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History Internal Assessment
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How significant was the First World War as a cause of the October Revolution?
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Personal Code: jqt358
Word Count: 2199
Session: May 2022
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Table of Contents
Section 1: Identification & Evaluation of Sources…………………………………………… 3
Section 2: Investigation………………………………………………………………………. 4
Section 3: Reflection…………………………………………………………………………..9
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Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………11
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Section 1: Identification & Evaluation of Sources
This investigation explores How significant was the First World War as a cause of the
October Revolution in Russia?, while discussing the relative importance of other factors that
contributed to the Bolshevik party seizing power in 1917. The first source evaluated is The
Russian Revolution – a book published by Richard Pipes. It is relevant to the investigation
because it covers the years 1905 to 1921, providing information on the conditions in Russia
in the years preceding the October revolution; this helps with identifying causes of the
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revolution, which is the focus of this investigation. The second source is a journal article
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titled ‘(Good) Land and Freedom (for Former Serfs)’. It is relevant because its scope is
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narrower, and it focuses more in-depth on only one of the factors contributing to the October
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revolution – the significance of the First World War in aggravating peasant unrest.
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The origin of Pipes’ book is valuable because it was published in 1990, meaning that
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the author had hindsight and access to primary and secondary sources when writing it.
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Another value of the origin is that it was written by an American historian, meaning he is
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likely observing the situation in Soviet Russia from afar, rather than a Russian historian
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during 1990 who may have glorified or disregarded certain aspects that contributed to the
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revolution in fear of consequences from the communist regime. Further, since the scholarly
work synthesises various primary and secondary sources, it has a greater degree of
objectivity, deeming its purpose and content valuable. Conversely, the source’s origin may
be a limitation as some of the points made are the judgements of one historian – Richard
Pipes; this may limit the source’s value in providing an overview of historiography on the
causes of the Bolshevik Revolution. The source’s content is valuable to this investigation as
the book focuses a significant portion of its content on the specific discussion of the war and
the revolution. However, as a limitation of purpose, since the book discusses events in
Russia after 1917, the scope of its content goes beyond the research question.
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The purpose of the second source is to “examine peasant unrest in the period from
March to October 1917” by providing “systematic statistical evidence to support [the] view”
that the revolution was driven by peasant’s desire for land and freedom1. The narrow time
period makes its purpose valuable for specifically studying the causes of the October
revolution, while the attempt to find quantitative evidence to support an existing viewpoint
makes the source’s content more objective. A value of the origin is that the article was
written by three historians in 2017, meaning they had hindsight and access to various sources
– data from the provisional government’s records, Aleksandr Maliavskii’s work from 1981,
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and the FAO’s data on soil fertility from 19902. However, the source’s purpose of focusing
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primarily on peasant unrest limits its relevance to studying all the causes of the October
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revolution, which are discussed in the investigation. A limitation of the content is that the
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article uses quantitative data from only two sources, which have their own limitations: the
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provisional government’s data is “incomplete for the early months”, and Maliavskii’s study
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Section 2: Investigation
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includes data “for only some provinces”3.
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Considering the plethora of problems Russia was facing preceding the revolution, this
investigation will focus on the First World War and its contribution to the events of October
1917. This investigation will argue that WWI, although significant in deteriorating living
conditions and aggravating long term civil unrest, mainly contributed to the October
revolution by fostering conditions that forced the provisional government to make decisions
that generated popular dissent the Bolshevik party capitalised on to seize power. As historian
Peter Gatrell summarised in his book Russia’s First World War, “the war sharpened existing
antagonisms and cultivated fresh fields of social conflict”4.
1
Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and Dmitrii Kofanov, “(Good) Land and Freedom (for Former Serfs): Determinants of
Peasant Unrest in European Russia, March–October 1917.”
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War : A Social and Economic History, 215.
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The First World War deteriorated Russian living conditions, aggravating long term
dissatisfaction among the workers, soldiers, and peasants, contributing to increased civil
unrest that allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power in October. Growing shortages of consumer
goods and inflation5 resulted in the workers and soldiers developing grudges against the
government6. Famine, coupled with long-term peasant desire for land reform, culminated in
bazaar disorders, hunger riots, and pogroms7 that, according to political scientists Finkel,
Gehlbach and Kofanov, proved decisive in 19178. This is further supported by Nina
Khitrina’s argument that “alongside war, [the land question] was the most contentious of
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issues over which it was impossible to reach agreement”9. Furthermore, factory closures and
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industry shortages affected living conditions, while heavy casualties, according to Igor
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Grebenkin, led to the “gradual decline in…morale of Russian armed forces”10, exacerbated by
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the war and lasting problems of Imperial Russia. The mayor of Moscow commented on these
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issues: “we have grain at the flour mill which has no fuel, flour where there are no waggons
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to transport it, and waggons where there is no freight”11. As he references, the fall in
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production caused by the military draft, evidenced by a one-fifth reduction in output per head
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1913–191712, resulted in a rise in prices and a fall in the ruble’s value: by October, it was
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worth 6–7 kopeks of a pre-war ruble13. This disincentivised peasants to produce grain,
resulting in shortages of consumer goods transported to urban areas and the introduction of
food rationing. Ultimately, as argued by Ian Thatcher, “the spectre of hunger that resulted
from [the war]…alienated the urban population from the [government]”14, contributing to
their decision to support the Bolshevik party alternative. However, Pipes argues that unlike
5
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 332.
Michal Reiman, About Russia, Its Revolutions, Its Development and Its Present, 16.
7
Barbara Alpern Engel, “Not by Bread Alone: Subsistence Riots in Russia during World War I.”
8
Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and Dmitrii Kofanov, “(Good) Land and Freedom (for Former Serfs): Determinants of
Peasant Unrest in European Russia, March–October 1917.”
9
Ian D. Thatcher, “Post-Soviet Russian Historians and the Russian Provisional Government of 1917.”
10
Igor Grebenkin, “From War to Revolution: Political Aspects of the Mood of Russian Officers between 1914 and 1917.”
11
Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War : A Social and Economic History, 199.
12
Andrei Markevich and Mark Harrison, “Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia's National Income, 1913 to 1928.”
13
Yury Petrov, “Russia on the Eve of the Great Revolution of 1917: Recent Trends in Historiography.”
14
Ian D. Thatcher, “Post-Soviet Russian Historians and the Russian Provisional Government of 1917.”
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other European nations engaged in the war, Russia had revolutionary movement as an
intrinsic element of its history since the 1860s15. Consequently, the incidents of extra-lethal
violence16 in response to war-related problems demonstrate the population’s desperation,
which facilitated the rise of communism in Russia – as was not the case in other war-torn
countries.
Arguably, without the terrible conditions fostered by WWI, the provisional
government could have had a chance at digesting the “social conflicts plaguing [Russia]”17.
However, inheriting Russia’s unpreparedness for war, backwardness of the economy, and
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shortcomings of its cultural development18 alongside WWI – “the supreme test of [the]
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nation’s vitality and cohesion”19 – they failed to do so. The problems caused by the First
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World War were “naturally blamed on the country’s political leadership”20, forcing the
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provisional government to address them; however, their policies were either ineffective or
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non-existent. Understandably, suffering from attrition, the government had to make
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concessions regarding what issues to address and which to leave unattended21. For instance,
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they attempted to address the financial catastrophe by printing 9.5 billion rubles – more than
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had been printed over the preceding two years22. This stimulated inflation, decreasing the
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purchasing power of wages and upsetting the Russian population, as evidenced by the July
uprisings. Furthermore, the provisional government’s “inability to coordinate…food
distribution…became an important cause of political crisis”23. Feeding the soldiers was a
priority, with the army requisitioning one-third of the rolling stock, leaving little food and raw
materials for industrial and consumer needs24. Arguably, the government could have resolved
15
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 26.
Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and Dmitrii Kofanov, “(Good) Land and Freedom (for Former Serfs): Determinants of
Peasant Unrest in European Russia, March–October 1917.”
17
Yury Petrov, “Russia on the Eve of the Great Revolution of 1917: Recent Trends in Historiography.”
18
Igor Grebenkin, “From War to Revolution: Political Aspects of the Mood of Russian Officers between 1914 and 1917.”
19
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 290.
20
Igor Grebenkin, “From War to Revolution: Political Aspects of the Mood of Russian Officers between 1914 and 1917.”
21
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 332.
22
Yury Petrov, “Russia on the Eve of the Great Revolution of 1917: Recent Trends in Historiography.”
23
Ibid.
24
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 298.
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these issues with an adequate food rationing system; in fact, as Alexander Nove
acknowledges, “other powers too suffered from…food shortages”25. For example, the
German government introduced a successful ration card system26. This shows that the food
shortages Russia faced were worsened by the provisional government’s failure to address
them effectively. Nonetheless, with an estimated 1.7 million casualties, Russia exceeded
losses suffered by Germany, Britain, and France27, illustrating that the war affected Russia
more severely. Hence, to some extent, the provisional government’s incompetencies in
dealing with WWI can be justified, though undeniably significant to the October revolution.
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In addition to mismanaging the consequences of the First World War, the provisional
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government prioritised long-term stability over conceding to the demands of the population,
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which ultimately led to their downfall. The government lost public support when they
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decided to remain at war and later failed to regain national morale in the June Offensive –
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opportunities the Bolsheviks used to gain popularity. Coming to power, the provisional
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government aimed to rededicate Russia to “the cause of war”28, but, suffering from four years
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of attrition, the Russian population opposed this. Michal Reiman argues that by 1917,
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“Russian society knew that Russia already lost the war”29; they were convinced the faster the
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war would end, the better living conditions would get. Therefore, the continued engagement
in WWI – the drafting of soldiers, prolonged food rationing, and investment into weapons’
production – was a severe blow to the government’s popularity and an opportunity for the
Bolsheviks to exploit. The population’s antagonism towards the government was further
exacerbated by the failed June Offensive, which, in historian Lang’s words, was “supposed to
be the great offensive that would show that revolutionary Russia could succeed where tsarist
Russia had failed”30. Since the German troops “cut the Russians to pieces”, the June
25
Andrei Markevich and Mark Harrison, “Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia's National Income, 1913 to 1928.”
Yury Petrov, “Russia on the Eve of the Great Revolution of 1917: Recent Trends in Historiography.”
27
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 567.
28
Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War : A Social and Economic History, 198.
29
Michal Reiman, About Russia, Its Revolutions, Its Development and Its Present, 16.
30
Sean Lang, “Why couldn’t Lenin work with Kerensky?”
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Offensive, followed by the July uprisings, was arguably the defining moment when Russians
lost faith in Kerensky31. Thus, the provisional government’s decision to stay at war and its
subsequent military defeats were integral to popular dissent that laid the foundation for the
Bolshevik revolution.
However, it is important not to underestimate the efforts of the Bolshevik party in
capitalising on unfavourable conditions of the First World War to gain popularity in the
Soviet and ultimately overthrow the government. For example, Lenin’s slogan of ‘Peace,
Bread, and Land’ that the Bolsheviks introduced in the April Theses emphasised the main
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unresolved problems32. These three pillars were aspects the Russian public wanted resolved,
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so Lenin’s promise to achieve them mobilis[ed] the masses…in support of these demands”33
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and gained the Bolsheviks the popularity needed to remove the provisional government from
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power. Furthermore, as the situation with the war worsened, the Bolsheviks gained popularity
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within the Soviet because they despised the “imperialist war” from the beginning34, and their
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desire to leave it aligned with Russian popular opinion. In fact, the Soviet grew even more
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powerful after the Bolshevik’s success in the Kornilov Affair: it became armed35, meaning the
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peasantry and working-class gained a key militia that proved useful during the revolution.
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Hence, WWI and the provisional government’s actions were not exclusively responsible for
the revolution. As supported by Pipes, by blaming the provisional government for the
struggles Russia was facing during WWI, the Bolsheviks were able to aggravate public
dissatisfaction and eventually execute a ‘classic coup d’etat’36.
Overall, it can be argued that the First World War was significant to the October
revolution by fostering conditions that increased the population’s appeal to radicalism.
However, after evaluating historiographical evidence, the provisional government’s
31
Ibid.
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 537.
33
Wilhelm Pieck, “Freedom, Peace and Bread! The Activities of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.”
34
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 532.
35
Sean Lang, “Why couldn’t Lenin work with Kerensky?”
36
Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 527.
32
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unfavourable yet unavoidable actions combined with the Bolshevik party’s efforts cannot
remain uncredited as contributing factors to the October revolution. The government’s failure
to relaunch the military and eliminate civil unrest due to food shortages and land hunger
culminated in “tumultuous opposition”37. This created conditions for the Bolsheviks to
express their “staunch opposition to the war and insistence on food for the cities and land for
the peasants”38. Ultimately, the political and economic consequences of WWI played into the
hands of the Leninists39, and, as stated by political scientist ​Ronald Suny, “the democratic
institutions created in February 1917 failed to withstand the dual onslaught from the Germans
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and the Leninists”40.
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Section 3: Reflection
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My topic had a lot of sources available, but, due to time constraints, I could not read
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all, requiring me to condense them into a variety representative of everything available. I
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selected sources of different text-types and from different time periods. For example, I read
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about the significance of living conditions in Russia in Gatrell’s book but found quantitative
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evidence to support this in a separate journal article. Additionally, when beginning my
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research, I assumed the First World War was the most important factor, so I was inclined to
choose sources that supported this view, subjecting myself to confirmation bias. These
situations showed me the difficulty historians face with selecting sources from a large volume
available and attempting to avoid confirmation bias by exposing themselves to differing
perspectives in historiography of the topic they are researching.
Similarly, I found it difficult to locate many primary sources because most were not
available on the English-speaking databases I consulted. It is likely that many primary
sources, such as diaries of peasants or speech records from the time, were not preserved or
37
“Desperate measures.”
Ibid.
39
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Toward a Social History of the October Revolution.”
40
Ronald Grigor Suny, “Revision and Retreat in the Historiography of 1917: Social History and Its Critics.”
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are located in national archives not available to the public. Such limited access to primary
sources made it difficult to provide first-hand accounts of peasants or the working-class to
illustrate the extent of desperation in Russia during the First World War, which could have
supported my analysis. Therefore, this limitation demonstrated to me the technical issues
historians face when producing historical knowledge that is supposed to be a balanced
synthesis of primary and secondary sources.
Furthermore, the primary source I reference – the mayor of Moscow’s letter – was
taken from within one of my secondary sources. Since I did not have access to the entire
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source, it was difficult to determine its reliability without access to the context around the
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quote. This showed me that even though primary sources can be valuable in providing
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historians with perspectives of individuals living during said historical event, they may lose
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accuracy when they are not fully quoted within a secondary source.
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