Consti Cases: New Voluntary Recits: 06/27/23
INVALID EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER
Laurel V. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990)
FACTS:
The petition is to prevent/postpone the bidding for the sale of state-owned Philippine properties in the
country of Japan specifically in Tokyo. Petitioner prays for the invalidation of the bidding activity and a
call for a writ of mandamus on the respondents, compelling party to disclose to the public basis for the
decision on the sale of the Roppongi Property. In addition petitioner wants full disclosure on the
proceedings that prevent Filipino citizens and Filipino entities from participating in the said bid should it
persevere.
The court could not act with immediacy on the case since both respondent and petitioner filed for
motions of extensions for 5 consecutive times, as to the submission of their replies.
The Roppongi property is part of 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement the country entered into with Japan in 1956 as part of the indemnification for
World War II crimes against the Philippines by Japan. The reparations were intended and categorized as
either for government use or for private parties. The Roppongi property upon receipt was listed under
the Government Sector, and as intended became the site of the Philippine Embassy, but then later on
transferred to a different site as the included building in the Roppongi property needed major repairs.
Due to the Philippine’s lack of funds, the Roppongi property and the structure on site remained as is, and
unutilized.
Initial proposals were to lease the property to Japanese companies, which eventually led to EO 296 in
1987 entitling non-Filipino citizens to avail of said reparations capital goods and properties. The
executive branch was adamant on selling off the property, with priority given to non-Filipino buyers.
ISSUE:
WON the president and the executive branch have authority and jurisdiction, in the exercise of their
powers and function to sell off a state-owned property like Roppongi?
WON EO 296 is unconstitutional in terms of the invalid exercise of executive power.
RULING:
No. The Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the
above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it,
not even by the State. The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of
the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service. They are held by
the State in anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be
appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated
nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]).
Yes. The executive order contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national
patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to
Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth
Act 141)
(2) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not wholly owned by Filipino
citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12
of Rep. Act No. 1789)
(3) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern (Section
7, Article III, Constitution)
Review Center v Ermita
FACTS:
In June of 2006, the yearly Nursing Board Exam was held nationwide. Subsequently, applicants reported
to the PRC that handwritten copies of 2 sets of exams were circulated during the exam period at Gapuz
and Inress review centers. President of the review center Cordero was at the same time incumbent
president of the Phil. Nurses Assoc. The leakage was extensive and provided actual questions to the
exam. PRC later admitted to the leakage and traced it to 2 board members.
On June 19 the results for the exams were released.
August 18, the CA restrained PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the passers. To which,
consequently, Pres. GMA replaced all the PRC board of nursing members and ordered for a retake of the
exam. A month later GMA issued EO 566 authorizing CHED to supervise the setup and operations of all
review centers nationwide. CHED then approved MO 49 – allowing higher education institutions or
consortiums thereof to administer reviews and act as review centers to which the Review Center Assoc.
of the Phil. Reacted to, since this would effectively abolish the need for smaller independent review
centers.
RCA petitioner prays the suspension of the MO, and the IRRs that follow. To which the executive branch
replied with a revision to the IRR, thereby excluding existing review centers from the authority of the
CHED as commanded by EO566.
ISSUE: WON the RIRR released under then pres. GMA was an invalid exercise of the executive’s power
and therefor unconstitutional.
RULING: The court sides on the affirmative since it is tantamount to usurpation of Legislative power and
an invalid use as such.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under
RA 7722. Legislative power is solely lodged with the congress.
Substantively the power over agencies that the executive has is administrative and therefore concerned
with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. To this end, she can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations to facilitate
governmental agencies in aid of harmonizing them to the law. However the RIRR covers private Review
Centers that are neither institutions nor higher education institutions covered by CHED.
Final ruling declared EO566 and the accompanying MOs void for being unconstitutional.
POWER OF CONTROL
DENR v. DENR Employees, GR No. 149724, Aug. 19, 2003
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional
Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato
to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR
Secretary.
ISSUE: WON DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as
provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710
FACTS:
Petitioner Villaluz seeks reinstatement with backpay of his position as the Administrator of Motor
Vehicles Office. He attests to his proper appointment and installation citing dates of concurrence with
the Commission on Appointments.
Investigative findings by the Committee on Good Government of the HOR through the request of Cong.
Joaquin Roces alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency citing: a. malpractice in office amounting
to losses to the government, b. failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the
same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption, c. negligence to remedy unsatisfactory
accounting. Thereafter AO 232 was created proceeding a prosecution panel headed by Special
Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco, encapsulating the removal of petitioner and his assistant as well as
requiring a total revamp of the Motor Vehicles Office following proper notification to petitioner and a 72
hour window to refute said allegations with proper explanations (due process).
ISSUE:
WON the prosecution panel overstepped in opening an investigation on Petitioner
WON Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee
of the president AO 232
RULING:
No. As inferred from Sec10, Art 7 of the constitution, the power to appoint extends to the power to
investigate, suspend or remove any officer, with the only exemptions being the officers who belong to
the classified service. Although there is merit in petitioner’s claim that since he is a presidential
appointee he should therefore be exempt from investigation, he however belongs to the noncompetitive/unclassified service of government thereby authorizing the president, the courts, as well as
the head of departments to carry out disciplinary matters.
Yes. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a
presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA
2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of
the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by
the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint” . There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be
justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with
regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent
power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that `the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts,
or in heads of department.