as well
as an extension of great power competition at sea. The new doctrine is a clear reflection of this last
element and its recognition by Russia: “the development of maritime activities and maritime potential is
one of the decisive conditions for the sustainable social-economic development of the Russian
Federation in the XXI century”.6) The document establishes five “functional areas” where the
government aims to develop its activity: development of maritime transport, development and
conservation of resources in the world’s oceans, development of offshore pipeline systems, scientific
marine research, and naval activity.7) After them, it defines the “regional directions” of its maritime
policy, providing the most fundamental objectives for each region, which includes the Atlantic (which
encompasses the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black and Azov Seas as well), the Pacific, the Caspian Sea, the
Indian, the Arctic and the Antarctic. From all the aforementioned important regions established in the
document, the Arctic appears as the most important for Moscow, with aspirations to establish “a
given operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation by reinforcing combat
capabilities of the forces of the Northern and Pacific Fleets”.8) Driven by “significant mineral and
hydrocarbon resources, which abound in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the
Russian Federation”, it also recognizes the ongoing transition the region is experiencing as it turns “into
a region of global competition in economic and military domains.”9) Such abundance of natural
resources lying under the seabed (which remains, however, yet to be fully studied and explored) has
been acknowledged by many nations, including China, the US and many NATO allies. Thus, Russia has
also underlined as a priority the development of its Arctic zone “as a strategic resource base, and its
sustainable use” in the coming decades. To this end, there are 21 objectives established for this region,
more than any of the other regions defined in the document. Among the most interesting ones,
“enforcing control over activities of foreign navies in the waters of the Northern Sea Route,” which
has been a concern for them for a long time, clearly reflects the Russian mindset towards its position
in the region.10) The importance of such route is considerable for Russia, as it traverses through the
entirety of its Arctic coast and will be critical for future oil and gas extractions there; and the proof for
this can be found in the eighth threat listed in the strategy: “efforts by a number of states to weaken
Russian control over the Northern Sea Route [and] an expansion of foreign naval presence in the
Arctic.”11)
Russia will increase sabotage operations that could escalate
Stefan Hedlund, a professor of Russian Studies at Uppsala University, April 17, 2023,
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/the-arctic/, The Arctic in Russia’s crosshairs
While the danger of Russia deliberately initiating a large-scale armed conflict in the Arctic may, in
consequence, be viewed as slim to nonexistent, there remains a danger of close encounters that may
result in serious escalation. The incident with a Russian fighter jet downing a U.S. reconnaissance drone
over the Black Sea in March brings that message home.
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The leading cause for concern is that as Russia realizes it is losing the war in Ukraine, it will likely seek
to save face by engaging in brinkmanship elsewhere. Given its location and its increasingly important
role as a supplier of gas to the European Union, Norway offers a tempting target for deniable Russian
intelligence and sabotage actions.
The waters off its long coastline offer soft targets that range from drilling platforms to pipelines and
assorted underwater cables. The sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines illustrates vulnerability,
and there have been mounting indications of Russian ambitions to scout and chart such assets.
Following numerous incidents of drones flying close to critical installations on land, members of the
Norwegian Home Guard have also been called up to patrol and protect such potential targets.
Russia increasing military power in the region, need to increase US presence to deter
Vazquez, April 2023, Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations and
senior research analyst at the Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies of the University of Navarre,
2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for NATO & the Future of Great Power Competition in the
Arctic, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2022-russian-maritime-doctrine-implications-nato-futuregreat-power-competition-arctic/
Evidence of this is the expansion of the Northern Fleet, based in Severomorsk, which has seen a growth
of its assets over the last three years. The first units of the fourth generation Borei-class submarines
(SSBN) were incorporated into service in June 2020, with a stealthier capacity than previous
designs.15) Its icebreaker fleet, largest by far in the world and still growing, provides Russia further
capacity and strategic autonomy in the region, especially against the smaller and fewer vessels
operated by Canada, Norway or the US. With two already deployed, the remaining three vessels of the
new Arktika-class (biggest icebreakers in the world) are expected to be finished by 2024.16)
Implications for NATO
The nature of Russian activity and the growing presence of its military make it imperative, as said, for
NATO and its allies to take action. Increasing current levels of military presence throughout the region
to act as a deterrent against Russian expansion would be more than welcome by nations such as
Norway, which has experienced firsthand the expansion of Russian activity throughout the region.17)
Russia currently has the military advantage in the Arctic
Vazquez, April 2023, Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations and
senior research analyst at the Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies of the University of Navarre,
2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for NATO & the Future of Great Power Competition in the
Arctic, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2022-russian-maritime-doctrine-implications-nato-futuregreat-power-competition-arctic/
Secondly, adding to this, the limited presence of the US, Canadian and Norwegian Navies, together with
the low level of sensors required to detect and follow Russian units, is also a significant impediment.
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Furthermore, as pointed out by Breitenbauch, Soby and Groemeyer, “the new strength and breadth of
Russia’s access-denial strategy increasingly enables Moscow to threaten distant targets without
deploying traditional power projection.”20) As discussed, developing and securing the Northern Sea
Route is a priority for Moscow, and, as Mathieu Boulege argues, “operations have led to a complete
reconstruction of forward bases and outposts in the AZRF [Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation],
partly to increase search and rescue (SAR) capabilities and partly to meet Russia’s ambition there.”21)
Thus, allied navies find themselves in a situation of considerable disadvantage, without even getting
close to Moscow’s capacity to deploy and support vessels into the Arctic waters. Norway, having long
been the advocate for further involvement of the alliance in the region, is expected to keep “a
combination of deterrence and deténte” as its security policy towards the region.22) Andreas Østhagen
argues Norway should strive to keep cooperation with Russia in certain aspects of Arctic affairs, such as
nuclear security or fisheries. This way, it is more likely Russia will change its approach to regional
security.23) Yet, as Rolf Folland points out, the main weakness Russia could attempt to take advantage
of is the great military inequality between both nations’ military forces.24) And with the increase in
exercises and joint training with both the US and the UK, Russia did warn about possible negative
consequences back in 2020.25) Thus, increased presence by allied powers in the Barents Sea and the
GIUK Gap (critical for NATO’s North Atlantic defense but highly consuming in terms of operational
resources)26) will be an essential element of the Alliance´s defense and deterrence in the High North.
Russia increasing Arctic militarization
Steven E. Miller, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, March 2023, The Return of the Strategic Artic,
https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf
Similarly, in its new 2022 naval doctrine, announced in Decree No. 512 on July 31, 2022, Russia
emphasizes defense of the Arctic as an important national interest. As one account of the new
doctrine explained, “The transformation of the Arctic into a region of ‘global competition not only from
an economic, but also from a military point of view’ is especially stressed.” (Tebin, 2022) Consistent with
this strategic priority, in recent years Russia has put emphasis on “rebuilding” its Arctic military
capabilities. (For a concise overview of Moscow’s military improvements in the Arctic, see Lozier, 2022,
pp. 19-21). It has created a new Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command and an Arctic Land Forces
Brigade. It is upgrading its military infrastructure in the region. In military terms, the Arctic is above all a
maritime theater, so it is particularly important that Russia has embarked on an ambitious,
comprehensive naval modernization program involving all classes of naval vessels – and as in the past,
the bulk of the Russian Navy is based on the Kola Peninsula and inevitably must operate in northern
waters. (Naval Technology, 2022). It conducts air and naval exercises in the northern region. (See, for
example, Episkopos, 2021). In general, the Russian government is committed to strengthening its
military capabilities in the Arctic. (Staalesen, 2021). It is hardly surprising, then, that a survey of Arctic
experts found “concerns that the Arctic may be torn apart as a result of geopolitical forces.” (Thomasen,
2022, p. 6)
Russia has a military advantage in the Arctic
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
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Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
Despite the military superiority that Russia enjoys in terms of icebreakers, US military actions cannot be
sidelined. In October 2018, the USS Harry S. Truman and its associated escort sailed above the Arctic
Circle, the first such strike group to do so since the Cold War.73 This operation in the Norwegian Sea
means that Washington is raising its game in the Arctic. Moreover, VADM Linda L. Fagan, who oversees
Coast Guard operations in the Arctic and Pacific, states that “we’re obviously watching both the Russians
and the Chinese quite closely.” Despite the vitality of the geopolitical competition, the difference in
military power might hurt the United States.74
The weak US naval presence can be observed from statement offered by Coast Guard Capt. Gregory
Tlapa, who commands the lone USS military icebreaker traveling to the Arctic each year. He stated
that, “The nation doesn't have deep-bench strength in terms of capabilities to operate up here and
project power and protect our national interests.”75 This is why the US Navy, like the other branches of
the US armed forces, has introduced a new Arctic strategy.76 The United States has maintained its
military presence in the northern base of Thule, Greenland, which is 750 miles north of the Arctic,
hosting radar systems that will scan for any nuclear missiles launched against the United States.77
Although the United States lacks the deep-bench strength in the Arctic, recent steps are raising its
influence in the region.
Their cards are old – Sweden and Finland kill Russia’s Arctic threat
Stavridis, 7-13, 23, James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. A retired U.S. Navy admiral,
former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the
boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings,
Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the
cybersecurity sector, Washington Post, Sweden and Finland Give NATO an Arctic Opportunity
In the wake of Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
alliance can take a well-deserved victory lap. I commanded troops from both nations in Afghanistan,
and Swedish forces in the Libyan campaign of 2011. The countries have professional and motivated
personnel equipped with superb technology systems, from advanced fighter jets to stealthy naval
corvettes. This spells trouble for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military, already much depleted by
its misadventure in Ukraine. Both new members have painful historical experiences with Russia. Finland
comes with 800 miles of NATO border the Russians will have to plan to defend. If Putin were to invade
Estonia, for example, he would now be vulnerable to being flanked through previously neutral
Finland, seriously complicating his military calculus. One aspect of the Sweden-Finland accession
gaining little geopolitical attention — when all is focused on Ukraine — is how they will add to NATO’s
strength in the Arctic. When I visited the Nordic states a decade ago as the alliance’s supreme allied
commander, their defense chiefs gave me a demonstration of their winter capabilities — their mastery
at operating in what our Canadian allies call the High North, above the Arctic circle. I came away deeply
impressed. So, given the new members, what would a coherent NATO strategy for the increasingly
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important Arctic look like? Step back and look at the geography. The top of the world is a geopolitical
Thunderdome, with the prize of the Arctic Ocean at the center. As global warming removes more and
more of the ice cover, access to vital shipping routes and hydrocarbons — oil and gas — will be
increasingly crucial for the nations on the front porch of the Arctic Sea. (My Bloomberg Opinion
colleague Liam Denning, newly returned from the region, is doing an excellent series of articles and
videos on all this.) Before Sweden and Finland, five such countries were already NATO allies: Canada,
Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), Iceland, Norway and the US. The two new allies, despite lacking
ocean coastlines, are considered Arctic nations. About 15% of Sweden and a third of Finland are
within the Arctic Circle: the region known as Lapland. Seven NATO allies now face Russia across the
Arctic Ocean.
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Answers to: Ukraine Reduces the Russia Threat
The Ukraine has not reduced Russia’s Arctic threat
Heather Conley & Sophia Arts, 7-5, 23, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-policy-and-posture-arcticrevisiting-allied-capabilities-and-command-plans, NATO’s Policy and Posture in the Arctic: Revisiting
Allied Capabilities and Command Plans,
Assessing the Threat Landscape
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has irrevocably altered security dynamics in the
Euro-Atlantic region. Although the war has drained conventional Russian land forces and degraded the
country’s ability to pose a land threat to the Nordic countries (primarily Finland and Norway), for the
time being, Russia’s Arctic air and maritime forces and assets remain largely intact. Despite their
preoccupation with Ukraine, the Kremlin and its military leadership remain focused on the Arctic
region, and its military capabilities there continue to pose a challenge to NATO. Because the Arctic
remains central to Russia’s economic development and national interest, and given that key assets of
Russia’s second-strike nuclear capability are located on the Kola Peninsula, the Arctic is existentially
important to the Kremlin’s security calculations. Domestic instability in Russia and setbacks affecting
its war aims may further raise the Kremlin’s risk tolerance as it seeks to demonstrate its military
strength externally. This includes saber-rattling with its Arctic-based nuclear capabilities, which
heightens instability in the region. In addition, Russia will likely rely even more on hybrid warfare
tactics as its conventional capabilities are further degraded by economic limitations and sanctions
affecting electronics and other hardware. This tracks with a recent uptick in sub-threshold attacks and
economic and intelligence activities in Arctic countries, to include Norway, Finland, and Sweden. It will
be important for present and future NATO members to gain a common understanding of this threat and
to agree on appropriate response scenarios. The North American Arctic (the United States and Canada),
and the European and Eurasian Arctic must agree on appropriate responses to deliberate escalation by
Russia and reach a consensus on the strategic implications of China’s increased presence in the Arctic
(both North Pacific and North Atlantic). The Vilnius summit can provide the necessary impetus to begin a
long overdue discussion around a NATO Arctic policy that bridges threat assessments and establishes
strategic foundations on which the allies can build. Along the way, they will need to address capabilities
gaps and command and control inefficiencies. Streamlining the Arctic Command Structure To
strengthen NATO’s posture in the Arctic and manage the risk of horizontal escalation, NATO allies
must streamline the multi-layered national and allied command structure for the European and North
American Arctic. This involves determining the best way to integrate new Nordic Allies. For the time
being, Finland has been integrated via NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum. But with an eye to
integrating and enhancing NATO’s Nordic operations and readiness, there are strong arguments for
integration via JFC Norfolk, which oversees Norway and the UK. As the alliance sets out to reform
command and control (C2), NATO staff and military leadership will have to work closely with individual
allies, including the United States and Canada, to further integrate command plans across the US Total
Force, NORAD, and NATO. In parallel, the United States will need to streamline its national command
structure and update the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for the Arctic to address overlaps in areas of
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operation—including among the 6th Fleet based in Naples, the 2nd Fleet operating out of Norfolk, and
US Joint Forces Command—and also to account for growing Sino-Russian alignment and greater Chinese
engagement in the region.
Ukraine tensions increase Arctic escalation risks
Yvonne Murray, 7-2, 23, https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2023/0701/1392214-melting-ice-leads-to-newcold-war-in-the-arctic-circle/, Melting ice leads to new cold war in the Arctic Circle
But, with Russia, China and the US increasing their activity in the high north, experts fear that the
great power rivalry could spill over. Scientists predict that the Arctic Sea will see its first ice-free
summer by 2034 "The tensions resulting from the war in Ukraine has led to increased military air and
naval activity and alertness in the Arctic," Prof Moe said. "In the present situation there is a growing
risk that unintended incidents, for example a collision between warships could escalate into a bigger
conflict."
Russia’s Northern Fleet is strong despite Ukraine weaknesses
Joel Matthis, 6-22, 23, The Week, The new Cold War in the Arctic, explained, U.S., Russia and China
battle for Arctic control | The Week
Eight countries with territory in the region are on the Arctic Council: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. In the era of "Great Power competition," though, Russia
and China stand out. "Despite its military problems in Ukraine, Russia remains a formidable potential
adversary in the Arctic," Abbie Tingstad and Yuliya Shokh wrote for The Hill. The country's Northern
Fleet has made annual trips to the region for the last decade, practicing "large-scale amphibious assault
landings, raids, and reconnaissance." And China — while it doesn't possess territory on the Arctic — is
also showing interest, the Brookings Institution noted. "China seeks to become a 'polar great power'"
and sees the Arctic as "ripe for rivalry and extraction." CONTINUED…. Not the United States. "At the
moment, the military balance in the Arctic is heavily weighted towards Russia," one expert told Reuters.
That's because Russia has a head start: Its bases in the region outnumber NATO's by "about a third."
While the United States is just now establishing its first deepwater port on the Arctic, "Russia has
invested heavily in ports, infrastructure and vessels to develop and protect the Northern Sea Route." It
also has seven nuclear-powered icebreaker ships, in addition to 30 diesel-powered icebreakers. The U.S.
and China, meanwhile, each have two diesel-powered icebreakers. (The U.S. plans to build six more
icebreakers.)
Ukraine weakness means Russia goes nuclear
Emily Rauhala, July 17, 2023, Washington Post, An Arctic ‘Great Game’ as NATO allies and Russia face
off in far north, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/17/an-arctic-great-game-nato-alliesrussia-face-off-far-north/
For several years now, European and U.S. security and intelligence officials have been keeping a closer
eye on the world above the Arctic Circle, knowing that melting polar ice will open new trade routes,
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propel a race for natural resources and reshape global security. Western officials watched as Russia
revived Soviet-era military sites and while China planned a “Polar Silk Road.” Vardo, Norway, is home to
the U.S.-funded Globus I, II and III radars. But the war in Ukraine and the dramatic deterioration of
Western relations with Moscow have put the frostbitten borderlands between Norway and Russia on
heightened alert, while increasing the geostrategic importance of the Arctic. The result is an uptick in
military, diplomatic and intelligence interest that could usher in an iteration of the “Great Game,” the
19th-century rivalry between the British and Russian empires for influence in Asia. For Russia, because
the war in Ukraine has diminished Moscow’s conventional military forces and hobbled the Russian
economy, its Arctic assets have become more critical. “The Arctic has become more important
because the nukes are more important,” said Maj. Gen. Lars Sivert Lervik, the chief of the Norwegian
army.
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Answers to: US Allies Solve
Deterrence in the Arctic depends on the US
Vazquez, April 2023, Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations and
senior research analyst at the Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies of the University of Navarre,
2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for NATO & the Future of Great Power Competition in the
Arctic, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2022-russian-maritime-doctrine-implications-nato-futuregreat-power-competition-arctic/
Canada is also turning to the Arctic with clear intentions of strengthening its role in preserving regional
security. Despite Trudeau’s government has shown interest in having more NATO presence across the
region27) it must be remembered the Harper government blocked a NATO move to include the Arctic
in an alliance-level strategic text back in 2007.28) Although that desire to restrain NATO’s involvement in
Arctic affairs was aligned with Canada’s official position at the time, in the longer run it has translated
into a lack of sufficient NATO presence to deter Russian ambitions. In the words of Charles Burton,
from the MacDonald-Laurier Institute, “Canada has long paid lip service to the importance of Canadian
Arctic sovereignty, but the defense of the Arctic has long been a low priority for Canadian military
expenditures.”29) To this end, the development of the Harry DeWolf-class of Arctic/Offshore Patrol
Vessels (AOPVs) intended to strengthen their regional awareness and maritime control, as well as
NATO’s. With three already built, the last one was delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy in early
September 2022,30) and three more are on their way. Yet, the program has faced strong criticism, with
detractors arguing they are not well suited to fulfill their mission, and that Canada would be better off
with icebreakers for the Arctic, and AOPVs for other regions.31) Certainly, they can’t be compared to
Russia’s Arktika class of nuclear-powered heavy icebreakers; which currently stand as the world’s most
capable cutters.32) Aware of the current situation, other members of the Alliance are increasingly
investing more and turning their sights to the High North, including the United Kingdom and Germany.
The former expressed in its latest UK’s Defence Contribution to the High North its intent to “maintain a
coherent defense posture, presence, and profile in the region, including training, partnering, and
operating from and in the Arctic.”33) The latter, who also published its Germany’s Arctic Policy
Guidelines back in 2018, expressed its concerns on the importance of safeguarding peace and ensuring a
secure exploitation of natural resources. In sum, most national Arctic strategies of NATO allies
acknowledge the importance of maritime routes and natural resources in the region, and support
military presence in order to protect allied interests. It is unlikely, however, any of them will lead an
expansion of military presence in the region; that role will most certainly be for the US. The recent US
National Strategy for the Arctic Region identifies four main pillars of work in its Arctic activity: Security,
Climate Change and Environmental Protection, Sustainable Economic Development, and International
Cooperation and Governance. Regarding the security dimension, the strategy clearly states their
intentions to “enhance and exercise both our military and civilian capabilities in the Arctic as required to
deter threats…”34) The emphasis placed on geopolitical tensions was barely mentioned in the previous
strategy from 2013; evidencing the evolution of the region.
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War Risks
Russia-US tensions high in the Norway Arctic region
Emily Rauhala, July 17, 2023, Washington Post, An Arctic ‘Great Game’ as NATO allies and Russia face
off in far north, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/17/an-arctic-great-game-nato-alliesrussia-face-off-far-north/
For several years now, European and U.S. security and intelligence officials have been keeping a closer
eye on the world above the Arctic Circle, knowing that melting polar ice will open new trade routes,
propel a race for natural resources and reshape global security. Western officials watched as Russia
revived Soviet-era military sites and while China planned a “Polar Silk Road.” Vardo, Norway, is home to
the U.S.-funded Globus I, II and III radars. But the war in Ukraine and the dramatic deterioration of
Western relations with Moscow have put the frostbitten borderlands between Norway and Russia on
heightened alert, while increasing the geostrategic importance of the Arctic. The result is an uptick in
military, diplomatic and intelligence interest that could usher in an iteration of the “Great Game,” the
19th-century rivalry between the British and Russian empires for influence in Asia. For Russia, because
the war in Ukraine has diminished Moscow’s conventional military forces and hobbled the Russian
economy, its Arctic assets have become more critical. “The Arctic has become more important
because the nukes are more important,” said Maj. Gen. Lars Sivert Lervik, the chief of the Norwegian
army.
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Answers to: Ukraine Destroyed Russia
Russia now rebuilding in the Arctic
G. Dunkel, 6-7, 23, https://www.workers.org/2023/06/71470/m Militarizing the Arctic
There is now “a significant Russian military buildup in the High North,” according to NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg. NATO forces monitor the Baltic and North Seas, while projecting a presence in
the Arctic. This comes after Russia withdrew “as much as three-quarters of its land forces from the
High North region near the Arctic” to send them to fight in Ukraine. (CNN, Dec. 22, 2022)
Ukraine won’t drain Russia’s military capabilities
Greenwood, 2023 (January/February, Cmdr. Jeremy Greenwood is an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard
with more than 20 years of experience at-sea and ashore throughout various policy offices, including
serving as a Coast Guard liaison officer at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs.
He was a Brookings Foreign Policy federal executive fellow from 2021-22, GREAT POWER COMPETITION
AND OVERSEAS BASING IN THE ARCTIC, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2023/02/FP_20230207_arctic_basing_greenwood.pdf
To be sure, the war in Ukraine remains a drain on Russian military assets, but the Arctic will continue to
be a priority region for the Russian military. It should not be assumed that significant capability will be
lost there in the near term. As Rebecca Pincus of the Wilson Center stated, “While the war in Ukraine
has impacted Russia’s low-end military capabilities and capacity, in the Arctic, it retains a seriously
formidable set of high-end capabilities.
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China-Russia Coop
China and Russia set to dominate the Arctic, the US is not prepared
Kenneth Rosen, 7-6, 23, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/06/arctic-cold-warrivalry/, Washington Post, A growing rivalry in the Arctic? Talk about a cold war.
Strategic rivals are moving quickly to dominate the region. Over the past decade, Russia has reopened
and modernized upward of 50 Cold War-era bases along the necklace of its Arctic coastline of roughly
15,000 miles. China has invested in liquefied natural gas projects in the Russian north. India has also
invested in energy and mineral resources in the Arctic as its economy rapidly expands. One researcher
who frequents the Arctic aboard U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers for scientific missions expressed shock
“we weren’t paying more attention” to the region. An updated National Strategy for the Arctic Region,
released by the White House last autumn, was disappointing. Like its predecessor from the Obama era,
the strategy lacked concrete steps and actionable plans, while once again painting the Arctic as a remote
and peculiar afterthought for the nation, home to poor infrastructure and lacking access to health care.
And yet there are signs of progress that might point the way to an effective, though belated, future
strategy. In 2020, the State Department opened a consulate in Nuuk, Greenland; the same year, a U.S.
coordinator for the Arctic region was appointed. In the past year, a diplomatic mission in Tromso,
Norway, has opened, and two positions have been created to focus on the region: an ambassador at
large for the Arctic region at the State Department and a deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic
and global resilience working at the Pentagon. The Northern Warfare Training Center in Alaska prepares
twice as many troops than in years past. A $600 million-plus project will create Alaska’s first deep-water
port in Nome There is much more to be done. “I’ve been making the case for years on the need to
establish greater American presence in the Arctic — vessels, personnel and ports — as America’s
strategic rivals lay claim to this important region,” Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska) said last year. The
United States must also update its northernmost military facility, in Qaanaaq, Greenland, to take
account of rising temperatures and thawing permafrost, which are damaging aircraft runways. It’s time
to expand the U.S. fleet of icebreaker ships instead of relying on other nations’ fleets. Ratifying the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea would put the United States on equal footing with
Russia and other nations staking claims to resources extending to the North Pole Further, the United
States should shoulder the burden of integrated Arctic defense by filling gaps in surveillance,
specifically in the North Atlantic between Greenland and Iceland and the United Kingdom. U.S. drones
can keep an eye on remote Arctic regions, while imagery from surveillance satellites is more widely
shared with Arctic allies, rather than relying on infrastructure and equipment owned and operated by
those allies that are already turning their defense strategies homeward. American forces should
participate more regularly in NATO Arctic exercises. (American B-1 bombers and F-35s joined an
exercise in the Nordic region for the first time in June.) The long-running dispute between the United
States and Canada over the boundary of the Beaufort Sea — north of Alaska and Yukon — should be
resolved in a display of good faith to enhance cooperation with Canada (another state whose Arctic
policy is turning more inward) in modernizing the NORAD network of air defense systems. Such steps
would illustrate a previously unseen U.S. commitment to being a cooperative, not passive, regional
partner while expanding the vision of a more global Arctic. Competition among great powers cannot be
avoided, but it can be ignored. Despite the actions of our rivals, Washington has made only modest
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60
efforts to increase its Arctic footprint, both in Alaska and beyond. A longer and wider vision is
required to meet overt and covert threats. That starts with the United States coming to understand
that the Arctic is not just Alaska plus ice; it reaches across the northern flank and is a key to national
security, global stability and climate resilience.
Russia and China dominance of the Arctic will increase vis-à-vis the US
Rosario Rivera, Mexican Center for International Relations, Alí Gómez Villascán, 7-24, 23, Dispute for the
Arctic: China and Russia against the United States, https://cemeri.org/en/art/a-disputa-artico-chinarusia-usa-au
The current dispute between the United States of America against the People's Republic of China (PRC)
and the Russian Federation is not only limited to a trade war, it also encompasses a strategic
competition for different regions – including the Arctic. Although the United States could be thought of
as a favorite given its hegemony, it has actually been weakening to such a degree that it could lose the
battle in the Arctic against Russia and China. The contemporary system, established after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, has been characterized by the excessive actions of the USA.
However, almost thirty years later, its supremacy has already been threatened by the rise of new
emerging powers and certain unexpected events such as the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the
hegemon has had more limitations than ever. In this regard, Fareed Zakaria, who is a leading author of
neoclassical realism, indicates that the world has entered a post-American phase in which two other
main players have emerged. The concern of the United States in the face of the increasing expansion of
Russian power is undeniable, but there is a bigger one that challenges even the established world order:
"the Red Dragon". It would be both anticipated and uncertain to affirm that any of these last two
countries can – individually – impose a new era and place themselves at the top of the international
system. However, such a scenario is not very distant if we talk about Sino-Russian cooperation, that
[strategic] association (https://sputniknews.lat/20201027/alianza-militar-entre-china-y-rusia-quepasaria- if-the-two-superpowers-join-forces-1093266157.html) [2] unprecedented that aims to put US
unilateralism in check. The economic, political, military and technological power that Russia and China
have developed gives them a fairly strong bargaining power. In such a way that they have expanded
their influence in the world through what is known as smart power or intelligent power. This type of
power is based on creating a strategy that combines the elements of both hard power and soft power.
While it is true that the European Union (EU) has the support of the United States, its closeness to the
two aforementioned powers makes decision-making for the good of European economic integration
difficult under pressure from the North American hegemon. However, in the face of facts such as
Europe's dependence on Russian gas and heavy Chinese investment in the region, the options are so
limited that Russian and Chinese expansion is virtually inevitable. Climate change, which brings with it
severe consequences for all living beings on the planet, paradoxically, creates a unique opportunity in
the Arctic: the extraction of strategic resources such as oil and gas, as well as various precious stones
such as diamonds and gold; and essential elements (mainly those belonging to the platinum group) used
in the manufacture of electronic gadgets. The bilateral relationship between Russia and China seems to
benefit from this event, because Russia has an excellent location in the Arctic, being the nation with
the largest territory in this area, and China can complement Russia's ambitions by contributing
manpower and essential technological resources for extraction.
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Russia and China Arctic presence put them at the US back-door and provide a huge
advantage in a conflict
Buchanan, 5-4-23, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan is a non-resident fellow of the Modern War Institute at West
Point and a First Sea Lord Five Eyes fellow with the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre. Her book Red
Arctic was published on March 24, 2023, with The Brookings Press,
https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/russias-gains-in-the-great-arctic-race/, RUSSIA’S GAINS IN THE
GREAT ARCTIC RACE
The extraction of resources also presents emerging opportunities to draw states that are also at odds
with the United States into the Arctic picture. Of course, states like China do much more than invest in
resource projects — they have the domestic legislation and capability to protect state investments as
strategic interests with military deployments. A situation in which Russia facilitates an increased
footprint of Beijing in the Arctic, right at America’s back door, is at best concerning given that China
could legitimize an active military presence in the Arctic arena. In the event of a conflict scenario,
Russia is unmatched when it comes to Arctic capability. Moscow operates some 40-plus icebreakers —
with more on the way — should it require polar muscle to push the other North Pole seabed claimants
out. The United States has only two Arctic-capable icebreakers (Polar Star and Healy), both of which
are increasingly prone to breakdowns and fires.
China-Russia Arctic cooperation now
AP, 6-19, 23, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/06/19/first-us-deep-water-portfor-the-arctic-to-host-military-cruise-ships/, Military Times, First US deep water port for the Arctic to
host military, cruise ships
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg last year warned that Russia and China have
pledged to cooperate in the Arctic, “a deepening strategic partnership that challenges our
values and interests.”
Rapid ice melting in the Arctic now, Russia securing its interests
Barry Gardiner is the Labour MP for Brent Nort, 6-13, 23, The Guardian, s the ice melts, a perilous
Russian threat is emerging in the Arctic,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/13/arctic-russia-nato-putin-climate
To understand why this matters, we must first understand the climate emergency taking place in the
region. Summer sea ice has declined by 30% in the past 30 years; 90% of old ice, which is classified as
five years old or more, has gone. That ice used to act as the great heat shield for the planet, reflecting
back the sun’s rays. But the loss of ice is producing a vicious spiral of heating. The Arctic is now warming
three times faster than the global average. This process is called Arctic amplification. It means that
scientists now project an Arctic free from summer ice by 2040–45. As the ice cover is lost, a trans-polar
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62
route is opening to connect east Asia to Europe and the eastern coast of North America. And the ice
barrier that once protected Russia’s northern shore will be exposed as never before. Russia represents
53% of the Arctic coastline and the need to protect its northern border as the ice barrier melts is a key
national security concern. Vladimir Putin already had ambitious plans for the northern sea route,
seeking to more than double the cargo traffic. But over the past six years, Russia has also built 475
military sites along its northern border. The port of Severomorsk, on the Kola peninsula, is the base of
the country’s northern fleet. In recent years, the Russians have reactivated 50 Soviet outposts in the
Arctic and equipped its northern fleet with nuclear and conventional missiles.
China and Russia moving into the Arctic to control resources
Liam Denning, 6-4, 23, Bloomberg, An Army at the Top of the World,
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-opinion-arctic-geopolitics-resources/army-training.html
Now, as geopolitical tension encroaches on the Arctic, the US is once again experiencing a Sputnik
moment in its far north. More effective and relentless than any artillery, climate change is crumbling
the Arctic’s walls of ice, raising hopes of access to its resources and new sea routes to project power
and influence. A 2008 report from the US Geological Survey teased the “largest unexplored prospective
area for petroleum remaining on Earth.” Old World riches like gold and the building blocks of new
technologies like rare earth metals and graphite are also scattered around up there. Russia is
campaigning to carve out a large zone of economic exclusivity in the Arctic and has invested heavily in
rebuilding its military capabilities there, fueling angst that the US is being left behind (after the missile
gap comes the icebreaker gap). Meanwhile, China has artfully declared itself a “near Arctic nation,”
underlining its intention to muscle into the region as a “polar great power” and establish a presence in
an echo of the South China Sea.
Russia building up its military, developing ties with China
Norimitsu Onishi, 6-4, 23, New York Times, Caribou Meat and Moon Signs: Inuit Lessons for Soldiers in
the Arctic, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/04/world/canada/canada-military-arctic-climate.html
Russia is rapidly building up its military and partnering on commercial ventures with China, as thawing
ice provides access to vast natural resources below the Arctic sea floor and unlocks new shipping lanes.
Even Canada’s closest ally, the United States, disputes Canadian claims of sovereignty over the
Northwest Passage.
Russia and China threaten US Arctic interests
Whitfield, 6-3, 23, Ian Whitfield is a graduate student at Georgetown University, in the Security Studies
Program focusing on Energy Security and climate-related security risks. Ian is also an active duty officer
in the U.S. Army, Glacial Gambit: Advancing the Army’s Arctic Strategy,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/06/03/glacial_gambit_advancing_the_armys_arctic_st
rategy_903402.html
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The United States faces significant questions regarding the Arctic Circle and its commitments to
northern security. Just as the Arctic has experienced rapidly rising temperatures, regional competition
will intensify because of the region’s strategic importance. The buildup of Russian military assets
along the country’s Northern coast, China’s polar trade investments, and the alliance between these
nations threaten America’s Arctic interests. The security of the Arctic is inextricably linked to the safety
of the United States and its allies.
China-Russia Arctic cooperation
Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Aidan Powers-Riggs Center for Strategic
and International Studies, April 2023, https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-researchfacility/, Frozen Frontiers China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions
Concerns about the potential military applications of Chinese scientific research are not new, but recent
events have brought them into sharper focus. The conflict in Ukraine has deepened political fault lines,
leaving many European governments viewing Beijing and Moscow as increasingly aligned against
democratic states. Finland’s recent accession to NATO and Sweden’s push for membership have
further strained their relationship with China. In this emerging geopolitical landscape, China’s
prospects of expanding its presence in the Arctic via Nordic states look increasingly dim and its
partnership with Russia appears to be taking center stage. China has long viewed Russia as a gateway
to the Arctic. The two countries began holding official dialogues on the Arctic more than a decade ago,
but Russia has historically bristled at China’s push into its far north. Russia initially opposed China’s
campaign to become an observer state of the Arctic Council, and in 2012, it blocked Chinese research
vessels from conducting surveys along the Northern Sea Route. Part of Moscow’s concern likely stems
from the fact that the Russian military operates some of its most sensitive strategic assets there,
including ballistic missile submarines, strategic test sites, missile defense systems, and advanced radar
arrays. This dynamic may now be changing. The war in Ukraine has left Russia increasingly isolated and
reliant on China for crucial investments in technology and infrastructure. The conflict has also left the
Arctic Council in flux, as Russia has been shunned by the remaining member states, and China has said it
will refuse to recognize the body without Russia’s participation. Chinese scholars have previously
analyzed how best to gain a foothold in the Russian Arctic. In 2019, prominent academics from the
Chinese Academy of Sciences and Fuzhou University conducted a study to identify which Russian ports
along the strategic Northern Sea Route hold the greatest potential for facilitating Chinese access to
the region. The report ranked 13 Russian ports based on five primary factors: natural conditions,
infrastructure, port operation, interior environment, and geographic location. It also assessed 17
secondary factors, including “strategic value.” Major Chinese firms have already homed in on several of
the key ports identified in the study. Over the last seven years, a subsidiary of the state-owned defense
industry giant China Poly Group has poured $300 million into a coal terminal in Murmansk and agreed to
develop a deepwater port at Arkhangelsk. Chinese financers also provided up to 60 percent of the
capital for Russia’s Yamal liquefied natural gas project terminating in the port city of Sabetta. The
project is considered the “crown jewel” of Russia's investments in the Northern Sea Route and there are
hopes it could produce up to 926 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas from the South Tambey
field.
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Russia-China military cooperation in the Arctic
Perez, 2022, February 25, Christian Perez is a Senior Policy & Quantitative Analyst with FP Analytics,
Foreign Policy’s independent research and analysis division. His work focuses on trade and investment,
emerging technologies, sustainability, and impact analysis. He is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies., Foreign Policy, ow Russia’s Future With NATO Will Impact the Arctic,
How Russia’s Future With NATO Will Impact the Arctic https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/25/arcticukraine-russia-china-eu-invasion-nato/
Closer cooperation with Russia grants China the chance to expand its role in the Arctic, where it has
been steadily ramping up its activity over the past decade, further transforming the region into a future
arena of great power competition. In 2013, China became an Arctic Observer state on the Arctic
Council, and from 2012 to 2017 it invested over $435 billion across Arctic states in a range of sectors,
including research, infrastructure, and resource extraction. In 2018, China published its Arctic Strategy
and outlined its plan for a “Polar Silk Road” as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. China’s interest in the
Arctic to date has centered on ensuring access to the rapidly opening Northern Sea Route—an Arctic
shipping lane connecting Europe and Asia along Russia’s Northern ocean—and securing a share of the
region’s energy and critical mineral reserves. Pursuing these interests has led to major economic
agreements with Russia, including a $400 billion natural gas deal signed in 2014 and, most recently, a
30-year natural gas deal finalized this month.
China and Russia’s cooperation in the Arctic is sparking further security concerns from the U.S. and EU
and is generating speculation that China is using the Arctic as an arena to expand its global ambitions.
While Russia can supply China with energy resources, China provides a lucrative market for energy
exports, access to capital, and financial services to counteract NATO sanctions on Russia. Additionally,
China’s participation in Russian military drills, conducted in the Arctic in 2018 and 2019, raises
concerns that future agreements between the two nations in the region could include military
cooperation. As the ongoing crisis in Ukraine leads to new sanctions on Russia from both the U.S. and
EU, it is likely that Russia will increasingly turn to China for economic support. While that bilateral
relationship is nuanced, this dynamic could create an opening for China to further pursue and cement its
long-term presence in the Arctic region. An expansion of China’s role in the Arctic would increase
tensions with the U.S. and other Arctic nations already wary of China’s intentions, and potentially
catalyze a transformation of the Arctic’s future role in geopolitics.
Growing risk of Arctic superpower conflict
Batool, 7-14, 23, Ms Fizza Batool is a student of International Relations from Kinnaird College for
Women. She is particularly interested in geo-economics, geopolitics, area studies, diplomacy, conflict
and peace, strategic and defense studies, political economy, and global politics of the environment,
Significance of the Arctic Region, https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/the-arctic-region/
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Primarily, agreements are a natural part of the great power strategic approach if the
Arctic holds a zone of geopolitical struggle. The Arctic Ocean and its natural riches are
becoming more accessible due to increasing temperatures worldwide, and the United
States, Russia, and China all strive for their mobility of passage and sovereign claims and
aims to be preserved. Yet, the increasing influence of China and its novel claims over the
Arctic, the Russian militarism in the Arctic sea lanes, the growing integration between
China and Russia, the geopolitical disputes between Russia and the US, and
international competition between the US and China are all entwining the Arctic in an
emerging era of global power struggle. Due to climate change and human activity, the
Arctic area is undergoing rapid and unprecedented changes. The countries that border
the Arctic as well as those with interests in the region are currently confronting new
opportunities and challenges because of these developments. Researchers have issued
warnings that the Arctic region is becoming a new theater for geopolitical rivalry and
possibly conflict, particularly between Russia, the United States, and China. According
to the key characters, implications, and actors involved in the Arctic area, there would
be a “new Cold War” taking place. The security situation in the region has also become
more complicated and unclear because of China’s rising interest in and presence in the
Arctic. China has branded itself as a “near-Arctic state” and made significant
investments in the area’s scientific research, economic growth, and diplomatic
involvement. Through Arctic maritime routes, China’s “Polar Silk Road” program looks
to link Asia and Europe, posing a threat to the supremacy of the United States and its
allies in the area. Researchers who foresaw the start of resource wars in the Arctic
have been drawn in by the thirst for riches. Most of the resources in the Arctic are in
contested areas like the Beaufort Sea, where the boundary between Canada and the US
has been a cause of intense debate for some time. When the US government leased off
oil and gas licenses in the contested territory in 2003, Ottawa lodged an official
objection, heightening the possibility of protracted legal disputes and scaring off foreign
energy businesses. It is understood that the possibility of a military conflict between the
two members of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is unimaginable given the
close relations that exist between Canada and the United States. The shifting dynamics
of the balance of power and security in the area are another factor contributing to the
“new Cold War” in the Arctic. Russia, which has the longest Arctic coastline and the
greatest proportion of the region’s resources, is the most significant player in this
respect. In the Arctic, Russia has been pursuing an assertive and ambitious strategy that
includes building up its military capabilities, increasing patrols and exercises,
modernizing its icebreakers and nuclear forces, and asserting its claims over sizable
portions of the continental shelf. Other Arctic governments, particularly NATO allies, are
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concerned about Russia’s intentions and capabilities in the area because of its actions.
Russia’s participation in the wars in Syria and Ukraine has further heightened tensions
and antagonism between Moscow and Washington, which might spread into the
Arctic.
Russia-China Arctic cooperation increasing
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Russia’s diplomatic isolation from the A7 states in the Arctic has led to increased Russian cooperation
with China in the Arctic102—a development that could strengthen China’s presence and activities in
the region and affect views among observers in the A7 states and elsewhere regarding China’s
motivations and goals for its Arctic activities and China’s ability to work with the A7 states on matters
relating to the Arctic.10
Arctic critical to great power competition
Bremmer, 7-18, 23, Dr. Esther Bremmer is, is the James H. Menger. Senior Fellow in global
governance at the Council of Foreign Relations. Dr. brimer. His work focuses on international
organisations and transatlantic relations. During her time at the council, Dr. Bremmer served as
the project director for the 2017 Council task force report Arctic imperatives, reinforcing us
strategy on America's fourth coast. In addition to posts in academia, the private sector and with
a large nonprofit organisations, Dr. Bremmer, previously served as the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organisation affairs and worked on the Department of State's policy
planning staff.
I will begin by commenting on the geopolitics and the changing institutions in the Arctic. As
we've already noted, in this hearing, the geopolitics of the hero of the Arctic was dramatically
altered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Both Finland and Sweden abandoned, in
Sweden's case 200 years of neutrality to join America's most important in a military alliance and
we hope there'll be members soon. Finland's invasion of Ukraine not only enhance NATO, it
also inadvertently stalled competition, and one of the Arctic's most distinctive multilateral
organisations the Arctic Council, founded in 1996, in the afterglow of the end of the Cold War,
the Arctic Council embodied the spirit of cooperation. Decisions were made by consensus, and
the forum focused on sustainable development and environmental issues. By design, it did not
focus on security. Unusual for an intergovernmental body the Arctic Council also includes six
permanent participant organisations representing Arctic indigenous peoples This special facility
for interaction is distinctive and should be preserved. cultural ties span current national borders.
At the time of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia happening unfortunately Russia
happened to be holding the chair of the Arctic Council. Obviously the other seven paws
relationships with the Arctic Council, Norway is now chair and seeks to revitalise cooperation in
this body. This strategic realignment in the Arctic builds on political ships that were already
evident before the invasion. Recent years witnessed the resurgence of great power
competition, the US faces a rising power China and the Russian Federation. And
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increasingly countries outside the Arctic have been active in the region. One greatest concern,
of course, is China. But that said, there are numerous observers at the Arctic Council, including
Japan, India, Italy, from the Republic of Korea and Singapore. Oh, they're just joined in 2013 on
a longer list of members of the observer group at the Arctic Council. But even before the war in
Ukraine, Russia needed partners for economic development, and indeed, the Russia's need for
economic partners creates an opening for China, China invested $90 billion in energy
resources, and most of those projects are in Russia. And increased activity by China and
Russia in the Arctic is a manifestation of another trend, great power competition in
global spaces. In many parts of the world, great powers and assertive middle powers seek
access to resources. Access to areas beyond or at the edge of national jurisdiction is
crucial for success and in this era of Strategic and Commercial rivalry. Therefore, the
protection of coastlines, waterways, safe commercial transit, and management of Marine
Resources is increasingly important, placing greater demands on the Coast Guard.
Russia cooperating with China in the Arctic due to loss in the Ukraine
Strategic Competition in the Arctic, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I,
Strategic Competition in the Arctic
Russia to partner with China, which we're beginning to witness. And this is a concern to me.
So beginning with Mr. Rourke, if you could comment, and then we'll go to Mr. Coffee and Dr.
Bremmer, I'll just make two quick points. One would be to reinforce what I said earlier that
Russia's sense of being diplomatically isolated from the seven other Arctic states as a
consequence of the war on Ukraine has encouraged Russia to increase its cooperation
with China in the Arctic. And that is creating new opportunities for China in the Arctic,
that are above those that they were already pursuing. The other thing I'll note is that even
though the war in Ukraine has disrupted the operations of the Arctic Council, and has led to
Russia's diplomatic isolation in other ways, from the other seven Arctic states, there are still
forms of cooperation that continue even in this situation, for example, the United States and
Russia continue to cooperate in the regulation of sea traffic through the Bering Strait in the
performance of the agreement that the two countries reached about the regulation of that see
traffic in 2018. So there is some limited degree of cooperation underway between US and
Russia, even in this larger situation.
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European Deterrence
US needs control of the Arctic to resupply forces in the event of a conflict
Military Times, 7-29, 23, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myYF-bPfjvs
All the units operating here in the Arctic region. They need to be very, very robust to cope with this
harsh environment. It just prevents any aid from the outside you need to bring everything yourself. The
Arctic Region is the gateway to the North Atlantic for NATO and its allies maintaining a strong presence
here is vital to protect trade, transport, and communication links between North America and Europe.
Historically, this has been an area of low tension but that is changing. Climate change is causing the
world's ice caps to melt at an alarming rate. As this ancient landscape forever changes, what does the
future hold for security at the region known as the High North? What's that? I'll be joining the Danish
Armed Forces in Greenland at sea and in the air to find out the challenges of patrolling this vast area.
The geo gap, Greenland, Iceland and UK is hugely important for NATO. It's what ties the transatlantic
bonds together. That's the way we would get the reinforcement from North America in a conflict
scenario in Europe. [Host] No one knows how to operate in the freezing waters off the coast of
Greenland, better than the Royal Danish Navy who have been patrolling here for centuries. We'll be
boarding the HDMS Triton one of four Danish ocean frigates patrolling Greenland at any given time
under the Joint Arctic Command. Safely onto the ship, I went up to the bridge to meet the commanding
officer. Commander Senior Grade Peter Krogh is a veteran of these waters and a former commander of
one of NATO's Naval task forces. Can you give us some idea of just a vastness of this area? It's extreme
distances, so you need to think ahead about the ship's performance, about the crew skills and about
logistics. We start to feel and growing interests from other navies that also wish to explore the northern
region. And of course, we want to keep the sovereignty and protect the interests of Denmark and also
our allies up here. Therefore, we are very pleased to share our knowledge with others and especially
allied navies. I mean, it's the sea level that's changing, and it's the amount of ice that is changing. Let's
take an example here in the Bay of Disko where we are now. People on the shore side, they used to visit
the island Disko, and they could go there, buy food, but they haven't been able to do that for a very long
time because the temperature is increasing. So it is very, very easy to see the changes of the climate.
As the ice melts, it creates the opportunity for new shipping routes and with it potential risks and
threats to Euro-Atlantic security. The availability of new Arctic routes while presenting potential
commercial opportunities could also lead to competition between nations and jeopardize the security
of the entire region. With Russia stating its intention to be a primary force in the Arctic region and
China declaring itself as a near Arctic power, Arctic security has become a priority for the NATO
alliance and its allies. Our area of responsibility will be more used by the whole world, trade, the ships,
by research, by tourism, so there will be more people in our area and that, of course, gives us a
challenge both in the surveillance part but also in the search and rescue part. We need to be capable to
handle that so there will be challenges. [Host] The truth is that nobody knows exactly what will happen
in the coming years and decades with regards to rising sea levels and the effects they could have on
security in the High North, but what we do know is that Greenland's ice caps are diminishing, and sea
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levels are rising year on year. In an age when global security is both unpredictable and volatile, it is vital
NATO maintains a strong allied presence in a strategically important region.
Russia could block resupply ships
Emily Rauhala, July 17, 2023, Washington Post, An Arctic ‘Great Game’ as NATO allies and Russia face
off in far north, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/17/an-arctic-great-game-nato-alliesrussia-face-off-far-north/
Western officials worry, too, that Russia could block commercial shipping lanes or U.S. Navy ships en
route to Europe, particularly at a potential maritime chokepoint called the “Greenland, Iceland, U.K.
gap” that separates the Norwegian and North seas from the open Atlantic Ocean. “Russia’s ability to
disrupt reinforcement is a real challenge to the alliance,” said one senior Western intelligence official,
also speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss security matters. There is also concern that
Moscow has mapped critical undersea infrastructure and could engage in sabotage against Europe.
Last month, NATO launched a center for protecting undersea pipelines and cables.
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China Arctic Threat
China become a polar power and deploying monitoring devices at the top of the Arctic
Ritu Sharma -July 30, 2023, Eurasian Times, China To Deploy ‘Listening Devices’ In The Arctic Ocean To
Exert Dominance, Track US, Rival Submarines, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-to-deploylistening-devices-in-the-arctic-ocean-to/
China has unequivocally stated its intentions to become a “polar great power” by 2030. Despite being
900 miles away from the Arctic circle, Beijing has never shied away from asserting itself as a “near Arctic
state,” and now it is gearing towards deploying a network of listening devices in the Arctic Ocean that
would very well herald the militarization of the top of the world. The Arctic could see its first ice-free
summer by 2030 if current projections hold. And this has made countries interested in the region
increase the pace of their commercial, scientific, and military endeavors. A Hong Kong-based news
organization South China Morning Post carried out the news about China seeking to deploy acoustic
devices in the Arctic after successfully testing and evaluating its underwater listening device The report
quotes a study published in the Chinese Journal of Polar Research that says: “The acoustic information
collected by the planned large-scale listening network could be used in a wide range of applications,
including “subglacial communication, navigation and positioning, target detection and the
reconstruction of marine environmental parameters.” “They are for scientific purposes, but all such
things have a dual purpose,” an Indian expert of the Arctic region told the EurAsian Times. However,
observers of the Arctic region feel that acoustics devices play an important role in understanding climate
change in the Arctic as the oceanographic data from the Arctic Ocean, especially from the deep ocean,
are scarce. But the data can also be used to track the movement of submarines and understand the
marine ecosystem to chart new routes – both under and over the surface. The Polar Research Institute
of China is conducting the research: “The system carried several instruments, but the most important
was a vector hydrophone with multiple sensors arranged in different orientations to measure both the
pressure and particle motion of sound waves.” The world above 66 degrees latitude has remained
intractable for most human existence, impeding large-scale commerce. Explorers, speculators, and
scientists long believed a trove of rich resources and shipping routes lay hidden beneath the Arctic’s ice
and snow. But deadly cold, debilitating darkness and enormous distances have hampered any
exploitation of the resources. However, the unknown depths of the Arctic are soon being charted,
making their navigation a possibility sooner than later The institute asserts that since the region is
sensitive to climate change, sound pressure data can be used to track whales, seals, and other soundemitting sources. The horizontal and vertical vibration of water particles can help scientists understand
marine conditions such as currents, waves, and the sea floor. The Shanghai-based institute is a central
government agency that plans and coordinates China’s polar activities. Chinese scientists and engineers
installed the “polar subglacial shallow surface acoustic monitoring buoy system” on a chunk of floating
ice in a remote area of the Arctic Ocean on August 9, 2021. During the test, the institute used an
American communication satellite service. China’s polar listening network would likely shift to Chinese
BeiDou satellites for communication. Militarization Of The Top Of The World Countries across the globe
are scrambling to cement their foothold in the polar region as global warming is rapidly melting polar ice
caps, drastically transforming the environment. Mutual distrust is pushing major world powers to
enhance their civil and military engagements in the Arctic. “It is a complex situation. Militarization has
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increased, but it is by both sides, the West and Russia.” A 10-year Arctic strategy released by the White
House in 2022 calls for deterring increased Russian and Chinese activity in the region. Russia makes no
bones about its stake in the region. Since 2013, Russia has refurbished and activated hundreds of
Soviet-era bases in the region. The US National Strategy for the Arctic Region notes that Moscow is
“deploying new coastal and air defense missile systems and upgraded submarines, and increasing
military exercises and training operations with a new combatant command equivalent for the Arctic.”
The Russian military adventurism in Ukraine has also strained the cooperation between countries and
Russia in the region. Russia is far ahead in its goals to make the Arctic navigational. Presently it has 51
icebreakers as compared to the US’ five functioning ones. China has also expressed an interest in
building a ‘Polar Silk Road’ in the region. It has doubled its investments in the region ostensibly to focus
on critical mineral extraction and expand its scientific activities. But the strategic value of being able to
traverse the region year around is not lost on either China or Russia. The latest Chinese plan to do
undersea acoustic modeling can also be used for naval navigation, oceanography, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), submarine stealth and navigation, anti-submarine warfare,
targeting, and weapons delivery. The data from the devices is directly transmitted to the command
center in China via satellites. This can bring more tension to the region, which is fast becoming a
contested place for global power plays owing to its strategic location, natural resources, and the
potential for new shipping routes. The US maintains more than 22,000 active-duty troops in Alaska and
also has a base in Greenland. China has invented the designation “near Arctic country” to seek a greater
role in Arctic governance. With no direct access to the Arctic and the West apprehensive of its
presence in the region, China has been pushed closer to Russia to ensure it has a seat at the table
when the Arctic policy is decided. In December 2022, a US Coast Guard cutter spotted the ships during
a routine patrol of the Bering Sea, north of Alaska: a guided missile cruiser and two smaller ships from
China, traveling in formation with four ships from Russia. The cutter followed until they split up and
dispersed. The ships broke no rules and violated no boundaries. But their appearance so close to the
Arctic this past fall raised concern in Washington nonetheless.
China wants military dominance of the Arctic
Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Aidan Powers-Riggs Center for Strategic
and International Studies, April 2023, https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-researchfacility/, Frozen Frontiers China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions
China’s own strategic writings make clear that the PLA has its sights on the region. The 2020 edition of
Science of Military Strategy—the most recent edition of an influential textbook on military thinking
published by China’s National Defense University—states bluntly that “military-civilian mixing is the
main way for great powers to achieve a polar military presence.” It adds that China should “give full
play to the role of military forces in supporting polar scientific research and other operations.” The
dual-use nature of Arctic research epitomizes China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy, which aims to
marshal civilian resources to support the PLA, and ultimately to fuse together China’s various national
strategies to simultaneously advance security and development goals. President Xi Jinping has
significantly elevated the importance of MCF, and it is unsurprising that this thinking is being applied
to the Arctic.
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Long-term PLA threat
Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
The PLA’s primary military aims today are to hold the U.S. military at bay in potential conflicts near China
’s coasts via counter-intervention capabilities (反侵入), often described by U.S. analysts as “antiaccess/area denial” capabilities.42 On a longer time horizon, it is conceivable that a reformed, more
joint and expeditionary PLA with greater sustainment an power projection capabilities, if it entered
into a large-scale or all-out conflict, might aim to threaten the U.S. access to, or threaten the United
States via, the Arctic. To prepare for the possibility that the Arctic will once more be a site of great
power military competition, China would logically seek to lay the groundwork now for a supporting
infrastructure that it would need in the Arctic should conflict occur there.43 In that case, China’s
ambitions for access to the North American Arctic could include
• using any ostensibly scientific research base or facility it constructs in the Arctic to collect
intelligence or compromise the operations of U.S., Canadian, or broader North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) forces
• holding at risk U.S. forces, bases and facilities in Alaska or Greenland that would support power
projection in the event of a crisis or conflict, possibly through the use of PLA joint forces, including PLAN
vessels or ostensibly commercial vessels, operating in Arctic waters
• targeting assets of the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) network and
the U.S. Air Force (USAF), including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) facilities, ballistic
missile early warning systems (BMEWS), and ballistic missile defenses and support architecture based
across the region
• potentially inserting its own submarines into the Arctic Ocean, either to contest the U.S. ability to use
those waters as a bastion for American nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) or to
enhance the survivability of the PLAN’s own at-sea strategic nuclear assets.44
Recent efforts by Chinese firms to undertake sensitive infrastructure projects in Greenland suggest some
of these concerns have merit. As discussed further in Chapter Three, one private mining company made
a bid to the Greenlandic government in 2016 to acquire an abandoned Danish naval base at Grønnedal
(Kanilinnguit). The Danish government intervened, reportedly over security concerns, and decided to
reactivate the base for logistical support and personnel training.45 In 2018, a Chinese state-owned
enterprise (SOE) was a finalist in a $560 million solicitation by the Greenlandic government to develop
three civilian airports. The Danish government again intervened, offering substantial financing for the
project, which Greenland accepted, and the Chinese firm withdrew its bid.46 Media reports indicated
that Copenhagen acted because of concerns that a sustained Chinese presence in Greenland could
compromise the security of certain operations at the USAF’s Thule Air Base, which hosts missile warning
and space surveillance systems, a 10,000-foot runway, and a deepwater port.47
In its quest to gain influence in the Arctic, China has sought to leverage eight distinct pathways:
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1. through access, especially in the form of military presence in the Arctic and commercial shipping
operations in international waters, supported by its right to use the Arctic based on the United Nations
(UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
2. by establishing research station on land in Svalbard, Norway (2003), which it has a right to set up as a
signatory of the 1920 Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty; and the aforementioned CIAO in Kárhóll, Iceland
(2018). China attempted to establish a third site in Finland, but the local government terminated
negotiations, reportedly due to concerns expressed by the Finnish armed forces48
3. through investment in Arctic states (However, as outlined in Chapter Three and in Almén and
Weidacher Hsiung, 2022, Chinese investments have been quite limited in both the North American
Arctic and Nordic regions. Many planned investments have not been realized, and these countries have
strengthened their legal mechanisms to limit foreign investments in sensitive sectors.)
4. via bilateral diplomatic relationships with Arctic states that can be incentivized to cooperate with
China or disincentivized to support the United States or other Arctic states in the event of a dispute
5. through outreach and influence operations (often supported by or in support of China’s investments),
directed at national but also subnational government bodies, such. as states, provinces, tribal nations,
and autonomous territories; universities; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and private-sector
commercial actors, aiming to play these disparate forces off each other to China’s benefit49
6. by building and deploying relevant capabilities and supporting infrastructure that will enable Chinese
access and activities in the future
7. through soft power diplomacy and normative statements that seek to characterize the Arctic as the
common heritage of all mankind and frame China’s approach as if it “privileges cooperation over
competition”50
8. by participating in the Arctic Council and other regional and international organizations.
Although China’s overarching approach to the Arctic is publicly framed around scientific inquiry,
commercial access, and international cooperation; in practice, Chinese policy treats the region as a site
of geostrategic competition.
Increased US presence deters greater China involvement in the Arctic
Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
In addition to monitoring Arctic developments for these red flags, the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD), working in collaboration with interagency and international partners, can take steps to
maintain and reinforce current factors of resilience, and to address some of the gaps and uncertainties
that remain. We present five specific recommendations. A first recommendation is to not only
maintain solidarity among U.S. allies and partners in the Arctic, but also to strengthen it wherever
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possible. There is a strong consensus among Arctic states to maintain the governance of Arctic affairs
among themselves, and this remains a powerful obstacle to undesirable Chinese involvement in the
region. This recommendation calls for sustaining active multilateral and bilateral diplomatic activities
with these countries and in the Arctic Council and other international fora. In addition, DoD and the
U.S. Coast Guard have important roles in maintaining, and in some cases enhancing, engagement with
other Arctic states—minus Russia—through security cooperation activities, which range from highlevel exchanges to exercises, to joint training, to maritime domain awareness and safety activities
(particularly with counterparts in Canada, Norway, and Denmark and in the context of certain North
American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
activities).
Ukraine war makes Russia dependent on China and gives China influence in the Arctic
Bekkeveld & Hilde, 7-28, 23, Jo Inge Bekkevold is a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies and a former Norwegian diplomat, Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/28/arctic-nato-russia-china-finland-sweden-norway-northerneurope-defense-security-geopolitics-energy/ Paal Sigurd Hilde is a professor at the Norwegian Institute
for Defence Studies. Twitter: @Paal_S_H
Fifth, Russia’s war in Ukraine has strengthened China’s relations with Russia and given Beijing more
leverage over its junior partner—which, in turn, increases China’s potential influence in the Arctic.
Beijing wants access to Arctic resources, and it could have a strategic interest in the region for early
warning purposes and a potential naval presence.
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Rare Earth Contention
Arctic full of rare earth minerals
Mark Rowe, August 14, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-minethe-arctic, Geographical, Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources
Large deposits of rare earth metals and other minerals are believed to be present in the Arctic
For now, however, oil and gas aren’t at the top of the international wishlist. ‘If you want to get oil and
gas out of the Arctic, it’s going to cost you a lot – setting up the infrastructure, transporting it,’ says
Nima Khorrami, a research associate at the Washington DC-based Arctic Institute. ‘Why do that when
there’s still so much available in the Middle East?’ Instead, the main drivers of the Arctic resource rush
are minerals, in particular rare earth metals such as neodymium, praseodymium, terbium and
dysprosium. These minerals are key to the world’s electric-vehicle and renewable-energy revolutions,
underpinning battery technology and wind turbines among other things. However, it’s worth noting that
lead, iron, nickel, zinc, gold, silver, coal, mica, precious stones and construction minerals such as sand,
gravel and crushed rock are also believed to be present in significant quantities.
Arctic rare earths can be used to challenge China’s dominance
Gabriel Black, January 30, 2023, Sweden discovers major rare earth deposits in Arctic region, Sweden
discovers major rare earth deposits in Arctic region - World Socialist Web Site (wsws.org), Sweden
discovers major rare earth deposits in Arctic region - World Socialist Web Site (wsws.org)
A Swedish mining company reported earlier this month that it has discovered a large deposit of rare
earth minerals in the far north of the country. Rare earths are a series of 17 minerals commonly found
together that are used in most high-tech electronics, military systems and batteries. While widely
distributed throughout the world, they are hard to find in sufficient concentrations to be economic to
extract. The deposit was found by Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara Aktiebolag (LKAB), a state-owned mining
company that operates two major iron mines in the far north of the country, just inside the Arctic
Circle. The discovery was made at LKAB’s Kiruna mine, which is about 130 kilometers from the Finnish
border and 300 kilometers from the Russian border. Like many critical minerals, rare earths are found in
relatively lower quantities, often near or interspersed with other, more common metals, like copper or
iron. In this case, the minerals were found interspersed with phosphorous in an iron-oxide apatite
deposit a few kilometers from the Kiruna mine. The discovery was heralded in the mainstream press
throughout Europe and the US as a significant geopolitical development that would wrestle control
over the rare earth supply chain away from China. NPR’s Paddy Hirsch described it as “a very big deal
for the West.” He continued, “We have seen in the last 10 years that the U.S. in particular has been
very, very worried about the fact that China has such a lock hold on the production of rare earths. …
So this find in Sweden is a very big deal for the West and for Western nations and NATO…” According to
the International Energy Agency (IEA), about 60 percent of the world’s rare earths come from China. The
vast majority of that—more than a third of the world’s total production—comes from a single location,
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the Bayan Odo deposit in the Inner Mongolia region of Northern China. The United States is the second
largest producer of rare earths, accounting for a little more than 10 percent of the supply.
China can cut-off REMs
Institute for Energy Research, August 4, 2020, China Dominates the Rare Earths Supply Chain,
https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/international-issues/china-dominates-the-rare-earthssupply-chain/
China Can Use Rare Earths to Retaliate China indicated recently that it would impose sanctions on
Lockheed Martin in retaliation for a U.S. decision to sell missiles to Taiwan. China could “cut off
material supply including rare earths, which are crucial to advanced weapons production.” That would
mark the latest phase in the weaponization of rare earths. Analysts say a move to restrict rare earths
supplies to Lockheed, the largest arms manufacturer in the United States, could intensify a U.S. push
towards a technological decoupling with China and booster efforts to create a non-Chinese supply
chain in a global industry worth up to $5 billion a year. As mentioned above, steps are underway in the
United States, Australia, and the European Union to bolster the security of supply of rare earths. In
November, Australia signed an agreement with the United States, which mandated both nations’
geological agencies to work together to assess the potential for new supply. Australia has a sixth of the
world’s rare earths deposits and is home to Lynas Corp, the only large non-Chinese rare earths producer.
Australia identified 15 rare earth and critical minerals projects hoping to attract commercial funding and
is offering state-backed loans to help develop them. Conclusion Put simply—“Control the supply chain,
control the world”—is what China’s 2025 strategy is all about. China is way ahead of the game and only
with governmental commitment and alliances with friendly nations can the United States come out of
the hole past policies created. The West needs to move rapidly to regain control of its industrial
future; green energy policies that foster an overwhelming dependence on China threaten it.
REMs key to the entire economy
White House Supply Chain Report, July 2021, BUILDING RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAINS, REVITALIZING
AMERICAN MANUFACTURING, AND FOSTERING BROAD-BASED GROWTH,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf
Strategic and critical materials and their supply chains are the bedrock of value-added manufacturing
and the development, production, delivery, and sustainment of essential services, such as
telecommunications and computing, food and agriculture, finance, healthcare, education,
transportation, and public safety. In civilian sectors of the U.S. economy, strategic and critical
materials and their supply chains are essential to countless manufactured goods, ranging from
personal electronics and consumables for fuel, food, and medical supplies, to home construction and
sustaining the nation’s critical infrastructure. Reliable access to strategic and critical materials
strengthens the global economy and helps improve the quality of life.
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Semiconductors critical to all parts of the economy, disruptions in materials put the
entire US economy at-risk
White House Report, 2021, SUPPLY CHAINS, REVITALIZING AMERICAN MANUFACTURING,
ANDFOSTERING BROAD-BASED GROWTH, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf
Semiconductors are the material basis for integrated circuits that are essential to modern day life and are used by
the typical consumer on a daily, if not hourly, basis. The semiconductor-based integrated circuit is the “DNA” of technology
and has transformed essentially all segments of the economy, from agriculture and transportation to healthcare,
telecommunications, and the Internet. The semiconductor industry is a major engine for U.S. economic
growth and job creation. Semiconductors are used in virtually every technology product and underpin state-ofthe-art military systems. Semiconductors are an integral part of a consumer’s everyday life and can be found in household items such as light
switches, garage door openers, and refrigerators, as well as in more complex products such as mobile phones, computers, and automobiles The
two semiconductor industry-related NAICS categories directly employed 207,400 workers in 2019, accounting for 1.6 percent of total U.S.
manufacturing employment. These are high-quality, well-paying jobs: the semiconductor manufacturing workforce earned an average of
$163,871 per person in 2019, more than twice the average for all U.S. manufacturing workers ($69,928).5
Eighteen U.S. states have
major semiconductor manufacturing operations, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). These
statistics, however, capture only a portion of the overall semiconductor industry and therefore
understate its importance to the U.S. economy. Information on the broader industry further highlights its importance to the
U.S. economy. SIA estimates that the U.S. semiconductor industry had $208 billion in annual sales in 2020, capturing nearly half of the world
market. Despite the global COVID-19 pandemic, worldwide sales of semiconductors increased by 6.5 percent in 2020. SIA estimates the global
semiconductor market will reach $726 billion in annual sales by 2027, a compound annual growth rate of 4.7 percent. Further, SIA estimates
that each direct job in the semiconductor industry supports nearly five additional jobs.6 Semiconductors are
also a major
export for the United States with $47 billion in export sales in 2020, ranking fourth overall, after aircrafts, refined oil, and crude oil.7
Semiconductors power virtually every sector of the economy—including energy, healthcare, agriculture, consumer electronics, manufacturing,
defense, and transportation. Worldwide demand for semiconductors in 2019 by end use was: mobile phones (26 percent), information and
communications infrastructure (including data centers, communications networks) (24 percent); computers (19 percent), industrial (12
percent), automotive (10 percent), and consumer electronics (10 percent).8 Among these diverse applications, those that directly support
national security and critical infrastructure account for about nine percent of semiconductor demand. These critical semiconductor end uses
include defense and aerospace, telecommunications networks, energy and utilities, healthcare, and financial services.9 Defense and other
government use is slightly over one percent of worldwide consumption of semiconductors.10 In summary, while
U.S. production
capacity has been stable, the United States lacks sufficient capacity on a relative basis to produce
semiconductors and relies extensively on sources in Taiwan, South Korea, and China for production.
The United States is heavily dependent on a single company–TSMC–for producing its . Since semiconductors are such key components, the
fragile supply chain for semiconductors puts virtually every sector of the economy at risk of disruption.
Recent events affecting global supply chains, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, weather-related events,
and the blockage of the Suez Canal demonstrate the importance of preparedness and supply chain
resilience. The lack of domestic production capability also puts at risk the ability to supply current and future national security and critical
infrastructure needs. U.S. production is also threatened by significant Chinese investments to expand its chip production capability and a
greying of the U.S. workforce.
Slower growth increases populist conflict---140 years of data proves.
James Pethokoukis 6/4/21. The DeWitt Wallace Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where
he runs the AEIdeas blog. "Biden's budget predicts the Roaring Twenties will end in 2022. Uh oh.".
https://theweek.com/politics/1001118/the-populist-political-warning-in-the-biden-budget
But there's a big non-economic reason to hope for growth faster than the pace predicted in the Biden
budget. The historically slow recovery out of the Great Recession coincided with a rise of nativist
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populism, both here and in other rich countries. When economic growth falters, bad things often
happen. In the study "Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870 – 2014," researchers found
after a severe financial crisis, "voters seem to be particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the
extreme right, which often attributes blame to minorities or foreigners." This reaction equates to a 30
percent increase, on average, in the vote share going to far-right parties. A similar cause-and-effect is
suggested in "Populist psychology: economics, culture, and emotions," which finds that economic crises
"cause emotional reactions that activate cultural discontent. This, in turn, activates populist attitudes."
Slow growth collapses the liberal order AND causes global hotspot escalation---it
culminates in numerous existential risks.
Michael F. Oppenheimer 21, Clinical Professor, Center for Global Affairs, New York University. Senior
Consulting Fellow, Scenario Planning at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Former
Executive Vice President, The Futures Group. Member, Council on Foreign Relations. Member, The
Foreign Policy Roundtable at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Member, The
American Council on Germany, "The Turbulent Future of International Relations," in The Future of
Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction, Chapter 2, 2021, pg. 23-43.
Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal
rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider
distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and
subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of
Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and
secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging
populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health
challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will
intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states
behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle,
rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade.
Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity
(inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5
plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict
management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year
period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It
ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept
multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be
sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully
accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political
legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of
economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of
decoupling, including the current American president.7 Divergent values plus globalization can be
managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington
Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated
institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural
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adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—
increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9
But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and
cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global
institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of
global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in
any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful
thinking and believe our own eyes.10
Secular Stagnation
This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other
states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism
has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while
exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new
era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated
market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality
around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The
skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods
of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations,
accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very
difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call
“secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising
nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of
diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic
challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains:
…rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make
lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result.
Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth…
This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain
level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment
is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible.
…in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might
actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development.
Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research.
This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period
ahead.12
The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will
make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will
become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies.
International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism,
in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal
hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be
unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being
inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one
agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight.
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In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this
confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of
the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a
weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’
recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win
for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing
countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.
Illiberal Globalization
Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will
profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global
institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the
quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide
companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global
investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—
and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on
multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which
has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership
may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management,
environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that
America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight
matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a
sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically proTrump Republican Party, is
committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global
collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership.
It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and
military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to
convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing
material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump
has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope
with them.
What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as
an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that
globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example,
precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in
violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives,
aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did
China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direc t investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and
regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18
As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. I t
represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, t o an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg
Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19
Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs,
incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the
global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global,
nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end. Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less
investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth
and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from
excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk
and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of
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Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of
US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods:
We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh.
That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for
our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have
a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can
we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place?
That’s what America used to be.20
The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other
to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization
represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying
competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down
growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-firstcentury protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a
top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints
of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is
the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled
“Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the preWorld War I
period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the
present:
Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the
globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to
conceive of a general war.
We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one,
the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or
never knew—how this played out a century ago.
…In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and
transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The
incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that
ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against
cheap imports.
…The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence
was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments
can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars.
In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914
were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to
ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made
that option conceivable.
…the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current
moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era.
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Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In
2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of
Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial
balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the
Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry.
Multipolarity
We can define multipolarity as a wide distribution of power among multiple independent states. Exact
equivalence of material power is not implied. What is required is the possession by several states of the
capacity to coerce others to act in ways they would otherwise not, through kinetic or other means
(economic sanctions, political manipulation, denial of access to essential resources, etc.). Such a
distribution of power presents inherently graver challenges to peace and stability than do unipolar or
bipolar power configurations,22 though of course none are safe or permanent. In brief, the greater the
number of consequential actors, the greater the challenge of coordinating actions to avoid, manage, or
de-escalate conflicts. Multipolarity also entails a greater potential for sudden changes in the balance of
power, as one state may defect to another coalition or opt out, and as a result, the greater the degree of
uncertainty experienced by all states, and the greater the plausibility of downside assumptions about
the intentions and capabilities of one’s adversaries. This psychology, always present in international
politics but particularly powerful in multipolarity, heightens the potential for escalation of minor
conflicts, and of states launching preventive or preemptive wars. In multipolarity, states are always on
edge, entertaining worst-case scenarios about actual and potential enemies, and acting on these fears—
expanding their armies, introducing new weapon systems, altering doctrine to relax constraints on the
use of force—in ways that reinforce the worst fears of others.
The risks inherent in multipolarity are heightened by the attendant weakening of global institutions.
Even in a state-centric system, such institutions can facilitate communication and transparency, helping
states to manage conflicts by reducing the potential for misperception and escalation toward war. But,
as Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu argues in his chapter on the United Nations, the influence of multilateral
institutions as agent and actor is clearly in decline, a result of bottom-up populist/nationalist pressures
experienced in many countries, as well as the coordination problems that increase in a system of
multiple great powers. As conflict resolution institutions atrophy, great powers will find themselves in
“security dilemmas”23 in which verification of a rival’s intentions is unavailable, and worst-case
assumptions fill the gap created by uncertainty. And the supply of conflicts will expand as a result of
growing nationalism and populism, which are premised on hostility, paranoia, and isolation, with
governments seeking political legitimacy through external conflict, producing a siege mentality that
deliberately cuts off communication with other states.
Finally, the transition from unipolarity (roughly 1989 –2007 ) to multipolarity is unreg ulated and hazardous , as the e xisting superpow er fears and resists challenge s to its prima cy from a rising power or powers, while the risi ng power e ntertains new a mbitions as entitlements now within its reach. Such a “power transition” and its dangers were identifie d by Thucydide s in e xplaining the Peloponnesian Wars,24 by Organsk i (t he “rear -en d collisi on”)25 during the Cold War, and re cently rep opularize d and broug ht up to date by Graham Allis on in pre dicting conflict between the US and China.26
A useful, a nd cons equential illustration of the inherent challenge of conflict ma nagement duri ng a power transition toward multipolarity, is the weakening of the ar ms control regi me neg otiated by the US and the Soviet Union duri ng the Col d War. Des pite the e xistential, global conflict betwee n two nuclear armed superpowers e mbraci ng diametr ically oppose d world views and operating in e conomic is olation fr om ea ch other, the two manage d to avoid worst -cas e out comes. They accomplishe d this in part by institutionalizing verifia ble limits on testing and depl oyment of both strategic and interme dia t e-range nuclear mi ssiles. Yet as diplomatically and te chni cally challe nging as these a chieve ments were, t he introduction of a t hird great power, China, into t his twocountry cal culus has pr oven to be a deal breaker. U nconstraine d by these bilateral agreement s, China has bee n free t o build up its ca pabili ty, and has taken full advantage in ramping up production and depl oyment of inter mediate -range ground -launched cr uise mi ssiles, thus challenging the US ability to credibly guarantee the security of its allies in Asia, and great ly increasing the cost s
of mai ntaining its Asian regional hege mony. As a result, the Inter mediate N uclear For ce treaty is effe ctively dead, and the New Start Treaty, covering strategic missiles, is due to e xpire next year, with no i ndicati on of any US– Russia n conse nsus to exte nd it. The US ha s with logic indicated its intere st in making these agreeme nts trilateral; but Chi na, with its growing pow er and a mbition, has also l ogically rejected t hese overture s. Thus, all three great powers are e ntering a period of nuclear weapons competition unconstraine d by the major Cold War ar ms control regimes. In a period of rapid a dvance s in technology and wor sening great power relations, the nuclear competition will be a de fining characteristi c of the ne xt deca de and beyond. This dyna mic will also complicate nuclear nonproliferation efforts, a s both the de mand for nuclear wea pons (a cons eque nce of risi ng regional and global ins ecurity), and supply of nuclear materials and technology (a result of the weakening of the nonproliferation regime and deteriorating great power relations) will increa se.
Will deterrence prevent war in a world of several nuclear weapons states, (the curre nt nucl ear powers plus South Kor ea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japa n, Turkey), as it hel ped to do duri ng the bipolar Col d War? Some neorealist observers view nuclear weapons proliferation as stabilizi ng, exte nding the balance of terror, and t he imperative of restraint, to new nuclear weapons states with much to fig ht over (Saudi Arabia and I ran, for e xample). 27 Other s,28 e xami ning iss ues of command and control of nuclear weapons de ployment and use by newly a cquiring states , asymmetries in doctrine s, force structures, and ca pabilities betwee n rivals, the perils of variable rates in transition to wea pons de ployme nt, problems of communi cation between states with deep mutual grievances, the heightene d risk of trans fer of such wea pons to non-state actors, have grave doubts a bout the safety of a multipolar, nuclear-ar med worl d.29 W e can at least conclude that prude nce dictates heightene d efforts to sl ow the pa ce of proli feration, while re alis m req uires that we fa ce a proli ferated future with eyes wide ope n.
The curre nt distribution of power is not per fectly multipolar. The US still comma nds the world’s largest e conomy, and its military power is unrivaled by any state or combination of states. Its population is still growing, des pite a recent decline i n birth rates. It enj oys extraor dinary geographi c advantages over its rivals, who are distant and live in far worse neig hbor hoods. Its e conomy is less de pen dent on foreig n markets or res our ces. Its political syste m has pr oven —up to now —to be resilie nt and ada ptable. Its global alliance syste m greatly extends its capa city to defend itsel f and s hape the world t o its l iking and is still intact, des pite growing doubts a bout America’s reliability as a se curity guarantor. Ba sed on these mostly material and hist orical criteria, continued American pri macy would se em to be a good bet, if it chooses to use its power in t his way.30
So why multipolarity? The clearest and most freq uently cited evide nce for a wide ning distribution of global power aw ay from American unipolarity is the narrowing gap in GD P betwee n the US and China . The IMF’s World E conomic Outlook foreca sts a $0.9 trillion increase i n US GDP for 20 19–20 20, and a $1.3 trillion increa se for Chi na in the sa me period.31 Ma ny who s upport the Ameri can pri macy ca se argue that GDP is a n imperfe ct mea sure of pow er, that Chinese GD P data is inflate d, that its growth r ates are in de cline while Chine se debt is rapi dly increasi ng, and that China does poorly on other fa ctors that contribute to pow er—its low per capita GDP , its political s uccessi on challenges, its e nvironmental crisi s, its abse nce of any e xternal alliance system. Yet G DP is a good place to start, as the single most useful mea sure and long -term pre dictor of power. It is fr om the overall economy that states extract and a pply material pow er to leverage desired behavior from other states. It is true that robust f uture Chines e growth is not guara nteed, nor is its ca pacity to convert its wealth to power, whi ch is a function of how well its political syste m
works over time. But this is eq ually the case for the US, and consi dering rece nt political developments i s not a given for either country.
As an alternative to measuri ng inputs —e conomi c size, political legitima cy, technologi cal innovation, p opulation growth —in asse ssing relative power and the natur e of global pow er distribution, we should consider outputs : what are states doi ng with their power? The i nput meas ures are use ful, pos sibly predictive, but are usually depl oyed in the course of maki ng a foreign policy argument, s ometimes on be half of a reassertion of Ameri can pri macy, s ometi mes on be half of retren chment. As such, their obje ctivity (despite their ge nerous depl oyme nt of “data”) is open to question. What is unde niable, to any clear-eye d obs erver, is a real decline i n America n influen ce in the w orld, and a rise in the influen ce of other powers, w hich predates t he Trump administration but has a ccelerate d into America’s free fall over the last four years. T his has produce d a de fa cto multipolarity, whether explai nable in the v arious measures of power —actual and latent—or not. Thi s decli ne results i n part from policy mistakes : a reckless s qua ndering of material power and legiti macy in Iraq, a n overabunda nce of caution i n Syria, and now pure impulsivity. But more
fundame ntally, it is a product of relative de cline in A merican capa city—political and e conomi c—t o which Ameri can leader ship is a djusting ha phazar dly, but in the direction of retre nchme nt/restraint. It is highly revealing that the last two Ameri can presi dents, polar opposites in intellect, te mpera ment a nd values, agree d on one fundame ntal point: the US is ove re xtende d, and needs to retrench. The fact that neither Oba ma nor Trump (up to this point in hi s presiden cy) believed t hey had the power at their disposal to do anything els e, tells us far more a bout the future of A merican power and poli cy —a nd about the emerging sha pe of international relations—t han the power measures a nd comparisons made by foreign policy advocates.
Observation of re cent tren ds in US versus Russian relative infl uen ce prompt s another questi on: do we understand the e merging characteristics of power? Rigor ously measuri ng and comparing the wrong para meters will get us now here at best and mislea d us int o misg uided polici es at worst. How often have we heard, with puzzle ment, that P utin punches far above his weig ht? Coul d it be that we mis understand what constitutes “weight ” in the conte mporary and e merging world? P utin may be on a high wire, a nd bound to come crashi ng dow n; but the fact is that Russia n infl uen ce, leveraging sophisticated communi cations /social me dia/influen ce operations, a strong military, an agile (Putin -dominate d) decisi on proces s, and taking advantage of the egregi ous mistakes by the W est, has been adva ncing for over a de cade , show s no sig n of slowing down, and has created additional opport unities for itself in the Middle East, E urope, Asia, Latin Ameri ca, the Arctic. It ha s done this with an e conomy roughly the si ze of Italy’s. There are few signs of a domesti c political challenge t o Putin. Hi s external oppone nts are in disarray, and Russia’s main
adversary is politically disable d from confronting the problem. He has e stablishe d Russia as the Mi ddle East power broker. He has reached int o the internal politics of his Western adver saries and i nfluenced their leader ship choi ces. He has invaded and abs orbed the territory of neighboring states . His actions have produced deep divisi ons within NATO. Again, si mple observation suggests multipolarity in fact, and a full e xplanati on for this power shi ft awaiting future hi storians able t o look with more obj ectivity at twenty -first-century ele ments of power.
When that hi story is written, surely it will emphasi ze the e xtraordinary polarization in A merica n politics. Was mult ipolarity a case of others fi nding leverage in new sources of power, or the US underutilizing its own? T he material measure s suggest s ufficie nt capa city for sustained A merica n prima cy, but with this latent capacity unavailable (as perceived , I believ e correctly, by political lea dershi p) by virtue of weakening institutions : two major parties in separate universes ; a winnertake-all political me ntality; deep polarization between the parties’ popular bas es of support; divided governme nt, with the Presiden cy and the Congress often in separate and antagoni stic hands; dimini shing trust in the perma nent gover nme nt, and in the knowledg e it brings to important de cisions, and dee pening distrust betwee n the intelligen ce community and policymakers ; and, i n Trump’s case, a chaotic policy pr oce ss that lacks any strategic referen ce points, mis-communi cates the Administration’s intentions, and has proven incapa ble of sustained, cohere nt diploma cy on be half of any e xplicit and consiste nt set of policy goal s.
Rising Nationalism/Populis m/Authoritarianism
The eviden ce for these tren ds is clear. Free dom House, the g o-to a uthority on the state of global de mocra cy, just published its annual asse ssment for 2020, a nd recorde d the fourteent h conse cutive year of global de mocratic de cline and advancing authoritarianism. T his dra matic deterioration include s both a weakening in democratic pra ctice withi n states st ill dee med on balance de mocratic, and a shi ft from weak de mocracies to a uthoritarianis m in others. Commitme nt to de mocratic nor ms and pra ctices —free dom of spee ch a nd of the pre ss, indepe ndent j udiciaries , prote ction of mi nority rights—is in decline. T he de cline is evide nt across the global system and en compas ses all maj or power s, from India and China, to E ur ope, to the US. Right-wing populist parties have ass umed power, or constitute a politically signifi cant mi nority, in a lengtheni ng list of democratic st ates , including both new (Hu ngary, Poland) and established (I ndia, the US, the UK ) de mocracie s. Nationalis m, frequently dis mi ssed by liberal globalization advocates as a weak for ce whe n confr onted by market de mocracies’ presume d inhere nt superiority, has experien ced a
resurgen ce in Russia, China, the Mi ddle East, a nd at home. Given t he breadt h and depth of right-wi ng populis m, the raw power that pr omotes it—mainly Russian a nd Ameri can —and t he disarray of its liberal oppone nts, this fa ctor will weigh heavily on the futur e.
The maj or fact ors contributing to right -wing populis m and its global sprea d is the s ubje ct of much di scussion.32 T he most straightforwar d explanation is risi ng ineq uality and dimi nishe d intergenerational mobility, particularly in devel oped countries whose labor-inte nsive ma nufacturing has bee n hit har dest by the globalizati on of capital combine d with the immobility of labor. Jobs, wages, e conomic se curity, a reasonable hope that one’s offspring has a shot at a better life than one’s ow n, the erosion of s ocial ca pital within economically margi nalized communities, gover nme nt failure to provide a de ce nt safety net and j ob retraining for those battered by globalization: all have contributed to a se nse of de speration and raw anger in the holl owed -out communities of formerly pr osper ous industrial areas. T he de clining life e xpectancy number s33 tell a story of i mmiseration: drug addition, s uicide, poor health care, and g un violen ce. The political e xpre ssion of s uch conditions of life s houl d not be surprisi ng. Simpl e, extre mist “s olutions” become irresi stible. Sectarian, ra cial, regional divide s are strengthen ed, and exclusive id entities are sharpene d.
Political entrepre neurs offering to bl ow up the system blame d for s uch conditions be come credible. T hos e who are per ceived as having ben efited from the corrupt syste m—l ong -standi ng institutions of g overnment, foreign countries and p opulations, i mmigra nts, mi norities getting a “fre e ride,” elites — become targets of recri mination a nd violen ce. T he simple sol utions of cour se, don’t work, dee peni ng the underlying crisis, but in the pr oce ss politics is poisoned. I f this sounds like the US, it should, but it also des cribes major E uropea n countries (the U K, France, Italy, Ger many, P oland, H ungary, the Czech Rep ublic), and could be an indi cation of thing s to come for non -Wester n de mocracies like India.
We have emphasi zed thr oughout this chapter the intera ction of four structural force s in sha ping the future, and this interacti on is evide nt here as well. Is it mer ely coincide nce that the period of democratic decline documente d by Freedom House, coincide s preci sely with the global fi nancial and e conomic crisis? Low er growth, increa sing jobless ness, wage stagnati on, superimposed on longer -term widening of ine quality and declini ng mobility, constitute a forbi dding stre ss test for democratic systems, and many cont inue to fail. And if we are correct about se cular stagnation, the stress will continue, a nd authoritarianism’ s fourteen -year run will not be over for s ome time. The antide mocratic trend will gain additional impetus from the illiberal directi on o f globalization, with its growth suppre ssing pr otectionism, wea ponization of global economic e xchange, a nd weakeni ng global economi c institutions . Multipolarity also contributes, i n several ways. The former hege mon a nd author of globalization’s liberal structure ha s lost its appetite, and arguably its ca pacity, for lea dershi p, and i ndee d has be come part of the pr oble m, succumbing to and
promoting the global right -wing populist s urge. It is sufferi ng an unprece dente d de cline in life expectancy, and re cently a de cline in the birth rate, signaling a degree of rot commonly associated with a collapsi ng Soviet Union. While A merican politics may once again cohere around its liberal v alues and i nterests, the time w hen American lea dershi p had the self -confiden ce to s hape the gl obal syste m in its liberal image is gone. It may build coalitions of the like -minded to la unch liberal pr ojects, but there will be too much power outside the se coalitions to permit liberal globalizati on of the sort i magined a t the end of the Cold War. In multipolarity, the values around whi ch global politics rev olve will reflect the diversity of major powers, their interests, and the nor ms they e mbra ce. Convergen ce of nor ms, practice s, poli cies is out of the que stion. Gl obal collective action, even in the face of gl obal crise s, will be a long shot. To e xpe ct anything else is fantasy
Unbrave New World and Future Challenges
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At the outset of thi s cha pter we des cribed these structural forces a s interacting to pr oduce more conflict and dimi nishe d pro sperity. We als o predi cted a world with s hrinking collective ca pacity to addre ss new challenge s as they arise. W hat spe cifi cally will such a world l ook like? We addr ess bel ow thre e principal challeng es to global proble m solving over the ne xt deca de.
Interstate Conflict
In the world e xperie nce d by most readers of this vol ume , confli ct is obs erved within weak states, someti mes pr omoted by regional competitor s, by terrorist groups, or by great power s, acting through s urrogates or by indirect means. Someti mes, as in Syria, this conflict spills over to co ntiguo us states and contributes to regional instability, and challenge s other regions to res pond effe ctively, a challenge that Eur ope ha s not met. Much of this will continue, but the global signifi cance of such local confli cts will be greatly magnifie d by incr easing great power conflict, whi ch will fe ed —rather than manage or resolve—local instabilities a nd will in turn be e xa cerbated by them. Great powers will jockey for advantage, s upport their local part ners, es calate pree mptively. Confli cts initially confine d to failing states or unstabl e regions will be re defi ned by great pow ers as global in scope and signifi cance.
This tendency of states to view local conflicts in the context of a zero-sum, global struggle for power is familiar to students of the Cold War, but now with the additional challenges to collective
action, expanded uncertainty and worst-case thinking associated with the power transition to multipolarity. We can easily
observe increased conflict in US–
China relations, as we will in US–Russia relations as future US administrations try to make up for ground lost during the Trump presidency, especially in the
Middle East. We can observe it among powerful states with mutual historical grievances, now with a weakening
presence of the hegemonic security guarantor and having to consider the renationalization of their
defense: Japan-South Korea, Germany-France. We can observe it among historical rivals operating in rapidly changing security
landscapes: India-China. We can observe it within the Middle East, as internal rivalries are appropriated by regional powers in a contest for regional dominance. We can observe it
clearly in Syria, where the regime’s violent suppression of Arab Spring resistance led to all-out civil war, attracted outside support to proxy forces by aspiring regional hegemons Saudi Arabia
and Iran, enabled the rise of ISIS, and eventually to great power intervention, principally by Russia. In a world of effective great power collaboration or American primacy, the Syrian civil war
might have been settled through power sharing or partition, or if not, contained within Syria. The collapse of Yugoslavia, occurring during a period of US “unipolarity” and managed effectively,
demonstrates the possibilities. Instead, with the US retrenching, Middle East rivals unconstrained by great powers, and great power competition rising, the Syria civil war was fed by outside
powers, then metastasized into the region, and—in the form of refugee flows—into Europe, fundamentally altering
Minerals key to readiness
White House Supply Chain Report, July 2021, BUILDING RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAINS, REVITALIZING
AMERICAN MANUFACTURING, AND FOSTERING BROAD-BASED GROWTH,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf
In the defense industrial base, strategic
and critical materials ensure that U.S. Armed Forces and those of our
allies can conduct and sustain operations, while expanding the output and development of military
items to maintain technical dominance over adversaries. Without these materials, history shows that industrialized
nations have been compelled to make performance trade-offs and suboptimal capital allocations, which contributed to their defeat on the
battlefield.
White House Supply Chain Report, July 2021, BUILDING RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAINS, REVITALIZING
AMERICAN MANUFACTURING, AND FOSTERING BROAD-BASED GROWTH,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf
6. Strengthen U.S. Stockpiles
National stockpiles can play a key role in supply chain resilience by providing a buffer against shortterm supply disruptions or bridging the gap between peacetime and full industrial mobilization.
However, U.S. stockpile authorities and funding have not kept up with needs.
National stockpiles are critical to avoiding supply chain disruptions
White House Supply Chain Report, July 2021, BUILDING RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAINS, REVITALIZING
AMERICAN MANUFACTURING, AND FOSTERING BROAD-BASED GROWTH,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf
6. Strengthen U.S. Stockpiles
National stockpiles can play a key role in supply chain resilience by providing a buffer against shortterm supply disruptions or bridging the gap between peacetime and full industrial mobilization.
However, U.S. stockpile authorities and funding have not kept up with needs.
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Oil Spills Contention
Oil spill risks increasing
Ethan Wong, 8-18, 23, The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of 14 August, 2023,
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-week-take-five-week-14-august-2023/
Take 2: Once again, unexpected ice has disrupted vessels sailing through the Northern Sea Route (NSR).
Despite warming temperatures and melting sea ice, shipping through the passage remains dangerous, as
conditions can change rapidly.. This was starkly demonstrated in 2021 when an early freeze along the
NSR left more than 20 ships stuck in sea ice. However, receding sea ice may also come with its own
challenges. A recent study found that as ice disappears due to climate change, the Arctic Ocean has
been getting foggier, reducing visibility and raising the potential for disastrous accidents, like oil spills.
Therefore, with or without ice, the difficult operating conditions can lead to costly delays, undermining
the NSR’s main advantage of being shorter than alternative routes. These continued issues, along with
harsh weather, logistical challenges, the lack of infrastructure, and environmental concerns, all raise
questions about the reliability, safety, and long-term economic viability of the passage. With Russia
identifying the NSR as a critical state priority and investing heavily in transforming the route into a
competitive maritime corridor, low demand for the passage could have serious consequences. As the
Arctic continues to change, the situation of the Primorsky Prospect and NS Arctic serves as yet another
warning of the dangers of Arctic shipping, which may further deter interest in the NSR. (Harvard
International Review, High North News, Polar Journal)
Slow response times means problems with Arctic oil spills linger, crushing local
ecosystems
High North Times, 8-3, 23, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russian-crude-oil-now-flowing-chinaarctic-ocean, Russian Crude Oil Now Flowing To China Via Arctic Ocean
In terms of cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters, burning the oil in place has been identified as
the most effective and often only option, with serious environmental impacts. Environmental
organizations also warn against further fossil fuel exploration in the region. “New fossil fuel production
projects in the Arctic pose additional risks to Arctic ecosystems, species and communities that have
been already impacted by rising temperatures,” explains Dr Sian Prior, Lead Advisor to the Clean Arctic
Alliance, a coalition of 20 non-profit organizations working to protect the Arctic. The region’s
remoteness and lack of infrastructure will also increase the response time, prolonging the time the oil
remains in the water. “Remote and harsh Arctic conditions means long spill response clean-up times,
with accidents ruining local ecosystems for decades,” cautions Prior.
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Hegemony Contention
China-Russia collaboration checks US hegemony
Batool, 7-14, 23, Ms Fizza Batool is a student of International Relations from Kinnaird College for
Women. She is particularly interested in geo-economics, geopolitics, area studies, diplomacy, conflict
and peace, strategic and defense studies, political economy, and global politics of the environment,
Significance of the Arctic Region, https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/the-arctic-region/
Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic is a strategic alliance that is beneficial to both nations and helps
the Global Arctic flourish peacefully. Exploiting natural resources, advancing scientific research, and
fostering commerce and connectivity through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) are all things that China and
Russia have in common. China and Russia have been able to make concessions and work together on
several initiatives, including the Yamal LNG project, the Ice Silk Road plan, and the joint exploration of
oil and gas reserves, despite certain legal and political disagreements. Cooperation between China
and Russia in the Arctic region also acts as a check on the growing power and influence of Western
nations, particularly the United States, which sees the region as a possible battleground for
geostrategic rivalry. China has been actively collaborating with Russia for the implementation of its
policy. Russia, being the nearest to the Arctic, provides China with a crucial sea route, and in turn, China
provides Russia access to warm waterways with the prime ambition to conduct trade. Thus, SinoRussian collaboration in the Arctic is not an imminent risk but rather a logical and practical reaction to
the Arctic’s shifting geopolitical and environmental circumstances.
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Asia Deterrence Advantage
Strengthening US military presence in the Arctic increases deterrence in Asia
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Department of Defense (DOD) officials have stated that U.S. military operations in Alaska can play a
role in supporting U.S. military operations not only in the Arctic, but in the Indo-Pacific region. In July
2021 remarks at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III stated: “We are
an Indo-Pacific nation and we are an Arctic nation. And here in Alaska those two critical regions
intersect. This is where we can project power into both regions and where we must be able to defend
ourselves from threats coming from both places.” 162 Parts of Alaska (particularly the panhandle, the
southern part of mainland Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands) are situated on or near great circle routes
(i.e., the shortest possible routes) linking the U.S. West Coast to locations in the Western Pacific that
are close to China.
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NATO Advantage
NATO now involved in the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Six of the eight Arctic states—the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and (since April 4,
2023) Finland—are members of NATO. A seventh Arctic state—Sweden—has applied to become a
member of NATO. During the Cold War, U.S. and allied political and military officials viewed NATO
member Norway and its adjacent sea areas as the northern flank of NATO’s defensive line against
potential aggression by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance. With the end of the Cold War, NATO
planning efforts shifted away from defending against potential aggression by Russia against NATO
countries, including NATO countries in the Arctic. With the emergence of great power competition,
NATO began to once again focus more on the question of how to deter potential Russian aggression
against NATO countries, including NATO countries in in the Arctic. Russia’s war in Ukraine has further
strengthened NATO’s focus on this question.
US Arctic activities conducted with NATO
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
DOD and the Coast Guard (which is part of the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]) are devoting
increased attention to the Arctic in their planning, budgeting, and operations. DOD as a whole, the
Army, the Navy and Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard have each issued Arctic strategy
documents. 166 All U.S. military services are conducting increased exercises and training operations in
the region, some in conjunction with forces from the other A7 states and with non-A7 NATO allies,
that are aimed at • reacquainting U.S. forces with—and responding to changes in—operating conditions
in the region, • identifying Arctic military capability gaps, • rebuilding Arctic-specific warfighting skills
that eroded during the post-Cold War era, • testing the performance of equipment under Arctic
conditions, • strengthening interoperability with allied forces for conducting operations in the region,
and • sending Russia and China signals of resolve and commitment regarding the Arctic. 16 In addition
to these increased exercises and training operations, the Coast Guard, as a major acquisition project, is
procuring new polar icebreakers called Polar Security Cutters (PSCs) to replace its aging heavy polar
icebreakers. (For further discussion of this program, see the next section of this report on icebreakers.)
Canada, the UK, and the Nordic countries are taking steps to increase their own military presence and
operations in the region, and as noted above, have participated alongside U.S. military forces in
certain Arctic exercises.168 NATO is conducting increased exercises in the region, some of which have
been large exercises involving thousands of personnel from multiple countries.
Arctic key to strengthening ties with NATO
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Bremmer, 7-18, 23, Dr. Esther Bremmer is, is the James H. Menger. Senior Fellow in global
governance at the Council of Foreign Relations. Dr. brimer. His work focuses on international
organisations and transatlantic relations. During her time at the council, Dr. Bremmer served as
the project director for the 2017 Council task force report Arctic imperatives, reinforcing us
strategy on America's fourth coast. In addition to posts in academia, the private sector and with
a large nonprofit organisations, Dr. Bremmer, previously served as the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organisation affairs and worked on the Department of State's policy
planning staff, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the
Arctic
Dr. Bremer from a NATO perspective with Finland and soon Sweden's ascension to NATO. Am I correct
that the Arctic presents a unique opportunity for us to strengthen our global alliances with with the
other six Arctic NATO nations, particularly around global stability, economic prosperity?
Yes, sir. Indeed, this is a remarkable moment for NATO, America's most important military alliances,
indeed, the arrival of Finland brings with us highly competent country with expertise in the high
north, which will be extremely important. Of course, it also brings a land border with the Russian
Federation and Finland of over 800 miles. But it also brings us expertise in the high north, this will be
increasingly important. Ironically, we're having to go back to look at maps that were so familiar during
the Cold War, we're talking again about the Greenland, Iceland, UK gap, that area in the North
Atlantic, which would be important if there ever had to be resupply for Europe from North America.
So indeed, there's both important strategically yet this is an opportunity for NATO to deepen its
cooperation, drawing on the expertise of existing and new members in the defence of our democracy.
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Search & Rescue
Search & rescue limits now
Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, US General Acc ounting Office, Dedember 7, 2022,
ARCTIC MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE Government-wide and Coast Guard Strategies Lack a Means to
Measure Progress, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106411.pdf
Although warming over the past decades has made trans-Arctic maritime routes more accessible, Arctic
sea ice extent remains seasonal, with most shipping occurring during a narrow window extending from
summer to early fall. Arctic sea ice typically reaches its maximum extent in March and its minimum in
September each year; as a result, the shipping season is typically from June through October. As shown
in figure 2, the extent of sea ice in September 2019 had a much smaller coverage area than the median
September extent from 1981 to 2010. Meanwhile, the contraction of sea ice over time has increased
accessibility to the Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago and the Northern Sea Route
along the northern border of Russia. These two trans-Arctic maritime routes enable shipments between
non-Arctic destinations, such as between Asia and Europe.6 However, most traffic in the U.S. Arctic is
destinational, meaning it transports goods to and from the U.S. Arctic. Such traffic includes shipping
supplies to U.S. Arctic communities, as wel Although diminished sea ice has prolonged the shipping
season and opened up shipping routes, environmental changes have also resulted in less predictable
conditions, with more volatile weather and sea ice. In April 2020 we reported that stakeholders told us
variation in ice conditions from year to year makes planning Arctic voyages difficult to do with
reasonable accuracy.7 The unpredictable and harsh weather and ice conditions—combined with the
vast distances and lack of maritime infrastructure—pose safety risks that stretch the region’s already
limited search and rescue capabilities and slow incidence response, according to stakeholders.
Status quo solves the search and rescue problem
Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, US General Acc ounting Office, Dedember 7, 2022,
ARCTIC MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE Government-wide and Coast Guard Strategies Lack a Means to
Measure Progress, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106411.pdf
In 2020, we found that federal agencies had taken some actions to address gaps in U.S. Arctic
infrastructure. For example, the Coast Guard reported that it had taken a flexible approach to
addressing infrastructure gaps by establishing seasonal, forward operating bases in the U.S. Arctic as
needed to provide search and rescue support in areas where major shipping activity is occurring. In
addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported in 2019 that it had acquired
nearly 1,500 square nautical miles of Arctic hydrographic survey data over the past 3 years
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Icebreakers Pro
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US Behind on Icebreakers Vis-à-vis Russia
Russian military advantage in the Arctic; US behind on icebreakers
J.J. Brannock, 7-18, 23, https://www.thecentersquare.com/national/article_08ba124a-2580-11ee-a5287f90ab71117d.html The Center Square, Security concerns grow as the U.S. continues to be outmatched
in arctic territory
(The Center Square) – The Committee of Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security held a hearing on Tuesday concerning security threats in the Arctic Region. The U.S. is
one of eight countries with territory above the arctic circle. Russia also has territory in the area.
Historically, both Japan in World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War sought U.S. arctic
territory for strategic purposes. The U.S. has cited the arctic region as a potential entry point for
Russian nuclear missiles and therefore crucial to protect. “For the past decade the Russian military has
been building up its capabilities in the arctic, including its fleet of heavy icebreakers,” Chair Carlos
Gimenez, R-Fla., said at the hearing. Gimenez cited Putin’s continued push for using the Northern Sea
Route as an alternative to the Suez Canal to allow faster trade between Europe and Asia. He also
mentioned Putin’s progressive noncompliance with other arctic states after the invasion of Ukraine.
“The arctic has never been more essential to America’s national security,” said Rep. Shri Thanedar, DMich. “Unfortunately, the Coast Guard’s icebreaking capabilities are outmatched by our enemies, and
rising threats from China and Russia pose a serious risk to American prosperity and security.” The U.S.
currently has only 2 polar ice breaker ships in their fleet. The Russian government has roughly 36 in
their arsenal, with an extra 15 being owned by private entities.
US needs more icebreakers to compete with Russia
J.J. Brannock, 7-18, 23, https://www.thecentersquare.com/national/article_08ba124a-2580-11ee-a5287f90ab71117d.html The Center Square, Security concerns grow as the U.S. continues to be outmatched
in arctic territory
China has also expressed interest in the arctic area in recent years, writing out a 5,500-word arctic
strategy in 2018, including entering the territory “for the common interests for all countries, law-based
governance, climate change, and sustainable developments.” The Chinese have 2 polar ice breakers
despite not owning any territory above the arctic circle. Gimenez said that one of the reasons for
China’s interest in the arctic may be for fishing purposes. “They are raping the oceans,” Gimenez said
about China’s overfishing activities. “My concern would be that they are trying to do the same in the
arctic region.” Thanedar requested Congress to approve “robust funding” for new polar ice cutters and
other budget increases for the Coast Guard to help maintain national security in the arctic. One of two
large ships funded for the Coast Guard has been delayed repeatedly, from an expected 2024 delivery
to a now estimated 2028 at the earliest before being fully operational. Witnesses on the hearing said
that the U.S. would need about eight more ships compared to their current two to compete with
China and Russia’s growing influence in the area.
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Resources Contention
Icebreaker fleets are essential for resource access
Rosario Rivera, Mexican Center for International Relations, Alí Gómez Villascán, 7-24, 23, Dispute for the
Arctic: China and Russia against the United States, https://cemeri.org/en/art/a-disputa-artico-chinarusia-usa-au
Unfortunately, the melting of the Arctic is an inevitable fact and therefore it is expected that humanity
will witness the last summer ice in the year 2036, however, the race for Arctic resources has already
begun; In this way, icebreaker fleets are essential tools that will serve to extract resources as long as
the Arctic ice continues to persist. Despite its technological limitations, Russia has a crushing advantage
over any other Arctic nation; It has nothing more and nothing less than a fleet of forty icebreakers,
four of which are heavy icebreakers that operate year-round in moderate multi-year ice; 31 are
medium and operate year-round in thick first-year ice and 16 are light and operate only in summer
and fall in medium-thick first-year ice; while the United States has only one icebreaking fleet, thus
putting it at a huge disadvantage against the Eurasian giant.
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Not Enough Icebreakers Now
Inadequate ice breakers now
Chairman Giminez,July 18, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic
Competition in the Arctic
For the last decade, Russia has been building up its military capabilities in the Arctic,
including its fleet of heavy icebreakers. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated his vision for
the northern sea route to become an alternative to the Suez Canal to facilitate faster trade
between Europe and Asia. More recently, Russia is foregoing cooperation on Arctic issues
with other Arctic states. As it continues its illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, thus
breaking decades of precedent, in which the eight Arctic slave states collaborated closely on
scientific research, environmental protection, and maritime safety. Additionally, the People's
Republic of China despite despite having no sovereign territory within the Arctic region, are
attempting to stake stakeout interests in the Arctic Arctic affairs. In 2018, the CCP declared the
PRC to be a so called near Arctic station nation, the CCP and state owned entities own and
operate icebreakers and other polar capable ships. And during the last decade, these entities
showed an increased willingness to transit their vessels through Arctic waters. United States
cannot afford to ignore this increased interest in the Arctic from near peer competitors. As CI
sea ice recedes and technology improves traffic in the Arctic's maritime channels will continue to
increase. This will lead to greater scientific research, natural resource exploration, fishing and
tourism taking place in the Arctic region. Additionally, our military relies upon the flight routes
through the Arctic to deploy personnel, equipment and other material to theatres around the
world. The United States Coast Guard has an active presence in the Arctic for decades,
providing invaluable search and rescue capabilities, patrolling US waters and upholding US
sovereignty and see their presence and enforces US customs and laws concerning trade and
fishing and supports the military sustained presence at bases around Alaska. Coast Guard's
icebreakers have long been an integral component of the US government's presence in
the Arctic. However, I am concerned with the delays the Coast Guard is experiencing
with the new development and deployment of new polar security cutters. That will
negatively impact the Coast Guard's ability to carry out its diverse mission set and
protect the homeland in the Arctic. Going forward, this subcommittee needs to play an active
role in ensuring that the United States can effectively respond to threats in the Arctic. I'm
grateful to have our three witnesses to share with us their perspective on the geopolitical
situation in the Arctic and ways in which the Coast Guard Department of Homeland Security and
the wider US government can deter threats and protect our homeland in the Arctic. Thank you
again. And I look forward to your testimonies. And now. I now recognise the Ranking Member,
the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Theodore, for his opening statement.
US doesn’t have enough icebreakers and they won’t get built in time
O’Ourke, 7-18, 23, Ronald O’Rourke, is a specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service, starting at CRS in 1984. Mr. O'Rourke, has written many reports for
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Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defence acquisition, China's
naval forces and maritime territorial disputes the Arctic and the international security
environments. He's one of the most respected authorities on naval issues and of special interest
to this subcommittee, the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
In the CRS report on the Arctic, I'm the author of the strip of the section on strategic competition
in the region, and I'll be happy to discuss various aspects of that topic during the q&a. The
subcommittee asked me to focus my prepared testimony on the Coast Guard's polar
icebreakers, which I've been covering in detail since 2008. When I initiated my CRS report on
the topic in connection with strategic competition, it can be noted that the Coast Guard's polar
icebreakers don't simply break ice. There are multimission cutters that conduct a variety of
operations in polar waters. US polar ice operations conducted in large part by the
icebreakers support nine of the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions. In general the
icebreakers conduct and support scientific research in the polar regions. They defend us
sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to maintain a US presence in territorial waters in the
region. They defend other US interest in polar regions, including economic interests in
waters that are within the US exclusive economic zone north of Alaska. They monitor sea
traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the United States. And they conduct other
Coast Guard missions such as search and rescue, law enforcement and protection of
marine resources in Arctic waters, including us territorial waters north of Alaska. Discussions
of us Arctic capabilities often note the lack of infrastructure in the region. With their built in
capabilities. The Coast Guard's polar icebreakers act as a form of mobile infrastructure,
something that can be seen when the icebreaker heli for example, uses its built in science
support facilities to support embarked contingents of Arctic researchers. The Coast Guard
testified in April in June that it had recently signed out a new fleet mix analysis that
concluded that the Coast Guard will require a total of eight to nine polar icebreakers.
Prior to that coast guard officials had stated that the service would need at least six icebreakers
including three capable of breaking heavy polar ice. The Coast Guard initiated the polar security
cutter or PSC programme for procuring new heavy polar icebreakers in its FY 13 budget, from
FY 13 to 16 programme received only minor funding starting in FY 17. The programme has
received significant funding and the first two PSCs are now fully funded. The Coast Guard
originally aimed to have the first PSC delivered in 2024, but the ship's estimated delivery date
has been delayed repeatedly given the degree of design completion The GAO has reported
construction of the ship might begin no earlier than 2024. If so, and if the ship takes at
least four years to build, which might be a reasonable estimate for a lead ship of this size
and complexity, then the first PSC might be delivered no earlier than 2028. Admiral Fagan
reportedly provided a similar estimate in testimony on the Senate side last week. If the first ship
is delivered in 2028, that will be 20 years after I initiated the icebreaker report.
US needs 8-9 Coast Guard cutters
O’Ourke, 7-18, 23, Ronald O’Rourke, is a specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service, starting at CRS in 1984. Mr. O'Rourke, has written many reports for
Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defence acquisition, China's
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naval forces and maritime territorial disputes the Arctic and the international security
environments. He's one of the most respected authorities on naval issues and of special interest
to this subcommittee, the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
in order for the Coast Guard to conduct it. Its mission, how many icebreakers does the Coast Guard
need? And what kind of mix is that?
T the Coast Guard has testified that their new fleet mix analysis indicates a need for a total of eight to
nine. That's an increase over the previously envisaged total of six that included three heavy so now
we're looking at eight to nine, presumably still including three heavies.
Russia and China have more than 40 operational icebreakers, US has two
Representative Garcie, 7-18, 23 Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
Thank you very much for your question, if I may follow up on particularly that, indeed,
recognising the importance of port facilities is crucial to the economic health of the United
States, as you mentioned, particularly the ports of what I was just in Long Beach. And indeed,
as we look at changing dynamics, we see the importance of other regions. And I would note,
particularly on the Arctic, although the we comment on the size of the coastline to the Russian
Federation, we know that there are significant resources in the Arctic, the management of those
required will require careful planning for years in the future, managing future fish stocks,
managing other natural resources will be important. And indeed, because of the rapid pace of
climate change, we will see increasing pressures for greater navigation through the Arctic. But
that will still be difficult. Even if we have the important resources that we all support, in order to
make it possible to travel that area, they'll continue to be a challenge. And that will be important
for the United States. Great, thank you. So we also have, of course, national security issues
here. So the world is rapidly changing. Our adversaries are quickly evolving with that change.
And it's certainly essential to our national interests and our security of our allies in the US that
we're meeting this important moment. Now we have concerns that our operational capacity and
our competitiveness in the Arctic is falling behind both Russia and China. I think that's been
mentioned already here here today. And so the Coast Guard obviously needs the tools to
operate in this new landscape, as has been mentioned, has been discussed also here. Russia
is upwards of 40 operational icebreakers while Chinese mobilising the commercial
shipping capacity. We just obviously mentioned also there the increasing was happening
around fishing, as well around the Arctic. The US, however, is still operating with just two
polar icebreakers. And it's the same two icebreakers we know that we roughly had about 60
years ago, also Dr. Bremer from a NATO perspective with Finland and soon Sweden's
ascension to NATO. Am I correct that the Arctic presents a unique opportunity for us to
strengthen our global alliances with with the other six Arctic NATO nations, particularly around
global stability, economic prosperity?
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Ice breakers are Key Infrastruture
Icebreakers are key because they are mobile infrastructure
O’Ourke, 7-18, 23, Ronald O’Rourke, is a specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service, starting at CRS in 1984. Mr. O'Rourke, has written many reports for
Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defence acquisition, China's
naval forces and maritime territorial disputes the Arctic and the international security
environments. He's one of the most respected authorities on naval issues and of special interest
to this subcommittee, the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
in order for the Coast Guard to conduct it. Its mission, how many icebreakers does the Coast Guard
need? And what kind of mix is that?
Most I think most people would say that they are central to the Coast Guard's ability to perform
its missions in the Arctic. The Coast Guard would not be able to do most of its statutory
missions in the Arctic without them. They aren't the only thing that the Coast Guard would need
to perform its missions and I mentioned some of the other things the aircraft possibly UAVs
improved shore facilities and communications but the coast but the icebreakers are central to
that and as I mentioned in my opening statement, they can be considered a form of
mobile infrastructure. So when we talk about improving us infrastructure in the Arctic,
the icebreakers can be considered to be part of that. Well, how many edge breakers do
those United States operate up there up there in the in the Arctic, and the US operational polar
ice breaker fleet is currently two ships the heavy icebreaker polar star and the medium polar
icebreaker heli. So one medium and one heavy. That's right. How many does Russia operate?
They have about 36 government operated icebreakers including six heavies, 22, mediums
and eight lights. Those are the government operated ones. They also have private sector
polar icebreakers, nine medium and six light I would think that that add all those together
that's 51. But I would figure that that they have a much bigger footprint on the other side of the
of the Arctic. In terms of the the
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Answers to Common Con Arguments
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Answers to: Military Presence Kills Cooperation/Arctic Council Good
The Russia Council is suspended
Ritu Sharma -July 30, 2023, Eurasian Times, China To Deploy ‘Listening Devices’ In The Arctic Ocean To
Exert Dominance, Track US, Rival Submarines, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-to-deploylistening-devices-in-the-arctic-ocean-to/
The Arctic Council, a governing body of Arctic States and indigenous nations, suspended its meetings last
year, refusing to engage with Russia after it attacked Ukraine. A panel of experts that RAND convened
for its study noted that Russia could seek to form its own Arctic governing council, with a more central
role for its ally, China.
Arctic Council not working now
Emily Rauhala, July 17, 2023, Washington Post, An Arctic ‘Great Game’ as NATO allies and Russia face
off in far north, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/17/an-arctic-great-game-nato-alliesrussia-face-off-far-north/
The Arctic Council — an intergovernmental forum that promotes cooperation — is in disarray because
seven of its members refuse to work at a political level with its eighth member, Russia, disrupting
collaboration on critical issues such as climate change. In the past year, Norwegian media outlets have
reported about drones buzzing airports and oil and gas installations, the expulsion of Russian
diplomats as spies, and the case of a man accused of illegal intelligence gathering while posing as a
Brazilian guest researcher at a Norwegian university. For NATO allies, “a flashing yellow light turned red,
and we need to think more carefully,” said a senior U.S. official who spoke on the condition of
anonymity to discuss alliance thinking. “Countries need to be sharing more information on destabilizing
actions, on things that look strange, and we need to be less naive and more aware.”.
Russia may not continue to participate in the Arctic Council
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
On March 3, 2022, in response to Russia’s invasion, the seven Arctic states other than Russia—who are
sometimes referred to as the Arctic 7 or A7—announced that they would be “temporarily pausing
participation in all meetings of the [Arctic] Council and its subsidiary bodies.”83 (The Nordic Council of
Ministers similarly stated that it was suspending its cooperation with Russia and Belarus.84) The
suspension of Arctic Council meetings ruptured the normal operations of the council, but did not
prevent the chairmanship of the council from being transferred from Russia to Norway on May 11, 2023.
In October 2022, China’s special envoy to the Arctic reportedly stated that China would not recognize
the legitimacy of an Arctic Council that does not include Russia. He also reportedly stated that China
would continue to cooperate in the Arctic with both the A7 states and Russia.85 On February 21, 2023
(i.e., almost a year after the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine), Russia published amendments to its Arctic
policy statement that removed mentions of the Arctic Council.86 In May and June 2023, it was
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reported that while all cooperation with Russia will remain suspended, other activities of the Council
and its working groups would resume in mid-June 2023.87 A June 2023 press report stated: “At the
end of his tenure as chair of the Arctic Council’s senior officials committee in May, Russia’s Nikolai
Korchunov said Moscow could withdraw from the organisation if it was not invited to participate in
events during the Norwegian presidency.”88 These developments have prompted new or heightened
questions about the future of the Arctic Council, Arctic governance, and cooperation in general among
the eight Arctic states.89
China not participating in the Arctic Council
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, great power competition and increased human activities in the Arctic
resulting from the diminishment of Arctic ice put a spotlight on the issue of Arctic governance and the
limits of the Arctic Council as a governing body.110 As noted earlier, Russia’s war in Ukraine has
prompted new or heightened questions about the future of the Arctic Council and Arctic governance.
Regarding the limits of the council as a governing body, the council states that it “does not and cannot
implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments or recommendations. That responsibility belongs to
each individual Arctic State. The Arctic Council’s mandate, as articulated in the Ottawa Declaration,
explicitly excludes military security.” 111 Arctic security issues currently can be addressed, to some
degree at least, through other existing mechanisms, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable
(ASFR) and the Arctic Chiefs of Defense (ACHOD) Forum. Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, China raised
questions as to whether the Arctic Council as currently constituted and the current broader legal
framework for the Arctic should continue to be the principal means for addressing issues relating to
the Arctic, and had begun to use other approaches for influencing Arctic governance.112
No cooperation with Russia in the Arctic
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the A7 states cooperated with Russia on a range of issues in the Arctic.
One example is cooperation on Arctic search and rescue (SAR) under the May 2011 Arctic Council
agreement on Arctic SAR that is discussed later in this report. The A7 states also cooperated with Russia
through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), an organization intended to “foster safe, secure, and
environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.”120 The United States and Russia in 2018
cooperated in creating a scheme for managing two-way shipping traffic through the Bering Strait and
Bering Sea, 121 and in February 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard and Russia’s Marine Rescue Service signed
an agreement updating a 1989 bilateral joint contingency plan for responding to transboundary
maritime pollution incidents. 122 Prior to Russia’s war in Ukraine, some observers saw possibilities for
further cooperation by the A7 states with Russia in the Arctic.123 Since the start of Russia’s war in
Ukraine, those possibilities have narrowed considerably, but U.S.-Russian marine safety-related
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cooperation in the Bering Strait reportedly continued,124 and some observers see some limited
possibilities for additional cooperation.
Russia not involved in Arctic cooperation now
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Following the end of the Cold War, the Arctic states sought to maintain the Arctic as a region of
cooperation, low tension, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international law. Over the
past 10 to 15 years, the emergence of great power competition between the United States, Russia, and
China has introduced elements of competition and tension into the Arctic’s geopolitical environment.
Russia’s war in Ukraine beginning on February 24, 2022, has further affected the region’s geopolitical
environment by prompting the seven Arctic states other than Russia to suspend most forms of Arctic
cooperation with Russia, by prompting Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, and in
other ways.
Not possible to cooperate with Russia now
O’Ourke, 7-18, 23, Ronald O’Rourke, is a specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service, starting at CRS in 1984. Mr. O'Rourke, has written many reports for
Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defence acquisition, China's
naval forces and maritime territorial disputes the Arctic and the international security
environments. He's one of the most respected authorities on naval issues and of special interest
to this subcommittee, the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
Yes, as long as Russia maintains its military forces inside the borders recognised as being part of the
Russian Federation. It's their prerogative to do what they want with them. The concern will become
when they decide to use these forces outside of the borders of the Russian Federation. In terms of the
notion of cooperating with Russia. I don't think this is it. in any meaningful sense in the Arctic or
otherwise, I don't think that this is geopolitically possible right now. And there is a growing relationship
between Beijing and Moscow that Beijing is very much the Seri senior partner in Russia is the junior
partner. And I know Mr. Higgins asked me to stay restricted to the Arctic. But often these geopolitical
issues are interconnected. And that is why strong Ukraine will equal a safer and more secure Taiwan as
China's junior partner, anything we do to weaken Russia will indirectly weaken China. And China is
watching how we respond to Ukraine because they have their eye on Taiwan, and a stronger Ukraine or
Ukraine could perhaps deter China from doing something in Taiwan. And then ultimately, this comes
back to the arts.
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Answers to: Increased Military Presence Undermines Arctic Science
Coop
No Arctic science cooperation now
Barry Gardiner is the Labour MP for Brent Nort, 6-13, 23, The Guardian, s the ice melts, a perilous
Russian threat is emerging in the Arctic,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/13/arctic-russia-nato-putin-climate
On a recent visit to the Ny-Ålesund international research station on Svalbard, it was depressing to hear
that scientific cooperation with Russia on climate matters has effectively ceased. The Arctic is an
environment where cooperation is essential. Arctic science must be done over the long term, and the
relationships and trust built up between partners offer predictability and greater stability. In a region
that is becoming over-securitised, every opportunity to minimise accidental misunderstandings and
avoid a military response should be seized.
No Arctic cooperation now
Stefan Hedlund, a professor of Russian Studies at Uppsala University, April 17, 2023,
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/the-arctic/, The Arctic in Russia’s crosshairs
Global warming and the melting Arctic ice cap were once associated with visions of a new era of
international cooperation on initiatives like hydrocarbon exploitation and speeding up east-west
transport via the Northern Sea Route. Now, those phenomena have triggered another type of heating –
in the militarization race between Russia and the NATO alliance. As Western governments resolved to
stand by Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion, cooperation was replaced by open conflict, and
there likely can be no going back any time soon. The danger of a military confrontation in the Arctic is
the highest since the peak of the Cold War. A harbinger of coming trouble was the 2014 launch of the
first stage of the Russian invasion, the Crimea takeover.
No possibility of peaceful cooperation with Russia
Alendar, May 11, 2023, Minna Ålander is a research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. Her research topics are Northern European security and Nordic defense
cooperation, as well as German and Finnish foreign and security policy. Previously, she worked at the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, High North, High Tension: Th End
of Arctic Illusions, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/05/high-north-high-tension-the-end-of-arcticillusions/
While the Northern European Arctic states—Norway, Sweden, and Finland—have been eager to
cooperate with Russia in the Arctic in good faith, Russia has used the narrative of “Arctic
exceptionalism” and framing the region as a zone of low tensions as a screen for its military build-up.
Russia has also been able to get away with actions directly threatening the safety of the wider region,
while its Nordic neighbors have kept extending a helping hand. In 2021, the European Union offered to
bear half of the cost of an operation to lift the two nuclear submarines that Russia has sunk in the
Barents and Kara Sea. Previously, Sweden and Norway had provided substantive financial support for
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equipping the Russian ship Serebryanka to tackle the nuclear waste issue. Russia, however, ended up
using the vessel in a nuclear testing and developing program.
With the European security order in pieces, there is no reason to expect the Arctic to remain a zone of
peace, safely secluded from growing geopolitical tensions elsewhere. A recent Finnish governmentcommissioned study assesses the security outlook in the European Arctic as bleak, with Putin’s regime
survival directly linked to the military-strategic value and energy resources of the region. The trust basis
for cooperation with Russia has eroded, even if Russia’s stated strategic objectives for the Arctic do
not necessarily change in the future. Its smaller Nordic neighbors must become increasingly cautious
about resuming cooperation with Russia, as Russia could use such frameworks against their interests.
No cooperation with Russia on the Arctic now
Buchanan, 5-4-23, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan is a non-resident fellow of the Modern War Institute at West
Point and a First Sea Lord Five Eyes fellow with the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre. Her book Red
Arctic was published on March 24, 2023, with The Brookings Press,
https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/russias-gains-in-the-great-arctic-race/, RUSSIA’S GAINS IN THE
GREAT ARCTIC RACE
Russia has used the international rules for over two decades to secure rights in the North Pole seabed.
In February 2023, Moscow quietly secured a major win in the Arctic seabed legal battle. Yet, this
significant legal gain comes in the midst of an international security context that is quite different from
when Moscow planted its flag at the bottom of the ocean. The Arctic was a place of few avenues for
cooperation and coordination between Russia and the West, and this ceased to be the case following
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Without guardrails to facilitate dialogue and engagement, and
perhaps incentives for Moscow to continue to adhere to the international legal regime of the Arctic, it is
possible that the region is set to face its most challenging era yet.
Arctic cooperation will fail
Lunday & Fields, 2023, Kevin Lunday Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Kevin Lunday, Vice Admiral, U.S.
Coast Guard, assumed the duties as Commander, Atlantic Area in May 2022 and is responsible for
directing all Coast Guard operations in the inland navigable waters east of the Rocky Mountains, the
Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean, including the eastern Arctic, Atlantic
basin, and the Middle East. He previously commanded Coast Guard operations in Oceania and the South
Pacific as well as Coast Guard Cyber Command. He is a former Special Advisor to the Standing
Committee on Law and National Security. He is licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia
and State of Arizona. Stanley Field Commander, U.S. Coast GuarStanley Fields, Commander, U.S. Coast
Guard, serves as the Staff Judge Advocate at Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Naval Air Station Key
West, Florida. His previous assignment locations include Alaska, Rhode Island, Afghanistan, Virginia, and
Georgia. He is a graduate of Western New Mexico University, Eastern New Mexico University, the
University of New Mexico School of Law, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School, and Air War College, The Arctic: Shrinking Ice, Growing Importance,
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https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_national_security/publications/aba-standing-committee-onlaw-and-national-security-60-th-anniversary-an-anthology/the-arctic-shrinking-ice-growing-importance/
However, the Arctic is more likely to turn into another theater of strategic competition with increasing
risk of conflict as Russia and China aggressively challenge established international norms. Given the
recent disruptions to diplomatic efforts with Russia across a range of issues, and China’s apparent
diplomatic alignment with Russia, and with no apparent near-term end to the conflict in Ukraine, it
seems prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic are beyond the horizon. Zachary Basu,
China Lays Out 5-point Position on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, Axios, Feb. 25, 2022.
No Arctic cooperation now
Wall & Wegge, 2023, hird, given the state of Russia’s conventional armed forces, Russian aggression
toward Arctic European states may continue to lean heavily on hybrid tools. There have been
encouraging signs of a Western response to this, such as Norway’s deployment of the Home Guard to
protect critical infrastructure, and NATO allies’ assistance to help them do so via increased allied ship
patrols in the North Sea.[154] Norway also recently adopted its annual Flotex naval exercise to include a
component focused on protecting oil and gas installations.[155] Even the U.S. Arctic strategy recognizes
the challenge, promising to focus on “building the resilience of critical infrastructure,” including against
cyberattacks.[156] This is a welcome recognition from the Biden administration of Russia’s penchant for
using hybrid tactics in the High North—however, the administration may not yet have fully recognized
that this tool is likely becoming more attractive to Russia in the Arctic, relative to conventional force.
NATO allies like Norway, and future members like Sweden and Finland, may need to further impress this
probability on the United States and other allies at the NATO level, The Russian Arctic Threat:
Consequences of the Ukraine War. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequencesukraine-war
Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 disrupted the European security
architecture and altered the risk calculus underpinning the foreign and security policies of its neighbors.
This shift was also stark in the Arctic, which had for a long time been hailed by many as a highly
cooperative and unusually peaceful part of international affairs.[1] First, the Arctic Council ceased to
function when its seven members other than Russia suspended participation in official meetings.[2] This
left the region without its main intergovernmental venue for cooperation.
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Answers to: Encircling Russia Bad
NATO expansion already encircles Russia in the Arctic
Steven E. Miller, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, March 2023, The Return of the Strategic Artic,
https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf
Second, the Ukraine war has remade the geostrategic map of northern Europe. The impending
membership of Sweden and Finland in NATO means that NATO’s longest and most direct border with
Russia lies in the Nordic region, along the Russo-Finnish border – a line some 1400 kilometers long.
(Alander and Alburque, 2022.) Northern Europe is now entirely a NATO region – a development that is
due to the belligerence and aggression of an increasingly unfriendly Russia led by an increasingly
assertive and autocratic leader. As Kendall-Taylor and Kofman have written, “Finland’s and Sweden’s
entry into NATO – a direct result of Russia’s attack on Ukraine – will increase security tensions with
Russia in the Baltic and Arctic regions….Their membership also brings new borders for NATO to defend
and contingency plans to develop.” (Kendall-Taylor & Kofman, 2022). Indeed, the accession of Finland
and Sweden to NATO will complete the picture of the Arctic as a region marked by a divide between
NATO members (the United States, Canada, Denmark Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland), on the
one hand, and Russia on the other. Given the importance of the Arctic to Russia and the fractured
relationship between NATO and Moscow, this fault line could increasingly important and potentially
contentious in the future.
US increasing its military presence in the Arctic now
Steven E. Miller, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, March 2023, The Return of the Strategic Artic,
https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf
The effect of the evolving strategic realities in the Arctic can already be seen in the military policies and
investments of key regional actors. The United States now feels challenged by the growth of Russian
capability in the Arctic, a region described by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2019 as “an arena of
global power and competition.” (Conley and Melino, 2020, p. 2; Baker 2022). Indeed, fears that Russia
has achieved military superiority in the region and has a head start measured in years now animate
discussions of US and western policy in the Arctic. (Gronholt-Pedersen and Fouche, 2022). Accordingly,
Washington is investing in enhanced reconnaissance and command and control capabilities in the
Arctic, intends to put more emphasis on cold weather assets and to train and exercise more
frequently in the north, and has plans to develop additional infrastructure in the Arctic, including a
strategic port. (US Department of Defense, 2019; Madeira, 2019). It is also bringing decommissioned
facilities back into military service, including restoration of activities based in Iceland, formerly the
lynchpin of NATO maritime power in the North Atlantic. (Sterkeby and Hole, 2022; McLeary 2017).
Operationally, as one report noted, the US Navy “continues to prioritize re-learning how to operate in
the Arctic.” (Eckstein, 2019).
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Any encirclement arguments are made non-unique by NATO expansion
Nick Paton Walsh,, 12-22, 22, Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of
International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of IndoPacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/, Russia’s militarization of the Arctic shows no sign of slowing down
The Arctic is also vital to Russia because its melting ice is rapidly opening up new shipping routes from
Asia’s southeast to Europe, using a much shorter path along the Russian coast. The Northern Sea Route
could cut around two weeks off the current journey time across the Suez Canal. Russian state TV has
reveled in the launch of several atomic-powered icebreakers, designed to boost Russian influence and
power in the region. Critics say Moscow is seeking to exert outsized control over a route that should be
equally accessible to all nations. Speaking via videolink at the launch of a new nuclear-powered
icebreaker in St. Petersburg last month (November 22), Russian President Vladimir Putin said the
development of the “most important” Northern Sea Route “will allow Russia to fully reveal its export
potential and to establish effective logistics routes, including to southeast Asia.” At the same time, the
war in Ukraine has boosted NATO’s presence in the region. Once Finland and Sweden join the block,
as is widely expected, seven out of eight Arctic states will be NATO members. The alliance has also
ramped up its military clout in the region. In August, Norway released the first images of US B52
bombers flying over its territory escorted by Norwegian F35 jets and 2 Swedish JAS Gripen. Increased
signaling by NATO included a recent test of the new weapons system, the Rapid Dragon Palletized
Munition Deployment, involving a complex drop by US special forces of a normal supply pallet from the
back of a C130 cargo craft. The pallet contains a cruise missile, which launches as the pallet falls by
parachute. The display was designed to show the United States can launch these powerful weapons
systems from the back of an ordinary cargo plane. The test took place in Norway, not far from the
Russian border. NATO has also become increasingly concerned about the potential sabotage of
Norway’s oil and gas infrastructure. Now Russian energy is subject to sanctions, Norway’s natural gas
makes up more than 20% of Europe’s supply, according to some analysis. “Since the sabotage in the
Baltic Sea,” Stoltenberg said, “we have doubled our presence, with ships, with submarines, with
maritime patrol aircrafts in the Baltic and North Seas, partly to monitor, to have better situational
awareness, but also to send a message of deterrence and readiness to protect this critical
infrastructure.” The NATO head was referring to the blasts at the Nord Stream pipeline in September,
which were caused by an act of sabotage, according to Swedish prosecutors, after evidence of
explosives was discovered at the sites. The senior intelligence official said, however, that a recent
Norwegian review of its infrastructure security concluded no major attempts to attack it had occurred
and that “the oil infrastructure is well secured now.”
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Answers to: Military Presence  Sexual Assaults
Russian aggression means violence against women
TRINE JONASSEN, 8-21, 23, High North News, Believes Norway’s Cautiousness Toward Russia to Be
Outdated, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/believes-norways-cautiousness-toward-russia-beoutdated
"It is important to discuss base policy. Especially after (the war crimes, ed.note) in Bucha, when we have
seen how Russia acts. Should we then be so scarcely defended in Finnmark? Perhaps we should have a
NATO base in Finnmark or at least discuss the base policy?" asks Friis.
Ukraine is investigating almost 60 000 possible war crimes. It concerns everything from murder,
kidnapping, random bombings to sexual assaults conducted by Russian soldiers.Friis believes that we
must take a look at Russia with new eyes and remind them about what the base policy was really about.
More sexual assault prosecutions now
Rachel Coen 2022, June 30, Air Force Times, New rules make it easier to kick out airmen, guardians
guilty of sexual assault, New rules make it easier to kick out airmen, guardians guilty of sexual assault
(airforcetimes.com)
Airmen and guardians who commit sexual assault will automatically face military discharge unless
they qualify for an exception to that rule, the Air Force said in a recent update to its department-wide
guidance. “Sexual assault is incompatible with our core values, the ‘guardian ideal’ and military service,”
Air Force Undersecretary Gina Ortiz Jones said in a news release. “These revisions will significantly
improve our ability to discharge those unworthy of calling themselves airmen and guardians.” The
new policy, revised June 24, reflects the work underway at the federal level to reform the Uniform Code
of Military Justice and how the Pentagon handles sexual assault cases. While the Department of the Air
Force argues it has “zero tolerance” for those crimes, critics say the system often falls short of
meaningful investigation or punishment.
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Answers to: Undermines Arms Control
Arms control fails; deterrence essential
Steven E. Miller, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, March 2023, The Return of the Strategic Artic,
https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf
Fifth, all of this is playing out in a strategic context in which arms control has largely collapsed. There are
today fewer constraints in place to mitigate the intensity of the nuclear rivalry than at any point in
several decades. The only remaining major strategic arms control agreement, the New START
agreement of 2010, expires in 2026. Even now, however, New START is sputtering. In February 2023,
after a period in which Russia was not fully compliant with the treaty’s verification provisions, President
Putin announced that Russia is suspending its participation in the agreement. (Sanger, 2023). While it
remains possible that the agreement could eventually be extended or replaced with a follow-on
agreement, there is presently no negotiation underway (worrisome because it usually takes years to
negotiate nuclear arms agreements) and the severe breakdown of US-Russian relations caused by the
Ukraine war makes a resumption of diplomacy seem unlikely anytime soon. There is a real possibility
that there will be no strategic arms control in place after New START’s expiration in 2026, meaning a
return to the unconstrained nuclear competition of the early Cold War years. History suggests that in
such an environment, intense arms racing may ensue. Antagonism will motivate vigorous competition,
fears will intensify, vulnerability scares will multiply, defense budgets will expand, forces will grow,
modernization will accelerate, and nuclear concerns and risks might again occupy center stage. Because
the Arctic will play a critical role in the strategic nuclear balance as the arena in which the heart of
Russia’s nuclear deterrent force is deployed, operated, and defended, it is unlikely to be exempt from
the effect of intense and unregulated strategic competition. Further, arms control did little to restrain
the naval competition in the northern waters during the Cold War and is unlikely to do so in the future
even if some arms control measures remain in place.
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Answers to: Increased Presence Kills the Environment
War in the Arctic kills the environment
Perez, 2022, February 25, Christian Perez is a Senior Policy & Quantitative Analyst with FP Analytics,
Foreign Policy’s independent research and analysis division. His work focuses on trade and investment,
emerging technologies, sustainability, and impact analysis. He is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies., Foreign Policy, ow Russia’s Future With NATO Will Impact the Arctic,
How Russia’s Future With NATO Will Impact the Arctic https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/25/arcticukraine-russia-china-eu-invasion-nato/
The Arctic region is set to play a key role in each of these considerations. Abundant natural gas and
energy reserves are concentrated in Russian Arctic territory, which European countries are highly
dependent on for their energy supply. Meanwhile, Russia has made the Arctic a focal point of its military
modernization efforts, leading to a steady buildup of Russian and NATO forces throughout the region.
The widespread military buildup since 2007 amplifies the potential for a conflict between Russia and
NATO-allied states to spill over into the region. Armed conflict in the Arctic could permanently damage
regional cooperation, compromising coordinated efforts, dating back to 1996, among the Arctic states
(Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S.) in search-and-rescue
operations, environmental protection, and prevention of illegal fishing, among other issues
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Answers to: Russian Encirclement
Russia already encircled by Finland’s militarization
Bekkeveld & Hilde, 7-28, 23, Jo Inge Bekkevold is a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies and a former Norwegian diplomat, Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/28/arctic-nato-russia-china-finland-sweden-norway-northerneurope-defense-security-geopolitics-energy/ Paal Sigurd Hilde is a professor at the Norwegian Institute
for Defence Studies. Twitter: @Paal_S_H
Third, Europe’s northern flank is witnessing an increase in military activity. Russia stated that it expects
a militarization of the region following Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accession. Like Norway, Finland
borders Russia’s Kola Peninsula, the strategic significance of which makes Russia sensitive to allied
activity nearby. Unlike Norway, which has long put limits on NATO activity near its border with Russia,
Finland might show less constraint. It has, for instance, opened its skies for U.S. intelligence flights along
its eastern frontier, and the first sortie took place in March 2023. Furthermore, forces from NATO
countries are increasingly visible conducting military exercises in Europe’s northern waters. For
instance, in June, the U.S. Navy’s newest supercarrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, participated with its air
wing in Arctic Challenge, a major exercise across northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland.
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Answers to: Indigenous Knowledge
AI protects Arctic indigenous knowledge and the environment
Arctic Economic Council, no date, https://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/news/understanding-climatechange-through-a-digital-twin-of-the-arctic-ocean/, Understanding Climate Change Through a Digital
Twin of the Arctic Ocean
The PolArctic’s digital twin will integrate unique multiscale information in a novel and unprecedented
way. It will combine traditional indigenous knowledge, data science, ocean modelling, and advanced
artificial intelligence to create individuals with unique behaviours in simulated ocean habitats. “The
project explores various data sources that highlight the value of including artificial intelligence and
traditional knowledge from indigenous people, who have a deep understanding of their environment.
Often positioned as if artificial intelligence and indigenous culture were in conflict with each other, the
project achieves a level of success that would not be possible without the benefit of both,” explains
Leslie Canavera, CEO of PolArctic. The virtual simulations will enable PolArctic to concretely visualise
the ecosystem characteristics and the fish stocks in different ocean areas. It will indicate the
emergence of new phenomena such as acidification, temperature changes, illegal fishing, and
predator-prey interactions. The model will support precision-fishing techniques, increasing industry
profits while simultaneously raising the total fish biomass by allocating fishing in regions of
abundance and regeneration for schools and regions suffering overfishing or climate change impacts.
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Answers to: Hurts Indigenous People
Coast Guard key to support indigenous people in the Arctic
O’Ourke, 7-18, 23, Ronald O’Rourke, is a specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service, starting at CRS in 1984. Mr. O'Rourke, has written many reports for
Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defence acquisition, China's
naval forces and maritime territorial disputes the Arctic and the international security
environments. He's one of the most respected authorities on naval issues and of special interest
to this subcommittee, the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
Thank you very much for the question, because indeed, out of the 4 million people who live in the
Arctic, about 500,000 of them are indigenous peoples. And indeed, those include our caught our fellow
citizens in the great state of Alaska. And I would like to say that, indeed, that the Coast Guard provides
important search and rescue for people who are working out working on the coastlines they have, as the
coastlines change, there is greater challenge of for those, including those who are still subsistence
hunters, that is important to have the infrastructure to support the well being of people who actually
live in the Arctic. And if I may combine this point with the earlier conversation about the role of
international organisations that support people in the region. The Arctic is and has layers of
international organisations. I will note that whatever the future of the Arctic Council, the ability to bring
together indigenous people, including those in Alaska is important support for those people. And
whatever the venue is, that's an important structure to help with human well being and human security.
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A2: Russia Oil DA
Russia’s Arctic oil development has been limited
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
Soon after the start of result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, several major oil companies and investors
announced that they were withdrawing from Russian resource development or not pursuing new
projects with Russia, including in the Arctic. 105 Western sanctions reportedly have impeded Russian
energy projects in the Arctic.
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CON
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Status Quo Solves
US already increasing its military presence in the Arctic
AP, 6-19, 23, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/06/19/first-us-deep-water-portfor-the-arctic-to-host-military-cruise-ships/, Military Times, First US deep water port for the Arctic to
host military, cruise ships
ANCHORAGE, Alaska (AP) — As the Arctic sea ice relents under the pressures of global warming and
opens shipping lanes across the top of the world, more tourists are venturing to Nome — a northwest
Alaska destination known better for the Iditarod Trail Sled Dog Race and its 1898 gold rush than luxury
travel. And so are U.S. military vessels, to counter the presence of Russian and Chinese ships in the
Arctic. The problem? There’s no place to park the big boats. While smaller cruise ships are able to dock,
officials say that of the dozen arriving this year, half will anchor offshore. That’s expected to change as a
$600 million-plus expansion makes Nome, population 3,500, the nation’s first deep-water Arctic port.
The expansion, expected to be operational by the end of the decade, will accommodate not just larger
cruise ships of up to 4,000 passengers, but cargo ships to deliver additional goods for the 60 Alaska
Native villages in the region, as well as military vessels. U.S. Sen. Dan Sullivan, an Alaska Republican,
said the expanded port will become the centerpiece of U.S. strategic infrastructure in the Arctic. The
military is building up resources in Alaska, placing fighter jets at bases in Anchorage and Fairbanks,
establishing a new Army airborne division in Alaska, training soldiers for future cold-weather conflicts
and has missile defense capabilities. “The way you have a presence in the Arctic is to be able to have
military assets and the infrastructure that supports those assets,” Sullivan said. The northern seas near
Alaska are getting more crowded. A U.S. Coast Guard patrol board encountered seven Chinese and
Russian naval vessels cooperating in an exercise last year about 86 miles (138 kilometers) north of
Alaska’s Kiska Island. Coast guard vessels in 2021 also encountered Chinese ships 50 miles (80 km) off
Alaska’s Aleutian Islands.
The US has increased its Arctic presence
G. Dunkel, 6-7, 23, https://www.workers.org/2023/06/71470/m Militarizing the Arctic
The U.S./NATO forces have been matching the Russian efforts with a buildup of their own, doubling
NATO’s presence with ships, submarines and patrol aircraft. War games were held in March 2022, within
days of the Russian entry into Ukraine. Known as Cold Response, these games are held every two years
enabling the NATO forces to rehearse coordinating and commanding personnel and supplies from 27
different countries, with no common language, under Arctic conditions.
The U.S. announced last week that it will open a consular office in Tromsø later this year to monitor
Russian moves in the region. The U.S. has expanded its military presence and training to enhance its
Arctic preparedness. The USS Gerald R. Ford, the largest aircraft carrier in the world, is operating in
Norway’s Arctic waters under NATO command. There are currently 150 jets from 14 NATO nations
training in the region, more above the Arctic Circle than at any time since the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Other U.S. destroyers, aircraft carriers and submarines are in the area as well. Some are part
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of Arctic Challenge 2023, a biannual large-force, live-fly field training exercise to advance Arctic security
initiatives and enhance interoperability of the NATO forces. (Air National Guard website, June 2)
The US has reactivated the 11th Airborne Division in the Arctic
Liam Denning, 6-4, 23, Bloomberg, An Army at the Top of the World,
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-opinion-arctic-geopolitics-resources/army-training.html
As a result, Washington’s gaze has been drawn northward with an intensity not seen in decades. In
2019, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discomfited his audience at the collegial Arctic Council by
branding the region “an arena of global power and competition.” Then, the US Army published a new
strategy titled, plainly enough, “Regaining Arctic Dominance.” It followed that up last summer by
reactivating the 11th Airborne Division, headquartered at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson outside
Anchorage, as a dedicated force of “Arctic Angels.”
US increasing military support and exercises in the Arctic
Zhang Chi, 6-5, 23, NATO's large-scale military exercises intensify Arctic game,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/WORLD_209198/WorldMilitaryAnalysis/16228909.html
On the other hand, NATO has pressed the "accelerate button" of the Arctic game. The Arctic region
has become a hot spot for major military powers to compete against each other in recent years. The
Biden administration's Arctic policy emphasizes "military deterrence" against Russia, and the US military
has rebuilt the 11th Airborne Division to carry out combat missions in the Arctic. As a response, Russia
has introduced the latest Arctic policy and fine-tuned the previous version to highlight national and
territorial security. Russia has also built and renovated hundreds of military facilities in the Arctic
including six military bases, 19 airports, and 16 deep-water ports. Next, the U.S. and its NATO allies will
rely on exercises such as Cold Response, Arctic Edge, Polar Bear and Arctic Challenge to continuously
improve Arctic combat and integrated deterrence capabilities.
US and allies increasing military presence in the Arctic now
Jiminez, 5-25, 23, María Milagros Martín Jiménez is a Law and International Relations graduate with a
Master’s Degree in the EU and China. Through her involvement with the ESThink Tank and other
European organizations she has specialised and published research on EU External Relations Law and
Foreign and Security Policy as well as on China and the Indo-Pacific region, Modern Diplomacy, China’s
Game in the Arctic: A Tale of Deception?, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/05/25/chinas-game-in-thearctic-a-tale-of-deception/
As a matter of fact, the best example of the seriousness with which major players in the region are
reacting to China’s advance in the Arctic is found in the shift of the US Arctic policy. The new strategy
released in October 2022, which complements NATOS’s, calls for the enhancement of military
exercises, the expansion of the US’ military presence in Alaska and NATO States and the compromise
to rebuild its icebreaking fleet (Grady, 2022). Few months later, in February 2023, US-led military
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119
exercises in the Arctic, hosted by Norway and Finland, brought together more than 10,000 military
personnel from the UK, US, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Finland (Bridenthal,
2023). Likewise, Denmark, owing to what the country’s Foreign Policy has described as “a new
geopolitical battlefield”, has reviewed its security policy, increasing its military budget with the “Arctic
capacity package” aimed at intensifying surveillance with radar, drones and satellites (Grady, 2022).
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Answers to: US Doesn’t Have Enough Ice Breakers
The number of ice breakers does not matter
Andreas Østhagen, Arctic Institute, 6-1, 23, Five Misconceptions in Arctic Security and Geopolitics,
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/five-misconceptions-arctic-security-geopolitics/
Arctic-related stories love to count how many icebreakers the Arctic countries have. This is often done
to showcase how Russia is dominating in the Arctic and the USA is a laggard. The main problem here is
that icebreakers are contextual. A range of different factors explain why Russia has the number of
icebreakers it has: the size of its Arctic coastline, economic activity in that area, and ice conditions
(which is why you have a breaker-of-ice in the first place). This is beside the intra-institutional set-ups of
each Arctic coastal state concerning coast guard / navy tasks and whether icebreakers are even useful
for the latter.Do not get me wrong. There is no doubt that the USA is in need of more icebreakers. It
currently has only two operational ones: the USCGC Healy from 1999 and the USCGC Polar Star from
1976. Moreover, icebreakers are important for a number of reasons, including their ability to support
ship traffic, keep harbours open in wintertime, and conduct research at high latitudes.However,
icebreakers are not the ultimate sign of strength or military power in the Arctic. Other parameters,
such as military expenditure, presence and capabilities (beyond breaking ice), are better suited. In
most instances, icebreakers are not even operated by the various Arctic countries’ armed forces. Why
does Finland have four times as many as the USA when it is not even an Arctic coastal state? Because
the country needs to break ice in the Gulf of Bothnia and is attempting to reap commercial benefits
from icebreaking services. As such, the numbers of icebreakers do not demonstrate the Russian Arctic
threat—there are other things that are more relevant for that, ranging from military capacities (like
subsea or surface naval vessels, or airborne capabilities) to patterns of behaviour (like military
exercises, troop posture, statements).
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121
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Increasing Presence Crowds-Out Russia
Russia views competition win the US in the Arctic as Zero-Sum: Increased US presence
will crowd them out
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
Russian Arctic strategy aims to develop untapped energy reservoirs to elevate its economy.3 This
includes the interrelated projects of Yamal LNG (liquified natural gas) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR),
which are strengthening the Russian economy, reducing maritime routes, and assisting Russia to
become a dominant power in the region. Besides this, Russian attempts to develop and utilize the NSR
as a global shipping artery raise the value of the Arctic in the Kremlin’s geopolitical calculus. Moreover,
Russia perceives the United States as a geopolitical competitor in the Arctic. Thus, Moscow is
undergoing an overhaul of the Soviet-era bases to counter threats to its oil and gas terminals and
reinforce its position as a maritime power.4 Russia’s declining energy assets and its status of an energy
superpower as its foreign policy tool are the motives to maintain its hold on the untapped energy
reservoirs in the region.5 Therefore, the interplay of economics and geopolitics has transformed the
region into a hotspot for a renewed geopolitical competition among the great powers.
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Second-Strike Contention – Subs
This contention needs some work, but there are two basic ideas.
One, if the US pushes Russia out of the Arctic, Russia will lose key positioning for its submarines. Russia
relies on its subs to retaliate with nuclear weapons IF the US were to strike Russia. This is called Isecond
strik capability. A loss of second strike capability undermines deterrence and strategic stability because a
country will fear not being able to retaliate if a successful firs strike takes out all of its missiles.
Russia’s Artic position is the bedrock of its deterrent posture; control of the Arctic is
key to hide its submarines, which provide essential second strike capabilities
Steven E. Miller, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, March 2023, The Return of the Strategic Artic,
https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf
Fourth, nuclear modernization is likely to exacerbate these trends. Both Russia and the United States are
engaged in expensive, comprehensive, long-term modernization programs that will replenish and
upgrade their nuclear capabilities. This modernization process is having and in the future will continue
to have an impact on the strategic contours of the Arctic. Advances in surveillance, accuracy, and
lethality, for example, are reinforcing the vulnerability of ground-based forces, which in turn will
heighten the importance of sea-based nuclear assets as the bedrock of Russia’s deterrent posture.
(Lieber and Press, 2017). Russia is investing in new, more advanced ballistic missile submarines and in
new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which will make its sea-based nuclear forces more capable
and hence more valuable as targets even as advances in anti-submarine warfare may make them
more vulnerable. Barring an unforeseen breakthrough, anti-submarine warfare will remain a
challenging mission but there can be little doubt that Arctic waters will witness an intense cat and
mouse competition in which Russia seeks to hide and protect its ballistic missile submarines while the
US Navy seeks to find them and render them vulnerable. This is, in effect, a replay of the Cold War
dynamic in northern waters, but in modern technological conditions with more advanced capabilities
Russia’s deterrent force is deployed in the Arctic
Steven E. Miller, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, March 2023, The Return of the Strategic Artic,
https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf
Because the Arctic will play a critical role in the strategic nuclear balance as the arena in which the
heart of Russia’s nuclear deterrent force is deployed, operated, and defended, it is unlikely to be
exempt from the effect of intense and unregulated strategic competition. Further, arms control did
little to restrain the naval competition in the northern waters during the Cold War and is unlikely to do
so in the future even if some arms control measures remain in place.
Russian Arctic dominance is key to protect its second strike capabilities
Greenwood, 2023 (January/February, Cmdr. Jeremy Greenwood is an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard
with more than 20 years of experience at-sea and ashore throughout various policy offices, including
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serving as a Coast Guard liaison officer at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs.
He was a Brookings Foreign Policy federal executive fellow from 2021-22, GREAT POWER COMPETITION
AND OVERSEAS BASING IN THE ARCTIC, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2023/02/FP_20230207_arctic_basing_greenwood.pdf
Much has been made about Russia’s “military buildup” in the Arctic region and its renewal of old
military bases along its northern coastline.2 It is estimated that Russia has nearly 30 military or dual-use
facilities in active use or under construction north of the Arctic Circle, including air bases, naval ports,
radio/communications facilities, and military nuclear facilities.3 Some of these facilities are quite
elaborate and are militarily capable, given that Russia has made significant investments in military
power well into the central Arctic Ocean.4 Russia’s bases inside the Arctic Circle outnumber NATO’s by
about a third, according to data compiled by Reuters and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies.5 Of course, Russia has always been an Arctic nation and has prioritized the Arctic since the 16th
century and the conquest of Siberia.6 Today, the Arctic is an essential access point for Russian naval
assets in and around the Kola Peninsula and is critical to Russia’s ability to maintain a second-strike
capability in the unlikely event of nuclear conflict with the West.7 Moscow views the Arctic as one of
the largest fronts in its competition with Europe and NATO forces, and the likely accession of Sweden
and Finland to NATO will only intensify that view Isolationism Nuke Ukraine
Baltic and North Seas
Arctic contains key second-strike capabilities
Alendar, May 11, 2023, Minna Ålander is a research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. Her research topics are Northern European security and Nordic defense
cooperation, as well as German and Finnish foreign and security policy. Previously, she worked at the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, High North, High Tension: Th End
of Arctic Illusions, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/05/high-north-high-tension-the-end-of-arcticillusions/
A closer look reveals, however, that tensions had been growing in the Arctic well before 2022 due to
Russia’s military build-up and increasing “show-of-force” exercises. Russia’s latest military drill in and
around the Kola Peninsula, including extensive submarine action that worries NATO most, took place in
mid-April 2023. In the past decade, Russia has rebuilt almost all of its Soviet-era Arctic military bases
close to its Western border. According to Reuters and the International Institute of Strategic Studies,
Russia outnumbers NATO in terms of military bases in the Arctic region by one-third. The nuclearcapable submarines in the Northern Fleet constitute Russia’s main second-strike capability, around
which it has built the Soviet-inspired “Bastion defense.” To underline the significance of the Northern
Fleet, it was made its own military district in 2021.
Russia currently using its strength in the Arctic to contain NATO
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
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https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
The Kremlin has recently upgraded the status of the Northern Fleet amid the growing significance of
the Arctic in its policy circles. The presidential decree signed by Putin41 granted the Northern Fleet the
status equivalent to the existing four military districts of East, West, and South.42 Rob Huebert analyzed
this move as “…a recognition that offensive and defensive capabilities of the Northern Fleet represent
one of the most important elements of the Russian military.”43 The Kremlin’s modernization of the
Northern Fleet aims to protect its oil and gas terminals, which are strategic assets for the Kremlin. This
development includes the stationing of the S-400, which strengthens the Russian air defense
capabilities. Moreover, the Kremlin has increased its offensive capabilities by equipping the MIG-31 of
the Northern Fleet with Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missile, which will project the military prowess of the Kremlin
in the Arctic.44
The security concerns linked with the NSR revolve around preserving Russian territorial integrity and
denying foreign incursions. The Northern Fleet remains at the center when it comes to the regulation of
shipping in the NSR. Moreover, the Kremlin is also intensifying its presence to intercept the actions of
the foreign military forces in the region, which includes the joint exercises of the United States,
Norway, and NATO above the Arctic Circle in 2018.45 The access of the Northern Fleet to the High Seas
will provide it an offensive capability, while the functioning of the NSR will put Russia in a position to
control the traffic in the region. Hence, the Kremlin’s aggressive military buildup in the Arctic is to
contain NATO and respond to the US maneuvers.
Arctic key to Russia’s Poiseden subs
Alendar, May 11, 2023, Minna Ålander is a research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. Her research topics are Northern European security and Nordic defense
cooperation, as well as German and Finnish foreign and security policy. Previously, she worked at the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, High North, High Tension: Th End
of Arctic Illusions, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/05/high-north-high-tension-the-end-of-arcticillusions/
Apart from the eight ballistic missile submarines, the capabilities located in the Northern Fleet Military
District also include nineteen attack submarines, two cruisers, seven destroyers and frigates, sixteen
patrol boats, eight mine countermeasure ships, eight landing ships, and an aircraft carrier currently
under repair. The 45th air and air defense army, 14th army corps, and coastal forces are also located in
the Northern Fleet Military District. Russia has been investing heavily in its submarine capabilities in
the Arctic. In the summer of 2022, it introduced a new Belgorod-type submarine that can carry
Poseidon torpedoes with nuclear warheads and can sneak past coastal defenses close to the seabed.
Second strike capabilities critical to reassure and protect deterrence and strategic
stability
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Rose Gottemoeller, Fall 2021, Texas National Security Review, The Standstill Conundrum: The Advent of
Second-Strike Vulnerability and Options to Address It, The Standstill Conundrum: The Advent of SecondStrike Vulnerability and Options to Address It - Texas National Security Review (tnsr.org)
https://tnsr.org/2021/10/the-standstill-conundrum-the-advent-of-second-strike-vulnerability-andoptions-to-address-it/
The theory of nuclear retaliation goes as follows: The United States and Soviet Union, now Russia,
maintain ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on high alert in a more or less
equivalent way. These are the first-strike deterrent forces: Each side knows that the other does not have
the capability to get away with a disarming first strike, because both countries maintain these missiles
on such high alert that if one side should launch, the other side would launch too, as nuclear missiles
began to detonate on that country’s territory. The weapons would launch under attack. Both sides know
it and thus remain deterred from trying to launch a first strike. Second-strike retaliatory forces are a
kind of insurance policy — the submarines that are concealed in the deep ocean would be available to
retaliate no matter what happened. Even if Russia somehow brought off a first strike on the United
States, its leaders know that they would face a devastating retaliatory nuclear blow — again, at least,
that is, the theory. The bombers that each country maintains offer an additional retaliatory capability.
They have the advantage of also being available for other missions, such as strategic signaling during
crises, because they are recallable. Once launched, they can be recalled to base, but missiles cannot.
Russia and China have also sought second-strike retaliatory capabilities, partially by building
submarines, but mostly by building mobile missiles that are difficult to target because they keep
moving, and because they deploy in areas — such as the heavily forested taiga of Russia — where they
can be hidden. Both these countries are land powers and have invested less in the naval tradition than
has the United States. Thus, their continued emphasis on ground-based systems for second-strike
retaliation is natural — they look for concealment above ground, not below the ocean surface. There are
certain advantages to this approach. Communications with submerged submarines have always been
difficult, and communications for something so important as nuclear launch orders are many times more
so. The United States has worked hard to overcome these difficulties. But nevertheless, Moscow and
Beijing can take advantage of the greater simplicity of communicating with above-ground nuclear units,
despite the need to maintain operational security at a high level. All of this is a vast simplification, of
course: U.S. submarine-based missiles are highly accurate and could, in theory, be part of a first-strike
targeting package. Likewise, for the Russian mobile ICBM force: It is highly accurate and could
participate in a first strike. But no matter what, their concealment means that some portion of them,
both U.S. submarine-based missiles and Russian ground-based missiles, would be reserved for assured
retaliation — a second strike. The ability to successfully retaliate even after a devastating first nuclear
strike has long been seen as that vital insurance policy and a cornerstone of strategic stability.
Because of this, each side suspects the other of being on a long quest to undo the second-strike
retaliatory capability of the other side. It would be one way to gain a decisive strategic advantage.
Second-strike capability is the cornerstone of deterrence
Dr Beyza Unal, Former Deputy Director, International Security Programme, 2021,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/perspectives-nuclear-deterrence-21st-century-0/nucleardeterrence-destabilized, Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century
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Nuclear deterrence is heavily reliant on second-strike capability – the ability of a state to launch a
devastating (nuclear) response to a nuclear attack. Otherwise, a nuclear first strike could be a knockout blow, and states would have strong incentives for first use. However, technological advances,
particularly in cyberwarfare, have the potential to destabilize the assurance of second-strike capability,
particularly for countries with smaller arsenals. Known as ‘left-of-launch’ tactics, because they pre-empt
an opponent’s ability to launch missiles, these cyber and electronic techniques can ‘sabotage missile
components, impair command and control systems, or jam communication signals’.40 Left of launch is
likely to encourage, rather than deter, nuclear use. For example, the leader of state Y fears that their
ability to launch a second strike could be compromised by left-of-launch cyber tactics by state X. In this
scenario, leader Y has a greater incentive to launch nuclear weapons before the start of a conflict, for
fear they will not be able to do so later.
Arctic key to protect Russian nuclear deterrence
Bekkeveld & Hilde, 7-28, 23, Jo Inge Bekkevold is a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies and a former Norwegian diplomat, Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/28/arctic-nato-russia-china-finland-sweden-norway-northerneurope-defense-security-geopolitics-energy/ Paal Sigurd Hilde is a professor at the Norwegian Institute
for Defence Studies. Twitter: @Paal_S_H
Second, Putin’s war in Ukraine has likely raised the importance of the European high north and the
Arctic region in Moscow’s military strategy. For the foreseeable future, the decimation of Russia’s
conventional forces in Ukraine makes Moscow even more reliant on its nuclear deterrence. The largest
share of the sea leg of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad is made up of the submarines operating in the
Arctic Ocean from their bases on the Kola Peninsula.
Moreover, with Finland and Sweden in NATO, the Baltic Sea has turned into a virtual NATO lake,
constraining the operations of Russia’s Baltic Fleet while Putin’s war in Ukraine increases the
vulnerability of its Black Sea Fleet. These new vulnerabilities suggest that Moscow will find its Kola
Peninsula-based Northern Fleet increasingly important—particularly its bastion defense concept for
protecting Russia’s second-strike nuclear capability in the Arctic region.
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Second Strike Contention -- NATO/Ukraine Loss/Isolationism
Russia using the Artic to offset losses and isolation in the Ukraine
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
That pursuit takes on a new urgency today. Russia remains existentially threatened by thawing
permafrost, atop which some 60 percent of its civilian and energy sector infrastructure sits unstable,
so Russia is trying to find new ways to reshape the region in its favor before it reshapes the country.
And the Kremlin’s losses in Ukraine (together with the sanctions pressuring its economy) are forcing it
to look for dominance and control elsewhere, according to Andreas Osthagen, a senior research fellow
at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo. Barentsburg is a Russian settlement and coal mining town in
Svalbard, Norway with about 455 residents. Here you could find the northernmost Orthodox chapel in
the world and a school that is still in use.
As much as Russia admires the region, its approach to developing and maintaining the Arctic has been
aggressive, if not disastrous. Russia has been mining and drilling in the Siberian stretches of the Arctic
for years. In 2020, Putin declared a state of emergency in a region of northern Siberia where a river was
turned crimson after what the Kremlin called the “world’s largest” Arctic oil spill. Lack of regulations and
an emphasis on profit over safety and environmental protection have led to a handful of similar
disasters in recent years. Each year about 18,000 residents leave the Russian Arctic while three quarters
of the Russian defense budget (about $1.9 billion) went to expansion in the same region. Cities like
Murmansk offer military employees in the country’s north twice the annual median income. Military
personnel are now the region’s main taxpayers. In August, Moscow pledged 1.5 billion rubles (about
$23,986,500) for Barentsburg and the nearby Soviet-era settlement of Pyramiden to rebuild public
infrastructure. According to Alexei Chekunkov, the minister of the Russian Federation for the
Development of the Far East and the Arctic, the raised funds will be used not to maintain coal
production but to develop and encourage tourism and facilitate the transition to renewable energy.
Timofey Rogozin, the former top Russian tourism official in Barentsburg, who now lives in nearby
Longyearbyen, told me this is an attempt to maintain Russia’s realm of influence on Svalbard. Where
other countries have only recently begun seeing the Arctic as a new front in Russia’s war on the West,
Russia has seen it that way for decades. Over the past eight years, Moscow has reopened and
modernized upwards of 50 Cold War-era bases along the necklace of its 15,000 miles of Arctic
coastline. Russian forces patrol the country’s Northern Sea Route off the southeastern coast of Svalbard,
conducting sporadic military testing which inconveniences Norwegian fishing vessels. Russian forces also
taunt American maritime vessels off Alaska’s coast. In 2018, during the Trident Juncture NATO exercises,
Russia was accused of jamming GPS signals in and above the waters off the Kola Peninsula in the Barents
Sea. Its use of asymmetric warfare in gray-zone battlegrounds — from military GPS jamming to
embedding spies in research institutes — in the Arctic is well-documented.
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Russia could use nuclear weapons in the Ukraine
John Cleave, 6-21, 23, The Sun, DEFCON ONE Vladimir Putin vows to deploy world’s most powerful nuke
‘Satan 2’ to ‘combat duty’ in chilling new threat to West, https://www.thesun.com/news/8421543/putin-worlds-most-powerful-nuke-satan-battle-threat/
In February, Putin reportedly tested his hypersonic Sarmat missile while US President Joe Biden was visiting Ukraine and meeting with President
Volodymyr Zelensky. However, its deployment has proceeded slower than planned, as Russia had claimed they would be in place last autumn.
Dmitry Rogozin, former head of Russia's space agency, hailed the new "super-weapon" as an historic event that would guarantee the security of
Russia's children and grandchildren for the next 30-40 years. It comes as Biden warned
that the threat of the Russian
President using tactical nuclear weapons is "real". He referred to Putin's decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in
neighbouring Belarus as "absolutely irresponsible". Putin has repeatedly said since the start of the Ukraine conflict that Russia is ready to use all
means, including nuclear weapons, to defend its "territorial integrity". Last
week, the city-killer nuclear weapons arrived
on Belarusian soil and puppet President Alexander Lukashenko claimed he "won't hesitate" to use
them. The addition of nuclear weapons to Belarus provides Russia with an advantage, as they can now
strike within NATO territories. READ MORE ON THE US SUN CEO of missing Titanic sub never hid the dangers, expedition divers
reveal DARK WARNING CEO of missing Titanic sub never hid the dangers, expedition divers reveal TikToker Britney Joy and mom die in horror
car crash as sister shares details STAR GONE TikToker Britney Joy and mom die in horror car crash as sister shares details Last year, Putin
claimed to be placing territories illegally seized
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Ukraine Scenario
Russia could use nuclear weapons in the Ukraine
John Cleave, 6-21, 23, The Sun, DEFCON ONE Vladimir Putin vows to deploy world’s most powerful nuke
‘Satan 2’ to ‘combat duty’ in chilling new threat to West, https://www.thesun.com/news/8421543/putin-worlds-most-powerful-nuke-satan-battle-threat/
In February, Putin reportedly tested his hypersonic Sarmat missile while US President Joe Biden was visiting Ukraine and meeting with President
Volodymyr Zelensky. However, its deployment has proceeded slower than planned, as Russia had claimed they would be in place last autumn.
Dmitry Rogozin, former head of Russia's space agency, hailed the new "super-weapon" as an historic event that would guarantee the security of
Russia's children and grandchildren for the next 30-40 years. It comes as Biden warned
that the threat of the Russian
President using tactical nuclear weapons is "real". He referred to Putin's decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in
neighbouring Belarus as "absolutely irresponsible". Putin has repeatedly said since the start of the Ukraine conflict that Russia is ready to use all
means, including nuclear weapons, to defend its "territorial integrity". Last
week, the city-killer nuclear weapons arrived
on Belarusian soil and puppet President Alexander Lukashenko claimed he "won't hesitate" to use
them. The addition of nuclear weapons to Belarus provides Russia with an advantage, as they can now
strike within NATO territories. READ MORE ON THE US SUN CEO of missing Titanic sub never hid the dangers, expedition divers
reveal DARK WARNING CEO of missing Titanic sub never hid the dangers, expedition divers reveal TikToker Britney Joy and mom die in horror
car crash as sister shares details STAR GONE TikToker Britney Joy and mom die in horror car crash as sister shares details Last year, Putin
claimed to be placing territories illegally seized
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131
Military Presence Trade-Off Contention
Uniqueness: US military is prioritizing China – current budgets and diplomatic efforts
are key to maintain deterrence, specially over Taiwan.
Benar News ’22 (Staff written, “US not seeking to create ‘Asian NATO,’ defense secretary says,”
2022.06.11, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/singapore-summit-day-106112022015249.html)-mikee
The U.S. defense secretary emphasized partnership as the main priority for the American security strategy in the Indo-Pacific during a keynote
speech in Singapore on Saturday, but stressed that the U.S. was not seeking to create “an Asian NATO.” The
United States remains
“deeply invested” and committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, Lloyd Austin said in a 30-minute speech during the
first plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum here. “We do not seek confrontation and conflict and we do not seek a new Cold
War, an Asian NATO or a region split into hostile blocs,” the U.S. defense chief said, referring to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russian
President Vladimir Putin had cited Ukraine’s interest in joining the regional inter-governmental alliance as a reason for launching an invasion of
the smaller country next-door in late February. The
United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific have recently
expressed concern over China’s increasingly assertive military posture in the region, and that the war in Ukraine
might encourage Beijing even more. Beijing, for its part, has been complaining about what it sees as attempts by the U.S. and its partners to
form a defense alliance in the region. When leaders from the U.S., Japan, India and Australia met last month for a summit of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue, or Quad, China cried foul. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Washington was “keen to gang up with ‘small circles’ and change
China’s neighborhood environment,” making Asia-Pacific countries serve as “pawns” of the U.S. hegemony. “I think Secretary Austin made it
very clear that there’s no appetite for an Asian NATO,” said Blake Herzinger, a Singapore-based defense analyst. “The U.S. values collective
partnerships with shared visions and priorities, without the need to form a defense alliance,” he told BenarNews. ‘A region free from coercion
and bullying’ The U.S will “continue to stand by our friends as they uphold their rights,” said Austin, adding that the
commitment is “especially important as the People’s Republic of China adopts a more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial
claims.” He spoke of the Chinese air force’s almost daily incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and an “alarming”
increase in the number of unsafe and unprofessional encounters between Chinese planes and vessels with those of other countries. Most
recently, U.S. ally Australia accused China of conducting a “dangerous intercept,” of one of its surveillance aircraft near the Paracel Islands in
the South China Sea. On Friday, Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. During the
meeting that lasted nearly an hour, the two sides discussed how to better manage their relationship and prevent accidents from happening but
did not reach any concrete resolution. Austin used his speech on Saturday to remind Beijing that “big powers carry big responsibilities,” saying
“we’ll do our part to manage these tensions responsibly – to prevent conflict, and to pursue peace and prosperity.” The
Indo-Pacific is
the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) “priority theater,” he noted, adding that his department’s fiscal
year 2023 budget request calls for one of the largest investments in history to preserve the region's
security. This includes the U.S. $6.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen multilateral
information-sharing and support training and experimentation with partners. The budget also seeks to
encourage innovation across all domains, including space and cyberspace, “to develop new capabilities
that will allow us to deter aggression even more surely,” he said. The U.S. military is expanding exercises
and training programs with regional partners, the defense secretary said. Later in June, the Pentagon will host the
28th Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise with forces from 26 countries, 38 ships and nearly 25,000 personnel. Next year, a Coast
Guard cutter will be deployed to Southeast Asia and Oceania, he said, “the first major U.S. Coast Guard cutter permanently stationed in the
region.” Protecting Taiwan “Secretary Austin offered a compelling vision, grounded in American resolve to uphold freedom from
coercion and oppose the dangerously outmoded concept of aggressively-carved spheres of influence,” said Andrew Erickson, research director
of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, speaking in a personal capacity. “The
key will be for
Washington to match Austin’s rhetoric with requisite resolve and resources long after today’s Dialogue
is over,” Erickson said. “It is that follow-through that will determine much in what President Biden rightly calls the ‘Decisive Decade’,” he
added. Last month in Tokyo, Biden announced a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) that Austin said would
provide better access to space-based, maritime domain awareness to countries across the region. The
U.S. defense secretary spoke
at length about his government’s policy towards Taiwan, saying “we’re determined to uphold the status
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132
quo that has served this region so well for so long.” While remaining committed to the longstanding one-China policy, the
U.S. categorically opposes “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.” “We do not support Taiwan independence. And we stand
firmly behind the principle that cross-strait differences must be resolved by peaceful means,” Austin said. The
U.S. continues assisting
Taiwan in maintaining self-defense capability and this week approved the sale of U.S. $120 million in spare parts and technical
assistance for the Taiwanese navy.
Increasing presence in the Arctic trades-off with military deployments in East Asia
Wall & Wegge, CSIS, 2023, The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war
Second, Russia’s relative incapacity to threaten a conventional military land incursion into European
Arctic allies will be welcome news to the Biden administration, whose recent strategic documents do
not indicate a high prioritization of the region in terms of defense. Most notably, the NSS lists the
Arctic last in its overview of regional policies.[148] The strategy is cautious about promising U.S.
presence in the Arctic, saying it will only be exercised “as required, while reducing risk and preventing
unnecessary escalation.”[149] The U.S. National Defense Strategy mentions the Arctic fleetingly and is
also cautious: “U.S. activities and posture in the Arctic should be calibrated, as the Department
preserves its focus on the Indo-Pacific region.”[150] Its emphasis is on stability, homeland defense, and
maritime domain awareness, and there is no language in the Arctic section about deterring threats to
Arctic allies and partners. This language does appear in the U.S. Arctic strategy, which states, “We will
deter threats to the U.S. homeland and our allies by enhancing the capabilities required to defend our
interests in the Arctic.”[151] The document promises needed investments in domain awareness
capabilities and icebreakers.[152] Still, it also emphasizes avoiding escalation and notably states that it
“may be possible to resume cooperation under certain conditions.”[153]
Security cooperation is zero-sum. Focus on Europe trades-off with Asia. The aff
escalates US involvement in NATO at the expense of deterring China.
Townshend and Corben ’22 (Ashley Townshend is director of foreign policy and defense and Tom
Corben is a research associate in the foreign policy and defense program at the United States Studies
Centre at the University of Sydney. “Op-Ed: War in Ukraine Threatens America's Ability to Counter
China,” The Strategist, MAR 16, 2022, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-war-inukraine-threatens-america-s-ability-to-counter-china)
But while America can—and must—continue to buttress European security, it doesn’t enjoy the luxury of
riches or unchallenged military primacy required to underwrite an expansive global strategy against two
great-power rivals. Matching ends with means in the Indo-Pacific—America’s so-called ‘priority theatre’—requires
difficult trade-offs between competing priorities, including in Ukraine. A more sustainable division of US and allied
defense responsibilities in Europe and Asia is urgently required. Biden understands this and deserves credit for attempting to match US global
interests and commitments in his first year. Poor execution aside,
his Afghan withdrawal showed a willingness to
make tough, politically unpopular trade-offs. His initially restrained approach to the Ukraine crisis
suggested he would keep it in global strategic perspective. But Washington won’t be able to sideline Moscow from its
foreign policy agenda the way it had hoped. Delays to the publication of the US national defense strategy and national security strategy suggest
that Russia is forcing a hurried reassessment of Biden’s global priorities. In
a worst-case scenario for the Indo-Pacific, it’s
possible these documents will return US military strategy to an equally weighted focus on Asia and
Europe—contradicting hard-fought efforts in recent years to make China the Pentagon’s outright
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priority. This is not a callous point to make. America simply doesn’t have the military resources required to
prosecute an effective multi-theater strategy in an era of great-power rivalry. Nor is it spending enough
to change this equation: while the 2018 national defence strategy recommended three to five percent real growth in defense spending
annually to keep pace with China and Russia, not a single defense budget since has met these targets. Biden’s budget continues this
unsatisfactory trend. And in contrast to the stark warnings from top brass at US Indo-Pacific Command, who see conflict with China as a
possibility this decade, the administration’s defense budget prioritizes long-term military modernization in anticipation of high-end conflict in
the 2030s - leaving the US underprepared to deal with Chinese military coercion over the next few years. Budget shortfalls are mirrored by
slow-moving efforts to realign US forces globally. Efforts
to empower US allies are even more important as
Washington is once again pulled in conflicting global directions. Indo-Pacific allies should advocate for more. As a
priority, Australia should caucus with Japan and other close security partners to push for overdue reforms to US export controls on defense
technology. Indo-Pacific
allies should also press Washington for greater insight and input into its regional
military planning. A credible collective defence strategy requires clarity on when, where and how to
address shared defence challenges. Biden’s effort to build support among regional allies for a Taiwan
contingency is a step in this direction. But while Taiwan is the Pentagon’s "pacing challenge," regional countries
face Chinese military coercion across a far wider range of lower intensity scenarios, as China’s intimidation of an Australian military aircraft in
the Arafura Sea last month attests. New strategic planning initiatives must reflect these realities. In the end, however, these initiatives can’t
change the strategic physics of the Indo-Pacific. A favorable balance of power with China can only be upheld with unprecedented US support.
Alliance modernization is a necessary component of this strategy, but it’s not a substitute for a robust US military posture and presence in the
Indo-Pacific. As the conflict in Ukraine grinds on, America’s capacity
to deliver an effective defense strategy for the
region will depend on its ability to keep its escalating involvement in check and in global strategic
perspective.
Impact:
A failed Asian Pivot emboldens China to invade Taiwan.
Sacks ‘22 (David, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political
thought of Hans Morgenthau, “Don't Pivot From the Pivot to Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/dont-pivot-pivot-asia)//BB
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major war has returned to Europe and with it calls for the United States to
prioritize countering the present threat posed by Russia over the threat China could one day pose. But Russia’s
ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making
in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to finally pivot to Asia and focus
on the more formidable challenge China represents. A failure to do so could embolden China and give
Beijing an opening to increase its influence, to the detriment of U.S. security and prosperity. Over a decade
ago, President Obama announced the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in a speech to the Australian Parliament, declaring “the United
States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” The president’s speech followed an essay by Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” where she argued for a “strategic turn to the region.” All too often, however, the United
States has failed to pair this ambitious rhetoric with policies that reflected the region’s importance. Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has
to view Russia as its primary geopolitical challenge and shift resources to
Europe. But such a reorientation of U.S. strategy would again delay the pivot to Asia just when it is both more
necessary and more viable than ever. The reasoning may be counterintuitive but holds all the same. The war in Ukraine
has revealed Russia’s military is incapable of waging modern warfare and does not have the ability to
fundamentally threaten NATO. Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, its logistics are in shambles, and morale among
led to a growing consensus that the United States needs
its soldiers is reportedly dangerously low. The defining image of this war thus far is of a stalled Russian convoy stretching forty miles on a road
leading to Kyiv. Overcoming these issues will take years and require a fundamental overhaul of Russia’s military culture and doctrine. Russia will
have to undertake these difficult reforms with its military in tatters. While it is difficult to know exactly how many casualties Russia has suffered
in Ukraine, it is well into the thousands, and the Russian military will likely suffer far greater losses if it attempts to take Kyiv. Russia
lost some of its most advanced fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, while depleting its
has
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munitions. It will take a long time for Russia to rebuild its material strength, a prospect that will be even
more daunting given the sanctions that are in force. The crisis in Ukraine has also forced European
countries to awaken from their slumber, and they are now willing to shoulder a greater burden for their
defense. Most consequentially, Germany has announced it will increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and purchase 35 F-35
fighter jets, which will increase interoperability with NATO forces. Sweden is also looking to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP,
while support for joining NATO has surged in the country. Denmark has pledged to meet the 2 percent target, while Latvia, Poland, and
Romania have signaled they will boost defense spending to exceed that target. A
depleted and exhausted Russian military and
increased European investments in their defense mean the United States can meet its obligations to its
NATO allies while shifting resources to Asia. As such, the Department of Defense should continue to
identify China as the pacing challenge given its military might and its regional ambitions. Taiwan should
remain the pacing scenario, as it is the most difficult one for the United States to address and therefore
if the United States gets that right it will be well-positioned to respond to other regional contingencies.
Capabilities most relevant for a Taiwan scenario should be prioritized, in particular long-range missiles and submarines,
while the United States should continue to distribute its military presence throughout the region. With NATO’s conventional capabilities set to
improve, once this crisis passes the United States should withdraw the seven thousand troops it sent to Europe following Russia’s invasion and
review its force posture on the continent, where it currently has ninety thousand service members based. While
Putin has upended
European security, nothing has occurred since the war in Ukraine began that reduces the challenge that
China poses for the United States. China’s military spending shows no sign of slowing down and is projected to increase by over 7
percent this year. It is continuing to invest in capabilities designed to prevent the United States from successfully intervening on behalf of its
allies and is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. China’s economy is set to grow by 5.5 percent this year and it is pulling additional economies
into its orbit with the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ongoing Belt and Road Initiative investments.
While the
United States certainly needs to deal with the urgent threat to European security, it cannot lose sight of the more
serious and multidimensional challenge coming from Beijing. Indeed, if the perception takes root that the
United States is pivoting away from Asia and toward Europe this could prompt China to conclude it has
a window of opportunity for remaking the regional order.
That war goes nuclear – conventional and nuclear forces are intermingled.
Talmadge ‘18 (Caitlin; associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University; 11/18; "Beijing’s Nuclear Option"; Foreign Affairs;
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option; SM)
As China's power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi
Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on
coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington's fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S.
allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from
Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through
the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries
remains unlikely, but the
prospect of a military confrontation-resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign
against Taiwan-no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going
nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China's strategic community tend to dismiss such
concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as
basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the IndoPacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as "somewhere between nil and zero." This assurance is misguided. If
deployed against China, the Pentagon's preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe
for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' signature approach to war has been simple:
punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent's key military assets at minimal
cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none
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of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled
them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other.
This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China's conventional forces would likely also threaten its
nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they
were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact
that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its
consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue
their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the
illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military
tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long
stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a
much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear
weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear
weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a "no first use" pledge, promising that it
will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the
United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. Nato stood ready to use nuclear weapons first
to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-fromthe-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief
that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S.
nuclear weapons stationed on nato soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear
escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing
on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other's territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about
a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is
the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its
enemy will respond in kind. The
bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens
China's nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate
pressures to escalate- especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with
relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China's
nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the
conventional war- that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China's nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a
prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear
escalation- an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation- was a viable option to defend itself.
STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing's long-term
objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington's longstanding desire
to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could
decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch
an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S.
law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will "consider any effort
to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." Were Washington to
intervene on Taipei's behalf, the
world's sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of
the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely
threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities- whether doing so was
Washington's stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced
over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its
conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack
U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an
antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China's "boomers," the four nuclear armed ballistic
missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China's conventionally armed and nuclear-armed
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submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would
thus not only disrupt the activities of China's attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing,
leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile
submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If
the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects
China's ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous,
U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all,
at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its
boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since
correctly identifying targets
remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within
shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment
like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines
might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions
later. Adding to China's sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear armed submarine force means that
just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that
escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an
escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval
nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend
with China's growing land based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of
Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S.
victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would
be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China's nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese
conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that
they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is
also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be
unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To
add to the challenge, some of China's ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear
warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting
the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending
manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn
would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading
China's coastal air defense network in order to fight a
conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its
leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country's interior were vulnerable. For years,
observers have pointed to the U.S. military's failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990-91 Gulf War as evidence
that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what
harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and
less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking
them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its
residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, highintensity conventional war. China's vehement criticism of a U.S. regional
missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing's worry is that this
system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of
campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing's eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of
China's nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China's real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding
the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the
favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional
victory would likely endanger much of China's nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the
United States actually intended to target all of China's nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would
matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question
becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the "no first use" pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack?
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Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into
backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China
considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea based
nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical
discontinuity in its calculus. The danger
lies in wartime developments that could shift China's assumptions about
U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate
effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited
nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons
to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a
nuclear strike with no direct military purpose-on an unpopulated area or at sea-as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.
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Biden pushing normalization - top priority
Biden is fervently pursuing normalization now through hosting meetings with Israeli
and Saudi officials
Barak Ravid 7-17. Ravid is an alumnus of the University of Bristol and currently the American Leader of
EY-Parthenon, one of the largest global consulting organizations. His representation of EY-Parthenon
and his writing is frequently published and acknowledged in popular media organizations, “Top Biden
adviser in Saudi Arabia to discuss possible normalization with Israel,” Axios, July 17, 2023,
https://www.axios.com/2023/06/17/saudi-israel-normalization-path-mcgurk-biden-mbs/CR
Brett McGurk, President Biden’s senior Middle East adviser, arrived in Saudi Arabia this weekend for
talks with Saudi officials that will focus on the administration's efforts to reach a normalization
agreement between Israel and the kingdom as well as other issues, two U.S. officials told Axios.
Why it matters: McGurk's trip, first reported by the NYT, is part of an effort by the White House to
make a diplomatic push for a Saudi-Israeli peace deal in the next six to seven months before the
presidential election campaign consumes President Biden’s agenda, as Axios reported last month.
Driving the news: McGurk’s visit to Saudi Arabia comes less than two weeks after U.S. Secretary of
State Tony Blinken visited the kingdom and met Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman (MBS).
Blinken and MBS discussed the issue of possible normalization with Israel and on his way back to the
U.S., Blinken called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to brief him about the talks. McGurk is
also expected to meet with MBS. Barbara Leaf, the State Department’s senior Middle East diplomat, is
expected to visit Israel, the West Bank, Egypt and Jordan this week, U.S. officials said. According to the
officials, Leaf joined Blinken on his trip to Saudi Arabia and is expected to follow up on it in her talks
with Israeli officials.
State of play: Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories will be one major hurdle on any path towards an Israeli-Saudi peace deal.
Blinken said at an AIPAC conference earlier this month that any such normalization agreement should
also advance the prospects of a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. The Saudi
foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan said at a press conference with Blinken that "without finding
a pathway to peace for the Palestinian people…any normalization will have limited benefits."
The big picture: The Saudi foreign minister visited Tehran on Saturday and met with his Iranian counterpart and the Iranian president. It was the
first such visit in many years.
It comes as part of the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran on reestablishing diplomatic
relations — and a wave of normalization in the region.
Biden is improving U.S-Saudi relations, holding meetings with both Saudi Arabia and
Israel, and pushing normalization through “behind the scenes” diplomacy
Jennifer Hansler 23. Hansler graduated from the University of Rochester and has since worked for
WROC-TV, ABC News, and CNN, where she currently works as State Department Reporter/Producer,
“Blinken says Israel-Saudi normalization remains a priority as he wraps visit to the Kingdom,” June 8,
2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/08/politics/blinken-saudi-arabia/index.html/CR
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US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Thursday reaffirmed the Biden administration’s commitment
to normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as he wrapped up his first solo visit to the Kingdom.
At a press conference in Riyadh, the top US diplomat said he discussed the matter of normalization in
his meetings, “and we will continue to work at it and to advance it in the days, weeks and months
ahead.”
“We fully support Israel’s integration into the Middle East and from day one, we have been working
both to deepen some of the existing agreements, and also expand them to other countries. That
includes Saudi Arabia,” Blinken said.
Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, speaking alongside Blinken, noted that “it’s quite clear that we believe that normalization is in the
interest of the region, that it would bring significant benefits to all. But without finding a pathway to peace for the Palestinian people, without
addressing that challenge, any normalization will have limited benefits.”
Following his visit to Saudi Arabia, Blinken spoke by phone with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
about “areas of mutual interest, including expanding and deepening Israel’s integration into the
Middle East through normalization with countries in the region,” according to a State Department
readout.
Blinken’s trip to Riyadh and Jeddah, where he met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, comes as the administration works to navigate a
complicated and at-times tense relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Last October, the Biden administration reacted furiously to a decision by OPEC+ to slash oil production, with Blinken saying that Saudi Arabia
knew that the OPEC+ decision to cut oil production “would increase Russian revenues” and that the United States is reviewing “consequences”
for that decision.
However, the administration did not react harshly to an announcement from Saudi Arabia just days before Blinken’s trip that it would once
again slash oil production, nor a call between the Crown Prince and Russian President Vladimir Putin to praise their cooperation on OPEC+ less
than a day after Blinken met MBS.
Brian Katulis, the vice president of Policy at the Middle East Institute, noted the difference in tone between the reaction in October and this
week, noting that “part of that was just this work to try to rebuild trust and confidence on multiple fronts.”
“I think what you see in this visit is – and what happens with these visits is – they’re often the capstone
or the end product of months of diplomatic work behind the scenes, and much of that work between
the US and Saudi has been trying to put things on a steadier footing, a more solid foundation,” he said.
Biden reiterated his dedication to Israel and normalization in a recent conversation
with Netanyahu
White House Press Release, 7-17, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,” July 17, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2023/07/17/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-call-with-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-ofisrael-2//CR
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. spoke today with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel to discuss
a broad range of global and regional issues of mutual concern. The President underscored his iron-clad,
unwavering commitment to Israel’s security and condemned recent acts of terror against Israeli
citizens. The two consulted on our close coordination to counter Iran, including through regular and
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ongoing joint military exercises. They noted that U.S.-Israel partnership remains a cornerstone in
preventing Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. The President stressed the need to take
measures to maintain the viability of a two-state solution and improve the security situation in the
West Bank. To that end, he welcomed Israel’s willingness to consider new steps to support Palestinian
livelihoods, and recognized promising steps by the Palestinian Authority to reassert security control in
Jenin and other areas of the West Bank. He expressed concern about continued settlement growth and called on all parties to
refrain from further unilateral measures. The two leaders agreed to consult with regional partners with the aim of convening a meeting soon in
the Aqaba/Sharm format as soon as possible. They
also consulted on progress towards establishing a more
integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Middle East, including through efforts to deepen and expand
normalization with countries in the region and beyond. Finally, President Biden reiterated, in the context of the current
debate in Israel about judicial reform, the need for the broadest possible consensus, and that shared democratic values have always been and
must remain a hallmark of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
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AT: Israel says no
Israel and Saudi both want normalization, they’ll say yes.
Lahov Harkov 23 (Harkov is a freelance reporter currently working at Jerusalem Post where she
previously served as Senior Knesset Reporter and Analyst and currently serves as Senior Contributing
Editor and Diplomatic Consultant,) “Israel 'very optimistic' about Saudi Arabia ties within one year - FM
Cohen”, Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-747663/CR
Foreign Minister Eli Cohen is “very optimistic” that Israel and Saudi Arabia will normalize relations
before March 2024, he said in a briefing on Sunday.
“Israel is interested in advancing a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia,” Cohen said. “This is an
attainable agreement…the Saudis are interested in it, as well.
”Normalization talks are taking place over a number of channels, the primary of which is through the
Biden administration, " the foreign minister said.
An agreement with the Saudis will include additional countries, Cohen said, and it will not use the name “Abraham Accords” as the
establishment of relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain did.
Cohen said that once Israel and Saudi Arabia have diplomatic relations, more Arab and Muslim states
will follow.
Securing normalization is a shared priority among all 3 countries AND the U.S and
Israel will cooperate with Saudi demands
Andrew Parasiliti 23 (Parasiliti has a MA in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia and a PHD from
the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He has previously served as Foreign Policy
Advisor for senator Chuck Hagel, Principal of Government Affairs for the BGR group, Executive Director,
IISS-US; Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is
now an adjunct political scientist at RAND corporation and President and Chief Content Officer at ALmonitor,) “Biden gives priority to Israel-Saudi normalization”, AL-Monitor, May 19, 2023,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/05/biden-gives-priority-israel-saudinormalization#:~:text=The%20Biden%20administration%20is%20making,all%20of%20whom%20want%
20it/CR
Given Israel’s fractious right-wing government and the Arab Sunni states’ rapprochement with Iran, “the
dream of peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia should have been relegated to the realm of science
fiction,” writes Ben Caspit. “Surprisingly, it remains real.”
Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “dreams” of Israeli-Saudi normalization, a senior Israeli
diplomatic source told Caspit. For Netanyahu, another historic star turn as statesman would be a
reprieve from the agony of Israeli domestic politics. The country is bitterly divided over his right-wing
government’s judicial reform program. There are few rewards for Israel’s longest serving prime minister in the unruly coalition
politics, demonstrations in the streets and remonstrations from Washington over the controversial legislation.
A deal with Saudi Arabia remains Netanyahu’s top priority, along with preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon, and they are of course linked. While Netanyahu has taken satisfaction in both the
impasse over the Iran nuclear deal and increased US-Israeli security coordination regarding Iran, the
regional fence-mending with the Islamic Republic has become a source of anxiety, which has
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occasionally spilled out into the otherwise smooth mind-meld between Washington and Jerusalem over
Iran.
That Netanyahu is willing to pay a “heavy price” for Saudi normalization is a given, as Caspit notes.
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman wants it too, but on his terms.
Saudi Arabia is looking for a package deal with more benefits and impact, that distinguish such agreement from the Abraham Accords, reached
in 2020 between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan.
The United States is no mere facilitator in this negotiation; it is more of a third principal. In return for
normalization, Riyadh is reportedly seeking to take the US-Saudi security partnership to the next level —
access to the most advanced weapons systems (on a par with Israel), a defense treaty and a US-Saudi
civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
Each of these three reported asks would require congressional buy-in, and some Hill members are concerned about the kingdom’s human
rights record and conduct in the war in Yemen. The best chance for a civil nuclear agreement would be along the lines of the US-UAE nuclear
deal, which is known as the “gold standard” because it does not include enrichment, refining or storage of uranium on Emirati soil. Whether
Saudi Arabia would accept those restrictions is uncertain. Karen Young breaks down the issues around the Saudi nuclear program here. Saudi
Arabia would also benefit from increased engagement and investment from Israel’s tech industries, given the kingdom’s expansive Vision 2030
development program. There are now reports that Saudi Arabia may soon approve direct flights for Muslims in Israel for the hajj, which has
been under discussion for over a year.
The Biden administration is making Saudi-Israeli normalization a priority. Perhaps surprisingly, the
recent escalation in Israeli-Palestinian tensions has not yet influenced or slowed the course of
negotiations among the three parties, all of whom want it. Given the stakes in the region, progress
doesn’t come easily or quickly.
Netanyahu wouldn’t mind the boost in relations with the Biden administration that would come from
a Saudi deal. He still has not received an invitation to the White House. “The situation in Jerusalem is becoming increasingly awkward,”
writes Caspit. “The Biden administration is not hiding its clear distaste for the policies of the Israeli leader and his radical nationalist, racist
For US President Joe Biden, Israel-Saudi normalization would represent a major
breakthrough on Middle East peace, the foreign policy holy grail of American presidents. That it would
come in an election year adds to its attraction and urgency. While the Saudi asks of the US Congress
are substantial, Israel’s support would help smooth the process with both Democrats and Republicans.
government.”
The Biden administration’s focus on diplomacy and de-escalation has facilitated such a breakthrough.
The more organic regional security engagement that has evolved was something regional strategists,
academics and analysts always talked about and never expected. And now it’s happening on Biden’s
watch. The US-led diplomacy in the region, which occurs at a sometimes frenetic pace, signals an
intensively engaged United States, but one that is empowering its partners, including Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, to deal with adversaries like Syria, end the war in Yemen and reduce tensions with Iran. The
US role in Israeli-Saudi normalization, and in groups such as the Negev Forum ( which includes the
United States, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Egypt) is also a reminder that China can’t compete with
American diplomacy and influence.
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AT: Saudi says no
Saudi Arabia is dedicated to securing a deal and has been willing to negotiate and
reduce its Palestinian related demands
Hélène Sallon 23 (Sallon has a master’s degree from Sciences Po Aix and a doctorate from Ecole normale
supérieure, both in politics. She is a Lebanon-based journalist on Middle Eastern news and a regional
correspondent for the Middle East with Le Monde,) “Normalization with Israel: Saudi Arabia shows signs
of openness,” Le Monde, June 13, 2023,
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/06/13/normalization-with-israel-saudi-arabiashows-signs-of-openness_6031069_4.html/CR
Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, a priority for Joe Biden's administration, was at the
heart of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to Riyadh from June 6 to 8. The Americans have
given themselves until the end of the year, before being caught up in the 2024 presidential campaign,
to make progress on this issue, which is also a priority for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The monarchy, which is in return negotiating for increased military cooperation with Washington and
support for its civilian nuclear program, is showing signs of opening up.
"It's quite clear that we believe that normalization [with Israel] is in the interest of the region, that it
would bring significant benefits to all," said Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan on
Thursday. "But without finding a pathway to peace for the Palestinian people, without addressing that
challenge, any normalization will have limited benefits. And therefore, I think we should continue to
focus on finding a pathway toward a two-state solution, on finding a pathway toward giving the
Palestinians dignity and justice," added Farhan.
The choice of words is not insignificant. By speaking of a simple "pathway to peace," the Saudi foreign
minister seems to be indicating that Riyadh is prepared to scale down its demands: The creation of a
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders would no longer be a prerequisite for normalization with
Israel. This condition was established in Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's peace initiative, approved by the
countries of the Arab League in 2002.
Saudi will say yes, but only with continued Biden focus
Binyamin Rose 23 (Rose is a journalist, Editor at Large for Mishpacha Magazine. He previously reported
for two Jersey newspapers and later news director and producer at major-market all-news stations in
Miami and Charlotte. “How Close Is Israeli-Saudi Peace?” Mishpacha Magazine, May 30, 2023,
https://mishpacha.com/how-close-is-israeli-saudi-peace//CR
The likelihood is growing that by the end of 2023, if not sooner, Saudi Arabia will agree to normalize
relations with Israel, paving the way for most Arab and Muslim relations to establish and strengthen
ties with Israel. It won’t happen without US mediation and guarantees, which the Biden
administration is now contemplating after almost three years of treating Saudi Arabia as a pariah
nation. What factors contributed to America’s change of heart? What will the US, the Saudis, and Israel gain from normalization? And is this
all win-win for Israel, or does it have anything to lose?
1. Reversing China’s Momentum
Saudi Arabia will not normalize relations with Israel without a major upgrade in US security
guarantees, access to military equipment it doesn’t currently have, and assistance in building a
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peaceful nuclear energy program. After President Biden’s July 2022 visit to the desert kingdom to meet
with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the Saudis realized the US was dragging its
feet, so the Saudis pivoted to China.
China can’t fulfill the Saudis’ wish list, but they performed a diplomatic feat the US couldn’t, brokering
a Saudi rapprochement with Iran in March 2023, buying the Saudis a respite from ongoing Iranian
threats. China’s diplomatic triumph provided one more glaring example of its ascending global power
and America’s declining prestige. The Biden administration got the message, and within a month,
dispatched four top officials to Riyadh, including National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and CIA
director William Burns. In that sense, China’s diplomatic foray with the Saudis provided the US with keener insights into Saudi Arabia’s
needs and goals and how Israel fits into that picture.
Saudi Arabia is already taking steps towards normalization by improving its
relationship with Israel BUT only Biden can make a normalization deal a reality
Robert Satloff 23 (Satloff has a BA from Duke, a MA from Harvard and a PHD from Oxford. He is
Executive Director of The Washington Institute, a member of the board of editors for the Middle East
Quarterly, and is a published author. He specializes in U.S., Arab, and Israeli politics, policy, and
diplomacy,) “Saudi Normalization with Israel, Domestic 'Transformation,' and U.S. Policy,” The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/saudi-normalization-israel-domestic-transformation-and-us-policy/CR
Prospects for a Saudi-Israel diplomatic breakthrough appear to have cooled lately amid Riyadh’s rapprochement with Tehran and domestic
ferment in Israel.
But a narrow focus on these obstacles misses deeper, more encouraging trend lines,
including Saudi public receptivity to people-to-people contact already underway in business and
sports. Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has stirringly referred to Israel as a “potential ally,” and
the transformative post-oil future he is mapping out for the kingdom offers the promise of bilateral
cooperation in commerce, high-tech, and tourism, among other sectors. Notwithstanding Riyadh’s deal
with Iran, the Saudis and Israelis still share a common threat in the Islamic Republic and a common
interest to address it.
The key to a Saudi-Israel normalization agreement, writes Segal Executive Director Robert Satloff in this
new Institute Policy Note, is the U.S. role. While cautioning that a “Sadat to Jerusalem” moment is
unrealistic for Saudi Arabia and Israel in the near future, especially given competing priorities for Riyadh,
he argues that President Biden could—if he so chooses—negotiate a historic three-way, win-win-win
arrangement that not only establishes formal Saudi-Israel relations but also advances a range of
important American interests.
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Russian Isolationism Contention
Russia uses Arctic to offset other losses
Coffee, 7-18, 23, Mr. Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. His work focuses on
national security issues in Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic. As a decorated veteran of the United
States Army and former senior special advisor to United Kingdom Defence Secretary Liam Fox.
Mr. Coffey brings a unique perspective to this field. Mr. Coffey previously testified before the
subcommittee in his prior role as director of the Allison Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at the
Heritage Foundation, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition
in the Arctic in order for the Coast Guard to conduct it. Its mission, how many icebreakers does the
Coast Guard need? And what kind of mix is that?
Going back to Peter to the grades to come Shakta expeditions, the Arctic region has always
held a special place in the in the minds and the identity of the Russian people. Therefore, focus
on the Arctic serves as a low risk and useful distraction for Russia's other geopolitical
shortcomings like we've seen in Ukraine.
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Russian Economy Contention
Arctic key to Russia’s economy
Coffee, 7-18, 23, Mr. Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. His work focuses on
national security issues in Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic. As a decorated veteran of the United
States Army and former senior special advisor to United Kingdom Defence Secretary Liam Fox.
Mr. Coffey brings a unique perspective to this field. Mr. Coffey previously testified before the
subcommittee in his prior role as director of the Allison Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at the
Heritage Foundation, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition
in the Arctic
in order for the Coast Guard to conduct it. Its mission, how many icebreakers does the Coast Guard
need? And what kind of mix is that?
President Putin is acutely aware of the economic potential of the region. It is estimated that
Russia's Arctic Region already accounts for 20% of the country's GDP and could grow in the
future. Russia also sees the region as vital to its security and up until Russia has large scale
invasion of Ukraine last year, it invested heavily in militarising its Arctic region.
China consuming all the fish stocks
O’Ourke, 7-18, 23, Ronald O’Rourke, is a specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service, starting at CRS in 1984. Mr. O'Rourke, has written many reports for
Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defence acquisition, China's
naval forces and maritime territorial disputes the Arctic and the international security
environments. He's one of the most respected authorities on naval issues and of special interest
to this subcommittee, the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
Its mission, how many icebreakers does the Coast Guard need? And what kind of mix is that
God has testified that their new fleet mix analysis indicates a need for a total of eight to nine.
That's an increase over the previously envisaged total of six that included three heavy so now
we're looking at eight to nine, presumably still including three heavies. Fair enough. Why not
one, one observation is that the Chinese, the PRC has fishing fleets around the world. And
we're going to be looking at I sit also on the Subcommittee on China, we're going to be looking
at those activities. Apparently they are.
They're raping the oceans. Okay. And so my concern would be the same, they would try to
do the same thing in the Arctic region. And so maybe that's part of the reason to why
they want access to those fisheries up in the in the Arctic region, and China's worldwide
fishing activities are a growing concern, including what is referred to as IUU fishing,
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. As conditions in the Arctic change. Fish
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stocks may be migrating further north. And so we have a dynamic situation of China possibly
being interested in northern fish stocks and the exact locations of those fish stocks moving
further northward in response to warming waters.
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Cooperation DA Contention
Still some cooperation with Russia in the Arctic
O’Ourke, 7-18, 23, Ronald O’Rourke, is a specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional
Research Service, starting at CRS in 1984. Mr. O'Rourke, has written many reports for
Congress on various issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defence acquisition, China's
naval forces and maritime territorial disputes the Arctic and the international security
environments. He's one of the most respected authorities on naval issues and of special interest
to this subcommittee, the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the Arctic
in order for the Coast Guard to conduct it. Its mission, how many icebreakers does the Coast Guard
need? And what kind of mix is that?
And that is creating new opportunities for China in the Arctic, that are above those that they were
already pursuing. The other thing I'll note is that even though the war in Ukraine has disrupted the
operations of the Arctic Council, and has led to Russia's diplomatic isolation in other ways, from the
other seven Arctic states, there are still forms of cooperation that continue even in this situation, for
example, the United States and Russia continue to cooperate in the regulation of sea traffic through the
Bering Strait in the performance of the agreement that the two countries reached about the regulation
of that see traffic in 2018. So there is some limited degree of cooperation underway between US and
Russia, even in this larger situation.
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Consult the Natives Contention
Consult the natives
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
This strategy is intended to serve as a framework to guide the U.S. government’s approach to tackling
emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic. Our work will be guided by five principles that
will be applied across all four pillars. • Consult, Coordinate, and Co-Manage with Alaska Native Tribes
and Communities: The United States is committed to regular, meaningful, and robust consultation,
coordination, and co-management with Alaska Native Tribes, communities, corporations, and other
organizations and to ensuring equitable inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and their knowledge.
Arctic Council key to include indigenous voices
Bremmer, 7-18, 23, Dr. Esther Bremmer is, is the James H. Menger. Senior Fellow in global
governance at the Council of Foreign Relations. Dr. brimer. His work focuses on international
organisations and transatlantic relations. During her time at the council, Dr. Bremmer served as
the project director for the 2017 Council task force report Arctic imperatives, reinforcing us
strategy on America's fourth coast. In addition to posts in academia, the private sector and with
a large nonprofit organisations, Dr. Bremmer, previously served as the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organisation affairs and worked on the Department of State's policy
planning staff, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE8CGxMOR0I, Strategic Competition in the
Arctic
Indeed, the Arctic Council was unusual among international organisations in that it actually has
a structure for non governmental participation. There are six groups associated with indigenous
peoples that are part of the Arctic Council. Four of those groups include people in Alaska, so
that they actually have an opportunity to speak and participate in the activities of an international
organisation, which is unusual, and something that is a value to Americans in the state of
Alaska.
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China Encirclement Contention
A NATO presence in the Arctic alienates China
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
Finland and Sweden, currently non-NATO Arctic states, have begun reconsidering their stance on the
alliance. Should they join NATO, shifting the Arctic state balance from five NATO members to seven
would send a strong signal to Moscow on the feasibility of future Arctic cooperation as well as to Beijing
on the sustainability of its omnidirectional Arctic diplomacy. It may also embolden NATO as a new forum
for Arctic cooperation and increase non-Arctic NATO members’ interest in Arctic matters. In the long
run, this may lead to a more militaristic view of Arctic cooperation and one that bodes ill for climate and
economic cooperation. For China, having been declared a strategic challenge for NATO, an enhanced
NATO presence throughout the Arctic would not be in its interest.
Arctic critical to China’s geopolitical power
Rosario Rivera, Mexican Center for International Relations, Alí Gómez Villascán, 7-24, 23, Dispute for the
Arctic: China and Russia against the United States, https://cemeri.org/en/art/a-disputa-artico-chinarusia-usa-au Since ancient times, the People's Republic of China has had the objective of expanding its
trade routes to other strategic places outside its natural zone of influence, such as Southeast Asia. In
the first place, it is necessary to understand that the importance of maritime traffic for China is
considered a matter of National Security, since more than 60% of its trade is mobilized by sea, taking
into account that the commodities most traveled by means of its maritime routes (Strait of Malacca) are
energy, mostly oil. As a result of the great concern of the Chinese government and following the
teachings of the Qing Empire, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, decided to
reactivate the well-known Silk Road, but with strategic and geopolitical overtones. It was not only the
reactivation of the land route, but the same mentioned vision promoted the development of two more
Routes: the Maritime Silk Road of the XXI Century and the Polar Silk Road. Both branches of the route
have geostrategic, military and expansionist overtones in order to project a new China suited to its
needs and geopolitical ambitions in a context that is constantly changing. In addition, these routes are
important in the development of the Asian country, however, this time we will focus on analyzing the
Polar Silk Road. "China published its own Arctic strategy in January 2018. It declared itself a 'near-Arctic'
state and outlined a Polar Silk Road economic plan." However, Chinese interest in this strategic pivot
became more noticeable after «the People's Republic of China became an observer nation in the Arctic
Council in 2013. Its interest in the Arctic region is clear: access to the natural resources of the Arctic and
use of the Northern Route, working together to improve its image as a great power. The New York Times
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reported in May 2019 that China is investing heavily in projects in almost all Arctic countries». The
interpretations of the objectives of the current Xi Jinping government may vary, however, there are
situations and characteristics of the nation that must be considered when analyzing the reason for
Chinese interest in other geostrategic areas. Two aspects that are extremely relevant in this analysis are:
firstly, the economic and commercial issue, and secondly, the aspect of national security. One of the
great interests of China is the expansion of its commercial routes with the aim of having greater power
in maritime trade and an exponential reach towards vital countries with which it has an important
economic relationship. The expansion of these routes arises from the need to diversify them; In the
southern part, China has the 21st century Maritime Silk Road as part of the strategy known as “OBOR”
(One Belt One Road). The aforementioned route has origins on the east coast of China, passes through
the South Sea, connecting the Spratly Islands, the Strait of Malacca in order to have access to the entire
Indo-Pacific area, which allows it to expand towards the markets of Western Asia and Africa, which are
exporters par excellence of natural resources that China needs for its national, military and economic
development. However, this southern route also carries a risk that Chinese government strategists
consider, the fact that 80% of the oil imported by Beijing passes through the Indian Ocean and the Strait
of Malacca, poses a security threat. due to the volatility of the conflicts in that area, as well as the
presence of European powers, but even more so of two of China's most important rivals: the United
States and India. These actors pose a threat to the PRC due to territorial and geopolitical disputes over
control of the Malacca Strait. In this sense, one of the purposes that influenced the creation of the
Polar Silk Road was the security of essential energy supply for China, as well as the expansion of its
alternative routes with a future perspective that results in the approach of a scenario that China would
undoubtedly fear in its existence: if at some point the conflicts within Southeast Asia worsen and its
Indian and US rivals decide to blockade the Straits of Malacca, China would find itself locked within its
own region, halting its economic growth. Taking this hypothetical situation into account, China
maintains its preventive measures by increasing its strategic and commercial oil reserves thanks to its
long-term vision in order to care for and maintain its status quo as an emerging world power.
Therefore, the Arctic Silk Road is considered a strategy that helps to diversify its energy and trade
pathways with two purposes: first, to maintain energy security that is not at risk of collapse in the event
of any confrontation of a warlike nature, and the second, to expand the Chinese ideology through
diplomacy and international cooperation. The three routes of the Belt and Road Initiative. In this sense,
China is characterized by exercising South-South cooperation diplomacy when executing its foreign
policy in relation to countries of its interest, and the Arctic countries have not been the exception, an
example of this is the offer that He did to Denmark to establish a research station in Greenland, as
well as the renovation of its airports, coupled with this, he offered the possibility of expanding mineral
exploration. However, and as expected, the US supported Denmark to reject that offer in exchange for
the same benefits offered, but by the US nation. Despite the Danish refusal, China did not stop to
continue looking for strategic allies within Europe, knowing that in 2019 the European Union formally
declared Beijing a "strategic rival", but the objectives of the Asian country looked with greater interest
to Central and Eastern Europe, those countries that at the time were members of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. However, China seeks even more legitimate support from nations belonging to the
Arctic, which is why one of its most important allies is Russia, being the largest country in the world,
connecting Europe and Asia, which gives it a strategic location by having outlet to the Pacific and
Arctic oceans. The relevance of Sino-Russian relations can be analyzed from different perspectives,
however, what the present analysis is based on is the territorial, military and economic power that both
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nations create in their entirety. The cooperation between them suggests an exponential creation of
opportunities for collaboration in the regional and international security sector vis-à-vis the United
States of America.
153
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China Economy Contention
China’s oil imports from Russia make its economic recovery possible
High North Times, 8-3, 23, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russian-crude-oil-now-flowing-chinaarctic-ocean, Russian Crude Oil Now Flowing To China Via Arctic Ocean
Meanwhile, China stands to benefit from Russia’s pivot to the East as it continues to expand its energy
imports, primarily LNG and crude from the Arctic. In 2022, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s
largest supplier of oil. In total, China spent $58bn on oil imports from Russia in 2022, a figure that is
likely to grow larger this year. In addition, it purchased $8bn of LNG from Russia, primarily from
Novatek’s Yamal LNG plant in the Arctic. Last year Russia sent around 35 percent of its oil exports to
China, up from 31 percent in 2021. On average, China pays $7 less per barrel for Russian crude oil than it
pays for products from other countries. Analysts say that Chinese refineries have been able to use the
western ban on Russian crude oil to their advantage in price negotiations with Russian sellers. “As
Moscow is no longer able to sell its fossil fuels in Europe, Asia has become a vital partner for Russian
energy trade, with China at the head of the line,” explains Marc Lanteigne professor and researcher in
politics, security and international relations at the University of Tromsø. “Beijing has also successfully
been able to negotiate bargain prices for these shipments, helpful at a time when China is still
recovering from its post-Covid economic disruptions,” he continues. While Chinese support of Russia’s
energy ambitions has limits – in May President Xi Jinping did not publicly endorse the development of
the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline – it appears committed to take receipt of fossil fuels delivered via the
NSR. “It is highly likely that Beijing will continue to take advantage of a window of opportunity to import
more oil and gas from Russia as European markets remain closed,” concludes Lanteigne.
Russia is using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to ship to China, which is the only way it
can sell oil given the current sanctions
High North News, 8-3, 23, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russian-crude-oil-now-flowing-chinaarctic-ocean#:~:text=With%20the%20onset%20of%20the,Arctic%20during%202023%20and%20beyond.
With the onset of the summer navigation season on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), Russia has begun
sending crude oil shipments to China via the Arctic. After an initial trial voyage in November 2022,
energy analysts expect Russia to send regular shipments through the Arctic during 2023 and beyond.
With Europe completely out of the picture as a result of sanctions, Russia now diverts parts of its
Arctic production to China. Additional shipments are destined for India. Two initial shipments departed
from the Primorsk and Ust-Luga oil terminals near St Petersburg on 12 July and 13 July, passing through
the Baltic Sea and up the Norwegian coast lines. The two Aframax oil tankers, NS Arctic and Primorsky
Prospect, each carrying around 730,000 barrels of crude oil, traveled along the NSR throughout the
second half of July and are expected to arrive in Rizhao, China in mid-August. Compared to the
traditional route through the Suez Canal, the Arctic shortcut is around 30 percent faster. In November
2022 the Aframax tanker Vasily Dinkov traveled from near Murmansk also to Rizhao in around four
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weeks. The NSR will be key to diverting the flow of crude oil away from Europe and toward Asia. With
the massive Vostok oil project slated to open next year, the amount of crude oil being shipped via the
Arctic will increase rapidly. Until recently the NSR had seen less than a handful of oil shipments to Asia
over the past decade. The pivot to the East in terms of the flow of exports of oil and liquefied natural gas
(LNG) was always planned by the Russian government, says Matt Sagers who specializes in Russian
energy at S&P Global, a research and analysis company. “This process is now being pushed harder with
the loss of the European market for Russian oil and the re-orientation of oil exports to “East of Suez”.
Use of the Northern [Sea] Route reduced the number of days at sea and therefore the number of
tankers (and overall capacity) that is required to move oil eastward. Entire upstream developments, like
Vostok Oil, are intended to be evacuated via the route,” explains Sagers. x “According to our records,
Russian state-owned tanker company - Sovcomflot (SCF) alone owned over 35 ice class tankers above
70,000 dwt. There is more tonnage in operation, with varied ownership,” says Svetlana Lobaciova,
Senior Market Analyst at E.A. Gibson, an international shipbroker.
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Science Cooperation Contention
Militarized Arctic undermines scientific cooperation
Barry Gardiner is the Labour MP for Brent Nort, 6-13, 23, The Guardian, s the ice melts, a perilous
Russian threat is emerging in the Arctic,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/13/arctic-russia-nato-putin-climate
A militarised Arctic would undermine scientific cooperation and pose an existential threat. Somehow,
we need a diplomatic effort to separate the politics of war from the imperatives of climate research.
During the cold war, the USSR and the west had cultural and scientific exchanges that kept backchannels of communication open when political temperatures were running high. Now, more than ever,
we need similar initiatives to thaw the permafrost between Russian and western research efforts.
Potential for Russia-US Arctic cooperation
Lunday & Fields, 2023, Kevin Lunday Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Kevin Lunday, Vice Admiral, U.S.
Coast Guard, assumed the duties as Commander, Atlantic Area in May 2022 and is responsible for
directing all Coast Guard operations in the inland navigable waters east of the Rocky Mountains, the
Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean, including the eastern Arctic, Atlantic
basin, and the Middle East. He previously commanded Coast Guard operations in Oceania and the South
Pacific as well as Coast Guard Cyber Command. He is a former Special Advisor to the Standing
Committee on Law and National Security. He is licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia
and State of Arizona. Stanley Field Commander, U.S. Coast GuarStanley Fields, Commander, U.S. Coast
Guard, serves as the Staff Judge Advocate at Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Naval Air Station Key
West, Florida. His previous assignment locations include Alaska, Rhode Island, Afghanistan, Virginia, and
Georgia. He is a graduate of Western New Mexico University, Eastern New Mexico University, the
University of New Mexico School of Law, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School, and Air War College, The Arctic: Shrinking Ice, Growing Importance,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_national_security/publications/aba-standing-committee-onlaw-and-national-security-60-th-anniversary-an-anthology/the-arctic-shrinking-ice-growing-importance/
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has significantly disrupted the geopolitical environment. It is unclear how
the Arctic will be impacted as established international norms and governance are being challenged. In
theory, the Arctic could be one area where Russia, China, and the United States find opportunities for
communication and dialogue over shared interests, despite tensions elsewhere. The Arctic presents a
unique opportunity for constructive dialogue and cooperation between Russia, the United States, and
the other Arctic nations. Russia seeks to establish the Northern Sea Route as a globally recognized
transportation corridor that significantly reduces the distance, travel time, and fuel costs between
European and Asian markets, thereby allowing goods to be transported faster and cheaper. Ahmad and
Zafar, supra; James Kraska, International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage, 42
Vanderbilt J. of Transnational L. 1109, 1124 (2021). Moreover, Russia’s economic viability and energy
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independence hinges on the Arctic because 75% of its oil reserves and 95% of its natural gas reserves
are in the region. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 10, supra. To serve its own interests, Russia could choose a
more collaborative approach to establishing or reinforcing norms for maritime law in the Arctic.
Ahmad and Zafar, supra.
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Climate Cooperation Contention
Militarizing the Arctic undermines climate cooperation
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
Finland and Sweden, currently non-NATO Arctic states, have begun reconsidering their stance on the
alliance. Should they join NATO, shifting the Arctic state balance from five NATO members to seven
would send a strong signal to Moscow on the feasibility of future Arctic cooperation as well as to Beijing
on the sustainability of its omnidirectional Arctic diplomacy. It may also embolden NATO as a new forum
for Arctic cooperation and increase non-Arctic NATO members’ interest in Arctic matters. In the long
run, this may lead to a more militaristic view of Arctic cooperation and one that bodes ill for climate
and economic cooperation.
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Indigenous People Contention
Increasing the number of outsiders threatens indigenous people
G. Dunkel, 6-7, 23, https://www.workers.org/2023/06/71470/m Militarizing the Arctic
The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental body headquartered in Tromsø, Norway, a small Norwegian
city about 200 miles above the Arctic Circle. This council was first established in 1996 to provide a forum
for Arctic countries, including Sweden, to work on common problems.
It also includes organizations of Arctic Indigenous people who first settled the region several thousand
years ago: the Aleut International Association (AIA); the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC); the Gwich’in
Council International (GCI); the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC); the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North (RAIPON); and the Saami Council. Four million people, many Indigenous, live in
the Arctic. The machinations of the United States and its allies like Canada are threatening their
existence, their cultural integrity, their livelihoods. They deserve our solidarity and support. The
Council has worked on environmental and development issues, facing large and difficult problems
relating to climate change, high latitude pollution, conflicting territorial claims, maritime transportation,
infrastructure needs and resource exploitation. These
Energy extraction in the Arctic threatens indigenous peoples
Joel Matthis, 6-22, 23, The Week, The new Cold War in the Arctic, explained, U.S., Russia and China
battle for Arctic control | The Week
Plenty. The BBC reported the Arctic region could be home 160 billion barrels of oil and 30% of the
planet's undiscovered natural gas. And because the Arctic is mostly water — unlike Antarctica, a land
mass — there is no treaty protecting it from international development. "Commercial industry stands to
gain access to billions of dollars' worth of resources—in the forms of oil, natural gas, critical minerals,
and fisheries," Foreign Policy reported. But there's also plenty of room for consequences. The increased
competition in the region will "accelerate sea ice melt, ocean acidification, and rising temperatures."
That's bad for the planet and for people: "Arctic nations, Indigenous populations, and environmental
groups" are already facing increased tensions as a result of the rivalries.
Arctic key to Russia’s energy needs
lendar, May 11, 2023, Minna Ålander is a research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
(FIIA) in Helsinki. Her research topics are Northern European security and Nordic defense cooperation,
as well as German and Finnish foreign and security policy. Previously, she worked at the German
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Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, High North, High Tension: Th End of Arctic
Illusions, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/05/high-north-high-tension-the-end-of-arctic-illusions/
For Russia, the Arctic is an essential area of interest not only in terms of national security but also for
economic reasons. Russia’s hydrocarbon sector depends on Arctic resources: they account for 80
percent of Russia’s natural gas and 17 percent of its oil production. Safeguarding its interests along the
Northern Sea Route (NSR)—now more accessible due to climate change—is a high priority for Russia.
The route is particularly important for Russia’s energy exports—such as liquified natural gas (comprising
64 percent of total cargo volume in 2020 and currently growing, as it is not subject to Western sanctions
yet), oil and petroleum products, coal, and iron—to both Europe and Asia. However, Russia’s 2022
invasion of Ukraine halted traffic on the NSR for a while. Likewise, prospects of major energy
infrastructure projects (e.g., Rosneft’s plans to construct one of the world’s largest oil loading terminals)
are currently uncertain due to Russia’s increasing international isolation.
Russia needs to secure year-round navigability of the NSR to access markets in the East, which are
now more important given Western sanctions. As a result, the country is investing in an increasing
number of nuclear-powered icebreakers. The future of Russia’s Arctic resource exploitation will depend
to a large extent on how the nation’s relationship with China develops and whether Russia can secure
India as a customer. The current prospects look promising on both accounts.
Russia’s Arctic orientation is not defensive
Alendar, May 11, 2023, Minna Ålander is a research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. Her research topics are Northern European security and Nordic defense
cooperation, as well as German and Finnish foreign and security policy. Previously, she worked at the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, High North, High Tension: Th End
of Arctic Illusions, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/05/high-north-high-tension-the-end-of-arcticillusions/
So far, the Arctic has been kept largely out of NATO’s reach, as the regional allies Norway and Canada
considered it the best approach. But with Finland now NATO’s thirty-first member, and Sweden
hopefully following suit soon, the Arctic inevitably becomes a relevant sphere for NATO. From the
alliance’s perspective, the North Atlantic and Arctic waters are crucial for delivering reinforcements
from North America to the European Arctic. In a conflict, securing allied freedom of navigation in the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap would be key for NATO—and cutting off Northern
American allies from Europe by disrupting the GIUK line would be equally important for Russia.
The Finnish-Swedish NATO accession changes the situation fundamentally for founding member
Norway, which has hitherto been the sole gatekeeper of the High North within NATO. To manage
relations with Russia, Norway—which shares a short border with Russia in the Arctic—has followed a
dual-track approach: deterrence and reassurance, or “calibrated deterrence.” Deterrence has been
provided by Norway’s NATO membership, while reassurance measures have included self-restraint in
conducting NATO military drills in the northern parts of the country close to the border with Russia.
Norway, however, started to increase its own military presence in its northernmost region Finnmark
already in 2017, as a response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s 2022 full-scale war
against Ukraine has triggered further recalibration of Norway’s deterrence: American troops were
exercising demonstratively in northern Norway in November 2022. Russia has been framing its military
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posture in the Arctic as defensive. However, it has invested heavily in dual-capable weapons and
carried out simulated attacks on neighbors during exercises, such as against Sweden in 2013, which
was a simulated nuclear attack according to a NATO report. Russia’s “deterrence by intimidation”
strategy and zero-sum understanding of security require its Western neighbors—and NATO—to increase
their military presence in the Arctic as well, “to maintain the Arctic balance,” as Norway’s Chief of Navy
Rune Andersen told Finnish media during the recent Joint Viking exercise with NATO partners. Now that
the alliance is reconfiguring its deterrence posture on the northeastern flank, it is vital to view the
wider Baltic Sea-North Atlantic-Arctic region as a coherent area and make sure no ambiguity is left
that can be exploited—or misunderstood—by Russia.
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Arctic Cooperation Contention
US should focus on diplomacy and international cooperation
Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Aidan Powers-Riggs Center for Strategic
and International Studies, April 2023, https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-researchfacility/, Frozen Frontiers China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions
China’s expanding presence in both the Arctic and Antarctic is part of its broader pursuit of global
great power status. Its contributions to polar science have given it a voice and a presence in polar
affairs, while opening the door to advance military and strategic goals. China is by no means the only
great power to use science for strategic ends, yet mounting geopolitical competition is raising the stakes
for China's polar pursuits.International cooperation will be necessary for the responsible management
and stewardship of the poles, and China can play a positive role in those efforts. Still, the United States
and its allies should carefully monitor China’s evolving activities and push for greater transparency.
Washington should also focus on crafting stronger diplomatic and economic partnerships with likeminded countries and strengthening international governance mechanisms. Through these efforts, the
United States can help ensure the world's frozen frontiers do not become the next hot spots of
geopolitical competition.
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Diplomatic Capital Trade-Off Contention
US action in the Arctic trades-off with other regions
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
In light of great power competition and increased human activities in the Arctic resulting from the
diminishment of Arctic ice, some observers argue that there is a need to devote more U.S. attention and
resources to the region. 113 On the other hand, great power competition is also being expressed in
Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. In a situation of finite U.S.
policymaker attention and resources, the Arctic competes for attention and resources against these
other regions.
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Russian Economy Contention
Russia is using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to ship to China, which is the only way it
can sell oil given the current sanctions
High North News, 8-3, 23, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russian-crude-oil-now-flowing-chinaarctic-ocean#:~:text=With%20the%20onset%20of%20the,Arctic%20during%202023%20and%20beyond.
With the onset of the summer navigation season on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), Russia has begun
sending crude oil shipments to China via the Arctic. After an initial trial voyage in November 2022,
energy analysts expect Russia to send regular shipments through the Arctic during 2023 and beyond.
With Europe completely out of the picture as a result of sanctions, Russia now diverts parts of its
Arctic production to China. Additional shipments are destined for India. Two initial shipments departed
from the Primorsk and Ust-Luga oil terminals near St Petersburg on 12 July and 13 July, passing through
the Baltic Sea and up the Norwegian coast lines. The two Aframax oil tankers, NS Arctic and Primorsky
Prospect, each carrying around 730,000 barrels of crude oil, traveled along the NSR throughout the
second half of July and are expected to arrive in Rizhao, China in mid-August. Compared to the
traditional route through the Suez Canal, the Arctic shortcut is around 30 percent faster. In November
2022 the Aframax tanker Vasily Dinkov traveled from near Murmansk also to Rizhao in around four
weeks. The NSR will be key to diverting the flow of crude oil away from Europe and toward Asia. With
the massive Vostok oil project slated to open next year, the amount of crude oil being shipped via the
Arctic will increase rapidly. Until recently the NSR had seen less than a handful of oil shipments to Asia
over the past decade. The pivot to the East in terms of the flow of exports of oil and liquefied natural gas
(LNG) was always planned by the Russian government, says Matt Sagers who specializes in Russian
energy at S&P Global, a research and analysis company. “This process is now being pushed harder with
the loss of the European market for Russian oil and the re-orientation of oil exports to “East of Suez”.
Use of the Northern [Sea] Route reduced the number of days at sea and therefore the number of
tankers (and overall capacity) that is required to move oil eastward. Entire upstream developments, like
Vostok Oil, are intended to be evacuated via the route,” explains Sagers. x “According to our records,
Russian state-owned tanker company - Sovcomflot (SCF) alone owned over 35 ice class tankers above
70,000 dwt. There is more tonnage in operation, with varied ownership,” says Svetlana Lobaciova,
Senior Market Analyst at E.A. Gibson, an international shipbroker.
Control of the NSR is key to Russia’s economy
Luca Cinciripini is a Ph.D. candidate at Catholic University of Milan and Research Fellow at ITSTIME,
March 1, 2023, http://turkishpolicy.com/article/1186/from-east-to-north-new-frontiers-for-the-eunato-arctic-defense, From East to North: New Frontiers for the EU-NATO Arctic Defense,
http://turkishpolicy.com/article/1186/from-east-to-north-new-frontiers-for-the-eu-nato-arctic-defense
In addition, the disappearance of the fields also allows for the opening of invaluable new maritime trade
routes, such as the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR).16 In fact, according to
data from the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic region would contain an estimated $20 trillion in wealth,
the result of 40 percent of global hydrocarbon reserves, and 30 percent of all global resources. It would
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also be one of the global areas of greatest economic growth, with GDP growing at an average rate of
around 10-11 percent per year over the past few years.17 The Arctic represents an essential building
block for Russian expansionist aims, especially in the wake of economic sanctions imposed by the
West. Control of the NSR, in particular, is crucial to guarantee Moscow an outlet to China and India
that will allow it to continue exporting oil from Russia’s Arctic fields, which alone is worth 10 percent
of the national GDP
NSR key to Russia
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
The policy posture adopted by Moscow as its Arctic strategy 2020 includes the utilization of the Arctic as
a strategic resource base to fulfill the country's socioeconomic needs.10 It also centers on using the NSR
as a national transport route for Russia in the Arctic. The strategic priorities of the Russian Federation
can be seen in the expansion of the resource base region to fulfill its energy needs.11 It is not surprising
that the Arctic accounts for 10 percent of Russia’s GDP and 20 percent of its exports. Therefore, the
region is crucial in the strategic designs of the Kremlin. While dealing with military and security, the
Russian government favors an auspicious operating regime, including the army and other military
formations. Therefore, the deployment of the Northern Fleet demonstrates the Russian intent to
protect the NSR. Meanwhile, the policy posture of 2035 shows the Kremlin’s urge to access the naval
chokepoints in Greenland, Iceland, and the UK to demonstrate the significance of Russia’s sea power.
Hence, the opening of the NSR and the revival of the Northern Fleet is transforming Russia from a
continental to maritime power in the region. The parallels in the policy postures of 2020 and 2035 exist
in the Russian national interest in naming the Arctic as a strategic resource base. Moscow is aiming to
utilize the opportunity to develop energy reserves, including 85.1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and
17.3 billion metric tons of crude and condensate oil. Moreover, it is also trying to intensify its LNG
production to 91 million tons by 2035. Furthermore, it is planning to increase the role of the Arctic in
crude and condensate oil production to 20 percent in 2024, 23 percent in 2030, and eventually 26
percent in 2035. However, these economic gains are highly dependent on the successful functioning of
the NSR. The strategic plan to develop the NSR as a global shipping route will allow the Kremlin to play
a dominant role in Arctic geopolitics. While referring to the security interests linked to the NSR, the role
of the Northern Fleet cannot be overlooked to intercept the aggressive actions by NATO countries in
Norway.13 Therefore, the intensified activities of the Northern Fleet to establish an effective monitoring
system for surface and underwater activities show how regulation and control of shipping along the NSR
is a priority for the military as an effective stakeholder.The development of the NSR is crucial for the
Kremlin's strategic designs and the Arctic's future geopolitical course. The NSR remains closed for
eastbound shipping for half of the year due to Arctic ice. The change in the climate patterns unlocked
the NSR much earlier during the past year, which significantly reduced the time for Yamal LNG cargoes
to reach East Asian markets.15 The success of Yamal LNG endeavors on developing the Arctic
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infrastructure depends upon the functioning of the NSR because it can assist the Kremlin in extending its
influence to the Asia-Pacific.16 Yamal LNG will allow the Kremlin to attract potential customers by
offering them the Arctic LNG at a low cost. Moreover, Novatek's smooth price enhances the company's
portfolio in global market positioning.17 James Henderson has argued that the NSR not only provides a
shortcut from Yamal to Asia, but also provides an alternative to the US-controlled maritime routes. He
further asserts that the Russian military modernization along the NSR has made it a “potential leverage
point” amid growing geopolitical competition. The Northern Fleet remains a focal point when it comes
to maritime shipping in the NSR. The Kremlin has elevated the significance of the Northern Fleet by
upgrading its status to a military district. According to Matthew Melino and Heather A. Conley,
Moscow’s ambitions to project Russian power in the Arctic is an “avenue of approaches” for United
States.19 The Murmansk-based fleet is crucial for safeguarding maritime shipping in the NSR. Moreover,
the addition of offensive and defensive capabilities to the Northern Fleet includes the equipment of S400 and hypersonic missiles, which shows the Kremlin’s concern regarding the security of the route.
Moreover, the induction of the Knyaz Vladimir, a Borei-A strategic missile submarine armed with Bulava
ICBMs and 667BDRM Delfin submarines equipped with Sineva ICBMs, is a powerful signal to other actors
regarding the Russian defense planning of the Arctic and the NSR.20 The growing Russian military
presence along the NSR is due to the evolving security concerns revolving around the defense of
Russian national security and the denial of US maneuvers. The Kremlin's Northern Fleet is crucial to
deny the US claims of freedom of navigation and maintaining Russian status quo in the region. Although
the NSR is a strategic enabler for the Kremlin, it however requires the Northern Fleet to deter the United
States, a geopolitical challenge for Russia. 21 Thus, the success of the Kremlin's policy is dependent upon
the successful functioning of the NSR.
Arctic oil access critical to Russia’s economy
Greenwood, 2023 (January/February, Cmdr. Jeremy Greenwood is an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard
with more than 20 years of experience at-sea and ashore throughout various policy offices, including
serving as a Coast Guard liaison officer at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs.
He was a Brookings Foreign Policy federal executive fellow from 2021-22, GREAT POWER COMPETITION
AND OVERSEAS BASING IN THE ARCTIC, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2023/02/FP_20230207_arctic_basing_greenwood.pdf
Former Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Karl Schultz, was fond of saying that in the Arctic,
“presence equals influence. If we don’t have a presence there, our competitors will.”27 With China’s
annual deployment of icebreakers and other research vessels to the Arctic and its increased scientific
and economic investments in the region, it is in a position to have more operational presence in the
Arctic than the United States does — for some time.28 And Russia has made it very clear that its future
depends on the extraction and sale of fossil fuels, which makes the Arctic an essential part of its
foreign policy.
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Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Bad Links
China control of the Arctic critical to its Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)
Peiqing & Huiwen, 6-20, 23, Guo Peiqing is a Professor at the School of International Affairs and Public
Administration, Ocean University of China. Chen Huiwen is a Ph.D. candidate of the College of Foreign
Languages, Ocean University of China, Chinese Perspective on the Arctic and its Implication for Nordic
Countries, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/chinese-perspective-arctic-implication-nordic-countries/
The U.S.-China global competition is spilling over into the Arctic, which has been heating up in recent
years, especially in the Arctic-Atlantic linkage zone where the five Nordic countries are located. This
region connects the Arctic Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean north-south, overlooks the North American
and European continents east-west, and is closely connected to the security of the U.S. homeland. The
U.S. can’t afford to have China gain a foothold or grow strong there, and will therefore do its utmost
to exclude China from this region. But at the same time, China regards the Nordic countries as the
western end of the Chinese “Polar Silk Road,” where China has important shipping, scientific and
strategic interests. The “Polar Silk Road” is of great significance to China’s “Belt and Road” initiative and
connectivity between Asia and Europe.2).
China wants to expand the BRI to the Arctic
Zero Hedge, 6-19,23, China And Russia’s Ice-Breaking Ambitions In The Arctic,
https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/China-And-Russias-Ice-Breaking-Ambitions-In-TheArctic.html
In 2018, Beijing released a white paper on how China could extend its Belt and Road Initiative to the
Arctic region, suggesting that polar stakeholders could work together on connectivity and economic and
social development, including the exploration and exploitation of resources such as oil, gas and
minerals, as well as on scientific research into the effects of climate change on the region. According to
Deutsche Welle, the United States is worried about what this means, while Russia “smells business.”
China will use Arctic assess to strengthen One Belt, One Road
Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
Separately, scholars from Tsinghua University published an article in 2018 that introduced the concept
of the Northeast Passage as the third component of a “One Belt, One Road, One Channel” plan (italics
added for emphasis), illustrating some ways in which China might conceptualize the strategic
advantages of a developed Arctic Passage. The article suggests that a developed Arctic Passage could
bring numerous advantages, although the One Belt One Road initiative by itself faces risks associated
with geopolitical factors, regional instability, cultural and religious differences, and energy security
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vulnerabilities. There are few countries along the Arctic Passage and little threat of piracy, making
terrorist attacks on overseas investments relatively easy to guard against. They also note that,
compared with the One Belt One Road plan, the Arctic One Channel is “less troubled by illegal
immigration and refugee influx.”20 Other Chinese scholars of maritime transportation have argued that
the Arctic Passage is important to improving China’s energy security and that China can have greater
influence over the construction of the Passage as a “near-Arctic country.” Consequently, these experts
concluded, “The earlier the construction of the Arctic Passage begins, the earlier the future of China’s
energy security will be determined.”21 The Arctic Passage could present a strategic benefit by reducing
congestion in the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal and lowering the possibility of China’s energy
lifeline being choked off, something former Chinese leader Hu Jintao called “the Malacca dilemma.”22 A
developed Arctic Passage also offers efficiency advantages for the BRI. Chinese maritime experts
estimate that, compared with the traditional China-European Union (EU) maritime shipping route that
passes through the Suez Canal, the Northeast Passage reduces the distance between Chinese and
European ports by 18 percent to 26 percent, favoring China’s northern ports. Additionally, though icy
conditions can slow ship speeds, Arctic container ships need not call at multiple ports like their
counterparts on traditional shipping routes. According to Chinese experts, this reduces Arctic shipping
times by eight to 11 days on average, saving both time and fuel cost as compared with the traditional
route.23 Shorter trans portation times reduce energy expenditure costs, and the Arctic route also
provides a new connection between China and the wealthy nations of northern Europe, meaning China
can more easily export midlevel products and import advanced products. Opening the Arctic Passage
could also reduce costs and thereby increase the competitiveness of certain industries. These generally
optimistic Chinese assessments of the viability of Arctic shipping diverge from other international
scholarly and commercial assessments that cite hazardous conditions and limited support infrastructure
as limiting factors and reflect a degree of “boosterism” present in some Chinese thinking about the
Arctic.24
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Miscalculation Answers
Miscalculation won’t escalate to conflict
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
\Overt military action, especially by a non-Arctic state, that significantly escalates tension in the region
and results in a sidelining of Arctic diplomacy would challenge our judgment that increased activity in
the Arctic, while raising the possibility of miscalculation, is unlikely to result in outright conflict
because of the harsh operating environment and existing mechanisms for cooperation. Persistent
challenges to Russia’s supremacy of the Northern Sea Route [NSR]108 by a non-Arctic state’s military
could result in armed conflict with Russia if diplomatic negotiations had stalled and foreign militaries
continued to operate in what Moscow views as its territorial waters. Alternatively, if a nonArctic state,
especially China, were to begin regular, large-scale military operations in the area to protect an
economic foothold in the region, the risk of conflict with Arctic states could increase and contribute to a
buildup of forces.10
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Arctic War Answers (General)
No Arctic territorial disputes
Andreas Østhagen, Arctic Institute, 6-1, 23, Five Misconceptions in Arctic Security and Geopolitics,
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/five-misconceptions-arctic-security-geopolitics/
Let us start with the most obvious. No territorial disputes remain in the Arctic region. No land border
between any of the eight Arctic states is in dispute. No Arctic state is currently claiming another Arctic
state’s territory for historic reasons or to protect an ethnic minority. Furthermore, no island is in
dispute (the last minor island dispute was settled between Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark in
2022). The closest situations to a dispute over sovereignty concern the legal status of shipping through
Canadian and Russian territorial waters and domestic discussions in some Arctic countries about
indigenous/local rights and land ownership. At sea, 7 out of 8 maritime boundaries are agreed. Of
these, only one remains: between Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea. This is in stark
contrast to other maritime domains around the world encircled by states (the Mediterranean, the South
China Sea and the Caribbean).
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Answers to: China Arctic Threat
China is not a threat to the Arctic, it wants collaboration
Peiqing & Huiwen, 6-20, 23, Guo Peiqing is a Professor at the School of International Affairs and Public
Administration, Ocean University of China. Chen Huiwen is a Ph.D. candidate of the College of Foreign
Languages, Ocean University of China, Chinese Perspective on the Arctic and its Implication for Nordic
Countries, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/chinese-perspective-arctic-implication-nordic-countries/
To achieve mutual development through win-win cooperation is the first aim of Chinese Arctic policy.
China and the Nordic countries are highly complementary in terms of economic structure. China is an
important manufacturing country with strong infrastructure capacity and is the world’s largest
consumer market. As for the Nordic countries, the pillar industries are animal husbandry, fisheries,
shipping, resource extraction, high-tech manufacturing, and tourism. China and Nordic countries are
complementary in the international industrial and supply chains and there is no competition. In China’s
Arctic Policy published in 2018, China systematically elaborates the objectives, principles and policy
propositions of China’s participation in Arctic affairs. Cooperation and mutual benefits are the basic
position of China. Unlike the U.S. dichotomy of “friend or foe” and the confrontational mindset of
“lose or win,” China bases its policy on its long-history of Confucian culture and peace-harmony gene
and does not force Nordic countries to take sides between China and the United States, but advocates
the concept of “making friends with the world” and aims for win-win results.4) China advocates
solidarity, mutual assistance and sharing the same boat, likes working together with other countries
on Arctic climate, scientific research and trade issues, and hopes to extend China’s concept of
“community with a shared future for mankind” to the Arctic region.
China is not a military threat to the Arctic
Jiminez, 5-25, 23, María Milagros Martín Jiménez is a Law and International Relations graduate with a
Master’s Degree in the EU and China. Through her involvement with the ESThink Tank and other
European organizations she has specialised and published research on EU External Relations Law and
Foreign and Security Policy as well as on China and the Indo-Pacific region, Modern Diplomacy, China’s
Game in the Arctic: A Tale of Deception?, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/05/25/chinas-game-in-thearctic-a-tale-of-deception/
At this point, the question of whether Chinese ulterior motives for accessing the Arctic are realistic and
attainable might come up. In this regard, everything seems to suggest that Beijing’s interests in the
region are likely long-term. It is important to bear in mind that the Arctic is not the South China Sea,
its number one priority together with Taiwan, with which the PCR has historic ties and is exercising a
more aggressive policy
China has no significant presence in the US Arctic
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Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
This chapter examines in detail China’s current and, in some cases, projected presence and activities in
the North American Arctic. We searched for four different types of presence and activities: shipping
investments, infrastructure development, resource exploitation, and scientific research installations.
Figure 3.1 further details what types of activities we searched for under each of these four headings.
Overall, we found that China’s presence is fairly limited in the North American Arctic. Some key
aspects of Chinese presence in other regions, such as the development and operation of ports and
airports, the building of pipelines, or the devel opment of connected public services and surveillance
technology, are not present at this time in the North American Arctic. As a result, this chapter examines
seven areas that have been found to be of relevance for the region: mining, hydrocarbons, other
infrastructure, fisheries, communications, access enablers, and tourism. The first section provides an
overview of broad similarities and country-by-country differences in Chinese presence. The second
section details specific investments and activities in each of these seven domains.
China cooperating with Arctic countries
Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
Although a particularly aggressive style of Chinese diplomacy—dubbed the Wolf Warrior diplomacy
after a successful Chinese movie franchise—has not played out particularly well in the Arctic, as
evidenced by China’s checkered bilateral relations with several Arctic states, China might change its
approach to make its presence and influence more palatable, if given sufficient incentives to do so.109
To some extent, it has already started doing so, showing a clear ability to “step back” when its efforts in
the Arctic met with suspicion or hostility, particularly with those countries that are also U.S. allies.110
China has also been careful not to appear to directly threaten the strategic interests of various Arctic
states. During the controversy over a Chinese company’s bid over the airport renovation contract in
Greenland, a high-ranking Chinese general asserted that “China has a one-Denmark policy,” possibly
to reassure Copenhagen that China’s ambition is not to help Greenland on its path to
independence.111 This relative “tactical retreat,” in the words of Camilla T. N. Sørensen, comes at a
small cost for China, because the Arctic is not currently a top strategic priority in comparison to other
more pressing matters.112 Tactical retreat, however, might also be part of a longerterm approach of
“non-contention” that emphasizes instead cooperation to reach more effectively one’s strategic
objectives.11
China would view US gains in the Arctic as zero-sum
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Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
China’s overall foreign policy focuses on the realization of the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation,
the recouping of supposedly “lost territories,” such as Taiwan, various uninhabited maritime features in
the East and South China seas, and sometimes territory in the presentday Russian Far East lost to
Imperial Russia during the Qing Dynasty, as well as the establishment of a position of preeminence, first
regionally, and then eventually globally.31 In the course of China’s quest for greater regional influence,
PRC officials and authors tend to treat the United States and its network of alliances and partners, as
well as the liberal international order they are embedded in and generally supportive of, as key
obstacles to the accomplishment of China’s ambitions.32 Because Chinese foreign and military policies
regard the United States as the most capable actor that could frustrate China’s ambitions, Chinese
officials also treat it as the one country against which they benchmark their own country’s progress.
China competes with the United States and other adversaries to advance and deter challenges to the
CCP’s policy goals. The PLA is tasked with advancing those goals by competing with and being capable
of defeating the U.S. military, if necessary, it in any direct confrontation.33 For this reason, many of
the more strategic aspects of the PRC’s interest in the Arctic, especially the North American Arctic,
relate to its geostrategic competition with the United States
China cares more about its own regional security issues
Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
Because such goals are less openly discussed, in the next section we identify possible dimensions of
China’s military ambitions in the North American Arctic, recognizing that, for now at least, the
country’s core areas of focus on security and defense policy are much closer to its own shores.
Therefore, the assessments in the next section should be treated somewhat speculatively and are
derived from the overall military strategy, capabilities, and direction of development of the PLA, which
regards global commons and transnational spaces, such as the poles, the deep sea, outer space, and
cyberspace, as “new strategic frontiers” (战略新疆域) where great-power strategic competition is
expected to be intense.30
China’s navy cannot project in the short-term
Pezard, Rand, 2022, STEPHANIE PEZARD, STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, SCOTT W. HAROLD, IRINA A. CHINDEA,
BENJAMIN J. SACKS, ABBIE TINGSTAD, TRISTAN FINAZZO, SOO KIM, China’s Strategy and Activities in the
Arctic, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1282-1-v2.html
Because many dimensions of China’s military strategy and capabilities specifically related to the Arctic
are not publicly discussed in any detail in official PRC documents, analysis of this question necessarily
requires a degree of reasoning from broader categories of knowledge about the PLA to more discrete, if
caveated, conclusions. As the 2020 DoD report on Chinese military developments noted, the PLA’s
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current approach to armed conflict is focused on being prepared to fight and win “informatized local
wars,” that is, regional conflicts under conditions where advanced militaries employ systems that link
sensors, platforms, weapons, and command and control.37 In addition, the PLA assesses that such
conflicts are likely to be defined by “systems confrontation and system destruction warfare” centered
on “information systems-based systems of systems,” to include neutralizing the interdependent
command and control and surveillance systems of any adversary forces to destroy their operational
capability.38 Below the level of military grand strategy and concepts of operating, previous RAND
research has tracked how, at the service level, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have
only begun to assume the profile of more expeditionary forces that can operate in distant waters and
air spaces in the past decade and half-decade, respectively.39 Other U.S. analyses have similarly
confirmed the logistical challenges the PLA faces as it seeks to develop into a joint force capable of
operating far from China’s shores, including the lack of bases, at-sea replenishment ships, organic air
defenses, icebreakers, and experience.
A NATO presence in the Arctic alienates China
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
Finland and Sweden, currently non-NATO Arctic states, have begun reconsidering their stance on the
alliance. Should they join NATO, shifting the Arctic state balance from five NATO members to seven
would send a strong signal to Moscow on the feasibility of future Arctic cooperation as well as to Beijing
on the sustainability of its omnidirectional Arctic diplomacy. It may also embolden NATO as a new forum
for Arctic cooperation and increase non-Arctic NATO members’ interest in Arctic matters. In the long
run, this may lead to a more militaristic view of Arctic cooperation and one that bodes ill for climate and
economic cooperation. For China, having been declared a strategic challenge for NATO, an enhanced
NATO presence throughout the Arctic would not be in its interest.
China does not want military conflict with the US in the Arctic
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
Similarly, while joint military exercises can act as a counterweight to US pressure, the Kremlin must keep
Chinese military presence out of the region.116 This doesn’t mean that China’s desire to hold a military
base in the region must meet a green signal from the Kremlin. The maintenance of security in case of
confrontation with the United States depends on Russia; China has no interest in being drawn into
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military conflict with the United States in the region. The Kremlin must assure China that any
cooperation in the sphere of maritime security will be to protect mutual economic activities.
China does not want to challenge the US in the Arctic
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
However, there exist several divergences in Sino-Russian cooperation. Despite the strategic
reproachment, China neither shares Russian ambitions to confront the United States directly, nor is it
willing to harm its relationship with the United States for the sake of the Russian Arctic agenda.
Aglaya Snetkov has termed Russia as a “loud dissenter” and China as a “cautious partner.”103 It is
evident in the statement of Chinese diplomat Fu Ying who stressed that “China has no interest in a
formal alliance with Russia, nor in forming anti-US or anti-Western bloc of any kind.”104 Similarly,
despite China’s growing bilateral engagement with Russia, it is still cautious and has sought ways to
steer itself out from the international security crisis with Russian involvement, notably in Ukraine and
Syria.
China not building significant military capabilities in the Arctic
Greenwood, 2023 (January/February, Cmdr. Jeremy Greenwood is an officer in the U.S. Coast Guard
with more than 20 years of experience at-sea and ashore throughout various policy offices, including
serving as a Coast Guard liaison officer at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs.
He was a Brookings Foreign Policy federal executive fellow from 2021-22, GREAT POWER COMPETITION
AND OVERSEAS BASING IN THE ARCTIC, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2023/02/FP_20230207_arctic_basing_greenwood.pdf
China likely has no plans to build traditional military bases or outposts in the Arctic, but it will seek
occasional access rights to existing Russian bases for its ships and aircraft operating in support of
research missions or possible joint exercises with Russia in the NSR. These missions will demonstrate
Beijing’s ability to project power into the Arctic, but in a limited way — primarily to protect China’s
research and commercial interests. Chinese military presence in the Arctic will most likely remain in the
form of dual-purpose facilities operating as research stations or economic investments
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China-Russia Cooperation Threat Answers
China does not trust Russia in the Arctic
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
China is likely still in the process of assessing the ramifications of the war in Ukraine for its Arctic
interests. It would be ideal for China to continue its Arctic engagement as usual. But Russia’s isolation as
well as tough sanctions have cast much uncertainty on the sustainability of China’s omnidirectional
Arctic engagement. Even if a divided Arctic becomes an inevitable reality in the near future, Beijing
may live with it and strive to walk a fine line between Russia and other Arctic countries. Beijing knows
that Russia does not want China to have a growing role in the Arctic and that their Arctic partnership
is and will likely remain a marriage of convenience. Therefore, China may see a more cautious
approach toward its cooperation with Russia in the Arctic best serve its own interests as it navigates
through great uncertainty in the region.
Russia does not trust China in the Arctic
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
Despite these Arctic project collaborations, Moscow views China’s growing presence in the Arctic with
distrust. With vast territory and a more-than-20,000-mile coastline in the Arctic circle, Russia has a
strong interest in preventing external powers from influencing Arctic affairs, and thus sees China’s
claim to “near-Arctic state” status and advocacy for non-Arctic states to have a greater say in Arctic
affairs as an unwelcome push for “internationalization” of the region. Tensions between the two
nations surface at times. In 2012, for instance, Russia blocked Chinese research vessels from conducting
surveys along the Northern Sea Route during China’s fifth Arctic expedition. Up to 2013, Moscow
persistently opposed granting China observer status on the Arctic Council. Even after the 2014 Crimea
crisis, when Russia began to demonstrate a warmer posture toward China’s role in the Arctic, Moscow’s
suspicions remained in place. In 2020, Russia arrested the head of the Arctic Civic Academy of Sciences
in St. Petersburg on the charge of passing classified information to China. Beijing clearly knows Russian
distrust.
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China trying to avoid West-Russia disputes
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
Over the past decade, while pursuing its Arctic interests through omnidirectional diplomacy, Beijing has
in general managed to stay clear of the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the western Arctic
states, especially the NATO countries. Even shortly before the eruption of the war in Ukraine, Chinese
experts were voicing cautious optimism on China’s continued engagement with the Arctic. But the war
and the latest moves taken by the Arctic Council cast a cloud over the outlook of China’s Arctic
aspirations, at least in the short run.
Economic pressures means China will not fully align with Russia
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
However, it remains questionable how far China is willing to risk its economic ties with Europe and the
United States, especially at a time when China is grappling with a slowing economy at home and
internationally facing a more unified West that has shown its resolve to impose significant costs.
China may see the imperative to tread with extra caution. Indeed, China’s state-owned Sinopec’s
decision on March 25 to suspend projects in Russia suggests that Beijing is heeding Washington’s
warning despite the foreign ministry’s insistence that China has the “right to carry out normal
economic and trade exchanges” with other countries. As China’s National Petroleum Corporation and
China National Offshore Oil Corporation are reportedly also assessing the potential ramifications of the
sanctions, Beijing may watch other international investors that have not yet decided to exit or freeze
their projects in Russia, including India’s state-owned energy company Oil and Natural Gas Corp, and
Japanese investors in liquefied natural gas projects in Sakhalin and Arctic LNG 2, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and
Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Co.
Ukraine war means China cannot be completely aligned with Russia
Greenwood & Luo, 2022, Jeremy Greenwood is a federal executive fellow with the Brookings Institution
in Washington D.C. and a U.S. Coast Guard officer with more than 20 years of military service. Shuxian
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Luo is a post-doctoral research fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Her research focuses
on Chinese foreign policy, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and America’s relations with Asia,
COULD THE ARCTIC BE A WEDGE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?,
https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/could-the-arctic-be-a-wedge-between-russia-and-china/
The Arctic Council proved to be an early casualty of the war in Ukraine. All of the Arctic states except for
Russia released a joint statement on March 3, announcing their intention to temporarily suspend
participation in all meetings of the Arctic Council and its subsidiary bodies. The premier forum for Arctic
governance, which tended to be immune from geopolitical tensions, can no longer function in its
consensus-based format with the ongoing war. China, though not an Arctic state, has been an official
observer on the Arctic Council since 2013 and harbors growing Arctic ambitions. What does the
suspension of the Arctic Council — at least for the near future — mean for China? The continuing
conflict in Ukraine casts a cloud over China’s Arctic aspirations. Beijing may still want to have it both
ways, i.e., to continue its cooperation with Russia without spoiling ties with other Arctic states. But
with the ramifications of the war spreading northward, China may find itself more constrained in
pursuing its Arctic interests Beijing knows it cannot put all its eggs in the Russian basket, and this
could be explored by the West as an opportunity to distance China from Russia. But reducing China’s
dependence on Russia for advancing its Arctic interests requires keeping China in the game in the first
place.
Currently no Russia-China military alliance in the Arctic
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
Despite the optimism regarding Sino-Russian cooperation, there exist various limitations to SinoRussian cooperation. The grievances and mistrust rooted in the history and differences in the strategic
culture, particularly on the Russian side regarding the shift in relative power.105 Similarly, China’s
priority regarding its economic growth compels her to align with the United States, which is Beijing’s
trading partner. Bobo Lo has argued that China and Russia “share neither a long-term vision of the
world nor a common understanding of their respective places in it.”106 Hence it can be argued that
Sino-Russian cooperation is more like a flexible strategic partnership in which both states are pursuing a
pragmatic approach of cooperation on mutual strategic interests. Nevertheless, there exists no longterm strategy to assist or defend each other.
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Answers to: Russia Threat
INCREASING U.S. presence will trigger a backlash
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
Strategically, the United States might deploy a nuclear submarine fleet due to the rising tensions and
disparity in the military capability. The deployment of the large surface warships and sea-based
ballistic missile defense systems in the Arctic is due to the periodic visits of US submarines.79
Furthermore, the United States will enhance its capabilities to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) launches at the initial phase and making a preventive strike by ICBMs, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, irrespective of their nuclear or nonnuclear nature.80
However, the execution of these plans will create a hard security threat in the region, which can be
observed from the negative response of Russia over joint UK-US naval exercises in the Norwegian and
Barents seas in May 2020.
Finland and Sweden joining NATO deters Russian aggression
Bekkeveld & Hilde, 7-28, 23, Jo Inge Bekkevold is a senior China fellow at the Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies and a former Norwegian diplomat, Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/28/arctic-nato-russia-china-finland-sweden-norway-northerneurope-defense-security-geopolitics-energy/ Paal Sigurd Hilde is a professor at the Norwegian Institute
for Defence Studies. Twitter: @Paal_S_H
Fifth, Russia’s war in Ukraine has strengthened China’s relations with Russia and given Beijing more
leverage over its junior partner—which, in turn, increases China’s potential influence in the Arctic.
Beijing wants access to Arctic resources, and it could have a strategic interest in the region for early
warning purposes and a potential naval presence.
Collaboration in the Arctic needed to avoid great power war; increasing military
presence undermines that
Batool, 7-14, 23, Ms Fizza Batool is a student of International Relations from Kinnaird College for
Women. She is particularly interested in geo-economics, geopolitics, area studies, diplomacy, conflict
and peace, strategic and defense studies, political economy, and global politics of the environment,
Significance of the Arctic Region, https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/the-arctic-region/
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The phenomenon of the Arctic presents a chance for realism theory analysis. Realism is a wide notion
that encompasses everything from classical realism as described by Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) to
neorealism as developed by Kenneth N. Waltz (1979). It is believed that the global order is wholly and
permanently chaotic. Neo-realists often assert that these influences do not change the vital role that
conflict performs in global politics, even though conventions, laws and structures, opinions, and other
variables are accepted to influence the conduct of states. Since climate change has presented the Arctic
nations and other players with new opportunities and problems, the region has become a focal point
of great power conflict. A neo-realist narrative can, hence, help in explaining the dynamics of this
rivalry. Neo-realism holds that in an international system that lacks a central authority to enforce laws
or norms, nations want to maximize their relative strength and security. State interests in accessing and
using the region’s natural resources, supporting their maritime borders, and extending their military
presence and influence will be pursued in the Arctic as a result. In the case of the US-China power
confrontation in the Arctic, neorealism implies the fact that conflict is an undeniable phenomenon,
whereby the developed strategies can supply a dimension to the persistence of conflict which is merely
an economic one. Resource wars are an example of the implication of conflict in the region. Neorealism,
however, also acknowledges that states may work together under specific circumstances. This implies
that to resolve their issues and advance regional stability, governments in the Arctic will also take part
in multilateral organizations like the Arctic Council and abide by international law like the UNCLOS
(United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea). To understand the intricate and dynamic nature of great
power conflict in the Arctic, a neo-realist story can be a helpful tool. Thucydides Trap: An Idea American
political scientist Graham T. Allison coined the phrase “Thucydides trap” to characterize the propensity
for conflict when a growing power poses a danger to replace an established great power as a regional or
global hegemon. The phrase is based on a statement made by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides,
who said that Sparta’s dread of Athens’ development made the Peloponnesian War between the two
cities unavoidable. Allison contends that this pattern has appeared several times throughout history,
with war breaking out in 12 of the 16 instances of great power conflict. A possible flashpoint for such a
confrontation is the Arctic region because of its abundance of natural resources, strategic locations,
and environmental significance. Exploration, exploitation, and navigation in the area now face new
potential and problems due to the melting of the polar ice caps brought on by climate change. The eight
Arctic Council nations – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United
States – are the key players in the region. Moreover, other nations have also expressed interest in the
region, including China, India, Japan, and the European Union. Also Read: The Syrian Port of Tartus: A
New Gateway for Russia According to The Thucydides trap, China’s desire to increase its presence and
influence in the Arctic might lead to tension and war between the United States and China. China has
referred to itself as a “near-Arctic state” and has undertaken several diplomatic, scientific, and
commercial projects there. China has also made significant investments in the region to link Asia with
Europe and Africa via land and water routes over the Arctic. Some Arctic nations, particularly the United
States, which sees China as a strategic rival and a possible danger to its interests and allies, have serious
concerns about China’s intentions. The Thucydides trap suggests that a conflict between China and the
United States over the Arctic is not inescapable, but rather might result from their rivalry instead.
Both parties must practice restraint, communication, collaboration, and respect for international law
and standards to avert such a situation. All regional parties may benefit greatly from the calm and
fruitful engagement promoted by the Arctic Council. The Thucydides trap also cautions that human
initiative and creativity may sculpt many futures and that history is not destiny. To avoid being
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constrained by the past, it is crucial to learn from it. The “new Cold War” in the Arctic region has wideranging effects that are important for both local and global stability. On the one hand, the region’s
growing competitiveness and collaboration have certain advantages. For instance, competition may
encourage innovation and progress in fields like indigenous rights, environmental preservation, and
renewable energy. Cooperation might encourage communication between Arctic governments on topics
including fisheries management, scientific research, and security. However, there are many challenges
to the increasing rivalry in the area. A nuclear exchange or conventional war between large countries,
for instance, might result in conflict that has disastrous effects on ecosystems, human life, and the
environment. Conflict may also weaken the institutions and laws now in place to manage the Arctic,
including the Ilulissat Declaration, the UNCLOS, and the Arctic Council. Conflict could also take resources
and focus away from tackling pressing issues like climate change adaptation and mitigation. Given the
scenario of a power struggle and the urgency of climate change, the rise of China is inevitable. The
implementation of climate preservation policies is used as a tool to invest in the Arctic region and
collaborate for interdependence on geopolitical constraints. The Polar Silk Road, if completed, would
directly pose an economic threat to the US, laying the foundation for the Thucydides trap. The strategic
significance of the Arctic region, its abundance in resources, and the menace of global warming have
dragged the attention of international players whereby, they tactically hold the notion of environmental
preservation in the Arctic region. However, in reality, international actors are exploiting the region with
the initiation of projects to enhance their economic status. The main concern over the Arctic theatre is
the US-China power competition where China is the rising power, and the US is the ruling power. If, in
the coming times, China overpowers the US, the presented idea of the Thucydides trap would be
considered successful. In conclusion, the argument lies in the fact that there would be a “new Cold
War” in the Arctic due to the region’s growing economic prospects and security threats. There are
both positive and negative effects of this phenomenon on regional and global stability. To foster a
peaceful and sustainable development of this crucial region, the international community must
cooperate to prevent and manage possible disputes in the Arctic.
Attempted coup proves Russia’s military is a wreck
McFaul, former US ambassador to Russia, 6-24, 23, NPR, Former U.S. ambassador to Russia says aborted
Moscow march signals Putin's weakness, Former U.S. ambassador to Russia says aborted Moscow march
signals Putin's weakness : NPR
DETROW: So you think, in your mind, there's no question that whatever this possible resolution is, Putin is weaker than he was before it began.
MCFAUL: Yes. I mean, how else can one describe this? These
are two Russian armies that, instead of fighting the
Ukrainian army, were gearing up to fight each other. Mr. Prigozhin was at least doing a mutiny and maybe a coup, and
Putin did not look like he was in control of this situation at all. He talked a really tough game several hours ago when he spoke to the people,
but he was rather feckless in his response to this mutiny, this coup. That suggests that he's much weaker today than he was just 24 hours ago.
DETROW: You have been predicting for a long time, along with many others, that that the Ukraine war could endanger Putin's regime, as it's
gone so poorly for Russia. Did the specifics of what has happened here - as far as we know what they are right now - did the specifics of this
particular threat surprise you? MCFAUL: Not the specifics in terms of who the actors were. I've been talking about this for a long time, like you
said. But I was surprised by how fast Prigozhin could get his forces to seize one of the largest cities in all of Russia... DETROW: Yeah. MCFAUL:
...Without a fight. That surprised me. DETROW: What do you think this means for the war in Ukraine going forward? The
Wagner group
has played such a big role in it for Russia. I mean, the Kremlin has said that all will be forgiven for the soldiers who participated.
But it just seems hard to me to envision marching on your own country, then turning around and
rejoining the lines with Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. MCFAUL: I agree with you entirely. I think for morale
purposes, this is a disaster for both the Wagner forces that allegedly are now going to join the conventional Russian army but also for
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the Russian army that are fighting there. I think it's an opportunity, I hope, for the Ukrainians to succeed faster with their counteroffensive. And
here I agree with Prigozhin. At one point in one of his missives last night, he described and explained why this war was a mistake and a disaster.
And they've been lying to you from the Kremlin. I hope that message gets out to Russian soldiers and to Russian people as well. DETROW: Does
Prigozhin represent a continued threat to Putin at this point? MCFAUL: Yes. I will be surprised if he just goes to Belarus and retires for the
rest of his time. He has become a populist figure. His soldiers were cheered as they left Rostov, and I just cannot imagine that he
just fades away. I think he presents a real problem for Putin for the future. DETROW: And I just want to go back to this point of Putin
saying he will not be charged or the Kremlin, rather, announcing he will not be charged - because without speculating too much, there is a clear,
very long trend of how Putin responds to political threats. And this does not seem to fit in them. MCFAUL: You're exactly right. I mean, think
about the paradox here. Mr. Kara-Murza, who was just sentenced for 25 years in jail for mildly criticizing the war, yet Prigozhin threatens to
overthrow the Russian military, and he doesn't face any charges and goes to Belarus - that is something we have not seen ever in Putin's Russia.
And I think it underscores just how weak he is right now. DETROW: And what are you going to be looking for in the next day or so in terms of
getting a sense of this crisis has immediately calmed or it might flare up again? What do you think the key things to keep an eye out are?
MCFAUL: Two or three things. First, it's been alleged that as part of the deal, Prigozhin forced out Gerasimov, General Gerasimov, who's the
commander of the Russian armed forces. That has not been confirmed, but that will be very interesting to see if that was true. And second,
does Prigozhin, from his new post in Belarus, continue to criticize the Russian armed forces? He's got a big social media presence. Or does he
now go silent? And was that part of the deal for him to remain alive and in exile? We don't know the answers to those questions... DETROW: Do
you think he's at risk physically, personally at risk in Belarus? MCFAUL: Oh, absolutely. I would be very concerned, if I were him, for his health
and his safety. DETROW: How does the - how does what happened over the past 24 hours stack up to you to, you know, the coup attempts of
the '90s, the other unrest we've seen over the years. In about 30 seconds, is this going to be a major moment in Putin's presidency? MCFAUL:
Without question, it's
the weakest moment of his presidency. It's the strongest threat to him. And it
undercuts the image of Putin the great, Putin the powerful, Putin supported by everyone. He's not
supported by everyone inside Russia.
Ukraine war wiped-out Russia’s Arctic military threat
Wall & Wegge, CSIS, 2023, The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war
To summarize, Russia’s conventional land forces in the Kola Peninsula, including naval infantry and
possibly special forces, are today depleted and substantially weakened. Russia’s ability to successfully
conduct a rapid conventional ground incursion toward its western neighbors in the Arctic is in the
short term even more minimal than before the war. Its ability to do so in the medium and long term
will depend on its ability to recruit new conscripts and train them for Arctic operations. There is also
reason to think that the same issues relating to “low morale, poor execution of combined arms, subpar
training, deficient logistics, [and] corruption” may bedevil Russian forces in the Arctic, as they have in
Ukraine—though one should not underestimate Russia’s potential to learn from its failures.[129]
Russia is a paper tiger
Nick Patton, 1-1-23, https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/01/europe/putin-ukraine-war-shift-europesecurity-intl-cmd/index.html, Europe’s big question: What a diminished Russia will do next
The prospect of a Russian defeat is in the broader picture: that it did not win quickly against an inferior
adversary. Mouthpieces on state TV talked about the need to “take the gloves off” after Kharkiv, as if
they would not be exposing a fist that had already withered. Revealed almost as a paper-tiger, the
Russian military will struggle for decades to regain even a semblance of peer status with NATO. That is
perhaps the wider damage for the Kremlin: the years of effort spent rebuilding Moscow’s reputation
as a smart, asymmetrical foe with conventional forces to back it up have evaporated in about six
months of mismanagement.
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Russia eviscerated from the Ukraine war, can’t rebound militarily
Pavel Luzin, 11-15, 22, Pavel Luzin, Ph.D. in international relations (IMEMO, 2012), is a visiting fellow at
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and a senior fellow at the Jamestown
Foundation with a focus on research of Russia’s foreign policy and defense, space policy, and global
security issues. In 2017–2018, he was a consultant on the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and
defense industry issues for Alexei Navalny’s presidential campaign, Doomed to Failure — Russia’s Efforts
to Restore its Military Muscle, https://cepa.org/article/doomed-to-failure-russias-efforts-to-restore-itsmilitary-muscle/
Faced with an acute loss of advanced components and industrial equipment as a result of Western sanctions,
the Russian defense
industry will simply be unable to compensate for its losses in the foreseeable future. The Kremlin is adopting
measures to restore some of its lost military power by giving priority to quantity instead of quality in its arms manufacturing efforts. Yet
increasing the productivity of domestic defense corporations is hard, if not impossible. Much is revealed by
examining Russia’s defense budget. The planned 2022 national defense (ND) budget was 3.51 trillion rubles ($57.4bn), which rose to 3.85
trillion rubles after the all-out invasion began. In addition, 2.82 trillion rubles were planned for national security and law enforcement (NSLE.)
This latter element plays a significant role in the analysis of Russia’s military spending, because the Russian national guard (Rosgvardia)
including its Chechen units, plus some units of the FSB and other law enforcement agencies, are directly involved in the war. Presumably,
Russian mercenaries like the Wagner group are indirectly and at least partly funded by this element of the budget, which may amount to a third
of the NSLE spend. The rest, some 60%–65%, is usually earmarked for the ministry of internal affairs (police, migration service, etc.), the
ministry of justice, emergency providers, prisons, prosecutors, and other services mostly absent from Ukraine. In ruble terms, the budget is
higher than in previous years and inevitably so; that is due to the huge materiel losses in Ukraine, continuing defense industry financial losses
and the Kremlin’s decision to make Russia more authoritarian in economic as well as political terms. The aggression has changed the fragile
balance of the defense budget. Monthly updates of defense and national security spending have been classified since June, but before this
national defense spending in January-April alone was 1.6 trillion rubles, around 500 billion rubles monthly in March–April. This was significantly
higher than in previous years and its extrapolation gives an annual total of at least 5.5–5.6 trillion rubles by the year’s end. Despite a recent leak
from the Russian government indicating national defense spending would reach 4.68 trillion rubles this year, additional spending for arms
procurement alone was officially estimated to be at least 600bn–700bn rubles (pre-war, the share of arms procurement was to be 1.8 trillion
rubles for all of 2022.) Russia’s real national defense spending will inevitably be much higher; it is equally reasonable to suppose that the
national security and law enforcement spending will be much higher too. This financial turbulence may become even worse as the budget
deficit grows. Fiscal revenues were originally planned to be 25 trillion rubles, with spending at 23.69 trillion rubles. Yet in November, planned
revenues were unchanged while total spending is now planned to be 29 trillion rubles. The Kremlin’s budgetary planning for 2023 shows no
improvement. In October, the budget proposal assumed 4.98 trillion rubles for national defense and 4.42 trillion rubles for national security and
law enforcement, huge increases on the 3.5 trillion rubles and 2.97 trillion rubles in the 2023 preliminary planning a year ago. By November,
planned national defense spending for 2023 had exceeded 5.1 trillion rubles, a rise of 46% on the original figure. The share of arms
procurement here is significant, but it cannot become a “game changer” in restoring Russia’s military power. Officials and defense sector
managers declare that the defense industry is ready to make up all losses as the government increases its arms procurement budget. In 2022,
arms procurement will total at least 2.5 trillion rubles after all known budgetary corrections, and may even exceed this figure. Arms
procurement in 2023 will be no less than 2.5–2.6 trillion rubles according to current information, and may also be higher. However, part of this
spending will have to compensate for probable declines in arms exports. In August, Rosoboronexport, the subsidiary of the Rostec state-owned
defense corporation and the country’s arms trade monopoly, was expecting less than $11bn in arms sales by the end of 2022 (for comparison,
it was $13 billion in 2020), and total arms exports will barely surpass $12 billion. Moreover, Russia supports arms exports through subsidized
loans, offering its customers the opportunity to delay payments for years, while converting export contracts from less stable national currencies
(actually, into rubles.) Therefore, annual figures for arms exports do not translate into real revenue. Meanwhile, the Russian defense industry
has been generating net losses for years. For instance, the volume of the industry’s non-performing loans surpassed 1.7 trillion rubles in 2016–
2020, with the ultimate responsibility lying with the government. There is no evidence that defense companies improved their economic
efficiency in 2021–2022. Consequently, even
if the arms budget rises, it changes little in the economics of Russian
defense manufacturing ⸺ it merely plugs the holes in the industry’s already dismal financial balance
sheet. Officials are now traveling intensively from one defense factory to another trying to manage multiple problems arising on production
lines. The main challenge is how to maintain productivity; any hopes of actually raising it look almost impossible. The only way to do so would
be to simplify manufacturing and give priority to obsolete armaments. Thus, Russia is going to modernize 800 T-62 battle tanks in the next
three years. These tanks were first introduced in 1961, the same year that construction began on the Berlin Wall. This same approach is a
hypothetical possibility only for battle tanks and armored vehicles, not for combat aircraft, helicopters, missiles, artillery, and other systems.
For example, if Russia can produce 15 Ka-52 combat helicopters annually, it cannot rapidly raise this figure to 20–25 helicopters to cover losses
in Ukraine (which total at least 27.) This is especially true considering Russia’s continuing dependence on supplies of Ukrainian-made helicopter
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engines. Nevertheless, the
problem here is not only a lack of imported components, technology, and
industrial equipment, but also a lack of human capital. The Russian authorities estimate the total
current workforce deficit in the defense sector at 400,000 people. As a result, the losses of Russia’s
military during its invasion of Ukraine are irreversible.
Russia wants to cooperate in the Arctic now. Pushing against Russia risks war
Buchanan, 5-4-23, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan is a non-resident fellow of the Modern War Institute at West
Point and a First Sea Lord Five Eyes fellow with the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre. Her book Red
Arctic was published on March 24, 2023, with The Brookings Press,
https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/russias-gains-in-the-great-arctic-race/, RUSSIA’S GAINS IN THE
GREAT ARCTIC RACE
Putin’s Russia appears interested (not least given the aforenoted Arctic strategy revisions) in
maintaining dialogue with Denmark and Canada as overlapping Arctic seabed claimants. Further, as
the Arctic Council chairmanship rotates from Moscow to Norway, Oslo’s agenda appears rather focused
on the survival of the council as the premier forum for circumpolar diplomacy. Norway has so far
avoided calls to keep Moscow out in the cold — with Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre
recently stating: “people are cutting Russia out of the map as if it is no longer there. It is.” Evidently,
Western unity in the Arctic is facing a precarious future state of cohesion. Of course, the region’s
“known unknown” is whether Russia will return to the Arctic Council table at all.
Against the backdrop of the shattering of European peace, Russia’s next steps in the Arctic could very
well sink indefinitely the notion of “high north, low tension.” This specific Arctic saga has no clear end
point, and this also underscores the complexities of international law in action: Russia is at once a rulebreaker in one theater and rule-abiding and rule-centric (for now) in another. Navigating this duality
will require agile diplomatic abilities and at least a baseline of circumpolar dialogue. Let’s hope that
Moscow plans to pick up the phone.
Russia wants cooperation in the Arctic, not conflict
Lipunov, 5-30-23, Nikita Lipunov is an analyst at the Institute for International Studies at the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University).,
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-2023-russian-foreign-policy-concept/
Russian foreign policy doctrines and strategies are official texts that outline Russia’s goals and objectives internationally, how and under what
conditions it intends to achieve them, and most importantly, what it expects from other states’ foreign policies. Their language is some kind of
foreign policy Latin: it is almost legal, without accidental words and phrases. They are straightforward, devoid of literary imagery and hidden
agendas – they convey what really matters. For the Russian foreign policy community, it is a guidebook, a step-by-step instruction; for the rest
of the world, it is a clear signal and a declaration of intent. The 2023 document replaces the previous version of the Concept from 2016.2) Like
its previous editions, the document captures the trends in Russian foreign policy that have emerged and taken shape earlier, and in this sense is
the product of the Russian leadership’s reflection on international developments in recent years. For the first time, the new Concept clearly
identifies regional foreign policy directions, a style more characteristic of Western states’ strategic documents. This is probably done to make
the new hierarchy of regional foreign policy priorities clearer. The Arctic region stands out as one of top regions of priority. It is noteworthy that
the update has affected not only the list of directions and their hierarchy, but also the content of the policy itself, including in northern
latitudes. Previously, the Arctic was perceived as part of western policy. The relevant paragraph was located between the Euro-Atlantic and the
Asia-Pacific regions and followed mentions of the United States and Canada. In light of recent developments in international Arctic policy and a
reassessment of regional priorities, the Arctic now occupies an honorable second place after the ‘near abroad’ (i.e., the Commonwealth of
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Independent States – CIS). The focus of Russia’s Arctic policy is shifting to the development of the Russian Arctic, and international cooperation
now serves this goal. For Russia, as the largest regional power, Arctic policy has always had both internal and external dimensions. In the new
Concept, Russia’s foreign policy in the Arctic is an organic extension of its domestic Arctic development policy. The reassessment of the Arctic’s
position in relation to other regional priorities should be seen in the light of one of the leitmotifs of Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept. From
now on, Moscow does not seek integration into the Western community of states, and its institutions are not perceived as a value per se or a
status marker. This trend emerged in Russian foreign policy several years ago, but has now been formalized. However, this does not mean that
Russia is closing its doors and rejecting established institutions as such. Its approach is becoming more utilitarian and pragmatic: it is only
prepared to use them if it corresponds with its national interest and if other actors are eager to take them into account. The paragraph on the
Arctic has doubled in size, becoming more detailed and structured, with subparagraphs outlining foreign policy priorities in the Arctic. The main
goal is still the preservation of peace and stability. Instead of ‘constructive international cooperation’, there are now domestic objectives:
increasing environmental sustainability; reducing threats to national security in the Arctic; and, crucially, ensuring favorable international
conditions for the socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. It is the first time that indigenous peoples are
mentioned in the document: the protection of the ancestral habitat and traditional way of life of the small-numbered indigenous peoples of the
Russian Arctic is considered an integral part of its socio-economic development. One
of Russia’s key objectives in the Arctic
remains ‘the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a competitive national transport artery
with the possibility of its international use for transportation between Europe and Asia’. It is in relation to
the NSR that one of the new priorities of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic should be considered: ‘ensuring the invariability of the historically
established international legal regime of the internal sea waters of the Russian Federation’. The policy point on the ‘special responsibility of the
Arctic states for the sustainable development of the region’ remained constant, but all the regional formats with the participation of Western
states — the Arctic Council, the ‘Arctic Five’ and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council — have disappeared. Just a month prior, Russia’s Fundamentals
of State policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035, Russia’s official Arctic strategy, was amended.3) The changes included removal of all the
mentioned multilateral formats from the paragraph on international cooperation. The strategy was updated to emphasize the ‘development of
relations with foreign states on a bilateral basis, within the framework of relevant multilateral structures and mechanisms.’ However,
despite some media alleging Russia removed all mentions of the Arctic Council, Russia’s Arctic
strategy retained the point of ‘the Arctic Council as the key regional platform coordinating
international activities in the region’.4) This shows that Russia has no intention of creating alternative
platforms and remains committed for the time being to constructive international cooperation within
the framework of established and proven regional mechanisms. In the aftermath of the 2022 Arctic
Council pause, some experts feared Russia or the seven other Arctic states would create its own
regional institution without the participation of the party, but this is not likely to materialise in the
near future. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this commitment endures until Russia is treated as an equal party whose interests are
taken into consideration seriously. After Norway had taken on the chairship of the Council, the Russian Arctic ambassador Nikolay Korchunov
expressed that Moscow could leave the Council if its rights were violated.5) Russia still
remains committed to international
law in the Arctic. The Concept reaffirms the sufficiency of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to regulate
interstate relations in the Arctic Ocean. The new Concept clarifies the areas of UNCLOS that are relevant to Russia: protection of the marine
environment, which is important in light of the recently adopted UN agreement on protecting marine biodiversity in international waters, as
well as maritime delimitation, which replaced the ‘establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf’ in the previous Concept.
Moscow has long opposed ‘attempts to bring elements of confrontation, including a military one, to
the Arctic and to politicize international interaction in the region’. The 2023 Concept redefines this thesis as
‘neutralizing the policy of unfriendly states to militarize the region and limit Russia’s opportunities to exercise its sovereign rights in the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation’. Russia is rethinking the geography of international cooperation in the Arctic — now the document mentions
‘mutually beneficial cooperation with non-Arctic states that pursue a constructive policy towards Russia and are interested in international
activities in the Arctic, including infrastructure development of the Northern Sea Route’. This wording suggests an inclination to work with
states outside the Arctic region, such as China. This echoes another February 2023 amendment to the State Policy Framework, which now
includes ‘foreign’ instead of ‘Arctic’ states. The key message of the new Concept is that Russia is self-sufficient and open to cooperation with all
those eager to respect its interests, but will not tolerate their neglect. The same applies to the Arctic, where international
policy now
serves the national interest, so Russian policy in the region should be seen through this prism.
Russia doesn’t need to use force to accomplish its goals in the Arctic
Buchanan, 5-4-23, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan is a non-resident fellow of the Modern War Institute at West
Point and a First Sea Lord Five Eyes fellow with the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre. Her book Red
Arctic was published on March 24, 2023, with The Brookings Press,
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https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/russias-gains-in-the-great-arctic-race/, RUSSIA’S GAINS IN THE
GREAT ARCTIC RACE
To date, Moscow has adhered closely to the rules of game in the “race” to claim the seabed (and the
riches) of the North Pole. The race refers to the converging strategic interests from Arctic-rim states:
Russia, the United States, Denmark, Canada, and Norway. These interests include access to and use of
emerging global transportation corridors, the future of data routes via submarine cables, preeminent
satellite basing opportunities for both military and scientific purposes, as well as access to (and
potentially control of) Arctic resources (living and non-living). Russia has cleared the scientific burden of
proof required to have its extended continental shelf claim legitimized. Decades of scientific research,
Arctic missions, and information exchanges with Denmark and Canada have resulted in the U.N.
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf dubbing the majority of Moscow’s claim to an
extended Arctic continental shelf to be “valid.”
Russia’s military stinks
Stefan Hedlund, a professor of Russian Studies at Uppsala University, April 17, 2023,
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/the-arctic/, The Arctic in Russia’s crosshairs
Discounting the danger of a ground war in the Arctic, the question that remains concerns just how
combat-capable the Russian naval and air assets are. Military analysts have already been proven
fundamentally wrong in their assessments of the capability of the Russian ground forces. The fact that
the Russian air force failed to achieve air superiority in Ukraine, and has since been mainly withheld
from combat, does say something meaningful about its capability.
Russia’s missile technology is terrible
Stefan Hedlund, a professor of Russian Studies at Uppsala University, April 17, 2023,
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/the-arctic/, The Arctic in Russia’s crosshairs
The prior media hype about advanced Russian missile technology has taken an even bigger hit. It is
not enough that the stocks of some of the more advanced missiles have been seriously depleted.
Their accuracy has already proven to be poor, and as planners dig deeper into old stockpiles, reliability
will deteriorate even further. If the Russian military command were to contemplate getting into a
shooting war with NATO, it would have to consider that indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets in
Ukraine offers a very different challenge from engaging technologically advanced NATO forces that
possess effective countermeasures, including long-range precision strike capabilities that have been
denied the Ukrainian defenders.
Russia doesn’t have the economic means to project military power in the Arctic
Vazquez, April 2023, Gonzalo Vázquez is a Spanish senior-year student of International Relations and
senior research analyst at the Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies of the University of Navarre,
2022 Russian Maritime Doctrine: Implications for NATO & the Future of Great Power Competition in the
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Arctic, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2022-russian-maritime-doctrine-implications-nato-futuregreat-power-competition-arctic/
Yet, the main shadow over the newest doctrine remains whether or not Russia has the capacity to carry
out its objectives. Essentially, as Flanagan pointed out back in 2018 when discussing the importance of
North Atlantic security for Europe, “Russia’s capacity to realize these goals remains a subject of
considerable debate and uncertainty among Western military experts.”12) Taking into account the
economic difficulties and strains Moscow is already facing with the war in Ukraine, the aspirations
depicted in the new document, which include “developing and ensuring the construction of warships,
naval auxiliary ships, transport, fishing, research and other civilian vessels”13) and becoming a global
maritime power, appear to be unrealistic and hard to be achieved in the medium term.
Russia currently has an incentive to engage in peaceful action and maintain access
Ahmed, 2022, Shaheer Ahmad,. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Faculty of
Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Russia’s Reimagined
Arctic in the Age of Geopolitical Competition,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2959221/russias-reimagined-arctic-in-the-age-ofgeopolitical-competition/
Despite of the growing ante over military competition and the unprecedented naval prowess of Russia
in the region, the Kremlin must have an offensive-defensive policy action in the region. Maximization
of power is important, yet it is also important to maintain Russia’s leading status quo in the Arctic.114
Hence, it is important to keep the area free of conflict to reap the benefits from the NSR and allow
maximum cooperation in the region.
The NSR provides the Kremlin with an opportunity for economic gains and indicates the Kremlin’s
commitment to the multipolar world. The crisis in Ukraine hurt Russia’s global reputation. Therefore,
the opening of the NSR, its commitment to build projects in the High North, and the creation of
opportunities for international businesses must be utilized to improve its global standing. To achieve
these interests Russia must avoid military confrontation of any length with regional players,
specifically the United States, which will increase the trust deficit that exists between the Kremlin and
the world. Russia plays a vital role in the Arctic115 by providing icebreaker and navigation support as
well as energy production. This will allow regional actors to increase their trust in the Kremlin’s position
which is plausible only through trade, in the region.
Russia won’t initiate war in the Arctic, they are overextended in the Ukraine
Rosen, 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen is an independent journalist based in Italy and the author, most recently,
of Troubled: The Failed Promise of America’s Behavioral Treatment Programs, Politico Magazine, A
Battle for the Arctic Is Underway. And the U.S. Is Already Behind., A Battle for the Arctic Is Underway.
And the U.S. Is Already Behind. - POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/17/climate-change-arctic-00071169
“This idea about hybrid threats has really risen,” Marisol Maddox, an Arctic analyst at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington told me by phone days before Yakunin’s arrest
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for piloting a drone around critical infrastructure. “That’s where the Arctic comes in, where we’re
concerned about certain types of infrastructure. Russia’s not wanting to engage in another theater.
They’re already overextended in Ukraine, but they then are more likely to utilize these tactics that fall
just below the threshold of kinetic warfare.”
War turns case: Russia defensive in the Arctic now but could turn offensive if a war
with NATO starts
Wall & Wegge, CSIS, 2023, The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war
Russia’s military interests in the Arctic are ostensibly defensive: to defend its second-strike, sea-based
nuclear deterrent capability operating out of the Kola Peninsula; to defend the homeland; and to
protect its regional economic endeavors, especially oil and gas megaprojects like the Yamal LNG and
Vostok Oil ventures, and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which Russia views ambitiously as a future
global trade thoroughfare. [9]
Russia also has offensive goals.[10] First, it seeks to use the Arctic as a staging ground for power
projection, especially into the North Atlantic Ocean via the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap.[11]
Second, it may consider hybrid activities to intimidate or coerce European Arctic countries. Finally, in an
unlikely—but not unthinkable—wider NATO-Russia conflict, having escalated to a war, one can
imagine Moscow risking a limited incursion into Norway or Finland in a bid to protect its critical
nuclear assets in the Kola Peninsula by creating greater defensive depth through, for example, the
establishment of more western anti-access/area denial system systems at relatively easily defended
sites west of its border.
The Russian way of war makes it impossible for them to win in battle
Colonel John “Buss” Barranco was the 2021-22 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Atlantic Council’s
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, October 2022, Six Months, twenty-three lessons: What the
World Has Learned from Russia’s War in the Ukraine, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/newatlanticist/six-months-twenty-three-lessons-what-the-world-has-learned-from-russias-war-in-ukraine/
Russia spent around $65 billion on defense in 2021, or more than ten times what Ukraine did that
year. If equipment was the deciding factor, Russia would have achieved the overwhelming, lightning-fast
victory it sought months ago. But in this war, Ukraine has shown that good leadership and training—of
which it has plenty, but Russia has very little—make all the difference. Since both countries share a
long military tradition dating back to Imperial Russia, the difference in their respective performances
on the battlefield (and the reasons why) are instructive. Since 1993, Ukraine has been part of the US
National Guard’s State Partnership Program, in which its armed forces have been trained according to
the US model of giving mission-type orders to junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs),
explaining the commander’s intent, and empowering them to make on-the-spot decisions based on the
changing facts on the ground. No one becomes an expert combat decision-maker overnight, so realistic
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exercises are held and a culture is fostered that encourages individual initiative and demands rigorous
assessment. This open and transparent way of operating has resulted in high morale and performance
on the battlefield. By contrast, Russia’s armed forces (which rely heavily on conscripts) lack
professional NCOs and discourage initiative and feedback. Decision-making authority remains heavily
centralized, with only senior officers permitted to act independently. This is why so many Russian
generals have been killed in this war; nobody at a lower level had the leadership experience, bigpicture understanding, or authority to act decisively when things didn’t go as planned. The Russian
way of war has been predictable: battlefield failure and low morale.
Russia’s military is a joke
Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic
Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and worked for twenty-six years at the Central
Intelligence Agency, October 2022, Six Months, twenty-three lessons: What the World Has Learned from
Russia’s War in the Ukraine, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/six-months-twentythree-lessons-what-the-world-has-learned-from-russias-war-in-ukraine/
Six months ago, there was a plethora of doom-and-gloom analysis: The notion that the Russian military
believed it could take Kyiv in thirty-six hours was reportedly shared not only by Putin but also by
Western academic and intelligence-community analysts. Almost everyone got this fantastically wrong.
Except, of course, the one entity that mattered most: the Ukrainians, who fought bravely and nearly
unanimously believe they’ll win. A quick Russian blitzkrieg turned into a morass that will go down in
military history, with 80,000 Russian casualties and no end in sight to Putin’s “special operation.” Now
we see that the Russian military is a Potemkin village—corrupt, unfit, and fundamentally lacking in
basic principles of logistics.
Equally important, Russian hybrid-warfare efforts in Ukraine—particularly in the informationoperations space—have also fallen short. Previous efforts around the world, such as Moscow’s
meddling in the 2016 US presidential election, had spooked many (and perhaps for good reason). But
Russia succeeded in the past mainly because it operated without pushback. No longer: Ukraine now
appears one step ahead at every turn. Consider the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s expert trolling on
Twitter after a presumed strike by Ukrainian forces on a Russian airfield deep in occupied Crimea: It
showed Russian tourists fleeing the beach to the sound of the 1983 Bananarama track “Cruel
Summer.” How times have changed: Ukraine trolling Russia, not vice versa. This is exactly what was
needed in the information-operations sphere: an offensive strategy that was proactive instead of
reactive.
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Answers to: Overfishing Threat
MPA’s fail---can’t spillover to solve larger alt causes
Gies 18 [Erica Gies covers water, energy, critters and more on the science and environment beat, holds a
master’s degree in literature, with a focus in eco-criticism, her work has appeared in The New York
Times, Scientific American, Nature, The Economist and others, this story originally appeared in
bioGraphic, an online magazine about nature and sustainability powered by the California Academy of
Sciences, “Does Size Matter? Debating the Role of Marine Protected Areas,”
https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/oceans/articles/2018/04/27/does-size-matter-debating-therole-of-marine-protected-areas]
Whether we manage to set aside 2 percent of our oceans, or 10 percent or even 16 percent, scientists
and policymakers are fiddling around the edges of decline. And because the science is complex and there aren’t simple
answers, and because the need is vast and the money and political will are slim, conservationists are fighting over scraps. They are
recommending compromises that embed loss into the calculation. If
we really want to maintain biodiversity and ensure a
healthy future for our oceans that sustain human life – with food, CO2 absorption, climate regulation
and much more – according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, we need to protect 30 percent of our oceans with no
extractive activities by 2030. Some scientists have suggested that an even higher percentage is necessary for long-term
sustainability.
And even
the strongest MPAs cannot protect against climate change, oil spills, plastic pollution, agricultural
runoff, illegal fishing – all factors aggravated by the twin fundamental drivers of biodiversity loss: the exponentially
increasing number of humans on the planet and their consumption of resources, according to a recent paper in Nature Ecology & Evolution. But
protected areas can provide space for resilience.
To make the best possible decisions that will give the greatest number of species a shot, marine scientists are calling for more investment in
monitoring and a reporting framework linked to conservation goals so that the limited resources the world is willing to set aside for other
species will buy maximum value. MPAs
need to be placed “where they can make the most difference,” says Barnes.
Overfishing is a myth---the newest, most comprehensive studies show stocks are
rebounding
Emma Bryce 20, MS in Science Journalism from New York University, Freelance Journalist Based in
London, Work Appeared in publications including The Guardian, Wired Magazine UK, Audubon
Magazine, The Atlantic, The New York Times, Slate, and Yale e360, “Contrary To Popular Belief, Fish
Stocks Are Not Declining In All Parts Of The Ocean”, Anthropocene Magazine, 1/17/2020,
https://anthropocenemagazine.org/2020/01/the-verdict-managing-fisheries-really-does-work/
Fisheries management around the world is working, increasing ecosystem abundance and safeguarding
harvests for the future, across huge swathes of global ocean.
This piece of good news comes from a new PNAS study, and it’s giving researchers cause for optimism,
because until now there’s been a dominant belief that fish stocks are declining in most parts of the
planet’s oceans. The comprehensive new paper points out that while overfishing continues to be a
major concern, it certainly doesn’t describe the case everywhere.
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Instead, the study showed that wherever fisheries are being scientifically monitored, there has actually been an average
increase in abundance over the past few decades. The researchers put this down to improved
management in these monitored fisheries – which allows stocks to recover and replenish, thanks to measures
including catch limits designed to curtail overfishing.
What’s more,
because scientifically monitored fisheries make up a surprising 50% of all the reported catch
in the world, this paints a much more positive picture of how fisheries may actually be faring across
large parts of the globe.
Zooming in to the country-scale, the researchers drew up an index of fisheries management around the world to rank countries’ efforts. This
revealed that those regions that have taken steps to intensively manage their fisheries – among them, Alaska, the West Coast of the United
States, Norway, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands – showed increasing stock abundance, or fisheries that were at least improving.
In contrast, in regions that ranked lower on the index because management is more lax – like parts of the Mediterranean and North Africa –
harvest rates are three-fold higher. Consequently, fish stocks there were only half as abundant as better-managed fisheries, the analysis
showed.
This provided evidence of a concrete link between reduced fishing pressure – driven by better management – and more abundant fisheries.
And, this
is occurring in more places than we think, despite the gloomy prognosis on overfishing we’ve
become accustomed to. “Fish stocks are not all declining around the world. They are increasing in
many places, and we already know how to solve problems through effective fisheries management,” the
researchers said.
Previous studies on fisheries management relied on databases that only looked at about 20% of the world’s catch –
which was too limited to get a realistic gauge on how effective management efforts really are. The major
boon of this study is that it brings that figure up by 30%, to now cover half the world’s recorded catch.
Fishery disputes are small AND won’t escalate.
Ragnar Arnason 21, Professor, Economics, University of Iceland, "Economics of Fisheries Conflicts," in
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Environmental Science, 04/26/2021, Oxford.
It is well established that if valuable resources
are subject to sufficiently strong property rights conflicts over their
use are greatly diminished and the use of the resources are reasonably close to being Pareto efficient (optimal) (Arnason, 2007; Scott,
2008). The social institution of property rights has worked very well in land-based resource use. It doesn’t require much
contemplation to realize that property rights are the cornerstone of modern-day economic affluence.17
In the ocean, however, and most other water bodies, the system of property rights is much less developed. This applies not the least to the
living aquatic resources such as fish stocks and other aquatic biota. Therefore, in the absence of property rights, these resources, if at all
valuable, give rise to simmering conflicts with occasional flare-ups and generally very costly misuse.
It stands to reason that if
a system of property rights in aquatic resources, similar to that for terrestrial resources, were
established, fisheries conflicts and other aquatic conflicts would be much reduced and, at the same time, efficiency in the
use of aquatic resources would be increased. There are two obstacles to this solution, however. First the property rights
technology for aquatic resources is much less developed than for land resources. For instance, there is, as yet, no inexpensive way to identify
individual fish as belonging to an owner or even to keep wild fish within a given enclosed area. Second, it should not be forgotten that property
rights are a social institution. To establish them in particular resources requires sufficient social support. In fact, as human history informs us,
the extension of the system of property rights to new resources been generally marked by conflicts, clashes, fights, and wars. While property
rights may reduce conflicts over resource use, attempts to establish these property rights create their own conflicts.
In spite of this, the past
several centuries have witnessed a creeping expansion of property rights in ocean and
aquatic resources. The most noticeable of these developments have been (a) the enlargement of exclusive national
economic zones (EEZs) and (b) the establishment of individual harvesting rights, the so-called individual and individual
transferable quotas (IQs and ITQs). The former, the enlargement of EEZs, is a process that has been going on for centuries. The IQ/ITQs are
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a much more recent phenomenon emerging in the 1970s.18 However, since this time, the application of ITQs in ocean fisheries has expanded
very fast. According to a recent count, over 25% of the global ocean catch was taken under ITQ or ITQ-like systems (Arnason, 2013). It should be
noted that an extension of the national EEZ is often a prerequisite for the introduction of ITQs.19
EEZs may be seen as national property rights. Provided they are respected, the establishment of EEZs virtually
eliminates
international conflicts over the fisheries and other aquatic resources within their confines. EEZs fail, however, to eliminate conflict
over fish stocks that straddle the EEZ boundary or periodically migrate outside the EEZ. Such transboundary or migratory fish stocks remain a
source of conflicts between fishing nations. According to established law of the sea, specifically the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (Bjørndal &
Munro, 2003; United Nations, 1995), in such cases the nations fishing from the stocks should
form a RFMO (Regional Fisheries
Management Organization) to coordinate the fishing activity. Several such RFMOs have been established around the
world, managing over 150 species (Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, 2010). While these RFMOs seem to have reduced or at least
defused international fisheries conflicts, they have apparently proven quite ineffective in efficiently managing the fish stocks
within their purview (Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, 2010; Salenius & Arnason, 2020).
Properly designed IQs and ITQs provide the holder with a right to a certain share of the total allowable catch (TAC) every fishing season (usually a year). This largely removes the competition
between fishers for catch and, therefore, a good part of the resulting conflicts. Moreover, it provides each ITQ holder with an incentive to move the fish stocks to their most productive level
(because this maximizes the value of his ITQ). Furthermore, because of ITQ tradability, ITQ systems tend to bring about the most efficient number and configuration of fishers in the fishery.
The less efficient fishers tend to trade their quota rights to the more efficient ones, thus receiving a share in their greater efficiency in the form of a monetary payment. As a result, ITQs
promote efficiency in fishing. Note that this applies to all types of fishers: commercial, subsistence, and recreational ones, as well as their subgroups, such as high-technology and lowtechnology fishers, large-scale and small-scale ones, and so on. In summary, for all types of fishers, ITQs may be said to resolve a substantial part of fisheries conflicts in an efficient way.
It is important to realize, however, that ITQs are only harvesting rights, that is, property rights in harvesting. As a result, they do not resolve fisheries conflicts that do not directly involve
harvesting, such as competition for landing spots, ocean space to access high fish densities, and so on. This is because these conflicts are about other resources, that is, landings facilities in the
first case and ocean space in the second, while the ITQs are merely property rights in harvest quantity. It is another matter that these types of fisheries conflicts usually become less heated
under an ITQ regime because, typically, there will be less fishing activity and fewer fishing boats.
It should also be noted that the establishment of ITQs, while reducing conflicts in fisheries, may be a source of a different kind of conflict. This is because the allocation of property rights to
individuals or groups necessarily excludes non-receivers. Non-receivers naturally contest the allocation, sometimes bitterly. History abounds with such examples. In fisheries in which ITQs and
other individual property rights have been established such disputes are very common. The same applies to the extension of national EEZs in the past, although the associated international
disputes have died down somewhat recently. It follows, that the benefits of ITQs and similar individual property rights as conflict-resolving mechanisms in fisheries must be set against the
costs of increased conflicts about the property rights system itself.
What is not so obvious is that ITQs, despite their limitations as property rights, provide a certain basis for resolving conflicts between fishers and non-fishing uses of aquatic resources. Nonfishing uses of aquatic resources may be divided into uses that are concerned with the state of the fish stocks and, therefore, indirectly harvesting, and non-fishing uses that are uninterested in
fishing and fish stocks but may affect both. Examples of the former are aquatic conservation and certain types of aquatic recreation and tourism such as reef diving. Examples of the latter are
aquatic mining, aquatic transportation, and aquatic dumping of refuse.
Consider first non-fishing uses of fish stocks, such as aquatic conservation and tourism. Assume, as
is empirically reasonable, that
these activities would like to see larger fish stocks than the fishers would. This is a source of conflict with the fishers.
Within the ITQ system, however, aquatic conservation and tourism are able to increase the size of commercial
stocks, and basically move the ecosystem closer to a pristine state, by purchasing ITQs and leaving them unused. Thus, the
ITQ institution provides the aquatic conservationists and tourists with a way to achieve their preferred fish stocks by
simply trading ITQs with the fishers instead of fighting them. As they do the trading they continually compare their benefits of
purchase to their valuation of the monetary outlays, ending purchases when the two values are equal. The same, of course, applies to the
fishers; they do not have to fight with these other users of aquatic resources. They can simply trade with them. These ITQ
trades will find
an equilibrium where the shadow value of additional catch to fishers equals the shadow value of addition conservation to the
conservationists. Needless to say, this ITQ trading will increase the total value of resource use, benefit both parties, and
allocate the scarce resources more efficiently between the parties (Arnason, 2008, 2012).
It is important to recognize, however, that unlike in the case of fisheries, decentralized ITQ trades between fishers and conservationists (or
aquatic tourists), while likely
to significantly alleviate the conflicts between these groups, are very unlikely to bring about
generate positive
external effects for both groups. Consider the case of a conservationist purchasing one unit of quota from a fisher for retirement.
the optimal allocation of aquatic resource use between these groups. The fundamental reason is that these trades
Since this will, ceteris paribus, lead to a larger fish stock, all other conservationists and fishers will benefit from the trade. In other words, an ITQ
trade from fishers to conservationists generates a positive external effect for both fishers and conservationists (as well as aquatic tourists and
others preferring larger fish stocks). These extra benefits of the trade are naturally not taken into account by the fisher and the conservationist.
As a result, the extent of such decentralized trades is less than would maximize total benefits (Arnason, 2012). It follows that if fishers hold the
ITQs to start with, there will, from the social perspective, be too much fishing and too little conservation. Trades from conservationists to
fishers will, on the other hand, generate negative external effects for both fishers and conservationists because this reduces the fish stocks.
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Therefore, decentralized trades of this kind will be larger than would be collectively optimal with the same result: there will be too much fishing
and too little conservation.
It is possible to illustrate the essence of this analysis with the help of a simple supply and demand diagram. In Figure 4, the volume of harvest is measured along the horizontal axis and values along the vertical axis. Consider the trade of ITQs between one fisher and one conservationist.
Assume that under the ITQ system the ITQ holding of the fisher is at Q.20 Let the marginal benefits of harvest to the fisher be indicated by the bold downward sloping curve. The curve may be interpreted as the fisher’s demand function for harvest. However, since fishing his quota (rather
than not fishing it) reduces the fish stocks, the marginal benefits of this fishing to all the fishers jointly is less, indicated by the dashed downward sloping curve, which may be interpreted as the aggregate demand curve for harvest (out of the fisher’s Q).
[Figure omitted]
The conservationist suffers costs from the fishing. The conservationist’s marginal cost is indicated by the bold upward slopi ng curve in the diagram. This may be interpreted as his supply curve of harvest. However, since there are other conservationists, the joint marginal cost curve is
higher, indicated by the dashed upward sloping curve in the diagram.
From the figure, it can be seen that the trading equilibrium between the fisher and the conservationist is at harvest q° where their individual supply and demand curves intersect (and their evaluations of the value of additional harvest is equal). However, the optimal harvest occurs at
much lower harvest, q*, where the joint supply and demand curves intersect.
So, under decentralized trades, the ITQ system will not result in the optimal allocation of resource use between fishers and conservationists. Note, however, that although decentralized ITQ trades fail to generate full efficiency, they definitely represent an improvement in resource
allocation efficiency, as well as reducing conflicts, compared to not allowing conservationists to participate in the ITQ system at all.
The obvious solution to this problem is centralized trades. If, instead of trading individually, both groups, fishers and conservationists, acted jointly with regard to trades of quota shares, the external effects would be internalized and, in principle, optimal ITQ allocation would result. This of
course means that the trading quantity and the quota price is a matter of bilateral negotiation between the two groups. However, the very substantial added benefits to be gained increase the likelihood of an agreement. Moreover, in this situation, where rights are well de fined by virtue
of the ITQ system, the so-called Coase-theorem (Coase, 1960) indicates that there is a high likelihood that the parties will agree on the harvesting solution that maximizes their joint benefits.
What about the other users of aquatic resources such as aquatic miners, transporters, and polluters that are not interested in fish stocks? It is clear that they would not buy ITQs to enhance fish stocks and would sell all their ITQs, if they had them. Thus, ITQ trading would not facilitate the
optimal sharing of aquatic resources between them and fishers or alleviate conflicts between them. This outcome is because the ITQs, being merely harvesting rights, do not cover the aquatic resources these users want, namely minerals, ocean surface, and ocean s pace and currents. For
this purpose, the ITQs property rights are simply too limited.
If, however, the ITQ right were extended to cover the right to a certain state and regenerative ability of the fish stocks and the aquatic environment, the situation would be changed.21 In that case, any aquatic use that reduces the productivity of valuable fish stocks would violate the ITQ
rights and be subject to the appropriate compensation. This would, of course, curtail these other activities and move them toward the overall optimal level. Moreover, with these rights in hand, fishers acting jointly could negotiate with these other aquatic users a jointly optimal sharing of
the resources along the lines discussed.
Conclusions
Fisheries conflicts have a very long history in human societies. They seem to be present wherever fishing takes place.
Apparently, most of them are of relatively low intensity, but they sometimes flare up into armed confrontations
and even the application of national navies. In addition to their direct costs, to the extent that these conflicts prevent the optimal use of
renewable aquatic resources, they
can be very costly indeed.
Fisheries conflicts are fundamentally caused by the shortage of fish resources relative to demand. However, similar scarcity of natural resources
on land does not, at least not in recent history, generate the same degree of conflicts. The reason seems to be that most land-based resources
have become subject to an extensive system of property rights, which has channeled the conflicts into a less harmful form. This suggests that a
similar system of property rights in aquatic resources would reduce fisheries conflicts to the level seen for terrestrial resources.
The extensions of national exclusive economic zones (EEZs) constitute a step in this direction. Although far from enclosing all
international ocean commons and fish stocks, these extensions have already significantly
reduced international fisheries
conflicts and mollified many of the remaining ones.
Another type of property rights in aquatic resources that has been expanding fast in recent decades are individual quotas (IQs) and individual
transferable quotas (ITQs). These, however, are only harvesting rights and are, therefore, extremely limited as property rights in aquatic
resources. Nevertheless, where
they have been implemented, they have proven capable of both reducing fisheries
conflicts and greatly enhancing the economic efficiency in fishing (Arnason, 2013). The main practical drawback is that individual quota
systems, as other property rights, need considerable enforcement to be effective. Therefore, they are more suitable for advanced societies
than those with weak administrative capacity. Nevertheless, since
their beginnings in the 1970s, they have expanded very fast
around the world and currently account for over a quarter of the global ocean catch (Arnason, 2013).
It has been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically (Arnason, 2009, 2013) that ITQs
are capable of solving
resource allocation conflicts between all major types of fishers, commercial ones, recreational ones, and subsistence ones, as well as
those between subgroups such as large-scale and small-scale ones and inshore and offshore ones. The main reason is that the ITQ rights
eliminate the need to fight with other fishers for catch, and by trading of these rights each fisher can share in the greater efficiency of
the others. Thus, as an example, under the ITQ system, a poor subsistence fisher can indefinitely maintain his lifestyle by continuing to use his
quota for subsistence fishing or can increase his wealth by trading his quota rights to a more efficient high-tech commercial fisher.
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No modelling---other countries won’t think the US is credible and the plan is too
costly.
COVID thumps shocks---decked food production by 3.5%
No food wars
Jonas Vestby 18, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral
researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and
Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political
Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the
Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18,
https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]
It is perhaps surprising, then, that there
is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access
to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent
conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are
not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact,
the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they
often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in
protests.
Accordingly, there
is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates
primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to
political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general
economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of
living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as
drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.
Marine Species will migrate out the zone
Welch and McHenry 18 [Heather Welch, researcher in ecosystem dynamics at the University of
California, Santa Cruz, and is affiliated with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and
Jennifer McHenry, PhD student at Florida State University, “Follow the Fish: Why Marine Protected
Areas Should Be Mobile,” June 26, 2018,
https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/oceans/community/2018/06/26/follow-the-fish-why-marineprotected-areas-should-be-mobile]
THIS SUMMER, MANY Americans will visit national parks and wildlife refuges in hope of seeing wild animals, such as bison on the Plains or
alligators in the Everglades. Creating
protected areas that forbid or manage activities like hunting is an
important tool for protecting wildlife.
But it doesn’t always work perfectly. Mobile species, like wolves, elk and bears, seasonally roam beyond protective park boundaries, where
they may be shot, hit by cars or put down for straying into urban areas.
The challenge is even harder at sea. Fish and other marine species, such as sea turtles, don’t face roads, mountain ranges or other barriers that
limit where they can move. What’s more, suitable
habitat for many marine species is governed by factors that
change with the seasons, such as currents, fronts and eddies. This means that the distribution of marine
species can vary a lot from month to month.
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We study ocean habitats and strategies for conserving ocean life. In
analyzing marine protected areas, we’ve concluded
that simply designating protected zones is not enough. To be effective, these areas must be designed
to take more account of how sea life moves in and out of their boundaries.
Underwater Parks
Over the past century, the United States has created over 1,200 marine protected areas covering 26 percent of its
national waters. These zones are designed to safeguard important undersea ecosystems, such as coral reefs, and the creatures that depend on
them.
More than one-fourth of these areas are concentrated in the mid-Atlantic between Massachusetts and North Carolina. These reserves were
designed to protect static features, such as sensitive bottom habitat and nursery grounds.
In a study, we assessed how well marine protected areas in this zone accommodated the movements of marine species. To do this we built
species distribution models for 171 marine species that occur in the mid-Atlantic.
For each species, we acquired records for where it had been caught by a trawl net during regular surveys performed by the NOAA National
Marine Fisheries Service. Then, using satellite and ocean model data, we determined the environmental conditions at each of these locations,
using variables like temperature and salinity. This process showed us, for example, that dogfish prefer zones with water temperatures between
roughly 5 and 15 degrees Celsius and specific salinity levels. These relationships between species and the environment are called species
response curves.
Since we were interested in how species move seasonally, we wanted to know where they were likely to be in each month. Using data from
satellites and ocean models and our response curves, we predicted monthly distributions for each of our 171 species in the mid-Atlantic.
To make this huge quantity of data manageable, we clustered the species predictions into monthly assemblages – large multispecies clusters
that tended to form in certain areas. Our species grouped in ways that produced between five and 11 of these large assemblages each month
across the mid-Atlantic region, for a total of 85 large marine species groupings throughout the calendar year.
For example, lobster, bluefish and striped bass move together from a northern assemblage inshore in the summer to a southern assemblage in
the winter to stay in consistent water temperatures.
Then we looked to see what fraction of our 85 assemblages of marine species were adequately conserved within protected areas. In 2010,
nations that are members of the international Convention on Biodiversity set a target calling for marine reserves to protect 10 percent of the
world’s coastal and marine areas, especially zones that are critically important for biodiversity. But when we examined the most strictly
enforced marine protected areas in the mid-Atlantic – those that restrict or prohibit commercial fishing – we found that they fell far short of
this goal.
Among the 85 marine species assemblages in our study that formed at various times during the year,
only 36 had at least 10 percent of their preferred habitat protected within marine reserves. For the remaining
assemblages and the marine species they contained, less than 10 percent of their preferred habitat fell inside marine reserves.
Redesigning Protected Areas
How could marine protected areas be improved to protect mobile species more effectively? To answer this
question we used specialized reserve design software called Marxan. Marxan works by finding spatial solutions that maximize
targets for marine biodiversity protection – in this case, protecting 10 percent of each assemblage’s preferred habitat – while minimizing cost.
In this analysis the cost was represented by marine protected area size: The larger a marine protected area is, the more extractive uses such as
fishing will be barred or restricted within it, and these limits represent opportunity costs for fishers.
The areas that our Marxan solutions focused on protecting were offshore at the edge of the continental
shelf – the relatively shallow seafloor adjacent to the coastline. Many species move across the shelf
seasonally, exploiting productive inshore waters during summer months and then moving offshore to
deeper and more stable waters in winter. Existing marine protected areas that are strictly enforced are
generally located inshore, so when marine species move out toward the edge of the continental shelf,
they move out of the protected zones.
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Our work shows that if species protection is a primary goal, the mid-Atlantic needs a new configuration of marine protected areas that take
species’ seasonal movements into account. Complex dynamic features like these are unlikely to be protected unless they are explicitly planned
for when marine protected areas are designed.
Should Marine Protected Areas Move Around With Sea Life?
Other studies
have also proposed designs for protected areas that manage dynamic features such as
seasonally mobile species. Now some scientists are suggesting that it would be more efficient to make the
protected areas themselves movable.
Dynamic ocean management is an emerging approach that makes protected area boundaries flexible in
space and time, so that they can track the dynamic features they are designed to manage. For example, an
interdisciplinary group of researchers is working on a tool for the U.S. West Coast in which boundaries are updated each day to protect turtles,
sharks and sea lions from unwanted interactions with fishing vessels. They have shown that this
approach would actually close
off less territory to fishers, while protecting key species more effectively.
This is a new strategy that has been applied in only a few locations, but it
looks to be a viable approach for protecting
mobile marine species. In a world where climate variability and change are accelerating, society’s
approach to marine conservation needs to change with it.
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Answers to: Environmental Impacts
Oceans are stable and resilent
Ivo Vegter 15, Columnist and The Author of Extreme Environment, Writes for Publications such as The
Daily Maverick, CAR Magazine and ITWeb Brainstorm, “Are the Oceans Really Dying?”, Daily Maverick,
2/16/2015, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-02-16-are-the-oceans-reallydying/#.VOM3QPmsU40
Whenever environmental doomsayers run out of arguments, they
turn to the sea for hope – or rather, fear. Fish stocks are
collapsing, and if climate change doesn’t get us, ocean acidification will. But how true are these claims?
It may not surprise you to learn that I have a lot of conversations about the supposedly disastrous impact on the planet of human civilisation. As a defender of said civilisation, I’m often at the
receiving end of disdain and even hatred from those who believe humans are a plague ravaging the planet.
Often, once the most obvious myths, exaggerations and misconceptions are exhausted, my interlocutor retreats to the water. That is, they point at the sea as the final proof of humanity’s
depravity and guilt. After all, what is more obvious than the collapse of fish stocks, and the fact that this time next year, the ocean will be vinegar?
It is a matter of record, if you’re a regular reader of my columns, that exaggeration is common among green-minded people. There
are good reasons for this. People tend to believe environmentalists because they appear well-intended, despite the fact that green groups have
a marketing job to do. Their careers, like those of any company staffer, depend on meeting revenue targets.
Environmentalists are not immune to using hyperbole, lies of omission, red herrings, and appeals to
sentiment, fear, guilt, reward or empathy. These are the exact same techniques that a corporate spin
doctor would use in advertising. True, many environmentalists are motivated by a genuine belief that they have science on their
side, and that they are doing something good for society (or, if they are more misanthropic, for the earth). However, this is also true for many
corporate employees.
Few people knowingly spend their lives doing what they consider to be evil, but motives and good intentions don’t matter half as much as facts and consequences.
If green exaggeration is so common, what about the claims about places most people don’t actually go, like the ocean? Are they real concerns, or are they mere bogeymen to scare us onto the
straight and narrow path of green religion?
It is easy to believe that the crises are real. After all, the sea, unlike land, is for the most part not owned by anyone. That means that it is subject to the tragedy of the commons. Because
everyone has to look after it, nobody does.
I’ve cited the decline of major fisheries myself as an example of a serious environmental issue that needs to be addressed. (Of course, I believe that the best solution is to establish and trade
property rights in fish stocks, and that individual transferrable quotas go some way towards doing so. Disconcertingly, environmentalists agree.)
But, if the media are to be believed, things are much worse than having to order tuna-friendly dolphin at the sushi bar.
No lesser authority than the New York Times warned
that “ocean life faces mass extinction”.
All this sounds terribly serious. However, a bit further into the story, we
discover this: “Compared with the continents, the oceans
are mostly intact, still wild enough to bounce back to ecological health… Until now, the seas largely
have been spared the carnage visited on terrestrial species.”
Well, are the oceans on the brink of a mass extinction event, or are they mostly intact because they’ve been spared carnage? Pick one.
Another typical newspaper account, from the Seattle Times, read: “Ocean acidification, the lesser-known twin of climate change, threatens to scramble marine life on a scale almost too big to
fathom.”
The idea of humanity’s disastrous effects on marine ecosystems is far from new. In one of the most cited papers in the field, Jackson (2001), one can find this alarming line: “Synergistic effects
of habitat destruction, overfishing, introduced species, warming, acidification, toxins, and massive runoff of nutrients are transforming once complex ecosystems like coral reefs and kelp
forests into monotonous level bottoms, transforming clear and productive coastal seas into anoxic dead zones, and transforming complex food webs topped by big animals into simplified,
microbially dominated ecosystems with boom and bust cycles of toxic dinoflagellate blooms, jellyfish, and disease.”
Ouch. If true.
The panic of popular science writers (and some scientists) notwithstanding, it appears many
of the scares related to the
oceans have been overblown. That is the finding of a recent study entitled “Reconsidering Ocean Calamities”, by eight scientists
led by Carlos Duarte, published in the journal BioScience.
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“News
headlines convey the notion that the ocean is in [sic] imminent risk of ecological collapse,” they write.
However, upon testing the accounts of calamities, it turns out they sometimes lack robust evidence. The
authors also point the finger at marine research scientists themselves, who they say “may not have remained sufficiently skeptical”.
The authors consider calamities as events that satisfy three criteria: whether they can be attributed to human activity, whether they have
spread to a global scale, and whether they cause severe ecosystem damage.
“An analysis of some of the calamities reported in doom and gloom media accounts shows some – at times, severe – disconnect with actual
observations. For instance, there is no evidence that ocean acidification has killed jellyfish predators, nor that
jellyfish are taking over the ocean, and predictions that the killer algae, Caulerpa taxifolia, was going to devastate the Mediterranean ecosystem
have not been realized, despite claims to the contrary from the media.”
For each criterion, they cite examples of issues for which there is robust evidence, equivocal evidence, and weak evidence.
In the first category, we find that fisheries
depletion can be attributed to human impact, as expected, and that this also has
a serious impact on marine ecosystems. However, the authors disagree that this means, as one CNN story would have it, that
the oceans are “on the brink of collapse”.
Harmful algae
blooms like red tides and associated hypoxia (depletion of oxygen), are often attributed to human activity.
However, the paper finds that the evidence for this claim, or even that it is a global problem, is ambiguous at
best.
Marine biodiversity is resilient
David Nield 17, freelance journalist who has been writing about technology, science, apps, gadgets and
the web since 2002. Extensively citing "Impact of the Late Triassic mass extinction on functional diversity
and composition of marine ecosystems," written by Alexander M. Dunhill, William J. Foster, James
Sciberras, and Richard J. Twitchett. Marine Ecosystems Can Survive The Worst Mass Extinction Events,
Study Shows. October 23, 2017. https://www.sciencealert.com/marine-ecosystems-cling-on-to-lifethrough-some-of-the-worst-mass-extinction-events
Researchers have studied fossil records from the Late Triassic mass extinction, which happened around 201.3
million years ago, and found that marine life did not fundamentally change, even though the vast proportion
of species were killed off.
The international team of researchers says that while marine species were still badly affected by the
event, enough life survived underwater to keep the ecosystems functioning. The findings could help us
understand more about how the changing climate of today could affect the planet.
"While the Late Triassic mass extinction had a big impact on the overall number of marine species, there
was still enough diversity
among the remaining species that the marine ecosystem was able to function in the same way it had
before," says lead researcher Alex Dunhill from the University of Leeds in the UK.
It's thought that huge volcanic eruptions, and the subsequent warming of the planet caused by the
greenhouse gases produced, was behind the Late Triassic extinction event.
At least half the species on Earth at that time were wiped out by the rise in temperatures, and in the event's aftermath, dinosaurs came to
dominate life on our planet.
The researchers analysed fossils dated between the Middle Triassic to the Middle Jurassic periods, a time span of around 70 million years,
covering life before and after the mass extinction event.
Ocean-dwelling animals were classified by how they moved, where they lived, and how they fed, and the study showed that none of these
categories of life completely disappeared after the extinction event.
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That said, there were major impacts on different regions and the environment as a whole, and some specific marine ecosystems were badly
damaged.
"We're not saying
nothing happened," says one of the researchers, palaeontologist William Foster from the University of Texas at
Austin. "Rather, global oceans in the extinction's aftermath were a bit like a ship manned by a skeleton
crew – all stations were operational, but manned by relatively few species."
The idea of a skeleton crew of lifeforms keeping the lights on in an ecosystem was first raised by Foster and his colleague Richard J. Twitchett in
2014, after another study focussed on the Late Permian mass extinction event about 252 million years ago.
The current study found one of the hardest-hit underwater organisms were corals, and the fossil record shows it took some 20 million years
before tropical reef ecosystems recovered from the Late Triassic extinction, even though the ecosystem as a whole carried on functioning.
With corals again under threat from rising temperatures in the modern day, the new research could provide a blueprint for the potential
damage we're going to see – and perhaps give us some clues for how to prevent it.
On a more positive note, it
shows life underwater is incredibly resilient, and capable of surviving through even
the worst times of environmental upheaval on our planet.
Alt causes thump
Richard Black 12, Environmental Correspondent at BBC News, “Governments Make 'Pitiful' Progress
On Oceans”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-18447516
Little has been done to protect marine life since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, conservation scientists
conclude. On pledges to protect key habitat and restrict the size of fishing fleets, they say progress has
been "pitiful". Their analysis is carried in the journal Science and is being discussed during final preparations for the Rio+20 summit,
which opens next week. Conservationists were delighted by Australia's move to set up the world's largest network of marine reserves. But
globally, the picture is bleak , they say. "Our analysis shows that almost every commitment made by
governments to protect the oceans has not been achieved," said Jonathan Baillie, director of conservation at the
Zoological Society of London (ZSL). "If these international processes are to be taken seriously, governments must be held accountable and
any future commitments must come with clear plans for implementation and a process to evaluate success or failure." Progress reviewed
The researchers assessed the various pledges made at the landmark 1992 Earth Summit and 10 years
later at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. Governments vowed to establish an
ecologically sound network of marine reserves by 2012, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal
fishing, protect critical habitat, look after the needs of local fishermen and restore depleted stocks to
healthy levels by 2015. Subsidies have not been eliminated, and illegal fishing is still a major issue in
some parts of the world. Little over 1% of the seas are protected . Two years ago, governments agreed to
raise that to 10% by 2020, but the new analysis shows that at the current rate of progress, the world is
off course to meeting that target. The pledge to restore stocks to healthy levels by 2015 has also seen slow progress. European
ministers meeting earlier this week voted to give themselves until 2020 to achieve the target in EU waters. The latest exception to this
rather gloomy picture emerged earlier this week, when the Australian government announced it was creating a network of marine reserves
around its shores that will cover 3.1 million sq km of water, including the ecologically rich Coral Sea off the Queensland coast. Coming just
before ministers arrive in Rio, conservationists hope it will inspire other countries to commit to strong safeguards.
Marlow is just BioD.
The environment’s rebounding
Dr. Alex Berezow 19, PhD in Microbiology from the University of Washington, Vice President of
Scientific Communication at the American Council on Science and Health, Non-Resident Fellow at The
Council on Strategic Risks, Speaker at The Insight Bureau, Former Adjunct Faculty Member at Northwest
University, “The Environment: Getting Better All The Time”, American Council on Science and Health,
7/23/2019, https://www.acsh.org/news/2019/07/23/environment-getting-better-all-time-14176
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In 1967, the Beatles released Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band, one of the best albums ever made. One of its hit songs was titled "Getting
Better," and part of the chorus goes like this:
I've got to admit it's getting better
A little better all the time
The song was about life in general, but it could have been dedicated to the environment. Contrary
to what you see reported in
the news, the environment is, bit by bit, getting better.
The Environment: Getting Better All the Time
The latest evidence for this comes from France, which is becoming heavily re-forested. According to The
Economist:
Since 1990, thanks to better protection as well as to a decline in farming, France’s overall wooded or forested areas have increased
by nearly 7%. And France is far from being alone. Across the EU, between 1990 and 2015, the total forested and wooded area grew
by 90,000 square kilometres—an area roughly the size of Portugal. Almost every country has seen its forests grow over the period.
Believe it or not, Europe
is not an outlier. The United States has more trees now than it did 100 years ago. A
study in Nature concluded that there is more tree cover on Earth now than 35 years ago1.
Why? Because of technology and wealth. Technology, including agricultural technology, helps decouple
the economy from natural resources. In other words, we humans are becoming less reliant on Mother Nature for our well-being.
We can grow more food on less land, for instance. Soon, using hydroponics, we may be able to grow food in
skyscrapers.
Wealth is the other major driver. When a poor country becomes wealthier, it usually does so at the expense of the environment.
(That's why China is belching out pollution and Brazil is destroying the Amazon rain forest.) The primary concern of these countries is to escape
poverty. But as countries become even richer, they decide to use some of that wealth
Green spaces and parks are often seen as a luxury that only the wealthy can afford.
to benefit the environment.
This concept is neither new nor a myth propagated by industry. It's known as the environmental Kuznets curve. (Source:
Govinddelhi via Wikipedia.) A textbook co-authored by Paul Krugman (yes, that Paul Krugman) called International Economics: Theory and
Policy said that the relevance of the environmental Kuznets curve "has
been confirmed by a great deal of further
research."2
None of this is meant to suggest that there are no environmental problems. Poor regions really are doing some very bad things to the planet.
Asia and Africa, for example, are primarily responsible for dumping plastic into the ocean3.
As is often the case, the cure is wealth. If we want these countries to treat the planet well, we should do whatever we can to help make them
richer. Incidentally, they'll also have fewer kids.
Notes
(1) Naysayers, pessimists, and Debbie Downers will
note that biodiversity is lower in new forests than in old-growth forests.
patience. Biodiversity will return. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and
South Korea has become a haven for wildlife, including endangered species.
That's probably true but have
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General War Answers
Multilateral Arctic Council can solve conflict
Stavridis, 7-13, 23, James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. A retired U.S. Navy admiral,
former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the
boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings,
Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the
cybersecurity sector, Washington Post, Sweden and Finland Give NATO an Arctic Opportunity,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/07/13/sweden-finland-give-us-and-nato-arcticdominance-over-russia/acc33394-2134-11ee-8994-4b2d0b694a34_story.html
There is a diplomatic aspect to NATO’s role in the region as well. The international organization known
as the Arctic Council includes all seven NATO members and Russia, as well as observer nations
including China. It has provided a forum for planning for shared use of international waters and
airspace — a forum where disputes can be heard and compromises reached. Despite immense
differences over Ukraine, NATO and Russia must seek to avoid a war at the top of the world. The
Arctic Council, like the effective Cold War arms-control agreements, can be part of a diplomatic track
to address non-Ukrainian issues.
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Russia Cyber Threat Answers
West is defended against Arctic cyber attacks now
Wall & Wegge, CSIS, 2023, The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war
Second, Russia’s relative incapacity to threaten a conventional military land incursion into European
Arctic allies will be welcome news to the Biden administration, whose recent strategic documents do
not indicate a high prioritization of the region in terms of defense. Most notably, the NSS lists the
Arctic last in its overview of regional policies.[148] The strategy is cautious about promising U.S.
presence in the Arctic, saying it will only be exercised “as required, while reducing risk and preventing
unnecessary escalation.”[149] The U.S. National Defense Strategy mentions the Arctic fleetingly and is
also cautious: “U.S. activities and posture in the Arctic should be calibrated, as the Department
preserves its focus on the Indo-Pacific region.”[150] Its emphasis is on stability, homeland defense, and
maritime domain awareness, and there is no language in the Arctic section about deterring threats to
Arctic allies and partners. This language does appear in the U.S. Arctic strategy, which states, “We will
deter threats to the U.S. homeland and our allies by enhancing the capabilities required to defend our
interests in the Arctic.”[151] The document promises needed investments in domain awareness
capabilities and icebreakers.[152] Still, it also emphasizes avoiding escalation and notably states that it
“may be possible to resume cooperation under certain conditions.”[153]
Third, given the state of Russia’s conventional armed forces, Russian aggression toward Arctic
European states may continue to lean heavily on hybrid tools. There have been encouraging signs of a
Western response to this, such as Norway’s deployment of the Home Guard to protect critical
infrastructure, and NATO allies’ assistance to help them do so via increased allied ship patrols in the
North Sea.[154] Norway also recently adopted its annual Flotex naval exercise to include a component
focused on protecting oil and gas installations.[155] Even the U.S. Arctic strategy recognizes the
challenge, promising to focus on “building the resilience of critical infrastructure,” including against
cyberattacks.[156] This is a welcome recognition from the Biden administration of Russia’s penchant for
using hybrid tactics in the High North—however, the administration may not yet have fully recognized
that this tool is likely becoming more attractive to Russia in the Arctic, relative to conventional force.
NATO allies like Norway, and future members like Sweden and Finland, may need to further impress this
probability on the United States and other allies at the NATO level.
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Oil Security/Dependence Answers
Oil companies don’t want to drill in the Arctic for reasons that have nothing to do with
security
Alex Kimani - Jul 14, 2023, Alex Kimani - Jul 14, 2023,, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/3-ReasonsBig-Oil-Might-Turn-Down-Bidens-Arctic-Bonanza.html
One of the biggest reasons why Big Oil is largely disinterested in Arctic drilling is due to many
potential backers backing off. Back in 2019, Goldman Sachs became the first big U.S. bank to rule out
financing new oil exploration or drilling in the Arctic, as well as new thermal coal mines anywhere in
the world. The bank’s environmental policy declares climate change as one of the “most significant
environmental challenges of the 21st century” and has pledged to help its clients manage climate
impacts more effectively, including through the sale of weather-related catastrophe bonds. The giant
bank also committed to invest $750 billion over the next decade into areas that focus on climate
transition. Others soon followed suit: All five major U.S. banks and hundreds of financial institutions
across the globe have pledged to restrict or stop financing Arctic oil exploration. The second big
reason why Big Oil does not find the Arctic an attractive proposition is due to high drilling costs. For
instance, when former President-Alaska Production at Exxon Darlene Gates showed a chart comparing
estimated returns on investment at oil fields such as the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, the North Slope
and Angola, Alaska oil was by far the least profitable due to its high cost of production. It’s a big reason
why BP Inc.(NYSE:BP) sold off all of its assets in Alaska, including leases on lands that lie within ANWR,
after 60 years in the state. The situation is not helped by the thawing permafrost. The Arctic is warming
twice as fast as the rest of the planet, turning the permafrost into a land of sinkholes, lakes and boggy
peat in the summer. Three years ago, a giant diesel fuel tank in the Siberian city of Norilsk sank into the
tundra and ruptured, spilling 21,000 metric tons (157,500 barrels) of fuel after weeks of record high
temperatures that hit over 100 degrees Fahrenheit. That marked the largest spill in modern Russian
history and nearly half the amount spilled by the Exxon Valdez tanker off Alaska in 1989. Finally, there’s
a lot of speculation regarding how much oil actually resides beneath the ANWR. Results of the only
test well ever drilled in the refuge back in the early 1980s remains one of the most tightly guarded
secrets in the oil industry. Interestingly, a 2006 National Geographic investigation reported the well was
a “dry hole.’’ The fact that BP executives who knew what was down that hole and were on the cusp of
getting the greenlight to develop their leases for the first time in 40 years thanks to the Trump bonanza
instead chose to walk away does not inspire a lot of confidence in the refuge's potential. Neither does
the fact that the British oil giant sold its Alaskan assets to Houston-based Hilcorp, Inc.,a privately held
company specializing in squeezing the last drop out of dying oil fields. Meanwhile, oil companies have
been cutting their workforce in Alaska, from 15,000 in 2015 to 6,900 in 2019 well before the pandemic
hit, pushing 40,000 more Alaskans out of work. In the final analysis, the triple whammy of high
production costs, lack of financial backing and hostile government policies might mean that ANWR
continues to be the refuge’s “biological heart” and a breeding ground for polar bears, caribou and
more than 200 other species for decades to come.
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Cables Answers
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1NC – AT: Cables
Squo solves cable attacks
David 22 – Rona has been a journalist for over 20 years, collaborating with various media trusts: Pro
Tv, Prima Tv, RFI, Cotidianul (…). Notable is also her experience within the Environment Commission of
the Romanian Senate, as an advisor to the Chairman of this commission. In the period 2008-2010 she
was a correspondent for Prima TV at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which allowed her a
European approach to media issues. (Rona Rita David, "Submarine Cables: Risks and Security Threats,"
Energy Industry Review, 3-25-2022, https://energyindustryreview.com/analysis/submarine-cables-risksand-security-threats/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)
The US executive has recently investigated
possible risks in the event of multiple attacks. In addition to
expanding the SSGP grant program, it has encouraged the Maritime Administration to involve various
civil society associations, such as the International Propeller Club, in programs designed to minimize these threats.
The idea is to create a kind of “submarine cable militia” capable of responding quickly in a crisis.
The Propeller Club
has more than 6,000 members and has recently provided $ 3.5 billion in aid to the maritime
industry in the fight against Covid-19. Similarly, the creation of a “submarine cable Airbus” capable of competing with
GAFAMs, whose market share could increase from 5% to 90% in six years, can obviously become a reality only if Europe
pays attention to this topic.
In a context of growing international tensions, the creation of a European program modelled on the US
and Japanese programs, which aims to increase operations to deter attacks on these infrastructures and
to develop a high-stakes construction and repair, has become very important.
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A/C --- 1NC
Cyberattack alt cause – they can’t solve
David 22 – Rona has been a journalist for over 20 years, collaborating with various media trusts: Pro
Tv, Prima Tv, RFI, Cotidianul (…). Notable is also her experience within the Environment Commission of
the Romanian Senate, as an advisor to the Chairman of this commission. In the period 2008-2010 she
was a correspondent for Prima TV at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which allowed her a
European approach to media issues. (Rona Rita David, "Submarine Cables: Risks and Security Threats,"
Energy Industry Review, 3-25-2022, https://energyindustryreview.com/analysis/submarine-cables-risksand-security-threats/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)
The most vulnerable point of submarine cables, however, is where they reach land: the landing stations Thus, the
town of Lège-Cap-Ferret, where the interface room between the Franco-American cable “Amitié” will be built, has recently become a veritable
nest of spies, according to informed sources.
But the most worrying trend is that more
and more cable operators are using remote management systems for
their networks. Cable owners are excited about the staff cost savings. However, these systems have poor security, which
exposes submarine cables to cyber security risks.
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No Attack --- 1NC
No attack impact – incentive and backups
Boykin 19 – Nick Boykin is the News Marketing Producer at WUSA 9. ("How vulnerable are the
undersea cables that power the global internet?" WTKR, 7-26-2019,
https://www.wtkr.com/2019/07/26/how-vulnerable-are-the-undersea-cables-that-power-the-globalinternet, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)
However, with more
than 50 cables connected to the UK alone, Clatterbuck was skeptical about how useful a
deliberate outage could be in a time of war, pointing to the level of coordination and resources required
to cut multiple cables at once.
“If
you wanted to sabotage the global internet or cut off a particular place you’d have to do it simultaneously on
multiple cables,” he said. “You’d be focusing on the hardest aspect of disrupting a network.”
It would likely be easier to target onshore internet infrastructure with cyber and DDoS attacks, flooding the
network and knocking key facilities offline. Though even then, Clatterbuck pointed out, military and other government
organizations likely have satellite backups.
Risk is hype – they break all the time and Egypt thumps
Starosielski 15 – Nicole Starosielski is from the New York University. (Nicole Starosielski, "Are the
Internet's Undersea Cables at Risk for Sabotage?," livescience, 11-4-2015,
https://www.livescience.com/52685-are-the-internets-undersea-cables-at-risk-for-sabotage.html,
Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)
The biggest
problem with cable systems is not technological – it’s human. Because they run underground, underwater
and between telephone poles, cable systems populate the same spaces we do. As a result, we accidentally break them
all the time. Local construction projects dig up terrestrial lines. Boaters drop anchors on cables. And submarines can pinpoint
systems under the sea.
Most of the recent media coverage has been dominated by the question of vulnerability. Are
global communications networks
really at risk of disruption? What would happen if these cables were cut? Do we need to worry about the threat of sabotage from
Russian subs or terrorist agents?
The answer to this is not black and white. Any
individual cable is always at risk, but likely far more so from boaters
and fishermen than any saboteur. Over history, the single largest cause of disruption has been people
unintentionally dropping anchors and nets. The International Cable Protection Committee has been working for years to
prevent such breaks.
As a result, cables
today are covered in steel armor and buried beneath the seafloor at their shore-ends,
where the human threat is most concentrated. This provides some level of protection. In the deep sea, the ocean’s
inaccessibility largely safeguards cables – they need only to be covered with a thin polyethelene sheath. It’s not that it’s much more difficult to
sever cables in the deep ocean, it’s just that the primary forms of interference are less likely to happen. The sea is so big and the cables are so
narrow, the probability isn’t that high that you’d run across one.
Sabotage has actually been rare in the history of undersea cables. There are certainly occurrences (though
none recently), but these are disproportionately publicized. The World War I German raid of the Fanning Island cable station in
the Pacific Ocean gets a lot of attention. And there was speculation about sabotage in the cable disruptions outside
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Alexandria, Egypt in 2008, which cut 70% of the country’s internet, affecting millions. Yet we hear little
about the regular faults that occur, on average, about 200 times each year.
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Aff Fails --- 1NC
Aff fails – they would just move farther into the ocean – military might can’t prevent
attacks.
Barker 18 – Lieutenant Commander Peter Barker is a serving Royal Navy officer and barrister. He is
currently the Associate Director for the Law of Coalition Warfare at the Stockton Center for the Study of
International Law. (Peter, "Undersea Cables and the Challenges of Protecting Seabed Lines of
Communication," CIMSEC, 3-15-2018, https://cimsec.org/undersea-cables-challenges-protectingseabed-lines-communication/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)
Clearly, a protection
strategy for undersea cables cannot depend solely on military action. It is impossible
to protect the entire cable network given its global expanse. The geographic area requiring protection is
simply too large, even for the most powerful of navies. The natural consequence of this conclusion is to focus on
identifying and intercepting ships and submarines capable of interfering with the cable network. However, the practicalities of this
option are not promising. The technology required to tamper with cables is not overly sophisticated. It
can be hosted in a wide range of vessels and easily transferred between them. Submarines present
additional challenges in monitoring, tracking and interception, requiring the use of satellites,
intelligence, and underwater sensors. For a military commander, the task of protecting seabed submarine
cables from attack can seem almost impossible.
Given this conclusion, national
strategies may need to focus on alternative methods of safeguarding the
exchange of information. One method would be to increase the level of redundancy within the system by
laying additional cables. As cables are expensive and most cables are privately owned, additional routes
have to be assured of sufficient funding to make them viable. Somewhat ominously, the International Cable Protection
Committee (which represents cable owners) states that “most cable owners feel that there is enough diversity in the
international submarine cable network.” This might be true if the only threat is from accidental damage. However, this analysis
might change with the realistic prospect of deliberate targeting.
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Aff Fails --- 2NC
Redundancy solves BUT the impact is inevitable – they’re IMPOSSIBLE to monitor
Starosielski 15 – Nicole Starosielski is from the New York University. (Nicole Starosielski, "Are the
Internet's Undersea Cables at Risk for Sabotage?," livescience, 11-4-2015,
https://www.livescience.com/52685-are-the-internets-undersea-cables-at-risk-for-sabotage.html,
Accessed 7-5-2022, LASA-SC)
The fact is it’s incredibly
difficult to monitor these lines. Cable companies have been trying to do so for
more than a century, since the first telegraph lines were laid in the 1800s. But the ocean is too vast and the lines
simply too long. It would be impossible to stop every vessel that came anywhere near critical
communications cables. We’d need to create extremely long, “no-go” zones across the ocean, which
itself would profoundly disrupt the economy.
Fewer than 300 cable systems transport almost all transoceanic traffic around the world. And
these often run through narrow
pressure points where small disruptions can have massive impacts. Since each cable can carry an extraordinary
amount of information, it’s not uncommon for an entire country to rely on only a handful of systems. In many places, it would take only a few
cable cuts to take out large swathes of the internet. If the right cables were disrupted at the right time, it could disrupt global internet traffic for
weeks or even months.
The thing that protects global information traffic is the fact that there’s some redundancy built into the
system. Since there is more cable capacity than there is traffic, when there is a break, information is
automatically rerouted along other cables. Because there are many systems linking to the United
States, and a lot of internet infrastructure is located here, a single cable outage is unlikely to cause any
noticeable effect for Americans.
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SQ Solves --- 1NC
Satellites solve
Hitchens 22 – Theresa Hitchens is the Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense. The former
Defense News editor was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for
International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Before that, she spent six years in Geneva,
Switzerland as director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (Theresa
Hitchens, "US needs to temper reliance on at-risk undersea internet cables, satellites can help:
Aerospace," Breaking Defense, 2-3-2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/us-needs-to-temperreliance-on-at-risk-undersea-internet-cables-satellites-can-help-aerospace/, Accessed 7-5-2022, LASASC)
“Government
and industry should continue to secure the communications enterprise—including undersea,
terrestrial, air, and satellite segments,” the study states.
In particular, the study finds that new, high-capacity
broadband satellites could provide backup for undersea cable
infrastructure (UCI). These include the emerging mega-constellations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) such as
SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper.
“Although UCI will continue to offer unrivaled backbone capacity for years to come, space-based
solutions … will offer alternate
secure data paths,” the study says. Aerospace Corporation is a non-profit federally funded research and development center that advises
the US government on aerospace policy issues, and pioneers technology solutions.
The study also suggests that the US consider working with the international community to develop norms of behavior around best practices and
against damaging cables as they cross the high seas, as well as working with allies and partners to beef up best practices to secure facilities and
enhance resilience, and to share information on threats.
Gordon stressed that the key takeaway from their in-depth study is that US needs to bring together all
the different communications sectors that up to now have functioned primarily in stovepipes in order to
both secure UCI and establish resilient hybrid networks. This includes supporting the development of emerging
technologies.
For example, she noted, the Pentagon’s
Space Development Agency (SDA) already is playing a key role with its
effort to build a data transport layer for military communications in LEO to augment current Pentagon
satellites. As part of that effort, it is investing in the development of optical inter-satellite links that are crucial for LEO-based
megaconstellations to function.
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U.S. Naval Dom Inev
U.S. naval dominance is locked in and inevitable---any factor that affects us is worse
for competitors
Robert Kaplan 17, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a senior advisor at
Eurasia Group, 1/24/17, “America Is a Maritime Nation,”
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/01/24/america_is_a_maritime_nation_112189.html
The United States, bordered by two oceans, is a maritime nation. Not
only is its Navy the largest in the world by far, but its
coast guard would qualify as the 12th largest fleet in the world. The U.S. Navy is America's foremost
strategic instrument -- much more so than its nuclear arsenal, which in all probability can never be used. The U.S. Navy is on the high
seas around the world in peacetime as well as in wartime, guarding the sea lines of communication and the main maritime choke points. This,
in turn, allows for a free global trading regime and guarantees access to hydrocarbons for America's allies. This Navy, by the way, also allows for
an inland strike capacity. To wit, America bombed Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo from warships in the Indian Ocean and the Adriatic Sea.
Historically, America is not unique in this regard. Athens, Venice, and Great Britain were all great global maritime powers. So were Holland and
Portugal. Maritime powers, with exceptions of course, were generally more benign than land powers such as Germany and Russia. For while
armies invade, ships make port visits and facilitate commerce. Navies also do not occupy foreign territory to anywhere near the extent that
land forces do. While armies are required for unpredictable contingencies, navies (and air forces) project power on a daily basis. America might
have gotten into unnecessary wars in Vietnam and Iraq, but American power is
undiminished, largely because of the size
of its Navy and Air Force. Finally, the U.S. Navy helps keep America engaged but out of trouble.
If we consider ourselves a maritime nation, chances are that we will make fewer mistakes in foreign policy, since naval power is about
protecting commerce and a free trading order more than about having imperial-like possessions and interests. This is why a Navy can deploy
anywhere all the time, though sending large numbers of ground troops overseas often involves a debate in Congress.
The United States currently has a Navy with almost 300 warships. This is an important fact, since if America's
Navy had only, say, 200 warships, the world would be a very different place. It would be considerably more violent
and anarchic than it already is. The U.S. 7th Fleet essentially keeps the peace in East Asia, while the U.S. 5th Fleet helps prevent war
between Iran and the Arabian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
This 300-ship Navy, combined with America's other armed services, gives the United States more power than any other
nation in the world. Yet we must keep in mind that this considerable power does not equal overwhelming
power. It is in the space between these two concepts that much of the violence and instability in the world takes place. For even a 600ship Navy, or even an army much larger than our present one, would be unable to prevent the collapse of states
across the Middle East. America, in other words, while guarding its interests, must be prepared to tolerate a world where it is not in
control.
Let me elaborate on this.
America's ability to influence the world will likely decrease, but the ability of other powers to do
likewise will also decrease over time, owing to internal economic challenges in China, Russia, and Europe
that dwarf America's own economic problems. Thus our power will increase relative to other major states and
unions, even as it decreases in absolute terms around the world. In all this, our Navy will be a barometer for our national health:
this is because maritime platforms are frightfully expensive, thus the ability to maintain a Navy the size of ours requires public support through
taxes and a healthy rate of increase in the gross domestic product.
A big Navy says a lot about who we are. And given
I believe it
the structural economic weaknesses of China, Russia, and Europe,
is questionable whether they can keep up with the U.S. Navy over the long run. The big
unknown is not Russia, which is a near-term threat rather than a long-term one, but China: Can it really reform its economy? I am not sure.
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AT: Miscalc---General
No miscalc-induced US-Russia war---existing CBMs solve
Saradzhyan 20, MPA @ JFK School of Government, Director, Russia Matters Project; Assistant
Director, U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs (Simon, “What Stops US and Russia From Stumbling Into War?,” Russia Matters,
https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/what-stops-us-and-russia-stumbling-war)
As we are all well aware, the original Cold War, which officially ended 30 years ago last month, featured a number of close calls that almost
turned it into a hot war. Thankfully, neither the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 nor the Able Archer exercise of 1983 (nor any other perilous
incidents), led to a war between Washington and Moscow. More recently, however, respected statesmen have again begun to sound alarms.
“Not since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis has the risk of a U.S.-Russian confrontation involving the use of nuclear weapons been as high as it is
today,” former U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn warned in a recent article in Foreign Affairs. I have
expressed some doubts about this proposition, but it is nevertheless worth asking what it is—other than the fear of mutually assured
destruction—that keeps
the U.S. and Russia from stumbling into a war today or tomorrow. Part of the answer lies in the
bilateral and multilateral agreements specifically designed to prevent incidents that could escalate into a war.
As is clear from the list below, there are at least half a dozen bilateral agreements between Moscow and
Washington that have been concluded for the purposes of preventing dangerous military incidents. These deals include the
1972 U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of incidents on and over the high seas and the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of
dangerous military activities. Some other NATO members—including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, the
Netherlands, Canada, Greece and Portugal—have agreements with Russia on prevention of incidents on the high seas that are similar to the
1972 agreement between Moscow and Washington, while Canada and Greece also have agreements with Russia on prevention of dangerous
military activities. However, almost a dozen NATO members have no such agreements with Russia, even though they abut seas. These countries
include Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia. Nor are there any multilateral NATO-Russia (or NATO-Collective
Security Treaty Organization) agreements on prevention of dangerous military incidents, though a NATO-Russia Memorandum of
Understanding on avoiding and managing such incidents has been discussed in Track II. The U.S. and its NATO allies should consider forming a
unified position and approach Russia about formal negotiations on how some of the existing U.S.-Russian agreements on avoiding incidents
could be multilaterized, shifting from a bilateral format to a multilateral NATO-Russia format. In particular, NATO and Russia should also discuss
multilaterizing the 1989 U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of dangerous military activities. NATO and Russia could discuss including concrete
mechanisms on actual prevention of incidents in such existing multilateral agreements as the 2011 Vienna Document and the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, including, perhaps, a requirement for warplanes to fly with their transponders turned on at all times while in
international airspace.1 The U.S. and its NATO allies should also, of course, discuss how to save the Open Skies Treaty of 1992. In addition to
enhancing the legal framework for prevention of incidents, Russian and Western leaders should also make sure their military commanders do
not take unauthorized actions that increase the risk of an accident that could unintentionally lead to a conflict. There have been quite a few
instances when the U.S. and Russian militaries have accused each other of unsafe behavior during one and the same encounter. For instance, in
June 2019 the U.S. Navy accused the Russian Navy’s Admiral Vinogradov anti-submarine destroyer of “maneuver[ing] from behind and to the
right of [U.S. missile cruiser] Chancellorsville, accelerat[ing] and clos[ing] to an unsafe distance" as the U.S. warship was recovering a helicopter
within 50 meters of the Russian ship in the Philippine Sea. The Russian Navy in turn accused the Chancellorsville of unsafe maneuvers, saying
this cruiser crossed the Russian destroyer’s path and then abruptly changed direction. Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin had commented
on risk-taking by his senior military officials after Russia’s taking of Crimea: In a documentary-style film about those events, which aired on
Russian state television in March 2015, the then commander of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Alexander Vitko, describes how a Su-24 attack plane
was sent to fly low over the deck of the USS Donald Cook in April 2014: “It was decided to show use and resolve to use force.” When the
documentary’s creator Andrei Kondrashov asks Putin to comment, the Russian president says: “It was not my decision. It was hooliganism on
their [the commanders’] part and they didn’t even tell me anything about it.” Last but not least, the sides should discuss how to prevent
incidents in one domain that did not exist during the original Cold War. That domain is cyber and it is essential that the U.S. and Russia, which
both now have cyber troops, and their allies discuss how to prevent incidents in that domain that could ultimately lead to an accidental war. In
doing so they could take a cue from various sources, among them the aforementioned U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of dangerous
military activities of 1989, which warns against “interfering with command and control networks in a manner which could cause harm to
personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party.” A
new Cold War may indeed be inevitable. Some
that doesn’t mean the U.S., its allies and Russia cannot jointly work to reduce
grave but common risks potentially posed by unintended military incidents. I. Agreements on prevention of military
incidents and accidents I.A. Bilateral U.S.-Russian agreements on prevention of military incidents and accidents I.A.1. U.S.Soviet Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link
of 1963 Contents: At the Pentagon, the hotline system is located at the National Military Command Center. The hotline was first used by the
say it has already started. However,
United States and Russia in 1967 during the Six-Day War. Meant to avoid war, but U.S. President Barack Obama used it in October 2016 to warn
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Putin against using hackers to disrupt the U.S. election. Operational status: Remains in
force. I.A.2. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War (Accidents Measures) of 1971 Contents includes: A pledge by
each party to take measures each considers necessary to maintain and improve its organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; Arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, from
detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems or from any accidental, unauthorized or other unexplained incident involving a
possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and Advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party
and in the direction of the other party. Operational status: Remains in force. I.A.3.
U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of
Incidents on and over the High Seas of 1972 Contents: Not interfering in the "formations" of the other party; Avoiding maneuvers in areas
of heavy sea traffic; Requiring surveillance ships to maintain a safe distance from the object of investigation so as to avoid "embarrassing or
endangering the ships under surveillance"; Using accepted international signals when ships maneuver near one another; Not simulating attacks
at, launching objects toward or illuminating the bridges of the other party’s ships; Informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them;
Requiring aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party. Operational
status: Remains in force. I.A.4. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973 Contents: the
signatories agree “[T]hat an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.” That they
“will refrain from the threat or use of force against” each other. That “if at any time relations … involve the risk of a nuclear conflict," then they
"will immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk." Operational status: Remains in
force, “of unlimited duration.” I.A.5.
U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of dangerous military activities of
1989 Contents: “Each Party shall take necessary measures directed toward preventing dangerous military activities, which are the following
activities of personnel and equipment of its armed forces when operating in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the
other Party during peacetime: “Entering by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other
Party owing to circumstance brought about by force majeure, or as a result of unintentional actions by such personnel … “Interfering with
command and control networks in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other
Party. “Hampering the activities of the personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party in a Special Caution Area2 in a manner
which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment;” The agreement covers not only personnel but also “any ship, aircraft or
ground hardware of the armed forces of the Parties.” Operational status: Remains in force. I.A.6. Moscow
Declaration by U.S.
President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin of 1994 Contents: “The presidents announced that they
would direct the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands so that by not later than May 30, 1994, those
missiles will not be targeted. Thus, for the first time in nearly half a century—virtually since the dawn of the nuclear age—the United States and
Russia will not operate nuclear forces, day-to-day, in a manner that presumes they are adversaries.” Operational status: Unclear. I.A.7.
U.S.-Russia Memorandum on safety of fights in Syria of 2015 Contents: The memorandum contains specific protocols
for air crews to follow to avoid an inadvertent clash over Syria, calling for U.S. and Russian aircraft to maintain a safe distance. The
memorandum provided for creation of a ground communications link between the two sides in the event air communications fail, and the
communications link was established. The memorandum also provided for formation of a working group to discuss any implementation issues.
The U.S. has also told Russia where its special forces are in Syria so that Russia would not bomb them. Operational status: Remains in force.
I.A.8. U.S.-Russian agreement of early November 2017 on dividing line in Syria. U.S. and Russian officers reportedly agreed on the Euphrates
River as a dividing line in Syria and on a system of advance notifications prior to any river crossings. Operational status: Unclear. I.B.
Multilateral agreements on prevention of military accidents and incidents I.B.1. International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972 (both U.S. and Russia are signatories, as is China) Contents: Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper
look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full
appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and
effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. Every vessel
shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. When two
power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision each shall alter her course to
starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other. When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the
vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing
ahead of the other vessel. A vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver when engaged in an operation for the maintenance of safety of
navigation in a traffic separation scheme is exempted from complying with the Rule [on traffic separation schemes] to the extent necessary to
carry out the operation. Operational status: Remains in force. I.B.2. Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea of 2014 (signed
by Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, the United States and Vietnam at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium) Contents:
Calls on naval warships and planes to maintain a safe separation between vessels. When conducting exercises with submarines, surface naval
ships should consider the display of appropriate signals to indicate the presence of submarines. Naval ships should generally avoid the
simulation of attacks, discharge of signal rockets and weapons, illumination of navigation bridges and aircraft cockpits, aerobatics and
simulated attacks in the vicinity of ships encountered. Does not apply to coastguards. Operational status: Remains in force, but non-binding. II.
Confidence-Building Measures II.A. Bilateral Confidence-Building Measures II.A.1. U.S.-Soviet
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Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 1987 Contents: Each party agreed to
establish a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in its capital and to establish a special facsimile communications link between these centers. The
centers are intended to supplement existing means of communication and provide direct, reliable, high-speed systems for the transmission of
notifications and communications at the government-to-government level. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers do not replace normal
diplomatic channels of communication or the "Hot Line," nor are they intended to have a crisis management role. Operational status:
Remains in force. II.A.2. U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (BML) of 1988 Contents: Provides for notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned
date, launch area and area of impact for any launch of an ICBM or SLBM. The agreement also provides that these notifications be provided
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. II.A.3.
U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of
Major Strategic Exercises (MSE) of 1989 Contents: The agreement provides for each party to give the other advance notification of
one major strategic-forces exercise that includes the participation of heavy bombers each year. Operational status: Remains in force.
Miscalc doesn’t cause conflict
Steven Stashwick, Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve, completed graduate studies in
international relations at the University of Chicago, “South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and
‘Miscalculation’ Myths”, Sept 25th 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflictescalation-and-miscalculation-myths/
This concern over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger “incidents at
sea” poses to peace stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships were concerned that an incident
between “peppery young ship captains” could “lead people to shoot at each other with results that might…be impossible to control,” in the
words of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S. and Soviets were openly adversarial and
serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost commonplace. Yet despite explicit mutual, strategic, and existential antagonism
between the U.S. and U.S.SR, none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred over the four decades of the Cold War escalated into
anything beyond a short diplomatic crisis. It
is possible that they avoided a nuclear spiral in these incidents through
diligent diplomacy and luck. But more likely, it suggests that this type of maritime incident is insufficient
on its own to lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned. Mitigating the miscalculation concerns of officials and the
extreme scenarios of some commentators is that these maritime incidents do not occur in a vacuum, de-coupled from explicit national
interests. In a famous 1988 Cold War incident, Soviet vessels in the Black Sea shouldered the U.S. warships Yorktown and Caron (a controlled
collision meant to push a ship off-course) while the latter were deliberately contesting what the U.S. deemed excessive Soviet legal claims over
maritime rights. The Soviets knew the U.S. vessels were there to intentionally flout their claims, and the U.S. knew the Soviets would likely try
to enforce them. Even if the firmness of the Soviet response was unanticipated (or deemed unlikely), there was no mystery to either side’s
objectives. Thus, neither side was going to start shooting in confusion; the Soviet vessels even radioed their intention to strike the U.S. ships.
While not “safe” in the strictest sense (ships do not like to “swap paint” with each other), footage from the Yorktown and Caron being pushed
shows the actions to be intense but deliberate, professionally executed, and clearly of an enforcement nature, rather than a prelude to combat.
While a serious diplomatic incident, both sides understood the situation, which served to moderate concern over escalation. Similarly, a
shouldering incident between the U.S. cruiser Cowpens and a Chinese warship in 2013, while concerning to the U.S. from a safety-at-sea
perspective, was understood to be motivated by Chinese sensitivities around testing their new aircraft carrier, not a precursor to hostilities.
Nonetheless, concerns over maritime incidents, miscalculation, and spiraling conflict contain enough intuitive logic to have endured. A shared
Cold War concern over miscalculations led to accords that are still in effect, such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over
the High Seas (INCSEA) and Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) agreement, and may be credited with helping keep incidents
between the U.S. and U.S.SR under “control.” However, the fact that agreements were reached at all is likely more significant than their
content. Such agreements indicated a shared belief between U.S. and Soviet military leaderships that despite their feverish preparations for
war against one another, neither wanted war to come as the result of a tactical-level incident between individual ships and aircraft. This
suggests neither would let an incident, however serious, become an independent casus belli. The substance of these accords (and those
reached in the South China Sea) further strengthens this thesis. While INCSEA and DMA contained rules of behavior, these were, again in
Zumwalt’s words, “little more than a reaffirmation of the [maritime] Rules of the Road” (international rules that direct how ships stay safe
around each other at sea). What was groundbreaking was that in concluding the accords, the U.S. and U.S.SR implicitly recognized their
intentions to violate those rules and practices when advantageous (consider the Yorktown and Caron). The accords created new parallel rules
by which each could do so “safely,” as well as new communications protocols to inform one another of their intentions. Together, this affirms
that both sides were playing a (serious) game to establish positions and assert rights more than they were interested in war. Of course,
incidents intended to reinforce maritime claims and hostile actions can look the same right up until ordnance is exchanged, but now both sides
could be more confident that if shooting did start, it was an intentional act of war. Precedent for Restraint In
Asia, there is recent and
dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical
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arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When
the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in
2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere ‘incident’ of the sort worried
over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea’s armed forces . And yet, there was
no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response. It remains unknown
whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or,
perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control.
This suggests that South Korea’s political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth
the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tacticallevel event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic
so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to
war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically
overstated. It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a
local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional
impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility.
Miscalc theory is wrong
Marc Trachtenberg, February 14, 2000 - professor of Political Science at the University of California,
Los Angeles. He received his Ph.D in History from the University of California, Berkeley, "The "Accidental
War" Question", www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/inadvertent.pdf
First, what do we mean exactly by "miscalculation"? Suppose someone gives me ten-to-one odds that if I role a die, I won't be able to come up with a six. I take the bet and I lose. Does this
mean I "miscalculated"? Of course not: the calculation was perfectly rational, but I just happened to be unlucky. Similarly, in international politics, states might assume at the beginning of a
crisis that there is only a relatively small risk of war, say one in five or one in six. If war nonetheless breaks out, that fact does not in itself mean that they had miscalculated; they had not, after
all, assumed that war would be impossible. To prove miscalculation, one therefore has to demonstrate somehow that the probability of war breaking out, as it existed at the beginning of a
crisis, really was much higher than people thought, which of course might be very difficult to do. If one simply assumes that a gap between expectation and outcome shows that people had
miscalculated, one is not really explaining very much; one is simply giving a name to the fact the things worked out in a way people had not initially thought was very likely. The point here is
that we tend to use language in a fairly sloppy way; these habits enable us to avoid focusing on the real issues. The real issue here has to do with how easy it is to slide into a war, even if both
sides very much want to avoid that outcome. Those who take "inadvertent war" seriously tend to assume that that risk is high; their critics, like Brodie, assume that they wildly overestimate
the risk of a war happening in that way. What is to be said about this issue? First of all, it is clear that people who talk about how wars can come about even if no one sets out to engineer them
do have something real in mind. As a crisis develops, each side gets more and more deeply involved; the stakes keep rising, the ante keeps going up, and it becomes harder and harder to give
way. If one knew this was going to happen, one might have chosen not to engage in the confrontation in the first place. But there is no way to turn back the clock; and so one might be led in
this way to fight a war that one would have very much wished to avoid. A dynamic of this sort certainly exists. One thinks, for example, of the crisis set off by the Japanese move into southern
Indochina in July 1941, or even of the Anglo-German crisis in the summer of 1939, which led to a war which both Hitler and the British did not intend and would have liked to avoid, at least at
that point.8 The July Crisis in 1914 is another case in point; it is hard to believe that either side would have conducted its affairs the way it did if it knew at the start that the policy it adopted
was going to lead to war, let alone to the kind of war that eventually developed. But does the fact that a dynamic of this kind exists mean in itself that it is appropriate in such cases to refer to
as long as states choose courses of action
with their eyes open--if they decide to engage in a test of will, knowing full well that this is what they are
doing, and deliberately adopt tactics limiting their own freedom of action (and in particular their ability to avoid ending up in an
armed conflict) as a way of prevailing in the crisis-- then it can scarcely be said that the outcome of that confrontation is to be viewed as essentially an
"accident." And the basic point here is that states, by and large, do know what they are doing; to a certain extent, they burn their bridges in
the course of a crisis, but they do this with important political objectives in mind. They know that if their prestige is engaged,
their adversary will know that it is hard for them to draw back, and so their adversary will be under more pressure to
accommodate them on the issue at hand.¶ The second point has to do with how much risk there really is in situations of this sort. It should not be
assumed too readily that states underestimate the degree to which they lose control of the situation when they
engage in a crisis. States can generally pull back from the brink if they really want to; prestige will be sacrificed, but often
states are willing to pay that price. The history of international politics in the century that just ended is full of crises that were liquidated by one side accepting what
the war that breaks out as an "accidental" war?¶ There are two points to be made on this issue. First of all,
amounted to defeat, sometimes even humiliating defeat; and in the July Crisis in 1914, the German government chose at the most critical moment to let the war come rather than press for a
compromise solution.9¶ The key thing here is that in 1914 and 1939 political leaders had not totally lost control, but had chosen to accept war rather than back off in a crisis. Their aversion to
when both sides very much want to avoid a full-scale armed conflict, the story is very different.
This was the case during the Cold War. People sometimes seem to assume that peace was hanging by a thread during that
conflict, and that we were lucky to make our way through it without a thermonuclear holocaust. But I don't think this is true at all: and in general I think it is
very unlikely that a great war would break out if both sides are determined to avoid it.¶ These arguments
war was not overwhelming. But
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about how war could break out almost by accident were frequently made during the Cold War itself--and indeed were
made by responsible and experienced officials. A British document from March 1946, for example, argued that the Soviets did not want war, but the kind of 10
tactics they used with the West might lead to a war that neither side wanted: "although the intention may be defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Russian
leaders may misjudge how far they can go without provoking war with America or ourselves."10 A year later, a British Foreign Office official warned that the fact that the Soviets had military
superiority in Europe might make them careless, and that they might "misjudge what measures can safely be taken without producing a serious crisis." Events might get out of control and a
this point of view? It assumes that the Soviets would not be
cautious, that they would not frame their actions very carefully with an eye to the American reaction, that in
deciding how far to go they would not gauge very closely how the Americans reacted to the measures they had taken up to that point. This point of view assumes also
that the Soviets would find it very hard to draw back if it became clear that they had overstepped the bounds and had thought the
situation might develop that could "lead to disaster."11¶ What is wrong with
American reaction would not be as vigorous as it in fact was--or indeed that they had not made the mental reservation that they could draw back, in necessary, when they decided to embark
the assumption is that the Soviets did not care enough about what a war would
entail to take these rather elementary and normal precautions. This point of view also assumes that the American response would be very rigid
and "spring-loaded": a slight Soviet infringement, and the Americans immediately take the plunge into
general war--as though there are no intermediate measures of a political or military nature that would be taken, no process that would unfold
within which the two sides would test each other out before resorting to extreme measures. To my mind, anyone with any sense should know that
things would never move directly and mechanically from initial provocation to full-scale war, that things would unfold almost
inevitably in a more complex way--or, in short, that enough "cushioning" exists in the system to keep
relatively minor provocations from leading directly to general war. When people during the Cold War period spoke about war through
on a provocative course of action. Basically
miscalculation, they often were not thinking simply in terms of one side overstepping the bounds and setting off a new war essentially by accident. They frequently had a more specific
mechanism in mind. During the Berlin Crisis period especially (1958-62), people were worried that a war could come if each side calculated that the other would back down if only one's own
side took a sufficiently firm line. This type of argument took shape as an answer to the hard-liners' argument--that is, the argument of people like Dean Acheson and Charles de Gaulle--that
one had to be very tough: the adversary, the hard-liners argued, had to be forced to recognize that if he continued with his policy, the result would be war; in that case, the adversary would
certainly give way. But what if both sides made this kind of calculation? The result might well be war; one therefore could not accept the hard-liners' argument critically, and one perhaps
needed to take a more flexible line.¶ Llewellyn Thompson, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow during this period, frequently argued along these lines. "I think we can be fairly confident," he
wrote in March 1959, "that Khrushchev will not deliberately risk total war over Berlin and I suspect his colleagues might pull him back if it were clear that a real risk of this was involved. On the
other hand, we must remember that he doubtless holds a similar view about us and thus the real danger is that we could both drift on into a situation which might get out of control."12 In
May 1961, he pushed the argument a good deal further and drew out the implications. "Both sides," he wrote, thought that the other "would not risk war over Berlin." The danger arose from
the fact that if Khrushchev "carries out his declared intentions and we carry out ours," the situation would in all probability "get out of control." Each 12 side's prestige would become
increasingly engaged, "making retreat for either side even more difficult." The Soviets had "strong nerves," and geography as well as the local military balance around Berlin were in their favor.
If America was in fact prepared to carry her policy through to the end, and Khrushchev "found he had misjudged us," it would probably be "too late for retreat." He concluded that the United
States should therefore "make every effort" to prevent such a situation from developing."13¶ The basic point was widely understood not just by the western governments. One top British
military leader (Lord Mountbatten) referred at about this time to the "danger of war breaking out by miscalculation since both the Americans and the Russians believed that the other would
not resort to global war over Berlin."14 Secretary of State Rusk told the other western foreign ministers in December 1961 that "one of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the
two sides persuaded that neither will fight."15 The fact that war could come in this way was understood by the broader public; see, for example, the cartoon reproduced below:¶ The point
governments understood what they were doing. They understood the risk inherent in the situation. They were
conducting policy with their eyes open; they were not just stumbling through a minefield. If they had not understood these mechanisms, and if war had
broken out through a process of this sort, then one could reasonably hold that mechanism responsible for the coming of the war. But the fact that they understood
this dynamic tended to reduce its importance as a causative factor; an awareness of the problem had been factored
in advance into the decision-making process; any war that did break out would, by virtue of that fact, would be rendered
less "accidental."¶ The Role of the Military System¶ The idea that the political process can be overwhelmed during a
crisis by forces arising from within the military system is very common, and indeed probably should be considered as the heart of the
"inadvertent war" thesis. To the extent that this thesis has a major historical basis, it is supported essentially by claims about the coming of
war in 1914. Many political scientists take it as practically an article of faith that the First World War was an "inadvertent war," brought on by factors of an essentially military nature.
here is simply that
The rigidity of the war plans, the emphasis placed on offensive military action, the system of interlocking mobilizations, the premium placed on moving first and getting a jump on one's
adversaries, the fact that the political leadership (supposedly) did not understand the logic of the situation created by the war plans--all this is said to have a lot to do with the outbreak of the
war.¶ For me as an historian, all this was rather bizarre when I first encountered it. But since these arguments were made by intelligent people, and since they were so common and played so
I thought it would be worthwhile to try to get to the bottom of this issue and see
what there was to this argument. The answer was: not very much. I am not going to repeat the analysis that supported that conclusion
important a role in supporting fundamental claims about what made for war,
here. Anyone interested should simply read the article in question.16 I do, however, want to deal with one substantive point, the point about 1914 that Scott Sagan raises in his piece.17 But
mainly I will be talking here not about substance but about the way these issues are dealt with in the literature. The basic point, once again, is that if these issues are to be discussed at all, we
really need to analyze them a lot more rigorously than we have so far.¶ But, as I say, I would like to deal first with Scott Sagan's argument about the July Crisis. There is, he says, one reason
why the First World War should be considered an "accidental war," and this has to do with the way General von Moltke undercut Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's efforts to get the Austrians to
accept the Kaiser's plan for a peaceful settlement, the so-called "Halt in Belgrade" proposal, a variant of which had also been proposed by the British government.18 Moltke, the chief of the
German general staff, at around 2 p.m. on July 30th told the Austrian military attaché that Austria should mobilize against Russia and should reject the British peace plan. This helped convince
the Vienna government that it should indeed reject that plan and, Sagan says, opt instead for "total mobilization and war."¶ There are a number of issues here. Let us accept, first of all, the
point that Moltke's move confirmed the Austrians in their decision to take a tough line--to go ahead with the mobilization and to ignore the pressure for a compromise peace. Did this mean
that this move was therefore a cause, let alone a major cause, of the war? The answer is no, because whatever effect Moltke's advice had on Vienna, it came too late to influence the course of
events: the attaché's report was dispatched at 5:30 p.m. on the 30th and was received in Vienna during the night; the decisions it influenced were made the next day--that is, July 31st.19 But
by then, Russian had already ordered general mobilization, the key event that set off the avalanche and made war unavoidable: the Russian decision had been made at around 5 p.m. on the
30th. So even if Moltke had not spoken to the Austrians, one would still have had war; Moltke's move had no fundamental effect on what happened.¶ We could, if we like, just leave it there.
After all, Sagan tells us on p. 6 of his paper that "for a conflict to be considered an accidental war, there would have to be some activity or incident inside the military machine, without which
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war would not have occurred," and Moltke's move clearly does not fall into that category. But there is a certain value, in the present context, in pushing the analysis a bit further. Let us
suppose Russia had not ordered general mobilization on the afternoon of July 30. Would Motlke's move have led to a war, and in that event, could one say that such a war would have been
"accidental"? Moltke was asking the Austrians to order general mobilization and, in passing, he also advised them to reject the English plan. Austrian mobilizaton as such would not have led to
war: as the Austrian general Conrad said, "if the Russians do not touch us, we need not touch them either."20 In fact, an Austrian mobilization would in some ways have made general war less
likely: by mobilizing against Russia, Austria would have found it harder to move against Serbia and thus the Russians would not have been provoked into attacking quite so quickly; and an
Austrian army on the Russian frontier would have pinned down Russian forces, thus relieving some of the pressure on Germany to move quickly against France.¶ What then about the pressure
on Austria to accept the "Halt in Belgrade" proposal? If Russia had not mobilized, there would have been time for Bethmann to exert pressure on Austria effectively; indeed, I think that the
reason Moltke toughened his position on the afternoon of the 30th is that he had received information that a Russian general mobilization was imminent and no longer saw any point to doing
things other than what was militarily necessary. But whatever line Moltke took, on political issues Bethmann and the Kaiser were still ultimately calling the shots; and if they had both the time
and the inclination, they could certainly have brought Austria around.¶ But time was a factor, and there is no getting around the fact that time was lost because of the way the Germans
managed things during this climactic phase of the crisis (July 28-30). Their government was not a well-oiled machine, working out its policy rationally and implementing it efficiently. Moltke's
line on the afternoon of the 30th was different from Bethmann's line the previous night; but Albertini shows quite convincingly that the German ambassador in Vienna, Tschischky, did a lot
more to sabotage the Halt in Belgrade plan during the really crucial period than Moltke had.21 Indeed, as is well known, Bethmann himself had initially tried to sabotage the plan when the
Kaiser first proposed it on July 28th. Because all this took place prior to the Russian general mobilization, it was much more important than what Moltke did. Moltke's role is stressed simply
because he was a military man, and the theory is that what the military was doing was of primary importance. I think, however, that the evidence shows that Moltke's advice to the Austrians
on the afternoon of the 30th played a relatively minor role in bringing on the war; its role is certainly wildly exaggerated in much of the literature.¶ The more general issue here has to do with
the fact that different people in the government 17 were working at cross-purposes. This is par for the course in political life. As Sagan notes, what this means is that from the point of view of
the individual at the top, things are "out of control," and the events that were precipitating the war could be viewed as "accidents." But the real issue is not whether from the point of view of
the person at the top, events were not fully under control; the real issue is whether, from the point of view of the scholar, what happened was "accidental." My personal view is that what
happened with German policy in late July 1914 is typical of the way things work in government. Control and discipline were less than perfect, but this is the way states actually operate, and
this kind of thing should be taken as the norm. Power is generally somewhat spread out; you have a variety of people able to influence the course of events, and each of them acts
purposefully. This of course makes for a rather complex story. But it does not mean that what finally happens should be regarded, by the scholar at any rate, as "accidental."¶ But what I really
want to talk about here is not Sagan's argument, but the way this set of issues is dealt with in the literature as a whole. Let me begin by citing another extract from the Brodie-Schelling
correspondence, this time some comments Brodie wrote on the manuscript of what was to become Schelling's great classic, Arms and Influence. To support one of his arguments about how a
general war could begin, Schelling made certain arguments about how the military system in place in 1914 helped bring on the First World War.22 Commenting on that section, Brodie
suggested that Schelling use the famous story (which Sagan also discusses) about how the Kaiser, having been led to believe that Britain would stay out of the war if France were not attacked,
told Moltke to cancel the mobilization plan and fight the war only in east; this Moltke said was impossible and the Kaiser supposedly had to give way. Barbara Tuchman, Brodie wrote,
described the incident her best-seller, the Guns of August. Schelling replied that he had "thought of using that 18 business about the Kaiser's being told the trains couldn't be turned around,"
but he "had a nagging impression that Barbara Tuchman or somebody thought the story was possibly undocumented, and maybe a little too good to be true," so he "let it go." If, however,
Brodie or some "other genuine scholar" could assure him that the story was correct," he said he would like to use it. But he was too busy to "trace down any documented version" himself.23¶
This exchange I found quite revealing. Here were the two greatest figures in the history of American strategic thought. Brodie repeats a story that radically distorts what actually happened: the
evidence, including the evidence Barbara Tuchman presented in her book (although the way she framed the issue gave exactly the opposite impression), shows very clearly that it was Moltke
and not the Kaiser who was overruled. What this shows, therefore, is that Brodie had never really studied the July crisis the way it should have been studied, above all by an expert of his
stature, and was content to repeat the usual clichés. As for Schelling, his reply to Brodie was even more striking. He could not be bothered to do the work needed to get to the bottom of such
an important issue. He could not even go to the library or to a bookstore and look up the story in the Tuchman book. It was as though the historical evidence had purely ornamental value; if
this story did not work, well then it need not be used. An accurate understanding of what happened in July 1914 was not seen as fundamental in its own right. ¶ Indeed, Schelling had little feel
for what constituted good historical work and tended to use historical sources uncritically. In the final version of Arms and Influence, the one book he cited ( on p. 223) to support his view
about the importance of the mobilization system in bringing on the war was Ludwig Reiners's The Lamps Went out in Europe. The Reiners book was not a serious, scholarly work; the book, for
example, had no footnotes, and indeed was popular history of the most dubious sort. Chapters 13-15 in the Reiners book, Schelling wrote, was "the best" source he knew "on the dynamics of
mobilization and their effect on decisions." But Reiners did not stress the role of the mobilization system in those chapters; instead he developed a rather bizarre theory that actions taken by
the British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey were crucial in bringing on the war, and indeed that Grey half-wanted the war. Grey, Reiners argued, encouraged the Russians to mobilize against
Austria, knowing full well that the Germans would find it hard to sit on their hands if this happened--that is, knowing that it might well precipitate a war. This was why, according to Reiners,
Gray supposedly withheld from Russia some key information to the effect that Austria would not move against Serbia immediately, even if the Serbs rejected the Austrian ultimatum: he did
not want to calm the Russians, Reiners claimed, he instead wanted to push them toward action, even though he knew how risky that action would be. But the claim that Grey "failed to inform
St. Petersburg" of this key piece of information was simply false: as soon as Grey learned from the Austrians that a rejection of the ultimatum would lead to "military preparations (not
operations),” he informed the Russians of that fact. Reiners was just twisting the evidence to support his own rather idiosyncratic theory of the origins of the war; indeed, in the very first
paragraph of the first of the chapters that Schelling cited, Reiners distorts a passage from Grey's memoirs to make it support his theory that Grey's duplicity was an important factor in brigning
on the war.24¶ Is it fair to hold Schelling responsible for relying on a source like this? Given that he was writing a very important book, given that in that book he was making a general
argument about how war could break out "accidentally" (because of the "dynamics of mutual alarm"), given that to the extent that this theory was based on the historical record, it turned on a
specific interpretation of the coming of the First World War, yes, given all these things, I do think Schelling had a responsibility 20 to get the story straight. And he had a responsibility to
exercise a degree of critical judgment when it was a question of deciding which historical accounts to rely on. The method for making that decision is not hard to master; anyone, for example,
can check to see whether claims are supported by evidence cited in footnotes. The claims people make about how a war might come are too important, and their historical basis is too
important, to be dealt with in what was essentially a very amateurish way.¶ Things have of course changed a good deal since Schelling and Brodie had that exchange. Political scientists have
become much better at using historical sources, and indeed at doing history themselves. And perhaps one should not be too hard on political scientists and others who accepted these familiar
stories, because they probably got them from books by historians. Sagan suggests something of the sort (in his n. 42) and he is absolutely right. Among other works, he alludes in this context
to Gordon Craig's Politics of the Prussian Army, which in fact (on p. 294) echoes the standard account of the confrontation between Moltke and the Kaiser. But Craig is of course a first-rate
scholar, and when you see things like this you begin to suspect that something is going on that is not strictly intellective in nature.¶ You have the sense that people argue along these lines
because this is what they really want to believe. They really do think that there is a basic danger, even in contemporary America, of things spinning out of control because of the way the
military behaves. Craig, in the final sentence of the introduction to his book, points out the contemporary relevance of his argument: reflecting on the history of the Germans, he says, a people
"whose political aspirations were defeated in part by their inability to set proper limits to the activities of their military leaders, may help us avoid dangerous mistakes in our own time." But the
question for us is whether this is in fact a serious risk--or really 21 whether focusing on this kind of thing reflects a distorted view of what is important in war causation, and leads us to focus on
the wrong questions and neglect the more significant ones. ¶ Let me give another example, this time from the work of a political scientist who, more than most, has actually done serious work
in empirical and especially historical sources: Richard Ned Lebow. A few years ago, Lebow published a book called Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion. In that book, he talks a lot
about the July Crisis. In one important passage, he stresses the role of miscalculation in 1914. When they ordered general mobilization, he says, the Russian leaders did not understand what
they were doing; they did not believe their action "would directly trigger war." And you could not entirely blame them for this, he goes on, because they had not been effectively warned of
what the danger was. Bethmann "made only a belated and ineffectual effort to alert the Russians to the danger." As proof, he goes on to cite the fact that Bethmann instructed Pourtalès, the
German ambassador in St. Petersburg, to inform Russian foreign minister Sazonov that Russian military measures directed against Germany "would force us to take counter measures which
would have to consist of mobilizing the army. Mobilization, however, means war, and would moreover have to be directed simultaneously against Russian and France, since France's
engagements with Russia are well-known." Belated? This message was sent on July 26, days before the Russians even ordered partial mobilization against Austria. Insufficiently clear? It is hard
to imagine how Bethmann could have put the point more forcefully.¶ But maybe the message did not get through because Pourtalès fumbled? Lebow in fact goes on to argue that Pourtalès
"did not grasp the import of the chancellor's message for, by his own account, in his subsequent conversation with Sazonov he failed to warn him that Russian mobilization would make war
unavoidable," and that "if anything, their talk seems to have 22 strengthened Sazonov's impression to the contrary." The proof here is an extract from the ambassador's memoirs: Pourtalès
relates that Sazonov put the question: "Surely mobilization is not the equivalent of war with you either. Is it?" The ambassador admitted that he confirmed Sazonov's belief to this effect, but
he also claims to have warned him that "once the button is pressed and the machinery set in motion, there is no stopping it." Well, doesn't that extract show that Sazonov was given the
message that even if war and mobilization were not formally the same thing, for all practically purposes, mobilization meant war? You get the feeling that Lebow is aware of this, because he
then goes on to discount the importance of a passage he himself had cited as proof that the Russians had not been warned that mobilization would lead to war: he says that it was unlikely that
Pourtalès had said anything of the sort since "his memoirs are riddled with self-serving falsehoods." But in that case why had he cited it in the first place? Rather odd, you must admit; but this
is not the end of it.¶ In the next paragraph, the final paragraph in this section, Lebow goes on to quote the warning Bethmann sent on the 29th: "Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously
that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then a European war could hardly be prevented." Again, one can scarcely imagine how Bethmann
could have been any clearer. But Lebow's conclusion here, at the end of this paragraph, is that the German chancellor had "once again failed to make the danger of Russian mobilization
explicit"!25¶ Problems of this sort become quite clear when you make an effort to free yourself from the standard dogmas and get in the habit of reading things critically--that is, with an eye
to the evidence. And when you read this sort of thing, you can't help asking yourself: what exactly is going on here? 23 People like Lebow are not dishonest. If they were, they would never
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present evidence that so clearly contradicted their basic claims. And they are obviously not stupid either. But they are blinded-- blinded by what they want to believe. They do not understand
the importance of setting up problems in such a way that the answers turn on what the evidence shows. They know (or think they know) the answers in advance, and that shapes--what I really
People want to believe that the military system can be a major cause of
war. They want to believe that rigid war plans can cause trouble: after all, rigidity is bad and war is bad, and people take it for granted that
one bad thing must be connected with another.26 They want to believe military officers cause trouble by acting on their own: military officers
represent a different culture, and scholars tend to view them with suspicion. They want to believe that the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack"
can be a real problem, partly, I suspect, because the idea is so elegant analytically. It doesn't matter that this was not the problem in 1914, because the Germans (for political
mean is, that distorts--their reading of the historical material.¶
reasons) had adopted the equivalent of a "second-strike strategy": to get support at home, and to maximize the probability that Britain would stay out of the war, they wanted Russia to take
the first decisive step, and and had decided not to mobilize until Russia mobilized first.
It doesn't matter that this was not a problem during the
Cold War either: there was never a period when both sides had anything like a first-strike capability, for the simple reason that it was easier to build a second-strike than a
firststrike force, that a second-strike force would therefore come into being first, and when it did the adversary no longer had a first-strike capability. Nevertheless, since the
assumption that the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" was a real problem served as the foundation for a whole superstructure
of academic and policy-oriented work (on both military and arms control questions) people had an interest in not asking whether the
assumption itself had much validity. ¶ Why does all this matter? The reason is ultimately quite simple. The belief that "accidental war" is a
serious problem results in a misallocation of intellectual effort: it diverts attention away from fundamental issues--namely, political issues--to
relatively minor problems. In the case of 1914, especially, people have drawn the wrong lessons, lessons about how the military system created a situation where the political process was
overwhelmed, about how generals had to be kept on a short leash, about the great risk of things spinning out of control for military reasons, about miscalculation and ignorance and all their
people have tended to not ask the right questions, questions about what should have been done politically, both
during the crisis itself and during the period that led up to it. Focusing on those latter questions, I claim, would have a much greater
payoff in terms of our understanding of how policy is to be conducted; the problem with the accidental war theory is that it misdirects our attention--that it pulls us away from the
horrifying consequences. And
questions we should really be concentrating on.¶
Reject the aff’s alarmism—nuclear crises have been historically overstated. Tetrais 17
Bruno Tetrais (Deputy Director at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. He was the Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs
at the French Ministry of Defense between 1993-2001, a Visiting Fellow at RAND Corporation in 1995-96, and Director of the Civilian Affairs
Committee at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly between 1990-1992). “‘On The Brink’—Really? Revisiting Nuclear Close Calls Since 1945.” The
Washington Quarterly, 40:2, 51-66, 2017. JDN. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1328922
Why have nuclear weapons not been used since 1945? The more time passes, the more the question
becomes relevant and even puzzling for pessimists. Most strategists of the 1960s would be stunned to hear that as of 2017, there
still has yet to be another nuclear use in anger. The prospects of a “nuclear weapons ban” or recurring proposals for “de-alerting”—instituting
changes that can lengthen the time required to actually use the weapons—make the question even more relevant. Has mankind really stood
“on the brink” several times since Nagasaki, and have we avoided nuclear catastrophe mostly because of pure “luck”? 1 Recent books, articles,
and reports, as well as two wide-audience documentaries, say yes.2 This is not the case. The
absence of any deliberate nuclear
explosion (except for testing) since 1945 can simply be explained by human prudence and the efficiency of
mechanisms devoted to the guardianship of nuclear weapons. Banning nuclear weapons may or may not be a good idea. But it should not
be based on the myth of an inherently and permanently high risk of nuclear use. The analysis that follows covers the deliberate use of
nuclear weapons by a legitimate authority, either by error (“false alarm”) or not (“nuclear crisis”). It does not cover the risk of an accidental
nuclear explosion, an unauthorized launch, or a terrorist act.3 It covers
37 different known episodes, including 25 alleged
nuclear crises and twelve technical incidents, which have been mentioned in the literature to one degree or another as
potentially dangerous.4 The short answer? If we are to discard Pope John Paul II’s explanation (“Divine Providence”),5 it is that the system
worked and that, with rare exceptions, those
in charge of nuclear weapons have been responsible, prudent, and
careful. “Close calls” have ranged in fact from “not-so-close” to “very distant.”
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---AT: Miscac---US
Miscalc is impossible – there’s extensive checks built into the system
Kehler 17 [Gen. C. Robert Retired General in the US Air Force, testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. 11-14-17. “STATEMENT OF GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER.”
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Kehler_Testimony.pdf]
US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the
United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons, and the President’s ability to exercise that
authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications
capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed
with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to neutralize our
deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby “disconnecting” the President and
other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces—even in the most
stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability. NCCS
capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also preventing their unauthorized,
accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving US nuclear weapons are surrounded
by layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly classified, general methods range from
personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls. In addition, sensors and communications links
that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially certified, and tests and exercises are frequently
held to validate the performance of both systems and people. Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to
evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual cyber intrusions. Other factors contribute to the
prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental use. “Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller
and postured much less aggressively than its Cold War ancestor”. ii Not only are the long-range bombers
and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless
ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), but ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the
ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer in many other
potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global security environment. As I mentioned
earlier, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring an explicit order from the
President. The process includes “assessment, review, and consultation…(via) secure phone and video
conferencing to enable the President to consult with his senior advisors, including the Secretary of
Defense and other military commanders.”iii Once a decision is reached, the order is prepared and
transmitted to the forces using “procedures…equipment, and communications that ensure the President’s nuclear control orders are received and properly
Nuclear Command and Control (NC2)
implemented…”.iv The law of war governs the use of US nuclear weapons. Nuclear options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon. Here, US policy as articulated in
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided important context regarding the consideration of US nuclear use (i.e., extreme circumstances when vital national interests are at stake). The
2010 NPR also restated the “negative security guarantee” (i.e., the US will not consider using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the Nuclear
the legal principles of military necessity, distinction,
and proportionality also apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions. Legal advisors are deeply
involved with commanders at all steps of the deliberate and crisis action processes to offer perspective
on how force is to be used as well as the decision to use force. The decision to use nuclear weapons is
not an all or nothing decision. Over the years, successive Presidents have directed the military to prepare a range of
options designed to provide flexibility and to improve the likelihood of controlling escalation if
deterrence fails. Options are clearly defined in scope and duration and the President retains the ability
to terminate nuclear operations when necessary. Military members are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) to follow orders provided they are legal and come from appropriate command authority. They are
equally bound to question (and ultimately refuse) illegal orders or those that do not come from appropriate
Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations). In addition,
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authority. As the commander of US Strategic Command, I shared the responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military and
civilian leaders to address and resolve any concerns and potential legal issues on behalf of the men and women in the nuclear operating forces during the decision process. It was our duty to
pose the hard questions, if any, before proceeding with our military advice. Nuclear crew members must have complete confidence that the highest legal standards have been enforced from
target selection to an employment command by the President.
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---AT: Miscalc---China
No miscalc ever
Stashwick, USN Lieutenant Commander and Chicago IR graduate studies, 2015
(Steven, “South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths”,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/)
The threat of “miscalculation” is again in vogue. What was once a preoccupation of accidental war
theorists has resurfaced in discussions about maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and Sino-U.S. relations.
During the Cold War, policymakers and scholars worried about nuclear annihilation sparked by misinterpreted warnings, rogue officers, technical glitches in command and control systems, or a
lower-level confrontation spiraling out of control. Absent the Cold War’s looming nuclear threat, today’s oft-repeated concerns focus on “miscalculation” causing a local or tactical-level
incident between individual ships or aircraft (harassment, collision, interdiction, and so on) to lead to broader military confrontation. Some variation of this theme has been featured in public
remarks by former U.S. Defense Secretaries Gates, Panetta, Hagel, and current Defense Secretary Carter, as well as Commanders of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Command, and
was a topic of policymaker discussion going back at least to the 1996 Taiwan Strait incident. These concerns are likewise found in too many op-eds, reports, interviews, commentaries, and
However, while history shows that strategic miscalculations can lead
states to war, or dangerously close to it, evidence does not support the worry that miscalculation may
cause a local or tactical-level incident to spiral out of control. To understand the risks associated with
miscalculation, we must distinguish between miscalculation at the strategic level and miscalculation
stemming from a localized incident between naval or air forces. At the strategic level – that is, a nation’s a priori willingness to escalate a
articles to count (see also here, here, here, and here, etc.)
conflict and use military force to achieve its objectives – no country starts a war expecting to lose. Yet, “most wars…end in the defeat of at least one nation which had expected victory,”
That may be a plausible danger in Southeast Asia, but a distinct
one. Instead, much of the discourse about localized maritime incidents in the South China Sea conflates
strategic and local miscalculation risks, focusing on the latter’s potential to lead to a wider conflict. This
implying all wars result from some degree of strategic miscalculation.
concern over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger “incidents at sea” poses to peace stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships
were concerned that an incident between “peppery young ship captains” could “lead people to shoot at each other with results that might…be impossible to control,” in the words of Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S. and Soviets were openly adversarial and serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost
despite explicit mutual, strategic, and existential antagonism between the U.S. and U.S.SR,
none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred over the four decades of the Cold War
escalated into anything beyond a short diplomatic crisis. It is possible that they avoided a nuclear spiral
in these incidents through diligent diplomacy and luck. But more likely, it suggests that this type of
maritime incident is insufficient on its own to lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned. Mitigating
the miscalculation concerns of officials and the extreme scenarios of some commentators is that these
maritime incidents do not occur in a vacuum, de-coupled from explicit national interests. In a famous 1988 Cold War
commonplace. Yet
incident, Soviet vessels in the Black Sea shouldered the U.S. warships Yorktown and Caron (a controlled collision meant to push a ship off-course) while the latter were deliberately contesting
what the U.S. deemed excessive Soviet legal claims over maritime rights. The Soviets knew the U.S. vessels were there to intentionally flout their claims, and the U.S. knew the Soviets would
likely try to enforce them. Even if the firmness of the Soviet response was unanticipated (or deemed unlikely), there was no mystery to either side’s objectives. Thus, neither side was going to
start shooting in confusion; the Soviet vessels even radioed their intention to strike the U.S. ships. While not “safe” in the strictest sense (ships do not like to “swap paint” with each other),
footage from the Yorktown and Caron being pushed shows the actions to be intense but deliberate, professionally executed, and clearly of an enforcement nature, rather than a prelude to
combat. While a serious diplomatic incident, both sides understood the situation, which served to moderate concern over escalation. Similarly, a shouldering incident between the U.S. cruiser
Cowpens and a Chinese warship in 2013, while concerning to the U.S. from a safety-at-sea perspective, was understood to be motivated by Chinese sensitivities around testing their new
Nonetheless, concerns over maritime incidents, miscalculation, and spiraling
conflict contain enough intuitive logic to have endured. A shared Cold War concern over miscalculations led to accords that are still in effect, such
aircraft carrier, not a precursor to hostilities.
as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) and Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) agreement, and may be credited with helping keep
incidents between the U.S. and U.S.SR under “control.” However, the fact that agreements were reached at all is likely more significant than their content. Such agreements indicated a shared
belief between U.S. and Soviet military leaderships that despite their feverish preparations for war against one another, neither wanted war to come as the result of a tactical-level incident
between individual ships and aircraft. This suggests neither would let an incident, however serious, become an independent casus belli. The substance of these accords (and those reached in
the South China Sea) further strengthens this thesis. While INCSEA and DMA contained rules of behavior, these were, again in Zumwalt’s words, “little more than a reaffirmation of the
[maritime] Rules of the Road” (international rules that direct how ships stay safe around each other at sea). What was groundbreaking was that in concluding the accords, the U.S. and U.S.SR
implicitly recognized their intentions to violate those rules and practices when advantageous (consider the Yorktown and Caron). The accords created new parallel rules by which each could do
so “safely,” as well as new communications protocols to inform one another of their intentions. Together, this affirms that both sides were playing a (serious) game to establish positions and
assert rights more than they were interested in war. Of course, incidents intended to reinforce maritime claims and hostile actions can look the same right up until ordnance is exchanged, but
In Asia, there is recent and dramatic
precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical
arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship
Cheonan was sunk in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere
‘incident’ of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South
now both sides could be more confident that if shooting did start, it was an intentional act of war. Precedent for Restraint
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Korea’s armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a
strategically calibrated response. It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any
responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors
killed, the incident did not spiral out of control. This suggests that South Korea’s political calculus did not
view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which
is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some
take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels
and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the
recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state
already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient
casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents
would prevent the hostility. On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is
actually a sign of restraint. For a front so often considered a “flashpoint,” it is notable how few incidents
in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that
regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military “white hull” vessels to enforce their
claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals
their desire to avoid escalation. And while “gray hull” naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further
constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses. As in the Cold War, parties
in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the
perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the
bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning
concerns about miscalculation and escalation­, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by
avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the
symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and
sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional
norms and “facts on the ground” (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto
resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China’s efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing
vessels from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that China’s regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that
The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over
incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat
perceptions, and justify arms build-ups. Whether an incident is deliberate, or a true organic accident, if
it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the
strategic level. However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA,
China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions.
DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes).
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---AT: Stability/Instability Paradox
Deterrence is the best unifying historical explanation for the lack of conflict since the
1950s.
Tertrais 15 Bruno Tertrais (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in
France. He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and associate
editor of Survival as well as a member of the editorial board of the Washington Quarterly and of
Strategic and Military Affairs. In 2010, he was the recipient of the Vauban Prize, awarded for his
distinguished career and in 2014, he was made a Knight of the Legion of Honor), “How Relevant is
Nuclear Deterrence Today?”, Nação e Defesa, 2015 N. 140 pp. 10-24,
https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/23984/1/TERTRAISBruno_p10_26.pdf.
In Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea or Israel, the relevance of nuclear deterrence is hardly questioned. However, in Western countries, nuclear deterrence has been the target of
criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds since 1945. In the past decade, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. Efforts led
by four US statesmen, or the more radical Global Zero movement, as well as various diplomatic initiatives, have been accompanied by a flurry of new, serious academic studies questioning the
legitimacy of nuclear weapons. More than ever, nuclear deterrence is attacked by many, both on the Left and on the Right. To the traditional arguments related to the credibility of nuclear
deterrence are now added two other factors. First, nuclear weapons, it is argued, have limited value vis-à-vis proliferation and terrorism, and such risks bolster the case for nuclear
disarmament. Second, alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense are said to now be much more effective than they were in the past. This paper refutes these
arguments on the grounds that nuclear deterrence has proven to be an effective war prevention instrument, that it is cost-effective, and that today’s challenges confirm its relevance.¶
Nuclear Weapons Have Been Effective War-Prevention Tools¶ It is by definition impossible to prove that deterrence has worked, and
correlation is not causality. But History gives us solid arguments in support of the positive role played by nuclear weapons, especially since our database now covers seven decades. Firstly,
no major power conflict has taken place in 70 years. The role of nuclear deterrence to explain this
historical anomaly has been highlighted by leading historians and authors such as John Lewis Gaddis, Kenneth Waltz, and Michael Quinlan.
No comparable period of time has ever existed in the history of States. There were two dozen conflicts among major powers in the
equivalent amount of time following the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), and several after the Vienna Congress (1815).1 ¶ Secondly, there has never been a direct
military conflict between two nuclear States. Beyond this mere observation, two studies have shown that the possession
of nuclear weapons by two countries significantly reduced the likelihood of war between them (Pasley, 2008;
Rauchhaus, 2009). Events in Asia since 1949 provide an interesting test case. China and India fought a war in 1962, but have refrained from
resorting to arms against each other ever since. There were three India-Pakistan wars (1962, 1965 and
1971) before both countries became nuclear; but since the late 1980s (when the two countries acquired
a minimum nuclear capability), none of the two has launched any significant air or land operations
against the other.¶ Thirdly, no nuclear-armed country has ever been invaded. This proposition too can be tested by the evolution of
regional crises. Israel was invaded in 1948, on the day of its independence. But in 1973, Arab States deliberately limited their operations to disputed territories (the Sinai and the Golan
Heights). It is thus incorrect to take the example of the Yom Kippur war as a “proof” of the failure of nuclear deterrence. Likewise, India refrained from penetrating Pakistani territory at the
occasion of the crises of 1990, 1999, 2002 and 2008, whereas it had done so in 1965 and 1971. Another example is sometimes mistakenly counted as a failure of nuclear deterrence: the
no country covered by a
nuclear guarantee has ever been the target of a major State attack. Here again evidence is hard to give, but can be found a contrario.
The United States refrained from invading Cuba in 1962, for instance, but did not hesitate in invading Grenada, Panama
or Iraq. The Soviet Union invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, but not a single US ally. China has refrained from invading Taiwan, which
Falklands War (1982). But this was a British Dependent Territory for which nothing indicated that it was covered by nuclear deterrence.¶ Fourthly,
benefits from a US defense commitment. North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in 1950 after Washington had excluded it from its “defensive perimeter”, but has refrained from doing so
since Seoul has been covered with a nuclear guarantee. Neither South Vietnam nor Kuwait were under the US nuclear umbrella. Russia could afford to invade Georgia and Ukraine because
these countries were not NATO members. A partial exception is the shelling of Yeongpyeong island (2011); but the limited character of the attack and its location (in a maritime area not
recognized by Pyongyang as being part of South Korean territory) make it hard to count it as a major failure of extended deterrence.¶
Miscalc is impossible and no lashout
Kehler 17 [Gen. C. Robert Retired General in the US Air Force, testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. 11-14-17. “STATEMENT OF GENERAL C. ROBERT KEHLER.”
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Kehler_Testimony.pdf]
Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) US
nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of
the United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons, and the President’s ability to exercise
that authority and direction is ensured by the people, procedures, facilities, equipment, and
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communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS
has been designed with resilience, redundancy, and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot
hope to neutralize our deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby
“disconnecting” the President and other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the
nuclear forces—even in the most stressing scenarios. These features enhance deterrence and contribute
to crisis stability. NCCS capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons
while also preventing their unauthorized, accidental, or inadvertent use. Operations and activities involving
US nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards. While many of the specifics are highly
classified, general methods range from personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls. In
addition, sensors and communications links that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially
certified, and tests and exercises are frequently held to validate the performance of both systems and
people. Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual
cyber intrusions. Other factors contribute to the prevention of unauthorized, inadvertent, or accidental
use. “Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller and postured much less aggressively than its Cold War
ancestor”. ii Not only are the long-range bombers and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and
poised to take off with nuclear weapons (unless ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration), but
ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the ocean. Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still
exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer i
n many other potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global security
environment. As I mentioned earlier, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring
an explicit order from the President. The process includes “assessment, review, and consultation…(via)
secure phone and video conferencing to enable the President to consult with his senior advisors,
including the Secretary of Defense and other military commanders.”iii Once a decision is reached, the
order is prepared and transmitted to the forces using “procedures…equipment, and communications that ensure the
President’s nuclear control orders are received and properly implemented…”.iv The law of war governs the use of US nuclear weapons. Nuclear
options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon. Here, US policy as articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) provided important context regarding the consideration of US nuclear use (i.e., extreme circumstances when vital national interests are
at stake). The 2010 NPR also restated the “negative security guarantee” (i.e., the US will not consider using nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapons state that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations). In
addition, the
legal principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality also apply to nuclear
plans, operations, and decisions. Legal advisors are deeply involved with commanders at all steps of the
deliberate and crisis action processes to offer perspective on how force is to be used as well as the
decision to use force. The decision to use nuclear weapons is not an all or nothing decision. Over the years,
successive Presidents have directed the military to prepare a range of options designed to provide
flexibility and to improve the likelihood of controlling escalation if deterrence fails. Options are clearly
defined in scope and duration and the President retains the ability to terminate nuclear operations
when necessary. Military members are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to follow orders
provided they are legal and come from appropriate command authority. They are equally bound to
question (and ultimately refuse) illegal orders or those that do not come from appropriate authority. As the
commander of US Strategic Command, I shared the responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other
senior military and civilian leaders to address and resolve any concerns and potential legal issues on behalf of the men and women in the
nuclear operating forces during the decision process. It was our duty to pose the hard questions, if any, before proceeding with our military
advice. Nuclear crew members must have complete confidence that the highest legal standards have been enforced from target selection to an
employment command by the President.
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Miscalc theory is wrong
Marc Trachtenberg, February 14, 2000 - professor of Political Science at the University of California,
Los Angeles. He received his Ph.D in History from the University of California, Berkeley, "The "Accidental
War" Question", www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/inadvertent.pdf
First, what do we mean exactly by "miscalculation"? Suppose someone gives me ten-to-one odds that if I
role a die, I won't be able to come up with a six. I take the bet and I lose. Does this mean I
"miscalculated"? Of course not: the calculation was perfectly rational, but I just happened to be unlucky.
Similarly, in international politics, states might assume at the beginning of a crisis that there is only a
relatively small risk of war, say one in five or one in six. If war nonetheless breaks out, that fact does not
in itself mean that they had miscalculated; they had not, after all, assumed that war would be
impossible. To prove miscalculation, one therefore has to demonstrate somehow that the probability of
war breaking out, as it existed at the beginning of a crisis, really was much higher than people thought,
which of course might be very difficult to do. If one simply assumes that a gap between expectation and
outcome shows that people had miscalculated, one is not really explaining very much; one is simply
giving a name to the fact the things worked out in a way people had not initially thought was very likely.
The point here is that we tend to use language in a fairly sloppy way; these habits enable us to avoid
focusing on the real issues. The real issue here has to do with how easy it is to slide into a war, even if
both sides very much want to avoid that outcome. Those who take "inadvertent war" seriously tend to
assume that that risk is high; their critics, like Brodie, assume that they wildly overestimate the risk of a
war happening in that way.
What is to be said about this issue? First of all, it is clear that people who talk about how wars can come
about even if no one sets out to engineer them do have something real in mind. As a crisis develops,
each side gets more and more deeply involved; the stakes keep rising, the ante keeps going up, and it
becomes harder and harder to give way. If one knew this was going to happen, one might have chosen
not to engage in the confrontation in the first place. But there is no way to turn back the clock; and so
one might be led in this way to fight a war that one would have very much wished to avoid. A dynamic
of this sort certainly exists. One thinks, for example, of the crisis set off by the Japanese move into
southern Indochina in July 1941, or even of the Anglo-German crisis in the summer of 1939, which led to
a war which both Hitler and the British did not intend and would have liked to avoid, at least at that
point.8 The July Crisis in 1914 is another case in point; it is hard to believe that either side would have
conducted its affairs the way it did if it knew at the start that the policy it adopted was going to lead to
war, let alone to the kind of war that eventually developed. But does the fact that a dynamic of this kind
exists mean in itself that it is appropriate in such cases to refer to the war that breaks out as an
"accidental" war?
There are two points to be made on this issue. First of all, as long as states choose courses of action with
their eyes open--if they decide to engage in a test of will, knowing full well that this is what they are
doing, and deliberately adopt tactics limiting their own freedom of action (and in particular their ability
to avoid ending up in an armed conflict) as a way of prevailing in the crisis-- then it can scarcely be said
that the outcome of that confrontation is to be viewed as essentially an "accident." And the basic point
here is that states, by and large, do know what they are doing; to a certain extent, they burn their
bridges in the course of a crisis, but they do this with important political objectives in mind. They know
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that if their prestige is engaged, their adversary will know that it is hard for them to draw back, and so
their adversary will be under more pressure to accommodate them on the issue at hand.
The second point has to do with how much risk there really is in situations of this sort. It should not be
assumed too readily that states underestimate the degree to which they lose control of the situation
when they engage in a crisis. States can generally pull back from the brink if they really want to;
prestige will be sacrificed, but often states are willing to pay that price. The history of international
politics in the century that just ended is full of crises that were liquidated by one side accepting what
amounted to defeat, sometimes even humiliating defeat; and in the July Crisis in 1914, the German
government chose at the most critical moment to let the war come rather than press for a compromise
solution.9
The key thing here is that in 1914 and 1939 political leaders had not totally lost control, but had chosen
to accept war rather than back off in a crisis. Their aversion to war was not overwhelming. But when
both sides very much want to avoid a full-scale armed conflict, the story is very different. This was the
case during the Cold War. People sometimes seem to assume that peace was hanging by a thread during
that conflict, and that we were lucky to make our way through it without a thermonuclear holocaust.
But I don't think this is true at all: and in general I think it is very unlikely that a great war would break
out if both sides are determined to avoid it.
These arguments about how war could break out almost by accident were frequently made during the
Cold War itself--and indeed were made by responsible and experienced officials. A British document
from March 1946, for example, argued that the Soviets did not want war, but the kind of 10 tactics they
used with the West might lead to a war that neither side wanted: "although the intention may be
defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Russian leaders may misjudge
how far they can go without provoking war with America or ourselves."10 A year later, a British Foreign
Office official warned that the fact that the Soviets had military superiority in Europe might make them
careless, and that they might "misjudge what measures can safely be taken without producing a serious
crisis." Events might get out of control and a situation might develop that could "lead to disaster."11
What is wrong with this point of view? It assumes that the Soviets would not be cautious, that they
would not frame their actions very carefully with an eye to the American reaction, that in deciding how
far to go they would not gauge very closely how the Americans reacted to the measures they had taken
up to that point. This point of view assumes also that the Soviets would find it very hard to draw back if
it became clear that they had overstepped the bounds and had thought the American reaction would
not be as vigorous as it in fact was--or indeed that they had not made the mental reservation that they
could draw back, in necessary, when they decided to embark on a provocative course of action. Basically
the assumption is that the Soviets did not care enough about what a war would entail to take these
rather elementary and normal precautions. This point of view also assumes that the American response
would be very rigid and "spring-loaded": a slight Soviet infringement, and the Americans immediately
take the plunge into general war--as though there are no intermediate measures of a political or military
nature that would be taken, no process that would unfold within which the two sides would test each
other out before resorting to extreme measures. To my mind, anyone with any sense should know that
things would never move directly and mechanically from initial provocation to full-scale war, that
things would unfold almost inevitably in a more complex way--or, in short, that enough "cushioning"
exists in the system to keep relatively minor provocations from leading directly to general war
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MARK
. When people during the Cold War period spoke about war through miscalculation, they often were not thinking simply in terms of one side
overstepping the bounds and setting off a new war essentially by accident. They frequently had a more specific mechanism in mind. During the
Berlin Crisis period especially (1958-62), people were worried that a war could come if each side calculated that the other would back down if
only one's own side took a sufficiently firm line. This type of argument took shape as an answer to the hard-liners' argument--that is, the
argument of people like Dean Acheson and Charles de Gaulle--that one had to be very tough: the adversary, the hard-liners argued, had to be
forced to recognize that if he continued with his policy, the result would be war; in that case, the adversary would certainly give way. But what
if both sides made this kind of calculation? The result might well be war; one therefore could not accept the hard-liners' argument critically, and
one perhaps needed to take a more flexible line.
Llewellyn Thompson, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow during this period, frequently argued along these lines. "I think we can be fairly
confident," he wrote in March 1959, "that Khrushchev will not deliberately risk total war over Berlin and I suspect his colleagues might pull him
back if it were clear that a real risk of this was involved. On the other hand, we must remember that he doubtless holds a similar view about us
and thus the real danger is that we could both drift on into a situation which might get out of control."12 In May 1961, he pushed the argument
a good deal further and drew out the implications. "Both sides," he wrote, thought that the other "would not risk war over Berlin." The danger
arose from the fact that if Khrushchev "carries out his declared intentions and we carry out ours," the situation would in all probability "get out
of control." Each 12 side's prestige would become increasingly engaged, "making retreat for either side even more difficult." The Soviets had
"strong nerves," and geography as well as the local military balance around Berlin were in their favor. If America was in fact prepared to carry
her policy through to the end, and Khrushchev "found he had misjudged us," it would probably be "too late for retreat." He concluded that the
United States should therefore "make every effort" to prevent such a situation from developing."13
The basic point was widely understood not just by the western governments. One top British military leader (Lord Mountbatten) referred at
about this time to the "danger of war breaking out by miscalculation since both the Americans and the Russians believed that the other would
not resort to global war over Berlin."14 Secretary of State Rusk told the other western foreign ministers in December 1961 that "one of the
quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight."15 The fact that war could come in this way was
understood by the broader public; see, for example, the cartoon reproduced below:
The point here is simply that governments understood what they were doing. They understood the risk
inherent in the situation. They were conducting policy with their eyes open; they were not just
stumbling through a minefield. If they had not understood these mechanisms, and if war had broken out
through a process of this sort, then one could reasonably hold that mechanism responsible for the
coming of the war. But the fact that they understood this dynamic tended to reduce its importance as a
causative factor; an awareness of the problem had been factored in advance into the decision-making
process; any war that did break out would, by virtue of that fact, would be rendered less "accidental."
The Role of the Military System
The idea that the political process can be overwhelmed during a crisis by forces arising from within the
military system is very common, and indeed probably should be considered as the heart of the
"inadvertent war" thesis. To the extent that this thesis has a major historical basis, it is supported
essentially by claims about the coming of war in 1914. Many political scientists take it as practically an
article of faith that the First World War was an "inadvertent war," brought on by factors of an essentially
military nature. The rigidity of the war plans, the emphasis placed on offensive military action, the
system of interlocking mobilizations, the premium placed on moving first and getting a jump on one's
adversaries, the fact that the political leadership (supposedly) did not understand the logic of the
situation created by the war plans--all this is said to have a lot to do with the outbreak of the war.
For me as an historian, all this was rather bizarre when I first encountered it. But since these arguments
were made by intelligent people, and since they were so common and played so important a role in
supporting fundamental claims about what made for war, I thought it would be worthwhile to try to get
to the bottom of this issue and see what there was to this argument. The answer was: not very much. I
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am not going to repeat the analysis that supported that conclusion here. Anyone interested should
simply read the article in question.16 I do, however, want to deal with one substantive point, the point
about 1914 that Scott Sagan raises in his piece.17 But mainly I will be talking here not about substance
but about the way these issues are dealt with in the literature. The basic point, once again, is that if
these issues are to be discussed at all, we really need to analyze them a lot more rigorously than we
have so far.
But, as I say, I would like to deal first with Scott Sagan's argument about the July Crisis. There is, he says, one reason why the First World War should be considered an "accidental war," and this has to do with the way General von
Moltke undercut Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's efforts to get the Austrians to accept the Kaiser's plan for a peaceful settlement, the so-called "Halt in Belgrade" proposal, a variant of which had also been proposed by the British
government.18 Moltke, the chief of the German general staff, at around 2 p.m. on July 30th told the Austrian military attaché that Austria should mobilize against Russia and should reject the British peace plan. This helped
convince the Vienna government that it should indeed reject that plan and, Sagan says, opt instead for "total mobilization and war."
There are a number of issues here. Let us accept, first of all, the point that Moltke's move confirmed the Austrians in their decision to take a tough line--to go ahead with the mobilization and to ignore the pressure for a
compromise peace. Did this mean that this move was therefore a cause, let alone a major cause, of the war? The answer is no, because whatever effect Moltke's advice had on Vienna, it came too late to influence the course of
events: the attaché's report was dispatched at 5:30 p.m. on the 30th and was received in Vienna during the night; the decisions it influenced were made the next day--that is, July 31st.19 But by then, Russian had already ordered
general mobilization, the key event that set off the avalanche and made war unavoidable: the Russian decision had been made at around 5 p.m. on the 30th. So even if Moltke had not spoken to the Austrians, one would still have
had war; Moltke's move had no fundamental effect on what happened.
We could, if we like, just leave it there. After all, Sagan tells us on p. 6 of his paper that "for a conflict to be considered an accidental war, there would have to be some activity or incident inside the military machine, without which
war would not have occurred," and Moltke's move clearly does not fall into that category. But there is a certain value, in the present context, in pushing the analysis a bit further. Let us suppose Russia had not ordered general
mobilization on the afternoon of July 30. Would Motlke's move have led to a war, and in that event, could one say that such a war would have been "accidental"? Moltke was asking the Austrians to order general mobilization and,
in passing, he also advised them to reject the English plan. Austrian mobilizaton as such would not have led to war: as the Austrian general Conrad said, "if the Russians do not touch us, we need not touch them either."20 In fact,
an Austrian mobilization would in some ways have made general war less likely: by mobilizing against Russia, Austria would have found it harder to move against Serbia and thus the Russians would not have been provoked into
attacking quite so quickly; and an Austrian army on the Russian frontier would have pinned down Russian forces, thus relieving some of the pressure on Germany to move quickly against France.
What then about the pressure on Austria to accept the "Halt in Belgrade" proposal? If Russia had not mobilized, there would have been time for Bethmann to exert pressure on Austria effectively; indeed, I think that the reason
Moltke toughened his position on the afternoon of the 30th is that he had received information that a Russian general mobilization was imminent and no longer saw any point to doing things other than what was militarily
necessary. But whatever line Moltke took, on political issues Bethmann and the Kaiser were still ultimately calling the shots; and if they had both the time and the inclination, they could certainly have brought Austria around.
But time was a factor, and there is no getting around the fact that time was lost because of the way the Germans managed things during this climactic phase of the crisis (July 28-30). Their government was not a well-oiled machine,
working out its policy rationally and implementing it efficiently. Moltke's line on the afternoon of the 30th was different from Bethmann's line the previous night; but Albertini shows quite convincingly that the German ambassador
in Vienna, Tschischky, did a lot more to sabotage the Halt in Belgrade plan during the really crucial period than Moltke had.21 Indeed, as is well known, Bethmann himself had initially tried to sabotage the plan when the Kaiser first
proposed it on July 28th. Because all this took place prior to the Russian general mobilization, it was much more important than what Moltke did. Moltke's role is stressed simply because he was a military man, and the theory is
that what the military was doing was of primary importance. I think, however, that the evidence shows that Moltke's advice to the Austrians on the afternoon of the 30th played a relatively minor role in bringing on the war; its role
is certainly wildly exaggerated in much of the literature.
The more general issue here has to do with the fact that different people in the government 17 were working at cross-purposes. This is par for the course in political life. As Sagan notes, what this means is that from the point of
view of the individual at the top, things are "out of control," and the events that were precipitating the war could be viewed as "accidents." But the real issue is not whether from the point of view of the person at the top, events
were not fully under control; the real issue is whether, from the point of view of the scholar, what happened was "accidental." My personal view is that what happened with German policy in late July 1914 is typical of the way
things work in government. Control and discipline were less than perfect, but this is the way states actually operate, and this kind of thing should be taken as the norm. Power is generally somewhat spread out; you have a variety
of people able to influence the course of events, and each of them acts purposefully. This of course makes for a rather complex story. But it does not mean that what finally happens should be regarded, by the scholar at any rate,
as "accidental."
But what I really want to talk about here is not Sagan's argument, but the way this set of issues is dealt with in the literature as a whole. Let me begin by citing another extract from the Brodie-Schelling correspondence, this time
some comments Brodie wrote on the manuscript of what was to become Schelling's great classic, Arms and Influence. To support one of his arguments about how a general war could begin, Schelling made certain arguments about
how the military system in place in 1914 helped bring on the First World War.22 Commenting on that section, Brodie suggested that Schelling use the famous story (which Sagan also discusses) about how the Kaiser, having been
led to believe that Britain would stay out of the war if France were not attacked, told Moltke to cancel the mobilization plan and fight the war only in east; this Moltke said was impossible and the Kaiser supposedly had to give way.
Barbara Tuchman, Brodie wrote, described the incident her best-seller, the Guns of August. Schelling replied that he had "thought of using that 18 business about the Kaiser's being told the trains couldn't be turned around," but he
"had a nagging impression that Barbara Tuchman or somebody thought the story was possibly undocumented, and maybe a little too good to be true," so he "let it go." If, however, Brodie or some "other genuine scholar" could
assure him that the story was correct," he said he would like to use it. But he was too busy to "trace down any documented version" himself.23
This exchange I found quite revealing. Here were the two greatest figures in the history of American strategic thought. Brodie repeats a story that radically distorts what actually happened: the evidence, including the evidence
Barbara Tuchman presented in her book (although the way she framed the issue gave exactly the opposite impression), shows very clearly that it was Moltke and not the Kaiser who was overruled. What this shows, therefore, is
that Brodie had never really studied the July crisis the way it should have been studied, above all by an expert of his stature, and was content to repeat the usual clichés. As for Schelling, his reply to Brodie was even more striking.
He could not be bothered to do the work needed to get to the bottom of such an important issue. He could not even go to the library or to a bookstore and look up the story in the Tuchman book. It was as though the historical
evidence had purely ornamental value; if this story did not work, well then it need not be used. An accurate understanding of what happened in July 1914 was not seen as fundamental in its own right.
Indeed, Schelling had little feel for what constituted good historical work and tended to use historical sources uncritically. In the final version of Arms and Influence, the one book he cited ( on p. 223) to support his view about the
importance of the mobilization system in bringing on the war was Ludwig Reiners's The Lamps Went out in Europe. The Reiners book was not a serious, scholarly work; the book, for example, had no footnotes, and indeed was
popular history of the most dubious sort. Chapters 13-15 in the Reiners book, Schelling wrote, was "the best" source he knew "on the dynamics of mobilization and their effect on decisions." But Reiners did not stress the role of
the mobilization system in those chapters; instead he developed a rather bizarre theory that actions taken by the British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey were crucial in bringing on the war, and indeed that Grey half-wanted the
war. Grey, Reiners argued, encouraged the Russians to mobilize against Austria, knowing full well that the Germans would find it hard to sit on their hands if this happened--that is, knowing that it might well precipitate a war. This
was why, according to Reiners, Gray supposedly withheld from Russia some key information to the effect that Austria would not move against Serbia immediately, even if the Serbs rejected the Austrian ultimatum: he did not want
to calm the Russians, Reiners claimed, he instead wanted to push them toward action, even though he knew how risky that action would be. But the claim that Grey "failed to inform St. Petersburg" of this key piece of information
was simply false: as soon as Grey learned from the Austrians that a rejection of the ultimatum would lead to "military preparations (not operations),” he informed the Russians of that fact. Reiners was just twisting the evidence to
support his own rather idiosyncratic theory of the origins of the war; indeed, in the very first paragraph of the first of the chapters that Schelling cited, Reiners distorts a passage from Grey's memoirs to make it support his theory
that Grey's duplicity was an important factor in brigning on the war.24
Is it fair to hold Schelling responsible for relying on a source like this? Given that he was writing a very important book, given that in that book he was making a general argument about how war could break out "accidentally"
(because of the "dynamics of mutual alarm"), given that to the extent that this theory was based on the historical record, it turned on a specific interpretation of the coming of the First World War, yes, given all these things, I do
think Schelling had a responsibility 20 to get the story straight. And he had a responsibility to exercise a degree of critical judgment when it was a question of deciding which historical accounts to rely on. The method for making
that decision is not hard to master; anyone, for example, can check to see whether claims are supported by evidence cited in footnotes. The claims people make about how a war might come are too important, and their historical
basis is too important, to be dealt with in what was essentially a very amateurish way.
Things have of course changed a good deal since Schelling and Brodie had that exchange. Political scientists have become much better at using historical sources, and indeed at doing history themselves. And perhaps one should
not be too hard on political scientists and others who accepted these familiar stories, because they probably got them from books by historians. Sagan suggests something of the sort (in his n. 42) and he is absolutely right. Among
other works, he alludes in this context to Gordon Craig's Politics of the Prussian Army, which in fact (on p. 294) echoes the standard account of the confrontation between Moltke and the Kaiser. But Craig is of course a first-rate
scholar, and when you see things like this you begin to suspect that something is going on that is not strictly intellective in nature.
You have the sense that people argue along these lines because this is what they really want to believe. They really do think that there is a basic danger, even in contemporary America, of things spinning out of control because of
the way the military behaves. Craig, in the final sentence of the introduction to his book, points out the contemporary relevance of his argument: reflecting on the history of the Germans, he says, a people "whose political
aspirations were defeated in part by their inability to set proper limits to the activities of their military leaders, may help us avoid dangerous mistakes in our own time." But the question for us is whether this is in fact a serious risk-or really 21 whether focusing on this kind of thing reflects a distorted view of what is important in war causation, and leads us to focus on the wrong questions and neglect the more significant ones.
Let me give another example, this time from the work of a political scientist who, more than most, has actually done serious work in empirical and especially historical sources: Richard Ned Lebow. A few years ago, Lebow published
a book called Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion. In that book, he talks a lot about the July Crisis. In one important passage, he stresses the role of miscalculation in 1914. When they ordered general mobilization, he
says, the Russian leaders did not understand what they were doing; they did not believe their action "would directly trigger war." And you could not entirely blame them for this, he goes on, because they had not been effectively
warned of what the danger was. Bethmann "made only a belated and ineffectual effort to alert the Russians to the danger." As proof, he goes on to cite the fact that Bethmann instructed Pourtalès, the German ambassador in St.
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Petersburg, to inform Russian foreign minister Sazonov that Russian military measures directed against Germany "would force us to take counter measures which would have to consist of mobilizing the army. Mobilization,
however, means war, and would moreover have to be directed simultaneously against Russian and France, since France's engagements with Russia are well-known." Belated? This message was sent on July 26, days before the
Russians even ordered partial mobilization against Austria. Insufficiently clear? It is hard to imagine how Bethmann could have put the point more forcefully.
But maybe the message did not get through because Pourtalès fumbled? Lebow in fact goes on to argue that Pourtalès "did not grasp the import of the chancellor's message for, by his own account, in his subsequent conversation
with Sazonov he failed to warn him that Russian mobilization would make war unavoidable," and that "if anything, their talk seems to have 22 strengthened Sazonov's impression to the contrary." The proof here is an extract from
the ambassador's memoirs: Pourtalès relates that Sazonov put the question: "Surely mobilization is not the equivalent of war with you either. Is it?" The ambassador admitted that he confirmed Sazonov's belief to this effect, but
he also claims to have warned him that "once the button is pressed and the machinery set in motion, there is no stopping it."
Well, doesn't that extract show that Sazonov was given the message that even if war and mobilization were not formally the same thing, for all practically purposes, mobilization meant war? You get the feeling that Lebow is aware
of this, because he then goes on to discount the importance of a passage he himself had cited as proof that the Russians had not been warned that mobilization would lead to war: he says that it was unlikely that Pourtalès had said
anything of the sort since "his memoirs are riddled with self-serving falsehoods." But in that case why had he cited it in the first place? Rather odd, you must admit; but this is not the end of it.
In the next paragraph, the final paragraph in this section, Lebow goes on to quote the warning Bethmann sent on the 29th: "Kindly impress on M. Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures
would compel us to mobilize and that then a European war could hardly be prevented." Again, one can scarcely imagine how Bethmann could have been any clearer. But Lebow's conclusion here, at the end of this paragraph, is
that the German chancellor had "once again failed to make the danger of Russian mobilization explicit"!25
Problems of this sort become quite clear when you make an effort to free yourself from the standard dogmas and get in the habit of reading things critically--that is, with an eye to the evidence. And when you read this sort of
thing, you can't help asking yourself: what exactly is going on here? 23 People like Lebow are not dishonest. If they were, they would never present evidence that so clearly contradicted their basic claims. And they are obviously not
stupid either. But they are blinded-- blinded by what they want to believe. They do not understand the importance of setting up problems in such a way that the answers turn on what the evidence shows. They know (or think they
know) the answers in advance, and that shapes--what I really mean is, that distorts--their reading of the historical material.
People want to believe that the military system can be a major cause of war. They want to believe that
rigid war plans can cause trouble: after all, rigidity is bad and war is bad, and people take it for granted
that one bad thing must be connected with another.26 They want to believe military officers cause
trouble by acting on their own: military officers represent a different culture, and scholars tend to view
them with suspicion. They want to believe that the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" can be a real
problem, partly, I suspect, because the idea is so elegant analytically. It doesn't matter that this was not
the problem in 1914, because the Germans (for political reasons) had adopted the equivalent of a
"second-strike strategy": to get support at home, and to maximize the probability that Britain would stay
out of the war, they wanted Russia to take the first decisive step, and and had decided not to mobilize
until Russia mobilized first. It doesn't matter that this was not a problem during the Cold War either:
there was never a period when both sides had anything like a first-strike capability, for the simple
reason that it was easier to build a second-strike than a firststrike force, that a second-strike force would
therefore come into being first, and when it did the adversary no longer had a first-strike capability.
Nevertheless, since the assumption that the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" was a real problem
served as the foundation for a whole superstructure of academic and policy-oriented work (on both
military and arms control questions) people had an interest in not asking whether the assumption itself
had much validity.
Why does all this matter? The reason is ultimately quite simple. The belief that "accidental war" is a
serious problem results in a misallocation of intellectual effort: it diverts attention away from
fundamental issues--namely, political issues--to relatively minor problems. In the case of 1914,
especially, people have drawn the wrong lessons, lessons about how the military system created a
situation where the political process was overwhelmed, about how generals had to be kept on a short
leash, about the great risk of things spinning out of control for military reasons, about miscalculation
and ignorance and all their horrifying consequences. And people have tended to not ask the right
questions, questions about what should have been done politically, both during the crisis itself and
during the period that led up to it. Focusing on those latter questions, I claim, would have a much
greater payoff in terms of our understanding of how policy is to be conducted; the problem with the
accidental war theory is that it misdirects our attention--that it pulls us away from the questions we
should really be concentrating on.
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MisIce Breakers Neg
No need for ice breakers now
Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2023, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41153.pdf
• Navy officials have stated that they do not see a strong near-term need for building ice-hardened
surface ships and deploying them into the Atlantic, but acknowledge that such a need might emerge
in the longer run.174
• Cooperation with other Arctic cCooperation with other Arctic countries will be valuable in achieving
defense and homeland security goals.
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Arguments
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Pro Contentions
Contentions
China Threat (General)
Belt and road bad
Russia Threat (General)
 Finland
Strengthen NATO Cooperation
Hegemony good contention
Sea cable cuts bad
Increased oil access reduces oil dependence on the Middle East
Presence protects sea cables/the internet
Presence enables faster search & rescue
Presence enables faster response to oil spills
Presence critical to military resupply in Europe/Russia deterrence
Presence key to access to rare earth metals – military security, economic security, hegemony, renewable
energy good impacts
General arguments as to why more icebreakers are good (reasons covered above)
Greater oil access reduces dependence on the Middle East
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Con Contentions
Pressure on Russia leads to a lash-out (including nuclear lashout, as Russia relies on a strong military
presence in the Arctic for forward nuclear bases)
Crowding Russia out hurts their economy, instability and war impacts
China Politics/Encirclement
 Belt and Road good
Military trade-off (East Asia)
Diplomatic Capital trade-off
Increasing presence undermines cooperative approaches to security
US unilateralism undermines NATO
Presence hurts environment
Presence hurts indigenous people
Presence leads to sexual assault
Presence undermines cooperative security approaches needed to solve conflict
Undermines science coop
Undermines climate coop
More energy from the Arctic lowers energy prices and increases use
More oil from the Arctic means less oil purchased from other countries and lower oil prices (Saudi
Arabia economy impact, for example)
Securitization K
Capitalism K – Greater resource access enables capitalism