CLPS0610S Exam II Study Questions
Note: Questions of the form: “Describe/Provide an experiment that…” or “Use empirical
evidence to support your answer.” indicate that you should describe the methods (including
age of participants and key points of procedure), results, and implications of those results.
The description may be brief, as long as it conveys the aspects of the experiment relevant to
the question.
 Your discussion should clearly address how your example(s) provide evidence for/against
a particular claim (e.g., if I ask for an experiment that suggests that infants believe the
earth is flat, you should describe the experiment, and also explain what the results indicate
about infants’ belief in a flat earth, and why they indicate that).
 You may use any study from either class or the readings to answer a question (but not
studies from outside of the class material).
 For all questions, you should justify or explain your answers using information and
concepts from class.
 I will not take off points if you do not remember the name of the authors or the date of a
study you describe—however, I do think this material serves as a good way of organizing
your thoughts.
Lectures 11 & 12 – Language Acquisition
1. What’s special or interesting about language? What are some features of language that
make it a challenging learning problem? Discuss at least three features of human
language and explain why they make human language challenging and/or unique.
Arbitrariness: there is no inherent connection between the physical form of a word and
what it refers to.
 Challenge: learners must memorize these arbitrary associations rather than deduce
them logically.
Productivity: language is endlessly creative and flexible. Users can generate an infinite
number of new sentences by combining words in different ways.
 Challenge: learners must understand not only individual words but also how they can
be combined and recombined.
Duality of Patterning: language operates on two levels of structure - sounds (phonemes)
and meaning (morphemes)
 Challenge: learners deed to recognize and produce individual sounds, and understand
how they can be grouped into meaningful units.
2. Children must develop a number of language competencies to become fluent speakers of
their language. Briefly define phonological, semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic
development.
 Phonological development: the ability to recognize, produce, and understand the
sound patterns of one's native language.
 Semantic development: the understanding of meaning of words and word
combinations; learning the definitions of words and how context can alter meanings.
 Syntactic development: the understanding of the structural rules of a language, such
as grammar and sentence structure; learning how words can be combined to form
meaningful sentences.
 Pragmatic development: the understanding of the social rules of language use;
learning the appropriate use of language in different social contexts.
3. What is the relationship between language comprehension and language production?
Provide two pieces of evidence for this relationship (do not need to be complete
experiments).
The Self-Repairs Evidence: during conversations, speakers often correct their own
errors (self-repairs), showing the relationship between production and comprehension.
 Self-repairs usually occur before the listener can notice the error, indicating that
speakers monitor their own speech.
The Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas evidence: neurological studies show that Broca's
and Wernicke's areas are closely connected in the brain. Damage to either area can affect
both comprehension and production.
 Broca's area: involved in speech production.
 Wernicke's area: involved in language comprehension.
4. What is categorical perception? How do we know that both infants and adults perceive
speech sounds categorically? Use experimental evidence to support your answer.
Categorical perception: the phenomenon of perceiving physically distinct stimuli as
identical if they belong to the same category.
 Infants: infants as young as 1 month old can categorically perceive phonemes
(e.g., distinguishing between 'pa' and 'ba').
 Adults: adults also perceive speech sounds categorically, demonstrated by the fact that
they consistently identify sounds falling within certain acoustic boundaries as the same
phoneme.
5. How does infants’ ability to perceive phonemic distinctions not found in their native
language change over time (be specific about the timeline)? Describe an experiment
illustrating how we know this (note: make sure to describe the procedure used in this
experiment). Are there ways to change this timeline?
Infants can initially perceive phonemic distinctions from all languages—not just their
native one. However, by 6-12 months, they start to specialize in their native language
sounds and lose the ability to distinguish non-native phonemic contrasts.
 Conditioned head turn: infants were trained to turn their head when they detected a
change in sound. They showed a preference for the phonemes of their native language
over time, showing the loss of ability to perceive non-native phonemes.
 This timeline can potentially be altered. Studies have shown that exposing infants to a
second language during the first year of life can help preserve the ability to perceive
non-native phonemic contrasts.
6. Describe at least two different ways that infants might be able to segment words and
provide evidence (does not need to be a complete experiment) for infants’ ability to use
each.
Statistical learning: infants are sensitive to the statistical probabilities of sound
sequences. They learn to recognize words by noting which syllables frequently appear
together.
 For instance, in the word 'baby', the syllables 'ba' and 'by' occur together more
frequently than 'ba' and 'di'. Infants as young as 8 months have been shown to be
capable of this kind of learning.
o In a study by Saffran, Aslin, and Newport (1996), infants listened to a continuous
stream of syllables with certain syllables grouped into 'words' by their high cooccurrence rate. After exposure, infants showed a preference for these 'words'
over other syllable combinations, suggesting they had segmented the speech
stream based on statistical properties.
Phonotactic cues: phonotactics refers to the permissible combinations of phonemes in a
particular language. Infants can use these rules to infer word boundaries.
 For example, in English, some sounds (like 'ng') only occur at the end of words.
Infants can learn these rules and use them to segment speech.
 Jusczyk, Luce, and Charles-Luce (1994) showed that infants as young as 9 months
prefer listening to sequences that conform to English phonotactic rules, suggesting that
they use these rules in speech segmentation.
7. Describe Saffran et al.’s (1996) study on infant word segmentation and what it
demonstrated. What is the difference between frequencies and transitional probabilities in
statistical word segmentation? Explain why infants might need to use transitional
probabilities rather than just frequencies to segment natural languages.
Saffran et al.'s (1996) study involved exposing 8-month-old infants to a continuous
stream of syllables with no pauses or prosodic cues to indicate word boundaries. The
'words' in this stream were created by frequently repeating certain sequences of syllables.
After listening to this stream, the infants showed a preference for these 'words' over other
combinations of syllables that did not appear frequently together, suggesting they had
segmented the stream based on statistical properties. The difference between frequencies
and transitional probabilities lies in what they measure. Frequencies refer to how often a
specific event, such as a syllable, occurs. In contrast, transitional probabilities refer to the
likelihood of one event (e.g., a syllable) following another.
In language, this could be the likelihood of 'by' following 'ba' in the speech stream.
Infants might need to use transitional probabilities rather than just frequencies because
language is inherently sequential. Recognizing the likelihood of one sound following
another helps to identify patterns and word boundaries.
8. What is the naming spurt? When does it occur in children whose native language is
English? Provide an example of at least one conceptual change that might be associated
with or help generate the naming spurt and explain why. Include experimental evidence
supporting this hypothesis. What is an alternative interpretation to children being in a
naming spurt at 18 months?
Naming spurt: a period in a child's development (~18-24 months for English-speakers)
when the rate of vocabulary acquisition increases rapidly.
 One conceptual change associated with the naming spurt is the realization of the
principle of categorical scope—that words label categories of objects, not just
individual items. This could lead to a rapid increase in vocabulary as children can
now apply a word to a range of similar objects.
 For example, once a child realizes that the word "dog" can refer to all dogs, not just
their pet dog, they can more rapidly incorporate new words into their vocabulary.
Evidence for this comes from studies showing that children who understand
categorical scope have larger vocabularies.
An alternative interpretation is that the 'naming spurt' might simply reflect a natural
progression in learning, where accumulation of vocabulary enables better learning of new
words, rather than a specific developmental change.
9. What is the shape bias? Describe an experiment providing evidence that it is learned.
How does the shape bias relate to children’s lexical development?
Shape bias: the tendency of children to generalize a novel word by the shape of an object
rather than its size, color, or texture.
 One experiment showing this bias is learned involved exposing children to a series of
novel objects and labels where shape was not a reliable cue. These children were less
likely to demonstrate a shape bias compared to children for whom shape was a
reliable cue, suggesting that the bias is learned rather than innate.
 The shape bias contributes to lexical development by facilitating word learning: once
children learn this bias, they can more easily map new words to objects of the same
shape, accelerating vocabulary growth.
10. What is fast mapping? Describe at least two ways that children might accomplish fastmapping, and provide evidence for each (does not need to be a complete experiment). Do
you think this phenomenon is specific to language development? Why or why not?
Fast mapping: the ability to quickly form an initial hypothesis about the meaning of a
new word after just one or two exposures. Children can accomplish this using mutual
exclusivity and syntactic cues.
 Mutual exclusivity: suggests that each object should have only one name. So, when
presented with a known object (e.g., a ball) and an unknown object, a child will map a
new word to the unknown object.
o Evidence for this comes from studies where children are more likely to map a new
word to an unknown object than a known one.
 Syntactic cues: when children can use the grammatical structure of a sentence to make
inferences about a new word. For instance, if a new word is used as a noun in a
sentence, they might infer that it refers to an object.
o Evidence comes from studies where children correctly guess the meanings of new
words based on their use in sentences.
Whether fast mapping is specific to language development is a subject of debate. Some
argue it reflects more general cognitive abilities, like memory or attention, as there's
evidence of similar rapid learning in other domains, like learning faces or places.
11. Describe two different aspects of language that could be learned, at least in part, through
statistical learning, and provide experimental evidence in support of each. How does the
role of statistical learning in language development relate to the nativist/empiricist debate
over language learning abilities?
The role of statistical learning in language development relates to the nativist/empiricist
debate over language learning abilities. Nativists argue that our language ability is innate
and relies on specialized language-learning mechanisms, while empiricists believe
language is learned through general learning mechanisms like statistical learning. The
evidence that infants can learn aspects of language through statistical learning supports
the empiricist view, but it doesn't entirely refute the nativist perspective, as it's possible
both innate mechanisms and statistical learning contribute to language development.
 Word segmentation: infants can use statistical learning to segment continuous speech
into individual words (Question 7)
 Grammar learning: infants can use statistical learning to acquire grammatical rules.
o Gomez and Gerken (1999) found that infants could learn artificial grammatical
rules (e.g., certain syllables always occurring in certain positions) from a stream
of syllables presented with those rules.
12. A speaker of Quinian points to this and says “Gavagi.” Why is figuring out what
“Gavagai” means a hard problem? What biases or learning mechanisms might a child use
to help figure it out? Provide at least two examples of a bias or mechanism and explain
how they would help solve this problem.
The speaker could be referring to the whole object, a part of it, its movement, its color, or
any number of properties or relations. This is known as the problem of referential
ambiguity. However, children seem to overcome this problem using certain biases or
learning mechanisms:
 Whole object assumption: suggests that a new word refers to a whole object rather
than a part of it or a property of it.
o If the speaker of Quinian points to a rabbit and says "Gavagi", the child would
assume "Gavagi" refers to the whole rabbit, not just its ears or fur, for instance.
 Mutual exclusivity assumption: suggests that each object has only one name.
o If the child already knows the word for 'fur', they would be more likely to assume
"Gavagi" refers to the whole rabbit rather than just its fur.
These biases help children make educated guesses about word meanings, reducing the
complexity of the language learning task.
Lecture 13 & 14 – Causality
1. What are Hume’s three causal principles? Clearly define and describe the principles, and
provide evidence that children are sensitive to all three. Evidence for at least one
principle should describe a complete experiment.
Contiguity: suggests that causes and effects must be adjacent in space and time.
 Evidence for children's sensitivity to this principle comes from research showing that
infants expect causal events to occur in close spatial and temporal proximity.
 For example, if a ball hits another and the second moves, infants expect the movement
to happen immediately after contact, not with a delay.
Priority: causes must precede their effects.
 Leslie & Keeble (1987): infants watched a screen where a box appeared to 'cause'
another box to move. When the 'cause' (first box's movement) was shown after the
'effect' (second box's movement), infants showed surprise, as measured by longer
looking times, indicating they expected the cause to come first.
Constant conjunction: suggests that causes and effects must consistently co-occur.
 Evidence for this principle comes from research showing that infants expect outcomes
to be consistent. For example, if a hand repeatedly reaches for one of two objects,
infants will be surprised if it suddenly reaches for the other object, indicating they
expect the same action to have the same outcome.
2. Define the following terms: Direct Launching, Delayed Launching, No Contact
Launching. Describe an experiment that tests whether infants’ represent launching events
causally (and explain the alternative). How does infants’ interpretation of these displays
compare to that of adults?
Direct launching, delayed launching, and no contact launching describe different types of
perceived causal events.
 Direct launching: occurs when object A contacts object B, causing B to move
immediately after contact.
 Delayed launching: occurs when object A contacts object B, but B does not move
immediately. There is a noticeable delay before B starts moving.
 No contact launching: occurs when object A moves towards object B, stops before
making contact, and then B starts moving.
An experiment testing infants' representation of launching events was conducted by
Leslie & Keeble (1987). They habituated infants to a direct launching event, then during
test trials, they showed infants a delayed launching event. The infants showed surprise
(measured by increased looking time) when viewing the delayed launching event,
suggesting they were expecting the direct launching pattern they had been habituated to.
The alternative interpretation is that infants are merely responding to the violation of
simple motion patterns, not necessarily to the violation of causal principles.
Adults interpret these displays similarly to infants, but with a more nuanced
understanding based on their more developed knowledge of physics and causality. Adults
usually see direct launching as a clear causal event, while they may interpret delayed
launching or no contact launching as non-causal, influenced by their understanding of
real-world physics.
3. Dave notices that whenever he drinks beer, he can’t sleep, and infers that drinking causes
his insomnia. Dave almost always drinks beer at parties. Is his inference justified?
Clearly explain why or why not. What are the possible causal relationships? What
evidence would Dave need to determine what causes his insomnia?
Dave's inference that drinking beer causes his insomnia is a potential hypothesis, but it
might not be justified based on the information provided. There could be other factors at
play that are confounding his observations. For example, it might be that the late nights,
the noise, the excitement, or some other aspect of the parties is causing his insomnia, not
the beer per se.
Possible causal relationships could include: beer causing insomnia, parties causing
insomnia, a specific component of beer causing insomnia (like alcohol or caffeine), or
even a psychological expectation of insomnia causing the actual insomnia.
To determine the actual cause, Dave would need to conduct a more controlled
investigation. For instance, he could try drinking beer outside of the party context, see if
he has insomnia when he attends a party but doesn't drink beer, or see if he has insomnia
when he drinks non-alcoholic beer. By systematically manipulating and isolating these
variables, he can get closer to identifying the true cause.
4. What is the role of temporal priority in causal perception or reasoning? Describe an
experiment that suggests preschoolers prioritize temporal priority over other cues to
causality.
Temporal priority is a principle in causal perception or reasoning that states that causes
must precede their effects. An experiment by Schlottmann and Surian (1999) suggests
that preschoolers prioritize temporal priority over other cues to causality. In the study,
children were shown two videos: in one, a toy bear caused a toy lion to move by "magic"
(no contact); in the other, the bear hit the lion, causing it to move (contact). The children
saw the "magic" event as more causal when the bear moved first, indicating a priority of
temporal sequence over physical contact in their causal reasoning.
5. What’s the difference between a correlation and a causal relation? Describe an
experiment that suggests two events can be correlated, but other information is required
to make a causal judgment.

Correlation: a statistical relationship between two variables, indicating that when one
variable changes, the other tends to change as well, but without implying a causeeffect relationship.

Causal relation: suggests that changes in one variable directly bring about changes in
another.
An experiment by Kushnir and Gopnik (2005) suggests that children need more than just
correlation to make causal judgments. In the study, preschoolers were shown a "blicket
detector" that would activate (light up and play music) in the presence of certain objects
("blickets"). Sometimes the detector activated with a high correlation to a certain object,
but in a context that suggested the object didn't cause the activation (for instance, it might
always activate when a certain object is placed on it, but also activates at other times).
The children were less likely to judge these highly correlated objects as blickets,
suggesting they were considering other information beyond correlation in their causal
judgments.
6. Describe Gopnik et al.’s (2001) blicket detector experiment. What is screening-off, and
how does this experiment relate to screening off? What is an intervention, and how does
this experiment relate to intervention? What is an alternative explanation for children’s
causal inferences that is ruled out by this experiment?
In Gopnik et al.’s (2001) blicket detector experiment, children were presented with a
machine that lights up when a "blicket" is placed on it. Through a series of trials, children
were able to learn complex causal structures, such as when one block is a blicket and
another is not, or when two blocks in combination cause the machine to go off.
"Screening-off" refers to the situation where if you know the state of a middle variable,
knowing the state of the first variable doesn't provide any additional information about
the final variable. In the experiment, the children were able to figure out when one object
"screened off" another. For instance, if the detector went off when A was on it and when
A and B were on it together, but not when B was on it alone, children could infer that A
was the true cause and B was screened off.
An intervention refers to actively manipulating a variable to observe the effects on other
variables, allowing causal inference. In the experiment, children made interventions by
choosing which blocks to put on the machine to figure out which were the true blickets.
An alternative explanation for children’s causal inferences is that they were simply
responding to frequency information, but this is ruled out by the fact that the children
were able to correctly infer causal structure even when frequency information was
ambiguous or misleading.
7. Describe Kushnir & Gopnik’s (2005) blicket detector experiment (with probabilistic
evidence). What does this experiment tell us about children’s reasoning about causal
strength? How did children’s inferences change when in the different demonstration
conditions (experimenter interventions vs own), and what are some possible explanations
for these differences?
In Kushnir & Gopnik’s (2005) blicket detector experiment, children were presented with
probabilistic evidence about which objects were "blickets." The experiment showed that
children as young as 24 months could use this probabilistic evidence to make accurate
causal inferences.
When the experimenter intervened to make the detector go off, children interpreted this
as evidence of causality. When they themselves were allowed to intervene, they used this
evidence to make stronger causal inferences. This suggests that children understand the
difference between evidence generated by their own interventions and evidence observed
passively, and they give more weight to the former.
The differences in children's inferences could be due to their understanding that their own
actions can reveal causal structure more clearly than simply observing others' actions,
because their own actions allow them to isolate variables and observe the effects of
specific changes.
8. Draw a causal graphical model for the following causal relationships:
(a) A causes B causes C
(b) A causes C causes B
(c) A causes B and C.
How could you figure out which one is the true causal relationship? Illustrate this (be
sure to clearly explain your illustration).
A causal graphical model represents causal relationships between variables as a directed
graph, where nodes represent variables and arrows represent causal effects. Here are the
models for your scenarios:
(a) A → B → C
(b) A → C → B
(c) A → B, A → C
To figure out which model represents the true causal relationship, you'd need to gather
data and perform interventions. For example, you could manipulate A and observe the
effects on B and C. If changing A changes B, and changing B changes C, but changing A
doesn't directly change C (after controlling for B), then you would infer model (a) is
correct. Similarly, if changing A changes C, and changing C changes B, but changing A
doesn't directly change B (after controlling for C), then you would infer model (b). If
changing A directly changes both B and C, then you would infer model (c). These
procedures are based on the principles of causal inference and require careful
experimental design to properly control for confounding variables.
9. Describe an experiment that suggests that children can use prior knowledge and/or
mechanistic information to help reason about causal relations (explain how it shows this).
Describe another experiment where children’s prior knowledge or mechanistic
knowledge appears to lead their causal learning astray. Why do you think this occurs?
An experiment by Sobel and Munro (2009) suggests that children can use prior
knowledge to reason about causal relations. In the study, children were given a novel
causal problem where they had to determine which of four blocks made a machine light
up and play music. The blocks were divided into two pairs, and each pair was painted the
same color. Children who had prior knowledge that same-colored blocks had similar
properties were more likely to make correct causal inferences. This suggests that children
can apply prior knowledge to new situations to inform their causal reasoning.
However, children's prior knowledge can sometimes lead their causal learning astray. For
example, Schulz, Bonawitz, and Griffiths (2007) conducted an experiment where children
were shown a box that played music when beads were placed on it. Some children were
told beforehand that red beads make music and blue beads do not. When later presented
with a mix of red and blue beads that made the box play music, these children were less
likely to explore other possibilities (like the number or arrangement of beads) compared
to children who were not given prior information. This suggests that pre-existing beliefs
can sometimes limit children's exploration and discovery of new causal relationships.
This might occur because children, like adults, use their existing knowledge as a
framework for understanding new information, and this framework can sometimes bias
their interpretations and limit their exploration of alternative hypotheses.
10. Describe an experiment that suggests that children can learn causal relationships through
exploratory play. Describe another experiment that suggests scientific reasoning is
difficult for children. Why might children succeed at one but not the other?
In an experiment by Bonawitz et al. (2011), children were given a toy that had multiple
functions (it could squeak, light up, play music, etc.) and were either given explicit
instruction about one of its functions or were simply allowed to play with it freely. The
children who were allowed to play freely discovered more of the toy's functions than
those who received explicit instruction, suggesting that exploratory play can promote
causal learning.
However, other research suggests that scientific reasoning can be challenging for
children. For example, Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, and Andersen (1995) conducted an
experiment where children were asked to design an experiment to test a hypothesis. Many
of the children struggled to design an experiment that systematically manipulated one
variable while controlling others, suggesting that the scientific reasoning skills needed to
isolate variables and draw valid causal inferences can be difficult for children to master.
This might be because scientific reasoning requires more abstract and formalized
thinking, while learning through exploratory play is more concrete and directly tied to the
child's actions and observations.
11. Describe Schulz and Bonawitz’s (2007) pop up toy experiment. What were the different
conditions presented to children, and what was the purpose of these conditions? What did
this study demonstrate?
In this experiment, children were presented with a toy that could perform several actions
(squeak, light up, play music, etc.). In one condition, children saw an experimenter
seemingly discover one of the toy's actions by accident ("Look, it squeaks!"), while in
another condition, the experimenter demonstrated the same action intentionally ("I'll
show you how this works. It squeaks!").
Children who saw the accidental discovery spent more time playing with the toy and
discovered more of its functions compared to those who saw the intentional
demonstration.
This suggests that children's exploratory play and discovery can be influenced by their
beliefs about the knowledge and intent of others. If they believe there is more to learn
about a toy (as implied by the accidental discovery), they will explore more broadly than
if they believe they have been shown everything there is to know (as implied by the
intentional demonstration).
Lecture 15, 16, and 18 – Memory & Cognitive Control
1. Describe two different pieces of evidence (does not require complete experiment) for
very young infants having some form of memory (at least one piece of evidence should
be for newborns). What form(s) of memory is this evidence for?
Habituation studies: infants are presented with a stimulus (such as a sound or image)
repeatedly until they show decreased attention to it, indicating that they've become
habituated to it. If later the same stimulus is presented along with a new one, infants tend
to pay more attention to the new stimulus, indicating that they remember the old one.

Evidence for a form of implicit memory called recognition memory.
Newborn imitation studies: a newborn will imitate a facial expression or gesture made
by an adult, such as sticking out their tongue.

Requires the newborn to form a memory of the action and then reproduce it, which is
evidence for another form of implicit memory.
2. Describe an experiment that suggests that children under 2 years old may have
episodic/autobiographical memories. How does it demonstrate this?
An experiment by Bauer and colleagues (2000) suggests that children under 2 years old
may have episodic memories. The researchers taught 16-month-old children to perform a
sequence of actions with a toy (like pushing a button, turning a crank, and pulling a
lever). When tested a month later, many of the children could reproduce the sequence of
actions, indicating that they remembered the event.
This is evidence for episodic memory, as it involves remembering a specific event and
the sequence of actions within it.
3. What is infantile amnesia? Describe two reasons it might occur. Using experimental
evidence, describe one reason you find more convincing and why.
Infantile amnesia refers to the phenomenon where adults have few if any
autobiographical memories from the first few years of life. One explanation is that the
brain structures involved in forming explicit memories, such as the hippocampus, are not
fully developed in early infancy. Another explanation is that autobiographical memory
relies on language and a sense of self that aren't fully developed until later in childhood.
An experiment by Bauer and Leventon (2013) supports the second explanation. They
found that the age at which children start using personal pronouns (like "I" or "me") in
their speech is related to the age of their earliest memories.
This suggests that having a concept of self, which is tied to language development, might
be a key factor in the formation of early autobiographical memories.
4. What was Simcock and Hayne’s (2002) Magic Shrinking Room experiment? What was
the relationship between children’s verbal abilities when introduced to the machine and at
test? What can we conclude about their memories from this?
In Simcock and Hayne’s (2002) Magic Shrinking Room experiment, 2- and 3-year-old
children were shown a toy being placed into a "magic" shrinking machine, which
appeared to make the toy shrink. Two years later, the children were asked to recall what
happened.
Those who had more advanced language skills at the time of the event were better able to
verbally recall it. However, even those who had limited verbal skills at the time of the
event were able to show recognition of the toy and the machine, and could reenact the
event using toys, suggesting that they had formed a nonverbal memory of the event.
This supports the idea that verbal and nonverbal memories can form independently in
early childhood.
5. What is the articulatory loop? What is the visuo-spatial sketchpad? Do these develop at
the same time or at different times? Use an empirical example to support your answer.
The articulatory loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad are components of Baddeley's
model of working memory. The articulatory loop is involved in the verbal rehearsal of
information, while the visuo-spatial sketchpad is involved in the manipulation and
storage of visual and spatial information.
These components develop at different times. For example, research has shown that
children's performance on tasks involving the visuo-spatial sketchpad improves
significantly between the ages of 4 and 6 (Alloway, Gathercole, Willis, & Adams, 2004),
whereas their performance on tasks involving the articulatory loop continues to improve
into adolescence (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004).
This suggests that the development of these components of working memory is at least
partly independent and is tied to the maturation of different cognitive abilities.
6. Do younger (6 or younger) and older children encode information visually or verbally?
Describe two experiments (total) to support your answer for both age groups.
Younger children, particularly those under the age of 6, tend to rely more heavily on
visual encoding.

An example experiment demonstrating this was conducted by Hitch, Halliday,
Schaafstal, & Schraagen (1988). They showed children a set of pictures and then
either presented the same pictures or new ones.

The younger children were better at recognizing the old pictures than the new ones,
indicating that they had encoded the information visually.
Older children, on the other hand, begin to use more verbal encoding as their language
skills develop.

An experiment by Palmer (2000) illustrates this shift. In this study, children were
presented with a list of items either visually or auditorily and then were asked to
recall the items.

Older children (around 10 years old) performed better when the items were presented
auditorily, indicating that they were using verbal encoding.
These experiments suggest a developmental shift from primarily visual to more verbal
encoding as children age and their language skills improve. This shift likely reflects the
increasing importance of language in children's cognitive processes, including their
ability to use verbal rehearsal strategies to enhance memory.
7. Describe an experiment that suggests that how parents talk to their children influences
children’s developing memory abilities.
An experiment by Reese & Newcombe (2007) indicates that how parents talk to their
children can influence their memory abilities. The researchers analyzed the way mothers
conversed about past events with their children and found that mothers who provided
more detail and encouraged their children to contribute to the conversation had children
who provided more accurate and detailed accounts of past events.
This suggests that parental conversation style can foster children's developing memory
skills by encouraging them to pay attention to and encode detailed information about
their experiences.
8. What is inhibitory control? Describe a task used to measure inhibition in children. What
did the researchers find? Describe at least one outcome or ability correlated with
inhibitory control, and one reason why children might vary in their inhibitory control.
Inhibitory control: the ability to suppress or control one's impulses, actions, or thoughts
in favor of more appropriate behavior.

A common task used to measure inhibitory control in children is the Stroop task. In
this task, children are presented with color words (e.g., "red", "blue") printed in a
color that does not match the word (e.g., the word "red" printed in blue ink). They are
then asked to name the color of the ink rather than read the word.

Requires inhibitory control: children must inhibit the impulse to read the word.
Researchers often find that older children and adults are better at this task than younger
children, indicating that inhibitory control improves with age. Inhibitory control is
correlated with various outcomes, including academic achievement and social
competence. Individual differences in inhibitory control may be due to a combination of
genetic factors and environmental influences, such as parenting style and educational
experiences.
9. What is the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS)? Describe the methods used and the
results using this measure. How does performance change across the preschool years?
The Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task is a measure of cognitive flexibility in
children. In this task, children are asked to sort cards based on one dimension (e.g., color)
and then switch to sorting them based on a different dimension (e.g., shape). Younger
preschoolers often struggle to make the switch, continuing to sort the cards based on the
original dimension even after being told to change. However, performance on this task
improves across the preschool years, with older preschoolers typically able to make the
switch more successfully.
This indicates that cognitive flexibility, the ability to adapt one's thinking in response to
changes in rules or demands, develops significantly during this period.
10. What is the Marshmallow task? How is it traditionally interpreted? Describe a factor
beyond inhibitory control that influenced whether children eat the marshmallow.
The Marshmallow task is a measure of delay of gratification and inhibitory control in
children. Children are presented with a marshmallow and told that they can eat it now, or
wait and receive a second marshmallow later. The task is traditionally interpreted as a
measure of children's ability to delay gratification and inhibit the impulse to eat the
marshmallow immediately.
However, research has shown that trust in the experimenter and the child's home
environment can influence performance on the task. For example, children who have
reliable experiences in their home environment are more likely to wait for the second
marshmallow.
11. Describe how Saxe et al., (2006) used fMRI to explore whether explicit theory of mind
relies on specialized cognitive capacities, or relies primarily on more general inhibitory
control capacities (do NOT need to know the specific brain areas). How did the task
work? What was measured? What did they find?
In a 2006 study, Saxe and colleagues used fMRI to investigate whether explicit theory of
mind relies on specialized cognitive capacities or more general inhibitory control
capacities. They designed a task where participants had to reason about the beliefs of
others, which requires theory of mind, or they had to inhibit prepotent responses, which
requires inhibitory control.
By comparing brain activation during these tasks, the researchers could determine
whether the same or different brain regions were involved in each. They found that
different brain regions were activated during the theory of mind task and the inhibitory
control task, suggesting that explicit theory of mind relies on specialized cognitive
capacities rather than on general inhibitory control capacities.
Lecture 17 – Animal Cognition
1. What aspects of others’ mental states do you think that at least some non-human animals
do or don’t understand? Justify your response using experimental evidence from two
different animal species.
Non-human animals seem to understand some aspects of others' mental states, but this
understanding seems to vary greatly among species. For instance, many primates, like
chimpanzees, appear to understand the concept of intention, as seen in experiments where
they respond differently to a human who is unwilling to give them food versus a human
who is unable to give them food (Call et al., 2004).
However, evidence suggests that they may not fully understand false belief, a more
complex aspect of others' mental states. On the other hand, some bird species like crows
show sophisticated problem-solving abilities indicating a complex understanding of cause
and effect, yet their understanding of others' mental states is less clear.
2. Describe and explain at least three challenges of studying animal cognition relative to
adult human cognition. At least two of these challenges should also be unique to the study
of animals (vs. human infants or children).

Communication: unlike with humans, researchers cannot verbally instruct animals or
ask them to verbally report their perceptions or thoughts, making it more difficult to
understand their cognitive processes.

Anthropomorphism: researchers must be careful to avoid attributing human-like
thoughts and feelings to animals without sufficient evidence. This can make
interpreting animals' behaviors particularly challenging.

Ethical considerations: researchers must ensure that their studies are ethically
conducted and cause minimal stress or harm to the animals, which can limit the types
of studies that can be done.
3. What is the mirror self-recognition task and what is it meant to demonstrate? Describe an
alternative experiment used to test dogs’ self-recognition abilities. What were the
findings? What challenge(s) to studying animal cognition does this alternative task
address?
The mirror self-recognition task involves placing a mark on an animal's body in a place
that can only be seen with the aid of a mirror. If the animal touches or investigates the
mark upon seeing their reflection, it is taken as evidence that they recognize the reflection
as their own, suggesting self-awareness.
However, dogs typically fail this task, leading some researchers to develop an alternative
"sniff test" based on dogs' keen sense of smell. In this test, dogs were presented with their
own urine alongside that of another dog. Dogs spent more time sniffing the other dog's
urine, suggesting they recognized their own scent, indicating some form of selfrecognition.
4. In Herrmann et al. (2007)’s Primate Cognition Test Battery (PCTB) children’s
performance differed from other great apes on some tasks, but was very similar on others.
Discuss the similarities and differences found in children and other primates’
performance. What might these findings suggest about the origin of uniquely human
cognition?
Herrmann et al.'s (2007) Primate Cognition Test Battery found that while children and
other great apes performed similarly on tasks related to physical cognition (understanding
the physical world), children outperformed apes on tasks related to social cognition
(understanding others).
This suggests that while some cognitive abilities may have a long evolutionary history,
others (especially those related to understanding others' mental states) may be more
uniquely human.
5. What is convergent evolution, and how does it impact the way we can study the
evolutionary origins of the mind? Provide an example of convergent evolution.
Convergent evolution: the process by which different species independently evolve
similar traits due to similar environmental pressures, rather than from a common ancestor.
This can make it challenging to infer the evolutionary origins of a trait based on its
presence in multiple species. For example, the similar body shapes of sharks (fish) and
dolphins (mammals) is a result of convergent evolution.
6. The definition of what is and is not tool use in animals is widely debated. Please provide
at least two components of the definition of tool use according to comparative cognition.

Direct use or manipulation of an object: the animal must be actively involved in
manipulating the object.

Goal-directed behavior: the tool use should serve a clear purpose, such as obtaining
food or grooming.

Modification of the environment: the tool use should have a measurable effect on
the environment, such as moving an object from one place to another.
Lectures 19-20 – Social Cognition
1. What is joint attention? Describe two different abilities that emerge around 10 months
suggesting that infants are developing an understanding of joint attention.
Joint attention: the ability to focus on an object or event along with another individual,
often facilitated by pointing or eye-gazing.
Around 10 months, two key abilities suggesting the development of joint attention
emerge in infants:

Responding to joint attention: infants begin to follow the gaze or pointing gestures
of others, indicating their awareness of others' focus of attention.

Initiating joint attention: infants also start to use pointing gestures or eye-gazing
themselves to direct others' attention to objects or events of interest.
2. Describe an experiment on infants’ (younger than 18 months) developing social cognition
that shows a link between the infants’ own behavior or experience and their performance
on a social cognition task. What do these data suggest for how infants understand others’
behavior?
One experiment that shows a link between infants' own behavior or experience and their
performance on a social cognition task is the "Still Face Experiment" (Tronick et al.,
1978). In this experiment, mothers interacted normally with their infants (usually around
6 months old), but then suddenly adopted a neutral, non-responsive expression. Infants
quickly became distressed and attempted to re-engage their mothers, suggesting they
understood the social nature of their mothers' previous responses and expected these to
continue. This demonstrates a link between infants' own experiences of social interaction
and their understanding of others' behavior.
3. What does it mean to interpret actions as goal-directed? Provide two pieces of empirical
evidence, using two different methodologies (e.g., looking-time vs action) suggesting that
young children (under 2 years) understand goal-directed action, and expect others to act
rationally with respect to their goals.
Interpreting actions as goal-directed: recognizing that actions are performed with a
specific purpose or intention.

Looking-time Studies: a study found that infants as young as 5 months looked longer
when an actor reached for a different object than they had previously, suggesting
infants understood the actor had a goal (the original object) and found it surprising
when the goal changed.

Action studies: another experiment found that 18-month-olds could imitate an adult's
failed attempt to perform a task (such as pulling apart a dumbbell), suggesting they
understood the adult's goal despite the lack of successful completion.
4. What was Woodward’s (1998) experiment on infants’ understanding of goal-directed
action? What conclusions can you make about infants’ understanding of goal directedness
from these data?
Woodward's (1998) experiment involved showing infants a sequence where an adult
reached for one of two objects. When the position of the objects was switched, infants
looked longer if the adult reached for the different object, suggesting that they understood
the adult's original action was directed towards a specific object (the goal), and found it
unexpected when the adult reached for a different object.
5. What is Sommerville and Needham’s “sticky mittens” experiment? What does it tell us
about how infants learn to understand goal-directed action?
Sommerville and Needham's "sticky mittens" experiment gave infants mittens with
Velcro that enabled them to pick up objects, effectively giving them an early experience
of reaching and grasping. After this experience, these infants, like older infants, showed a
preference for watching others reach for objects, suggesting that their own experience of
goal-directed action (reaching for objects) helped them understand this action in others.
6. Describe two experiments that demonstrate selective imitation by infants 12 months or
older. What do these experiments tell us about infants’ understanding of goal-directed
action at this age?
An example of selective imitation by infants can be seen in Meltzoff's (1988) study where
14-month-olds imitated an adult turning on a light with their head, suggesting they
understood the adult's unusual action was goal-directed. In another study by Gergely et
al. (2002), 14-month-olds watched an adult achieve a goal in a rational or irrational way
(given certain constraints).
When given the chance to perform the action themselves, infants imitated the adult's
action selectively depending on whether it was rational or not under the circumstances,
again suggesting an understanding of goal-directed action.
7. Describe and explain two pieces of empirical evidence that suggest that infants treat
animate agents differently from other objects (at least one experiment should demonstrate
this for infants 12 months or younger) [Hint: You can also look to earlier lectures]

Visual tracking experiment: a study where 4-month-olds watched computeranimated shapes that moved either randomly or in a goal-directed manner (such as
one shape "chasing" another) showed that infants looked significantly longer at the
shapes that moved as if they were animate, indicating they distinguished animate
movement from random movement.

Motion cue experiment: another study showed that infants aged 12.5 months old
watched an inanimate box move out of the way of a hand (animate agent) or a toy car
(inanimate object). Infants looked longer when the box moved out of the way of the
toy car, suggesting they expected the box to move for the hand (animate agent), but
not for the toy car (inanimate object).
8. When do children develop a concept of another’s preferences/desires? Support your
answer with two empirical examples (describe the experiments). Why might
understanding others’ desires develop earlier than understanding others’ beliefs?
Children start to develop a concept of another's preferences/desires around the age of 18
months.

One experiment showed that 18-month-old children could understand an
experimenter's food preference (broccoli over crackers) that was different from their
own. When asked to give food to the experimenter, they gave the broccoli, even
though they personally preferred crackers.

Another study found that 9-month-olds expected an individual to reach for the same
object they had previously reached for, even when the locations of the objects were
switched, suggesting an understanding of consistent preferences.
Understanding others' desires might develop earlier than understanding others' beliefs
because desires are directly observable through behavior and do not require
understanding that beliefs can be false, which is a more abstract concept.
9. What is Theory of Mind? How does Theory of Mind go beyond responding to others’
observed surface behavior? Why is it necessary to study children’s knowledge of false
belief instead of their knowledge of true belief in order to gain insight into their
understanding of mental representation?
Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires,
pretending, knowledge—to oneself and others and to understand that others have beliefs,
desires, intentions, and perspectives that are different from one's own.
ToM goes beyond responding to others’ observed surface behavior by acknowledging the
internal mental states that drive those behaviors. The study of children’s knowledge of
false belief is necessary because understanding that someone can hold a belief that is
different from reality (a false belief) provides clear evidence of the child's understanding
of mental representations.
10. Describe the classic unexpected transfer (Sally-Ann) task OR the unexpected contents
(Smarties) task. What is the developmental trajectory for performance on this task, and
how does it relate to Theory of Mind development? Why might younger children perform
differently than older children on this task? Justify your explanation.
The classic unexpected transfer (Sally-Ann) task involves two dolls, Sally and Anne.
Sally hides a marble in a basket and leaves the room, then Anne moves the marble to a
box. Children are then asked where Sally will look for the marble when she returns.
Successful performance on this task, typically seen around age 4, demonstrates an
understanding that Sally holds a false belief about the marble's location. Younger children
typically say that Sally will look in the box because they fail to understand that Sally's
belief is based on her own experience, not the current reality.
11. What was Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) experiment on infants’ understanding of false
belief? What did the researchers find and how did they interpret their findings? What is
one alternate explanation for their pattern of results?
Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) experiment used a violation of expectation paradigm to
test infants’ understanding of false belief. They showed 15-month-old infants scenarios
where an actor watched an object being hidden in one of two boxes, then the object was
moved while the actor was not watching. The infants looked longer when the actor
searched in the correct location, indicating surprise and suggesting they expected the
actor to hold a false belief about the object's location.
An alternate explanation could be that the infants were simply responding to behavioral
cues or routine, rather than demonstrating a true understanding of false belief.
12. Describe an experiment examining understanding of false belief in infants 1-2 years of
age. Why do you think that infants perform as they do on these experiments, but children
do not succeed in classic false belief tasks (e.g. Sally-Anne task) until they are about age
4? (Hint: there is no right answer to this question – pick a side and support your answer
the best you can). [NOTE: you should understand the arguments on both sides of this
debate]
One experiment used anticipatory eye movements to examine whether 25-month-old
toddlers could predict an actor's behavior based on the actor's false belief about a location
of an object. In this study, an actor first demonstrated a preference for one of two objects.
Then, in the critical trials, the actor saw the preferred object being hidden in one of two
boxes but was absent when the object was moved to the other box. The results showed
that the toddlers often looked at the box where the actor falsely believed the object to be,
anticipating that the actor would search there.
This experiment suggests that infants as young as 25-months-old can attribute false
beliefs to others, much earlier than the age of 4, as traditionally believed based on tasks
like the Sally-Anne task. The discrepancy between the success of infants on nonverbal
false belief tasks and the failure of 3-year-olds on verbal tasks may be due to task
demands: traditional false belief tasks require children to understand the question,
remember details of the story, inhibit the prepotent response to point to the actual location
of the object, and predict the behavior of the character based on their false belief. These
are complex cognitive demands that may be challenging children younger than age 4.
On the other hand, nonverbal tasks used with infants involve looking behavior, which is
more spontaneous and does not require the same level of linguistic comprehension,
working memory, or inhibitory control. So, it's possible that infants and toddlers have
some basic understanding of others' false beliefs, but this understanding is not robust or
flexible enough to be demonstrated on traditional verbal tasks until the age of 4.
However, it's worth noting that there's ongoing debate in the field about the interpretation
of these nonverbal false belief tasks. Some argue that infants' performance could be due
to simpler cognitive processes or behavioral rules, not a genuine understanding of false
belief.
Lecture 21 and 22 – Pretense and Symbolic Reasoning
1. What is a symbol? What is symbolic (or representational) competence? Define what is
required for representational competence and explain why it is required.
Symbol: an object, word, or sign that stands for something else.
Symbolic or representational competence: the ability to use and understand symbols.

Requires understanding that symbols can represent objects, ideas, or events that are
not present.

Also requires the ability to mentally manipulate these symbols in thought.
2. What is dual representation? Describe and discuss two experiments (should be for
different ages) suggesting that young children have difficulty with dual representation.
Dual representation: the idea that a symbolic artifact, like a map or a model, must be
represented in two ways at the same time (as a real object itself and as a symbol for
something else).

2.5-year-olds were shown a miniature room and a larger room that it represented.
When asked to find a hidden toy in the larger room based on its placement in the
model, children struggled, indicating difficulty with dual representation. However, by
age 3, children become more successful at tasks requiring dual representation.
3. What is a scale error? When and why do children begin making scale errors? Why do
they stop making scale errors? Do you think that children who stop making scale errors
have representational competence? Justify your answer.
Scale error: a serious attempt by a young child to perform an action on a miniature
object that is impossible due to the object's small size.

Around the age of 18 to 30 months, children start making scale errors, possibly due to
the immature development of their ability to connect perception and action. They stop
making these errors as their cognitive abilities mature and they become better at
coordinating their representations of objects with appropriate actions.

Whether children who stop making scale errors have representational competence is
debatable. They certainly show progress, but representational competence involves a
broad set of symbolic abilities, some of which continue to develop beyond early
childhood.
4. What is the scale-model task? What was it designed to show and what did it find?
Describe and explain an experimental manipulation that makes the scale-model task
easier, and another one that makes the task harder. What do these manipulations have in
common?
The scale-model task is a task designed to test children’s understanding of symbolic
representations. Children are shown a larger room and a scale model of it, and asked to
find an object in the larger room based on its location in the model. This task is
challenging for children under 3, indicating difficulty with dual representation.
An experimental manipulation that makes the task easier is to use a picture instead of a
model (DeLoache, 2000), perhaps because pictures are more common symbols in
children's experience. Making the model 3D or more detailed, on the other hand, can
make the task harder, because it increases the object-like qualities of the model and
makes it harder for children to focus on its symbolic function.
5. Children engage in a number of kinds of pretense as they develop. Define object
substitution and object representation pretense and discuss their developmental
progression.

Object substitution pretense: when children use one object as if it were another, like
using a banana as a telephone.

Object representation pretense: when children pretend an object is present when it's
not, like pretending to drink from an invisible cup.
Both types of pretense emerge around 18-24 months, with object substitution usually
appearing first. As children's symbolic abilities mature, they become more sophisticated
and flexible in their pretend play, being able to integrate multiple symbolic actions into
coherent scenarios and to understand and negotiate shared symbolic meanings with
others.
6. Describe a piece of empirical evidence suggesting that children understand the
fantasy/reality distinction. What is some evidence that sometimes they blur the lines
between fantasy and reality?
Taylor and Carlson (1997) provided evidence that children understand the fantasy/reality
distinction by asking them to imagine a pretend friend and then asking them various
questions about this friend. Children clearly differentiated their pretend friends from real
ones.
However, there are cases where children blur the lines between fantasy and reality. For
instance, Harris et al. (1991) showed that children who engaged in pretend play about a
tea party became more likely to believe that they had actually eaten real food.
7. What was Skolnick and Bloom’s (2006) experiment on children’s reasoning about
fictional worlds (e.g., Batman and SpongeBob)? What did the researchers find and how
did they interpret their findings?
Skolnick and Bloom (2006) conducted an experiment where they asked children about
the existence of entities from fictional worlds like Batman and SpongeBob. They found
that children believed that these characters did not exist in the real world but existed in
the fictional world of TV. Researchers interpreted these findings to mean that even young
children can differentiate between real and fictional worlds.
8. Describe an empirical example suggesting that young children do not understand the
representational nature of pretending. Provide one counterexample suggesting that they
do understand pretense in a representational manner.
An empirical example suggesting that young children do not understand the
representational nature of pretending is the study by Lillard (1993) where preschoolers
were shown to have difficulty distinguishing between pretend and real actions.
However, a counterexample is a study by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) where they found
that even 3-year-olds could distinguish between claims made in pretense and claims made
in reality.
9. What is the “acting-as-if” hypothesis with regards to children’s understanding of
pretending? Describe an experiment that supports this approach. What does this
hypothesis mean for the child’s developing theory of mind?
The "acting-as-if" hypothesis suggests that children understand pretending as acting as if
something is true when it's not. Onishi et al. (2007) conducted an experiment supporting
this approach. They showed that 15-month-olds could predict an actor’s pretend actions
based on her false belief about a toy's location.
This indicates a connection between understanding of pretense and developing theory of
mind, as both involve understanding
10. Describe Flavell and colleagues’ appearance-reality task. How does children’s
performance on this task relate to their performance on false belief tasks and what does
this suggest? How does it compare to their performance on pretense-reality tasks?
In Flavell and colleagues’ appearance-reality task, children are presented with objects that
look like one thing but are actually another (e.g., a sponge that looks like a rock). They
are asked to state what the object looks like and what it really is. Younger children often
struggle with this task, conflating the appearance with the reality.
This is similar to their performance on false belief tasks, where they struggle to separate
what they know from what another person believes, suggesting that both tasks require a
kind of representational understanding. However, children perform better on pretensereality tasks, possibly because the context of pretense encourages them to consider
alternative realities.
11. What is the difference between level-1 and level-2 visual perspective taking? When does
each develop? Describe an experiment examining performance at each level (you must
describe 2 experiments to answer this question).

Level-1 visual perspective taking (age 2-3): understanding that different people can
see the same thing in different ways due to their spatial positions.

Level-2 visual perspective taking (age 4-5): understanding that two people can look
at the same object but interpret it differently based on their knowledge or beliefs.
For instance, in an experiment by Moll and Tomasello (2006), 2-year-olds could
understand that an adult couldn't see a toy hidden behind a barrier from their perspective
(Level-1). However, in a study by Flavell et al. (1981), only children 4 and older could
understand that a picture that looks like a rabbit to them might look like a duck to
someone viewing it from a different angle (Level-2).
12. In what way is understanding pretense similar to understanding false belief? Discuss the
representational similarities between the two abilities. Do you believe that these abilities
emerge at the same time or along different timelines? Provide evidence for one or the
other (make sure to explain how the evidence supports your viewpoint).
Understanding pretense and understanding false belief both involve the ability to
entertain representations of the world that differ from reality. Both require a form of
mental simulation and an understanding that the mind can hold representations that do
not match the current state of the world. While there are similarities, evidence shows
these abilities may develop along different timelines.
Children start engaging in pretense play around 18 months of age (Leslie, 1987), while
they typically pass false belief tasks around age 4 (Wellman et al., 2001). This suggests
that while both abilities involve representational understanding, they may rely on
different cognitive capacities that mature at different times.
Integrative Lectures
1. Throughout the semester I have suggested that data can be interpreted differently by
different theories. Provide an example. Pick a developmental phenomenon that we have
discussed in class or in the reading during the second half of the semester and explain
how two different theories of cognitive development might explain this phenomena. Use
empirical evidence to support your answer, including how the different theories might
interpret the data.
A good example of this is infants' understanding of object permanence - the
understanding that objects continue to exist even when they are not perceived. Piaget's
cognitive developmental theory posits that infants lack object permanence until they are
about 8 months old. This is based on his experiments where infants would not search for
a toy hidden under a cloth.
However, the violation-of-expectation paradigm proposed by Renee Baillargeon suggests
that infants as young as 3.5 months understand object permanence. In her experiments,
infants looked longer at impossible events, where objects seemed to disappear, indicating
they held the expectation that the object should still be there. The different interpretations
stem from the different methodologies and underlying assumptions of the theories.
2. At the beginning of the semester, we talked about several theories of cognitive
development. Choose one and describe it. Then, using any experiment we have discussed
in class, describe how the results of that experiment are consistent with the theory you
have chosen.
Vygotsky's Sociocultural Theory posits that cognitive development is a social process and
largely influenced by interaction with others, especially through language. This theory
could be used to interpret the results from the study by Tomasello and Farrar (1986)
which found that children's use of language about mental states (e.g., think, know)
predicted their performance on false belief tasks. This would be consistent with
Vygotsky's emphasis on the role of language in cognitive development.
3. Many different kinds of developmental changes occur around the 18-month mark in
children. Pick at least 2 abilities that change or emerge around 18 months (describe the
abilities), and discuss whether you think their emergence is related [there is no right or
wrong answer]. At least one of your choices should be from the second half of the
semester. Justify your response.
Around the age of 18 months, children start to engage in pretend play and also show
signs of understanding others' perspectives. For instance, they might use a banana as a
telephone (pretend play) and also show signs of understanding when someone else cannot
see a toy because it is hidden from their view (perspective-taking). These abilities could
be related as both involve representational thinking - understanding that one thing (a
banana, one's own perspective) can stand for something else (a telephone, another's
perspective).
4. Using the information we’ve covered in the class so far, do you think that a 5 year old
would be able to correctly answer the following commonsense questions? “Do doctors
wear underwear?”, “If President Obama is in Washington is his spleen in Washington?”
Why or why not? Justify your response.
By the age of 5, children typically have developed an understanding of basic everyday
knowledge and concepts. They would likely be able to answer that doctors do wear
underwear and that if President Obama is in Washington, so is his spleen, as these are
based on their knowledge of clothing norms and the concept that a person's body parts
stay with the person.
5. What is inductive reasoning and why is it a hard problem? Pick a topic covered in either
half of the class that you believe is an example of an inductive reasoning problem and
explain your choice. How do infants or children solve this problem (or part of this
problem)? Use at least two pieces of empirical evidence (at least one from the second half
of the semester) to support your answer.
Inductive reasoning involves deriving general principles from specific examples, which is
challenging because it requires abstraction and generalization. Infants' learning about
object permanence can be seen as an example of inductive reasoning. They observe
specific instances where objects continue to exist when hidden and must generalize this
to a broader understanding of object permanence.
Research by Baillargeon and colleagues has shown that infants as young as 3.5 months
seem to demonstrate this understanding, as evidenced by their longer looking times at
events where objects seem to disappear.
6. Looking time or other implicit measures have revealed that infants may have cognitive
capacities that are significantly more sophisticated than previously thought. Provide two
different examples of this phenomena (at least one from the second half of the semester),
and briefly describe the capacity under study, and the findings for infants versus older
children (hint: these should come from two different lectures). Do you think that these
results demonstrate the same underlying abilities in the different age groups?
One example of infants demonstrating advanced cognitive capacities comes from the
work of Baillargeon and colleagues on object permanence. Even young infants showed
surprise (in the form of longer looking times) when objects seemed to disappear,
suggesting an understanding of object permanence.
Another example comes from research on false belief understanding. Onishi and
Baillargeon (2005) found that 15-month-old infants seemed to understand that a person
could hold a false belief about the location of an object, again evidenced by longer
looking times. In both cases, infants show an understanding of complex concepts much
earlier than would be expected based on explicit measures with older children. However,
it's still a matter of debate whether these results demonstrate the same underlying abilities
in different age groups, or whether infants' understanding is more rudimentary and less
flexible than that of older children.