FROM MOBILIZATION
TO REVOLUTION
Charles T i l l y
University of Michigan
..
,PROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION
March 1977
.........................
by Charles T i l l y
CRSO Working Paper 8156
Copies a v a i l a b l e through:
Center f o r Research on
S o c i a l Organization
University of Michigan
330 Packard S t r e e t
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
CONTENTS
.
CENERAI PLAN OF THE BOOK
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i
g e n e r a l p l a n of t h e hook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i v
t a b l e of c o n t e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v
l i s t of t a b l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i.x
preface
Chapter 1:
Introduction
Chapter 2:
T h e o r i e s and D e s c r i p t i o n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action
C l ~ a p t e r3:
I n t e r e s t s . O r g a n i z a t i o n and M o b i l i z a t i o n
Chapter 4:
The O p p o r t u n i t y t o Act Together
Chepter 5:
Changing Forms of C o l l e c t i v e Action
C l ~ n p t e r 6:
C o l l e c t i v e Violence
Chapter 7:
Rmrolutlonand R e b e l l i o n
Chapter 8:
Concludivns and llew Beginnings
Appendices
Bibliography
.............................
Chapter 1: I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1
The S t u f f of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1
Studying C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.7
The Components of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.10
Groups. Events and Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.12
What You W i l l Find Here . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.15
Chapter 2: T h e o r i e s and D e s c r i p t i o n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . .2.1
M a r x o n 1 8 4 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
.
Durkheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
.
The Durkheiminn T r a d i t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.12
M i l l and t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.
.19
C o l l e c t i v e Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.22
.
S t r a t e g i c I n t e r a c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.29
M i l l and Pseudo-Mill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.35
.
Weber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.38
.42
S o c i a l Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.
Marxian Analyses s i n c e Marx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.48
C o l l e c t i v e H i s t o r y of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.53
Our Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.58
.
Chapter 3: I n t e r e s t s . O r g a n i z a t i o n and M o b i l i z a t i o n . . . . . . . . . .3.1
listoffigures
The Elementary Models
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-1
iii
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.3
Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.12
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.17
Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.26
..41
Measuring Moblization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
General Conditions for Moblization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.45
From Moblization to Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.50
The Detection and Measurement of Collective Action . . . . . . . .3.58
Chapter 4: The Opportunity To Act Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4
.
From Mobilization to Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
..4
Repression and Facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
.
3
.
Repressive and Tolerant Governments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.14
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.
.27
.
Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-29
Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-31
.
A Simple Account of Collective Action
Interactions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4..33
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.34
Power and Polity Membership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.41
Detecting Changes in Polity Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.44
Opportunity/Threst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4..53
The Interplay of Mobilization and Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . .4.60
The Measurement of Power
. . . . . . . . . . . . .1.5
The Forms of Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
.
5
Chapter 5: Changing Forms of Collective Action
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5..14
..25
A Case in Point: The Strike. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Repertoires of Collective Action
. . . . . . . . . .5.38
Collective Violence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
.
1
Elections, Demonstrations and Political Systems
Chapter 6:
British Brawls as Collective Violence
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.1
iv
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.4
.
8
Some Lineaments of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Violence in America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6..10
Political Action and Involvement in Violence . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Changing Contexts for Collective Violence . . . . . . . . . . .6.20
Chapter 7: Revolution and Rebellion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
.
1
.
Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes. . . . . .7
.
1
Violence: Concept and Reality
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Revolutionary Situations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Situations and Outcomes Combined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Revolutionary Outcomes
. . . . . . . . . 7-18
Alternatives to the Existing Polity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-20
Acceptance of Alternative Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
.32
Governmental Inaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.
Proximate Causes of Revolutionary Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . 7-36
Coalitions between Members and Challengers. . . . . . . . . . 7-38
Proximate Causes of Revolutionary Situations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-41
Revolutionary Sequences and Collective Violence. . . . . . . 7-44
Revolutionary Outcomes and Further Structural Changes. . . . . 7-50
Control of Substantial Force
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
.
Back to the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
Chapter 8: Conclusions and New Beginnings
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .8.8
The Importance of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8-13
Theorizing About Collective Actions
The History of Collective Action in Modern France
. . . . . . .8.19
. . .8.25
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A..O'
A Last Case in Point: Rural Collective Action in Burgundy
Appendix 1: Procedures for the Studies of Strlkes and Collective
Violence in France
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A. I.
TABLES
Appendix 2:
M n t c r i a l s from t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e V i o l e n c e i n
France
Appendix 3:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-14
P r o c e d u r e s f o r t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-36
i n Great Britain.
Appendix 4:
Bibliography.
Kerr 6 S i e g e l ' s S m a r y of S t r i k e P r o p e n s i t i e s .
T a b l e 3-2:
French S t r i k e R a t e s by I n d u s t r y . 1890-1960.
T a b l e 4-1:
Groups F i g u r i n g i n 1906-07 R o l l C a l l s o f French Chamber
of D e p u t i e s
M a t e r i a l s Prom t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-55
i n Great Britain.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
a
*
.
.
.
. . . . . . .3-22
. . . . . . . . .3-24
T a b l e 3-1:
T a b l e 6-1:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-49
P e r c e n t of A l l P o l i t i c a l Events P r e c e d i n g t h e Cermsn E l e c t i o l l S
o f September 1930 and J u l y 1932 I n v o l v i n g D i f f e r e n t : , T y p e s of
B-1
A c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . .
T a b l e 7-1:
D.E.H.
R u s s e l l ' s Armed F o r c e
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6-16
D i s l o y a l t y S c a l e . . . . . . . .7-43
vii
viii
I d e a l i z e d S k e t c h of C o n d i t i o n s f o r A c t i o n of a run-of-the-mill
. . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
Competi~igAnalyses of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . .2-6
Durkheim'a Analyaia of C o l l e c t i v e Action. . . . . . . . . . . .2-11
l l u n t i n g t o n ' a Basic Argument. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Contender
Unita i n t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e Action.
I d e a l i z e d S k e t c h of C o n d i t i o n s f o r I n a c t i o n of a run-of-the-mill
Contender......
..........................
aZealot
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-18
The A l t e r a t i o n of French S t r i k e Shapes, 1890-1954 . . . . . . . .5-32
Action.
One of Douglas Hibba' C a u s a l Models of P o l i t i c a l Violence.
l l y p o t h e t i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of governmental r e p r e s s i o n a s a f u n c t i o n
of t h e s c a l e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and t h e power of t h e a c t o r . .4-24
I n t e r e a t s and Returna from C o l l e c t i v e Action f o r an O p p o r t u n i s t
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-35
H y p o t h e t i c a l Schedule of Returna from C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . . . . 4-37
Gainin8 va. Losing Schedules of R e t u r n a . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-38
llow M o b i l i z a t i o n L i m i t a C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . 4-40
Contender
C o l l e c t i v e Action a s a F u n c t i o n of T h r e a t s and O p p o r t u n i t i e s . .4-54
Asymmetrical E f f e c t of T h r e a t and O p p o r t u n i t y on C o l l e c t i v e
Action.
...........................
.4-56
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11
.
Four Models of Croup Readineaa t o Adopt New Means of C o l l e c t i v e
.2-14
. . 2-37
T h e p o l i t y Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . .,. . . . . . . . . .3-2
The M o b i l i z a t i o n Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-7
Components of O r g a n i z a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-18
Pour I d e a l P a t t e r n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action. . . . . . . . . . . .3-57
S n y d e r ' s Code f o r Labor Support of C a n d i d a t e s . . . . . . . . . 3-61
Repression, T o l e r a t i o n , F a c i l i t a t i o n and Coercion. . . . . . . 4-16
Repression i n E g a l i t a r i a n and O l i 8 a r c h i c Governments. . . . . .4-17
T o l e r a n c e v a . Rebreaaion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-19
R e p r e s s i v e P a t t e r n s i n D i f f e r e n t Typea of Regime. . . . . . . .4-20
Repression a s a F u n c t i o n of S c a l e and Power. . . . . . . . . . 4-23
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-64
n y p o t h e t i c a l E f f e c t s of Lowered Coats of C o l l e c t i v e Action on
T r a j e c t o r i e s of Slow nnd Rapid S o c i a l Change i n H u n t i n g t o n ' s
Argument.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-61
Combinations of R e v o l u t i o n a r y S i t u a t i o n a and R e v o l u t i o n a r y Outcomes
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-11.
S y n d i c a l i s t . Marxist and B r i n t o n i a n Mapa of R e v o l ~ l t i o n o r y
Reality
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-13
S i t u a t i o n s and Outcomes i n D i f f e r e n t Typea of Power T r a n s f e r s
.
.7-15
The Timing of C o l l e c t i v e Violence i n Tension-Release and Cont e n t i o n Models of Revolution.
,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-47
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTLON
petition
The S t u f f of C o l l e c t i v e Action
f o r government i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t high food p r i c e s , country-
men s e i z e d and s o l d food a t t h e i r own p r i c e s , townsmen.attacked t h e c o l -
1765 was a l i v e l y y e a r i n England. a s i t was i n America.
News coming
i n from t h e American c o l o n i e s d e s c r i b e d t h e u s u n l c o n f l i c t s : r u n - i n s between
l e c t o r s a p p o i n t e d f o r England's own v e r s i o n of t h e Stamp Act.
That was n o t a l l .
Near lpswich, on t h e 1 2 t h of August:
smugglers and customs men, s k i r m i s h e s of I n d i a n s w i t h s e t t l e r s , a t t e m p t s
of f r o n t i e r s m e n t o t n k e t h e law i n t o t h e i r own hands.
But t h e b i g news
from America was t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e British-imposed Stamp Act.
The u s e
of c o s t l y stamped paper f o r o f f i c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s was supposed t o b e g i n on
t h e f i r s t of November.
Long b e P o r e . t h e n , anonymous n o t i c e s and determined
crowds t h r e a t e n e d anyone who showed s i g n s of w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply w i t h t h e
Stamp Act.
I n Roston and elsewhere,'groups
of c i t i z e n s produced c o l o r f u l
s t r e e t t h e a t e r , complete w i t h g a l l o w s , h a n d - l e t t e r e d
of r o y a l o f f i c i a l s .
s i g n s , and e f f i g i e s
Sometimes they sacked t h e . houses o r o u t b u i l d i n g s of
d e s i g n a t e d stamp a g e n t s and government o f f i c e r s .
t h c A c t ' s n p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e American c o l o n i e s .
l n n d , they o b t a i n e d r e p e a l i n March, 1766.
They succeeded i n b l o c k i n g
With t h e i r a l l i e s i n Eng-
That c o n c e r t e d r e s i s t a n c e
s t a r t e d t e n y e a r s of n e a r l y c o n t i n u o u s s t r u g g l e w i t h i n t h e American c o l o n i e s ,
and ended i n a g r e a t s t r u g g l e between t h e c o l o n i e s and England.
"
. . .a
body of
t o t h e house of P e e r s , f o r r e p e a l i n g t h e American stamp-duty a c t ; an i n s t a n c e of such a number going up w i t h a s i n g l e b i l l , h a s n o t been known
i n t h e memory of t h e o l d e s t man" (Annual R e g i s t e r 1766: 72).
t h e i r bold-
n e i t h e r t h e e x p o s t u l a t i o n s of t h e
m a g i s t r a t e 8 a g a i n s t t h e i l l e g n l i t y of t h e i r d e s i g n , which they
openly avowed, t h e consequences of t h e r i o t proclamation a c t
b e i n g r e a d , which were e x p l a i n e d t o them, nor t h e appearance of
a body of r e g u l a r h o r s e end f o o t , c a l l e d i n a s p o r t of t h e posse
comitatus,
seemed t o make t h e l e a s t impression on them; nny,
though t h e proclamation was t h e n r e a d t o them w i t h an a u d i b l e
v o i c e , and t h e y seemed t o h e a r i t w i t b a t t e n t i o n . n o t o man s t i r r e d
(Annual R e g i s t e r 1765: 116-117).
On t h e c o n t r a r y .
A s t h e t r o o p s r e a d i e d themselves f o r t h e a t t n c k , t h e
a s they had, peasemakes, hedge-stakes,
upwards of two hundred mcmbers of t h e house of Commons c a r r i e d up t h e b i l l
Nevertheless,
i n 1765 and I766 most of England's v i s i b l e c o n f l i c t concerned domestic
issues.
n e s s t o such l e n g t h t h a t ,
. . . carried
crowd o f a hundred o r s o " f e l l upon both h o r s e s and men w i t h such arms
I n Englnnd, t h e r e was some s y m p a t h e t i c r e a c t i o n t o t h e American
For exnmple, a t t h e beginning of March, 1766,
of i n d u s t r y , l a t e l y e r e c t e d a t Nncton
America
was a l r e a d y on i t s way t o r e v o l u t i o n .
cause.
S e v e r a l p e r s o n s r i o t o u s l y assembled t o p u l l down t h e house.
T a i l o r s went on s t r i k e , weavers marched on P a r l i a m e n t t o demand
t h e e x c l u ~ i o no f f o r e j g n c o m p e t i t i o n , t h e s h e r i f f s of London paraded t o
t h e a f f a i r was over."
c u d g e l s , e t c . , but i n f i v e minutes
The s o l d i e r s a r r e s t e d seven men a s examples, and
dispersed the r e s t .
Was t h a t a r i o t ?
I n t h e t e c h n i c a l l e g a l s e n s e , i t was: twelve o r
more p e o p l e had, i n d e e d , assembled w i t h on a p p n r e n t i n t e n t whtch l o c a l o f f i c i a l s could reasonably r e g a r d a s i l l e g a l ; they had n o t d i s p e r s e d w i t h i n
t h e hour t h e law a l l o t t e d them from t h e time t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s hod
rend t h e r i o t a c t .
I n t h e l o o s e r s e n s e o f f r e n z y , c o n f u s i o n o r wanton
d e s t r u c t i o n , however, t h e e v e n t does n o t q u a l i f y a s a r i o t .
Both s i d e s
wonder t h e poor people of S u f f o l k r e s i s t e d t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h e sy8tem.
a p p a r e n t l y knew what they were d o i n g , and d i d i t a s b e s t t h e y c o u l d .
The move a g a i n s t t h e Nacton poorhouse was one of many ouch c o n f l i c t s
That was g e n e r a l l y t r u e of t h e many " d i s o r d e r s " r e p o r t e d i n t h e Annual
i n 1765.
R e g i s t e r f o r 1765.
I n t h e c a s e of Nacton, t h e "house of i n d u s t r y " t h e crowd proposed
t o d e s t r o y was a r e c e n t l y - b u i l t
workhouse.
ments were m i s e r a b l e , b u t t h e y a s s u r e d s u r v i v a l .
a right.
That was "outdoor r e l i e f . "
t o d i s p l a c e t h e o l d e r system.
Some
The pay-
d r e d s of W i l f o r d , and
and t o s h i p t h e i r l o c a l paupers elsewhere.
i n S u f f o l k , caught tlie reform f e v e r .
Admire1 Vernon donated a s i t e on
A blue-ribbon committee s u p e r v i s e d i t s
The Nncton House of I n d u s t r y , a model of i t s k i n d , s t a r t e d
e n r o l l i n g paupers from a number of a d j a c e n t p a r i s h e s i n 1758.
The p a r i s h
poor went t o work weaving s a c k s , making cordage and s p i n n i n g wool (Webb 6
By 1765. however. t h e e l i t e s u p e r v i s i o n had s l a c k e n e d .
I t had proved d l f f l c u l t t o f i n d p r o f i t a b l e work f o r t h e i n c a r c e r a t e d paupers.
n e i g h b o r s c o n s i d e r e d t h e new i n s t i t u t i o n improper and i n t o l e r a b l e .
During t h e second week of August, 1765, i n f n c t , much of S u f f o l k was
a l i v e with rebellion.
t h e l a n d l o r d s and p a r s o n s of t h e p a r i s h e s n e a r l p s w i c h ,
Nacton lleath f o r a new workhouse.
A t Saxfnundham, n o t o n l y t h e poor, b u t a l s o many of t h e i r l e s s impoverished
The poor f o u g h t i n d o o r r e l i e f
i n t h e name of e s t a b l i s h e d r l g h t s .
Webb 1963: 1 2 7 ) .
I n t h i s r i o t . t h e m i l i t a r y ware
d i s p e r s e d (GM 1765: 392).
It a l s o p e r m i t t e d many p a r i s h e s t o r e d u c e t h e i r r e l i e f payments
construction.
e,
etc.
c a l l e d i n , and s e v e r a l l o s t t h e i r l i v e s b e f o r e t h e r i o t e r s were
P a r l i a m e n t a r y l e g i s l a t i o n had l e g a l i z e d b o t h e f -
The b u i l d i n g of workhouses f o r m u l t i p l e p a r i s h e s combined t h e two
I n t h e 17508,
T h e i r p r e t e n a e was t o r e l e a s e t h e poor t o
p a r l i a m e n t , l a t e l y o b t a i n e d f o r t h e r e l i e f of t h c poor of t h e hun-
b i n i n g t h e poor-law e f f o r t s of a number of a d j a c e n t p a r i s h e s i n t o a
of them.
i n which
a s s i s t i n t h e h a r v e s t u o r k ; b u t t h e f n c t was t o d e f e a t a l a t e a c t of
onward, many E n g l i s h l o c a l
i n n o v a t i o n s : l o c k i n g up t h e poor t o work under p u b l i c s u p e r v i s i o n ; com-
forts.
thousands of r i o t e r s assembled i n t h c neigllborliood oE
t h e poor were employed.
a u t h o r i t i e s responded t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g numbers of poor w i t h two i m p o r t a n t
single administration.
Magazine r e p o r t e d f o r t h e week b e f o r e tlic
Saxmundham i n S u f f o l k , and d e s t r o y e d t h e industry-liousc,
And t h e payments were
"Indoor r e l i e f " was now t h r e a t e n i n g
From t h e 1730s
The Gentleman's
Nacton c o n f r o n t a t i o n :
Poor E n g l i s h v i l l a g e r s had
l o n g drawn r e l i e f from t h e i r own p a r i s h e s w h i l e l i v i n g a t home.
As
The c o o p e r a t i n g p a r i s h e s , f u r t h e r m o r e , had dumped i n t o t h e poorhouse
young and o l d , s i c k and w e l l , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o work.
Small
A l a r g e crowd o f people f i r s t a n t h e r e d a t Wickham
Market, when tlie D i r e c t o r s of t h e Poor f o r Loes and Wilford Hundreds met
t o p l a n a new poorhouse; t h e crowd f o r c e d t h e D i r e c t o r s t o s i g n a repudiat i o n of t h e i r plan.
For a week. t h e group went from workhouse t o workl~ouse
t e a r i n g t h e b u i l d i n g s down and demanding t h a t t h e o v e r s e e r s commit themselves not t o rebuild.
They demanded " t h a t t h e poor should be maintained
a s u s u a l ; t h a t t h e y s h o u l d range a t l i b e r t y and be t h e i r own mnstcrs"
(Webb 6 Webb 1963: 141-142).
word.
R i o t s t h e s e were. i n t h e l e g a l s e n s e of tlie
They were c l e a r l y much more than t h a t .
The
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a t Nacton and Snxmundham a c t e d o u t p e r v a s i v e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n f l i c t s i n G r ~ a tB r i t a i n a s a whole.
While David Nume and Adam Smith worked o u t t h e r e l e v a n t t h e o r i e s , o r d i n a r y
c e n t u r y B r i t a i n were f i g h t i n g t h e l o s i n g b o t t l e of t h e moral economy
B r i t o n s f o u g h t a b o u t who had t h e r i g h t t o d i s p o s e of l a n d , l a b o r , c a p i t a l
a g a i n s t t h e r i s e of p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m .
and commodities.
Not t h a t t h e f i g h t e r s on e i t h e r s i d e were mere t h e o r i s t s , s i m p l e
A t t a c k s on poorhouses, c o n c e r t e d r e s i s t a n c e t o e n c l o s u r e s ,
food r i o t s and a number of o t h e r common forms of e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n f l i c t
i d e o l o g u e s , h a p l e s s v i c t i m s of s h a r e d d e l u s i o n s .
a l l s t a t e d an i m p l i c i t two-part t h e o r y : t h a t t h e r e s i d e n t s of a l o c a l
play.
community had a p r i o r r i g h t t o t h e r e s o u r c e s produced by o r c o n t a i n e d
d i s t a n c e , we may f i n d some of t h e i r pronouncements q u a i n t , incomprehensible,
w i t h i n t h a t community; t h a t t h e community a s such had a p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n
o r h o p e l e s s l y romantic.
t o a i d i t s weak and r e s o u r c e l e s s members.
means t h e y used t o forward t h e i r i n t e r e s t s : s c o f f a t t e a r i n g down poor-
The r i g h t and t h e o b l i g a t i o n
Real i n t e r e s t s were i n
The p a r t i c i p a n t s saw them more o r l e s s c l e a r l y .
A t two c e n t u r i e s '
I n c o m f o r t a b l e r e t r o s p e c t , we may q u e s t i o n t h e
should t a k e p r i o r i t y o v e r t h e i n t e r e s t of any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l and
houses, anger a t t h e u s e of t r o o p s a g a i n s t unarmed crovds.
o v e r any i n t e r e s t o u t s i d e t h e community.
s p e c t we a l s o s e e t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s followed a b a s i c , v i s i b l e l o g i c .
It s h o u l d . e v e n t a k e p r i o r i t y
over t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e Crown, o r of t h e c o u n t r y a s a whole.
That was,
i n E.P. Thompson's t e r m s , t h e i l l - a r t i c u l a t e d b u t powerful t h e o r y of t h e
"moral economy.
Yet i n r e t r o -
The more we l e a r n a b o u t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y changes i n G r e a t B r i t a i n , t h e
c l e a r e r and more c o m p e l l i n g t h a t l o g i c becomes.
The s t r u g g l e d i d n o t simply p i t d i f f e r e n t wnys of t i l i n k i n g a b o u t t h e
"
Meanwhile, many merchants, m a n u f n c t u r e r s , l a n d l o r d s and l o c a l a u t h o r -
world a g a i n s t each o t h e r .
Two modes of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n locked i n a
i t i e s favored a n o t h e r , newer, f o u r - p a r t t h e o r y : t h a t a l l goods, i n c l u d i n g
b a t t l e t o t h e death.
l a b o r power, should be d i s p o s a b l e p r o p e r t y ; t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y
The new mode combined t h e expansion o f c a p i t a l i s t p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s
owner h a d , t h e r i g h t , and t o some e x t e n t t h e o b l i g a t i o n , t o u s e i t t o h i s
w i t h t h e r i s e of t h e n a t i o n a l s t a t e .
own a d v a n t a g e ; t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t , a s s r t i c u l a t e d by t h e s t a t e ,
f a t e f u l combination: l a r g e r - s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n c r e a s i n g commercinliza-
had p r i o r i t y o v e r p a r o c h i a l i n t e r e s t s ; t h a t on t h e whole t h e c o l l e c t i v e in.-
t i o n , expanded communications, t h e growth of a p r o l e t s r i a t , a l t e r a t i o n e
t e r e s t w i l l b e s t be s e r v e d by t h e r a t i o n a l , u n c o n s t r a i n e d p u r s u i t of i n -
of t h e v e r y t e x t u r e of d a i l y l i f e .
dividual interests.
s i v e individualism."
C.B. Macpherson h a s c a l l e d i t t h e t h e o r y of "possesThe f o u r - p a r t t h e o r y i s f a m i l i a r nowadays.
p r e s s e s some founding p r i n c i p l e s of o u r own e r a .
It ex-
But i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h
c e n t u r y t h e t h e o r y of p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m was s t i l l new and c o n t e s t able.
To become dominant, i t had t o d i s p l a c e t h e r i v a l t h e o r y of t h e
"moral economy."
Although t h e y d i d n o t dream of s a y i n g i t i n t h o s e t e r m s ,
t h e c o n t e s t a n t s a t Nacton, Saxmundham and many o t h e r p l a c e s i n e i g h t e e n t h -
The o l d mode v e s t e d power i n l a n d and l o c a l i t y .
moral economy d i s s o l v e d .
Many o t h e r changes flowed from t h a t
The new mode won.
The world of t h e
But when o r d i n a r y e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i m n s
a c t e d c o l l e c t i v e l y a t a l l , u s u a l l y t h e y a c t e d a g a i n s t one f e a t u r e o r
a n o t h e r of t h i s new world.
On t h e whole, t h e y a c t e d i n d e f e n s e o f p a r t i c -
u l a r f e a t u r e s of t h e moral economy.
The e f f o r t t o understand t h e e v e n t s of 1765 t h u s t a k a s u s i n s e v e r a l
very d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s .
It r e q u l r e s some knowledge of t h e p a r t i c u l a r
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s found themselves: t h e problems
1-8
1-7
t h e y f a c e d , t h e enemies b e f o r e them. t h e means of a c t i o n a t t h e i r d i a -
t h e l e s s o n s of t h e i r p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e .
p o s a l , t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s of what was happening.
o r s e x , o r s p e e c h , t h e determined s t u d e n t o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r u n s t h e
In eighteenth-century
As w i t h t h e s t u d e n t of food,
B r i t a i n , t h e m a g i s t r a t e s ' e f f o r t s t o c o n s o l i d a t e poor law a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
r i s k e i t h e r o f l a b e l i n g t h e obvious o r o f u r g i n g hypotheses which common
t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e l a n d l e s s poor t o swings i n p r i c e s , t h e s t r e n g t h
sense contradicts.
of o t r a d i t i o n i n v o l v i n g l o c a l d i r e c t a c t i o n a g a i n s t m a l e f a c t o r s a r e a l l
Deep i n e v e r y d i s c u s s i o n of c o l l e c -
t i v e a c t i o n s t i r s t h e l a v a of a v o l c a n i c e r u p t i o n : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s
Understanding 1765 a l s o c a l l s f o r an a n a l y s i s of t h e l a r g e -
crucial.
I t i s more d e l l c a t e than t h a t .
s c a l e changes behind t h e c o n f l l c t s of t h e moment; i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h
obout power and p o l i t i c s : i t i n e v i t a b l y r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s of r i g h t and
c e n t u r y we can s o r t o u t l i t t l e of t h e p a t t e r n of c o n f l i c t u n t i l we d e t e c t
wrong, j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e , hope and h o p e l e s s n e s s ; t h e v e r y s e t t i n g of
t h e c o n J o i n t expansion of c a p i t a l i s m and r i s e of t h e s t a t e .
t h e problem is l i k e l y t o i n c l u d e judgments a b o u t who has t h e r i g h t t o a c t .
I t takes us,
f i n n l l y , t o a g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e ways t h a t people a c t t o g e t h e r
and what good i t does.
i n p u r s u i t of s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s .
(Detroit Free'Preas
I t t a k e s u s , t h a t i s , i n t o t h e s t u d y of
Consider t h e s e words from s newspopcr e d i t o r i a l
October 1 5 , 1975):
collective action.
Present-day l i b e r a l i s m had i t s r o o t s i n t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y f a i t h
Studylng C o l l e c t i v e Action
The t h i r d I n q u i r y
concern o f t h i s book.
-- t h e
s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
-- is
i n t h e i d e a of human p r o g r e s s ; t h a t t h e l i v e s of men could be made
the chief
b e t t e r by c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
I n i t s extreme form, I t was always a
I w i l l o f t e n i l l u s t r a t e from s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l
n a i v e f a i t h , based on a n a i v e view of human n a t u r e .
c i r c u m s t a n c e s and w i l l f r e q u e n t l y propose explanations i n v o l v i n g s t s t e The 2 0 t h c e n t u r y h a s been a more tumultuous time. and i t h a s
making, t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , o r some o t h e r b i g
meant c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t
s t r u c t u r n l change.
w i t h t h e i d e a of chong.lng t h e
But t h e pages t o f o l l o w w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e genhuman c o n d i t i o n .
Consider i t s m u l t i p l e t r a g e d i e s : Two world w a r s ,
e r a l a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n .
t h e G r e a t Depression, t h e o f t e n b e w i l d e r i n g impact of technology on
The a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n is a r i s k y a d v e n t u r e .
For one
p e o p l e , t h e a f t e r e f f e c t s of c o l o n i a l i s m and i n a t i t u t i o n o l i z c d r a c i s m ,
t h i n g , t h e r e o r e t o o many e x p e r t s around.
I t i s a b i t l i k e food, o r s e x ,
t h e growth i n t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of w e a l t h and i n f l u e n c e , t h e 11-bomb,
o r speech.
Almost a l l of u s know enough obout food, s e x and speech t o s u r the
Cold War, t h e near-breakdown of mony c i t i e s .
v i v e i n o u r own environments, and none of u s l i k e s t o b e t o l d he is i g n o r a n t i n any of t h e t h r e e r e g a r d s .
Yet from a s c i e n t i f i c p o i n t of view,
we a l l have l o t s t o l e a r n a b o u t a l l t h r e e .
oction.
The same is t r u e of c o l l e c t i v e
Like t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p e o p l e of Nacton, we a l l draw on a r i c h .
c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e of a c t i n g on s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s .
seasoned o r g a n i z e r s a r e around t o s h a r e --,and
Among u s , f u r t h e r m o r e ,
even t o l e c t u r e u s on
--
("Heavy s t u f f , t h a t C o l l e c t i v e Action!"
s a i d t h e n o t e inked on t h e e d i t o r -
i a l when someone tacked i t on o u r r e s e a r c h g r o u p ' s b u l l e t i n board.)
In
some s e n s e , ' e v e r y p o s i t i o n one t a k e s on t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y . f e a s i b i l i t y o r
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s a p o l i t i c a l p o a i t i o n .
The t o n e of
l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n s i n t h i s book
is
g e n e r a l l y h o s t i l e t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e ac-
a l s o hard t o b u i l d p u r p o s i v e models which s p e c i f y t h e c o n s t r a i n t n l i m i t i n 8
t i o n of governments and f a v o r s b l e t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of o r d i n a r y
t h e p u r s u i t of i n t e r e s t s , g r i e v a n c e s and a s p i r a t i o n s .
people; t h a t , t o o , is a p o l i t i c a l s t a n c e .
So why n o t t r y a s y n t h e s i s ?
These r i s k s p r o v i d e , a l a s , a s t r o n g t e m p t a t i o n t o d r e s s up t h e t o p i c
i n f a n c y , o b s c u r e terminology and fearsome a b s t r a c t models.
s h a i n t s w i t h p u r p o s i v e models o f c h o i c e s among a v a i l a b l e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n ?
Yet p l a i n
The s y n t h e s i s i s s u r p r i s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o a c h i e v e .
t a l k a l s o h a s i t s d i s a d v a n t a g e s : p e o p l e o f t e n respond more t o t h e overt o n e s and u n d e r t o n e s than t o t h e s o l i d i n f o r m a t i o n .
a l t e r n a t i v e s , and t r y i n g t o draw them t o g e t t i e r .
The Components of C o l l e c t i v e Action
of bogging down i n more and more fastidious d e s c r i p t i o n of tlie d e t a i l s of
The a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n h a s f i v e b i g componcnts: i n t e r e s t .
We must f i n d t h e b a l a n c e p o i n t between i m p r e c i s i o n
o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n , o p p o r t u n i t y and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i t s e l f .
and o b s c i ~ r a n t i a m .
g r o u p ' s i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o t h e r groups.
s d i v l d e which o r d i n a r i l y R e p a r a t e s one major kind of s o c L a l
r e a l , durable interests.
We may choose t o c o n s i d e r t h e a c t i o n
The o r g a n i z a t i o n which c o n c e r n s u s most i s t h a t a s p e c t ol: a g r o u p ' s
of a n i n d i v i d u a l o r of a group a s t h e r e s u l t a n t of f o r c e s \ e x t e r n a l t o t h e
i n d i v i d u a l o r group; t h o s e e x t e r n a l f o r c e s supposedly
cause t h e
s t r u c t u r e which most d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s i t s c a p a c i t y t o a c t on i t s t n t c r e s t s .
behavior.
C l e a r l y one of t h e problems is t o d e t e r m i n e which fentclres of o r g n n i z o t i o n
I n t h i s c a s e , we a r e l i k e l y t o t h i n k we have a good e x p l a n a t i o n when a
do make
-
c a r e f u l l o o k a t t h e a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n p e r m i t s u s t o deduce more o r l e s s
a difference.
lective action?
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we may c o n s i d e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r group t o b e making
Hobi.lizstion i s t h e p r o c e s s by which a group a c q u i r e s c o l l e c t i v e
Then we a r e l i k e l y t o t h i n k we have a sound e x p l a n a t i o n
c o n t r o l o v e r t h e r e s o u r c e s needed f o r a c t i o n .
when we c a n impute t o t h e a c t o r a r u l e which l e a d s l o g i c a l l y t o most o r
It is
Those r e s o u r c e s may b e l a b o r
power, goods, weapons, v o t e s and any number of o t h e r t h i n g s , j u s t s o l o n g
I n t h e realm of c o l l e c -
t i o n t o t h e i n t e r e s t s , g r i e v a n c e s and a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e a c t o r s .
Is i t p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e n e a t n e s s of an o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s
d i v i s i o n of l a b o r m a t t e r s g r e a t l y ?
c h o i c e s a c c o r d i n g t o some s e t of r u l e s , i m p r i c i t o r e x p l i c i t ; t h a t approach
t i v e a c t i o n , i t is hard t o b u i l d c a u s a l models which g i v e s e r i o u s a t t e n -
Is i t p o s s i b l e , f o r example, t h a t how committed mem-
b e r s a r e makes l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e t o tlie form and i n t e n s i t y of t h e i r c o l -
a c c u r a t e l y how t h e a c t o r w i l l behave.
a l l of t h e c h o i c e s we o b s e r v e t h e a c t o r making.
L a t e r on we w i l l have t o worry
a b o u t what c o n s t i t u t e s a r e l e v a n t group. and how t o i d e n t i f y o r measure
That i s t h e d i v i d e between c a u s a l and p u r p o s i v e
e x p l a n a t i o n ( s e e Coleman 1973: 1-5).
is p u r p o s i v e .
Tl~e
i n t e r e s t s which concern u s most e r e t h e g a i n s and l o s s e s r e s u l t i n g from a
Another r j s k r e s u l t s from t h e f a c t t h a t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s t r a d d l e s
a n a l y s i s from a n o t h e r .
Before t h i s book j s
o v e r , we w i l l have s p e n t a good d e a l of time o s c i l l a t i n g between t h e two
Without some s t a n d s r d -
i z a t i o n of terms and some e f f o r t a t a b s t r a c t i o n we r u n t h e f u r t h e r r i s k
particular actions.
Why n o t combine c n u s a l models of con-
a s they a r e u s a b l e i n a c t i n g on s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s .
,-
Sometimes a group such
a s s community h a s a complex i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e , b u t few pool.ed r e s o u r c e s .
Sometimes i t is r i c h i n r e s o u r c e s , b u t t h e r e s o u r c e s a r e a l l under i n d i v i d -
ual control. The analysis of mobilization deals witti the ways that groups
the group. Witti respect to organization, they focus on relntl.vely well-
acquire resources and make them available for collective action.
defined groups. They therefore neglect two fascinating sorta of questions:
Opportunity_ concerns the relationship between a group and the world
around it.
terests.
Changes in the relationship sometimes threaten the group's inThey sometimes provide new chances to act on those interests.
how new groups oriented to new world-views come into being, nnd under wl~ot
conditions ill-defined sets of people such as pnnsersby or friendship nctworks become important collective actors.
--
In regard to mobilization. they
atress the factors of production
opportunities realistically available to the group at the time. Knowledge
and neglect the possibility that attitudes are more important resources
of later outcomes makes it too easy to second-guess a group's action, or
for collective action than any of these. On the side of opportunity, tlie
inaction. We con minimize that disadvantage by looking only at contempor-
analyses in this book atress political opportunity. coalitlon, repression.
ary collective action or by concentrating on situations in which the op-
relations among governments and well-defined contenders for power over
portunities are rigorously defined and strictly lindted.
those governments. When it comes to collective action as such, most of
But then we lose
land, labor, capital, technology
--
The trouble with studying opportunity is that it is hard to reconstruct the
our ability to follow large-scale changes, in their real complexity, over
the concrete discussion deals with contentious gatherings: publicly visible
considerable periods of time.
assemblies in which conflicting interests are cle~rlyin play.
Collective action consists of people's acting together in pursuit of
common interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of
Groups, Events and Movements
We find our subject-matter in the overlaps of three intersecting
interests, organization, mobilization and opportunity. The most persistent
areas.
Sometimes we are interested jn a particulnr population in its own
problem we will face in analyzing collective action is ita lack of sharp
terms.
For example, we want to know what was happenlng to poor people in
edges: people v ~ r ycontinuously from intensive involvement to passive
eighteenth-century Suffolk. Sometimes we are chiefly concerned with a set
compliance, interests vary from quite individual to nearly universal. To-
of beliefs.
ward the end of this book, we will pursue that complexity into the analysis
about the proper treatment of the poor and incompetent. Sometimes certain
of revolutionary processes. Our chief effort, then, will flow along the
kinds of action attract our attention; we might want to understand the con-
lines going from organization to mobilization to collective action to rev-
ditions in which people take the law into their own hands.
olution.
collective action ordinarily requires us to deal with nt least two of these
Especially from mobilization to revolution.
In dealing with each of these problems, the analyses which follow
make serious, debatable choices. With respect to interests, they give
priority to economic and politico1 life. They favor a group's own articulation of its interest over the assumptions of contemporary observers and
over our own retrospective judgment as to what would have been best for
For instance, we wont to follow the r i ~ eand fall of ideas
areas at once.
We could dlagram tlie situation like tl~is:
The study of
1-14
We can t a k e groups a s o u r b a s i c u n i t s f o r t h e s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
F i g u r e 1-1 U n i t s i n t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e Action
Then we t y p i c a l l y s t a r t w i t h s p o p u l a t i o n which h a s some common s t r u c t u r e
and s h a r e d b e l i e f s .
We a r e l i k e l y t o a c c e n t t h o s e n c t i o n s whicll we t h l n k
r e s u l t from t h a t combination of s t r u c t u r e and b e l i e f s .
We pay r e l n t l v e l y
l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o o t h e r v e r s i o n s of t h e some b e l i e f s o r t o o t h e r n c t i o n s
of t h e same kind.
H i s t o r i e s of t h e working c l a s s o f t e n t a k e t h i s form:
much a t t e n t i o n t o changes i n l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s ; work and i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n ; p l e n t y of m a t e r i a l on b e l i e f s and o u t l o o k ; a n a l y s i s of t h o s e a c t i o n s
which appear t o e x p r e s s t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e working-class p o p u l a t i o n and
its beliefs.
We can a l s o t a k e e v e n t s a s o u t s t a r t i n g p o i n t .
p a r t i c u l a r r e v o l u t i o n , ceremony o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
We b e g i n wit11 a
Or we b e g i n w i t h a c l a s s
of e v e n t s : a t t a c k s on poorhouses, d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , revolutions i n g e n e r a l .
I n e i t h e r c a s e , we become concerned a b o u t p o p u l a t i o n s and h e l i e f s t o t h e
e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e involved d i r e c t l y i n t h e e v e n t s .
l e c t i v e behavior" comnonly t a k e t h i s t a c k .
Analyses of "col-
At t h e i r a b s t r a c t extreme.
they s t r i v e f o r g e n e r a l laws g o v e r n i n g a l l a c t i o n s of c e r t a i n k i n d s of
.
p o p u l a t i o n s : l a r g e crowds. f o r example, o r p e o p l e h i t by d i s a s t e r .
The n o t i o n of a "movement" i s more complicated than t h e l d e a s of
groups and e v e n t s .
By a s o c i a l movement we o f t e n mean a group of p e o p l e
i d e n t i f i e d by t h e i r a t t a c h m e n t t o some p a r t i c u l a r s e t of b e l i e f s .
In t h a t
c a s e , t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n can change d r a s t i c a l l y , b u t s o l o n g a s
some group of p e o p l e i s s t i l l working w i t h t h e same h e l i e f s , we c o n s i d e r
t h e movement t o s u r v i v e .
Thus t h e Women's Movement s u r v i v e s major changes
i n composition and i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .
action.
But movement a l s o commonly means
People w r i t i n g h i s t o r i e s of t h e women's movement a r e q u i t e l i k e l y
t o i n c l u d e p a s t h e r o i n e s who were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n b e l i e f s and p e r s o n a l
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from c u r r e n t a c t i v i s t s , j u s t s o long a s t h e i r a c t i o n s were
z a t i o n , e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s and formally-organized
s i m i l a r o r had s i m i l a r e f f e c t s .
them have f i g u r e d i m p o r t a n t l y i n t h e modern Europenn and American e x p e r i -
The f a c t t h a t p o p u l a t i o n , b e l i e f and ac-
t i o n do n o t always change t o g e t h e r c a u s e s s e r i o u s problems f o r s t u d e n t s of
s o c i a l movements.
action, regardless
The f o c u s on t h e modern West a l s o c o a t s u s something.
s t a t e , a b o u t p e o p l e whose s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s a r e orgnnized mainly around kin-
Should we f o l l o w t h e
s h i p , a b o u t e x o t i c movements such a s ~ e l a n e s i a t ic a r g o c u l t s .
of who does i t and w i t h what i d e a s ?
Sometimes we w i l l b e g i n by a s k i n g what p e a s a n t s a r e up t o , and how
h e l p 8 u s understand r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
a c t i o n of poor people.
I
Sometimes we w i l l t r y t o s t a r t
Cllspter 2 c a t a l o g s
competing t h e o r i e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n o r d e r t o l a y o u t t h e c h o i c e s
b e f o r e u s and t o i d e n t i f y t h e major d i s a g r e e m e n t s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s .
Chapter 3 p r e s e n t s and i l l u s t r a t e s a s i m p l e s e t of c o n c e p t s and models f o r
Sometimes we w i l l be-
g i n by a s k i n g what food r i o t s a r e a b o u t , and how t h a t h e l p s u s understand
the collective
The remaining c h a p t e r s f o l l o w a s i m p l e p l a n .
We w i l l a l t e r n a t e between
groups and e v e n t s a s o u r s t a r t i n g p o i n t s f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e ac-
that
one book.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , p l e n t y of m a t e r i a l o t h e r people have analyzed under
t h a t heading w i l l come i n t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n .
Still.
making s e n s e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n t h a t world i s a b i g enough t a s k f o r
T h i s book w i l l g e n e r a l l y a v o i d t h e a n a l y s i s of s o c i a l movements a s
tion.
The conclu-
s i o n s may, a t b e s t , a p p l y o n l y t o t h e modern u r b a n - i n d u s t r l a l world.
What You W i l l Find Here
such.
It gives us
l i t t l e chance t o t h i n k a b o u t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e absence of a a t r o n g
Should we f o l l o w t h e
p o p u l a t i o n . wliotever b e l i e f s and a c t i o n s i t a d o p t s ?
A l l of
ences with c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
When they d i v e r g e , s h o u l d we f o l l o w t h e b e l i e f s , whatever
p o p u l a t i o n s and a c t i o n s they become a s s o c i a t e d w i t h ?
i n t e r e s t groups.
I
t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , then works o u t t h e i r implications f o r
t h e ways groups a c q u i r e t h e a b i l i t y t o a c t ; t h a t c h a p t e r d w e l l s on l n t e r -
both p l a c e s a t once, s e a r c h i n g f o r c o n n e c t i o n s between food r i o t s and pea-
e s t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n and m o b i l i z a t i o n .
s a n t s o c i a l l i f e , o r between some o t h e r c l a s s of e v e n t s and some o t h e r kind
a n a l y s i s ; i t d w e l l s on c o n f l i c t , r e p r e s s i o n and s t r u g g l e s f o r p w e r .
of s o c i a l group.
Chapter 5 c l o s e s i n on t h e s p e c i f i c forma of c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n : how they
From M o b i l i z a t i o n to Revolution
a proposal f o r f u r t h e r inquiry.
o f f e r s both a p a r t i a l s y n t h e s i s and
A s o r e s u l t , i t does not contain a sus-
t a i n e d a n o l y a i s of a s i n g l e body of e v i d e n c e .
The i l l u s t r a t i o n s and
f i n d i n g s r u n from b r a w l s t o s t r i k e s t o r e v o l u t i o n s .
other
t h e d i s c u s s i o n r a n g e s o v e r much of t h e world.
A t one p o i n t o r w-
Most of t h e m a t e r i a l .
however, comes from t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of Western Europe end North America
o v e r t h e l o s t few c e n t u r i e s .
That f o c u s g i v e s u s much o p p o r t u n i t y t o con-
s i d e r s t a t e m a k i n g , t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , urbani-
Chapter 4 adds o p p o r t u n i t y t o t h e
v a r y , how they r e l a t e t o each o t h e r . and h w they a l t e r under t h e impact
of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , s t a t e m a k i n g and o t h e r b i g s o c i s l changes.
Chnpter
6 c l o s e s i n on v i o l e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n w h i l e Chapter 7 a p p l i e s t h e g e n e r a l
l i n e of r e a s o n i n g t o r e b e l l i o n s and r e v o l u t i o n s .
Chapter 8 then sums up
c o n c l u s i o n s , and i n v e n t o r i e s new problems encountered a l o n g t h e way.
CIIAPTER 2:
c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n of l a n d l o r d s and b o u r g e o i s formed, wit11 p a s s i v e
TIIEORIES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
s u p p o r t from t h e more c o m f o r t a b l e segments of t h e p e a s a n t r y .
Marx on 1848
Well o v e r a c e n t u r y ago. K a r l Narx s e t o u t h i s a n a l y s i s of t h e
French Revolution of 1848, and of t h e i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e s which engaged
France f o r t h e n e x t f o u r y e a r s .
To Marx, t h e r e v o l u t i o n was t h e work
began t h e p r o c e s s which l e d t o Louis Napoleon's coup d ' 6 t a t and t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a n empire, a n empire devoted t o c a n c e l i n g t h e g a i n s
of t h e r e v o l u t i o n and i n s u r i n g a g a i n s t i t s r e c u r r e n c e .
--
of a temporary c o a l i t i o n among t h e P a r i s i a n p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e p e t t y
c o n t a i n e d a good d e a l more
b o u r g e o i s i e and an e n l i g h t e n e d fragment of t h e b o u r g e o i s i e .
on t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s of '48
Among
tlie mnny segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n w i t h i n t e n s e g r i e v a n c e s a g a i n s t
Morx' accottnt
n o t l e a s t t h e r e l e n t l e s s w i t he t r a i n e d
-- b u t
t h e s e a r e t h e main l i n e s
of t h e a n a l y s i s .
Twelve decades of h i s t o r i c a l work have i d e n t i f i e d some gaps and
t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s , t h e s e were t h e ones who combined a
e r r o r s i n Marx' a n a l y s i s .
high d e g r e e of i n t e r n a l communication, a c o n s c i o u s n e s s of common
For one example, Marx d i d n o t s e e t h a t many
French workers were a l r e a d y s y m p a t h e t i c t o Bonaporte i n 1848.
i n t e r e s t s , and a c o l l e c t i v e v i s i o n , however f l e e t i n g , of f u t u r e
For
a n o t h e r , h e n e i t h e r a p p r e c i a t e d t h e e x t e n t of t h e armed r e s i s t a n c e
t r a n s f o r m u t i o n s which could improve t h e i r l o t .
Altliough each group had i t s own communications s t r u c t u r e , i t s
t o t h e 1851 coup nor recognized t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e involvement oE
landwning peasants i n that insurrection.
own i n t e r e s t s and i t s own v i s i o n , i n Marx' a n a l y s i s tlie c r i s i s of
1846-47 drove them t o g e t h e r and made t h e regime v u l n e r a b l e .
Thus
stated i n
Thus
The
Yet t h e arguments Morx
E i u h t e e n t h Brumaire of L o u i s Bonaparte and The Claos
S t r u g g l e s i n France have s t o o d t h e passage of time r a t h e r w e l l .
they j o i n e d i n t o p p l i n g t h e regime, a s a m i s e r a b l e b u t i n c o h e r e n t
In
p e a s a n t r y s o t by, a s t h e b o u r g e o i s of f i n a n c e and b i g i n d u s t r y wrung
h i s book-length c o n f r o n t a t i o n of Marx' account wit11 t h e Second Republic
t h e i r hands, a s t h e g r e a t l a n d l o r d s looked f o r t h e i r own ways t o
s c h o l a r s have come t o k n w , Roger P r i c e o f f e r s many a c a v i l and n o t a
p r o f i t by t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of a regime which had shunted them a s i d e .
few nuances, b u t ends up i n b a s i c agreement.
a n a l y s i s have s u r v i v e d more then a hundred y e a r s of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m .
The c l a ~ sb a s e of each p a r t i c i p a n t l i m i t e d i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y
v i s i o n and checked i t s a c t i v i t y .
The c l a s s b a s e s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
*
c o a l i t i o n a s a whole, Marx thought. condemned i t t o d e f a u l t on t h e
promises of s p r i n g 1848.
The brood l i n e s of Marx'
D e s p i t e t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
t o expand i t s program o r i t s power.
It f a i l e d
The c o a l i t i o n began t o d i s i n t e g r a t e
a s t h e workers and t h e b o u r g e o i s w i t h i n i t headed s e p a r a t e ways.
concerning t h e d c t e r m l n o n t s of worker m i l i t n n c y , which c o n c l u d e s
w i t h a more e x t e n s i v e r e s t a t e m e n t than P r i c e f i n d s n e c e s s a r y f o r
c o a l i t i o n t o p r o l e t a r i a n s and b o u r g e o i s i n a few advanced c e n t e r s
o u t s i d e of P a r i s , tlie r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p compromised.
For a determined a t t e m p t t o review and r e v i s e Morx' arguments
A
1848, s e e J . A . ~ a n k s 'Marxist S o c i o l o g y i n Action.
*
Few i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s l a s t a s l o n g a s a
century.
personal disorganization.
Some endure because s c h o l a r s l o s e i n t e r e s t s i n tlie e v e n t s .
o t h c r s because t h e y f i t p r e v a i l i n g p r e j u d i c e s and d o c t r i n e s .
the
While h e saw t h e L u m p e n p r o l e t a r i a t o s
l i a b l e t o crime and d i s o r d e r , he a l s o sow a world of difference between
,
brawling and making r e v o l u t i o n s .
I f you want t o a n a l y z e major c o n f l i c t s ,
remaining few because t h e y e x p l a i n what happened b e t t e r t h a n t h e i r
we h e a r him t e l l i n g u s , i d e n t i f y t h e major c l a s s e s and i n t e r e s t s which
a v a i . l a b l e c o m p e t i t o r s do.
emerge from t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r o d u c t l o n .
Although t h e r i s e of Marxist d o c t r i n e s
Catalogue t h e r c s u l t l n g
and p o l i t i c a l movements h a s undoubtedly promoted t h e a c c e p t a n c e of
c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t .
Morx' h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s e s a s w e l l , i t h a s a l s o d i r e c t e d c r i t i c i s m
of i t s p r e p a r e d n e s s t o a c t on i t s i n t e r e s t s .
and new r e s e a r c h t o h i s main arguments.
of t h e c h i e f i n s t i t u t i o n s and l e a d e r s involved i n t h e c o n f l i c t .
That t h e y hove s u r v i v e d
t e s t i f i e s t o t h e i r e x p l a n a t o r y power.
Examine each c l a s s you have enumerated i n terms
Work o u t tlie c l a s s b a s e s
Wntch
o u t f o r c r i s e s which make t h e dominant c l o s s e a v u l n e r a b l e , sod e x p e c t
I f t h a t i s s o , we might pay a t t e n t i o n t o Marx' mode of a n a l y s i s .
T m p l l c i t l y . Harx d i v i d e d t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n i n t o s o c i a l c l a s s e s
based on t h e l r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g means of p r o d u c t i o n .
There i s much more t o i t , b u t
t h e organized underclasses t o s t r i k e .
t h o s e a r e Marx' e s s e n t i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s .
We a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a t h e o r y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n :
of t h e
E x p l i c i t l y , he i d e n t i f i e d t h e major v i s i b l e a c t o r s i n t h e p o l i t i c s
c o n d i t i o n s i n which p e o p l e a c t t o g e t h e r i n p u r s u i t of common e n d s .
of t h e time w i t h t h e i r c l a s s b a s e s , o f f e r l n g judgments of t h e i r b a s f c
Harx' t h e o r y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s d e b a t a b l e .
i n t e r e s t s , c o n s c i o u s a s p i r a t i o n s , a r t i c u l a t e d g r i e v a n c e s and c o l l e c t i v e
e v i d e n t t h a t s o c i a l c l a s s e s and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e t h e p r i n c i p a l
rcadiness for action.
actors i n politics.
Classes a c t , o r f a i l t o a c t .
In general,
It i s not s e l f -
It i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t p r i o r o r g a n i z a t i o n
i n d i v i d u a l s and i n s t i t u t i o n s a c t on b e h a l f of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l
s t r o n g l y a f f e c t s a group'a r e a d i n e s s t o n c t .
classes.
m a i n t a i n e d , c o n t r a r y t o Harx, t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s i n mass movements
(There is an i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n :
i n analyzing Louis
It can e a s i l y be
Napoleon's s e i z u r e of power. Marx allowed t h a t t h o s e who run t h e
t e n d t o i g n o r e t h e i r own t r u e i n t e r e s t s .
s t a t e may a c t , a t l e a s t f o r a w h i l e , i n t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t
t h e c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n .
w i t l ~ o u tr e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r c l a s s b a s e . )
In analyzing readiness to
The Morxinn t h e o r y emplinsizes
Nowadays, ~ a r x 't h e o r y sounds f a m i l i a r .
I n some wnyu i t seems
a c t . Uarx a t t a c h e d g r e a t importance t o t h e e a s e and d u r a b i l i t y of
obvious.
communications w i t t ~ i . nt h e c l a s s , t o t h e v i s i b l e p r e s e n c e of a c l a s s
p r e v a i l i n g s c c o u n t s of mass a c t i o n .
enemy.
people" a s i n c a p a b l e of c o n t i n u o u s , c a l c u l a t i n g p u r s u i t of t h c i r
When Morx' p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s a c t e d , they d i d s o o u t of common
i n t e r e s t s , mutual awareness and i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .
A s compared w i t h o t h e r a n a l y s t s of t h e same e v e n t s , Harx a t t a c h e d
l i t t l e importance t o g e n e r a l i z e d t e n s i o n , momentary impulses o r
Yet i n tlie n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . i t broke d e c i s i v e l y w l t h tlie
Other t h e o r i e s t r e n t e d " t h e
c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s , a s responding mainly t o impulses
o r bffd
--
and t o m a n i p u l a t i o n by e l i t e s .
has important competitors.
--
good impulses
Today t h e Hdrxlon view a g a i n
The condescending n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y view
of mass action has remained popular with critics of democracy.
has lingered on in academic analyses of "mass society."
It
Figure 2-1:
And that theory.
too, has rivals.
Competing Analyses
of Collective Action
-
Marxian
Among processional students of politics, at least three additional
organization
of production
lines of argument have acquired eloquent advocates. We can identify
solidarity
the lines loosely with three other nineteenth-century and early
collective
twentieth-century figures: Emile Durkheim. John Stuart Mill and Max
Weber.
conflicting
interests
Figure 2-1 sketches out the general logic of Marxian, Durkheim-
Ian, Millian and Weberisn analyses. The Marxisn analysis, as we have
just seen, generally traces collective action back to solidarity
I
I
Durkheimian
NON-ROUTINE
within groups and conflicts of interest between groups, considers
J
discontent
the solidarity and tlie conflicts of interest to reinforce each other,
solidarity
(cl
dividual
interest
routine action
and bases both of them on the organization of production. Durkheim
treated collective action as a relatively direct response to processes
1
ROUTINE
division of labor
collective
ec tion
I
II
I
of integration and disintegration in whole societies. As the diagram
suggests, his followers have developed rather different explanations
of routine and non-routine collective action.
The non-routine forms.
according to Durkheimians, grow from the discontent and pursuit of
interest
action
action
individual interests produced by disintegration of the division of
labor; under conditions of routine integration, on tlie other hand,
aolidnrity leads to collective action, which in its turn reinforces
Weberian
solidarity. Mill rooted collective action in the strictly calculating
pursuit of individual interest. The distinctive approach of Millians,
ON-ROUTINE
interest
collective
ROUTINE
interest - ,
collective
as the diagram indicates, is the analysis of the various decision
belief
rules which translate individual interests into individual action and
which aggregate individual actions into collective action. Max Weber,
finally, portrayed collective action as the outgrowth of commitment to
organization
belief -.
organization
c e r t a i n systems of b e l i e f .
Weberians, l i k e Durkheimions, tend t o propose
I n The D i v i s i o n of Labor i n S o c i e t y and i n S u l c i d e , Durkheim l n i d o u t
d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r r o u t i n e and non-routine c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n :
a view o f something c a l l e d a " s o c i e t y " d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g u n s t e a d i l y i n
i n t h e non-routine forms t h e s h a r e d b e l i e f s of t h e group have a s t r o n g ,
r e s p o n s e t o a v a r i e t y of p r e s s u r e s .
d i r e c t impsct on t h e g r o u p ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , w h i l e a s a c t i o n r o u t i n i z e s
summed up t h o s e p r e s s u r e s a s a growth i n t h e volume and d e n s i t y of
two t h i n g s happen:
society.
o r g a n i z a t i o n grows up t o m e d i a t e between t h e b e l i e f s
and t h e a c t i o n , and group i n t e r e s t s p l a y a l a r g e r and more d i r e c t r o l e
Speaking c o n c r e t e l y , he d i s c u s s e d o c c u p o t i o n o l changes.
The p r e s s u r e s e m p h a t i c a l l y i n c l u d e d t h e i n t e r n a l l o g i c of Lndustrialization.
i n collective action.
Marx. Durkheim, M i l l and Neber had d i s t i n c t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t views
of t h e world, and bequeathed t o t h e i ;
Spenking a b s t r a c t l y , Durkheim
On t h e v e r y f i r s t page of D i v i s i o n of Labor, Durkhcim
t e l l s us
heirs significantly different
We need have no f u r t h e r i l l u s i o n s about t h e t e n d e n c i e s of modern
a n a l y s e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
L e t u s review c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a n a l y s e s
industry:
i t advances s t e a d i l y towards powerful mochines.
i n t h e Durkhcimian, M i l l i o n and Weberian t r a d i t i o n s b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o
towards g r e a t c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of f o r c e s and c a p i t o l , and c o n s e q u e n t l y
t h e Mnrxian l i n e of argument.
t o t h e extreme d i v i s i o n of l a b o r .
Occupations a r e i n f i n i t e l y
Durkheim
s e p a r a t e d and s p e c i a l i z e d , n o t o n l y i n s i d e t h e f a c t o r i e s , b u t
Durkheim c r y s t a l l i z e d a widespread n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y view o f .
e a c h product i s i t s e l f a s p e c i a l t y dependent upon o t h e r s (Durkhelm
what i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was doing t o t h e world.
He f a s h i o n e d i t i n t o
1933:
39).
a s e t of arguments which have remained dominant i n s o c i o l o g y , e s p e c i a l l y
The
h e r i c a n , s o c i o l o g y , up t o o u r own time.
" s o c i e t y , " a c c o r d i n g t o Durkheim, e x e r t s i t s c o n t r o l o v e r i n d i v i d u a l s
A s T a l c o t t Parsons put i t :
v i a t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a shared consciousness.
. . . it
was t h e problem of t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e s o c i a l system,
of wliat l ~ o l d ss o c i e t i e s t o g e t h e r , which was t h e most p e r s i s t e n t
p r e o c c u p a t i o n of Durkheim's c a r e e r .
I n t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h e time,
A s Durkheim p u t s i t ,
"The t o t a l i t y of b e l i e f s and s e n t i m e n t s common t o a v e r a g e c i t i z c n s of t h e
same s o c i e t y forms a d e t e r m i n a t e system which h a s i t s own l i f e ; one may
c a l l i t t h e c o l l e c t i v e o r common conscience" (Durkheim 1933:
79).
The
one could n o t have chosen a more s t r a t e g i c f o c u s f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g
advancing d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , he s a y s , t h r e a t e n s t h e s h a r e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s
t o s o c i o l o g i c a l theory.
based on t h e e s s e n t i a l s i m i l a r i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s , and t h e r e b y t h r e a t e n s
Moreover, t h e work Durkheim d i d i n t h i s
f i e l d can b e s a i d t o have been n o t h i n g s h o r t of epoch-making;
he
t h e primacy of t h e needs and demands of t h e s o c i e t y a s a whole o v e r t h e
A new s h a r e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s
d i d n o t s t a n d e n t i r e l y a l o n e , b u t h i s work was f a r more s h a r p l y
impulses and i n t e r e s t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l .
focused and d e e p l y p e n e t r a t i n g than t h a t of any o t h e r a u t h o r of
based on i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and common f a t e i s both p r o b l e m a t i c and slow
h i s timc (Parsons 1960:
t o emerge.
118).
I n t o t h e gap between t h e l e v e l of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and t h e
l e v e l of s h a r e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s moves
e.
To be precise, anomie is Durkheim's name for that gap between the
shared consciousness, and the free-for-all which results from anomie.
The
Elementary Forms of the Religious E,we find Durkheim
degree of differentiation and the extent of regulation of social relations;
Later. in
from it he derives a set of undesirable results:
analyzing the solidarity producing consequences of ritualized, approved
individual disorienta-
tion, destructive social life, extensive conflict. Uis concrete examples
forms of collective action.
again come almost entirely from the industrial world.
says:
They are the
In an amazingly anthropomorphic passage. IIC
economic crash, the conflict between management and labor, the separation
When a society is going through circumstances which sadden, perplex
of work arid family life, and so on through the standard concerns of
or irritate it, it exercises a pressure over its members, to make
nineteenth-century reformers.
them bear witness, by significant acts, to their sorrow, perplexity
In Suicide. Durklieim sketches the consequences of a rapid growth in
or anger.
It imposes upon them the duty of weeping, groaning or
power and wealth:
inflicting wounds upon themselves or others, for these collective
Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and
manifestations, and the moral communion which they show and
things. So long as the social forces tlius freed have not regained
strengthen, restore to the group the energy which circumntances
equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all
threaten to take away from it, and tlius they enable it to hecome
regulation is lacking for a time
restraint upon aspirations
. . . Consequently, there is no
. . . With increased prosperity desires
settled (Durkheim 1961: 459).
The basic Durkheimisn idea presents s society strained by a continuous
increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost
struggle between forces of disintegration (notably rapid differentiation)
thcir autl~ority,the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates
and forces of integration (notably new or renewed commitment to al~sred
them and makes them more exigent and impatient of colitrol. The
beliefs).
state of de-regulation or anomy is thus further heightened by
different kinds of collective action:
passions being less dlsclplined, precisely when they need more
and restorative.
disciplining (Durkheim 1951:
let us call them routine, snomic.
We might sum up Durkheim's snalysin of collective action in a aimplc
253).
We begin to see that Durkheim not only propounded a theory of social
chnnge, but also proposed a theory of collective action.
In fact, he proposed two or three of each.
From the basic notion Durkheim derives models of three
When it comes to the
link between large-scale social change and collective action, we find
Durkheim distinguishing sharply between the orderly pursuit of shared
interests which occurs when the division of labor is not outrunning the
diagram:
F j g u r e 2-2:
Durklieim's A n a l y s i s
of C o l l e c t i v e Action
The shaded a r e a above t h e d i a g o n a l i s n n f e ; t h e r e , t h e development of
s h a r e d b e l i e f i s e q u a l t o or g r e a t e r than t h e s t r e s s imposed by
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and o t h e r c a l a m i t i e s .
The a r e a below t h e d i n g o n n l is
dangerous: t h e r e , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o u t s t r i p s t h e e x t e n t of s h a r e d b e l i e f .
Routine c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n g o e s on i n t h e s a f e a r e a , and renews s h a r e d
belief routinely.
Anomic c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n c r e a s e s a s t h e n o c i e t y
s l i d e s down from tlie d i a g o n a l . and p e r p e t u a t e s i t n e l f by s h a k i n g slinred
SIIARED
RELIEF
b e l i e f s even more tlian t h e y were a l r e a d y shaken.
Restorative col.lective
a c t i o n o c c u r s n e a r t h e d i a g o n a l , and moves t h e s o c i e t y back i n t o t h e s a f e
area.
Although t h e language ts a l i t t l e odd, tlie argument is very f a m i l i a r .
Durkheim'a t h e o r y , i n c o n t r a s t t o Marx'.
l e a d s u s t o e x p e c t anomic
and r e s t o r a t i v e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o r i s e a s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a c c e l e r n t e n .
I t l e a d s u s t o a n t i c i p a t e f i n d i n g tlie p o p u l a t i o n s newly c r e a t e d o r d i s placed by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a t t h e c e n t e r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
It
DIFFERENTIATIONpp ,
p r e d i c t s s c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n among s u i c i d e , c r i m e , violence rind nonroutine collective action.
I n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . most t h e o r i e s
f o r c o l l e c t i v e b e h a v i o r embody some v e r s i o n of tlie Durkhejmian argument.
Indeed, t h e s t a n d a r d a n a l y s e s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , u r b s n i e n t I o n , deviance.
s o c i a l c o n t r o l , s o c i a l d i s o r g a n i z ~ t i o nand c o l l e c t i v e behavior which
e m e r g e d i n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a l l b b r e t h e Durkheimian stomp.
The Durkheimian T r a d i t i o n
To s e e t h i s c l e a r l y , we need o n l y exnmine an i n f l u e n t i n 1 book from
t h e 19608:
Samuel H u n t i n g t o n ' s P o l i t i c a l Order i n Changlng S o c i e t i e s .
Huntington a r g u e s t h a t t h e e x t e n s i v e domestic c o n f l . i c t i n d e v e l o p i n g
c o u n t r i e s a f t e r World War I1 r e s u l t e d from t h e f a c t t h a t p o l i t t c a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s developed o n l y s l o w l y , w h i l e r a p i d s o c i n l change b o t h
p l a c e d new s t r a i n on e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and promoted tlie
Social and economic change
--
Basic Argument
urbanization, increases in literacy
and education, industrialization, mass media expansion
--
Iluntington's
Figure 2-3:
participation of new, demanding groups in political life. Concretely:
extend
political consciousneaa, multiply political demands, broaden political
A
participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of
RIGIDITY
,
.'
political authority and traditional political institutions; they
enormoua1.y complicate the problems o,F cresting new bases of political
association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and
effectiveness. The rates of social mobilization and the expansion
of political participation are high; the rates of political organization
and institutionalization are low.
The result is political instability
REVOLUTION
and disorder (Huntington 1968: 5 ) .
Tlle larger the discrepancy between institutionalization and modernization.
the greater the disorder. At the extreme lies revolution:
>
MODERNIZATION
"The
political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political
consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics
at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions
Figure 2-4: Trajectories of Slow and Rapid Social
to assimilate them"
(Huntington 1968:
266).
Change in Huntington's Argument
In this formulation, either a speedup of instittltionalization or a
slowdown of modernization will decrease the amount of disorder.
But if
political institutions are very rigid, they will inhibit essential social
change.
2-3.
Schematically, Huntington's analysis takes the pattern of Figure
I
SLOW SOCIAL CHANGE
RAPID SOCIAL CHANCE
I
R
Furthermore, the argument describes different paths through these
possibilities, depending on the pace of social change:
R
Inability of authorities to develop policies which mnintaln the
2.
Slow social cl~onge,then, is likely to be orderly throughout its course.
confidence of ordinary people.
Rnpid social change brings a likelihood of disorder, and a possibility
L
of revolution.
The similarity to Durkheim is impressive.
Institutional-
ization takes the place of Durkheim's shared beliefs, modernization the
clearly political than Durkheim's.
means of enforcing conformity, or which lead revolutionary groups
Huntington's model is much more
place of Durklieim's differentiation.
On the one side of Huntington's
argument, the capacity of political institutions (not of society in
general) to handle new demands becomes crucial. On the other, the
political mobilization of new groups and the production of new political
problems are the chicf means by which modernization incites disorder.
Yet Durkheim could not have disagreed very vociferously; at most he
3 . . Events, often fortuitous, which deprive tlie elite of thetr
to believe they can deprive the elite of those means.
,
Johnson then links these very general phenomena to individual behavior
through the sequence:
rapid change
\
systemic disequilibrium
.
would hove insisted on the importance of non-political restraints,
of onc part of Huntington's argument
(For an empirical evaluation
-- casting doubt on rapid mobiliza-
tion as a major source of political disorder
-- see Przeworski 1975).
Another version from the 1960s appears in Chalmers Johnson's
Revolutionary Change.
Johnson identifies three clusters of causes for
\
individual disorientation
-panic-anxiety-shame-guilt-depression,ctc.
especially religion, ritual, and occupational organization. The
Durkheimian argument is very much alive.
\
overtaxing of existing means of homeostatic and purposive
response to change
formation of movements of protest
True to his Durkheimian heritage, he proposes the suicide rate as o
prime index of disequilibrium.
The Durkheimian kernel in Johnson's scheme hns around it a husk
of post-Durkheimisn,words and ideas. Johnson's analysis of revolution
differs from Huntington's in several important regards.
revolution:
strictly political than Huntington's.
1. A disequilibrated social system, especially one with power
deflation:
"the fact that during a period of change the inte-
gration of a system depends increasingly upon the maintenance and
deployment of force by the occupants of the formal authority
statuses" (Johnson 1966: 90).
authority of the established elite.
It is even more
The pivotal vnriablc is tlie
Yet the central idea treots disorder
as the outcome of a process in which social change weakens the controls
and attachments which under more stable conditions hold people in their
places.
Let us take a third recent example: Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel.
Gurr seeks to provide a general explanation of "political violence."
Political violence includes all collective attacks on major political
actors
-- e s p e c i a l l y
a g e n t s of t h e s t a t e
-- w i t h i n
a p a r t i c u l a r community.
Gurr complements h i s argument w i t h an a n a l y s i s of 1 , 1 0 0 " s t r i f e
I n s t e a d of e l a b o r a t i n g a t h e o r y of how p o l i t i c a l communities o p e r a t e ,
e v e n t s " which o c c u r r e d i n 114 s t a t e s o r c o l o n i e s from 1961 through 1965.
however, Gurr c o n c e n t r a t e s on e x p e r i e n c e s which happen t o i n d i v i d u a l s
I n t h e f i r s t round of a n a l y s i s , Gurr t a k e s t h e r e s u l t s a s c o n f i r m i n g t h e
nnd then cumulaee i n t o mass a c t i o n .
i n f l u e n c e of some of t h e v a r i a b l e s which presumably produce RD, some
G u r r ' s c e n t r a l arguments concern a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s .
Individuals
v a r i a b l e s measuring b e h a v i o r which presumably r e f l e c t
JUST and,
nnger when they s e n s e a l a r g e gap between what they g e t and what t h e y
e s p e c i a l l y , a c l u s t e r of v a r i a b l e s o u t s i d e t h e c o r e t h e o r y :
deserve.
and S t r u c t u r a l F a c i l i t a t i o n .
That can happen through a d e c l i n e i n what they g e t , o r s r i s e
i n what t h e y f e e l t h e y d e s e r v e .
Given t h e chance, angry p e o p l e r e b e l .
psychology.
A l a t e r f o r m u l a t i o n c o n t a i n s much l e s s
I n t h e new s e t of models, t h e major p r e d i c t o r s t o t h e
Whcn many people go through t h a t same e x p e r i e n c e of i n c r e a s i n g R e l a t i v e
magnitude of p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e r e p r e s e n t
D e p r i v a t i o n p l u s widening o p p o r t u n i t y f o r r e b e l l i o n a t t h e same time.
inequalities
p o l i t i c a l violence generalizes.
tation
Gurr once summarized t h e argument i n
blsgnitude of
poJ.itica1
violence
. . . relative
. . . short-term
dissident-initiated
=
RD
+ (RD
x JUST x BALANCE)
+
"
' c l e a v a g e s ' and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
impoverishment and f o r e i g n economic e x p l o i -
d e c l i n e s i n economic c o n d f t i o n s
i m p o s i t i o n of new p o l i t i c a l s a n c t i o n s
t h i s way:
Social
conflicts
. . . historical
. . . level
. . . rcgimc
p e r s i s t e n c e of
of economic development
e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n on b e h a l f of d i s s i d e n t s "
...
(Gurr h Duval 1973:
"wl~ere RD i s t h e scope nnd i n t e n s i t y of r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n ( d i s -
138-139).
c o n t e n t ) i n a p o p u l s t i o n ; JUST i s t h e scope and i n t e n s i t y of b e l i e f s
of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n i n major domestic c o n f l i c t s from 1961
i n t h a t p o p u l a t i o n a b o u t t h e j u s t i f i a b i l i t y and u t i l i t y of engaging
through 1965.
i n o v e r t s t r i f c ; BALANCE r e f e r s t o t h e b a l a n c e of o r g a n i z a t i o n and
almost bleached away.
c o e r c i v e c a p n c i t i e s between d i s s i d e n t s and regimes; and
term" (Curr h Duval 1973:
137).
is an e r r o r
S i m i l a r i d e a s hove o f t e n emerged i n
t h e a n a l y s i s of American g l ~ e t t or e b e l l i o n s . of L a t i n Anlerican p a l a c e
coups, and of t h e French Revolution.
We saw p a r t of t h e argument
formulated i n Durkhelm's t r e a t m e n t of s u i c i d e .
Gurr h a s e x p l i c a t e d t h e
l o g i c of t h i s l i n e of n n a l y s l s , and developed means of measuring n
number of t h e v a r i n b l e s involved
measure RD and JUST d i r e c t l y .
--
a l t h o u g h n o t , na i t happens, t o
These v a r i a b l e s do appear t o account J o i r l t l y f o r a good d e a l
I n t h i s r e f o r m u l a t i o n , Ilowever, t h e Durkl~elmlsn L i n t h a s
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e models embody a c e n t r a l
argument, t h e argument a c c e n t u a t e s t h e p r i n c i p a l a c t o r s ' i n t e r c a t s and
capacity t o act.
The s t a n d a r d Durkheiminn arguments, a s we have s e e n , s e l e c t h e a v i l y
from among t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
m o b i l i z a t i o n , o p p o r t u n i t y and i n t e r e s t s .
- organization,
On t h e whole, they n e g l e c t
t h e a n a l y s i s of o r g a n i z a t i o n and m o b i l i z a t i o n i n f a v o r o f a vlcw of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s a r e s u l t a n t of i n t e r e s t p l u s o p p o r t u n i t y .
p r e v a l e n t v e r s i o n of i n t e r e s t , f u r t h e r m o r e , is n t t i t u d i n a l :
m o t i v a t i o n s , a n x i e t i e s and needs of i n d i v i d u a l s .
The
the
Opportunlty, i n t h e
Durkheimian l i n e , c o n s i s t s mainly of t h e p r e s e n c e o r absence of s o c i a l
does s o i n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h e p u r s u i t of h i s i n t c r e s t s i n t h e long run.
c o n t r o l s d v e r t h c e x p r e s s i o n ' o f t h o s e m o t i v a t i o n s , a n x i e t i e s and needs.
As Buchanan and T u l l o c k s a y of Mill's most d i s t i n g u i s h e d predccesnor:
Tf we t a k e Durkheimian arguments s e r i o u s l y , we w i l l e x p e c t t o f i n d
Hume r e c o g n i z e d , of c o u r s e , t h a t were i t poossible, t h e i n d i v l d ~ l a l ' s
s h a r p d i s c o n t i n u i t y between r o u t i n e and non-routine c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ;
own i n t e r e s t would b e s t b e s e r v e d by t h e a d h e r i n g t o t h e c o n v c n t i o n a l
t h e i r c a u s e s , c o n t e n t and consequences w i l l a l l d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y .
r u l e s of e l l o t h e r p e r s o n s b u t himself w h i l e remaining f r e e t o v i o l a t e
We w i l l h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t t h e f a s t e r and more e x t e n s i v e t h e s o c i a l change,
these rules.
However, p r e c i s e l y because such r u l e s a r e s o c i a l l y
t h e more widespread t h e onomic and r e s t o r a t i v e forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ;
d e r i v e d , they must a p p l y g e n e r a l l y .
Ilence each i n d i v i d u a l must
c o n c r e t e l y , we w i l l e x p e c t r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o r u r b a n i z a t i o n t o
r e c o g n i z e t h a t , were he t o b e f r e e t o v i o l a t e c o n v e n t i o n , o t h c r s
produce e x c e p t i o n a l l y high l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t and p r o t e s t .
We w i l l
must be s i m i l a r l y f r e e , and a s compared w i t h t h i s c h a o t i c s t a t e of
srlppose t h a t i n d i v i d u a l d i s o r d e r and c o l l e c t i v e p r o t e s t a r e c l o s e l y
a f f a i r s , h e w i l l r a t i o n a l l y choose t o a c c e p t r e s t r i c t i o n s on h i s
t i e d t o each o t h e r , and sometimes i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .
We w i l l a r g u e
own b e h a v i o r (Buchsnan h T u l l o c k 1962:
315):
t h a t t h e more c o h e r e n t and compelling a g r o u p ' s b e l i e f s , t h e l e s s l i k e l y
The key a n a l y t i c q u e s t i o n s concern t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of i n d i v i d u a l
i t is t o engage i n d i s o r d e r l y b e h a v i o r .
We w i l l imagine t h a t s h i f t s i n
d e c i s i o n s , t h e c o l l e c t i v e consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e d e c i s i o n r u l e s ,
i n d i v i d u a l d l s s o t i n f a c t i o n s and a n x i e t i e s a r e t h e s t r o n g e s t and most
and t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e two.
r c l i a b l e p r e d i c t o r s of c o l l e c t i v e c o n t e n t i o n .
M i l l and t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s a r e i m p e r f e c t exemplars of t h e r e l e v a n t
Some v e r s i o n of t h e Durkheimian f o r m u l a t i o n hns been t h e dominant
e x p l a n a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
routine collective action
t o many people today.
--
--
t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y l i n e of argument.
T h e i r account of collective a c t i o n
e s p e c i a l l y c o n t e n t i o u s and nond e a l t almost e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h t h e s t a t e .
f o r c l o s e t o a century.
I t still appeals
I t gave nlmost no a t t e n t i o n
e i t h e r t o t h e s t r i v i n g of groups between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and t h c s t a t e
N e v e r t h e l e s s , even i n America, Durkheim's a n a l y s i s
a s a d e t e r m i n a n t of p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s o r t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e
hns never q u i t e squeezed o u t i t s major r i v a l s :
arguments i n t h e t r a d i b e h a v i o r of t h e groups themselves.
"The i n d i v i d u a l i s m of t h e u t i l i t o r i o n s .
t i o n s of M i l l . Weber and Marx.
t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n of s o c i a l phenomena by e humah psychology supposedly
M i l l and t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s
p r i o r t o s o c i e t y , " colmnents John Plamenatz (1949:
158). " n l s o made
John S t u a r t M i l l r e p r e s e n t s t h e t r e a t m e n t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s
them i n d i f f e r e n t t o s o c i a l c l a s s e s .
a s t r i c t l y c a l c ~ ~ l a t i npgu r s u i t of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t .
They conceived of ~ o c i e t ya s
Among t h e E n g l i s h
composed of a number of competing i n d i v l d r l n l s and n o t of r i v a l g r o ~ ~ p s . "
U t i l i t a r i a n s , we f i n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l a c q u i e s c i n g i n a s e t of b i n d i n g
For John S t u a r t M i l l , i t would be more a c c u r a t e t o s a y Ile
p o l i t i c a l arrangements (n s t e t e , t h e r u l e s of t h e game o r some system
c l a s s a c t i o n than t o s a y be ignored i t .
of c o o p e r a t i o n ) a t t h e expense of some of h i s s h o r t - r u n i n t e r e s t s .
He
feRred
I n a c h a p t e r of h i s 9 r c s e n t a t i v e
Government titled OF THE INFIRMITIES AND DANCERS TO WllICH REPRESENTATIVE
A good constitution and a valid theory of political obligation,
GOVERNMENT IS LIABLE, Mill wrote "If we consider as a class, politically
thought Mill, would facilitate that outcome.
speaking, any number of persons who have the same sinister interest
'
--
By contrast with Mill, twentieth-century theorists of indivldunl
that is, whose direct and apparent interest points toward the same
interests show relatively little interest in the general problem of
description of bad measures; the desirable object would be that no class,
political obligation.
and no combination of classes likely to combine, should be able to
problems:
exercise a preponderant influence in the government" (Mill 1950:
causes and effects of different forms of interest-group politics.
(The term "sinister interest" comes from Bentham.)
342).
At some points in
Instead, they show much interest in two other
the consequences of alternative decision rules and tlie
Yet
Mill is a useful symbol for a line of argument which leads us to expect
hia political career. Mi11 feared the class action of landowners: at
collective action to fluctuate largely as a consequence of changing
others, of landless laborers (Duncan 1973: chapter 6).
decision rules and the changing costs of accomplishing various individ-
But at all
points he considered it natural and inevitable that a class given an
ual interests.
opportunity to act on a particular narrow interest would do so. The
Collective Choice
task of government
--
and of a theory of representative government
--
The clearest contemporary expressions of this view appenr in
choice:
was to forestall that opportunity, to make likely action on the common
models of collective
interest of the entire population.
in situations in which two or more parties make choices affecting the
tlill's liberal solution and his cautious optimism foreshadowed
those of twentieth-century pluralists:
outcomes.
the determinants of alternative outcomes
In a sense, all of microeconomics deals with collective
choice. Microeconomic models have been tlie best developed and most
popular in the field. Nonetheless, political scientists, psychologists,
The reason why, in any tolerably constituted society, justice
sociologists, logicians, statisticians and mnthemtlcinns have all
and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point,
accompanied the economists in their search. Come theory, some forms
is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost
of voting analysis, some approaches to formal organization, many
always divided:
some are interested in what is wrong, but some,
treatments of public goods and a few analyses of power illustrate
also, have their private interest on the side of what is right;
the relevant work within this tradition (for a careful review, see
and those who are governed by higher considerations, though too
Taylor 1975).
few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others, usually
James Coleman's general treatise on collective choice offers the
after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough
following examples of applications:
a simple legislature, realization
to turn the bnlance in favour of the body of private interests
of interests as a func'tion of their conceqtrntion, paying the cost of
which is on the some side with them (Mill 1950: 343).
'
o p u b l i c facility, formation of a c o n s t i t u t i o n , p a t t e r n s of i n f l u e n c e
p a r t of t h e s e c r e t of t h e i r s u c c e s s ; second, i n our own a g e on enor-
i n i n f o r m a l groups, exchange between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and c o n s t i t u e n t s ,
mously i n c r e a s i n g s h a r e of i m p o r t a n t r e s o u r c e s h a s been coming under
o p o r l i a m c n t a r y system, money a s power i n l e g i s l a t i v e i s s u e s , committee
t h e c o n t r o l of c o r p o r a t e a c t o r s .
s t r u c t u r e i n a l e g i s l o t u r e , , ~s i m p l e b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e (Colemon
of i n t e r e s t s t h a t men have, t h o s e i n t e r e s t s t h a t have been s u c c c s s f u l l y
1973:
c o l l e c t e d t o c r e a t e c o r p o r a t e o c t o r s a r e t h e i n t e r e s t s t h a t dominate
96-126).
I n a l l t h e s e c a s e s , Coleman works w i t h some v e r s i o n
t h e s o c i e t y " (Coleman 1974:
o f a b a s i c equation:
49).
Consequence:
"
. . . among
We a r e no l o n g e r d e o l i n g wltli t h e
Yet t h e problem is
consequences of d e c i s i o n r u l e s i n any s i m p l e s e n s e .
very s i m i l a r .
~ o l e m nis s t i l l a n a l y z i n g how t h e method of a g g r e g a t i n g
i n w b i c h v is t h e v a l u e of a g i v e n e v e n t w i t h i n an a r r a y of k p o s s i b l e
i
i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h o s e i n t e r e s t s
events.
interests are.
jXji
i s t h e sum o v e r j a c t o r s of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s i n
the variety
-- wliotever
those
Under t h e c o n d i t i o n s Coleman d e s c r i b e s , an i n c r c o s i n g
t h a t e v e n t , vk i s t h e v a l u e t o an i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r of a p a r t i c u l a r
s h a r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t l i a t
e v e n t , and ckj i s t h e c o n t r o l a c t o r j h a s o v e r e v e n t k .
changes t h i n g s , i s c a r r i e d on by, w i t h i n , o r a g a i n s t c o r p o r o t e o c t o r s .
I n example 6 , t h e exchange between a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and h i s
c o n s t i t u e n t s , Coleman assumes o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who is t o t a l l y i n t e r e s t e d
H i l l i a n a n a l y s i s i d e n t i f i e s a s i t u a t i o n which H i l l would have obhorred.
A l b e r t Hirschmon s u p p l i e s a complement t o C o l e m n ' s a n a l y s i s .
Exit,
In
i n r e e l e c t i o n and s i x b l o c s of v o t e r s who have no i n t e r e s t i n t h e
t h e v e r y t i t l e of
outcome of t h e e l e c t i o n o s such b u t have v a r y i n g i n t e r e s t s w i t h r e s p e c t
main r e s p o n s e s t h e members o r c l i e n t s of a c o r p o r o t e a c t o r m y g i v e t o
t o a half-dozen d i f f e r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n s , a s w e l l a s v a r y i n g
i t s d e c l i n i n g performance.
d e g r e e s of c o n t r o l o v e r t h e e l e c t i o n ' s outcome.
a t a p r i c e , v o t e w i t h t h e i r f e e t ; t h e y may
He i s a b l e t o show
Voice, and L o y o l t y , h e i d e n t i f i e s t h e t h r e e
The c o n s t i t u e n t s of o c o r r u p t s t o t c m y ,
m. They
may
thetr
good t h e o r e t i c a l grounds f o r e x p e c t i n g t h e l e g i s l a t o r t o f o l l o w t h e
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n more o r l e s s a g g r e s s i v e l y ; t l i a t r e s p o n s e , t o o , w i l l hove
c o n s t i t u e n c y where t h e r e is consensus.
its price.
Less o b v i o u s l y , he g i v e s
Or they may w a i t o u t t h e bod t i m e s i n hopes of b e t t e r
a.
Loyolty,
-
grounds f o r a t t r i b u t i n g g r e a t e r chances of s u c c e s s t o t h e a c t o r whose
remin
i n t e r e s t s a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n few l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n s a n d / o r a l l i e d
performance.
w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r o c t o r s (Colemon 1973:. 115-117).
is t o s p e c i f y t h e t r s d e o f f s among e x i t , v o i c e and l o y a l t y , and t o s e e
Colemon h a s extended t h e same s o r t of i n q u i r y t o t h e s t r u c t u r e
of s o c i e t y a s a whole.
first, in
-
Ile p u t s t o g e t h e r two c r u c i a l o b s e r v a t i o n s :
t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e c o r p o r a t e a c t o r s e a c h a t t e n d t o a narrower
range of i n t e r e s t s t h a n n o t u r a l persons do; t h a t is t h e i r r a t i o n a l e ,
'too, h a s o p r i c e :
e n d u r i n g t h e substondord
A l l t h r e e r e s p o n s e s c o s t something.
The a n a l y t i c problem
how t h e t r a d e o f f s vary.
For t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , H i r s c l ~ m n ' s f o r m u l e t i o n
improves g f e a t l y on a s i m p l e analogy w i t h a p r i c e system.
In a simplc
p r i c e system, t h e i n e f f i c i e n t f i r m f a c e s t h e l o s s of i t s customers t o
i t s c o m p e t i t o r s , b u t no o t h e r s a n c t i o n .
The model of a s i m p l e p r i c e
s e l f - i n t e r e s t of t h e a v e r a g e p a r t i c i p a n t .
One l i k e l y c a n d i d a t e w h l c t ~
system o f t e n a p p l i e s p o o r l y t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , s i n c e t h e c o s t s of
Olson i d e n t i f i e s i s t h e p r o v i s i o n of s e l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e s o t h e r than
e x i t a r e f r e q u e n t l y t o o high.
t h e outcome of t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o particular members of t h e group.
When tlie government i s c o r r u p t , most
a c t o r s have t o c l ~ o o s ebetween s t a t i n g t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n and s u f f e r i n g
Another i s c o e r c i o n , which is t h e n e g a t i v e c o u n t e r p a r t of s e l e c t i v e
i n ~ i l e n c e ,between v o i c e and l o y a l t y .
incentives.
However, tlirschman a r g u e s ,
a r e a l i s t i c t h r e a t ) b u t n o t s o e a s y t h a t people r u s h away a s soon a s
modicum of l o y a l t y
e f f e c t of v o i c e .
Voice t h e n c a r r i e s t h e t h r e a t of e x i t .
-- of
reluctance t o leave
--
strengthens the corrective
Mirschman's a n a l y s i s s t e e r s u s i n t o t h e world of c o l l e c t i v e goods,
A c o l l e c t i v e good i s
"
. . . any
. . . Xi . . . X
good
consumes i t ,
i t cannot f e a s i b l y be w i t h h e l d from t h e o t h e r s i n t h a t group" (Olson
1965:
14).
Examples a r e a smog-free environment and m i l i t a r y d e f e n s e .
Mancur Olson t r e a t s c o l l e c t l v e a c t i o n , i n e s s e n c e , a s t h e e f f o r t t o
produce c o l l e c t i v e goods.
That p e r m i t s him t o a p p l y tlie economic
t h e o r y of p u b l i c goods t o s new domain:
t h e a c t i o n s of l a b o r u n i o n s ,
i n t e r e s t groups and s i m i l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o s common assumption:
Some t r y t o r e f i n e and q u a l i f y i t .
Some c r i t i c i z e Olson's a n a l y s i s .
Some go buck t o t h e c l s s s i c p o l i t i c a l
i d e a of a government ( o r a n o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h powers o f compulsion)
which o v e r r i d e s i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s t o s e r v e t h e common good; i n t h a t
s c t i o n i n a world of g l a n t c o r p o r a t e a c t o r s .
s u c l ~t h a t , i f any person Xi i n a group X1
Many o t h e r s t u d e n t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n have t r i e d t o p i c k up
t h e problem where Olson l e f t i t .
A
Hirschmnn c l a r i E i e s tlie s t r a t e g i c choice^ f o r c o l l e c t i v e
n s w e l l a s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
--
b u t t h e n we must e x p l a i n why.
v o i c e i s a t i t s most e f f e c t i v e when e x i t i s p o s s i b l e (and t h e r e f o r e
perrormnnce d e c l i n e s .
It is a l s o possible t h a t people a r e a c t i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y
One r e s u l t i s Olson's
t h a t t h e e x l s t e n c e and a c t i v i t y
c a s e , i t does n o t m a t t e r whether t h e c o e r c i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n came i n t o
b e i n g through a d e l i b e r a t e p r i o r agreement, a c o n q u e s t , a d e c e p t i o n o r
something e l s e .
Other people have t r i e d t o i d e n t i f y a s p e c t s of r a t i o n a l i t y which
Olson n e g l e c t e d .
One promising s u g g e s t i o n s e p a r a t e s 1 ) t h e a v e r a g e
p a r t i c i p a n t ' s r e t u r n from c o l l e c t i v e a c t l o n and 2) t h e p o s s i b l e r e t u r n
t o tlie p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r who o r g a n i z e s on a c t i o n .
Oppenheimer end Young (1971:
A s Frohllch,
6) p u t i t , c o l l e c t i v e goods "wilJ be
s u p p l i e d when someone f i n d s i t p r o f i t a b l e t o s e t up an o r g a n i z a t i o n ( o r
make u s e of some e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n ) , c o l l e c t r e s o u r c e s , ond s u p p l y
of s o c l ~o r g a n i z a t i o n s flows n a t u r a l l y from t h e r a t i o n n l p u r s u i t of
t h e goods i n question."
shared i n t e r e s t s .
t h e c o l l e c t i v e good i n r e t u r n f o r d o n a t i o n s , e x t o r t i o n s , p u r c h a s e s nnd
I n most c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a c c o r d i n g t o O l s o n ' s a n a l y s i s , t h e a v e r a g e
group member's e s t i m a t e d a d d i t i o n a l r e t u r n from p n r t i c i p a t l o n i n t h e
e f f o r t w i l l be l e s s than t h e c o s t of t h e e f f o r t i t s e l f .
If c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n does o c c u r , t h e n , i t s e x p l a n a t i o n must l l e o u t s i d e t h e r a t i o n a l
taxes.
The e n t r e p r e n e u r a r r a n g e s f o r t h e s u p p l y of
If t h e sum of d o n a t i o n s , e x t o r t i o n s , purchases and t a x e s 1s
s m a l l e r than t h e v a l u e of t h e c o l l e c t i v e good t o n l l r e c i p i e n t s , y e t
l a r g e r than t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r ' s c o s t i n s u p p l y i n g i t , t h e c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n s e r v e s t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r a s w e l l ns t h e c o l l e c t i v e
interest
.
F r o h l i c h , Oppenheimer and Young work o u t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s
oE such an approach i n microeconomic language.
The t h e o r y l e a d s t o
some interesting hypotheses c o n c e r n i n g c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
For example:
Thus tlie t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s becomes n major
p a r t of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e form and i n t e n s i t y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
A s i n most M i l l i a n work. t h e i n t e r e s t s i n q u e s t i o n a r e g i v e n and f i x e d .
Yet t h e a n a l y s i s p e r m i t s both u n c e r t a i n t y and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n
"The more a p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r depends upon d o n a t i o n s , t h e more
wary h e w i l l be of c o l l e c t i v e goods t h a t a r e d u r a b l e o r have
high i n i t i a l c o s t s of s u p p l y . "
c o n c e r n i n g a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
The same emphasis on t h e i n c e n t i v e s and t a c t i c a l problems OF
p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s a p p e a r s i n t h e r e c e n t work of John UcCarthy
and Mayer Zald.
"A p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r w i l l d i v e r s i f y h i s a c t i v i t i e s more and
more I n t o t h e p r o v i s i o n of p r i v a t e goods a s t h e s i z e of h i s o v e r a l l
operation increases
. . ."
L o o k i n g ' e t American s o c i s l movements, ElcCnrthy and Zald
o b s e r v e tlie r i s e of p r o f e s s i o n a l l y - s t a f f e d
movement o r g a n i z a t i o n s such
a s Common Cause and t h e N a t i o n a l Council of S e n i o r C i t l z e n s f o r I l c e l t h
Care through S o c i a l S e c u r i t y .
R e f l e c t i o n on such o r g a n i z a t i o n s l e a d s
them t o two c r i t i c i s m s o f c l a s s i c a n a l y s e s of s o c i a l movements:
"If h i s chances of v i c t o r y a r e n e a r z e r o , a n o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r
w i l l d i f f e r e n t i a t e h i s program s h a r p l y from t h a t of t h e incumbent
l e a d e r , a n d / o r p l a n h i s a c t i o n s t o maximize t h e s u r p l u s he can
o b t a i n from remaining i n o p p o s i t i o n . "
1 ) t h e i r s t r o n g emphasis on g r i e v a n c e s and s t a t e s of mind a s opposed
t o o r g a n i z a t i o n a l end t a c t i c a l problems; 2) t h e i r assumption of a n
i d e n t i t y among t h e a g g r i e v e d p o p u l a t i o n , t h e s u p p o r t f o r a movement,
and t h e s o u r c e s of l e a d e r s h i p o r a c t i v i s m .
Against t h e " c l a s s i c model"
t h e y a r g u e t h a t a l l movement o r g a n i z a t i o n s , whatever t h e g r i e v a n c e s t o
"Competitors o p e r a t i n g under s d e c i s i o n r u l e w i l l p l a c e a h l g h e r
premium on f i r m commitments on t h e p a r t of t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s
than t h o s e who do n o t
."
which t h e y respond, f a c e t h e common, p r e s s i n g problems of a c q u i r i n g
enough r e s o u r c e s t o do t h e i r work.
I n a s i m i l a r environment, t h e
common problems tend t o produce common s o l u t i o n s , such a s t h e prof e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e s t a f f and t h e t u r n i n g t o p e o p l e o u t s l d e t h e
"Whenever s c o m p e t i t o r makes a d e f i n i t e promise t o s u p p l y a
c o l l e c t i v e good i n exchange f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s from a g i v e n
s u p p o r t e r o r group o f s u p p o r t e r s , h e w i l l t r y t o h i d e t h i s
f a c t from a s many people a s p o s s i b l e . "
and Young 1971:
139-141.)
( F r o h l l c h , Oppenheimer
aggrieved population f o r support.
produce t h e i r own problems
- for
The common s o l u t i o n s , i n t u r n ,
example, r e s l ' c o n f l i c t s among t h e
i n t e r e s t s of t h e movement o r g a n i z a t i o n a s s u c h , t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e
o u t s i d e r s who p r o v i d e major s u p p o r t f o r tlie o r g o n l z a t i o n , and t h e I n t e r e s t s f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n presumably f i r s t n r o s e .
If
we a r e a l o n g way from Mill's concern w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r good
government, we a r e a very long way from Durkheim's anomic i n d i v i d u a l s .
The a n a l y s i s is s t i l l e s s e n t i a l l y M i l l i a n ; i t t e n d s t o t a k e t h e i n t e r e s t s
f o r g r a n t e d , and t o emphasize t h e c a u s e s and e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t means
of a c t i o n on t h o s e i n t e r e a t s .
Strategic Interaction
B-
We have followed t h e p a t h from John S t u a r t M i l l which l e a d s t o
s o c i a l movements v i a c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e and c o l l e c t i v e goods.
i
There
And we can d e s c r i b e some extreme t y p e s of i n t e r a c t i o n by p l a c i n ~
b o u n d a r i e s around a l l p o s s i b l e outcomes:
a r e o t h e r , l e s s t r o d d e n , p a t h s , which c o u l d t a k e us t o t h e same
destination.
The most i m p o r t a n t p a s s through t h e s t u d y of s t r a t e g i c
interaction:
b a r g a i n i n g , warmaking, game-playing and t h e l i k e .
Here
we tend t o t a k e b o t h t h e i n t e r e s t s and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of o u r a c t o r s
a s g i v e n , and t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t a c t i c s and s t r a t e g y a s f u n c t i o n s of
v a r y i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s and of v a r y i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h o s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
I m p l i c i t l y , most s t u d i e s of s t r a t e g i c ' i n t e r a c t i o n b e g i n w i t h some
v e r s i o n of t h e f o l l o w i n g scheme:
I n t h e p u r e - c o n f l i c t c a s e , no p o s s i b l e outcome p r o v i d e s g a i n s f o r
B GAINS
I
A LOSES
A GAINS
both p a r t i e s .
I n t h e pure-cooperation c a s e , t h e w o r s t t h a t can
happen is t h a t n e i t h e r g a i n s .
I n t h e open c a s e , a l l f o u r q u a d r a n t s
a r e available.
B LOSES
'The same diagram s e r v e s t o t r a c e t h e patli of a s t r a t e g i c i n t e r -
I n t h e s i m p l e two-party i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h a s i n g l e outcome, an end p o i n t
anywhere i n q u a d r a n t 2 means t h a t A g a i n s w h i l e B l o s e s , a n , e n d p o i n t
i n q u a d r a n t 3 means t h a t b o t h l o s e , and s o on.
The p o s s i b l e outcomes
of a zero-sum i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l f a l l i n t o a s t r a i g h t l i n e :
a c t i o n through a s e r i e s of i n t e r m e d i a t e outcomes:
I n its many v a r i a n t s , t h i s approach c l a r i E i e s t h e a n a l y s i s of o u t I
comes and p a t h s t o outcomes.
ks i n s t u d i e s of c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e , t h e
a n a l y s t t y p i c a l l y manipulates t h e relevant i n c e n t i v e s , information.
d e c i s i o n r u l e s and a v a i l a b l e s t r a t e g i e s .
He does n o t a t t e m p t t o
e x p l a i n how and why i n c e n t i v e s , i n f o r m a t i o n , d e c i s i o n r u l e s and a v n i l -
\\
77
BOTH
DISARMED
a b l e s t r a t e g i e s vary.
t h e o r y of games.
That i s g e n e r a l l y t r u e , f o r example. of t h e
I t i s "a g e n e r a l framework f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of i n t e r -
a c t i o n s among s e v e r a l a g e n t s who a r e m u t u a l l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n t
. . . and
whose i n t e r e s t s a r e t o some d e g r e e c o n f l i c t i n g " (Kramer and l l e r t z b e r g
1975:
379).
Game t h e o r i s t s t y p i c a l l y o r g a n i z e t h e i r a n a l y s e s around
a'payoff'matrix.
I n a n e l e m e n t a r y v e r s i o n , we have two s h a r p s h o o t i n g
p i r a t e s , Hook and Blackbeard, d u e l l i n g o v e r a t h o u s a n d - d o l l a r c h e s t of
gold.
N e i t h e r one e v e r m i s s e s h i s mark, b o t h f i r e st o n c e , b u t t h e i r
o l d p i s t o l s f a i l one t i m e o u t of two.
gold;
The s u r v i v o r , i f any. t a k e s t h e
i f b o t h s u r v i v e , t h e y s p l i t t h e t r e a s u r e evenly.
The payoff
matrix looks l i k e t h i s :
BLACKBEARD
FIRES
FIRES
I n t h i s i n s t a n c e (adapted from Kenneth Boulding ' s C o n f l i c t and Defense,
p. 50). t h e s h o r t - s i g h t e d i n t e r e s t of e a c h p a r t y i s t o arm a g a i n s t t h e
o t h e r , and t h e s h o r t - s i g h t e d e q u i l i b r i u m h a s both worse o f f because of
arming.
The d o t t e d l i n e r e p r e s e n t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a l o n g e r - s i g h t e d ,
more advantageous c q u l l l b r i u m through disarmament.
HOOK
MISFIRES
MISFIRES
( I n each c a s e , t h e payoff t o Hook l i e s above tlie d i a g o n a l , t h e payoff
t o Blackbeard below t h e d i a g o n a l . )
much of a game.
L e f t i n t h i s form, t h e d u e l i s n o t
Each p i r a t e h a s two chances i n f o u r of d y i n g , one
O v e r a l l , grab-and-run
is a more f a v o r a b l e a t r a t e g y f o r e i t h e r p l r a t e .
But i f Hook is s u r e t h a t Blackbeard w i l l g r a b and r u n , h e may b e
tempted t o f i r e .
I f Blackbeard is s u r e t h a t llook w l l l r u n , he w l l l be
chance of g a i n i n g a thousand d o l l a r s , and one chance of g a i n i n g 500.
i n c l i n e d t o g r a b and r u n h i m s e l f ; Hook, b e i n g f o s t e r , is more l i k e l y
I f each v a l u e s h i s own l i f e a t a thousand d o l l a r s , i n t h e i n s t a n t b e f o r e
t o e s c a p e w i t h t h e l o o t , b u t t h e r e i s some chance Blackbenrd w i l l g e t
f i r i n g each p i r a t e aliould e s t i m a t e h i s p r o b a b l e gairi a s
t h e r e f i r s t , a good chance t h a t t h e y w i l l s p l i t t h e t r e a s u r e , and no
chance t h a t e i t h e r w i l l d i e .
T h i s f a n c i f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n makes t h e e s s e n t i a l p o i n t :
a game-
t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s p o r t r a y s a s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n a s t h e outcome
Not very encouraging.
Without a chance t o r u n away, t o b a r g a i n o r
of one o r more w e l l - d e f i n e d ,
d e l i b e r a t e d e c i s i o n s on t h e p a r t of each
t o c h e a t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e s i z e of t h a t e s t i m a t e w i l l n o t a f f e c t Hook's
of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s .
The d e c i a i o n is a f u n c t i o n of t h e outcomes each
o r Blackbeard's b e h a v i o r .
To c o n v e r t t h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n t o an i n t e r e s t i n g game, we muat
p a r t i c i p a n t c o n s i d e r a l i k e l y t o f o l l o w from t h e v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e comb i n a t i o n s of h i s own a c t i o n and t h e a c t i o n of t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p o t i t e .
g i v e each p i r o t e a c h o i c e of s t r a t e g i e s , and i n t r o d u c e some u n c e r t a i n t y
So f a r , t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s of game t h e o r y t o t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e
a b o u t which s t r a t e g y each w i l l choose.
We can do t h a t by a ) g i v i n g
a c t i o n have been i n d i r e c t .
At i t s b e a t , game t h e o r y l i e l p s u s under-
each p i r a t e t h e c h o i c e between f i r i n g , a s b e f o r e , o r t r y i n g t o run o f f
s t a n d t h e s t r a t e g i c problems of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s , and h e l p s u s s e e
w l t h t h e c h e a t w l ~ l l et h e o t h e r p i r a t e is l o a d i n g h i s gun, b ) n o t i c i n g
how tlie a v a i l a b l e means of i n t e r a c t i o n l i m l t t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
t h a t one is a slower r u n n e r , t h e o t h e r a worse s h o t .
One p l a u s i b l e
r e a l i z i n g t h e b e a t i n t e r e s t s of any p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r , o r of a l l
m a t r i x r e s u l t i n g from t h o s e changes is:
acotrs together.
Analyses of b a r g a i n i n g l i k e w i s e c o n c e n t r a t e on outcomes and p a t h s
BLACKBEARD
FTRE
t o outcomes.
activity.
FIRE
A s h e n f e l t e r and Johnson, f o r example, a n a l y z e s t r i k e
CRAB AND RUN
They b e g i n w i t h a t h r e e - p a r t y b a r g a i n i n g model which i n v o l v e s
a f i r m , i t s workers and t h e workers' union l e a d e r s h i p .
The s t r i k e ,
i n t h a t model, i s a consequence of t h e f i r m ' s u n r e a d l n e s a t o accede t o
G
M
AND
RUN
wage demands p r i o r t o open c o n f l i c t , which i n t u r n depends i n p a r t on
t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between what t h e workers want and what t h e union l e a d e r s
t h i n k they can g e t .
The f i r m - l e v e l model t h e r e f o r e i n c o r p o r a t e s a
series of conditions (the size of wage illcrease acceptable to the workers,
their theoretical content, or lack of it. Some (like Ted Curr's
the speed at which the workers' expectations decline during a strike,
earlier work) attempt to estimate essentially sttitudinal models in an
and so on) which predict to that unreadiness.
econometric style. Some (like Gurr's reformulation of his initial
argument) are eclectic efforts to assemble individually plausible
For lack of evidence to test their models at the level of the firm,
Ashenfelter and Johnson make some plausible inferences to determinants
of strike activity at s larger scale. At the level of the labor force
variables into equations which state their joint effects and interrelations.
,
In either case, we find relatively little of the MillCan
os a whole, they build models involving unemployment levels, previous
concern with the effects of alternative decision rules in the context
changes in real wages and corporate profits.
of fixed interests and changing opportunities to act on those ioterests.
Estimating their principal
Douglas Hibbs' cross-national study of "mass political violence"
equations on numbers of strikes reported quarterly in the U . S. from
January 1952 through June 1967, they achieve a good fit to the observed
exemplifies the best in pseudo-Million onolyseo. Hibbs analyzes counts
time series. They conclude thst strike activity is, in fact, mainly
of riots, armed attacks, political strikes, ossassinstions. deaths
a function of the tightness of the labor market and of previous rates
from political violence and antigovernment demonstrations in 108 countries
of change in real wages (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969:
summed for two adjacent decsdes:
47).
(All the
1948-57 and 1958-67.
Via factor
substantial work done so far points to a general tendency for strike
analysis, Hibbs combines these diverse events into two dimensions:
activity in contemporary western countries to rise in good times and
Collective Protest and Internal War.
to decline in bod.)
literature for proposed predictors of these variables, cautiously
In both the emll-scale model they formulate
and the large-scale model they estimate, Ashenfelter and Johnson portray strike activity as one outcome of a coherent bargaining process
II
working them into causal models.
Then he combs the existing
One of Hibbs' diogroms of the cstimted
causal relationships (expressed here os standardized regression co-
in which all parties watch closely their opportunities to act on their
efficients) appears in Figure 2-5.
interests. The Cormul.ation differs from those of game theory, but the
things, thst the negative sanctions (censorship, restrictions on political
tone of the analysis is still resolutely Millian.
activity) imposed by the government during tlie second decade predicted
Mill and Pseudo-Mill
strongly to the country's level of internal war and of collective
At the edge of the Millian tradition stand s number of quantitative
The diagram indicates, among other
protest, while the membership of the nstlonsl Communist Party in 1960
analyses of conflict and collective action. We might better call them
predicted weakly to the level of collective protest during the second
pseudo-Millisn.
decade.
They resemble the work of collective-choice ond col-
lective-goods theorists in that the models and estimating procedures
typically take on econometric form. They are pseudo-Millian because of
~ibbs'work is representative in that it formulates and tests
general arguments by means of comparisons of aggregated measures for
Figure 2-5:
considerable numbers of whole countries.
One of Douglas Hibbs'
It does not examine variation
within countries, among groups or from one time period to another; it
Causal Models of Political Violence
does not treat the determinnnts of particulsr events or deal with their
internal development. With the expanded use of computers, multivariate
statistical analysis and international banks in the 19608, a large
Internal War D2
Elite Electoral
number of studies in the same style appeared. tlibb's study summarizes
and improves upon the entire lot.
As compared with Durkheimlan work, Million analyses of collective
action have regularly involved careful. formalization and statistical
estimation of their arguments. Where Durkheimians postulate two or
Product pc 1960
Sanctions D2
three rather distinct types of collective action arising out of different
patterns of social change, Millians tend to think of all collective
action as expressing the same fundamental rationality. The price of
these advantages has been some loss of richness, some concentrnti'on on
situations in which the choices and interests are exceptionally clear,
some tendency to emphasize variables which are easy to quantify. So
far we have a good deal of rigor, but no models of revolution so
Membership 1960
suggestive as those of Huntington or Johnson.
The Millinn emphasis on
the rational pursuit of interests is a welcome antidote to notions of
(Abbrcviatlons: In = log-normal transformation; D2 = second decade,
1958-67; pc
-
per capita)
crowd action as impulsive and irrational. Yet so far the followers of
Mill have'not given us much insight into the way those interests arise
and change. They have not said much about the way people define,
articulate and organize their interests. For further ideas on those
questions, we may turn to the tradition of Max Webcr.
Weber
In Max Weber's treatment , groups commit themselves to coll.ective
definitions of the world and of themselves. The definitions incorporate
2-39
g o a l s , e n t a i l s t a n d a r d s of b e h a v i o r , and i n c l u d e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e
power of a u t h o r i t i e s .
groups.
of t h e charisma i n q u e s t i o n
C o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t i e s a c t on b e h a l f of t h e
Sometimes t h e a u t h o r i t i e s a c t on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l
Which of t h e a e b a s e s t h e group
t h e i r charisma.
a d o p t s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t s i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s f a t e .
development of r e l i a b l e means f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r u e and f a l s e v e r s i o n s
of t h e b e l i e f s , p r o v i s i o n f o r s u c c e s s i o n t o t h e l e a d e r a h i p .
Whether i n
Weber s e e s s i x main mechanisms by which c h a r i s m a t i c groups s o l v e
t r a d i t i o n a l , c h a r i s m a t i c o r r a t i o n a l - l e g a l form, however, t h e j u a t i f i cations a l l constrain the authorities' actions.
t h e problem of s u c c e s s i o n (Weber 1972:
I n Weber's a c c o u n t ,
t h e s t r u c t u r e and a c t i o n of t h e group a s a whole s p r i n g l a r g e l y from t h e
i n i t i a l commitment t o a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of b e l i e f system.
Beliefs
hnve t h e i r own l o g i c and f o r c e .
its secular equivalents.
a s e a r c h f o r a n o t h e r c h s r i a m a t i c l e a d e r o f t h e same t y p e ;
2.
r e v e l a t i o n through some procedure honored by t h e group;
3.
t h e o l d l e a d e r ' s p e r s o n a l d e s i g n a t i o n of a s u c c e s s o r , w i t h
t h e group'a a p p r o v a l ;
t h e d i v i n e g i f t of g r a c e and
According t o Weber, r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l
v i r t u o s o s o r e c o n t i n u a l l y f o r m u l a t i n g new d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e world and
of themselves.
inventors.
both t o t h e
Only a few, however, a t t r a c t anyone b e a i d e s t h e i r
t h e e x c e p t i o n a l moral q u a l i t i e a
--
-
of t h e l e a d e r s , o b j e c t s and r i t u e l s
c o n s e c r a t e d by t h o s e b e l i e f s .
d o f i n i t i o n s of t h e world p r o v i d e more c o h e r e n t answers t o t h e problem
of meaning they f a c e t h a n do t h e o l d d e f i n i t i o n s a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e t o
and t h e group expands.
Then t h e group a s a whole
f a c e s t h e problem of t h e " r o u t i n i z a t l . o n of charisma".
f o r r o u t i n i z a t i o n is V e r n l l t i g l i c h u n g
r i t u a l d e s i g n a t i o n by t h e body of s u r v i v i n g l e n d e r a ;
5.
r e l i a n c e on k i n s h i p , w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t charisma i s i n h e r i t a b l e ;
6.
t r a n s f e r of charisma t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e t o i t a
The c h o i c e among t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s then l i m i t s what t h e group can do
next.
But a l l t h e c h o i c e s r e q u i r e t h e c r e a t i o n of a c e r t a i n amount of
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , w i t h i t s own momentum and i t s own e x i g e n c i e s .
I f t h e group s u r v i v e s t h a t p r o c e s a , we have a n o t h e r d u r a b l e collective
Where many more p e o p l e , f o r whatever r e a s o n , f i n d t h a t t h e new
them, they j o i n
4.
o f f i c i a l s and r i t u a l s .
I n t h o s e few c a s e s , a group of f o l l o w e r s commit themselves
b e l i e f system and t o a n acknowledgment of t h e charisma
143-144):
1.
Weber o f f e r e d h i s f u l l e s t a c c o u n t of t h e o r i g i n s of t h e fundamental
b e l i e f s i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n s of charisma:
The r o u t i n i z o t i o n of charisma i n v o l v e s
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of t h e b e l i e f s w i t h t h e e x i g e n c i e s of o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
a g e n t s f o r t h e group, sometimes on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r e x t r a o r d i n a r y
--
s t a t e s d r a m a t i c a l l y t h e p r o c e s s of
t u r n i n g something e x t r a o r d i n a r y i n t o something o r d i n a r y , i n t o something
u n d e r s t o o d and c o n t r o l l a b l e . )
r o l e s , sometimes on t h e b a a i s of t h e i r r a t i o n a l - l e g a l d e s i g n a t i o n a s
personal character
-- which
-- l i t e r a l l y
(Weber's German
t h e "everydaying"
a c t o r o p e r a t i n g under t h e d i r e c t i o n of i t s own constituted a u t h o r i t i e s .
Weber's d i s c u s s i o n of t h e "everydaying" of charisma f i t s n e a t l y
i n t o h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y of s o c i a l change.
Weber p o r t r a y s t r a d i t i o n a l
a u t h o r i t y a s a s o r t of e q u i l i b r i u m i n t o which s o c i a l l i f e t e n d s t o
f a l l i f no s t r e n u o u s d i s r u p t i o n o c c u r s .
d i s r u p t i o n a r e always p o s s i b l e :
But two opposing s o u r c e s of
t h e power of r a t i o n a l i t y and t h o
2-41
power of charism.
Each represents the force of a coherent idea, of a
pure principle, when applied to history.
Nevertheless, Weber's formulation agrees with Durkheim's in sug-
Bureaucratic rationalization, says Weber, "can be a revolutionary
force of tlie first rank against tradition, and often has been.
revolutionizes by means of techniques
arrangements first" (Weber 1972: 657).
the movements in the first place.
But it
. . . from outside, things and
The rational rearrangement of
the environment eventually transforms people and their world-views.
Chnrl.sma, in Weber's analysis, works in exactly the opposite way:
gesting that rapid social change (hence, presumably greater likelihood
that existing beliefs will become inadequate as guides to routine social
life) will produce widespread non-routine collective action. Then
Weber goes his own way in implying that there are really two main
categories of collective actors. those oriented to deviant beliefs and
first
those oriented to beliefs which hove won general acceptonce; routinizotion
transforming tlie inner life, then leading people to transform their
and diffusion turn one into the other. By extension, the Weberian theory
worlds.
also suggests that commitment to a group is on incentive, rather than a
"It is in this purely empirical and value-free sense the
supremely and specifically 'creative' force in history" (Weber 1972:
barrier, to participation in collective action
658).
collective action.
As Frnncesco Alberoni points out, in Weber's view "Charisma
--
including non-routine
Today, political analysts commonly invoke essentlnlly
does not grow from bureaucracy, but counterpoises itself to bureaucracy;
Weberian explanations of tlie collective actions of notional states and
it appears as something gratuitous, miraculous, irrational" (Alberoni
complex organizations.
1968: 15).
of crowds, political movements or revolutionary groups.
As Alberoni also points out, Weber's theorizing stops at exactly
that point.
Weber gives us a dramatic, compelling sense of social
change as a product of the irruption of charisma into history and of
the diffusion of rationalization through history.
Me provides a sense
They are less likely to apply Weber to tlie actions
Social Movements
Studies of collective action within the Weberian tradition hove
commonly employed the framework of the social movement.
In his brief
conceptual work on the subject. Paul Wilkinson defines a sociol movement
of tlie historical power of a movement oriented to a coherent idea. Yet
lie offers no theory of the circumstances under which charismatic movements arise. His giant comparison of civilizations gives us a heroic
historical analysis of the way one rationalizing movement
modern western Europe
--
--
. . . a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any
direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality,
that of
revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' community
developed, but no manageable general scheme for
...A
social
movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this
the explanation of rationalizing movements. As a result, Weber's followers
may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization
have had to complement their Weberian treatments of the life-courses of
to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the
movements with non-Weberion explanations of why people formed and joined
c o r p o r a t e group
. . .A
s o c i a l movement's commitment t o change and
proceeds l o g i c a l l y :
t h e c h a r a c t e r of campus d i s c o n t e n t , c o n s c r i p t i o n a s
t h e r a i s o n d ' k t r e of i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a r e founded upon t h e c o n s c i o u s
a r e a l i t y and a s an i s s u e , t h e b a s e and p r o c e s s of r e c r u i t m e n t t o t h e
v o l i t i o n , normative commitment t o t h e movement's aims o r b e l i e f s ,
movement, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l problems and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f t h e movemcnt.
and a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e f o l l o w e r s o r members
p o l i t i c a l outcomes of movement a c t i o n s .
(Wilkinson 1971:
t h e g r e a t importance of t h e f r a g i l e s t u d e n t d r a f t deferment a s s s t i m u l u s
27).
For example, Useem p o l n t s o u t
T h i s d e f i n i t i o n , a l t h o u g h c l e a r e r t h a n most of t h o s e one e n c o u n t e r s on
t o j o i n i n g t h e movement.
e t o u r through t h e l i t e r a t u r e of s o c i a l movements, conveys t h e u s u a l
temporary c o a l i t i o n s between R e s i s t a n c e and o t h e r p r o t e s t groups s e e k i n g
meaning of tlie term.
s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t g o a l s ; i n h i s view, t h e decay of c o a l i t i o n s w i t h
The u n d e r l y i n g c o n c e p t i o n r e f l e c t s t h a t o f Weber:
a group of people somchow o r i e n t themselves t o t h e same b e l i e f system
and a c t t o g e t h e r t o promote change on tlie b a s i s of t h e common o r i e n t a t i o n .
Thus t h e s t a n d a r d q u e s t i o n s become:
a r i s e and a c q u i r e f o l l o w i n g s 7
llow do such systems of b e l i e f s
How do they c o n s t r a i n t h e i r a d h e r e n t s 7
For a n o t h e r , he a n a l y z e s t h e s . i g n l f l c a n c e of
s u c h groups a s SDS a c c e l e r a t e d t h e d e c l i n e of R e s i s t a n c e a s a movement.
Useem's agenda is c l a s s i c .
We f i n d i t d i r e c t i n g s t u d i e s of r e v o l u -
t i o n a r y movements, r e l i g i o u s movements, e t h n i c movements. movcmcnta of
reform.
Useem himself h a s a p p l i e d t h c same scheme t o a wide v a r i e t y of
He ends t h a t s u r v e y w i t h two major c o m p l a i n t s
How do they and t h e groups which form around them change, r o u t i n i z e ,
American p r o t e s t movements.
disappear7
a b o u t e x i s t i n g a n a l y t i c e l schemes:
We a r e n o t s u r p r i s e d , t h e n , t o f i n d Michael Useem beginning h i s
d i a c u s s i o n of t h e R e s i s t a n c e , t h e American movement of t h e 1960s a g a i n s t
1 ) a l t h o u g h t l ~ c yp r o v i d e a r e n s o n a b l e
g r i p on t h e i n t e r n a l development of a movemcnt once i t h a s begun, t h e y
c o n t a i n no s e r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e g e n e s i s of p r o t e s t movements;
2) t h e i r a c c o u n t s of t h e p r o c e s s by which such movements m o b i l i z e f o r
m i l i t a r y c o n s c r i p t i o n , w i t h t h e s e words:
a c t i o n a r e q u i t e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . . " A t t e n t i o n must b e d i r e c t e d . " c o n c l u d e s
The formati,on of a p r o t e s t movement i s g e n e r a l l y c o n t i g e n t on
t h e p r e e x i s t e n c e of a group of people u n i t e d around a s e t of
p o l i t l c a l p r i n c i p l e s d e a l i n g w i t h a s o l u t i o n t o a s o c i a l problem.
Some p r o t e s t s e r u p t s p o n t a n e o u s l y and r e f l e c t l i t t l e c o n s c i o u s
e f f o r t by a p o l i t i c i z e d l e a d e r s h i p .
But many movements, t h e
Resistance included, a r e i n s t i t u t e d only a f t e r a lengthy maturation
p r o c e s s i n which a s u b s t a n t i a l number of p e o p l e come t o view a
new p r o t e s t program a s v a l i d and r e a l i s t i c (Useem 1973:
37).
Given t h a t b e g i n n i n g , Useem's own i n q u i r y i n t o American d r a f t r e s i s t a n c e
.Useem. " a t t h e c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n major i n s t i t u t i o n a l systems i n America,
b o t h a s s o u r c e s of p r o t e s t and a l s o f o r t h e r o l e they p l a y i n s l ~ a p i n g
t h e program, o r g a n i z a t i o n , and growth of tlie movemcnt.
S i n c e mnny
t y p e s o f c o l l e c t i v e b e h a v i o r and s o c i a l movements do n o t s h a r e such r o o t s ,
a t t e m p t s t o develop a s i n g l e t h e o r y f o r e x p l n i n i n g a f u l l r a n g e of
c o l l e c t i v e phenomena a r e bound t o o v e r l o o k f a c t o r s t h a t p l a y a r o l e i n
p r o t e s t , but not
o t h e r t y p e s o f , movements" (Useem 1975:
51).
old middle class in the twentieth century.
Anyone who runs through the many writings on American social
Roberta Ash embeds her own brief discussion of Temperance in a
movements will notice, in fact, a good deal of agreement about tlie
survey of nineteenth-century middle-class movements.
characteristic life histories of movements and widespread disagreement
about why and how movements arise in the first place.
Joseph Gusfield's
They were more
or less interchangeable, she says, but Temperance mingled "a desire to
Symbolic Crusade, a thoughtful analysis of the American Temperance
ameliorate the lot of workers, to destroy a less genteel life style
movement, distinguishes among three types of movement:
and perhaps unconsciously express frustration st the loss of political
class, status
...
and expressive. The class movement, according to Gusfdeld, organizes
power
instrumentally around some specific interest of its public.
from Gusfield's, but the basic pro~edureis the same: account Eor the
The status
The characterization differs somewhat
In her general
analysis of social movements in America, Ash portrays changes in the
or by pursuit OF goals which are unrelated to the discontents from which
23).
136).
which the adherents find themselves at the start.
Expressive movements "are marked by goalless behavior
the movement had its source" (Gusfield 1966:
(Ash 1972:
movement's genesis and content by means of the structural situation in
movement orients itself toward the enhancement or maintenance of the
group's prestige.
"
organization of production as producing new structural problems for
In all three cases
the character of tlie public and the character of the goal provide the
different social groups; when ideologically legitimate means for acting
major explanations of the movement's content.
on those problems are not available, the groups tend to create social
movements for the solutions of their problems. She eventually comes to
Temperance, in Gusfield's view. is largely a status movement; it
arose as a defense of old elites against their declining prestige.
the'conclusion that the "status politics" which ark so important to
In
Gusfield's analysis actually turn out to be class politics, misdirected
the twentieth century:
or in disguise.
The polarization of the middle classes into abstainers and moderate
The analyses of Gusfield and Ash are only loosely Weberian. They
drinkers is port of a wider process of cultural change in which
accept the Weberian idea of a social movement with its own rotionole,
traditional values of the old middle class are under attack by
momentum and life history. Yet they do not assign such s compelling
new components of the middle stratum.
In this process of change,
,
Temperance is coming to take on new symbolic properties as a
xehicle of status protest (Gusfield 1966:
139).
Gusfield sees post-Prohibition Temperance as coalescing with a new
.
parer to the idea around which the movement organizes in the first
i
place, and they expend much of their effort in tracing the correspondences
1
between the social situations of the actors and the contents of the
I
t
movements they form or join.
Furthermore, Ash self-consciously adopts
fundamentalism against self-indulgent, morally lax, consumptionoriented modernism
- and
Marxian ideas concerning the origins of structural change. Yet in
thus expressing the status anxieties of the
identifying the social movement as a coherent object of study and in
treating its formation as a break with legitimate, routine social life,
both Ash and Guafield align themselves with Max Weber.
The Weberian tradition has been rich in inspiration for case studies
and poor in inspiration for further theorizing. In both regards it
end mobilization wars against the autonomy end separotencss inllcrcnt in
the idea of a "movement."
win; the notion of a social movement as anything more thnn a set of
mobilized conflict groups collapses.
differs from the Durkheimian and Millian traditions: both of them have
stimulated reformulation after reformulation, but have proved very hard
to apply to individual, concrete cases.
identified the problem for us.
Alberoni and Useem have already
Weber left almost untouched the analysis
of the genesis and mobilization of charismatic movements. At the same
timc, he taught that such movements had their own logic, and represented
a sharp break with routine, legitimate social life.
The assumptions
In this case, the interests nnd strategy
So why bother with Weber?
Because Weber and the Weberians have
pursued several problems in collective action more persistently and
effectively than have the followers of Durkheim and Hill.
People
sometimes group around distinctive definitions of thc world and of
themselves: why and how? There
something about the growth of
Temperance or Abolitionism that neither an analysis of whole social
classes nor a study of specific associations exhausts: what is It?
of autonomy and separateness make it awkward for the student of a movement
A group's conception of its aims and rights does inform its action
to fill the gap in Weber's analysis by appealing to the everyday interests
and influence its very readiness to act:
of the participants.
can't we take that into
account? Weber left us an important agenda.
Nevertheless, students of social movements who were serious about
Marxian Analyses since Morx
origins and mobilizntion have normally gone outside the Weberian frame-
The classic Marxist analysis derives shared interests from common
work for their explanations. Ash turns to an unexpected combination:
position in the organization of production, changes in interest from
neo-Marxism and the work of Edward Shils. Useem's proposal to study
shifts in the organization of production. Any set of people in a
"institutional contradictions" is Marxist in inspiration. Anthony
common relationship to the means of production form a class, but
Oberechall's general work on Social Conflict and Social Movements
classes very greatly in internal structure and common consciousness.
essentially breaks the subject into three parts:
Shared aims and beliefs emerge from shared interests, as mediated by
1) an analysis of social
conflict, which is quite eclectic in its theoretical origins; 2) an
nnalysia of the mobilization of conflict groups, which relies especially
a class' internal structure and its relationship to other classes.
Collective action likewise results from shared interests, ss mediated
on the Millian framework of Mancur Olson; 3) an analysis of the life
by internal structure, relationship to other classes end common conscious-
histories of conflict groups, which resembles classic treatments of
ness.
social movements.
In Oberschsll's analyses, the strong emphasis on
real interests and strategic problems with regard to social conflict
Thus the broad logic runs:
organization
i n England; 2) t h e f u r t h e r i d e a t h a t t h e c l a s s c o a l i t i o n mnklng t h e
production
r e v o l u t i o n h a s s t r o ~ ~ g li nyf l u e n c e d t h e subsequent p o l t t i c n l o r g a n i z a t i o n
consciouaneaa
of t h a t c o u n t r y , w i t h a c o a l i t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t s and l a n d l o r d s , f o r
i n s t a n c e . t e n d i n g t o produce f a s c i s m .
Thus p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy
becomes t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y - s p e c i f i c consequence of t h e e a r l y emergence
t o other
of a g r a r i a n c a p i t a l i s m i n c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s , a c i r c u m s t n n c e perhops
Marxian a n a l y s e s s i n c e Marx have v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t h e r e l a t i v e
weight and autonomy t h e y have a s s i g n e d t o t h e s e v a r i a b l e s .
They have
a l s o v a r i e d i n how much t h e y have recognized o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t a c t o r s
than s o c i a l c l a s s e a :
s o on.
s t a t e s , e t h n i c g r o u p s , r e l i g i o u s movements, and
never t o be repeated again.
t h e s e s v i a extended compariaona of t h e h i s t o r i e s of England. France.
t h e United S t a t e s . China. J a p a n and I n d l a , p l u s numerous e x c u r s i o n s
t o Germany and Russia.
R e v o l u t i o n t a k e s on a n i n t e r e s t i n g r o l e i n Moore's scheme.
The s t r i c t e r t h e Marxism, t h e l e s s s i g n i f i c a n c e a t t r i b u t e d t o
these other actora.
By a s t r i c t s t a n d a r d , many people i n t h e Marxian
t r a d i t i o n do n o t q u a l i f y a s M a r x i s t s a t a l l .
Nonetheless, they stand
o u t from t h e f o l l o w e r s of Durkheim, M i l l and Weber by i n s i s t i n g on t h e
,.
p r i o r i t y of m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s and by f o l l o w i n g t h e g e n e r a l l o g i c of
Marx' e x p l a n a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Although t h e r e a r e s t r i c t l y
contemporary examples, two of t h e most u s e f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n s f o r o u r
p u r p o s e s ' a r e t h e h i s t o r i c a l s y n t h e s e s of B a r r i n g t o n Moore, J r . and
major r e v o l u t i o n
s o on
--
--
The
t h e English C i v i l War, t h e French Revolutton. and
a c t s a s a c r u c i a l s w i t c h i n t h e t r a c k a l o n g w l ~ i c ha p a r t i c u l a r
c o u n t r y moves.
Yet r e v o l u t i o n d i s s o l v e s a s a phenomenon
& generis.
f o r i t becomea simply t h e maximum moment of c o n f l i c t s which endure
long b e f o r e and l o n g a f t e r t h e t r a n s f e r of power; i n d e e d , t h e c n s e of
Germany shows t h a t t h e fundamental t r a n s f e r s of power which occupy
t h e c e n t e r of Moore's a n a l y s i s can occur w i t h o u t any r e v o l u t i o n a t
a l l i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l s e n s e of t h e word:
E r i c Wolf.
The complex web of Moore's S o c i a l O r i g i n s
Democracy hangs on two pegs:
--
of D i c t a t o r s h i e d
1) the idea that the c l a s s coalitions
involved i n t h e g r e a t modernizing r e v o l u t i o n s
of t h o s e r e v o l u t i o n s
Moore p r o v i d e s evidence f o r h i s twtn
-- hence
the character
have depended e s p e c i a l l y on t h e f a t e s of t h e
The n o t i o n t h a t a v i o l e n t popular r e v o l u t i o n is somehow n e c e s s a r y
i n o r d e r t o sweep away "feudal" o b s t a c l e s t o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
i a p u r e nonsense, a s t h e c o u r s e of German and J a p a n e s e h i s t o r y
demonstrates.
On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e p o l i t i c a l consequences
a g r a r i a n c l a s s e a i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e c o m e r c i a l i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e
from dismounting t h e o l d o r d e r from above a r e d e c i d e d l y d i f f e r e n t .
and t h e growth of t h e a t n t e , w i t h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n of t h e p e a s a n t r y and
As they proceeded w i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e m o d e r n l z a t i o n , t l ~ e s esemi-
t h e c o o p t a t t o n of t h e a r i s t o c r a c y and g e n t r y , f o r example, b e i n g c r u c i a l
p a r l i a m e n t a r y governments t r i e d t o p r e s e r v e a s much of t h e o r i g i n a l
social structure as they could, fitting large sections into the
To ensure continuity upon the land and suatenance for his household,
new building wherever possible.
the peasant most often keeps the market at arm's length, for unlim-
The results had some resemblance
to present-day Victorian houses with modern electrical kitchens
ited involvement in the market threatens tiis hold on his source of
but insufficient bathrooms and leaky pipes hidden decorously
livelihood. He thus cleaves to traditional arrangements which
behind newly plastered walls.
guarantee his access to land and to the labor of kin and neigh-
(Moore 1966:
Ultimately the makeshifts collnpsed
438).
bors
. . . Perhaps it is precisely when the peasant con no longer
We find ourselves at the opposite pole from Chalmers Johnson's "dis-
rely on his accustomed institutional context to reduce his risks,
equilibration" and "dysfunction."
but when alternative institutions are either too chaotic or too
conElicts which occur
--
In Moore's analysis, the major
including the revolutions themselves
--
are
port of the very logic of the political systems they shake apnrt.
The second case in point is Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twentieth
Century. Wolf takes on the revolutions of Mexico;Russia,
China, Viet
restrictive to guarantee a viable commitment to new ways, that
the psychological, economic, social and politico1 tensions all
mount toward peasant rebellion and involvement in revoli~tion
(Wolf 1969: xiv-w).
Nam, Algeria nnd Cuba. He extracts from them importnnt lessons about the
From that springboard. Wolf lesps to a close examination oE the experience
response of peasants the world over to being drawn into the capitalist
of the peasantry in each of his countries, to scrutiny of the conditions
world economy.
under which each of the revolutions in question broke out. and to com-
Even less concerned to lay out an explicit theoretical
structure thnn Moore, Wolf nevertheless builds a powerful analysis of
parative analyses of the determinants of the considerably different
the structural foundations of peasant life, the precise ways in which
forms of involvement of these various peasant populations in their
the expansion of national and internationnl markets shakes those
national movements.
foundations, the conditions under which peasants resist the threat with
Some common features emerge:
the crucial role of the middle
force, and the circumstnnces under which that resistance (however
peasants, rather than the rural proletarians or the kulaki; the in-
reactionary its inception) serves revolutionary ends.
fluence of alliances with-disaffected intellectusla; the initially
The most general argument is simple and telling:
defensive and inward-looking character of all the peasant rebellions;
the frequent occurrence of a deadlock of weak contenders for power,
The major aim of the peasant is subsistence and social status gained
ultimately favorable to well-organized central groups allied with
within a narrow range of social relationships. Peasants are thus
military power; the final inability of peasants to accomplish their
unlike cultivators, who participate fully in the market and who
political ends, however successful their rebellions in the short run.
commit themselves to a status game set within a wide social network.
in the absence of strong alliances with determined and organized nonpeasants.
Wolf's sense of the variables involved will probably contribute
(The "sections" were essentially neighborhood governmenta and political
more to our understanding of political conflict than his enumeration of
associations.)
the conatants. He shows very effectively (in a line of argument similar
demanding analysis of the papers of the sections themselves, and the
to Moore's) that the coalitions formed by rebellious peasants strongly
painstaking reconstitution of their membership.
affect whether their actions go beyond the immediate redress of grievances.
It did so mainly through the straightforward but extremely
At about the same time. Richard Cobb was carrying out a close study
that where comercialization has proceeded so far as to dissolve the
of the composition and characteristics of the volunteer Revolutionary
traditional organization of the peasant community, rebellion does not
Armies which played such a crucial role in the early yearsof theRevolution.
occur (contrary to the mass-society notion that atomized and anguished
K8re Tdnnesaon was following the Parisian sans-culottes through the Yenr
people make ideal rebels), that a center-outward pattern of rebellion,
111. George Rudd was analyzing the composition of the revolutionary crowds
as in Russia, China, and Viet llam, favors the expanded power of a single
on the great Journ<es, Adeline Dnumard. Louis Chevalier and Fmnsois
party, as opposed to on army andlor a national bourgeoisie.
Furet were closely scrutinizing the changing composition and wealth of
The Collective History of Collective Action
the Parisian population from the late eighteenth century to 1848, and
Both Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf are non-historians who turned
RQmi Gossez was applying many of the same microscopic procedures to the
to history for evidence concern processes going on in the contemporary
Revolution of 1848. These historians varied greatly in preconceptions.
world.
techniques and subject matter.
They have plenty of companions within the hiatorical profession.
Among recent historians of collective action. Marxian thinking has
prevailed.
Georges Lefebvre, the great, long-lived historian of the
What brought them together, with dozens
of their compatriots, as exponents of s new brand of history is the
deliberate accumulation of uniform dossiers on numerous ordinary indivi-
French Revolution, provided much of the inspiration, if not much of the
uals in order to produce solid information on collective chsracteristica
techniques. He forwarded the idea of multiple, semi-autonomous revolutions
not readily visible in the experiences of any one of them. The solid
converging into a single Revolution.
information was often numerical. although the quantification involved was
.
.
He demonstrated that the semi-
autonomous revolutions -- especially the peasant revolution -- were
accessible to study from the bottom up.
But he did not systematize the
study of the populations involved.
The adoption of this sort of "collective historyv did not guarantee
success. It could have been a terrible waste of time.
Albert Soboul did. Soboul has no doubt been Eefebvre's most
influential heir in both regards. His 1958 thesis.
ordinarily elementary.
& sans-culottes
Indeed, it
have been a waste of time, if old theories about the blind spontaneity
of the masses were correct. As it turned out, however. collecrive history
pariaiens en l'an 11, shone a torchlight on faces previously deep in
yielded great returns when applied to French political conflicts. llistorians
shadow:
nar understand how wide and deep was the political mobilization of ordinary
the faces of the day-to-day activists of the Parisinn sections.
Frenchmen in 1789 and 1848, how coherent the action of the so-called mob,
action in three industrial tarns
how sharp the rifts within the coalition which made the Revolution of 1789
Shields
lied become by 1793. The Marxist approach to the study of French political
features of Foster's study are extraordinary. He is meticulous and self-
conflicts gained new strength, both because Marxists were more inclined
conscious in his theorizing; he carefully spells out the empirical
than others to take up the close study of the "little people" which this
implications of an essentially Leninist argument: a labor aristocrscy
sort of collective history involved, and because the Marxist tradition
forms, and serves for a time as a vanguard of class-conscious collective
provided more powerful means of analyzing major divisions within the
population than its rivals did.
--
--
Oldl~am. Northampton and South
during the first half of the nineteenth century. Severs1
action, but is eventually split, its fragments coopted or isolated in
the capitalist counterattack. Foster is equally meticulous in assembling
Outside of France, the greatest impact of collective history on
and presenting his evidence; it includes close analyses of marriage
the study of collective action appeared in England. England has its own
patterns, collective biographies of working-class activists and treatments
tradition of collective biography, exemplified by the parliamentary
of changes in the labor force. Finally, Foster devotes great attention
analyses of Lewis Namier.
to the opponents and exploiters of the workers: the local bourgeoisie.
In the field of collective action, however,
the distinctive English contribution did not consist of formal individual-
Indeed, one of Foster's most illuminating discussions treats the bourgeois
by-individual analysis of participants.
adoption of rigorous religious practice as a means of taming and shaming
It was the application of the
logic of collective hiogrnphy to events, complemented by the identification
and analysis of evidence concerning the character, outlook and behavior
the workers.
It is no accident that solid Marxist analyses abound in European
of ordinary participants in major conflicts and movements. As a prime
historical work and are rare in studies of contemporary America. There
example of the first we have Hobsbawm and Rudd's Captain Swinp; the book
are two basic reasons. The first is simply thnt Marxism has remained a
reports a thorough systematic study of the many local conflicts comprising
lively, evolving body of thought in Europe while sometimes fossilizing
the Swing Rebellion, the great agricultural laborers' revolt of 1830.
and sometimes having to hide underground in America.
As the dominant work of the second type we have E. P. Thompson's
The
The second is that
Marxist ideas are most adequately developed in regard to the experience
Making of the English Working Class, a richly-documented portrayal of
Marx himself treated most fully: the conflicts surrounding the growth
workers' struggles from the period of the French Revolution to the
of capitalism in Europe. The Marxist scholar's task is to adapt to
beginning of Chartism.
other settings a model which is already well fitted to the European
A recent English example combines the Hobsbawm-Rudd and Thompson
approaches. John Foster's
Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution
traces the development of class consciousneaa and working-class collective
historical experience.
Among the determinants of collective action, Marxists have generally
given grent attention to interests and organization, have sometimes dealt
w i t h m o b i l i z a t i o n , b u t have g e n e r a l l y n e g l e c t e d o p p o r t u n i t y .
Our Task
As compared
I f we t r y t o a d j u d i c a t e among t h e t h e o r i e a of c o l l c c t i v c a c t i o n I
w i t h Durkheimian, M i l l i o n and Weberian a n a l y s e s , t h e Marxian t r e a t m e n t
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s t r e s s e s t h e u b i q u i t y of c o n f l i c t , t h e importance
have aomewhat a r b i t r a r i l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Marx, M i l l , nurkheim and Weber,
of i n t e r e a t a r o o t e d i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o r p r o d u c t i o n , t h e i n f l u e n c e of
we f i n d o u r s e l v e s i n a f r u s t r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n .
s p e c i f i c forms of o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e c h a r a c t e r and i n t e n s i t y of c o l l e c t i v e
common i n t h e a o c i a l s c i e n c e s .
action.
d i f f e r e n t directions.
M a r x l s t a have n o t paid a s much a t t e n t i o n a s Weberians have t o
t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of p r e v a l e n t b e l i e f ayatems. o r t o , t h e p r o c e a a e s by
which movements r i s e and f a l l .
.
They have n o t matched t h e M i l l i a n s i n
p r e c i s e modeling of decision-making p r o c e s s e s .
There i s , however, no
The s i t u a t i o n , n l a a , is
The t h e o r i e a a t hand c l e a r l y l e a d i n
Yet i n many a r e a s they a r e t o o incomplete o r t o o
imprecisely a p e c i f i e d t o permit e i t h e r c l e a r confrontations with o t h e r
theories o r decisive testing against the facts.
Where .they a r e w e l l
s p e c i f i e d , f u r t h e r m o r e , i t o f t e n t u r n a o u t t h a t they a r e t a l k i n g about
obvious a n a l y t i c ground on which t h e Durkheimians have t h e advantage
d i f f e r e n t things:
o v e r t h e Marxiana.
which t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e l i m i t e d and w e l l d e f i n e d , t h e o r i e s of c o l l e c t i v e
That w i l l be t h e g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e of t h e a n a l y s e s t o f o l l o w :
doggedly anti-Durkheimian, r e s o l u t e l y pro-Marxian,
t o Webe: and sometimes r e l i a n t on M i l l .
b u t sometimes i n d u l g e n t
Good Durkheimiana w i l l f i n d l i t t l e
comfort i n my arguments o r i n such e v i d e n c e a s I p r e s e n t :
no s u p p o r t i n
e i t h e r r e g a r d f o r uprooted masses a s makers of r e v o l u t i o n s , r a p i d s o c i a l
cllange a s a g e n e r a t o r of anomic c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and s o on.
Orthodox
M a r x i s t s w i l l f i n d themaelves aomewhat more a t home than t h e Durkheimiana,
b u t w i l l s t i l l f i n d much t o d i s a g r e e w i t h
-- n o t a b l y
the considerable
importance a t t a c h e d t o p o l i t i c a l p r o c e a a e s and t o i n t e r e a t a which a r e
n o t obvioualy and d i r e c t l y based on c l a s s c o n f l i c t .
Followers of Weber
t h e o r i e s of c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e a p p l y t o s i t u a t i o n s i n
b e h a v i o r r e f e r t o what happens when t h e s t a n d a r d c h o i c e s a r e suspended,
and s o f o r t h .
I n Kenneth Boulding'a t e r m s , t h e o r i e s i n t h e t r a d i t i o n of M i l l d e a l
mainly w i t h exchange ayatems ( t h o a e i n which t h e i n c e n t i v e f o r one person
o r group t o a c t i s t h e d e s i r a b l e r e t u r n someone e l s e w i l l g i v e them i n
response).
Durkheimian t h e o r i e s d e a l mainly w i t h i n t e g r e t i o n systems
( t h o s e i n which t h e i n c e n t i v e is a s e n s e of common f a t e o r i d e n t i t y ) .
Weber'a l i n e emphasizes t h r e a t systems ( t h o a e i n whlch t h e i n c e n t i v e i s
an u n d e s i r a b l e r e s p o n s e a n o t h e r group w i l l v i s i t on t h e a c t o r i f h e f a i l s
t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way).
The Marxian l i n e of t h i n k i n g d e a l s mainly
w i l l d e s p a i r a t t h e v i r t u a l absence of charisma snd a t my avoidance of
w i t h t h r e a t 8 and exchange, a l t h o u g h i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h i n groups
t h e a o c i a l movement a s a u n i t of a n a l y s i s ; a t l e a s t they w i l l g l o a t
within classes
o v e r t h e conccaalons made t o s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n s of r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s
t h o a e groups.
a s b a s e s of c o l l e c t i v e ~ a c t i o n . M i l l i a n a w i l l r e j e c t much of t h e d i a -
--
--
especially
becomea a n i m p o r t a n t c o n d i t i o n f o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n by
We can c r i t i c i z e t h e a v a i l a b l e t h e o r i e s on l o g i c a l grounds, a p p r a i s e
c u a a i o n a s i m p r e c i s e and unparsimonioua, y e t they should f i n d f a m i l i a r
t h e i r f r u i t f u l n e s s i n g e n e r a t i n g h y p o t h e s e s , e x p l a n a t i o n s and r e s e a r c h
t h e e f f o r t s t o a n a l y z e t h e s t r a t e g i c problems of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s .
s t r a t e g i e s , examine how w e l l t h e y work i n t h e i r ovn f i e l d s of a p p l i c a t i o n .
.
and a s s e s s t h e f i d e l i t y o r e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h which t h e i r a d v o c a t e s employ
t h e r e a tendency f o r p o l i t i c h l i f e t o become l e s s and l e s s t u r b u l e n t ,
them.
more and more r o u t i n i z e d , a s a c o u n t r y g e t s o l d e r and r i c h e r ?
I n t h e i r p r e s e n t a t n g e o f development, however, we cannot d e v i s e a
To what
s e t of g e n e r a l t e s t s which w i l l c o n v i n c i n g l y e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e l a t i v e
e x t e n t (and when) a r e s o c i a l c l a s s e s t h e c h i e f p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s ?
validity.
q u e s t i o n s r u n t h e whole range of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s n e s from t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n
of groups f o r a c t i o n t o t h e working o u t of r e v o l u t i o n .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e accumulating l i t e r a t u r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
offers an inviting t e r r a i n for theoretical exploration.
contempornry o r h i s t o r i c a l
-- of
--
n e c t i o n s among t h e problems.
We r e t u r n t o some of t h e problems posed, b u t n o t r e s o l v e d , by Marx'
how do b i g s t r u c t u r a l
changes a f f e c t t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a t t e r n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ?
T h e i r purpose is more l i m i t e d .
They l a y o u t a s e t of c o n c e p t s which a p p l y
a c r o s s t h i s wide r a n g e of problems; they t h e r e b y h e l p i d e n t i f y t h e con-
c o n c r e t e c a s e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
a n a l y s e s of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s :
The pages t o f o l l o w w i l l n o t l a y o u t f i r m answers t o t l ~ c s eq ~ ~ e s t i o n s .
My p l a n h e r e i s
t o draw on i t i n proposing g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s , hypotheses f o r t h e s t u d y
Our
Among t h e
The f o l l o w i t ~ gc h a p t e r s s t a t c some g e n c r n l
arguments concerning t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s i n v o l v e d , and i l l u s t r a t e t h e
arguments w i t h a number of d i f f e r e n t c o n c r e t e c a s e s .
Now and then t l ~ e y
b i g changes. I want e s p e c i a l l y t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e e f f e c t s of u r b a n i z a t i o n .
pause t o sum up t h e e x i s t i n g e v i d e n c e on some mnjor c o n t r o v e r s y concerning
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , state-making and t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m .
collective action.
Among
The i l l u s t r a t i o n s and t h e e v i d e n c e d e a l mainly w i t h d i s c o n t l n u o u a .
p r e v a i l i n g p a t t e r n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , I would p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e t o
know w l ~ a tk i n d s of groups g a i n o r l o s e t h e c a p a c i t y t o a c t t o g e t h e r
contentious collective action:
e f f e c t i v e l y , and how t h e forms of a c t i o n themselves change.
r a t h e r than workaday ward p o l i t i c s .
I n t h i s n b s t r a c t f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e problems look l i k e a d e s e r t :
dry and f o r b i d d i n g .
t h i s one.
huge,
Happily, a l l r e n l d e s e r t s c o n t a i n o a s e s ; s o does
Some of tlie s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s which f o l l o w from t h e ~ b s t r n c t
problem a r e engaging nnd i m p o r t a n t .
Some a r e even answerable:
1s i t
s t r i k e s , demonstrntiona and t a x r e b e l l i o n s
That i s no a c c i d e n t .
The Elnrxian
t r a d i t i o n on which I r e l y h a s d e a l t moat f u l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h
s i t u a t i o n s of open c o n f l i c t .
).ly own e m p i r i c a l work h a s c o n c e t ~ t r a t e don
A t a number of p o i n t s l a t e r i n t h e book
c o n f l i c t r a t h e r t h a n consensus.
I a r g u e and i l l u s t r a t e t h e g r e a t c o n t i n u i t y between open c o n f l i c t and
t r u e t h a t tlie p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of o r d i n a r y p e o p l e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s
r o u t i n e c o n t e n t i o n f o r power.
w i t h u r b a n i z a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and t h e growth of n a t i o n a l s t a t e s ?
e v i d e n c e concerning everyday, r o u t i n i z e d , peaceful c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
Is i t t r u e t h n t r e p r e s s i o n can o n l y work f o r a w h i l e , because sooner o r
w i l l l e a v e open t h e possibility t h a t Weber and Durkheim were r i g h t :
l a t e r people become s o f r u s t r a t e d t h e y s n a t c h a t any chance t o r e b e l ?
t h e r e r e a l l y i s a s e p a r a t e realm of c o n t e n t i o u s , e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o l l e c t i v e
Why h a s t h e a n t i - t a x r e b e l l i o n , once t h e most common o c c a s i o n f o r l a r g e -
a c t i o n which r e q u i r e s a s e p a r a t e mode of e x p l a n a t i o n .
s c a l e p o p u l a r v i o l e n c e i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , almost d i s a p p e a r e d ?
so.
own t i m e , why l ~ a v es t r i k e s and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s become s o f r e q u e n t ?
I n our
Is
S t i l l , t h e r e l a t i v e weakness of t h e
But t h e s k e p t i c a l r e a d e r may
refer
thnt
I do not t h i n k
t o t r e a t w l ~ a t f o l l o w s a s an
a n a l y s i s of d i s c o n t i n u o u s , c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and t o r e s e r v e
judgment about the rest .
CHAPTER 3:
The Elementaty'Mddels
The remainder of this book proposes strategies for the study of
mobilization, repression, struggles for power and related processes.
INTERESTS, ORCANIZATLON AND MOBILIZATION
It
To get anywhere at all, we will l~oveto hew out rough models of inter-
returns repeatedly to the problems of observing and measuring the political
action among groups, and of a single group's collective action. At flrst
processes reliably, because those problems of observation and measurement
chop, the model of interaction is quite static. Let us call it our pollty
have been handled thoughtlessly in the past.
passing
--
In passing
-- but
only in
the following discussion comments on previous work concerning
model.
Its elements are a population, a government, one or more contenders.
a polity and one or more coalitions. We define a population of interest
collective action, conflict and revolution. Our main concern is with the
to us by any means we please.
work that has yet to be done.
more of the following:
Within that population we search For one or
a government: an organization which controls the prlncipal concentrated means of coercion within the population.
a contender: any group which, during some specified period, applies
pooled resources to influence the government. Contenders include
challengers and members of the polity.
A =is
any contender
which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the
government; a challenger is any other contender.
a polity consisting of the collective action of the members snd the
government.
a coalition: a tendency of a set of contenders andlor governments to
corrdinate their collective action.
Figure 3-1 presents these elements schemntically.
To a p p l y t h e p o l i t y model t o an a c t u a l p o p u l o t i o n , we hove a c h o i c e
F i g u r e 3-1:
The P o l i t y Model
of s t a r t i n g p o i n t s .
We can i d e n t i f y a government, thcn i d e n t i f y t h e pop-
u l a t i o n o v e r which t h a t government e x e r c i s e s ( o r c l a i m s ) c o n t r o l ; t h e g r e a t
b u l k of p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s s t a r t s t h a t way, and w i t h i n p o l l t i c a l a n n l y s i s
n a t i o n a l s t a t e s a r e t h e most comnon p o i n t s of r e f e r e n c e .
We c a n , however,
POPULATION
s t a r t by i d e n t i f y i n g a p o p u l a t i o n , t h e n i d e n t l f y a l l governments e x e r c i s i n g
c o n t r o l w i t h i n t h a t p o p u l a t i o n a n d / o r d e s i g n a t e one such government a s t h e
POLITY
p o i n t of r e f e r e n c e .
I n t h e f i r s t approach, we might t a k e t h e U.S.S.R.
a s our p o i n t of
d e p a r t u r e , and t h e n i n t e r e s t o u r s e l v e s i n a l l p o p u l a t i o n s o v e r which
.
t h e U.S.S.R.
exercises jurisdiction.
The c r i t e r i a we u s e f o r "government"
/
and " j u r i s d i c t i o n " w i l l c l e a r l y d e t e r m i n e how l a r g e a p o p u l o t i o n w i l l
f a l l i n t o o u r a n a l y s i s : by a weak c r i t e r i o n much of A s i a and E a s t e r n Europe
would q u a l i f y ; by a s t r o n g c r i t e r i o n , g i v e n t h e f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e
U.S.S.R.,
------
we could end up w i t h n o t h i n g b u t t h e c e n t m l b u r e a u c r a c i e s .
I n t h e second approach, we might t a k e t h e p o p u l a t i o n r e s i d i n g withcoalition
i n t h e mapped b o u n d a r i e s of a n o t i o n a l s t a t e ; t h a t would produce a r e s u l t
s i m i l a r t o t h e f i r s t approach, w i t h t h e main d i f f e r e n c e s due t o m l g r o t i o n
a c r o s s t h e boundary i n b o t h d i r e c t i o n s .
However, we might a l s o t a k e n l l
n a t i v e s p e a k e r s of R u s s i a n , a l l e t h n i c Kurds, a l l p e r s o n s l i v i n g w i t h i n
500 k i l o m e t e r s of t h e Black Sea.
Those s t a r t i n g p o i n t s w i l l produce very
d i f f e r e n t p o p u l a t i o n s . r~ndvery d i f f e r e n t s e t s of r e l e v a n t governments.
In
t h i s approach, t h e s t i c k i e s t problem i s l i k e l y t o b e how d u r a b l e t h e a t t n c h -
!
.
,
!
ment of i n d i v i d u a l s t o t h e p o p u l a t i o n must b e b e f o r e wc i n c l u d e them.
American t o u r i s t s i n Moscow c o u n t ?
I f n o t , what a b o u t American d i p l o m a t s
who spend f o u r o r f i v e y e a r s i n Moscow?
j a i l for four o r f i v e years?
Do
Americans whom t h e Russians put' i n
We w i l l s o l v e t h e s e problems a r b i t r a r i l y o r
--
better
--
as a F~rnctionof the questions we are asking. The solutions, how-
the contender; as a process, an incrense In the reanurces or in tile
degree of collective control (we can call n decline in either one
ever, will affect the answers to our questions.
In the primitive, stntic version of this model, all contenders are
attempting to realize their interests by applying pooled resources to each
other and to the government. They vary in the success with which they get
demobilization).
collective action: the extent of a contender's Joint action in pursuit
of common ends; as a process, the joint action itself.
back resources in return; the biggest division in that regard separates the
high-return members of the polity from the low-return challengers. Among
other things, all contenders (members and challengers alike) are struggling
for power.
In the model, an increase in power shows up as an increasing
rate of return on expended resources. All challengers seek, among other
tlllngs, to enter the polity. A11 members seek, among other things, to
remain in the polity.
Changes in tlie resources controlled by each contender
nnd by the government, changes in the rates at which the contenders and the
government give and take resources and changes in the coalition structure
add up to produce entries into the polity, and exits from it.
The model
conveys a familiar image of interest-group politics.
The second model describes the behavior of a single contender. Let us
call it our mobilization model.
Interest, organization, mobilization and collective action are four of the
five components we reviewed earlier.
The fifth was opportunity.
Opportunity describes the relationship between the populatloli's Lnterests and the current state of the world around it.
In this First rough
'statement of the model, it has three elements:
power: the extent to which the outcomes of the population's interactions with other populations favor its interests over those of
the others; acquisition of power is an incrense in the fnvorability
of such outcomes, loss of power a decline in their fnvorabillty;
political power refers to the outcomes of internctions with governments.
Four important, variable characteristics
of contenders are:
repression: the costs of collective action to the contender reaultin~
from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by a-
interests: the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to
the population in question as a consequence of various possible interactions with other populations.
orgnnizotion: tlie extent of common identity and unifying structure
among the individuals in the population; as a process, an increase in
common identity and/or unifying structure (we can call a decline in
common identity and/or unifying structure disorganization).
mobilization: the extent of resources under the collective control of
nother group which raises the contender's cost of collective action;
an action which lowers the contender's cost is a form of facilitntton;
let us reserve the term politicnl repression and political fncilitation for the relationships between contender(s)
and government(s).
opportunitylthreat: the extent to which other groups, including governments, are either a) vulnernble to new claims which would, if successful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests or b) threntening to make claims which would, if successfu.l. reduce the contender'e
realization of its interests.
Repression and power refer to closely related transactions. Repression
Figure 3-2: The Mobilization Model
refers to the volume of collective action as a function of the costs of
producing it, while power refers to the returns from collective action as
o function of its volume.
If by some unlikely chance the volume of collec-
tive action were to increase while total costs and total returns remained
constant, by definition both repression and parer would fall.
however, a group which is subject to heavy repression
high coat per unit of collective action
gets
R
--
--
In general,
that is, pays a
also has little power (that is.
low return per unit of collective action).
Interests and opportunity/threat are also closely connected. Loosely
speaking, interest refers to advantages and disadvantages which would
theoretically result from possible interactions with other groups, opportunitylthreat to the Jlkelihood that those interactions will really occur.
A Simple Account of Collective Action
Before moving on to the difficulties hidden behind these elementary
concepts, let us consider the simplest version of an argument linking them.
Figure 3-2 presents it in schematic form. The diagram declares that the
mnin determinants of s group's mobilization are its organization, its
interest in possible interactions with other contenders, the current
~~portunitylthreat
of those interactions and the group's subjection to
repression. The diagram says that the group's subjection to repression is
mainly a function of the sort of interest it represents.
It treats the
extent of a contender's collective action as a resultant of its power,
its mobilization, and the current opportunities and threats confronting its
interests. And so on.
It is easy to add hypothetical connections.
For instance, it is
quite possible that the form of s contender's organization, as such, affects
REPRESSlONl
FACILITATION
the repression to which other contenders and governments subject it; when
the costs of organizing and mobilizing are also Eeirly low and equal. When
voluntary associations become legal vehicles for one kind of interest,
he comes to consider the drawbacks of pragmatic two-party politics, Robert
they tend to become legal for other kinds of interest. My provisional srgu-
Dahl offers some intriguing reflections:
ment, however, is that such effects are secondary as compared with the
Consider the lot of the political dissenter
particular interest embodied in the contender. Repression depends mainly
. . . If he enters
into a third party, he is condemned to political impotence
...
on that interest, end especially on the degree to which it conflicts with
It is natural for him to interpret political conflict among
the interests of the government and members of the polity.
national leaders as sham battles within a unified power elite
...
Likewise. a number of these connections are reciprocal over the
For the political dissenter, continued political impotence and
longer run.
For example, in the longer run a contender's form, pace and
rejection breed frustration. Frustration may produce epothy
extent of mobilization surely affect the repression which other groups
and withdrawal from politics, but frustration may also turn to
apply to it.
So does power position. A mobilizing group which concentrates
hostility. resentment, vengefulness, and even hatred for national
on building sn arsenal is likely to run afoul of the law, although the more
leaders in both parties.
The political dissenter, then, is
powerful the group is in other respects the more likely it is to get away
likely to become alienated from the political system
--
from
with it. Over the longer run a group's form of organization and of mobiliits prevailing practices. its institutions, its personnel, and
zation both affect its interest. Roberto Michele made the classic statement
their assumptions (Dahl 1966: 65-66).
of the dilemma: to act on an interest, a group of people have to organize
and mobilize; but complex and effective forms of organization give their
Dahl does not claim to be building a general account of collective action.
managers new interests to advance or defend, and the new interests often
The work just quoted deals with the conditions for different patterns of
conflict with the interests around which the group organized and mobilized
political opposition in democracies.
in the first place. This, then, is a short-run model; it deals with the
useful to generalize Dahl's argument, for it contains the main proposals
determinants of collective action at the moment of action.
pluralist theory offers for the analysis of collective action in genernl.
Although these short-run connections are plausible, they are not selfevident.
processes.
Some of them contradict standard arguments concerning political
For instance, many "pluralistic" analyses of politics in
Nevertheless it is legitimate and
Dahl's reflections place a remarkable emphasis on individual, as
opposed to group, aspirations end grievances. They assume that an individual defines his interest. then searches for a way to forward that
parliamentary democracies make two assumptions which compete with those
interest within the existing poljtical system. They contain an indirect
of our model: first. that repression is relatively low and spread evenly
observation that the costs and returns of collective action differ from
across the whole range of contenders and potential contenders; second, that
one potential actor to another as a result of the particular lineaments
.
of the American political system.
Neither repression nor mobilizing costs
seem to play a significant part in Dahl'a explanation of differentials in
for the ways a contender's collective action affects its opportunities
and its power.
The model provides no place for strategic interactions and
no place for the conquest or loss of power.
political participation.
"Political participation" itself, in this view, consists of voting.
party work, holding office and communicating with legislators: people
whose problems these procedures won't solve tend to withdraw or to act
Collective action affects s
group's parer, but that effect takes time. As we move along, we will have
to treat time-sequences more explicitly and carefully.
Finally. the model is essentially quantitative.
It concerns the
outside the political system. The extent to which a group's interests
amount of collective action. the extent of organization, and so on.
are facing new threats or new opportunities becomes, in Dahl's argument
Unquestionably, the
=
and the plurallst argument in general, the chief determinant of its
effects the =of
collective action of which a contender is capable: in
collecti.ve action.
Furthermore, the argument draws sharp distinctions
among normal politics, abnormal politics and collective action outside
the realm of politics.
In all these regards. our collective-action model
lead^ in other directions: assuming groups as the political participants,
attributing major importance to repression and to mobilizing costs, minimizing the political/nonpolitical distinction and arguing that the main
difference between "normal" and "abnormal" political action is the power
The comparison of our barebones mobilization model with the pluralist
assumptions also helps display some worrisome gaps in the mobilization
argument. For one thing, the model does not directly represent the effects
of beliefs, customs, world views, rights or obligations.
Instead, in this
elementary version, it assumes that beliefs, customs, world views, rights
and obligations affect collective action indirectly through their influence
on interest, organization, mobilization and repression. This assumption,
and others like it, will need attention later on.
For another thing, the model has no time in it.
does.
many circumatances it affects the quantity of collective nction an well:
In Karl Marx' analysis of 1848, which we looked at in the last chapter,
the social and geographic fragmentation of the peasantry helps explain
their inaction in the face of assaults on their interests. We will have
much to do with these qualitative relationships later on.
If we were to apply the elementary mobilization model to the changing
collective action of different groups of workers in the course of industrialization
position of the groups involved.
Collective action
The most obvious defect of the model is that it makes no allowance
of organization, of interest, of mobilization
-- which is one of the purposes for which it is intended --
we would find ourselves pursuing two somewhat separate bunches of questions:
first, how the shared interests, general organization and current mobilization
of a trade affected its members' capacity for acting together; second, how
its current relationship to the government and to powerful contenders
effected the costs and returns of each of the available opportunities to act
on common g r i e v a n c e s and a s p i r a t i o n s .
Under t h e f i r s t heading come.questions
a b o u t t h e s p a t i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e i n d u s t r y . t h e e x t e n s i v e n e s s of t h e
i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o ~ ~network,
s
t h e e x i s t e n c e of u n i o n s , and s o on.
Under t h e second a r e q u e s t i o n s concerning t h e e x i s t e n c e of c o a l i t i o n s w i t h
power-holders,
t h e e x t e n t of l e g i s l a t i o n p e n a l i z i n g l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e
rewards s v l i l n b l e t o v i c t o r s i n e l e c t i o n s o r i n s t r i k e s , e t c .
Much of t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l propose arguments concerning
s u c l ~s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s .
I t w i l l o f f e r c o n c e p t s t o c l a r i f y t h e arguments
a s w e l l a s s t r a t e g i e s of measurement and a n a l y s i s .
I f , equipped o n l y w i t h
o u r elementary model, we p r e s s e d o u r i n q u i r y i n t o working-class c o l l e c t i v e
tively,
some c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s f a i l t o contend f o r power, nnd many a c t o r s
come and go: i n d i g n a n t women now, angry f a r m e r s t h e n , temperance ndvocntes
some o t h e r time.
A v a l i d t h e o r y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n must e x p l a i n t h e
comings and goings.
all.
I t must a l s o e x p l a i n why some groups never sl~owup a t
P a r t of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n l i e s i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l problems we wLll
t a k e up l a t e r .
varying
But p a r t of i t s u r e l y r e s i d e s i n t h e f a c t t h o t groups have
interests in collective action.
T h e o r i e s i n t h e t r a d i t i o n of John S t u a r t lI111 g i v e u s l i t t l e guidance
i n t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t .
Yet they s u g g e s t t h a t t h e
n a t u r e of t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s c e n t r a l decision-making s t r u c t u r e s
--
i t s mnrket.
a c t i o n , we would soon need f c r t h e r assumptions about r i g h t s , b e l i e f s , and
i t s system of v o t i n g , o r something e l s e of t h e s o r t
t h e r u l e s of t h e p o l i t i c a l game.
which p e o p l e have an i n t e r e s t i n a c t i n g t o g e t h e r , and w i l l t h e r e f o r e do s o .
The l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n w i l l o f t e n t a r r y
o v e r such problems.
--
strongly aifects
Durkheimisn t h e o r i e s t e l l u s t o walch t h e c r e a t i o n and d e s t r u c t i o n
For t h e moment, n e v e r t h e l e s s , we s h o u l d s t i c k w i t h i n t e r e s t s , o r g s n i -
of groups by t h e changing d i v i s i o n of l a b o r .
They t e l l u s t o e x p e c t g r e a t e r
z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n , . c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , repression-facilitation, power
a c t i o n ( o r a t l e a s t a d i f f e r e n t kind of a c t i o n ) from t h e groups b e i n g most
and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t .
completely and r a p i d l y transformed.
a s we go.
Let u s go around o u r diagram i n t h a t o r d e r , r e f i n i n g
Then we can r e s t a t e t h e model b e f o r e a p p l y i n g i t t o t h e a n a l y s i s
of d i f f e r e n t forms of c o n f l i c t .
T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l t a k e u s through i n t e r e s t ,
o r g a n i z a t . i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
add r e p r e s s i o n - f a c i l i t a t i o n ,
Chapter 4 w i l l then
power and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t t o t h e a n a l y s i s
b e f o r e r e c o n s i d e r i n g both o u r models and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r r e a l - l i f e
For Durkheim, i n d i v i d u n l and c o l l e c -
t i v e i n t e r e s t s g e n e r a l l y c o n f l i c t i n t h e s h o r t run.
I n d i v i d u a l Jmpulses
and i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s e r e roughly e q t r i v s l e n t ; t h e c r u c i a l v a r i a t i o n from
one group o r s o c i e t y t o a n o t h e r is how much t h o s e i n d J v i d u a 1 impulses and
i n t e r e s t s a r e under s o c i a l c o n t r o l .
Weberian t h e o r i e s a l s o draw bur a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d i v i s i o n of l n b o r ,
conflict.
b u t l e a d us t o a n t i c i p a t e g r e a t e r a c t i v i t y from groups w l ~ i c hhave a t t a c h b d
Interests
themselves t o new systems of b e l i e f .
Elont a n a l y s e s of m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d ' c o n t e n t i o n f o r power t a k e t h e groups
i n v o l v e d , and t h e i r I n t e r e s t s , f o r g r a n t e d .
Once we n o t i c e who i s a c t i n g , i t
Stlared b e l i e f i t s e l f l e a d s t o a d e f -
i n i t i o n of i n t e r e s t , and s t i m u l a t e s a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o t h a t d e f i n i t i o n .
The Mnrxian l i n e , f i n a l l y , is w e l l known: t h e changing o r g a n i z a t i o n
r a r e l y seems d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n why t h e y , and n o t o t h e r groups, a r e a c t i n g .
of p r o d u c t i o n c r e a t e s and d e s t r o y s s o c i a l c l a s s e s which a r e d e f i n e d by d i f -
Yet many groups f a i l t o m o b i l i z e , some mobilized groups f a l l t o a c t c o l l e c -
f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o t h e b a s i c means of p r o d u c t i o n ; o u t O F t h e o r g a n i -
.
z a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n a r i s e fundamental c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t e r e s t .
a r t i c u l a t e d them f a l s e l y .
A c l a s s a c t s t o g e t h e r , i n t h e Marxian a c c o u n t , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t h a s
hard t o i d e n t i f y , assemble.and s y n t h e s i z e :
e x t e n s i v e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t s i n t e r e s t s a r e
things, o r nothing a t a l l .
c u r r e n t l y being t h r e a t e n e d .
from a g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between i n t e r e s t s and s o c i a l
The M i l l i o n , Durkheimian. Weberian and Marxian views produce
position
--
For a n o t h e r , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e e v i d e n c e i s very
people o f t e n s a y conflicting
But t h e second c h o i c e
a l s o h a s s e r i o u s drawbacks.
--
inferring interests
I t t a k e s c o n f i d e n c e , even
competing s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e r e s t and
a r r o g a n c e , t o o v e r r i d e a g r o u p ' s own v i s i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s i n l i f e .
organization.
General i n t e r e s t schemes commonly r e v e a l a c o n f l i c t between s h o r t - r u n
A major p a r t of t h e disagreement c o n c e r n s t h e p r o p e r way
t o i d e n t i f y a population's i n t e r e s t i n t h e f i r s t place.
c h o i c e s a r e two.
1)
The b a s i c
We can:
(Much i n t e r e s t i n g game t h e o r y d e a l s w i t h
s i t u a t i o n s i n which s h o r t - r u n i n t e r e s t l e a d s t o s t r a t e g i e s c o n t r a r y t o
i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t from t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s own u t t e r a n c e s and
actions;
2)
and long-run i n t e r e s t s .
t h e long-run i n t e r e s t of t h e p a r t i e s . )
interest?
i n f e r i t from a g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between
i n t e r e s t and s o c i a l p o s i t i o n .
I n t h a t c a s e , w h i c l ~is t h e " r e a l "
F i n a l l y , we a r e t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n why people behave n s they
do; t h e g o a l s t h e y have f a s h i o n e d f o r themselves appear t o i n f l u e n c e
t h e i r b e h a v i o r even when t h o s e g o a l s a r e t r i v i a l , vague, c l n r e o l i s t i c Or
M i l l i o n t h e o r i s t s tend t o do some v e r s i o n of t h e f i r s t ; they t r y t o
self-defeating.
ground t h e i r a n a l y s e s on u t i l i t i e s o r p r e f e r e n c e s r e v e a l e d d i r e c t l y
1 ) t r e a t t h e r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n a s p r e d i c t o r s of t h e i n t e r e s t s
o r i n d i r e c t l y by t h e a c t o r s .
Elarxists o f t e n do some v e r s i o n of t h e
My own r e s p o n s e t o t h i s dilemma c o n t a i n s two r u l e s :
people w i l l p u r s u e on t h e a v e r a g e and i n t h e l o n g run. b u t 2) r e l y , a s
second; they d e t e r m i n e o g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t a p r i o r i from i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p
much a s p o s s i b l e , on p e o p l e ' s own a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s a s nn
Lo t h e means of p r o d u c t i o n .
e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e i r b e h a v i o r i n t h e s h o r t run.
between t h e two.
There a r e many e l a b o r a t i o n s and compromises
For example, some a n a l y s t s i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t of
workers a t one p o i n t i n time r e t r o a c t i v e l y from an i n t e r e s t they a r t i c u l a t e
later.
Many t r e a t m e n t s of s o c i a l movements t a k e t h a t t a c k , l o o k i n g back
We e s c a p e t h a t f e r o c i o u s dilemma, however, o n l y t o r u s h o n t o t h e
h o r n s of a n o t h e r :
i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s v s . group i n t e r e s t s .
we i d e n t i f y b o t h w i t h c o n f i d e n c e , they need n o t c o i n c i d e , ond m y well.
t o t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of t h e movement f o r t r a c e s of awareness of g o a l s which
conflict.
would l o t e r become c l e a r and dominant.
w i t h p r e c i s e l y t h a t dilemma
The f i r s t c h o i c e
--
i n f e r r i n g t h e i n t e r e s t from t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s
own u t t e r a n c e s and a c t i o n s
--
is open t o s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n s .
For one
Even i f
Much t h e o r i z i n g i n t h e v e i n of John S t u a r t M i l l h a s d e a l t
--
sometimes by s t r i v i n g t o show t h a t
i n d i v i d u a l p u r s u i t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t w i l l s e r v e t h e common good, somet i m e s by a t t e m p t i n g t o i d e n t i f y and e x p l a i n t h o s e s i ~ u a t i o n si n which
t h i n g . many groups a p p e a r t o be unaware of t h e i r own r e a l i n t e r e s t s .
a genuine c o n f l i c t d o e s emerge. sometimes by l o o k i n g f o r d e c i s i o n r u l e s
E i t h e r they have not a r t i c u l a t e d t h e i r s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s o r they have
which w i l l cumulate i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e advnntnge.
I n a famous psaaage of The Wealth of Nations (Chapter 3. Book 4 ) , Adam
t r a n s l a t e i n d i v i d u a l p r e f e r e n c e s i n t o c o l l e c t i v e outcomes.
Smith s e t t h e t o n e of t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e :
s e a t h a t f o l l o w , I w i l l o c c a s i o n a l l y w r e s t l e w i t h t h e s e t h e o r e t i c a l problems.
Every i n d i v i d u a l i s c o n t i n u a l l y e x e r t i n g himself t o f i n d o u t t h e
most advantageous employment f o r whatever c a p i t a l he can command.
It is h i s own advantage, i n d e e d , and n o t t h a t of t h e s o c i e t y ,
which he h a s i n view.
is most advantageous t o t h e s o c i e t y .
e a r l i e r ( d e s p i t e i t s d e b t t o Adam Smith) i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l
i n t e r e s t and group i n t e r e s t u s u a l l y do c o n f l i c t .
At l e a s t t h e y c o n f l i c t
each i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r o r d i n a r i l y h a s an i n c e n t i v e t o
a v o i d c o n t r i b u t i n g h i s s h a r e t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s which w i l l b e n e f i t
everyone.
Adnm Smith r e s o l v e s t h e dilemma by denying i t ; by i m p l i c a t i o n ,
he d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g s p e c i a l a b o u t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which
t h e p r o p e r s t u d y of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n w i l l n o t e x p l a i n .
Mancur Olson.
however, makes t h a t very ' l i n k p r o b l e m a t i c .
Organization
We should remain c l e a r
t h a t c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s e x i s t . however l a r g e a p a r t t h e p u r s u i t of
i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s may p l a y i n t h e accomplishmentof t h o s e c o l l e c t i v e
We should d e l i b e r a t e l y t r e a t t h e d e g r e e of c o r ~ f l i c tbetween
i n d i v i d u a l end c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s a s a v a r i a b l e a f f e c t i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d and c h a r a c t e r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
H a r r i s o n White h a s made a powerful d i s t i l l a t e of t h e most i n s i p i d
wines i n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l c e l l a r
-- group
taxonomies.
There we f i n d o n l y
There a r e c a t e g o r i e s of p e o p l e who s h a r e some c h n r a c t e r i a -
t i c : they a r e a l l female, a l l Sunni Muslims, a l l r e s i d e n t s of Timbuktu, o r
something e l s e .
A f u l l - f l e d g e d c a t e g o r y c o n t a i n s people a l l of whom recog-
n i z e t h e i r common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and whom everyone e l s e r e c o g n i z e s a s
having t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .
There a r e a l s o networks of people who a r e
l i n k e d t o e a c h o t h e r , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , by a s p e c i f i c kind of i n t e r p e r s o n a l bond: a c h a i n of p e o p l e each of whom owes someone e l s e i n t h e s e t
a t t e n d a n c e a t h i s o r h e r wedding, l e t u s s a y , o r t h e s e t of i n d i v i d u a l s def i n e d by s t a r t i n g a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h some person, i d e n t i f y i n g everyone t h a t
person t a l k s w i t h s t l e a s t once e v e r y day, then i d e n t i f y i n g everyone tlley
We a r e n o t d e f e n s e l e s s s g a i n s t t h e dilemma.
interests.
how t h e people involved a g g r e g a t e them.
two e l e m e n t s .
On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e argument by Mancur Olson which we reviewed
i n t h i s sense:
Usually. however. I w i l l t r e a t them a s p r n c t i c n l m a t t e r s : how t o de-
t e r m i n e , i n p a r t i c u l a r t i m e s end p l a c e s , which i n t e r e s t s a r e lmpprtant and
But t h e s t u d y of h i s own advantage n a t u r a l l y ,
o r r a t h c r n e c e s s a r i l y , l e a d s him' t o p r e f e r t h a t employment which
I n t h e annly-
We s h o u l d t r e a t t h a t d e g r e e
of c o n f l i c t , more p r e c i s e l y , a s i n c r e a s i n g t h e c o s t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s and t o t h e group a s a whole.
And we 6ho11ld p u r s u e t h e
a n a l y s i s of t h e ways t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e arrangement^ f o r making d e c i s i o n s
t a l k w i t h a t l e a s t once e v e r y d a y , and s o on u n t i l no new persona j o i n t h e
list.
I f t h e common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l bond I s o r d i n n r y ,
t h e c a t e g o r i e s and networks d e f i n e d by them tend
t o be l a r g e .
C l e a r l y we
can s h r i n k t h e c a t e g o r i e s and networks by i n s i s t i n g on c r i t e r i a ( o r comblna t i o n s of c r i t e r i a ) which occur r a r e l y : female Sunni Muslim r e s i d e n t s of
Timbuktu, p e r h a p s , o r d a i l y c o n v e r s a t i o n p l u s i n v i t a b i l i t y to n wedd4.ng.
The more i n t e r e s t i n g combination i s t h e one White c n l l n n c a t n e t :
a s e t of i n d i v i d u a l s comprising both a c a t e g o r y and a network.
The c a t n e t
c a t c h e s g r a c e f u l l y t h e s e n s e of "groupness" which more complicated concepts m i s s .
For t h a t r e a s o n , I w i l l s u b s t i t u t e t h e word group f o r t h e e x o t i c
cntnet.
A s e t of i n d i v i d u a l s is s group t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t comprises
b o t h s c a t e g o r y and a network.
T h i s n o t i o n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r e s s e s t h e g r o u p ' s i n c l u s i v e n e s s : llow
c l o s e i t comes t o a b s o r b i n g t h e members' whole l i v e s .
The i d e a of o r g a n i z a t i o n f o l l o w s d i r e c t l y .
The more e x t e n s i v e i t s
(For " i n c l u s i v e n c s a "
we have o u r c h o i c e of t h r e e r e l a t e d s t a n d a r d s : t h e nmount of time, t h e
common i d e n t i t y and i n t e r n a l networks, t h e more o r g a n i z e d t h e group.
amount of energy, o r t h e p r o p o r t i o n of a l l s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n wlilcll t h e
CATNESS X NETNESS
S c h e m a t i c a l l y , F i g u r e 3-3 sums up t h e
members and o t h e r p e o p l e a r e t a k i n g i n t o account t h e f a c t o f group mem-
"All B r a z i l i a n s " comprise a s e t of peo-
bership.)
ORGANIZATION.
r e l a t i o n s h i p s among t h e c o n c e p t s .
O t h e r f e a t u r e s of a g r o u p ' s s t r u c t u r e one might want t o c o n s i d e r
p l e o n l y weakly l i n k e d by i n t e r p e r s o n a l networks, b u t s t r o n g l y i d e n t i f i e d
i n j u d g i n g l~ow"organized" i t is a r e i t s e f f i c i e n c y and i t s e f f c c t i v e n e s s
by themselves and o t h e r s a s a s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y of b e i n g : low on n e t n e s s ,
--
high on c a t n e s s .
The p r i n t e r s ' union l o c a l s p o r t r a y e d i n L i p s e t , Trow
o r t h e s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s presumably e f f e c t i n g e f f i c i e n c y and e f f e c -
I stress
t i v e n e s s , such a s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , c e n t r a l i t y and s t r n t l f i c a t i o n .
and Coleman's Q Democracy have b o t h d i s t i n c t , compelling i d e n t i t i e s
i n c l u s i v e n e s s on two grounds: 1 ) t h e (unproved) l ~ y p o t h e s l st l i s t i t i s t h e
and e x t e n s i v e , a b s o r b i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l networks: l i i g l ~on b o t h c a t n e s s and
main a s p e c t of group s t r u c t u r e which a f f e c t s t h e a b i l i t y t o m o b i l i z e ; 2 )
n e t n e s s , t h e r e f o r e on o r g a n i z a t i o n .
t h e i n t r i n s i c d i f f i c u l t y of s e p a r a t i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y from
t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n we a r e t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n .
F i g u r e 3-3:
Components of O r g a n i z a t i o n
By t h e
s t a n d a r d of i n c l u s i v e n e s s , an i s o l a t e d community w i l l tend t o be h l g h l y
o r g a n i z e d , b u t s o w i l l some o c c u p a t i o n a l g r o u p s , some r e l i g i o u s groups
and some p o l i t i c a l groups.
We need t h e s e d e f i n i t l o n s i n o r d e r t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e groups which c o u l d ,
i n p r i n c i p l e , mobilize.
We a l s o need them t o s p e c i f y what i t means t o soy
t h a t o r g n n i z a t i o n promotes m o b i l i z a t i o n .
is enormous.
,&n
s u a l Crowd
*
Low
The number of p o t e n t i a l mobilizers
The t s s k of enumerating a l l of them f o r a g i v e n p o p u l a t i o n
would l o o k something l i k e t h i s :
F r i e n d s h i p Network
NETNESS
> High
1 ) i d e n t i f y e v e r y s i n g l e s t a t u s d i s t i n c t i o n employed v i t h l n t h e
populst ion;
2 ) s e l e c t t h o s e d i s t i n c t i o n s which imply some d i f f e r e n c e i n i n t e r e s t
between t h o s e i n one c a t e g o r y and t l ~ o s ei n a n o t h e r ;
3) produce t h e (tremendous) l i s t c o n s i s t i n g of a l l combinntions o f
the selected distinctions:
4) e l i m i n a t e those, wlilch llave no r e a l p e r s o n s w i t h i n them (e.g.
p r o c e d u r e i s t h a t a group must have a c t e d t o g e t l i e r somewhow t o b c mentioned
Chinese-.lewish-cowboy-grandmother);
i n h i s t o r i c a l accounts.
I t i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a r e l i a b l e way of determining
what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s e t o f f t h o s e groups which m o b i l i z e from a l l t l ~ o s c
5 ) s e l e c t t h o s e w i t h some minimum p o s s i b i l i t y of i d e n t i f y i n g and
o t h e r s which c o u l d ,
communicnting w i t h each o t h e r .
i n t h e o r y , have mobilized.
We have an a l t e r n a t i v e .
I n s t e a d of a t t e m p t i n g t o p r e p a r e an unbinaed
T h i s f a n t a s t i c t a s k is probably o u t of r e a c h f o r l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n s organl i s t of a l l p o t e n t i a l m o b i l i z e r s , we can t n k c one o r two dimensions o r
i z e d i n complicated ways, a l t h o u g h Edmonson (1958) d i d a n a l y z e a p p a r e n t l y
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n which a r e of t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t , s e n r c l ~f o r e v i d e n c e oC
e x h a u s t i v e l i s t s of s t a t u s terms f o r North American I n d i a n groups.
But
group f o r m a t i o n , and then of m o b i l i z a t i o n , a t d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s a l o n g t h e
o n e m i g l ~ tbe a h l e t o c a r r y o u t s t e p s 1 and 2 a s sampling o p e r a t i o n s , i f
dimension,
l e t t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s t e s t more g e n e r n l a s s e r t i o n s con-
t h c r e were an unbiased s o u r c e of s t a t u s d i s t i n c t i o n s ; t h e n t h e l i s t f o r
c e r n i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of o r g a n i z a t i o n and m o b i l i z a t i o n .
s t e p 3 could b e a s s m a l l a s one d e s i r e d .
I f s t e p s 4 and 5 l e f t no c a t e -
g o r i e s , one could go back t o 1 and 2 o v e r and o v e r .
Voting a n a l y s t s
and s t u d e n t s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t sometimes do on i m p o r t a n t p n r t of t h e
n e c e s s a r y work.
I n v o t i n g s t u d i e s , i t i s common t o t a k e t h e e n t i r e popu-
Gamson's procedure f o r i d e n t i f y i n g " c h a l l e n g i n g groups" i n American
l a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l v o t e r s i n some t e r r i t o r y , d i v i d e i t up i n t o mnjor demop o l l t i c s b e a r s a g e n e r a l resemblance t o t h i s i d e a l p l a n , b u t s t a r t s much
g r a p h i c c a t e g o r i e s , t h e n examine d i f f e r e n t i a l s among t h e c a t e g o r i e s i n o r f a r t h e r along i n t h e mobilization process.
("Challenging groups" a r e
g a n i z a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and v o t i n g p r o p e n s i t i e s .
I n s n n l y s e s of
t h o s e w h i c l ~ i n t h e p e r i o d from 1800 t o 1945 made a new, c o n t e s t e d b i d t o
s t r i k e s , i t i s common t o t a k e an e n t i r c l a b o r f o r c e , d i v i d e i t i n t o induscllangc tile o r g a n i z a t i o n o r b e h a v i o r of t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l system;
t r i e s and t y p e s of f i r m s , t h e n document v a r i a t i o n i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of
t h e y a r e a s p e c i a l c a s e of t h e groups which, not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , I e a r l i e r
work, t y p e and i n t e n s i t y of u n i o n i z a t i o n and p r o p e n s i t y t o s t r i k e .
c a l l e d "challengers".)
Gamson s c a ~ i snumerous h i s t o r i c a l s o u r c e s f o r any
D i f f e r e n t ways of d i v i d i n g up t h e e l e c t o r a t e o r t h e l a b o r f o r c e w i l l
mention whatsoever of a group making new c l a i m s , and p l a c e s a l l group namea
produce d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s .
i n a pool from which he then draws groups st random f o r c l o s e s t u d y .
After
But t h a t can be an advantage: i t h e l p s u s de-
c i d e which d i f f e r e n t i a l s a r e d u r a b l e and g e n e r a l .
For example, some y e a r s
somc e l i m i n a t i o n s f o r d u p l i c a t i o n , l a c k of g e o g r a p h i c s c o p e , e t c . and a f ago C l a r k Kerr and Abraham S i e g e 1 made a p l a u s i b l e and widely-accepted
t e r a l a r g e s c o r c h f o r a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n concerning t h e groups drawn,
Gamson h a s an unbiased, well-documented sample of a l l c h a l l e n g i n g groups
meetins h i s c r i t e r i a over t h e e n t i r e period.
Within t h e sample, he c a n
then s t u d y changes i n t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c h a l l e n g i n g groups o v e r time,
d i f f e r e n c e s between s u c c e s s f u l and u n s u c c e s s f u l c h a l l e n g e r s , and a number
o f o t h e r i m p o r t a n t problems.
a n a l y s i s of i n d u s t r i a l s t i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s .
F i r s t , they s u m r i z e d t h e
o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of s t i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s i n A u s t r a l i a , Czechoslovakia, Germany,
I t a l y . t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , New Zealand. Norway, Sweden. S w i t z e r l a n d , t h e United
Kingdom and t h e United S t a t e s d u r i n g v a r i o u s p e r i o d s from World War I t o
t h e l a t e 19401~. T h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e ~ e n e r a lp a t t e r n a p p e a r s
411
For o u r p u r p o s e s , t h e weakness oE Camson's
3-1.
llaving i d e n t i f i e d t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s , they t r i e d t o e x p l a i n them.
Tnblc
They s e t t l e d on t h e p r e s e n c e of a n " i s o l a t e d maan"
w o r k f o r c e , s e g r e g a t e d from o t h e r workers
d u c i n g high s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t y .
T a b l e 3-1:
Kerr C S i e g e l ' s Summary of S t r i k e P r o p e n s i t i e s
-- a s
--
3-23
a liomogenco~~s
t h e major c o n d i t i o n pro-
They a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t ,
I f t h e j o b i s p h y s i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t and u n p l e a s a n t , u n s k i l l e d o r
s e m i s k i l l e d , and c a s u a l o r s e s s o n s l , and f o s t e r s an independent s p i r i t
PROPENSITY TO STRIKE
lligh
INDUSTRY
( a s i n t h e l o g g e r i n t h e woods), i t w i l l draw tough, i n c o n s t a n t com-
mining
b a t i v e , and v i r i l e workers, and they w t l l be i n c l i n e d t o s t r i k e .
m a r i t i m e and l o n g s h o r e
t h e j o b i s p h y s i c a l l y e a s y and performed i n p l e a s a n t s u r r o u n d i n g s ,
If
s k i l l e d and r e s p o n s i b l e , s t e a d y , and s u b j e c t t o s e t r u l c s and c l o s e
Medium High
Medium
lumber
s u p e r v i s i o n , i t w i l l a t t r a c t women o r t h e more s u b m i s s i v e t y p e of man
textile
who w i l l abhor s t r i k e s (Kerr 6 S i e g e l 1954: 1 9 5 ) .
chemical
printing
of some s t a n d a r d d i f f e r e n t i a l s among i n d u s t r i e s i n s t r i k e - p r o p e n s i t y ;
g e n e r a l manufacturing
t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of whatever d i f f e r e n t i a l s a c t u a l l y a p p e a r .
construction
t h e Kerr-Siege1 a n a l y s i s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e second, a p p e a r t o b e wrong.
clothing
gas, water, e l e c t r i c i t y
hotels, restaurants, 6
other services
Low
I n e i t h e r v e r s i o n , t h e argument h a s two l e v e l s : 1 ) t h e i d e n t i f i c n t i o n
leather
food 6 k i n d r e d p r o d u c t s
Medium Low
But t h i s was, f o r t u n a t e l y . a secondary h y p o t h e s i s .
railroad
agriculture
trade
Both f a c e t s of
For
t h e c a s e o f France, T a b l e 3-2 p r e s e n t s r a t e s of s t r i k e s and man-days i n
s t r i k e s f o r major i n d u s t r i e s from 1890 t o 1960.
The d a t a stlow no more
t h a n a moderate s t a b i l i t y i n r e l a t i v e s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s from one p e r i o d
t o tlie n e x t .
They show a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e i n r c l a t l v e s t r i k e pro-
p e n s i t i e s as measured
by frequency of s t r i k e s and hy t o t a l man-days.
Although a g r i c u l t u r e does s t i c k a t t h e bottom of t h e l i s t , s o do t r a n s p o r t
and t e x t i l e s .
Food i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t l y low, c o n t r a r y t o t h e p r e d i c t i o n .
There is l e s s c o n s i s t e n c y a t t h e t o p : q u a r r y i n g t u r n s o u t t o linve m n y
s t r i k e s , but r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t , a m 1 1 ones.
Source: Kerr 6 S i e g e l 1.954: 190
2)
s t r i k e s , b u t b i g , long ones.
Mining t u r n s o u t t o linve few
I n any c a s e , t h e o t h e r French i n d u s t r i e s
which rank r e l a t i v e l y high i n s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t y
b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s and s m e l t i n g
--
--
chemlcals, c o n s t r u c t i o n ,
a r e n e i t h e r high on a l l i n d i c e s nor ob-
v i o u s i l l u s t r a t i o n s of tlie g r e a t e r s t i k e - p r o p e n s i t y o f i s o l a t e d , homogen-
eous a n d / o r "tough"
T a b l e 3-2:
S t r i k e s p e r 100,000
Labor Force
Man-Days Lost p e r 100 M i l l i o n
Labor Force.
1890-1914
1915-1935
1915-1932
.
1950-1960
Quarrying*
30
22
40
Ill*
Cl~emlcels
24
10
54
62
Construction
24
15
50
31
Uuilding M a t e r i a l s
Ceramics
23
19
5
151
*
P r i n t i n g 6 Paper
1.6
11
37
15
Smelting
14
17
220
70
Leother 6 llides
13
14
77
13
Metalworking
12
10
46
88
Transport
I)
8
14
86
Textiles
8
7
72
27
2
a
Wood Industries
8
9
19
Food I n d u s t r i e s
5
6
10
0.3
n.a.
Agriculture, Fish,
Forest
0.4
T o t a l Non-Agriculture
7
mass" p o r t i o n o f t h e argument, Fdward
S h o r t e r and I regrouped t h e French s t r i k e d a t e by sm11 d i s t r i c t i n t o
t h r e e t y p e s of a r e a s : mono-industrial,
poly-industrial,
metropolitan.
The Kerr-Siege1 a n a l y s i s p r e d i c t s a s t r o n g tendency f o r t h e mono-industrial
a r e a s t o have h i g h e r s t r i k e r a t e s , g r e a t e r m i l i t a n c y , and s o on.
poly-industrial
d i s t r i c t s , and t h e one-industry d i s t r i c t s come i n l a s t
When Muhammnd F i a z a r r s y c d French indus-
t r i e s by t h e i r d e g r e e of g e o g r a p h i c s e g r e g a t i o n o v e r t h e c o u n t r y o s a
whole, he d i s c o v e r e d no r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n o l a t i o n and s t r i k e proyens i t y ; such f a c t o r s a s u n i o n i z a t i o n and p l a n t s i z e , on t h e o t h e r hand, s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d t h e r e l a t i v e p r o p e n s i t y t o s t r i k e ( F i a z 1973).
Ltke-
w i s e , t h e a n a l y s e s Snyder and K e l l y have done f o r I t a l y , 1878-1903,
indicate
t h a t once obvious o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f e a t u r e s such a s s i z e and u n i o n i z o t l o n
a r e allowed f o r , i n d u s t r y a s s u c h h a s no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e broad
q u a n t i t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f s t r i k e s (Snyder 6 Kelly 1976).
111
these
'
t r i a l s , a t l e a s t , no v e r s i o n of t h e Kerr-Siege1 argument h o l d s up.
These examples o f f e r a n i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n t o u s e r s of a group-comparis o n s t r a t e g y : t h e l e s s compelling your a p r i o r i r e a s o n s f o r employing a
6
37
p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a s a b a s i s f o r t h e s t u d y of d i f f e r e n t i n l s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h e more i m p o r t a n t i t is
t o compare t h e e f f e c t s of u s i n g d i f f e r e n t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .
*Quarrying and Nining combined i n 1950-1960.
Source: S h o r t e r 6 T i l l y 1974: 201.
In f a c t ,
i t i s t h e o t h e r way round: on t h e whole, m e t r o p o l i t a n d i s t r i c t s outshadow
( S h o r t e r 6 T i l l y 1974: 287-295).
Mining .
Garments
3-25
I n o r d e r t o g e t a t t h e '!isolated
French S t r i k e R a t e s by I n d u s t r y , 1890-1960
Industry
industries.
Each a p p l i c e -
t i o n of a new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o t h e d a t a i s , i n i t s c r u d e way, t h e t r i a l
of a new theory.
The c o r o l l a r y a p p l i e s more g e n e r a l l y : t h e b e t t e r - s p e c i f i e d
your t h e o r y , t h e nore l i k e l y you a r e t o f i n d some a c c e s s i b l e c o r n e r of
r e a l i t y i n which t o t r y i t o u t .
The b e t t e r - s p e c i f i e d your t h e o r y , t h e l e s s
you w i l l have t o worry a b o u t t h e monumental t n s k of enumerating a l l groups
a t r i s k t o o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
An obvious
sermon,. b u t one l i t t l e heeded.
u n i t s , t h e s u p l a u n i t of which t h e u n i t is o member, o r e x t e r n o l u n i t s ,
The Kerr-Sicgel a n o l y s i s p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r l e s s o n a s w e l l .
o r e s form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Strikes
u n l e s s tlie n s s e t s whose c o n t r o l t h e u n i t goined a r e newly-produced
To e x p l a i n group d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n any kind
ones
. . . A mere
i n c r e a s e i n t h e a s s e t s o f members, of s u b - u n i t s ,
or
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g s t r i k e s , we w i l l have t o t a k e i n t o a c -
even o f t h e u n i t i t s e l f does n o t mean t h a t m o b i l i z a t i o n llas o c c u r r e d ,
count a l l o u r components: i n t e r e s t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and oppor-
though i t i n c r e a s e s t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n p o t e n t i a l .
tunity.
Kerr and S i e g e l a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s w i t h i n t e r -
e s t s and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o n e .
The reasoning a b o u t i s o l a t e d masses and
toughness g i v e s s p a r t i c u l a r (ond i n a d e q u a t e ) account of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
s t r u c t u r e and i n d i v i d u a l workers' i n t e r e s t s c h a r o c t e r i s t i c of d i f f e r e n t
industries.
Rut i t s a y s n o t h i n g a b o u t d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n m o b i l i z s t i o n o r
E t z i o n i o f f e r s a rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a s s e t s , o r r e s o u r c e s :
To be more e x a c t , Kerr and S i e g e l assume i m p l i c i t l y e i t h e r 1 ) t h o t
m o b i l l z o t i o n ond o p p o r t u n i t y a r e rougllly e q u a l a c r o s s i n d u s t r i e s o r 2)
( e . g . weapons, armed f o r c e s , m a n i p u l ~ t i v et e c h n o l o g i e s ) ; u t i l i t a r i a n (e.g.
goods, i n f o r m a t i o n s e r v i c e s , money); normative (e.8.
no independent e f f e c t s on s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t y ; t h e y r e s u l t from t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t c r e s t and o r g a n i z s t i o n .
Those assumptions, t o o , a r e h y p o t h e s e s
control.
In p r a c t i c e , E t z i o n i ' s c l s s s i f i c s t i o n of r e s o u r c e s is d i f f i c u l t t o maintain.
I t r e f e r s t o t h e i r use r a t h e r than t h e i r i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r .
f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , we w i l l have t o l o o k a t t h e e v i -
c e r t a i n kind.
Furthermore, l o y a l t y and o b l i g o t i o n a r e not s o much r e -
l i v e r e d when c a l l e d f o r .
Mobilization
The word " m o b i l i z a t i o n " c o n v e n i e n t l y i d e n t i f i e s t h e p r o c e s s by which
a group goes from b e i n g o p a s s i v e c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s t o an a c t i v e
Demobilization is t h e r e v e r s e p r o c e s s .
The r e s o u r c e is l o b o r power of s
s o u r c e s a s c o n d i t i o n s s f f ' e c t i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t r e s o u r c e s w i l l b e de-
dence c o n c e r n i n g m o b i l i z s t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y .
porticipsnt i n public l i f e .
The
s e r v i c e a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c a b a l draws from i t s 272 l o y a l memhers is 1.ikcly
t o b e st once c o e r c i v e and u t i l i t a r i a n .
Before a c c e p t i n g i n t e r e s t and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o n e a s
E t z i o n i (1968: 388-389)
loynlties, obligatlons).
u t i l i t a r i a n o r normative r e s o u r c e s , d e m o b i l i z e s i f i t l o s e s t h o t s o r t of
t h a t whatever d j f f e r e n c e s i n m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y do e x i s t have
ones.
coercive
A group m o b i l i z e s i f i t g a i n s g r e a t e r c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l o v e r c o e r c i v e ,
opportunity t o s t r i k e .
- dubious
The change i n t h e cap-
a c i t y t o c o n t r o l and t o u s e a s s e t s i s what is s i g n t f i c s n t .
Amitai
If.we a r e a c t u a l l y comparing t h e c u r r e n t mobilizo-
t i o n l e v e l s of s e v e r a l groups, o r t r y i n g t o gouge o g r o u p ' s change over
t i m e , we w i l l o r d i n a r i l y do b e t t e r t o f a l l back on t h e e c o n o m i s t ' s f o c t o r s
of p r o d u c t i o n :
l a n d , l a b o r , c a p i t o l , perhaps t e c l ~ n i c o le x p c r t i s c o s w e l l .
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a l l of t h e r e s o u r c e s have w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d market
p u t s i t t h i s way:
v a l u e s i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n st l a r g e , r e l i a n c e on p r o d u c t i o n f o c t o r s w i l l h e l p
We r e f e r t o t h e p r o c e s s by which s u n i t g a i n s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e
c o n t r o l of a s s e t s i t p r e v i o u s l y d i d n o t c o n t r o l a s m o b i l i z a t i o n
...
By d e f i n i t i o n , i t e n t a i l s a d e c l i n e i n t h e n s a e t s c o n t r o l l e d by aub-
US
s e t r a t e s of r e t u r n f o r r e s o u r c e s expended i n tlie p o l i t i c a l o r e s n a .
We
can then r e p r e s e n t l o y a l t i e s , o b l i g a t i o n s , commitments and s o f o r t h a s det e r m i n a n t s of t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t eoch r e s o u r c e nominally under group con-
3-28
trol will be available:
[~~~~!~~j)
Loyalty refers to the breadth of membera' commitments to deliver
resources. It has three dimensions:
mobilization level = sum
when called
II
production
nominally under
group control
--
the amount of resources committed
--
the range of resources involved
--
the range of circumstances in which the resources will be delivered.
A commitment to deliver substantial resources of only one kind in a
Political life mokes the probabilities hard to estimate a priori and un-
narrowly-specified situation bespeaks relatively little loyalty. A commit-
likely to remnin constant from one possible type of action to another:
ment to deliver many resources of different kinds regardless of the
the militants who will vote or picket will not always go to the barricades.
situation reveals great loyalty. Real-life organizations lie somewhere
This formulation poses the problem explicitly. We can then ask, as a
between the two extremes.
question for research, whether the use of elections as a reference point
Albert Hirschman turns this observation inside out; he considers loyolty
produces the same polnt in time (or for the some group at different points
as one of the major alternative modes of demand for on orgnnizntion'e
in time) than does the use of street demonstrations.
services.
We can also close in on the old problem of differences between a disciplined professional stoff and committed volunteers: it should appear not
only as a difference in the morket value of the labor under group control,
but also as a variation in the probability that the available labor will
actually do the different things whicl~might be demnnded of it: stuff
I
(We looked at Hirschman's analysis briefly while reviewing the
Million approach to collective action.)
In the context of response to
decline in the performance of organizations, he distinguished three
possible reactions of consumers, clients or members of a given organizetion:
exit, voice end loyalty. Economics, Hlrschman comments, treats exit
cessation of demand for the commodity or service
envelopes, picket, lobby, bribe, kidnap, bomb, write legal briefs.
to declining quality.
--
--
a
as the normal response
In the case of schools, governments and other orgoni-
The formulotion neatly states an old political dilemma: the choice
zations whose performances fluctuate, he argues, two other responses are
bctween loyalty and effectiveness.
Effective employees or members often
common. The relevant public may voice its dissatisfaction, with implicit
use their effectiveness to serve themselves or to serve others instead of
or explicit threats of exit.
Or it may tolerate unsatisfactory performance
the orgnnization to which they are attached, while loyal employees or memfor a while because the costs of exit or voice are greater than the loss
bers are often ineffective; sometimes the solution of the tax farmer (who
of quality. That tolerance is a measure of subjective returns from the
uses his power to enrich himself, but at least has enougli effectiveness to
organization, hence of loyalty.
produce n surplus for his nominal masters) is the best nvailable.
SomeThe economic problem is to work out the trodeoffs among exit, voice
times the disloyalty of the professionals is so great as to make loyal amnand loyalty. That specifies the conditions under wl~ichone or anotllcr
teurs n more desirable alternative.
occurs.
For our purposes. Iiowever, the value of Hirschman's analysis is
the action clearly defends the interests of every member and if the group
to help us calculate the probability that resources ostensibly on call will
is an all-embracing moral community, the probability of delivery is close
actually be delivered. Exit is the analogue of refusal to deliver, while
to 100 percent.
voice and loyalty are alternative ways of continuing to yield. At least
ture or contestation
in the short run, voice raises the cost of group access to the resources.
In general,
fl
Loyalty is then at its maximum, the probability of depnr-
-- exit or voice --
is at its minimum.
Indeed, a significant part of the work of mubilizntion goes into
group which puts a large proportion of its membership
changing these three variables: reducing the competing claims on resources
into remunerated positions within its own organization (for example, a
controlled by members, developing a program which corresponds to the per-
bureaucratized priesthood) raises the cost of exit, and thereby makes voice
ceived interests of members, building up a group structure which minimizes
and loyalty more likely responses to its performance.
It does so at the
exit and voice.
In her survey of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
cost of committing an important share of its mobilized resources to the
American communes, Rosabeth Moss Kanter identifies a series of "commitment
maintenance of the organization itself.
mechanisms."
The alternative of placing its members elsewhere
politics1 party often dispofies of government jobs
drain on the organization.
--
--
"For communes," she tells us :
as a victorious
the problem
reduces the internal
i
of commitment is crucial.
Since the community
represents an attempt to estahlish an ideal social order within
However, it also lowers the cost of exit, unless
the larger society, it must vie with the outside for the members'
members continue to hold their posts at the pleasure of the organization.
Building an all-embracing moral community also raises tlie relative costs
I
i
loyalties.
It must ensure high member involvement despite
external competition without sacrificing its distinctiveness or
of exit.
Earlier I suggested that tlie most important element of organization.
so far as impact on mobilization was concerned, was the group's inclusiveness
of different aspects of social life.
The creation of a moral community is
I
ideals.
It must often contravene the earlier socialization of
its members in securing obedience to new demands.
It must calm
internal dissension in order to present a united front to the
therefore on extreme case of organization-building in general. On the whole,
world.
the higher the level of organization, the greater the likelihood of voice
or loyalty.
If a group emphasizes coercion, however, it probably shifts the
likelihood away from voice, toward exit or loyalty.
I
I
The major variables affecting the probability of delivery are therefore
mobilizing group is.
If the resources are free of competing claims, if
is central (Kanter 1972: 65).
She is describing a mobilization program which concentrates on the lahorpower and loyalty of the members themselves.
the extent of competing claims on the resources involved, the nature of the
action to which the resources are to be committed, and how organized the
The problem of securing total and complete commitment
What organizational arrangements promote that sort of mobil.ization?
I
I
I
Ksnter compares nine nineteenth-century comm~~nal
movements (including the
Shakers, Harmony, Jerusalem and Oneida) which lasted 33 yeflrs or more with
twenty-one (including Modern Times. Oberlin, Brook Farm and the Iowa
Pioneer Phalanx) which lasted 16 years or less.
The social arrangements build loyalty. and enliance mobilization.
The commitment mechanisms
Most social groups are unlike communes. They differ in the priorl.ties
they assign to exit, voice and loyalty. The professionals Concentrate on
wliicli were substantially more common among the long-lived communes included:
eexual and material abstinence
I
I '
accumulating resources free of competing claims, the rat'on~lists
on
prohibition of nonresident members
adapting their program to current group interests, the moralists on building
signing over property at admission
an inclusive group which commands assent for its own sake.
non-reimbursement of defectors for property and labor
group will concentrate on the first while appearing to concentrate on the
provision of medical services
second or the third: actually working to free resources while appearing to
insulation mechanisms, such as a special term for the Outside,
ignoring of' outside newspapers, speaking a foreign language and/or
a special jargon
shape a program to the interests of its members or to build a satisfying
group.
An exploitative
Religious frauds often take this latter form.
rules for interaction with visitors
Thus any group's mobilization program breaks down into these components:
discouragement of pairing: free love or celibacy required
1.
accumulating resources
physical separation of family members
2.
increasing collective claims on the resources
communal ownership of clothing and personal effects
no compensation for labor
1
a.
by reducing competing claims
b.
by altering the program of collective action
c. by changing the satisfaction due to participntion in
no charge for community services
the group as such.
communal work efforts
A successful mobilization program does all of them at once.
daily meetings, and most time spent with other group members
Groups do their mobilizing in a number of different ways. We can
mortification procedures such as confession, mutual surveillance
and denunciation, or distinctions among members on moral grounds
make crude distinctions among defensive, offensive and preparatory mobiliinstitutionalization of awe for the group and its leaders through
the attribution of magical powers, the legitimation of group demands
through appeals to ultimate values, and the use of special forms
of address (Kanter 1972: chapter 4).
zation. In defensive mobilization, a threat from outside induces the members
of a group to pool their resources to fight off the enemy.
Eric Wolf (1969)
has pointed out how regularly this sort of response to the representatives
Kanter's list begins to give us a feeling for the real-life manifestations
of the process Max Weber called the routinization of charisma. Faith and
I
of capitalism and state power has preceded peasant rebellions.
magic play a part, to be sure. But so do a concrete set of social arrange-
i
European forms of rural conflict
ments which place the available resources at the disposal of the group, and
of fields, draft resistance and
make either voice or exit costly ways to respond to unsatisfactory performance.
defensive mobilization.
I
Standard
-- food riots, tax rebellions, invasions
so on -- typically follow the same sort of
This large class of actions challenges the common
assumption (made by Etzioni, among others) that mobilization is always a
the face of a threat of firings, wage reductions or cutbacks in privileges.
top-down phenomenon, organized by leaders and agitators.
It normally required risky organizing efforts by local leaders who were
Offensive mobilization &, however, often top-down.
In the offensive
case, a group pools resources in response to opportunities to realize its
willing to get hurt.
The preparatory part of the strategy was always difficult, since it
interests. A common form of offensive mobilization consists of the diffusion
required the members to forego present satisfactions in favor of uncertain
of a new organizational strategy.
future benefits. As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory
In the late 18208, for example, the
success of O'Connell's Catholic Association in forcing the expansion of
mobilization, in fact, we see the increasing force of Hancur Olson's
the political rights of British and Irish Catholics inspired the creation
statement of the free-rider problem: a rational actor will ride for nothing'
of political associations aimed at expanding the franchise and gusranteeing
if someone else will pay the fuel and let him aboard.
rights to assemble, organize end act collectively. A coalition of bourgeois
tries to ride free the vehicle goes nowhere.
and substsntinl artisans arose from that strategy, and helped produce the
especially in the face of high risks, requires strong incentives to overcome
great Reform Rill of 1832.
the reasonable desire to have someone else absorb the costs.
In this instance, the top-down organizational
efforts of such leaders as Francis Place and CJilliam Cobbett were crucial.
But if everyone
Preparatory mobilization,
As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory mobilization, we
Nevertheless, in pariah after parish the local dissidents decided
also see that the distinction between offensive and preparatory is less clear
on their own that it was time to organize their own association, or (more
than the distinction between offensive and defensive.
likely) to convert their existing forms of organization into a political
preparatory mobilization require foresight and an active scanning of the
association.
world outside the group.
Preparatory mobilization is no doubt the most top-down of all.
In this
Both offensive and
Both are unlikely in any but the smallest groups
without active leadership and deliberate organizational effort. One frequent
variety, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities
pattern is for leaders to employ resources which are already mobilized to
and threats.
assure the commitment of other resources to collective ends. That happens,
The nineteenth-century trade union is a classic case. The
trade union built up s store of money to cushion hardship
--
hardship in the
form of unemployment, the death of a breadwinner or loss of wages during a
strike.
It also pooled knowledge and organizational skills. When it
for example. when priests play on their congregations, already obliged to
assemble, for cash contributions.
It also happens when landlords send
bailiffs to claim part of the crop. or when word heelers trade jobs for votes.
escaped the union-busting of employers and governments, the trade union
These are concrete examples of the "selective incentives" for participation
greatly increased the capacity of workers to act together: to strike, to
whose importance Mancur Olson has stressed.
boycott, to make collective demands. This preparatory mobilization often
began defensively, in the course of a losing battle with employers or in
Unlike defensive mobilization, neither offensive nor preparatory
mobilization occurs very often as a simple extension of the group's everyday
routines for doing its work: gathering at the market, shaping up for hiring
result. any mobilization at all is more costly to the poor and powerless;
at the dock, getting together for a little poaching. Offensive and prepara-
only a threat to the little they have is likely to move them to mobilize.
tory mobilization resemble each other; the main difference is whether the
Tlie rich and powerful are well-defended against such threats: they rnrely
opportunities to which the group responds are in the present or the future.
have the occasion for defensive mobilization.
So the basic distinction runs between defensive hnd offensive modes of
If, on the other hand, we hold mobilization constant and consider
mobillzntion.
collective action itself, common sense is vindicated.
A population's initinl.wenlth and power significantly affect the probability that its mobilization will be defensive or offensive.
Relatively poor and
powerless groups which have already mobilized are more likely to act
Common sense
collectively by claiming new rights, privileges end advantages. At the
says that the rich mobilize conservatively, in defense of their threatened
same level of mobilization the rich and powerful are more likely to act
interests, while the poor mobilize rndically, in search of what they lack.
collectively in defense of whet they already have.
Common sense is wrong.
It is true that the rich never lash out to smash
the status quo, while the poor sometimes do.
But the rich are constantly
Thus the well-docu-
!
mented tendency of strikes to become more frequent and more demnnding in
!
times of prosperity, when workers have more slnck resources to devote to
mobilizing to take sdvant~geof new opportunities to maximize their interests.
acting together, and employers have more to lose from the withholding
The poor can rarely afford to.
of labor.
The poor and powerless tend to begin defensively, the rich and powerful
Mobilization implies demobilization. Any process by wllich s group
offensively. The group whose members are rich can mobilize a surplus without
loses collective control over resources demobilizes the group. Now could
threatening a member's othcr amusements end obligations. A group with a
that happen7 Anything which destroys resources tends to hnve that effect:
poor constituency has little choice but to compete with daily necessities.
I
The group whose members are powerful can use the other organizations they
control
--
including governments
--
powerless must do it on their own.
war, neglect, potlatch.
But the more common source of demobilization is
the transfer of control over certain kinds of resources to another group:
to do some of their work, whereas the
a subunit of the group in question, a large unit of which the group itself
The rich and powerful can forestall claims
is a part, a group outside.
A lost war, for example, frequently produces
from othcr groups before they become articul'ated claims, and can sfford to
all three sorts of demobilization in the losing country. Hen and women
seize opportunities to make new claims on their own. Tlie poor and the power-
return from military service to the service of their fomilics; the govern-
less often find that the rich, the powerful and the government oppose and
ment, for a time, gives up some of its control over its own operations to
punish their efforts at mobilization. (The main exception, an important one,
a concert of nations of which it is a part; other countries seize some of
is the powerless group whlch forms a coalition with a rich, powerful patron;
the loser's territory, population, equipment or wealth.
European Fascists of the 1920s mobilized rapidly in that fashion.)
As a
Whether such
processes produce a negative sum, a positive sum or a zero sum depends
entirely on the relative rates at which new resources are being created,
up resources as people in other categories ncquire them. \hen conscrip-
nnd old ones destroyed.
tion occurs, a group gives up labor power.
In the European feudal period.
the "group" was charscteristically a fief.
The vassal's personal obli-
Often two groups, one containing the other, mobilize st approximately
the same time.
A confusion between the two levels has regularly dogged
gation to the overlord tied his fief to the overlord's fief, to he sure;
discussions of mobilization, since Karl Deutsch's initial formulation of
but the fief owed the knight service. As states grew stronger. communities
the idens (1953).
typically became the units which owed n certain numher of recruttn. The
The most notable examples from our own era involve
national states and smaller units within them: parties, unions or even
usual mechanism of the draft consisted of the assignment of s quota to s
organized ethnic groups.
commune, with some sort of collective decision (frequently the drawing oE
(Many Africenists, for instance, have noticed
the strengthening of the ostensibly traditional groups which outsiders
lots) determining which of the eligible young men would go. The purchase
call "tribes" with the growth of new states).
of substitutes by those who could afford it, as shockin8 as it nppesrs to
Political theorists, both totalitarian and democratic, have often
egalitarian eyes, expresses precisely this sense of a debt owed by n
considered the mobilization at one level end at the other to be comple-
comunity, rather than en individual, to the state: Community X owes six
mentary. The party, in such an account, sccumulates loyalties which
conscripts. Under these circumstances, resistance to the draft united s
transfer to the state. There is actually, however, little guarantee that
community, not just a group of young people, against the ntate. The greot
this harmony will prevail.
counter-revolution of the ~endgeagainst the French revolutionsry state,
In the usual situation, the smaller and larger
units compete for the same resources. They may follow well-defined rules
in 1793, began with solidery resistance of commt~nltiesto the demnnd for
of combat, and one of them may consistently have the upper hand, but they
conscripts. The c m u n i t y as e whole stood to lose part of its supply
compete nonetheless. Likewise, two or more groups mobilizing simultaneously
of labor, love, loyalty end procreative power.
within some larger group which is also mobilizing commonly struggle over
The spread of the political theory end practice of "possessive jndi-
control of the same resources. The Teamsters and the Transport Workers
vidualism" (as C. 8 . Hscpherson calls it) shifted tlie military obll&stion
fight for jurisdiction over the same drivers. lJhen union members pay more
toward the individual, but only incompletely. Within French villnges, the
taxes they l~aveless for union dues. Illen all a person's time goes into
classe oE young men coming up for the draft in the same yeor remnins one
o religious sect, he has none left either for union membership or for
of the principal solidar~groups, one which symbolizes its Jons through
government service. Military conscription withdrew8 a man from his obli-
rituals, banquets and ceremonial gifts.
gations to s circle of friends end relatives.
groups and some of the professions have, in tlie course of acquiring
This lest example underscores the collective character of the process.
We ere not simply dealing with the fact that people in some categories give
In most western countries. religious
distinct political identities. worked out special compacts with the state
exempting some of their members
-- nt least their priests -- from service,
and s e t t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e s e r v i c e of o t h e r s .
a b s o l u t e o r p r o p o r t i o n a t e monpower committed t o c o l l e c t i v e ends i n c r e a s e s .
I n t h e United S t a t e s ,
t h e American Medical A s s o c i a t i o n h a s achieved t h a t s o r t of g u a r a n t e e f o r
An i n c r e a s e of r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n a u n i t normally f a c i l i t a t e s i t s m o b i l i z n t i o n ,
i t s members, w h i l e t h e American C h i r o p r a c t i c A s s o c i a t i o n h a s n o t .
simply by p e r m i t t i n g s u b u n i t s t o keep r e c e i v i n g r e s o u r c e s w h i l e t h e l o r g e r
R e l i g i o u s S o c i e t y of F r i e n d s h a s , t h e Black Muslims have n o t .
The
u n i t g a i n s c o n t r o l o v e r more than i t had b e f o r e .
This tying
But i t is t h a t i n c r e a s e
of r e l i g i o u s exemptions t o s p e c i f i c group memberships caused g r e a t c o n f u s i o n
i n c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l i t s e l f which c o n s t i t u t e s m o b i l i z a t i o n .
i n t h e 1960s a s young Americans opposed t o t h e Vietnam war begal; a p p l y i n g
m o b i l i z a t i o n , a group may p r o s p e r , b u t i t cannot contend f o r power;
f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n a s c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r s on g e n e r a l moral grounds
c o n t e n d i n g f o r power means employing mobilized r e s o u r c e e t o i n f l u e n c e o t h e r
w i t h o u t c l a i m i n g a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h one of t h e p r i v i l e g e d s e c t s .
I
I n t h e America of t h e 1960s. something e l s e was going on a s w e l l .
In d i f f e r e n t ways, groups of b l a c k s and groups of young p e o p l e began t o
c l a i m a c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t t o withhold t h e i r members from m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e .
I do n o t mean they were widely s u c c e s s f u l e i t h e r i n m o b i l i z i n g t h e i r own
populations o r i n holding o f f t h e s t a t e .
1
I
groups.
I d e a l l y , t h e n , we a r e l o o k i n g a t a s e t of groups, and t r y i n g t o
e s t i m a t e f o r each group and f o r each r e s o u r c e under t h e c o n t r o l of any
of t h e groups two d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s :
a ) t h e v a l u e of t h e r e s o u r c e nominally
under group c o n t r o l , and b) t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e w i l l be
d e l i v e r e d when c a l l e d f o r , g i v e n some s t a n d a r d assumption obout t h e u s e s
Both groups c o n t a i n competing
m o b i l i z e r s p u r s u i n g competing e n d s , and have many members who r e f u s e t o
t o which t h e r e s o u r c e s w i l l b e p u t .
commit t h e i r r e s o u r c e s t o any of t h e m o b i l ' i z e r s , even though t h e y a r e w i l l i n g
c l o s e t o e s t i m a t i n g t h e s e q u a n t i t i e s f o r any s e r of groups.
t o y i e l d them t o t h e s t a t e .
rough approximations.
Yet t h e c l a i m was t h e r e , i n t h e form of
o r g a n i z e d campaigns t o r e s i s t o r evade t h e d r a f t .
How t o do i t ?
e x c l u s i o n of c o r p o r a t e and m i l i t a r y r e c r u i t e r s from campuses l i k e w i s e
With t h e end of t h e d r a f t and t h e withdrawal
of American t r o o p s from t h e Vietnam war, t h e groups involved demobilized.
I do n o t t h i n k t h e y , o r t h e i r c l a i m s , have d i s a p p e a r e d .
Reminder:
m o b i l i z a t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e
I f t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of d i v e r s e r e s o u r c e s f e l l i n t o a
s c a l e of m o b i l i z a t i o n w i t h o u t having d i r e c t meosures of each of t h e component
c l a i m was a s i g n t h a t some m o b i l i z a t i o n was o c c u r r i n g ; groups, r a t h e r than
l a b o r power of young people.
We have o n l y
s t a n d a r d sequence w i t h i n any p a r t i c u l a r p o p u l o t i o n , one could produce a
The
i n d i v i d u a l s , were s t r u g g l i n g over t h e r i g h t t o p r e c i o u s r e s o u r c e s : t h e
To my knowledge, no one h a s e v e r come
Measurinu M o b i l i z a t i o n
The demands f o r t h e
mnde c l a i m s f o r c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of manpower.
Without some
I
resources.
We might t a k e a s a methodolop.ica1 model t h e s c a l e s f o r
" c e n t r a l i t y " of v i l l a g e s which Frank Young h a s c o n s t r u c t e d ( s e e Young 1966).
Such a s c a l e would resemble t h e f o l l o w i n g s e t :
1 ) No one w i t h i n t h i s c a t e g o r y e v e r i d e n t i f i e s i t a s a group, s o
f a r a s can be determined from some s t a n d a r d s e t of s o u r c e s .
c o n t r o l o v e r r e s o u r c e s . r a t h e r t h a n t h e s i m p l e a c c r e t i o n of r e s o u r c e s .
2 ) Members of t h i s c a t e g o r y sometimes i d e n t i f y themselves a s a group.
A group t h a t grows i n s i z e h a s more manpower i n i t .
That does not mean t h e
3) The group has a standard name known to members and nonmembers
close association between organization and mobilization.
alike.
a scale could not be used to establish the existence of that relationship.
Obviously such
In my own research group's work on collective action in Europe and
4) Members of the group sometimes appear in public as a group.
America, we have approached the measurement of mobilization in two
identified by name.
simple ways.
5 ) The group has standard symbols, slogans, songs, styles of dress
and/or other identifying marks.
They fall short of the comprehensive accounts and internally
consistent scales we would like to have; the real world is hard.
The first and more obvious way is to take one or two widely-available
indicators of mobilization, such as union membership, and prepare comparable
6) The group contains one or more organizations which some members
series of those indicators for the set of groups under study.
In this case,
of the group recognize as having the authority to speak for the
we make no a priori effort to combine available indicators. On the contrary,
group as a whole on some matters.
we hope to learn something about their relationships from the analysis.
7) The group contains one or more organizations controlling well-
In our studies of French strike activity from 1830 to 1968. Edward Shorter
defined buildings and spaces which are at least nominally open to
and I recurrently use number of union members andlor years of continuous
members of the group as a whole.
existence of a local general labor organization (a bourse de travail) as
8) Thc group has at lenst one common store of major resources
money, labor, weapons, information or something else
-- held
--
indicators of a local labor force's mobilization level (Shorter and Tilly
1974).
David Snyder (1974) uses union membership in his time-series analyses
in
of strikes in Italy, France and the U.S. from various points in the nine-
the name of the group as a whole.
teenth century to 1970. Joan Lind, studying strikes and labor-related
9) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises extensive
street demonstrations in Sweden and Great Britain from 1900 to 1950,
control over group members' allocation of time and energy in the
measures mobilization via union membership and union income. With interesting
name of the group as a whole.
exceptions to be discussed later on, alternative indicators of mobilization
turn out to be strongly correlated with each other, and to have a signi-
10) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises
ficant positive effect on the level of strike activity.
extensive control over the personal relations of members of the group.
The second and riskier way we have indexed mobilization is to build
The first four items on the list clearly belong under the heading "organidifferent versions of the sort of ordinal scale I have just sketched from
zation" rather than "mobilization."
The fifth bal.ances uncertainly between
descriptions -- statistical or otherwise
--
of the groups in question.
the two. Thus the lower end of the scale rests on the assumption of a
Ronald Aminzade's study of Marseillaise workers illustrates this tack.
Aminznde was trying to assess the influence of organizational charac-
Louis Napoleon's 1851 coup d16tat: for the insurrections of August 1870
teristics, prior experience with collective action and mobilization level
and March 1871 in Marseille, he reconstructed a list of 429 portlcipnnts
on the involvement of different groups of workers in Marseille from 1830
from police dossiers on persons involved in the revolutionary International,
to 1871. Drawing on evidence from French archives and from published
and Erom arrest records
from conviction records for the 1870 ins~~rrection
works, he found that he could assemble more or less continuous descriptions
for the 1871 insurrection.
for each of twenty-one occupational categories concerning a) the presence
with involvement in one or another of these events from 0 to +.8.
or absence and b) the general pattern of activity of guilds (more exactly,
correlations of participation with the combined mobilization index are:
Individual indicators of mobilization correlate
The
compagnonnages), cooperatives, trade unions, mutual benefit societies, and
1848:
+. 333
1851:
+.571
1870-71:
+.473
resistance societies. For 1848, he was also able to ascertain whether the
occupational group had its own representation to the Republican Central
Committee. its own political club, and any collective privileges formally
There is a substantial relationship between mobilization level
recognized by government regulations.
(Informtion on membership and on
crudely measured by Aminzade
-- and
--
as
involvement in Marseille's major
funds controlled was also ovailable, but not regularly enough for the
revolutionary movements from 1848 to 1871.
construction of continuous series.)
General Conditions for Mobilization
Aminzade then combined this information into three indicators:
According to our mobilization model, the broad factors witl~ina popu1)
total number of occupational organizations
lation affecting its degree of mobilization are the extent of Its shared
2)
total years of prior existence of different organizational
forms
interest in interactions with other popu.lntions. and the extent to which
it forms a distinct category and a dense network: its interest end its
organization. Outside the group, its power, Its subjection to repression and
3)
total number of collective actions previously carried out
the current constellation of opportunities and threats most strongly affect
by these organizations
its mobilization level.
the third being the most debatable as an index of mobilization.
Power, repression and opportunitylthreat will
Aminzade
come in for detailed discussion in the next chapter.
Interest and organi-
essentially ranked each occupational group as high or low on each of the
three items (2 = high; 1
(6
-
three highs; 1
-
-
zation have already hod their share of attention. Yet it would be good to
low) and summed them into a six-point scale
three lows).
review their impact on mobilization before rushing on to examine collective
Using the scores for the periods just
action itself.
preceding the events in question, he analyzed occupational differentials in
Anthony Oberschall has provided a neat synthesis of a good deal of
arrests during Marseille's insurrection of June, 1848 and in the course of
recent thinking about these relationships.
Oberschnll deliberately counters
hrkl~eimlanthinking
--
especially its "mass society" variety
--
Thus, comunism and fascism have gained strength in social systems
by insisting
on the importance of some forms of prior group coherence to the mobilization
undergoing sudden and extensive changes in the structure of suthor-
of conflict groups. Among other things, he points out that newly mobilizing
ity and community. Sharp tears in the social fabric caused by
conflict groups usually reduce their organizing costs by building, inten-
widespread unemployment or by major military defeat are higl~ly
tionally or unintentionally, on existing group structure.
favorable to mass politics.
Instead of
Social classes which provide dispro-
starting from a shared interest but no organization, existing groups coalesce
portionate support for mass movements are those that possess the
and reorganize. Thua the conflict group escapes, to some extent, from the
fewest social ties among their members. This means above all the
lower social classes. However, since there are sections of all
great cost of starting at zero mobilization.
social classes which tend to be sociolly atomized, members of
Considering that prior organization, Oberschall cnlls particular
attention to two dimensions: the character of links within the population
all social classes are to be found among the participants in mans
(communal orgonizatlon, associational organization, or little organization
politics: unattached (especially free-lance) intellectuals, morginol
of any kind) and to the ties between the population and other groups (inte-
(especially small) businessmen and farmers, and isolated workers
grated with other groups vs. segregated from them).
have engaged in mass politics in times of crisis (Kornhauser 1959: 229).
In combination, the two
We have already encountered the same line of argument in our review of
dimenslons produce a sixfold classification of populations:
Durkheimian analyses of collective action.
internal links
comunal
ties to
other
groups
weak
Oberschall counters with the argument that populations with weak internal
associationol
integrated
structure rarely act at all.
segregated
internal structure and external ties produces a different variety of
He also argues that each combination of
mobilization and collective action.
In general, he sees ties to other
We will use a related classification later on, when we try to distinguish
groups (especially elite groups) as constraints on the formation of conflict
the major varieties of collective action.
groups; in that one regard, he tends to agree wlth the moss-society theorists.
Oberschnll's analysis directly confronts mass-society theory.
The
But in his analysis, segmented populations with either extensive comunnl
mass-socjety argument says that populations in the central column, especially
or extensive associational structure are especially likely to produce
those which are segregated from the'rest of society, ore the great breeders
,
or become
of protest movements. One of the best-known statements of the theory runs:
Groups which are particularly vulnerable to mass movements manifest
mnjor discontinuities in their structure during periods of change.
more,
--
--
conflict groups. To put it in mass-society terms, they are
not less, "available" for social movements.
Oberschall then proposes a useful series of hypotheses about the
mobilization of conflict groups:
1.
In a segmented context, the greeter the number end variety of
Although the third hypothesis provides en escape clause, the mnin srgumcnt
organizations in a collectivity, and the higher the participation of
strongly emphasizes the influence of prior organization.
members in this network, the more rapidly and enduringly does
varied evidence which Oberschall reviews.
mobilization into conflict groups occur, and the more likely it is
too exclusively: the argument I have been building up here gives greater
thst bloc recruitment, rather than individual recruitment, will
weight to interests, mobilization strategy, repression end power position.
take place (Oberschall 1973: 125).
Nevertheless, the two lines of argument agree in denying thst unattached
So does the
Perhaps too strongly, or rather
individuals and homogenized masses have any special propensity to form
2.
The more segmented s collectivity is from the rest of the
or join social movements.
society, and the more viable end extensive the communal ties within
Oberschall's hypotheses focus on just that issue: joining or not
it, the more rapid and easier it is to mobilize members of the
joining.
collectivity into en opposition movement (p. 129).
3.
If a collectivity is disorganized or unorganized along trsdi-
For that reason, the c o m u n s l end of his classification remains
more mysterious than the asaociationnl end.
It is valuable to point out.
as Oberschall does, thst events such as great peasant revolts do not
tional c o m u n s l lines and not yet organized along associations1 lines,
ordinarily sweep up society's rootless, disorganized, leftover people, but
collective protest is possible when members share c o m o n sentiments
draw in coherent but aggrieved eroups of people who remain attached to
of opression and targets for hostility.
each other and to their socisl settings.
These sentiments are more
likely to develop if the collectivity is segmented rather then
vertically integrated with other collectivities of the society.
But to speak of "recruitment"
compromises the insight.
The implicit model has modern contours.
It applies easily to such
Such protest will, however, tend to be more short-lived and more
membership organizations as labor unions, political parties and religiocts
violent than movements based on c o m u n a l or sseociational orgsni-
organizations.
zstion (p. 133).
countrymen who tore down poorhouses and then went back to work in their
shops and fields.
4.
Participants in populnr disturbances and activitiat in oppo-
of 1848.
collectivity, whereas socially isolated, atomized, end uprooted
individuals will be underrepresented, at least until the movement
has become substantial (p. 135).
It distorts the experience of nineteenth-century artisans
who built barricades in the streets near their shops during the revolutions
sition organizations will be recruited primarily from previously
active end relatively well-integrated individuals within the
.
It does not apply so easily to the eighteenth-century
The eighteenth-century people of Nacton and the nineteenth-
century people of Paris mobilized end acted collectively. all right.
Btlt
they did not form or join a "socisl movement" or even s "conflict group"
in the sense ,required by Oberschall's model.
To cover the whole range from anti-poorhouse crowds to revolutionary
artisans to political parties to religious cults, we need a very broad
It must accommodate a great variety of resources.
view of mobilization.
action.
In this general statement, the argument is not very controversial.
It rejects Durkheimian theories which trace routine co11,ective action
and not be tied to any particular organizational form or type of interest.
back to society's integration and which trace non-routine collective action
In that spirit, the three major principles we have laid down so far are
back to society's disintegration. Still a grent many Weberian, Marxinn and
brond indeed; schematically:
Millian analyses will fit, with a bit of shoving, into the boxea defined
1.
(quantity of resources
by interests, organization and mobilization.
(probability
x
collectively controlled)
= mobilization
At thia level of argument, the main differences among the Weberian,
of delivery)
Marxian and Millian analyses are in the weighta they assign to the various
2.
mobilization = f(organization)
3. organization
-
determinants of collective action. On the whole, Weberian arguments
--
especially as they appear in analyses of social movements and their
catness x netness
The first and third are, obviously, definitions.
The second is a proposition.
routinization -- assign different weighta to interests in routine and
but one which needs a good deal more specification before it has much value.
non-routine collective action.
In a full-fledged social movement. runs
The specification will drive us back toward the same problems Oberachall
the argument, interests have a leas immediate effect because the group's
emphasizes: the differences between segmented and integrated populations,
beliefs override or redefine them. The Weberian approach tends to treat
the contrasting mobilization patterns of communal and associational
the costs and effects of organization as great, but then to consider the
groups, the conditions for organizational effectiveness. In short, we are
group's interests and organization a sufficient explanation of ita actions.
on the right path, but not very far along. Let us try to stride on by
Implicitly, that is, it treats the coats of mobilization and collecttve
dealing with collective action itself.
action as slight.
Marxian analyses likewise give high weights to interests and organi-
From Mobilization to Collective Action
Collective action is joint action in pursuit of common ends. Up to
this point, I have argued that the extent of a group's collective action
is a function of 1) the extent of its shared interests (advantages and
disadvantages likely to result from interactions with other groups).
zation. low weighta to the costa of mobilization and collective action as
such.
The difference from the Weberian line. in thia regard. is in the
strong Marxian emphasis on material interests
--
more precisely, on interests
.defined by relationship to the predominant means of production
-- and in
2) the intensity of its organization (the extent of common identity and
the argument that the organization of production underliea and dominates
unifying structure among its members) and 3) its mobilization (the amount
other forms70r organization.
of resources under its collective control).
Soon I will add repression,
power, and opportunity/threat to those determinants of a group's collective
Milliana are the only one of our four clusters who commonly assign
major importance to the costa of coll,ective action itself. The standard
Millian analysis jumps from defined interests to collective action with
relation to their interests, and are expcnding valuable resources In the
scant attention to organization and mohilization.
effort.
Starting from the
challenge laid down by Msncur Olson, Millians have sharpened the analysis
/
of collective action by connecting it to the production of collective goods.
The ideal col.lective good is inclusive and indivisible.
If we can imagine assigning relative values to the collective
goods produced and the resources expended, we can think of a contender
as gaining, losing or breaking even.
Diagramatically:
If any member
of the group receives it, all receive it. There is no way of breaking
it up into shares. The draining of a swamp to prevent malaria is s fairly
pure example.
that ideal.
Real goods vary considerably in how much they approximate
Police protection, for example, is ideally a pure collective
good; ideally, it is inclusive and indivisible.
In practice, some people
get little or no police protection, and others buy up extra shares for
themselves. We therefore have to say that action is collective to the
COLLECTIVE
GOODS
OBTAINED
extent that
--
it produces inclusive, indivisible gooda.
more restrictive in others. Joint action in pursuit of c m o n ends often
fails to produce any goods at all, but so long as it &?&
collective goods I propose to include it.
to produce
On the other hand, some collec-
tive gooda (and many collective bads) are produced unintentionally, as
by-products of Individual efforts.
definition of collective action.
L
LOSS
The definition I have proposed is more relaxed in some regards and
I propose to exclude them from the
That choice has its disadvantages; it
requires us to think about what an unsuccessful action might have produced
and to be sure that people really did act jointly, instead of simply
searching around for the appearance of collective goods. Yet it has
the advantage of focusing the analysis more clearly on the explanation
of the action itself, instead of aiming at its outcomes.
Let us borrow the basic Millian insight: collective actors are
attempting to produce collective goods that have a specific value in
O
RESOURCES EXPENDED
111
opportunities
t h e shaded a r e a above t h e d l a g o n a l , t h e v a l u e of t h e c o l l e c t i v e goods
o b t n i n e d i s g r e a t e r than t h e v a l u e of t h e r e s o u r c e s expended; t h a t i s
o gain.
Below t h e d i a g o n a l we have l o s s e s , and t h e d i a g o n a l i t s e l f is a
--
t h a t i s , by i n c r e a s i n g i t s power o r r e d u c i n g Lta s l r b j c c t i o n
t o repression.
'
I f t h i n g s were t h i s s i m p l e , we would e x p e c t e v e r y group t o m o b l l i z e
t o i t s utmost c a p a c i t y t o m a n i p u l a t e o p p o r t u n i t i e s a s much a s p o s s i b l c
brca k-even 1 i n e .
I n any r e a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h e r e a r e r e a l l i m i t s on how much of
t h e s p a c e i n t h e diagram is a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a c t o r .
We have t a l k e d about
t h e two main l i m i t s a s m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y .
To modify t h e d i a -
and t o maneuver i t s e l f i n t o t h e h i g h e s t a v a i l a b l e p o s i t i o n above t h e d l a gonal.
To some e x t e n t , t h a t i s a r e a s o n a b l e simplification of whnt goes
on i n power s t r u g g l e s .
i t s e l f is c o s t l y .
gram:
But i t i g n o r e s important r e a l i t i e s : m o b l l l z a t i o n
The g r o u p ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n i t s e l f s e t s i m p o r t a n t l i m i t s
on t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , m o b i l i z a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s and m a n i p u l a t i o n s of
o p p o r t u n i t y i t c a n o r w i l l undertake.
And i t s i n t e r e s t s d e f i n e w h i c l ~s o r t s
of g a i n s and l o s s e s a r e a c c e p t a b l e o r u n a c c e p t a b l e .
OPPORTUNITY
To p u t i t a n o t h e r way, groups d i f f e r c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t h e r e l o t l v e
v a l u e s they a s s i g n t o c o l l e c t i v e goods and t o t h e r e s o u r c e s which must bc
COLLECTIVE
expended t o a c q u i r e them.
Many, perhaps most, groups behave l i k e p e a s a n t s
GOODS
who a r e s e e k i n g . t o draw a t a r g e t income from t h e i r l a n d ; i n s t e a d of lo-
OBTAINEI)
c a t i n g themselves a t t h e p o i n t of maximum p r o f i t , t h e y aim f o r a c e r t a i n
0
RESOURCES EXPENDED
return.
I f t h e y c a n , they expend t h e minimum r e s o u r c e s r c q u i r c d f o r t l ~ s t
reason.
Thus a group of workers f i r s t d e c i d e they want an elght-hour day.
t h e n c a l c u l a t e what e f h r t t h e y w i l l have t o expend i n o r d e r t o win t h a t
particular objective.
The group cannot expend more r e s o u r c e s t h a n i t h a s c u r r e n t l y m o b i l i z e d ;
t h n t s e t s an unbreakable l i m i t i n one d i r e c t i o n .
The o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r
gain nre f i n i t e ; that s e t s a l i m i t in the other direction.
w i l l look c o r e f u l l y a t l i m i t s on o p p o r t u n i t y .
L a t e r on we
I t f o l l o w s , c l e a r l y , t h a t a change i n m o b i l i z a t i o n o r
Zero m o b i l i z n t i o n
-
t h e i r cherished objectives.
From t h e viewpoint of t h e a v e r a g e group, they
a r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h a p o s i t i o n below t h e break-even
o p p o r t u n i t y w i l l produce a change i n t h e s e t of g a i n s and l o s s e s a v a i l a b l e
t o a group.
w i l l i n g t o i n c u r what o t h e r groups r e g a r d a s n e t l o s s e s i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e
For t h e moment i t i s enough
t o s e e t h a t both m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y l i m i t t h e p o s s i b l e g a i n s Erom
collective action.
Some groups v a l u e a g i v e n c o l l e c t i v e good s o h i g h l y t h a t t h e y a r e
zero gains o r losses.
d i s t i n c t i o n among f o u r group s t r a t e g i e s :
llne.
We can mnke a
1 ) t h e z e a l o t s who, compared t o
o t h e r groups, s e t a n e x t r e m e l y h i g h v a l u e on some c o l l e c t i v e good i n terms
of t h e r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d t o a c h i e v e t h a t good: w l l l i n g t o expend l i f e and
A group can i n c r e a s e
t h c range of g a i n s and l o s s e s a v a i l a b l e by m o b i l i z i n g o r by m a n i p u l a t i n g
lLmb, f o r i n s t a n c e , i n o r d e r t o a c q u i r e self-government;
2) t h e m i s e r s . who
F i g u r e 3-4
Four I d e a l P a t t e r n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action
v a l u e t h e r e s o u r c e s t h e y a l r e a d y hold s o h i g h l y t h a t h a r d l y any a v a i l a b l e
ZEALOT
c o l l e c t i v e good can draw them i n t o expending t h e i r mobilized r e s o u r c e s on
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ; we s h o u l d e x p e c t m i s e r s t o a c t t o g e t h e r d e f e n s i v e l y
when t h e y a c t a t a l l ; 3 ) t h e run-of-the-mill
OPPORTUNITY
c p n t e n d e r s who aim f o r a
l i m i t e d s e t of c o l l e c t i v e goods, making t h e minimum e x p e n d i t u r e of r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e s e gooda, and remaining i n a c t i v e when t h e c u r r e n t combination of m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y makes
a n e t l o s s on t h e exchange l i k e l y ; 4 ) t h e o p p o r t u n i s t s who s t r i v e t o
maximize t h e i r n e t r e t u r n
--
t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n v a l u e between r e s o u r c e s
expended and c o l l e c t i v e gooda o b t a i n e d
-- r e g a r d l e s s
of which c o l l e c t i v e
RESOURCES EXPENDED
goods they a c q u i r e .
.
F i g u r e 3-4 p r e s e n t s t h e t o u r i d e a l t y p e s s c h e m a t i c a l l y .
In this
s i m p l i f i e d p i c t u r e . o p p o r t u n i t y and m o b i l i z a t i o n a r e t h e same f o r a l l
types.
The diagrams v a l u e t h e r e s o u r c e s expended and t h e c o l l e c t i v e
RUN-OF-THE-MILL
goods a c q u i r e d s t a v e r a g e s o v e r a l l groups i n s t e a d of showing t h e r e l a t i v e
v a l u e s u s u a l l y a s s i g n e d t o mobilized r e s o u r c e s and c o l l e c t i v e goods by
each t y p e of group.
According t o t h e diagram, z e a l o t s f i n d a c c e p t a b l e
o n l y a narrow r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e goods; t h e goods a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
t h o s e t h ~ ot t h e r groups v a l u e most h i g h l y .
They a r e w i l l i n g t o spend up
t o t h e l i m i t of t h e i r mobilized r e s o u r c e s t o a c q u i r e t h o s e c o l l e c t i v e
goods, even i f by t h e s t a n d a r d s of o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s t h e y a r e t a k i n g l o s s e s .
Misers w i l l o n l y spend a s h a r e of t h e i r mobilized r e s o u r c e s f o r a v e r y
v a l u a b l e r e t u r n i n c o l l e c t i v e goods.
l i m i t s e t by t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n .
They w i l l n e v e r spend up t o t h e
Run-of-the-mill
c o n t e n d e r s resemble
z e a l o t s . e x c e p t t h a t t h e y a r e w i l l i n g t o s e t t l e f o r a w i d e r r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e goods. and u n w i l l i n g t o s e t t l e f o r a l o s s .
w i l l t a k e any c o l l e c t i v e goods t h e y c a n g e t .
Finally, opportunists
They w i l l . spend up t o t h e i r
l i m i t t o g e t i t , j u s t s o long a s t h e y make a p r o f i t .
. ,
ACCEPTABLE
.
MISER
I
The diagram invites further theorizing. For example, it is reasonable
to suppose that zealots tend to maintainhigher levels of mobilization than
other klnds of actors. They therefore have more chances to acquire their
i
up the opportunity line by aucll tactics as forming coalitions with other
powerful contenders.
Some of these strategic questions will become impor-
I
1.
the-mill contenders more than the zealots or the misers.
period to another, and which are always hard to convert reliably into
i
That is even
They. too, reward opportunists
and punieh zealots.
Oddly enough, the opportunist is the least likely of the four extremes.
i
I
Regardless of group stmtegy, the return the group seeks is rarely or never
reason, we cannot simply graft the analysis of collective action on the existing
The existing economics of collective
But it, too, has yet to solve the problems of interest,
organization and mobilizstion we have encountered.
The Detection and Measurement of Collective Action
When trying to study joint action in pursuit of common ends, we face
the practical problems of detecting the action, and then determining how
If we confine our attention to clesr-
strikes provide a case in point.
Snyder uses number and proportion of
labor union members in the civilian labor force as a mobilization measure.
Data for long periods are difficult to locate and hard to make comparable.
but when they are available at all they are usunlly in quantitative form
First come the strike-activity measures: number of strikes.
number of participants in atrikes, mean duration of strikes, days lost.
In fact, both
the supply and the demand are "lumpy", clumped, discontinuous. For that
David Snyder's time-series analyses of Italian. French and American
variables.
Labor unions usually don't want papal dispensations.
clans usually don't want recognition as bargaining agents.
meaningful numbers.
from the start. On the side of collective action, Snyder uses two sets of
o simple profit on collective action. Groups care about the character of
joint it is and how common its ends.
narrow or too remote to repreaent adequately the range of action we have
are usually discontinuous, which often vary in coverage from one group or
No doubt every political sys-
tem rewards the opportunists more than the run-of-the-mill, and the run-of-
goods comes closer.
action which come to us in a more or lees qunntitatlve form, but are too
in mind, or b) indicators derived from qualitative descriptions, which
portunists and run-of-the-mill contenders.
microeconomics of private goods.
As with the meosurcmcnt of
mobilization, we commonly have the choice between a) indicators of collective
Every political system sorts its contenders among zealots, misers, op-
the collective goods.
--
especially if we want to any "how much" collective action one group or
another engaged in over some period of time.
tant in our later discussions of power.
true. I fear, after zealots seize power.
houses we still face the practical problems of gauging their mngnitudes
I
desired collective goods, but they also run a greater risk of heavy losses.
Opportunists, on the other hand, probably work more effectively at moving
cut examples, such as strikes, elections, petitions and attacks on poor-
proportion ending in success or failure, proportion making offensive or de-
!
fensive demands, and so on.
Ultimately, all of these come from official
sources, where they appear as summary statistics or as uniform descriptions
of all the strikes reported for some period, area and definition of the
relevant labor force. As in the case of union membershfp, it tokes some
ingenuity and effort to wrest comparable measures from the sources, but
the quantification itself is not very difficult.
That is certainly not true of Snyder's second set of measures.
concern other forms of collective action by workers.
Tliey
Snyder's list (from
Snyder 1974: 114) r u n s :
F i g u r e 3-5:
Economic and D i r e c t l y Job R e l a t e d A c t i o n s
S n y d e r ' s Code f o r
Labor Support of C a n d i d a t e s
1)
employment i n f o r m a t i o n and placement
2)
l o c a l c o n t r o l of working c o n d i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g g r i e v a n c e
The coder i s e v a l u a t i n g a a i n g l e - y e a r sununary of a b s t r a c t s from h i s t o r i c a l
procedures. l o c a l a d j u s t m e n t s of n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t s , e t c .
s o u r c e s c o n c e r n i n g a p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s s u p p o r t of c a n d i d a t e s f o r
3)
n e g o t i a t i o n of e x t r a l o c a l c o n t r a c t s ( u s u a l l y n a t i o n a l )
4)
disbursement of s t r i k e funds
elective office.
Code
-
Economic, But Not Job R e l a t e d A c t i o n s
0
1)
a i d t o members f o r a c c i d e n t , s i c k n e s s , unemployment, b u r i a l
2)
p r o v i s i o n of social/recreationalleducational f a c i l i t i e s
3)
finencjpg c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t a ( b o t h p r o d u c t i o n and consumption)
Evaluation
Criteria
none a t a l l
no s u p p o r t o f c a n d i d a t e s
s m a l l amount
endorsement of c a n d i d n t e e i n
p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l of t h e orgnni-
P o l i t i c a l . Actions
zatior!
1)
lobbying a c t i v i t i e s
2)
d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l
3)
s u p p o r t of c a n d i d a t e s f o r e l e c t i o n
moderate
speechmaking, e t c . . by l a b o r
leaderslrnembers i n s u p p o r t of
candidates
4) c o a l i t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l p a r t y
and endorsement
in
printed material
Snyder read through a l a r g e number of economic, l a b o r , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l
good d e a l
h i s t o r i e s f o r each of h i s t h r e e c o u n t r i e s , a b s t r a c t i n g any mention of any
of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s , r e g r o u p i n g t h e a b s t r a c t s i n t o o r g a n i z a t i o n - y e a r
m a r i e s . t h e n coding cnch of t h e e l e v e n i t e m s i n a s t a n d a r d way.
summed t h e s c o r e s f o r each o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t o f o u r g e n e r a l s c o r e s
f o r h i s Job R e l a t e d , Economic-Not-Job-Related
and o summary C o l l e c t i v e Action s c o r e .
f o r candidates (pnssing o u t l e a f -
sum-
l e t s , going door t o d o o r , c t c . )
For
example, t h e code f o r s u p p o r t of c a n d i d a t e s a p p e a r s i n F i g u r e 3-4.
and i t e m s
-
Snyder
-- one
each
great deal
and P o l i t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s ,
t i o n f o r t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e l a b o r f o r c e i t c o n t n i n e d , and summed each
Snyder's
Source:
Snyder 1974: 302
l i s t e d nbove
f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t oE c a n d i d a t e s
and i t e m s
-
F i n a l l y , he weighted each o r g a n i z a -
weighted s c o r e over a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r a country-year t o t a l .
a c t i v e compaigning by members
l i s t e d above
a n a l y s e s of t h e u n i o n i z a t i o n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and s t r i k e v a r i a b l e s f o r
analysis, the pattern of collective violence w i l l yield valuable inforontion
France and I t a l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e b e s t summary of t h e l r r e l a t i o n s h i p s
a b o u t t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s a whole.
runs, schematically:
hove done d e t a i l e d enumerations and d e s c r i p t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e
My c o l l o b o r a t o r e and I
violence
i n I t a l y , Germany, France and England over s u b s t a n t i a l b l o c k s of time w i t h
e x a c t l y t h a t purpose i n mind.
L e t u s c o n c e n t r a t e on c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e w i t h i n a p o p u l a t i o n under t h e
c o n t r o l of a s i n g l e government.
L e t u s a g r c e t o pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o
war, t o f u l l - f l e d g e d games, t o i n d i v i d u a l v i o l e n c e and t o h i g h l y d i s c o n t i n u ous i n t e r a c t i o n s .
~ d w b r dS h o r t e r end I had i m p l i c i t l y adopted a d i f f e r e n t mbdel:
U
N
~
N
Z
A
f;
T
~
We a r e t h e n s t i l l f r e e t o exnmine e v e n t s i n w l ~ i c h t h e
damage was o n l y i n c i d e n t a l t o t h e aims o f most of t h o s e i n v o l v e d .
In our
own i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , my r e s e a r c h group h a s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t w c con, wittiout
~
huge u n c e r t a i n t y , s i n g l e o u t e v e n t a o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n a p o r t l c u l a r n a t i o n a l
s t a t e i n which a t l e a s t one group above some minimum s i z e (commonly
THER COLLECTIVE ACTION
twenty o r f i f t y p e r s o n s ) s e i z e s o r dsmoges someone o r something from
Rut we n e i t h e r formulated t h a t model c l e a r l y nor ( e x c e p t f o r some a n a l y s e s
f o r t h e purpose.
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t r i k e a c t i v i t y and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e )
made much of on e f f o r t t o e s t i m a t e i t .
Thus Snyder's work i n d e s c r i p t i o n
Aside from s t r i k e s , o u r r e s e a r c h group's most e x t e n s i v e f o r a y s i n t o
(For
g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s end p r e l i m i n a r y r e s u l t s , s e e T i l l y , T i l l y and T i l l y
1975.)
For r e a s o n s which w i l l become c l e a r e r i n t h e c o u r s e of my l a t e r
d i s c u s s i o n s of v i o l e n c e a s s u c h , c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e s e r v e s a s a u s e f u l
" t m c e r " of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l .
Although c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s
which produce damage t o p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s a r e by no means a random sample
of a l l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , t h e p r e s e n c e of v i o l e n c e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s t h e
l i k e l i h o o d ' t h a t t h e e v e n t w i l l b e n o t i c e d and r e c o r d e d .
With prudent
We u s e newspapers, a r c h i v a l s o u r c e s and h i s t o r i c n l works
As t h e minimum s i z e goes down, c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e be-
g i n s t o f a d e i n t o b a n d i t r y . b r a w l i n g , vandalism, t e r r o r i s m and s wlde
v a r i e t y of t h r e a t e n i n g n o n v i o l e n t e v e n t s , s o f a r a s o u r a b i l i t y t o d i s -
and measurement l e a d s u s t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e p r o c e s s e s we a r e a n a l y z i n g .
t h e meosuremellt of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n have d e a l t w i t h v i o l e n t e v e n t s .
a n o t h e r group.
t i n g u i s h them on t h e b a s i s o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d is concerned.
We u s e t h e community-population-day
a s a n elementnry u n i t .
On o
p a r t i c u l a r d a y , d i d t h i s segment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of t h i s community
engage i n c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , a s j u s t d e f i n e d 7
Is s o , we hove t h e elemen-
t a r y u n i t of a v i o l e n t e v e n t .
Did an o v e r l a p p i n g s e t of p e o p l e c a r r y on t h e
a c t i o n i n a d j a c e n t community?
I f s o , b o t h communities were involved jn
t h e same e v e n t .
f o l l o w i n g day?
Did a n o v e r l a p p i n g s e t of people c o n t i n u e t h e a c t i o n t h e
I f s o . t h e i n c i d e n t l a s t e d a t l e a s t two days.
Introduce
a b r e a k i n time. s p a c e o r p e r s o n n e l , and we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h two o r more
3-65
distinct events.
The result of this modular reasoning is both to greatly
simplify the problem of bounding the "same" incident and to fragment into
20-100 persons:
eine Anzahl. ein Trupp. Schwsrm. Ilac~femeistmit
spezifizierenden ~ u A t z e nwie "ein Haufe Arbeiter", "ein Haufe Volks".
many separate incidents series of interactions (such as the Spanish Civil
100-1000 persons:
Rotte, Zusamenrottierung, Haufen, grsssere Haufen,
War as a whole) which many analysts have been willing to treat as s single
zshlreiche oder gr5ssere Menge, einige Hundert.
unit.
More details on definitions and procedures are in the appendix.
For some purposes, like the comparative study of revolutions, a
broader criterion may serve better.
Still other investigations will re-
1000-2000 pe'rsons:
Menge, grosse Menge, grosser Volksaufl.nuf. Hsssen,
unzthlige Menschenmasse (Volkmann 1975: 89).
quire more stringent standards: more participants, a certain duration, someone killed, a particular minimum of property damage.
But the general
reasoning of such choices would be the same: identify
the events above
He 1s thus able to estimate sizes for another 60 events. leaving almost
exactly half without either a numerical statement or a codable verbal
a certain magnitude, or at least a representative sample of them, before
description.
trying to sort them out in terms of legitimacy or in terms of the aims
part from the nature of the action itself.
Presumably Volkmann judged whether at least 20 persons took
In s study of "mass disturbances" in Japan from 1952 to mid-1960,
of the participants.
I, '
Let us consider some alternative ways of handling the enumeration
of events.
Reacting to what he regards as the weakness of our concentra-
tion on violent events. Heinrich Volkmann has delineated a class of events
called "social protests".
In general, he thinks of a social protest as
"any collective disturbance of public order on behalf of common objectives"
(Volkmann 1975: 33).
part.
Events qualify when at least twenty persons take
..'
Looking at Germany (as defined by the frontiers of 1937) during
done independently of our research group, Yoshio Sugimoto adopted some of
our definitions and procedures.
Ile used a Gmber of Japanese newspapers
to identify all events involving st least fifty people in which the police
intervened and there was some detectable violence. Ile identified 945
such events in his 8.5-year period.
Sugimoto's measurement of magnitudes
followed the same pattern: number of events, size, duration. But, following Sorokin and Gurr, he added a fourth dimension:
intensity. The inten-
the revolutionary years f r y 1830 through 1832, he finds 165 events
sity measurement is unusual.. Instead of simply scoring the injuries,
meeting the criteria in the
property damage and arrests that occurred in any particular event, Sugimoto
. :;..,, -.
of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung.
Just as in the case of Prance we use certain key words ("multitude",
.
attempted to estimate their probability as function of the various kinds
"rassemblement", "reunion", "f oule". "attroupement", etc ) to establish
of action that made up the event.
the presence of at least fifty people when our reports contain no numeri-
phases consisting of only one kind of action. he then sorted all action
cal estimate, Volkmann establishes rough numerical equivalents for certain
phases from all events in his sample by type of action.
terms. He does so by taking the 22 accounts which contain both a numerical
the 70-item list (with numbers of action phases s h a m in parenthesis)
estimate and a verbal description of'magnitude. The claaaificstion runs:
llaving broken down every event into
Items 31 to 40 on
t h e pace of t h e reform was more r a p i d , t h a t t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l a b o r
were, f o r example:
uniona s t r o n g l y promoted d i s t u r b a n c e s i n v o l v i n g w o r k e r s , and many o t h e r
p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s from a t t a c k (109)
f i n d i n g s of e q u a l i n t e r e s t .
p i c k e t a g a i n s t c a r s (105)
Let u s t a k e a l a s t example which is e n t i r e l y independent of my g r o u p ' s
a t t e m p t t o b r e a k p i c k e t l i n e (312)
work.
s k i r m i s h (1133)
(1966) p r e p a r e d an i n d e x of " p o l i t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n " by E n g l i s h workingmen.
a t t e m p t t o throw someone i n t o t h e s e a (3)
I t s i n g l e d o u t e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e n a t i o n a l government, i n c l u d i n g
Drawing on t h e Annual R e g i s t e r from 1815 t o 1848, C h a r l e s T a y l o r
f o r c e f u l removal of o b j e c t s (10)
"meetings t o demand a reform of t h e f r a n c h i s e . r i o t s t o p r o t e s t t h e i n t r o -
a t t e m p t t o t r a m p l e down f i e l d s (1)
d u c t i o n of new poor law and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s t o s u p p o r t aome p a r t i c u l a r group
a t t e m p t t o d i g a w e l l (1)
cause" (Taylor 1966: 1 5 ) .
a t t e m p t t o dam w a t e r i n a r i v e r (5)
s c o r e d p e t i t i o n s , group v i o l e n c e , t h e f o r m a t i o n of a s s o c i a t i o n s and t h e
a t t e m p t t o hammer p i k e s i n t o ground (1)
founding of p u b l i c a t i o n s , j u s t s o long a s they b o r e e x p l i c i t l y on t h e
p o l i t i c a l system.
The c o n t e x t makes i t a p p e a r t h a t Taylor a l s o
He weighed each i n s t a n c e from 1 t o 5 depending on i t s
For each of t h e s e v e n t y t y p e s of a c t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e d , he summed i n j u r i e s ,
d u r a t i o n and t h e number of p a r t i c i p a n t s .
p r o p e r t y damnge and a r r e s t s .
s t r a t e s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a c o u n t y ' s
The " p r o b a b i l i t y " of i n j u r y a s s i g n e d t o each
He then used t h e index t o demonl e v e l of p o l i t i c a l a r t t c -
a c t i o n i s t h e p r o p o r t i o n of a l l a c t i o n s i n t h e c l a s s which produced i n -
u l a t i o n over t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d and t h e c o u n t y ' s urban p o p u l a t i o n , d e n s i t y ,
juries.
growth r a t e and n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o r f o r c e .
Sugimoto t h e n combined t h e t h r e e i n d i v i d u a l s c o r e s f o r each
action-phase by means of t h e weighta d e r i v e d from a f a c t o r a n a l y s i s of t h e
t h r e e , computed t h e magnitude of t h e a c t i o n - p h a s e by m u l t i p l y i n g
I n my own g r o u p ' s e f f o r t t o i n d e x R r t t l s l ~ c o l l e c t i v ea c t i o n d u r i n g
t h e same span of time, we have avoided r e l y i n g on a p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i o n
a t t h e s t a r t , i n hopes of c a p t u r i n g a wide r a n g e of a c t i o n ; then we have
intensity x s i z e x duration
some chance t o d e t e r m i n e whether c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o n a t i o n a l
p o l i t i c s and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l r i s e and f a l l t o g e t h e r . o r
and then computed t h e magnitude of t h e e v e n t a s a whole by summing t h e
magnitudes of a l l i t s a c t i o n - p h a s e s .
whether t h e r i s e of n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s r e p r e s e n t s a n e t s h i f t w i t h i n t h e
The r e s u l t was probably t h e most
r e f i n e d measure of magnitude e v e r computed f o r a l a r g e sample of v i o l e n t
body of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
(For d e t a i l s , s e e t h e Appendjx.)
That impor-
t a n t e x c e p t i o n a s i d e , t h e two approaches t o t h e measurement of c o l l e c t i v e
even t a .
What i s more, Sugtmoto made good u s e of h i s r e f i n e d measures.
He
shows t h a t t h e magnitude of a g r a r i a n d i s t u r b a n c e s was g r e a t e r i n r e g i o n s
where l a n d h o l d i n g was r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l b e f o r e t h e l a n d r e f o r m s , and where
a c t i o n have much i n common.
I n l i n e w i t h t h e hope of assembling e v i d e n c e on t h e p a t t e r n o f col-
lective sction as a wliol.e, we have coded many features of the violent
Some of the reasons for these changes are obvious, and some require
events: chsracteristica of tlie setting, types of participants, forms of
reElection and research. rile twentieth-century rise of the big demun-
action, outcomes.
strstion and the one-day protest strike as modes of collective action
In thinking of the magnitude of collective action
involved, we hsve followed the model of strike analysis. We have at-
and as contexts for collective violence played s large part in the net
tempted to estimate the total person-days absorbed by the action, and to
shift toward large, short, violent events.
disaggreeate that estimate into its components: number of participants,
is to ask about the expanding importance of special-purpose nssociotlons,
duration.
the changing relations between organized labor and the notional govern-
For the total amount of collective action produced by e given
To ask why they rose, however.
population in a certain period of time, we then hsve a three-dimensional
ment, the movement of protests toward large cities and big plants.
figure which can assume quite different proportions:
short, the alterations an the forms of collective sction result from
In
changes in its determinants.
Interest, organization and mobilization, however. are not tlie only
determinants of the intensity and character of collective actlon. Opportunity matters. too. We must look st the three major components of
opportunity
--
power, repression/facilitstion and opportunitylthreot
before we have a rounded picture of collective action.
Croup A produces a few long events of medium size, while Group B produces
many large, short events; the volume of collective action as measured by
person-days, however, is about the-same in the two hypothetical cases.
This simple sort of representation brings out the fact that in France
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century both strikes and collective
violence shifted from a pattern of small size and long duration to large
size and short duration; the number of strikes and the person-days in
strikes expanded greatly, whlle the number of violent events and persondays in violence did not rise significantly faster than the French population.
--
CHAPTER 4: THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACT TOGETHER
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n too poorly t o help u s here.
From M o b i l i z a t i o n t o O p p o r t u n i t y
Real c o n t e n d e r s a r e more a c t i v e than Durkheim's p o r t r a i t i m p l i e s .
We began t h e l a s t c h a p t e r w i t h two models.
The " m o b i l i z a t i o n model"
d e s c r i b e s t h e b e h a v i o r of a s i n g l e c o n t e n d e r i n terms of i n t e r e s t , o r g a n i z n t i o n , power and o t h e r v a r i a b l e s .
That model we have k e p t much i n view.
They p u r s u e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s .
They s t r u g g l e f o r p a r e r .
On t h e wny, they
maneuver, form and b r e a k c o a l i t i o n s , t r y a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , win and
lose.
Our p r i m i t i v e models a i m p l i f y a l l t h i s c o n t e n t i o n by d e a c r i h i n g i t
We I ~ o v e , however, looked mainly a t one s i d e of i t : t h e s i d e d e a l i n g w i t h
a s a s e r i e s of r e s p o n s e s t o changing e s t i m a t e s of t h e c o s t s and h e n e f i t s
the contender's i n t e r n a l structure.
l i k e l y t o r e s u l t from v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h governments and
S c h e m a t i c a l l y , we have c o n c e n t r a t e d
on t h e f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s :
with o t h e r contenders.
The c e n t r a l assumptions run:
1. C o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
costs something.
2.
A l l contenders count c o s t s .
3.
C o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n b r i n g s b e n e f i t s , i n t h e form of c o l l e c t i v e
goods.
By i t s e l f , t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e model i s i n a d e q u a t e .
It d e a l s only with
4.
t h e c a p a c i t y t o a c t , n o t w i t h t h e immediate i n c e n t i v e o r o p p o r t u n i t y t o
act.
Those i n c e n t i v e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s f i n d t h e i r p l a c e s i n t h e o t h e r
5.
h a l f of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model, and i n t h e p o l i t y model.
--
b o t h c h a l l e n g e r s and members of t h e p o l i t y
and s t r u g g l e s f o r p a r e r .
Both c o s t s and b e n e f i t s a r e u n c e r t a i n because a ) c o n t e n d e r s have
i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e of t h c p o l i t y ;
The " p o l i t y model" r e l a t e s c o n t e n d e r s t o a government and t o o t h e r
contenders
Contenders c o n t i n u o u s l y weigh expected c o a t s n g n l n s t expected
benefits.
--
b ) a l l p a r t i e s engage i n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n .
via coalitions
So l o n g a s we were examining t h e i n t e r n a l s t r u c -
t u r e of a c o n t e n d e r , we could t a k e i t s e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s f o r g r a n t e d .
As
We sum up t h e r e l e v a n t c o s t s and b e n e f i t s under t h e h e a d i n g s r e p r e a s i o n /
f a c i l i t a t i o n , power and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t .
On t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s i d e , t h e
main r e l a t i o n a h i p a i n t h e model r u n :
we move i n t o t h e world of o p p o r t u n i t y , we must pay s u s t a i n e d a t t e n t i o n t o
other actors.
T h e i r s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses comprise t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o a c t on i t s i n t e r e s t s .
COLLECTIVE ACTION
OPPORTUNITY/THREAT
I n Durkheimian t h i n k i n g , t h e main word f o r t h i s s e t of r e l a t i o n s between t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r and i t s environment i s s o c i a l c o n t r o l .
Social
c o n t r o l c o n s i s t s of t h e e f f o r t s of a u t h o r i t i e s , o r of s o c i e t y a s n whole,
t o b r i n g d e v i a n t s back i n t o l i n e .
Thia i d e a of s o c i a l c o n t r o l a s s i g n s a
passive, uncreative role t o collective actors.
I t f i t s t h e r e a l i t y of
Remember t h a t t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p a r e f e r t o t h e moment of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Over t h e long r u n , t h e e x t e n t and form of a c o n t e n d e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
a f f e c t i t s power. t h e r e p r e s s i o n t o which i t i s a u h J e c t e d , and t h e f u r t h e r
o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s i t f a c e s .
Thia v e r s i o n of t h e model i g n o r e s time.
Let us consider each component of the timeless model in turn.
Despite the two faces of repression/facilitation, the elementary mobilization model shows no direct connection between repressionlEacilitation
Repression and Facilitation
Contention for power always involves at least two parties. The be-
and collective action.
Instead, it portrays repression/facilitstion as
havior of the second party runs along a range from repression to facili-
acting on power, which in turn influences collective action.
tation.
cause the elementary model refers to the moment of action alone. At that
Let us recall the definitions: repression is any action by another
That is be-
group which raises the contender's cost of collective action. An action
moment, the prior effects of repression translate into power: into tlie cx-
which lowers the group's cost of collective action is a form of facilita-
tent to which the outcomes of the contender's various possible interactions
tion.
-
with other contenders favor its interests over those of the others.
(We cell repression or facilitation political if the other party is
s government.) A group bent on repressing or facilitating another group's
Governmental repression is the best-known case. For example, the
action has tlie choice of working on the target group's mobilization or
United States government's outlawing of the Communist Party during the Cold
directly on its collective action.
War essentially guarsnteed that the party would lose lenders to jail when
For example, a government can raise a
group's mobilization costs (and thereby raise its costs of collective ac-
it acted together in sny visible way.
tion) by disrupting its organization, by making comunicstions difficult
lective action. The law also raised the party's cost of mobilization by
or inaccessible, by freezing necessary resources such as guns and manpower.
penalizing individuals who dared to contribute time, money or moral support
Standard repressive measures such as suspending newspapers, drafting
to its work.
strikers, forbidding assemblies and arresting leaders illustrate the anti-
lization is a more reliable repressive strategy than raising the costs of
mobilization avenue.
collective action alone. The anti-mobilization strategy neutralizes tlie
Or a government can operate directly on the costs of
That is a high cost to pay for col-
From a government's point of view, raising the costs of mobi-
collective action by raising the penalties, making the targets of the ac-
actor as well as the action, and makes it less likely that the actor will
tion inaccessible or inducing a waste of the mobilized resources; the
be able to act rapidly when the government suddenly becomes vulnerable, a
egentprovocatex, the barricades around the city hall, the establishment
new coalition partner arises, or something else quickly shifts the probable
of military tribunals for insurgents fall familiarly into the strategy of
costs and benefits of collective action.
moving directly against collective action.
action alters the pattern of effective demand from mobilized groups, while
Facilitation likewise has two
faces, both familiar: pro-mobilization activities such as giving a group
publicity, legalizing membership in it and simply paying it off; activities
Raising the costs of collective
raising the costs of mobilization reduces demand across the board.
Governmental repression is uniquely important because governments
directly reducing the group's costs of collective action, such as lending
specialize in the control of mobilization and collective action: police
information or strategic expertise, keeping the group's enemies out of the
for crowd control, troops to back them, spies and informers for infiltra-
action, or simply sending forces to help the action along.
tion, licensing to keep potential actors visible and tame.
Yet groups
of t h e game, and i n t h e i r changes; a t a given time, i t may b e l e g n l t o p e t -
o u t s i d e government a l s o r e p r e s s each o t h e r , i n t h e s e n s e of m a n i p u l a t i n g
each o t h e r ' s c o s t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
quasi-governments
e
i t i o n , a s s o c i a t e , v o t e a s a b l o c , a c q u i r e n p a t r o n i n t h e l e ~ i s l s t i ~ rand
That is obvious i n t h e c a s e of
assemble a s a f o r m a l l y - c o n s t i t u t e d community, b u t n o t t o d e m o n s t r a t e ,
such a s l a r g e f i r m s : simply c o n s i d e r how much t h e s t r u c -
t u r e and p o l i c y of t h e f i r m a f f e c t t h e chances f o r u n i o n i z a t i o n and t h e r e -
s t r i k e , b o y c o t t , form m i l i t a s o r i n v a d e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e .
fore for strike activity.
and f a c i l i t a t i o n r e s i d e i n t h e government's a c t i o n t o a l t e r t h e r e l a t i v e
It i s l e s s obvious i n t h e c a s e of r o u t i n e compe-
The r e p r e s s i o n
t i t i o n among o t h e r groups: t h e v o l u n t e e r f i r e companies which burned each
c o s t s of d i f f e r e n t forms o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
o t h e r ' s premises and h e l d d e a d l y s h o o t o u t s i n tlie s t r e e t s of n i n e t e e n t h -
l a w s s t a t e t h e c o s t a and b e n e f i t s which governments a r e prepared ( o r a t
c e n t u r y P h i l a d e l p h i a ended up r e s e t t i n g t h e r e l a t i v e a b i l i t y of each f i r e
l e a s t empowered) t o a p p l y t o o n e form of a c t i o n o r a n o t h e r .
company t o w i e l d p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e ( L a u r i e 1972).
L e g a l i t y m a t t e r s because
Impressed by t h a t f a c t . I once thought we should index f l u c t u a t i o n s
The f i g h t s between
groups of young b l a c k s nnd I r i s h f o r c o n t r o l of l o c a l t u r f s i n Boston s i g n i -
i n a government's r e p r e s s i v e n e s s by watching c a r e f u l l y i t s flow o f l e g i s -
f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e g r o u p ' s f u t u r e c o s t s of assembling and a c t i n g t o g e t h e r .
lation.
I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e n , r e p r e s s i o n sums t h e e f f e c t s of t h e a c t i o n s of a l l o t h e r
t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i t a i n d i d t h e i r work of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n ,
groups, i n c l u d i n g governments, on a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p ' s c o s t of c o l l e c t i v e
however, diminishedmy c o n f i d e n c e .
action.
l i e d t h e number of c a p i t o l o f f e n s e s .
more obvious.
I
f e a t u r e s of complex b l l l s designed t o advance t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t s o f
shipowners, merchnnts, l a n d l o r d s o r o t h e r p r o p e r t y - h o l d e r s (Hoy 1975).
T h i s much seems q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r i s e
e s e L i b e r a t i o n Army, t h e Vietnam V e t e r a n s A g a i n s t t h e War, and t h e DemoAgencies of t h e government have a l s o worked t o f a c i l i t a t e
t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of t h e B l a c k s t o n e Rangers, tlie American Medical AssoP o l i t i c s ss u s u a l i n v o l v e s a g r e a t d e a l of
conlition-making among and a g a i n s t d i f f e r e n t c o n t e n d e r s f o r power.
Moreover, t h e b l l l s
l e g i s l a t i o n ; i n f a c t , t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s o f t e n appeared a s i n c i d e n t a l
S e l e c t i v i t y by group is t h e
I n r e c e n t y e a r s , a g e n c i e s of t h e U.S. government have
c i a t i o n and t h e A.P.L.-C.I.O.
Penalties for offenses against
which extended t h e d e a t h p e n a l i t y were c h o r o c t e r i s t i c a l l y s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t
worked t o impede t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of groups a s d i v e r s e a s t h e Symbion-
c r a t i c Party.
l e g i s l a t i o n multip-
f o r c i b l e e n t r y and t h e f t became p u n i s h a b l e by hanging.
t r a t e on m o b i l i z a t i o n and sometimes on c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i t s e l f , they a l s o
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n encouraged o r d e t e r r e d .
Eighteenth-century
p r o p e r t y l e d t h e way: p l u n d e r i n g shipwrecks, food r i o t i n g , m n y forms o f
If d i f f e r e n t forms o f r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n sometimes concen-
s e l e c t i n two o t h e r i m p o r t a n t r e g n r d s : t h e t a r g e t groups and t h e v a r i e t i e s
A c l o s e r l o o k a t t h e way t h e m a g i s t r a t e s o f e i g h t e e n t h - and nine-
Divi-
s i o n s of t h e government p l a y i m p o r t a n t p o r t s on b o t h s i d e s .
S e l e c t i v i t y by t y p e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n shows up i n t h e v e r y r u l e s
I
of " p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m . "
But one f a c t is i n c o n v e n i e n t : t h e a p p l i c o -
t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y became l e s s f r e q u e n t d u r i n g t h e eigliteentli cent u r y ( B e a t t i e 1974).
What a r e we t o make of t h a t 7
Perhaps t h e d e t e r r m t
worked s o w e l l t h a t fewer c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s were committed.
tempered t h e law'^ s e v e r i t y by r e f u s i n g t o c o n v i c t .
Perhaps j u r i e s
Perhaps, a s Douglna
Hay s u g g e s t s , t h e combination of widespread t h r e a t s and d e c l i n i n g execu-
t i o n s r e s u l t e d Erom a system of g e n e r a l t e r r o r < s e l e c t i v e r e ~ r e s s i o nand
e x t e n s i v e patronage.
I n any of t h e s e e v e n t u a l i t i e s , t h e r e a d i n g o f r e p r e s -
s i v e n e s s from l e g i s l a t i o n a l o n e is f a u l t y .
One m i g l ~ thope t o ~ e a tt them by
s t u d y i n g c u r r e n t l e g i s l a t i o n and j u r i s p r u d e n c e .
E.P. Thompson's a n a l y s i s o f t h e background o f t h e Black Act of 1723
is a c a s e i n point.
The f i r s t and t h i r d e l e m e n t s a r c b o t h m a t t e r s of t h e law a s m i t t e n
by j u d g e s , l e g i s l a t o r s and l a w y e r s .
But t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
and a p p l i c a t i o n of e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n a r e s u b t l e , v a r i e d and s c a t t c r c d .
I n B r i t a i n , t h e J u s t i c e s o f t h e Peace had g r e a t d i s c r e t i o n .
The Black Act s e t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y f o r no fewer
They used i t .
than f i f t y o f f e n s e s , e s p e c i a l l y armed and d i s g u i s e d h u n t i n g , poaching,
On t h e one hand, they never e x e r c i s e d t h e i r l e g a l powers t o tlie f u l l e s t
rick-burning and o t h e r a t t a c k s on r u r a l p r o p e r t y .
p o s s i b l e e x t e n t ; t h e r e were groups on which t h e f u l l r i g o r o f tlic law d i d
Thompson shows t h a t i t
was e s s e n t i a L l y c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n ; i t was engineered by S i r Robert Walpole
n o t descend, laws which remained unused, numerous i n s t a n c e s i n w h l c l ~o n e
and h i s f r i e n d s t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r e x c l u s i v e enjoyment o f t h e i r e s t a t e s
person was punished a s a n example w h i l e t h e o t h e r o f f e n d e r s were l e f t t o
o v e r t h e r e s i s t a n c e of t h e s m a l l f a r m e r s nearby.
a c q u i r e c o n t r i t i o n and f e a r by proxy.
At a s u p e r f i c i a l r e a d i n g .
one might e a s i l y t a k e t h e Black Act a s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e manner i n
which l e g i s l a t i o n makes t h e r i s e a n d f a l l of r e p r e s s i o n v i s i b l e
. . . and
I n t h e c a s e o I t h e p r o v i n c i a l hvn-
g e r r i o t s of 1766:
. . . the magistrates not
o n l y r e f r a i n e d from e f f e c t i v e measures t o
t h u s , perhaps, makes i t q u a n t i f i a b l e .
c r u s h t h e i n t i t i a l d i s o r d e r s , they a c t u a l l y a b e t t e d o t h e r members of
Thompson, however, p o i n t s o u t t h e d i f f i c u l t y :
t h e landed and i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r encouragement o f tlic
On t h e one hand, i t . i s t r u e t h a t t h e law d i d m e d i a t e e x i s t e n t c l a s s
p e o p l e t o r e g u l a t e mnrkets and r e d u c e t h e p r i c e s of p r o v i s i o n s by
r e l a t i o n s t o t h e advantage of t h e r u l e r s ; n o t o n l y is t h i s s o , b u t
force.
a s t h e c e n t u r y advanced t h e law became a s u p e r b i n s t r u m e n t by which
men .and
t h e s e r u l e r s were a b l e t o impose new d e f i n i t i o n s o f p r o p e r t y t o
terests.
t h e i r even g r e a t e r advantage, a s i n t h e e x t i n c t i o n by law of i n d e f i n -
of 1766 d i d n o t i n v o l v e d i r e c t a t t a c k s on londowneru o r mnnufacturcrs.
i t e a g r a r i a n u s e - r i g h t s and i n t h e f u r t h e r a n c e of e n c l o s u r e .
Thus wtiile n o t a c t u a l l y i n c i t i n g t h e r i o t s , t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e magis-
On t h e
..
By t h i s means, t h e y d i v e r t e d t h e r i o t e r s towards middle-
l a r g e f a r m e r s , and away Erom t h e landed and i n d u s t r i a l . i n U n l i k e o t h e r a g r a r i a n d i s o r d e r s of tlie c e n t u r y , t h e r i o t s
o t h e r hand, t h e law mediated t h e s e c l a s s r e l a t i o n s through l e g a l
t r a t e s c e r t a i n l y gave them d i r e c t i o n .
forms, which imposed, a g a i n and a g a i n , i n h i b i t i o n s upon t h e a c t i o n s
of d i s o r d e r f r i g h t e n e d them, dLd t h e g e n t r y - m n g i s t r a t e s c l o s e r a n k s
of t h e r u l e r s (Thompson 1975: 264).
w i t h t h e a r i s t o c r a c y and o t h e r r u r a l l e a d e r s t o c r u s l ~what t h e y had
We have t o d e a l w l t h n o t one element
--
legislation alone
-- b u t
Only b e l a t e d l y , when t h e s c a l e
come t o f e a r was t h e s t a r t of s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n
( S h e l t o n 1973: 95-96).
with three:
t h e l e g i s l a t i o n a s such; t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e l e g i s -
When i t s u l t e d them, on t h e o t h e r hand. t h e J u s t i c e s of t h e Pence o f t e n
l a t i o n ; t h e l i m i t s s e t on t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n ' s e f f k c t by o t h e r . e x i s t i n g
used portmanteau laws c o n c e r n i n g p u b l i c o r d e r .
law.
They a r r e s t e d people f o r
vagrancy, t r e s p a s s i n g , breach of t h e peace, unlawful assembly o r h i n d r a n c e
d e m o l i s h i n g t u r n p i k e s , p u l l i n g down houses. s e d i t i o n , " c u t t i n g and
of an o f f i c e r i n t h e p u r s u i t of h i s d u t y .
Sometimes they r e i n t e r p r e t e d
an e x i s t i n g law, such a s t h e law of t r e a s o n , t o cover t h e form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a t hand.
"mobbing and r i o t i n g " and "attempted murder".
bably had unusual freedom of a c t i o n , a s compared w i t h t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e P r u s s i a n Junker who judged
h i s own t e n a n t s a s Landrat and t h e humbler French n o t a b l e who h e l d c o u r t
o v e r h l s n e i g h h o r s a s j u g e d e p a i x a l s o chose t h e i r weapons from a l a r g e
legal arsenal.
And t h e l a s t
b a t c h o f t r a n s p o r t e d p r o t e s t e r s t o bc s e n t t o A u s t r a l l a from England
were 21 a r s o n i s t s who a r r i v e d t h e r e i n half-a-dozen
B r i t i s h m a g i s t r a t e s of t h e e i g h t e e n t h and n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s pro-
Jn o t h e r w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s .
maiming",
s h l p s i n 1852.
A f t e r t h i s , t m n s p o r t a t i o n c e a s e d i n Tasmania nu i t had t e n y e a r s
e a r l i e r i n Sydney; and when i t r e v i v e d b r i e f l y i n Western A u e t r n l i a
between 1860 and 1868, t h e r e was n o t a s i n g l e Englisli, Welull o r
S c o t t i s h p r o t e s t e r among t h e 9,000 c o n v i c t s t h a t went o u t .
Ilcnce-
f o r t h , such p r o t e s t e r s a s remained t o b e sentenced were c o n f i n e d t o
j a i l s a t home; and, a s we noted e n r l l c r , i n d i c t m e n t s f o r such o f f e n s e s
The e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n w i t h i n t h e system d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e
were, by t h e 1860's.
i n f a i r l y steady decline
(Rudk 1973: 22-23):
d i s t i n c t i o n between l e g a l and i l l e g a l means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s i n s i g nificant.
T t means we must d e r i v e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n from l e g a l p r a c t i c e i n -
s t e a d of r e l y i n g n a i v e l y on t h e s t a t u t e books.
Criminal s t a t i s t i c s thus
A s Rude p o i n t s o u t , t h i s u s e of t h e c r i m i n a l r e c o r d s h i f t s t h e a n a l y t i c
s l ~ o et o t h e o t h e r f o o t .
I n s t e a d of assuming a c o n s t a n t p a t t e r n of r e p r e s -
s i o n and r e a d i n g t h e r e p o r t e d c o n v i c t i o n s a s a h i s t o r y o f c r i m i n a l n c t i J i t y .
r e c e i v e a new l e a s e on l i f e .
Criminnl s t a t i s t i c s a r e p r o p e r l y s u s p e c t a s a comprehensive ( o r even
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) r e c o r d of a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n s of t h e law.
Yet they do un-
q u e s t i o n a b l y r e f l e c t t h e a c t i o n p f t h e j u d i c i a l a p p a r a t u s . and t h e r e f o r e
p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e on changes i n t h a t a c t i o n .
George Rude n o t e s t h e marked
d e c l i n e i n t h e B r i t i s h u s e of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y a g a i n s t p r o t e s t a f t e r 1800:
wewant t o "hold c o n s t a n t " t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y and f o r c e t h e r e c o r d t o
t e l l u s about r e p r e s s i o n .
Not e a s y , b u t a t l e a s t we can a n a l y z e t h e punish-
ment meted o u t f o r s i m i l a r o f f e n s e s i n d i f f e r e n t t l m e s and p l a c e s , watch
tlie waxing and waning involvement o f d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s
( f o r example, t h e i n c r e n s i n g r o l e of p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l l c c i n n i n e t e c n t l i
and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s ) , a t u d y i n g t h e changing l i f e h i s t o r i e s of t y p i c a l
Once a r s o n , r i o t and a t t a c k s on p r o p e r t y had v i r t u a l l y ceased t o
b e c a p i t a l o f f e n c e s , t h e w o r s t he would have t o f a c e
was t e r r i f y i n g enough
-- was
--
a term of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
and t h i s
h e c c a ' s Daughters, f o r example
--
--
I n l o o k i n g a t much t h e same m a t e r i a l a s Rudg, E.P. ll~ompsonn o t e s
I t is n o t
s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e t y p i c a l c r i m e s f o r which prot e s t e r s were t r a n s p o r t e d i n t h e 1 8 4 0 ' s
complaints.
t h e C h a r t i s t s and Re-
were f o r former c a p i t a l o f f e n ~ e sl i k e
t h e f r e q u e n t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y u s e o f exemplary punlshment
t h e p u b l i c hanging
--
--
especially
i n s t e a d of widespread p r o s e c u t i o n a s a d e t e r r e n t t o
t h e rambunctious e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E n g l i s h popular c l a s s e s , and i t s
l a t e r d e c l i n e i n f a v o r o f a tendency t o p r o s e c u t e a l l ofCenders, t o Jncnr-
c e r a t e them i n s t e a d o f s u b j e c t i n g them t o banishment o r b r i e f agony, t o
of t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f i r r e g u l a r l o c a l f o r c e s i n t o t h e n o t i o n a l p o l i c e
remove punishment from t h e p u b l i c view, t o dream of reforming t h e i n d i v i d -
( s e e T i l l y . L e v e t t , Lodhi and Munger 1975).
ual.
Thompson i s t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r l y s k e p t i c a l t h a t anyone could e s t i m a t e
i n t h e United S t a t e s , no
n a t i o n a l p o l i c e emerged, b u t p a r a l l e l changes i n p o l i c i n g a c c u r r e d .
e i t h e r t h e amount o f p r o t e s t o r t h e d e g r e e o f r e p r e s s i o n by f o l l o w i n g such
we s e e t h e s h i f t from " e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l " t o " b u r e a u c r a t i c "
s t a t i s t i c s a s a r r e s t s , imprisonments and e x e c u t i o n s .
( L e v e t t 1974).
h e l p s s p e c i f y what h a s t o b e measured.
Yet h i s v e r y o b j e c t i o n
C l e a r l y we have t o d i s t i n g u i s h
There
police forces
I n t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l s t a g e , t h r e e k i n d s of f o r c e s shared
t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : 1 ) c i t i z e n f o r c e s ; t h e y were c a l l e d such t h i n g s a s
between t h e volume and t y p e of r e p r e s s i v e a c t i v i t y , on t h e one hand, and
p o s s e and d e p u t i e s when t h e government d i d n o t a u t h o r i z e them; 2) r e g u l n r
i t s symbolic s i g n i f i c a n c e , on t h e o t h e r .
t r o o p s ; 3) c o n s t a b l e s and s i m i l a r o f f i c e r s , o f t e n s h o r t - t e r m o r p a r t - t i m e ,
S i n c e groups v a r y s o much i n t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c u s e of one s o r t
o f t e n g i v e n l i t t l e o r no r e g u l n r remuneration, o f t e n drawing most of t h e i r
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n o r a n o t h e r , t h e s e l e c t i v i t y of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i -
p o l i c e income from f e e s : f i n e s , a s h a r e of recovered p r o p e r t y , rewords
t a t i o n with r e s p e c t t o t y p e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n u s u a l l y e n t a i l s a s e l e c -
posted f o r t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of major c r i m i n a l s , and s o on.
t i o n by kind of a c t o r a s w e l l .
had l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o c a r r y on comprehensive p a t r o l s , t o d e a l w i t h
No doubt a b r i d g i n g t h e r i g h t of assembly
i s l e s s s e l e c t i v e t h a n o u t l a w i n g t h e Communist P a r t y .
Even when t h e a s -
~ o u t i n ep u b l i c o r d e r o f f e n s e s , o r t o p r o t e c t t h e poor.
Thesc f o r c e s
The t h i r d group
sembly laws a r e e q u i t a b l y e n f o r c e d , however, t h e y f a l l w i t h s p e c i a l f o r c e
were " e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l " i n t h a t t h e y made t h e i r l i v i n g s by competing f o r
on t h o s e groups which can o n l y make c o n t a c t by g a t h e r i n g i n p u b l i c s p a c e s .
the available fees.
I n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . t h e workers who c u s t o m a r i l y g o t t o g e t h e r i n pubs
i n g l y foreign-born working c l a s s g a t h e r i n g i n n l n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c i t i e s ,
o r on t h e s t r e e t found themselves more g r e a t l y hampered by r i o t a c t s t h a n
however, American p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l s became i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r e s t e d i n
did the rich.
forming r e g u l a r p o l i c e f o r c e s which would p a t r o l t h e e n t i r e c i t y . d e a l w i t h
The r i c h could e s c a p e t o t h e i r s a l o n s and p r i v a t e c l u b s .
The n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y c a s e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g because of
With a growing, i n c r e a s i n g l y s e g r e g a t e d and i n c r e a s -
v i c t i m l e s s o f f e n s e s such a s p u b l i c drunkenness, and c o n t o i n rnaJor t h r e a t s
t h e g r e a t p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n of p o l i c i n g which o c c u r r e d i n most w e s t e r n
of h o s t i l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
c o u n t r i e s a s t h e c e n t u r y moved on.
uniformed f u l l - t i m e f o r c e s .
Some of t h e a p p a r e n t l y huge expansion
of p o l i c e f o r c e s i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y r e s u l t e d from t h e b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n o f v o l u n t e e r and p a r t - t i m e p o l i c i n g .
Thus they o r g a n i z e d b u r e a u c r a t i z e d , s o l a r i e d .
The same g e n e r a l change took p l a c e i n England.
I n France, t h e r e g u l a r n a t i o n a l
Robert Storcli p o i n t s
o u t t h a t a s t h e middle and working c l a s s e s drew a p a r t , n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
f o r c e s r o s e from a b o u t 5,000 policemen and 1 6 , 0 0 0 gendarmes ( f o r a combined
middle c l a s s l e a d e r s i n c r e a s i n g l y f e l t t h e need f o r a f o r c e which would
r a t e of 57 p o l i c e p e r 100,000 p o p u l a t i o n ) i n 1848 t o a b o u t 1 6 , 0 0 0 p o l i c e -
c o n t a i n and c i v i l i z e t h e workers:
men and 21,000 gendarmes ( f o r a combined r a t e of 97 p e r 100,000 p o p u l a t i o n )
I
i n 1897.
But a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e i n c r e a s e i n policemen
consisted
The d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f a common s p h e r e of enjoyment was of c o u r s e
p a r a l l e l e d by a p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of t h e c l a s s e s
d e s c r i b e d by Engela
ian'bour&oisie
.
,
--
--
classically
unprecedented i n w e s t e r n h i s t o r y .
The V i c t o r -
wliicl~ s e t t h e moral t o n e of c i t i e s l i k e Manchester
R e p r e s s i v e and T o l e r a n t Governments
L e t u s s e t t h e s e i d e a s down more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y .
The r e p r c s s i v c n e s s
of a government i s never a s i m p l e m a t t e r o f more o r l e s s .
I t is aLways
and Leeds were n o t l i k e l y t o p a t r o n i z e t h e c o c k p i t a s t h e P r e s t o n
s e l e c t i v e , and always c o n s i s t s of some combination of r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r n -
g e n t r y of t h e l a t e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . had done, nor to-shower c o i n s
t i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n .
on s Guy Fawkes crowd a s Wakefield T o r i e s s t i l l f e l t a t l i b e r t y t o
of groups, and t o d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of a c t i o n s .
d o a t mid-century.
a r e f i n e indeed: t h e same government which s m i l e s on c l ~ u r c hs e r v i c e s b r i n g -
Such gentlemen were much more i n c l i n e d t o e i t h e r
mind t h e i r own b u s i n e s s and b u s i n e s s e s o r e l s e t o p a r t o n i z e temperance
o r r a t i o n a l r e c r c a t i o n s o c i e t i e s o r mechanics' i n s t i t u t e s .
I t was
a l s o they who s u p p o r t e d t h e moral-reform m i s s i o n a s s i g n e d t o t h e pol i c e and added t o i t i n t h e language o f numerous l o c a l improvement
acts.
The ncw demands f o r c i v i l o r d e r i n rdneteenth-century England
produced a novel t y p e o f s u r r o g a t e
t o r e p l a c e o l d e r and perhaps more
p e r s o n a l l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y a n d , d e f e r e n c e which were now conceived
t o be moribund.
produced t o
The p o l i c e , a "bureaucracy o f o f f i c i a l m o r a l i t y . " were
tiy t o
f i l l t h i s vacuum and t o a c t a s a l e v e r of moral
reform on t h e m y s t e r i o u s t e r r a i n of t h e i n d u s t r i a l c i t y ' s i n n e r c o r e
( S t o r c h 1976: 4 9 6 ) .
Governments respond s e l e c t i v e l y t o different s o r t s
Sometimes t h e discriminations
i n g t o g e t h e r a thousand p e o p l e assembled t o pray f o r s a l v a t i o n s l ~ o o t s
w i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n i n t o a crowd of a thousand workers assembled t o pray
for justice.
Governments which r e p r e s s a l s o f a c i l i t a t e .
While r a i s i n g t h e c o s t a
o f some k i n d s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o some k i n d s of groups.
they lower
t h e c o s t s of o t h e r k i n d s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o o t h e r k i n d s of groups.
They do s o i n two d i f f e r e n t ways: a ) b y ' s i m p l y d i m i n i s h i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t y
o f s p e c i f i c v a r i e t i e s of m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d l o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and b)
by p r o v i d i n g p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e s f o r s p e c i f i c v a r i e t i e s o f mobill.zation
andlor c o l l e c t i v e action.
i n t o compulnion:
performance.
At t h e extreme, f a c i l i t a t i o n t h e r e f o r e t u r n s
p u n i s h i n g n o n - p e r f o r m n c e i n s t e a d o f simply rewarding
For p r e s e n t purposes, however. we can t r e o t f a c i l i t a t i o n
What is more, t h e poor of E n g l i s h c i t i e s r e s i s t e d t h e growth of r e g u l a r
and compulsion a s a s e a m l e s s continuum.
police forces.
They sow t h e p o l i c e , i u i t e r i g h t l y , a s s p e c i a l i s t s i n i n T o l e r a t i o n i s t h e s p a c e between r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n .
For
t r u d i n g on t h e i r l i f e s p a c e , k e e p i n g them under s u r v e i l l a n c e , i n t e r f e r i n g
some combinations o f groups and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , a g i v e n government
i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n and e n t e r t a i n m e n t .
They a s s a u l t e d p o l i c e who c l o s e d
does not r e a c t a t a l l :
t h e r e s i d e n t s of an urban neighborhood g e t to-
pubs d u r i n g church s e r v i c e s o r t r i e d t o break up crowds of i d l e r s on tlie
g e t h e r t o w r i t e a l e t t e r t o t h e e d i t o r a b o u t l o c a l houslng f o r t h e e l d e r l y ,
street.
The r e s i s t a n c e was, t o b e s u r e . s e l f - d e f e a t i n g :
i t o n l y gave t h e
and t h e government n e i t h e r impedes them nor h e l p s them; s t r i k i n g s t u d e n t s
f e a r f u l middlc c l a s s e s s t r o n g e r i n c e n t i v e s t o expand and r e g u l a r i z e t h e
s t a y away from c l a s s e s , and t h e p o l i c e s t u d i o u s l y i g n o r e them.
police forces.
Thus an o s t e n s i b l y g e n e r a l p r o t e c t i v e measure i n c r e a s e d
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t tlie a c c e p t a b i l l t y of n c t i o n s and o f groups t o a
t h e r e p r e s s i o n d i r e c t e d a t urban workers.
given government each f a l l i n t o a s i n g l e rank o r d e r , we have a s i m p l e way
of r e p r e s e n t i n g both t h e l i m i t s o f t o l e r a b l e b e h a v i o r and t h e g e n e r a l
l e v e l of governmental r e p r e s s i v e n e s s .
F i g u r e 4-1:
R e p r e s s i o n , T o l e r a t i o n , F a c i l i t a t i o n and Cocrcion
F i g u r e 4-1 o f f e r s a s i m p l e d e s c r i p -
t i o n of r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r a t i o n and f a c i l i t a t l o n .
I n t h i s i d e a l i z e d dia-
gram, any group l e s s a c c e p t a b l e then D g e t s r e p r e s s e d no m a t t e r what i t
docs.
Any a c t i o n l e s s a c c e p t a b l e than B g e t s r e p r e s s e d no m a t t e r which
group d o e s i t .
AC t h e r e f o r e r e p r e s e n t s t h e amount o f r e p r e s s i o n .
Nigh
ercion
Any
acilitntion
group more a c c e p t a b l e t h a n E and any a c t i o n more a c c e p t a b l e than F re-
17
.U
-I
c e i v e governmental s u p p o r t .
EG r e p r e s e n t s t h e g e n e r a l e x t e n t of govern-
mental f a c i l i t a t i o n , CG t h e g e n e r a l e x t e n t of governmental t o l e r a n c e .
2
(U
0
X
With t h e s e t o o l s , we can manufacture t h e two i d e a l t y p e s of regimes
r(
4
d
.
shown i n F i g u r e 4-2:
E g a l i t a r i a n and O l i g a r c h i c .
I n t h e extreme c a s e of
e g a l i t n r i a n i s m , tlie a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e group makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e
.a
U
8
4
l i k e l i h o o d t h a t tlie government w i l l r e p r e s s o r f a c i l i t a t e a gtven s o r t o f
a c t i o n by t h a t group.
In t h e extreme c a s e of o l i g a r c h y , t h e s o r t of ac-
t i o n undertaken makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e government
Low
A
Low
A c c e p t a b i l i t y of Croup
w i l l r e p r e s s t h e a c t i o n of a group w i t h a given amount of power.
I n t h a t never-never world where e v i d e n c e is f r e e , c l e a r and r e l i a b l e ,
we c s n compare r e a l regimes i n t h e s e r e g a r d s , and t h u s b e on o u r way t o
t e s t i n g arguments c o n c e r n i n g such t h i n g s a s t h e tempering e f f e c t s of parl i a m e n t a r y systems on t h e r e p r e s s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Real e v i d e n c e
would a l s o g i v e u s tllemeans of j u d g i n g t h e u t i l i t y o f t h e p o l i t y model
p r e s e n t e d e a r l i e r : t h e c l e a r e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between members and c h a l lengers.
F i g u r e 4-2:
Repression i n E g a l i t a r i a n and O l i g a r c h i c Governments
A. EGALITARIAN
4-17
t h e s h a r p e r tand more n e a r l y v e r t i c a l should b e t h e l i n e between r e p r e s s i o n and t o l e r a t i o n .
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t governments a r e t r u l y e g a l i t a r i a n
and t h a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t o l e r a t i o n t o r e p r e s s t o n i s g r a d u a l insLend
Facilitation
C
of a b r u p t , t h e d i v i s i o n of c o n t e n d e r s i n t o manhers and c l m l l c n g e r a i s m i s -
0
leading.
The r e c t i l i n e a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n we have been u s i n g s o f a r i s not v e r y
Toleration
realistic.
9
L e t u s n e g l e c t t h e u n r e a l i t y i n t r o d u c e d by having no g r a y a r e a s ,
no governmental wavering and no t a c t i c a l maneuvering.
Even w i t h g r e a t
certainty a s t o when t h e government w i l l and w i l l not r e p r e s s , t o l e r a t e o r
f a c i l i t a t e , F i g u r e 4-3 i s more l i k e everyday r e a l i t y .
Low
I n b o t h c n s e s shown
i n t h e diagrams, even h i g h l y u n a c c e p t a b l e groups have a few innocuous c o u r s e s
Low
A c c e p t a b i l i t y o f Group
Iligh
of a c t i o n open t o them.
b a r r e d t o them.
Even h i g h l y a c c e p t a b l e groups have some a c t i o n s
Rut t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e a c t i o n v a r J e s w i t h t h e a c c e p t -
a b i l i t y of t h e group.
I n t h e diagrams, a l t h o u g h governments X and Y do a b o u t t h e same
High
amount of f a c i l i t a t i n g of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , Y i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y more r e p r e s s i v e than X.
Y i s a l s o l e s s t o l e r a n t than X.
We c a n r e p r e s e n t tlie d i e -
f e r e n c e i n r e p r e s s i v e n e s s between t h e governments a s AC
-
A'C'.
The same
d e v i c e w i l l s e r v e t o p o r t r a y t h e change i n t h e r e p r e s s i v e n e s s of a s i n g l e
government over time: t h e q u e s t i o n is how f a r C moves up and down tlie d J a gonal
.
The diagram h a s a n i n t e r e s t i n g by-product:
i t h e l p s s p e c i f y some s t n n -
d a r d i n t u i t i o n s of t h e r e p r e s s i v e p a t t e r n s i n d i f f e r c n t s o r t s of regimes.
F i g u r e 4-4 l a y s o u t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s among r e p r e s s i v e , t o t a l i t a r i a n . t o l e r -
Low
Low
High
a n t and weak regimes.
I n t h i s chorncterieation.
a r e p r e s s i v e regime
A c c e p t a b i l i t y of Croup
represses
many groups and a c t i o n s , w h i l e f a c i l i t a t l n g few o f e i t h e r .
A
t o t a l i t a r i a n regime may r e p r e s s l e s s , b u t i t f a c i l i t a t e s a wide r a n g e of
Figure 4 - 4 :
A.
Repressive Patterns i n D i f f e r e n t Typcs o f Rcgtmc
REPRESSIVE
Figure 4 - 3 : Tolernnce v s . Rcpression
Government Y
Government X
\
A '-
C.
TOLERANT
8.
TOTALITARIAN
a c t i o n s , even t o t h e p o i n t of making them compulsory.
t h e bnnd of mere1.y t o l e r a t e d a c t i o n s narrows.
s i o n probably does hold.
As a consequence,
T h i s e f f e c t of power on r e p r e s s i o n and E o c i l i t o t i o n r e v e r s e s ~ l i cmain
The t o l e r a n t regime widens
r e l a t i o n s h i p proposed by o u r e l e m e n t a r y m o b i l i z a t i o n model.
t h a t middle bnnd: diagram C s n e a k s i n t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t o do s o i t
must b a r some a c t i o n s t o t h e most powerful groups w i t h i n i t .
the
week
I
regime a l s o h a s a wide band of t o l e r a t e d b e h a v i o r , b u t , i t f o c i l i -
I
!
t a t e s l e s s , and t i p s i t s r e p r e s s i o n toward t h e weaker groups w h i l e d o i n g
.
p r o p o s i t i o n s by a s k i n g what f e a t u r e s of a c t i o n s make them a c c e p t a b l e ,
q u e s t i o n s . tough o n e s .
them a c c e p t a b l e .
Again t h e d i f F e r e n c e i s d u e t o a s l ~ i f ti n perspec-
The elementary model d e a l s w i t h t h e moment of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ,
tive.
T h i s supplcmentory model of
repression/facilitation. however, d e a l s w i t h a government's d e c i s i o n t o
repress
We con edge a b i t f a r t h e r i n t o t h e world of t e s t a b l e
and what f e a t u r e s of groups make
e r , but not vice versa.
and aims a t t h e a c t i o n of t h e c o n t e n d e r .
p r a c t i c a l l y n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of t h e s t r o n g .
of r e p r e s s i v e n e s s .
tlie
contender's c u r r e n t s u b j e c t i o n t o r e p r e s s i o n l f a c i l i t o t i o n a f f e c t s its pw-
Finally,
So f a r we have simply been e x p l o r i n g a two-dimensional d e f i n i t i o n
'Illere,
i
--
e i t h e r i n r e s p o n s e t o some s i n g l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , o r a s a
p a t t e r n of r e s p o n s e s o v e r a l o n g e r p e r i o d .
Our e a r l i e r diagrams now t r a n s l a t e i n t o F i g u r e 4-5.
Those a r e e m p i r i c a l
I n t h i s idealized
map, a g r o u p w e a k e r t h a n A w i l l be r e p r e s s e d no m a t t e r how s m a l l tlie s c a l e
T h e i r d e t a i l e d answers vary a c c o r d i n g t o t h e kind
of people and t h e kind of government we a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t . . Whatever e l s e
of i t s a c t i o n .
a f f e c t s t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a n a c t i o n , however, i t s s h e e r s c a l e c e r t a i n l y
a n a c t i o n l a r g e r t h a n E.
does.
p o r t f o r i t s s m a l l e r - s c a l e a c t i o n s . and t h e s t r o n g e s t groups w i l l r e c e i v e
The l a r g e r t h e s c a l e of a c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , on t h e whole. t h e more
r e p r e s s i o n a government is l i k e l y t o throw a t i t . .
I
D.
The o d d i t y of some o f t h e s e i m p l i c a t i o n s makes i t c l e a r t h a t o v a l i d
map would show more bumps and d e p r e s s i o n s .
d e g r e e of f o r c e m o b i l i z e d , o r some weighted combination of them.
weak t o b o t h e r w i t h ; s i n c e t h e y pose no t h r e a t , t h e i r s m n l l - s c a l e
That . f o r two r e a s o n s : because might
t i v e a c t i o n s a r e ignored.
acceptability.
t h e o r e t i d a l and e m p i r i c a l problem.
The more powerful t h e group, on t h e average. t h e l e s s r e p r e s -
The l a s t f i g u r e i n t h i s s e r i e s , o f f e r s some s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t t h e
Although a t f i r s t h e a r i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p sounds obvious,
i t is n e i t h e r s e l f - e v i d e n t nor t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n .
Indeed, a government
a t t h e edge oE a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n o f t e n c o n c e n t r a t e s whatever r e p r e s -
collec-
Making t h e map more r e a l i s t i c i n a s i g n i f i c a n t
o f t e n makes right,..and because c u r r e n t . p o w e r sums up many o t h e r k i n d s of
sion it receives.
For example. i n any p a r t i c u l a r
p o l i t i c a l system t h e r e i s no doubt a t h r e s h o l d below which groups a r e t o o
On t h e s i d e of g r o u p ~ o c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e g r o u p ' s c u r r e n t .power i s
t h e most promising s i n g l e f a c t o r .
A group s t r o n g e r than B w i l l r e c e i v e n c t i v e sup-
f a c i l i t a t i o n from t h e government f o r t h e f u l l r a n g e o f a c t i o n s from C t o
By " s c a l e " we may mean
number of p a r t i c i p a n t s , d u r a t i o n , geographic r a n g e , e i t e n t of o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
Even t h e s t r o n g e s t group w l l l b e r e p r e s s e d i f i t u n d e r t o k e s
I
I
I
s t a n d a r d d i s t r i b u t i o n s of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n i n p o p u l a t i o n s w i t h
r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g governments.
I mean them t o a p p l y t o major w e s t e r n
s i v e s t r e n g t h i t h a s on i t s most powerful r i v a l s , and l e t s t h e weak r u n f r e e .
s t a t e s o v e r t h e l a s t two o r t h r e e c e n t u r i e s .
The r e p r e s s i o n c u r v e now
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n g e n e r a l a n i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between power and r e p r e s -
r e g i s t e r s t h e i d e a t h a t groups w i t h a l i t t l e power pose a g r e a t e r t h r e a t
Figure 4 - 5 : Repression a s a Function of S c a l e and Power
1
A
B
Figure 4-6:
C
Hypothetical d i s t r i b u t i o n of governmental rcpresslon n s o
function of t h e s c a l e o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and t h e powcr
of the actor.
Small
Small
Facilitation
D
4
V)
E
Large
+-
Weak
Strong
Repression
Power of Croup
Large
Weak
+Strong
'
Power of Group
t o t h e government and i t s main s u p p o r t e r s than do powerless groups.
Tlie
t h e c o s t s of p a r t i c u l a r k i n d s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and perhaps of c o l l c c -
h y p o t h e t i c a l government r e p r e s s e s a l l b u t t h e s m a l l e s t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s
t i v e a c t i o ~ i ,i n general.
of s l i g h t l y powerful groups, w h i l e a l l o w i n g more l a t i t u d e t o t h e g e n u i n e l y
s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n should have two r e l a t e d e f f e c t s : d e p r e s s i n g o r
powerless.
group r i s e s
government
I t a l s o c o n t a i n s t h e i d e a t h a t a s t h e power of a p a r t i c u l a r
-- a s , f o r example, i t a c t u a l l y becomes i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e
-- t h e r a n g e o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s denied t o i t e v e n t u a l l y
dwindles t o n o t h i n g n e s s .
The f a c i l i t a t i o n c u r v e t e l l s u s t h a t even r e l a -
To b e more e x a c t , a l i l E t s I n t h e p a t t e r n of r e p r e s -
r a i s i n g t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , a l t e r i n g t h e r e l n t i v e
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of d i f f e r e n t forms o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
The h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e f o r t h e impact of r e p r e s s i o n on t h e g e n e r n l
l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n is. I t h l n k , q u l t e s t r o n g .
A t t h e extreme, t h e
t i v e l y ppwerless groups r e c e i v e i n c e n t i v e s t o c a r r y o u t c e r t a i n h i g h l y ac-
Europe of o u r own t i m e p r o v i d e s tlie examples of Spain under Prifno d e Rivera
c e p t a b l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s ; t h e r e s u l t of t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e i s t o s q u e e z e
and Franco, P o r t u g a l under S a l a z a r , Germany under H i t l e r , and S o v i e t Unton
t h e r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of s l i g h t l y powerful groups
under S t a l i n and h i s s u c c e s s o r s , I t a l y under Mussolini. France under
which i s simply t o l e r a t e d : e i t h e r they c a n ' t do i t o r t h e y must do i t .
Vichy and t h e Nazis
A s s r e s u l t , r e l a t i v e l y powerless groups f i n d t h e i r world more t o t a l i t a r i a n
i n t h b s e c o u n t r i e s , e x c e p t f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n d i r e c t l y i n i t i n t c d by tlie
state.
than do t h e powerful o r t h e c o m p l e t e l y powerless.
At t h e o t h e r end of t h e power r a n g e , t h e extremely powerful e n j o y
governmental s u p p o r t i n a l m o s t any c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n they c a r r y on.
At t h e extreme, where t h e government and t h e most powerful group merge
i n d i s s o l u b l y , government s u p p o r t s e v e r y t h i n g t h e group does.
This basic
p a t t e r n i s p o s s i b l e w i t h a s m a l l e r o r l a r g e r a r e a of t o l e r a t i o n , s m a l l e r
I f t h i s argument is c o r r e c t , r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n should work.
I t should n o t b e t r u e , f o r example, t h a t a people l o n g h e l d under a r e
p r e s s i v e regime w i l l g r a d u a l l y b u i l d up s o much resentment t h a t i t b u r s t s
I t should be t r u e , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h a t v i s i b l e
changes I n a government's r e p r e s s i v e p o l i c y
of a c e r t a i n law, o r e a s i n g up on them
--
-- w i l l
a l l t i m e s of enormously reduced c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
I n g e n e r a l , when a European s t a t e t e m p o r a r i l y t r a i n e d i t s f u l l
r e p r e s s i v e power on i t s i n t e r n a l enemies ( a s when t h e I t a l l n n s t a t c a t tacked t h e S i c i l i a n F a s c i o f 1893-94), t h e enemies s u b s i d e d .
The a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of d i f f e r e n t forms of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by r e p r e s s i o n end f a c i l i t a t i o n i s easy t o i l l u s t r o t c
and hard t o e s t a b l i s h a s a g e n e r a l r u l e .
T l ~ e"channeling" of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n by governments shows up i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p r e f e r e n c e f o r
o r l a r g e r zones of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n .
o u t a g a i n s t t h e regime.
--
c r a c k i n g down on v i o l a t o r s
r a p i d l y encourage o r d i s -
c o u r a g e tlie c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of mnny groups b e s i d e s t h o s e most d i r e c t l y
a f f e c t e d ; t h e news of t h e change should q u i c k l y a f f e c t t h e i r e s t i m a t e s o f
mutual-aid s o c i e t i e s o v e r t r a d e
Western governments g e n e r a l l y
unions.
d i s c o u r a g e d t h e banding t o g e t h e t ' of workers who s o u g h t t o c o n t r o l production.
They d i v e r t e d workers i n t o presumably s a f e r o r g a n i z n t i o n s o r i e n t e d
t o consumption.
The
t a c t i c worked i n t h e s h o r t run; u n t i l they bccame
l e g a l , t r a d e unions a t t r a c t e d few members.
A t l i r s t , Friendly S o c i e t i e s
and s o c i b t 6 s d e s e c o u r s mutuels busied themselves w i t h problcms O F w e l f a r e
away from work.
I n t h e l o n g e r r u n , however, they became t h e n u c l e i of ac-
t i o n a g a i n s t employers and a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e .
e v e n t u a l l y bccame a v e r y e f f e c t i v e one.
T l ~ elower c o s t a l t e r n a t i v e
That r e p r e s s i o n makes a d i f f e r e n c e
does n o t mean t h a t i t slwnys sccompl.ishes what t h e r e p r e s s o r s had i n mind.
sometimes f a i l s u t t e r l y t o a r r a n g e p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s ; i t s power is h i g h
Power
w i t h r e s p e c t t o l a b o r , low w i t h r e s p e c t t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e .
The p r o v i s i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s of t h i s lsst d i s c u s s i o n , t h e n , r u n s a s
A group
of r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s who were i n e f f e c t u o l lsst y e a r sometimes r e o r g o n j z e and
f o l l o w s : t h e e x t e n t t o which a g i v e n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by s g i v e n group
s t a r t making a r e v o l u t i o n t h i s year: i n lsst y e a r ' s i n t e r a c t i o n s they
is s u b j e c t t o r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r a t i o n o r f a c i l i t a t i o n i s mainly a f u n c t i o n
were powerless, w h i l e i n t h i s y e a r ' s t h e y a r e powerful.
of two f a c t o r s : 1 ) t h e s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n , 2) t h e power of t h e group.
a b o u t whether a g i v e n group i s powerful, we a r e o c c n s i o n a l l y d i s n g r e e i n g
The l a r g e r t h e s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n , t h e more l i k e l y i t s r e p r e s s i o n ; t h e
more powerful t h e group, t h e l e s s l i k e l y i t s r e p r e s s i o n .
The l a t e r d i a -
grams r e f i n e d t h n t c r u d e h y p o t h e s i s by s p e c i f y i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s between
t h e s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n and t h e power of t h e group.
But t h e c o r e of t h e
about t h e f a c t s .
But u s u a l l y we a r e c o n t e n d i n g o v e r which p n r t i e s . i n t e r -
e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s d e s e r v e t o b e tnken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and how t o
weigh
then.
Now and then someone i n t r o d u c e s p o t e n t i n l power i n t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n .
P o t e n t i a l power d e s c r i b e s t h e e x t e n t . t o which t h e p a r t y ' s i n t e r e s t s would
h y p o t h e s i s remains.
S c a l e of a c t i o n i s s f a i r l y c l e a r i d e s .
Power i s n o t .
n n t e l y f o r c l a r i t y , t h e word h a s many t o n e s and o v e r t o n e s .
Unfortu-
Enough, I
p r e v a i l i f i t used a l l t h e means a t i t s d i s p o s a l : i f a l l women used a l l
t h e w e a l t h , t o o l s , knowledge, e t c . they d i s p o s e of now t o e n f o r c e t h e i r
t h i n k , t o make t h e s e a r c h f o r one e s s e n t i a l meaning o r one comprehensive
r i g h t s t o employment, f o r example.
d e f i n i t i o n of power a w i l d goose c h a s e .
powe;
is s i m p l e and commonsense.
ties.
When we a r g u e
The meaning I have i n mind h e r e
Suppose we have two o r more i n t e r a c t i n g p s r -
Suppose each p a r t y h a s an i n t e r e s t i n a n outcome of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n .
Suppose a t l e a s t one such i n t e r e s t of o n e p a r t y t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n conf l i c t s w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t of a n o t h e r p a r t y t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n .
The power
The t r o u b l e w i t h n o t i o n s o f p o t e n t i o l
i s t h a t by d e f i n i t i o n t h e y r e f e r t o s i t u a t i o n s we c a n ' t o b s e r v e ,
t h a t t h e y f o r c e u s t o d e c i d e between assuming t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s t o
t h e i n t e r a c t i o n c o n t i n u e t o behave a s b e f o r e ( e . g .
t h a t men d o n ' t respond
by p i l i n g up a l l t h e w e a l t h , t o o l s , knowledge e t c .
thev c o n t r o l )
and
t h e o r i z i n g a b o u t t h e whole sequence o f i n t e r a c t i o n l i k e l y to' follow: war
Yet we c a n ' t simply brush a s i d e p o t e n t i o l power n s a n i n c o n v e n i e n t
of t h s t p a r t y i s t h e e x t e n t t o which i t s i n t e r e s t s p r e v a i l o v e r t h e o t h e r s
games.
w i t h which i t i s i n c o n f l i c t .
i d e a , f o r t h e i m p l i c i t t h r e a t t h n t s p a r t y w i l l u s e t h e means i t hns i n
The o t h e r a c t o r s may r a n g e from s s i n g l e person t o t h e sum of a l l
o t h e r p e r s o n s and groups.
The power of a g i v e n p a r t y i s t h e r e f o r e always
r e l a t i v e t o a s p e c i f i c 1 ) o t h e r p a r t y o r s e t of p a r t i e s ; 2) i n t e r e s t o r s e t
of i n t e r e s t s ; 3) i n t e r a c t i o n o r s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s .
A farmer who t r a m p l e s
t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r members of h i s household sometimes makes no headway
i n t h e v i l l a g e c o u n c i l ; he h a s e x t e n h i v e power a t home. b u t n o t abroad.
An i n d u s t r y which g e t s e x t e n s i v e governmental p r o t e c t i o n from u n i o n i z a t i o n
r e s e r v e o f t e n ( p e r h a p s always) m u l t i p l i e s t h e e f f e c t o f t h e means a c t u n l l y
used.
A r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s e p a r a t e s power-as-effectiveness
efficiency.
from powcr-ns-
(An e x a c t l y p a r a l l e l d i s t i n c t i o n a p p e a r s i n d i s c u s s i o n s of
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o u t p u t s ; s e e , e.g. Yuchtman and S e a s h o r e 1967.)
A group
which accomplishes what i t s e t s o u t t o do is e f f e c t i v e , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t s t h e r e b y pre-
my way o f t h i n k i n g , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s among p a r t y . a u t h o r i t y and govern-
v a i l o v e r o t h e r i n t e r e s t s w i t h which t h e y a r e i n c o n f l i c t , t h e group i s
ment a r e p u r e l y r e l a t i v e : on a u t h o r i t y i s simply a p a r t y which c o n t r o l s
e x e r c j s i n g e f f e c t i v e power.
some c o n c e n t r a t e d means o f c o e r c i o n ; a government i s simply t h e p a r t y
costs i t incurs.
On t h e o t h e r hand, a group which g e t s a l a r g e
r e t u r n r e l a t i v e t o t h e means a t i t s d i s p o s a l i s e f f i c i e n t , r e g a r d l e s s of
which c o n t r o l s t h e moat i m p o r t a n t c o n c e n t r a t e d means o f c o e r c i o n w i t h i n
t h e s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r of t h a t r e t u r n .
some d e f i n e d p o p u l a t i o n .
To t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e r e t u r n f a v o r s
P o l i t i c a l power, t h e n , i s power o v e r governments.
t h e g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t s and c o u n t e r s t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r groups, t h e
g r o u p ' s p o l i t i c a l power w i l l depend on which o t h e r p a r t i e s we t a k e i n t o
group i a e x e r c i s i n g e f f i c i e n t power.
consideration.
Both e f f e c t i v e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y a r e r e l a t i v e t o t h e g r o u p ' s defined interests.
ment a l o n e .
But an e f f e c t i v e group may be r a t h e r i n e f f i c i e n t ; by
v i r t u e of t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o s a c r i f i c e almost s n y t h i n g f o r t h e i r object i v e s , our "zealots" o f t e n f a l l i n t o t h a t category.
+ voice
to exit.
we u s u a l l y have some o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s f o r t h e government's f a v o r i n mind,
An extreme answer t o t h a t d i f f i c u l t y i s t o i n c l u d e a l l o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s .
The answer i s extreme because i t e n t a i l s a ) enumernting a l l t h o s e o t h e r
b) t o l o s e i t s s u p p o r t t o o t h e r groups p u r s u i n g t h e same i n t e r e s t s more
c o n t e n d e r s , b) p r e p a r i n g t h e huge b a l a n c e s h e e t o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s vs.
I n o r d e r t o s u r v i v e and p r o s p e r , r e a l groups must m a i n t a i n
parer-effectiveness.
That r e s u l t i s vaguely u n s e t t l i n g , p r e c i s e l y because
such a p a r t y had no p o l i t i c a l power!
A v e r y i n e f f i c i e n t group w a s t e s i t s m o b i l i z e d
themselves above some minimum of power-efficiency
i n t e r e s t s p r e v a i l o v e r t h o s e of t h e government when t h e two s e t s of i n t e r -
a g i v e n p a r t y and t h e government: s u r e l y we wouldn't want t o soy t h a t
r e s o u r c e s and t h e n t e n d s e i t h e r a ) t o become i n e f f e c t i v e ss a r e s u l t o r
efficiently.
Then t h e g r o u p ' s p o l i t i c a l power is t h e e x t e n t t o wliicl~ f t s
and v i s u a l i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n of a p e r f e c t c o i n c i d e n c e of i n t e r e s t s between
A v e r y i n e f f e c t i v e group t e n d s t o d e m o b i l i z e through t h e p r o c e s s
t h a t A l b e r t Hirschman a n a l y z e s : a s u c c e s s i o n from some combination of
loyslty
At o n e extreme, we c a n l o o k a t t h e group and t h e govern-
e s t s are in conflict.
Likewise, an e f f i -
c i e n t group may b e r e l a t i v e l y i n e f f e c t i v e ; o u r "misers" f r e q u e n t l y end up
there.
Our e s t i m a t e of a
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e group whose power we a r e t r y i n g t o a s s a y .
and some minimum of
The i n -
t e r m e d i a t e answer i s t o l i m i t t h e s e t o f c o n t e n d e r s taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a -
The s n a l y s i s which f o l l o w s p r o v i d e s a means f o r
t l e a l l n g w i t h b o t h a s p e c t s of power.
tion:
Parties
which h a v e made themselves known wltli r e s p e c t t o some p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e
a n d l o r some p a r t i c u l a r phase of governmental a c t i v i t y , and s o on.
Let u s go back t o our t h r e e p o i n t s of r e f e r e n c e : p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s .
Many s t u d e n t s of power l i k e t o d i s t i n g u i s h be-
tween "governments" o r " a u t h o r i t i e s " ,
s i d e t h e government, on t h e o t h e r .
on t h e one hand, and a l l p a r t i e s o u t -
The n o t i o n of a " p o l i t y "
power t o r e f e r t o t h e e f f e c t of a u t h o r i t i e s on o t h e r p a r t i e s , and i n f l u e n c e
TO
t o k e s a s t e p i n t h a t direction
by s i n g l i n g
o u t a l l c o n t e n d e r s which have r o u t i n e a c c e s s t o t h e government.
articular
William Camson, f o r example, u s e s
t o r e f e r t o t h e e f f e c t s of o t h e r p a r t i e s on a u t h o r i t i e s (Camson 1968).
o n e c o m p e t i t o r , a l i m i t e d s e t o f powerful c o m p e t i t o r s , a l l t h o s e
For t h i s
n o t i o n o f p o l i t y t o b e u s e f u l , t h e r e must b e a b r e a k I n t h e d i s -
t r i b u t i o n of power.
The b r e a k must s e p a r a t e t h e r e l a t i v e l y g r e n t power
o f a l l c o n t e n d e r s ("members o f t h e p o l i t y " ) who h a v e r o u t i n e a c c e s s t o t h e
i n t e r e s t t o s o c i a l position.
government from t h e r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l power of a l l o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s
t i o n " which c o u n t s i s t h e g r o u p ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e means of p r o d u c t i o n .
("challengers")
who l a c k t h a t r o u t i n e a c c e s s .
I t a l s o i m p l i e s a break i n
I n t h e Marxist . t r a d i t i o n , t h e " s o c i a l p s i -
I t is e a s y t o a c c e p t t h e r e f o r m i s t c o n c e p t i o n of power a s a s u b s t i t u t e
t h e l i f e h i s t o r y of a group which moves from c h a l l e n g e t o membership o r
f o r t h e p l u r a l i s t conception.
membersl~ip t o c h a l l e n g e .
t e r e s t s t o t h o s e a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d r e l e v a n t by t h e p l u r n l i s t .
To tlie e x t e n t t h a t t h e s e p r o c e s s e s a r e c o n t i n u o u s
and g r a d u a l , t h e concept of p o l i t y l o s e s i t s v a l u e .
The r e f o r m i s t appeoach simply a d d s new inThe c h o i c e
between t h e r a d i c a l approach and t h e o t h e r two i s more d r a s t i c .
It lcnds
t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t some a p p a r e n t i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and
Interests
pursue a r e not r e a l l y i n t e r e s t s .
We f a c e t h e trilemma which Steven Lukes l a y s o u t .
consciousness, t r i v i a l i t i e s .
among " p l u r a l i s t , "
They a r e chimeras, p r o d u c t s of f a l s e
" r e f o r m i s t " and " r a d i c a l " c o n c e p t i o n s of power.
The r a d i c a l approach a l s o l e a d s t o t h e iden-
The
t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s which t h e a c t o r s themselves do n o t
e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n r e s t s on t h e means used t o i d e n t i f y t h e r e l e v a n t
t i m e s , would n o t
i n t e r e s t s of each a c t o r .
A " p l u r a l i s t " view, i n Lukes'
'
Lukes d i s t i n g u i s h e s
--
r e c o g n i z e a s t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s .
--
and, somc-
I t second-guesses
terminology, o n l y
t h e a c t o r s ' o m p e r c e p t i o n of t h e world.
t a k e s i n t o a c c o u n t t h o s e i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and p r e s s i n t h e
S u b s t i t u t i n g o n e ' s own a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e r e l e v a n t i n t e r e s t s f o r t h a t
p o l i t i c a l arena.
A "reformist"
c o n c e p t i o n of power adds o t h e r i n t e r e s t s
of t h e a c t o r s on t h e s c e n e t a k e s c o n f i d e n c e , sometimes even condescension
which a group a r t i c u l a t e s , b u t ,has no o p p o r t u n i t y t o a c t upon.
In a reand a r r o g a n c e .
Those i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and pursue, whether
f o r m i s t a n a l y s i s , a t r u l y powerful group n o t o n l y s e e s t o i t t h a t i t s ina n o u t s i d e a n a l y s t r a t e s them a s " r e a l " o r not.. s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t r e a l
t e r e s t s p r e v a i l i n t h e e v e n t of a n open c o n f l i c t w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l
s t r u g g l e s f o r power.
I n prudence and h u m i l i t y , then, we should g i v e them
a r e n a , b u t a l s o manages t o keep o t h e r g r o u p ' s c h a l l e n g e s t o i t s i n t e r e s t s
priority.
o f f t h e p u b l i c agenda.
Nothing p r e v e n t s u s , however, from posing t h e f o l l o w i n g crnpfri-
Both t h e p l u r a l i s t and t h e r e f o r m i s t a n a l y s e s
c a l problem:
l i m i t t h e l i s t of r e l e v a n t
i n t e r e s t s t o t h o s e which t h e groups themselves
IMPUTED INTERESTS
%- -
articulate.
ARTICULATED INTERESTS
The " r a d i c a l " analysis, a c c o r d i n g t o Lukes, c o n s i d e r s a g r o u p ' s r e a l
CONTENTION FOR POWER
i n t e r e s t s r e g a r d l e s s of whether t h e group h a s a r t i c u l a t e d them.
We looked
We may a s k , t h a t i s , how a c c u r a t e l y t h e i n t e r e s t s we Impute t o o group on
a t t h i s c h o i c e i n tlie p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r : 1 ) i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t s from t h e
g r o u p ' s own u t t e r a n c e s and a c t i o n s
--
g e n e r a l grounds p r e d i c t t o a ) t h e i n t e r e s t s t h e group n r t i c u l a t e o and puru t t e r s n c e s and a c t i o n s i n t h e p u b l i c
s u e s , a n d / o r b) t h e power s t r u g g l e s
it1
which t h e group engages.
The
a r e n a f o r t h e p l u r a l i s t s , u t t e r a n c e s and a c t i o n s i n any a r e n a f o r t h e
M a r x i s t a n a l y s i s s a y s t h a t both w i l l have p r e d l c t i v e power.
Over tlie long
r e f o r m i s t s ; 2) d e r i v e t h e i n t e r e s t s from a g e n e r a l scheme which r e l a t e s
r u n , a g r o u p ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g means of production d e t c r -
mlnes t h e i n t e r e s t s which t h e group a r t i c u l a t e s and pursues.
The g r o u p ' s
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n a l s o nf f e c ts i t s c o n t e n t i o n f o r
related
w i t h t h e power which would show up i n t h e interactions
s h i e l d e d from o u r eyes: i f J.P.
Morgan could do t h a t much i n p u b l i c , then
. The
p w c r d l r e c t l y , by d e t e r m i n i n g i t s l i k e l y enemies and a l l i e s , and by
how much h e could do i n p r i v a t e 1
shaping i t s i n t e r n a l organization.
o f f a c t , a s u b j e c t of p o s s i b l e d i s p u t e , and an assumption we c a n n o t con-
M a r x i s t s d i f f e r among themselves when
i t comes t o d e c i d i n g how much importance t o a t t r i b u t e t o t h e s e d i r e c t e f -
c o r r e l a t i o n is n e v e r t h e l e s s a m n t t e r
t i n u e t o make i n d e f i n i t e l y .
f e c t s of c l a s s p o s i t i o n on c o n t e n t i o n f o r power, and how much t o i n s i s t
The Measurement o f Power
on c l a s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r s u s t a i n e d o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n .
L e t u s suppose, m i r n b i l e d i c t u , t h a t we have s e t t l e d on n s p e c i f i c
T C we c a n rind a r e a s o n a b l e way of gauging c l a s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h i s , t o o ,
s e t o f p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s .
Wo can now u s e t h e s i m p l t f i e d
can become an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n .
model of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s t h e p u r s u i t of c o l l e c t i v e goods t o d e s c r i b e
Interactions
Ilaving s e t t l e d on a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of p a r t i e s and a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of
a s i n g l e g r o u p ' s power p o s i t i o n .
F i g u r e 4-7 r e f i n e s t h e e a r l i e r c o l l e c -
t i v e goods model i n two r e g a r d s .
The r e t u r n s now i n c l u d e t h e p o s a i b t l i t y
i n t e r e s t s , we s t i l l have t o s e t t l e on a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s .
of c o l l e c t i v e bads: n e g a t i v e r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
The most obvious l i m i t i s time: power today, power t h i s y e a r , power o v e r
r e p r e s e n t t h e group's complete e x t i n c t i o n .
t h e l a s t decade, power a t some time i n t h e Euture?
interactions a r e relevant:
-1 might
The diagram a l s o r e p r e s e n t s
t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e s o r t of c o n t e n d e r we e a r l i e r c a l l e d an o p p o r t u n i s t :
DifEerent s e t s o f
I f we want t o s i n g l e o u t t h e e f f e c t s o f power,
a group which w i l l a c c e p t any s o r t o f c o l l e c t i v e goods, s o l o n g a s they
we a r e a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y going t o a t t e m p t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between power
r e p r e s e n t a s i g n i f i c a n t g a i n o v e r t h e r e s o u r c e s expended t o g e t them.
today and power tomorrow, on t h e assumption t h a t t o d a y ' s e x e r c i s e of power
With t h e a d d i t i o n a l p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e bnds, t h e diogrnm n i s o
w i l l , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , a f f e c t tomorrow's power d i s t r i b u t i o n .
shows t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s i n t e r e s t e x t e n d s t o d e f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e s e nega-
In
a d d i t i o n t o f i x i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n time, we have t o d e c i d e whether t o
c o n s i d e r a l l i n t e r a c t i o n s , o r o n l y some c r u c i a l s u b s e t
--
every comunica-
t i v e outcomes.
Even I n t h e c a s e of t h e omnivorous o p p o r t u n i s t . t h e c o l -
l e c t i v e goods we now t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n a r e t h o s e which r e s u l t from
t i o n , d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t , between S t a n d a r d O i l and t h e U.S. Government,
a s p e c i f i e d s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of p a r t i e s by r e f e r -
o r j u s t formal r e q u e s t s f o r r a t e a d j u s t m e n t s ?
e n c e t o which we want t o gauge t h e
We sometimes s i d e s t e p t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by l o o k i n g simply a t t h e r e t u r n s
a g i v e n group g e t s from o t h e r p a r t i e s o v e r some p e r i o d of i n t e r a c t i o n ,
w l t h o u t t r y i n g t o d e t e c t t h e impact oE every s i n g l e i n t e r a c t i n n .
speaking, t h a t is a g r o s s s i m p l i f i c a t i o n .
power which shows up i n a v l s i b l e
Logically
We a l s o tend t o assume t h a t t h e
s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s i s s t r o n g l y c o r -
c o n t e n d e r ' s power.
For s i m p l i c i t y ' s s a k e , l e t u s narrow o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n
of two p a r t i e s .
The narrowing is n o t q u i t e s o d r a s t i c a s i t may seem,
s i n c e o n e o f t h e " p a r t i e s " t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n may be a sum of a l l o t h e r
parties.
We c a n e a s i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e a c t i o n s o f t h i r d p a r t i e s a s i n f l u e n c e s
on t h e outcomes i n q u e s t i o n .
Then, a s b e f o r e , t h e diagram r e p r e s f m t s
s e v e r a l c r u c i a l f a c t s : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r e q u i r e s on e x p e n d i t u r e of reF i g u r e 4-7:
I n t e r e s t s and R e t u r n s from C o l l e c t i v e Action f o r an O p p o r t u n i s t
Con t e n d e r
s o u r c e s ; t h e c o l l e c t i v e goods o b t a i n e d a r e v o r t h something; t o t h e ext e n t t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e s expended and c o l l e c t i v e goods o b t a i n e d have comp a r a b l e v a l u e s t h e i n t e r a c t i o n can r e s u l t i n a g a i n , a l o s s o r a s t o n d off.
Above t h e d i a g o n a l , P a r t y A g e t s back more than i t expends; i t
thus gains.
Below t h e d i a g o n a l , P a r t y A g e t s back l e s s t h a n i t expends;
thus i t loses.
The d i a g o n a l i s a b r e a k - w e n l i n e .
I n any r e a l i n t e r a c t i o n , a number of t h i n g s c o n s t r a i n 0 ' s r e s p o n s e
Value of Coll e c t i v e Coods
Produced by
lnteractidns
with 0
t o A's a c t i o n : t h e r e s o u r c e s under 0 ' s c o n t r o l , 0 ' s own d e s j r e and cnpac i t y t o r e s i s t o r c o o p e r a t e , t h e i n t e r e s t of t h i r d p o r t l e s i n t h e r e s o u r c e s under B's c o n t r o l , and s o on.
For a number of r e a s o n s i t i s
r e a s o n a b l e t o suppose t h e f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s :
1. a c o n t e n d e r which d o e s n o t a c t a t a l l w i l l r e c e i v e c o l l e c t i v e
bads;
2.
a c o n t e n d e r which a c t s on a v e r y s m a l l s c a l e v i l l r e c e i v e even
more c o l l e c t i v e b s d s , a s t h e o t h e r p a r t y r e s p o n d s n e g a t i v e l y t o
i t s efforts;
-I
Interest
--------
3.
beyond t h a t p o i n t , t h e c o n t e n d e r w i l l r e c e i v e on i n c r e a s i n g ret u r n f o r i n c r e a s i n g o u t p u t s of c o l l e c t i v e s c t l o n , b u t o n l y up
to a l i m i t ;
-1
4.
'
Value of Resources Expended by A
Maximum
t h e marginal r a t e of r e t u r n f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n e v e n t u a l l y bccomes n e g a t i v e .
The c u r v e i n F i g u r e 4-8 d e s c r i b e s t h o s e h y p o t h e t i c a l e f f e c t s .
The r a t e
of r e t u r n e v e n t u a l l y d e c l i n e s because B's resources a r e not inexhaustible.
because B w i l l defend i t s e l f a g a i n s t t h r e a t s t o i t s own s u r v i v a l , and bec a u s e t h i r d p a r t i e s w i l l i n t e r v e n e when A ' s g a i n s v i s i b l y t h r e a t e n t h e i r
own i n t e r e s t i n t h e r e s o u r c e s under B'S c o n t r o l .
Under t h e c o n d i t i o n s of
4-37
F i g u r e 4-8: t l y p o t h e t i c a l Sclledule o f Returns from C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n
Maximum
X
Col.lcctive
Goods
Produced
Z
0
Resources Expended by A
Maximum
F i g u r e 4-9:
Gaining v s . L o s i n g S c h e d u l e s o f Returns
4-39
F i g u r e 4-10:
F i g u r e 4-8, an u n c o n s t r a i n e d , c o o l l y c a l c u l a t i n g P a r t y A
--
--
an opportunist
would mnximlze by expending Z r e s o u r c e s , l a n d i n g a t Y on t h e r e t u r n s
c u r v e and g e t t i n g back X i n c o l l e c t i v e goods, f o r a g a i n of X-Z.
The
r e t u r n s c u r v e g i v e s a s i m p l e d e s c r ' i p t i o n of A ' s power o v e r B.
P u t t i n g t h e d i a g o n a l back i n makes i t c l e a r e r t h a t some groups might
always b e i n a l o s i n g p o s i t i o n because t h e i r e n t i r e r e t u r n s c u r v e l i e s below t h e break-even l i n e .
F i g u r e 4-9 s t a t e s t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y .
There, P a r t y
P a r t y A1 i s b e t t e r o f f ; a
A 2 h a s l i t t l e hope; i t s c u r v e l i e s t o o low.
p o r t i o n of i t s c u r v e l i e s above t h e break-even l i n e .
With r e s p e c t t o
t h i s s e t of p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s , P a r t y A1 h a s more power
than P a r t y A 2 .
t o Z2.
I
I
!
I
An o p p o r t u n i s t
P a r t y A2 wou1.d a c t o n l y enough t o f o r e s t a l l c o l l e c t i v e bods
--
and work
i
t o improve i t s s c h e d u l e of r e t u r n s .
i
We have f o r g o t t e n , however, t h a t n e i t h e r A
s o u r c e s t o expend.
1
nor A2 tias u n l i m i t e d r e -
The amount of r e s o u r c e s P a r t y A c u r r e n t l y h a s under
i t s c o n t r o l ( t h a t i s , mobilized r e s o u r c e s ) l i m i t s how Par o u t on t h e
S-curve of r e t u r n s A can move.
F i g u r e 4-10 i d e n t i f i e s t h a t l i m i t .
Wit11
i n m o b i l i z e d r e s o u r c e s , P a r t y A can o n l y l o s e , d e s p i t e i t s t h e o r e t i c a l l y
favorable position.
I f A can a r r a n g e t o m o b i l i z e m o r e r e s o u r c e s , then a c t ,
t h a t l o o k s l i k e a good s t r a t e g y .
hand w l l l make s e n s e .
t h i n g around M2,
I
1
1
1
I
An o p p o r t u n i s t P a r t y A would c o n f i n e i t s a c t i o n t o t h e
rnngc producing r e t u r n s nbove t h e d i a g o n a l : Z
M
1
With M,,
With M2,
expending a l m o s t e v e r y t l ~ i n gon
i t would s t i l l b e smart t o expend some-
and keep t h e r e s t i n r e s e r v e f o r a n o t h e r time.
T h i s l a s t diagram p e r m i t s two r e f i n e m e n t s t o t h e a n a l y s i s of power.
F i r s t , t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of t h e S-curve w l t h t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n 1.ine i s a
f a i r l y good approximation of p o t e n t i a l power.
I t t e l l s u s what e f f e c t
P a r t y A could have i f i t expended n l l t h e r e s o u r c e s under i t s c o n t r o l .
II
i
!
How M o b i l i z a t i o n L i m i t s C o l l e c t i v e Action
(You may p r e f e r t o s e a r c h f o r t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t on tlie S-curve which f a l l s
t o t h e l e f t of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n l i n e , and c a l l
that A ' s
p o t e n t i a l power.)
At any p o i n t i n time, some (and o n l y some) of t h e c o n t e n d e r s hove
achieved r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s t o wield power o v e r t h e
Second, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between p o w e r - e f f e c t i v e n e s s and power-efficiency
government, and have developed r o u t i n e ways of e x e r c i s i n g t h o s e r i g h t s .
nppenrs c l e a r l y .
They a r e members of t h e p o l i t y .
P o w e r - e f f e c t i v e n e s s r e f e r s t o how f a r up t h e v e r t i c a l
a x i s P a r t y A can r e a c h , o r does r e a c h .
Power-efficiency r e f e r s t o t h e
s l o p e of t h e r e t u r n c u r v e a t t h e p o i n t P a r t y A c a n o r d o e s r e a c h .
A 1 1 other contenders o r e challengers.
They contend w i t h o u t r o u t i n e o r r e c o g n i t i o n .
g i v e s i m p o r t a n t a d v a n t a g e s t o a group.
In
Memhership i n t h e p o l i t y
In t h e most general s e n e e , i t s
e i t h e r c a s e , tlie diagram t e l l s u s t h a t t h e c u r r e n t m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l of
power r i s e s : i n terms of t h e diagrams of t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , p o l i t y
P a r t y A s e t s a f i r m l i m i t on P a r t y A ' s power.
membership produces a r i s e i n t h e c u r v e of r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t l o n .
A prudent d e s c r i p t i o n
D e p a r t u r e from t h e p o l i t y produces a d r o p i n t h e c u r v e .
o f A ' s power i n t h e r e a l world d i s r e g a r d s
t h e p o r t i o n of t h e S-curve t o t h e r i g h t of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n b a r r i e r .
For
t h i s s t a t e of t h e world, t l ~ i ss e t of p a r t i e s , t h i s s e t of i n t e r e s t s and
C o n c r e t e l y , recog-
n i t i o n pays o f f i n c o l l e c t i v e a c c e s s t o j o b s , exemptions from t a x a t i o n .
0 a v a i l a b i l i t y of p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n , and s o on.
Every p o l i t y e s t a b l i s h e s t e s t s of membecshlp.
t h i s s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s , t h e segment of t h e c u r v e t o t h e l e f t of t h e mo-
A l l p o l i t i e s include
among such t e s t s tlie a b i l i t y t o m o b i l i z e o r c o e r c e s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of
b i l i z a t i o n l i n e d e s c r i b e s t h e power of P a r t y A.
people.
Furthermore, w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y members c o n t i n u a l l y t e s t o n e anoth-
Power and P o l i t y Membership
er;
r e p r e a t e d f a i l u r e s of p a r t i a l t e s t s l e a d t o f u l l e r t e s t s .
The f u l l e r
C o n t e n t i o n f o r power l i n k s t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model t o t h e p o l i t y model.
t e s t s l e n d , i n e x t r e m i s , t o e x c l u s i o n from t h e p o l i t y .
Each new e n t r y o r
Contention f o r power c o n s i s t s of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s t o i n f l u e n c e
e x i t r e d e f i n e s t h e c r i t e r i a of membership i n a d i r e c t i o n f a v o r a b l e t o t h e
o t h e r groups, and power i t s e l f c o n s i s t s of a g r o u p ' s making i t s i n t e r e s t s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e p r e s e n t s e t of members.
p r e v a i l o v e r o t h e r s w i t h which t h e y a r e i n c o n f l i c t .
c a l power
-
I n t h e p r o c e s s , t h e members
Contention f o r polititend t o become a t t a c h e d t o t h o s e c r i t e r i a a s s m a t t e r o r principle.
i n v o l v e s a p p l y i n g r e s o u r c e s t o a p a r t i c u l a r kind o f o r g a n i z a t i o n :
a government.
I n t h e o r y , a group can m o b i l i z e w i t h o u t contending f o r power:
i L can
A government is simply t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , i f any, which conapply i t s c o l l e c t i v e resources e n t i r e l y to r e c r e a t i o n , t h e search f o r
t r o l s t h e p r i n c i p a l c o n c e n t r a t e d means of c o e r c i o n w i t h i n some p o p u l a t i o n .
enlightenment o r some o t h e r n o n - p o l i t i c a l
end.
A commune o r r e l i g i o u s cnm-
The c o n t e n d e r s f o r power w i t h i n a g i v e n p o p u l a t i o n i n c l u d e a l l groups which
munity r e t i r i n g from t h e world moves i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n .
n r e c o l l e c t i v e l y a p p l y i n g r e s o u r c e s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e government.
Within tlie modern
In r e a l
world, however, governments a r e s o l i k e l y t o c l a i m tlie r i g h t t o r e g u l a t e and
l i f e , we u s u a l l y want t o s e t some t h r e s h o l d For c o n t e n t i o n , i n o r d e r t o elimt o e x t r a c t r e s o u r c e s from any m o b i l i z i n g group t h a t m o b i l i z a t i o n u s u a l l y
i n a t e t i n y , e v a n e s c e n t , i n t e r m i t t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n s of r e s o u r c e s t o t h e governp r o p e l s a group i n t o c o n t e n t i o n f o r power o v e r o n e government o r a n o t h e r
ment.
--
I n t h e o r y , we can g e n e r o u s l y i n c l u d e a l l of them.
a t l e a s t i n t o a n e f f o r t t o s e c u r e g u a r a n t e e s of i t s b a s i c r i g h t s t o e x i s t ,
4-4 3
assemble, nccumu.Late r e s o u r c e s , and c a r r y on i t s valued a c t i v i t i e s .
Eric
f r a g e and temperance movements i n England and t h e United S t a t e s w i t h
Wolf's a n a l y s i s of t h e involvement of p e a s a n t communities i n r e v o l u t i o n s ,
o t h e r e s t a b l i s h e d segments of t h e middle c l a s s e s , f o r example, a l m o s t
f o r i n s t a n c e , shows how r e g u l a r l y t h e y m o b i l i z e , a n d t h e n contend f o r power
c e r t a i n l y r e s t r a i n e d t h e u s e o f f o r c e a g a i n s t them.
n o t because they i n i t i a l l y want a change i n government, b u t i n s e l f - d e n f e n s e .
c o a l i t i o n i s t o s p l i t t h e p o l i t y i n t o f a c t i o n s m k i n g e x c l u s i v e and incom-
W o l f ' s a n a l y s i s a l s o t e l l s u s how c r u c i a l t o t h e s u c c e s s of t h a t conten-
p a t i b l e c l a i m s on t h e government, Ilowever, a high d e g r e e of c o l l e c t i v e
t i o n f o r power a r e t h e c o a l i t i o n s p e a s a n t communities make w i t h o t h e r groups
violence is l i k e l y t o follow.
outside.
tion.
No c o a l i t i o n = l o s t r e v o l u t i o n .
I n a g r e a t many s i t u a t i o n s , a
s i n g l e c o n t e n d e r d o e s n o t have enough r e s o u r c e s
enough guns, enough t r a i n e d lawyers, enough c a s h
Where t h e e f f e c t of
That is, i n f a c t , a r e * o l u t i o n a r y s i t u n -
-- enough committed people,
--
D e t e c t i n g Changes i n P o l i t y M e m b e r s h i p
t o i n f l u e n c e t h e govP o l i t i c a l power i s a characteristic of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s between con-
ernment by i t s e l f .
A c o a l i t i o n w i t h a n o t h e r c o n t e n d e r which h a s o v e r l a p p i n g
t e n d e r s and governments.
I n s e e k i n g t o d e t e c t major changes i n p o l i t i c a l
o r complementary d e s i g n s on t h e government w i l l then i n c r e a s e t h e j o i n t
power, we have t h e c h o i c e of s t a r t i n g w i t h ' t h e c o n t e n d e r s o r oE s t a r t i n g
power o f t h e c o n t e n d e r s t o accomplish t h o s e d e s i g n s .
w i t h t h e government.
What should we l o o k f o r ?
A simple, i f s l i g h t l y
C o a l i t i o n s most commonly o c c u r between members of t h e p o l i t y o r ber i s k y , approach would b e t o t a k e running a c c o u n t s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e a s
tween nonmembers of t h e p o l i t y .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , c o a l i t i o n s between members
t h e y appear i n p o l i t ' i c a l h i s t o r i e s , yearbooks, memoirs and s o on, t o dc-
and nonmembers o f t e n occur when t h e members a r e s e e k i n g ends f o r which t h e r e
t e r m i n e whether informed o b s e r v e r s r e p o r t changes i n t h e m J o r a c t o r s on
a r e n o t enough c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y . and f o r which t h e r e t h e scene.
s o u r c e s b e i n g mobilized by t h e nonmembers would be u s e f u l .
J e a n Laponce (1969) h a s i n v e n t e d a r e f i n e d v e r s i o n of t h i s
T h i s happens
s t r a t e g y : h e watches t h e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of p a r t y l a b e l s i n Conadion p o l i -
when a p a r t y wins an e l e c t i o n by buying o f f t h e s u p p o r t of a t r i b e through
t i c s a n a n i n d i c a t i o n of t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of v a r i o u s b l o c s o f v o t e r s .
promises of j o b s and i n f l u e n c e .
I t a l s o happens when a d i s s i d e n t b u t
A s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y such a s t h e L i b e r a l s t e n d s , a t i t s u c c e e d s , t o d r o p
e s t a b l i s h e d group o f i n t c l l e c t u a l s forms a n a l l i a n c e w i t h n new w o r k e r ' s
t h e q u a l i f i e r s from i t s l a b e l and t o r e t a i n a s h o r t e n e d v e r s i o n of i t s
movement.
These c o a l i t i o n s t a k e on s p e c i a l importance because t h e y o f t e n
original title.
A p a r t y a t i l l g a t h e r i n g i t s f o r c e s (and perhaps o n e on
open tlie way t o t h e new n c q u i s i t i o n of membership i n t h e p o l i t y , o r t h e way
t h e way o u t , a s w e l l ) t e n d s t o accumulate changes and q u a l i f i e r s a s i t
to a revolutionary alliance.
makes new, p r o v i s i o n a l c o a l i t i o n s .
Member-nonmember c o a l i t i o n s a l s o m a t t e r because they a f f e c t t h e
That approach h a s promise.
amount of v i o l e n c e which grows o u t of c o n t e n t i o n f o r power.
Another p o s s i b i l i t y is t o examine tlie
Under most
e x p e n d i t u r e p a t t e r n s of t h e government.
I f a new b u d g e t ' l i n e r e p r e s e n t i n g
c o n d i t i o n s a c o a l i t i o n with a member r e d u c e s t h e v i o l e n c e which a t t e n d s a
s e r v i c e s t o l i n g u i s t i c m i n o r i t i e s a p p e a r s , t h a t may be a s i g n t h a t a l l n c l l a l l c n g e r ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of membership.
The c o a l i t i o n s of t h e women's s t ~ f g u i s t i c a l l y - b a s e d c h a l l e n g e r is b r e a k i n g i n t o t h e p o l i t y .
I f a n o l d pro-
gram d i s a p p e a r s ( a s when s p e c i a l b e n e f i t s f o r Spanish-American War v e t e r a n s
m e l t i n t o t h e g e n e r a l v e t e r a n s ' program),
i t s e l f is dissolving.
t h a t probably t e l l s u s t h e b l o c
Major changes i n t h e amounts s p e n t on war, edu-
c n t i o n o r w e l f a r e might p o i n t i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n , a l t h o u g h ( a s Fenno
1966 makes c l e a r ) some such c h a n g e s a r e m y s t i f i c a t i o n s , and o t h e r s depend
mainly on t h e i n t e r n a l dynamics of t h e government i t s e l f .
Perhaps t h e a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e of a g e n c i e s
-- a
Department of l a b o r t o
match t h e a r r i v a l of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r , a Department of V e t e r a n ' s A f f a i r s
t o match t h e a r r l v s l of v e t e r a n s
--
p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e of t h e same kind.
But i n a p a r l i a m e n t a r y system, t h e b e h a v i o r of t h e p a r l i a m e n t i t s e l f probably r e f l e c t s t h e va-et-vient
of c o n t e n d e r s more a c c u r a t e l y than a n y t h i n g
I)o d i s c u s s l o n s o f i s s u e s c l e a r l y l i n k e d w i t h one c o n t e n d e r o r a n o t h e r
else.
(whether r e p r e s e n t e d i n tlie p a r l i a m e n t o r n o t ) wax and wane i n time w i t h
t h e p o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s of t h o s e c o n t e n d e r s 7
Does t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a re-
l i a b l e s p l i t of t h e v o t e on such i s s u e s s i g n a l t h e a r r i v a l of a member7
Is t h e r e a s o r t of s c a l e going:
With t h e i d e a t h a t some such p r o c e s s might be going on. J e f f Pearson
analyzed r o l l - c a l l v o t e s i n t h e Ninth L e g i s l a t u r e of t h e French Chamber
of D e p u t i e s , which met i n 1906-1907.
France.
Those were t u r b u l e n t y e a r s i n
S o c i a l i s t s had withdrawn t h e i r s u p p o r t from t h e government i n t h e
f a l l of 1905 o v e r t h e i s s u e of s c h o o l t e a c h e r s ' r i g h t t o u n i o n i z e and t o
strike.
The e l e c t i o n s of J a n u a r y 1906 renewed t h e S e n a t e and b r o u g h t
i n a new P r e s i d e n t , Armand ~ a l l i 2 r e s . A s t r i k e wave c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e
mines b u t i n v o l v i n g many workers i n c h e m i c a l s nnd s m e l t i n g a s w e l l began
t o r o l l i n March and reached a c r e s t i n Mny.
e l e c t i o n s of May, t h e P a r t i S o c i s l i s t e ~ n i f i 6conducted a n a t i o n a l campaign f o r t h e f i r s t time; q u e s t l c m s of n a t i o n a l i z a t l o n of r a i l r o a d l i n e s ,
r e t i r e m e n t p l a n s and b e n e f i t s i n g e n e r a l f i g u r e d widely i n tlie campalgn
debates.
1907 f e a t u r e d a massive p r o t e s t of s o u t h e r n winegrowers r e s u l -
t i n g from a n o v e r p r o d u c t i o n c r i s i s .
And throughout t h e p e r l o d t h e gov-
ernment was implementing t h e d i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e C a t h o l i c Church which
had been d e c i d e d two y e a r s b e f o r e , and l i q u i d a t i n g t h e Dreyfus A f f a i r
which had hung o v e r France f o r a decade.
-- a
d i s c u s s i o n of a n i s s u e c l e a r l y l i n k e d w i t h a c o n t e n d e r (e.g.
p u t t i n g down u n r u l y workers o r r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s )
-- i n t r o d u c t i o n
--
of b i l l s o r r e s o l u t i o n s
b r i n g i n g such b i l l s o r r e s o l u t i o n s t o a v o t e
-- n p p e a r a n c e s w i t h i n
-- a p p e a r a n c e w i t h i n
--
t h e p a r l i a m e n t of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p u b l i c l y
Judging from tlie g e n e r a l p o l i t -
c a l h i s t o r i e s of t h e time, o n e could r e a s o n a b l y a s s e r t t h a t two mojor
changes i n p o l i t y membership were o c c u r r i n g : o r g a n i z e d l a b o r was a c q u i r i n g
a n e s t a b l i s h e d p l a c e i n t h e n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of power, and t h e C a t h o l i c
Church was l o s i n g a n i m p o r t a n t s h a r e of power.
t h e p a r l i a m e n t of s b l o c , o r s t a n d a r d a l i g n -
ment, w i t h r e s p e c t t o i s s u e s c l e a r l y i i n k e d w i t h t h e c o n t e n d e r .
During t h e l e g i s l a t l v e
P e a r s o n ' s a n a l y s i s j i b e s n i c e l y w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of t h e
time.
He examined 228 of t h e 324 r o l l - c a l l v o t e s which o c c u r r e d i n t h e
parliamentary s e s s i o n .
(The i s s u e s of t h e J o u r n a l O f f i c i e l r e p o r t i n g t h e
i d c n t i f i e d with a s p e c i f i c contender
other
a p p e a r a n c e w i t h i n t h e p a r l i a m e n t of a p a r t y p u b l i c l y i d e n t i f i e d
i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s : l e g i s l a t i v e r o l l c a l l s d e c i d i n g tlie f a t e of l a w s
with a s p e c i f i c contender7
proposed f o r enactment; sanctioning r o l l c a l l s a p p r o v i n g o r d i a p p r o v i n g
96 r o l l - c a l l s were u n a v a i l a b l e t o Pearson a t t h e time.)
They f e l l
4-47
4-48
b e s t s u i t e d t o t h e d e t e c t i o n of groups whose p o s i t i o n is c l i n n ~ i n g , r o t l t c r
an
a c t i o n of t h e government; o t h e r s which cover a v a r i e t y of p r o c e d u r a l
than calmly e n j o y i n g l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d
matters,
r e s o l u t i o n s and o t h e r a c t i o n s none of which can l e a d t o t h e
p s s s n g e of a law o r t h e C a l l o f a government.
Using t h e c o n t e n t of t h e de-
b a t e s and suclt secondary s o u r c e s a s Bonnefous' H i s t o i r e p o l i t i q u e
&&
~ r o i s i h n eR z p u b l i q t ~ ea s a g u i d e . Pearson coded ench v o t e f o r t h e groups
o u t s i d e t h e Chnmber, i f any, t o w h i c l ~ t h e a c t i o n was supposed t o a p p l y .
benefits.
I t assumes t h n t a
s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t o f p u b l i c b u s i n e s s i s a c t u a l l y b e i n g done i n t h e
legislature.
I f some c o n t e n d e r s ( b a n k e r s , say. o r t h e m i l i t a r y ) t y p i c a l l y
do t h e i r work through o t h e r branches of government, t h e procedure w i l l
n o t work s o w e l l .
One might have t o t u r n t o t h e s o r t of a n a l y s i s Tudesq
h a s undertaken f o r g r a n d s n o t a b l e s and f o r c o n a c i l l e r s Rgn&rsux, o r t h n t
The r e s u l t s of t h e coding appear i n T a b l e 4-1.
many o t h e r s have undertaken f o r c a b i n e t members, government o f f l c i n l s
Pearson was a b l e t o i d e n t i f y a b o u t h a l f t h e r o l l c a l l s h e examined
or legislators:
w i t h some f a i r l y well-defined
group.
Some of t h e e n t r i e s r a i s e doubts:
person-by-person
c o l l e c t i v e biography a g g r e g a t e d i n t o
a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e c a t e g o r y of p e r s o n s .
At t h e edges of
l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , f o r example, o r t h e Army i n g e n e r a l ; t h o s e d o u b t s
t h e government, i t might b e p r o f i t a b l e t o s e a r c h f o r t h e r i s e nnd fn1.l
i n v o l v e important q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g b o t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t e n d e r s
f o r power i n g e n e r a l and t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o n t e n t i o n w i t h i n t h e French
p o l i t i c a l system.
The i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e r o l l c a l l s a r e t h e i s s u e s which r e n t France
a s a whole i n 1906 and 1907.
And t h e t a l l y of outcomes i s s u g g e s t i v e .
To be t h e sub-
j e c t o f r o l l c a l l s which a c t u a l l y p a s s i s e v i d e n c e of power, a t l e a s t power
in the legislature.
Although t h e numbers of r o l l c a l l s a r e t o o s m a l l t o i n -
s p i r e confidence. P e a r s o n ' s t a b u l a t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t i n 1906-07 t h e power
p o s i t i o n of miners and r a i l r o a d workers was s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of s c l ~ o o l t e a c h c r s and p o s t a l workers.
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . away from t h e a c q u i s i t i o n and l o s s of power a s s u c h .
I n d e a l i n g w i t h r e l a t i o n s between major i n d u s t r i e s and t h e U.S.
government from 1886 t o 1906, William Roy h a s i n v e n t e d some p r o c e d u r e s
which n e a t l y l i n k t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s e s and t h e power p r o c e s s e s ,
"Fcvornble" r o l l c a l l s a r e simply t h o s e i n which t h e p r o p o s a l v o t e d on approves o r promotes t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e group i n q u e s t i o n .
That remains t o b e v e r i f i e d w i t h o t h e r e v i d e n c e .
w i t h o u t confounding them.
Roy's work f o c u s e s on t h e i n f l u e n c e e x e r t e d
by d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s over i n t e r a c t i o n s between t h e U.S.
and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s .
t y p e s of e x p l i c i t mention which t h e i n d u s t r i e s i n q u e s t i o n r e c e i v e i n
correspondence between t h e S t a t e Department and ombassndorisl o f C i c i n l s
overseas.
The i n d e x is i m p e r f e c t ; some i m p o r t a n t k i n d s of i n f l u e n c e m y
n o t appear i n t h e correspondence because they a r e e i t h e r t o o r i s k y o r
t o o r o u t i n e t o commit t o p r i n t .
-- t l l s t
i n t e r e s t -- i s
Neverthel.ess, t h e b a s i c n o t i o n
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t . c o n t e n t i o n f o r power a t t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l from t h e ample
t o hold power i s t o b e t a k e n account of i n your a r e a s of
proceedings of I e g i s l a t u r e s .
government
IIe i n d e x e s t h a t i n f l u e n c e v i a t h e frequency and,
n u t t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n m k e s i t seem p o s s i b l e t o draw s y s t e m a t i c
The u s e of r o l l c a l l s and d e b a t e s h a s some obvious l i m i t a t i o n s .
By t h i s p o i n t ,
Itowever, we a r e beginning t o edge back i n t o t h e s t u d y of m o b i l i z a t i o n nnd
Ln g e n e r a l , however, t h e l i s t c a t c h e s e x a c t l y t h e a c t o r s
one would hope f o r : winegrowers, p o s t a l workers, t h e C a t h o l i c Church, and s o
on.
of p r e s s u r e groups, p r o f e s s i o n a l l o b b y i s t s and t h e 1.ike.
v a l i d , and t h e method of implementing i t ingenious.
I t is
Roy a t t e m p t s t o account f o r v a r i a t i o n s i n power among i n d u s t r i e s
Table 4-1: Groups Figuring i n 1906-07 R o l l C a l l s of French Chamber of Deputies
Number of R o l l C a l l s :
Issue
Group
schoolteachers
Legislative
r i g h t of s t a t e emplyees t o
s t r i k e f o r vages v i t h o u t
government s a n c t i o n s
0
p o s t a l workers
same
6
r a i l r o a d workers
f r e e from compulsory dependence
on employer-run economats
miners
i n t r o d u c e maximum 8-hour day
spinners
winegrowers
winegrowers
Sanctioning Other
Total
Percent
Favorable
Percent
Favorable
and Passed
0
3
9
89
11
0
0
2
100
50
1
0
0
1
100
100
emergency funds f o r unemployed
0
0
1
1
100
0
stemming t h e overproduction
c r i s i s of 1907 and s a f e g u a r d s
for future
22
punishment f o r June 1907
demonstrations i n South
0
wine merchants
and middlemen
s a f e g u a r d s and c o n t r o l s on
them t o prevent watering wine
Second Amy
d i s c i p l i n e regiment which refused t o q u e l l demonstrations
Second Amy
provide e a r l i e r r e l e a s e of
draftees to aid harvest
3
Amy i n g e n e r a l
v i n d i c a t e Dreyfus and P i q u a r t
4
Amy i n g e n e r a l
increase appropriations
3
Amy i n g e n e r a l
reduce compulsory s e r v i c e
by one year
5
Table 4-1:
1
Groups Figuring i n 1960-07 R o l l C a l l s of French Chamber of Deputies (continued)
Number of R o l l C a l l s :
Percent
Percent
Favorable
Favorable and Passed
Group
Issue
small grocers
impose t a x on, t o r e g u l a t e s a l e
of sugar t o l o c a l wine makers
2
workers i n g e n e r a l
c r e a t e N n i s t r y of Labor
1
0
1
2
100
100
workers i n g e n e r a l
l e g a l i z e n a t i o n a l Sunday
holiday f o r
3
0
0
3
67
33
abolish p r i v a t e property
in behalf of
0
2
0
2
50
0
left-leaning legislative districts
i n s t i t u t e p r o p o r t i o n a l repres e n t a t i o n in a l l e l e c t i o n s
0
0
2
2
50
0
lower c l a s s e s
r e l a t i v e t a x burden on
1
4
0
5
20
0
agriculture
emergency a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r
1
0
0
1
100
100
private railroad
company (Chemin d e
Fer d e l ' o u e s t )
s t a t e takeover of
Roman C a t h o l i c
Church
r i g h t t o r e t a i n tax-free
property
workers i n g e n e r a l
Total classifiable
Unclassif i a b l e
Total Roll Calls
Legislative
S a n c t i o n i n g Other
Total
4-52
4-51
and o v e r time t l ~ r o u g hLhree d i f f e r e n t s e t s of i n d u s t r i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
.orderly:
s t o l i d ' ~ r i t o n 8w a i t i n g i n l i n e , r a t l o n books i n hand.
tn
1 ) t h e network p o s i t i o n of f i r m s i n t h e i n d u s t r y , a s measured e s p e c i a l l y
r e a l i t y , i t is t h e o c c a s i o n f o r some of t h e g r e a t e s t s t r u g g l e s i n which
by i n t e r l o c k i n g d i r e c t o r a t e s and by r e l a t i o n s of i n d u s t r y p e r s o n n e l t o
p e o p l e engage.
government and s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; 2) " o b j e c t i v e " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
mean e v e r y c h a l l e n g e r h a s e q u a l chances of meeting t h o s e t e s t s , o r t h a t
t h e i n d u s t r y such a s s i z e , number of f i r m s and revenue from f o r e i g n
t h e l e a d e r s o f e v e r y c o n t e n d e r a r e e q u a l l y w i l l i n g t o make t h e e f f o r t .
t r n d e ; 3) m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e i n d u s t r y , a s
I f e v e r y p o l i t y h a s t e s t ' s o f membership.
t h a t does n o t
The l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a new c o n t e n d e r w i l l a c c e p t and employ t h e means
r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i n t e n s i t y of economic c o o p e r a t i o n and c o n c e n t r a t i o n
of a c q u i s i t i o n of power t h e members of t h e p o l i t y p r e s c r i b e (e.8.
among f i r m s , tlie c h a r a c t e r of t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s and t r a d e p u b l i c a t i o n s ,
enough v o t e s t o e l e c t a p a r t y , s a c r i f i c i n g enough people i n war, b r i n g i n g
t h e e x t e n t of lobbying, p o l i t i c a l involvement of e x e c u t i v e s , and s o on.
i n enough food from t h e h u n t , buying enough government o f f i c i a l s ) depends
Roy's r e s e a r c h d e s i g n does n o t q u i t e b r i n g u s t o t h e p o i n t o f
gathering
on t h e congruence of t h e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e which p r e v a i l w i t h i n i t
mcnsuring t h e r e t u r n s d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s r e c e i v e f o r t h e r e s o u r c e s
t o t h o s e b u i l t i n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e p o l i t y .
they a p p l y t o t h e government; i t t h e r e f o r e f a l l s s h o r t of t h e i d e a l
w i d e l y , t h e c h a l l e n g e r i s l i k e l y t o employ i r r e g u l a r means
measure of power proposed e a r l i e r .
a p p l y i n g r e s o u r c e s t o t h e government and t o members of tlie p o l i t y which
direction.
I t takes important s t e p s i n t h a t
Furthermore, i t makes p o s s i b l e a v a l u a b l e p a r t i a l t e s t of
t h e proposed d i s t i n c t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r s end members of t h e p o l i t y .
a r e r a r e l y used i n t h o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
Where the'y d i v e r g e
-- wl~iclimeans
A c o n c r e t e example:
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s kidnap government o f f i c i a l s and American e m i s s a r i e s i n
I f a " p o l i t y " e x i s t s i n a s t r o n g s e n s e of t h e term, t h e r e s h o u l d be a
o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e r e l e a s e of t h e i r own members from p r i a o n .
d i s t i n c t break i n t h e continuum o f i n f l u e n c e - w i e l d i n g ;
L a t i n American c a s e :
t h e break should
Guatemalan
Another
P e r u v i a n t r a d e unions d e l i b e r a t e l y s t a e e v i o l e n t
correspond t o t h e t h r e s h o l d below which an i n d u s t r y i s simply n o t a
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a s a way of p r e s s i n g t h e i r demands on' t h e c e n t r a l govern-
p o l i t y member t o be taken account o f .
ment (Payne 1965).
I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, tlie continuum runs smoothly from 0 t o i n f i n i t e
power, t h e motion of a bounded p o l i t y i s misleading.
Likewise t h e n o t i o n
1
The i d e a of a p o l i t y , t h e n , sums up t h e major r e l a t i o n s h i p s among
r e p r e s s i o n , power, and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . . Members of tlie poll.ty have
r e q u i r e s a b r e a k i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i e between l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
more power and f a c e l e s s r e p r e s s i o n than c h a l l e n g e r s do.
and amount of i n f l u e n c e . c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r r e t u r n
become members through c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and members defend themselves
p o l i t y members should r e c e i v e f o r t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t s .
I n any c a s e , i f
a g a i n s t l o s s of power t h r o u g h ~ c o l l e c t i v ea c t i o n .
Challengers
T h i s much i s a u s e f u l
But t h e p o l i t y model l a c k s an i m p o r t a n t element:
interests.
t h e r e is no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i n d u s t r y ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n
simplification.
and i t s p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , t h e model of t h e p o l i t y l a i d o u t h e r e w i l l
I t p r o v i d e s no g u i d e t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s a f f e c t i n g nny por-
lose plausibility.
t i c u l a r group's i n t e r e s t s .
So f a r , my account makes t h e p r o c e s s of e n t r y and e x i t t o o calm and
Without some i d e a of t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of
i n t e r e s t and power p o s i t i o n , we can have no c l e a r i d e a how t h e e x t e n t and
4-53
4-54
c h a r a c t e r of c h a l l e n g e r s ' and members' c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n d i f f e r from
F i g u r e 4-11.
C o l l e c t i v e Action a s a Function of T h r e a t a , o n d O p p o r t l l n i t i e s .
one a n o t h e r .
~p~ortunit~l~hreat
I
O p p o r t u n i t y h a s two s i d e s .
On t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s i d e , we have t h e
.
!
i
e x t e n t t o which o t h e r groups, i n c l u d i n g governments, a r e v u l n e r a b l e t o
I
Maximum
new c l a i m s which would, i f s u c c e s s f u l , enhance t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n
of i t s i n t e r e s t s .
On t h e t h r e a t a i d e . we have t h e e x t e n t t o which o t h e r
groups a r e t h r e a t e n i n g t o mike c l a i m s which would, i f s u c c e s s f u l , reduce
t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s .
t h r e a t p a r a 1 l e l . s t h e a n a l y s i s of power:
The a n a l y s i s of o p p o r t u n i t y l
Extent
i n p r i n c i p l e , i t embraces every-
of
t h i n g about t h e s u r r o u n d i n g world which i s l i k e l y t o a f f e c t t h e a c t o r ' s
well-being.
Collective
Action
In p r a c t i c e , we can o n l y d e a l w i t h i t by r e f e r r i n g t o some
s p e c i f i c s e t o f i n t e r e s t s , p a r t i e s and i n t e r a c t i o n s .
One i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between t h e a n a l y s e s of power and of
o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t concerns p e r c e p t i o n s and e x p e c t a t i o n s .
of power we can choose t o n e g l e c t them:
In the analysis
power then r e f e r s t o t h e
o b s c r v a b l e t r a n s a c t i o n s amon8 t h e p a r t i e s .
In the case of opportunityl
t h r e a t we have no c h o i c e b u t t o c o n s t r u c t some model of t h e way t h a t
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e environment comes t o t h e a c t o r ' s a t t e n t i o n .
For
t h e moment. l e t us assume t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r , who i s engaged i n f r e q u e n t
i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h o t h e r groups, simply responds t o t h e t r e n d of t h o s e
interactions.
The c o n t e n d e r responds i n d i v i d u a l l y t o t h e t r e n d of i t s
i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h each s p e c i f i c group, and c o l l e c t i v e l y t o t h e t r e n d i n
all. interactions.
A c o n t e n d e r which is e n c o u n t e r i n g i n c r e a s i n g a t t a c k s
I
I
\
i.
I
0-1
Threat
0
Opportunity
Extent of Change i n
on i t s i n t c r e s t s a n t i c i p a t e s more a t t a c k s ; a . c o n t e n d e r which f i n d s t h e
Realization of I n t e r e s t s
government i n c r e a s i n g l y r e s p o n s i v e t o i t s o v e r t u r e s a n t i c i p a t e s f u r t h e r
responsiveness.
L a t e r on we w i l l have t o c o n s i d e r a c o n t e n d e r ' s o b s e r v a t i o n
of i n t e r a c t i o n s among o t h e r j p a r t i e s
--
n o t i n g , f o r example, t h a t when a
I
+1
government shows s i g n s of weakness i n d e a l i n g w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r con-
F i g u r e 4-12.
t e n d e r most o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s read t l ~ o s es i g n s a s t h r e a t s o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s
w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s .
Asymmetrical E f f e c t of T h r e a t and O p p o r t u n i t y on
C o l l e c t i v e Action.
We w i l l a l s o have t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n u s u a l l y i n v o l v e s f e i n t s and m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s .
L e t us i g n o r e t h e s e i n t e r e s t i n g c o m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e time being.
F i g u r e 4-11 b r e a k s o p p o r t u n i t y / t h r e a t i n t o two dimensions:
1) the
e x t e n t of a n t i c i p a t e d change i n t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of i t s
i n t e r e s t s ; i t runs from -1. (comp1.ete o b l i t e r a t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s ) t o
0 (no change) t o +I. (complete r e a l i z a t i o n o f i t s i n t e r e s t s ) ; 2) t h e
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e change w i l l o c c u r a ) i f t h e c o n t e n d e r does n o t n c t ,
I
i n t h e c a s e of t h r e a t s . b) i f t h e group a c t s . i n t h e c a s e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
The diagram s a y s t h e t t h e g r e a t e r t h e a b s o l u t e v a l u e of t h e q u a n t i t y
Extent
of
Collective
( p r o b a b l y of o c c u r r e n c e x e x t e n t o f change). t h e more e x t e n s i v e t h e
contender's collective action.
Act i o n
In t h i s simple version, the contender's
r e s p o n s e s t o t h r e a t and t o o p p o r t u n i t y a r e e x a c t l y symmetrical:
more of e i t h e r , t h e more c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
the
The two c u r v e s a r e g e n t l y
concave t o r e p r e s e n t s mild tendency f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o a c c e l e r a t e
Extent of A n t i c i p a t e d Change
more r a p i d l y w i t h h i e h e r l e v e l s of t h r e a t o r o p p o r t u n i t y .
i n R e a l i z a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s
An a s y m m e t r i c s l response t o t l ~ r e s tand o p p o r t u n i t y i s more p l a u s i b l e
than a symmetrical response.
Assuming e q u a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s of o c c u r r e n c e ,
a given amount o f t h r e a t t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e more c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n than
t h e "same" amount of o p p o r t u n i t y .
On t h e whole, r e s p o n s e t o o p p o r t u n i t y
i s l i k e l y t o r e q u i r e more a l t e r a t i o n of t h e group!s o r g a n i z a t i o n and
m o b i l i z a t i o n p a t t e r n than i s response t o t h r e a t ; t h e group can respond
to threat via its established routines.
European p e a s a n t communities
r e l i e d on t h e i r l o c a l communication networks end s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s
i n g e t t i n g t o g e t h e r t o chase o u t t h e unwanted t a x c o l l e c t o r .
They had
much more t r o u b l e s e n d i n g a d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e c a p i t a l t o demand an
4-57
a l t e r a t i o n of t h e t a x burden.
Furthermore, groups g e n e r a l l y i n f l a t e t h e
s e r i o u s way.
Max H e i r i c h p o i n t s o u t t h e s t n r k c o n t r a s t i n t h e rcsponse
v a l u e of t h o s e t h i n g s they a l r e a d y p o s s e s s , when someone e l s e is s e e k i n g
of U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a o f f i c i a l s t o two e q u a l l y obscene e v e n t s w l ~ i c h
t o t a k e them ahay.
o c c u r r e d about t h e same time i n 1965:
For e q u a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s , t h e l o s s of t h e e x i s t i n g
tlie campus Ugly Man c o n t e s t (won
v i l l a g e common l a n d c o u n t s more than t h e g a i n of t h e same amount of
by Alpha E p s i l o n P i f r a t e r n i t y , whose c a n d i d a t e was Miss Pussy G a l o r e )
common l a n d .
and t h e l a t e s t a g e s of t h e F r e e Speech Movement. now redubbed tllc F i l t h y
do.
F i n a l l y , t h r e a t s g e n e r a l i z e more r e a d i l y t h a n o p p o r t u n i t i e s
A group is more l i k e l y t o s e e a t h r e a t t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t a s
Speech Movement.
At t h a t p o i n t , t h e Movement's q u i n t e s s e n c e was t h e
a s i g n of t l ~ r e a t st o a wide range of i t s i n t e r e s t s than i t i s t o s e e
p o s t i n g and p a r a d i n g of s i g n s s a y i n g , simply. Fuck.
an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r enhancement o f one of i t s i n t e r e s t s a s a s i g n of
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h a f a c u l t y member who a c t i v e l y opposed t h e F6M nnd was
opportrrnity f o r a wide range of i t s i n t e r e s t s .
i n c e n s e d a b o u t a r e c e n t " o b s c e n i t y r a l l y " a ~ r o u pof f r e e speech a d v o c a t e s
These a r e , of c o u r s e . n o t e s t a b l i s h e d v e r i t i e s , b u t hypotheses.
F i g u r e 4-12 sums them up:
t h e e x t e n t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i t s a y s ,
mounts more r a p i d l y a s a [unction of t h r e a t t h a n a s a f u n c t i o n of
opportunity.
H e i r i c l ~r e p o r t s a
had o r g a n i z e d :
When I asked him why he was angry a b o u t t h i s b u t n o t a b o u t t h e
obscene remarks by t h e f r a t e r n i t y boys, h e r e p l i e d :
On t h e t h r e a t s i d e , i t s a y s , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r i s e s t o
different.
That was
That was a bunch of f r a t e r n i t y boys blowing o f f stenm.
t h e maximum p e r m i t t e d by t h e group's m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l c o n s i d e r a b l y
You know t h a t when i t ' s a l l o v e r t h e y ' r e going t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r
b e f o r e t h e p o i n t a t which t h e t h r e a t means a n n i h i l a t i o n .
p l a c e a s r e s p e c t a b l e members of s o c i e t y .
time l a g c o n s i d e r e d , t h e g r e a t e r tlie asymmetry.
The l o n g e r t h e
Over a l o n g e r p e r i o d
d e f e n s i v e m o b i l i z a t i o n i n r e s p o n s e t o t h r e a t t e n d s t o add i t s e f f e c t
B r ~ t t h e s e people n r e o u t
t o d e l i b e r a t e l y b r e a k e v e r y r u l e they c a n , t o t r y t o t e a r down
s o c i e t y ( H e i r i c h 1971: 363).
more r a p i d l y than o f f e n s i v e o r p r e p a r a t o r y m o b i l i z a t i o n i n response t o
Throughout 1964 and 1965 t h e v a r i c o l o r e d Movement was. indeed. r a p i d l y
opportunity.
m o b i l i z i n g and demobilizing; i t made r e c u r r e n t , spasmodic b i d s f o r power
The asymmetry. T b e l i e v e , produces a deep c o n s e r v a t i s m i n e v e r y
polity.
Members of t h e p o l i t y r e s i s t changes which would t h r e a t e n t h e i r
w i t h i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e u n i v e r s i t y , o r d i n a r i l y by t e s t i n g Lhe Berkeley
r u l e s of assembly, speech, o r advocacy s t t l ~ e i rmost v u l n e r a b l e l i m i t ,
c u r r e n t r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s even more than they s e e k changes
and then c l a i m i n g some a l t e r n a t i v e l e g i t i m a c y f o r i t s a c t i o n .
which would enhance t h e i r i n t e r e s t s .
u n i v e r s i t y ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e claimed r i g h t would tend t o ndmit t h e
They f i g h t t e n a c i o r ~ s l ya g a i n s t
l o s s of power, and e s p e c i a l l y a g a i n s t e x p u l s i o n from t h e p o l i t y .
They
group making t h e c l a i m t o membership i n i t s p o l i t y . and t h e r e b y t o s h i f t
work a g a i n s t admission t o t h e p o l i t y of groups whose i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t
t h e c r i t e r i a of membership i n general..
s i g n i f i c a n t l y w i t h t h e i r own.
i n e v e r y such change.
E x i s t i n g members tend t o be more e x a c t i n g i n t h e i r demands of
c o n t e n d e r s whose very admission would c h a l l e n g e t h e system i n some
The
Something s e r i o u s i s a t s t a k e
A s a consequence, people a r e e x c e p t i o n a l l y ready t o f i g h t o v e r
e n t r i e s i n t o a p o l i t y , and e x i t s from i t .
A s A r t h u r Stinchcombe (1965)
s a y s , l e a d e r s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y t o employ, a u t h o r i z e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o t h e i r members i n s t e a d of r e l y i n g on d i f f u s e n p p e a l s t o
o r t o l e r a t e u n l i m i t e d means of combat when they s e n s e a d i s c r e p a n c y
between what t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n i s g e t t i n g ond what i t i s due.
s o l i d a r i t y . and were b u r e a u c r a t i c ,
That
an argument f o r c o o l l y - o r g a n i z e d p r e s s u r e groups.
e n r a g i n g disagreement t y p i c a l l y h a s t o do, p r e c i s e l y , w i t h what t h e
o r g a n i z a t i o n is due.
and o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s i n t h e i r q u e s t f o r power.
T h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s h a s s t r o n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e l o c u s , t i m i n g
of v i o l e n c e had v e r y low r a t e s o f s u c c e s s .
and p e r s o n n e l of major s t r u g g l e s f o r power.
p o r t r a y a l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n two main ways:
d e f i n e d o b j e c t i v e s w i t h s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s
tlie United Sons of Vulcan. t h e Tobacco Night R i d e r s and t h e S t e e l Workers'
-- which
does n o t mean they
a c t i o n s cannot be e x p l a i n e d by l o o k i n g a t t h e c h a l l e n g i n g groups a l o n e ;
a c c e p t a n c e o r non-acceptance of t h e group by a t l e a s t one o f
they r e s u l t from an i n t e r a c t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r s and o t h e r groups.
I n t h e terms we have been u s i n g h e r e , they r e s u l t from t h e i n t e r p l a y
claims t o represent
of i n t e r e s t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n , and m o b i l i z a t i o n , on t h e one s i d e . and of
a c q u i s i t i o n o r n o n - a c q u i s i t i o n of new a d v a n t a g e s f o r i t s members.
repression / f a c i l i t a t i o n ,
The a c c e p t a n c e of t h e group, a s d e f i n e d by Gamson, o v e r l a p s t o some
e x t e n t with entrance i n t o a p o l i t y , a s described e a r l i e r .
L e t us c o n t i n u e t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model.
a c c e p t a n c e a c q u i r e d any new advantages.
t h e groups which gained acceptance tended t o d i f f e r
i n form and s t r a t e g y from t h e o t h e r s :
on t h e whole, they were groups
which d i d n o t demand t o d i s p l a c e o t h e r groups, o r g a n i z e d around a s i n g l e
i s s u e , were r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e , provided s e l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e s f o r
We can
c r y s t a l l i z e t h e p r i n c i p a l t e a c h i n g s of t h e l a s t two c h a p t e r s i n a p a i r
8 0 p e r c e n t of t h e groups which g a i n e d some a c c e p t a n c e a l s o a c q u i r e d new
a d v a n t a g e s , w h i l e o n l y 2 1 p e r c e n t o f t h o s e which f a i l e d t o g a i n any
power, and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e s t . on t h e o t h e r .
The I n t e r p l a y of M o b i l i z a t i o n and O p p o r t u n i t y
As one might
e x p e c t , a c c e p t a n c e and t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of new a d v a n t a g e s a r e connected:
More important.
1 ) i t s a c t o r s spproscli
c o n s i s t e n t and a t t a i n a b l e ; 2) t h e i r a c t i o n s and t h e outcomes oE t h o s e
i t s a n t a g o n i s t s a s a l e g i t i m a t e spokesman f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s i t
--
Gomson's r e s u l t s
always choose t h e b e s t s t r a t e g y o r t h a t t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s o r e o l u a y s
The r e s e a r c h examines two main s o r t s of outcomes
of t h e c h a l l e n g e s :
--
I f i t is true that organization
Gamson's world i s k e e n l y a n t i - ~ u r k l i e i m i a n : '1t opposes t h e Durklteimian
(The l i s t makes
n e i g h b o r s of t h e Anarcho-Communists and t h e N a t i o n a l Urban League, of
O r g a n i z i n g Committee.)
The p a s s i v e r e c i p i c n t a
a r e congruent w i t h tlie 'general a G u m e n t . which is u n f o l d i n g h e r e .
Gamson and h i s a s s o c i a t e s s t u d i e d
from 1800 t o 1945.
used v i o l e n c e
pays, i t is n o t s o t r u e t h a t p a t i e n c e and moderation pay.
The r e c e n t work of William Gamson (1975) d e a l s e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h
53 "clial.lenging groups" i n t h e U.S.
But t h e s u c c e s s f u l
c h a l l e n g e r s were a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y more l i k e l y t o ha;e
I t i s a m a t t e r o f p r i n c i p l e , of r i g h t s , o f j u s t i c e .
some a s p e c t s of t h e power s t r u g g l e .
Thus f a r , t h e r e s u l t s sound l i k e
Remember t h e e a r l i e r d i s t i n c t i o n s among f o u r t y p e s o f
of diagrams.
-
contenders:
z e a l o t s , run-of-the-mill
The run-of-the-mill
c o n t e n d e r s . misers. and o p p o r t u n i s t s .
c o n t e n d e r s d e f i n e t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n terms of a l i m i t e d
range of c o l l e c t i v e goods, and a r e u n w i l l i n g t o a c t i f t h e a c t i o n is
l i k e l y t o bring a loss.
run-of-the-mill
I n f i g u r e s 4-13 and 4-14 u e s e e an i d e a l i z e d
c o n t e n d e r i n two c o n t r a s t i n p , s i t u a t i o n s .
In the f i r s t ,
t h e p r e c e d i n g arguments s a y t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r is l i k e l y t o produce somc
In t h e second, i f t h e arguments a r c c o r r e c t , t h e
collective action.
contender should n o t a c t .
I n F i g u r e 4-13,
I
F i g u r e 4-13:
I d e a l i z e d S k e t c h of C o n d i t t o n s f o r A c t i o n of s run-of-the-mill
Contender.
t h e run-of-the-mill
current incentives f o r collective action.
c o n t e n d e r hne s i g n i f i c a n t
Current opportunity includes
t h e g r o u p ' s narrow a r e a of i n t e r e s t , w h i l e c u r r e n t t h r e a t i n c l u d e s t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s , nlthough n o t t h e -1 of t o t a l e x t i n c t i o n .
I f t h o s e were t h e o n l y c o n s t r a i n t s i n o p e r a t i o n . we would e x p e c t t h e
c o n t e n d e r t o a c t b o t h t o c a p i t a l i z e on i t s o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t o defend
i t s e l f against threats of loss.
There i s , however, one o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t :
mobilization.
In t h i s
s k e t c h , t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l is high enougl~ LO p e r m i t
a c t i o n throughout t h e range of i t s c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t and o p p o r t u n i t y .
Nevertheless,
Collective
Goods
Returned
t h e group's power p o s i t i o n would p e r m i t i t t o a c q u i r e
s t i l l more c o l l e c t i v e goods i f i t mobilized f u r t h e r ; t h e d o t t e d c u r v e
t o t h e r i g h t of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n l i n e d e s c r i b e s t h o s e t h e o r e t i c n l
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; i t a l s o shows t h e t h e o r e t i c a l d e c l i n e i n t h e group'n
r e t u r n i f i t pushes c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o o f a r .
Beyond a c e r t a i n p o i n t .
we e x p e c t r e p r e s s i o n t o s t a r t d i m i n i s h i n g t h e g r o u p ' s r e t u r n from
collective action.
Repression does n o t a p p e a r i n t h e diagram. b u t i t s e f f e c t i s t h e r e .
F a i t h f u l t o t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model. we r e p r e s e n t i t a s one of t h e f a c t o r s
producing t h e c u r r e n t shape and l o c a t i o n o f t h e p r o b a b l e - r e t u r n curve.
a s well as the current location of the mobilization line.
Organization
l i k e w i s e remains hidden from view, a s a v n r i a b l e w h i c l ~works through
Resources Expended
i n t e r e s t and m o b i l i z a t i o n .
Power is p r e s e n t , however.
The crlrve o f
p r o b a b l e r e t u r n s g i v e s us a s i m p l i f i e d summary of t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s c u r r e n t
power p o s i t i o n .
power a r e t h e r e :
Indeed. s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s
power-efficiency
i n t h e r a t e s of r e t u r n of c o l l e c t i v e
4-63
goods f o r r e s o u r c e s expended i n t h e two zones of most l i k e l y a c t i o n ;
p o w e r - e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n tlie p o r t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t
percent
--
--
i n t h i s c a s e 100
t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r can r e a l i z e ; p o t e n t i a l power i s t h e h i g h
F i g u r e 4-14:
I d e a l i z e d s k e t c h of c o n d i t i o n s t o r i n a c t i o n of a run-of-the-mill
contender.
p o i n t of t h e p r o b a b l e - r e t u r n l i n e .
I n o u r f i r s t dlagram, then. t h e c u r r e n t combination of i n t e r e s t ,
m o b i l i z a t i o n , power and o p p o r t u n i t y - t h r e a t l e a d s u s t o e x p e c t t h e
c o n t e n d e r t o engage i n two k i n d s and l e v e l s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n :
a
low i n t e n s i t y of a c t i o n t o c o u n t e r t h r e a t s of l o s s , a h i g h e r i n t e n s i t y
of n c t i o n t o t a k e advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r g a i n i n t h e a r e a of t h e
group's i n t e r e s t .
F i g u r e 4-14 shows u s tlie same s o r t of c o n t e n d e r i n
a very d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n .
'Eniy?
The s i t u a t i o n i s a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r i n a c t i o n .
Because a l l f o u r major v n r i a b l e s a r e now i n d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s .
Take o p p o r t u n i t y - t h r e a t :
t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r a n g e of d e s i r e d c o l l e c t i v e
Collective
Goods
Returned
goods l i e s above t h e l i m i t s e t by c u r r e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and t h e c u r r e n t
t h r e a t of l o s s is v e r y s l i g h t .
I n o t h e r words, no o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s a r e
c u r r e n t l y v u l n e r a b l e t o c l a i m s which would enhance t h i s run-of-the-mill
c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n o f i t s d e f i n e d i n t e r e s t s ; h a r d l y any o t h e r
c o n t e n d e r is making p l a u s i b l e t h r e a t s a g a i n s t i t s c u r r e n t r e a l i z a t i o n
of i t s i n t e r e s t s .
M o b i l i z a t i o n l l k e w i s e i n h i b i t s t h i s run-of-the-mill
capncity for collective action.
contender's
The c u r r e n t m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l r e s t r i c t s
t h e c o n t e n d e r j s p o s s i b l e a c t i o n t o t h e range i n which a n e t l o s s i s
almost c e r t a i n .
The c o n t e n d e r ' s curve of p r o b a b l e r e t u r t i s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
i s unfavorable a s well.
I t b a r e l y c r o s s e s t h e break-even
line
--
and
t h a t o n l y i n a r e g i o n which a ) i s c u r r e n t l y i n a c c e s s i b l e because of t h e
m o b i l i z a t i o n c e i l i n g , b) does n o t q u i t e r e a c h t o t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s a r e a
of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t .
Another way o f s t a t i n g t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s is
Resources Expended
t h e g r o u p ' s aims n r e " t o o high" f o r i t s c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
this:
A change i n any of t h e f o u r v a r i a b l e s could i n c r e a s e t h e
action.
l i k l i h o o d of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
h a p l e s s run-of-the-mill
An o r g a n i z e r who wanted t o p u t t h i s
c o n t e n d e r i n t o a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n would a t t e m p t
t o i n c r e a s e i L s m o b i l i z a t i o n and t r y t o augment i t s power by such t a c t i c s
n s forming c o a l i t i o n s .
IIe might a l s o t r y t o f o s t e r a r e d e f i n i t i o n of
t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s i n t e r e s t s , i n o r d e r t o b r i n g them w i t h i n t h e range o f
possibility.
A powerful c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r might t r y maneuvering t o mnke
o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s o r t h e government more v u l n e r a b l e t o t h i s c o n t e n d e r ' s
claims
--
t o r a j s e t h e l i m i t s e t by o p p o r t u n i t y .
Any of t h e s e e f f o r t s ,
i f s u c c c s s f u l , would i n c r e a s e t h e l i k e l i h o o d of t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e
Tn t h e s l ~ o r trun we have been c o n s i d e r i n g , t h e e x t e n t of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n depends g r e a t l y on t h e d e g r e e t o which t h e group involved h a s
Most a l t e r n a t i v e
t h e o r i e s e i t h e r make m o b i l i z a t i o n such an immediate f u n c t i o n of changing
i n t e r e s t s t h a t mobiliznLion c e a s e s t o a c t a s an independent v a r i a b l e ,
o r m n i n t a i n t h a t under many c i r c u m s t a n c e s unmohilized groups t e n d t o
m o b i l i z e s o r a p i d l y and e f f e c t i v e l y a s t o wipe o u t any g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p
o n l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of highly-mobilized g r o u p s , and t h a t i n any c a s e t h e
groups which r e b e l do n o t respond t o t h e g e n e r a l f a c t of d c p r i v n t l o n ; they
respond t o t h e s p e c i f i c f a c t of a n o t l ~ e rg r o u p ' s making c l a i m s which would.
i f r e a l i z e d , v i o l a t e t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d r j g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s .
The a l t c r -
n a t i v e arguments u n d e r e s t i m a t e o r e l i m i n a t e t h e c o s t s of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t ion.
I f t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model i s an improvement o v e r p r e v i o u s a n a l y s e s
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i t s t i l l h a s some s i g n i f i c a n t weaknesses.
I t has
C o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e immediate s i t u a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e
actors greatly simplifies the analysis.
But i t a l s o mnkes i t d i f f i c u l t t o
d e a l w i t h r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e s such a s t h o s e which l i n k power nnd c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n : c u r r e n t power p o s i t i o n c e r t a i n l y a f f e c t s t h e l i k e l i h o o d
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , a s t h e model s a y s ; c u r r e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a l s o
a f f e c t s f u t u r e power p o s i t i o n , a s t h e model does n o t s a y .
The nbsence of
time, f u r t h e r m o r e , e l i m i n a t e s t h e f e i n t s and h e s i t a t i o n s of s t r a t e g i c i n teraction.
The most t h e mode1,can do f o r u s i n t h e s e r e g a r d s is t o h e l p
us reduce t h e b l u r of t h e newsreel i n t o many d i s t i n c t s u c c e s s i v e frames.
between p r i o r m o b i l i z a t i o n and p r e s e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Simple c l a s s - v o t i n g schemes f o l l o w t h e f i r s t l i n e ; b l o c v o t e s r i s e
nnd f a l l ns an immediate e f f e c t of changing t h r e a t s t o c l a s s i n t e r e s t s .
James Davies' J-curve e x p l a n a t i o n of r e b e l l i o n s f o l l o w s t h e second l i n e ;
a p o p u l a t i o n which e x p e r i e n c e s n l o n g p e r i o d of r i s i n g s a t f s f a c t i o n of
i t s i n t e r e s t s nnd then e x p e r i e n c e s a r a p i d d e c l i n e i n t h a t s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
Davles a r g u e s , Lends t o m o b i l i z e and t o s t r i k e o u t a t once.
The argument
answers t h e Davies l i n e by s a y i n g t h n t t h e q u i c k r e s p o n s e t o d e c l i n e is
no time i n i t .
action.
p r e v i o u s l y a c q u i r e d c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l of r e s o u r c e s .
t h e c l a s s ' r e s p o n s e depends on i t s p r i o r m o b i l i z a t i o n .
The argument
o f r e r e d h e r e nnswers t h e f i r s t l i n e by s a y i n g t h n t t h e e f f e c t of changing
t h r e a t s e x i s t s , b u t i s n o t immediate becnuse t h e speed and i n t e n s i t y o f
each w i t h i t s own l o g i c .
The m o b i l i z a t i o n model i s e s s e n t i a l l y q u a n t i t a t i v e .
I t d e a l s with
amounts of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , r e s o u r c e s and c o l l e c t i v e gooda r n t h e r than
with t h e i r q u a l i t i e s .
Unless we c a n f i n d some way of e s t e b l i s h i n g t h e
q u a n t i t a t i v e e q u i v a l e n c e s among d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n s .
resources
and c o l l e c t i v e goods, f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e model w i l l o n l y a p p l y t o
the simplest situations.
With t h e d i s c u s s i o n of r e p r e s s i o n and f n c i 1 l . t ~ -
t i o n , we wandered i n t o t h e comparison of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of c o n t e n d e r nnd
d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
But by end l a r g e we n o t i c e d q u a l i -
CHAPTER 5:
CHANGING FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
t a t i v e v a r i a t i o n s w i t h o u t b u i l d i n g them i n t o t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model.
We f a c e a n i r r p o r t a n t c h o i c e .
1Je can c o n t i n u e t h e step-by-step
e x p l o r a t i o n snd e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n and p o l i t y models.
Or
we c a n jump headlong i n t o t h e world of time and q u a l i t a t i v e v a r i a t i o n .
I hope many of my r e a d e r s w i l l f o l l o w t h e f i r s t c o u r s e : r e v i s i n g t h e mo-
b i l i z a t i o n and p o l i t y models t o d e a l e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h time, q u a l i t y and
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n , then s c r u t i n i z i n g t h e e v i d e n c e t o s e e i f t h e
models work r i g h t .
The Forms of C o n t e n t i o n
Real p e o p l e do n o t g e t t o g e t h e r and Act C o l l e c t i v e l y .
They meet t o
p e t i t i o n P a r l i a m e n t , o r g a n i z e t e l e p h o n e champaigns, demogstrate o u t s i d e
of c i t y h a l l , a t t a c k powerlooms, go on s t r i k e .
The a b s t r a c t mobilization
model we have been u s i n g h a s many v i r t u e s , b u t i t t e n d s t o o b s c u r e two
fundamental f a c t s .
F i r s t , collective action generally involves inter-
a c t i o n w i t h s p e c i f i c o t h e r groups, i n c l u d i n g governments.
Collective
I p l a n t o keep st t h a t work myself. b u t e l s e w h e r e .
The n e x t t h r e e c h a p t e r s w i l l f o l l o w t h e second c o u r s e .
They w i l l make
l o o s e a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e models t o major h i s t o r i c a l problems i n t h e
s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Chapter f i v e t r e a t s changes i n t h e p r e v a l e n t
forms of c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which o c c u r r e d i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s
a s l a r g e - s c a l e i n d u s t r y developed, c i t i e s grew, powerful n a t i o n a l s t a t e s
formed, and c a p i t a l i s m expanded.
Chapter s i x d e a l s w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e .
c u s s e s r e b e l l i o n and r e v o l u t i o n .
Chapter seven d i s -
Then, s t t h e end, we t a k e one more l o o k
a t t h e g e n e r a l l o g i c of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
.
a c t i o n r a r e l y c o n s i s t s of s o l i t a r y performances.
P e o p l e do n o t o r d i n a r i l y
a c t t o i n f l u e n c e a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e s such a s p o l i t i e s and mnrkets; they
t r y t o g e t p a r t i c u l a r o t h e r p e o p l e . t o do p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s .
A s a consc-
quence, e x p l a n a t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which C o n c e n t r a t e on t h e cnpnc i t i e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s of one p a r t i c i p a n t a t o time
-- o r
t h e average
c a p a c i t i e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l l c s v e us d i s o p p o i n t c d .
Second, c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n u s u a l l y t a k e s well-defined
f a m i l i a r t o the.participants.
forms e l r e n d y
i n t h e some s e n s e t h a t most of an e r a ' s
a r t t a k e s on of e s m a l l number of e a t o b l i s h $ d forms.
Because o f t h a t ,
n e i t h e r t h e s e a r c h f o r u n i v e r s a l forms (such a s t h o s e
nometimes proposed
f o r crowds o r r e v o l u t i o n s ) n o r t h e assumption of on i n f i n i t y of means t o
group ends w i l l t a k e us v e r y f a r .
Because o f t h a t , t h e s t u d y of t h e con-
c r e t e forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n immediately draws u s i n t o t h i n k i n g a b o u t
\
t h e c u l t u r a l s e t t i n g s i n which more forms a p p e a r .
Much of tlie p l e a s u r e
and a d v e n t u r e i n t h e h i s t o r i c a l s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n comes from t h e
r i c h complexity of t h e m a t e r i a l : having t o l e a r n how and why t h e P a r i s i a n s
of 1793 paraded s e v e r e d hends on p i k e s . how and why t h e young p e o p l e of
Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a occupied a m a k e s h i f t p a r k i n 1.969.
P u t t i n g t h e two themes t o g e t h e r opens t h e way t o a f i r s t rough
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t r e s s e s
c h a r i v a r i were r e v e r s e d and t h e c o u p l e were accompanied by n n o i s y
t h e n a t u r e of t h e i n t c r o c t i o n between o t h e r groups and t h e group whose
crowd t o t h e i r wedding bed, t h e r i t u a l send-off
a c t i o n we a r e c l a s s i f y i n g .
b e r s by t h e p e e r group.
More p r e c i s e l y , i t depends on t h e c l a i m s t h e
of i t s former mem-
The m a r r i a g e f e a a t . end t h e Abbcy's p a r t l c i -
c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s a r e a s s e r t i n g i n t h e i r action: competitive claims,
p o t i o n i n i t , symbolized t h e c e n t r a l purpose of t h e y o u t l ~group,
--
which was t o p r o v i d e o prolonged r i t e o f p a s s a g e from r o t ~ g h l yt h e
r e a c t i v e claims o r p r o a c t i v e claims.
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n l e a v e s o u t pur-
s u i t of common ends which i n v o l v e no c l a i m s on o t h e r groups: p u r e r e c r e a t i o n , contemplation, escape.
c l a i m s e x p r e s s a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t among t h e p a r t i e s .
I have worked
o u t t h e c a t e g o r i e s i n s t u d y i n g t h e e v o l u t i o n of forms of c o n f l i c t i n
w e s t e r n Europe, and w i l l i l l u s t r a t e them from European e x p e r i e n c e .
Competitive a c t i o n s l a y c l a i m t o r e s o u r c e s a l s o claimed by o t h e r
groups which t h e a c t o r d e f i n e s a s r i v a l s , c o m p e t i t o r s , o r a t l e a s t a s
p n r t i c i p n n t s i n t h e same c o n t e s t .
"shivaree"
--
f o r a n example.
o n s e t of puberty t o t h e p o i n t of m a r r i a g e .
I n f a c t . i t a p p l i e s most e a s i l y where the'
Take t h e c h a r i v a r i
--
t h e American
Only r e c e n t l y have European h i s t o r i a n s be-
gun t o uncover t h e l a r g e b a s e of c o m p e t i t i o n and c o n t r o l on which t h i s
o s t e n s i b l y f r i v o l o u n custom r e s t e d .
John G i l l i s (1974: 30-31)
describes
The Englisli o f t e n c a l l e d t h e i r s i m i l a r custom Rough Music.
Host of t h e .
time, i t was a c o n t a i n e d b u t raucous a f f a i r , accompanied by t h e tllumping
of pans and blowing of horns.
The c h a r i v a r i became a " d i s o r d e r " t o t h e
e y e s (and, no d o u b t , t h e e a r s ) of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s when i t p e r s i s t e d more
than a n i g h t o r two, o r when dozens of young p e o p l e j o i n e d t h e fun.
The p r e c i s e form of t h e c h a r i v n r i d i f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l y from one
r e g i o n o f Europe t o a n o t h e r .
Within G r e a t B r i t a i n . E.P. Thompson d i s t t n -
g u i s h e s f o u r mnin v a r i a n t s :
a ) c e f f y l p r e n (Welsh f o r "wooden horse").
which i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
t h e Rebecca R i o t a i n many p a r t s of I,lales;
one s t a n d a r d v e r s i o n :
I n a t y p i c a l r u r a l c h a r i v a r i , s r e c e n t l y remarried widower might
f i n d himself awakened by t h e clamor of t h e crowd, on e f f i g y of
b) "Riding t h e stang".
commonly p m c t i c e d i n t h e S c o t t i s h Lowlands
and t h e n o r t h of England;
h i s dead w i f e t h r u s t up t o h i s window and a l i k e n e s s of h i m s e l f ,
C ) t h e Skimmington o r Skimmety parade, which s t i l l s u r v i v e d i n t h e
placed backwarddon an a s s , drawn through t h e s t r e e t s f o r h i s
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n t h e West, a s w e l l a s i n some r e g i o n s of t h e
neighbors t o see.
Paying o f a " c o n t r i b u t i o n "
t o t h e Lord of Mis-
South; and f i n a l l y
r u l e might q u i e t h i s y o u t h f u l t o r m e n t o r s , b u t by t h a t time t h e
v o i c e s of v i l l a g e c o n s c i e n c e had made t h e i r p o i n t .
Second m a r r i a g e s
i n v a r i a b l y drew t h e g r e a t e s t wrath and. by c o n t r a s t , endogamous
m a r r i a g e s of young people of roughly t h e same a g e were t h e o c c a s i o n
of t h e youth g r o u p ' s r e j o i c i n g .
I n t h a t c a s e , t h e [ u n c t i o n s of
d ) Rough Music i t s e l f , w i t h o u t a parade, b u t i n t h e c o u r s e of which
p e o p l e o f t e n burned e f f i g i e s o f t h e v i c t i m s ; a widespread custom.
b u t found e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e I t i d l a n d s and t h e South (Thompson 1972:
287-288).
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s h l v a r c e , v a r i a n t s of t h e s e o t h e r forms of a c t i o n r e m i n embedded i n American f o l k l o r e , even i f they have come unstuck from
r e v o l r ~ t i o n a r ymovements o r g r e a t r e b e l l i o n s .
of dead and i n j u r e d .
Some f e a t u r e s of c o l l e c t i v e c o m p e t i t i o n such a s t h e r i t u a l i z e d mockery,
burning e f f i g i e s , and s o on.
V i l l a g e sue-groups were t h e t y p i c a l i n i t i a t o r s of c h a r i v a r i n .
The
o r g n n i z a t i o n and f u n c t i o n s oE age-groups v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y from one
Varagnnc 1947).
(For r e g i o n a l p a t t e r n s i n France, e . g . ,
see
They o f t e n had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Lenten b o n f i r e s and
other celebrations.
They sometimes c o n t r o l l e d t h e p a i r i n g up of young
c o u p l e s f o r bundling and c o u r t i n g .
V i l l a g e age-groups a l s o f o u g h t tlie
youth of n e i g h b o r i n g v i l l a g e s , sometimes t o tlie d e a t h .
They o f t e n a s -
sembled a s a b l o c a t p u b l i c ceremonies, sometimes mounting e l e a b o r a t e
c h a r a d e s t o mock and warn t h o s e who had t r a n s g r e s s e d t h e i r r u l e s .
All
t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s afctrmed t h e i r p r i o r i t y o v e r t h e e l i g i h l e females and
o v e r t h e r i t u a l s of c o u r t s h i p w i t h i n t h e i r own v i l l a g e s .
Within t h e i r
l i m i t e d s p h e r e , t h e activities were deadly s e r i o u s .
The c h a r i v a r i , t h e v i l l a g e f i g h t and t h e youth group's mocking c e r e mony
had many k i n .
There were b r a w l s between s t u d e n t groups, between
d l f f e r e n t detachments of s o l d i e r s , between s o l d i e r s and c i v i l i a n s , between
e t l ~ n i cand r e l i g i o u s groups.
There were t h e more h i g h l y r o u t i n i z e d s t r u g -
g l e s of ~ i v a lgroups of a r t i s a n s t o d i s h o n o r each o t h e r ' s symbols, impede
each o t h e r ' s ceremonies and c h a l l e n g e each o t h e r ' s p r i o r i t y i n p r o c e s s i o n s
and o t h e r p u b l i c a s s e m b l i e s .
I n times of c r i s i s , they blended i n t o mnjor c o n f l i c t s .
They were i m p o r t a n t forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
d a i l y p r a c t i c e : r i d i n g someone o u t of town on a r a i l , p a r a d i n g and
p a r t of Europe t o a n o t h e r .
Yet they l e f t t h e i r t o l l
Somehow t h e s e forms of a c t i o n seem t r i v i a l
and q u a i n t t o t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y people.
Me of t h i s c e n t u r y have s e e n
g l a n t wars and mass murder, and have come t o t h i n k of " s e r i o u s " p o l i t i c s
on having a nadonnl o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l scope.
indeed, usually small, sllort-lived,
The e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n were.
localized.
They r a r e l y l i n k e d w i t h
c a r r i e d o v e r i n t o t h e second major c a t e g o r y :
reactive c o l l e c t i v e actions.
(We c a n a l s o c a l l them c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n s . )
They c o n s i s t of group e f f o r t s
t o r e a s s e r t e s t a b l i s h e d c l a i m s when someone e l s e c h a l l e n g e s o r v i o l a t e s
them.
Speaking of p e a s a n t l a n d i n v a s i o n s i n contemporary Peru. E.J.
Hobsbawm p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e y t a k e t h r e e forms:
s q r ~ a L t i n gon l a n d t o
which no one ( o r o n l y t h e g o ~ e r n m e n t ) h a s a c l e a r t i t l e , e x p r o p r i n t i n g land
t o which t h e i n v a d e r s have n o t p r e v i o u s l y enjoyed a c l a i m and t o which
someone e l s e h a s , r e p o s s e s s i n g l a n d from which t h e i n v a d e r s have thems e l v e s been e x p r o p r i a t e d (Hobsbawm 1974: 120-121).
The t h i r d v a r i a n t i s t h e c l e a r r e a c t i v e c a s e : t h e d i s p o s s e s s e d r e a c t .
Thar s o r t of land re-occupation c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e f i r s t s t a g e s of Zopato's
r e b c l l i o n d u r i n g t h e Mexican Revolution, r e c u r r e d through much of s o u t h e r n
I t a l y d u r i n g t h e massive n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n c e n t r a t i o n of land i n bourg e o i s and n o b l e hands, and marked t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of b o u r g e o i s landowners h i p wherever i t developed i n tlie p r e s e n c e of s o l i d a r y p e a s a n t communlLies.
I n a s t a n d a r d Europeanscenario, a ~ r o u pof v i l l a g e r s who had long p a s t u r e d
t h e i r c a t t l e , g a t h e r e d firewood and gleaned i n common f i e l d s . found a
l a n d l o r d o r a l o c a l o f f i c i a l ( o r , more l i k e l y , t h e two i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n )
f e n c i n g tlie f i e l d s by newly-acquired o r newly-ssscrted
The v i l l a g e r s commonly warned a g a i n s t tile f e n c i n g .
heeded, they a t t a c k e d t h e f e n c e s and t h e f e n c e r s .
r i g h t of p r o p e r t y .
I f t h e warning Went unThey a c t e d i n t h e name o f
r i g h t s they s t i l l considered v a l i d .
The o v e r l a p w i t h c o l l e c t i v e c o m p e t i t i o n appeared c l e a r l y when costumed
a v e n g e r s t o r e down t h e f e n c e s o r occupied t h e f i e l d s , a s i n t h e Demoiselles
movement of t h e 1830's i n t h e Pyrenees ( s e e Merriman 1975).
l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n s , t h e o v e r l a p was a t l e a s t a s n o t a b l e .
In o t h e r col-
f o r i n both
c a n e s t h e a c t o r s commonly assumed. more o r l e s s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y ,
the
r o l e of t h e a u L h o r i t i e s who were b e i n g d e r e l i c t i n t h e i r d u t y , and t h e
groups which r e a c t e d were o f t e n t h e same l o c a l s o l i d a r i t i e s :
t h e youth
groups, g i l d s , and s o on.
Proactive
-
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s a s s e r t group clntms which have n o t
p r e v i o u s l y been e x e r c i s e d .
proaction.)
(We may a l s o c a l l them i n s t a n c e s of c o l l e c t i v e
The s t r i k e f o r h i g h e r wages o r b e t t e r working c o n d i t i o n s pro-
v i d e s an everyday i l l u s t r a t i o n .
D e l i b c r a t e work s t o p p a e e s t o ~ n l na
p o i n t have probably e x i s t e d s i n c e people f i r s t worked f o r one a n o t l ~ e r .
T l ~ cb n s i c o u t l i n e of t h e l a n d o c c u p a t i o n a p p l i e d t o t h e b u l k o f
E u r ~ p e a nfood r i o t s , machine-breaking,
ngninst military conscription:
t a x r e b e l l i o n s and l o c a l a c t i o n s
a l l moved d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t someone who
had u n j u s t l y d e p r i v e d , o r t r i e d t o d e p r i v e , a l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n of a prec i o u s resource.
a c t i v e and p r o a c t i v e forma of c o l l e c t i v e a c t l o n s .
Yves-Marie 8erc6. expanding on h i s comprehensive a n a l y s i s
N a t a l i e Davjs (1975: 1-16) d e s c r i b e s well-organized s t r i k e s i n s l x i e e n t t ~
c e n t u r y Lyons.
But t h e s t r i k e o n l y became a common way of doing p u b l i c
business i n t h e nineteenth-century.
A s wage-work i n o r g a n l z s t t o n s
l a r g e r than households expanded, t h e number and s c a l e of s t r i k c s expondcd.
I n most w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , f i f t y t o a hundred y e a r s went by i n w l ~ i c h
--
of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e b e l l i o n of t h e Croquants i n s o u t h w e s t e r n
s t r i k e s were i n c r e a s i n g l y f r e q u e n t b u t remained i l l e g a l
Frnnce, h a s proposed t h a t t h e k e r n e l of European p e a s a n t r e b e l l i o n s b e f o r e
s e c u t e d , sometimes broken up by armed f o r c e , sometimes t o l e r a t e d , alwnys
t h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y was t h e r e s i s t a n c e of c l o s e d , s o l i d o r y p e a s a n t
disapproved.
communities t o o u t s i d e a t t e m p t s t o i n f r i n g e upon t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s
a l l i e s . most w e s t e r n governments l e g a l i z e d t h e s t r i k e between 1860 nnd 1900.
and r o u t i n e s .
S i n c e t h e n , s t a t e s t h a t have ~ t e p p e dup r e p r e s s i o n ( s t a t e s o f emergency,
I n t h e c a s e of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y France, h e d i s t i n g u i s h e n
f o u r major o c c a s i o n s f o r r e h e l l i o n s :
high food p r i c e s , b i l l e t i n g of
sometimes pro-
Under p r e s s u r e from o r g a n i z e d workers and t h e i r p a r l i n m c n t a r y
wartimes governments. F a s c i s t regimes) have normnlly r e s c i n d e d t h e r i g h t
t r o o p s . t a x c o l l e c t i o n and t h e i m p o s i t i o n of e x c i s e t a x e s by t a x f a r m e r s .
t o s t r i k e , and a l l regimes have n e g o t i a t e d c o n t i n u a l l y wiLh workers nnd
Tn a l l theoe c a s e s , s a y s Berc'e, "Revolt is t h e s t r a t e g y OF t h e l i t t l e
employers o v e r who had t h e r i g h t t o s t r i k e . and how.
people, a n extraordinary organization f o r defense a g a i n s t f i s c a l aggression"
s t r i k e h a s been widely a v a i l a b l e a s a means of a c t i o n s i n c e t h e beginning
(Berci? 1974: 11, 680-681).
of t h e t w e n t l e t h c e n t u r y .
A s community s o l i d n r i t y d e c l i n e d , a c c o r d i n g t o 8 e r c 6 , t h e c o n c e r t e d
p e a s a n t r e b e l l i o n disnppenred.
Only much l a t e r d i d f a r m e r s and a g r i c u l t u r a l
But
ill
general the
Government s a n c t i o n of t h e s t r i k e shows up i n s t r i k e s t a t i s t i c s ; they
d a t e from t h e 18808.or 1890s i n most western c o u n t r i e s .
T h e i r sppenronce
workers r e a p p e a r i n a c t i o n ; now they were o r g a n i z e d around forward-looking
r e f l e c t s t h e working o u t o f a s t a n d a r d p u b l i c d e f i n i t i o n of t h e word
s p e c l a l - i n t e r e s t groups.
"strike".
A l t l ~ o u g h ( a s 8 e r c 6 himself concedes) t h e scheme
and t h e formation o f a bureaucracy t o monitor nnd r e g u l a t e t h e
homogenizes unduly t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s and motivcs i n t h e o l d e r forms of con-
s t r i k e ' s use.
f l i c t , i t c a p t u r e s an e n s e n t i n l c o n t r a s t .
l o s t much of i t s e x p r e s s i v e f u n c t i o n . its f e s t i v a l a i r , i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y
I t is t h e c o n t r a s t between re-
I n France, M i c l ~ e l l eP e r r o t (1974) a r g u e s t h a t 1l1e s t r i k e
potential, as the bureaucratization of the 1890s set in.
as competitive, reactive or proactive depends on the claims being nsserted.
By way of corn
pensation, it became a more widely accessible, less risky way of making
not on the form of the action.
demands.
pations described by Hobabawm have a far more proactive flavor than the
re-occupations of lost land.
Several other forms of collective proaction came into their own
during the nineteenth century.
threatened job rights.
The demonstration, the sponsored public
demands, and are peculiarly suitable to the effort to m k e gains rother
The military pronunciamento is of
than to forestall losses.
On the other hand, the general strike, the sit-in, and
righta against attack, and make little sense as means of stating new claims.
Proactive forms of collective action have proliferated
On the average, the demonstration and the strike are proactive, the food
over the last two centtrries.
This labeling of forms has two catches.
riot and tax rebellion reactive.
First, although we are
In Europe of the last few hundred years, tlle three forms of col-
dealing with situations in which contenders interact. w e are not classifying the interactions themselves.
In general, the tax rebellion, tlle food riots
and similar events have cascaded when ordinary people were defending their
the farmers' dumping of surplus crops in protest are essentially twentiethcentury creations.
In general, the demonstro-
risen in periods and places in which ordinary people were articulating new
tee also generalized during the nineteenth century, although the ties to
the same vintage.
Those strikes were reactive.
tion and the strike have been privileged vehicles for new claims, have
The seizure of premises by an insurrectionary c o m i t -
electoral politics are more distant.
Workers have often struck in defense of
Yet the general correletion persists.
meeting and the petition drive began to thrive with the arrival of mass
electoral politics.
The squatting and expropriating land occu-
lective action have waxed and waned in sequence.
On the whole, if one group is engaging
teenth centuries, competitive actions seem to have predominated.
in collective proaction, then at least one of its partners is engaging
in collective reaction: a group of dissident colonels attempts a coup, the
junta defends itself against the coup.
Landlords band together to raise
rents, peasants band together to resist the raising of rents.
Only the
In the fifteenth and six-
I
From the
seventeenth into the nineteenth century, the reactive forms became much
more widespread, while the competitive forms remained steady or perhaps
declined.
With the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, collective pro-
collective competition is usually symmetrical: when one party jockeys for
action began to predominate, the reactive forms dwindled, while new forms
a visible position in a public ceremony, so does another.
of competition came into existence.
Second catch.
Strictly speaking, a public meeting or a general
strike could fit any of the three types: competitive. reactive or proactive.
Just as the charivari could mock a wrongdoer or celebrate a right-
doer. people can demonstrate for something, against something, or both for
one thing and against another thing at the.same time.
The classification
If I read the record nright, seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century Europeans took collective oction in defense of threatened rights much more than their predecessors had, while
twentieth-century Europeans became exceptionally prone to act in support
of claims they had not previously exercised.
The reasons for the successive changes are, I think. twofold:
'
5-10
1) during the period from 1600 to 1850, more so than before and after, the
agents of international markets and of national states were pressing their
i
Figure 5-1: Hypothetical Effects of Lowered Costs of Collective Action
on a Zealot.
II
new (and proactive) claims on resources which had up to then been under the
Mobilization
control of innumerable households, comunities, brotherhoods and other
I
small-scale organizations. The small-scale organizations reacted repeatedly,
fighting against taxation, conscription, the consolidation of landed property and numerous other threats to their organizational well-being.
Even-
tually the big structures won, the battle died darn, the reactive forms diminished.
2) Increasingly, the pools of resources necessary to group sur-
vival came under the control of large organizations, especially governments,
which only redistributed them under the pressure of new claims.
Collective
Goods
There may be a third factor: 3) a general decline in the costa of
Produced
mobilization and co1,lective action during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuriea.
Such a decline might have resulted from the massing of popu-
lation in large settlements and big organizations, from the elaboration of
comunicntiona and from the expansion of elections as a way of doing public
business. This is roughly the same set of changes which Karl Deutsch calls
Social Mobilization, end which Amitsi Etzioni regards as making possible
the self-directed Active Society.
If the analysis of the previous chapter
is correct, however, we could only expect such changes to elevate the level
of collective action if the relationship between contenders and their interests altered.
,
For a fixed set of interests and a given level of oppor-
tunity/threat, a general decline in the costs of mobilization and collective
action could well depress the level of colJ.ective action.
Figure 5-1 shows liar that could happen.
lem for a zealot
--
(It illustrates the prob-
a contender which aims at a narrow range of collective
goods and is prepared to take what others would regard as a loss in order
Resources Expended
t o a c h i e v e t h o s e goods
m i l l contenders.
--
b u t a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o m i s e r s and run-of-the-
p o l i t i c a l end, t h e p a r t y a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e s o c i a l i s t o r g a n i z a -
O p p o r t u n i s t s p r e s e n t , a s we s h a l l s e e , a n o t h e r problem.)
t i o n , whose s o l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s found p r e c i s e l y i n i t s p n t i e n t
Under high c o s t s ( c u r v e A f o r expected r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ) .
b u t s y s t e m a t i c p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e orgnniza-
o u r c o n t e n d e r would b e u n a b l e t o a t t a i n i t s i n t e r e s t , r e g a r d l e s s of i t s
t i o n of t h e s t a t e i n i t s e x i s t i n g form.
m_obilizstion l e v e l o r t h e c u r r e n t c o n s t e l l a t i o n of o p p o r t u n i t i e s ; a l l we
g a n i z e s t h e framework o f t h e s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n .
could r e a s o n a b l y a n t i c i p a t e i n t h a t c a s e would be d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n t o
i t c o n t i n u a l l y e n d e s v o r s t o s t r e n g t h e n i t s p o s i t i o n s , t o extend
f o r e s t a l l t h r e a t s : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of amount A on t h e resources-expen-
i t s b u r e a u c r a t i c mechanism, t o s t o r e up i t s e n e r g i e s and i t s
ded a x i s .
Under medium c o s t s ( c u r v e B),
t h e c o n t e n d e r can a c h i e v e i t s
The I r o n Law of O l i g a r c h y
(Being a z e a l o t ,
--
t h s t e v e r y s u c c e s s f u l s t r u g g l e ends w i t h t h e
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a governing e l i t e
t h e c o n t e n d e r h a s no i n t e r e s t i n t h e h i g h e r r e t u r n s o b t a i n a b l e by pushing
a b i t beyond B2
--
but not too f a r
--
For t h l s r e a s o n
f u n d s (Michels 1949: 3 8 4 - 3 8 5 ) .
e n t i r e i n t e r e s t i n new c o l l e c t i v e goods and f o r e s t a l l t h r e a t s a t t h e same
time by p l a c i n g i t s a c t i o n i n t h e r a n g e from B1 t o B2.
Tlie s u b v e r s i v e p n r t y or-
--
t h u s a p p l i e s , n c c o r d i n g t o Michela,
t o democratic r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s a s well a s t o a l l o t h e r s .
on t h e resources-expended
scale.)
T r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e code we have been u s i n g , t h e I r o n Lnw t a k e s two
But n o t e what happens i f c o s t s become v e r y low: c u r v e C a p p l i e s .
In t h i s
forms.
F i r s t , t h e p r o c e s s of m o b l l i z s t i o n i n i t s e l f t r a n s f o r m s t h e g r o u p ' s
c a s e , t h e p r e s e n t l e v e l s of o p p o r t u n i t y and m o b i l i z a t i o n p e r m i t o u r cond e f i n e d i n t e r e s t s ; t h o s e who l e a d t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n a c q u i r e t h e
t e n d e r a v e r y high r e t u r n indeed.
Because t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s d e f i n e d i n t e r e s t
d e s i r e and t h e means t o m a i n t a i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e y have b u i l t and t o
remains t h e same, however, i t can a c h i e v e t h e name o b j e c t i v e s w i t h a
i d e n t i f y t h e i r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s w i t h t h o s e of t h e group a s a whole.
s m a l l e r amount of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t h a n when c o s t s a r e medium.
Now t h e
Second, t h e lowering of c o s t s i n c r e a s e s t h e gap between t h e g r o u p ' s mo-
i d e a l r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r u n s from C1 t o C2.
Lowering c o s t s lowers
b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l and t h e r e s o u r c e s i t must expend t o a c h i e v e i t s ends.
t h e expected l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
That produces a s u r p l u s .
Tlie a c c r e t i o n of a s u r p l u a might l o g i c a l l y lend
To be s u r e , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n t e n d e r s and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s
t o demobilization.
may a l t e r i n some r e g u l a r f a s h i o n a s c o s t s d e c l i n e .
But a c c o r d i n g t o Mlchels i t encourages t h e o l i g n r c l i s
Tlie most obvious a l t o d i v e r t t h e a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s t o ends which t h e y themselves d e f i n e an
t e r n a t i v e i s t h e one proposed long ago by Robert Michels.
"The revolu-
!
desirable.
I n t h e extreme c a s e , t h e new i n t e r e s t s which emerge do n o t
t i o n a r y p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , " s a i d Micliels.
even i n c l u d e t h e i n t e r e s t s which o r i g i n a l l y brought t h e c o n t e n d e r i n t o ex-
i s a s t a t e w i t h i n a s t a t e , p u r s u i n g t h e avowed aim of d e s t r o y i n g
istence.
the existing s t a t e i n order t o s u b s t i t u t e for i t a s o c i a l order
a c t f o r a wide v a r i e t y of c o l l e c t i v e goods, prepared t o s t r i k e f o r t h e
of a fundamentally d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r .
To a t t a i n t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y
I n t h e extreme c a s e , a z e a l o t becomes a n o p p o r t u n i s t , ready t o
b e s t r e t u r n a v a i l a b l e , b u t u n w i l l f n g t o a c t i n t h e f a c e of a p r o b a b l e
loss.
The " s o c i a l movement o r g a n i z a t i o n s " i n contemporary America analyzed
t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Canadians, Japanese. Greeks. B r a z i l i a n s and many o t h e r s . '
by Zald and ElcCarthy come c l o s e t o t h i s c a r i c a t u r e .
We must a l s o weigh something e l s e a g a i n s t t h e presumed c o s t - c u t t i n g
The r e p e r t o i r e a l s o i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l v n r j e t i e s of s t r i k e s , p e t i t i o n i n g .
e f f e c t s of communications improvements, t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of f r e e e l e c t i o n s ,
t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r e s s u r e groups, and s few o t h e r ways of a r t i c u l a t i n g
and t h e l i k e :
g r i e v a n c e s and demands.
t h e i n c r e a s e d r e p r e s s i v e a c t i v i t y and r e p r e s s i v e e f f i c i e n c y
of governments and o t l ~ e rl a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
But t h e c o s t s imposed by o t h e r s a r e up.
I n t r i n s i c c o s t s a r e down.
I guess t h a t t h e i n t r i n s i c c o s t s
hove d e c l i n e d more t h a n t h e Imposed c o s t s have r i s e n .
In the present
Pew Americans, on t h e o t h e r hand, know how t o o r g a n i z e t h e h i j a c k i n g
of a n a i r p l a n e , d e s p i t e t h e p u b l i c i t y h t j a c k i n g s have r e c e i v e d t n r e c e n t
y e a r s ; even fewer would s e r f o u s l y c o n s i d e r h i j a c k i n g a s a way of accomplishing
s t a t e of our knowledge, however, t h a t judgment i s b o t h r i s k y and u n v e r i f i a b l e .
their collective objectives.
R e p e r t o i r e s of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n
a few groups anywhere.
At any p o i n t i n t i m e , t h e r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e
t o a population is s u r p r i s i n g l y limited.
S u r p r i s i n g l y , g i v e n t h e innumerable
ways i n which people c o u l d , i n p r i n c i p l e , deploy t h e i r r e s o u r c e s i n p u r s u i t
of common ends.
S u r p r i s i n g l y , g i v e n t h e many ways r e a l groups have pursued
Most t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Americans, f o r example, know how t o demonstrate.
Uachine-breaking,
dropped o u t of t h e r e p e r t o i r e .
once s f r e q u e n t o c c u r r e n c e , hnn
So have tlie c l ~ s r i v a r iand t h e s e r e n a d e .
So
h a s t h e r e g u l a r i n t e r - v i l l a g e f i g h t ; o n l y f o o t b a l l remains t o remind u s of
t h a t o l d form of b l o o d l e t t i n g .
Almost no one anywhere i s now f a m i l i a r w i t h a Eorm of a c t i o n which
was once canmon
t h e i r own common ends st one time o r a n o t h e r .
H i j a c k i n g b e l o n g s t o t h e r e p e r t o i r e of o n l y
ir?
Europe:
t h e r e b e l l i o n i n which an e x i s t i n g , f u n c t i o n i n g
group such a s a n army o r a conmnrnity a s s e m b l e s , c a s t s o f f i t s c o n s t i t u t e d
They know t h a t s group w i t h a c l a i m t o make assembles i n a p u b l i c p l a c e ,
a u t h o r i t i e s , commissions t h a t s u c c e s s o r (who knows f u l l w e l l t h a t once
i d e n t i f i e s i t s e l f and i t s demands o r c o m p l a i n t s i n a v i s i b l e way, o r i e n t s
t h e a c t i o n is completed he i s l i k e l y t o b e hanged, o r worse, f o r I l l s p a i n s )
i t s common a c t i o n t o t h e p e r s o n s , p r o p e r t i e s o r symbols of some o t h e r group
t o p r e s e n t a s e t of g r i e v a n c e s and demands t o s h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y , r c s j n t s
i t i s seeking t o influence.
w i t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n u n t i l t h o s e demands have been met o r u n t i l i t hns been
Within t h o s e g e n e r a l r u l e s , most Americans
know how t o c a r r y on s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t forms of d e m o n s t r s t i o n :
t h e massed
u t t e r l y d e s t r o y e d , t h e n r e t u r n s t o i t s p r e v i o u s s t a t e of submission t o t h e
mnrch, t h e assembly w i t h speechmaking, t h e temporary o c c u p a t i o n of premises.
constituted authorities.
Moreover, t h e r e a r e some s p e c i f i a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which most Americans
b u t unpaid Spanish a r m i e s i n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s toward t h e end of t h e s i x t e e n t h
would a c t u a l l y a p p l y t h e i r knowledge by j o i n i n g a r e a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n .
century:
Americans who have n o t l e a r n e d t h i s complicated s e t of a c t i o n s through
they would f o l l o w no one e l s e ' s o r d e r s u n t i l t h e i r demands f o r hack pay
p e r s o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n have n o n e t h e l e s s w i t n e s s e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s d i r e c t l y ,
and o t h e r b e n e f i t s were s a t i s f i e d .
read about them. watched them on t e l e v i s i o n .
even t o f i g h t h e r o i c a l l y . b u t under t h e i r own d i r e c t t o n .
Various forms of d e m o n s t r a t i o n
belong t o tlie r e p e r t o i r e of t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Americans
--
n o t t o mention
Remember t h e r e c u r r e n t r e v o l t s of t h e v i c t o r i o u s
they r e g u l a r l y e l e c t e d t h e i r own c h i e f , t h e e l e c t o ; they d e c l s r c d
They sometimes c o n t i n u e d t o f i g h t ,
p i l l a g e d when i t appeared t h e i r demands would n o t be met.
'Chey sometimes
They always
5-16
demanded amnesty f o r a l l a c t i o n s committed d u r i n g t h e r e b e l l i o n
u s u a l l y won.
--
and t h e y
t o what d e g r e e d o e s t h e group p r e f e r t h e means i t h a s used b e f o r e o v e r
Armies m a t t e r e d t o t h e Spanish k i n g ( P a r k e r 1973).
t h o s e which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y a v a i l a h l e f o r t h e same purpose?
Or r e c a l l t h e P i l g r i m a g e of Grace, t h e g r e a t Y o r k s h i r e r i s i n g of 1536
d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n t o answer i n x t h e r e a l world.
a g a i n s t Henry V I I I ' s d i s p o s s e s s i o n of t h e m o n a s t e r i e s and a g a i n s t o t h e r
measures d e s i g n e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e r o y a l revenues.
That i s a
I t is hard t o knov two
t h i n g s : 1 ) what o t h e r forms of a c t i o n a r e r e a l l y " a v a l l a b l e " t o a group,
The "commons" r o s e by
2) t h e r e l a t i v e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y of t h e means t h e group
t e n s of thousands, took gentlemen f o r t h e i r c a p t a i n s and London lawyer
a c t u a l l y u s e s and t h e a l t e r n a t i v e meana which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y n v a i l n h l e .
Robert Aske n s t h e i r c h i e f c a p t a i n .
However, two a o r t a of n a t u r a l e x p e r i m e n t s occur o f t e n enough t o p r o v i d e
t h e North.
They e v e n t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d much of
But t h e Duke of N o r f o l k ' s vague, l y i n g promises t o t a k e t h e i r
c a s e t o t h e King d i s p e r s e d them.
i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t .
By J u l y of 1537 Robert Aske had d i e d on
sometimes u s e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
a s c a f f o l d a t t h e c a s t l e of York, and two hundred o t h e r r e b e l s had p e r i s h e d
a t t h e e x e c u t i o n e r ' s hand (Dodds and Dodds 1915).
conveys s s e n s e of t h a t o l d form of a c t i o n .
exclusively i n a military context.
I n tlie 1950s.
f o r example, we f i n d Swedish t r a n s p o r t workers t a k i n g t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s t o
The word "mutiny" s t i l l
government a g e n c i e s w h i l e t h e i r B r i t i s h c o u n t e r p a r t s g o o u t on s t r i k e .
But now we u s e t h e term almost
Second, t h e meana of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a l t e r and s p r e a d from one group t o
We f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t i t was once
another.
an e s t a b l i s h e d , i f r i s k y , p a t h o u t of an i n t o l e r a b l e s i t u a t i o n .
H i j a c k i n g , mutiny, machine-breaking,
F i r s t , s i m i l a r groups i n s i m i l a r s e t t i n g s
For i n s t a n c e , i n t h e I t a l y of 1919 sit-down s t r i k e s were r a t h e r
a novelty.
charivaris, v i l l a g e fights, tax
But by August, 1920 h a l f a m i l l i o n workers were occupying
their factories.
Given such e v e n t s , we c a n g a u g e t h e importance of r e p e r -
r e b e l l i o n s , food r i o t s , c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - i m m o l a t i o n , l y n c h i n g , v e n d e t t a
t o i r e s by comparing t h e s u c c e s s i v e c h o i c e s of s i m i l a r groups and by ob-
have a l l belonged t o t h e s t a n d a r d c o l l e c t i v e - s c t i o n r e p e r t o i r e of aome
s e r v i n g i n n o v a t i o n and d i f f u s i o n i n t h e means o f a c t i o n .
group a t aome time.
I n one s e t t i n g o r a n o t h e r , p e o p l e have known r o u t i n e l y
how t o i n i t i a t e e v e r y one of them.
F i g u r e 5-2 p r e s e n t s f o u r p o s s i b l e r e s u l t s of s u c h comparisons.
People have a t sometime recognized
e a c h c a s e , we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a group which is p r e p a r i n g t o a c t c o l l e c -
e v e r y one of them a s a l e g i t i m a t e , f e a s i b l e way of a c t i n g on an u n s a t i s f i e d
grievance o r aapirntion.
t i v e l y i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i m i l a r t o o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t h a s fnced be-
Most of t h e s e forms of a c t i o n a r e t e c h n i c a l l y
f e a s i b l e i n contemporary America.
Yet they occur r a r e l y , o r n o t a t a l l .
More i m p o r t a n t , no s u b s t a n t i a l American group w i t h a p r e s s i n g g r i e v a n c e
fore.
i
We i d e n t i f y a l l t h e means which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y o r p r a c t i c a l l y
"available"
t o t h e group, and t h e n a r r a y them i n terms of t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y
t o t h e means t h e group h a s p r e v i o u s l y employed.
In the sheer-efficiency
model, s i m i l a r i t y t o f a m i l i a r means makes no d i f f e r e n c e ; t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n
o r a s p i r a t i o n c o n s i d e r s any of them t o b e a g e n u i n e a l t e r n a t i v e t o
d e m o n s t r a t i n g , s t r i k i n g , p e t i t i o n i n g o r forming a p r e s s u r e group.
In
They
d o not belong t o t h e contemporary American r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
To s p e c i f y t h e menning of r e p e r t o i r e , i t h e l p s t o a a k t h i n q u e s t t o n :
is t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e means t o t h e end.
That model i s extreme; i t
may, i n f a c t , be more e f f i c i e n t t o u s e f a m i l i a r means because f a m i l i a r i t y
i t s e l f l e a d s t o b e t t e r execution.
The a d v a n t a g e - o f - f a m i l i e c i t y
model
I
F i g u r e 5-2:
t a k e s t h a t l i k e l i h o o d i n t o a c c o u n t ; i t p o s t u l a t e s a smooth g r a d i e n t i n t h e
Four Models of Group Readiness t o Adopt New Meana of
C o l l e c t i v e Action.
p r o b a b i l i t y of a d o p t i o n from moat f a m i l i a r t o l e a s t f a m i l i a r .
The model im-
p l i e s t h a t f a m i l i a r i t y is simply one of s e v e r a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e
Sheer E f f i c i e n c y
Advantage of F a m i l i a r i t y
I
c h o i c e of a p a r t i c u l a r means from among a l l t h o s e which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y
available.
100
The t h i r d model d e s c r i b e a a f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e .
Tn t h i s
c a a e , t h e group h a s a heavy b i a s toward meana i t h a s p r e v i o u n l y used. b u t
is n o t c o m p l e t e l y c l o s e d t o i n n o v a t i o n .
Probability
Finolly, the rigid-repertoire
model d e s c r i b e a a group which chooses f a m i l i a r meana u n f a i l i n g l y .
of
Adoption
To t h e
e x t e n t t h a t t h i s model a p p l i e a . we would e x p e c t i n n o v a t i o n t o b e r a r e , and
of
t o occur through b r e a k s and c r i s e s .
Meona
I f t h e sheer-efficiency o r advantage-of-familiarity
i t i s m i s l e a d i n g t o speak of r e p e r t o i r e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
--
0,
Low
D i s s i m i l a r i t y from
E x i s t i n g Meana
Flexible Repertoire
model a p p l i e a ,
Only i n
t h e t h i r d and f o u r t h c a s e s i s t h e word a u s e f u l summary of t h e r e a l i t y .
High
Thus we have a n e m p i r i c a l t e a t f o r t h e u t i l i t y of t h e concept: how c l o s e
Rigid R e p e r t o i r e
t h e o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s comes t o one o r a n o t h e r of
t h e f o u r modela.
My own h y p o t h e s i s i s t h a t t h e f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e i a
t h e moat g e n e r a l c a a e f o r o r g a n i z e d groups.
The l e a s o r g a n i z e d t h e group.
t h e more l i k e l y t h a t t h e advantage-of-familiority model w i l l d e s c r i b e i t s
behavior.
We might r e a s o n a b l y suppose t h a t a c o n t e n d e r
member of t h e p o l i t y
--
--
especially a
which remains i n t h e same power p o s i t i o n f o r n
I
I
I
long time t e n d s t o move from a f l e x i b l e t o a r i g i d r e p e r t o i r e .
zation s e t s i n .
Routini-
I t is h a r d , on t h e o t h e r hand, t o imagine any c o n t e n d e r
m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s h e e r - e f f i c i e n c y p a t t e r n f o r a a i g n i f i c o n t span of time.
A f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e p e r m i t s c o n t i n u o u s . g r a d u a l change i n t h e
g r o u p ' s meana.
The change may o c c u r through i m i t a t i o n of o t h e r groups o r
through i n n o v a t i o n .
The i m i t a t i o n of o t h e r groupa is moat l i k f l y when t h e
members of one c o n t e n d e r o b s e r v e t h a t a n o t h e r c o n t e n d e r i s u s i n g a new
means s u c c e s s f t ~ l l y ,o r new1.y u s i n g an o l d means s u c c e s s f u l l y .
That i s no
o n l y a h a n d f u l of a l t e r n a t i v e s .
I t g e n e r a l l y changes slowly. seems o b v i o u s
doubt one of t h e main r e a s o n s "waves" of s t r i k e s o r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s occur:
and n a t u r a l t o t h e p e o p l e i n v o l v e d .
t h e f a c t t h a t a g i v e n s o r t of group g e t s somewhere w i t h t h e t a c t i c s p r e a d s
f a m i l i a r a s t h e day t o i t s u s e r s , f o r a l l i t s p o s s i b l e q u a i n t n e s s o r incom-
t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t employers o r governments w i l l b e v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e
p r e h e n s i b i l i t y t o an o u t s i d e r .
snme t a c t i c i n t h e hands of o t h e r s i m i l a r groups.
i n t o being?
I n n o v a t i o n i s r a r e r , and h a r d e r t o e x p l a i n .
One of t h e main pro-
I t resembles an elementary lnngunge:
Ilow. t h e n , d o e s such a r e p e r t o i r e come
How does i t change?
The answer s u r e l y i n c l u d e s a t l e a s t
t h e s e elements:
c e a s e s i s s u r e l y t h e s t r e t c h i n g of t h e b o u n d a r i e s of forms of a c t i o n which
1. t h e s t a n d a r d s of r i g h t s and j u s t i c e p r e v n i l t n g i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n ;
a l r e a d y belong t o t h e r e p e r t o i r e .
2. t h e d a i l y r o u t i n e s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n :
In the early nineteenth century, f o r
i n s t a n c e , we b e g i n t o s e e t h e French c h a r i v a r i i n a new g u i s e .
I t no
3. t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n ;
longer aimed e x c l l ~ s i v e l ys t c u c k o l d s . May-September m a r r i a g e s and c o u p l e s
4. i t s accumulated e x p e r i e n c e w i t h p r i o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ;
who f a i l e d t o t r e a t t h e l o c a l b a c h e l o r s t o t h e customary n u p t i a l c e l e -
5. t h e p a t t e r n of r e p r e s s i o n i n t h e world t o which t h e p o p u l a t i o n
bration.
Many c h a r i v a r i s began t o d r a m a t i z e t h e o p p o s i t i o n of l o c a l p e o p l e
t o a p a r t i c u l a r p u b 1 . i ~o f f i c i a l o r p o l . i t i c a 1 c a n d i d a t e .
Likewise.
the
complimentnry s e r e n a d e extended t o p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s who had e n t h u s i a s t i c
popular s u p p o r t .
I n France, t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y was
t h e heyday of t h e p o l l t i c a l c h a r i v a r i l s e r e n a d e .
Then t h e i n s t i t u t i o n gave
belongs.
Let u s t h i n k b r i e f l y a b o u t each of t h e s e e l e m e n t s .
The p r e v a i l i n g s t a n d a r d s o f r i g h t s and j u s t i c e govern t h e accept a b i l i t y of t h e components of v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e t y p e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
They do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y govern t h e p a r t i c u l a r Corm of a c t i o n .
Por exnmple.
way t o t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h e r a l l y , t h e p u b l i c banquet and t h e f o r m a l
a group which c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h e s e t of p e r s o n s d i r e c t l y producing a n ob-
meeting
j e c t o r a s e r v i c e h a s a p r i o r r j g h t t o i t s consumption is l i k e l y t o condone
I n a p a r a l l e l f a s h i o n , t h e American p a t r i o t s who mobilized from t h e
some k i n d s of f o r c i b l e r e s i s t a n c e t o e x p r o p r i a t i o n of o b j e c t s and s e r v i c e s .
Stamp Act c r i s i s onward a d a p t e d o l d E n g l i s h customs such a s t a r r i n g and
That i s t h e i m p l i c i t r a t i o n a l e of t h e modern European food r i o t and t a x re-
f e a t h e r i n g o r r i d i n g t h e s t a n g ( r i d i n g a r e p r o b a t e o u t of t a r n on a r a i l ) .
bellion.
N a r t h e s e shaming a c t i o n s coupled w i t h mock p u b l i c t r i a l s , and a p p l i e d t o
a n t e e d by, t h e n a t i o n a l s t a t e , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i t s e l f n a t i o n n l i z e d .
1 , o y a l i s t s and o t h e r presumed enemies of t h e c o l o n i s t s .
I n t h e French
A s important r i g h t s
The p o p u l a t i o n ' s
came t o b e i n v e s t e d i n , end sometimes gtlar-
d a i l y r o u t i n e s m a t t e r becnuse they a f f e c t t h e e a s e
and American c a s e s , b o t h t h e form of t h e a c t i o n and i t s o h j e c t changed.
w i t h which one o r a n o t h e r of t h e p o s s i b l e forms of a c t i o n c a n n c t r ~ a l l y
But i n b o t h c a s e s t h e b a s i c a c t i o n was a l r e a d y p a r t of t h e p o p u l a r r e p e r -
be c a r r i e d on.
toire.
p e o p l e assemble t o work i n t h e same l o c a t i o n .
I\ p o p u l n t l o n ' s r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n g e n e r a l l y i n c l u d e s
The s t r i k e becomes f e n s i b l e when c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers of
The n o t a b l e s h i f t of c o l -
l e c t i v e a c t i o n sway from r o u t i n e a s s e m b l i e s such a s markets and f e s t i v n l s
toword d e l i b e r a t e l y - c a l l e d g a t h e r i n g s a s i n d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and s t r i k e s r e s u l t e d i n p n r t from t h e r e s i d e n t i a l d i s p e r s i o n of o c c u p a t i o n a l groups nnd
of o t h e r s who s h a r e d a common i n t e r e s t .
They no l o n g e r came t o g e t h e r
c a a u a l l y nnd d i s c u s s e d t h e i r c o m o n g r i e v a n c e s o r a n p i r o t i o n s i n c i d e n t a l l y .
I n t h a t p r o c e s s , t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of European women i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
d e c l i n e d n o t i c e a b l y ; t h e s e g r e g a t e d w o r l d s of p o l i t i c s and l a b o r orgoni-
I n European and American c i t i e s , t h a t p r o c e s s of s e g r e g a t i o n passed
between home and work.
I n t h e f i r s t , t h e r e was l i t t l e d i e t i n c t i o n
For example, c r a f t s m e n l i v e d and g a t h e r e d i n t h e i r
shops and i n t11e nearby s t r e e t s .
The growth of l a r g e r f i r m s and workplaces
produced a s e p a r a t i o n of home and work.
The t y p i c a l arrangement, however,
was f o r workers t o crowd i n t o d w e l l i n g s w i t h i n walking d i s t a n c e of t h e i r
ellops, o f f i c e s and h i r i n g s i t e s .
hoods formed.
Thus d i s t i n c t i v e working-class neighbor-
They tended t o b e s m a l l i n s c a l e and s e g r e g a t e d by c r a f t .
Between t h e workplace and t h e home grew up g a t h e r i n g p l a c e s f r e q u e n t e d by
s i n g l e groups of workers: pubs, c n f e s . union h e l l s , s o c i a l c l u b s .
With
t h e f u r t h e r growth i n t h e s i z e and s e g r e g a t i o n of workplaces, j o u r n e y s t o
work became l o n g e r and working-clnsa neighborhoods l a r g e r b u t more h e t e r o geneous w i ~ l ir e s p e c t t o c r a f t s .
G a t h e r i n g witli your fellow-workers n e a r
To t h e f i r s t of o u r rough s t a g e s ( t h e p e r i o d of l i t t l e o r
no home-work s e p a r a t i o n ) correspond a r e p e r t o i r e of s m a l l - s c a l e a c t i o n a
which b u i l t d i r e c t l y on t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e t r a d e : t h e p e t i t i o n from
t h e l e a d e r s of t h e c r a f t , t h e p u b l i c p r o c e s s i o n , t h e s t a g e d b a L t l e hetween r i v a l groups of a r t i s a n s , and s o on.
I n t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s t n g e OF
T h e w chnnges i n workers' d a i l y r o u t i n e s g e n e r a l l y r a i s e d t h e mobiliz a t i o n c o s t a of p a r t i c u l a r t r a d e s .
l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by t r a d e .
They t h e r e f o r e tended t o r e d u c e t h e
A t t h e same time, t h e changes may
hove lowered t h e c o s t s of m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r t h e urban working c l a s s a s a
Thot p o s s i b i l i t y d e s e r v e s f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
of t h e s t r i k e , t h e b l a c k l i s t of u n c o o p e r a t i v e employers, tlie o s t r n c i m o r
punishment of non-conforming workers, and s o f o r t h .
At t h e s t a g e of l n r g e
f i r m s and e x t e n s i v e home-work s e p a r a t i o n , t h e d e l i b e r n t e l y - c a l l e d meeting.
r a l l y . d e m o n s t r a t i o n and s t r i k e took o v e r .
I n t h i s s e t of changes. i t i s hard t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e e f f e c t s of
a l t e r a t i o n s i n d a i l y r o u t i n e s from t h e e f f e c t s of our n e x t f a c t o r : changes
i n t h e r e l e v a n t groups' i n t e r n a l orgnnizntion.
t e r n a l organization overlap.
D a i l y r o u t i n e s ond in-
The t h r e e s t a g e s correspond approximately
t o p u r e c r a f t o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e organization of p r o l e t a r i a n i z l n g t r a d e 0
and t h e f u l l - f l e d g e d p r o l e t a r i a n s t r u c t u r e .
The r e l i g i o u s c o n f r a t e r n i t y i s
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n of s o l i d a r i t y a t t h e f i r s t s t a g e , t h e mutualb e n e f i t s o c i e t y a t t h e second, t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c t r a d e union a t t h e t h i r d .
These s h i f t s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t e r a c t w i t h changing d a i l y r o u t i n e s t o
make d i f f e r e n t forms of c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n f e a s i b l e nnd n d v a n t a p , e o ~ ~ a .
t h e workplace became i e s s and l e a s f e a s i b l e .
whole.
of urban form.
l a r g e r workplaces and a d j a c e n t homogeneous d w e l l i n g a r e a s we s e e t h e r i s e
z a t i o n became mole p r e s e r v e s .
t l ~ r o u g ht h r e e rough a t o g e s .
working-class c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n changed i n c o n j u n c t i o n witli tlie a l t e r a t i o n
For t h e p r e s e n t
d i s c u s s i o n , however, t h e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g t o n o t i c e i s t h a t t h e
form
of
P r i o r experience a l s o counts.
The r e l e v a n t e x p e r i e n c e i n c l u d e s b o t h
t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s own s u c c e s s e s o r f n i l u r e a
of o t h e r s i m i l a r groups.
and t h e contender's o b s e r v n t i o n s
We nee Lliat blend of previoun p r a c t i c e and ob-
s e r v a t i o n i n t h e r i c h s t r e e t t h e a t e r which grew up i n t h e American c o l o n i e s
from t h e Stamp Act c r i s i s of 1765 Lo t h e R e v o l u t i o n .
Mock t r i a l s , pn-
r a d i n g of e f f i g i e s , r i t u a l i z e d a t t a c k s on t h e homes nnd o f f i c e p of r o y n l
o f f i c i a l s , t a r r i n g and f e a t h e r i n g of L o y a l i s t s accompanied p e t i t i o n s , dec l a r a t i o n s and solemn a s s e m b l i e s .
p a r t i c u l a r r e p e r t o i r e , how t h e p o p u l a t i o n s e l e c t e d a p a r t i c u l a r form of
Within weeks of B o s t o n ' s f i r s t d i s p l a y
a c t i o n ( o r no a c t i o n a t a l l ) from t h a t r e p e r t o i r e .
of a boot c o n t a i n i n g a d e v i l a s a symbol of Stamp Act promoter Lord Bute.
vation i n collective action
t h e b o o t and d e v i l had become s t a n d a r d p a r t i c i p a n t s i n urban g a t h e r i n g s t o
oppose t h e Stamp Act up and down t h e American c o a s t .
and c o n t e n t of t h e s e g a t h e r i n g s were new.
tions
But a l l t h e i r p r i n c i p a l e l e -
c o r r e c t o r not
It a l s o matters i n the
long run hecause t h a t s o r t of c o s t - s e t t i n g t e n d s t o e l i m i n a t e some forms
r e l a t i v e t o d i r e c t a t t a c k s on employers end on i n d u s t r i a l p r o p e r t y t h a t
All these
The forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which
worked d u r i n g t h e l a s t c r i s i s have a s p e c i a l a p p e a l d u r i n g t h i s o n e a s
well.
Thus t h e s u c c e s s e s and f a i l u r e s of c o n t e n t i o n f o r power produce
changes i n t h e r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , b u t o n l y w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s
s e t by t h e a c t o r s ' own d a i l y r o u t i n c s and c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e .
The i d e a of a s t a n d a r d r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s . i f c o r r e c t , s i m p l i f i e s t h e s t u d y of v a r i a t i o n s i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n from one
p l a c e , time and p o p u l a t i o n t o a n o t h e r .
I t s i m p l i f i e s by b r e a k i n g t h e
problem i n t o two p a r t s : how t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n came t o have i t s
--
t h a t t i e c o s t a and b e n e f i t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e a c t i o n
The news t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o r e ( o r a r e n o t )
c r a c k i n g down on d e m o n s t r a t o r s i n c i t y A f i l t e r s r a p i d l y t o c i t y B. and
I
I
The widespread l e g a l i z a -
t i o n of t h e s t r i k e i n t h e 1860s and 1870s s o i n c r e a s e d i t s a t t r a c t i v e n e s s
--
have suddenly changed.
t h e r e l a t i v e c o s t s and p r o b a b l e r e t u r n s of d i f f e r e n t forms of a c t i o n
changes, however, occur w i t h a l a g .
It r a i s e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
d i f f u s e s i s n o t t h e model of t h e b e h a v i o r i t s e l f , b u t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
Repression makes a
t h e l a t t e r v i r t u a l l y d i s a p p e a r e d from t h e workers' r e p e r t o i r e .
i n collective action.
t h a t when a p a r t i c u l a r form o f r i o t o r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s p r e a d s r a p i d l y , what
l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s h o r t r u n because o t h e r powerful groups a f f e c t
of a c t i o n a s i t c h a n n e l s b e h a v i o r i n t o o t h e r s .
b r e a k s n e a t l y i n t o t h e same two p a r t s .
t a g i o n " and "spontaneity"
c h a n t s shaped t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
t h e o r e t i c a l l y o v s i l ~ b l et o a p a r t i c u l a r group.
--
The i d e a of a s t a n d a r d r e p e r t o i r e a l s o p r o v i d e s i n s i g h t i n t o "con-
The p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e of urban s a i l o r s , a r t i s a n s and mer-
Repression l i k e w i s e a f f e c t s t h e r e p e r t o i r e .
f o r example, t h e i n v e n t i o n and d l f f u s i o n
of t h e s i t - i n a s a way of p r e s s i n g f o r e q u a l r i g h t s i n p u b l i c nccomoda-
The p a r t i c u l a r form
ments were a l r e a d y w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d ways of d e a l i n g w i t h d e c l a r e d enemies
of t h e p e o p l e .
--
The a n a l y s i s of inno-
i
i n f l u e n c e s t h e e s t i m a t e s of p o t e n t i a l d e m o n s t r a t o r s i n c i t y B a s t o t h e
p r o b a b l e consequences of d e m o n s t r a t i n g .
I n t h a t regard t h e grouches
who a r g u e t h a t governmental "permisiveness" w i l l encourage more a g i t a t i o n
are often right.
I t is c l e a r . l i k e w i s e , t h a t a n a c t i o n can be "spon-
taneous" i n t h e s e n s e of n o t having been planned i n advance by any of t h e
p a r t i c i p a n t s , and y e t b e h i g h l y o r g a n i z e d , even r i t u a l i z e d .
There t h e
grouches a r e u s u a l l y wrong; t h e grouchy i n c l i n a t i o n i s t o a t t r i b u t e s u s t a i n e d , c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n t o some s o r t of c o n s p i r a c y .
A Case i n P o i n t : The S t r i k e
Over t h e l a s t c e n t u r y o r s o , Gie most v i s i b l e a l t e r a t i o n of t h e
w o r k i n g - c l a s s r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n v e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s h a s
been t h e r i s e of t h e s t r i k e .
f a r back i n time.
Some form of c o n c e r t e d work s t o p p a g e goes
What i s more, t h e i d e a muat have been i n v e n t e d inde-
p e n d e n t l y many t i m e s ; t h e d i s p a r a t e words f o r t h e s t r i k e which emerged
i n v a r i o u s European languages s u g g e s t m u l t i p l e o r i g i n s : s c i o p e r o , t u r n o u t ,
Streik, grsve, zabastovka, huelga.
f evert he less,
events at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
strikes were rare
nineteenth century. My own minimum guess is that in Europe as a whole from
By 1900, they were
1800 to 1900, while the total population rose from about 190 million to 500
routine facts of working-class life. They were generally illegal, and
frequently prosecuted, in 1800. . A century later, they were generally
million, the proletarian population increased from about 90 million to 300
I
million.
If that is true, the very kinds of workers who were the prime
legal, and rarely prosecuted. What is more, in most western countries
candidates for strike activity were multiplying.
the intensity of strike activity continued to rise past the middle of the
were
about proletarianization.
Furthermore. many strikes
Whether the immediate iasue was wages.
twentieth century (see Hibbs 1976). 'In the process, atrikes routinized:
hours or working conditions. the underlying struggle c m o n l y turned about
settled down to a few standard formats, acquired their own jurisprudence,
the employer's effort to exercise greater and greater control over the dia-
became objects of official statistics. By "routinized," I do not mean
position of the means of production, and therefore over the worker's own
calmed down." Despite the complex, standard rules according to which
use of his labor.
they are played, p r o f e s s i ~ n a l h o c k e ~ m a t c h eare
s often angry, bone-crunching affairs. The same is true of atrikes.
.
In his lucid analysis of "remuneration systems," Bernard Mottee discusses the broad nineteenth-century movement from various forms of task
llow and why did strikes enter the repertoire? In multiple ways,
compensation to various forms of time-effort compensation.
A clear exnmple
proletarianization created the strike. By definition, proletarianization
of task compensation is the set of contracting systems (marchandage) in
created the worker who exercised little or no discretionnry control over
which a family or work team undertook to produce a certain number of Fin-
the means of production and who was dependent for survival on the sale of
ished objects meeting certain standards at an agreed-upon price. Nuch
his or her labor power.
That proletarian and the worker threatened with
mining, woodworking and textile production once took place under contracting
becoming that proletarian have long been the chief participants in strikes.
arrangements. Indeed, early quasi-factories often consisted of assemblages
(The word "proletarian" has, alas, recently lost some of the precision
of more or less autonomous artisans who brought their own tools and ma-
Marx gave it in
Dns Kapital.
In Marx's analysis the central elements were
sepnration from the means of production + wage-labor.
Agricultural workers
were. in fact, the chief historical case Marx discussed.
did not concentrate on unskilled factory workers.)
He certainly
Of all workers, the
proletarian moat clearly had interests opposing him directly to his employer.
The proletarinn had the moat to gain through the'withh~ldin~
of labor power, and the least to gain by other means.
N o w , the pace of proletarianization increased greatly during the
terials into a c m o n workplace.
(Michael llanagan gives the example of the
artisanal filemakers of nineteenth-century Le Chambon-Feugerolles, near
St. Etienne, who sometimes worked at home and sometimes in omall shops, depending on
inclination and the current level of activity in the
trade. )
Time-effort compensation takes many forms. but the two most obviolle
are the hourly wage and piecework.
Piecework differo greatly from taskwork:
the employer characteristically owns the materials, tools and workplace.
and controls the basic location, timing and routines of the work; in ad-
One sign is its legalization. Moat western countries legalized some form
dition, the "piece" in question is not normally a finished product, but one
of strike activity during the latter half of the njneteenth century: Creat
small portion of it. Most contemporary forms of production incentives fall
Britain led the way in 1824. Saxony followed in 1861, France in 1864. Bel-
into the same category. They assume a proletarian labor force, while task-
gium in 1866. Prusaia in 1869. Austria in 1870.
work and contracting assume workers who have substantial control over the
of regular statistical reporting: there, the 1880s and 1890s saw tlie
means and conditions of production.
launching of annual strike statistics in many western countries. including
As Mottez points out, a nineteenth-century entrepreneur who wanted
Another sign js the advent
the United States. A third sign is the growth of professional bureaucracies
to assemble a group of relatively skilled workers into a good-sized pro-
devoted to monitoring, regulating, reporting and, on occasion. settling
ductive unit had no choice but to adopt some form of task compensation.
strikes. These officials, employers and organized workers hammered out
But when capital accumulated, when the scale of production rose, and when
standard definitions of strikes and lockouts. They worked out rules con-
innovations in technology and work-discipline made it possible to routinize.
cerning the proper behavior of the parties to a strike. They developed
subdivide and demystify the basic productive tasks, employers pushed toward
meana of registering and publicizing a strike's end and outcome. They, the
greater and greater pre-planning and surveillance of the entire process.
courts, police and other public officials were fixing the precise place
That included pushing toward time-effort compensation.
of the strike in the day's repertoire of collect~veaction. To he sure.
In general, workers resisted the entire process when they could. Not
the rules remained uncertain in important regards, the rules changed na
that they were simple conservatives; although on the average they did prefer
the balance of power changed, and most of tlie rule-making occurred as a
work arran~ementsthey knew and could somehow manage to those they did not
by-product of bitter struggle. That is the way repertoires of collcctive
know, their resistance sometimes took the form of demands for radical reor-
action usually change.
ganization of work and social life: the word "socialism" itself originally
-
Michelle Perrot's collective biography of the roughly 3,000 strikes
represented the vision of a social order in whicli producers would control
which occurred in France from 1870 to 1890 catches an important period in
their own fates. The strike grew up as one of the primary means by which
the routinization of the strike.
The book is a feast: rich with the folk-
artisans threatened with proletarianization and semi-proletarians threatened
lore, rhetoric and tactics of strike activity, jammed with telling obser-
with complete loss of control over the disposition of their labor fought
vation on the context of the issues about which workers struck. The
back.
largest theme of the book, however, is that the 18908 tamed and drilled
If my analysis is correct, the strike entered the collective-action
repertoires of European workers as a reactive means, but later became a
primary meana of collective proaction.
In the process, the strike routinized.
the strike, which had previously displayed great spontaneity, and had expressed the immediate concerns of workers quite directly. The growth of
large, centralized labor unions, in Perrot's view, helped smother the strike's
creativity, its spontaneity, perhaps its revolutionary potential.
On the
last point some doubt remnins: the 18900 brought a great swelling of strike
activity, an outpouring of revolutionary displays on the occasion of May
Day and the great strlken, and the heyday of anarcho-syndicelism.
Further-
more, smaller-scale workers' organizations had been crucial to the development of local strike activity before 1890.
Nevertheless, the main obser-
vation stands: through an interplny of unions, workers, government and employers, the strike was indeed standardizing.
LO
tolerate limited forms of strike activity.
None of these explains the invention of the strike, which goes bock well before the nineteenth century.
But they are a convenient inventory of the
major factors in the nineteenth-century emergence of the strike as a
standard workers' performance in western countries.
The strike continued to change in the twentieth century.
Figure 5-3
shows neveral aspects of that alteration for France From 1890 to 1954.
In terms of the checklist of factors in the production of collectiveaction repertoires which we looked at earlier, the nineteenth century
crystallization of the strike looks something like this:
5. pattern oE repression: increasing readiness of governmentn
The three-dimensionnl graphs represent the median duration, the n~~mber
of
strikers per strike and the strike rnte in terms of strikes per year per
,
100.000 workers in the labor force. The volume of the solid gives an ap-
1. prevailing standards of rights and justice: artisanal view that
proximation of striker-days per year. The shape of the aolid then sums
the contribution of labor gives n right to control the dinposition
up the combination of length, size and frequency of strj.kes. In the 18900,
of its product and the conditions of.its use. confronting bourgeois
French strikes were relatively small and infrequent, but they tended to last
view that the ownership of capital bestows a right to its untrammeled
a long time.
disposition;
short. That general change in shape was very common in western countries
In the,1950s. French strikes averaged large and frequent, but
(Shorter and Tilly 1974: chapter 12).
2. daily routines of the population: increasing concentration of
workcra in large shops and the equivalent;
3. population's internal organization: combination of residues of
It reflected. among other things,
the shift from small shops. artisnnsl organization and local unjons toward
large plants, fully proletarian workers and large-scale unione.
While these changes were quite general, nntionsl patterns of strike
croft organization, e'mployer pressure toward proletarianization,
activity diverged considerably. The general withering away of the strike
increasing residential segregation of workers;
which many theorists expected to come with "mature" industrialization fniled
to materialize; strike frequencies, sizes and volumes genernlly rose after
4. accumulated experience with collective action: demonstrated success of artisanal strikes, failure of appeals to officials and
patrons;
World War I and remained high or cltmbed even higher after World War 11.
Yet important contrasts upened up.
One of the most dramatic contrasts separated the Scandinavian
countries from the rest of the West.
While strike levels were reaching new
5-32
heights elsewhere, they were declining in Scandinavia.
Figure 5-3: The Alteration of French Strike Shapes, 1890-1954.
Joan Lind'a com-
parison of industrial conflict in twentieth-century Britain and Sweden.
brings out an important element of that contrast.
At fjrst inspection,
her findings fall into the pattern we have already discussed at length.
Time-series analyses of strike activity in both countries reveal strong relationships between the level of induatrial conflict and the extent of
worker mobilization, as measured either by union membership or by union
Median Daya = 6
income.
StrikerslStrike = 250.5
Strikes/100.000
8
Median DayslStrike
0
-
But the finding is less straightforward than it sounds.
In Bri-
tain the relationship is positive: the higher the mobilization level. the
2.2
more strikes.
%a
In Sweden. it is negative.
Swedish strikes declined stea-
dily as union membership mounted.
That is not all.
In Britain, a monthly time-series analysis in-
dicates that the repressive measures of World War I had a small dcpressant effect on the overall level of strike activity (allowing for the efMedian Daya = 7
StrikerslStrike
Strikes/100,000
-
fect of such other variables as prices and unemployment) and a larger ten477.2
4.9
dency to promote government-aided voluntary negotiations and binding arbitration as an alternative to strike activity.
World War I1 produces no such results.
But a similar analysia of
There, strikes rose greatly during
the later months of the war, despite the outlawing of strikes and the establishment of compulsory arbitration in June, 1940.
Median Days
-
They roae despite
the rise of prosecutions for strikes and lockouts from fifty in 1941 to
1
StrikeraIStrike = 747.2
Strikea1100.000 = 9.2
582 in 1942 to 1,279 in 1943 (Lind 1973: 156).
The contradictions are troubling.
clear enough.
Some of the things going on are
In Britain, organized labor. despite the Labor Party, never
developed the continuous, intimate and reliable tie to the government that
the long incumbency of the Social Democrats nfforded to Swedish labor; in
Sweden, the stronger labor became the easier it was to settle disputes
through o t h e r means t h a n t h e s t r i k e : n e g o t i a t i o n , l e g i s l a t i o n , gov&rnment a l p r e s s u r e on t h e employers.
a c t i v i t y . o r t o t a k e advar)tage of i t s momentary f a v o r . s u b s i d e d i n f a v o r
As l a b o r e n t e r e d t h e B r i t i s h p o l i t y , mul-
of a fundamentally economic c o n t e s t between employers and o r g a n i z e d
t i p l e t r a d e u n i o n s r e t a i n e d a good d e a l of autonomy; no c e n t r a l l a b o r or-
workers.
g a n i z a t i o n a c q u i r e d t h e power t o n e g o t i a t e f o r a l l i t s members o r t o f o r c e
t h e government.
t h o s e members t o a b i d e by t h e terms of t h e i r c o n t r a c t s .
t h e power of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r much weaker and more v a r i a b l e , i n I t a l y
I n Sweden, a highI
l y - c e n t r a l i z e d f e d e r a t i o n a c q u i r e d g r e a t p a r e r b o t h a s a n e g o t i a t o r and
a s an e n f o r c e r .
'
The c o n t e s t was f o u g h t o u t w i t h i n l i m i t s s e t and g u a r a n t e e d by
The r o l e of t h e government remained much more c o n t i n g e n t ,
and France.
Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , p o l i t y membership encouraged
S n y d e r ' s b e s t - f i t t i n g composite models resemble t h e ones which
s t r i k e s i n B r i t a i n and made r o u t i n e p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e a more a t t r a c t i v e
Edward S h o r t e r end I found t o b e most e f f i c i e n t i n a c c o u n t i n g f o r yenr-to-
a l t e r n a t i v e t o s t r i k e s i n Sweden.
y e a r f l u c t u a t i o n s i n French s t r i k e a c t i v i t y between 1885 and 1965 ( S h o r t e r
David Snyder's a n a l y s e s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t i n I t a l y , France
I
and T i l l y 1974, esp. c h a p t e r 4 ) .
Snyder improves on o u r foumulation by
and t h e United S t n t e s l i k e w i s e p o i n t t w a r d a more complex model of power-
c l a r i f y i n g t h e e f f e c t of l a b o r ' s r e l a t i o n t o aovernment.
holding.
changes i n t h a t r e g a r d resembles L i n d ' s comparison of B r i t a i n and Sweden.
When Snyder t e s t s s t a n d a r d economic models on a n n u a l s t r i k e
s e r i e s r u n n i n g from t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t o around 1970, he f i n d s
they have u n s a t i s f s c t o r y ( a l t h o u g h n o t n e g l i g i b l e ) p r e d i c t i v e power i n a l l
t h r e e c o u n t r i e s b e f o r e World War I1 and i n France and I t a l y s i n c e t h e n ; f o r
t h e United S t a t e s , t h e p r e d i c t i v e power of a p u r e economic model g r e a t l y
improves a f t e r World War 11. A p u r e p o l i t i c a l model ( i n which union memb e r s h i p , Democrats i n Congress, p a r t y of P r e s i d e n t and t h e p r e s e n c e of
n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s f i g u r e ) provides a b e t t e r f i t t o t h e observations i n
H i s a c c o u n t of
Douglas Hibbs h a s b r o u g h t a s i m i l a r p e r s p e c t i v e t o b e a r on twen-
!
t i e t h - c e n t u r y s t r i k e t r e n d s i n Belgium. Canada, Denmark. F i n l a n d , Prance,
I t a l y . Japan. N e t h e r l a n d s , Norway. Sweden, United Kingdom and United
I
S t a t e s (Hibbs 1976).
His g e n e r a l conclusions run a s f o l l w s :
. . . strike activity
f o r power
-
i s one m a n i f e s t a t i o n f~ ongoin8 s t r u g g l e
between s o c i a l c l a s s e s o v e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e s ,
p r i n c i p a l l y a l t h o u g h not e x c l u s i v e l y n a t i o n a l income.
a l l c a s e s b u t t h e U.S. a f t e r World War 11.
As one might e x p e c t . s s y n t h e s i s of t h e economic and p o l i t i c a l
The main
t h e s i s of t h e s t u d y i s t h a t long-run changes i n t h e volume of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t a r e l a r g e l y e x p l a i n e d by changes i n t h e l o c u s of
models p r o v i d e s t h e most a c c u r a t e p r e d i c t i o n s ; even t h e r e , t h e p o l i t i c a l
v a r i a b l e s c a r r y a major p a r t of t h e e x p l a n a t o r y weight e x c e p t i n t h e r e c e n t
the distributional
-
struggle.
S t r i k e a c t i v i t y h a s d e c l i n e d dmma-
t i c a l l y i n n a t i o n s where S o c i a l Democratic o r Labor p a r t i e s assumed
U.S. e x p e r i e n c e .
S n y d e r ' s p r o p o s a l i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t t h e New Deal and
power i n t h e 1930s
t h e accommodations of World War I1 s t r e n g t h e n e d and s t a b i l i z e d t h e t i e s of
o r g a n i z e d American l a b o r t o t h e government.
It stabilized those t i e s s o
-- o r j u s t
a f t e r t h e second World War
c r e a t e d t h e modern " w e l f a r e s t a t e " .
-- and
I n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s an enor-
mous f r a c t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l income n w p a s s e s through t h e p u b l i c
much t h a t p r e v i o u s e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e government i t s e l f by s t r i k e
s e c t o r and is a l l o c a t e d by t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s .
P o l i t i c a l con-
f l i c t between l e f t - and right-wing p a r t i e s i n t h e e l e c t o r a l
arena
. . . has
through t h e p r o v i s i o n of o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o a c t on g r i e v a n c e s o r o s p i r a -
r e p l a c e d i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t between l a b o r and ca-
p i t o l in the private sector
. . . as
d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t i o n a l income.
t h e u l t i m a t e mechanism f o r t h e
By comparison, i n c o u n t r i e s go-
t i o n s long nurtured.
As a r e s u l t of t h e s e and o t h e r r e c e n t s t u d i e s , tlcere
i s l i t t l e remaining doubt c o n c e r n i n g a g e n e r a l tendency of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y t o r i s e w i t h economic e x p a n s i o n and f a l l w i t h c o n t r a c t l o c i (e.8.
Knovlcs
verned more o r l e s s c o n t i n u o u s l y by b o u r g e o i s p a r t i e s of t h e c e n t e r
1952. Weintraub 1966. A s h e n f e l t e r and Johnson 1969. Vonderkamp 1970. S k e e l s
and r i g h t . t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r c o n t i n u e s t o dominate t h e a l l o c a t i o n
1971, K a e l b l e and Volkmann 1972).
a s w e l l a s t h e p r o d u c t i o n of r e s o u r c e s .
p o r t a n c e t o i t s complement, f a c i l i t a t i o n , i n t h e nense of government ac-
The economic m a r k e t p l a c e
remains t h e primary l o c u s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t i n t h e s e na-
None of t h e s e a n a l y s e s attnclcen much i m -
t i o n s l o w e r i n g t h e c o s t of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y t o workers.
t i o n s , and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e a v e r a g e l e v e l of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y h a s
The comparison of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s b r i n g s o u t two i n -
been r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t f o r t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of a c e n t u r y o r more
teresting difficulties.
F i r s t , t h e s t r i k e i s o n l y o n e of s e v e r a l means of
(Ilibbs 1976: 26-27;
a c t i o n open t o workers.
At d i f f e r e n t t i m e s , p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e , s a b o t n g e ,
i t a l i c s i n original).
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and occtcpation of t h e workplace a l l become n t t r n c t i v e s1-
S y n t h e s i z i n g tlce f i n d i n g s of Lind, Snyder and Hibbs, we a r r i v e a t a t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n : 1 ) c o u n t r i e s i n which t h e market i s t h e l o c u s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of l a b o r and management t o govern-
ternatives t o striking.
The workers' r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s n l -
ways i n c l u d e s more i t e m s t h a n t h e s t r i k e .
Furthermore, whether a p a r t i -
c u l a r s t r u g g l e a c t u a l l y produces a work s t o p p a g e depend0 on t h e belcavlor
ment r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e ; t h e r e , market v a r i a t i o n s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t t h e l e v e l
of t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s : management f i r s t of a l l , u n i o n s and government i n
of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y ; 2) c o u n t r i e s i n which a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s a r e b a s i c a l l y
under p o l i t i c o 1 c o n t r o l ; t h e r e , s t r i k e a c t i v i t y i s low o r n o n - e x i s t e n t ,
many c a s e s .
The l e v e l of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y is t h e r e f o r e a t b e n t nn imper-
and
f e c t i n d i c a t o r of working-class c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s a whole.
A proper
t h e r e a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s o c c u r i n t h e c o u r s e of e l e c t i o n s and
e x p l a n a t i o n of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y must i n c l u d e en a c c o u n t h o t h of tlce c h o i c e
o t h e r p o l i t i c a l c o n t e s t s ; 3) c o u n t r i e s i n which t h e l o c u s of a l l o c a t i o n deamong a l t e r n a t i v e forms of c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n and of t h e p r o c e s s of negoc i s i o n s i s i t s e l f a t i s s u e ; t h e r e , s h o r t - r u n p o l i t i c a l f l ~ r c t u a t i o n ss t r o n g ly affect strike activity.
The
form
of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y
t h e p r e v a l e n c e of t h e one-day p r o t e s t s t r i k e
--
--
tiation.
f o r example,
undoubtedly v a r i e s i n a
of t h e t i e s between o r g a n i z e d
l a b o r and government a f f e c t s s t r i k e a c t i v i t y q u i t e s t r o n g l y .
p a r a l l e l way.
A l l t h e s e a n a l y s e s b r i n g o u t t h e g r e a t importance of m o b i l i z a t i o n ,
a t l e a s t a s r e p r e s e n t e d by u n i o n i z a t i o n of t h e workforce.
The second d i f f i c u l t y is t h a t t h e
A l l of them i n -
To t h e e x t e n t
t h a t l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s become powerful w i t h i n t h e government ond a c q u i r e
c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n of workers i n g e n e r a l , s t r i k i n g becomes
a r e l a t i v e l y e x p e n s i v e way of doing l a b o r ' s b u s i n e s s . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t
d i c a t e t h a t t h e most d i r e c t wny i n which s h o r t - r u n economic f l u c t u a t i o n s
t h e t h r e a t o r promise of government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n s t r i k e s d e c l i n e s .
promote s t r i k e o c t i v i t y i s n o t through t h e i m p o s i t i o n of hardslcips b u t
workers become f r e e t o t u n e t h e i r s t r i k e a c t i v i t y t o t h e rhythms of t h e
economy.
I
I
Tlie t h r e a t o r promise of government i n t e r v e n t i o n depends on t h e
gins.
Tlie g r a n t of l e g a l i t y t o e n e l e c t o r a l a s s o c i a t i o n o r a n e l e c t o r a l
assembly p r o v i d e s a c l a i m t o l e g a l i t y f o r a s s o c i a t i o n s nnd a s s e m b l i e s which
s t r u c t u r e of power among l a b o r , management and t h e government.
a r e n o t q u i t e e l e c t o r a l , n o t only e l e c t o r a l o r n o t
E l e c t i o n s , Dcmonstrations and P o l i t i c a l Systems
g r a n t of l e g a l i t y l o w e r s t h e g r o u p ' s c o s t s of m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v c
The l e s s o n is more g e n e r a l .
The s i m p l e model of t h e p o l i t y l a i d
electorsl.
The
action.
I t a l s o p r o v i d e s a p r e s t i g i o u s , a c c e s s i b l e model f o r a c t i o n i n
o u t e a r l i e r p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t , b u t i t m i s s e s t h e importance
general.
I n t h e United S t a t e s of t h e 1960s we f i n d a grudgtng g r a n t of
of p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n s and of t h e means of a c t i o n b u i l t i n t o t h e e x i s t i n g
l e g i t i m a c y t o t h e Black P a n t h e r P a r t y , t h e M i s s i s s i p p i Freedom Democratic
p o l i t i c a l organization.
major c a s e t n p o i n t .
The u s e of e l e c t i o n s t o do p u b l i c b u s i n e s s i s a
P a r t y , t h e Peace and Freedom P a r t y .
P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have long s i n c e n o t i c e d t h a t
Agents of t h e government t r i e d t o h a r a s s a l l t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t
t h e e s t a b l i s l m e n t of b i n d i n g n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s promotes t h e growth of political parties
-- n o t
of e x i s t e n c e a t one time o r a n o t h e r .
o n l y b e c a u s e governments tend t o l e g a l i z e e l e c t i o n s
and p a r t i e s a t t h e same t i m e b u t because e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i o n g i v e s such
a p a t e n t advantage of i n t e r e s t s which a r e o r g a n i z e d i n p a r t i e s .
But t h e r e formed on i m p l i c i t c o a l i -
t i o n between t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and "white l i b e r a l s " w i t h n s t r o n g i n t e r e s t
I
I think
i n a broad d e f i n i t i o n of a c c e p t a b l e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y .
The c o a l i t f o n
made i t h a r d e r f o r t h e government t o withhold from t h e q u a s i - p a r t i e s r i g h t s
t h e e f f e c t of e l e c t o r a l systems on t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n is even
t o o r g a n i z e , r e c r u i t , assemble, s o l i c i t , p u b l i c i z e and d e m o n s t r a t e which
more g e n e r a l .
e s t a b l i s h e d p a r t i e s e x e r c i s e d a s s m a t t e r of c o u r s e .
A comparison of tlie h i s t o r i e s of c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e ac-
Yet i t was n o t a p u r e
t i o n i n I t a l y , Germany, F r a n c e and England ( T i l l y . T i l l y and T i l l y 1975) s u g - .
power p l a y .
g e s t s a c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s and
t i v e s b e s i d e s winning e l e c t i o n s had chosen t o o r g a n i z e i n t h e g u i s e of po-
t h e u s e of f o r m a l a s s o c i a t i o n s of a l l s o r t s a s v e h i c l e s f o r c o l l e c t i v e ac-
l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i t s e l f a f f o r d e d them a p r o t e c t i o n u n a v a i l a b l e t o s i m i l a r
tion.
The g r c n t p r o l i f e r a t i o n ' of c l u b s , c i r c l e s and s o d a l i t i e s i n t h e
movements which c h o s e t o o r g a n i z e a s autonomous communities, m i l i t a r y
French. German and I t a l i a n r e v o l u t i o n s of 1848 ( i n which expanding t h e e l e c t o r a t e and i n c r e a s i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of e l e c t i o n s were s t a n d a r d
p a r t s of t h c r e v o l u t i o n a r y program) i l l u s t r a t e s t h e c o n n e c t i o n .
The ex-
The f a c t t h a t movements w i t h i m p o r t a n t a c t i v i t i e s and objec-
u n i t s o r c o n s p i r a t o r i a l networks.
I
So d o i n g , t o be s u r e , they r a n t h e r i s k
of c o o p t a t i o n , i n f i l t r a t i o n and e a s y s u r v e i l l a n c e .
There l i e s t h e e t e r n a l
dilemma o f tlie m i l i t a n t group which f i n d s a p r o t e c t i v e c l e f t i n tlie l e g a l
p e r i e n c e of t h o s e same c o u n t r i e s a l s o makes p l a u s i b l e t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t
system: s o l i d a r y r e s i s t a n c e witti a chance of d e s t r u c t i o n , o r a d a p t a t i o n
t h c growth of e l e c t i o n s promotes t h e c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n and s p r e a d of t h e de-
w i t h a chance of a b s o r p t i o n o r d i s s o l u t i o n .
m o n s t r a t i o n a s n form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Why?
Because of an umbrella e f f e c t : t h e l e g a l umbrella r a i s e d t o
p r o t e c t t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , and t o keep i t huddled i n tlie c e n t e r away
from t h e r a i n , h a s a ragged edge.
There i s s h e l t e r f o r o t h e r s a t i t s mar-
Why s h o u l d t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n p r o s p e r a s a consequence of t h e growth
of e l e c t i o n s ?
Because i t s b a s i c form resembles t h a t of tlie e l e c t o r a l ss-
sembly, and because i t p r o v i d e s a n e f f e c t i v e means of d i s p l a y i n g tlie
s t r e n g t h of a c o o t e s t a n t , sometimes of i n f l u e n c i n g t h e outcome of an e l e c t i o n .
The d e m o n s t r a t i o n we know e n t e r e d t h e s t a n d a r d r e p e r t o i r e of c o l -
I
The f i r s t , known t o b e f r e q u e n t e d by E n g l i s h C a t h o l i c g e n t r y , was burned
l e c t i v e a c t i o n s i n most w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s d u r i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
t o t h e ground; b o t h were plundered and ransacked and t h e i r c o n t e n t s burned
I n England and America, n e v e r t h e l e s s . we can s e e i t s form c r y s t a l l i z i n g be-
i n t h e s t r e e t s " ( ~ u d e '1971: 221-222).
f o r e 1800.
The e l e c t o r a l assembly came i n t o i t s own a s t h e s e t t i n g of dcmon-
For s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s , Englishmen had g a t h e r e d i n l a r g e num-
b e r s on c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d h o l i d a y s , such a s Guy Fawkes' Day.
s t r a t i o n a i n t h e same p e r i o d .
During t h e
of t h e p o p u l a r h e r o John Wilkes:
f e s t i v i t i e s t h e y o f t e n e x p r e s s e d t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e o p i n i o n s of t h e d a y ' s her o e s , v i l l a i n s and f o o l s .
At t h e f i n a l e of t h e 1769 e l e c t i o n campaign
They paraded e f f i g i e s , f l o a t s , c h a r a d e s and
Wilkes' s u p p o r t e r s formed themselves i n t o v a r i o u s c a v a l c a d e s t h a t
placards.
Hangings, f u n e r a l s , e x i t s from p r i s o n , r o y a l b i r t h d a y s , an-
i
paraded p e a c e f u l l y through t h e s t r e e t s of London b e f o r e proceeding
nouncements of m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s drew crowds end, sometimes, c o n c e r t e d
t o Brentford t o c a s t t h e i r v o t e s .
e x p r e s s i o n s of demands, sympathies o r c o m p l a i n t s .
One of t h c a e s e t o u t from tlie
In a l l these cases, the
P r i n c e of Orange i n Jermyn S t r e e t . b e f o r e whom were c a r r i e d s i x o r
a u t h o r i t i e s provided t h e o c c a s i o n and. t o some d e g r e e , t h e s a n c t i o n f o r t h e
seven f l a g s ( B i l l of R i g h t s , Magna C a r t s , e t c . ) ,
a s s e m b l i e s i n question,.
a l l badges of t h e
Contested e l e c t i o n s f e l l e a s i l y i n t o t h e same patd i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s of which Mr. Wilkes had been made a member
t e r n , and t h e a s s e m b l i e s of s u p p o r t e r s of d i f f e r e n t c a n d i d a t e s a c q u i r e d
( ~ u d ; 1962: 69).
a d e g r e e of p r o t e c t i o n .
I n t h e f u l l - f l e d g e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n . t h e crowd became more autonomous,
choosing i t s own o c c a s i o n and manner of assembly.
A f t e r 1750, t h e preaen-
resounding m a j o r i t y .
That f a c t i n i t i a t e d a n o t h e r g r e a t p e t i t i o n d r i v e , .
t h i s one n a t i o n w i d e i n scope; many of t h e p e t i t i o n s a r r i v e d a t P a r l i a m e n t
t a t i o n of a p e t i t i o n t o P a r l i a m e n t o r t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s now and t h e n
brought t o g e t h e r thousands of p e o p l e i n s u p p o r t of a common p o s i t i o n .
As i t happens. P a r l i a m e n t r e f u s e d t o s e a t Wilkes a f t e r h i s e l e c t i o n hy a
The
o r t h e King's d o o r t o t h e accompaniment of d e m o n s t r a t i n g crowds.
Wilkes'
famous Gordon r i o t s of 1778 began w i t h a meeting and march o r g a n i z e d around
s u p p o r t e r s i n h i s r e p e a t e d s t r u g g l e s w i t h t h e government employed t h e
t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o P s r l i a m e n t of t h e P r o t e s t a n t A s s o c i a t i o n ' s p e t i t i o n .
mass p e t i t i o n march w i d e l y t o e x h i b i t t h e i r growing s t r e n g t h .
s i g n e d by some 44,000 p e o p l e , a g a i n s t t h e C a t h o l i c Emancipation Act of t h a t
year.
Lord George Gordon l e d f o u r g r e a t columns of d e m o n s t r a t o r s t o t h e
House of Commons.
They were t h e n u c l e u s of t h e l a r g e crowd t h a t formed
and waited through t h e s e s s i o n i n P a r l i a m e n t Square.
L a t e a t n i g h t , "one
That i n n o v a t i o n took a l o n g s t e p toward t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e demons t r a t i o n a s a d i s t i n c t i v e ' f o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
would complete t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n :
Two more changes
t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e p e t i t i o n a s a
n e c e s s a r y p r e t e x t f o r t h e show of s t r e n g t h , and tlie g e n e r n l i z a t i o n of
s e c t i o n of tlie crowd moved o f f towards t h e p r i v a t e c h a p e l of t h e Sar-
t h e form of a c t i o n beyond King and P a r l i a m e n t .
I n t h e s t r u g g l e s between
d i n i a n ambassador i n Duke S t r e e t , L i n c o l n ' s I n n F i e l d s , a n o t h e r t o t h e
London R a d i c a l s and t h e C r a m which b l a z e d i n t h e l a s t d e c a d e s of t h e
c h a p e l a t t a c h e d t o t h e Bavarian Embassy i n Warwick S t r e e t , S t . James'.
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t h o s e f u r t h e r changes began t o o c c u r .
s t r e e t i n t o Boston; one r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t a x stsmp d i s t r i h u t o r . Andrew
By t h e 1790s. t h e R a d i c a l s o c i e t i e s of London and e l s e w h e r e o r g a n i z e d
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , l a r g e o n e s , w i t h g r e a t frequency.
O l i v e r , t h e o t h e r . a l a r g e boot c o n t a i n i n g a d e v i l .
I n S h e f f i e l d , according
g a t h e r e d r e f u s e d t o l e t t h e e f f i g i e s b e t a k e n down.
t o E.P. Thompson:
Demonstrations were h e l d a t t h e end of November t o c e l e b r a t e t h e
Towards e v e n i n g some men c u t down t h e e f f i g y of t h e stamp-mnster
s u c c e s s of t h e French a r m i e s a t Valmy, and they were r e p o r t e d i n
and placed i t on a b i e r , which was c a r r i e d through t h e town ac-
the Sheffield Register
the reformers.
. . . , a weekly newspaper
which s u p p o r t e d
companied by a c h e e r i n g and lluzzaing m u l t i t u d e : " L i h e r t y and propert y f o r e v e r , " "No stamps."
A p r o c e s s i o n of f i v e o r s i x thousand drew a quar-
I n t h e p r o c e s s i o n were
Britannia
--
--
o r d e r , " "and i n solemn manner."
"a c a r i c a t u r e p a i n t i n g r e p r e s e n t i n g
Burke r i d i n g on a swine
--
...
thousands of t h e mob followed
---
At t h e head of t h e p r o c e s n i o n
...
"
The concourse, a m i d s t t h e
a c c l a m a t i o n s of l a r g e numbers of p e o p l e l i n i n g t h e s t r e e t , went
t h e p o l e of L i b e r t y l y i n g broken on
t h e ground, i n s c r i b e d ' T r u t h i a L i b e l '
I n t h i s concourse,
"Forty o r f i f t y tradesmen, d e c e n t l y d r e s s e d , preceded; and some
and a f i g u r e , t h e upper
p a r t of which wss t h e l i k e n e s s of a S c o t c h S e c r e t a r y , and t h e lower
p a r t t h a t of a n Ass
"No Placemen."
"some of t h e h i g h e s t Reputotion" were walking " i n t h e g r e a t e s t
t e r e d r o a s t e d ox through t h e s t r e e t s amid t h e f i r i n g of cannon.
down b i n S t r e e t . t u r n e d i n t o King S t r e e t and stopped under t h e
t h e Sun b r e a k i n g from
behind a Cloud, and t h e Angel of Peace, w i t h one hand dropping t h e
town h o u i e where Governor and Council were assembled.
' R i g h t s of Man', and e x t e n d i n g t h e o t h e r t o r a i s e up B r i t a n n i a
t u d e , w e l l knowing t h i s , "gave t h r e e huzzas by Way of Defiance,
(Thompson 1963: 104).
and p a s s ' d on" (Hoerder 1971: 153).
The symbols a r e e x o t i c , r e m i n i s c e n t of William Blake.
I t is e a s y t o f o r -
c o f f i n s , and dummies, and masks.
The b a s i c form of t h a t 1792 d e m o n s t r a t i o n
I
I n S h e f f i e l d i s t h e o n e we know today.
During t h e s e same y e a r s t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n was becoming a s t a n -
The m u l t i -
The g r e a t elm which h e l d t h e e f f i g i e s l a t e r became famous a s t h e L i b e r t y
Tree.
g e t , however, t h a t t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y d e m o n s t r a t o r s o f t e n c a r r y symbolic
.
Tlle crowd which
I t was t h e model f o r thousands of l i b e r t y t r e e s c o n s e c r a t e d . and
II
s t r u g g l e d o v e r , i n America.
i
i n R e v o l u t i o n a r y France.
L a t e r t h e L i b e r t y T r e e became a prime symbol
I n many h i s t o r i e s t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e Stamp
Act c o u n t s a s t h e beginning of t h e American Revolution.
The demonntrs-
dard way of doing p u b l i c b u s i n e s s i n B r i t a i n ' s North American c o l o n i e s .
t i o n took a n i m p o r t a n t and d u r a b l e p l a c e i n t h e American r e p e r t o i r e of
L i k e t h e contemporaneous b a t t l e s o v e r Wilkes i n England, t h e American r e -
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s s a t h a t r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement s w e l l e d .
s i s t o n c e t o t h e Stamp Act of 1765 helped s e p a r a t e t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n from
t h e s a n c t i o n e d ossembly, helped e s t a b l i s h i t s importance a s a r o u t i n e i n strument f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e .
On t h e f o u r t e e n t h of
August two e f f i g i e s appeared, suspended from s g r e a t t r e e on a s t r a t e g i c
The c a s e of t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n t e a c h e s a g e n e r a l l e s s o n .
f r e q u e n c i e s and p e r s o n n e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n depend
e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e of government and p o l i t i c s .
Tlle forms,
i n t i m a t e l y on tile
When we b e g i n r e f i n i n g t h e
s i m p l e model of government, p o l i t y and c o n t e n d e r s w i t h which we s t a r t e d ,
The d e n i a l of r i g h t s t o a c h a l l e n g e r o n l y t h r e a t e n s t h e r i g h t s of e x i s t i n g
we must pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s p e c i f i c r u l e s of p o l i t y membership, t h e
members of t h e p o l i t y when t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , o r g a n i z a t i o n .
e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n of r e p r e s s i o n and f n c i l i t a t i o n , t h e r i g h t s claimed by
o b j e c t i v e s o r a c t i v i t i e s resemble t h o s e of some members, o r when o c o a l i -
d i f f e r e n t contenders.
t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r and member h a s formed.
Our e l e m e n t a r y model does l i t t l e more t h e n spe-
c i f y i n what c o n n e c t i o n s each of t h e s e v a r i a b l e s s h o u l d b e s i g n i f i c a n t .
On t h e q u e s t i o n of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e argument
A l l our i n q u i r i e s i n t o t h e forms and f r e q u e n c i e s of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n e v e n t u a l l y l e a d u s back t o q u e s t i o n s of power.
A c l o s e l o o k st
unfolded s o f a r f a v o r s a view of t h e r i g h t t o v o t e , t o p e t i t i o n , t o
c o m p e t i t i v e , r e a c t i v e and p r o a c t i v e forms of a c t i o n d i s s o l v e s t h e common
assemble, t o p u b l i s h , and s o on a s
d i s t i n c t i o n between " p r e - p o l i t i c a l ' '
a ) c o n s i s t i n g n o t of a g e n e r a l p r i n -
and " p o l i t i c a l " p r o t e s t .
A careful
c i p l e , b u t of a s p e c i f i c c l a i m of a d e f i n e d c o n t e n d e r on a c e r t a i n gov-
e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e c o n t e x t of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y c h a l l e n g e s t h e s e p n r a t i o n
e r m e n t , b) coming i n t o b e i n g a s t h e r e s u l t of s t r u g g l e s among mobilized
of "economic" and " p o l i t i c a l " c o n f l i c t s from each o t h e r .
c o n t e n d e r s and governments.
f l e c t i o n on t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h e c h a r i v a r i and t h e food r i o t r a i s e s fun-
Thus t h e common i d e a of s t a n d a r d s e t of
p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s g r a d u a l l y extended from a s m a l l e l i t e t o t h e g e n e r a l popul a t i o n is misleading.
Not wrong, b e c a u s e on t h e whole t h e s h a r e of t h e
A thoughtful re-
damental d o u b t s a b o u t any e f f o r t t o s i n g l e o u t a c l a s s of spontaneous, exp r e s s i v e , i m p u l s i v e , e v a n e s c e n t crowd a c t i o n s
--
although i t confirms
p o p u l a t i o n having e n f o r c e a b l e c l a i m s on v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l governments w i t h
t h e importance of c r e a t i v i t y , i n n o v a t i o n , dramo and symbolism w i t h i n t h e
r e s p e c t t o v o t i n g , p e t i t i o n i n g , a s s e m b l i n g , and p u b l l s h i n g h a s expanded
l i m i t s s e t by t h e e x i s t i n g r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n nnd t h e e x i s t i n g
enormously o v e r t h e l a s t two c e n t u r i e s , h a s i n c r e a s e d i n d i s t i n c t s t e p s
s t r u c t u r e o f power.
from e l i t e s t o o r d i n a r y p e o p l e , h a s n o t c o n t r a c t e d d r a s t i c a l l y once i t
has g r a m .
Nevertheless misleading, because t h e s i m i l a r claims ordinary
people hnve had on o t h e r governments ( e s p e c i a l l y l o c a l governments) have
g e n e r a l l y dwindled i n t h e same p r o c e s s , and b e c a u s e e a c h s t e p of t h e expansion hns u s u a l l y o c c u r r e d i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e demand of some w e l l d e f i n e d c o n t e n d e r o r c o n l i t i o n of c o n t e n d e r s .
The f a c t t h a t t h e r i g h t s c o n s i s t of e n f o r c e a b l e c l a i m s on t h e government by p a r t i c u l n r groups makes i t l e s s p u z z l i n g t h a t such elementary
r i g h t s a s nssembly nnd p e t i t i o n s h o u l d b e s o e a s i l y d e n i e d t o c h a l l e n g e r s
whose p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , o h j e c t i v e s o r a c t i v i t i e s a r e u n a c c e p t a b l e
t o most o t h e r groups: p r o s t i t u t e s , m i l l e n n i a l i s t s . F a s c i s t s , homosexuals.
CiIAPTER 6:
t h a t t h e r e i s no v i o l e n t a c t i o n t o which i t could n o t a p p l y i n p r i n c l p l e ,
COLLECTLVE VIOLENCE
and t h e r e f o r e no way t o prove i t wrong.
B r i t i s h Rrawls a s C o l l e c t i v e Violence
Nothing st a l l . i n t h a t i t
f i n a l l y r e d u c e s t o a d e s c r i p t i o n of what h a s t o b e e x p l o i n e d .
"We n l l know what a nomination day i s l i k e , " commented The Times
i n J u n e 1868.
Avallnble
a c c o u n t s of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i t i s h electoral v i o l e n c e , however, g i v e
u s hope of e s c a p i n g from t a u t o l o g y and of d e t e c t i n g r e g u l o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s
between tlie p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e and tlie n a t u r e of c u r r e n t
The p r e s i d i n g f u n c t i o n a r y b e s p e a k s s f a i r h e a r i n g f o r b o t h s i d e s ,
and i t i s w e l l
if
s t r u g g l e s o v e r r i g h t s and power.
he g e t s t o t h e end of h i s few s e n t e n c e s w i t h o u t
As i t happens. R i c h t e r himself g i v e s u s nome v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n
d e r i s i v e c h e e r s and i r o n i c a l c r i e s e x p l i c a b l e o n l y by a l o c a l
on t h e o r i g i n s of B r i t i s h e l e c t o r a l rowdiness.
historian.
A f t e r t h a t no one g e t s s h e a r i n g .
"It wns n o t u n c m o n , "
Unceasing clamour
he r e p o r t s :
p r e v a i l s ; p r o p o s e r s , s e c o n d e r s , and c a n d i d a t e s speak i n dumb show,
o r c o n f i d c t h e i r s e n t i m e n t s t o t h e r e p o r t e r s ; heads a r e broken,
f o r a g e n t s of t h e c a n d i d a t e s , n o t always w i t h o u t t h e l a t t e r ' s
blood flows from numerous n o s e s , and t h e judgment of t h e e l e c t o r s
c o g n i z a n c e , t o h i r e gangs of r u f f i a n s from nearby collieries t o
is g e n e r a l l y s u b j e c t e d t o a s e v e r e t r a i n i n g a s a p r e l i m i n a r y t o
i n t i m i d a t e and b u l l y r i v a l v o t e r s .
t h e v o t i n g of t h e f o l l o w i n g day ( R i c h t e r 1971:
Committee i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e e l e c t i o n of 1868 t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t
21).
A w i t n e s s b e f o r e t h e Pnrlinmentnry
B r i s t o l L i b e r a l a g e n t s from London o r g a n i z e d end paid " f l y i n g
A s Donald R i c h t e r s a y s , t h e j e e r s and b r a w l s which r e g u l a r l y accompanied
columns," bands of from 200 t o 300 men r e c r u i t e d from t h e B r i s t o l
n i n c t e e n t h - c e n t u r y e l e c t i o n s b e l i e b o t h t h e o r d e r l y r e p u t a t i o n of V i c t o r i a n
B r i t a i n and t h e n o t i o n t h a t e l e c t o r a l reform
calm.
Nineteenth-century
in Britain a s well
--
British elections
+
suburbs.
regular policing
-- and
isp posed
i n q u a s i - m i l i t a r y f o r m a t i o n and armed w i t h
civic
bludgeons, they appeared on e l e c t i o n day a t v a r i o u s p o l l i n g b o o t h s
much o t h e r p u b l i c l i f e
and d r o v e o f f C o n s e r v a t i v e v o t e r s " ( R i c h t e r 1965: 180).
ran v i o l e n t .
"Public rowdiness and r e s i s t a n c e t o
--
More g e n e r a l l y , tlie s u p p o r t e r s of a g i v e n c a n d i d a t e
c h a r a c t e r through c e n t u r i e s of independence and p o l i t i c a l i n t r a n s i g e a n c e "
o f t e n made a h o l i d a y of t h e e l e c t i o n , s p o r t i n g t h e i r c o l o r s . d r i n k i n g
( R i c h t e r 1971: 28).
R i c h t e r ' s i d e a resembles t h e s e n t i m e n t of t h e
nineteenth-century a u t h o r i t i e s :
t h a t they were d e a l i n g w i t h n a t u r a l l y
amply t o t h e h e a l t h of t h e i r champion, j e e r i n g h i s r i v a l s , brawling w i t h
t h e b e a r e r s of o t h e r c o l o r s .
T h i s b e h a v i o r may exemplify " p u b l i c rowdincsa
and r e s i s t a n c e t o a u t h o r i t y , " b u t i t n l s o i d e n t i f i e s a c l e n r e r l i n k betwecn
u n r u l y people who had t o b e checked, t r a i n e d and c i v i l i z e d .
The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s s o r t of c h a r a c t e r o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of
v i o l e n c e i s t h a t i t e x p l a i n s t o o much, o r n o t h i n g st a l l .
hfred o r not
--
a u t h o r i t y , " c o n c l u d e s R i c h t e r , "have been n u r t u r e d i n t o t h e B r i t i s h
Too much, i n
v i o l e n c e and o r g a n i z e d s t r u g g l e s f o r power t h a n The Times commentntor was
ready t o concede.
Two y e a r s b e f o r e t h e 1868 e l e c t i o n , t h e Tory government which had
' Except p e r h a p s f o r t h e good c h e e r , t h e a f f a i r was a t e x t b o o k example of
newly come t o power announced, through D i s r a e l i . t h a t i t would n o t neces-
large-scale collective violence:
s a r i l y t a k e up p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e f o r m i n t h e n e x t s e s s i o n .
which d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y s t a t e s a c l a i m ; a second group c h a l l e n g e s
The Reform
Lesgue c a l l e d f o r a mass meeting i n Hyde Park o n 23 J u l y 1866.
t h a t claim: t h e y s t r u g g l e .
The
one group u n d e r t a k e s a l a r g e a c t i o n
The group s t a t i n g t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m i s o f t e n
--
p o l i c e , troops, posse, v i g i l a n t e
--
meeting was t h e o c c a s i o n f o r what F r a n c i s Sheppard c a l l s t h e "only
a specialized repressive force
s i g n i f i c a n t o u t b r e a k ' o f v i o l e n c e " i n t h e g r e a t campaign l e a d i n g up t o
a c t i n g on b e h a l f of t h e dominant c l a s s e s .
t h e Reform B i l l of 1867:
t o r s i n 1866 were a n g r y , some were drunk, and some enjoyed t h e rough-andtumble.
The law o f f i c e r s of t h e Crown had d e c i d e d t h a t t h e Crown had t h e
r i g h t t o c l o s e t h e g a t e s , and t h e llome S e c r e t a r y . Spencer Walpole,
now decided t o e x e r c i s e t h i s r i g h t .
No doubt some of t h e demonstm-
But t h e b r e a k i n g down of f e n c e s and t h e s c u f f l i n g w i t h p o l i c e
was a by-product of t h e p l a y of c l a i m and c o u n t e r c l a i m .
That i s t h e
s t a n d a r d s t r u c t u r e of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e .
On b e i n g informed of t h i s t h e
l e a d e r s of t h e League d e c i d e d n e v e r t h e l e s s t o march t o llyde Park,
Violence:
Concept and R e a l i t y
I n o r d e r t o g e t t h a t p o i n t s t r a i g h t , however, we have t o d i s p o a e
and i f prevented from e n t e r i n g , t o proceed t o T r a f a l g a r Square.
"Violence" o f t e n s e r v e s a s a
P r i n t e d l e a f l e t s t o t h i s e f f e c t were d i s t r i b u t e d i n l a r g e numbers.
of some s e r i o u s c o n c e p t u a l problems.
When t h e l e a d e r s of t h e p r o c e s s i o n reached Marble Arch t h e y found
c a t c h a l l c o n t a i n i n g a l l t h e v a r i e t i e s of p r o t e s t , m i l i t a n c y , c o e r c i o n ,
t h e g a t e s c l o s e d and a l a r g e body of p o l i c e assembled.
A f t e r being
condemn.
r e f u s e d admission by t h e p o l i c e commissioner, S i r Richard Mayne.
B e a l e s and t h e crowd n e a r him l e f t f o r T r a f a l g a r Square.
But o t h e r
The
r a i l i n g s and stonework were o l d and week, and breach a f t e r b r e a c h
was q u i c k l y made a l o n g P a r k Lane and t h e Bayswater Road.
V i o l e n c e , a s Henry Bienen comments, " c a r r i e s o v e r t o n e s of
' v i o l a t i n g ' , and we o f t e n u s e v i o l e n c e t o r e f e r t o i l l e g i t i m a t e f o r c e "
(Bienen 1968: 4 ) .
p r o c e s s i o n s were s t i l l s r r i v i n g , c o n t r o l b r o k e down, and soon a
densely-packed mass of men were p r e s s i n g a g a i n s t t h e r a i l i n g s .
d e s t r u c t i o n o r m u s c l e - f l e x i n g which a g i v e n o b s e r v e r happens t o f e a r o r
Grundy and Weinstein (1974: 113) a r r a y competing
d e f i n i t i o n s of v i o l e n c e on a continuum from narrow t o broad:
narrow:
t h o s e u s e s of p h y s i c a l f o r c e which a r e p r o h i b i t e d by a
The p o l i c e
normative o r d e r presumed t o be l e g i t i m a t e :
r e s i s t e d t h e s e i n c u r s i o n s , and s c u f f l i n g broke o u t , b u t many thousands
of p e o p l e were now i n s i d e t h e p a r k , and even s company of t h e
G r e n a d i e r Guards, whose a r r i v a l was l o u d l y c h e e r e d , could n o t o u s t
t h e i n v a d e r s e x c e p t by t h e u s e of f i r e a r m s .
intermediate:
broad:
any u s e of p h y s i c a l f o r c e ;
a l l d e p r i v a t i o n s of a s s e r t e d human r i g h t s .
A f t e r an hour o r two
of c h e e r f u l s p e e c h i f y i n g d a r k n e s s began t o f a l l , and t h e crowd
I n g e n e r a l , they p o i n t o u t , d e f e n d e r s of c o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t y p r e f e r
d i s p e r s e d v o l u n t a r i l y " (Sheppard 1971: 341).
narrow d e f i n i t i o n s .
Opponents p r e f e r broad ones.
I n betwecn, t h e p l a c e
t h e " l i b e r a l democrats who d e f i n e v i o l e n c e a s any u s e of p h y s i c a l f o r c e .
s e e k power, o r something e l s e .
because t h e y would l i k e t o j u s t i f y r e v o l u t i o n s a g a i n s t a u t h o r i t a r i a n
i n t e n t i o n s is t h a t i n t e n t i o n s a r e mixed and h a r d t o d i s c e r n .
regimes which do n o t have b u i l t - i n mechanisms f o r p e a c e f u l change" (Grundy
o u t s i d e r s make c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n s of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o n f l i c t s
and Weinstein 1974: 113).
u s u a l l y i n c l u d e i m p l i c i t t h e o r i e s of c a u s a t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
o f t e n change o r m i s f i r e i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e a c t i o n .
The narrow d e f i n i t i o n of v i o l e n c e a s i l l e g i t i m a t e f o r c e
intentions
i n t r o d u c e s t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p r o p e r scope of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t o t h e
v e r y d e l i n e a t i o n of t h e phenomenon t o b e i n v e s t i g a t e d
way t o b e g i n .
--
a n unpromising
The broad d e f i n i t i o n of v i o l e n c e t o i n c l u d e a l l v i o l a t i o n s
The judgments
Even
w i t h f u l l knowledge, i n t e n t i o n s o f t e n t u r n o u t t o b e mlxed and d i v e r g e n t ,
We have, however, p r a c t i c a l a s w e l l a s p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s f o r s e l e c t i n g
t h e middle term.
The t r o u b l e w i t h l e t t i n g much depend on
I
We must n s k
when.
Violence, f u r t h e r m o r e , i s r a r e l y a s o l o performnnce.
grows o u t of a n i n t e r a c t i o n of opponents.
It u s u a l l y
Whose i n t e n t i o n s sliould c o u n t :
of human r i g h t s n o t o n l ) r e q u i r e s agreement on t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h o s e
t h e s m a l l group of d e m o n s t r a t o r s who g a t h e r on t h e s t e p s of t h e c a p i t a l .
r i g h t s , b u t a l s o expands t h e phenomenon t o such a l a r g e range of s o c i a l
t h e l a r g e r group of s p e c t a t o r s who e v e n t u a l l y g e t drawn i n t o t h e a c t t o n .
r e l a t i o n s a s t o make s y s t e m a t i c s t u d y of i t almost u n t h i n k a b l e .
t h e p o l i c e who f i r s t s t a n d guard and t h e n s t r u g g l e t o d i s p e r s e t h e crowd?
I f we
r e s t r i c t o u r a t t e n t i o n t o human a c t i o n s which damage p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s ,
Both i n t h e o r y and i n p r a c t i c e . then. i n t e n t i o n s p r o v i d e sliaky c r i t e r i a
we have a t l e a s t a chance t o s o r t o u t t h e r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e appearance
f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of v i o l e n c e from n o n v i o l e n c e .
I n h e r b r i l l i a n t e s s a y on v i o l e n c e . Hannah Arendt urged a fundnmental
of t h o s e a c t i o n s .
Even t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n c a l l a immediately f o r f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s .
Violence s o d e f i n e d s t i l l i n c l u d e s :
--
Power, i n h e r view, I s " t h e
human a b i l i t y n o t j u s t t o a c t b u t t o a c t i n c o n c e r t . " ' B u t t h e d i f f i c u l t t e s
w i t h which we a r e w r e s t l i n g a p p e a r i n one f a c t :
Arendt n e v e r q u i t e
c u t thumbs
defined violence.
-- murders
- hockey games
- rebellions
-- normal wear
-- d i s p o s a l of
-
d i s t i n c t i o n between power and v i o l e n c e .
T h i s was t h e c l o s e s t approach:
V i o l e n c e i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by i t s i n s t r u m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r .
Phenomeno-
l o g i c a l l y , i t is c l o s e t o s t r e n g t h , s i n c e t h e implements of v i o l e n c e ,
l i k e a l l o t h e r t o o l s , a r e designed and used f o r t h e purpose of
of s u t o m o b i l e s o r t h e r o a d s t h e y t r a v e l
m u l t i p l y i n g n a t u r a l s t r e n g t h u n t i l , i n t h e l a s t s t a g e of t h e i r
noxious w a s t e s
development. they c a n s u b s t i t u t e f o r i t (Arendt 1970: 46).
c i g a r e t t e smoking
As a d i s t i n c t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l philosophy
--
t h a t is. i n t h e p r i n c i p l e 8
The obvious t e m p t a t i o n i s t o add some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e
upon which we can r e a s o n a b l y found s system of government and by which
i n t e n t i o n s of t h e a c t o r s :
we can j u s t i f y o r condemn p u b l i c a c t i o n s
they want t o d e s t r o y , t h e y a r e a n g r y , they
--
A r e n d t ' s t r e a t m e n t of power
and violence is illuminating. As a guide to observation of acting people.
so on, enters the definition in order to exclude self-destruction, pot-
however, it has the fatal flaw of resting on exactly the features of col-
latches, ceremonial mutilation, urban renewal and other collective damsge
lective action which observers and participants dispute most passionately.
in which all partiea are more or less agreed to the damage.
That is precisely because they are the features of the action which will
to certify the preaence of complicating interests.)
bring on it justification from some and condemnation from others. Justi-
In short,
Further distinctions start from there: collective vs. individual,
fication end condemnation are important business, but they are not our
depending on the number of parties to the interaction; games va. nongnmea,
business here.
depending on the extent to which all participants begin with en agreement
Nor do any easy alternatives lie close at hand.
We may try to de-
fine "normal" or "expected" or "legitimate" uses of force in social life.
and define deviations from them as violent.
That approach not only re-
to work toward a determinate set of alternative outcomes by fo.llowing
sane standard rules; continuous vs. discontinuous, depending on how great
a time span we observe and how large an interval we permit to elapse be-
quires the (difficult) assessment of the normal, expected state of af-
fore we call the action at an end; and so forth.
fairs, but also tends to define away violence exerted by professional
Some Lineaments of Violence
specialists in coercion: police, soldiers, mafiosi, muggers.
If, on the
Once collective violence is defined in these terms, interesting con-
other hand, we turn to the amount of damage sustained by the individuals
clusions begin to emerge from the close examination of the actual record
or objects involved, we face the difficulty of determining how direct
of violent events. Our study of thousanda of violent incidents occurrii~g
and material the damage must be: Does a firm's dumping of garbage which
in western Europe since 1800 reveals several strong tendencies which nf-
promotes disease count? Does the psychic burden of enslavement count?
fect our understanding of the roots of violence.
I recite these tedious complications in order to emphasize that in
the present state of knowledge 5 definition will be arbitrary in some
regards and debatable in others.
call violent.
People do not agree on whet they will
What is more, their disagreement springs to an important
First, most collective violence
--
in the sense of interactions which
produce direct damage to persons and obJects
--
grows out of nctions which
ere not intrinsically violent, and which are basically similar to n much
larger number of collective actions occurrilig without violence in the
extent from differences in political perspective. My own inclination is
same periods and s'ettings.
towsrd what Terry Nardin cells e "brute harm" conception of violence: any
Some group displays its strength and determination in the presence of the
observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are
public, of the agents of the state. and perhaps of its enemies as well.
seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance.
(Direct or indirect
The clearest example is the demonstration:
The great majority of demonstrations pass without direct damage to perBut a small proportion do turn to violent encounters
resistonce, in the form of attacks on persons. erection of barriers,
sons or property.
standing in the way, holding on to the persons or objects at issue, and
between police and demonstrators, or attacks on property by the demon-
strators. When that happens, we conventionally use a new word for the
event
--
"riot"
--
and thereby obscure its connection witn nonviolent
events. The demonstration is such a common way of doing political business in modern Europe that even the small proportion of violent outcomes
violent, and repressive forces receive the order to stop them by whatever means are necessary. The means are often violent.
Violence in America
Since no one has done the necessary detailed studies of contemporary
is enough to make the demonstration the most frequent setting for collec-
Latin America. North America. Africa or Asia, it is hard to say h w
tive violence. The strike, the parliamentary session, the public meeting.
generally these generalizations apply. The fragments of evidence n w
the fiesta follow something like the same pattern: the great majority of
available indicate that they apply very widely in contemporary countries
them going off without violence, the violent ones not differing in any
with strong governments. Jerome Skolnick (1969: 258) says in aummary of
fundamental way from the rest.
one part of his analysis of contemporary American protests. "It is mLs-
A second important feature of collective violence which stands out
leading to ignore the part played by social control agencies in aggrn-
in the modern European record is the heavy involvement of agents of the
vating and sometimes creating a riot.
state, especially repressive agents like police and soldiers. This is,
Commission observed, for a riot to begin @ end with police violence."
unsurprisingly, a matter of scale: the fewer the people involved, the
less likely that repressive agents will be there.
Rut it does not mean
It is not unusuel. a8 the Kerner
A chronological review of violence in American labor-management dis-
putes makes it clear both that over the long run police, troops and plant
simply that the larger the scale of violence the more likely the police
guards have done the bulk of the killing and wounding, and that the typical
are to step in. For in the niodern European experience repressive forces
starting point has been some sort of illegal but nonviolent collective
are themselves the most consistent initiators end performers of collective
action by the workers
violence.
sending of delegations.
There is a division of labor: repressive forces do the largest part
of the killing and wounding, while the groups they are seeking to control do most of the damage to objects. The division of labor follows from
the usual advantage repressive forces have with respect to arms and military discipline; from the common tactics of demonstrators, strikers and
other frequent participants in collective violence, which are to violate
symbolically-charged rules and prohibitions whose enforcement is the affair of agents of government; from the typical sequence of events, in
which demonstrators are carrying on an action which is illegal yet non-
--
a walkout, a sitdown, a demonstration. picketing.
In their sketch of the usual circumstances in
which the total of at least 700 persons died in American "labor violence"
-
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Taft and Ross report:
Facing inflexible opposition, union leaders and their members frequently.found that nothing, neither peaceful persuasion nor the heads
of government, could move the employer towards recognition.
Frus-
tration and desperation impelled pickets to react to strike-breakers
with anger. Many violent outbreaks followed efforts of strikers to
restrain the entry of strike-breakers and raw materials into the
struck plant.
St~chconduct, obviously illegal, opened the opportunity
for forceful police measures.
myth of peaceful progress and the culpability of the violent
In the long run, the employer's side
--
it is the
was better equipped for success. The use of force by pickets was
existence of this coalition, exercising power through a highly centralized
illegal on its face, but the action of the police and company guards
Federal bureaucracy, which helps keep emerging groups powerless and de-
were in vindication of the employer's rights (Taft end Ross 1969:
pendent" (p. 17).
289-290).
bids for power have met determined resistance and brought forth the pious
The consequence, in Rubenstein's view, is that recent
recommendation that the members of the groups involved attempt to enter
The same general pattern recurs in the bulk of contemporary American colthe system as individuals, on their own merits. rather than dentroying
lective violence: a group undertakes an illegal andlor politically unacthe system through collective efforts to wrest benefits from it.
ceptable action, forces of order seek to check the group, a violent encounter ensues, the "rioters"
--
Rubenatein's analysis includes both an idea of how the American eysfor that is the label the group acquires
at the moment of violent contact with police or troops
--
tem usually works and a notion of the changes it has undergone since the
sustain most
1930s. The general picture corresponds to William Gameon's portrayal of
of the casualties.
"stable unrepresentetion" in American politics:
"
. . . the American po-
Reflecting on the long succession of violent encounters between
litical system normally operates to prevent incipient competitors from
cl~sllengersend power-holders in America. Richard Rubenstein makes an imachieving full entry into the political arena" (Gamaon 1968 : 18).
That
portant observation:
description applies to all political systems; the real questions are: How
At the outset, one thing seems clear: those groups which achieved
great are the obstacles? How do they vary from system to system and time
success without participating in sustained rioting, guerrilla terror-
to time?
That brings up the second part.
ism or outright insurrection were not necessarily more talented,
Has the American system closed down
hard-working or "American" than those that resorted to higher levels
since the 1930~7 To try that question out seriously, we shall need much
of violence. The resistance of more powerful groups to change is
more precise information than we now have concerning the fates of succes-
one key struggle; another is the match between out-group charac-
sive challengers. Gamson's investigation does not reveal any significantly
teristics and the needs of a changing political-economic system
(Rubenstein 1970: 15-16).
I
increased tendency for the recent challengers in his sample to fail.
his investigation deals with small numbers, and stops in 1945.
obvious that recent challengers
Then he goes on to contrast the fluidity of the economic and political
But
It is not
-- antiwar students, organized blacks, goy
activists and aircraft manufacturers are likely candidates for the post-
arrangements open to the immigrants of 1880-1920 with the formation, in
1940 list
--
met more resistance than craft unions, Prohibitionists or
the 1930s and 1940s, of a new ruling coalition quite resistant to disAbolitionists had in the nineteenth century. There is probebly variation
placement: "Ironically, since these are the groups most wedded to the
I
I
over t i m e , and t h e r e may w e l l b e a long-run t r e n d .
Both a r e s u r e l y t o o
t o keep o t h e r s from c l a i m i n g t h e same r e s o u r c e s .
s u b t l e t o show up i n a few offhand comparisons.
Then two d i f f e r e n t sequences a r e l i k e l y t o produce c o l l e c t i v e vio-
P o l i t i c a l Action and Involvement i n V i o l e n c e
l e n c e i n v o l v i n g d e c l i n i n g members of a p o l i t y .
I n t h e terms we were u s i n g e a r l i e r , Rubenatein is s a y i n g t h a t members
The f i r s t is l i k e t h e one
i n v o l v i n g new c l a i m a n t s f o r membership i n t h e p o l i t y . i n t h a t a g e n t s of
of t h e p o l i t y , a c t i n g mainly through a g e n t s of t h e s t a t e , have banded to-
t h e government d i r e c t l y r e e f a t t h e c l a i m s of t h e p a r t i n g member t o keep ex-
g e t h e r t o r e s i s t t h e c l a i m s of newly-mobilized c h a l l e n g e r s f o r membership.
e r t i n g t h e i r former r i g h t s t o c e r t a i n r e a o u r c e s .
His moat prominent c a s e i s o r g a n i z e d b l a c k s .
The a n a l y s i s a p p l i e s more
The second p i t a t h e
p a r t i n g member d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t o t h e r s s e e k i n g t o a c q u i r e t h e d j a p u t e d
g e n e r a l l y t o t h e p a n t and p r e s e n t c o n t e n t i o n of wheat f a r m e r s , women, be-
r e s o u r c e s : v i g i l a n t e movements. p r i v a t e armies. and gangs of t h u g s a r e en-
I n t h e s e c a s e s and
p e c i a l l y l i k e l y t o e n t e r t h e a c t i o n a t t h i s p o i n t , a s t h e o l d member s e e k s
l i e v e r s i n Temperance, s t u d e n t s and o r g a n i z e d l a b o r .
many o t h e r s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e g r o u p ' s c o l l e c t i v e c l a i m s would a i g n i -
t o s u b s t i t u t e i t s own f o r c e f o r t h a t of t h e now-unreliable government.
f i c a n t l y r e a l l o c a t e t h e r e a o u r c e a under t h e c o n t r o l of t h e p o l i t y , redef i n e t h e r u l e s of membership f o r f u r t h e r c h a l l e n g e r s , change t h e l i k e l y
c o a l i t i o n s i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y .
I n such c a a e a , t h e main l i n e be-
The r e g i o n a l movement of r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t a c e n t r a l i z i n g s t a t e
commonly t a k e s t h i s form ( s e e Hechter 1975).
So d o e s t h e c l a s s i c European
food r i o t , i n which t h e members of a community c o l l e c t i v e d i s p u t e t h e r i g h t
tween v i o l e n c e and c o n t e n t i o n f o r power c o n s i s t s of t h e r e p e a t e d sequence
of anyone t o s t o r e g r a i n i n t i m e s of hunger o r s h i p g r a i n o u t of t h e commu-
i n which members of t h e c h a l l e n g i n g group p u b l i c l y l a y c l a i m t o some apace,
n i t y when l o c a l p e o p l e s t i l l need food, and r e i n f o r c e t h e i r d l a p u t e by
o b j e c t , p r i v i l e g e , p r o t e c t i o n o r o t h e r r e s o u r c e which t h e y c o n s i d e r due
a c t i n g i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s : i n v e n t o r y i n g t h e g r o i n
them on g e n e r a l grounds, and t h e a g e n t s of t h e government (backed by t h e
on hand, accumulating i t i n a p u b l i c p l a c e . and s e l l i n g i t o f f a t a p r i c e
members of t h e p o l i t y ) f o r c i b l y r e s i s t t h e i r c l a i m s .
l o c a l l y determined t o b e j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e ( s e e C. T i l l y 1975. L. T i l l y
Collective proaction
1971).
on t h e one s i d e , c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n on t h e o t h e r .
A complete p i c t u r e of t h e p r o c e s s l i n k i n g c o n t e n t i o n and v i o l e n c e ,
however, r e q u i r e s a d i s t i n c t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r s and members on t h e i r
way o u t of t h e p o l i t y .
Members l o a i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n a r e more l i k e l y t o
f i n d themselves t r y i n g t o m a i n t a i n e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s t o some p a r t i c u l a r
resource
exemption
---
a s c h o o l , a d i s t i n c t i v e costume, a s o u r c e of income, a t a x
and unable t o e n l i s t t h e s u p p o r t of o t h e r members o r of
a g e n t s of t h e government i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h o s e c l a i m s .
Under t h o s e c i r -
cumstances, t h e y commonly a t t e m p t t o e x e r t t h o s e c l a i m s on t h e i r own, and
So, f i n a l l y , do a v a r i e t y of f a s c i s t movements formed i n o p p o s i t i o n
t o t h e t h r e a t e n i n g c l a i m s of a m o b i l i z e d working c l a s a .
The sequences i n v o l v i n g new c o n t e n d e r s and d e c l i n i n g members mean
t h a t c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e t e n d s t o c l u s t e r around e n t r i e s i n t o t h e p o l i t y
and e x i t s from i t .
prevalent.
When membership i s s t a b l e , c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i s l e s s .
The most i m p o r t a n t s i n g l e r e a s o n f o r t h a t c l u s t e r i n g i s t h e
p r o p e n s i t y of t h e government's r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s t o a c t a g a i n s t new cont e n d e r s and d e c l i n i n g members.
Some i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e l i n k s between c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e and
.
6-16
6-15
struggles nt the edge of the polity appear in Dee Wernette's nnnlysis of
the Germnn elections of September 1930 and July 1932
Table 6-1: Percent of All Political Events Preceding the German Elections
-- crucial moments
of September 1930 and July 1932 Involvlng Different Types of
in the ride of the Nnzis and the disappearance of the communists from German political life.
Action.
Among other things. Wernette coded "politicnl events"
reported in the Kiilnische Zeitung during 'the two months preceding ench of
the elections.
The events he enumernted included 1) non-violent, organized
polltical activities such as electoral rallles; 2) acts of terrorimn such
Type of Action
as bombings and ambushes touching manifestly political targets; 3) Eights
election-oriented
and collective violence involving at'least one group clearly identified by
political affiliation; 4 ) repressive acts by the state, such as police in-
other nonviolent action
acts of terror
vestigations. arrests and trials.
As Table 6-1 shows, a significant proportion of all the events
included terror or collective violence.
nonviolent action
More important, the proportions
attacks on property
collective violence
rose as the struggle became more acute: 27 percent of the events involved
police investigations
collective violence. nine percent terror and eight percent attscks on
arrests
property in 1930. while the figures for 1932 were 57 percent, 25 percent
reports of trials
and thirteen percent.
bans on organizations
sive.)
(The categories are not. of course, mvtually exclu-
The leading participants in violent events, by far, ere Nazis,
Cotmnuniats. and police.
The chief settings of collective violence were
major areas of Comnunist strength: the regions of Berlin, Cologne, Diisseldorf and so on
--
bans on activities
the areas in which the Nazis concentrated their campaign
to extirpate the Communists.
In fact, the most frequent eventn were Nnzt-
Communist clanhes and attacks of each on the other's property.
The col-
lective violence grew directly from the struggle for places in the
Cerman polity.
I do 'not mean that'the sequences I have described are the only ones
which produce collective violence, just that they are the moat regular and
total number of events
percent in 1930
33
Percent
--
in 1932
15
reliable.
Routine testing among established members of a polity pro-
rage. the exhiliration or the resentment
duces a certain amount of violent conflict. but it tends to be limited;
and treated as a regrettable error.
cause
the collective action.
If these arguments are correct. they produce a paradoxical lesson
Conventional combats among teams.
for researchers: to understand and explain violent actions, you must under-
communitiea. youth groups or schools sometimes fit the pattern of "teeting"
stand nonviolent actions.
violence. but more often escape it; they. too, operate oa a small scale.
deals with the product of two different sots of determinants: 1) the de-
within large restrictions. Drunken brawls, private vengeance. festival
terminants of collective action in general. whether it produces violence
mdness, impcllsive vandalism, all reach a dangerous magnitude now and then.
or not; 2) the determinants of violent outcomes to collective action.
What is w r e . the frequency of conventional combats, brawls, vendettas
encountered a similar problem in the explanation of strikes: While in some
and so on undoubtedly varies with the basic conceptions of honor, obli-
sense a group of workers chooses to strike or not to strike. the strike is
gation and solidarity which prevail within a population.
Nevertheless. I
Any study which treats violent events alone
We
simply one of several alternative ways to deal with grievances: slowdowns.
would say tlmt in populations under tile control of atates all these forms
political pressure, sabotage, and individual grumbling are also possible.
account for only a smell proportion of the collective violence which
That is why we can't simply infer the level of discontent from the fre-
occurs, and change far too gradually to account for the abrupt surges end
quency of strike attempts.
Furthermore, whether a strike actually occurs
The
is a product of strategic estimates and strategic interaction on the part
chief source of variation in collective violence is the operation of the
of at least two contenders; when either party is much stronger and wilier
polity.
than the other, the grievance is likely to be settled. or squashed. short
recessions of collective violence which appear in such populations.
Nor do I mean that moat collective violence goes on in calculating
calm.
Par from it.
of a strike.
Both those who are arguing for the acquisition of
Snyder and Kelly (1976) find that from 1878 through 1903 ltalian
rights on the basis of general principles end those who are fighting for
strikes were more likely to be violent if they were large. long and/or
the defense of privilege on the basis of custom and precedent are usually
oriented to wage demands rather than union organization.
indignant, and often enraged.
H m e n t s of dangerous confrontation (as Louis
Contrary to many
arguments which proceed immediately from grievances to strikes. thcy find
Cirard saye of the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and almost every-
no relationship between the frequency of violence in strlkes and the rate
one saye of the Prencl~ Events of Hey, 1968) frequently bring an air of
of industrial growth or wage changes.
festival, of ext~iliration. of release from ordinary restrictions.
Plenty
and Tilly (1971) for Prance, they find thnt on the average violent strikes
of individual venting of resentments and settling of old scores takes place
were less successful then nonviolent strikes.
under the cover of collective action in the name of high principle. The
argument up to this point simply denies the common conclusion that the
Contrary to the findlnga of Shorter
These are important results.
They emphasize all the more the necessity of separating the determinants
.
of collective action (in this case, the decision to strike) in general
from t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of v i o l e n t outcomes t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
I n our f i r s t c a t e g o r y of d e t e r m i n a n t s , we f i n d such i t e m s a s t h e
frequency of v i o l a t i o n s of e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s , t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l s of
d i f f e r e n t c o n t e n d e r s f o r power, t h e c u r r e n t c o a t s of d i f f e r e n t forms of
Contentious g a t h e r i n g s s u c h ' a s t h e demonstration, t h e s t r i k e . t h e
groups.
s o - c a l l e d food r i o t and t h e t a x p r o t e s t a r e n o t , on t h e whole. i n t r i n s i c a l l y
violent.
I n f a c t , most of them o c c u r w i t h o u t v i o l e n c e .
The v i o l e n t v e r s i o n s of t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n . t h e s t r i k e , t h e food
a c t i o n which a r e i n t h e a v a i l a b l e r e p e r t o i r e , and s o on.
I n t h e second,
r i o t and t h e t a x p r o t e s t do n o t form a d i s t i n c t l y s e p a r a t e c l s s s of e v e n t s .
we f i n d t h e p r e s e n c e o r a b s e n c e of c o u n t e r - d e m o n s t r a t o r s ,
t h e t a c t i c s of
They o r d i n a r i l y o c c u r i n t h e m i d s t of s t r i n g s of s i m i l a r e v e n t s which a r e
I
r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s , t h e l e n g t h of time d u r i n g which opposing p a r t i e s a r e
q u i t e s i m i l a r t o them e x c e p t f o r t h e f a c t t h n t they produce no damage o r
i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h each o t h e r , and s o on.
s r j z u r e of p e r s o n s o r p r o p e r t y .
Each of t h e two sometimes
They a r e . f o r t h e moat p a r t , t h e membcrs
changes w h i l e t h e o t h e r remains more o r l e s s t h e same: d e m o n s t r a t i o n s be-
of t h e s t r i n g s i n which o t h e r p a r t i e s r e a i s t t h e c l a i m s b e i n g made.
come more f r e q u e n t , a l t h o u g h t h e p e r c e n t a g e of d e m o n s t r a t i o n s which pro-
o t h e r p a r t i e s a r e more l i k e l y t o r e s i s t i f t h e c o n t e n d e r making t h e c l a i m s
duce s t r e e t - f i g h t i n g
l a c k s a l a r g e advantage i n power o r i f t h e c l a i m s t h r e a t e n t h e i r s u r v i v a l .
remains t h e same; t h e a u t h o r i t i e s g e t tougher w i t h
s t r i k e r s , a l t h o u g h s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s have n o t a l t e r e d .
changes t h e frequency of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e .
E i t h e r one
A p r o p e r e x p l a n a t i o n of
v i o l e n c e l e v e l s must decompose i n t o a t l e a s t t h e s e two components.
Out of t h e e n t i r e s t r e a m of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , o n l y a s m a l l p a r t
produces v i o l e n c e .
The c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which produces v i o l e n c e a t t r a c t a
The
But v i o l e n t and n o n v i o l e n t e v e n t s of t h e same g e n e r a l t y p e c l u s t e r tog e t h e r s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r u s t o employ t h e v i s i b l e , v i o l e n t e v e n t s a s a
t r a c e r of t h e ebb and flow of c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s i n g e n e r a l .
Changing C o n t e x t s f o r C o l l e c t i v e Violence
The competitive/reactive/proactive scheme p r o v i d e s n convenient
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e a t t e n t i o n b e c a u s e 1 ) t h e immediate c o s t s t o t h e p a r t i -
means of summing up t h e l a r g e s t t r e n d s i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e mnjor con-
c i p a n t s tend t o b e g r e a t e r , more v i s i b l e and more d r a m a t i c t h a n i n non-
t e x t s of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s o v e r t h e l a s t f o u r o r
v i o l e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ; 2) t h e e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n o f t e n i n v o l v e t h e
five centuries.
i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s ; t h e s u t h o r i t i e s i n t e r v e n e because t h e y
r i s e of n a t i o n a l s t a t e s t o preeminent p o s i t i o n s i n a wide v a r i e t y of po-
find t h e i r i n t e r e s t s
other actors.
--
o r t h o s e of t h e i r a l l i e s
--
t h r e a t e n e d by t h e
C o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e is n o t . by and l a r g e , t h e r e s u l t of
Two main p r o c e s s e s have dominated a l l t h e r e s t : 1 ) t h e
l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s ; 2) t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y a s s o c i a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e
p r i n c i p a l c o n t e n d e r s f o r power a t t h e l o c a l a s w e l l a s t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l .
a s i n g l e g r o u p ' s p o s s e s s i o n by a n emotion. s e n t i m e n t , a t t i t u d e o r i d e a .
I n 1500, no f u l l - f l e d g e d n a t i o n a l s t a t e w i t h unquestioned p r i o r i t y o v e r
I t grows, f o r t h e moat p a r t , o u t of s t r a t e g i c = a c t i o n
t h e o t h e r governments w i t h i n i t s t e r r i t o r y e x i s t e d anywhere i n t h e West.
among groups.
I n t h e modern w e s t e r n e x p e r i e n c e , t h e most f r e q u e n t s e t t i n g s f o r
England was probably t h e c l o s e s t approximation.
The England of 1500 was.
c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e a r e c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s : a s s e m b l i e s of p e o p l e who
however, o n l y f i f t e e n y e a r s p a s t t h e s l a y i n g of King Richard 111 by Henry
mnke v i s i b l e c o l l e c t i v e c l a i m s which c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r
Tudor a t Bosworth F i e l d .
I t was f r e s h from t h e widely-supported r e b e l l i o n s
of Lsmbert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck.
Scotland.
It had yet to effect the union with
It still harbored a number of great lords who controlled their
only won their struggle for predominance over the furious resistance of
princes, communes, provinces and peasant communities.
For several cen-
own bands of armed retainers. Government itself consisted largely of
turies the principal forms of collective violence therefore grew from
shifting, competing coalitions among great magnates and their retinues,
reactive movements on the part of different segments of the general popu-
the king being the greatest magnate of the strongest coalition. Become
lation: communally-based contenders For power fought againat loss of mem-
Henry VII, Henry Tudor began the large work of statemaking which Henry
bership in polities, indeed against the very destruction of the politiea
VIII and Elizabeth so vigorously continued.
in which their power was invested. Collective resistance to conscription.
A century and a half after 1500, a great civil war reopened the
question of whether the centralized royal apparatus the Tudors, and then
to taxation, to billeting, to a whole variety of other exactions of the
state exemplify this reactive road to collective violence.
For a century or more in the experience of most West European coun-
the Stuarts, had begun building would be the dominant politicnl organization in England.
In fact, the state which emerged in 1688 had rather
tries, however, the most frequent form of violence-producing movement
different contours from the one the Tudors and Stuarts had been building.
simed at the k r k e t more directly than at the state.
The strength and autonomy of Parliament far exceeded anything a cool ob-
riot.
server of the England of 1600 or 1620 could reasonably have anticipated.
grain rather than edibles, and most of the time it did not reach the
In 1500 most states faced serious challenges to their hegemony from
Thot was the food
The name is misleading: most often the struggle turned about raw
point of physical violence.
The classic European food riot had three
both inside and outside the territory. Only a small minority of the hun-
main variants: the retributive action, in which a crowd attacked the per-
dreds of more or less autonomous governments survived the next two centuries
sona, property or premises of someone believed to be hoarding or profi-
of statemaking. Moat power was concentrated in politics of smaller than
teering; the blockage, in which a group of local people prevented the
national scale: communities, city-states, principalities, semi-autonomous
shipment of food out of their own locality..requiring it to be stored
provinces. Most contenders for power in those polities were essentially
andlor sold locally; the price riot, in which people seized Atored food
communal in structure: craft brotherhoods, families, peasant communities.
or food displayed for sale, sold it publicly at a price they declared to
The predominnnt forms of collective violence registered those circumstances:
be proper, and handed the money over to the owner or merchant.
wars between rival governments, brawls between groups of artisans, battles
In the best-documented cases
--
--
England and France of the eighteenth
b o n g the youth of neighboring communes, attacks by one religious group
and nineteenth centuries
on another.
price riot, and much more often than the retributive action.
The rise of the state threatened the power (and often the very survival) of all these small-scale polities. They resisted. The statemakers
the blockage occurred more frequently than the
In those
two countries, the food riot practically disappeared some time during the
nineteenth century. Later, questions of food supply motivated dramatic
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s now and t h e n , b u t almost always i n t h e form of demon-
t h e p r o c e s s s o l o n g a s l o c a l s o l i d a r i t y and some c o l l e c t i v e memory of t h e
s t r a t i o n s i n which p r o d u c e r s complained a b o u t low p r i c e s o r consumers com-
l o c a l i t y ' s p r i o r claims survived.
plained about high p r i c e s .
a c t i o n s o f b l o c k i n g . i n v e n t o r y i n g , s t o r i n g , d e c l a r i n g o p r i c e and h o l d i n g
The t i m i n g of t h e food r i o t ' s r i s e and f a l l i s r e v e a l i n g .
I n Eng-
To a n i m p o r t a n t d e g r e e , t h e crowd's
a p u b l i c s a l e f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e l o c a l s f u l f i l l e d what had p r e v i o u s l y
l a n d , France and some o t h e r p a r t s of w e s t e r n Europe, t h e food r i o t d i s -
been t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n d e a l i n g w i t h s h o r t a g e s
placed t h e t a x r e b e l l i o n a s t h e most f r e q u e n t v i o l e n t form of c o l l e c t i v e
and h i g h p r i c e s .
a c t i o n toward t h e end of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
p l i c i t l y by a c q u i e s c i n g i n t h e r o u t i n e ; when they took t h e i n i t i o t i v e
It declined precipi-
t o u s l y i n England j u s t a f t e r 1820. i n Germany and France j u s t a f t e r 1850.
o n l y t o l i n g e r on i n p a r t s of S p a i n and I t a l y i n t o t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y .
The c a l e n d a r d i d n o t conform t o t h e h i s t o r y of hunger; indeed t h e
M a g i s t r a t e s o r mayors o f t e n acknowledged t h a t f a c t i m -
themselves, t h e crowd u s u a l l y s t o p p e d i t s work.
The immediate o b j e c t s of t h e crowd's a t t e n t i o n were c m o n l y l o c a l
o f f i c i a l s , b a k e r s , r i c h f a r m e r s a n d , e s p e c i a l l y , g r a i n merchants.
The
g r e a t k i l l i n g famines of Medieval and Renaissance Europe were d i s a p p e a r i n g
s t r u g g l e p i t t e d t h e c l a i m s of t h e n a t i o n a l market a g a i n s t t h e c l a i m s of t h e
a s t h e food r i o t came i n t o i t s own, and p e r c a p i t a food s u p p l y was pro-
l o c a l population.
b a b l y i n c r e a s i n g through much of t h e p e r i o d .
f l e c t e d t h e geography of t h e g r a i n market: t e n d i n g t o form s r i n g around
Instead, three conjoint
For t h a t r e a s o n , t h e geography of t h e f w d r i o t re-
c l ~ a n g e saccount f o r t h e timing: 1 ) t h e p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n of t h e popula-
London, P a r i s , a n o t h e r c a p i t a l o r a major p o r t , c o n c e n t r a t i n g e s p e c i a l l y
t i o n , which meant a d r a s t i c d i m i n u t i o n i n t h e p r o p o r t i o n of households
a l o n g r i v e r s , c a n a l s end major r o a d s .
which produced enough food f o r t h e s u b s i s t e n c e of t h e i r own members, a
1795-96 and 1800-01. Stevenson remarks: "The map shows t h e extremely
g r e a t expansion i n t h e number dependent on t h e market f o r s u r v i v a l ;
c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p of d i s t u r b a n c e s t o t h e communications network i n t h e
2) t h e c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n of food p r o d u c t i o n , which i n c l u d e d t h e b u i l a i n g
p r o d u c t i o n a r e a s around London i n t h e g e two stlortogee.
of n a t i o n a l m a r k e t s and t h e promotion of t h e i d e a s t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l
p a t t e r n o v e r a l l i s t h a t of 1795-96 when a t l e a s t f i f t y food d i s t u r b a n c e s
markets
should
have p r i o r i t y o v e r l o c a l needs and t h a t t h e m a r k e t ' s
For t h e a c u t e E n g l i s h c r i s e s of
The most s t r i k i n g
took p l a c e a t c o m u n c a t i o n c e n t r e s , e i t h e r c o a s t a l p o r t s , c a n a l o r r i v e r
o p e r a t i o n tended t o s e t a j u s t , p r o p e r and e f f i c i e n t p r i c e ; 3) t h e d i s -
p o r t s , o r towns w i t h i n easy c a r t i n g d i s t a n c e of major p o p u l a t i o n c e n t r e s "
m a n t l i n g of t h e e x t e n s i v e p r e v i o u s l y - e x i s t i n g c o n t r o l s o v e r t h e d i s t r i b u -
(Stevenson 1974: 43).
t i o n of food, which gave t h e l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n a p r i o r c l a i m o v e r food pro-
d i s t o r t i n g m i r r o r , f o r t h e most thoroughly c o m e r c i a l i z e d a r e a s , a d j a c e n t
duced and s o l d i n s l o c a l i t y , and bound t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o p r o v i d e
t o l a r g e o l d c i t i e s , d i d n o t t y p i c a l l y produce food r i o t s .
f o r t h e a u b s i a t e n c e of t h e l o c a l poor.
market had a l r e s d y won o u t o v e r l o c a l r i g h t s t o t h e food s u p p l y .
E.P. Thompson h a s c a l l e d t h e e n t i r e p r o c e s s a d e c l i n e i n t h e o l d
Moral Economy, a s h i f t from a bread nexus t o a c a s h nexus.
People r e s i s t e d
Yet t h e r e f l e c t i o n of t h e market came through a
There, t h e
D e s p i t e t h e s a l i e n c e of t h e market. t h e food r i o t a l s o r e s u l t e d
i n p a r t from t h e r i s e of t h e n a t i o n a l s t a t e .
In g e n e r a l (although with
g r e a t h e s i t a t i o n s , v a r i a t i o n s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n outcome) European s t a t e -
forms, althougli a t t i m e s and tempos which v a r i e d markedly from one p a r t of
makers a c t e d t o promote a l l t h r e e of t h e p r o c e s s e s u n d e r l y i n g t h e food
t h e West t o a n o t h e r .
r i o t : p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n , c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n , d i s m a n t l i n g of l o c a l con-
a s k how complete t h e v i c t o r y of t h e s t a t e was i n t h e remote s e c t i o n s
trols.
A s t h e i r dependent governmental s t a f f s , urban p o p u l a t i o n s and non-
F i r s t , t h e s t a t e won almost everywhere.
One may
of v a s t t e r r i t o r i e s such a s Canada, A u s t r a l i a o r B r n z i l , and s p e c u l a t e
a g r i c u l t u r a f l a b o r f o r c e s s w e l l e d , t h e managers of s t a t e s i n t e r v e n e d i n -
whether r e c e n t s u r g e s of s e c t i o n a l i s m i n Belgium. G r e a t B r i t a i n and even
c r e a s i n g l y t o promote marketing.
France p r e s a g e t h e end of s t a t e c o n t r o l .
(There i s i r o n y i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y
a c t e d t h u s i n t h e nome of f r e e i n g t h e m a r k e t . )
As Stevenson s a y s of t h e
English c r i s i s of 1795:
Yet on t h e whole t h e two cen-
t u r i e s a f t e r 1700 produced an enormous c o n c e n t r a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s and
means of c o e r c i o n under t h e c o n t r o l of n a t i o n a l s t a t e s , t o t h e v t r t u n l
The government, however, was determined t o keep o u t of t h e i n t e r n a l
e x c l u s i o n of o t h e r l e v e l s of government.
c o r n t r a d e and a t t e m p t e d t o keep up t h e normal c i r c u l a t i o n of
z a t i o n n l changes c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o u r b a n i z a t i o n . i n d u s t r i a l i z n t i o l ~and t h e
Second, a whole s e r i e s of orgnni-
On
expansion of c a p i t a l i s m g r e a t l y reduced t h e r o l e of t h e communal group a s
t h e s e grounds t h e government r e f u s e d t o y i e l d t o t h e p l e a s of
a s e t t i n g f o r m o b i l i z a t i o n and a s a r e p o s i t o r y f o r power; t h e a s s o c i a t i o n
l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e normal movement of g r a i n
of one kind o r a n o t h e r came t o b e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c v e h i c l e f o r c o l l e c t i v e
. . . I t was
action.
g r o i n , s o t h a t t h e l a r g e urban c e n t r e s would b e s u p p l i e d .
r e p o r t e d t o t h e Home O f f i c e t h a t s t o p p i n g t h e move-
ment of g r a i n had become s o widespread t h a t c o u n t r y m i l l e r s were
s a i d t o b e f r i g h t e n e d t o send g r a i n t o t h e c a p i t a l e x c e p t by n i g h t .
The r i s e of t h e j o i n t - s t o c k company, tlie p o l i t i c a l p n r t y , tlie
l a b o r union, t h e c l u b a l l belong t o t h e same g e n e r a l t r e n d .
Working t o g e t h e r , t h e v i c t o r y of t h e s t a t e and t h e r i s e of t h e ss-
I n an a t t e m p t t o f r e e t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of g r a i n from t h e s e checks
s o c i a t i o n transformed t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s which most commonly produced
t h e government passed an a c t t o p r e v e n t t h e s t o p p i n g of g r a i n by
violence.
making t h e whole hundred l i a b l e t o f i n e and i n d i v i d u a l s l i a b l e t o
which m a t t e r e d was t h e one which c o n t r o l l e d t h e n n t i o n a l s t a t e ; t h e cru-
f i n e and imprisonment (Stevenson 1974: 41-42).
c i a l s t r u g g l e s f o r p a r e r went o n a t a n n t i o n a l s c a l e .
I n c o u n t r y of t e r c o u n t r y , p o l i t i c s n a t i o n a l i z e d ; tlie p o l i t y
And tlie p a r t i c i p a n t s
I n t h a t c r i s i s , many l o c o 1 o f f i c i a l s sought t o r e s t r i c t t h e f l o w of g r a i n
i n t h o s e s t r u g g l e s were most o f t e n o r g a n i z e d a s a s s o c i a t i o n s .
away from t h e i r own markets.
t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h e p a r t y c o n s p i r a c y , t h e o r g a n i z e d march on t h e c a p i t a l .
Within t h r e e d e c a d e s , however, t h e market
The s t r i k e .
and t h e n n t i o n a l government had won t h e i r b a t t l e ; few mayors and magis-
t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y s e s s i o n , t h e mass meeting become t h e u s u a l s e t t i n g s f o r
t r a t e s c h o s e t o c o u n t e r t h e n a t i o n a l w i l l , and few hungry crowds harbored
collective violence.
t h e hope of making them do s o .
One of t h e E n g l i s h forms.of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n had w i t h e r e d away.
Two t h i n g s e v e n t u a l l y p u t a n end t o t h e predominance of t h e r e a c t i v e
collective violence
The s t a t e became a n i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i c i p a n t Ln a l l
--
a s policemen, a s p n r t y t o t h e c o n f l i c t , a s t e r t i u s
gaudens.
The d i s c o v e r y t h a t c o l l e c t i v e ' v i o l e n c e i s a by-product of t h e
same political processes which produce nonviolent collective action does
not mean, then, that it is an uninteresting by-product.
CIWPTER SEVEN: REVOLUTION AND REBELLION
The occurrence
of damage to persons or objects gives us some small assurance that at
least one of the parties to the collective action took it seriously.
Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes
We have encountered our share of Big Words on the way from mobili-
More important, violence makes collective action visible: authorities,
zation to revolution.
Interest, power and violence have all turned out
participants and observers tend to set darn some record of their actions.
to be controversial concepts not only because they refer to complex reali-
reactions and observations. Collective violence therefore serves as s
ties but also because alternative definitions of each of them tend to im-
convenient trscer of major alterations in collective action as a whole.
ply alternative political programs. That is why Stephen Lukes npesks of
Like all tracers. we must use it with care.
"pluralist ," "reformist" and [truly] "rsdlcsl" definitions of parer. The
same is certainly true of our final Big Word: revolution. Revoli~tionary
reality is complex. And whether it includes coupn, sssossinations, terrorism or slow, massive changes such as induetriolieation is controversial
not only because the world is complex, but also becaune to call something
revolutionary is. within most forms of western political discourse, to
identify it as good or bad.
Nevertheless, most western analysts of revolution restrict their definitions by means of two sorts of requirements: 1) by insisting that the
actors and the action meet some demanding standards -- tl~atthey be booed
on an oppressed class, that they have a comprehensive program of social
transformation in view. or some other Cause of seriouness; 2) by dealing
only with cases in which parer actually changes hands.
Peter Cnlvert, for
example, builds the following elements into his conception of revolution:
(a) A process in which the political direction of a state hecomes
increasingly discredited in the eyes of either the populntion an a
whole or certain key sections of it
...
(b) A change of government (transition) at s clearly defined point
in time by the use of armed force, or the credible threat of its
u s e ; namely, a n
event.
(c) A more-or-less
c o h e r e n t programme of change i n e i t h e r t h e pol-
I
w h e r e . a l o n g t h e s e two dimensions.
I
Revolutionary S i t u a t i o n s
The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a r e v o l u t i o n o r y s i t u a t i o n , a s
i t i c a l o r t h e s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of o s t a t e , o r b o t h , induced by
t h e p o l i t i c a l leadership a f t e r a revolutionory event, the transi-
I
t i o n of power, h a s o c c u r r e d .
Thus, h e goes o n , " i n o r d e r t o i n v e s t i g a t e f u l l y t h e concept of r e v o l u t i o n ,
i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o s t u d y i n d e t a i l p r o c e s s , e v e n t , programme, and
d i s t i n c t phenomena" ( C a l v e r t 1970:4).
1
pre-revolutionary
i
of t h e c o u n t r y , h a s a c t u a l l y c o n c e n t r a t e d i n i t s hands a s i g n i f i -
p e r i o d , a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e c l a s s which is
c a l l e d t o r e a l i z e t h e new s o c i a l system, a l t h o u g h n o t y e t m i s t e r
imate government of t h e s t a t e ( C a l v e r t 1970:4).
myth a s
t i v e l y e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l o v e r s s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s :
The h i s t o r i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n b r i n g s about. i n t h e
( d ) A p o l i t i c a l myth t h a t g i v e s t o t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p r e s u l t i n g from a r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r a n s i t i o n s h o r t - t e r m s t a t u s a s t h e l e g i t -
Leon T r o t s k y s a i d l o n g ago, is t h e p r e s e n c e of more than one b l o c e f f e c -
I
c s n t s h a r e of t h e s t a t e power, w h i l e t h e o f f i c i a l a p p a r a t u s of t h e
government i s s t i l l i n t h e hands of t h e o l d l o r d s .
He c o n f i n e s h i s own s t u d y
That is t h e i n i -
t i a l d u a l power i n every r e v o l u t i o o .
t o r e v o l u t i o n o r y e v e n t s : changes of government accomplished by f o r c e .
That c h o i c e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s t h e number of c a s e s he h a s t o examine, s i n c e
But t h a t i s n o t i t s o n l y form.
most such e v e n t s do n o t meet h i s c r i t e r i a a , b and c .
by a r e v o l u t i o n which i t d i d n o t want, is i n e s s e n c e an a l r e a d y o l d ,
Yet t h e i n s i s t e n c e
I f t h e new c l a s s , pLaced i n power
on armed f o r c e and on an a c t u a l t r a n s f e r of power e l i m i n a t e s many i n s t a n c e s
h i s t o r i c a l l y b e l a t e d , c l a s s ; i f i t was a l r e a d y worn o u t b e f o r e i t
i n which competing o b s e r v e r s s e e something r e v o l u t i o n a r y : t h e I n d u s t r i a l
was o f f i c i a l l y crowned; i f on coming t o power i t e n c o u n t e r s on an-
Revolution, r e v o l u t i o n s from above, t h e l e g e n d a r y General S t r i k e of t h e
t a g o n i s t s u f f i c i e n t l y mature and r e a c h i n g o u t its hand toward t h c
s y n d i c a l i s t s , and s o on.
helm of s t a t e ; then i n s t e a d of o n e u n s t a b l e two-power
On t h e o t h e r hand. t h e d e f i n i t i o n h a s a hard-
cquilibrium,
nosed q u a l i t y which many a d v o c a t e s of r e v o l u t i o n w i l l f i n d u n a c c e p t a b l e ; i t
t h e p o l i t i c a l r e v o l u t i o n produces a n o t h e r , s t i l l l e s s s t a b l e .
does n o t i n s i s t t h a t t h e p a r t y which s e i z e s power be d i s p o s s e s s e d , pro-
overcome t h e "anarchy" of t h i s twofold s o v e r e i g n t y becomes a t c v c r y
g r e s s i v e o r even angry.
new s t e p t h e t a s k o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n
No concept of r e v o l u t i o n can e s c a p e some such d i f f i c u l t i e s , because
no c o n c e p t u o l i z e r con a v o i d making some such c h o i c e s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , we
c a n c l e a r a good d e a l of c o n c e p t u a l ground by means of a s i m p l e d i s t i n c t i o n
between r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s and revolutionor)! outcomes.
Most s i g n i f i -
c a n t disagreement a b o u t t h e proper d e f i n i t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n f a l l s some-
i
-- o r
To
t h e counter-revolution
(Trotsky 1965: 224).
The shadow of Russia i n 1917 f a l l s d a r k a c r o s s t h i s passage.
From t h e
p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , comes a n i d e a of g e n e r a l v a l u e .
Trot-
s k y ' s i d e a of d u a l s o v e r e i g n t y c l a r i f i e s a number of f e a t u r e s oE r e v o l u tionary situations.
P e t e r Amann h a s gone s o f a r a s t o f a s h i o n i t i n t o a
s e r v i c e a b l e d e f i n i t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f : f o r him, a r e v o l u t i o n b e g i n s
when more than o n e "power bloc" regarded a s l e g i t i m a t e and s o v e r e i g n by
t o a l l o w f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h r e e o r more s i m u l t a n e o u s b l o c s .
=-
s o v e r e i g n t y is t h e n t h e i d e n t i f y i n g E e a t u r e of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u A r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n b e g i n s when a government p r e v i o u s l y
some of a c o u n t r y ' s people emerges, and ends when o n l y one power b l o c
ations.
remains.
under t h e c o n t r o l of a s i n g l e , s o v e r e i g n p o l i t y becomes t h e o b j e c t of e f -
Amann's a d a p t a t i o n of T r o t s k y h a s t h e advantage of n e a t l y i d e n t i f y i n g
t h e common p r o p e r t i e s of coups, c i v i l wars and f u l l - s c a l e r e v o l u t i o n s
w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g knowledge of what happened n e x t .
It still permits
t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of t h e i d e n t i t i e s of t h e power b l o c s themselves.
At t h e same time i t I d e n t i f i e s a weakness i n T r o t s k y ' s f o r m u l s t i o n :
i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a s i n g l e c l a s s makes a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n .
the
,Barring-
ton Moore's t r e a t m e n t of t h e g r e a t e s t modern r e v o l u t i o n s c o r r e c t s t h a t
weakness by t r a c i n g o u t t h e c o a l i t i o n s of c l a s s e s which t o r e down t h e o l d
regimes.
Thus f o r Moore a c o n l l t i o n of workers, b o u r g e o i s and p e a s a n t s
made t h e French Revolution, even i f t h e workers and p e a s a n t s l o s t o u t
f a i r l y soon.
What is more, Moore argues t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e revolu-
t i o n a r y s l t u a t i o n shaped t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome.
was b o u r g e o i s
+
peasants
+ workers
The f a c t t h a t i t
.
f e c t i v e , competing, m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s on tlie p a r t of two o r more
distinct politiea.
I t ends when s s i n g l e s o v e r e i g n p o l i t y r e g a i n s con-
t r o l o v e r t h e government.
Such a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of p o l i t i e s o c c u r s under f o u r d i f f e r e n t conditions:
1. The members of o n e p o l i t y a t t e m p t t o s u b o r d i n a t e a n o t h e r previously d i s t i n c t polity.
Where t h e two p o l i t i e s a r e c l e a r l y s o v e r e i g n
and independent a t t h e o u t s e t we a r e l i k e l y t o c o n s i d e r t h i s conf l i c t a s p e c i a l v a r i e t y of war.
Circumstances l i k e t h e a n n e x a t i o n
of Texas t o t h e United S t a t e s o r tlie t r a n s f e r s of power t o v a r i o u s
communist regimes i n E a s t e r n Europe a t t h e end o f t h e Second World
War f a l l , i n f a c t , i n t o an u n c e r t a i n a r e a between war and r e v o l u t i o n .
r a t h e r than t h e d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n s
which made t h e American, E n g l i s h o r Russian r e v o l u t i o n s , i n Moore's view,
2.
pushed France toward t h e a t t e n u a t e d p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy s h e maintained
group of c o n t e n d e r s h o l d i n g power o v e r a r e g i o n a l government, a s s e r t
i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s .
sovereignty.
Two of T r o t s k y ' s r e s t r i c t i o n s t h e r e f o r e seem unnecessary: 1 ) t h a t
each of t h e b l o c s c o n s i s t of a s i n g l e s o c i a l c l a s s ; 2) t h a t t h e r e b e o n l y
two sucli b l o c s a t any p o i n t i n time.
E i t h e r of t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s would
e l i m i n a t e most of t h e s t a n d a r d c a s e s of r e v o l u t i o n
--
n o t l e a s t t h o s e of
France, China and Mexico.
rots sky's i d e a r e t a i n s i t s o n a l y s t i c r e s i l i e n c y i f expanded t o inc l u d e b l o c s c o n s i s t i n g of c o a l i t i o n s of c l a s s e s and/or o t h e r groups and
The members of a p r e v i o u s l y s u b o r d i n a t e p o l i t y . such a s t h e
t o mind.
Here tlie words " r e b e l l i o n " and " r e v o l t " s p r i n g r e a d i l y
Yet i n r e c e n t y e a r s i t h a s become q u i t e u s u a l t o c a l l one
v e r s i o n of such e v e n t s a c o l o n i a l o r n a t l o n o l r e v o l u t i o n
--
especially
i f t h e outcome i s independence.
3.
Contenders n o t h o l d i n g membership i n t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t y mob1,llze
i n t o a b l o c s u c c e s s f u l l y e x e r t i n g c o n t r o l o v e r some p o r t i o n of t h e
governmental a p p a r a t u s .
D e s p i t e t h e o t t r a c t i v e n c s s of t h i s v e r s i o n
t o l e a d e r s of t h e d i s p o s s e s s e d , i t r a r e l y ,
i f ever, occurs i n a
body c l a i m i n g c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government, o r c l a i m i n g t o
pure form.
4.
ment
p i t e t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s of a s t i l l - e x i s t i n g government t h e y Formerly obeyed.
That f r a g m e n t a t i o n f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e s t h e emer-
M u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y h a s begun.
gence o f c o a l i t j o n s between e s t a b l i s h e d members of t h e p o l i t y and
1
m o b i l i z i n g nonmembers.
/
i s s t i c k i e r than i t seems a t f i r s t g l a n c e .
The q u e s t i o n
N e i t h e r tlie p r e s e n c e nor t h e
expansion of a r e n s of autonomy o r of r e s i s t a n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e s u b j e c t
populntion i s a r e l i a b l e s i g n .
A 1 1 governments e x c i t e some s o r t s of r e s i s -
t a n c e , and a l l governments e x e r t incomplete c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i r s u b j e c t s .
That was t h e p o i n t of t h e e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s of r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r a t i o n and
facilitation.
Most s t a t e s f a c e c o n t i n u i n g marginal c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e i r
s o v e r e i g n t y : from w i t h j n , b a n d i t s , v i g i l a n t e s , r e l i g i o u s communities, nat i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s o r uncompromising s e p a r a t i s t s hold them o f f .
.
I
I
R e v o l u t i o n a r y Outcomes
I
litary
movements o r o u t s i d e s t a t e s a r e q u i t e common.
The c l a i m s them-
s e l v e s do n o t amount t o n r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n .
--
the revolutionary situation
w r i t e s Samuel Huntington. "is a r a p i d . fundnmentnl,
and v i o l e n t ' domestic change i n t h e dominant v a l u e s and myths of a s o c i e t y ,
i n i t s p o l i t i c a l i n s i t u t i o n s , s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . l e a d e r s h i p . and govern-
i
ment a c t i v i t y and p o l i c i e s .
R e v o l u t i o n s a r e t h u s t o be d i s t i n g u i s l ~ e d
from i n s u r r e c t i o n s , r e b e l l i o n s , r e v o l t s , coups, and wars of independence"
(Huntington 1968: 264).
H u n t i n g t o n ' s d e f i n i t i o n s t r e s s e s outcomes, n o t
t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s which l e a d t o t h o s e outcomes.
rare.
Depending on how g e n e r o u s l y one i n t e r p r e t e d t h e v o r d s "rapjd" and
"fundamental",
I
I
Such outcomes a r e
i t would be e a s y t o a r g u e t h a t no r e v o l u t i o n hns e v e r
o c c u r r e d , and h a r d t o a r g u e t h a t t h e number of t r u e c a s e s exceeds n h a l f dozen.
P e t e r ~ s l v e r t ' sd e f i n i t l o n o f r e v o l u t i o n , which we looked a t
e a r l i e r , i s somewhat l e s s demanding than H u n t i n g t o n ' s .
I t merely r e -
q u i r e s t h a t a government b e d i s c r e d i t e d , t h a t a new group s e i z e t h e gov-
The q u e s t i o n is whether some s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e s u b j e c t popul a t i o n honors t h e c l a i m .
"A r e v o l u t i o n . "
t h a t hsppeiis
I
A 1 1 of t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s have some d i s t a n t k i n s h i p t o r e v o l u t i o n , b u t
t h o s e of t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t y by t h e s d h e r e n t s o f d i s p l a c e d regimes, m i -
-- however
i
From with-
Even r i v a l c l a i m s t o
sing t h e i r claims
h a s ended.*
I
When o n l y one p o l i t y e x e r t i n g e x c l ~ r s l v e
c o n t r o l o v e r tlie government remains, and no r i v n l s a r e s u c c e s s f u l l y p r e s -
I
o u t , powerful s t a t e s i n f i l t r a t e them and encroach on t l i e i r p r e r o g a t i v e s .
they do n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s .
t h o s e p r e v i o u s l y a c q u i e s c e n t people obey t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
honor i t s symbols, give, time t o i t s s e r v i c e , o r y i e l d o t h e r r e s o u r c e s des-
p o l i t y i n t o two o r more b l o c s each e x e r c i s j n g c o n t r o l over some p a r t
How would we r e c o g n i z e t h e o n s e t of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y ?
t h e Rovcrn-
They pay t a x e s , p r o v i d e men t o i t s a r m i e s , f e e d i t s f u n c t i o n a r i e s ,
body.
The more u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e is t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of an e x i s t i n g
of t h e government.
. . . and
&
ernment by f o r c e , t h a t tlie newcomers i n t r o d u c e a program of change, and
The r e v o l u t i o n a r y moment a r r i v e s when p r e v i o u s l y
o c q u l e s c e n t members of t h a t p o p u l a t i o n f i n d themselves c o n f r o n t e d w i t h
s t r i c t l y i n c o m p a t i b l e demands from t h e
*
I r e g r e t t o s s y t h a t i n a n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r ( T i l l y 1975 ).
and f o r m an a l t e r n a t i v e
I used t h e word " r e v o l u t i o n " f o r t h e c i r c u m s t s n c e s I am h e r e c a l l i n g o r e v o l tionary situation
t l i a t a myth l e g i t i m a t i n g t h e t r a n s f e r of power come i n t o being.
tions.
Except f o r
The medium r u n of T r o t s k y ' s a n a l y s i s c o n c e r n s Lhe p e a s a n t s who
t h e discrediting, t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , too, a r e outcomes; t h e r e is no r e l i a -
had been m o b i l i z e d v i a t h e army. t h e o r g a n i z e d workers of P e t r o a r a d and
b l e way t o know whether a r e v o l u t i o n i s o c c u r r i n g u n t i l t h e whole p r o c e s s
Moscow, tlie p a r t i e s and t h e p r o c e s s e s by which each of them m o b i l i z e d
and formed c o a l i t i o n s .
h a s ended.
figure a s well
For t h e moment, I propose a n even l e s s demanding s t a n d a r d t h a n Calvert's.
sential to
o v n t l a b l e : power o v e r tlie means of p r o d u c t i o n , power o v e r symbols, power
P r o v i s i o n a l l y , l e t u s t a k e power o v e r government a s o u r
reference point.
A r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome i s t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t of o n e s e t
of members of :he
p o l i t y by a n o t h e r s e t .
Without t h e a p p e a r a n c e of mul-
I n t h e l o n g r u n , i n t e r e s t s and o r g a n i z a t i o n b e g i n t o t e l l .
In t h i s
book, we have o n l y faced t h e c h a l l e n g e of l o n g r u n a n a l y s i s i n t e r m i t t e n t l y ,
J
e x i s t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y b e a t down t h e i r c h a l l e n g e r s a f t e r a p e r i o d
I
I t is a t l e a s t logic-
!
a l l y p o s s i b l e f o r s r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome t o o c c u r w i t h o u t a r e v o l u t i o n a r y
1
s i t u a t i o n , through t h e g r a d u a l a d d i t i o n a n d / o r s u b t r a c t i o n of members of
through q u i c k g l i m p s e s a t t h e consequences of p r o l e t a r i a n i z n t l o n , t h e
development of c a p i t a l i s m , s t a t e m k i n g , u r b a n i z a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .
The q u i c k g l i m p s e s have, however, been g r a p h i c enough t o conunt~nicate t h e
fundamental importance of t h r e o t e n e d c l a s s i n t e r e s t s .
Over t h e l o n g run.
t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of production c r e a t e s t h e c h i e f h f s t o r i c a l a c t o r s .
the polity.
I n g e n e r a l , how does t h e displacement of o n e s e t of powerholders by
a n o t h e r happen7
The answer depends i n p a r t on t h e t i m e - p e r s p e c t i v e we
I n t h e s h o r t r u n , t h e q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n s t a c t i c s and t h e b a l a n c e
of f o r c e s .
a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome.
and m y be es-
highly unlikely.
can occur w i t h o u t n r e v o l u t i o n o r y outcome; i n t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e , t h e
adopt.
--
--
t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y a s i g n i f i c a n t t r a n s f e r o f power is e i t h e r i m p o s s i b l e o r
Clearly, a revolutionory situation
of e f f e c t i v e , competing, m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s .
I t i s I n t h i s medium r u n t l i a t t h e c r e a t i o n o r
emergence of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s t o
That s i m p l e d e f i n i t i o n l e a v e s many r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s
o v e r government.
n o t a b l y i n t h e d i s c r e d i t i n g and wenkening of t h e
T s a r i s t regime by tlie war.
A r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome i s t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t of o n e s e t of power-
h o l d e r s by a n o t h e r .
--
I n t h i s medium run, r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n
In T r o t s k y ' s a n a l y s i s of t h e October Revolution, f o r example.
t h e t a c t i c a l problems of winning over t h e Petrogrod g a r r i s o n and t h e n of
c a p t u r i n g t h e Winter P a l a c e loom v e r y l a r g e ; g e n e r a l i z e d . T r o t s k y ' s conc e r n s p l a c e t h e c o n t r o l o r n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of t h e a v a i l a b l e m l l i t a r y f o r c e
a t tlie c e n t e r of t h e s h o r t - r u n c o n d i t i o n s f o r a t r a n s f e r of power.
I n t h e medium r u n , we a r r i v e a t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which have domina t e d t h i s book: t h e p r e s e n c e of mobilized c o n t e n d e r s i n e f f e c t i v e c o a l i -
'
t h e major c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of i n t e r e s t s , t h e b a s i c t h r e a t s t o t h o s e i n t e r e s t s , and t h e p r i n c i p a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a n s f e r s of power.
S i t u a t i o n s and Outcomes Combined
Our c o n c e p t s w i l l do b e t t e r work f o r u s i f we t u r n them i n t o c o n t i n u o .
A s i t u a t i o n can be more o r l e s s r e v o l u t i o n a r y .
The c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n is:
a t t h e p o i n t i n time which we a r e e v a l u a t i n g , how much w u l d i t c o s t t o
e l i m i n a t e t h e s p l i t between t h e a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s 7
vocable is t h e s p l i t 7
How n e a r l y i r r e -
We should t r y t o make t h a t jugement from i n t o r m o t i o n
a v a i l a b l e a t the, p o i n t i n time we a r e judging, r a t h e r than from e v e n t u a l
outcomes.
I f we want t o judge a completed r e v o l u t i o n a s a whole,
we can f i x on t h e mean s p l i t between p o l i t i e s , t h e owximum s p l i t , t h e i n i t i a l s p l i t o r t h e time-function a s a whole.
I n any c a s e , o n e extreme i s
no m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y a t a l l , t h e o t h e r a n i r r e v o c a b l e s p l i t .
are
Inbetween
d i v i s i o n s c o s t i n g t h e p a r t i e s v a r y i n g amounts t o e l i m i n a t e .
I
The
tlie r e p r e s s e d .
enter in.
Combinations of R e v o l u t i o n a r y S i t u a t i o n s and Revolotionary
Outcomes
F i g u r e 7-1:
I
c o s t d e f i n i t e l y i n c l u d e s t h e c o s t of r e p r e s s i o n t o t h e r e p r e s s o r s and
I
The sum of a l l p a y o f f s and foregone b e n e f i t s should a l s o
I f s o , t h e e s t i m a t e d c o s t w i l l o b v i o u s l y depend on t h e time-
period c o n s i d e r e d
--
and w i l l o b v i o u s l y i n c l u d e some t h i n k i n g a b o u t what
might have happened i f
...
An outcome can a l s o be more o r l e s s r e v o l u t i o n a r y .
Now t h e c e n t r a l
1
Complete
Displacement
Revolution
q u e s t i o n is: how c l o s e d i d t h e e x i s t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y come t o
b e i n g compLetely d i s p l a c e d ?
We may s e t t l e f o r a s i m p l e h a d c o u n t .
Silent
Revolution
We
may weight t h e heads by t h e i r power p r i o r t o t h e change, b u t s t i l l s e t t l e
f o r c o u n t i n g how many heads r o l l e d .
We may t r y t o e s t i m a t e t h e power of
a l l p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g members b e f o r e and a f t e r .
I n any c a s e , o n e extreme
w i l l be t h e maintenance o r r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e s t a t u s quo a n t e , t h e o t h e r
extreme tlie complete e l i m i n a t i o n o f p r e v i o u s members from tlie p o l i t y .
In
between w i l l be v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of d i s p l a c e m e n t .
i
The d e c i s i o n whether t o c a l l a n e v e n t a r e v o l u t i o n now l o o k s l i k e
F i g u r e 7-1.
Politics
a s Usual
P o l i t i c s a s u s u a l i n v o l v e s l i t t l e o r no d i s p l a c e m e n t of e x i s -
t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y , and no more than low-cost s p l i t s between a l ternative polities.
Coups i n v o l v e h i g h e r - c o s t s p l i t s ( a l t h o u g h n o t i r -
I
NO
..
.
Split
r e v o c a b l e o n e s ) , b u t r e s u l t i n r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e displacement of e x i s t i n g
Revolutionary S i t u a t i o n
members.
S i l e n t r e v o l u t i o n s , i f they o c c u r , produce major d i s p l a c e m e n t s
w i t h l i t t l e o r no development of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n .
Great revolu-
t i o n s a r e extreme i n b o t h r e g a r d s : e x t e n s i v e s p l i t s between a l t e r n a t i v e
p o l i t i e s , l a r g e - s c a l e d i s p l a c e m e n t of e x i s t i n g members.
I n F i g u r e 7-1,
!
Irrevocable
Split
F i g u r e 7-2:
7-13
S y n d i c a l i s t , M a r x i s t and B r i n t o n l n n Maps of Revolutiorlnry
Reality
L i n e A r e p r e s e n t s a gencrous d e f i n i t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n : e v e r y t h i n g t o t h e
r i g h t g e t s counted.
Line B s t a t e s a r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n ; only g r e a t
SYNDICALIST
revolutions qualify.
Altliougl~t h e diagram i s e n t i r e l y c o n c e p t u a l , i t h e l p s p i n p o i n t some
important t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s .
S t u d e n t s of r e v o l u t i o n d i s a g r e e o v e r t h e
combinations of outcome and r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t t r a t i o n which a r e a c t u a l l y
p o s s i b l e i n t h i s world.
To s i m p l i f y a complex s e t of d i s a g r e e m e n t s , l e t
u s l o o k a t t h r e e i d e a l i z e d maps of t h e p o s s i b l e and t h e impossible:
"Syndicalist",
"Marxist" and "Brintonian".
I \-\/
/
Unreal
Difiplacement
NO
They appear i n F i g u r e 7-2.
s'plit
I
I
Irrevocable
Thc S y n d i c a l i s t argument, i n i t s s i m p l e s t form, r u n s : t h e more e x t e n s i v e
t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e more sweeping t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
I t is a c a u s a l argument.
MARXIST
outcome.
I t s a y s t h e c r e a t i o n of a n i r r e v o c a b l e s p l i t be-
Complete
1
tween a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s w i l l , i n i t s e l f , produce a t o t a l d i s p l a c e m e n t
o f t h e e x i s t i n g h o l d e r s of power.
It a l s o says: t h e l e s s extensive the
r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e l e s s e x t e n s i v e t h e t r a n s f e r of power.
Tlie Marxlst argumcnt ( e s p e c i a l l y a s a r t i c u l a t e d by such r e v o l u t i o n a r y
t h e o r i s t s a s Cramsci and Lenin) d i s a g r e e s .
I t a r g u e s t h a t many a r e v o l u -
t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n f a i l s t o produce a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome
--
for lack of
a vanguard, f o r l a c k of a d i s c i p l i n e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a r t y , f o r l a c k of
t h e r i g h t c l a s s c o a l i t i o n s , and so on.
But i t a g r e e s wit11 t h e s y n d i c a l i s t
nrgument i n o n e i m p o r t a n t r e g a r d : no r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r a n s f e r s of power occ u r w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e revolutionary s i t u a t i o n s .
Thus a two-part revolu-
tionary s t r a t e g y : c r e a t e (or look f o r ) a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n ; organize
t h e p o l i t i c a l means f o r a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome.
Crane R r i n t o n d e l i b e r a t e l y took t h e o p p o s i t e view.
He argued import-
a n t i n t e r n a l . l i m i t s on t h e c r e a t i o n of any r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n ; r e a c t i o n was i n e v i t a b l e .
He s u g g e s t e d , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between s i t u a t i o n and outcome was n e g a t i v e : t h e more r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e
No
'tl~pl
Irrevocable
Split
s i t u a t i o n , t h e l e s s r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e outcome.
A people who went through
a maJor r e v o l u t i o n r e t u r n e d , w i t h r e l i e f , more o r l e s s t o t h e s t a r t i n g
point.
But t h e more s e n s i b l e g r a d u a l i s t s ,
j o r a l t e r a t t o n s of t h e power s t r u c t u r e .
thought B r i n t o n , produced mn-
F i g u r e 7-3:
S i t u a t i o n s and Outcomes i n D i f f e r e n t Types of Power T r a n n f e r s
The arguments among S y n d i c a l i s t s ,
M a r x i s t s and B r i n t o n i a n s a r e w i t h u s today.
F i g u r e 7-3 o f f e r s a r e v i s e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t r a n s f e r s of power
i n terms of t h e e x t e n t t o which r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t r ~ tni o n s a n d / o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcomes o c c u r .
The diagram t e l l s u s t o t a k e a k o a d view of revolu-
t i o n , r e q u i r i n g o n l y some minimum combination of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n
and r e v o l u l i o n a r y outcome t o q u a l i f y an e v e n t a s a r e v o l u t i o n .
t h a t t h e phenomena we c a l l "coups",
"full-scale revolutions" overlap,
"insurrections",
It a s s e r t s
complete
Displacement
/'
I1
Revolution
" c i v i l wars" and
I ~ u tn o t c o m p l e t e l y .
Each h a s i t s own
c l i a r n c t c r i s t i c r a n g e o f outcomes and r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s .
But t h e
b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e s among them r e g a r d t h e i d e n t i t i e s of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e
t r a n s f e r of power: i n t h e coup, members of t h e q w l i t y d i s p l a c e each o t h e r ;
Outcome
i n a f u l l - s c a l e r e v o l u t i o n much o r a l l of t h e p r e v i o u s l y dominant c l a s s
l o s e s power. and s o on.
Although t h e diagram d o e s n o t s a y s o e x p l i c i t l y , t h e oblong f o r " c i v i l
war" b r u s h e s t h e extreme r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , i r r e v o c a b l e s p l i t , t o
remlnd u s t h a t one common outcome of c i v i l war i s t h e permanent d i v i s i o n
of a t e r r i t o r y p r e v i o u s l y c o n t r o l l e d by a s i n g l e government i n t o two o r
more autonomous t e r r i t o r i e s .
The diagram i n d i c a t e s t h a t
extensive revol-
u t i o n a r y outcomes do n o t occur w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s .
Rut i t d e n i e s t h e converse: extremely r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s do n o t
n e c e s s n r i l y produce extremely r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcomes.
The d e b a t e o v e r
dcEinitfons tokes u s i n t o n debate over t h e substance of p o l i t t c a l c o n f l i c t
and t h e strtrcLure of r e v o l u t i o n .
No
Displacement
1 Routine
Politics
I
No
Split
+
Revolutionary S i t u a t i o n
Irrevocohle
Split
Some of o u r most v a l u a b l e a n a l y s e s of r e v o l u t i o n and r e b e l l i o n do
...
ment
n o t concern t h e s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r one o r t h e o t h e r , b u t t h e placeD,
ment of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of groups w i t h i n some e q u i v n l e n t of t h e diagram.
and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from wnges l e n d s t o r e v o l u t i o n
Some o f t h e a n a l y s e s c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e m o b i l i z a b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s
( P a i g e 1975: 70-71).
of groups f o r d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of a c t i o n : f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i s m , f o r
p o l i t i c s a s u s u a l , and s o on.
Eric
Wolf's comparison o f t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y
a g r a r i a n r e b e l l i o n s emphasizes t h e r e l a t i v e m o b i l i z a b i l i t y of poor, midd l e and r i c h p e a s a n t s , a l t h o u g h i t a l s o s a y s i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s a b o u t t h e
way expanding c a p i t a l i s m impinges on r u r a l a r e a s and on t h e i n t e r e s t s of
A combination of n o n c u l t i v o t o r s dependent on income from l e n d
P a i g e t h e n c o n d u c t s two s o r t s of a n n l y s i s t o v e r i f y t h e s e hypotheses:
a comparison of r u r a l s o c i a l movements i n 1 3 5 e x p o r t s e c t o r s of 70 r e l o t i v e l y poor c o u n t r i e s from 1948 t o 1970, and d e t a i l e d c a s e s t u d i e s of
Peru, Angola and Vietnam.
d i f f e r e n t groups o f p e a s a n t s w i t h i n them.
The e v i d e n c e l o o k s good f o r h i s argument.
Note how t h e argument works: i t c r o s s - t a b u l a t e s t h e i n t e r e s t s of
Some a n a l y s e s g i v e t h e i r primary a t t e n t i o n t o t h e correspondence
between d i f f e r e n t forms of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n and d i f f e r e n t c o n f i g u r a t i o n s
c u l t i v a t o r s and n o n c u l t i v a t o r s , deduces t h e c h a r a c t e r and e x t e n t of t h e
i n t e r e s t c o n f l i c t r e s u l t i n g from each combination, and p r e d i c t s from
of i n t e r e s t s , w h i l e s a y i n g r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e a b o u t m o b i l i z a t i o n o r a b o u t
t h e c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s t o t h e form of t h e c u l t i v a t o r s ' p o l i t i c a l ac-
t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s l e a d i n g t o p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s and outcomes.
tion.
They commonly t a k e t h e form of comparisons f o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c forms
of a c t i o n of people i n c o n t r a s t i n g s t r u c t u r a l s e t t i n g s .
A g r a r i a n Revolution i s on o u t s t a n d i n g c a s e i n p o i n t .
The s u b s t a n c e of h y p o t h e s i s D i s t h a t t h e combinntion of l a n d
and wages
Jeffrey Paige's
P a i g e sums up h i s
g u i d i n g hypotheses i n t h e s e terms:
i n c l u d e s some forms of agricultural o r g n n i z a t i o n which combine
t h e i n f l e x i b l e b e h a v i o r of t h e c u l t i v a t o r s of a landed e s t a t e w i t h
t h e s t r o n g c u l t i v a t o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e c o r p o r a t e p l a n t a t i o n .
A.
A combination of b o t h n o n c u l t i v o t o r s and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent
on l a n d a s t h e i r p r i n c i p a l s o u r c e of income l e a d s t o an a g r a r i a n
revolt
8.
...
c i a l c a p i t a l and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from l a n d l e a d s t o
C.
b e a n a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n which a s t r o n g peasant-based
~uerrillo
movement o r g a n i z e d by a n a t i o n a l i s t o r Communist p a r t y a t t e m p t s
A combination of n o n c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from commer-
a reform commodity movement
When b o t h c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , t h e r e s u l t is l i k e l y t o
...
A combinaton o f n o n c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from c a p i t a l
and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from wagcs t o a reform l a b o r move-
t o d e s t r o y b o t h t h e r u r a l upper c l a s s t h e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e
s t a t e and e s t a b l i s h a new s o c i e t y .
( P a i g e 1975: 358-359).
P a i g e then makes f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o r r e l n t c u of r e v o l u t i o n a r y n a t i o n a l i s t movements and r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i n l i s t movements.
Al-
though i n h i s c a s e s t u d l e s P a i g e is s e n s i t v e nnd i n f o r m o t i v e a b o u t mobil-
7-L9
,
--
a r e s u l t which w u l d s u r -
i z a t i o n , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e b a s i c t h e o r y
and d i s a p p e a r a n c e of a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s
p r e d i c t s a c t i o n from i n t e r e s t s . Here, i n s t e a d , we a r e assuming i n t e r e s t s
p r i s e me
and d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s which l e a d from o r g a n i z e d and
s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r motives, t o ex-
conflicting i n t e r e s t s to revolution.
c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government c u r r e n t l y
Proximate Causes of R e v o l u t i o n a r y S i t u a t i o n s
e x e r t e d by t h e members of tlie p o l i t y .
L e t u s l o o k more c l o s e l y a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n of
a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n a s m u l t i p l e sovereignty.
By d e f i n i t i o n , t h e r e
--
t h e t h i n g t o watch f o r would a t i l l b e tlie commitment of a
So why d i d n ' t t h e United S t a t e s break i n t o r e v o l u t i o n w i t h t h e ons e t of t h e Depression a f t e r 19301
I c l a i m no s p e c i a l wisdom.
Assumlna
t h e working c l a s s a s t h e p r i n c i p a l c a n d i d a t e f o r counter-mobilization,
a r e t h r e e proximate c a u s e s of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y :
however, t h i s l i n e of argument s i n g l e s o u t f a c t o r s such a s t h e fol.lowing:
1.
t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o n t e n d e r s , o r c o a l i t i o n s of c o n t e n d e r s , ad-
vancing e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government which i s c u r r e n t l y e x e r t e d by t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ;
2.
commitment t o t h o s e c l a i m s by a s i g n i f i c a n t segment of t h e sub-
a low i n i t i a l l e v e l of m o b i l i z a t i o n , l a c k of a l i e n a t e d c o o l i t l o n p a r t n e r s
w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y , s h i f t o f tlie burden of e x t r a c t i o n , a t l e a s t r e l a t i v e l y .
t o unmobilized groups such a s b l a c k s , t r a d i n g of c o n c e s s i o n s which were
r e l a t i v e l y t o t h e government (For example, tlie r i g h t o f i n d u s t r i a l u n i o n s
The f a s c i s t s of Germany and
j e c t p o p u l a t i o n ( e s p e c i a l l y when t h o s e commitments a r e n o t simply
t o o r g a n i z e ) f o r t h e g r a n t i n g of l o y a l t y . .
acknowledged i n p r i n c i p l e , b u t a c t i v a t e d i n t h e f a c e of p r o h i b i t i o n s
I t a l y went a n o t h e r r o u t e , by d e l i b e r a t e l y d e m o b i l i z i n g t h e working c l a s s .
o r c o n t r a r y directives from t h e government);
The o t h e r n a t i o n s of t h e world paid t h e c o s t of t h e d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , i n t h e
form of t h e Second World War.
3.
i n c a p a c i t y o r u n w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e a g e n t s of t h e government t o
s u p p r e s s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n a n d l o r t h e commitment t o i t s
I n a n e s s a y which Followed h i s l a r g e comparative work. B a t r i n g t o n
Moore (1969) proposed f o u r p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r major r e v o l u t i o n s :
claims.
1.
Tlie c i r i t i c a l s i g n s of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , i n t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e ,
a r e s i g n s of tlie emergence of a n a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t y .
These s i g n s may pos-
s i b l y be r e l a t e d t o c'onditions o t h e r a n a l . y s t s have proposed a s p r e c i p i t a n t s
of r e v o l u t i o n : r i s i n g d i s c o n t e n t , v a l u e c o n f l i c t , f r u s t r a t i o n o r r e l a t i v e
deprivation.
Tlie r e l n t i o n s l i i p must, however, be proved and n o t assumed.
Even ' i f i t i s proved t h a t d i s c o n t e n t , v a l u e c o n f l i c t , f r u s t r a t i o n and
r e l a t i v e deprivation do f l u c t u a t e i n c l o s e correspondence t o tlie emergence
t h e e l i t e ' s l o s s of u n i f i e d c o n t r o l o v e r army, p o l i c y and o t h e r
i n s t r u m e n t s of v i o l e n c e :
2.
t h e emergence of a c u t e c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t w i t h i n t h e "dominant
classes";
3.
t h e development of widespread c h a l l e n g e s t o p r e v a i l i n 8 modes of
thought and t o t h e predominant expiana t i o n s of justifications of
human s u f f e r i n g ;
4.
t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y mass, most probably through
some sudden d i s r u p t i o n of everyday l i f e coupled with i n c r e a s e of
October Revolution, a s t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s which h a s j o i n e d t h e revoln-
misery.
t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n were b e i n g squeezed o u t of power:
The f i r s t two a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same c o n d i t i o n : t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of
Now, however.
t h e p o l i t y i n t o more than o n e c o a l i t i o n , each a p o t e n t i a l c l a i m a n t t o ex-
d e r i v e d from t h e a l l i a n c e of a l l t h e Russian monarchists w i t h
c l u s i v e c o n t r o l of t h e government, and each a p o t e n t i a l c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r
Anglo-French and American i m p e r i a l i s m a r e proving in p r a c t i c e
with c h a l l e n g e r s t h a t a r e mobilizing r a p i d l y .
Condition 3) may w e l l oc-
t h e c o u r s e of world e v e n t s and t h e b i t t e r l e s s o n s
t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c r e p u b l i c i s a bourgeois-democrntlc r e p u b l i c .
c u r r both i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y , a s t h o s e o u t s i d e e x p r e s s t h e i r
which is a l r e a d y o u t of d a t e from t h e p o i n t of view of t h e problems
o u t r a g e a t b e i n g excluded and some of t h o s e i n s i d e respond t o t h e i r com-
which i m p e r i a l i s m h a s placed b e f o r e h i a t o r y .
p l a i n t s w i t h sympathy o r m a n i p u l a t i o n .
i s no
The m o b i l i z a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y mass d e s c r i b e s t h e r a p i d appeara n c e of a new c h a l l e n g e r .
N o t h i n g i n m y a n a l y s i s o r i n my h i s t o r i c a l r e -
other a l t e r n a t i v e :
They show t h a t t h e r e
e i t h e r S o v i e t government triumphs i n every
advanced c o u n t r y i n t h e world, 5 t h e most r e a c t i o n a r y i m p e r i a l i s m
triumphs, t h e most snvage i m p e r i a l i s m , w l ~ i c h is t h r o t t l i n g t h e
f l e c t i o n l e a d s me t o assume t h a t t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n must be sudden o r t h a t
s m a l l and weak n a t i o n s and r e i n s t a t i n g r e a c t i o n a l l o v e r t h e world
i t must come from i m n i s e r a t i o n .
-- Anglo-American
But l i g h t n i n g m o b i l i z a t i o n , i f i t o c c u r s .
i m p e r i a l i s m , which h a s p e r f e c t l y mastered t h e
d o e s r e d u c e t h e c h a n c e s f o r t h e i n c r e m e n t a l c h a l l e n g i n g , t e s t i n g and c o a l -
a r t o f u s i n g t h e form of a democratic r e p u b l i c .
i t i o n - f o r m a t i o n which belong t o t h e r o u t i n e a c q u i s i t i o n of power, and con-
One o r t h e o t h e r .
c e n t r a t e s t h e a t t e n d a n t c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i n a s h o r t p e r i o d of time.
T h e r e i s no middle c o u r s e ; u n t i l q u i t e r e c e n t l y t h i s vlcw was r e -
We have narrowed t h e f o c u s of e x p l a n a t i o n and p r e d i c t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y .
I t now comes down t o s p e c i f y i n g and d e t e c t i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under
which t h r e e r e l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s o c c u r : 1 ) t h e appearance of c o n t e n d e r s
making e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s , 2) s i g n i f i c a n t commitments t o t h o s e
c l a i m s , 3) r e p r e s s i v e i n c a p a c i t y of t h e government.
The s h o r t r u n condi-
t i o n s of t h e s e outcomes m a y k q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h e l o n g run changes
which make them p o s s i b l e .
L e t u s c o n c e n t r a t e f o r t h e moment on t h e s h o r t
run conditions.
A 1ternatives to the Existing Polity
What 1 mean by " e x c l r ~ s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o c o n t r o l of t h e government" comes o u t d r a m a t i c a l l y i n an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n a h o u t a year a f t e r t h e
garded a s t h e b l i n d f a n a t i c i s m of t h e Bolsheviks.
But i t t u r n e d o u t t o b e t r u e (Lenin 19670: 35).
These c l a i m s came from a p a r t y a l r e a d y i n power.
But t h e y were a d d r e s s e d
t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r a t e g i s t s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s who wished t o c o n t i n u e a
c o l l a b o r a t i v e approach w i t h i n Russia i t s e l f .
When can we e x p e c t t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o n t e n d e r s ( o r c o a l i t i o n s of
c o n t e n d e r s ) advancing e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l of t h e
government c u r r e n t l y e x e r t e d by t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ?
The q u e s t i o n
is a t r i f l e m i s l e a d i n g , f o r such c o n t e n d e r s a r e a l m o s t always w i t h u s i n
t h e form of m i l l e n n i a 1 c u l t s , r a d i c a l c e l l s o r r e j e c t s from p o s i t i o n s of
power.
The r e a l q u e s t i o n is when such c o n t e n d e r s p r o l i f e r a t e a n d / o r mo-
f a l l of d i v e r s e movements of p r o t e s t s i n c e World War I1 h a s shown u s
bilize.
t h a t we s t i l l have a l m o s t no power t o a n t i c i p a t e where and when such com-
Two p a t h s l e n d t o t h a t p r o l i f e r a t i o n a n d / o r m o b i l l z a t i o n .
m i t t e d groups w i l l a p p e a r .
The f i r s t
i s t h e f l o u r i s h i n g of groups which from t h e i r i n c e p t i o n hold t o t r s n s -
The t u r n i n g of c o n t e n d e r s from c o m p a t i b l e o b j e c t i v e s i s r n t l i e r l e n s
forming aims which a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e c o n t i n u e d power of t h e members
of a m y s t e r y , because we can w i t n e s s i t s o c c u r r e n c e a s o l d members l o s e
of t h e p o l i t y .
t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e p o l i t y and ss c h a l l e n g e r s a r e r e f u s e d a c c e s s t o
T r u l y o t h e r - w o r l d l y and r e t r e a t i s t groups s e e k i n g t o t a l
power.
withdrawal from contemporary l i f e do n o t f u l l y q u a l i f y , s i n c e i n p r i n c i p l e
The former i s t h e r e c u r r e n t h i s t o r y of r i g h t - w i n & a c t i v i s m . t h e
!
t h e y can prosper s o l o n g a s t h e r e s t of t h e world l e t s them a l o n e .
True
l a t t e r t h e standard condition f o r left-wing activism.
Marx himself gave
/
r a d i c a l s , t r u e r e a c t i o n a r i e s , a n a r c h i s t s , p r e a c h e r s of t h e o c r a c y , m o n i s t s
t h e c l a s s i c a n a l y s i s of t h e p r o c e s s of r a d i c a l i z a t i o n away from some
of almost every p e r s u a s i o n come c l o s e r t o t h e mark.
s o r t of accommodation w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g system toward nn e x c l r ~ s i v e , r e v o l -
The second p a t h
i s t h e t u r n i n g of c o n t e n d e r s from o b j e c t i v e s which
utionary position.
o r e c u m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e s u r v l v o l of t h e p o l i t y t o o b j e c t i v e s which s p e l l
i t s doom:
a c l a i m t o a l l power, a demand f o r c r i t e r i a of membership
v i c t i m i z a t i o n under b o u r g e o i s democracy ( a v i c t i m i z a t i o n .
I
,
That he should
have o v e r e s t i m a t e d t h e p o l a r i z i n g e f f e c t s of i t i d u s t r i a l c a p i t n l i s m and
s e n t members.
--
t h e group committed from t h e
s t a r t t o fundomentnl t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e s t r u c t u r e of power
remains one o f t h e m y s t e r i e s of o u r time.
t o be sure.
d i c t a t e d by t h e l o g i c of c a p i t a l i s m ) workers would g r a d u a l l y t u r n away
from i t s i l l u s i o n s toward c l a s s - c o n s c i o u s m i l i t a n c y .
which would e x h a u s t a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s , o r e x c l u d e a l l i t s pre-
Why and how t h e f i r s t s o r t of group
l l i s areument was p r e c i s e l y t h a t through r e p e a t e d
--
forms
Mox Weber t a u g h t t h a t such groups
t
u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e a b s o r p t i v e c a p a c i t y of t h e p o l i t i e s i t s u p p o r t e d does
n o t reduce t h e a c c u r a c y of h i s p e r c e p t l o n of t h e r e l o t i o n s l ~ i p s . So f o r
a s n s r x was concerned o newly-brmingand
growing c l n s s was t h e o n l y candi-
In f a c t . t h e general p r i n c i p l e appears
formed nround charismatic i n d i v i d u a l s who o f f e r e d a l t e r n a t i v e v i s i o n s of
d a t e f o r such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .
t h e world, v l s i o n s t h a t made s e n s e of t h e contemporary chaos.
t o a p p l y a s w e l l t o n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s , age-sex groups, r e g i o n a l popu-
Marx sug-
g e s t e d t h a t from time t o time o few i n d i v i d u a l s would swing s o f r e e of
l a t i o n s o r any o t h e r m o b i l i z i n g group which makes r e p e a t e d u n s u c c e s s f u l
t h e i r , a s s i g n e d p l a c e s i n t h e e x i s t i n g c l a s s s t r u c t u r e t h a t t h e y could
b i d s f o r power.
view t h e s t r u c t u r e a s a whole and t h e h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s producing i t ;
The e l a b o r a t i o n of new i d e o l o g i e s , new c r e e d s . new t h e o r i e s of hw
they could then t e a c h t h e i r view t o o t h e r s who were s t i l l c a u g h t i n t h e
t h e world works, I s p a r t and p a r c e l of both patlis t o a r e v o l c ~ t f o n a r yposi-
structure.
t i o n : t h e emergence of brand-new c h a l l e n g e r s and t h e t u r n i n g of e x i s i n g
S i n c e Morx and Weber we have had some h e r o i c c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g
and c a t a l o g i n g of t h e v a r i e t i e s of i n t r i n s i c a l l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y s r o u p s
( s e c Smelser 1963, L i p s e t and Raab 1970. Gomson 1 9 6 8 ) .
But t h e r i s e and
contenders.
Flost l i k e l y t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of i d e o l o g i e s which c a p t u r e
and formulate the problems of such oontenders in itself accelerates their
ment of the subject popu'ation.
mobilization and change of direction; how great an independent weight
since the veering of an already-mobilized contender toward exclunive al-
to attribute to ideological innovation is another recurrent puzzle in
ternative claims to control of the government simultaneously eatnblinhes
th6 analysis of revolution.
the claims and produces commitment to them. Yet expansion of commitment
The first and second conditions overlap.
The need for elaboration of ideologies is one of the chief reasons
can occur without the establishment of any new exclus1,ve claims tliro~lgli
for the exceptional importance of intellectuals in revolutionary movements.
a) the further mobilization of the contenders involved, end b) the ecceptsnce of those claims by other individunls and groups.
The reflections of s leading French Marxist intellectual on current
It is in accounting
for the expansion and contraction of this sort of commitment that attitud-
political stracegy are revealing:
inal analyses of the type conducted by Ted Gurr, James Dsvies end Neil
The revolutionary party's capacity for hegemony is directly linked
Smelser should have their greatest power.
to the extend of its influence in the professions and in intellectual circles.
its inspires their inquiries and draws their vanguard into reflection on an "alternative model," while respecting the independence of
these inquiries. The mediation of the intellectual vanguard is indispensable in combatting and destroying the grip of the dominant
ideology.
Two classes of action by governments have s strong tendency to ex-
It can counter bourgeois ideology to the degree that
It is also necessary in order to give the dominated classes
a language end a means of expression which will make them conscious
of the reality of their subordination end exploitation (Gorz 1969:
pand commitment to revolutionary claims. The first is the sudden failure
I
of the government to meet specific obligations which members of the subject population regard as well established and crucial to their own
welfare. I have in mind obligations to provide employment, welfare services, protection, access to justice, and the other.mjor services of
government.
Italy, for example, experienced a series of crises of thts sort at
the end of World War I, despite the fact that she had ended up on the
"winning" side. The demobilization of the army threw over two million
This is e congenial doctrine for an intellectual to hold. Yet it corresponds to a vigorous reality: as Barrington Moore suggests, an outpouring
of new thought articulating objectives incompatible with the continuation
of the existing polity is probably our single most reliable sign that the
first condition of s revolutionary situation is being fulfilled.
Acceptance of Alternative Clsims
The second condition in commitment to the claims by a nignficant seg-
men on a soft labor market, the fluctuation and relaxation of controls
over food supplies and prices aggrieved millions of consumers. and peasants (including demobilized soldiers) began to tnke into their own hands
the redistribution of land they argued the government had promlsed during
the war. The consequent withdrawal.of commitment from the government opened
the way to fascism. Both Right and Left mobilized in response to the
government's inability to deliver on its promises.
In the event, the re-
'
gime chose t o ~ t o l e r a t eo r s u p p o r t t h e F a s c i s t strong-arm s q u a d r i i n t h e i r
s t a n c e s of t a x r e b e l l i o n s i n Europe s i n c e 1500 a r e n o t what mont historians
e f f o r t t o d e s t r o y t h e most e f f e c t i v e working c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
have thought.
For
I n s t e a d of b e i n g e i t h e r tlie l a s t r e s o r t of t h o s e who a r e
t h a t r e a s o n s ( r a t h e r than any fundamental s i m i l a r i t y i n t h e i r s o c i n l b a s e s )
i n such m i s e r y t h a t any more t a x a t i o n w i l l d e s t r o y tl~emo r t h e f i r s t
t h e i n i t i a l g e o g r a p h i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of I t a l i a n Fascism resembled t h e d i s -
r e s o r t of p r i v i l e g e d p a r t i e s who r e f u s e t o l e t a n y t h i n g s l l p away from
t r i b u t i o n of s o c i a l i s t s t r e n g t h : t h e Po V a l l e y , t h e n o r t h e r n i n d u s t r i a l
c i t i e s . and
SO
forth.
The R i g h t :
Fur Right c o a l i t i o n worked, more o r
l e s s , i n c r u s h i n g t h e organized segments of t h e L e f t .
But i t l e f t t h e
F a s c i s t s i n n e a r l y autonomous c o n t r o l of l a r g e p a r t s of I t a l y : m u l t i p l e
them, t h e r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t new t a x e s most commonly a r i s e s wherc comm u n i t i e s f i n d themselves i n c a p a b l e of marketing enough of t h e i r goods
t o a c q u i r e t h e f u n d s demanded by t h e government.
Ardsnt c o n s i d e r s " i n c a p a b l e of marketing" t o mean e i t h e r t h s t t h e
l o c a l economy i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y commercialized o r t h a t t h e market f o r
sovereignty.
The c a s e of postwar I t a l y h a s a t h r e e f o l d importance, f o r i t i l l u s t r n t e s n p r o c e s s which was widespread ( a l t h o u g h g e n e r a l l y l e s s a c u t e )
e l s e w h e r e i n Europe a t t h e same time.
I t f a l l s i n t o s v e r y g e n e r a l pat-
t e r n i n which t h e end of war ( v i c t o r i o u s o r n o t ) produces a c r i s i s of
governmental i n c a p a c i t y .
F i n a l l y , i t d e m o n s t r a t e s tlie way i n which
t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o d u c t s of t h e community i n q u e s t i o n h a s c o n t r a c t e d .
E r i c I J o l f ' s a n a l y s i s of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p e n s s n t s and t h e market.
however, s u g g e s t s t h s t " i n c a p a b i l i t y " r e f e r s more g e n e r a l l y t o any
demands which would make i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r people t o f u l f i l l t h e obl i g a t i o n s which bind them t o t h e l o c a l commun;ty,
and whose f u l f i l l m e n t
I t f o l l o w s d i r e c t l y from Wolf's orgument
movements of p r o t e s t themselves n o t c l e a r l y " r i g h t " o r " l e f t " i n o r i e n t a -
makes them h o n o r a b l e men.
t i o n sonctime open t h e way t o s right-wing
t h a t i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n i n t h e f a c e of l i t t l e c o m m e r c i n l i z a t i o n o r t h e
(or, f o r that matter, l e f t -
c o n t r a c t i o n of demand f o r t h e p r o d u c t s a l r e a d y b e i n g marketed by a
wing) s e i z u r e of power.
The
second c l a s s
of governmental a c t i o n which commonly expands t h e
commitment of i m p o r t a n t segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y c l a i m s
i s s r a p i d o r unexpected i n c r e a s e i n t h e government's demand f o r s u r r e n d e r
of r e s o u r c e s by i t s s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n .
An i n c r e a s e i n t a x e s i s t h e
p e a s a n t community t e n d s t o have d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t s on t h e s t r u c t u r e of
t h e community.
Other t y p e s of communities f a c e d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n s of t h e some
problems.
The consequence i s t h a t r a p i d l y i n c r e a s e d e x t r a c t i o n of
-- which
i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s h a s most
c l e a r e s t example, b u t m i l i t a r y c o n s c r i p t i o n , t h e commandeering of land.
r e s o u r c e s by t h e government
c r o p s o r farm a n i m a l s and t h e i m p o s i t i o n of c o r v e e s have a l l played
f r e q u e n t l y o c c u r r e d i n p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r war
a n h i s t o r i c a l r o l e i n t h e i n c i t e m e n t of o p p o s i t i o n .
segment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e government is no l o n g e r l e g i t i m n t e .
G a b r i e l Ardant
(1965) a r g u e s , w i t h widespread e v i d e n c e , t h s t i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n h a s been
tlie s i n g l e moat i m p o r t a n t s t i m u l u s t o popular r e b e l l i o n throughout western history.
Furthermore, h e p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c circum-
--
r e g u l a r l y p e r s u a d e s some
w h i l e t h o s e who oppose i t a r e .
Such n s h i f t i n p o s i t i o n sometimes o c c u r s r a p i d l y , w i t h l i t t l e
advance warning.
T h i s a p p e a r s t o be e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y when n c o n t e n d e r
or set of contenders mobilizes quickly in response to a general threat
to its ponition
--
by the tendency of most analysts to work from the fact of revolution
an invasion, an economic crisis, a major attempt by
back to the search for evidence of short-run deprivation and then
landlords, the state or someone else to deprive them of crucial resources.
further back to the search for evidence of long-run improvement, not
We find the villagers of northern England rising in a Pilgrimage of
necessarily with respect to the same presumed wonts, needs, or expecta-
Grace to oppose Henry VIII's disposscasion of the monasteries, EIexican
tiona. The latter procedure has the advantage of slmost alwnys pro-
peasnntn banding together to resist the threat of takeover of their
ducing s fit between the data and the theory, and the dlsndvantage of
common lands, Jnpanese countrymen recurrently joining bloody uprisings
not being a reliable test of the theory. The question remains open.
Assuming that sharp contractions following long exponsions
ngainst the imposition of new taxes.
produce revolutionary situations with exceptionnl frequency, however.
This defensive mobilization is not simply a cumulation of individual
dlssatisfections with hardship or a mechanical group response to depri-
the line of argument pursued here leads to en interesting alternative
vntfon.
explanation of the J-curve phenomenon.
Whether it occurs nt all depends very much, as Eric Wolf and
It is that during a lonu rut1
others have shown, on the pre-existing structure of power end solidarity
of expanding resources, the government tends to take on commitments
within the pop~rlationexperiencing the threat.
to redistribute resources to new contenders and the polity tends to
Furthermore, its character
is not intrinsically either "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary";
admit challengers more easily because the relative coat to existing
that depends mainly on the coalitions the potential rebels make.
members is lower when resources are expanding.
This
In the event of quick
contraction. the government has greeter commitments, new mnttera of
defensive mobilization is the most volatile feature of n revolutionnry
situation. both because it often occurs fast and because new coalitions
,-
right, to members of the polity, and has ncquitted partial cmitmcnts
between n rapidly-mobilized group and established contenders for power
to new contenders, perhaps not members of the polity, but very likely
can suddenly create s signiticant commitment to en alternative polity.
forming coalitions with members.
1) greatly increasing the coercion applied to the more vulnerable
If thst is thc case, there may be something to the common notion
segments of tlie population in order to bring up the yield of resources
that revolutions are most likely to occur when a sharp contraction in
for reallocntion or 2) breaking commitments where thst will incite
well-being follows a long period of improvement. Jsmea Davies has
propounded the idea under the label of "J-curve hypothesis" end Ted
The government faces a choice between
'
the least dangerous opposition.
Either step is likely to lend to n
Gurr has treated it ss one of the chief variants of his general condition
defenaive mobilization, and thence to a threat of revolution. Such a
for rebellion: a widening of the expectation-achievement gap. All the
situation does, to be sure, promote the disappointment of rising
attempts to test these attitudinal versions of the theory tlnve been
expectations.
dogged by the difficulty of measuring chnnges in expectations and
revolutionary situation, in this hypothesis, lies in the changing
achievements for large populations over substantial blocks of time nnd
But the principal link between tlie J-curve end the
r e l a t i o n s between c o n t e n d e r s and government l i k e l y t o occur i n a p e r i o d
of expanding r e s o u r c e s .
I n o r d e r t o produce m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y , and thua become revolut i o n a r y , commitments t o some a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m a n t must be a c t i v a t e d
I n a l o n g e r h i s t o r i c a l view, t h e changes which have most o f t e n
i n t h e f a c e of p r o h i b i t i o n s o r c o n t r a r y d i r e c t i v e s from t h e government.
produced t h e r a p i d s h i f t s i n commitment away from e x i s t i n g governments
The moment a t which some p e o p l e belonging t o members of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
and e s r a b l i s h e d p o l i t i e s a r e p r o c e s s e s which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e autonomy
c o a l i t i o n s e i z e c o n t r o l o v e r some p o r t i o n of t h e government, and o t h e r
of s m a l l e r u n i t a w i t h i n t h e span of t h e government:
p e o p l e n o t p r e v i o u s l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e c o a l i t i o n honor t h e i r d i r e c t i v e s
t h e r i s e and f a l l
of c e n t r n l i z e d s t a t e s , t h e expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n of n a t i o n a l markets,
marks t h e beginning of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n .
t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n and d i s p e r s i o n of c o n t r o l o v e r p r o p e r t y .
d i r e c t i v e s may, t o b e s u r e , occur a s a r e s u l t of d u r e s s o r d e c e p t i o n
Prosperity
and d e p r e s s i o n , u r b a n i z a t i o n and r u r a l i z a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and
a s w e l l of c o n v e r s i o n t o t h e c a u s e .
d e i n d u s t r i n l i z a t i o n , s a n c t i f i c a t i o n and s e c u l a r i z a t i o n occur i n a
and c o n v e r s i o n w i l l o f t e n do t h e job.
d i s p e r s e d and i n c r e m e n t a l f a s h i o n .
That a c c e p t a n c e of
A m i x t u r e of d u r e s s , d e c e p t i o n
The p r e s e n c e of a c o h e r e n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n mnken a
Although s t a t e m a k i n g , t h e e x p a n s i o n and c o n t r a c t i o n of m a r k e t s and
great difference a t exactly t h i s point.
An o r g a n i z n t l o n f a c i l i t a t e s
p r o p e r t y s h i f t s a l s o d e v e l o p i n c r e m e n t a l l y most of t h e time, t h e y a r e
t h e i n i t i a l s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l , s p r e a d s t h e news, a c t i v a t e s t h e com-
e s p e c i a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e of producinp, d r a m a t i c c o n f r o n t a t i o n s of r i g h t s .
mitments a l r e a d y made by s p e c i f i c men.
p r i v i l e g e s and p r i n c i p l e s ; t h i s t a x c o l l e c t o r wants tlie f a m i l y cow.
r e l i a b l e guide t o revolutionary s t r a t e g y than S o r e l ; Lcnin's closely-
t h i s merchant proposes t o buy t h e v i l l a g e commons, t h i s p r i n c e f a i l s t o
d i r e c t e d c o n s p i r a t o r i a l p a r t y c o n t r a s t s s h a r p l y w i t h t h e spontnneous
p r o t e c t h i s s u b j e c t s from b a n d i t s .
and p u r i f y i n g r e b e l l i o n i n which S o r e l placed h i s hopes.
S. N. E i s e n s t a d t (1963) h a s brought
I f s o , I.enin pkovides n more
But t h e
o u t t h e extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y of v a s t b u r e a u c r a t i c empires t o over-
e x i s t e n c e of such a n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s o makes t h e s t a r t of r e v o l u t i o n
ckpansion and t o damage a t t h e c e n t e r ; b o t h , i n h i s a n a l y s i s , tend t o
more c l o s e l y dependent on t h e d e c i s i o n s of a s m a l l number of men
produce r e b e l l i o n s i n which p e r i p h e r a l a g e n t s of t h e empire s e e k t o
t h u s , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , s u b j e c t t o chance end i d i o s y n c r a s y .
e s t a b l i s h autonomous c o n t r o l o v e r t h e l a n d s , men, o r g a n i z a t i o n s and
w e a l t h f i r s t mobilized by t h e empire.
Fernand Drnuclel (1966) h a s
--
and
I n tlie l a s t a n a l y s i s , a c t i v a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y commitments
happens through an e x t e n s i o n of t h e same p r o c e s s e s which c r e a t e t h e
s t r e s s e d t h e frequency w i t h which b a n d i t r y and r e l a t e d s t r u g g l e s f o r
cmitments.
l o c a l power p r o l i f e r a t e d a s t h e ephemeral s t a t e s of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
which maximizes t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e committed t o c n l c u l a t e t h e r i g h t
Europe c o n t r a c t e d .
moment t o s t r i k e a g a i n s t t h e government.
I n a l l t h e s e c a s e s , spokesmen f o r l a r g e - s c a l e
C o n s p i r a t o r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n simply linppens t o be t h e one
The government's sudden
o r g a n i z a t i o n and c e n t r i p e t a l p r o c e s s e s f i n d themselves locked i n s t r u g g l e
i n a b i l i t y t o meet i t s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ( a s i n t h e German i n s u r -
w i t h a d v o c a t e s of s m a l l - s c a l e autonomy.
r e c t i o n s d u r i n g t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e i m p e r i n l war e f f o r t i n 1918)
or lts violation of the established rights of its subject population (as
of the alternstive coalition in a rough and unknown terrain and the ndop-
in the 1640 rebellions of Portugal and Catslonia against Castile, which
tion of tactics unfamiliar to the professions1 forcen of the government all
followed Olivsres' attempt to squeeze exceptional resources from those re-
raise the cost of suppression as well.
Ted Gurr (1969: 235-2361 develops an interesting argument about
luctant provinces for the conduct of his war with France) can simultaneously
spread and activate the commitment to its revolutionary opposition.
In a case like that of the Tsiping rebellion, the rapid mobilization
the balance of coercive resources between a government end its opponents.
In his phrasing. "The likelihood of internal war incressen as the ratio
of s contender advancing exclusive alternstive claims to control over the
of dissident to regime coercive control approaches equality."
government itself leads quickly and inevitably to s break end to an armed
"equality," read "one;" Walter Korpi has expanded a similar argument into
struggle. The drsmntic weakening of a government's repressive capacity
a general model of conflict.)
through war, defection or catastrophe can simultaneously create the possi-
bable magnitude of collective violence; where the balance strongly favors
bility of revolution and encourage the revolutionaries to make their bid;
the government, goes the argument, only dispersed acts of rebellion occur;
the quick succession of the French revolution of 1870 to the defeat of the
where the balance strongly favors its opponents, the government tends to
Emperor by Prussis falls into this category.
be a pawn in their hands. The analysis applies even more plausibly to
Governmental Inaction
the likelihood of revolution, for an alternative coslition with large
Condition ehree is the incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of
(For
Gurr is referring directly to the pro-
coercive resources is likely to seize control with at most an instant of
the government to suppress the alternstive coalition or the commitment to
multiple sovereignty, while an alternative coslition with small coercive
its claims. Three paths are possible: a) sheer insufficiency of the avail-
resources will never get multiple sovereignty started.
able mesns of coercion; b) inefficiency in applying the means; c) inhibi-
I
Inefficiency in applying mesns which are, in principle, sufficient
tions to their application. The starkest cases of insufficiency occur
is harder to pin down and explain; the inefficient almost always plead
when the bslsnce of coercive resources between the government and the sl-
insufficient means.
ternstive coalition swings suddenly toward the latter, because the govern-
the authorities not bungled their repression of various populnr movements
ment l~sssuffered a sudden depletion of its resources (as in s lost war).
the European revolutions of 1848 would never hsve occurred. To have con-
because the alternstive coslition has managed a sudden mobilization of re-
fidence in his conclusion we hsve to assess the balsnce of coercive
sources (as in the p ~ ~ i i nof
g private arms) or because a new contender
mesns between popular movements and governments as well as the political
with abundant co,?rcive resources has joined the coslition (as in the de-
inhibitions to repress'ion. In pre-revol~~tionsry1848 the governments
fection of troops or foreign intervention).
clearly had the edge in men, weapons, supplies and coercive technique.
However, the massing of rebels
in locations remote from the centers of coercive strength, the implantation
William Lnnger (1969 esp. 321-322) 'contends that had
The strong commitment of the new bourgeois who had been acquiring signi-
7-34
ficant roles in European governments to certain kinds of civil liberties
but important segments of the military defected, disintegrated or refused
and various working-class movements, however. both stayed 'the government's
to repress their brethren. The more extensive the pre-revolutionary coo-
hand.
litions between challengers end militory units, tlie more likely this is to
Prom a strictly instrumental perspective, all such inhibitions ere
"inefficient." Yet not to distinguish them from tlie apparent incompetence
of the Egyptian reglme toppled in 1952 or the Turkish sultanate displaced
in 1919 blurs the essenti.al explanation of these events.
happen.
In this respect and others, war bears a crucial relationship to
revolution. Walter Laqueur (1968: 501) puts it this way:
Inhibitions to the application of available coercive means are
War appears to have been the decisive factor in the emergence of
more interesting than shortages or inefficiency, because they are so likerevolutionary situations in modern times; most modern revolutions,
ly to flow from the political process itself. The great importance of
both successful and abortive, have followed in the wake oE war
coalitions between established members of the polity and revolutionary
(the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian revolution of 1905. the
challengers exemplifies the point very well.
The United States of the
various revolutions after the two World Wars, including the Chinene
1960s witnessed the constant formation and reformation of coalitions berevolutions).
These have occurred not only in the countries that
tween groups of intellectuals, opposition politicians, Black Liberation
suffered defeat. The general dislocation caused by war. tlie mamovements, students and peace activists, some within the American polity
terial losses and h u m n sacrifices, create o climate conducive to
and some outside of it.
The total effect of these coalitions fell conradical change. A large section of the population has been armed;
siderahly short of revolution, but while operating they shielded those
human life seems considerably less valunble than in peacetime.
whose principles offered the greatest challenge to the existing distriIn a defeated country authority tenda to disintegrate, and acute
bution of power from the treatment they received from police, troops end
social dissatisfaction receives additional impetus from s sense
other repressors when acting on their own.
of wounded national prestige (the Young Turks in 1908, Naguib and
Despite the implications of this example, however, the most cruNasser in 1952).
The old leadership is discredited by defeat, and
cial coalitions over the whole range of revolutions surely link chsllenthe appeal for radical social change ond.nationa1 reossertion
gers directly with military forces. The Egyptian and Turkish revolutions
thus falls on fertile ground.
stand near the extreme at which the chief claims to alternative control
of the government come from within tlie military itself; in both cases
No doubt the statement suffers from a superabundance of explanations. Still
soldiers dominated a coalition linking dissident politicians and local
it points out the essential relationship between war and tlie repressive ca-
movements of resistance.
In the midst of the range we find events like
the Russian revolution, in which the militory were for from paramount,
pacity of the government.
Although war temporarily places large coercive resources under the
c o n t r o l of a government, i t d o e s n o t g u a r a n t e e t h a t they w i l l b e a d e q u a t e
of c o n d i t i o n s a p p e a r t o b e powerful proximate c a u s e s of s i g n i f i c n n t t r a n a -
t o tile demnnds placed upon them, t h a t t h e y w i l l b e used e f f i c i e n t l y , o r
f e r s of power: 1 ) t h e p r e s e n c e of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n : mcllttple eove r e i g n t v : 2) r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s between c h a l l e n g e r s and members of
Defeat
t h a t they w i l l even remain under t h e government's f i r m c o n t r o l .
a n d / o r d e m o b i l i z a t i o n p r o v i d e e s p e c i a l l y f a v o r a b l e c i r c u m n t a n c e s f o r revo-
t h e p o l i t y ; 3) c_ontrol of s u b s t a n t i a l f o r c e by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n .
l u t i o n b e c a u s e t h e y combine t h e p r e s e n c e of s u b s t a n t i a l c o e r c i v e r e s o u r c e s
To what e x t e n t t h e development of a r e v o l u t i o n n r y n i t u a t i o n is a
with uncertain c o n t r o l over t h e i r use.
War a l s o m a t t e r s i n q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t way.
symptom, r a t h e r t h a n a c a u s e , of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome is n o t cosy t o
By and l a r g e , wars have
resolve.
I n a l o n g view, whether a r e v o l u t i o r ~ n r y d i v i s i o n of t h e p o l i t y
always provided t h e p r i n c i p a l o c c a s i o n s on which s t a t e s have r a p i d l y in-
o c c u r s depends on t h e same c o n d i t i o n s wliicli d e t e r m i n e wllether a major
c r e a s e d t h e i r l e v i e s of r e s o u r c e s from t h e i r s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n s .
t r a n s f e r of power o c c u r s : t h e f o r m a t i o n of a c o a l i t i o n of mobilized con-
t i o n is only t h e self-evident case.
Conscrip-
Demands f o r t a x e s , f o r c e d l o a n s , food,
t e n d e r s o r g a n i z e d around i n t e r e s t s which p i t them and a s u b s t n n t i n l seg-
n o n - m i l i t a r y l a b o r , manufactured goods and raw m a t e r i a l s f o l l o w t h e same
pattern.
The i n c r e a s e d e x a c t i o n s almost always meet widespread r e s i s t a n c e .
ment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e dominant members of t h e p o l i t y .
.
In
t h a t l o n g view, whether t h e t r a n s f e r of power o c c u r s through a brenk i n
t h e p o l i t y , t h e t h r e a t of a break. o r a more g r a d u a l succenuion d o e s n o t
which t h e a g e n t s of s t a t e s c o u n t e r w i t h p e r s u a s i o n and f o r c e .
D e s p i t e t h e advantage of having e x t e n s i v e e s t a t e s t o squeeze and a
m a t t e r much.
N o n e t h e l e s s , I would hazard t h i s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n : t h e more ex-
wealthy church t o d i s p o s s e s s , t h e Tudors p r e s s e d t h e i r England hard t o
t e n s i v e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e g r e e t e r t h e l i k e l l h o o d of an ex-
s u p p o r t t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t h e y committed t o s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y w a r f a r e .
t e n s i v e t r a n s f e r of power.
They faced s e r i o u s r e b e l l i o n i n 1489, 1497, 1536, 1547, 1549, 1553 and 1569.
of F i g u r e 7-3,
The l a s t t h r e e
--
K e t t ' s , W y a t t ' s and t h e Northern R e b e l l i o n
--
c e n t e r e d on
d y n a s t i c i s s u e s and c o n s i s t e d l a r g e l y of r i s i n g s e n g i n e e r e d by r e g i o n a l
mngnntes.
Tlie f i r s t f o u r , on t h e o t h e r hand, were popular r e b e l l i o n s ;
every o n e ' o f them began w i t h t h e crown's sudden l a y i n g hand on r e s o u r c e s
previously outnide i t s control.
The g e n e r a l p a t t e r n i s t h e same a s I
That i s , indeed, one of t h e i m p l i c i t messages
t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p a r e r t r n n s f e r s .
An e x t e n s i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n
--
a c o s t l y s p l i t hetween t h e
e x i s t i n g p o l i t y and a n e f f e c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n
--
Increanea t h e
l i k e l i h o o d o f an e x t e n s i v e t r a n s f e r of power i n s e v e r a l ways.
The more ex-
t e n s i v e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e h a r d e r i t i~ f o r any orgnnized
group o r segment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o a v o i d committing i t s e l f t o one s i d e
have a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d f o r t a x r e b e l l i o n s : t h e r a p i d m o b i l i z a t i o n of an
or the other.
e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n which t h e n c h a l l e n g e s t h e v e r y i n j u s t i c e of t h e r o y a l
t o reconstitute its old multiple alliances i n the po~t-revolutionnry set-
demand f o r men, money o r goods.
tlement.
Proximate Causes of R e v o l u t i o n a r y Outcomes
p e r i e n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o ~ lw i l l have i n f o r g i n g i t s own In-
Let u s f o c u s on t h e s h o r t and medium r u n s , r e s e r v i n g f o r l a t e r ano t h e r l o o k a t l o n g l r u n conditions f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcomes.
Three s e t s
That commitment makes i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r any c o n t e n d e r
The more e x t e n s i v e t h e r e v o l r r t i o n a r y s i t i ~ a t i o n ,t h e morc ex-
s t r u m e n t s of government independent of t h e e x i n t i n g h o l d e r s of power.
Tlie
p a r t y , t h e nrmy o r t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n a r y committee becomes t h e s k e l e t o n ( o r
between members of t h e p o l i t y and t h e c o n t e n d e r s sdvancing e x c l u n i v e n l -
pertlops t h e b l u e p r i n t , o r b o t h ) of t h e new government.
t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government.
The more exten-
The r e l a t i o n s h i p is ac-
s i v e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e more o p p o r t u n i t y and j u s t i f i c a t i o n
t u a l l y c u r v i l i n e a r : I f no such c o a l i t i o n e x i s t s . t h a t d i m i n i s h e s t h e
t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n w i l l have t o a t t a c k t h e p e r s o n s and r e s o u r c e s
chance t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n w i l l win
of t h e powerholders, and t h u s t o b l o c k t h e i r chances t o r e g a i n power l a t e r .
t r a n s f e r of power a t a l l .
These g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s a r e n o t new.
r e v o l u t i o n a r y wisdom.
They a r e a s t a n d a r d p i e c e of
W r i t i n g i n December, 1948, Moo Tse-Tung p u t i t t h i n
t h a t t h e r e w i l l be any
The e x i s t e n c e of a c o a l i t i o n i n c r e a n e s t h e
l i k e l i h o o d of some t r a n s f e r of power.
But i f t h e c o a l i t i o n s o r e exten-
s i v e , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s e t t l e m e n t w i l l tend t o r e s t o r e t h e p r e v i o u s
s t a t u s quo.
way:
--
The w i s e r e v o l u t i o n a r y who w i s l ~ e st o produce a l a r g e t r a n s -
f e r of power forms t h e minimum n e c e s s a r y c o a l i t i o n w i t h e x i s t i n g members
The r a g i n g t i d e of China's r e v o l u t i o n i s f o r c i n g a l l s o c i a l s t r a t a
t o decide their a t t i t u d e .
of t h e p o l i t y , and f o r c e s h i s c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s t o breok i r r e v o c a b l y w i t h
A new change is t a k i n g p l a c e i n t h e bao t h e r members of .the p o l i t y .
l a n c e of c l a s s f o r c e s i n China.
M u l t i t u d e s of people a r e b r e a k i n g
away from Kumintnng i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l and coming o v e r t o t h e
r e v o l u t i o n a r y cnmp; and t h e Chinese r e a c t i o n a r i e s have f a l l e n i n t o
h o p e l e s s s t r a i t s . i s o l a t e d and abandoned.
As t h e P e o p l e ' s Mar of
L i b e r a t i o n draws c l o s e r and c l o s e r t o f i n a l v i c t o r y . a l l t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y people and a l l f r i e n d s of t h e people w i l l u n i t e more s o l i d l y
and, l e d by t h e Communist P a r t y of China, r e s o l . u t e l y demand t h e comp l e t e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s and t h e thoroughgoing
development of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s u n t i l a p e o p l e ' s d e m o c r a t i c
r e p u b l i c on n country-wide s c a l e i s founded and a peace based on
u n i t y and democracy i s achieved (Moo 1961: 305).
The e x p e r i e n c e of China i n t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r s c o n f i r m s t h e g e n e r a l r e l a -
The n a t u r e of such a c o a l i t i o n i s f o r a member of t h e p o l i t y t o
t r a d e r e s o u r c e s w i t h a c h a l l e n g e r , f o r example, an exchange of J o b s f o r
e l e c t o r a l support.
Such a c o a l i t i o n i s always r i s k y , s i n c e t h e c h a l l e n g e r
w i l l always b e on t h e l o s i n g end of t h e exchange a s compared wltll t h e v a l u e
of t h e r e s o u r c e s when t r a d e d among members of t h e p o l i t y . and t h e r e f o r e
d i s p o s e d t o move i t s e x t e n s i v e mobilized r e n o u r c e s e l s e w h e r e .
t h e c h a l l e n g e r i s l i k e l y t o a c c e p t a c o a l i t i o n where i L o f f e r s
Neverthcleus
a defense
a g a i n s t r e p r e s s i o n o r d e v a l u a t i o n of i t s r e s o u r c e s and t h e member i s l i k e l y
t o a c c e p t i t when t h e p o l i t y i s c l o s e l y d i v i d e d , o r when no c o a l i t i o n portn e r s a r e a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y , o r when i t s own membership is i n
jeopardy f o r want of r e s o u r c e s .
A c l n s s i c r e v o l u t i o n a r y t a c t i c a l s o f a l l s under t h e heading of
t i o n s h i p between t h e e x t e n s i v e n e s s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n and t h e
challenger-member c o a l i t i o n : t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of on o r g a n i z a t i o n whlch n l -
thoroughness of t h e t r a n s f e r of power.
ready h a s an e s t o b l i s l i e d p l a c e i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of power.
C o a l i t i o n s between Members and C h a l l e n g e r s
Lenin was e n u n c i a t i n g such an approach t o t r a d e unions:
The second proximate c a u s e of s i g n i f i c a n t power t r a n s f e r s , however,
works a g a i n s t t h e f i r s t t o some e x t e n t .
I t is t h e f o r m a t i o n of c o a l i t i o n s
A s e n r l y a s 1901.
Every Social-Democratic worker should a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e a s s i s t and
t o b e a c r u c i a l e a r l y omen of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n .
a c t i v e l y work i n t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
may, of c o u r s e , c o n s i s t of i n d i v i d u a l a c c e p t a n c e of e x c l r ~ s i v ea l t e r n a t i v e
But, w h i l e t h i s i s t r u e , i t
The " d e s e r t i o n "
i s c e r t a i n l y n o t i n our i n t e r e s t t o demand t h a t o n l y Social-Demo-
c l a i m s t o c o n t r o l of t h e government.
c r o t s should he e l i g i b l e f o r memhersliip i n t h e " t r a d e " u n i o n s , s i n c e
ing
t h a t would o n l y narrow t h e s c o p e of o u r i n f l u e n c e upon t h e masses.
by i n t e l l e c t u a l s which c o n t r i b u t e most t o h a s t e n i n g a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u n -
Let e v e r y worker who u n d e r s t a n d s t h e need t o u n i t e f o r t h e s t r u g g l e
t i o n , i n my view, c o n s i s t of c o a l i t i o n s between r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a l l e n g e r n
a g a i n s t t h e employers and t h e governments j o i n t h e t r a d e unions.
and groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s having memberallip i n t h c p o l i t y .
The v e r y aim of t h e t r a d e u n i o n s would b e i m p o s s i b l e of schievement,
p e n s i t y of French l e f t - w i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s t o form such c o a l i t i o n s
i f t h e y d i d n o t u n i t e a l l who have a t t a i n e d a t l e a s t t h i s e l e m e n t a r y
o u t q u i t e r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e i r own c l a i m s t o power and p r i v i l e g e
d e g r e e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . i f t h e y were n o t v e r y
broad
organizations.
The b r o a d e r t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . t h e b r o a d e r w i l l b e our i n f l u e n c e
o v e r them
--
a n i n f l u e n c e d u e , n o t o n l y t o t h e "spontaneous" devel-
ell c l a i m s ,
I t may a l s o t o k e t h e form of r e j e c t -
i n good a n a r c h i s t fashion:
But t h e n h i f t s i n commitment
.
The pro-
--
-- withis legen-
dary.
C o n t r o l of S u b s t a n t i a l F o r c e
C o n t r o l over t h e major o r g a n i z e d means of c o e r c i o n w i t h i n t h e popu-
opment of t h e economic s t r u g g l e , b u t t o t h e d i r e c t and c o n s c i o u s
l a t i o n i s p i v o t a l t o t h e s u c c e s s o r f a i l u r e of any e f f o r t t o s e i z e power.
e f f o r t of t h e s o c i a l i s t t r a d e union members t o i n f l u e n c e t h e i r c m -
Within a l l contemporary s t a t e s , t h a t means c o n t r o l of t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s .
r o d e s (Lenin 1967b: 1 9 1 ) .
Although d e f e c t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y is by no means a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n
f o r a t a k e o v e r by t h e r e b e l s , no t r a n s f e r of power a t a l l is l t k e l y i n a
I n t h e s e c a s e s , t h e t r a d e u n i o n s were normolly e s t a b l i s h e d members of t h e i r
r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n i f t h e government r e t a l n a complete c o n t r o l of t h e
r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i e s , w h i l e t h e S o c i a l Democrats i n q u e s t i o n were c h a l l e n m i l i t a r y p a s t t h e opening of t h a t s i t u a t i o n (Chorley 1943, Andreski 1968.
gers still outside the polity.
I n t h i s same message, Lenin c o n c l u d e s by
R u s s e l l 1974).
r e c o r n e n d i n g t h e c o n t r o l of t h e l a r g e , open, l e g a l union by t h e s e c r e t ,
D.E.H.
closed, d i s c i p l i n e d revolutionary p a r t y .
R u s s e l l took up t h e q u e s t i o n i n t h e c a s e of f o u r t e e n twen-
t i e t h - c e n t u r y mass r e b e l l i o n s , seven of them s u c c e s n f u l . neven of them un-
S p l i n t e r groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s a p p e a r t o have a s p e c i a l prosuccessful:
p e n s i t y t o form c o a l i t i o n s o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y .
They t r a d e o f f i d e o l o g i c a l
auccessful
unsuccessful
A f g h a n i s t a n 1929
A u s t r i a 1934
Albania 1924
Burma 1953
B o l i v i a 1952
Colombia 1948
B r a z i l 1930
Cuba 1912
work p u b l i c i t y f o r t h e demands of t h e c h a l l e n g e r , l e a d e r s h i p s k i l l s and
a c c e s s t o p e r s o n s i n high p l a c e s f o r v a r i o u s forms of s u p p o r t :
personnel
f o r demonstrations, e l e c t o r a l s t r e n g t h , defense a g a i n s t o t h e r threatening
c h a l l e n g e r s , and s o on.
A n a l y s t s of r e v o l u t i o n a s d i v e r s e a s Crane B r i n t o n
and B a r r i n g t o n Moore hove c o n s i d e r e d t h e " d e s e r t i o n of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s "
China 1949
llonduras 1933
Cuba 1959
I t a l y 1949
Mexico 1911
Spain 1934
T a b l e 7.1:
D.E.H.
R u s s e l l ' s Armed F o r c e D i s l o y a l t y S c a l e .
1. Degree of d i s l o y a l t y (D)
By " r e b e l l i o n " .
R u n s e l l means "a form of v i o l e n t power s t r u g g l e i n which
0 = willing, enthusiastic fighters
t h e overthrow of t h e regime i s t h r e a t e n e d by means t h a t i n c l u d e v i o l e n c e "
1 = unwilling f i g h t e r s , e.g. surrendered r e a d i l y
( R u s s e l l 1974: 56).
By s u c c e s s f u l r e b e l l i o n , which s h e e q u a t e s w i t h revo2 = n e u t r a l , e.g.
l u t i o n , R u s s e l l means t h o s e i n which t h e r e b e l s o r t h e i r chosen r e p r e s e n 3
t a t i v e s assume t h e p o s i t i o n s of power.
Her d i s t i n c t i o n between r e b e l l i o n
-
s t o o d by w i t h o u t r e s i s t i n g . r a n away
a c t i v e l y helped r e b e l s , e . g . gave arms, informed r e b e l s of
t r o o p maneuvers and b a t t l e p l a n s
and r e v o l u t i o n p a r a l l e l s t h e d j s t i n c t i o n between r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n
4 = f o u g h t on t h e s i d e of t h e r e b e l s
ond r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome, e x c e p t t h a t i t e x c l u d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of revol u t i o n wlthout r e b e l l i o n .
I n t h e f o u r t e e n c a s e s , R u s s e l l works o u t a s c a l e
f o r t h e d i s l o y a l t y of t h e governmental armed f o r c e s .
T a b l e 7.1.
The s c a l e a p p e a r s i n
As t h e t a b l e shows, t h e d i s l o y a l t y s c o r e h a s t h r e e components:
tlie d e g r e e of d i s l o y n l t y (D), t h e t i m i n g of d i s l o y a l t y (T),
t i o n of t h e armed f o r c e s which were d i s l o y a l (P).
2. Time a t which d i s l o y a l (T)
0 = n e v e r ( i n t h e l a s t 5% of tlie d u r a t i o n )
1 = n e a r t h e end ( i n t h e l a s t 6-252 of t h e d u r a t i o n
and t h e propor-
The b a s i c formula, w i t h
a d j u s t m e n t s f o r t h e number of d i f f e r e n t armed f o r c e s involved and t h e d i f -
a b o u t halfway through (from 26-752 of t h e d u r a t i o n )
2
3 = n e a r t h e b e g i n n i n g ( i n t h e f i r s t 6-25% of t h e d u r a t i o n )
4- from t h e s t a r t ( i n t h e f i r s t 0-5% of t h e d u r a t i o n )
f e r e n t phases of t h e i r a c t i o n , i s t h e p r o d u c t of t h e t h r e e components:
D x T x P.
R u s s e l l found some o v e r l a p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s of loy-
a l t y s c o r e a f o r successful and u n s u c c e s s f u l r e b e l l i o n s .
For example,
3. P r o p o r t i o n of armed f o r c e a d i s l o y a l a t a p n r t i c u l a r time (P)
.
tlie Burmese r e b e l l i o n of 1954 f a i l e d d e s p i t e wide s u p p o r t from t h e armed
forces.
For a n o t h e r , t h e d e f e c t i o n s of ~ a t i s t a ' sarmed f o r c e s t o C a s t r o ' a
s u c c e s s f u l Cuban r e v o l u t i o n were few and l a t e .
On t h e a v e r a g e , n e v e r t h e -
l e s s , t h e s u c c e s s f u l r e b e l l i o n s had much h i g h e r d i s l o y a l t y s c o r e s .
Further-
more, i n no c a s e d i d s u c c e s s come w i t h o u t some armed f o r c e d i s l o y a l t y s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e f o r e t h e end of t h e r e b e l l i o n .
0 = none (0-1%)
0.5
-
few (2-107.)
1 = some (11-252)
2
3
c o n s i d e r a b l e (26-502)
m a j o r i t y (51495%)
4 = a l l (96-1OOX)
This l a s t is necessarily
R u s s e l l ' s most c o n t r o v e r s i a l f i n d i n g ; one can e a s i l y a r g u e t h a t i t merely
shows t h a t t h e armed f o r c e s , t o o , e v e n t u a l l y s e e which way t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
Source: R u s s e l l 1974: 74.
wind i s blowing.
S i n c e R u s s e l l e x p l i c i t l y b u i l d s i n t h e t i m i n g of d i s -
c h a l l e n g e r s and members of t h e p o l i t y : c ) c o n t r o l of s u b s t a n t i a l f o r c e
by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n .
Put t o g e t h e r , t h e i t e m s a r e a r e c l p c
l o y a l t y , however, t h e g e n e r a l r e s u l t s look s o l i d .
f o r revolution.
I t f o l l o w s more o r l e s s d i r e c t l y t h a t t h e g r e a t e r t h e c o e r c i v e
resources
--
To sum up t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e r e c i p e , we might p u t t o g e t l ~ c ran
Lncluding p r i v a t e a r m i e s , weapons and segments of t h e
n n t i o n o l armed f o r c e s
--
i d e a l i z e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y sequenc&
i n i t i a l l y c o n t r o l l e d by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
c o a l i t i o n , t h e more l i k e l y a t r a n s f e r of power.
Likewise, t h e e a r l i e r
movement of c o e r c i v e r e s o u r c e s t o t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n , t h e more
l i k e l y a t r a n s f e r of power.
1.
g r a d u a l m o b i l i z a t i o n of c o n t e n d e r s making e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s t o
governmental c o n t r o l a n d / o r u n s c c e p t a b l e t o t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ;
The m o b i l i z a t i o n of o t h e r r e s o u r c e s probably
2.
r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n t h e number of people a c c e p t i n g t h o s e c l a i m s
a f f e c t s t h e chances of a c q u i r i n g power s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s w e l l , b u t a t a
.
a n d / o r r a p i d expansion of t h e c o a l i t i o n i n c l u d i n g t h e u n a c c e p t a b l e
lower r a t e t h a n t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of c o e r c i v e means.
It a l s o f o l l o w s
o r exclusive contenders;
t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e of e x i s t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
c o a l i t i o n w i l l i n c r e a s e t h e chances f o r some t r a n s f e r of power ( a l t h o u g l ~
3.
i t r e d u c e s t h e chances f o r a complete w r e s t i n g of power from members
of t h e p o l i t y ) t o s u p p r e s s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e coalition and/or t h e
of t h e p o l i t y ) both because of t h e a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s i t b r i n g s t o
a c c e p t a n c e of i t s c l a i m s : t h i s may w e l l i n c l u d e a t t e m p t s a t f o r c e d
~ l l ec o a l i t i o n and becnuse of t h e g r e a t e r l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e armed
demobilization
f o r c e s w i l l d e f e c t , waver o r remain n e u t r a l when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h e s t a b -
a t t h e d i s p o s a l of c o n t e n d e r s ;
u n s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s by t h e government ( a t t h e b e h e s t of members
s e i z u r e , d e v a l u a t i o n o r d i s p e r s i o n of t h e r e s o u r c e s
l i s h e d members of t h e p o l i t y .
4.
e s t a b l i s h m e n t by t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l 1 t i o n of e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l
Revolutionary Sequences and C o l l e c t i v e Violence
o v e r some p o r t i o n of t h e government
--
a t e r r i t o r i a l branch, a
We have e x p l o r e d t h r e e proximate c a u s e s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s :
f u n c t i o n a l s u b d i v i s i o n , a p o r t i o n of i t s p e r s o n n e l ;
1 ) t h e oppenrnnce of c o n t e n d e r s , o r c o a l i t i o n s of c o n t e n d e r s , advancing
e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government which
5.
i s c u r r e n t l y e x e r t e d by t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ; 2 ) commitment t o
that control;
s t r u g g l e s of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n t o m a i n t a i n o r expnnd
t h e s e c l a i m s by a s i g n i f i c a n t segment of t h e s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n ; 3) i n -
6.
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s i n g l e p o l i t y through t h e v i c t o r y of t h e
c a p a c i t y o r unwillingmess of t h e a g e n t s of t h e government t o s u p p r e s s
a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n . througb i t s d e f e a t , o r t h r o u g l ~t h e e s t a b t h e n l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n a n d l o r t h e commitment t o i t s c l a l m s .
Another
l i s h m e n t of a modus v i v e n d i between t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o o l i t i o n nnd
t r i a d summarized proximate c a u s e s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcomes:
a) the
some o r a l l of t h e o l d members; f r a g m e n t a t i o n of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
p r e s e n c e of a r c v o l u t i o n n t y s i t u a t i o n ; b) revolut5onory c o a H t i o n s between
coalition;
7.
r e h . p o s i t i o n of r o u t i n e governmental c o n t r o l throughout t h e
subject population.
F i g u r e 7-4: The Timing of C o l l e c t i v e Violence i n Tension-Release and
C o n t e n t i o n Models of Revolution.
I l a y o u t tlie sequence not t o propose a new " n a t u r a l h i s t o r y " of r e v o l u t i o n
1. Tension-Release
i n t h e a t y l e of Lyford P. Edwards o r Crane B r i n t o n , b u t t o i d e n t i f y t h e
l o g i c of t h e p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n .
That l o g i c d i f f e r s c o n s i d e r a b l y from t h e common i d e a of r e v o l u t i o n
u
a s a s o r t of t e n s i o n - r e l e a s e .
I f a t e n s i o n - r e l e a s e model of r e v o l u t i o n
rl
were c o r r e c t , one might r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t t h e l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e
v i o l e n c e t o mount u n s t e a d i l y t o t h e climax
itself
--
and then d e c l i n e r a p i d l y .
t e n s i o n i s dissipated.
--
t h e revolutionary situation
A t t h a t p o i n t . presumably, t h e
The " c o n t e n t i o n " model I have been f o l l o w i n g
s u g g e s t s o d i f f e r e n t sequence.
Time
I t does n o t p r e d i c t c l e a r l y t o t h e
curve of v i o l e n c e b e f o r e a r e v o l u t i o n , s i n c e t h a t depends on t h e p a t t e r n
of m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o n t e n t i o n l e a d i n g t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of m u l t i p l e
sovereignty.
Yet i t d o e s deny t h e n e c e s s i t y of a b u i l d u p of v i o l e n c e
before a revolution.
I
I
On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e c o n t e n t l o n model makes i t appear l i k e l y
t h a t once m u l t l p l c s o v e r e i g n t y b e g i n s , c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e w i l l c o n t i n u e
I
ti
4
I
4
>
a t high l e v e l s l o n g a f t e r t h e b a s i c i s s u e i s d e c i d e d , and w i l l t a p e r
off gradually.
S c h e m a t i c a l l y , t h e c o n t r a s t a p p e a r s i n F i g u r e 7-4.
a r e s e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i s general p r e d i c t i o n .
0
There
F i r s t , tlie appearance
3
u
0
4
rl
U
0
of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y p u t s i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e achieved p o s i t i o n of
w
e v e r y s i n g l e c o n t e n d e r , whether a member of t h e p o l i t y o r n o t . and t h e r e -
4
0
fore t e n d s t o i n i t i a t e a g e n e r a l round of mutual t e s t i n g among c o n t e n d e r s .
That t e s t i n g i n i t s e l f produces c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e .
Second, t h e s t r u g g l e of one p o l i t y a g a i n s t i t s r i v a l amounts t o
war:
a b a t t l e fought w i t h u n l i m i t e d means.
S i n c e c o n t r o l of t h e e n t i r e
Revolutionary
Situation
cl
Time
I
government i s a t s t a k e , h i g h c o s t s and high r i s k s a r e j u s t i f i e d .
High
c o s t s and high r i s k s i n c l u d e d e s t r u c t i o n of p e r s o n s and p r o p e r t y .
T h i r d , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n i s l i k e l y t o fragment once t h e
t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of v i o l e n c e produced by a r e v o l u t i o n .
In general, the
l a r g e r t h e number of c o n t e n d e r s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a t r u g g l e f o r p a r e r
( h o l d i n g c o n s t a n t t h e number of p e o p l e i n v o l v e d ) , t h e h i g h e r tlie l e v e l
i n i t i a l s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c e n t r a l governmental a p p a r a t u s o c c u r s .
of v i o l e n c e , because t h e number of mutual t e s t s of p o s i t i o n hetween
and t h a t f r a g m e n t a t i o n i t s e l f t e n d s t o produce f u r t h e r s t r u g g l e s i n v o l v i n g
c o n t e n d e r s l i k e l y r i s e s e x p o n e n t i a l l y w i t h t h e number of c o n t e n d e r s .
violence.
The g r e a t e r t h e f l u c t u a t i o n i n c o n t r o l of v a r i o u s segments of t h e govern-
The r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n fragments f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s :
i t t a k e s a l a r g e r m o b i l i z e d mass t o s e i z e power than t o m a i n t a i n i t ; t h e
ment by d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n s of c o n t e n d e r s , t h e h i g h e r t h e l e v e l of
i n e v i t a b l e d i v e r g e n c e of some major o b j e c t i v e s of t h e c o n t e n d e r s w i t h i n
v i o l e n c e , b o t h because t h e s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l i t s e l f b r i n g s v i o l e n t
tlie c o a l i t i o n w i l l come t o t h e f o r e once t h e common o b j e c t i v e of s e i z u r e
r e s i s t a n c e and because e a c h change of c o n t r o l s e t s o f f f u r t h e r t e s t i n g
of power h a s been accomplished; t h o s e c o n t e n d e r s which have mobilized
of p o s i t i o n .
r a p i d l y up t o t h e p o i n t of r e v o l u t i o n e r e a l s o l i k e l y t o d e m o b i l i z e
F i n a l l y , t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e r e p r e s s i v e means under government
r a p i d l y due t o t h e underdevelopment of t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h e manage-
c o n t r o l s t r o n g l y e f f e c t s t h e d e g r e e of v i o l e n c e .
ment of t h e mobilized r e s o u r c e s , and t h u s w i l l tend t o l o s e p o s i t i o n i n
obvious y e t c o m p l i c a t e d :
t h e n e x t rounds of t e s t i n g .
i n c r e a s e s d e a t h s through c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , t h e d i v i s i o n of l s b o r
F o u r t h , t h e v i c t o r i o u s p o l i t y s t i l l f a c e s t h e problem of reimposing
r o u t i n g governmental c o n t r o l o v e r t h e s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n even a f t e r
m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y h a s ended.
As t h e government r e t u r n s t o i t s work
The c o n n e c t i o n s a r e
t h e u s e of l e t h a l weapons f o r c r w d c o n t r o l
between s p e c i a l i s t s i n domestic o r d e r ( p o l i c e ) and war ( a r m i e s ) probably
d e c r e a s e s i t , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o v e r a l l r e p r e s s i v e c a p a c i t y of t h e
government is probably c u r v i l i n e a r ( l i t t l e damnge t o p e r s o n s o r p r o p e r t y
of e x t r a c t i n g and r e d i s t r i b u t i n g r e s o u r c e s , i t f i n d s p e o p l e r e l u c t a n t t o
where t h e government h a s g r e a t r e p r e s s i v e c a p a c i t y , l i t t l e damage where
pay t a x e s , g i v e up t h e i r l a n d , send t h e i r s o n s t o war, d e v o t e t h e i r time
i t s r e p r e s s i v e c a p a c i t y i s a l i g h t ) , t h e l e v e l of v i o l e n c e probably r i s e s
t o local administration.
a s t h e armament of t h e government and of i t s opponents spproaclles
v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e begins.
And s o a new round of v i o l e n t i m p o s i t i o n and
Where t h e i n i t i a l l o c u s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n
is c o n s t r i c t e d , t h i s i s l i k e l y t o show up a s a s p r e a d of c o l l e c t i v e
v i o l e n c e t o o t h e r p a r t s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n .
I n a c e n t r a l i z e d governmental
equality.
A l l of t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d more, a r e p l a u s i b l e , b u t no
more t h a n s l i v e r s of s y s t e m a t i c e v i d e n c e f o r t h e i r a c t u a l v a l i d i t y e x i s t .
I f t h e s e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s have something t o them, tlie e x t e n t of
system, t h e most common sequence i s t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y t o b e a l a r g e and
c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e produced by a r e v o l u t i o n should b e o n l y weakly and
d e c i s i v e s t r u g g l e s t t h e c e n t e r followed by a more w i d e ~ p r e a db u t l e s s
i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r e r
c r i t i c a l s e r i e s of b a t t l e s through t h e r e s t of t h e t e r r i t o r y 1 .
changes.
Within t h i s framework, s e v e r a l c o n d i t i o n s appear l i k e l y t o a f f e c t
A z e r o r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r e r (which most of u s would c a l l a
f a i l u r e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n ) can o c c u r a s nn outcome of any of t h e i d e a l
stages presented before, although it becomes less probable as the stages
aristocratic and ecclesiastical property from 1790 to 1793 permnnently
proceed.
shifted the weight away from those two powerful classes. The soviets
Revolutionary Outcomes and Further Structural Changes
!
survived the Bolshevik Revolution.
The Chinese communists began reor-
Under what conditions does extensive structural change accompany or
ganizing village structure almost as soon as they were on the scene.
result from a revolution? To the degree that structural change means
Contrary to the world-weary view of Crane Brinton, who argued tliat a
transter of power from class to class, party to party, contender to
revolution took a country through tremendous turmoil to a posltion
contender, to be sure, we have already examined the question. But if it
approximately the same as it would have occupied anyway after an
means further redistribution of resources, changes in the quality of
equivalent lapse of time, it may be that the extent of structurnl
life, urbanization, industrinlizstion, moral'reconstruction,everything
alteration occurring while multiple sovereignty persists is our best sign
depends on the time scale one adopts.
of the depth of the permanent change to be produced by tlic revolution.
Relatively few permanent changes of this sort actually occur in the
course of revolutions.
Over the long run, revolutions appear to chan~ethe direction of
Engels. Sore1 and Fanon all held out the hope
structural transformation to the extent that they produce a transfer of
of a vast moral regeneration within the act of revolution itself: the
historical experience is sadly lacking in examples thereof.
power. Where there is s large transfer of power among classes, tllc
The other
I
structural renrrangements which occur in the course of revolutions are
typically temporary:
particular coalition which gnins profoundly shapes the subsequent
political development of the country. Barrington Moore's comparison of
the mobilization of men, loyalties, organizational
India, Japan, China, the U.S., France, England, Germany and Russia makes
talents and weapons at a national level which recedes as the new structure
precisely tliat point. Military coups almost never produce any significant
of power crystallizes, the disruption of daily routines for festivals,
structural change
--
despite the declarations of national renovation
deliberations, emer~encies, the provisional appearance of commissars,
which ritually accompany them these days
governing committees, task forces. Michael Walzer has brilliantly
-- because they involve minor
rearrangements among extremely limited sets of contenders. The apparent
portrayed a revolutionary outlook for seventeenth-century England, Richard
exceptions to this rule, revolutions from above llke those of Japan and
Cobb a revolutionary mentality for eighteenth-century France; nevertheless.
Turkey, ordinarily have a reforming segment of the ruling elite effecfor the outlooks and mentalities of most people, revolutions are but
I
I
tively cutting bff their fellows from further access to power. and form-
passing moments.
ing coalitions with classes proviously excludcd from power.
A few great revolutions provide exceptions to this absence of short-.
However, the organizational means available to those who emerge from
run transformation; that is perhaps what permits us to call them great
the revolution with power affect the degree of structural transformation
revolutions. Although the nobles and the clergy regained some of their
position in France with and after Napoleon, the confiscation and sale of
deliberately promoted by the government in post-revolutionary years. In
a discussion of the effect of the "confining conditions" under which a re-
This analysis can be generalized.
Despite the "confining conditions"
volutionary coalition seized power on its subsequent capacity to transform
faced by the French revolutionary coalitions of 1789-94. they seized a
social organization, Otto Kirchheimer comes to the conclusion that the
state apparatus which was already exceptionally centralized and powerful
emergency powers accruing to states during twentieth-century crises like
by comparison with those whlch had grown up elsewhere in the world.
World War I drastically reduced the confinement of power-holders:
were able to use that great parer, in fact. to destroy tlie juridical
They
structure of feudalism, effect large transfers of wealth, subjugote the
The revolution of the 20th Century obliterates the distinction
Church, bui1d.a mass army. The nineteenth-century revoli~tionnrieswho
between emergency and normalcy. Movement plus state can organize
repeatedly seized control of the Spanish state grabbed an apparatus whose
tlie masses because: (a) the technical and intellectual equipment
extractive and repressive capacities were insufficient to any task of nais now at hand to direct them toward major societal programs mtional transformation.
ther than simply liberating their energies from the bonds of traIt is true that the mobilization of contenders which occurs before
dition; (b) they have the means at hand to control people's liveand during a revolution may itself fncilitote a further nationnl mobililihood by means of job assignments and graduated rewards unavailzation, putting resources at the disposal of the state which were simply
able under the largely agricultural and artisanal structure of
unavailable before the revolution: property, energy, information, loyaltlie 1790s and still unavailable to the small enterprise and comties.
That is, indeed, a characteristic strategy of contempornry na-
mission-merchant type economy of the 1850s and 1860s; (c) they have
tional revolutions. The Chinese experience indicates that in the course
fallen heir to endlessly and technically refined propaganda deof a long mobilizstion revolutionaries sometimes build nlternative inntivices substitut'ing for the uncertain leader-mass relations of the
tutions which are potentially stronger than tlie existing state, and serve
previous periods; and (d) they face state organizations shaken up
as the infrastructure of a strong new state when the revolutionories come
by war dislocation and economic crisis. Under these conditions
to power.
Most revolutionaries, however, seize a state apparatus without
Soviet Russia could carry through simultaneously the job of an
that long preparation of an organizational alternative. In those cases.
economic and a politic~l,a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois revoluthe already-accrued power of the state affects the probability that fundation in spite of the exceedingly narrow basis of its political
mental structural change will issue from the revolution much more atrongelite.
On the other hand, the premature revolutionary combination
ly than does the extent of mobilization during the revolution.
of 1793-94 not only dissolved quickly, but left its most'advanced
These facile generalizations, I confess, do not do justice to a
sector, the sans-culottes, with only the melsncl~olychoice between
desperate rioting
--
Germlnal 1795
--
critical question.
organized stage of utter helplessness and agony (Kirchheimer
1965: 973).
For on our estimate of the long-run effects of dif-
or falling back into a preferent kinds of revolution must rest our judgment as to whether any par-
t i c u l n r r e v o l u t i o n , o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y o p p o r t u n i t y , i s worth i t s c o s t .
e s t i m a t e some r e v o l u t i o n s a s worth i t .
I
But a t p r e s e n t no one h a s enough
Back t o t h e E i g h t e e n t h Century
s y s t e m a t i c knowledge about t h e p r o b a b l e s t r u c t u r a l consequences of one
v a r i e t y of r e v o l u t i o n o r a n o t h e r t o make such e s t i m a t e s w i t h c o n f i d e n c e .
Except. p e r h a p s , i n r e t r o s p e c t .
l l i s t o r i a n s c o n t i n u e t o d e b a t e what
CONCLUSIONS AND NEW BEGINNINGS
CHAPTER EIGHT:
We began t h i s i n q u i r y t o g e t h e r more than two c e n t u r i e s ago, In
1765.
At t h a t p o i n t we wandered through England, watching p e o p l e a t t a c k
poorhouses.
We were t r a v e l e r s i n time, simply t r y i n g t o g e t a s e n s e of
t h e E n g l i s h . French and Russian r e v o l u t i s n a c o s t and what t h e y accomplished.
t h e t e x t u r e and meaning of populnr c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
I n t h o s e c a n e s ( a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e ) they a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a c t u a l i t i e s
t o a r a t h e r t i m e l e s s world, a world c o n t a i n i n g a b s t r a c t models'of c o l l c c -
r a t h e r than p r o b a b i l i t i e s .
t i v e action.
T h a t p o t e n t i a l c e r t a i n t y , however, h a s a s e l f -
We went from t h e r e
We climbed up t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n s i d e from i n t e r e s t t o organ-
d e s t r u c t i v e s i d e ; when i t comes t o an e v e n t a s sweeping a s t h e E n g l i s h
ization t o mobilization to c o l l e c t i v e action.
Revolution, a l m o s t e v e r y p r e v i o u s e v e n t which l e f t some t r a c e i n seven-
o p p o r t u n i t y a i d e , from r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n t o power t o o p p o r t u n i t y /
t e e n t h - c e n t u r y England i s i n some s e n s e a "cause",
thrent, only t o return t o collective action.
and almost e v e r y sub-
We then climbcd down t h e
Next we r e - e n t e r c d
time,
s e q u e n t e v e n t i n t h e c o u n t r y and i t s ambit is i n some s e n s e an " e f f e c t " .
equipped w i t h o u r models.
Making c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t a n a l y s i s manageable i n t h i s c o n t e x t means r e d u c i n g
changes i n r e p e r t o i r e s of c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , tlrrough v a r i o u s
We made t h r e e main c i r c u i t s : tlrrouglr major
t h e r e v o l u t i o n t o c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l s , i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n t condi-
forms of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , i n t o t h e t u r b u l e n c e of: r e v o l u t i o n and r e -
t i o n s f o r t h o s e e s s e n t i a l s , and t h e n s p e c i f y i n g subsequent e v e n t s which
bellion.
would have been u n l i k e l y w i t h o u t t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y e s s e n t i a l s .
So i n f a c t
t h e c a u s a l a n a l y e i s of r e a l , h i s t o r i c r e v o l u t i o n s and of r e v o l u t i o n s i n
g e n e r a l converge on s t a t e m e n t s of p r o b a b i l i t y .
Here we a r e now, back n e a r o u r s t a r t i n g p o i n t : generaL r c f l e c -
t i o n on t h e t e x t u r e and meaning of popular c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
Suppose we s p i r i t e d o u r s e l v e s back t o 1765.
of: t h i s book, what would we do?
What
Armed w i t h tlte t e a c h i n g s
we do t h a t we c o u l d n ' t do
when f i r s t we t r o d on Nacton Heath?
One of t h e f i r s t t h i n g s would be t o r e s o l v e t h e g e n e r a l "turbulence"
of 1765 i n t o s p e c i f i c groups, i n t e r e s t s , a c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s among
groups.
We might. f o r example, s t a r t l o o k i n g hard a t such d i f f c r e n c e a a s
t h o s e between t h e Sussex poorhouse c o n f l i c t s and t h e a c t i o n behind t h i s
b r i e f n o t i c e f o r 1 0 J a n u a r y i n t h e Annual R e g i s t e r :
Some thousands of weavers went Jn a body t o Westminster, and prevented
petitions
t o b o t h houses of p n r l i a m e n t , i n behalf of themselves and
t h e i r n m e r o u s f a m i l i e s , most of them now, a s they
represented, in
a s t a r v i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r want of work: and begging. a s a r e l i e f
For o n e t h i n g , t h e poorhouse a t t a c k s have a r a t h e r r e a c t i v e tone: a n
t o t h e i r m i s e r i e s , t h a t t h e y would, i n t h e p r e s e n t s e s s i o n of
a t t e m p t t o defend t h e p a r i s h poor a g a i n s t i n c a r c e r a t i o n .
p a r l i a m e n t , g r a n t a g e n e r a l p r o h i b i t i o n of f o r e i g n wrought s i l k s .
p e t i t i o n march and t h e t a i l o r s ' i n c i p i e n t wage demands l e a n i n t h e pro-
The weavers'
a c t i v e d i r e c t i o n : a l t h o u g h both groups m y w e l l have been responding t o
We would want t o d l f f e r e n t i a t e t h a t from t h e R e g i s t e r ' s r e p o r t f o r 20 A p r i l :
t h r e a t s t o t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d , t h e c l a i m s t h e y made were f o r advnntages they
. . . ten
journeymen t a y l o r s were t r i e d , on a n i n d i c t m e n t f o r con-
s p i r i n g t o g e t h e r t o r a i s e t h e wages, and l e s s e n t h e h o u r s of work,
d i d n o t c u r r e n t l y enjoy.
The q u i c k n o t e on t h e Whiteboys o f f e r s no i n f o r -
mation on t h e c l a i m s a t i s s u e .
But when we l e a r n t h a t t h e Whiteboys oE
s e t t l e d by a n o r d e r of s e s s i o n s , p u r s u a n t t o an a c t of p a r l i a m e n t f o r
I r e l a n d were famous a n t i - B r i t i s h g u e r r i l l a w a r r i o r s , we r e c e i v e an i n d i c -
t h a t purpose, when n i n e of them, who were t h e p r i n c i p a l and committee-
a t i o n t h a t t h e i r s k i r m i s h f e l l somewhere i n t h e r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e
men of s e v e r a l of t h e a s s o c i a t i o n s , which r a i s e d a fund t o s u p p o r t
competition
and c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n .
For a n o t h e r t h i n g , t h e c o n t r a s t i n g a c c o u n t s g i v e an i n k l i n g of t h e
each o t h e r i n such unlawful meetings, and who had d i s t i n g u i s h e d
themselves by t h e name of F l i n t s , were found g u i l t y , and r e c e i v e d
p r e v a i l i n g s c h e d u l e of r e p r e s s i o n : no v i s i b l e penalties
s e n t e n c e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r s e v e r a l d e m e r i t s , v i z . two t o b e imprisoned
march. j a i l s e n t e n c e s f o r t h e m o b i l i z i n g t a i l o r s , a r r e s t s and s h o o t i n g
one y e a r i n Newgate, f i v e f o r t h e s p a c e of s i x months, and two f o r
f o r a t t a c k e r s of Sussex poorhouses, n i n e dead among t h e Whiteboys.
t h r e e months; and were, b e s i d e s , f i n e d o n e s h i l l i n g each and o r d e r e d
f o u r incompletely-documented c a s e s a r e a s l i m b a s i s f o r any g e n e r a l con-
t o f i n d s e c u r i t y f o r t h e i r behaviour.
c l u s i o n s , y e t they immediately draw a t t e n t i o n t o
p r e s s i o n w i t h t h e a c t i o n and group i n q u e s t i o n .
for the petition
The
t h e v a r i a b i l i t y of r e They a l s o s t a r t u s t h i n k -
A t t h e 30th of June, we would f i n d a b r i e f mention of t h e f a c t t h a t "Nine
i n g a b o u t what was changing: s e n d i n g thousands of weavers t o p r e s e n t n
w h i t e boys were l a t e l y k i l l e d , and twenty made p r i s o n e r s , i n a s k i r m i s h
p e t i t i o n was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n n o v a t i o n , w h i l e j a i l i n g people f o r c o n c e r t i n g
w i t h a p a r t y of dragoons, n e a r Dungannon i n I r e l a n d . "
t h e i r wage demands would p r a c t i c a l l y d i s a p p e a r o v e r t h e n e x t c e n t u r y .
The poor on Nacton Heath, t h e weavers a t Westminster, t h e F l i n t s i n
F i n a l l y , even t h e s e Eragmentnry news s t o r i e s g i v e u s some r e a s o n t o
London and t h e Whiteboys a t Dungannon were a l l a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y .
That
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n p r e v a i l i n g i n t h e
a l e r t s u s t o a n e x p l a n a t o r y agenda beginning w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e
B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d of 1765 d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from t h e forms n v n i l relevant populntions, i n t e r e s t s , organization, mobilization, r e p r e s s i o n /
a b l e t o o r d i n a r y t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y people.
Although t h e p e t i t i o n march
f a c i l i t a t i o n , power, and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t , a s w e l l a s a c l o s e l o o k a t
would have a s i g n i f i c a n t p l a c e i n t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n ' s a n c e s t r y , t h e demont h e s p e c i f i c forms, i n t e n s i t i e s and outcomes of t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
s t r a t i o n i t s e l f had n o t y e t e n t e r e d t h e r e p e r t o i r e .
I t a l s o draws o u r a t t e n t i o n t o i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s among t h e f o u r
a t o o l r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o workers
groups.
--
Tlie e t i k e was n o t then
p a r t l y , a s we have s e e n , because
of tlie r e p r e s s i o n v i s i t e d upon any workers who a t t e m p t e d t o c o n c e r t t h e i r
a l l the colonies.
wage demands.
Gentleman's Magazine s t e p p e d up i t s covernge of Americsn news a t t h e
The r e p e r t o i r e v a r i e d from o n e p a r t of B r i t a i n t o a n o t h e r ,
from o n e s o c i a l c l a s s t o a n o t h e r .
But i t was d i s t i n c t l y an e i g h t e e n t h -
To r e t u r n t o t h e B r i t i s h periodicn.l.s of 1765.
end of t h e y e a r .
The
For example:
century repertoire.
..
I f we took a somewhat l o n g e r view, we would f i n d t h e r e p e r t o i r e
chnnging.
1 October: T h i s day i s a p p o i n t e d t o b e held a t New-York i n
North America,
-
Indeed, some s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e whole p a t t e r n of
a g e n e r a l c o n g r e s s of a l l tlie c o l o n i e s , i n o r d e r
t o draw up a remonstrance t o b e p r e s e n t e d t o h i s m a j e s t y n g a i n a t
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n were o c c u r r i n g i n t h e B r i t a i n of t h e 1760s and 1770s.
t h e stamp d u t i e s , and o t h e r burtliens l a i d upon t h e c o l o n i c e , by
The y e a r 1766, f o r example, b r o u g h t one of t h e most widespread s e r i e s of
food r i o t s t o a p p e a r i n modern B r i t a i n ; more g e n e r a l l y , food r i o t s became
t h e l a t e a c t of t h e B r i t i s h p a r l i a m e n t .
...
v e r y common i n t h e v i l l a g e s and s m a l l towns of B r i t a i n d u r i n g t h e middle
5 October:
d e c a d e s of tlte e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , and o n l y began t h e i r d e f i n i t v e d e c l i n e
on board, f o r Maryland, New J e r s e y , and Pennsylvania, when s e v e r a l
a f t e r 1830.
I n London (end, t o some e x t e n t , i n o t h e r major c i t i e s ) we
witness a d i f f e r e n t trend.
t h e s h i p s a r r i v e d a t P h i l a d e l p h i a , w i t h t h e stamps
thousand c i t i z e n s assembled i n o r d e r t o c o n s i d e r ways and menns f o r
There we s e e a R a d i c a l movement forming on a
p r e v e n t i n g t h e stamp a c t t a k i n g p l n c e i n t h a t province. and a t l e a s t
m i d d l e - c l a s s b a s e with i m p o r t a n t a l l i a n c e s among s k i l l e d workers; they
came t o a r e s o l u t i o n t o r e q u e s t t h e d i s t r i b u t o r t o r e s f g n h i s o f f i c e ;
brought t o g e t h e r , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e demand f o r domestic p o l i t i c a l
which a f t e r some demur he i n p a r t d i d , a s s u r i n g h i s countrymen t h a t
reform and t h e criticism of t h e crown's p o l i c y i n America.
no a c t of h i s , o r h i s d e p u t i e s , should e n f o r c e t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e
Such s k i l l e d
workers a s t h e silk-weavers who marched on P a r l i a m e n t were b u i l d i n g l a r g e -
stamp-act i n t h e p r o v i n c e s f o r wliicli h e was c o m i s s i o n e d , b e f o r e tlie
s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and a p p l y i n g p r e s s u r e i n t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l a r e n a .
same should b e g e n e r a l l y p u t i n f o r c e i n t h e n e i g h b o r i n g c o l o n i e s .
The R a d i c a l s , t h e s u p p o r t e r s of John Wilkes, t h e s i l k - w e a v e r s and o t h e r
And a t t h e same time t h e l a w y e r s e n t e r e d i n t o an agreement n o t t o
o r g a n i z e d c o n t e n d e r s f o r power, f u r t h e r m o r e , were s h a p i n g new means of
p u r c h a s e any of t h o s e stamps, g i v i n g i t a s t h e i r o p l n i o n , t h a t i t
exercising their strength.
was i m p o s s i b l e t h e d u t y imposed by them c o u l d be paid f o r i n gold
They p r e s s e d t h e r i g h t t o assemble f o r p e t i -
t i o n i n g and f o r e l e c t i o n s beyond i t s o l d l i m i t , and began t o c r e a t e a
and s i l v e r .
p r o t o t y p e of t h e t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y d e m o n s t r a t i o n .
4 November [ d a t e l i n e New York] : Some e x t r a o r d i n a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s i n
The decnde a f t e r 1765 was l i k e w i s e a n i m p o r t a n t time of t r a n s i t i o n
i n America.
F o r t George,
-
The American t r a n s i t i o n , t o be s u r e , d i f f e r e d g r e a t l y from
having d i s p l e a s e d t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of t h i s c i t y , s v a s t number of
t h e B r i t i s h : i t went from t h e g r e a t r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e Stamp Act t o t h e
opening of a t r u l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n
--
of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y
--
f o r t h e s e c u r i n g t h e stamped paper i n t h a t g a r r l s o n ,
in
them assembled l a s t Frfday evening, and proceeded t o tlie f o r t w e l l s ,
where they b r o k e open t h e s t a b l e of t h e Lt-
G
r-
Cndwallnder
Colden, Esq; took o u t 111scoach and a f t e r c a r r y i n g t h e same t h r o '
p l a y between B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s and American c o l o n i s t s , tlie Amcricans
t h e p r i n c i p a l s t r e e t s of t h e c i t y , i n triumph, marched t o t h e Com-
moved u n s t e a d i l y toward a g e n e r a l b o y c o t t on p o l i t i c a l and economlc Lrnns-
mons where a g a l l o w s was e r e c t e d ; oh o n e end of which was suspended
actions with the British.
t h e e f f i g y of tlie g r e a t man, having i n h i s r i g h t hand s stamped b i l l
governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s
of l a d i n g , and on h i s b r e a s t a p a p e r w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g inscription:
tions
"The Rebel Drummer i n t h e y e a r 1715."
A t h i s back was f i x e d a drum,
a t t h e o t h e r end of t h e g a l l o w s hung t h e f i g u r e of t h e d e v i l .
After
--
them.
They moved toward tlie f a s h i o n i n g of a s e t of
--
committees, a s s e m b l i e s , c o u r t s and a s s o c i n -
p a r a l l e l t o B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and independent of
A s s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of Americans began t o t a k e t h e i r d i r e c t i o n s
from t h o s e p a r a l l e l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t o r e j e c t t h e o r d e r s of L i e u t e n a n t
hanging a c o n s i d e r a b l e time, t h e y c a r r i e d t h e e f f i g i e s , w i t h t h e
Governors and o t h e r B t d t i s h o f f i c i a l s , s r e v o l u t i o n a r y s l t u o t i o n was undcr-
g a l l o w s i n t i r e , being preceded by t h e coach, i n grand p r o c e s s i o n , t o
way.
t h e g a t e of t h e f o r t . from whence i t was removed t o t h e bowling
prominent s u p p o r t e r s of t h e B r i t i s h l e f t tlie c o l o n i e s , t h e Americans ac-
g r e e n , under t h e muzzles of t h e f o r t guns, where a b o n f i r e was i m -
q u i r e d p o l i t i c a l independence, and t h e m i d d l e - c l a s s members of t h e r e v o l -
m e d i a t e l y made, and t h e dummer, d e v i l , coach LC. were consumed
u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s wielded e x c e p t i o n a l power i n t h e s h a p i n g of t h e new
The whole body
a d m i s t tlie a c c l a m a t i o n s oE some thousand s p e c t a t o r s .
n e x t proceeded t o Vsux-hall,
t h e house of Major
r e p o r t e d , was a f r i e n d t o t h e Stamp-act,
James,
who, i t was
from whence they took evey
The outcome, t o o , was a t l e a s t a l i m i t e d r e v o l u t i o n : thousnnds of
polity.
The s t r u g g l e s of t h e 1760s i n B r i t a i n and America c l e a r l y belong i n
t h e world we have been e x p l o r i n g i n t h i s book: t h e world of c o n t e n t i o u s
i n d i v i d u a l a r t i c l e , t o a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e amount; and having made
collective action.
a n o t h e r b o n f i r e , t h e whole was consumed i n t h e flames.
o f "mobs",
Other people have often p o r t r a y e d t h a t world a s f u l l
" d i s o r d e r s " and "mass movements".
We have s e e n many of t h e
e v e n t s t h o s e w r d s r e f e r t o , and i n t h e p r o c e s s have n o t i c e d r e p e a t e d l y
The n e x t n i g h t , t h e assembled crowd demanded t h a t t h e L i e u t e n a n t Governor
how m i s l e a d i n g t h e words a r e .
hand o v e r tlie stamps.
After
Mob, d i s o r d e r and mass movement a r e top-
a w h i l e , h e d e c l a r e d under p r e s s u r e t h a t h e
down words.
They a r e t h e w o r d s o f a u t h o r i t i e s and e l i t e s f o r a c t i o n s of
o t h e r people
--
would n o t d j s t r i b u t c t h e stamps h i m s e l f , and f i n a l l y p u t them i n t o t h e hands
of t h e municipal c o r p o r a t i o n , i n t h e New York c i t y h a l l .
and, o f t e n , f o r a c t i o n s which t h r e a t e n t h e i r owl i n t e r e s t s .
Gentleman's
The bottom-up approach we have taken i d e n t i f i e s t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between
Magazine of 1765 p r i n t e d many more r e p o r t s on American Stamp Act r e s i s t a n c e ,
tlie c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s OF o r d i n a r y people and t h e ways they o r g n n i z e around
n o t t o mention m u l t i p l e e s s a y s and commentaries on t h e p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s .
t h e i r workaday i n t e r e s t s .
We a l r e a d y haveean i d e s what happened i n t h e n e x t t e n y e a r s .
That approach a l s o h e l p s c l a r i f y how much
I n the
of t h e v i o l e n c e which e l i t e o b s e r v e r s have been i n c l i n e d t o a t t r i b u t e t o
t r a d i n g c i t i e s of t h e American c o a s t , a n t i - B r i t i s h c o a l i t i o n s Formed,
t h e d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , d e s p e r a t i o n o r a g g r e s s i v e impulses of t h e masses is
drawing e s p e c i a l l y on t h e merchants, l a w y e r s , tradesmen and c r a f t s m e n , b u t
a c t u a l l y a by-product of i n t e r a c t i o n s between groups which a r e p u r s u i n g
o f t e n a i d e d by such groups a s s a i l o r s and longshoremen.
I n a complex i n t e r -
t h e i r ends i n r e l a t i v e l y r o u t i n e ways and r i v a l s o r a u t h o r i t i e s who c h a l l e n g e t h e c l a i m s embodied i n t h o s e r e l a t i v e l y r o u t i n e a c t i o n s .
There we a r r i v e a t t h e h a r d p a r t .
T h e o r i z i n g About C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n s
The hard p a r t i s t h e r e s e n r c l ~
agenda: s o r t i n g p o p u l a t i o n s i n t o members of t h e p o l i t y , c l ~ o l l e n a e r sand
We c o u l d , i f we wanted, now f o r m a l i z e t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e S p i t a l f i e l d s
weavers, t h e Nacton poorhouse-wreckers,
arguments and e x p l a n a t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
t h e Stamp Act crowds i n New York.
non-actors;
i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t s r e l i a b l y ; measuring t h e e x t e n t
and c h a r a c t e r of r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t a t i o n t o which they a r e s u b j e c t ; de-
The f o r m a l i z a t i o n would c o n s i s t of mapping t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e p a r t i c i -
t e r m i n i n g whether i t is t r u e , a s argued e a r l i e r , t h ~ rt i c h p o p u l a t i o n s
p a n t s , e s t i m a t i n g t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e of o p p o r t u n i t y and t h r e a t w i t h r e s p e c t
tend t o m o b i l i z e o f f e n s i v e l y , poor p o p u l a t i o n s t o m o b i l i z e d e f e n s i v e l y ;
t o t h o s e i n t e r e s t s , checking, t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l s , gauging t h e i r power
d e t e r m i n i n g whether i t is t r u e , n s I have a s s e r t e d r e p e a t e d l y , tlint t h e
p o s i t i o n s , then s e e i n g t o what e x t e n t t h e s e v a r i a b l e s accounted f o r t h e
g e n e r a l e f f e c t of s u s t a i n e d r e p r e s s i o n i s n o t t o b u i l d up t e n s i o n s t o
i n t e n s i t y and c h a r a c t e r of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
One s t e p back from
t h a t f o r m a l i z a t i o n we would f i n d o u r s e l v e s examining t h e p r e v a i l i n g patt e r n of r e p r e s s i o n a n d f a c i l i t a t i o n , t h e impact of t h e v a r i o u s g r o u p s '
t h e p o i n t of a g r e a t e x p l o n i o ~ l , b u t t o r e d u c e t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of c o l lective action.
This is t h e hard p a r t .
It is n o t o n l y hard because i t i n v o l v e s many
o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n and on t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , t h e e f f e c t of
v a r i a b l e s and i n t e r a c t i o n s among t h e v a r i a b l e s .
c o a l i t i o n s w i t h o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s on t h e i r c u r r e n t power p o s i t i o n s , and s o
t h e measurement problems a r e s o l a r g e ; d e v i s i n g g e n e r a l l y comparable and
on.
meaningful. measures of o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n , power, r e p r e s s i o n , and
Thnt is t h e e a s y p a r t : showing t h a t c o n c e p t s such a s m o b i l i z a t i o n
I t is a l s o hnrd because
s o on l i e s beyond t h e FreRent s t a t e of t h e a r t .
That is why t h i s book h a s
and r e p r e s s i o n p o i n t t o b r o a d l y s i m i l a r p r o c e s s e s i n d i f f e r e n t s e t t i n g s ,
s o o f t e n t u r n e d t o t h e problems of measurement.
P l e n t y of work t o do
and a p p l y c o n v e n i e n t l y i n t h o s e v a r i o u s s e t t i n g s .
there.
We would be s u r p r i s e d
and d i s a p p o i n t e d i f i t came o u t o t h e r w i s e ; a f t e r a l l , t h e c o n c e p t s were
meant t o be q u i t e g e n e r a l .
Yet t h e e a s y p a r t h a s i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n s .
h e l p s i d e n t i f y some unexpected and p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l comparisons
It
--
between, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of B r i t i s h r a d i c a l s i n t h e 1760s
and t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of American r a d i c a l s i n t h e 1960s.
It brings o u t
t h e r i c h n e s s nnd r e l e v a n c e of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l s f o r t h e c o n c e r n s of
contemporary n n n l y s t s of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s .
t o produce a t h i r d advantage: tlie r e c o g n i t i o n
Thse two advantages combjne
t h a t h i s t o r i c a l experiences
n r e a n important and a c c e s s i b l e domain f o r t h e t e s t i n g and refinement of
The a c c o u n t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n B r i t a i n and America we havc j u s t
reviewed a l s o r e c a l l a major t h e o r e t i c a l problem.
In the mobilization
model which t h i s book h a s employed, c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s a r e g i v e n a p r i o r i .
We impute them from some g e n e r a l h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s (my p r e f e r r e d nnalysis h e i n g Marx' r e l a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o t h e
p r e v a i l i n g means of p r o d u c t i o n ) o r we determine them e m p i r i c a l l y (my pref e r r e d p r o c e d u r e being t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o what people soy a r e t h e i r griev-,
ances, a s p i r a t i o n s and r i g h t s ) .
The t h e o r e t i c a l d i f F i c u l . t i e s m n l t i p l y .
M o b i l i z a t i o n , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n nnd a c q u i s i t i o n o r 1.088 of power f r e q u e n t l y
a l t e r a group's i n t e r e s t s .
count?
How s h o u l d we t a k e t h a t a l t e r a t i o n i n t o ac-
diminished l e v e l s ; t h a t i a becsuae tile governmental a p p a r a t u s p r o t e c t s
The i m p u t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s and t h e e m p i r i c a l d e r i v a t i o n o f t e n
them from t h r e a t s and because reduced c o s t s of m o b i l i z a t i o n and collective
c o n f l i c t w i t h each o t h e r ; L e n i n i s t 8 s p e a k of " f a l s e c o n s c i o ~ ~ s n e s s " . Does
a c t i o n mean they can r e a l i z e t h e same i n t e r e s t w i t h l e s s e f f o r t .
t h a t make s e n s e ?
t h e c r u c i a l changes a f f e c t c o n s t r a i n t s , n o t i . n t e n t i o n s .
Another problem h a s been w i t h u s from t h e s t a r t , and h a s r e f u s e d
Thua
Another kind of c a u s a l argument h a s a l s o f i g u r e d prominently i n t h e
t o go away: t h e c o n n e c t i o n between c a u s a l and p u r p o s i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s of
a n a l y s e s of p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s .
collective action.
s o c i a l changes, n o t a b l y s t a t e m a k i n g , p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l i z n -
them f i r m l y .
We have o s c i l l a t e d between t h e two w i t h o u t i n t e g r a t i n g
The m o b f l i z a t i o n model s e r v e s f o r s h o r t - r u n ana1ysb.s.
tion.
I t concerns tlie e f f e c t s of very 1.arge
There 1 have argued r e p e a t e d l y t h a t t h e change i n q u e s t i o n simultnne-
When we t a k e up a s e r i e s of a c t i o n s such a s t h e Stamp Act r e s i s t a n c e i n
o u s l y a f f e c t e d t h e i n t e r e s t s and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of v a r i o u s c o n t e n d e r s
P h i l . a d e l p h i a and New York we s o r t our o h S e ~ a t i 0 n Si n t o i n t e r e s t s , organ-
f o r power, and t h e r e b y a f f e c t e d t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
i z a t i o n , mobilization, r e p r e s s i o n , power, o p p o r t u n i t y and c o l l e c t i v e
I n t h e c a s e of p e a s a n t r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n accompanying
action i t s e l f .
But we u l t i m a t e l y v i s u s l i . z e t h e v a r i o u s groups involved
a t a temaking:
a s undertaking t h e i r a c t i o n purposively: seeking t o r e a l i z e t h e i r i n t e r ABSTRACT
CONCRETE
e s t s w i t h t h e means a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s s e t by t h e i r rel a t i o n s h i p t o t h e world around them.
DEEWD FOR TAXES
I have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t t h e
\
k
l i m i t a t i o n s of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model: tlie l a c k of allowance f o r uncert a i n t y nnd f o r s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . t h e f o c u s on q u a n t i t y r a t h e r t h a n
qt~nl.i.ty, t h e measurement d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n each of i t s v a r i a b l e s .
.
MOBILIZATION
\
1
L
L
THREAT TO
WCAL CONTROI. OF LAND,
CROPS. WF,N,TH,
SHORT-RUN REINFORCEMENT OF COMMUNLTY
POLITLCAL INSTITUTIONS
/
Even i f we f i n d ways of overcoming t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s , however, we a r e
SUILDUP OF LOCAL
PARAM!l.LTARY FORCES
s t i l l d e a l i n g with a p u r p o s i v e model.
J,
T M REBELLIONS
I n coping w i t h long-rlln changes i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , we have genera l l y t u r n e d from p u r p o s i v e t o c a u s a l models.
The p o l i t y model h a s s e r v e d
T h i s is n o t a complete a c c o u n t , s i n c e s t a t e m k i n g a l s o a f f e c t s r e p r e s s i o n 1
u s i n t h i s way; f o r example, i t p r o v i d e s a c r u d e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e
f a c i l i t a t i o n and power.
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i f f e r e n c e s i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n among groups which a r e
t h e s t a n d a r d Durkheimian arguments i n which t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between t h e
g a i n i n g power, groups which a r e l o s i n g power, and groups which a r e main-
pace of s t r u c t u r a l change and tlie i n s t i t u t l o ~ l a l i z a t i o nof s o c i a l c o n t r o l
t a i n i n g t h e i r power.
d e t e r m i n e s t h e l i k e l i h o o d of c o n f l i c t and p r o t e s t .
C h a l l e n g e r s g a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l power, r u n s one p a r t
of t h e e x p l a n n t i o n , tend t o s h i f t toward c o l l e c t i v e p r o a c t i o n , b u t a t
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s account c l e a r l y d i f f e r s from
Al.though t h e argu-
ment h a s i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r changes i n t h e plrrposes of p e a s a n t
I n p r i n c i p l e , i t s h o u l d n o t be h a r d t o i n t e g r a t e t h e p u r p o s i v e and
causal analyses.
The p o l i t y model we have used i n t h i s book
and s t r u c t u r e s of power.
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a c a u s a l argument.
I n p r i n c i p l e , we can i n t e g r a t e them by c o n t i n u i n g t o
s i n g l e s o u t o n l y one a s p e c t
ments
--
--
t h e relationship of c o n t e n d e r s t o eovern-
of a complex s e t of changes.
In order t o integrate the causal
t h i n k of group d e c i s i o n r u l e s and t a c t i c a l computations ( t h e p u r p o s i v e
and p u r p o s i v e arguments unfoldcd i n t h i s book, we need more.
p a r t ) which o p e r a t e w i t h i n s e v e r e c o n s t r a i n t s s e t by t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s
much f u l l e r a n a l y s i s of power s t r u a g l e s . c o o l i t t o n s . and o t h e r forms oE
i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r groups, and t h e c u r r e n t
i n t e r a c t i o n among c o n t e n d e r s .
s t a t e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s i n t h e world ( t h e c a u s a l p a r t ) .
i s the next challenge.
I n p r a c t i c e , t h a t is not s o easy.
The Importance of H i s t o r y
We might t r y t o do i t by g r a d u a l l y
For s t u d e n t s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h a t
H i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , t a k e n s e r i o u s l y , w i l l h e l p us fasltionmorc adc-
bttild ltig time i n t o t h e b a s i c mobil i z a t i o n model: showing, f o r i n s t a n c e .
how a c o n t e n d e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a t one p o i n t i n time changes t h e con-
q u a t e models of power s t r u g g l e s .
d i t i o n s wlticl~ a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e n e x t round of a c t i o n .
vant.
I n t h e agenda
We need o
The h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d i s r i c h nnd r e l e -
I t p e r m i t s u s t o f o l l o w m u l t i p l e groups and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s o v e r
C o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , c o n t e n t i o n and s t r u g g l e s
s e t by t h e model, t h a t means showing how t h e form, i n t e n s i t y and outcome
s u b s t a n t i a l b l o c k s of time.
of t h e a c t i o n a f f e c t t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s i n t e r e s t s , o r g a n i z a l l o n and mobili-
f o r p o l i t i c a l power a r e e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y t o l e a v e t h e i r t r a c e s i n t h e
z a t i o n . i t s power p o s i t i o n , dle new o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s c o n f r o n t i n g
h i s t o r i a n ' s raw m a t e r i a l s .
i t , and t h e r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n t o which i t is s u b j e c t .
I n a very
I t i s t o r y i s more t h a n an abundant s o u r c e of d a t n .
I t matters for
s h o r t r u n , we can i g n o r e some o f these r e l a t i o n s h i p s because they w i l l
i t s own sake; i t p u t s o u r own e x p e r i e n c e i n t o p e r s p e c t i v e and sometimes
r e n n i n e s s e n t i a l l y t h e name.
helps t o explain i t .
Over a s e r i e s of s h o r t - r u n s n a p s h o t s , how-
e v e r , t h e i r e f f e c t s w i l l hegin t o accumulate, and t o a f f e c t
-5, d r i f t of
11s
i n t o d i f f e r e n t p a t h s from t h e h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l
thought o r t h e h i s t o r y of powerholders, a l t h o u g h t h e t h r e e s o r L s of h i s -
t h e s i t u a t i o n a s a whole.
A s e r i e s o f many such s h o r t - r i m p o r t r a i t s s h o u l d i n t e g r a t e , l i k e a
many-Cramed movie, i n t o a c o n t i n u o u s account of t h e p r o c e s s by which c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n clinnges and flows.
i n q u i r y which t a k e s
The h i s t o r y o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s a f a s c i n a t i n g
The d i f f i c u l t y , however, i s obvious:
tory cross frequently.
The d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c n l t r a j e c t o r i e s of t h e
d e m o n s t r a t i o n and t h e s t r i k e i n western c o i t t ~ t r i e s . f o r example, h e l p u s
understand t h e d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s t h e y occupy i n t o d a y ' s p o l i t i c a l r c p e r -
f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n t we can a f f o r d t o t r e a t t h e s c -
t o i r e s , h e l p us g r a s p such p e c u l i a r t h i n g s a s t h e r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r
t i o n s of oLhcr groups (and t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r groups)
frequency w i t h which t h e demonstrations of o u r own time produce c o l l e c -
a s f e a t u r e s o f t h e environment.
t i v e v i o l e n c e ; a f t e r a l l , i n most western c o u n t r i e s s t r i k e s were once
As soon a s time e n t e r s , t h e a c t i o n s and
r e a c t i o n s of t h e o t h e r s become c r u c i a l .
tegic interaction.
I n t h e s h o r t r u n , we have s t r a -
I n t h e l o n g e r run, we have changing c o a l i t i o n s , c l e a v a g e s
v e r y common s e t t i n g s f o r shootinp,, b r a w l i n g and a t t a c k s on b u i l d i n g s o r
equipment.
llistorians commonly treat the history of collective action as a subsldsldiary form of political, social or economic history: strikes and
demonstrations serve as the moral equivalent of the statesman's memoirs.
provide evidence of the quality of life among the lower orders, lend
themselves to the measurement of the impact of economic fluctuations.
Those are all legitimate uses of the evidence on strikes and demonstrations.
of action, the results of action, the Intensitities and loci of nctlon
change in an intelligible manner in the course of such large-scale changes
as industrialization and statemaking; we can rensonnbly ask the same
questions about interest, organization, opportunity and action in widely different settings, and can even expect similar answers to some qucstions to come back from very different times and places.
Worthwhile? In the long run, the reaults of tl~einquiry will tell
Taken in its w n terms, however, tl~ehistory of collective action cuts
across political history, social history, economic history as we usually
imngine them. The categories and periods of collective action's history
do not f o l l w simply from those of political, social or economic history.
Collective nction follows its own course. Our repeated glimpses of historical experience in this book have given us clear indications of the impact
us.
gets us to the problems that concerned the ordinary actors of history in
a way that almost no other inquiry does.
collective action and the previous experience of the collective actors
constrain the way they act together on interests, aspirations and grievances.
Instead of treating it ns a minor elaboration of political or social history
--
for example, as the subject which George Rude labeled The Crowd
in llistory --
we have nome warrant to write the history of collective ac-
work and content of everyday life.
The question of accessibility is harder to settle. Too little of
BeEore we stake out a new liistorical field, however, we should not ask
merely whether it 1s conceivable and interesting. We have to ask whether
it is coherent, worthwile and accessible. In the case of collective
action, the answer to all three seems to be: yes.
the work of making the evidence for collective action available and comprehensible has been done.
--
The subject is coherent
in several fundamental regards: any given population tends to have a
fairly limited and well-established set of means for action on shared Interests, and to change tt~osemeans little by little; the available means
Interest, opportunity, organization, action
none of them is easy to reconstruct at a distance of o century or two.
The action is less difficult than the rest, because the most precise and
voluminous records come from legal authorities.
The nutlloritics tried
to establish what happened in order to punish it this time and prevent it
next time.
tion in its own terms.
It takes its place with the
historical study of work and the family: it is about the logic, fmme-
oncollective nction of changes in power structure and in the organization
of production, but they have also shown us how the existing repertoire of
In advance, we can see at least that the study of collective action
As for interest, opportunity and orgnnization, we muat either
infer them from the action itself, guess at them on the basis of general
arguments, or piece them together from scattered, brittle materials.
When dealing with the actions of ordinary people, most historians content
themselves wihh the first two choices: describe what the people did, then
deduce what interests they were pursuing, what opporttmities to pursuo
those interests they faced and how they were organized from what they said
and did during the action, as well as from general argumenta concerning the
character of crowds, the nature of pensant life, the mennlng of resistance
to conscription, and similar notions.
lective violence died away as the building of the state suc-
In the absence of direct, s'olid evidence concerning interest, op-
ceeded (Berce 1974a: 117).
portunity and organization, the indirect approach combining general ar~erc:'s
au-ry
underestimates the importance of expanding capitalism.
guments with observations from the action can serve us well. A11 we need
Yet it pinpoints themes which do recur, time and time again, in sevenare sound general arguments, well-documented actions, and the wit to corteenth-century revolts: established rights being crushed, long-respectrect the general arguments when the actions prove them wrong.
In analyed privileges being swept aside. miat much appears in the action itself,
zing the actions of the seventeenth-century rural rebels who show up in
as when, in 1636, the peasants of Saintonge declared
history books under such quaint names as Bonnets-Rouges, Camisards and
"... that they were
good Frenchmen and would die, rather than live any longer under the tyCroquants, Yves-Mar;e ~ b r c eframes a useful argument. At that time, acranny of Parisians who had reduced them to the despair and extreme povcording to Berce, the local community was the main locus of rural soliderty in which our province now find themaelves because of the great tax
arity and the chief repository of rights in which rural people had a strong
assessments and new burdens that they have imposed upon us and invented
investment. The expansion of the state under Louis XI11 and Louis XIV
in this reign
threatened both the solidarity and the rights.
..." (Berce 1974b:
736).
The complaint from Saintonge illustrates both the promise and the
To each form of local solidarity. ~ e r c gargues, corresponded a form
penalty of working with observations of collective action olone.
The
of rebellion: revolts of insecurity based on the institutions of common
promise is that people who act together generally have their own idea
defense ngalnst 'marauders, food riots based on the communal arrangements
of the grievances, hopes and interests which motivate them. and a notion
for provisioning in hard times, forceful defense of common agricultural
of their chances of success. If the "tyranny of Parisians" resppears in
rights based on the previous exercise and recognition of those rights,
complaint after complaint, we have some reason to believe thnt the people
,
rebellions against direct taxes based on the long participation of the
of Saintonge had a genuine grievance ogainst demands from outside. The
local community in the assessment of those taxes, armed resistance to
penalty, however, is that the rhetoric of rebellion does not reveal the
indirect taxes based on the prior existence of local cl~annelsfor the
origin or factual basis of the grievance: how to distinguish, for examtrading of the items now subject to inspection, taxation and seizure.
ple, betwzen a longstanding condition recently become intolerable beSays Berce:
cause of changing aspirations or self-definitions, and new privations
It is roughly from 1660 to 1680 that, irreversibly, communal
powers were dismantled, their military, judiciary and fiscal
which violate longstanding rights7
Part of the remedy consists of paying attention to the whole pat-
prerogatives choked or revoked, their established rights and
tern of actions and complaints:
privileges crushed. The chronology of great popular rebell-
who made a public lament complalned of "extreme poverty;" if you did
ions follows the same rhythm.
otherwise, there was the chance the tax collector would bite harder the
Then these reactions of col-
in old-regime France, almost everyone
next time lie passed by.
Complaints of "new burdens" and "Parisian ty-
-
ably warp the interpretation of the past to ftt the preoccupation of
ranny." on the other hand. varied from place to place, time to time,
the present, second because they wrench each event from the only con-
group to group. In that variation over place, time and group we have
text which can give it substance. "The Burgundian of the seventeenth
a chance to try out our ideas concerning the interests, opportunities
century," Gastron Roupnel tells us, "did not bear the mark of the modern
and organization lying behind the collective action.
In the case of
age.
~ercc's argument, we con determine whether there was, indeed, a tendency
was as if the Gauls were still around him in their new land where his-
for regions just coming under firm royal control to mount major resistance movements, then lapse into docility as the state won out.
At the bottom of his soul there wns something so old that it
tory had not yet arrived" (Roupnel 1955: xxx).
(There
If so, presumnb1.y
neither the Burgundian nor the American of our own time con reconstitute
'
wns, although the connections were more complex than ~erci's scheme allows.)
or explain the events of seventeenth-century Rurgundy without projecting
himself across the chasm between the present and on corlier age. Com-
Nevertheless, a broad correlation between the rhythm of statemaking
parisons will only serve to map the depth and contours oE the chasm.
and the rhythm of rebellion will leave open many alternative interpretations of the interests, opportunities and organization at work.
The depth and width of the chasm, however, are questions of fact,
Event-
not of fnith. We can, to some degree, determine whether the patterns
ually we will have to try to observe them directly. Two apparently contradictory strategies apply. The first is the more obvious: dig into
the evidence concerning the settings in which collective action occurs.
With enough spadework, it is often possible to discover the interests.
and explanations which help us order the collective action of thc
I
I
I
seventeenth century give us any grip o,r~that of the twentieth
--
pro-
vide usable categories for our observations, b r i n ~out obscure connections, anticipate features which are not readily visiblc at first sight.
opportunities and organization in operation outside the great episodes
The points at which the seventeenth-century categories €nil are clues to
of action.
change, signals thot we have something new to explnin. Our attempt to
But eventually we will need comparisons with places, times
and groups in which little or no action occurred:
if we find "extreme
move across the centuries may lead to the conclusion thot different
poverty" in the setting of every seventeenth-century rebellion, does
centuries require fundamentally different approaches to collective
that mean the peasants who did not rebel were less poor? That sort of
action. Then that conclusion, and the delineation of the essential
question leads us to the second strategy: broad comparisons of places,
breaks between one mode of action and another, will be accomplLshments
times, and groups which differed in interest, opportunity end organiza-
in themselves.
tion. Did their collective action, or lack of it, vary accordingly?
The History of collective Action in Modern France
In writing the history of collective action, we have a choice hctween historical particularism and the attempt to compare and generalize.
In one view, all such comparisons are odious, First because they inevit-
How, then, might we set concrete historical experience into the
framework this book has built up? The historical work consists of
grouping actions within the historical experience into governments, con-
In analyzing this interplay, we need to ask over and over for dif-
tenders, polities, coalitions, processes of mobilization, and so on.
ferent places and points in time wlwt contenders for power (potentinl and
Other fundamental phenomena, such as changes in beliefs, demographic
actrtal) the existing social structure made available, and what governments
change. or demographic crisis, enter the account only in so far as they
the existing stage of statemaking left them to contend over.
affect the pattern of pursuit of interests and contention for power.
strenuous current debates over the history
In the case of France since 1500, the largest frame for analysis
bf
n ~ most
e
the turbulent French seven-
teenth century, for example, pivot, first, on the extent to whlch the
shows us the interplay of a gradually urbanizing, industrializing and
national government squeezed out its provincial rivals and acquired firm
proletarianizing population with a national state which was at first
control over Frnech social life; second, and even more strenuously. on
emerging, then establishing priority, then consolid~tingits hold on
the extent to which the operative divisions of the population were social
the population. The two sets of processes depended on each other to some
classes in something like a Marxian sense (soe Mor~snier1970, Lebrun 1967,
degree
-- for example, in the way
that expanding taxation drove peasants
to market goods they would otherwise have kept at home, on the one hand,
Porchnev 1963. Lublinakaya 1968).
The analytic scheme I have laid out provides no pat answers to those
nnd the way thnt the degree of commercialization of land, labor, and
serious questions; if it did, one would have to suspect that its prin-
ngricultural production set stringent limits on the return from land
cipal assertions were true by definitlon.
taxes, income taxes, or excise taxes, on the other.
tracing of the actual issues, locations and personnel of violent encoun-
Rut their timing
It does suggest thnt the
differed. The epic periods of French state-making were the times of
ters in seventeenth-century France will provide crucip.1 evidence on the
Louis XI11 and Louis XIV.
pace and extent of political centralization, as well as on the nature of
turmoil.
Those periods had their share of economic
Furthermore, they saw both a significant increase in the impor-
the groups which were then engaged in struggles for power.
The basic
tnnce of Paris and n few other major cities for the life of France as a
research remains to be done. Yet the recurrent importance of new taxn-
whole and the oprend of trade and small-scale manufacturing through the
tion in seventeenth-century rebellions, the npparent suhsidence of those
towns and villages of the entire country.
Yet in terms of productivity.
rebellions toward the end of the century, and the frequent involvement of
organization and sheer numbers of persons involved, the urbanization, in-
whole peasant communities in resistance to the demands of the crown nll
dustrialization and yroletarianization of the nineteenth and twentieth
point toward a decisive seventeenth-century battle among locnl and nntion-
centuries produced incomparably greater changes. To oversimplify outrage-
a1 polities.
ously, the drama consists of two acts: flrst a fast-growing state acting
Not that nll struggle ended then.
As Tocqueville declared long ago,
on a slow-moving population and economy; then a tast-changing population
the Revolution of 1789 pitted centralizers agalnst guardians oC provincial
and economy dealine with a consolidating state.
autonomies.
The contest betwecn c r o w and provincinl parlemcnts (which
led quite directly to the calling for the Estates General, which in turn
against the regime, revealed the uncertain commitment of part of the
became the locus of multiple sovereignty in-1789) continued the strug-
armed forces to the government. brought the King to his ffrst accessions
gle of the seventeenth century.
Assembly on thc 15th
to the popular movement (his trip to tlie Natio~~sl
Throughout the Revolution, in fact,
the issue of predominance of Paris and the national government remained
open, with tax rebellions, movements against conscription and resistance
I
of July and his trip to Paris on the 17th) and stimulated a serles of
I
minor coups in the provinces:
I
to the calls of the nation for food recurring when the center weakened
Until. July 14th the handful of revolutlonary instituttons sct
and when its demands increased sharply. Most of the events of the soup in the provinces were disparate and isolated. Ilcnccfonsnrd
called peasant revolt of 1789 took the form of food riots and other
most of the towns and many of the villagcs of Prance wore to
classic eighteenth-centt~ry local conflicts.
imitate Paris with extraordinary swiftness. During the uceks
Yet they did not just represent "more of the same," because they
that followed the fall of tlie Bastille there arose evcrywhcre
came in extraordinary clusters, because theyoccurred in the presence of
revolutionary Toron Councils of permanent committees, and citizen
.
multiple sovereignty, and because the participants began to form coalittotis with other contenders for power.
Now, the exact contours of the
4
i
militias which soon assumed the name of national guards (Godechot
1970: 273).
major contenders and the precise nature of their shifting alliances are
the central issues of the big debates about the history of the Revolution
So if we date the start of multiple sovereignty from the Third Estate's
(see e.g. Cobhan 1964, Hazauric 1970).
Tennis Court Oath to remain assembled despite the prohibitions of
But it is at least roughly true
to say that a loose coalition among peasants, officials, urban commer-
the King, we still have to treat July 15th and its immediate nftcr-
cial cLasscs and small but crucial grotlps of urban craftsmen and stlop-
math as a great expansion of the revolutionary coalition.
keepers carried the revolution through its first few years, but began to
fall apart irrevocably in 1792 and 1793.
Looked at from the point of
Obviously the three proximate conditions for a revolutlonary sltuation enumerated earlier
-- coalitions of
contenders ndvnncing exclu-
vlew of coalition-formation and multiple sovereignty, the Revolution
sive alternative claims, commitment to those claims, Failure of the
breaks into a whole series of revolutionary situations, from the first
government to suppress them
declaration of sovereignty by the Third Estate in 1798 to the final
cannot be obvlous from a mere chronicle of the events is how long cach
defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
of the conditions existed. what caused them and whether they were suf-
Agagn, in this perspective we begin to grasp tile significance of
matertally trivial events like the taking of the Bastille.
For the at-
tack by Parisjans on the old fortress finally set a crowd unambiguously
-- appeared
in the France of 1789%'' Whnt
ficient to cause the collapse of the old re~ime. At least these are
researchable questions, as contrasted with attempts to ask directly
whether the rise of the bonrgeoisie, the increase in relattve deprivn-
tion or the decay of the old elite "caused" the Revolution. What is
Indeed, these reactive forms of collective action renched their climnx
more, they call attention to the probable importance of shifting coali-
around the Revolution of 1848, before fading rnpidly to insignificance.
From the mid-century crisjs we can date the date the definitive
tions among lawyers, officials, provincial magnates, peasants and workers in the nationwide political maneuvering of 1787 to 1789, as well
1
reduction of the smaller polities in whtch Frenchmen had once done
as to the effect of "defensive" mobilization of peasants and workers in
most of their political business. the virtual disappearance of communal
response to the multiple pressures impinging on them in 1789.
contenders for power, the shift of all contenders townrd associntional
The Revolution produced a great transfer of power.
organization and action at a national level. The massive urbanizntion
It stamped out
a new and difinctive political system. Despite the'Restoration of 1815,
and industrialization of France which gained momentum ofter 1830
the nobility and the clergy never recovered their pre-revolutionary
transformed the available contenders for power, especially by crenting
position, some segments of the bourgeoisie greatly enhanced their power
a large, new urban working class based in factories and other large
over the national government. and the priority of that national govern-
organizations.
ment over ell others increased permanently.
strike wer? the usual matrices of collective violence as well as the
In Barrington Moore's analy-
From that point on, the demonstration, the meeting. the
sis, whose main lines appear correct to me, the predominance of the
settings in which an enormous proportion of all struggles for power
coalition of officials, bourgeois and peasant in the decisive early
went on.
phases OF the Revolution promoted the emergence of the attenuated parlia-
life.
mentary democracy which characterizes post-revolutionary France (Moore
A Last Case'in Point: Rural Collective Action in Burgundy
If this broad sketch of the evolution of collective action holds
1966, ch. IT; for explication and critique see Rokkan 1969, Rothman 1970..
Stone 1967).
for France as a whole, it m y still lose its verisimilitude when compared
At thet scale and in the details of public administration,
to the experience of particular local populations.
education, ideology and life style, the Revolution left s durable heritage
.
In Caston Roupnel'a
opinion, which I quoted earlier, the old-regime Burgundian was so different from his modern counterpart that a historian hns to apply differ-
None of the old conflicts, nevertheless, disappeared completely with
the Revolution. The counter-revolutionary vendce, despite having come
close to destruction in 1793, again rose in rebellion in 1794, 1795,
1799, 1.815 and 1832.
Collective action evolved with the organization of public
Further revolutions overcame France as a whole in
1
ent explanatory principles to his behavior.
Roupnel!s
challenge to us is to discover vhether we can understand
and explain the co1,lective action of old-regime Burgundy in terms which
1830, 1848, and 1870. Host of the characteristic forms of resistance to
are relevant to the time and place, yet still hnve meaning in other
-- food riots, tax rebellions, movements against
conscri,ption,and so on -- continued well into the nineteenth century.
and especially later
demands from the center
-- times and placea.
--
I think we can. Old-regime
Burgundians felt the effects of two momentous processes: the expansion
of c a p i t a l i s m and t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power i n t h e French n a t i o n a l
That blockage of g r a i n e x p r e s s e d t h e demand of o r d i n a r y p e o p l e t h a t tlle
state.
needs of t h e community have p r i o r i t y over t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e mnr-
They f e l t t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m c o n c r e t e l y i n t h e growth
of a n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e s h i f t toward cash-crop p r o d u c t i o n ,
t h e d e c l i n e of communal p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n f a v o r of i n d i v i d u a l owners h i p , and a number of o t h e r ways.
They f e l t t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of s t a t e
ket.
The market, and t h e r e f o r e t h e merchants a s w e l l .
The second common form of a n t i c s p i t a l l s t a c t i o n was l e s s r o u t i n e
and more i r o n i c .
It was l o c s l r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e l a n d l o r d ' s c o n s o l i d a -
power i n tlie r i s i n g importance of r o y a l o f f i c i a l s i n t h e r e g i o n . t h e
t i o n of l e n d s and of r i g h t s i n t h e l a n d .
d e c l i n i n g autonomy of t h e Parlement and t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y of D i j o n , t h e
r e a d i n e s s t o p l a c e t h e l a n d l o r d s themselves i n t h e a n t i c a p i t a l i s t camp.
i n c r e a s e d c o n t r o l , t a x a t i o n and s a l e of l o c a l o f f i c e s by t h e Crown, and
A s t h e g r e a t r e g i o n a l h i s t o r i a n P i e r r e d e Saint-Jacoh showcd, tlie
a number of o t h e r ways.
Burgundisn l a n d l o r d s of t h e p e r i o d
The c o n f l i c t s over s t a t e m a k i n g a r e most v i s i b l e i n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h
c e n t u r y , e s p e i c a l l y d u r i n g t h e Fronde of t h e 1640s and 16508, when BurThe c o n f l i c t s
gundy wns t h e s i t e of major r e b e l l i o n s a g a i n s t t h e Crown.
--
The i r o n y l i e s i n o u r normnl
i n c l u d i n g b o t h t h e "old" n o b j l t t y
and t h e ennobled o f f i c i a l s and merchants
--
played t h e c a p i t a l i s t game
by s e i z i n g t h e f o r e s t s , u s u r p i n g common l a n d s , e n c l o s i n g f i e l d s and
i n s i s t i n g on c o l l e c t i n g a l l t h e u s e f e e s t o which t h e i r manors gnve
o v e r c a p i t a l i s m a r e more v i s i b l e i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , when s t r u g g l e s
claim.
f o r c o n t r o l of land. l a b o r and c r o p s r e c u r r e d throughout t h e p r o v i n c e .
a f a c t which d e S a i n t - J a c o b i n t e r p r e t s a s e v i d e n c e n o t o n l y of s e i g n i o r i s l
Let u s t a k e a b r i e f look a t t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s t r u g g l e s , t h l n k a b o u t
a g g r e s s i o n b u t a l s o of an i n c r e a s i n g l i b e r a t i o n of t h e p e a s a n t s from
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m , and then compare them
t r a d i t i o n a l respect.
with t h e r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
I n r u r a l Burgundy, e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
capitalist flavor.
c o n t e n t i o n had a s t r o n g a n t i -
I t was t h e golden a g e of food r i o t s .
The c r i s e s of
R u r a l p e o p l e f o u g h t back.
them
S u i t s against landlords multiplied.
Where t h e l a w s u i t was i m p o s s i b l e o r i n e f f e c t i v e , p e o s a n t s r e s i s t e d
t h e s e i z u r e of connnons by occupying them, r e s i s t e d e n c l o s u r e s by brcnking
t h e hedges o r f e n c e s .
A s P i e r r e d e Sajnt-Jacob d e s c r i b e s it:
1709, 1758 and 1775 brought t h e i r c l u s t e r s of c o n f l i c t s , and o t h e r s
The wardens of A t h i e were a t t a c k e d by tlie p e o p l e of Viserny
appeared between t h e g r e a t c r i s e s .
That is t h e meaning of t h e 1770
On tlie l e n d s o f
f o r t r y i n g t o f o r b i d e n t r y t o a shepherd.
e d i c t o f t h e P a r l e m e n t of Burgundy which f o r b a d e , l i k e s o many o t h e r e d i c t s
Bernard d e F o n t e t t e . P i e r r e ~ 6 s a rdu C r e s t , t h e l o r d of S a j n t of t h e p e r i o d
Aubin, o r g a n i z e d an unusual. e x p e d i t i o n .
t o g a t h e r and s t o p wagons loaded w i t h ' w h e s t o r o t h e r g r a i n , on
armed w i t h " g u n s ,
r o a d s , i n c i t i e s , towns o r v i l l a g e s , on p a i n of s p e c i a l prose-
sures.
cution
...
(Archives ~ 6 p a r t e m e n t a l e s~ G t ed'Or [ D i j o n ] C 81)
He went w i t h 17 men
s t a k e s and s t a v e s " t o h r e a k down t h e enclo-
They l e d i n 40 c a t t l e under t h e p r o t e c t i o n of two g u a r d s
"with guns
and h u n t i n g dogs," and k e p t t h e t e n n n t s of Bernard
d e F o n t e t t e from h r i n g i n g i n t h e i r c a t t l e .
I n Charmois, a t t h e
u r g i n g of two women, a band of p e a s a n t s went t o b r e a k down a f e n c e
s e t up by t h e o v e r s e e r of Grenand who could do n o t h i n g b u t watch
and r e c e i v e t h e j e e r s of t h e crowd.
I n P a n t h i e r , a merchant wanted
p o l i c i e s , and e s p e c i a l l y t h e f i s c a l p o l i c i e s , of t h e s t a t e .
The a c t i v e groups of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y came e s p e c i a l l y from
t h e s m a l l l a n d h o l d e r s and t h e workers of t h e commercialized, f u l l y c a p i t o -
t o erkclose h i s meodow; he g o t a u t h o r i z a t i o n from t h e l o c a l c o u r t .
l i s t vineyards.
P e o p l e assembled i n t h e s q u a r e and decided t o break t h e hedges, which
took p l a c e j u s t a f t e r t h e R e v o l u t i o n of 1830:
was done t h a t n i g h t .
They l e d i n t h e h o r s e s .
The
merchant wanted
. . . in
Robert Laurent p o r t r a y s t h o t s o r t of p r o t e s t a s L t
September, t h e announcement o f t h e resllmption of t h e
t o c h a s e them away, b u t t h e young p e o p l e who were g u a r d i n g them
i n v e n t o r y of wine on t h e premises of winegrower^ s t a r t e d turbu-
.
stopped him, "saying t h a t t h e y were on t h e i r own p r o p e r t y , i n a
l e n t demonstrations, n e a r - r i o t s ,
i n Beatlne.
On t h e 1 2 t h of Sep-
p u b l i c meodow, t h a t they had broken t h e e n c l o s u r e s and t h a t t h e y
would brenk them a g a i n
. . ." (Saint-Jacob
tember a t t h e time of t h e N a t i o n a l Guard review " c r i e s of anger
1960: 370-371).
o s e from I t s very
a g a i n s t t h e Revenue A d m i n i s t r a t i o n [ l a ~ e f g i er ~
A s we can s e e , t h e o p p o s i t i o n was n i t d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y a g a i n s t t h e
ranks."
landed n o b i l i t y , b u t a g a i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d s of any c l a s s who chewed a t
t o t h e t a x o f f i c e s i n o r d e r t o burn t h e r e g i s t e r s a s t h e y hod i n
t h e c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s of t h e r u r a l community.
1814, t h e mayor thought i t prudent t h a t e v e n i n g t o c a l l t h e a r t i l -
I f i n Longecourt i n 1764
i t wns t h e l o r d who demanded h i s own s h a r e of t h e commons, i n D a r o i s two
Told t h o t t h e r e s i d e n t s of t h e s u b u r b s planned t o go
l e r y company t o arms and convoke p a r t of t h e Notional Guord f o r
y e a r s l a t e r t h e Chapter of S a i n t e - C h a p e l l e , i n D i j o n , t r i e d t o t a k e . 0
5 o ' c l o c k t h e n e x t morning.
s h a r e of t h e communal woods, and i n ~ i l l ~ - l e - ~ di nl 61769 i t was a for-'
crowd of winegrowers and workers," s h o u t i n g "down w i t h t h e wolves,"
mer-notary who e n c l o s e d a meadow o n l y t o s e e t h e d i t c h e s f i l l e d i n by
"down wit11 e x c i s e taxes." occupied t h e c i t y h a l l s q u a r e .
t h e l o c a l p e o p l e (A.D. ~ $ t ed ' o r C 509, C 543, C 1553).
t h e d e m o n s t r a t o r s t h e mayor had t o send t h e N o t i o n a l Guard home a t
What a c o n t r a s t w i t h r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a f t e r t h e R e v o l u t i o n l
Food r i o t s d i d s u r v i v e u n t i l t h e middle of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
For
once.
On t h e 1 3 t h . toward 8A.H.,
"a huge
To calm
h he crowd t h e n d i s p e r s e d g r a d u a l l y " (I.aurent 1957: I . 484-
485).
example, i n A p r i l 1829 a crowd i n C h f t i l l o n f o r c e d M. Beaudoin, o p e r a t o r
D e s p i t e t h a t p e a c e f u l d i s p e r s i o n , t h e a u t h o r i t i e s had t o d e l o y t h e invenof a f l o u r m i l l . t o s e l l h i s wheat a t 5 f r a n c s and 25 s o u s p e r d o u b l e
t o r y of wine. I n iqeursault i t was l e s s p e a c e f u l : t h e winegrowers d r o v e
b u s h e l , when he had p o s t e d t h e p r i c e a t 5F30 (A.D. ~ & ed'Or M 8 I1 4).
o u t t h e t a x men.
At t h e next market, s e v e r a l b r i g a d e s of gendarmes were on hand t o p r e v e n t
What i s more, t h e a n t i - t a x movement connected d t r e c t l y t o p o l i t i c a l
such " d i s o r d e r s "
(A.D. C " a t e d 0 r 8 M 27).
Although t h e food r i o t c o n t i n movements.
The winegrowing a r e a s t o o d o u t f o r i t s r e p u b l i c o n i s m ; t h a t
ued t o f l o u r i s h . p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y r u r a l s t r u g g l e s h o r e h a r d l y a t r a c e
was e s p e i c a l l y t r u e of t h e h i n t e r l a n d s of Dijon and Beaune.
of t h e r e s i s t a n c e a g n i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d s .
I n s t e a d they concerned t h e
A 1 1 thlngs
changes of t h e R e v o l u t i o n l e d t o n s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n of t h e pre-
c o n s i d e r e d , we o b s e r v e a s i g n f i c n n t t r a n s b r m a t i o n of t h e r e p e r t o i r e of
c o l l e c t i v e s c t i o n i n Burgundy.
As compared w i t h t h e means of n c t i o n
'
p r e v a i l i n g h e f o r e t h e R e v o l u t i o n , t h o s e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y were
1.ess t i e d t o s communal hase. more a t t a c h e d t o n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .
i a t i o n s , c l u b s , s o c i e t i e s played an i n c r e a s i n g p a r t .
Assoc-
Yet t h e r e were
v a i l i n g modes of p o p u l a r c o l l e c t i v e a c l i o n .
The e v o l u t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n had n o t ended, however.
Although
t h e D i j o n winegrowers' d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of t h e 1830s c e r t a i n l y d i s p l a y
many more f a m i l i a r f e a t u r e s t h a n t h e r e g i o n a l t a x r e b e l l i o n s of t h e
i m p o r t a n t c o n t i n i ~ i t i e s : t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e c h a r v a r i , t h e food r i o t , t h e
1630s. they a l s o show t h e i r a g e .
c l a s s i c anti-tnxrebe1l.ion;
growers t y p i c a l l y assemble o u t s i d e t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l c a p i t a l . grouped
the persistent orientation t o the protection
Nowadays, tlie s u c c e s s o r s of t h o s e wine-
of l o c a l I n t e r e s t s n g a l n s t tlie c l a i m s of t h e s t a t e and t h e market r a t h e r
around p l a c a r d s and b a n n e r s i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s and s u m n r -
than
i z i n g t h e i r demands.
t o t h e c r e a t i o n of a b e t t e r f u t u r e .
of c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n s u r v i v e d tlie Revolution.
The o l d regime r e p e r t o i r e
The forms of n c t i o n
The c l a s s i c c h a r i v a r i and food r i o t have vanished,
a l o n g w i t h s number of o t h e r forms of s c t i o n which p e r s i s t e d i n t o t h e
~ o d a y ' s l a r g e - s c a l e a c t i o n s a r e even morc h e a v i l y
themselves a l t e r e d , adapted t o new c o n d i t i o n s ; among o t h e r t h i n g s , we
nineteenth century.
n o t i c e a s o r t o f p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of a l l t h e forms.
c o n c e n t r a t e d i n D i j o n , Beaune and o t h e r c f t i e s t h a n they were i n t h e
t i v e action nrosc;
e v c n t s i n Burgundy.
New forms of c o l l e c -
t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n and t h e s t r i k e became s t a n d a r d
That hundred y e a r s spanning t h e Revolution was a
p e r i o d of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and of growth of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
\ & a t of t h e R e v o l u t i o n ' s own p l a c e i n t h a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and growth
of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ?
The Revolution brouglit an e x t r a -
o r d i n a r y l e v c l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , a p o l i t i c i z a e i o n of a l l i n t e r e s t s
and t h u s of almost a l l t h e means of a c t i o n . a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of
power
and t h u s of almost a l l t h e means of a c t i o n , a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power
and t h u s of s t r i ~ g g l e sf o r power, a f r e n z y of a s s o c i a t i o n and t h u s of act i o n on t h e h n s i s of a s s o c i a t i o n n , a promotion of t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r
t h e development of c a p i t a l i s m and hourgeoin hegemony and t h u s of a mount i n g t h r e a t t o n o n - c a p i t a l i s t , non-bourgeois i n t e r e s t s .
I f t h a t sum-
mary i s c o r r e c t , t h e Revolution a c t e d a s a fundamental s t a g e i n t h e c o u r s e
of a t r s n s f o r m a t i o n f a r l o n g e r and l a r g e r than t h e Revolution i t s e l f .
Like t h e s e v e n t e e n t h - c c n t u r y c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f
the national s t a t e , the
1830s.
Labor unions and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f t e n a p p e a r i n t h e a c t i o n .
Although p r i c e s and t a x e s c o n t i n u e t o b e f r e q u e n t c a u s e s f o r c o m p l a i n t .
such e x o t i c q u e s t i o n s a s American warmaking i n Vietnam and t h e f u t u r e
of s t u d e n t s i n s p o r t s and p h y s i c a l e d u c a t i o n e x e r c i s e many a crowd.
t h e world h a s changed, s o h a s i t s c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n .
As
APPENDIX 1.
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDIES OP STRIKES AND COLLECTI.VE VIOLENCE I N FRANCE
APPENDICES
I n a n u t s h e l l , t h e s t r a t e g y of t h e French s t u d y hds been t o p l a c e
p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s i n time, s p a c e and s o c i a l s e t t i n g , n o t s o much t o ac-
1.
Procedures f o r t h e S t u d i e s
France
2.
M n t e r i a l s from t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e Violence i n France
3.
Procedures f o r t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s i n G r e a t B r i t a i n
4.
M a t e r i a l s from t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s i n Grent B r i t a i n
OF
S t r i k e s and C o l l e c t i v e V i o l e n c e i n
c o u n t f o r any s i n g l e e v e n t a s t o d e t e c t how l a r g e - s c a l e s o c i a l change
and a l t e r a t i o n s of t h e s t r u c t u r e of power a f f e c t e d t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c tive action.
We d e a l s e p a r a t e l y w i t h s t r i k e s and w i t h v i o l e n t e v e n t s ,
a l t h o u g h v i o l e n t s t r i k e s a p p e a r i n both h a l v e s of t h e a n a l y s i s .
Strikes
r e p r e s e n t a f r e q u e n t , i m p o r t a n t , well-documented and u s u a l l y n o n v i o l e n t
form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
V i o l e n t e v e n t s tend t o b e better-documented
t h a n t h e i r n o n v i o l e n t c o u n t e r p a r t s , and t h e r e f o r e s e r v e a s a b i a s e d b u t
useful tracer of c o l l e c t i v e action i n general.
The s t u d i e s ' w i n components a r e :
1. The enumeration and d e s c r i p t i o n o f e v e r y s t r i k e f o r which we
could g a t h e r a s t a n d a r d body of i n f o r m t i o n from 1830 t o 1968,
f o r a t o t a l of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 110,000 s t r i k e s ; t h e most d e t n i l e d
a n a l y s i s c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e 36,000 s t r i k e s r e p o r t e d i n t h e
S t a t i a t i q u e d e s ~ r h e sfrom 1890 through 1935.
2.
The enumeration and d e s c r i p t i o n of every v i o l e n t e v e n t meeting
c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s , t o be d i s c u s s e d i n a moment, from 1830 through
1960; o u r a n a l y s e s d e a l w i t h roughly 2,000 v i o l e n t e v e n t s .
3.
Indexing of change i n s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n France a s a whole
and i n i t s g e o g r a p h i c s u b d i v i s i o n s
--
communes, a r r o n d i s s e m e n t s
and. e s p e c i a l l y . t h e 8 5 t o 95 d e p a r t m e n t s
--
over t h e period
1830 t o 1960.
4.
Assembling of ( f u r l e s s complete. f a r more t e n t a t i v e ) i n f o r m t i o n on p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t i l r e and a c t i v i t y f o r F r a n c e u s a whole
and f o r some t i m e s and p l a c e s w i t h i n i t from 1830 t o 1960.
5.
'
& politique;
Use of a l l t h r e e t y p e s o f e v i d e n c e i n t h e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a t i o n s
of p o l i t i c a l yearbooks, l i k e t h e
i n t h e form,' i n t e n s i t y , l o c u s , s o c i a l composition and p r e c i p i -
newspapers, n o t a b l y t h e H o n i t e u r u n i v e r s e l .
t a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f s t r i k e s and v i o l e n t e v e n t s ; t h e a n a l y s i s
d e s Tribunaux,
--
d) l o n g s e r l c s O F French
& C o n s t i t ~ ~ t i o n n e lLo
. Gazette
t h e J o u r n a l d e s De'bats. Le Temps and Le Monde; e) r e g u l a r
s t r e s s e s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of long-run s h i f t s i n t h e p a t t e r n
secondary s o u r c e s , i n c l u d i n g r e g i o n a l l e a r n e d and a n t i q u a r i a n j o u r n n l s .
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n o r f a l s i f i c a t i o n of
We work l a r g e l y from microfilmed c o p i e s o f t h e s e s o u r c e s .
a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e e f f e c t s of l a r g e - f i c a l e soci a l change on
collective^ a c t i o n .
-
A compreliensive r e p o r t o f t h e s t r i k e s t u d i e s a p p e a r s i n S t r i k e s i n France,
1830-1968.
by Edward S h o r t e r and C h a r l e s T i l l y .
The most g e n e r a l sum-
mary o f t h e s t u d i e s of French c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i s c h a p t e r two o f
R e b e l l i o u s Century, by C h a r l e s T i l l y , L o u i s e T i l l y and Richard T i l l y .
The R e b e l l i o u s
-
Century a l s o summarizes o u r s t u d i e s of I t a l y and Germany.
For more d e t a i l on t h e French, German and I t a l i a n f i n d i n g s , c o n s u l t t h e
r e p o r t s l i s t e d i n t h e bibliography.
Because S t r i k e s i n France c o n t a i n s
an e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n of s o u r c e s and pro,cedures, w h i l e
The R e b e l l i o u s
C e n t u r y s u m r i z e s them r a t h e r q u i c k l y , t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l
f o c u s on t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e r a t h e r than s t r i k e s .
Although i n p r i n c i p l e o u r work could be done i n o t h e r ways, we have
T h e r e a r e f o u r o v e r l a p p i n g samples of e v e n t s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n
The f i r s t i n c l u d e s each s t r i k e r e p o r t e d i n t h e S t a t i s t i q u e d e s ~ r h v e s ,
I
t h e S t a t i s t i q u e annuelle, t h e
Revue
franpaise de Travail, t h e Assoclotions
p r o f e s s i o n n e l l e s o u v r i a r e s and s e v e r a l o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s t n any y e a r
from 1830 t o 1960.
I
1
I
The second c o n s i s t s of a hnphazard c o l l e c t i o n of con-
f l i c t s and s h o r t p e r i o d s o n which we happen t o have e x c e p t i o n a l l y d e t a i l ed e v i d e n c e , e v i d e n c e p e r m i t t i n g c a r e f u l s t u d y of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s and
of t h e sequence of a c t i o n :
The J u n e Days of 1848, t h e r c s i s t n n c e t o Louis
I
Napoleon's 1851 coup d ' e t a t . and a number of o t h e r s .
I
" g e n e r a l sample"
I
I
-- c o n t a i n s
The t h i r d
--
our
every e v e n t meeting c e r t a i n minimum c r i t e r i a
( t o b e d i s c u s s e d i n a moment) which t r a i n e d r e n d e r s encountered i n scann i n g newspapers c o n t i n u o u s l y , day by day, o v e r each y e a r from 1830 through
1860, t h r e e randomly-chosen months p e r y e a r from 1861 t o 1929, and each
r e l i e d h e a v i l y on high-speed d i g i t a l computers £of t a b u l a t i o n and quan-
y e a r from 1930 through 1960; t h e r e were two d i f f e r e n t newspnpers f o r each
t i t a t i v e analysis.
day i n most y e a r s , t h r e e newspapers i n a few c a s e s of f a u l t y coverage.
The codebooks mentioned h e r e , f o r example, a r e e s -
--
-- is composed
s e n t i a l l y s e t s of i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of comparable punched
The f o u r t h
c s r d s from t h e row d e s c r i p t i o n s of
t h e g e n e r a l sample e s t i m a t e d t o i n v o l v e a t l e a s t 1.,000 person-days
violent
events
encountered
i n a r c h j v a l documents, newspapers and p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r i e s .
The b a s i c d a t a f o r t h e s t u d y , indeed, come from a ) documents i n
o u r " i n t e n s i v e sample"
of e v e r y e v e n t i n
(1.000
p e o p l e f o r one day. o r 500 f o r two d a y s , o r 700 on t h e f i r s t pl.us 300
on t h e second. and s o o n ) , p l u s e v e r y t e n t h e v e n t o f a l l t h e r e s t .
The
French a r c h i v e s , mainly r e p o r t s on c o l l e c t i v e c o n f l i c t s and government
g e n e r a l sample h a s a b o u t 2.000 i n c i d e n t s i n i t , t h e i n t e n s i v e sample d-
r e s p o n s e s t o them; b ) published s e r i e s of governmental r e p o r t s and s t a -
bout 400.
t i s t i c s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , p o p u l a t i o n c e n s u s e s ,
s t r i k e s , s p e c i a l i n q u i r i e s , l a b o r o r g s n i z a t i o n , and s o on; c ) l o n g s e r i e s
The a c t u a l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e i n c i d e n t s i n t h e two samples comes
n o t o n l y from t h e newspaper a c c o u n t s , b u t a l s o from t h e n r c l l i v a l m t e r i -
a l s , h i s t o r i c a l works and o t h e r s o u r c e s enumerated e a r l i e r .
The i n t e n -
s i v e sample r e c e i v e s e x t e n s i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n and v e r y d e t a i l e d coding,
t h e g e n e r a l sample a l e s s i n t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t .
The s y s t e m a t i c , and l a r g e -
l y q u a n l i t n t i v e , a n a l y s i s of t h e s e coded a c c o u n t s d e a l w i t h
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
-
SOME MATTERS OF DEFINITION*
The s t u d y o f France a l s o r e l i c s f o r i n t e r n a l . c o n s i s t e n c y on n s e t
of s t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n s .
The c r u c i a l one i d e n t i f i e s t h e " v i o l e n t e v e n t . "
Without d e f e n d i n g i t , I s h a l l have t o p r e s e n t t h a t d e f i n i t i o n and t h e
t h e i n t e n s i t y , form, p a r t i c i p a n t s , and geographic i n c i d e n c e o f
r u l e s o f thumb we have developed f o r i t s a p p l i c a t i o n .
v i o l e n t e v e n t s f o r each major p e r i o d under s t u d y ;
a l r e a d y worked w i t h d e s c r i p t i o n s oC c o l l e c t i v e c o n f l l c t s w i l l q u i c k l y
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c o l l e c t i v e
n o t i c e two t h i n g s a b o u t t h e s e r u l e s of thumb.
v i o l e n c e and t h e n a t u r e of s o c i a l changes o c c u r r i n g i n t h e i r
between on a b s t r a c t d e f i n i t i o n and a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d and p l a c e : o t h e r
settings;
p e r i o d s and d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s would no doubt r e q u l r e somewhat d i f f e r e n t
c o v a r i o t l o n of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i n d i v i d u a l e v e n t s , i n c l u d i n g
bridges.
t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of common p r e c i p i t a n t s , s t a n d a r d sequences
good d e a l of room f o r judgment and a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of ambiguous
of e v e n t s , r e g u l a r outcomes;
cases.
c o n n e c t i o n s between t h e c h a r a c t e r of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t and
f i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f e v e n t s makesup a "vio-
t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i n a n a r e a a n d / o r p e r i o d ;
l e n t event" on t h e b a s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n one h a s e a r l y i n t h e game.
Anyone who h a s
F i r s t , they form t h e b r i d s e
Second, even i n t h e c a s e of France t h e r u l e s of thumb Lcave o
I o n l y c l a i m t h a t t h e s e c r i t e r i a i n most c a s e s permit n f n l r l y
changes of t h e s e p a t t e r n s o v e r time.
Obvlouuly, t h e s e a n a l y s e s u s e s t a n d a r d i n d e x e s of v a r i o u s s o c i a l changes
by a r e a and y e a r a s w e l l a s t h e coded a c c o u n t s of v i o l e n t e v e n t s .
*I have c r i b b e d most o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n from t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o
t h e i n t e n s i v e sample codebook, which i n t u r n drew hcnvi1.y from s t a f f memoranda by Lutz Berkner and C h a r l e s T i l l y .
a g i t a t i o n , s e d i t i o n , r i x e , bouleversement, f & e ) ,
Here is t h e g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n :
A " v i o l e n t event" i s a n i n s t a n c e of mutual and c o l l e c t i v e c o e r c i o n
b u t t h e ones we have
chosen imply t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e group of p e o p l e .
u s i n g t h e s e terms t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n t of v i o l e n c e , b u t
w i t h i n a n a u t o n o m o u s ' p o l i t i c a l system which s e i z e s o r p h y s i c a l l y damages
We a r e
persons o r objects.
o n l y a s a n i n d i c a t o r of p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
A d j e c t i v e s of s i z e used w i t h t h e s e words a r e i m p o r t a n t .
C o l l e c t i v e Coercion
One formntlon of a t l e a s t 50 p e r s o n s must b e p r e s e n t , r e p r e s e n t i n g
e i t h e r t h e f o r c e s of r e b e l l i o n o r t h e f o r c e s of r e p r e s s i o n .
This has
been done mainly a s a p r a c t i c a l measure, s i n c e we f e e l t h a t l a r g e r groups
mense) means i t i s i n c l u d e d .
-
However, f o r o v e r h a l f of o u r i n c i d e n t s , no e x a c t o r approximate
number of p a r t i c i p n n t s i s r e p o r t e d .
We have d e c i d e d t o a d o p t a List of
Diminutives ( p e t i t e f o u l e , e t c . ) keep t h e
i n c i d e n t o u t of t h e sample.
T h i s e x c l u d e s any independent v i o l e n t a c t i v i t y undertaken by an
a r c more l i k e l y t o b e r e p o r t e d and r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n is more r e a d i l y
a v a i t a b l e on them i n t h e s o u r c e s .
Thus. any
a d j e c t i v e s u g g e s t i n g a l a r g e s i z e (reassemblemcnts nombreux, r o u l c i m -
i n d i v i d u a l o r a s m a l l group of i n d i v i d u a l s .
Thus we do n o t i n c l n d e a s s a s -
s i n a t i o n s , murders, t h e f t s , o r o t h e r c r i m e s , c o m j t t e d by l e s s tlinn 50
p e o p l e ( o r a group d e f i n e d by o t h e r t h a n one of our c o l l e c t i v e t e r m s ) .
words which a r e o f t e n used t o d e s c r i b e t h e i n c i d e n t s , and we a r e t e n t a -
However, we i n c l u d e v i o l e n c e by a group on t h e p e r i p h e r y of a l a r g e r dem-
t l v e l y a s s c ~ m i n gt h a t they mean t h e involvement of a l a r g e group o f peo-
onstration.
p l e , i . e . , o v e r 50.
t a g e , bombs, o r f i r e s .
T h i s a l s o e x c l u d e s a c t i o n by unknown p e r s o n s such n s snboWe t a k e t h e s e i n t o a c c o u n t , b u t t h e y a r e n o t t o
mr~l.tLtude
rivolt e
b e i n c l u d e d i n t h e b a s i c sample.
rasscmblemen t
rebellion
Mutual
/
T h i s means t h n t t h e r e must be a t l e a s t two a n t a g o n i s t i c f o r m a t i o n s
reunion
insurrection
Eoule
Leute
involved.
nttroupement
6chauffour~c
symbols.
troupe
bngarre
of a u t h o r i t y o r a n o t h e r group.
tumulte
t h u s , workers a t t a c k i n g a newspaper o f f i c e a r e i n c l u d e d , w h i l e formers
However, one m y be jnvolved by t h e proxy of i t s p r o p e r t y o r
We i n c l u d e any o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e symbols o r r e p r e s e n t n t i v c s
Violence must be d i r e c t e d a t someone e l s e ;
d e s t r o y i n g t h e i r own produce i n p r o t e s t t o government farm p o l i c i e s a r e
not.
trouble
I f an i n c i d e n t meets t h e c r i t e r i a of damage o r v i o l e n c e (below)
and no number of p a r t i c i p a n t s i s g i v e n , we i n c l u d e i t i n t h e sample i f
i t i s d e s c r i b e d by one of t h e s e terms.
T h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e s e
a r e t h e o n l y terms which could be used ( e . g . .
incident, manifestation,
S e i z u r e o r ~ h y s i c i l ~ ~ a m aofg ePersons o r O b j e c t s
Any dead o r wounded mnke t h e i n c i d e n t q u a l i c y .
The major problem
c a s e s i n v o l v e r e s i s t a n c e t o p o l i c e when i t i s n o t c l e a r whether anyone
was h u r t , e.g.,
s t o n e s thrown a t t r o o p s o r mounted gendarmes surrounded
A-8
S e i z u r e of p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s w i t h o u t p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i s a l s o
by a mob.
a problem.
In general, i f persons o r o b j e c t s a r e seized over r e s i s t a n c e ,
Ii
A- 9
and a n a l i z e d .
When two o r more such a c t i o n s o c c u r , we must a l s o d e c i d e
whether t h e y a r e p a r t s of t h e "same" e v e n t , o r r e l a t e d ones.
t h a t i s enough.
An e v c n t bc-
I f t h e s e i z i n g group f i g h t s o f f a n o t h e r group o r b r e a k s
g i n s when a t l e a s t two of t h e f o r m a t i o n s t a k i n g p a r t i n t h e v i o l e n t a c t i o n
through a p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r of some s o r t , r e s i s t a n c e h a s o c c u r r e d .
b e g i n a c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n and ends when t h e l a s t two f o r m a t i o n s end
We
f n c l u d e any damage done by one group t o someone e l s e ' s p r o p e r t y
t h e i r continuous i n t e r a c t i o n .
by a t t a c k i n g o r s e i z i n g c o n t r o l of i t .
I t o c c u p i e s a l l t h e s p a c e i n which a spec-
Besides s i g n i f i c a n t d e s t r u c t i o n
t a t o r could d i r e c t l y o b s e r v e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o u t b e n e f i t of mechanical
t h i a i n c l u d e s broken windows o r symbolic minor damage.
I t does n o t i n -
devices.
The p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e a l l p e r s o n s who perform t h e c r u c j a l a c t i o n ( s ) .
cl.ude damage t o o n e ' s own p r o p e r t y ( f a r m e r s d e s t r o y i n g own c r o p s , mera l l p e r s o n s who i n t e r a c t w i t h them d i r e c t l y i n t h e c o u r s e of t h n t a c t i o n ,
c h a n t s burning t h e i r own r e c o r d s i n p r o t e s t ) and i t must be done by a
group
-- which
p l u s a l l p e r s o n s a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h members of e i t h e r of t h e F i r s t
e x c l u d e s s a b o t a g e , f i r e s , bombings of unknown o r i g i n s .
S e i z u r e of o b j e c t s i n c l u d e s " t a x a t i o n p o p u l a i r e "
--
two c a t e g o r i e s i n t h e s t r e a m of a c t i v i t y i n c l u d i n g t h e c r u c i a l a c t i o n ( s ) .
the forcible seizure
of g r a i n o r o t h e r f o o d s t u f f s , Eollowed by t h e i r p u b l i c s a l e a t a proclaimed " j u s t p r i c e . "
I t a l s o i n c l u d e s n o n - v i o l e n t o c c u p a t i o n of b u i l d -
i n g s such a s sit-down s t r i k e s .
I n o r d e r t o h a n d l e t h e huge number of
sit-downs i n 1936. 1937, and 1938, we have grouped them i n t o departmen-
F i n a l l y , s e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s f a l l i n t o s e p a r a t e f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e e x t e n t
I
t h a t t h e y a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y , communicate i n t e r n a l l y , oppose o t h e r sets of
p a r t i c i p a n t s and a r e . g i v e n d i s t i n c t i d e n t i t i e s by o b s e r v e r s .
Where we do
n o t have enough i n f o r m a t i o n t o a p p l y t h e u e d e f i n i t l . o n s w i t h any r i g o r
which is o f t e n
-- we
--
a c c e p t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l o b s e r v e r ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of
t a l summaries f o r e a c h month.
a c t o r s , s t a g e and a c t i o n .
These c r i t e r i a c l e a r l y e x c l u d e any l a r g e p o l i t i c a l g a t h e r i n g s t h a t
do n o t end i n v i o l e n c e o r crowds which s h o u t t h r e a t s of v i o l e n c e b u t
When two v i o l e n t a c t i o n s o c c u r on t h e same day o r c o n s e c u t i v e d a y s ,
i n t h e same commune o r a d j a c e n t ones ( i n P a r i s . Lyon o r M a r s e i l l e : t h e
t a k e no a c t i o n .
same q u a r t e r o r a d j a c e n t o n e s ) and t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e presumption of a n
Within an Autonomous P o l i t i c a l System
o v e r l a p of p e r s o n n e l e q u a l t o t e n p e r c e n t o r more of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n
T h i s segment of t h e d e f i n i t i o n e x c l u d e s war and b o r d e r i n c i d e n t s .
I t a l s o e x c l u d e s any v i o l e n c e w i t h i n a c l o s e d i n s t i t u t i o n o u t s i d e t h e
g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l s p h e r e such a s p r i s o n s , asylums and h o s p i t a l s .
I f they
b r e a k o u t of t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , however, t h e y must be i n c l u d e d .
We i n -
c l u d e army m u t i n i e s s i n c e t h e members of t h e armed f o r c e s a r e p a r t of
t h e p o l i t i c a l community.
Boundaries of V i o l e n t Events
When one of t h e a c t i o n s j u s t d i s c u s s e d h a s o c c u r r e d , we must s e t
some l i m i t s i n time, s p a c e and p e r s o n n e l on t h e e v e n t s t o be recorded
t h e s m a l l e r . a c t i o n , b o t h a c t i o n s c o u n t a s p a r t of t h e same d i s t u r b a n c e ,
and a l l of t h e i n t e r v e n i n g time b e l o n g s t o t h e e v e n t .
Three o r more v i o -
l e n t a c t i o n s w i t h s u c h c o n n e c t i o n s may compound i n t o e v e n t s c o v e r i n g
l o n g e r p e r i o d s and l a r g e r t e r r i t o r i e s .
Two e v e n t s a r e d i s t i n c t h u t l i n k e d
when they o c c u r i n t h e same o r c o n s e c u t i v e months, and meet any of t h e s e
c o n d i t i o n s : a ) c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n of a t l e a s t one f o r m a t i o n i n one e v e n t
w i t h a t l e a s t one f o r m a t i o n i n t h e o t h e r ; b) s t r o n g evidence of o v e r l a p i n
"
p e r s o n n e l ; c ) s t r o n g e v i d e n c e o f t h e p r o v i s i o n of m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e by
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n one e v e n t t o t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e o t h e r :
d) o v e r t
A.
VIOLENCE
i m i t a t i o n of t h e a c t i o n of one e v e n t by a formation i n a n o t h e r ; e ) o v e r t
1.
one dead
r e s p o n s e a s i n d i c a t e d by demands. s l o g a n s o r r i t u a l a c t s .
2.
one wounded
3.
any damage t o o b j e c t s
4.
s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l of o b j e c t s
Three o r more
e v e n t s may b e l i n k e d i n t h i s way.
I n sllmmary, t h e p r o c e d u r e comes t o t h i s :
1. Scan t h e s o u r c e s f o r v i o l e n t o c t i o n s .
2.
8.
COLLECTIVE
1.
llaving l o c a t e d a v i o l e n t a c t i o n , d e t e r m i n e whether t h e e v e n t of
st l e a s t 50 p e r s o n s i n one formation ( d i r e c t e v i d e n c e through
numbers of p a r t i c i p a n t s wounded o r a r r e s t e d )
which i t i s a p a r t meets t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " v i o l e n t e v e n t . "
2.
i n d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of a l a r g e group through t h e u s e of o c o l l e c -
3.
I f i t d o e s , s e t i t s b o u n d a r i e s i n s p a c e , time and p e r s o n n e l .
4.
I d e n t i f y t h e formations taking p a r t i n t h e event.
5.
Determine whether i t i s l i n k e d t o any o t h e r e v e n t .
multitude
r/evolte
dgsordre
6.
Code.
rassemblement
rehellion
trouble
reunion
(meu t e
foule
kchauff our'ee
attroupement
bsgsrre
troupe
tumulte
t i v e terminology:
The diagram a t t h e end of t h i s s e c t i o n r e p r e s e n t s t h e whole c o m p l i c s t ed p r o c e d u r e .
insurrection
C.
D.
MUTUAL
1.
two f o r m a t i o n s i n c o n f l i c t
2.
a formation v e r s u s an individual
3.
a f o r m a t i o n v e r s u s o b j e c t s o r symbols r e p r e s e n t i n g a n o t h e r group
EXCLUDE:
s a b o t a g e , bombings, f i r e s s e t by unknown p e r s o n s
a s s a s s i n a t i o n s , murders, c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s by i n d i v i d u a l s
l a r g e g a t h e r i n g s where no v i o l e n c e b r e a k s o u t even i f t h e y t h r e a t e n
violence
rebellions within closed i n s t i t u t i o n s :
symbolic damage t o o n e ' s own p r o p e r t y
p r i s o n s , h o s p i t a l s , asylums
E.
BOUNDARIES:
T h i s whole system o f d e f i n i t i o n s and p r o c e d u r e s works w e l l enough
1.
Begins w i t h c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n of st l e a s t two f o r m a t i o n s .
where t h e r e a r e good (and f a i r l y uniform) a c c o u n t s of many p o l i t i c a l d i n -
2.
Ends w i t h t e r m i n a t i o n of c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n of l e s t two f o r mations.
t u r b a n c e a , and where t h e r e is a n i d e n t i f i a b l e "autonomot~s p o l i t i c a l system"
3.
Occupies s p a c e w i t h i n which s p e c t a t o r could o b s e r v e i n t e r a c t i o n
directly.
o v e r means of c o l l e c t i v e c o e r c i o n .
P a r t i c i p a n t s : p e r f o r m e r s of v i o l e n t a c t s , o t h e r s i n t e r a c t i n g d i -
l o n g i n t e r r e g n a l i k e t h e Occupation and t h e R e s i s t a n c e of World Wnr 11.
r e c t l y w i t h them, p l u s o t h e r s a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h e i t h e r of
I n I t a l y and Germany, t h e p e r i o d s b e f o r e u n i f i c a t i o n p r e s e n t s e r i o u s prob-
t h e f i r s t two groups: t h e y a r e d i v i d e d i n t o f o r m a t i o n s .
lems.
w i t h a s i n g l e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y t e n d i n g t o monopolize l e g i t i m a t e c o n t r o l
4.
F.
MULTIPLE VIOLENT ACTIONS FORNING SINGLE EVENT
The whole system would probably have t o be r e c a s t t o h a n d l e such
c a s e s a s ZaYre ( f o r m e r l y t h e Belgian Congo) a f t e r 1960, t h e United S t a t e s
1.
Same day o r c o n s e c u t i v e d a y s .
from 1860 t o 1865 o r w e s t e r n Europe i t s e l f b e f o r e t h e 1 7 t h c e n t u r y .
2.
Same commune o r a d j a c e n t communes ( i n P a r i s , Lyon. M a r s e i l l e ,
scheme a l s o h a s two q u i t e i n t e n t i o n a l f e a t u r e s which s u i t i t w e l l f o r t h e
same q u a r t e r o r a d j a c e n t q u a r t e r s ) .
kind of a n a l y s i s we have u n d e r t a k e n , b u t might u n f i t i t f o r some o t h e r s o r t s
Overlap i n p e r s o n n e l of t e n p e r c e n t o r more of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s
of i n q u i r y :
i n the smaller action.
s p e c i a l w e i g h t , f o r example, t o t h e r e b e l l i o n wliicli t o p p l e s a regime; 2)
3.
G.
I n France i t s e l f , i t wenkens d u r i n g
DISTINCT BUT LINKED EVENTS:
The
1 ) i t i g n o r e s t h e p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s of t h e e v e n t , g i v i n g no
a l t h o u g h t h e c r i t e r i o n of "violence" is a f n i r l y generous one, t h e scheme
1. Same month o r c o n s e c u t i v e months.
b y p a s s e s i n s t a n c e s of n o n v i o l e n t c o e r c i o n u n l e s s they o r e coupled w i t h
2.
violence.
Concerted a c t i o n of f o r m a t i o n s .
OR
3.
Overlap i n p e r s o n n e l .
OR
4.
P r o v i s i o n of m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e .
OR
5.
Overt i m i t a t i o n .
OR
6.
Overt r e s p o n s e by demands, s l o g a n s . r i t u a l a c t s .
N e i t h e r a p a l a c e r e v o l u t i o n nor an u n f u l f i l l e d t h r e a t of m a s
r i o t i n g is l i k e l y t o q u n l i f y a s a v i o l e n t e v e n t under i t s restrictions.
These a r e c o s t s we hove a c c e p t e d because of t h e a d v a n t s g e s of economy and
p r e c i s i o n they b r i n g ; f o r o t h e r i n v e s t i g a t o r s and o t h e r purposes, they may
b e c o s t s too g r e a t t o b e a r .
A-13a
SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE
I
i
APPENDIX 2.
MATER1AI.S FROM VIE STUDY OF COI.I.ECT1VE VIO1,ENCE 1.N FRANCE
The m a t e r i a l f o l l o w s a s i n g l e r e l a t i v e l y well-documented
e v e n t from
n a r r a t i v e account through coding and t r a n s c r i p t i o n i n mncl~lne-readable form
War, b o r d e r
AUTONOMOUS
POLITICAL
SYSTEM?
-
- ftof oi gr ochcet c, Ru pienyssii nis dgt ae n c e
total
t o i t s integration into a quantitative analysis.
DISCARD
t h e l a t e 1 8 2 0 ' s through t h e R e v o l u t i o n of 1848.
by t h e French government i n 1828 c u r t a i l e d common r i g h t s t o g l e a n , g r a z e
and g a t h e r firewood, i n f a v o r of t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of b o u r g e o i s p r o p e r t y
i n woodlands.
COLLECTIVE? (=AT LEAST SO IN ONE
FORMATION, PER ACTUAL NUMBERS
OR WORD LIST)
Yes
Poor people of t h e m o u n t a i n s . c l ~ n l l e n g e d t h e Code Eor twen-
t y - f i v e y e a r s , e s p e c i a l l y a t moments when t h e government weakened, a s i n
no.
II)NY no
The F o r e s t Code e n a c t e d
'
institution
1-%
F o r e s t i n v a s i o n s of t h i s
s o r t ( a l t h o u g h n o t t h i s s c a l e ) were f r e q u e n t e v e n t s i n t h e Pyrenees from
T
ANY SIGNIFICANT DESTRUCTION
OR SEIZURE OF OBJECTS?
t h e r e v o l u t i o n s of 1830 and 1848.
The c o n f l i c t of l a Bsrousse t o o k p l a c e
j u s t one month a f t e r t h e February R e v o l o t i o n of 1848.
I
When I developed t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r sampling and coding v i o l e n t e v e n t s
i n t h e mid-19601s, I used t h e word " p o l i t i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e " t o d e s c r i b e t h e
e v e n t s under s t u d y .
As I worked w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l , I r e a l i z e d tlie p h r a s e
c o n t a i n e d a n u n j u s t i f i e d presumption and a m i s l e a d i n g metaphor.
Since
we enumerate e v e n t s on t h e b a s i s of s i z e and t h e p r e s e n c e of v i o l e n c e r e -
SUBSAMPLE
g a r d l e s s of p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t o r c o n t e n t , t h e word " p o l i t i c a l " presumes
what is t o b e proven: t h a t t h e b u l k of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e d o e s , indeed.
I
IN INTENSIVE
SUBSAMPLE
grow o u t of p o l i t i c a l processes.,
i m p l i e s malfunc-
t i o n , a b n o r m a l i t y , a b r e a k w i t h ord'inary l i f e which our a n a l y s e s of tlie
evidence g e n e r a l l y c o n t r a d i c t .
SEARCH, FOR ADDITIONAL
DATA IN ARCHIVES, PUBLISHED SOURCES
The word "disturbance"
I now p r e f e r t h e c o l o r l e s s " v i o l e n t event".
" v i o l e n t i n c i d e n t " o r even " c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n producing v i o l e n c e . "
Ilowever.
t h e o l d e r v o c s b u l a r y pervades o u r m a t e r i a l ; i t would be d l s l ~ o n e s t t o expunge i t .
The v i o l e n t e v e n t s s t u d i e d i n France i n c l u d e d e v e r y one meeting o u r
c r i t e r i a (some damage o r s e i z u r e of p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s , a t l e a s t one forma t i o n of f i f t y p e r s o n s o r more, a t l e a s t one formation non-miliory) we
encountered i n r e a d i n g two d a i l y n a t i o n a l newspapers f o r each day from
Dimensions f Q u a n t i t a t i v e Research i n H i s t o r y ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n Uni-
1830 t h r o u g l ~1860 and 1930 through 1960, p l u s t h r e e randomly-selected
v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972).
months p e r y e a r from 1861 through 1929.
those events.
I
I
The G e n e r a l Sample i n c l u d e s a l l
The I n t e n s i v e Sample, f o r t h e p e r i o d s 1830-60 and 1930-60
o n l y , i n c l u d e s a l l e v e n t s we e s t i m a t e d t o i n v o l v e a t l e a s t 1 , 0 0 0 persondays p111s a s y s t e m a t i c t e n p e r c e n t of t h e remaining e v e n t s .
8 . T a b l e 6 from C h a r l e s T i l l y , "The Chaos of t h e L i v i n g c i t y " i n C h n r l e s
T i l l y , e d . , An Urban IJorld (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown. 1974).
9. Graph r e p r e s e n t i n g a f i v e - y e a r moving a v e r a g e of o u r e s t i m a t e s of t o t a l
The informa-
,
t i o n coded comes from t h e newspaper a c c o u n t s , from h i s t o r i c a l works, from
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n French c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , 1830-1960.
p o l i t i c a l yearbooks and from French a r c h i v a l documents.
EXCERPTS FROM REPORTS ON EVENT 848 02 29 0 1
The i t e m s i n t h i s s e t i n c l u d e :
" L e t t e r s from Saint-Caudens w r i t t e n t h e 4 t h of Marc11 nnnounce t l l s t
...
1. E x c e r p t s from r e p o r t s of a c o n f l i c t between t r o o p s and " i n v a d e r s of
o r d e r h a s been r e s t o r e d
The band of l o o t e r s c o n s i s t e d of almost
f o r e s t s " i n l o Barousse, March 1848.
2,000 people; a t t h e approach of t h e l i n e t r o o p s and t h e N a t i o n a l Guard
they r e t r e a t e d toward t h e mountains of l a Barousse; b u t having a r r i v e d i n
2. R e p o r t s on P o l i t i c a l D i s t u r b a n c e used f o r a b s t r a c t i n g from newspapers,
t h e d e f i l e s , t h e y resumed t h e o f f e n s i v e .
a r c h i v a l documents and secondary s o u r c e s and a s a cover s h e e t f o r photo-
I
The f r o n t r a n k s , nrmed w i t h
guns, f i r e d ; t h e t r o o p s r e p l i e d and rushed toward t h e i r enemy w i t h b r a v e r y .
c o p i e s of e x c e r p t s from t h o s e s o u r c e s .
The e v i l d o e r s t h e n escaped i n e v e r y d i r e c t i o n o c r o s s t h e rough mountain
1.
t e r r a i n , and i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o f o l l o w them.
3. Excerpt from t h e I n t e n s i v e Sample Codehook used i n coding t h e e v e n t i n
!
l a Barousse.
I t a p p e a r s t h a t many of
them were s h o t a s they t r i e d t o e n t e r coves i n t h e m o u n t a i n s i d e s
...
"
(Le ~ i 2 c l e . 11 March 1848).
4. E x c e r p t s from t h e coded v e r s i o n . o f t h e e v e n t , i n c l u d i n g t h e complete
"The t r o u b l e s which broke o u t i n t h e v o l l e y of In Borousse were
s e t of c o d e r ' s comments.
s t a r t e d by i l l e g a l u s e r s of t h e f o r e s t .
A l a r u e number of i n h a b i t a n t s of
5 . Segments of computer p r i n t o u t i n c l u d i n g a p a r t i a l l i s t i n g of t h e card-
t h a t v a l l e y went t o t h e Cuard G e n e r a l of t h e F o r e s t s , who was a s s i g n e d t o
image v e r s i o n of t h e I n t e n s i v e Sample coding.
e x e c u t e t h e w a r r a n t s i s s u e d a g a i n s t them and burned a l l h i s p a p e r s w h i l e
h e was gone.
Thence t h e y went t o t h e o f f i c e of t h e C o l l e c t o r s f o r Na-
6 . Segment of computer p r i n t o u t i n c l u d i n g s complete 1 i s t i n g . o f t h e OSIRIS
t i o n a l Lands, where t h e y l i k e w i s e d e s t r o y e d a l l t h e r e g i s t e r s and f o r c e d
v e r s i o n of t h e I n t e n s i v e Sample coding.
t h e o f f i c e r s t o pay a c e r t a i n sum of money a s r e p s r n t j o n f o r t h e l a t e s t
7 . Machine v e r s i o n of T a b l e 1 5 from C h a r l e s T i l l y , "How P r o t e s t Modernized
i n France" i n 1.lilliom A y d e l o t t e , A l l a n Bogue and Robert F o g e l , e d s . ,
The
f i n e s t h e o f f i c e r s had c o l l e c t e d .
F i n n l l y t h e same p e o p l e d i d some damage
t o t h e c h a t e a u of Lusson, b e l o n g i n g t o M. Coulnrd, t h e ex-deputy of
A-17
~ a ~ n a r e who
s , h a s been d i s p u t i n g t h e ownership bf c e r t a i n f o r e s t s w i t h
t h e communes i n t h e v a l l e y .
blemakers have been a r r e s t e d and have a r r i v e d a t Bagnbres."
(Le Moniteur,
1 0 March 1848)
"A band of a b o u t 1,000, most of them armed, o r g a n i z e d i n t h e Hautes-
~ ~ r e / n i e,s
.,
1. T i t l e
2.
No.
4.
Date
5.
Source
6.
Location
8.
P r e c i p i t a t i n g Events
9.
Description
7.
3.
Recorder
.
Antecedents/Presumed O r i g i n s
During t h e n i g h t of 2-3 March, t h a t horde invaded t h e can-
t o n s oE S a i n t - B e r t r a n d and s a i n t - ~ b s t i n t h e a r r o n d i s s e m e n t of S a f n t Caudens (Haute-Garonne),
p i l l a g e d t h e c h a t e a u of M. Coulnrd, t h e former
d e p u t y , a t Lassan, and t h a t of t h e Duke of Rovigo a t Barbazon, and f i n a l l y
c o l l e c t e d a kind of t r i b u t e from a few well-to-do
area.
REPORT ON POLITICAL DISTURBANCE (4-65)
We l e a r n t h a t a E a i r l y l a r g e number of t r o u -
landowners i n t h e same
The N a t i o n a l Cuard of v a r i o u s communes j o i n e d w i t h l i n e t r o o p s
s e n t from Toulouse and Tarbes t o r e s t o r e o r d e r .
t e r tlie m i s c r e n n t s found them.
3 k i l l e d and 6 o r 7 wounded."
The detachments s e n t a f -
We o r e t o l d t h a t 25 were taken p r i s o n e r ,
(Archives N a t i o n a l e s BB 1 8 1461. r e p o r t of
p r o c u r e u r g b n & r n l , cour d'Appel, Toulouse, 4 March 1848)
"The change of regime o c c a s i o n e d f a i r l y s e r i o u s d i s o r d e r s i n t h e
arrondissement of Saint-Caudens.
A bond of p e a s a n t s from t h e mountains
10.
Objectiveu : D r l o n e ~ b s e r v e r ' s
11. C a s u a l t i e s
of l a Rarousse (~autes-I'vr6n6es) s p r e a d through t h e lowlands i n hopes t h a t
12.
P r o p e r t y Damage
tlie f a l l of t h e monarchy might caune an economic o v e r t u r n which could
14.
Participants
15.
Repressive Forces
16.
Linkage w i t h O t h e r D i s t u r b a n c e s
h a r d l y f a i l t o b e p r o f i t a b l e t o them.
i n f e r e n c e LI,---.explicit
13.
Duration
On t h e 2d of March, t h e coach from
~ a ~ n d r e s - d e - ~ u c h owos
n robbed between B e r t r a n and Bagiry, and t h e news
soon s p r e a d t h a t 1,500 o r 1 , 8 0 0 p e a s a n t s armed w i t h c l u b s , p i t c h f o r k s ,
p i c k s and h u n t i n g r i f l e s were p i l l a g i n g tlie houses and c a s t l e s of t h e
a r e a , ond h o l d j n g t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s f o r ransom
"Des journ6es d e f b v r i e r aux journ'ees du j u i n , "
La ~ Q v o l u t i o nd e
-
...
"
(Antonin cayrG,
i n J a c q u ~ sGodechot, ed.,
1848 $ Toulouse e t dons l a Haute-Caronne (Toulouse, 1948).
(The f u l l e s t a c c o u n t , however, a p p e a r s i n Louis C l a r e n c , "Les t r o u b l e s d e
l a Rarousse cn 1848," Annales du Midi 6 5 (1951), 329-348.)
---
17.
Consequences
I
18.
References
Notes on back
L-=ey
A d d i t i o n a l S h e e t s Dealing w i t h t h i s D i s t u r b o n c e
/-:-/
[.-
--I/
F u r t h e r I n f o r m a t i o n on C o n t i n u a t i o n S h e e t
A-19
Cards 31-39:
FORHATION BACKGROUND
l a r g e one could b e combined i n t o a s i n g l e f o r m a t i o n .
I n t h i a c a s e , choose
t h e code i n c o l s . 37-38 w i t h g r e a t c a r e . and COMMENT.
A NOTE ON FORHATIONS
Even i n s m a l l d i s t u r b a n c e s , groups s p e c i a l i z e d i n tlie maintenonce and
Some v i o l e n t a c t i o n ( k i l l i n g o r wounding of p e r s o n s , damage o r s e i z r e s t o r a t i o n of p u b l i c o r d e r (which t h i s codebook w i l l c a l l R e p r e s s i v e f o r
u r e of p r o p e r t y ) brought t h e e v e n t s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t o t h e sample of
s h o r t ) c a n always b e combined i n t o a s i n g l e Eormation t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t
disturbances.
The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e d i s t u r b a n c e i n c l u d e a l l persons who
their actions ere indistinguishable.
Thus when N a t i o n a l Guards and t r o o p s
performed t h e v i o l e n t a c t i o n , a l l p e r s o n s who i n t e r a c t e d w i t h them d i r e c t of t h e l i n e under a s i n g l e command d i s p e r s e a group of d e m o t ~ s t r n t d r s , t r e a t
l y i n t h e c o u r s e of t h a t a c t i o n , and a l l p e r s o n s a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h
them a s a s i n g l e f o r m a t i o n u n l e s s t h e y b e g i n t o a c t i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t
members of e i t h e r of t h e f i r s t two c a t e g o r i e s i n t h e c o n t i n u o u s s t r e a m of
ways.
Be s u r e t o COMHENT i f t h e code l e a v e s any doubt how and what you
a c t i v i t y which c o n t a j n s t h e v i o l e n t a c t i o n .
have combined.
We d i v i d e t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s up i n t o f o r m a t i o n s .
S e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s
I n any c a s e , i d e n t i f y t h e f o r m a t i o n s b e f o r e s t a r t i n g t o code.
When a
belong t o d i a t i r i c t f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y ,
f o r m a t i o n h a s a p u b l i c i d e n t i t y more s p e c i f i c than words l i k e f o u l e , n t t r o u p e communicate i n t e r n a l l y , oppose o t h e r s e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d / o r a r e g i v e n
ment, p e u p l e , and s o on, i n d i c a t e ( f o r exnmple. " P r o t e s t s n t s " ,
s p e c i f i c i d e n t i t i c s meaningful o u t s i d e t h e d i s t u r b a n c e i t s e l f ( . e . g .
"sohabitants de
cialistes",
"pnysans",
"gendarmes")
by t h e o b s e r v e r s .
however, compound s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of p e o p l e
--
Many f o r m a t l o n s ,
f o r example, m a i t r e s
and compagnons; we do n o t a s s i g n them t o s e p a r a t e f o r m a t i o n s u n l e s s t h e y
a r e r e p o r t e d t o a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o r i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t ways.
'.
, , M o s t d i s t u r b a n c e s i n v o l v e two o r t h r e e e a s i l y d i s t i n g u f s h a b l e forma-
tions.
I n an extreme c a s e ,
R
formation can have o n l y one member
ample, tlie v i c t i m of a l y n c h i n g .
v o l v e o n l y one formation
teau.
--
--
f o r ex-
A t a n o t h e r extreme, a d i s t u r b a n c e can i n -
f o r example, t h e unanimous d e s t r o y e r s of a cha-
I n v e r y complicated d i s t u r b a n c e s , where t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s would per-
m i t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of t e n o r more d i f f e r e n t f o r m a t i o n s , we combine t h e
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t o n i n e o r fewer f o r m a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e most i m p o r t a n t
divisions i n collective action.
For example, i f t h e b i j o u t i e r s , t h e eben-
i s t e s and tlie o r f 6 v r i e r s e a c h have t h e i r own b a r r i c a d e , t h e y would a p p e a r
a s s e p a r a t e f o r m a t i o n s i n t h e c o d i n g of a s m a l l d i s t u r b a n c e , b u t i n a v e r y
" .
"Anarchistes"),
"CRS",
"les
s p e l l o u t t h e i d e n t i t y i n columns 12-36.
Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND
cols. 1-2
CARD NUMBER
Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND
cols. 37-38
TYPES OF' FORMATION
(cant's.)
NUMBER FORMATIONS ARBITRARILY AND NOTE IN FILE
31
Formation 1
32
Formation 2
to 39
Formation 9
30 Military or paramilitary group
31 National guard
32 Civil guard
33 Regular nrmy
cols. 3-11
IDENTIFYING DATA
DO NOT CODE
- WILL
34 Gnrde mobile
BE DUPLICATED AUTOMATICALLY FROM
FIRST CARD
35 Milice bourgeoise
36 Palace guard
37 Bons citoyens (volunteers)
cols. 12-36
PUBLIC IDENTITY OF FORMATION: ALPHABETIC
39 Any military group plus public officials:
If the formation has no definite public identity,
MANDATORY COMMENT
leave blnnk.
If it has a name, put it here.
40 Police
41 Gendarmes
cols. 37-38
TYPE OF FORMATION
42 CRS
01 Crowd (further identifying information unavailable)
43 Military police
10 Crowd of common ideology
11 Crowd of common political attachment
12 Crowd of common religion
20 Activist group
21 Political cadres, hacks
48 Police and militnry group: comment encouraged
49 Police plus public officials:
MANDATORY CObfilENT
50 Occupational group
22 Terrorists
51 Workers of same industry
23 Criminal group (brigands)
52 Workers of snme factory
24 Guerrilla insurgents
53 Workers of same locality
25 Private (party) army
54 Union
26 Secret society
55 Students
,
A-23
A-24
.
040 02 7 ' C1
LA Bnronsso
,'
Cards 31-39:
FORMATION BACKGROUND
L
::1/1?'12 c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ u r o : . hI!rnf- ' T l i ~ !IIO% I i s t c . : r,rr! ~ c r t r ~ n ~ ~ ! - lTrouhnt(1I-F,,
),
md
n n ~ l r y:'!I&?).
Tho co~xnurlnl i n r o r m n t i o n ~ G ? I . tliom i t ~ l usaxe e s f o r t h o s c col:l:liunc
l i o t o d on t h o c o r d s
- A
p o l i l : i o ~ r \tandoncy o r npntlw notnd, ;:lnrtwc
2 1 t o ,"/ *7
t
a t n t o s *\lot t l ~ i arllstrlrbonco I ~ n dnot!~irr:: t o ?o w i t h p o l i t i u o a r
%
c o l s . 37-38
(con'td;)
-
TYPES OF FORMATION
60
O u t s i d e r s (group r e p r e s e n t i n g a l o c a l i t y )
6 1 Croup coming d i r e c t l y from a f o r e i g n
country
62
Croup coming from a n o u t s i d e l o c a l i t y
d r o i t s lcritimos
2 1 t o 2C!/42 !oson.Lncnt
!
,- '
63 Croup of m i g r a n t s from o u t s i d e France
,
64
Croup of m i g r a n t s from a n o t h e r a r e a of
France
70
Consumer group
71 Users of t h e same market
72
Users of t h e same w a t e r s u p p l y
80
Public o f f i c i a l s
90
Combinations:
-
MANDATORY COMMENT
&&+
:
a g o i n s t usnrors
* l - v -
r'
Fe-
=/4?
Ac+icns by n n t i o n a l c o v l t which d e l i v a r o d i n t o Iiands of
p r i o t a i r c a Innd ; ~ l i i c hrros f e l t t o bo oonnon
71 t o :2!'/48 Nunio~.oun proccs-verbntx o t c . o::rtinot v i o l a t o r s of Coda ? o r r . s t i o r
-."A7 ,!!rmt:rous j.ncidan+.z o r bri,:mdnKc oncl d o s t r u c t i o ! . occurrod 111 v11rio11s co:::mlmon.
I 11s:-o , ~ o u . o n da l l v i c t i n o t~o:c.tkcr. Thoso inclrrdc g r t 5 l i c
o r f i c ~ n l s ( o o n d u c t o ~d~! ~r D i l i ~ e n o o , n a i r a s , I ~ c c c v o u rdo I'!.'nro~iotromant n t o ) propr!ctr\Li.rcs and w u r a r s .
.53/.77 knrde nation nu^, m i l i t n i r o s , ~ c n d o r m o s , and soma p r i c a t o
32/43 ~ l d n i n i s t r n t i o n , ~
employor, d r o c o n t r i b u t i o n , ? r o p r ? . o t o i r e s e t a .
.73/45 P o l i c o , m i l i t n i r c s , n a t i o n n l gunrd, and p r i o s t s .
31/52 !!om of chnnzc i n r o s i n ? g i v o s h r i p m d s a p r c t c r t f o r r c v o l t ond an iuls e t t . ed s i t u a t i o n t o t n k c o d v o n t o ~ eo f
11/56 t o r t h e f i r s t 3 drip, t h o r o b c l s rriopondcd t o no v i o l o n c c . I b r r , On
!:nrch
t h e y mot t h o r o g r o n s i v q Porme.tion i n b n t t l c , b o t h s i d e s usin:: f i r o o r m s .
h,
9 1 D e l i b e r a t e combination f o r purposes of
b r e v i t y i n coding:
99
Others:
MANDATORY COMMENT
MANDATORY COMMENT
I
.
5 to~:ai!: of o v a r 110@0 inhnbitnnts!?tobnl.
Mationel p a r d s l : r c n ~ t i li:..'t.:'rq,;!
frola n n t u r e oE a c t i o n and ~ i z o sof tovrns
< l / 5 5 F o ~ i n n t i o n y n n e r n l l y ox:onding. !.iondnys.
42/55 Encli p 3 r t i c i p o n t i n t h i s f o n n n t i o n nnc
?.?/57 Thorc n e r o conlo ' o f f b c i n l s r n o l t r o i t o o '
./67 Clnrcnc n c n t i o n o n o rsioundod nnd c t n t c l :
.!
-
0 1 ) b u t !?O i s o f t o n rupcnkod, and uncd l?y
1 0 .:roro proacocuted nnd Pour~d ruilt;.
,:'lnrenc.
51-52/13 Tho so?uonco p r c s a n t o l bot:toen t h o two XX c o d c s i s n o t n t r u o ncquonco
b u t a ~ c c r c n t i o no f n t y p i c a l i n c i d o n t . 10-12 i n c i d o n t s of s i s l i l c r n:.two l:oqnk
p l n c c I?ol-::ccn ?cb. 2Pr&nd l.:nr. 3, ond t h o r c i s no r o o n t o coda thom s c u , ~ ~ t i n l l : . .
A f t e r t h o second :C,t h o b a t t l e of !.!arch 3 i s codcd uimxt@~
CIS Vl(rQ9. .
51/17 Invozion of m n i r i e , buroou do 1' cnro;:i,,-*rcnunt o r b w o n u o r bho fornn'.icr.
S t ~ h s c ~ u c burnin;:
nt
of r c c o r d s and n l o f ; r a n t l n s ofl'icicllc.
53/31 A d i r r c r c n t v i c t i m - n c h a t c n u ovmor
51-53/43 Pnrch 8 , noon, n t Antichnn. Roundin6 up of prisono1.s corltir~tr.:: .rn:il
5 :(20 >! .Tb.
G5/1,! C h n n ~ ci n roy.in2
-
FORMATION BACKGROUND
~.'./,!.1 'l:oromtioll 55 i s In.-! a.nfort.cmont f o r c c .
IIo~~:ovor,divisionbotwu,.n 51 m d 5:
con~bitp~r,
d i r l ' o r o n c o s of o c r u p : : t i o t ~ and p r o p o r t y
GB/T,IA ~ r m nt ~ p n h r rn P ~ ~ ~ b r cl cio o
rds h u r n o j i n n h o s t ovory tc~vn, mostly
! o r t n i ; t ~ i . ~ ~t :o; Codv ; ' o r o s t i c r , l i s t s of o r f r n c o n , f i n o n and prococ-vorbnus.
9ccorc!:: ol' dohgs e l s o b : ~ r i o d . :.:inor p r o p e r t y dann::o t o pr:bljc build in:;^. 1'.
h u i s o i . o r q s hcusc rrns pillny.o:l and l l c r s c s t o l r n i n I.:culoon-Daroosso. E. p i g , 3ona
?ark qnd, somo vrino ~ m st a k e n i n S o s t , nrc:s nnd i n s i g n o of a d m i n i s t r n t a u r f o r c s t i o r
o t o 1 . q . : i l l n ~ oi n I & u r c s - ? r r r o u s s ~ ~ ,house invndod nnd p i l l n p d i n Antichnn,
6 , non ~annozncld i n T r o b n t nnd B o r t r o n , monny nnd p r o v i o i o n o s t o l c n i n Anlo. Pln:;
t o r n :in :enotwt. I n r g c s l ; dmnaeo n t a p r o p i n t a i r o ' s cliotcnu i n L..scan vciloro
t r c c s vrcro c u t . rilles broken, d o o r s brokon i n , f u r n i t u r e brokon o r s t o l o n , and
l i m n nnd i:ooka d o s t r o y o d o r t n k e n .
'.6/55 T h i s ic a lois/ o s t i n n t o . 30,000 r r n n c s .n~n:o n l o n c n t c h a t o a u do Luscnn
~ 6 / 7 3 r!lt11011:h c o n p l o t c l y s t i f l o d , t h i s d i n t u r b n n c o s t i n u l n t c d l n t o r i n c i A c n t s ,
notnbl:? n p l o t t o n s o a o s i n n t o Rocovour rlc I ' c n ~ c ~ i s t r o m c n tgho
,
n p r i l 17 dist w b y ~ oo t S i : ~ n c , and t ' . c i n c i d o n t ~ t .R i z c - i i i s t o s 04; t ! rnd
~ of A p r i l .
73/10
U48-33-lO(501-50.7)
lI34~.~-08-11
Content of Code
Cord Number
Code 31-39
*IDENTIFICATION
D O N O T CODE
<
,.PUBLIC IDENTITY
ef F O R M T I O N
ivory m i c * ~ l t to codc bocntlso of ~ r c n tntwhcr o f s x n l l , incidents. Sco t110
modol ooqucncc co*lo devised t o Iiand!o t h i s and n o t o t h n t t h o r c a r e 1 2 cor:.l:;w:ns
involvbd.
Name ef
Formation
!\ .
Type of fmrmatlmn
Age-Sex
,/
FORMATION BACKGROUND ( 2 )
Contcnl of Code
Birthplace of members
Present residence
Occupotlonol
compositlon
:Politlcol
attochmentr
mmediate
background
Code i n units
of 2
Legality o f 1st Act
Precipitating
factor
r,
,'
Type of violence
Response t o violence
other forms of
participation
Concerted Action
Mutual A i d
Overt Imitation
'Objectives
Code I n
units of
L
Explicitness of
objectives
Urtity of objectives
Hom?gcneity of
objectives
Autonomy of objectiv
Fluct,uotion I n focus
.Territory controllcd
Fluctuation i n
territory conholled
.
.
ommcnts
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APPENDIX 3.
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATIIERINGS I N
GREAT BRITAIN
Our newest l a r g e e f f o r t is a s t u d y of c o n f l i c t s i n G r e a t B r i t o i n
from 1828 through 1833.
t a k i n g t h e new a n a l y s i s .
We have s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t i n c e n t i v e s f o r trnderF i r s t , o u r a n a l y s e s of v i o l e n t e v e n t s i n
I t a l y , Germany and France appeared t o confirm our s u p p o s i t i o n t h o t t h e
v i o l e n c e was on t h e whole t h e by-product of t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of f u r t h e r
i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i n a c t i o n s which were n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y v i o l e n t and
which o c c u r r e d f r e q u e n t l y w i t l ~ o u ts i g n i f i c a n t v i o l e n c e .
In particular,
we were i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e frequency w i t h which t h e v i o l e n c e hegsn w i t h
t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of t r o o p s , p o l i c e and o t h e r specialized r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s .
S i n c e t h e o n l y n o n v i o l e n t e v e n t s of which we had made l a r g e . s y s t e m a t i c
enumerations f o r some of t h e same p e r i o d s and p l a c e s were s t r i k e s . howe v e r , we d i d n o t have t h e e v i d e n c e t o l o o k c l o s e l y a t t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p
between
n o n v i o l e n t and v i o l e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s .
Second, i t seemed worth making a S l ~ S t o i n e dcomparison hetwecn pntt e r n s of c o n f l i c t i n n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i t a i n and t h o s e we ltod found
on t h e C o n t i n e n t .
S t u d e n t s of modern Europe o f t e n t h i n k of n i n e t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y B r i t a i n ' s e x p e r i e n c e a s s kind of s u c c e s s s t o r y
--
st l e a s t i n
'Bvoiding" tlie r e v o l u t i o n s which o c c u r r e d i n France, Germany. l t o l y ond
elsewhere.
A c l o s e s t u d y of c o n f l i c t s i n B r i t a i n sliould g i v e u s t h e means
t o rethink thot question.
Hore i m p o r t a n t , i t sliould p r o v i d e f i r m e r
ground f o r choosing among obvious a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between B r i t a i n and t h e c o n t i n e n t : t h o t B r i t a i n had fewer of t h e
k i n d s of p e o p l e who made n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e v o l u t i o n s and r e b e l l i o n s .
t h a t t h e most l i k e l y r e b e l s had fewer g r i e v a n c e s , t h ~ rt e p r e s s i o n , w a s more
e f f e c t i v e i n B r i t a i n , and s o on.
Our o r i g i n a l hope was t o examine t h e changing p a t t e r n s of c o n f l i c t
i n B r i t a i n throughout t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
With a wide r a n g e of non-
v i o l e n t e v e n t s t o c o n s i d e r , however, bhat would have r e q u i r e d a n enormous
effort
-- many
times t h e a l r e a d y f o r m i d a b l e e f f o r t p e r y e a r i n o u r s t u d i e s
of France and Germany.
A f t e r some p r e l i m i n a r y enumerations i n s c a t t e r e d
y e a r s from t h e end of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t o t h e end of t h e n i n e t e e n t h .
we narrowed o u r a t t e n t i o n t o 1828-1833.
f o r s e v e r a l reasons.
That p e r i o d recommends i t s e l f
F i r s t , i t was a time of major movements, c o n f l i c t s
and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s : C a t h o l i c Emancipation, Reform a g i t a t i 0 . n . i n d u s t r i a l
c o n f l i c t , t h e a t t a c k on s e l e c t v e s t r i e s , and t h e g r e a t a g r a r i a n r e b e l l i o n s
of 1830.
Second, t h e r e e x i s t e x c e l l e n t h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s of some of t h e
period's c o n f l i c t s
George Rud;
--
-- w i t h
f o r example. C a p t a i n Swing, by E . J . Hobsbawn and
which we c a n compare our own r e s u l t s .
T h i r d , we have
some r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p e r i o d a c t e d a s an h i s t o r i c h 1 p i v o t i n somet h i n g l i k e t h e aame way t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o n s of 1848 d i d i n France and
Germany: marking, and perhaps producing, a s h i f t from r e a c t i v e t o p r o a c t i v e ,
from "backward-looking"
t o "forward-looking"
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t
Drawing t h e boundaries
b o t h g e n e r o u s l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y is a d e l i c a t e and l a b o r i o u s t n s k .
We a r e s t i l l a d j u s t i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r t h a t t a s k .
t r i a l enumeration
I n t h a t p e r i o d , we a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o enumerate, d e s c r i b e and a n a l y z e
a l a r g e s h o r e of a l l t h e " c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s " which occurred i n England,
Roughly s p e a k i n g , a c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g is an oc-
c a s i o n i n which t e n o r more p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e government g a t h e r i n t h e
some p l a c e and make a v i s i b l e c l a i m which, i f r e a l i z e d , would a f f e c t t h e
i n t e r e s t s of some s p e c i f i c ~ e r s o n ( s )o r g r o u p ( s ) o u t s i d e t h e i r own number.
In p r i n c i p l e , t h e s e g a t h e r i n g s i n c l u d e j u s t about a l l t h e e v e n t s covered
i n our e a r l i e r enumerations of s t r i k e s and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e .
They
a l s o i n c l u d e a g r e a t many o t h e r e b e n t s : d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , p e t i t i o n meetings.
A f t e r doing a
and s u m s r y coding of some e v e n t s from 1830, we d i d
a p r e l i m i n a r y s c a n n i n g of t h i r t y randomly s e l e c t e d ten-day b l o c k s from
t h e e n t i r e s i x - y e a r p e r i o d , t h e n proceeded t o enumerate s y s t e m n t i c a l l y
from t h e beginning of 1828.
o f 1828.
We have completed t h e p r e l i m i n a r y enumeration
We f i n d t h e e v e n t s v i a a complete issue-by-issue
r e a d i n g of
t h e Morning C h r o n i c l e , The Times. Gentlemen's Magazine, Hansard's P n r l i a mentary Debates, The M i r r o r of P a r l i a m e n t end t h e Annual R e ~ i s t e r . Once t h e
e v e n t s a r e enumerated, we p l a n t o l o o k f o r more i n f o r m a t i o n nbout them i n
t h e p a p e r s of t h e Home O f f i c e (of which we have a l r e a d y b u i l t up s u b s t a n t i a l
s e l e c t i o n s v i a photocopy and m i c r o f i l m ) , i n o t h e r p e r i o d i c a l s , and i n
secondary h i s t o r i c a l works.
We a r e s t i l l making p l a n s f o r coding of t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n i n machine-readable form.
The f i l e f o r t h e s i x - y e a r p e r i o d
w i l l probably d e s c r i b e on t h e o r d e r of 25.000 e v e n t s .
We a r e a l s o s l o w l y making p l a n s Eor t h e c o l l e c t i o n of d a t a on t h e
p o p u l a t i o n s and a r e a s " a t r i s k " t o c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s .
of o r d i n a r y people.
S c o t l a n d , and Wales.
d e l e g a t i o n s , group poaching. and p l e n t y of o t h e r s .
The u n i t s of
o b s e r v a t i o n w i l l c e r t a i n l y i n c l u d e a l l c o u n t i e s of England. S c o t l a n d and
Wales.
They w i l l probably i n c l u d e complete s e t s of hundreds of p a r i s h e s
within selected counties.
I f p o s s i b l e , they w i l l a l s o i n c l u d e p n r t i c u l n r
p o p u l a t i o n s of p o t e n t i a l a c t o r s
--
f o r example, t h e handloom weavers of
L a n c e s h i r e and t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o r e r s of L e i c e s t e r s h i r e .
Ultimately
t h e c h o i c e of u n i t s and of k i n d s of d a t a concerning t h o s e u n i t s w i l l res u l t from a compromise between t h e arguments we a r e s e e k i n g t o t e s t and t h e
c o s t s of g e t t i n g t h e r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e .
Events t o be Enumerated
The e v e n t s a r e " c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s " (CGs),
O C C ~ ~ ~i nO which
~ R
ten
A-40
A-39
o r more p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e government g a t h e r i n t h e same p l a c e and make
DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF TIIWB
a v i s i b l e c l a i m which, i f r e a l i z e d , would a f f e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of some
reported.
s p e c i f i c p e r s o n ( s ) o r g r o u p ( s ) o u t s i d e t h e i r own numbers.
t h e t a b l e a p e t i t i o n "from a numerous meeting i n Oldham" which conforms
Most CGs i n
Any mention i n any c o n t e x t .
I f , f o r example, on M.P. l o y e on
our period f a l l i n t o one o r more of t h e f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s : 1 ) c o l l e c -
t o a l l o u r o t h e r c r i t e r i a , t h a t meeting e n t e r s t h e sample.
t i v e v i o l e n c e , 2) meetings. 3) d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , 4) parades. 5) a s s e m b l i e s ,
d e b a t e s , mentions of meetings do n o t need n u m e r i c a l i n f o r m t i o n t o be i n -
6) r a l l i e s , 7) c e l e b r a t i o n s , 8 ) d e l e g a t i o n s , 9 ) s t r i k e s , 10) union a c t i v -
cluded.
ities.
i o n e r s a t P r e s t o n t o p e t i t i o n P a r l i a m e n t , b u t mokes no mention of how many
More p r e c i s e l y , t h e e v e n t s i n c l u d e d a r e a l l o c c a s i o n s :
1. r e p o r t e d i n t h e London Times, Morning Chronicle,, Hanssrd's P a r l i a mentary Debates. Annual R e g i s t e r , Gentlemen's Magazine a n d l o r
Mirror
--
The
In parliamentary
For example, i f M i r r o r of P a r l i a m e n t r e p o r t s a meeting of p n r i s h -
people a t t e n d e d t h e m e e t i n g ,
we w i l l assume p r o v i s i o n a l l y t h a t o t l e a s t
1 0 people took p a r t .
of P a r l i a m e n t .
o c c u r i n g i n England, S c o t l a n d or'Wnles.
Ten o r more people must have
2. o c c u r r i n g i n England. S c o t l a n d o r Wales,
a t h e r e d w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l boundoriea ( i n c l u d i n g t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s ) of
3. beginning on any d a t e from 1 J a n u a r y 1828 through 31 December 1833,
England, S c o t l a n d o r Wales.
I f any p a r t of t h e a c t i o n o c c u r s w i t h i n t h o s e
4 . i n which t e n o r more p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e government:
b o u n d a r i e s , t h e e n t i r e e v e n t f a l l s i n t o t h e sample.
a . g a t h e r i n t h e same p l a c e ,
Sometimes i t is d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e how mnny p e o p l e a r e involved
b. make a v i s i b l e c l a i m which, i f r e a l i z e d , would a f f e c t t h e ini n an e v e n t o r a c t i o n .
I n vague c a s e s t a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g terms t o mean o t
t e r e s t s of some s e p e c i f i c person(8) o r g r o u p ( s ) o u t s i d e t h e i r
l e a s t t e n people:
own number.
AFFRAY
DISTURBANCE
NUMEROUS
ASSPIBLY
GANG
RALLY
BRAWL
GATHERING
RIOT
CONCOURSE
GENERAL BODYlBODY
RIOTOUS ASSEMBLAGE
CROWD .
MOB
TllRONC
DEMONSTRATION
MULTITUDE
TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLY
Terms which t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e working d e f i n i t i o n s :
reported
occurring
i n England, Scotland o r Wales
beginning
,
persons
b e g i n n i n g on a n y . d a t e from 1 J a n u a r y 1828 through 3 1 December 1833
o u t s i d e t h e government
The e v e n t b e g i n s a t t h e f i r s t p o i n t st which a t l e a s t t e n of t h e p e o p l e
gather
who e v e n t u a l l y make t h e v i s i b l e c l a i m a r e g a t h e r e d w i t h o u t f u r t h e r d i s -
same p l a c e
p e r s a l b e f o r e t h e y make t h e c l a i m .
v i s i b l e claim a f f e c t i n g i n t e r e s t s
s p e c i f i c person(s) o r group(s)
The day b e g i n s a t midnight.
persons.
Any human being who can reasonably be presumed to Ilave inten-
sentially shilar organizations.
..
tlonally participated in the making of the claim.
.
Aa segments of the citizenry. we are considering Freeholders. Householders.
outside the government. When officers ore acting in the capacity given
Inhabitants, Landowners, Leypnyeri, Occupiers, Parishioners, Ratepayers,
them by their offices and no group of ten or more non-officers is acting
Tithepayers and essentially similar collections of people.
If ten or more officers act together
. .
but on their own responsibility, we include their action. Among the sets
well want to analyze the actions of public committees, of segments of the
of people commonly named in discussions of English governments in the
iations, age-sex groups or families) separately. For the present, the
nineteenth century, we are actually distinguishing three categories,
crucial distinction separates officers from all the rest. Officers often
wtth cl~em,we exclude the action.
(6)
officers, (b) public committees, and (c) citizenry. As officers.
citizenry, and of other groups (such as members of particular crofts. assoc-
appear as parties in collective actions involving pub1.i~committees, segments of the citizenry and/or other groups.
we are considering:
One day we m y
But the only circumstances un-
Aldermen
Judges
Police Constables
der which their concerted action qualifies by itself is when they take
Bailiffs
Justices
Privy Councilers
part in a group of ten or more persons who on their own responsibility ns-
Beadles
Justices of the Peace
Schoolboards
aemble to make a publicly visible claim, demand or complaint.
Boroughreeves
Lord Lieutenants
Sheriffs
Burgesses
Magistrates
Scotch Guards
Churchwardens
Mayors
Special Constables
gather'same place Ten or more persons, meeting, assembling or any of
Common Councilers
Members of Parliament
Surveyors
the key words used in Page A-42 to define a get-together.
Constables
Military (see below*)
Town Councilers
defined as:
Coroners
Militia
Yeomanry
a) specific location, church, inn. field,
Directors of the Poor
Ministers
and others of
b) secondary location. town, parish, city.
Grand Juries
Overseers of the Poor
essentially
C)
Guardians of the Poor
Paymasters
similar position.
or any combination of these.
Horse Guards
Police
As citizens we are considering everyone else.
Place is
area location, county, hundred, etc.
visible claims affecting interesta of eome specific persons or groups
*(Militnry):
Cavalry, Infantry, Dragoons, Hussars, Marines, Blues, Grays
.
.
We are trying to prepare a comprehensive list of occasions where people
outside the government assemble to m k e a publicly visible claim, demand,
As public committees we are considering Town Meetings, Vestries, Select
or complaint. At one time or another, we use all the following words to
Vestries. Liveries, Improvement Commissions, Police Commissions, and es-
b ) o p p o s i t i o n t o government p o l i c y , form of govccnment o r p n r t i c u l n r
d e s c r i b e what we're a f t e r : c l a i m s , demands, c o m p l a i n t s , g r i e v a n c e s , a s pirations, interests. dissatisfactions.
"demands",
a g e n t s of i t ;
Some of t h e s e words, such a s
c l e a r l y have an o b j e c t o u t s i d e t h e group.
Others, l i k e
C) s u p p o r t f o r government;
"dissatisfactions",
do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have o u t s i d e o b j e c t s ; one can
e a s i l y be d i s s a t i s f i e d with oneself.
which
& have
d ) s u p p o r t f o r a n enemy of government;
We want t o c o n c e n t r a t e on a c t i o n s
a t a r g e t o u t s i d e t h e a c t i n g group.
L e t ' s t a l k about c l a i m s
e ) c o n t r o l of l o c a l government o r i n s t i t u t i o n ;
nnd o b j e c t s of c l a i m s . . We a r e t r y i n g t o b u i l d a sample of g a t h e r i n g s i n
which
--
o r by which
--
f ) o t h e r g r i e v a n c e s and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g r e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l
p e o p l e a r t i c u l a t e c l a i m s on a c t o r s o u t s i d e t h e i r
o r economic I s s u e s , d i s c u s s i o n of c o m p l a i n t s about wagca, h o u r s
own group.
What s o r t s of c l a i m s ?
o r c o n d i t i o n s of work;
B a s i c a l l y , any e x p e c t a t i o n which would, i f
r e a l i z e d , r e q u i r e t h e o t h e r a c t o r t o expend valued r e s o u r c e s : money, l a b o r Here a r e some r u l e s of thumb f o r t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of q u n l i f y i n g
power, i n f o r m a t i o n , and s o on.
What s o r t s of a c t o r s ?
B a s l o a l l y , any
and n o n - q u a l i f y i n g c l a i m s :
o t h e r s e t of r e a l people.
That e x c l u d e s a g r o u p ' s c l a i m s on i t s e l f .
e x c l u d e s a g r o u p ' s c l a i m s on s u p e r n a t u r a l o r imaginary b e i n g s .
It
I t does
n o t however, e x c l u d e c l a i m s on an imaginary "power s t r u c t u r e " , i f t h e
group identifies some r e a l p e o p l e w i t h t h a t s t r u c t u r e .
1.
I n t h e a b s e n c e of c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n f o r m a t i o n , collective v i o l e n c c
c o n s t i t u t e s prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e of a c l a i m .
I f t e n o r more p e r s o n s
a c t t o g e t h e r t o a t t a c k , damage o r f o r c i b l y s e i z e n person o r object,
Nor does i t e x c l u d e
t h a t is p r o v i s i o n a l e v i d e n c e of n c l a i m .
c l a i m s on r e a l people i n t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s a s s e l f - d e c l a r e d a g e n t s of
s u p e r n n t u r a l b e i n g s o r imaginary groups: p r i e s t s , s o o t h s a y e r s , c h a r l a t a n s ,
2.
members of i n v e n t e d c o n s p i r a c i e s .
s o r t of c l a i m , p u r e l y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f o r t s do n o t q u a l i f y i n
It does n o t e x c l u d e c l a i m s on r e a l
Even i f t h e u l t i m a t e aim of t h c a c t i v i t y i s t h e making of some
For example, t h e c r e a t i o n of a l o c n l Rcform A s s o c i a t i o n
p e o p l e p r e s e n t a t t h e same g a t h e r i n g , j u s t s o l o n g a s t h e r e i s a welthey
themselves.
s c p a r s t i o t i between a c t o r s and o b j e c t s which i s n o t simply an i n t e r n a l
does n o t i n i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e a clnim.
d i v i s i o n of t h e a c t i n g group and which i s more d u r a b l e t h a n t h c g a t h e r i n g
o r more p e r s o n s who a r e o r g a n i z i n g an a s s o c i a t i o n s t a t e a q u a l i f y i n g
itself.
c l a i m a s they do s o , t h a t c l a i m c o u n t s .
I n f a c t , "any o t h e r s e t of r e a l people" does n o t e ~ c l u d eany i n -
d i v i d u a l anywhere, j u s t s o l o n g a s t h c r e i s a g a t h e r i n g i n which enough
people a r t i c u l a t e c l a i m s on t h a t i n d i v i d u a l .
When d e s c r i b i n g t h e p o s s i b l e c o n t e n t of such cla.tms, we enumerate:
a ) p e t i t i o n i n g o r a d d r e s s i n g o r memorializing l o c a l o r n a t i o n a l
government, e i t h e r f o r o r a g a i n s t government;
3.
I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, t e n
B e n e f i t s u p p e r s , b a l l s , e x p o s i t i o n s and t h e l i k e do n o t q u a l i f y
i n themselves, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e cnuse f o r which t h e y n r e conducted.
I f , however, we a c q u i r e f u r t h e r e v l d e n c e of t h e making of n cl.nim
(e.g.
a claim-making proclamation by t h e o r g a n i z e r s of t h e b e n e f i t ,
o r a widely-cheered
claim-making
i n c l u d i n g c e l e b r a t i o n s and f e s t i v i t i e s , wl~oaecommonly-understood
speech i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t ) ,
purpose is t h e d i s p l a y of s u p p o r t . e.g.
a b e n c f i t q u a l i f i e s i n t h e same way any o t h e r g a t h e r i n g q u a l i f i e s .
Lord Mayor's Day p a r a d e ;
b) t h e r e p o r t e r ' s i m p u t a t i o n of s u p p o r t o r r e j e c t i o n ; c ) a r t i c u l n t i o n
4.
A speech by a s i n g l e person which s t a t e s a c l a i m , a r t i c u l a t e s a
g r i e v a n c e o r makes a demand c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of a c o l l e c t i v e
c l a i m under any of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s : a ) t h e group f o r m a l l y a d o p t s t h e
1
of a s e n t i m e n t through c h e e r i n g , j e e r i n g . and s o on, however, a s i m p l e
i
t o a s t (e.g.
"To t h e King") doe8 n o t q u a l i f y i n i t s e l f , even i f par-
t i c i p a n t s cheer.
s p e a k e r ' s views by p e t i t i o n , r e s o l u t i o n o r memorial; b) t h e r e p o r t e r
e x p l i c i t l y imputes a p p r o v a l of t h e c l a i m t o t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e
1
i
7.
G a t h e r i n g s e x p l i c i t l y conducted t o s u p p o r t o r condemn an a c t i o n
g a t h e r i n g ; c ) t h e group m a i n i f e s t l y v o i c e s a n o p i n i o n by c h e e r i n g ,
of government s t a t e q u a l i f y i n g c l a i m s i f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves
J e e r i n g o r o t h e r vocnl display.
a r t i c u l a t e s e n t i m e n t s by p a s s i n g r e s o l u t i o n s . c h e e r i n g s p e e c h e s , and
s o on.
5.
I f a g a t h e r i n g i n c l u d e s two o r more f a c t i o n s , a t l e a s t one of
which h a s t e n o r more p a r t i c i p a n t s , c l a i m s made by one of t h e f a c t i o n s
8.
For
example. when Henry Hunt and h i s s u p p o r t e r s show up a t a p a r i s h v e s t r y
meeting and c h a l l e n g e t h e powers of t h e l o c a l e l i t e t o c o n t r o l t h e
e l e c t i o n of new v e s t r y o f f i c e r s , t h e d i v i s i o n e x t e n d s beyond t h a t
i f the
i
II
1
o r e l s e w h e r e , b) governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s o r officer^ o u t s i d e of
Britain.
I f a g a t h e r i n g makos f u r t h e r c l a i m s on e i t h e r of t h e s e
c a t e g o r i e s of o b j e c t s , however, t h e c l a i m s q u a l i f y .
For example, a
banquet i n honor of t h e deposed k i n g of S p a i n would n o t q u a l i f y u n l e s s
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s d i r e c t l y s t a t e d t h e demand t h a t he b e r e i n s t a t e d .
meeting and t h e c l a i m q u a l i f i e s .
6. E x p l i c i t s u p p o r t f o r government, o r d e n i a l of s u p p o r t t o government.
qualifies.
not q u a l i f y
o b j e c t s a r e a ) non-governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s o r o f f i c e r s i n B r i t a i n
on a n o t h e r i f t h e i s s u e s and d i v i s i o n s i n q u e s t i o n e x t e n d beyond t h e
p a r t i c u l a r g a t h e r i n g and t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f p a r t i c i p a n t s .
Simple e x p r e s s i o n s of s u p p o r t o r r e j e c t i o n do
I
I t can t a k e t h e form of s u p p o r t f o r i n s t i t u t i o n s ( P a r l i o -
BOUNDARIES OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS
Most CGs w i l l o c c u r on one day a t one l o c n t i o n ; however, many w i l l
ment, t h e p r e s e n t government, t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n ) o r of s u p p o r t f o r s p e c i f i c
l a s t l o n g e r a n d l o r w i l l t a k e p l a c e a t s e v e r a l s i t e s . s o we must d e l i n e a t e
o f f i c e r s o f government: t h e aldermen, b a i l i f f s , b e a d l e s , boroughreeves,
b o u n d a r i e s i n time and space.
and s o on. l i s t e d e a r l i e r .
of t h e same CG i f :
I t c s n t a k e t h e form of d e l i b e r a t e d e n i a l
of s u p p o r t f o r t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s o r o f f i c e r s .
The i n s t i t u t i o n s and
o f f i c e r s must b e . c u r r e n t l y i n o f f i c e ; f o r example, a c e l e b r a t i n g ban-
A c t i v i t i e s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o be p n r t
1. t h e y o c c u r on t h e same day. o r on c o n s e c u t i v e days
&
2. t h e r e i s s t r o n g e v i d e n c e of o v e r l a p p i n g p e r s o n n e l w i t h i n t h e
q u e t f o r a member-elect of P a r l i a m e n t does n o t i n i t s e l f q u a l i f y .
c i t i z e n f o r m a t i o n ( s ) , s u c h a s c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n between
Evidence of such s u p p o r t o r d e n i a l i n c l u d e s a ) p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e v e n t s ,
two o r more of t h e f o r m a t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e i n i t i a l a c t i v i t y
3. the activities involve the same issue, or some directly related
issue (e.g.
the escalation of demands).
accuracy of ending date
Activities that meet the above criteria will be defined as one CG even
duration: days
througl~they occur in different locations (e.g. different towns).
duration: hours
low estimate of total participants
If on event qualifies on the grounds of,the kind of action and kind
of group involved, but we lack sufficient information to assign it a time
and place in Britain from 1828 through 1833, we exclude the event pending
further information.
If only one of these elements
--
time or place
--
is
uncertain, we'include tlie event pending further information.
GENERAL AGENQA FOR CODING
This is a provisional set of plans for the preparation of a machinereadable description of each CG.
The record for a single event will con-
tain the following sections:
)
.
1.
2.
high estimate of total participants
best estimate of total participants
best estimate of person-days +margin of error
best estimate of person-hours
+ margin of error
+ margin
event + margin
best estimate of arrests during even
of error
best estimate of arrests after
of error
best estimate of wounded during event
best estimate of killed during event
+ margin of error
+ margin
number of formations
EVENT as a whole, including identification and summary description
sunnnary of formation type(s)
of all major features.
summary of participation by authorities
PLACE: one unit per place in which the event occurred.
smlacy of repression exercised durina event
3. FORMATION: one unit per formation participating in the event.
summary of repression exercised after evonb
4. ACTION-PIIASE: one unit per action by any formation.
s u m r y of major target(s)
5.
SOURCE: one unit per source 'from which information concerning this
broad event type
event was drawn.
summary of background
6. COMJIENTS: one unit per comment. All keyed to specific locations
in sections 1-5.
of action
summary of outcome
.
1. Event Section
identification number: starting date plus sequence number on that date
occuracy of starting date
day of week on which event began
date on which event ended
of error
2. Place Section
one unit per place in which the action occurred.
A "place" 1s any named
location, plus any unnamed location in whlcl~we have strong reason to helieve that some portion o l the action occurred. We produce a i1111tfor
"?omeplace" in two circumstnnces: 1) we cannot locate tlie action in at
A-49
A-50
l e a s t one s p e c i f i c p a r i a h ; 2) we have stro,ng r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t some
nine d,igita
l o c a t i o n i n B r i t i s h c e n s u s of 1831:
p o r t i o n of t h e a c t i o n o c c u r r e d o u t s i d e t h e p l a c e s f o r which t h e a c c o u n t
c o n t a i n s s p e c i f i c names.
A "name" can be v e r y g e n e r a l :
by t h e r i v e r , on
l
NOTE on t h e P l a c e S e c t i o n .
T h i s i s n o t t h e o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n on p l a c e s
t h a t we w i l l e v e n t u a l l y have a v a i l a b l e f o r a n a l y s i s .
We p l n n t o c o n s t r u c t
t h e road. a t t h e market, and s o on.
a s e p a r a t e P l a c e F i l e i n c l u d i n g a t l e a a t a l l p a r i s h e s i n which e v e n t s oca) for i n i t i a l codina
c u r r e d and a l l c o u n t i e s , whether o r n o t e v e n t s o c c u r r e d i n them.
p r i n c i p a l name of p l a c e , a l p h a b e t i c .
Parish takes priority.
p o s s i b l e , name county; i f county i s i m p o s s i b l e , c o u n t r y .
locations i n parenthesis.
I f i t is im-
i t i o n of f u r t h e r p l a c e s , i f any, w i l l depend on c o a t . convenience end ana-
Place inferred
l y t i c urgency.
Thus OXFORD means t h e a c c o u n t s p e c i f i c a l l y men-
The l i k e l y i t e m s of i n f o r m a t i o n i n such a f i l e a r e :
name of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t ( p a r i s h , e t c . )
t i o n s Oxford, (OXFORD) t h a t we have i n f e r r e d t h e l o c a t i o n from t h e a c c o u n t
p r o p e r name of t h e p l a c e
I
o r its context.
The sdd-
position within administrative hierarchy:
p a r i s h , hundred, county. e t c .
grid square location per Gazetteer
d e t a i l e d name of p l a c e . a l p h a b e t i c .
Blank i f we have a p a r i s h name and
l o c a t i o n i n 1831 c e n s u s
no o t h e r p l a c e i n f o r m a t i o n .
SOMEPLACE i f t h e p r i n c i p a l p l a c e is a county
o r a c o u n t r y (England, S c o t l a n d , Wales) and we have no f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n
!
on l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e county o r c o u n t r y ; a more s p e c i f i c d e s i g n a t i o n such
I
a s "near Norwich" ( i n p a r e n t h e s i s i f i n f e r r e d ) t a k e s precedence o v e r SOMEPLACE.
SOMEPLACE EI.SE f o r a d d i t i o n a l p l a c e s n o t . s p e c i f i c a l l y named.
p o p u l a t i o n i n 1831
o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h a t p l a c e :
e x t e n t of manufacturing, e t c .
I
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s p e c i f i c l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h a t p l a c e :
p u b l i c aquare;.shop,
b) f o r coding a f t e r a l p h a b e t i c s o r t of p l a c e s e c t i o n s
sequence number f o r g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n :
took p l a c e i n t h i s g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n , 1 t o 9 i f one of a c l u s t e r of 1
t o 9 p o s s i b l e c o n t i n u o u s g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n s , used t o d e s c r i b e i r r e g u l a r
Note:
I
I
.
3.
Formation S e c t i o n
Every participant must h e ss-
One u n i t p e r f o r m a t i o n k n w n t o b e p r e s e n t .
s i g n e d t o a t l e a a t one f o r m a t i o n .
So must e v e r y a c t i o n :
i f we know some
t h i s means t h a t a
s i n g l e p l a c e r e c o r d may c o n t a i n 1 t o 9 s u b r e c o r d s f o r g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n .
I
grid square location per Gazetteer:
I
two l e t t e r s p l u s f i v e d i g i t s
v e r t i c a l l o c a t i o n w i t h i n g r i d square:
etc
i n n , church.
enumeration o f a l l e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g i n t h a t p l a c e
0 i f some p o r t i o n d e f i n i t e l y
s h a p e s , e . g . a s t r e e t , town, r i v e r b a n k , r o a d .
p r e s e n c e o r absence of market.
0 i f n o t k n 6 , 1 t o 9 i f known
a c t i o n o c c u r r e d , b u t c a n ' t a s s i g n i t t o a s p e c i f i c f o r m a t i o n , we c r e a t e a
f o r m a t i o n named SOMEONE.
There may b e more t h a n one SOMEONE.
c a s e , we name them SOMEONE 1, SOMEONE 2.
In that
....
I
A f o r m a t i o n i s a s e t of p e o p l e who a c t t o g e t h e r a n d l o r i n t e r a c t w i t h a n o t -
h o r i z o n t a l l o c a t i o n w i t h i n g r i d square:
0 i f n o t known, 1 t o 9 i f known
h e r f o r m a t i o n i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t .
margin of e r r o r ' f o r g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n
The f i r s t f o r m a t i o n named must
A-51
We d i v i d e t h e remainder i n t o a s few f o r m a t i o n s a s p o s s i b l e :
liavc 10+ members.
g e n e r a l l y one f o r m a t i o n f o r e a c h s e t of p e o p l e wlio a c t d i s t i n g u i s h a b l y i n t h e
.
A-52
'
I
1
s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e :
code
b e s t e s t i m a t e of number a r r e s t e d .
Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i m a t e s a s COMMENTS.
c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t .
s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e :
code
b e s t e s t i m a t e of number wounded.
f o r m a t i o n numbers: two d i g i t s
o v e r l a p w i t h o t h e r f o r m a t i o n s : l i s t of o t h e r f o r m a t i o n ' s numbers
s o u r c e of b e e t e s t i m a t e :
r c l n t i o n of t h i s f o r m a t i o n t o e v e n t : p a r t i c p a n t , s p e c t a t o r , e t c .
b e s t e s t i m a t e of number k i l l e d .
nnme(s) of f o r m a t i o n : a l p l i a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g SOMEONE ( i n p a r e n t h e s i s i f
s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e :
Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i m a t e s oe COMMENTS.
code
Note a l t e r n a t i v e e e t i m a t e a a s COHMENTS.
code
t h e name i s i n f e r r e d r a t h e r t h a n g i v e n e x p l i c i t l y )
NOTE:
b e s t e s t i m n t e s of person-days, person-hours.
a r r e s t s , wounded, k i l l -
s o c j u l c o m p o s i t i o n of f o r m a t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DK ( d o n ' t know)
ed, must each sum t o t o t a l s g i v e n i n EVENT SECTION
o t h e r words d e s c r i b i n g f o r m a t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g NONE [ i n p a r e n t h e s i s
i f i n f e r r e d from a c c o u n t , e . g .
4.
(LED BY TAILOR)].
p l a c e of o r i g i n o r normal r e s i d e n c e : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DI;
An e v e n t b e g i n s a t t h e f i r s t p o i n t a t wllich a t l e a s t t e n of t h e p e o p l e wlio
words used t o d e s c r i b e maanitude of f o r m a t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g NONE
e v e n t u a l l y make a c l a i m which would q u a l i f y t h e e v e n t f o r i n c l u s i o n i n o u r
[ i n p a r e n t h e s i s i f i n f e r r e d from a c c o u n t , e . g .
sample a r e g a t h e r e d w i t h o u t d i s p e r s i n g b e f o r e they make tlie c l a i m .
(GROUP FILLED SQUARE)]
c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t d i s p e r s e s .
100, e t c . )
number of p a r t i c i p a n t s :
I
high e s t i m a t e
s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e : code (when t h e a v a i l a b l e a c c o u n t s c o n t a i n more
t h a n one e s t i m a t e , w r i t e COblMENT)
b e s t e s t i m a t e (00
-
I'erson-days
+
75 person-hours,
of t h e e v e n t .
For example. 025, 075 means
a s COMMENTS.
f o r m a t i o n b e g i n s a new a c t i o n .
A t least
A t l e a s t one phase must d e s c r i b e a c t i o n a f t e r t h e e v e n t
ends; when p o s s i b l e , t h e r e should b e one such u n i t form each f o r m a t i o n
which s u r v i v e d t o t h e end of t h e e v e n t .
a reasonable e s t i m a t e f o r a formation
of 25 p e o p l e i n c o n t i n u o u s a c t i o n t o r 1 day p l u s t h r e e more h o u r s .
75 means 0 person-days
A new a c t i o n - p h a s e b e g i n when
t h e r e s h o u l d b e one s u c h u n i t f o r each formation p r e s e n t a t t h e beginnjng
0 0 = unknown, 0 1 = l e s s t h a n 1 h o u r .
and person-hours a r e a d d i t i v e .
25 person-dnys
i n d e p e n d e n t l y q u a l i f y t h e e v e n t f o r i n c l u s i o n a r i s e i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e
one phase must d e s c r i b e a c t i o n b e f o r e t h e e v e n t s b e g i n s ; when p o e s i b l e ,
unknown, 01 = p a r t i c i p a t i o n
l a s t e d l e s s t h a n o n e day)
number o f person Ilours: b e s t e s t i m a t e .
I f new c l a i m s by 1 O t p e o p l e which would
e v e n t , they keep t h e e v e n t g o i n g .
number o f p a r t i c i p a n t s : b e s t e s t i m a t e
number of person-days:
The
e v e n t ends when t h e l a s t s e t of p e o p l e which h a s made such a c l a i m i n tlie
number of p n r l i c i p a n t s : low e s t i m a t e (50+ = a t l e a s t 50. 101+ = more t h a n
,
Action-Phase S e c t i o n
+ 75 person-liours.
01,
Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i m a t e s
I f more than one formntjon changes a c t i o n a t t h e same time. we mnke a
phase u n i t f o r each f o r m a t i o n and a s s i g n each u n i t t h e same time.
The minimtlm r e c o r d c o n t a i n s a t l e a s t one phase each:
1 ) b e f o r e t h e event
b e g i ~ ~ s2;) a t tile b e g i n n i n g oC tile e v e n t ; 3 ) i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t ;
name of s o u r c e : a l p l ~ a b e t i c . S t a n d a r d o b b r c v i a t i o ~ ~fso r major s o u r c e s
4 ) a t t h e end of t h e e v c n t ; 5) a f t e r t h e e v e n t .
l o c a t i o n w i t h i n s o u r c e : i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l v a r y w i t h t y p e of s o u r c e .
For
Every f o r m a t i o n namecl must a p p e a r i n a t l e a s t one a c t i o n - p h a s e .
newspapers, f o r example, l o c a t i o n w i l l t y p i c a l l y be d a t e , p a g e , l o c a t i o n
Two d i g i t s ; 0 0 = sometime
Sequence number: f i r s t new p h a s e a t t h i s t i m e .
Order number f o r m u l t i p l e p h a s e s which s t a r t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y : one d i g i t
on page.
f u r t h e r i d e n t i f y i n g i n f o r m a t i o n : i n c l u d e s NONE.
Hay c i t e h e a d l i n e , i n d i c a t e
l o c a t i o n i n f o o t n o t e , and s o on.
d a t e : y e a r , month, day
c l o c k time: 2400
-
comments on s o u r c e : a l p h a b e t i c .
-
0
action i n i t i a t i n g event;
i n c o u r s e of c v e n t ; 4 = a c t i o n e n d i n g e v e n t : 5
f o r m t i o n number: 0 0
t i o n : 99
-
-
-
6.
Comment S e c t i o n
a f t e r event ends
someone ( i f u s e d , we must enumerate a SOMEONE forma-
a l l formations
One u n i t p e r comment.
May be keyed t o nny l o c a t i o n w i t h i n EVENT, PLACE,
FORMATION, ACTION-PHASE,
OR SOURCE s e c t i o n s .
a c t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DK ( d e f i n i t e l y p e r m i t s p h r a s e s s u c h a s
. . . .; i n
p a r e n t h e s i s i f o u r summary o r i n f e r ~ ? n c e ,w i t h o u t
p n r e n t l ~ e s i s i f d i r e c t t r a n s c r i p t i o n of words i n a c c o u n t )
o b j e c t of a c t i o n : a l p l ~ a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DK, NONE, FOREli\TlOPl 2 3 , e t c .
immediate c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r o b j e c t : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g D K , NONE (consequences o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g same a c t i o n - p i l a s e o n l y ; u s e a f t e r - e v e n t p l ~ a s e s f o r
l a t e r consequences).
5. F o u r c r
-
SccLio:;
One u n i t p e r s o u r c e .
I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e r e s h o u l d be one s o u r c e u n i t p e r
c o v e r s h e e t and o n e c o v e r s h e e t p c r s o u r c e u n i t .
I n some c a s e s . t h e codebook
w i l l r e q u i r e t h e c o d e r who u s e s n c e r t a i n code t o make a CONMENT
J
ATTEMPT TO
May mention q u a l i t y , con-
t r a d i c t i o n of o t h e r s o u r c e s , u s e made i n c o d i n g .
r e l a t i o n t o cvent: 1 = before event begins; 2
3
l n c l u d e s NONE.
m i d n i g h t ; 0000 = unknown
l o c a t i o n i n r e c c r d : n u m e r i c a l code
comment: a l p h a b e t i c
APPENDIX 4.
MATERIALS FROM THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS IN GREAT
Type of CG
Place
Date
-
Issue
gathering
Weymouth
02-18
election victory celebration
meeting
Mary-la-bonne
02-20
parish rates
violence
Scarborough
02-28
smuggling affray
meeting
Sheffield
February (approx. )
test and corporation acts
meeting
Islington
February (approx. )
test and corporation acts
meeting
London
February (approx. )
test and corporation acts
meeting
Honiton
February (approx. )
teat and corporation acts
meeting
Dorcheater
February (approx. )
test and corporation acts
meeting
Manchester
February (approx.)
stamp duties
BRITAIN
The materiala
concern February 1828.
First comes a provisional list
of all contentious gatherings reported in our six sources (Morning Chronicle,
The Times.
--
Hansard's, The Mirror
-
gister) for that month.
of Parliament. Gentlemen's and Annual Re-
In the list, two events are underlined.
The mn-
terials which follow are readers' reports and copies of some of the relevant
articles in the periodicals.
Type of CC
Place
-
Date
Issue
meeting
Weymouth
02-02
parliamentary election
meeting
London
02-03
protection of victualler trade
meeting
Poultry
02-04
test corporation acts
Edinburgh
02-04
petition king about political favors
gathering
Liverpool
02-05
election to parliament
gathering
Durham
02-05
local election
gathering
Dover
02-06
election to parliament
violence
~bndon
02-06
crowd attacks informer
parade
Weymouth
02-07
election
meeting
Sheffield
02-07
vestry, church rates
violence
Newbury
02-07
crowd attacks informer
demonstration
Weymouth
02-09
election
meeting
Windsor
02-10
tax on carts
gathering-crowd
Weymouth
02-11
election
meeting
.
on don
02-13
threatens informer
gathering-crowd
Durham
02-13
county elections
meeting
London
-
02-15
-
licensed vs. non-licensed sellers
violence
Atherstone 02-16
poaching affray
meeting
Leicester
coin laws
gathering-mob
02-18
~
.Tndav':
:)
Ilansnrd
( ) IIVP
, ) L0NlK)W 'PIIIES
p;lge
: 5 MORNING
d a t e d -//- d-
CI!RONI<:l,E
- -&_~;~Y-.Q&~~/-C
F i r s t Lint:GENERAL DESCRIPTION:
(1)
(2)
VIOLENCE ( )
p r o p e r t y damage ( ) ,
p e r s o n a l i n j u r y ( ),
day
+
2
Bottom
197h
( )Scl~wei~zer
(word
( )Guest
()Eaton ,)Lewis
( )Green
( )Dunkle
( )Anderson ( ) B a r b e
- --- - -- ---- ---- - - -- -- -- -
s e i z u r e of p r o p e r t y , s p a c e s o r persons ( ).
t h r e a t o f a n y of t h e a b o v e ( ).
ElEETlNGS ( )
( ) Election
( ) Vestry
f , Liver\.
( ) Dinner
( ) Political clublparty
,
( ) with prtition, address, etc.
( ) o p p o s i t i o n t o government
( ) s u p p o r t f o r government
s u p p o r t f o r enemy o f g o v e r n m e n t
control of l o c a l governmentlinstitution
o t h e r g r i e v a n c e s and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s
o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r peoples o r groups
( ) o b j e c t i v e s unclear
( ) notices, requests(for past or f u t u r e meetings)
( ) other(1ist)
(
(
(
(
(/I:
GATHERINGS
demonstrflinns
rallies ( ),
o t h e r ( )-
8/
-
CllECK AS MANY AS APPLY(see memo /! 6 )
.
(3-8)
2-
column
-
datr
)
)
)
)
parade( ),
ass-es,
s p e c i a l celebrations ( ) .
c r o w d s , mobs
(4,
gatherings (
) I
(10)
LADllR ACTI\'ITIES ( )
comhination o r union mention ( ),
s t r i k e , t u r n o u t ( ).
l o c k o u t ( ),
r e t u r n t o work ( ).
t l i r e a t n t o s t o p work ( ) ,
work s t o p p a g e s ( ) .
dr!?iltations 1 3 f v o r k e r s ( ).
(11)
I.ECAI. ACTIOI:S ( )
a r r e s t s ( ).
rxaminntlons ( ),
r
t n o . (
t r j a l s l c o u r t procedings (
sentences. executions, r t c . ( ).
Re s u r e t o c h e c k t h r a p p r o p t n t r a r e a s a h o v e t h a t
p e r t a i n t o t h e a c t i o n Chat b r o u g h t a l > o l ~ tt h e a r r e s t o r t r i a l
.
EXTRA
E!:T[1'.
o r s u n o r s u s p e c t e d a r s o n ( 1.
s w e i l r ill,! i n <,Is p e c i a l c u n s t a h l e s ( 5 ,
m a c h i n e b r e a k i n g , d e s ~ r u c t i o no f looms o r t h r e s h e r s , c t c . ( ) .
Object .vc. v i a c i i u n
,
. p
l
liunhe
&
A&
!r
Kc6
l
t
> / fi C ~ ( h ' ;
s
,
rf
~ Y U C _&wD,~we
A~<
/;II /%
/&.
f7 ~ / , ~ ' ' ~ ~ f l d I.euders
~
7,
7iuwl
Y e : ; t e r d ; ~ y , I n s t w e e k , a few d a y s a g o
I.C,*:-,. i o a l - ;ri+€
speci i p!ace,
GAT^
'
inn. f i e l d . e t c .
.
&/.
.~GL)&x;
-
I ) u r a t i c n ( i f known)
1 d a y o r l e s s , a f r w d a y s , more
LC)[ [ & ~ d T / f
vi l l a y n r townlci ty
,
p a r i sli
:.,Lsa-
-
:>..-'
C!:!'m' DRlTAllJ STUDY
SAMl'LE
( ) Hansnrd
( ) 1101'
( :) L O N W N TIMES
pow
( ) MORNING CIIROIIICLE
date3-/
(2)
j
1-1
-
-.
.I/
column
7~:;
-'
day
( )Schweltzer
( )Lord
( )Guest
(
( )Levlo
T-qp ._.
w e '
Bottom
aton on
(dcreen
)Dunkle
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
I
support for enemy of government
control of local government/institution
other grievances and dissatisfactions
opposition to other peoples or groups
objectives unclear
notices, requests(for past or future meetings)
) other(1ist)
LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
strike, turnout ( ).
lockbut ( ) ,
cdmbination or union mention ( ),
threats to stop work ( 1,
work stoppages ( ).
return to work ( ) ,
deputations of workers ( ) . .
(1 I )
LEGAL ACTIOIIS ( 'j
errests ! ) ,
examinattons ( ) ,
pretrial info. ( ),
trials/court procedings ( ) ,
sentences. executions-,etc.'( ) . '
Be sure to check the npproplnte area5 ahove that
ner:ai? to t11c action that brought ahout the arrest or trial.
EX1'1 :
sveari.11gin oi special constables
,
arson or suspected arson ( 1.
s:~chlnebreaking, destruction of looms or threshers. etc. ( 1 .
( j
GI
I
dated'//-
(9)
VlOLENCE ( )
property damage ( 1,
personal injury ( ),
3
day 4
'
column
42 d
,
.-
-
:
1971,
3-7h
( )Scl~wcitzer
Top ( )Lord
( )Guest
t--!lipdl$
'
( )Eaton
( )Lewis
~ottom ~ ~ r c c ( n
seizure of property, spaces or persons ( ).
threat of any of the above ( ) .
(
(
.(
(
(
(
(
) support for enemy of government
) control of local government/institution
) other grievances and dissstisfactions
opposition to other peoples or groups
objectives unclear
,
) notices, requests(for past or future meetings)
) other(1ist)
.
)
)
GATHERINGS --'
demonstrations ( ),
parade( ) ,
assemhlies, crowds, mobs (I ),
rallies ( ) .
special celebrations ( 7 , '
other ( )
gatl~crings( ) ,
DELECATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )
(10)
LABOR ACTIVITIES ( !
1ock.out ( ) ,
comhination or union mention ( ) .
strike, turnout ( ) ,
threats to stop work ( ) ,
work stoppages ( ),
return to work ( ).
deputations of workers ( ) .
(11)
LEGAL ACTIONS ( )
arrests ( ) ,
examinations ( ) ,
prctrinl info. ( ) ,
trlalslcourt prncedit~gs ( ) .
sentences, cxeclltions, etc. ( ) .
Re sure to clicck the apprnpinte areas above that
pertain to the action that brought ahor~r the arrest or trial.
I - I
T~ri;~v'e
d;itl
3
( ) MORNING CllRONICLE
(3-8)
(10)
C'i.
SMI'1.I: HECORDIF'(: SIII:I:l
page
gatherings ( ) ,
DELEGATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )
;. C.:
(2) EIEETINCS ( )
( ) Election
( ) Vestry
( ) Livery
( ) Ginner
( ) Political clublparty
( j with petition, address, etc.
( ) opposition to government
( ) support for government
)
)
)
)
)
)
/
-
( ) llansnrd
( ) 1101'
( L)"LONIJI?: 'I'lFIIS
(1)
GATHERINGS
demonstrations ( 1.
parade( ) ,
assemblies, crovds, mobs ( G ' ,
rallies ( ),
special celebrations (. ) ,
other ( )
(9)
(
I
seizure of property, sp.sces.or persons ( ),
threat of any of the above ( ).
bEETINGS ( )
( ) Election
( ) Vestry
( ) Livery
( ) Dinner
( ) Political club/party
( ) with petition, address, etc.
( ) opposition to government
( ) support for.government
(3-8)
-
I .!
( ) G.M.
( ) A . ~ . C;RI:AT 1)Rll'Alh' STIIDY
1976
RECORDING SllEET 3-76
'8
VlOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ),
personal injury ( 1,
--
,.*'-,..,
Tnday's date
'
(1)
,"
swearlni: in of special constables ( ) .
ar:iurl or susoected nrs1.n
mnclilne hreakinp. destruction of looms or tlireshers, ctc. ( ) .
(
).
_ , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - -
/
Objective of action
. ar::ci!.,nts
Number
0
flf?
7~~'/ d )
Lttcati~nsl:r!fic
place, inn, field, etc.
+[l~'~uration(if
),nk
1 day or less, a few days, more
villagebr town/city
m7,,*~7
G',,
fi;A0
,
Pi~rcicipants
tiurnbrr
Leaders
f d f n /nu 0 1'.
Ycrterdcy, last Meek, s few days ago
i-it?
s3,
&/Fn3/i
of f l .
cci.&.f.-
e';;
-
parish
1
/Q14
,C
koA7[ . J ,,,'>
~
" '"
:...
Date
Ye:-;terd:~y,
last week, a few days ago
I.oca t ion
>- specific place, inn. field, etc.
.
I.earlers
/,'
,
j-
Ilurat ion(i f knnwn)
1 day or less, a few days, more
'. .___Z
par i sh
'I'<3d:4y1s,!:,tc -1
GREAT BRITAIN STIIDY
( ) Hansard
( )
MORNING
/
( )
il0P
LONINN TIMES
page
CllRONICLE
column
d-18-/ g28
date
VIOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ),
personal injury ( ),
(1)
'.i
'
1
( )Guest
)Eaton ( )Levlo
)~urke ( )Dunklo
day
(
)Burns
( )Driver
( )'support for enemy of government
( ) control of local governmentlinstitution
(4 other grievances and dissatisfactions
(d opposition to other
( ) objectives unclear
(9notices, requests(for&r
peoples or groups
future mertin(tp)
-
( ) other(I1st)
GATHERINGS
parade( ),
assemblies, crovds, mobs ( ),
demonstrations ( ),
rallies ( 1,
special celebrations ( ),
other ( )
(9)
l:l7(,
(
(
Top
CHiddle
I
(3-8)
-
seizure of property, spaces or persons ( ) ,
threat of any of the above ( ).
MEETINGS (4
( ) Election
( ) Vestry
( ) Livery
( ) Dinner
( ) Political clubfparty
( ) with petition. address, etc.
( ) opposition to government
( ) support for government
(2)
-
SAMP1.E RECOHDJNE SllEET 3 - 7 6
gatherinms ( ) ,
DELEGATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )
(10)
LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
strike, turnout ( ),
lockout ( ),
combination or union mention .( ),
threats to stop work ( ). . work stoppages : 1,
return to work ( ),
deputations of workers ( ) .
(11)
LEGAL ACTIONS ( )
arrests ( ),
examinattons ( ),
pretrial info. ( ),
trialslcourt procedlngs ( ),
sentences, executions> etc. ( ) .
Be sure to check the appropiate areas nbove thnt
pertain to the action that brought about the arrest or trinl.
I/ - -
EXTRA
/
I
1
EXTRA
suearin~in of speci~lconstables ( ) ,
arson or suspected arson ( ) .
machine breaking, destruction of looms or threshers, etc. ( ) .
Objective or action
~articipants
Number
AMIAJ~T
f- (@.AJ&C~
,se(/en 5
/VOAJ- L i ~ e d ~ t d
.
UIL~UIU~?RJ
,VOW ~ R O V J
Leaders
2.15./a8
Date
iCRi
Yesterday, last week, a few days ago
Location
L o f i d ~ TAUeU'
specific place, inn, field, etc.
,
C R ~ J ./ ~ L ~ A D P ~ J
nuration(lf know)
1 day or less, a feu days, more
~ d n l d d
village or townlcity
parish
county
COMMEhTS ON BACK? ( ) h - 7 6
6) Bobbi
' l ' a * J : ~ y ' sd : ~ t r
GREAT BRITAIN STUDY
( ) Hansard
(
(flLONDON TIMES
)
column
page
2.
VIOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ),
personal injury ( ),
1976
\&%k$izer
( )Lord
( )Guest
( aton on ( )Levis
( )Burke
( )Dunkle
Top,
9 . / 8- / J Z K
day /M
Rottom
- N ~ M ~ R ~ -U -J~-- ~- -7- -f -. -d- .- 6-( -)Burns
- - - -( -)Driver
-AS MANY-A'
%FLY(:~~memo I1 6)
date
First ~ine:- -A- GENERAL DESCRIPTION: CHECK
6 - Z'j -
3-76
HOP
( ) MORNING CllRONICLE
(1)
SAW1.E RECORDING SllEET
seizure of property. spaces or persons ( ).
threat of any of the above ( ).
(4
(2) MEETINGS
( ) Election
( ) Vestry
( ) Livery
( ) Dinner
( ) Political clubfpsrty
( ) with petition, address, etc.
( ) opposition to government
( ) support for government
(3-8)
(9)
( ) support for enemy of government
( ) control of local government/institution
( d o t h e r grievances atrd dtssstisfactions
(3/opposition to other peoples or groctps
( ) objectives unclear
( ) notices, requests(for past or future meetin~r)
( ) other(1ist)
GATHERINGS
parade( ).
sssemblies, crowds, mobs ( ).
demonstrations ( ),
rallies ( ),
special celebrations ( ) ,
other ( )
gatherlngs ( ) .
DELEGATIONS, DEPUTATIONS ( )
(10) LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
strike, turnout ( ),
lockout ( ),
combination or union mention ( ),
threats-to stop work ( ),
work stoppages : ),
return to work ( ),
deputations of workers ( ) .
(11)
LEGAL ACTIONS ( )
arrests ( ),
examinations ( ),
pretrial info. ( ),
trisls/court procedings (
sentences, executions, etc. ( 0.
Be sure to check the appropiate arena nbove thnt
pertain to the action that brought about the arrest or trial.
EXTRA
s w e a r i n g in of special constables ( ) ,
arson or suspected arson ( ) ,
machine breaking, destruction of looms or threshers, etc. ( ) .
............................................
Objective of action
Participants
IJ
//v~&?wP
L l t e ~ ~ d ~ic7~&l/ek5
/DO& ~ R O ~ J
Number
Leaders
m'
Date
2-/ S - / & z r
Yesterday, last week, a few days ego
(h&) B,!e~0erJ
I)uration(if
knovn)
s, a feu days, more
f
~ocation
O,?IO~FI
~ A V ~ ~ E, J
~ 3 d J ~ d
specific plac'e, inn, fieid, etc.
village or townfcity
psri sh
/n~ D O L J B ~
coun ly
COHMENTS ON BACK? (4
6-76 !6 ) Bobbi
A> mc Cued7
BW
.-
-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The bibliography falls into eight sections, corresponding to the book's
eight chapters.
In each section you will find the references cited in the
chapter, some background material and a few examples of further work along
the same lines.
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