systems
Article
Theory of an Emerging-State Actor: The Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Case †
Timothy Clancy
ID
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 100 Institute Rd, Worcester, MA 01609, USA; tbclancy@wpi.edu;
Tel.: +11-678-576-4776
† This paper is a revised version of our paper published in Clancy, T. Dynamics of ISIS—An Emerging State
Actor. In Proceedings of the 34th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, Delft,
The Netherlands, 17–21 July 2016.
Received: 28 February 2018; Accepted: 27 April 2018; Published: 18 May 2018
Abstract: This paper proposes a new theory of non-state actors who engage in irregular warfare to
seize territory and govern openly, called emerging-state actors. Emerging-state actors arise in periods
of irregular conflict, such as the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The theory tries to
answer “what is/was” the Islamic State because emerging-state actors differ notably from other
non-state actors and insurgencies in irregular conflict. Causal diagrams as well as key propositions
present the theory. Testing occurs against a system dynamics simulation called the “Emerging-State
Actor Model” (E-SAM), loaded with the ISIS historical case in Syria and Iraq. Through experiments
the simulation confirms evidence of emerging-state actor behavior as well as a range of contingencies
showing their applicability. The novelty of E-SAM as a simulation for irregular conflict is its
ability to handle multiple forms of conflict including political grievance, terrorism, insurgencies
and emerging-state actors. E-SAM can also simulate multiple actors within each conflict: domestic
and foreign state actors, local conflict actors, as well as different ethnographic groups. It can be
parameterized with scenarios to simulate a variety of scenarios: ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria,
Taliban in Afghanistan and even expatriated ISIS fighters returning to pursue new conflicts such as
in Indonesia.
Keywords: Islamic State of Iraq & Syria; the Islamic State; insurgency; irregular conflict; security;
non-state actor; emerging-state actor; combat simulator; national security; legitimacy
1. Introduction
The rise and staying power of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) created enormous regional
instability that survives after its territorial collapse. Although ISIS’s predecessor Al-Queda in Iraq
(AQI) presented a threat as a traditional insurgency, ISIS operates in an entirely different manner.
Terming ISIS an insurgency is difficult because they functioned openly. Likewise, explanations that
ISIS is a messianic religious cult or some form of mafia discounts how ISIS governed and looked to
establish civic institutions in territory it controlled. So, what was ISIS? What strategies can contain or
defeat it? Can the ISIS phenomena replicate elsewhere and under what conditions?
This paper proposes a new theory of a non-state actor, called an emerging-state actor, and presents
the dynamic hypothesis that ISIS is a case-study of this type of actor. Emerging-state actors operate
in fundamentally different modes than other non-state actors like insurgents or terrorists and this
difference helps explain the rapid growth of ISIS and why other insurgencies might shift to this
mode of conflict in the future. The theory of emerging-state actors is located within an existing
framework of non-state actors. We develop a dynamic hypothesis of an emerging-state actor through
a series of logical statements connected in a causal-loop diagram. Confidence is built in the theory
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through experiments on the propositions of the dynamic hypothesis. These experiments leverage a
detailed system dynamics simulation called the Emerging-State Actor Model (E-SAM) [1]. (Please see
Supplementary Materials for full model documentation.) The paper finishes with a conclusion that
summarizes the insights, discusses limitations, and identifies future opportunities for research with
the emerging-state actor theory as well as the simulation model created for this effort.
2. Problem Description
In 2003 AQI appeared as a potent threat to the stability of Iraq. The strength of AQI peaked in
2006 before declining as the result of three circumstances: a troop surge of United States (U.S.) Forces,
a Sunni-Shia civil war that AQI helped spark, and the indigenous resistance to AQI growing out of
the Anbar Awakening. In 2013 ISIS seized Ar-Raqqah, a medium sized city in eastern Syria with an
estimated 13,200 militants. By late 2014, ISIS had grown to between 50,000–80,000 militants strong,
taken control of thirty per cent of the territory in Syria and Iraq, and threatened regional stability.
It took the joint intervention of over five different international forces, of which the US led-coalition was
just one, plus the joint militaries and local militias of Syria and Iraq to remove ISIS from the territory it
held. The rapid growth of ISIS and its staying power created a problem in the study of insurgencies
and how to contain them. How did ISIS grow so quickly between 2013 and 2014? What made ISIS so
difficult to confront? What would have happened had the foreign interventions not occurred?
3. Literature Review
Immediately after 9/11 and through the beginning of the Iraq War research focused on the
individual-as-terrorist. Atran and Taylor both wrote on the psychological conditions by which someone
becomes a suicide-terrorist [2,3]. This reflected the circumstances of the time. From 2001–2003 the
Taliban were in retreat and the insurgency in Iraq had not yet materialized. Even as the Iraq insurgency
began demanding more attention, high profile terrorist attacks in Madrid and London continued to
drive a focus on research around individuals. Works by Sageman and Hoffman contrasted whether the
process of radicalization for such attackers was a bottom-up (“swarm”) or a top-down (“fisherman”)
and what role foreign-terrorist organizations played in threats to the homeland [3].
As insurgency morphed into civil war in Iraq old theories and new tactics were being intermingled
on the ground by military commanders working side-by-side with theorists. A key advisor to the
US military, David Kilcullen, made a case in 2009 for a shift in methods for studying irregular
conflict. While acknowledging the benefits of “stakeholder analysis, nodal analysis or link analysis” [4]
(loc. 3281) as popular tools of the time—he argued that systems theory and tools which analyzed
systems as a whole might provide better insights [4] (loc. 3233).
System dynamics is one such method of numerically simulating complex systems. Unfortunately,
there are only a handful of quantitative system dynamic efforts dealing with insurgencies or
irregular warfare in the manner described by Kilcullen. Khalid Saeed conducted an early multi-polar
examination of conditions that give rise to internal violence in developing economies was in 1983.
The paper analyzed how social and political factors influenced long term growth. Instability in the
form of dissidence and subversive activities were modeled, but not explicitly as a violent insurgency
or with resources becoming controlled by the dissidents [5]. In 2010 Turnley et al., specifically modeled
an irregular warfare environment enabling a computational representation of the interdependence
between kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of a battlefield. The model highlights the interaction of
latent structure as it is affected by kinetic activity, but Turnley does not model the organization of the
insurgency itself as a key factor in the dynamics of how it operates [6].
In an infamous case a model produced within the military on insurgent dynamics was leaked and
misreported on by the New York Times which mistook it for a power-point slide [7]. Although that
model was never formally published, portions of it were leaked. What appears to be an appendix
explaining many of the causal loops in the “spaghetti diagram” surfaced as well. While it is a
sophisticated approach to understanding the causal interactions between dynamic factors of an
Systems 2018, 6, 16
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insurgency, it is not clear that the model is simulatable. Nor is there enough detail in the leaked
documents to replicate the model or articulate its key insights. A thirty page appendix with a high-level
overview is attributed to Brett Pierson, a military Captain at the time, but has a “PA Consulting”
copyright mark on it [8]. Due to the leaked nature and copyright we didn’t incorporate elements of
this model in creating E-SAM.
In 2011 Anderson used actual data from the Anglo–Irish War of 1919–1921 to model insurgency
and counterinsurgency theories showing potential gaps in the theory when compared to simulation
results. However, the IRA was never able to seize and hold territory with this approach and may not
best represent the dynamics of an actor like ISIS which seizes territory to the exclusion of all other
actors [9].
In 2013 Saeed et al. developed a generic structure to model political conflict which could include
insurgencies [10]. The model, like Turnley, focuses on decision-making and choices of the population
rather than the explicit structure of how an insurgency like ISIS might operate.
In 2014 Aamir presented a paper on modeling terrorist organizations using existing system
dynamic models of business entities. However, except for Attacks and Agency the models Aamir
used were from existing system dynamics literature on business models, built generically, rather than
aiming to model the performance of any one insurgent group [11].
This paper seeks to build upon the work of this existing literature by proposing a dynamic
hypothesis that ISIS is a new form of insurgency created by an “emerging-state” actor. In this effort
we will adopt Turnley’s approach of using U.S. military definition of terms, the aspects of modeling
ISIS as a firm or state from Aamir and pay close attention to the causal mechanisms (financing,
recruiting, gaining equipment) that allows ISIS to operate and achieve its goals missing from the
theoretical structure of Anderson and the generic structure of Saeed. The model makes explicit internal
organizational processes such as financial budgeting, personnel management. Also modeled are the
crucial feedback loops between state and non-state actor discussed by Saeed.
My contribution to the literature in this paper is the theory of an emerging-state actor, that
ISIS is such an actor and the testable propositions of what constitutes such an actor. I test the
propositions of the emerging-state actor theory in simulation experiments to see whether they are
valid within the context of the model boundaries and build confidence in those boundaries. Finally,
I have contributed a detailed simulation model in E-SAM that can simulate the performance of a wide
variety of unconventional conflicts between state and non-state actors. Military planners or research
analysts can use E-SAM for planning or analysis. The model contains a combat simulator configurable
by scenarios to represent different terrain and types of environments as well as starting conditions [12].
The model serves as a platform for conducting a portfolio of policy tests to understand the behavior
of an emerging-state actor versus an insurgent non-state actor or clandestine terrorist network—but
as well conduct policy tests on interventions against such actors. It has organizational structure and
internal decision-making processes for actors missing from earlier work. For example, state and
non-state actors can have essential, non-essential and overseas expenditures. The priority given to
distributing available funds based on current and perceived reserves reflects loose or tight monetary
controls which affect actor performance and can drive declines as actors have to deal with scarce
resources and insufficient funding (See Supplementary Materials Section A-4.6 Revenue & Expenses
for more details on simulating actor’s finances.) Likewise organizational transparency—the ability
of “ground truth” to reach higher levels of leadership—is modeled through perception structures to
represent more transparent, or opaque, organizational designs. Current perception can result in more
aggressive or conservative allocation of fighting forces that could be reacting inaccurately to “fog of
war” or delayed information (See Supplementary Materials Section A-5.6 Territory Dynamics for more
details on how perception of momentum is structured.). This allows for different organizational styles
to be numerically represented and tested with plausible fidelity [1]. The model is fully published in
the Supplementary Materials and replicable. The level of aggregation remains at the level of state,
emerging-state and non-state actors. It does not reach deep into individual motivations of the kind
Systems 2018, 6, 16
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discussed by Atran, Taylor, Sageman and Hoffman—but instead focuses on aggregate causes and
dynamic. In addition to state and non-state actions, this also includes ethnographic groups and their
selection of sides to offer support, or resistance, to the actors.
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4. Hypothesis Development: What is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria?
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4 of 23
4. Hypothesis
Development:
WhatISIS
is the Islamic
State of Iraq actor
and Syria?
Developing
a hypothesisWhat
that
an emerging-state
first requires identifying the
4. Hypothesis
Development:
is thewas
Islamic
State of Iraq and
Syria?
existing
perspectives
on terrorism,
insurgencies
and irregularactor
warfare
locating
ISIS within
this
Developing
a hypothesis
that ISIS
was an emerging-state
first then
requires
identifying
the existing
Developing a hypothesis that ISIS was an emerging-state actor first requires identifying the existing
typology
of
non-state
actors.
Part
of
that
effort
involves
making
explicit
the
modeling
boundaries
perspectives on terrorism, insurgencies and irregular warfare then locating ISIS within this typology of
perspectives on terrorism, insurgencies and irregular warfare then locating ISIS within this typology of
and
problem
slices.
This
section
concludes
the explicit
proposed
of ISIS as an
emerging
non-state
actors.
Part
of that
effort
involveswith
making
thehypothesis
modeling boundaries
and
problemstate
slices.
non-state actors. Part of that effort involves making explicit the modeling boundaries and problem slices.
actor
This[13].
section concludes with the proposed hypothesis of ISIS as an emerging state actor [13].
This section concludes with the proposed hypothesis of ISIS as an emerging state actor [13].
Existing
terms
often
dodo
notnot
distinguish
between
tactics
usedused
by aby
non-state
actoractor
and threat
to theto
Existing
terms
often
distinguish
between
tactics
a non-state
and threat
Existing terms often do not distinguish between tactics used by a non-state actor and threat to
state
a non-state
actor. actor.
The two
below, below,
FiguresFigures
1 and 2,1 both
stand
continuums
along
the by
state
by a non-state
Thefigures
two figures
and 2,
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the state by a non-state actor. The two figures below, Figures 1 and 2, both stand for continuums
axes.
Beginning
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operations
furtheringin
along
axes. Beginning
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a continuum
of theofmethods
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anfurthering
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notionally
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and definitions
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annon-state
agenda by
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notionally established
terms and definitions
furthering an agenda by non-state actors can be notionally established using terms and definitions
U.S.
Military.
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Figure 2, In
at the
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of at
thethe
continuum,
non-state actors
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from
the U.S.
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left of theare
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are non-state
actors
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from the U.S. Military. In Figure 2, at the left of the continuum, are non-state actors who seek to
agenda
through
unconventional
warfare
defined
as
“
.
.
.
operating
through
or
with
an
underground,
achieve their agenda through unconventional warfare defined as “…operating through or with an
achieve their agenda through unconventional warfare defined as “…operating through or with an
auxiliary,
and guerrilla
force
inguerrilla
a deniedforce
area”in[14]
(p. 261)area” [14] (p. 261)
underground,
auxiliary,
and
a denied
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area” [14] (p. 261)
UnconventionalWarfare
Warfare
Unconventional
IrregularWarfare
Warfare
Irregular
Figure
Tactics
continuum.
Figure
1.1.Tactics
continuum.
Figure 1. Tactics continuum.
Onthe
theright
right
side of the continuum
are those
non-state actors
who further
their agenda
through
On
side
On
the right
side
of the continuum are
are those
those non-state
non-stateactors
actorswho
whofurther
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theiragenda
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througha
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among
stateand
andnon-state
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forlegitimacy
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andinfluence
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.a. “…violent
. violent struggle
struggle
among
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a“ “…violent
among
state
and non-state
actors for
legitimacy and
influence over
the relevant
population(s),”
[14]
(p.
125),
the
key
distinction
being
to
what
extent
the
non-state
actors
are
operating
population(s),” [14] (p.
(p. 125),
125),the
thekey
keydistinction
distinctionbeing
beingto
towhat
whatextent
extentthe
thenon-state
non-stateactors
actorsare
areoperating
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in
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and seeking
legitimacy
overpopulation.
the local population.
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in
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and
seeking
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The
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in a clandestine or more open fashion and seeking legitimacy over the local population. The
continuum
endswarfare
at irregular
warfare excluding full-spectrum
conventional operations
full-spectrum
operations
and nuclear
ends
at irregular
excluding
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being
continuum
ends at
irregular
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excluding conventional full-spectrum
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nuclear
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as
being
beyond
the
reach
of
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beyond
the reach
of non-state
war
as being
beyond
the reachactors.
of non-state actors.
State-Like
State-Like
Actor
Actor
Insurgent
Insurgent
Terrorist
Terrorist
Figure 2. Threat to the state.
Figure 2. Threat to the state.
Figure 2. Threat to the state.
Figure 2, “Threat to the state”, represents the extent to which the agenda of a non-state actor
Figure 2, “Threat to the state”, represents the extent to which the agenda of a non-state actor
represents
an“Threat
existential
threat
to the
survival and
continuance
of a state.
Agendas
which
seek change
Figure
tothreat
the
state”,
represents
extent to which
the Agendas
agenda
of
a non-state
actor
represents an2,existential
to the survival
andthe
continuance
of a state.
which
seek change
in
government
policy,
release
of
prisoners,
or
financial
demands
are
fundamentally
different
from
represents
an existential
threat to
survivalor
and
continuance
of a state.
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seek change
in
in
government
policy, release
ofthe
prisoners,
financial
demands
are fundamentally
from
agendas with
goals
to remove
or replace
currentdemands
leadership
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the state
itself.
government
policy,
release
of
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are
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different
from
agendas
agendas with goals to remove or replace current leadership or violently overthrow the state itself.
Kilcullen
distinguishes
betweencurrent
“terrorist”
and “insurgent”
based
on the question
of howKilcullen
much of a
with
goals
to
remove orbetween
replace
leadership
or violently
overthrow
the state
Kilcullen
distinguishes
“terrorist”
and “insurgent”
based
on the question
of itself.
how much of a
threat
to
the
state
the
non-state
actor
poses.
He
describes
how
in
“Western
popular
culture
the
distinguishes
between
“terrorist”actor
and “insurgent”
based onhow
the question
of how
muchculture
of a threat
threat
to the state
the non-state
poses. He describes
in “Western
popular
the
conception of terrorism became that of disembodied cells of radicalized, nihilistic individuals
conception of terrorism became that of disembodied cells of radicalized, nihilistic individuals
[who]…could not and did not tap into a mass base that drew its legitimacy from popular grievances,
[who]…could not and did not tap into a mass base that drew its legitimacy from popular grievances,
as traditional insurgents” [4] (loc. 3123). But many insurgencies, Kilcullen continues, especially those
as traditional insurgents” [4] (loc. 3123). But many insurgencies, Kilcullen continues, especially those
of the 21st Century, operate in a conflict where the insurgents “challenge the state by making it
of the 21st Century, operate in a conflict where the insurgents “challenge the state by making it
impossible for the government to perform its functions, or by usurping those functions—most
impossible for the government to perform its functions, or by usurping those functions—most
Systems 2018, 6, 16
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to the state the non-state actor poses. He describes how in “Western popular culture the conception
of terrorism became that of disembodied cells of radicalized, nihilistic individuals [who] . . . could
not and did not tap into a mass base that drew its legitimacy from popular grievances, as traditional
insurgents” [4] (loc. 3123). But many insurgencies, Kilcullen continues, especially those of the 21st
Century, operate in a conflict where the insurgents “challenge the state by making it impossible for
the
government
to perform
its functions, or by usurping those functions—most commonly, local-level
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2018, 6, x FOR
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political legitimacy; the rule of law; monopoly on the use of force; taxation; control of movement;
and
regulation
of the
economy”
[4] (loc. 2529).
So, insurgencies
differinsurgencies
from terrorism
their intent
terrorism
in their
intent
of challenging
the state,
however most
stillinoperate
in a
of
challenging
the state,
most
insurgenciesdoes
stillnot
operate
in a aclandestine
This is
clandestine
fashion.
Thishowever
is because
an insurgency
yet have
monopoly fashion.
on the activities
because
an insurgency
does
not yetsohave
monopoly
on the
within the
they occupy,
within the
territory they
occupy,
the anon-state
actor
canactivities
neither operate
norterritory
govern openly.
This
so
the non-state
cantoneither
operate nor
govern openly.
This territorial
controlactors.
leading
to
territorial
controlactor
leading
open-governing
distinction
is vital amongst
the non-state
Once
open-governing
distinction
is vitaltoamongst
the non-state
Once establishes
an insurgency
controls territory
an insurgency controls
territory
the exclusion
of any actors.
other force
enforcement
of law,
to
the exclusion
any activity,
other force
establishes
enforcement
of law,
commerce,
social activity,
commerce,
and of
social
they
have evolved
to something
more
than anand
insurgency.
In 2007they
the
have
evolved
something
more than
an insurgency.
2007 theon
United
StatesWarfare
militarytopublished
the
United
Statestomilitary
published
the Joint
OperatingInConcept
Irregular
guide future
Joint
Concept on
Warfare
guide
joint
force commanders
on a wideConcept
variety
joint Operating
force commanders
on Irregular
a wide variety
of to
types
of future
irregular
warfare.
The Joint Operating
of
types treats
of irregular
warfare.ofThe
Joint Operating
briefly fashion
treats this
of insurgencies
briefly
this concept
insurgencies
actingConcept
in sovereign
in concept
a footnote
“[s]tate-like
acting
in sovereign
in a footnote
“[s]tate-like
adversaries
refer
to non-traditional
adversaries
adversaries
refer tofashion
non-traditional
adversaries
that have
evolved
to the
point of attaining
state-like
that
have
evolved
to
the
point
of
attaining
state-like
power,
authority,
and
influence
over
a
population”
power, authority, and influence over a population” and later acknowledging that “these adaptive
and
later
acknowledging
adaptive
actorsand
may
possess
some of
the power[6].
of states
and
actors
may
possess somethat
of “these
the power
of states
adopt
state-like
structures”
This final
adopt
state-like
structures”
[6].of
This
final definition
allows
thethreat
creation
of astate.
vertical
the
definition
allows
the creation
a vertical
continuum
of the
to the
At continuum
the bottom,of
small
threat
state. At the
bottom,
small
groups
of individuals
pursue
policy change
but haveIn
little
groupstoofthe
individuals
pursue
policy
change
but have
little chance
of disrupting
state function.
the
chance
disrupting
state
function.
In the middle,
an insurgency
begins
to threatenthe
themeans
governing
a
middle,ofan
insurgency
begins
to threaten
the governing
of a state
by disrupting
to doofso.
state
by
disrupting
the
means
to
do
so.
At
the
top,
an
insurgency
has
begun
to
capture
territory
and
At the top, an insurgency has begun to capture territory and govern openly becoming a state-like
govern
openly
a state-like
actor.remaining
The only difference
at that point
a state-like
actor. The
onlybecoming
difference
at that point
from a state-like
actor remaining
and a statefrom
is international
actor
and a state
is international
recognition.
Using
the defined
horizontal
andare
vertical
axes, non-state
recognition.
Using
the defined horizontal
and
vertical
axes, non-state
actors
now plottable
based
actors
are
now
plottable
based
on
where
they
fall
on
both
continuums,
as
illustrated
in
Figure
3.
on where they fall on both continuums, as illustrated in Figure 3.
State-Like Actor
Challenge to State
Unknown Territory
Insurgent
Guerrilla Insurgencies
Terror Networks
Global Insurgency
Terrorist
Unconventional
Warfare (Clandestine)
Tactics
Irregular Warfare
(Open)
Figure 3. Non-state actor segmentation.
Figure 3. Non-state actor segmentation.
Further segmentation can be arrived at by illustratively separating the graph into four quadrants
Further segmentation
candistinctions
be arrived of
at aby
illustratively
separating
the graph into to
four
representing
the four natural
two-axis
arrangement
as: high-challenge
thequadrants
state with
representing
the
four
natural
distinctions
of
a
two-axis
arrangement
as:
high-challenge
to
the to
state
unconventional means, high challenge to the state with irregular warfare means, low challenge
the
with
unconventional
means,
high
challenge
to
the
state
with
irregular
warfare
means,
low
challenge
state with unconventional means, and so on. Existing terms can define three of the four quadrants. to
the state
unconventional
means, and
so on. Existing
terms
define threetoofstate”
the four
It iswith
worth
noting that “Guerrilla
Insurgencies”
do not
top can
the “challenge
axis.quadrants.
It follows
It
is
worth
noting
that
“Guerrilla
Insurgencies”
do
not
top
the
“challenge
to
state”
axis.
It
follows
logically that meeting the definition of a state-like actor would require the guerrilla insurgency to abandon
logically
that
meeting
the
definition
of
a
state-like
actor
would
require
the
guerrilla
insurgency
to
clandestine or underground methods characteristic of unconventional warfare and begin operating in the
abandon
clandestine
or
underground
methods
characteristic
of
unconventional
warfare
and
begin
open. Therefore, as a guerrilla insurgency gains territory and begins governing, it shifts to the right upper
quadrant currently named “Unknown Territory”. The actors who occupy this space are those who
conduct irregular warfare and yet present a threat to the state of equal or higher magnitude than guerilla
insurgencies. Defining the characteristics of this “unknown territory” quadrant occurs below.
First, we must trace the path of ISIS’s history and shifting modes of operation. Before 2003 what
would become AQI operated as at best a terrorist network of cells, the lower left quadrant. From 2003–
Systems 2018, 6, 16
6 of 24
operating in the open. Therefore, as a guerrilla insurgency gains territory and begins governing,
it shifts to the right upper quadrant currently named “Unknown Territory”. The actors who occupy
this space are those who conduct irregular warfare and yet present a threat to the state of equal or
higher magnitude than guerilla insurgencies. Defining the characteristics of this “unknown territory”
quadrant occurs below.
First, we must trace the path of ISIS’s history and shifting modes of operation. Before 2003
what would become AQI operated as at best a terrorist network of cells, the lower left quadrant.
From 2003–2013 as AQI operated as an insurgency in the upper left quadrant threatening various
governments conducting attacks, gaining criminal revenues all from within clandestine networks
hidden within the population. However, AQI never openly governed any population. With the capture
of Ar-Rakkah in 2013 this mode shifted from clandestine to open territorial seizure—moving to the
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
6 of 23
highest
point on the vertical scale. ISIS no longer sought to just deny governmental functions
to the
states vertical
(Syria and
Iraq),
but
through
the
seizure
of
territory
and
establishment
of
governance
create
scale. ISIS no longer sought to just deny governmental functions to the states (Syria and Iraq),their
own state.
Although
ISIS continued
clandestine
methods,
it also create
begantheir
attacking
in the
open with
but through
the seizure
of territoryits
and
establishment
of governance
own state.
Although
uniformed
troops
and
marked
vehicles.
This
was
more
a
form
of
irregular
than
unconventional
ISIS continued its clandestine methods, it also began attacking in the open with uniformed troops and war.
Because
of this
shift inThis
approach
and
end goals,
ISIS at
this
time was better
marked
vehicles.
was more
a form
of irregular
than
unconventional
war.located
Becauseinofthe
thisupper-right
shift in
approach
end goals,
at this
time was betteroflocated
in the upper-right
quadrant
andand
deserving
quadrant
and and
deserving
of ISIS
a term
representative
insurgencies
that govern
openly
no longer
of solely
a termunconventional
representative operations
of insurgencies
that govern
openly ofand
no longer
execute
solely
execute
but embrace
all aspects
irregular
warfare.
As ISIS
set up
unconventional
operations
but
embrace
all
aspects
of
irregular
warfare.
As
ISIS
set
up
courts
of
law,
courts of law, collected taxes, established government services, and enforced social norms the group
collected taxes, established government services, and enforced social norms the group began operating
began operating as a “state-like” actor, and given its rise might be better termed “emerging-state” or
as a “state-like” actor, and given its rise might be better termed “emerging-state” or “proto-state” actor.
“proto-state” actor. Indeed, the qualities of an “emerging-state” actor fit well within the upper right
Indeed, the qualities of an “emerging-state” actor fit well within the upper right portion of the
portion
of the previously
established
quadrant.
thisillustratively
space along
withother
illustratively
previously
established quadrant.
Locating
ISIS inLocating
this space ISIS
alongin
with
placing
nonplacing
other
non-state
actor
groups,
the
graph
now
appears
as
in
Figure
4.
state actor groups, the graph now appears as in Figure 4.
State-Like Actor
Challenge to State
Emerging State Actors
 The Islamic State
Insurgent
Guerilla Insurgencies
 Boko Haram?
 FARC  Taliban
‘01-’15
 IRA
 AQI
 PLO
 Taliban 1993-2001 & 2015?
 Al Nusra & AQAP 2015?
Terror Networks
 Red Army Faction
 Japanese Red Army
Terrorist
 Italian Red Brigade
Unconventional
Warfare (Clandestine)
 Al Queda Global Network
(e.g. Core AQ, AQIP,
AQIM, AQAP, Al Nusra pre
2015)
Global Insurgency
Tactics
Irregular Warfare
(Open)
Figure 4. Illustrative location of non-state actors by segmentation.
Figure 4. Illustrative location of non-state actors by segmentation.
This structure now provides a shaping context for the discussion of “what is ISIS” and a point
of alignment
innow
the modeling
the amount
of relevant
population under
someisform
control
This
structure
provideseffort:
a shaping
context
for the discussion
of “what
ISIS”ofand
a point
by
ISIS.
From
Turnley,
two
forms
of
control
over
a
population
are
the
control
through
coercive
power
of alignment in the modeling effort: the amount of relevant population under some form of control
andFrom
control
throughtwo
government
legitimacy.
power
from the
exercise
of
by ISIS.
Turnley,
forms of via
control
over aCoercive
population
areresults
the control
through
coercive
“coercion and reward” and is “particularistic as it is support for a specific action or specific person,
power and control through government via legitimacy. Coercive power results from the exercise of
not for an institution or a system of government.” Coercive power is more resource intensive as it
“coercion and reward” and is “particularistic as it is support for a specific action or specific person,
“requires the investment… to induce compliance whenever necessary” [6] (p. 37). Legitimacy is a
not for
an institution or a system of government.” Coercive power is more resource intensive as it
form of power that relies on the function of procedures that the governed considers fair established
“requires
investment
. . . toUnlike
induce
compliance
necessary”
[6] (p.
37). Legitimacy
withthe
credibility
over time.
coercive
power whenever
used to ensure
compliance,
control
by others is is a
form of
power
that
relies
on
the
function
of
procedures
that
the
governed
considers
fair
replaced by self-control, which socially is a much cheaper way to ensure social order” [6] (pp.established
38–40).
with credibility
over time.
Unlike coercive
power
to ensure
compliance,
bypower
others is
Turnley illustrates
the transitioning
distribution
of used
a population
controlled
throughcontrol
coercive
and governed through legitimacy with a diagram presented as Figure 5.
Systems 2018, 6, 16
7 of 24
replaced by self-control, which socially is a much cheaper way to ensure social order” [6] (pp. 38–40).
Turnley illustrates the transitioning distribution of a population controlled through coercive power
and governed
through legitimacy with a diagram presented as Figure 5.
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
7 of 23
Figure 5. Recreated image of transition from governing through power to governing through
Figure 5. Recreated image of transition from governing through power to governing through legitimacy
legitimacy via accumulation of fair procedures over time.
via accumulation of fair procedures over time.
Institutions created at times t1, t2 and t3, each deploya series of procedures to execute their
purpose.
As each
actoratdeploys
procedure
its perceived
as series
“fair”, the
of power
(coercivetheir
Institutions
created
times at1,
t2 and and
t3, each
deploya
of amount
procedures
to execute
power)
decreases
as
legitimacy
(governed
through
legitimacy)
increases.
Additionally,
the
succession
purpose. As each actor deploys a procedure and its perceived as “fair”, the amount of power (coercive
of credible and fair institutions also decreases the amount of power needed versus legitimacy. This
power)
decreases as legitimacy (governed through legitimacy) increases. Additionally, the succession of
means legitimacy is a function of the successful execution of each process as well as the accumulation
credible and fair institutions also decreases the amount of power needed versus legitimacy. This means
over time of the repetition of successful execution. Likewise, the length of time it takes to transition a
legitimacy
is a function of the successful execution of each process as well as the accumulation over
population from control through coercive power to legitimacy determines the overall resources
time of
the repetition
successful
execution.
Likewise,lying
the between
length ofCoercion
time it takes
to transition
required
to governof that
population.
A middle-stage,
and legitimacy,
a population
control
through
power to legitimacy
determines
the overall
resources
identifiedfrom
by Hurd
in 1999,
is a coercive
stage of “self-interest.”
Or, calculated
legitimacy
lying between
required
to govern
that population.
A middle-stage,
lying between
Coercion
and legitimacy,
identified
Coercion
and legitimacy.
The difference
between Coercion
and calculated
legitimacy
as described
by
Hurd:
“is that
application
of coercion
the coerced
actorlying
worse
off than
it was and
by Hurd
in 1999,
is a an
stage
of “self-interest.”
Or,leaves
calculated
legitimacy
between
Coercion
beforehand…whereas
a self-interest
perspective
sees the actor
as betteras
offdescribed
than it would
be taking
legitimacy.
The difference between
Coercion
and calculated
legitimacy
by Hurd:
“is that
any other available
path”
[15] (p.
The in-between
state
captures some
the
an application
of coercion
leaves
the386).
coerced
actor worse
offmore
thanaccurately
it was beforehand
. . . ofwhereas
complex patronage relationships where out of purely self-interested ethnographic groups will
a self-interest perspective sees the actor as better off than it would be taking any other available
temporarily align with the local power, but quickly remove that alignment if their interests diverge.
path” [15] (p. 386). The in-between state more accurately captures some of the complex patronage
In summary, by creating credible institutional procedures replicated over time provisioning both
relationships
where
out
of purely
ethnographic
groupsofwill
temporarily
aligngroup
with the
punishments
and
services
any self-interested
state-actor will affect
the distribution
a target
ethnographic
local power,
but
quickly
remove
that
alignment
if
their
interests
diverge.
In
summary,
by
creating
among Coerced, calculated legitimacy and Governed that indicates along a continuum the extent
of
credible
institutional
procedures
replicated
over
time
provisioning
both
punishments
and
services
external-threat vs. self-restraint that is necessary to achieve compliance of that population to the state.
any state-actor will affect the distribution of a target ethnographic group among Coerced, calculated
5. Modeling
Boundaries
Approach
legitimacy
and Governed
thatand
indicates
along a continuum the extent of external-threat vs. self-restraint
that is necessary
to
achieve
compliance
of that
to thebenefits
state. from development as logical
Prior to creating a simulation model,
thepopulation
proposed theory
arguments. In system dynamics these logical structures are visual and explicit with causal loop
5. Modeling
diagramsBoundaries
(CLD) that and
distillApproach
into to a key feedback loops the hypothesis of what is generating the
proposed behavior. From this CLD, the construction of a detailed simulation model proceeds. However,
Prior
to creating a simulation model, the proposed theory benefits from development as logical
since models can never truly represent reality, boundary selections confine the work to a reasonable
arguments. In system dynamics these logical structures are visual and explicit with causal loop
scope. Reasonable boundaries for proposed hypothesis can be selected through a “slicing approach” to
diagrams
(CLD) that distill into to a key feedback loops the hypothesis of what is generating the
complex systems as advocated by Saeed in 1992 [16]. In complex systems modes of behavior can exist
proposed
behavior.
From(both
this aCLD,
the construction
a detailed
simulation
modeland
proceeds.
However,
in time, geography
geography
of “terrain”ofand
a geography
of ”things”),
simultaneous
since models
can
never
truly
reality,
confine
the(See
work
to a reasonable
modes. In
this
paper
the represent
complex system
is boundary
“sliced” as selections
described in
Table 1.
Supplementary
scope.Materials
Reasonable
boundaries
for proposed
can
be selectedonthrough
a “slicing
Section
B-2 Boundary
Adequacyhypothesis
for additional
commentary
boundary
selectionapproach”
validity.) to
complex systems as advocated by Saeed in 1992 [16]. In complex systems modes of behavior can exist in
time, geography (both a geography of “terrain” and a geography of ”things”), and simultaneous modes.
Systems 2018, 6, 16
8 of 24
In this paper the complex system is “sliced” as described in Table 1. (See Supplementary Materials
Section B-2 Boundary Adequacy for additional commentary on boundary selection validity.)
Table 1. Proposed slicing of simulation model.
Axes
Slice Modeled
Slice Not Modeled
Mode
Exponential growth of Governed Population
Behavioral Limits to Growth
Systems 2018, 6, x FORDuration
PEER REVIEW
= 2010–2020
Time
Unit = 3 months, dt = 0.011
(or ~1 day)
of 23
Pre-2010 and greater than8 10
year
feedback loops
Table 1. Proposed slicing of simulation model.
Axes
Geography
Mode
Time
Policy Responses
Geography
Policy Responses
Territory: Iraq and Syria Provinces and Cities
Slice ModeledKurds, Shia and Sunni
Ethno-Social Populations:
Exponential
growth
Governed
Population
Forces:
ISIS
vs. ofSyria,
Iraq,
and Foreign
Duration = 2010–2020 Unit = 3 months, dt = 0.011 (or ~1 day)
Territory: Iraq and
Syria
Provinces and Cities
Exogenous
and
Endogenous
within the
Ethno-Social Populations:
Kurds,
Shia and Sunni
geography
boundary.
Forces: ISIS vs. Syria, Iraq, and Foreign
Exogenous and Endogenous within the geography boundary.
Cross Regional Flows
Slice Not
Modeled
Tribal
Structures
BehavioralTowns
Limits toand
Growth
Villages
Pre-2010 and greater than 10 year feedback loops
Cross
Regional
Flows
Global
responses
outside
Tribal
Structures boundary.
geography
Towns and Villages
Global responses outside of geography boundary.
of
6. Hypothesis Design through Causal Loop Analysis
6. Hypothesis Design through Causal Loop Analysis
Few existing causal loop structures for insurgencies are in the literature. Because the models
Few existing causal loop structures for insurgencies are in the literature. Because the models
used by Aamir
were already extant, he did not provide an integrated causal loop structure [11] (p. 8).
used by Aamir were already extant, he did not provide an integrated causal loop structure [11] (p. 8).
In their “Farmers, Bandits, and Soldiers” model Saeed et al., likewise did not depict a causal loop
In their “Farmers, Bandits, and Soldiers” model Saeed et al., likewise did not depict a causal loop
diagram
[10]. Only in Anderson’s paper was a causal loop diagram of his theoretical construct created,
diagram [10]. Only in Anderson’s paper was a causal loop diagram of his theoretical construct created,
as depicted
in Figure
6 [9]
(p.(p.
8).8).
as depicted
in Figure
6 [9]
Figure 6. Anderson causal loop diagram of full insurgency.
Figure 6. Anderson causal loop diagram of full insurgency.
Anderson’s model struggles to examine ISIS and other emerging state actors using irregular
warfare.
This model
is because
Anderson’s
model isISIS
builtand
on the
premise
that insurgents
areusing
fighting
a
Anderson’s
struggles
to examine
other
emerging
state actors
irregular
“classic”
insurgency
following
O’Neill’s
definition
that
largely
confines
insurgents
to
operating
in
a
warfare. This is because Anderson’s model is built on the premise that insurgents are fighting
a
guerrilla
manner,
e.g.,
“raids,
ambushes,
bombings,
etc.”
[9]
(p.
3).
This
is
consistent
with
the
Joint
“classic” insurgency following O’Neill’s definition that largely confines insurgents to operating in a
Forces definition of unconventional warfare of “operating through or with an underground, auxiliary,
guerrilla manner, e.g., “raids, ambushes, bombings, etc.” [9] (p. 3). This is consistent with the Joint
and guerrilla force in a denied area” [14] (p. 261). This does not comport with behavior that is stateForces definition of unconventional warfare of “operating through or with an underground, auxiliary,
like, nor defined above as emerging-state behavior.
and guerrilla
force
in adiagrams
denied area”
[14]in
(p.demonstrating
261). This does
not comport
behavior
thatalready
is state-like,
Causal
loop
can aid
transition
stateswith
between
phases
nor defined
above
as emerging-state
behavior.
identified:
clandestine
terror networks,
insurgencies and emerging-state actors. An can operate in all
Causal
loop diagrams
canlesser
aid indegrees
demonstrating
statesBut
between
phases already
identified:
three
phases
to greater or
within thetransition
same systems.
the differences
between
an
actor acting
predominantly
in one aspect
or emerging-state
another manifestactors.
in the theory
emerging-state
actor
clandestine
terror
networks, insurgencies
and
An canofoperate
in all three
phases
behavior
performance.
These the
differences
are testable
thedifferences
simulation model
for an
validation
to greater
or and
lesser
degrees within
same systems.
Butinthe
between
actor acting
against the hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging state actor.
This paper proposes that this cycle begins with a state actor and the desire to credibly govern a
specific ethnographic group. The higher that desire, the higher the legitimacy of the state actor within
that ethnographic group. This desire also exhibits a tolerance of civil reforms. This means when
grievances do arise—resolution can occur through less-than-violent means. However, if a state actor
has a low desire to credibly govern, this decreases their legitimacy to the ethnographic group,
Systems 2018, 6, 16
9 of 24
predominantly in one aspect or another manifest in the theory of emerging-state actor behavior
and performance. These differences are testable in the simulation model for validation against the
hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging state actor.
This paper proposes that this cycle begins with a state actor and the desire to credibly govern
a specific ethnographic group. The higher that desire, the higher the legitimacy of the state actor
within that ethnographic group. This desire also exhibits a tolerance of civil reforms. This means
when grievances do arise—resolution can occur through less-than-violent means. However, if a state
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
9 of 23
actor has a low desire to credibly govern, this decreases their legitimacy to the ethnographic group,
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
9 of 23
increasing
grievance,
and
the
reforms leads
leadsover
overtime
timetotogeneral
general
uprising
increasing
grievance,
and
theunwillingness
unwillingnessto
toallow
allow civil
civil reforms
uprising
andand
resistance.
Figure
7 and
depicts
this
below.
increasing
grievance,
the unwillingness
to allow
civil reforms leads over time to general uprising
resistance.
Figure
7 depicts
thisinitial
initialstage
stage
below.
and resistance. Figure 7 depicts this initial stage below.
State Actor Desire
State
ActorGovern
Desire
to
Credibly
to Credibly Govern
+
+
+
+
Failure to
Failure
Governto
- Govern
Tolerance of Civil
Ethnographic
Tolerance
of Civil
Reforms
Ethnographic
Greivance
Reforms
Greivance
+
+
General Uprising
General
Uprising
& Resistance
& Resistance
Legitimacy of
Legitimacy
State Actorof
State Actor
Figure7.7.Conditions
Conditions for civil conflict.
Figure
conflict.
Figure 7. Conditions for civil conflict.
If the State still refuses participation in civil reforms, the General Uprising and Resistance will
If the State still refuses participation in civil reforms, the General Uprising and Resistance will
If the
State
still refuses
participation
reforms,
the General
Uprising
andfirst.
Resistance
will
manifest
at the
extremes
as military
actionsin
of civil
which
clandestine
terrorism
will be the
This is the
manifest
at the
extremes
as as
military
actions
ofofwhich
clandestine
terrorism
will
be the
thefirst.
first.This
Thisisisthe
the
manifest
at
the
extremes
military
actions
which
clandestine
terrorism
will
be
Clandestine Terrorist Network stage where the first two positive feedback loops emerge as shown in
Clandestine
Terrorist
Network
stage
where
loops emerge
emergeas
asshown
showninin
Clandestine
Terrorist
Network
stage
wherethe
thefirst
firsttwo
twopositive
positive feedback
feedback loops
Figure
8.
Figure
8.
Figure 8.
<Military
Actions>
<Military
Actions>
+
+
Legitimacy of
State Actorof
Legitimacy
State Actor
-
<Clandestine
-State Actor Desire
Terrorism>
<Clandestine
toState
Credibly
ActorGovern
Desire
Terrorism>
+
to Credibly Govern
+
Failure to
Governto
Failure
- Govern
Ethnographic
Greivance
Ethnographic
Greivance
+
Tolerance of Civil
Reforms
Tolerance
of Civil
Reforms
Perception of
Instability of
Perception
+
General Uprising
Unaddressed
InstabilityGrievance Leads to General
& Resistance
Uprising
Unaddressed
Violence
Grievance
Leads to & Resistance
+
+
Violence
+
+ Clandestine
Military Actions
Terrorism
Clandestine
+
Military Actions
Terrorism
+
Figure 8. Clandestine terror stage of unconventional conflict.
Figure
Clandestineterror
terrorstage
stageof
ofunconventional
unconventional conflict.
conflict.
Figure
8. 8.
Clandestine
-
In this stage the extremists use clandestine terrorism to target the population or the government.
In this stage
the extremists
use clandestine
terrorism
to target
the population
or the
This increases
a perception
of instability
within the
targeted
population
that weakens
thegovernment.
legitimacy
In
this
stage
the
extremists
use
clandestine
terrorism
to
target
the
population
or
the
This
increases aperceived
perceptionasofbeing
instability
within
the targeted
population
that weakensthe
thegovernment.
legitimacy
of
government
unable
to control
the violence.
Simultaneously,
state
actor
This
a perception
of as
instability
withintothe
targeted
population
that
weakens the
legitimacy
ofincreases
government
being unable
control
the often
violence.
Simultaneously,
the
actorof
desire
to crediblyperceived
govern the
targeted
ethnographic
group
declines
in response to
thestate
violence
desire
to credibly
govern
the targeted
often
declines
the violence
of
terrorism
and other
military
actions. ethnographic
This cycle cangroup
exist for
a great
dealinofresponse
time andtonever
evolve
of terrorism
and
other
This
cycle
can exist
for aperformed
great dealby
of time
and never
evolve
past
this stage.
But
if itmilitary
does it actions.
is because
the
military
actions
extremists
within
the
past
this
stage.
But
if
it
does
it
is
because
the
military
actions
performed
by
extremists
within
the
general uprising and resistance begin to focus on recruiting into organized formal groups. These
generalbegin
uprising
and resistance
begin to focus
on recruiting
into organized
formal
groups.
groups
to exert
a shadow-influence
on the
population—gaining
support
from
someThese
and
groups beginothers.
to exert
a shadow-influence
the population—gaining
some
intimidating
Criminal
activities gain on
finances
which fund further support
military from
actions.
Thisand
is
Systems 2018, 6, 16
10 of 24
government perceived as being unable to control the violence. Simultaneously, the state actor desire to
credibly govern the targeted ethnographic group often declines in response to the violence of terrorism
and other military actions. This cycle can exist for a great deal of time and never evolve past this
stage. But if it does it is because the military actions performed by extremists within the general
uprising and resistance begin to focus on recruiting into organized formal groups. These groups begin
to exert a shadow-influence on the population—gaining support from some and intimidating others.
Criminal activities gain finances which fund further military actions. This is when a clandestine terror
stage Systems
morphs
an insurgency
2018,into
6, x FOR
PEER REVIEW stage of conflict as shown in Figure 9.
10 of 23
Figure 9. Insurgency stage of conflict.
Figure 9. Insurgency stage of conflict.
The logic of an insurgent is to leverage the local legitimate grievances of an ethnographic group
and logic
leverage
thatinsurgent
into finances
manpower
to conduct
violence
against the
This adds two
The
of an
is toand
leverage
the local
legitimate
grievances
of state.
an ethnographic
group
more positive feedback loops to the existing. As local grievances increase, so do militants, and if local
and leverage that into finances and manpower to conduct violence against the state. This adds two
grievances were to decrease, militants and their actions would also decrease. This is illustrative of the
more importance
positive feedback
loops to the existing. As local grievances increase, so do militants, and if local
of resolving local grievances, through political reform and changing the desire of the State
grievances
were
to
decrease,
militants
and to
their
actions
would also
This
is illustrative
to credibly govern, as a sustained
approach
ending
an insurgency
overdecrease.
time [4] (loc.
173–199).
These of
the importance
of
resolving
local
grievances,
through
political
reform
and
changing
the
desire
could be criminal activities targeting populations that are not aligned with the insurgents such asof the
State ransoms,
to credibly
govern,reselling
as a sustained
approach
to looting,
ending an
over time [4] (loc.
173–199).
extortion,
of stolen
property,
andinsurgency
selling of blood-antiquities
(stolen
artifacts).
Criminal
activities
also include
activities
which
globally
tolerated
Thesehistorical
could be
criminal
activities
targeting
populations
that
areare
notillegal
aligned
withbut
the
insurgents
locally
such as
the illegal
drug trade.
Finally,
criminallooting,
revenuesand
include
informal
taxation schemas
such as
ransoms,
extortion,
reselling
of stolen
property,
selling
of blood-antiquities
(stolen
that
bear
more
resemblance
to
extortion
than
a
formal
state
levied
tax.
These
funds
increase
historical artifacts). Criminal activities also include activities which are illegal globally non-state
but tolerated
actor insurgent’s finances, allowing them to support and pay more combatants. Logically, a sustained
locally
such as the illegal drug trade. Finally, criminal revenues include informal taxation schemas
reduction in local grievances through reconciliation, ability to gain finances, or reduction of
that bear more resemblance to extortion than a formal state levied tax. These funds increase non-state
combatants through military action all hold the potential to reduce the reinforcing feedback effect
actor that
insurgent’s
finances, allowing them to support and pay more combatants. Logically, a sustained
powers the classic non-state actor insurgent, especially when applied in combination. The means
reduction
in
local
grievances
throughboth
reconciliation,
ability
gaindegree
finances,
or reduction
of combatants
of these reductions
are accessible
to the State and
to ato
lesser
the local
ethnography.
through military
all with
holdthe
theemerging
potentialstate
to reduce
theisreinforcing
effect thatthat
powers
The first action
difference
actor CLD
the input offeedback
non-local grievances
the classic
non-state
actor
especially
applied
combination.
of these
bring foreign
recruits
toinsurgent,
an area. These
militantswhen
align to
the localingrievances
at first,The
but means
a reduction
in localare
grievances
will
not to
result
in a reduction
foreign
intervention
those grievances are
reductions
accessible
both
the State
and to a of
lesser
degree
the localsince
ethnography.
non-local. The second difference is that military actions in this model not only terrify or intimidate
populations, but also seizes territory. This territory then enables an additional feedback loop of
“territorial revenues” from land-intensive resources to activate. Control of territory allows a nonstate actor to control the resource extractions that occur in that territory. These territorial revenues
require coordination of workers and leveraging infrastructure, and they are difficult to secure when
an insurgency operates in a classical clandestine manner. In Afghanistan the Taliban took advantage
Systems 2018, 6, 16
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The first difference with the emerging state actor CLD is the input of non-local grievances that
bring foreign recruits to an area. These militants align to the local grievances at first, but a reduction
in local grievances will not result in a reduction of foreign intervention since those grievances are
non-local. The second difference is that military actions in this model not only terrify or intimidate
populations, but also seizes territory. This territory then enables an additional feedback loop of
“territorial revenues” from land-intensive resources to activate. Control of territory allows a non-state
actor to control the resource extractions that occur in that territory. These territorial revenues require
coordination of workers and leveraging infrastructure, and they are difficult to secure when an
insurgency operates in a classical clandestine manner. In Afghanistan the Taliban took advantage
of opium farming, while in Nigeria Boko Haram helps fund itself through oil while in Columbia
the Revolutionary
Systems 2018, 6, xArmed
FOR PEERForces
REVIEWof Colombia (FARC) exploited the production of cocaine.11For
of 23ISIS,
the territorial revenue is oil located in the territories they seize. These additional financial inputs
Revolutionary
Armedfungible,
Forces of Colombia
(FARC)
thereinforcing
production of
cocaine. For
ISIS,
theruns
produced
from lucrative,
globalized
tradeexploited
charge the
feedback
loop
that
territorial
revenue
is
oil
located
in
the
territories
they
seize.
These
additional
financial
inputs
through finances to obtain more militants, conduct more military actions and thus gain more territory.
produced from lucrative, fungible, globalized trade charge the reinforcing feedback loop that runs
Seizing
territory opens another powerful feedback loop of enabling non-state actors to begin
through finances to obtain more militants, conduct more military actions and thus gain more territory.
governing the population. This creates the processes by which coercive power shift to calculated
Seizing territory opens another powerful feedback loop of enabling non-state actors to begin
legitimacy
and legitimate governing power. Populations controlled through legitimacy are less resource
governing the population. This creates the processes by which coercive power shift to calculated
intensive
to control
the population
and allows
taxation
of normal
commerce
legitimacy
andsince
legitimate
governing“self-controls”
power. Populations
controlled
through
legitimacy
are lessand
individuals.
shift totolegitimacy
also
back on
itself. The more
people
governed
through
resourceThe
intensive
control since
thefeeds
population
“self-controls”
and allows
taxation
of normal
legitimacy,
the easier
collecting finances
through
taxation,
which
governance
mechanisms.
commerce
and individuals.
The shift
to legitimacy
also
feedsfund
backlocal
on itself.
The more
people
through legitimacy,
thecan
easier
collecting
finances that
through
whichstate
fundactor
local can
These governed
local governance
mechanisms
provide
the services
onlytaxation,
a sovereign
governance
mechanisms.
These
local
governance
mechanisms
can
provide
the
services
that
only
a
provide: law enforcement, judicial proceedings, building infrastructure, social services, and other
sovereign
state
actor
can
provide:
law
enforcement,
judicial
proceedings,
building
infrastructure,
government services that may have been lacking in the area.
social services, and other government services that may have been lacking in the area.
When
we add these aspects to our existing CLD structure, three loops emerge: seizure of territory,
When we add these aspects to our existing CLD structure, three loops emerge: seizure of
control of population through legitimacy, and foreign recruiting by playing on global grievances.
territory, control of population through legitimacy, and foreign recruiting by playing on global
Figuregrievances.
10 depictsFigure
the larger
CLD.
10 depicts the larger CLD.
Figure 10. CLD of an emerging-state actor.
Figure 10. CLD of an emerging-state actor.
The summary of emerging state actor theory to this point is:
(1) A failure of governance by the state-actor and inability to tolerate civil reforms decreases
legitimacy, increases grievance and leads to general uprising and resistance.
(2) This resistance manifests first in the form of clandestine terrorism which increases the perception
of instability, further decreasing the legitimacy of the state. Likewise, violent acts reduce
incentives of the state actor to credibly govern the ethnographic group from within which these
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The summary of emerging state actor theory to this point is:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
A failure of governance by the state-actor and inability to tolerate civil reforms decreases
legitimacy, increases grievance and leads to general uprising and resistance.
This resistance manifests first in the form of clandestine terrorism which increases the perception
of instability, further decreasing the legitimacy of the state. Likewise, violent acts reduce
incentives of the state actor to credibly govern the ethnographic group from within which
these actions emerge.
Local grievances create militants who join a local non-state actor or bring one in from afar.
The non-state actor uses militants and finances to conduct military actions.
As the non-state actor increases the controlled population, it begins extracting coercive revenues
through criminal activities and recruiting locally from within this population.
Within its territory, the non-state actor attempts to monopolize the use of force, taxation, control
of movement, and regulation of the economy. By operating in a sovereign manner, the non-state
actor shifts to an emerging state actor.
Coercive revenues and territorial revenues finance governing mechanisms which can begin
building legitimacy to shift the controlled population into a governed population.
As the emerging-state actor gains a governed population, it also gains taxation revenue and
increases its draw of non-local foreign recruits by propagandizing its non-local grievances,
which may or may not align to local grievances.
The loops complete into a positive feedback loop of exponential growth. More militants
mean more military actions, which means more territory and access to controlled populations,
which become governed, fueling finances, which fund more militants and military actions.
The shift from a classic non-state actor insurgency to an emerging-state actor, in this sequence,
begins at Step 6 and completes in Step 7. Described in another way, for a non-state actor to become an
emerging-state actor it must at some point:
(A) Control territory to the exclusion of all other state actors.
(B) Seek to govern that territory in an open manner that creates legitimacy.
In the case of ISIS’s predecessor AQI, the group was able to reach Step 5 and partially Step 6.
Even though AQI certainly influenced a population and extracted criminal revenues from them,
AQI was never able to meet the two criteria above to complete the transition from insurgency to
emerging-state actor. In this formulation, an emerging-state actor are a foregone conclusion once
militants enter the system. Additional balancing loops complete the CLD by representing various
limits to growth. Figure 11 depicts these loops.
These are endogenous limits on the emerging-state actor which even absent external pressure,
can and will engage to slow down or reverse the growth over time. The “Expansion Requires More
Garrison Forces” loop activates as an emerging-state actor controls more population—requiring
more forces to garrison than population to prevent uprisings against their rule. This reduces the
number of combatants available to gain more territory. Furthermore, the force ratios for garrisoning
a population controlled through coercive power are higher, ranging from 8:1 to as high as 55:1 than
the ratios necessary to police a population, ~2.8:1, governed through legitimacy. This loop can also
act in the same way the “Failure to Govern” loop does for the state actor, starting a general uprising
against the emerging-state actor. Another negative feedback loop in the emerging-state actor theory
is “Descent into Factions”. ISIS owes its existence to the activation of this loop within Al-Queda
as a previous incarnation split from the global terrorist network in 2013. A third negative feedback
loop, the “Dynastic Cycle” loop begins with the corruption and abuse of arbitrary power available
to a state, similar to Katouzian’s theory of arbitrary state and society [17] (p. 7). These abuses erode
governing by legitimacy, feeding both the Uprising and Resistance loop and the Descent into Factions
loop. However, Descent into Factions and the Dynastic Cycle loops have significant delay functions
The shift from a classic non-state actor insurgency to an emerging-state actor, in this sequence,
begins at Step 6 and completes in Step 7. Described in another way, for a non-state actor to become
an emerging-state actor it must at some point:
(A) Control territory to the exclusion of all other state actors.
(B) Seek to govern that territory in an open manner that creates legitimacy.
Systems 2018, 6, 16
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In the case of ISIS’s predecessor AQI, the group was able to reach Step 5 and partially Step 6.
and
therefore
may certainly
develop influenced
well after an
emerging-state
actor has criminal
established
itself. from
As modeled
by
Even though AQI
a population
and extracted
revenues
them, AQI
Langarudi,
the
Katouzian
dynastic
cycle
can
take
decades
to
manifest
[17]
(pp.
10–16).
The
Afghanistan
was never able to meet the two criteria above to complete the transition from insurgency to emergingTaliban,
as an
actor,
maintained itsactor
governing
legitimacy
despite widespread
abuses
state actor.
In emerging-state
this formulation,
an emerging-state
are a foregone
conclusion
once militants
enter
until
the
post-9/11
U.S.
invasion
in
2001.
The
attached
E-SAM
has
all
these
balancing
loops
modeled
the system. Additional balancing loops complete the CLD by representing various limits to growth.
numerically
so thethese
conditions
Figure 11 depicts
loops.for their activation are testable.
Figure 11. Emerging-state actor with balancing loops.
Figure 11. Emerging-state actor with balancing loops.
The emerging-state actor theory can help explain not only the rise of ISIS in 2013, but the collapse
of AQI forces in 2006–2007. The inability of AQI to establish institutions and processes with which
to govern legitimately meant it relied only on coercive and often abusive power. This activated the
“Expansion Requires More Garrison Forces” negative feedback loop from local fighters. Beginning in the
Anbar Awakening of 2006, followed soon thereafter with an U.S. troop surge AQI faced local-opposition
fighters. AQI as a classical insurgent could not sustain itself in that environment. A lesson perhaps
learned by its members and carried forward into the new incarnation of ISIS.
7. Hypothesis That Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Is an Emerging State Actor
Based on the previous theoretical development, I propose the following dynamic hypothesis: the
Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor, which uses methods of irregular warfare to capture
territory to influence populations (“coercive power”), which it then attempts to govern in furtherance
of its objective to become a functioning state (“legitimate power”). I recognize that although the term
for this category might be new in this application, the behavior and model is not, as other actors,
such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hezbollah in Lebanon have taken this route as indicated by
the segmentation.
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To test the hypothesis, I created a simulation model of sufficient detail to test the propositions of
the emerging-state actor theory and the hypothesis that ISIS is an emerging-state actor. The model
consists of two sections: a strategic architecture of both the state government named the “Green Actor”
and ISIS, named the “Red Actor.” The strategic architecture identifies the resources and capabilities
that determine performance at any point in time. The second section is a World Model within which
these two Actors compete against one another over control of a variety of ethnographic groups and
with varying degrees of foreign intervention. This strategy-dynamics approach to modeling recognizes
that these resources accumulate or deplete driven by flow-rates and the changes in the resource [18].
Sub-systems representing the constants, parameters, information flow, and leadership decisions,
behaviors and side-choosing of ethnographic groups, as well as the influence of other resource levels,
all combine to affect the rates of change. Reinforcing and balancing feedback interactions between
these resources can explain the dynamics of strategic performance. Figure 12 shows the aggregate
strategic
architecture
inREVIEW
sectors alongside world model sectors.
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2018,
6, x FOR PEER
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Resource
Stocks
Expenses
SFS
Combat
Simulator
Strategic
Architecture
Sectors
Territory
Dynamics
Revenue
Combatant
Recruiting
& Losses
Resistance
& Uprising
OpOrder
Impacts on
World
AFV/IFV &
Artillery
World Model
Sectors
Governance
<OpOrder Impacts Ethnographic
on World>
Side-Choosing
Ethnographic
Perceptions
<SFS Combat
Simulator>
OpOrder
Allocations
<SFS Combat
Simulator>
Foreign
Intervention
OpOrder
Allocations
Figure
Figure 12.
12. Emerging-State
Emerging-State Actor
Actor Model
Model (E-SAM)
(E-SAM) sectors.
sectors.
The strategic architecture, sectors marked in red, represents the resources, capabilities, and skills
The strategic architecture, sectors marked in red, represents the resources, capabilities, and skills
of each the Green and Red Actor. The world model, sectors marked in green, defines the
of each the Green and Red Actor. The world model, sectors marked in green, defines the “environment”
“environment” within which subsystems interact.
within which subsystems interact.
Two simulations seek to replicate the conditions in Syria and Iraq beginning in 2010, the
Two simulations seek to replicate the conditions in Syria and Iraq beginning in 2010, the grievances
grievances of the Arab Suuni’s that led to the rise and expansion of ISIS. The Baseline Historical
of the Arab Suuni’s that led to the rise and expansion of ISIS. The Baseline Historical scenario then
scenario then includes the significant foreign interventions that occurred beginning in 2014. The
includes the significant foreign interventions that occurred beginning in 2014. The Baseline without
Baseline without Intervention takes a counter-factual that this intervention never occurred and
Intervention takes a counter-factual that this intervention never occurred and projects what might
projects what might have occurred with ISIS absent foreign involvement. When simulated in this
have occurred with ISIS absent foreign involvement. When simulated in this fashion the Baseline
fashion the Baseline Historical replicates sufficiently, though not exactly, the rise of ISIS through
Historical replicates sufficiently, though not exactly, the rise of ISIS through stages of clandestine
stages of clandestine terrorism, insurgency and emerging-state actor. It also charts the decline and
terrorism, insurgency and emerging-state actor. It also charts the decline and collapse of ISIS under
collapse of ISIS under pressure of foreign interventions and increasing coordinated activities against
pressure of foreign interventions and increasing coordinated activities against it on multiple fronts.
it on multiple fronts. Figure 13 charts three primary measures-of-effectiveness of the Red Actor:
Figure 13 charts three primary measures-of-effectiveness of the Red Actor: Territory Controlled,
Territory Controlled, Total Combatants, and Population for the Baseline Historical.
Total Combatants, and Population for the Baseline Historical.
Baseline without Intervention takes a counter-factual that this intervention never occurred and
projects what might have occurred with ISIS absent foreign involvement. When simulated in this
fashion the Baseline Historical replicates sufficiently, though not exactly, the rise of ISIS through
stages of clandestine terrorism, insurgency and emerging-state actor. It also charts the decline and
collapse of ISIS under pressure of foreign interventions and increasing coordinated activities against
Systems
6, 16
it 2018,
on multiple
fronts. Figure 13 charts three primary measures-of-effectiveness of the Red Actor:15 of 24
Territory Controlled, Total Combatants, and Population for the Baseline Historical.
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
(a)
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
(b)
15 of 23
15 of 23
(c)
Figure 13. Primary measures of effectiveness. (a) The territory ISIS exercises control over population
Figure 13. Primary measures of effectiveness. (a)(c)
The territory ISIS exercises control over population
and natural resources. This territory need not be contiguous and may include vast areas of
and
natural
resources.
This
territory
need
not
be
contiguous
and may
includecontrol
vast areas
uninhabited
Figure
13. Primary
measures
effectiveness.
The territory
exercises
overof
uninhabited
terrain.
(b) Theoftotal
combatants,(a)whether
local orISIS
foreign
recruits, available
topopulation
ISIS. (c)
terrain.
(b)
The
total
combatants,
whether
local
or
foreign
recruits,
available
to
ISIS.
(c)
The total
and The
natural
territory
need not ISIS
be contiguous
and may
include
vast power,
areas
of
total resources.
population This
across
all ethnographies
controls whether
through
coercive
population
across
all ethnographies
ISIS controlswhether
whetherlocal
through
coercive
power,available
calculated
uninhabited
terrain.
(b) The
total combatants,
or foreign
recruits,
tolegitimacy
ISIS. (c)
calculated
legitimacy
or legitimacy.
or
legitimacy.
The
total population across all ethnographies ISIS controls whether through coercive power,
The Baseline
Historical
simulation successfully replicates the behavior mode on which the
calculated
legitimacy
or legitimacy.
dynamic
hypothesis
is
based
as well assuccessfully
the early growth
and resilience
of ISIS.
Figure
then the
The Baseline Historical simulation
replicates
the behavior
mode
on14which
compares
the
Historical
Baseline
with
the
Baseline
without
Intervention
to
demonstrate
that
E-SAM
Thehypothesis
Baseline Historical
the behavior
mode14on
which
the
dynamic
is based assimulation
well as thesuccessfully
early growthreplicates
and resilience
of ISIS. Figure
then
compares
can produce
substantially
different
behaviors.
dynamic
hypothesis
is based
as well
as the early growth and resilience of ISIS. Figure 14 then
the Historical Baseline with the Baseline without Intervention to demonstrate that E-SAM can produce
compares thedifferent
Historical
Baseline with the Baseline without Intervention to demonstrate that E-SAM
substantially
behaviors.
can produce substantially different behaviors.
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
Figure 14. Cont.
(c)
Systems 2018, 6, 16
16 of 24
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 14. Comparison of baseline historical and baseline without intervention. The counterfactual
Figure 14. Comparison of baseline historical and baseline without intervention. The counterfactual
case shows that without the combined foreign interventions, ISIS reaches an endogenous limit to
case shows that without the combined foreign interventions, ISIS reaches an endogenous limit to
growth in both territory (a) and total combatants (b). The population underneath ISIS control grows
growth in both territory (a) and total combatants (b). The population underneath ISIS control grows
until it reaches a peak point, then declines slightly as a result of ethnic cleansing (c).
until it reaches a peak point, then declines slightly as a result of ethnic cleansing (c).
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
16 of 23
In Figure 15 below a “Dashboard of Performance” compares results from both scenarios across a
In Figure 15 below a “Dashboard of Performance” compares results from both scenarios across
wide variety of measures.
a wide variety of measures.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 15. Cont.
(e)
(f)
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Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
17 of 24
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Figure 15. Comparison between baseline and baseline without intervention across a dashboard of
Figure 15. Comparison between baseline and baseline without intervention across a dashboard
primary measures including (a) territory controlled, (b) total combatants, (c) total population, (d)
of primary measures including (a) territory controlled, (b) total combatants, (c) total population,
finances, (e) actual garrison, (f) foreign combatants, (g) total opposition fighters by actor, (h) blue or
(d) finances, (e) actual garrison, (f) foreign combatants, (g) total opposition fighters by actor, (h) blue or
purple intervention size (from Green’s perspective), and (i) total civilians killed all ethnographies.
purple intervention size (from Green’s perspective), and (i) total civilians killed all ethnographies.
In the Baseline Historical, the defeat of ISIS (Red Actor) results from a combination of measures.
the Baseline
defeat of
(Red Actor)
results
a combination
TheIngrowth
of its Historical,
populationthe
requires
anISIS
increasing
amount
of from
Garrison
troops justofasmeasures.
foreign
The
growth
of
its
population
requires
an
increasing
amount
of
Garrison
just aswithout
foreign
intervention begins increasing and fewer Foreign Combatants are arriving. Introops
the Baseline
intervention
increasing
and envelope”
fewer Foreign
Combatants
are arriving.
In the Baseline
without
Interventionbegins
ISIS reaches
an “outer
of expansion
at about
~60% of available
territory.
Three
Intervention
ISIS
reaches
an
“outer
envelope”
of
expansion
at
about
~60%
of
available
territory.
factors create this limit. First the Green Actor opposition to ISIS becomes heaviest as they reach the
Three
factors
create this
limit.
First the
Green Actor
opposition
to ISIS
heaviest
as they
reach
strongly
defended
cities
of Aleppo,
Baghdad,
Kirkuk
etc. Second,
thebecomes
territories
on which
ISIS must
the
strongly
defended
cities
of
Aleppo,
Baghdad,
Kirkuk
etc.
Second,
the
territories
on
which
ISIS
fight to gain that next incremental amount of territory consists of densely packed urban areas must
that
fight
to gain
that next to
incremental
territory
of densely
packed
urban
areas that
are
are not
as favorable
its style of amount
fighting.ofThird,
the consists
ethnographic
makeup
of the
population
in the
not
as favorable
to its style
of away
fighting.
Third,
thefavor,
ethnographic
of the to
population
in the
territory
territory
conquered
shifts
from
ISIS’s
reducingmakeup
their ability
recruit local
militants.
conquered
from
favor,
reducing
their
ability
to recruit
local militants.
What and
was
What was shifts
once aaway
9:1 ratio
ofISIS’s
local to
foreign
militants
drops
to 1:1.
This activates
the Resistance
Uprising limit to growth negative loop identified in the CLD. Even though by converting their
Systems 2018, 6, 16
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once a 9:1 ratio of local to foreign militants drops to 1:1. This activates the Resistance and Uprising
limit to growth negative loop identified in the CLD. Even though by converting their populations to
governed over time, reducing the rate at which opposition fighters accumulate, the aggregate external
and internal threats mean “just staying still” for ISIS is not sufficient. The emerging-state actor must
continue recruiting locally and from abroad to hold onto what they have. ISIS has reached its limit to
growth—at least for the remainder of the simulation duration.
8. Experimentation to Test the Hypothesis
Having formed a logical construct of the hypothesis and its simulated baseline, it is worth
returning to the proposed dynamic hypothesis: the Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor
which is using methods of irregular warfare to capture territory in order to influence populations
(“coercive power”) which it then attempts to govern in furtherance of its objective to become a
functioning state (“legitimate power”). Testing this hypothesis requires experimentation via simulation.
Six propositions emerge from the dynamic hypothesis. Propositions 1–5 are individual experiments
where a simulation is run ceteris paribus with the only change being the stated formulation change
to the subject proposition. Significantly worse experimental performance from baseline indicates
potential validity of the proposition within the boundaries of the model, e.g., without this element ISIS
would have performed much worse. These propositions are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
The emerging-state actor must take and hold territory.
That territory must have valuable resources on it that the emerging-state actor can exploit.
Transition of a coerced population to legitimacy cannot take too long for an emerging-state actor.
The emerging-state actor must be able to exploit local grievances to attract local recruits.
The emerging-state actor must also be able to attract foreign recruits.
Can a classical insurgency perform as well as the baseline observed in the ISIS case? (Combine
experiments #1 and #3.)
Where appropriate, contingencies in each proposition are tested to identify the boundaries of
validity, such as the value of the underlying resource or the time the transition to legitimacy may take.
The full list of experiments and formulation changes are included in the Supplementary Materials.
(See Supplementary Materials Section D-7 Experiment Test Parameters & Results.)
These tests are against the Baseline Historical and Baseline without Intervention. The results of
these tests and final values against four measures compared to the two baseline scenarios are in in
Table 2.
The evidence for Experiment 1 and 2a indicates that an emerging-state actor must take both
territory and have some valuable resource upon that territory to fund expansion beyond ~20,000 Total
Combatants, the upper size of most insurgencies. However, the contingency tests of 2b and 2c indicate
that the resource need not be all that valuable relative to the expenses of maintaining the emerging-state
actor. ISIS still grows just as strongly when black market oil sells for $22/barrel (bbl) and $11/bbl
respectively vs. $45/bbl. The reason why is the path-dependency of the positive feedback loops
identified in emerging-state actor systems above in Figure 11. Once ISIS has reached a tipping point
of sufficient population in either calculated legitimacy or Governed, the territorial based resource
revenues become less important as they can rely on population-based taxation.
Experiments 3a–d confirm that using government services and credible institutional procedures
is important to maximize growth. But as with territorial resources, there are contingencies. When ISIS
is willing to credibly govern at 75% or even 50% they perform well in terms of maximum expansion
and combatants. However, at below 50% desire to credibly govern ISIS’s performance significantly
drops. Part of the reason they still have so many Combatants at max is that their territorial expansion
is so limited—they have not provoked a major response from Iraq or Syria. Like an insurgency in a
remote region that the government leaves alone for the most part.
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
19 of 24
Systems 2018, 6, 16
19 of 24
Table2.2.Proposition
Proposition test
test results.
Table
results.
Total
Total
Total
%
Total
Total
% Territory
Total PopTotal Total % Territory
Population
% Territory
Pop
Population
by by
Combatants
Controlled
at
Combatants
[Red]
Scenario
Experiment Territory
Scenario
Experiment
Combatants
Controlled
at
Combatants
Actor
at End
MAX [Red]
Actor
at
End
End[Red]
[Red]
[Red] MAX End [Red]
End [Red]
MAX
MAX
[Red] MAX
at at
End
[Red]
MAX
[Red]
Historical
Baseline
Historical
36%
1.03M
93k
0%
52k
532
Baseline
Historical
36%
93k
0% 0%
52k25k
532
Historical
EXP1
0 1.03M 35k
23k
30
Historical
Historical
EXP2A
5%
220k
23k
3%
33k
4
Historical
EXP1
0
35k
23k
0%
25k
30
Historical
EXP2B
41%
1.18M
94k
0%
53k
1719
Historical
EXP2A
5% 39% 220k 1.10M 23k
3% 0%
33k52k
43520
Historical
EXP2C
91k
Historical
EXP2B
41% 26% 1.18M 850K 94k
0% 0%
53k16k
1719
Historical
EXP3A
79k
130
Historical
EXP3B
71k
102
Historical
EXP2C
39% 18% 1.10M 681k 91k
0% 0%
52k14k
3520
Historical
EXP3C
60k
100
Historical
EXP3A
26% 17% 850K 1.10M 79k
0% 0%
16k27k
130
Historical
EXP3D
13%
614k
68k
0%
75
Historical
EXP3B
18%
681k
71k
0%
14k
102
Historical
EXP4
14%
824k
60k
0%
12k
89
Historical
EXP3C
17% 2% 1.10M 101k 60k 1.6k
0% 0%
27k 3k
100Historical
EXP5
Historical
EXP3D
13% 0% 614k
68k
0% 0%
- 30k
75
Historical
EXP6
35k
22k
435
Historical
EXP4
14%
824k
60k
0%
12k
89
Historical
EXP5
2%
101k
1.6k
0%
3k
Experiments
confirm that
and foreign 30k
recruiting are435
essential.
Historical
EXP64 and 5 0%
35k both local
22k recruiting0%
Although it may not be surprising that local recruiting is essential, the significant difference foreign
Experiments
and 5 confirm
that both
local recruiting
and
foreignisrecruiting
are essential.
recruiting
makes in4 comparing
Proposition
5 performance
to the
Baseline
noteworthy.
Although
it
may
not
be
surprising
that
local
recruiting
is
essential,
the
significant
difference
The final experiment, simulating a “classical insurgency” (EXP6 Historical) removes foreign
two key
recruiting
makes
in comparing
Proposition
5 performance
to the
Baseline
is noteworthy.This allows a
elements of
emerging-state
theory,
the seizure
of territory
and
open governance.
The final
simulatingversus
a “classical
(EXP6 Historical)
removes
two keyin
comparison
of experiment,
ISIS as an insurgency
ISIS asinsurgency”
an emerging-state
actor (Baseline
Historical)
elements
of
emerging-state
theory,
the
seizure
of
territory
and
open
governance.
This
allows
a
comparison
Figure 16.
of ISIS as an insurgency versus ISIS as an emerging-state actor (Baseline Historical) in Figure 16.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 16. Cont.
Systems 2018, 6, 16
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
20 of 24
20 of 24
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Figure 16. Dashboard performance of emerging-state actor (baseline) vs. classical insurgency (EXP6)
Figure 16. Dashboard performance of emerging-state actor (baseline) vs. classical insurgency (EXP6)
across a dashboard of primary measures including (a) territory controlled, (b) total combatants, (c)
across a dashboard of primary measures including (a) territory controlled, (b) total combatants, (c) total
total population, (d) finances, (e) actual garrison, (f) foreign combatants, (g) total opposition fighters
population, (d) finances, (e) actual garrison, (f) foreign combatants, (g) total opposition fighters by
by actor, (h) total civilians killed across all ethnographies, and (i) view of actor as best choice for now.
actor, (h) total civilians killed across all ethnographies, and (i) view of actor as best choice for now.
In both simulations ISIS begins gaining combatants quickly but ISIS as an insurgency-quickly
both
ISIS begins
combatants
quicklythe
but“insurgency”
ISIS as an insurgency-quickly
stallsInout
andsimulations
begins a general
decline.gaining
As it never
seizes territory
does not present
stalls
out and
begins
generaloffensives
decline. As
never
seizes territory
does notapresent
an obvious
target
for amilitary
as it
the
emerging-state
actorthe
ISIS“insurgency”
does. It still contains
great
an
obvious
target
for
military
offensives
as
the
emerging-state
actor
ISIS
does.
It
still
contains
a
deal of lethal capacity as seen in the Total Civilians Killed all Ethnographies, but the key chart isgreat
in
deal
of lethal right—which
capacity as seen
in thethe
Total
Civilianslegitimacy
Killed all Ethnographies,
but the
chart is in the
the bottom
charts
calculated
an Actor presents
tokey
ethnographies.
bottom
right—which
calculated
an Actor
to this
ethnographies.
Whereas
ISIS
Whereas
ISIS acting charts
in the the
fashion
of anlegitimacy
emerging-actor
canpresents
generate
form of strategic
sideacting
in the
fashion
of anSunni
emerging-actor
generate
this form
strategic
at least
choosing
at least
among
Arabs, ISIS can
as an
insurgency
neverofgains
even side-choosing
this limited form
of
among
Sunni
Arabs,
ISIS as an insurgency
never ISIS
gains
even thisaway
limited
formupofinlegitimacy
from as
the
legitimacy
from
the population.
The insurgency
dwindles
to end
similar straits
population.
The insurgency
ISISbut
dwindles
away to
end upthe
in massive
similar straits
theability
emerging-state
the emerging-state
actor version,
never having
obtained
successas
and
to create
actor
version, brand.
but never
obtained
thesuffered
massiveasuccess
and
ability
to create
a worldwide
brand.
a worldwide
It ishaving
possible
that AQI
scenario
such
as this
in 2006
when it rapidly
gained coercive control of a population of nearly one million civilians but was unable to openly seize
stalls out and begins a general decline. As it never seizes territory the “insurgency” does not present
an obvious target for military offensives as the emerging-state actor ISIS does. It still contains a great
deal of lethal capacity as seen in the Total Civilians Killed all Ethnographies, but the key chart is in
the bottom right—which charts the calculated legitimacy an Actor presents to ethnographies.
Whereas ISIS acting in the fashion of an emerging-actor can generate this form of strategic sideSystems 2018, 6, 16
21 of 24
choosing at least among Sunni Arabs, ISIS as an insurgency never gains even this limited form of
legitimacy from the population. The insurgency ISIS dwindles away to end up in similar straits as
emerging-state
actor
version,
but never
having
obtained
massive
success
and ability
to control
create
Itthe
is possible
that AQI
suffered
a scenario
such
as this
in 2006the
when
it rapidly
gained
coercive
a aworldwide
brand.
It is one
possible
thatcivilians
AQI suffered
a scenario
such
as this
in 2006
when
of
population
of nearly
million
but was
unable to
openly
seize
territory
inititsrapidly
area of
gained
coercive
control
of
a
population
of
nearly
one
million
civilians
but
was
unable
to
openly
seize
influence nor transition to an open system of governance due to the requirements to remain clandestine
territory
in
its
area
of
influence
nor
transition
to
an
open
system
of
governance
due
to
the
due to the presence of US forces. AQI also showed little interest in even a show of providing services.
requirements
to
remain
clandestine
due
to
the
presence
of
US
forces.
AQI
also
showed
little
interest
All lessons learned by its successor ISIS.
in even
a show
providing
services.
Allare
lessons
learned
by its of
successor
ISIS.on which an insurgency
How
do weofknow
that these
results
not just
reflective
the terrain
How
do
we
know
that
these
results
are
not
just
reflective
of
the
terrain
onor
which
anininsurgency
arises? That emerging-state actor behavior favors deserts but would fare better,
worse,
mountains
arises?
That
emerging-state
actor
behavior
favors
deserts
but
would
fare
better,
or
worse,
in
or rougher terrains. This is testable because the combat-simulator in E-SAM tracks the “Terrain Type”
mountains or rougher terrains. This is testable because the combat-simulator in E-SAM tracks the
on which conflict occurs with values representing Open, Mixed, Rough, Urban and Mountainous. In a
“Terrain Type” on which conflict occurs with values representing Open, Mixed, Rough, Urban and
series of experiments replacements are made for any value of “Open” in the terrain map with “Mixed”,
Mountainous. In a series of experiments replacements are made for any value of “Open” in the terrain
“Rough”, and “Mountainous” respectively. (See Supplementary Materials Section D-7 Experiment
map with “Mixed”, “Rough”, and “Mountainous” respectively. (See Supplementary Materials
Test Parameters & Results.) These are simulated with the historical case, including interventions and
Section D-7 Experiment Test Parameters & Results.) These are simulated with the historical case,
compared against the Baseline Historical in Figure 17 below.
including interventions and compared against the Baseline Historical in Figure 17 below.
Systems 2018, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW
(a)
(b)
21 of 23
(c)
Figure 17. Baseline scenario compared to different terrain defaults across three primary measures of
Figure
17. Baseline
scenario
compared(b)
tototal
different
terrain defaults
across
three primary
measures of
effectiveness:
(a) territory
controlled,
combatants,
and (c) total
population
by actor.
effectiveness: (a) territory controlled, (b) total combatants, and (c) total population by actor.
The introduction of differing terrains adjusts ISIS performance in specific point-values, but does
The introduction
differingmode.
terrains
ISIS performance
specific
point-values,
but
does
not change
the generalofbehavior
In adjusts
Figure 17a,
the territory, in
ISIS
gains less
territory in
Rough
not
change
the
general
behavior
mode.
In
Figure
17a,
the
territory,
ISIS
gains
less
territory
in
Rough
and Mixed than the Historical Baseline because fighting in those conditions is harder and each victory
and
than theas
Historical
Baseline
because fighting
in those
conditions is harder
and each
victory
doesMixed
not generate
much forward
movement
of control
(see Supplementary
Materials.)
ISIS
does
does
not better
generate
as much
forwardscenario
movement
of control
(seeISIS
Supplementary
does
perform
in the
Mountainous
however
because
does not relyMaterials.)
on armoredISIS
vehicles
perform
betterasinthe
theGreen
Mountainous
scenario
because
ISIS and
doespieces
not rely
armored vehicles
and artillery
Actor does.
And however
these heavy
vehicles
ofon
equipment
perform
and
artillery
as the Green
Actor
these heavy
vehicles
of equipment
poorly
in mountains.
As the
peakdoes.
valueAnd
of territory
adjusts
(a) so and
to dopieces
the total
combatantsperform
(b) and
poorly
in mountains.
As the
peak(c)
value
of territory
adjuststerritory
(a) so tomeans
do the less
totalpopulation
combatants
and
population
under control
change
as well.
Less captured
to(b)
control
population
change
as well.
Lessdifferences.
captured territory
means less
population
to control
and recruitunder
from.control
But these
are(c)only
tactical
At a strategic
level
across the
entire
simulation, the sharp increase in territory occurs at nearly the same time across all runs. Although
the collapse portion varies as to when it occurs, it does not significantly vary in shape. In no scenario
is ISIS able to sustain itself against the combined foreign interventions either at its height or lower
values. This same outcome repeats in Figure 17b,c, where the behavior modes of total combatants
and total population do not significantly vary in shape or outcome. Changing terrain types definitely
Systems 2018, 6, 16
22 of 24
and recruit from. But these are only tactical differences. At a strategic level across the entire simulation,
the sharp increase in territory occurs at nearly the same time across all runs. Although the collapse
portion varies as to when it occurs, it does not significantly vary in shape. In no scenario is ISIS able to
sustain itself against the combined foreign interventions either at its height or lower values. This same
outcome repeats in Figure 17b,c, where the behavior modes of total combatants and total population
do not significantly vary in shape or outcome. Changing terrain types definitely has a point-value
impact on the simulation, but does not appear to create dramatic changes in results.
This leads to an interesting thought-experiment. Given the US intervention in Vietnam—and
keeping everything else equal—if the terrain had been a desert rather than a jungle would the outcome
have been different? Likewise, the US invasion of Iraq, accepting as premise the invasion occurs and
all policy choices remain consistent would replacing the desert terrain with jungle would the path of
insurgency have altered substantially?
The simulation results suggest an interesting answer: terrain matters tactically, but not strategically.
What may matter more than physical terrain is the human-terrain, specifically the ethnographic
groups and their perception of legitimacy to both the state and non-state actors that are competing.
This is hinted at in sensitivity analysis conducted during confidence building tests of E-SAM.
(See Supplementary Materials Section B-12 Sensitivity Analysis.) Each Actor has a supporting or
opposed ethnographic group—one which naturally favors them and one that dislikes them. In the
Baseline Historical the Red Actor enjoys more support, and thus higher starting perception, from Arab
Sunni while Arab Shia support the Green actor. Likewise, the Green Actor is more opposed to Arab
Sunni and Red Actor opposed to Arab Shia. What the analysis revealed was that from a policy space
the starting ethnographic perceptions matter more in relation to the Green Actor, than to the Red.
And furthermore, that it is the ethnographic perception of the group opposing the Green Actor that
matters the most. In other words that the Arab Suuni who were more opposed to the Green Actor
happened to live in a desert is less important to the outcome than the extent and depth of opposition to
the Green Actor’s legitimacy. One could virtually swap out terrain types underneath this population,
replacing desert with mountains or jungles and the key outcomes remain similar.
Although policy implications are beyond the scope of this paper this suggests that mapping the
ethnographic-terrain could be just as, if not more important, than understanding the physical terrain in
which a conflict occurs. This need not be reduced to a simplistic “winning hearts and minds” but does
suggest that a nuanced understanding of grievances and perceptions between ethnographic groups
and actors is important for policy analysis. These results also indicate that emerging-state actors are a
phenomena not confined, or aided, by certain terrain features. And that terrain-based arguments for
the difficulty of a conflict may be overlooking latent structures such as grievances or lack of legitimacy.
9. Conclusions
In this paper I used the case of ISIS to formulate and test the theory of an emerging-state actor.
Gains in confidence of the theory result from simulation tests on key propositions. Calling upon local
and global grievances the emerging-state actor recruits locally and draws foreign fighters to seize
territory upon which it exercises sovereign control and begins openly governing. The use of governing
mechanisms shifts the population from control through coercion to perceptions of legitimacy. This frees
up garrison troops to continue expansion and territorial gain. The dynamic hypothesis that the so-called
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was an emerging-state actor is plausible. That ISIS used irregular warfare
to usurp existing state-actors and gain control of target populations. This dynamic hypothesis is better
able to explain ISIS’s behavior pattern than traditional insurgency models. This paper also offers a
detailed scenario-based simulation model for future use with clandestine terror networks, insurgencies
and other emerging-state actors. We conducted a full suite of validation and confidence building tests
for the E-SAM model. (See Supplementary Materials Section B Validation & Confidence Building.)
These tests revealed that the E-SAM can replicate at least plausible behavior in different regions
and contexts including a hypothetical counter-terrorism campaign in Indonesia upon the return of
Systems 2018, 6, 16
23 of 24
expatriated ISIS fighters home. Additionally, tests on the influence of terrain showed that the dynamics
were not limited to the kind of terrain ISIS began in. These indicate that the dynamics demonstrated by
ISIS may not be confined to Iraq and Syria, but subsume a more general structure. A larger potential
limitation is the significant use of group-behaviors in the simulation by ethnographic groups and
leadership of both ISIS and Syria and Iraq. Without substantial data on these qualitative dynamics
there remains room for parameter error.
Future work could build upon initial policy analysis for determining intervention and containment
policies against ISIS or emerging-state actors [13]. Modeling and simulation of this kind still faces
significant methodological challenges of which this model only addresses a few [12]. Future work on
emerging-state actor theory would continue building confidence by demonstrating applicability in
more regional and historical contexts as well as improving methods. This could include additional
testing of ISIS as well as other emerging-state actors in different time and regional spaces such as
the Taliban in Afghanistan, East India Company in India, the Angles in England etc. Finally using
a similar simulation approach to model individual radicalization processes that drive an individual
to terrorism can help clarify and test theories of Atran, Taylor, Sageman and Hoffman. Whether the
individual terrorist is acting as part of a group or a so-called “lone-wolf” terrorist. Even as ISIS’s
influence decreases the long-tail of its radicalization efforts may remain a source of threat.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/6/2/16/
s1(tbd): Section A Discussion of Model Structure & Parameter Values; Section B Validation & Confidence Building;
Section C Draft E-SAM User Manual; and Section D Model Documentation & Experiment Results. As well a zip
file with the raw model, copies of all scripts, and all results outputs.
Author Contributions: This work is the sole product of Timothy Clancy.
Acknowledgments: The author would like to acknowledge Khalid Saeed, Jessica Turnely, and Sara Citrenbaum
for their guidance and assistance in this research as well as the reviewers for their insightful comments and
suggestions. This study was not funded by any source or grants. However, the author has engaged in consulting
work with the Department of Defense using the E-SAM simulation.
Conflicts of Interest: Timothy Clancy is the founder of a consulting firm that has, and may in the future, receive
funds from the Department of Defense or other government agencies on topics related to those covered in this
research. However, the DoD had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of
data; in the writing of the manuscript, and in the decision to publish the results.
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© 2018 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).