In its June 22, 2009 Decision,[13] the trial court convicted petitioner of Bigamy and acquitted Baleda.
In so ruling, the RTC dismissed Pulido's claim that both his marriages are void. As to the first marriage, the trial court
noted that the certifications issued by the Civil Registrar merely proved that the marriage license and marriage
application could not be found, not that they never existed, or were never issued. It held that the marriage certificate
which reflected on its face the marriage license number of Pulido and Arcon's marriage has a higher probative value
than the certifications issued by the Civil Registrar.
Moreover, the trial court noted that the testimony of Pulido's witness shows only irregularities in the formal requisites
of Pulido's second marriage which did not affect its validity. Thus, the RTC upheld the validity of Pulido's marriage
with Arcon.
The fallo of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused Rowena M. Baleda. In turn, accused LUISITO G.
PULIDO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The appellate court further ruled that even assuming that the first marriage was void for lack of a marriage license,
one may still be held liable for bigamy if he/she enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. Bigamy was consummated the moment Pulido entered into the second
marriage without his marriage with Arcon being first judicially declared null and void.
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and second marriages obtained by the accused is
considered a valid defense in bigamy.
In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that
the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for
annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply
the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he
entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.[43] (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the doctrine laid down in Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior "void" marriage was
encapsulated in Article 40, which reads:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The prevailing rule, therefore, is that even if the marriage is void, a final judgment declaring it void for purposes of
remarriage is required. The Commission, in drafting Article 40, considered the Court's ruling in Landicho[49] that
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity; only competent courts have such
authority.[50] In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (Domingo),[51] the Court elucidated on the intent behind the provision,
thus:
"Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is
valid and that a court action is needed. xxx
xxxx
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage
and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages
are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked
that if this is so, then the phrase 'absolute nullity' can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase
to 'invalidity' if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice
Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral, attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked:
Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void?
Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage
because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that it is a void marriage. Justice
Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed
that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment ...
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He
proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab
initio. xxx
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41." [52] (Emphasis supplied.)
To repeat, Pulido's first marriage with Arcon was contracted in 1983 or before the effectivity of the Family Code while
his second marriage with Baleda was celebrated in 1995, during the effectivity of the said law. Pulido assails the
retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code on his case which requires him to obtain a judicial declaration
of absolute nullity before he can contract another marriage.
When the prior marriage was contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code while the subsequent marriage was
contracted during the effectivity of the said law, we recognize the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family
Code but only insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. In Atienza v. Brillantes,
Jr.,[53] and reiterated in Jarillo[54] and in Montañez v. Cipriano (Montañez),[55] we declared thus:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that
said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis[63] (Marbella-Bobis) held that without a judicial declaration of nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting and for all legal intents and purposes, the parties are considered as married at the time
the second marriage was celebrated.[64] Hence, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, [65] Thus, the Court declared that:
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry, again; otherwise
the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded
as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondeat entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination
of the, criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted
to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.[66] (Emphasis supplied.)
A thorough review of the foregoing rulings shows that the judicial declarations of absolute nullity of the first and
second marriages obtained subsequent to the celebration of the second marriage are not valid defenses in the
criminal prosecution for bigamy. The only valid defense recognized by the Court in the above-mentioned cases is a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage obtained by the accused prior to the celebration of the
second marriage.
However, if the first marriage is merely voidable, the accused cannot interpose an annulment decree as a defense
in the criminal prosecution for bigamy since the voidable first marriage is considered valid and subsisting when the
second marriage was contracted. The crime of bigamy, therefore, is consummated when the second marriage was
celebrated during the subsistence of the voidable first marriage. The same rule applies if the second marriage is
merely considered as voidable.
To our mind, it is time to abandon the earlier precedents and adopt a more liberal view that a void ab initio marriage
can be used as a defense in bigamy even without a separate judicial declaration of absolute nullity. The accused may
present testimonial or documentary evidence such as the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or
subsequent void ab initio marriages in the criminal prosecution for bigamy. The said view is more in accord with the
retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the purpose of and legislative intent behind Article 40 of the Family
Code, and the rule on statutory construction of penal laws. Therefore, the absence of a "prior valid marriage" and the
subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage, Pulido is hereby acquitted from the crime of
Bigamy charged against him.
New Doctrine on Bigamy: Pulido v. People
Summary
In the leading case of Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021,
Hernando, J., the SC en banc exonerated the accused from criminal
liability for bigamy when during the pendency of the bigamy case, a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was entered.
Previous decisions had held that a person who contracts a second
marriage without a prior court declaration of nullity of his first
marriage was liable for bigamy even if the first marriage was
subsequently declared void by a court. The SC held in Pulido that the
requirement of a prior judicial declaration of nullity under Article 40 of
the Family Code, which is for purposes only of remarriage, should not
have been extended to criminal cases.
Case law prior to Pulido
The crime of bigamy is committed by any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage while validly married to another. (See
Article 349, Revised Penal Code).
Consider this hypothetical: Horace contracted marriage with
Annika. Horace then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Annika on the ground of absence of a marriage license.
While this petition was pending, Horace contracted a second marriage
with Blondie. When Annika learned of this, she filed a criminal
complaint with the prosecutor for bigamy against Horace. The
information for bigamy against Horace was subsequently filed in
court.
(a) Horace filed a motion for suspension of the criminal case on the
ground that the marriage nullification case presented a prejudicial
question. Should the motion be granted?
(b) Assume that the motion was not granted. During the pendency of
the criminal case, judgment was entered declaring the marriage
between Horace and Annika as void because of the absence of a
marriage license. Will the judgment exonerate Horace from criminal
liability?
Prior to Pulido, the answer to (a) was in the negative. The petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage will not pose a prejudicial question
since, as will be discussed in the answer to (b), Horace can still be
convicted of bigamy even if his prior marriage to Annika was later
nullified.
The answer to (b) was also in the negative. In a line of cases, the
Supreme Court has held that a spouse cannot take the law into his
own hands and contract marriage without a previous judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. “Persons intending to
contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of
evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.” (See Vitangcol v. People,
780 SCRA 598 [2016]). This holding was based on Article 40 of the
Family Code which provides that “[t]he absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”
The Pulido case
In Pulido, the petitioner contracted marriage with a woman whom we
shall refer to as W1. Subsequently, petitioner contracted marriage
with another woman, W2. Stung by this betrayal, W1 filed a
complaint for bigamy against the petitioner. The petitioner’s defense
was that his marriage with W1 was void because of the absence of a
marriage license. In accordance with the then case law, the petitioner
was however convicted by the RTC of Las Piñas City since there was no
prior judicial declaration of his marriage with W1 at the time he
married W2. The Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner’s conviction
and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. While the case was
pending in the Supreme Court, a judgment was entered by the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, declaring the marriage between the petitioner and W1 as
void due to the absence of a marriage license.
With this development, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner
should be exonerated from criminal liability. The High Court stated
that for bigamy to arise, there must have been a prior valid
marriage. The fact that the judicial declaration of nullity was obtained
after the accused had contracted the second marriage will still not give
rise to bigamy because a void marriage is inexistent from the very
beginning.
With respect to Article 40 of the Family Code, the Court held that its
application to a bigamy charge was not warranted. The Court held
that by the express terms of Article 40, the prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage is a requirement only for purposes of
remarriage and that Article 40 should not have been construed as
imposing a requirement for the accused to raise the defense of nullity
of the first marriage.
Thus, in the light of Pulido, the answer now to (b) of the hypothetical is
that the judgment of nullification will exonerate Horace from criminal
liability for bigamy.
Effect of Pulido on prior rulings re prejudicial question
The doctrine laid down in Pulido will necessarily call for a revisit of
previous doctrines which held that a pending marriage nullification
case will not pose a prejudicial question in a bigamy case.
In light of Pulido, the answer to (a) of the hypothetical is that the
motion for suspension on the ground of prejudicial question should
be granted. The resolution of the issue of whether the prior marriage
between Horace and W1 is valid is determinative of whether the
criminal case for bigamy will proceed.
It should be noted that by virtue of the 1 December 2000
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil case in order
to pose a prejudicial question must have been filed prior to the
institution of the criminal case. Hence, if the civil case for marriage
nullification was filed after the criminal case had been instituted, there
will be no suspension of the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial
question.
In such a case, the remedy of the accused is to prove the nullity of his
prior marriage in the criminal case. Pulido held that a prior judicial
declaration is not the sole means of proving the nullity of the prior
marriage. The accused may collaterally attack the validity of the first
marriage by introducing evidence, for example, that no marriage
license was obtained therein. The Court held that a certification from
the LCR that no record of a marriage license was found in its record
would cast reasonable doubt on the accused’s guilt.
Retroactive effect of Pulido
What about an accused who had been convicted of bigamy
notwithstanding a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage? May
he invoke the Pulido doctrine?
It is submitted that the accused may do so. It is axiomatic that a law
should be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused. (Article
22, Revised Penal Code). Judicial decisions favorable to an accused
should be given retroactive effect since such decisions form part of the
law in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code and so as not to
infringe upon the constitutional right of the accused to equal
protection of the law. (Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
[1971]). In such a case, the accused may file a petition for habeas
corpus to obtain his release from prison.
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of
her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of
the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty
on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of
prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as
an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day
to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled
to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to
raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has
consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack
her union with Santos was in vain.
1âwphi1
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to
correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and
that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija,
prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of
her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an
agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing
officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and,
in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery
of the sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well
that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract
a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore,
unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as
innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
FRANZ BARTH BATAD y Feliciano