Peter Ronald DeSouza E Sridharan - India's Political Parties-SAGE Publications Pvt. Limited (2006)
advertisement
India’s Political Parties Readings in Indian Government and Politics–6 Readings in Indian Government and Politics Series Editors: Zoya Hasan Kuldeep Mathur Ghanshyam Shah Other volumes in the same series: Volume 1: Volume 2: Volume 3: Volume 4: Volume 5: Development Policy and Administration edited by Kuldeep Mathur Decentralization and Local Politics edited by S.N. Jha and P.C. Mathur Politics and the State in India edited by Zoya Hasan Social Movements and the State edited by Ghanshyam Shah Class, Caste, Gender edited by Manoranjan Mohanty India’s Political Parties Readings in Indian Government and Politics–6 Edited by Peter Ronald deSouza E. Sridharan Sage Publications New Delhi l Thousand Oaks l London Copyright © Peter Ronald deSouza and E. Sridharan, 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2006 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd B-42, Panchsheel Enclave New Delhi 110 017 www.indiasage.com Sage Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 Sage Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP Published by Tejeshwar Singh for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 10/12 pt. Times at Excellent Laser Typesetters, New Delhi, and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data India’s political parties / editors Peter Ronald deSouza, E. Sridharan. p. cm.—(Readings in Indian government and politics; 6) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Political parties—India. 2. India—Politics and government—1977–. I. deSouza, Peter Ronald. II. Sridharan, Eswaran. JO298.A1I535 324.254—dc22 ISBN: 10: 0–7619–3514–2 (Pb) 13: 978–0–7619–3514–8 (Pb) 2006 2006020411 10: 81–7829–666–7 (India–Pb) 13: 978–81–7829–666–1 (India–Pb) Sage Production Team: Vibha Arora, Janaki Srinivasan, Purnendu Kumar Barik, Sanjeev Sharma and Santosh Rawat Contents List of Tables List of Abbreviations of Political Parties Preface by the Series Editors Acknowledgements 01. Introduction: The Evolution of Political Parties in India E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza 02. A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity Jayaprakash Narayan 03. Politics without Party M.N. Roy 04. The Congress ‘System’ in India Rajni Kothari 05. Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002: From Hegemony to Convergence Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar 06. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour: From Independence to the 1980s Myron Weiner 07. The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism: The Bharatiya Janata Party in Contemporary Indian Politics Bruce D. Graham 08. Communalization of the Indian Polity Achin Vanaik 09. The Communist Parties in India Valerian Rodrigues 10. Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces? Suhas Palshikar 11. Telugu Desam Party K.C. Suri 7 9 11 12 15 37 51 58 73 116 155 173 199 253 281 6 Contents 12. Parties, the Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections: A Comparative Perspective on Possible Options E. Sridharan 13. Selection of Congress Candidates: The Formal Criteria Ramashray Roy 14. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas: Deghettoizing Women’s Politics and Enhancing Their Representation in Legislatures Madhu Purnima Kishwar 15. Political Nomadism and the Party System in India: The Struggle between the Fence and the Field Peter Ronald deSouza About the Editors and Contributors Index 311 341 356 384 402 406 List of Tables 05.1 06.1 06.2 06.3 06.4 07.1 07.2 07.3 09.1 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 11.1 Structure of Political Competition and Nature of Political Power in Indian States Indian Parliamentary Elections (1952–80) Congress Party Results in Parliamentary Elections (1952–80) Parliamentary Election Results (1971, 1977 and 1980) The Vote for the Congress in Urban and Rural Constituencies: All India [(1952–72) (in per cent)] Number of Seats and Proportions of Votes Obtained by the BJP in General Elections to State Legislative Assembly, 1980 Results of the Lok Sabha Elections, December 1984 Results of the General Elections to Legislative Assemblies, March 1985 Statewise Vote Share of the Communist Parties in Lok Sabha Elections (in per cent) Shiv Sena in Lok Sabha Elections Shiv Sena Performance in Assembly Elections Region-wise Performance in the Lok Sabha Elections in the 1990s Region-wise Distribution of Sena MLAs: 1990–99 Party Preference among Various Social Sections: 1996 and 1999 Party Preference among Caste/Community Groups: 1996 and 1999 (Row percentages) Caste Composition of Voters of Main Parties: 1996 and 1999 (Column percentages) Seats Won/Contested and Percentage of Votes Polled by the TDP and Other Parties in the Vidhan Sabha Elections in A.P. since 1983 87 131 135 137 149 161 163 165 242 256 256 257 257 267 268 268 282 8 List of Tables 11.2 Seats Won/Contested and Percentage of Votes Polled by the TDP and Other Parties in the Lok Sabha Elections in A.P. since 1984 11.n.1 Representation of Reddis and Kammas in the Assembly and the Ministry Before and After TDP Came to Power (in per cent) 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 15.1 15.2 Declining Representation of Women in State Legislatures 1952–97 (per cent of women MLAs) Women’s Representation in the Parliament 1952–98 Rotation of Seats Women’s Presence in Top Decision-making Committees, 1996 Independents Elected to the Lok Sabha in Successive General Elections The Gender Advantage Performance of Candidates of Recognized Parties in the Lok Sabha Elections—Gender-wise Defections and Government Formation in Goa Defections and Changes in Government 296 306 364 366 368 374 377 379 380 392 395 List of Abbreviations of Political Parties AC AGP AIADMK AIAWU AICCCR AIDWA AISF AISU AITUC AIYF BJD BJP BJS BKD BKMU BLD BSP CFD Cong (I) Cong (O) Cong (U) CPI CPI (M) CPI (ML) CSP DK DMK DMKP DYFI FB GRCP HVC Arunachal Congress Asom Gana Parishad All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam All India Agricultural Workers’ Union All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries All India Democratic Women’s Association All Indian Students Federation All India Students Association All India Trade Union Congress All India Youth Federation Biju Janata Dal Bharatiya Janata Party Bharatiya Jana Sangh Bharatiya Kranti Dal Bharatiya Kisan Mazdoor Union Bharatiya Lok Dal Bahujan Samaj Party Congress For Democracy Congress (Indira) Congress (Opposition) Congress (Urs) Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) Congress Socialist Party Dravida Kazhagam Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party Democratic Youth Federation of India Forward Bloc Goa Rajiv Congress Party Haryana Vikas Congress 10 List of Abbreviations of Political Parties HVP INC IPFT ISP INLD JD JD (S) JD (U) JMM KHAM LDF Lok Dal (B) MCC MDMK MGP MNF MUF NC NCP NFIW NPP PDP PDSU PMK PSP RJD RSP RSS RSU SAD SFI SP SSP SUCI TC TDP TMC TRS TUJS UDF UGDP UF VHP Haryana Vikas Party Indian National Congress Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura Indian Socialist Party Indian National Lok Dal Janata Dal Janata Dal (Secular) Janata Dal (United) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis, Muslims Left Democratic Front Lok Dal (Bahuguna) Maoist Communist Centre Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party Mizo National Front Muslim United Front National Conference Nationalist Congress Party National Federation of Indian Women National Panthers Party People’s Democratic Party Progressive Democratic Students’ Union Pattali Makkal Katchi Praja Socialist Party Rashtriya Janata Dal Revolutionary Socialist Party of India Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Radical Students Union Shiromani Akali Dal Students Federation of India Samajwadi Party Samyukta Socialist Party Socialist Unity Centre of India Trinamool Congress Telugu Desam Party Tamil Maanila Congress Telangana Rajya Samiti Tripura Upjati Juba Samiti United Democratic Front United Goans Democratic Party United Front Vishwa Hindu Parishad Readings in Indian Government and Politics Preface by the Series Editors This series focuses on significant themes in contemporary Indian government and politics. Each volume explores a wide range of problems and issues in specific areas of Indian politics and locates them within wider debates on politics, society, economy and culture. The series focuses on the interface of social forces, political institutions and processes in an attempt to understand the changing grammar of Indian politics. A variety of approaches have been deployed by social scientists in general and political scientists in particular to understand the relationships between state and society, democracy and development, state and classes controlling its power, formation of public policy and its implementation, and between issues of cultural recognition and distribution, as also between different segments and regions, religion, caste, languages and culture. The analysis of some of these themes and issues from different perspectives and approaches constitutes the principal endeavour of this series. The review of issues of theoretical and substantive importance both within institutional structures and outside them can illuminate the complex interplay of sociopolitical forces and political processes and the dynamics of social formation and political transformation in modern India. The aim is to strike a balance between empirical observation and theoretical analysis of political processes. Each volume in the series consists of a detailed introduction and a selection of essays essential for the understanding of the theme. Using this pattern, each volume will critically appraise the state of research in the theme, re-examine old problems and open up new issues for inquiry. The series will be of interest to anyone concerned with the study of Indian government and politics. However, it will be of special interest to students of political science, sociology and contemporary history and to policy makers, bureaucrats, journalists and social activists. Zoya Hasan, Ghanshyam Shah, Kuldeep Mathur Acknowledgements This reader has been very many years in the making. Too many. There are many persons who have been patient with us errant editors. We would like to record our appreciation of Zoya Hasan, Ghanshyam Shah, Kuldeep Mathur, the series editors who were generous with their patience and, in spite of the delay, still enthusiastic with the project. We also wish to thank the editors at Sage who badgered us with good humour, Omita Goyal who began the project, Mimi Choudhary who stayed with it and Ashok R. Chandran who has seen it to completion. We could not ask for better colleagues. Finally, we would like to thank Edzia Carvalho who worked with the changing manuscript, as articles were considered for inclusion and after some months were replaced by new articles, and who retained interest in the project from the student point of view even when there was little forward movement. We hope the audience for the book will enjoy the collection as much as we have had in putting it together and will endorse the logic of inclusion. The papers, with their complete citations, included in this volume are mentioned below: Jayaprakash Narayan 1980 M.N. Roy 1951 Rajni Kothari 1964 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar 2003 ‘A Plea For the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity’, in Bimal Prasad (ed.), A Revolutinary’s Quest. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. ‘Politics without Party’, Radical Humanist and also in M.N. Roy (ed.), Politics, Power and Parties. Delhi: Ajanta Publications. ‘The Congress System in India’, Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 12. ‘From Hegemony to Convergence: Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States 1952–2002’, Journal of the Indian School of Political Economy, Vol. 15, No.1 and 2. Acknowledgements Myron Weiner 1989 Bruce D. Graham 1987 Achin Vanaik 1997 Suhas Palshikar 2004 K.C. Suri 2004 E. Sridharan 1990 Madhu Purnima Kishwar 1996, 1997 and 2000 Ramashray Roy 1966 13 ‘Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour: From Independence to the 1980s’, in Ashutosh Varshney (ed.), The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. ‘The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism: The BJP in Indian Politics’, Hull Papers in Politics, No. 40. ‘Communalization of the Indian Polity’, in Achin Vanaik, The Furies of Indian Communalism : Religion, Modernity and Secularization. UK: Verso. ‘Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 14–15. ‘Telugu Desam Party: Rise and Prospects for Future’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 14–15. ‘The Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections: A Comparitive Perspective On Possible Options’, Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 3, No. 3. ‘Out of the Zenana Dabba: Strategies for Enhancing Women’s Political Representation’, Manushi, No. 96 (September–October), ‘Women’s Marginal Role in Politics’, Manushi, No. 97 (November–December), ‘The Logic of Quotas: Women’s Movement Splits on the Reservation Bill’, Manushi, No. 107 (July–August), ‘Enhancing Women’s Representation in Legislatures: An Alternative to the Government Bill for Women’s Reservation’, Manushi, No. 116, (January–February). ‘Selection of Congress Candidates: The Formal Criteria’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 1, No. 2. 1 Introduction: The Evolution of Political Parties in India E. SRIDHARAN and PETER RONALD DESOUZA Political parties are considered by many as intermediate organizations between the citizen and the state. They are regarded as having an important place in a democracy, carrying the weight of expectation and aspiration upwards from citizen to state, and the burden of policy downwards, from state to citizen. In this process, they perform multiple functions and develop multiple personalities. This volume seeks to provide glimpses of these different facets through a collection of both published classic articles and specifically commissioned ones. The objective is to provide the student with a view of the extensive and varied landscape of political parties in India. In this introductory essay, we situate the collection in the context of the literature on political parties globally and also in India. There are three sections to this introduction. The first constitutes a synoptic account of the discourse on political parties. The second presents the logic by which the articles in this reader have been selected. And the third offers some issues for future research. I Political parties are complex, multi-faceted organizations with multiple linkages to organizations in civil society and the institutions of the state, typically spanning both. This is because parties arise in civil society or are rooted in civil society even if they may have originated in the legislature as legislative 16 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza factions as in 18th and 19th century Britain and the United States.1 However, they are not purely civil society organizations. They overlap the institutions of the state or at least its legislative branch if they are represented in the national, regional (in a federal polity) or local legislatures, and also overlap the executive branch of the state if they are in power at the national, regional or local level. They are variously, and at times overlappingly, organizations embodying ideologies and programmatic visions, organizations that are at the same time social movements, organizations representing the interests of sections of civil society, whether secular/economic or sectarian/ethnic, organizations holding power in the institutions of the state, or in parts of it as in a federal state, and lastly, organizations with their own corporate interests, organizational structure and functioning which have consequences for political outcomes. They can be organizationally ‘thin’ or ‘thick’, deeply rooted and penetrative in civil society or superstructural, highly ideological or purely electoralist, strongly linked to particular sections of society or catchall in character. In this introductory essay, we view political parties in India as such multifaceted organizations functioning in interaction with each other as they compete for power at both the centre and the states in a federal political system that consists of distinct state and national party systems, the latter being to a large extent, but not reducible to an aggregation of state party systems. To so situate Indian political parties, we begin with a broad list of the functions of political parties and a state-of-the-art typology of political parties drawn from the comparative politics literature on parties before we turn our focus on Indian parties. There has been a plethora of typologies of political parties in the political science literature.2 Parties have been classified according to varied criteria or combinations of criteria. However, before we attempt a classification, let us list the various functions of political parties. A non-exhaustive list of the core functions of political parties would consist of the following.3 The most important function is the recruitment of political leadership, which consists of candidate nomination and electoral mobilization to win elections for their candidates and for capturing power. Closely related to this is the function of issue structuration or the framing of what become issues and determining how these issues are viewed and debated in the public sphere. This is particularly the case during election campaigns, but is not limited to them since such agenda setting takes place between elections as well as is an aspect of the normal activity of politics. Also closely linked is the function of forming and sustaining governments in office. Three broader non-electoral functions continuously performed by parties in civil society, in which the actions of parties overlap with the actions of civil society, are the functions of societal representation or representing the interests of various social groups in the Introduction 17 political sphere; interest aggregation, in which the diverse interests of different groups are aggregated into broader political programmes and policy platforms; and social integration, in which parties enable citizens to participate effectively in politics so that citizens develop a sense of the efficacy of participation in the political process. Gunther and Diamond (2001: 3–39), in a state-of-the-art survey and update of the literature on political party typologies, develop the following multiplecriterion typology of parties. Instead of classifying parties by employing only one of a variety of possible criteria, for example, functionalist or organizational or sociological criteria and associated typologies, they develop a much richer yet fairly parsimonious typology using a combination of criteria. It does not necessarily fit every country but is best suited for our purpose. Gunther and Diamond (2001) divide political parties into 15 types or species clustered into five broader genuses—elite parties, mass-based parties, ethnicity based parties, electoralist parties and movement parties. The first genus of the (traditional) elite parties consists of parties of local notables or clientelistic parties based on notables. These are weakly organized and mobilize support through personal resources of the notables or through vertical patron-client networks. They make election nominations on the basis of loyalty. Such parties were present in early democratizing rural polities and typified parties in the 18th and 19th centuries. They can also be seen in some developing countries with fledgling democracies. The second genus of the mass-based parties, or mass party (see Duverger 1963; Michels 1915) refers to a party created outside the legislature, such as an industrial working-class party, a peasant party, a religious party or, in some circumstances, a nationalistic party. These parties are well organized and have a mass membership. They are grouped into six species or three pairs of parties, namely, the socialist ideological parties, the nationalist ideological parties and the religious ideological parties. Each of these pairs consists of an organizationally thin, pluralist type of party and an organizationally thick ‘proto-hegemonic’ or authoritarian type of party. Thus there are ‘classmass’, socialist, social-democratic and labour parties, and there are Leninist revolutionary communist parties, both mass parties of the working class. There are broad-based nationalist mass parties and ultra nationalist or fascist parties. There are Christian Democrat type religious mass parties and religious fundamentalist parties. This genus of party is controlled by its professional bureaucracy. It has a variety of mass organizations that it uses for resource mobilization. The highest level of the party bureaucracy controls the nominations for elections (Michels 1915). The third genus of the ethnicity based parties can be either mono-ethnic parties that follow an ethnically exclusivist or even polarizing strategy, or broad, multi-ethnic coalitional or Congress parties. Parties of the first 18 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza type may be well organized or weakly organized but they are typically not internally democratic. They tend to be controlled either by organized religious hierarchies or charismatic leaders. Nominations for elections are made at the top levels. Examples of the second type are the Indian National Congress up to the mid-1960s, the Malaysian Barisan Nasional and the Tanzania African National Union, which are multi-ethnic parties following national integration ideologies combined with particularistic benefits. Nominations tend to be decentralized and a part of power sharing in multiethnic societies. The fourth genus is the electoralist parties. These may be personalistic, programmatic or catch-all parties. Personalistic parties are merely vehicles for the ambitions of their leaders and are purely election-oriented, for example, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia or Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party. In India, the various minor parties that have arisen at various times and are often suffixed with the names of their leaders like Congress (Tiwari), Akali Dal (Mann) or Telugu Desam (Lakshmi Parvathi) are instances of personalistic parties. Programmatic parties are also election-oriented and thinly organized, but are more ideologically or programmatically coherent than a pure catch-all party, for example, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party in Britain or the post-1980 Republican Party in the USA. The catch-all party is not a class party but essentially a machine oriented to winning elections (Kirchheimer 1996: 177–200). Winnability is its criterion for election nominations, electoral strategies and even policy stances. It tends to cut across class and other cleavages and make direct appeals to voters through the mass media. Lastly, the fifth genus is the movement party, which consists of parties that have evolved from contemporary social movements such as the Green Party in Germany or the various anti-immigrant extreme right parties in Europe such as the Austrian Freedom Movement or Jean Marie Le Pen’s Front National. They tend to straddle parties and movements and have a distinct, often issue-based programme. Viewing Indian parties through the prism of this typology and attempting to fit them into the categories of this most contemporary typology is a useful classificatory exercise yielding a useful mapping of the spectrum of Indian parties.4 To begin with, the Indian National Congress, henceforth the Congress Party or just the Congress, began and grew as a broad, encompassing coalition of the representatives of the Indian people during the last six-odd decades of the British Raj. It included even the Muslim minority that later became increasingly attracted to the separatist Muslim League. After independence, it became a broad multi-regional, multi-lingual, multi-religious, and multi-caste, in short, a multi-ethnic party. Sometime from the late 1960s onwards, it evolved into an electoralist catch-all party. Introduction 19 The other major national party of today, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), does not quite fit the religious fundamentalist, the ethnicity-based or the fascist/ultra nationalist categories although it shares, to a large degree, elements of all three. Its parent organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its various fronts like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal certainly share the characteristics of the ultra nationalist party and the fascist party minus the cult of the supreme leader. The BJP can perhaps be better defined as an ethnic party, in this case, the promoter of a religion and religious culture defined Hindu ethnicity and nationalism, something much narrower than a broad encompassing multi-ethnic Indian nationalism. However, the Shiv Sena, at the regional level, fits the characteristics of a fascist party, including the cult of a supreme leader. Electoral politics and coalition politics forces the BJP in the direction of becoming a catch-all party against the grain of its ideology. The two major Communist parties, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI (M)] and the Communist Party of India (CPI), fit the mould of the proto-hegemonic ‘class-mass’ Leninist party, but are, in practice, much more like social-democratic, worker-peasant parliamentary parties. The parties that can be loosely classified as the Janata family of parties, that is the Janata Dal and its various offshoots, viz., the Samajwadi Party (SP) of Uttar Pradesh, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) of Bihar, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) of Orissa, the Janata Dal (United) and Samata Party of Bihar, the Janata Dal (Secular) of Karnataka, the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) of Haryana, all overlap the categories of the catch-all electoralist party, the ethnicity-based parties (in all parties, particular caste combinations prevail), and to some extent Congress parties (many of them originated in the 1960s and 1970s as Congress offshoots). However, some of them are personalistic electoralist parties, for example, the BJD of Naveen Patnaik, and the INLD of Om Prakash Chautala. They are typically very loosely organized parties that are based on and are the vehicles of the land-owning, middle-peasant castes of North India, Orissa and Karnataka. The regional parties with an explicitly regional-ethnic character such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu, the Shiromani Akali Dal in Punjab, the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in Assam, can be considered to be from an all-India perspective, ethnicity-based parties representing a regional ethno-linguistic group. For example, the Shiromani Akali Dal represents only the Sikhs and the AGP represents the caste Hindu Assamese. However, within their states, they are essentially programmatic or catchall electoralist parties. To the extent that they are programmatic electoralist parties, they promote a distinct political programme such as the AGP’s anti-Bangladeshi immigrant platform. 20 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza The relatively new and fast-rising Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is again an ethnicity-based (Scheduled Caste-based) party as well as a programmatic electoralist party promoting an anti-caste ideology and a programme of social change benefiting the Scheduled Castes or the broader ‘bahujan’ bloc. It is also driven by the ambitions of its leaders, Mayawati and Kanshi Ram. II To answer the question of how parties evolve over time, we look at how existing parties periodically reinvent themselves and new parties characterized by new organizational forms and electoral strategies emerge. Katz and Mair (1995: 5–28) have outlined an evolutionary sequence of party types, using many of the party types mentioned above. This is based on the relationship of parties to civil societies and states in different stages of development in the context of European history, but their typology and staging can have useful insights for developing democracies too. Katz and Mair (1995) argue that the (Duverger’s) mass party, which is often taken as the benchmark of mass parties, is a product of industrial working class societies and is only a stage in the continuing process of political evolution. Parties evolve by adaptation to social and economic change. The mass party led to the development of Kirchheimer’s (1996: 177–200) catchall party in what was essentially a reaction of older, less organized, conservative or liberal parties or even clientelistic parties of notables, focusing on broad appeals and cutting across class barriers, to counter traditional classbased mass parties. The catch-all party, as a type, made its appearance and grew along with the growth of the middle class and the relative decline of the old industrial working class in the post-World War II boom era. In an era of the spread of television and the rise of a professional political class, the catch-all party or the electoral-professional party tended to pitch its appeal wide with a focus on electoral winnability, concentrating on electoral mobilization through the media rather than by grassroots organizations (Panebianco 1998). In the electoral-professional party, the party in government also tended to become stronger than the extra-parliamentary organization, unlike the older mass party. Katz and Mair (1995) and Katz (2001) posit the rise of cartel parties in the post-1970 period when established parties, both of the moderate left and right, which were closely integrated with the state bureaucracies, colluded to limit competition. These parties were more dependent on state subventions and less integrated with civil society following the relative decline of the older industrial working class and the growth of a managerial state deeply Introduction 21 involved in the economy. Some cartel parties, in their view, are a part of the adaptation by the old mass parties to the rise of catch-all parties. There has been a general trend over the period 1960–90 toward greater decentralization and transparency within parties (Bille 2001: 363–80; Hopkin 2001: 343–61; LeDuc 2001: 323–41; Rabat and Hazan 2001: 297–322). In several major parties in the democratic world, including both the major British parties and particularly the Labour Party, the Spanish Socialist Party and the Progressive Conservative Party in Canada, there have been movements by local and middle-level party activists and by the rank and file to reduce the power of entrenched party elites. Nomination processes and party leadership processes have been at the core of these struggles. There have been strong movements within parties to democratize these processes and make them open to broader and more inclusive selectorates. While it is generally agreed that parties in Europe have become more decentralized and transparent, there is no agreement on whether the recent reforms in several parties toward party primaries for nominations and leadership selection have significantly reduced the control of party leaderships and empowered the party membership base. One view is that party primaries will make parties, particularly the Canadian and British parties, more like the American parties; they will become candidate-centred and less cohesive, and party leaderships will lose control over candidate nomination (LeDuc 2001). Another view, based on the experience of the Swedish, Danish, British and Spanish parties is that introducing party primaries will not have a strong effect on the control of party leaderships over the party’s ideology, policy or even nominations because the party primaries are not stateregulated, as they are in the United States, but are subject to the party’s internal regulations. They are open only to party members and not to voters who register themselves as party supporters as in the United States (Hopkin 2001; Katz 2001). The effect of party member-based primaries is that even while widening the selectorate for nominations, party leaderships can centralize control in practice, since ‘an inclusive but unorganized selectorate may give the appearance of democracy without the substance’ (Katz 2001). This is because such democratization concerns ‘mainly “ordinary” members, who are more docile and prepared to follow party leadership than the middle-level elite and the activists’ (Mair 1994: 1–22).5 How well does the evolution of parties in India fit this pattern derived from the European experience? Have the existing and new parties evolved their structure and functioning and their relationship to civil society and the state in a similar pattern? Have they continually reinvented themselves? Let us consider these questions along with five aspects of the political party as a political organization, namely: (1) party as ideology; (2) party as movement; (3) party as societal group interests; (4) party as government; and (5) party 22 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza purely as organization and, derived from this, the political consequences of these organizational forms. Viewing Indian parties as each of these, and classifying them in these terms, we get the following picture of Indian parties and their evolution. The classic examples for parties as ideology are the communist parties. These parties are primarily about ideology. Their origins lie in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the international effect of the Russian Revolution of 1917. However, these parties are also, in defining ways, parties as movements, specifically the labour movement and the peasant movements. They are also parties of societal interest group representation, again of the working class and the poor peasantry. They are parties as government in the three states in which they have formed governments, either in their own or as a part of a coalition, viz., West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura. They also share the character of party as government from their presence in Parliament and in the state assemblies. They have a presence in the institutions of government, albeit in the opposition in the legislatures. Lastly, they are organized in a particular way, characterized in principle by ‘democratic centralism’ and a hierarchical and secretive cadre-based structure of cells, borrowed from the Soviet model. But above all, they are parties as ideology since their other features derive ultimately from their character as parties originating in and promoting a particular well-defined and elaborate ideology. The BJP and the Shiv Sena are also parties of an elaborate and structured ideology for nationalism of a particular brand—Hindutva, or Hindu-ness or Hindu nationalism. However, all aspects of their existence are not directly derived from their ideology. Their social base and the groups they represent are more flexibly defined and in a state of flux. Their organizational form is not directly derived from their ideology but from historical circumstances. The best example of parties as movements would be the Congress Party before 1947 when it embodied the broad, umbrella movement of the Indian people struggling for Independence. Other movement parties, that is, parties that are the spearhead and outgrowth of a broad social movement toward certain goals, are regional nationalist and autonomist movements like the National Conference and the Dravidian parties, the AGP that was an outgrowth of the All Assam Students’ Union’s movement in the early 1980s against illegal immigration of Bangladeshis to Assam, and the original Jharkhand Party and its offshoots which was a movement of the tribal peoples of Jharkhand for greater autonomy and political identity. However, several parties including the BJP and particularly some of its offshoots like the VHP and its Ramjanmabhoomi movement show some of the characteristics of movements. All parties represent societal group interests to some extent. The question is whether this is their dominant characteristic and whether they represent Introduction 23 narrowly and sharply defined groups. Ethnicity-based parties, including regional, linguistic, caste and religion-based parties, are particularly characterized by this aspect of political parties. Thus, the BSP definitely represents the Scheduled Castes in particular, the Akali Dal represents the Sikhs, the National Conference represents the Kashmiri Muslims, the AGP represents the caste Hindu Assamese, the DMK and the AIADMK represent the nonBrahmin Tamilians and the Shiv Sena represents the Maharashtrians in Mumbai (or did so at significant periods in time). An important caveat must be added here. Even ethnic-exclusivist parties are not the sole representatives of the group they claim to represent or in whose name they speak; no group’s vote is overwhelmingly monopolized by any party even though a large majority of the group may happen to vote for that party at a particular time or even regularly. Almost all parties, and certainly all major parties that have been in power at least in one state, share aspects of the party as government. As mentioned earlier, the leadership of the parties in power occupies positions in the executive branch of government and at various levels of government. Even the members of the parties not in power occupy position in the legislative branch of government including in legislative committees, as Members of Parliament, Members of the Legislative Assembly or members of bodies in the third tier of government. This affects the character of the party since party leaders wear two hats, those of government leaders and of party leaders. It also benefits the party as it has the formal and informal resources of the government, at least partially, at its command, to be used to benefit its political programme to the greatest extent possible. Lastly, all parties are also organizations. They can assume a variety of organizational forms, sometimes ideology-driven, sometimes leadership preference-driven but most often path-dependent because the organizational form is a legacy of the organizational form adopted, at its inception, by the party or a movement that became a party, combined with leadership preferences, the nature of its interaction with civil society and its specific social base. Most parties of the extremes, like the communist parties and the BJP, have tightly organized, cadre-based, centralized, hierarchical and secretive organizations that have emerged against a background of conflict with the state due to their ideological opposition to the constitutional philosophy of liberal democracy and a history of encouraging violence of either an insurrectionary or a communal kind. They may conduct internal elections and have processes for feedback from lower levels, but these are essentially stagemanaged in a top-down fashion. Most parties of the broad centre, particularly personalist and catch-all electoralist parties, and broad ethnic or movement parties, have relatively loose and weak organizations that wax and wane with elections. However, in India, all parties across the spectrum are 24 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza characterized by a relative absence of formal internal democratic procedures for taking crucial political decisions like an electoral platform and strategy, alliances if any, nominations of candidates and fund raising and distribution. In all these matters, they are more top-down than most European parties and sharply contrast with the two American parties which conduct their nomination processes in a bottom-up manner through primaries and in which candidates do their own fund raising. The broad political consequences of this top-down organizational style, whatever the formal structure of the party organization may be, is that vertical splits are common as the Hirschmanian logic of exit, voice and loyalty plays itself out, as seen when disgruntled leaders or factions secede from the parent party to float new parties or merge with other parties. In such cases, the primacy of the political leadership over the organizational structure, is also demonstrated. Coming to the evolution of Indian parties, there has been some evolution of the Congress Party, the Communist parties and the BJP. After 1947, the Congress Party evolved from a broad national umbrella movement for independence to a political party that mobilized for elections in a democracy with universal franchise and in which it formed, most crucially, the government at the Centre for 47 years from independence to the present day. The impact of elections, and of being in government, transformed the party from a grand-coalitional high command-led movement into a factionalized party and, after the 1969 split and the centralization under Indira Gandhi, into a top-down though still broad encompassing party used to being in power but having to compete in elections against an increasingly powerful multi-polar opposition. The Communist parties have evolved into parliamentary, social democratictype parties, tempered by their being in power for a nearly three decades in West Bengal and intermittently, for decades in Kerala and Tripura. The BJP has alternately moderated and hardened its Hindu nationalist platform. It has been alternately open and closed to electoral alliances and governmental coalitions, and more or less acceptable as an electoral ally and coalition partner to other members of the non-Congress political spectrum. One would expect Indian parties to evolve toward greater internal democracy, transparency, and accountability in their functioning as they evolve against a socio-economic backdrop of economic growth rates of over 5 per cent per annum in the 1980s and 1990s, higher income and educational levels, greater media penetration, greater voter turnout, especially of the lower castes and classes in the second democratic upsurge of the 1990s, which has resulted in the relative empowerment of the voters and the grassroots party workers (Yadav 2000). However, what is striking, in its contrast to the evolution of the parties in Europe outlined earlier, is that there has been no trend toward internal democratization and transparency in Indian parties, which Introduction 25 remain across the spectrum, remarkably top-down and centralized in their functioning, particularly with respect to election nominations, funds and basic stance and strategy. Vigorous competition between parties since 1989 and the considerable flux in alliance formation have not spilt over into parties in the form of open democratic competitive procedures and transparency and accountability of the leadership to the rank and file. Michels’ (1915) iron law of oligarchy seems prevalent within Indian parties right across the board. Coming to the relationship between parties and the party system, the question worth asking is whether the party system, that is, the structure of electoral competition and the taking of positions on issues shapes parties themselves? Does it force parties to adopt positions on various axes of polarity/polarization and therefore realign parties and their social bases? For a brief overview of the evolution of the Indian party system, it would be useful to divide it into three phases: (1) 1952–67 or the first four general elections, a period of Congress dominance in both the centre and the states with the Congress winning a majority of seats based only on pluralities of votes against a fragmented opposition; (2) 1967–89, a period of bipolarization of state party systems in which a single but varying leading opposition party tended to dominate non-Congress votes and seats in an increasing number of states, while the Congress remained dominant at the Centre, forming single-party majority governments, except for the Janata Party government of 1977–79 which was a Congress victory in reverse; (3) post-1989, a period of continued bipolarization of party systems combined with six consecutive hung parliaments, a multi-party system and coalition politics at the Centre, particularly since 1996.6 In the first and second phases, Congress dominance at the Centre led to opposition imperatives to form broad, ideologically and programmatically eclectic and even contradictory anti-Congress alliances, thus reinforcing the tendency towards broad centrism noted by the Rudolphs.7 Except for regional identity assertion, the tendency toward catch-all centrism tended to overpower caste and communal identities. In this phase, regional parties like the DMK and AIADMK, AGP, Shiromani Akali Dal, National Conference, TDP and the Left parties emerged as significant political forces in their states. This was not the case with the explicitly caste based parties; the Hindu nationalist BJP remained a minor force. However, since 1989 and especially since 1996, the trends have been different in the context of the absence of a dominant party and the emergence of very large multi-party coalitions at the Centre. What this fragmented party system with a BJP-led, very large multi-party coalition at the Centre (13 parties at the time of the formation of the government) and most of the states ruled by opposition parties, has meant for incentives for parties’ political behaviour, is that while all parties try to strike the best possible coalition bargains, the tendency towards centrism no longer 26 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza exists as strongly as it did earlier. Parties are no longer shy of being explicitly based on ascriptive identities, caste, communal or regional, that is, more ‘ethnicized’ and more ‘extreme’ in terms of ethnic outbidding or upping the ante, with moderate centrist parties like the Congress falling between more ‘extremist’ schools. This is because single-state and ‘ethnic’ parties can get elected so long as their base is spatially concentrated, and in a fragmented national party system, they can also get a share of power in an appropriate coalition. Thus, the progressive fragmentation of the party system over time has weakened imperatives towards moderation and centrism in political parties. III The foregoing section has given us a synoptic account of the topography of political parties, introducing us to the different ways by which they can be classified, to the various forms they can take, and to the processes of their evolution. It has sought to situate the discussion on Indian political parties within the larger global discourse on parties and to then place it within the even more extensive discourse on democracy. In this section, we shall briefly set out the logic of selection of articles for this reader, spelling out our reasons why some have found a place and some have not. We begin, quite obviously, with the recognition that since a reader can include only a limited number of articles of those that are available, this selection has therefore, had to adopt multiple principles of inclusion. The first principle is by way of a reminder of a discussion, and a time, in the making of independent India, when it was seriously argued that parties are antithetical to democracy. These arguments, made in the Gandhian spirit, stated that it was better for India to adopt a party-less polity if it wanted to build a true democracy that would be uncorrupted by the processes of party politics. Although this line of argument comes as a surprise today, since it goes against the established wisdom where parties are seen as a constitutive feature of democracy, it has a lineage not just in the political philosophy of Gandhi but also in the European writings of Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse and E.F. Schumacher where ‘small is beautiful’. Such arguments for a party-less democracy need to be considered today, even if they seem somewhat heretical, since they represent a worldview which has long been neglected but which, at a certain time, was the core vision of our freedom struggle. Jayaprakash Narayan (JP in the Indian idiom of politics) states this position very forcefully: Party rivalries give birth to demagoguery, depress political ethics, put a premium on unscrupulousness and aptitude for manipulation and intrigue. Parties create dissensions where unity is called for, exaggerate differences Introduction 27 where they should be minimized. Parties often put party interests over the national interests. Because the centralization of power prevents the citizen from participating in government, the parties, that is to say, small caucuses of politicians, rule in the name of the people and create the illusion of democracy and self-government (see Chapter 2, ‘A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity’). This critique of parties finds echo in the writing of M.N. Roy, one of the founders of the Communist Party of India, from which he later distanced himself to found the Radical Humanists. In a vein similar to JP, he writes that ‘political practice cannot be truly democratized unless people can nominate as well as vote for a candidate. It is easy to see that parties will have no place in the latter form of political practice which provides for sustained actual participation of the entire community’ (see Chapter 3, ‘Politics Without Party’). He disbanded the Radical Democrats and Humanist party in December 1949 in the belief that they should ‘no longer participate in a pattern of political practice which has done more harm than good, has soiled the fair name of democracy’ (Ibid.). This position on party-less democracy needs to be engaged with today on two counts: (i) to see the larger frame within which these arguments of a participatory decentralized democracy, based on a politics from below, is made, and to evaluate its continued relevance in today’s globalized political order and (ii) to assess whether the failures that been have listed by JP and M.N. Roy are endemic to the party politics of today, as claimed by them, and therefore ones that will have to be both lived with and struggled against, or whether they are, in fact, transient distortions that can be overcome. This collection begins with two chapters introducing us to this issue of a party-less democracy. The chapter by JP is a brief extract from his longer essay on ‘A plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity’, where he presents us with a larger body of arguments for a democratic society within which his comments on parties are located. The chapter by M.N. Roy is a short, perceptive piece that, although written about six decades ago, appears very contemporary in its observations and its suggestions of a radical restructuring of democracy along the lines of decentralized democracy. The caution, made by realists, against both JPs and M.N. Roy’s arguments is that they do not foresee what Paul Brass (1990), in his critique of Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism, foresaw—that in the absence of political parties offering a programme that cuts across ascriptive categories, mobilization along such lines as communal, caste and other ‘ethnic’ mobilization, would take place, gravely undermining democracy. But since such mobilization has taken place even in party based democratic polities we here invite scholars of parties to revisit these arguments. 28 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza From what some may consider a fleeting indulgence with utopia, but which we consider a necessary reminder of a democratic possibility, the collection returns to the beaten track of treating party politics as a given of democracy. The second principle of selection seeks to introduce the reader to: (i) the idea of a party system i.e., an arrangement of parties that are locked in a certain relationship with each other within the democratic polity, and (ii) the evolving character of this system, over time, in the increasingly assertive federal polity of India. The chapter by Rajni Kothari, and that by Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, work very well in tandem and almost seamlessly take the reader from the first three decades of Indian party politics 1947–77, to the period up to 2004. Kothari’s classic in addition to outlining the features of the one party dominance system, the party of consensus and the parties of pressure, also introduces the idea, in opposition to JP’s and M.N. Roy’s, that the Congress is internally democratic, that there was a growth of inner party democracy which subsequently declined, that factional politics were significant and that these were decades of the maturing of the political system. His typology of the party system in India as a ‘one party dominant system’, in addition to providing a better description than the oneparty, two-party, multi-party typologies on offer, also introduces, for consideration, the idea that intra-party democracy, as factional politics, is as important as inter-party democracy, and that the latter alone is not a sufficient measure of a democratic party system. This set of arguments is then extended, and modified, in their discussion of the subsequent three decades by Yadav and Palshikar. In a wide ranging study, both authors not only map the changing stages in the party system at the national level, from the one dominant party system, to the one salient party system, to the current phase of coalitional politics, but also trace the evolution of the party system at the state level, and the various forms these take in each state, where at least four models are at work: one-party dominance, two-party bi-polar competition, two party-plus competition and multiparty competition. Yadav and Palshikar see the decline of the Congress and the rise of the smaller parties, both regional and ethnic, as the inability of the catch-all party to accommodate divergent and increasingly assertive interests, and as the deepening of the democratic process, where new leaders emerge who have ambitions and aspirations and seek to consolidate their voter base and thereby increase their bargaining power. They suggest that such a reconfiguration can be mapped along two axes, an increasing voter choice on the one side and an increasing party competition on the other. While they offer several ideal types of the party system in the states they do not indicate the causal processes by which one ideal type declines and gives rise to another. This is a seminal article because it makes a contribution to our understanding of party politics at many levels, from delineating the structure Introduction 29 of party competition at the centre and the states, to the identification of the different drivers of politics, to the role of important events and processes, such as Mandir, Mandal and Market, on party politics. The details of party politics which it provides is supplemented by the sixth chapter of the set, by Myron Weiner, who in classical scholarly fashion takes us through the historical emergence of the party system from the national movement, through the decades of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, to the period upto 1984. The third principle of selection is to shift the discussion from the party system to parties seen in terms of their different personalities: as ideology, movement, societal group interests, government, and finally purely as organization. In the political science literature, parties have been discussed in these various ways and our selection attempts to provide the reader with examples of such readings. We have done so by an intensive discussion of national parties, the Congress, the BJP, and the Communist parties, and also of some regional parties such as the Shiv Sena of Maharashtra and the Telugu Desam Party of Andhra Pradesh. We had wanted to include more regional parties, from the thirty-odd listed, particularly the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), and the Dravida parties, since each would allow us to engage with a different issue of interest in the study of parties, such as the strategies of mobilization of the social base by the BSP, the complex intertwining of religion, politics and region in the SAD, and the cultural politics of the Dravida parties, but had to settle for the shorter list because of space constraints. Myron Weiner’s chapter gives an overview of party politics till 1984 and in doing so describes the different functions that the Congress Party performed in those decades of mobilizing local support, accommodating local factions, providing opportunities for competing political elites, transmitting information, and managing conflict. He discusses the role of the party system in addressing insurgent challenges to the nation-state through cooption, e.g., in the North-East, to providing access to state patronage, e.g., in the Punjab. These strategies, by which dissenting elites are coopted, are of importance, and must be discussed more extensively, since they take the analysis to an examination of the dialectics between the nation state and democracy. In this dialectics democracy is both pitted against the nation-state and is the solution to the emergent conflict. In the same scholarly tradition, the chapter by Bruce D. Graham’s offers a historically grounded view of the BJP—its origins, doctrines and policies, and its strategy and electoral record, from the vantage point of 1987, the year before the BJP began its meteoric rise based on a sharp rightward shift in its policies and strategy. Graham takes us back to the key texts from which the BJP draws its ideology and in particular the five principles of nationalism and national integration, democracy and fundamental rights, positive 30 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza secularism, Gandhian socialism, and value-based politics. While Graham’s discussion does not critically engage with the relationship (some would say gap) between precept and practice, Achin Vanaik’s chapter, an extract from his book (1997)8 is a detailed discussion of the BJP’s attempt to fill in the space provided by the decline of the Congress by taking the polity to the communal right. His characterization of the BJP and its affiliates as practising a fascist politics, of using a mobilization strategy of inventing an ‘enemy within’ in the Muslim minority, highlights the dangers of the politics of hate to the polity. It raises some fundamental issues of the normative and legal ‘limits’, which a democratic polity must regularly consider to constrain competitive party politics when a section of its citizens, as a result, has to live in a climate of fear. While competitive politics is often the best decider of the success or failure of exclusivist agendas such politics cannot be sans rules. It must take place within a certain competitive system of constraining rules. We need to ask ourselves whether ‘hate politics’ should be proscribed by these rules as has been the case in several democracies. If Vanaik presents a scathing critique of the ideological politics of the BJP, Valerian Rodrigues presents a more sympathetic assessment of the ideological politics of the Communist movement and parties. In an essay written specially for this volume, he offers a wide-ranging account of India’s two Communist parties, taking us through their historical evolution, ideological splits, organizational structure, engagement with civil society, characterization of the Indian state, and experience of participation in bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Because this in our opinion is one of the most comprehensive treatments of the communist movement and parties in India, it compels us to examine the issue of the contemporaneity of the arguments held by the movement particularly with respect to their characterizations of the Indian state and the nature of parliamentary democracy. When Communist parties in many regions of the world have reinvented themselves as social democratic parties, the Indian Communist parties by retaining the label of communism, exhibit a stubbornness of ideology which makes one sometimes feel that they have not quite assimilated the lessons of current history beginning with the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989. This analysis of parties in terms of their ideology, social class and practice of government, is once again illustrated in the two chapters on regional parties. Suhas Palshikar presents a detailed historical analysis of the origins, growth and transformation of the Shiv Sena in the context of the evolution of Maharashtrian politics, from a Maharashtrian Nationalist party to a ‘semifascist’, Hindu Nationalist Party. His discussion of the place of the plebiscitary leader in party politics introduces a new issue for consideration as also the well-crafted strategy of violence that the Shiv Sena employs and through which it increases its social base that has a significant component of Introduction 31 unemployed youth in urban Maharashtra. K.C. Suri’s analysis of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) also covers new ground. In addition to locating the rise of the TDP in the standard causes, the decline of the Congress, the changing caste coalitions, the shift in policy emphasis, etc., he also analyses the role of the towering regional leader, N.T. Rama Rao (NTR) in party formation. Many of the regional parties are leader-dependent, family-controlled, undemocratic organizations that effectively manipulate the politics of identity and hence are able to capture power at the level of the state. Suri’s study together with Palshikar’s compels us to look at regional parties as warlord parties that also decline after the decline of the warlord. These six chapters cover most of the familiar approaches to the study of political parties in India, with respect to their ideological moorings, changing social base, electoral successes or failures, organizational forms, role in government, and leadership structures. From the viewpoint of a reader, the eight chapters discussed above constitute a fairly complete list of issues on party politics in India. They, however, cover the same old terrain of party politics without venturing to engage with some of the important and new issues that need to be foregrounded. While this is valuable in itself a reader should also introduce the student to other related issues. This is what the fourth major principle of selection seeks to do. Four issues are chosen for close study: (i) the evolution of the system of political financing in India, the incentive structure involved and proposed, and the policy options available, by E. Sridharan; (ii) the procedure of selection of individuals as party candidates in elections, by Ramashray Roy; (iii) the pattern of reservation of seats for women in Parliament and Assemblies, by Madhu Purnima Kishwar; and (iv) the experience of defections and its impact on the party system, by Peter Ronald deSouza. These chapters are self-contained studies and introduce the student to the idea of undertaking detailed studies of related issues to add depth to our understanding of the relationship between parties and a working democracy. Interestingly, while they were all independently selected, Roy, Kishwar and deSouza, taken together, appear to address the core issue of the representation of interests in a plural polity. While Roy’s 1966 study of how candidates receive party nominations has not been replicated by others with respect to different parties and periods, the issue of securing party nomination remains a key issue of democratic politics since, in the Schumpeterian sense, we select our representatives from those already pre-selected for us by the party. The idea of representative democracy, where voters select those who are to represent them, therefore, is an idea that gets considerably diluted by the party system. We thus need to have more studies of the processes in each party, both national and regional, by which candidates are nominated. Kishwar’s study looks at the issue of women’s empowerment and the appalling record of women’s representation in the legislature in India. To combat the tokenism 32 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza often indulged in by parties with respect to ensuring women’s presence in the legislature, Kishwar recommends a political formula that will both reward parties that make a serious attempt to increase women’s representation as well as penalize those that do not. This is an institutional innovation for making the polity less exclusive, that needs to be considered. deSouza’s chapter is also a discussion of representation but from a different vantage point, that of defections from parties which the political leadership has been concerned with and tried to curb. He explores the arguments of the mandate and independence theories and suggests that perhaps, in our hurry to fence in the defectors or political nomads, we may have disregarded some of the important arguments of the independence theory of representation as enunciated by Burke (1999). His chapter also introduces the student to the possibility of applying A.O. Hirschman’s (1970) theory of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ to understanding the relationship between members and party organizations. Sridharan’s study also breaks new ground and is one of the earliest, if not the first, to examine the policy options available for election finance reform in India. He presents us with a comparative picture of political finance in other democracies and examines the pros and cons of introducing such practices in India. Given the close connection between corruption and the electoral system, since parties require large funds to fight elections, this study sets out the issues that need to be considered if we are to make our party and electoral system more accountable and transparent. This fourth set of chapters aims only to alert us to the range of issues that have become relevant in the study of political parties in India. They examines only a limited set of such issues in the hope that more such studies will be done. IV Political parties in India enjoy a very low level of trust. In a cross-sectional survey of people’s political attitudes, done by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in late 2004, the question was asked: ‘I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one could you tell me how much trust you have in them. Is it a great deal of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or none at all?’ Of the ten institutions polled the scores on a 100 point scale are: national government (79.4), state government (73.5), local government (72.5), civil service (57), police (48.8), army (85.5), courts (72.3), Parliament (67.1), political parties (45.8), and Election Commission (79), political parties got the lowest rank. Even the police fared better. This bodes ill for Indian democracy. Parties need to increase the level of the trust the public can place in them. This raises a number of issues for reform. However, Introduction 33 before one can make any recommendations, considerable research is needed on why the survey threw up such responses. In this context, this final section does what all final sections do, that is, sets out a limited agenda for future work. There are at least five issues on which detailed studies would add value to our discussion of political parties in India. The first is with respect to the relationship between party organizations and the party in government. While we have looked at strategies for winning elections or for forming governments, we need to look at this relationship when parties are in power. Do parties act as rent-seekers when in power, with the party in government dominating the party organization? The party rhetoric of public service needs to be confronted with studies of their actual behaviour when in power. The second issue to be explored is related to this. We need to return to examining the inevitability of Roberto Michels’ iron law of oligarchy and see how, in all parties, democratic procedures (if any) get subverted. The result of this subversion is that a small oligarchy always remains in full control. Perhaps JP’s and M.N. Roy’s critique that small oligarchies rule in the name of the people was not altogether utopian. The potential of, and constraints to, inner-party democracy needs more scholarly attention. The role of the leader’s family in the control of parties is a part of this. Many parties have become family fiefdoms. For example, Laloo Prasad Yadav appointing his wife to the Chief Minister’s position when he was compelled to relinquish office after a court verdict, remains the lasting image of the family takeover of political parties. The BJP and the Communist parties too do not seem immune to such processes. The third issue is the impact of party politics on caste, or as D.L. Sheth has suggested, the increasing politicization of caste: Put simply, competitive politics required that a political party seeking wider electoral bases must view castes neither as a pure category of ‘interest’ nor as one of ‘identity’. The involvement of castes in politics fused ‘interest’ and ‘identity’ in such a manner that a number of castes could share common interests and identity in the form of larger socio-political conglomerates. The process was one of politicization of castes which, by incorporating castes in competitive politics, reorganized and recast the elements of both hierarchy and separation among castes in larger collectivities. These new collectivities did not resemble the varna categories or anything like a polarized class structure in politics. The emergence of these socio-political entities in Indian politics defied the conventional categories of political analysis, which is class analysis versus caste analysis. The singular impact of competitive democratic politics on the caste system thus was that it delegitimized the old hierarchical relations among 34 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza castes, facilitating new horizontal power relations among them (Sheth 2000: 249). This issue of what competitive party politics is doing to caste, must be documented in all the regions of India to give us an understanding of the background conditions, particularly because of democracy’s promise of bringing about political equality. The fourth issue that calls for scholarly attention is the relationship between parties and other civil society organizations. This is a fairly broad agenda and would include the relationships with corporates, chambers of commerce, trade unions, new social movements, etc., and in turn, how these organizations mediate between the party and the voters and donors. The fifth and final issue that would be profitable to study is the dynamics of party strategies for coalition-building in a federal, multi-party system consisting of a variety of state party systems. A great deal needs to be done to relate political parties to each other, to competition for, or coalition with, each other’s social bases, and hence, to the evolution of the party system as a whole, in order to understand contemporary party dynamics. A thorough exploration of this research agenda is needed to understand the problem of low public trust in political parties and hence in order to be in a position to devise methods of improving this deficit for the growth and consolidation of a healthy, well-functioning, internally democratic, transparent and responsive political party system. Notes 01. For the evolution of the party system see LaPalombara and Weiner (1965). 02. For examples, Duverger (1954), Neumann (1956), Kitschelt (1994), Panebianco (1998). 03. We follow Gunther and Diamond (2001: 3–39) in listing these functions. 04. For a more detailed exercise along these lines, see Sridharan and Varshney (2001: 206–37). 05. Mair, Peter ‘Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State’, in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds), 1994. How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 1–22. An important caveat about intra-party democracy that needs to be noted is that there may be a danger of overemphasizing the importance of intra-party democracy to ensure accommodativeness and representation. It may well be possible for the accommodation and representation of all group interests to take place under an oligarchical leadership that is so inclined. On the other hand, an emphasis on intra-democracy in a context of majoritarianism in the rules of intra-party democracy and in the prevailing social ideology may marginalize minority interests in intra-party dynamics as well as in general elections or wider social dynamics. Introduction 35 06. For a detailed account of the evolution and fragmentation of the party system, 1952–99 see Sridharan (2002). 07. For details of alliances see Rudolph and Rudolph (1987); also see Sridharan 2002. References Bille, Lars. 2001. ‘Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality’, Party Politics, 7(3): 363–80. Brass, P. 1990. ‘Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies: The Consociational Solution and its Critics’, in P. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Burke, E. 1999. ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’, in E. Burke, Select Works of Edmund Burke. A New Imprint of the Payne Edition, 4 Vols. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc. Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties. London: Methuen. ———. 1963. Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley. Gunther, Richard and Larry Diamond. 2001. ‘Types and Functions of Parties’, in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), Political Parties and Democracy. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Hirschman, A.O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States, Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hopkin, Jonathan. 2001. ‘Bringing the Members Back In? Democratising Candidate Selection in Britain and Spain’, Party Politics, 7(3): 343–61. Katz, Richard. 2001. ‘The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy’, Party Politics, 7(3): 277–96. Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy’, Party Politics, 1(1): 5–28. Kirchheimer, Otto. 1996. ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Their Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner. 1965. ‘The Origin and Development of Political Parties’, in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press. LeDuc, Lawrence. 2001. ‘Democratizing Party Leadership Selection’, Party Politics, 7(3): 323–41. Mair, Peter. 1994. ‘Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State’, in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Michels, Robert. 1915. Political Parties. London: Jarrod. Narayan, J.P. Forthcoming. ‘A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity’, in Peter Ronald deSouza and E. Sridharan (eds), India’s Political Parties. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Neumann, Sigmund. 1956. Modern Political Parties. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 36 E. Sridharan and Peter Ronald deSouza Panebianco, Angelo. 1998. Political Parties: Organization and Power. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rabat, Gideon and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2001. ‘Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework’, Party Politics, 7(3): 297–322. Roy, M.N. Forthcoming. ‘Politics without Party’, in Peter Ronald deSouza and E. Sridharan (eds), India’s Political Parties. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Suzanne H. Rudolph. 1987. In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schumacher, E.F. 1973. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc. Sheth, D.L. 2000. ‘Caste and the Secularisation Process in India’, in Peter Ronald deSouza (ed.), Contemporary India: Transitions. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Sridharan, E. 2002. ‘The Fragmentation of the Indian Party System, 1952–99: Seven Competing Explanations’, in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Sridharan, E. and Ashutosh Varshney. 2001. ‘Toward Moderate Pluralism: Political Parties in India’, in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), Political Parties and Democracy. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Vanaik, Achin. 1997.Communalization Contested: Religion, Modernity and Secularization. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. Yadav, Yogendra. 2000. ‘Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s’, in Francine R. Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava and Balveer Arora (eds), Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2 A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity* JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN Some General Considerations about Democracy Perhaps it would be well at the outset to keep in mind that the ideal (of democracy) can never fully be realized in India or anywhere else. All that is possible is to approach the ideal as nearly as possible. It is for this reason that many political writers narrow down the ideal considerably and advance a realizable definition of democracy. Consider the following from an internationally recognized political authority: ‘Government of the people by the people’, ‘Government of the nation by its representatives’, these are fine phrases for arousing enthusiasm and fashioning eloquent perorations. Fine phrases with an empty ring. No people has ever been known to govern itself and none ever will. Any government is oligarchic; it necessarily implies the domination of the many by a few (Duverger 1954: 424–25). Again the same author writes: ‘The formula “Government of the people by the people” must be replaced by this formula “Government of the people by an elite sprung from the people”’ (ibid.). Consider again the following: The extreme case of political democracy is that in which people govern themselves directly, making the laws, dispensing justice, and (although * This article was originally published by the Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh (Kashi) for private circulation. An abridged version of the paper was published in Bimal Prasad (ed.), A Revolutionary’s Quest. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980. 38 Jayaprakash Narayan this is more difficult) carrying out or overseeing the administrative functions. But no such democracy ever existed, or ever will so long as men live together in large political units. Inevitably, then, political democracy must be translated into law and representative government. Democracy does not assume that the ‘people’ actually govern themselves, and its theory makes plenty of room for leadership. Democracy in Western usage stands for the free conflict of ideas and leaders, from among which the electorate makes a choice (Mayo 1955: 256). These are strong words from wise and learned authorities, but I doubt if they will serve for all times. It might be said that the farthest democracy has advanced in the West is elected oligarchy. Western democracy may, therefore, be called not democracy but democratic oligarchy. It is questionable, however, if the ‘people’ will remain permanently satisfied with such a situation. It may also be asked if the worldwide totalitarian assault on democracy does not acquire a point and a relevance on account of the fact that the people of the democracies do not experience the glow and satisfaction of self-government. It is further questionable if democrats of all times and climes, social idealists and thinkers, the spirit of man itself will ever remain satisfied with the current Western definition of democracy. Already, I believe, all these elements have combined—the thinkers, the idealists, the people, the spirit of man—to demand a more satisfying participatory democracy. Indeed, it is my firm belief that to the extent to which democracy becomes truly participatory, to that extent would the onrush of totalitarianism be stemmed and even rolled backwards. Let me now turn, as a part of this quest for democracy, to the formulation of some general considerations about democracy. First of all, let it be pointed out that the problem of democracy is basically, and above all, a moral problem. Constitutions, systems of government, parties, and elections—all these are relevant to the business of democracy. But unless the moral and spiritual qualities of the people are appropriate, the best of constitutions and political systems will not make democracy work. The moral qualities and mental attitudes most needed for democracy are: (1) concern for truth; (2) aversion to violence; (3) love of liberty and courage to resist oppression and tyranny; (4) spirit of cooperation; (5) preparedness to adjust self-interest to the larger interest; (6) respect for others’ opinion and tolerance; (7) readiness to take responsibility; (8) belief in the fundamental equality of man; and (9) faith in the educability of human nature. These qualities and attitudes are not inborn in man. But he can be educated in them and trained to acquire and practise them. This task, let it be A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity 39 emphasized, is beyond the scope of the state. The quality of the life of society should itself be such that it inculcates these values in its members. The prevailing social ethics, the family, the religious and educational authorities and institutions, the example that the elite set in their own lives, the organs of public opinion—all these have to combine to create the necessary moral climate for democracy to thrive. Thus, it should be clear that the task of preparing the very soil in which the plant of democracy may take root and grow is not a political but an educative task. It is undeniable that there is a conflict today between two values of life, namely, between wanting more goods and wanting more freedom. Those, however, who believe in freedom, should have no difficulty in making the choice. In a poor country like India, the masses may not yet be faced with this choice, but in the form of an ideal of life, the choice before India is as real as before Europe or America. Which of the two choices India will make depends not upon Parliament or any type of political action, but among other things, upon the example that the elite of society will set in their personal lives. The issue of voluntary limitation of wants has another fundamental significance for democracy. In the democratic countries, the cry is becoming stronger against the growing power of the state and against state-ism generally. This is a justifiable cry and democrats will have every sympathy with it. Here we have perhaps the most difficult question that any democracy faces today, the question as to how to resolve the following dilemma: when there is liberty it leads to abuse and necessitates state interference, and when there is state interference it leads to curtailment of liberty. How then to preserve liberty and prevent it’s abuse? There are no political means by which the dilemma can be resolved, there are only moral means. The obverse side of the ideal of liberty is responsibility. If the individual is not prepared to take social responsibility, if he uses liberty for self-aggrandizement and neglects or hurts the interests of others, some form of state-ism becomes inevitable. It is here that the pertinence and wisdom of Gandhiji’s concept of trusteeship becomes evident. The only democratic answer to state-ism and totalitarianism is trusteeship. But trusteeship cannot be practised without voluntary limitation of wants. An individual cannot function as a trustee unless he is prepared to share his possessions with his fellow men: this he cannot do unless he has learned to curtail his wants. Thus voluntary limitation of wants, in other words, the rejection of materialism or the unlimited pursuit of material satisfactions, is essential for the achievement and the preservation of democracy. The problem of democracy is intimately connected with such social institutions and attitudes of mind as represented by the caste system and the practice of untouchability. A society in which men are considered high, low or untouchable according to the families into which they are born, is 40 Jayaprakash Narayan very far from being democratic. It is quite a different matter that individuals are endowed at birth with different abilities and aptitudes. That is a biological phenomenon, with which caste has nothing to do. It should be appreciated by every Indian democrat that the system of caste hierarchy and untouchability is the greatest and most stubborn enemy of democracy in this country. At the same time it should also be appreciated that vanquishing of this enemy is, again, not a political but an educative task. The social stature of the depressed and backward castes will undoubtedly rise with improvement in their economic condition. But it would be a mistake to believe that economic improvement by itself would be sufficient to remove caste distinctions. The economically advanced castes too observe hierarchical distinctions among themselves. In countries like India that have but recently emerged from foreign rule, the problem of democracy is further complicated by the fact of economic backwardness and the absence of recent democratic experience or tradition. The problem of capital formation (which includes the problem of fixing the limits of present consumption and saving), the direction and utilization of labour and resources and similar problems of economic development are obviously capable of easier and quicker solutions under dictatorship— communist or any other—than under democracy. This is one reason for the attraction that communism has for the intelligentsia of the backward countries. Here the people of these countries are faced with a moral choice. Those who have chosen democracy have chosen the higher way of life and have shown that they are more developed as human beings than the others who sacrifice things of the spirit for material things. As for the difficulty in the building up of democracy in the backward countries, namely, the absence of recent democratic experience or tradition, it must be conceded that this difficulty is serious and real enough. In the case of India there are at least three factors of safety: (1) Due to the British connection, the intelligentsia or a large part of it, was subjected to the influence of British liberal democracy, and later a smaller part of it to British social democracy. (2) The struggle for independence, particularly because of Gandhiji’s leadership, was instrumental in inculcating to some extent the values of democracy in the intelligentsia as well as in the masses. Gandhiji’s influence is still considerable on the mass mind and is being reinforced by Vinobaji. (3) Even though India has had no democratic traditions in the recent past, democracy had flourished for centuries in many parts of ancient India. This rich tradition could be drawn upon in order to build democracy in the present. The danger considered above brings to the fore, among other things, the need to strengthen the base of democracy, so that even if something went A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity 41 wrong at the top, the base would endure and keep the foundations of democracy secure. This was the virtue of village councils, the town committees, the traders’, and artisans’ guilds of the old times. Kingdoms and empires rose and fell, conquerors came and went, but these organs of popular democracy, that drew their sanctions from the people of their own spheres and not from the central State, went on. Apart from the spiritual unity and way of life, it was these grass root democratic institutions that have been responsible for the continuity of Indian society and culture. I deal below more fully with the question of building these basic structures of democracy. Thus we see that democracy—to use an idiom of mathematics—is a ‘function’ of so many factors, the resultant of so many different activities. There is no single human or social activity by which democracy is created. The house of democracy has many mansions and many types of bricks, and various types of material and builders are needed to construct it. It is a pity that this is not realized more widely in this country. Otherwise there would not have been such an obsession with politics and other activities could have been consciously undertaken for the building up of democracy. The Social Nature of Man and the Community Man is a social animal and is endowed with a social nature. Further, the relation of the individual to society is not like that of the grain of sand to the sand dune. The relationship is rather like that of the living cell to the living organism. Man always lives in organic relationship with other men. It is the totality of these living relationships that constitutes society. Society is not a mere sum of separate individuals. Not even the crowd is an inorganic sum of human grains. Modern Western democracy is based on a negation of the social nature of man and the true nature of human society. This democracy conceives of society as an inorganic mass of separate grains of individuals; the conception is that of an atomized society. The brick with which the present edifice of democratic polity is constructed is the individual voter and the whole process of democracy rests on the arithmetic of votes. The individual voter casts his votes as an atom of society, not as a living cell in organic relationship with other living cells. It is not the living together that is expressed and represented in the institutions and processes of democracy but an abstracted individual. The problem of devising the right kind of polity is obviously a part of the larger problem of social reconstruction. While it is true that in the past greed and other false values of life distorted or thwarted the working of man’s 42 Jayaprakash Narayan social nature, it is necessary now when man is beginning consciously to reorder his life, to create economic, political and other institutions that are consistent with that nature. Modern industrialism and the spirit of economism that it has created, is a spirit which weighs every human value on the scales of profit and loss and so-called economic progress, it has disintegrated human society and made man an alien among his fellow men. Not only has the community been disintegrated, even the family is languishing in the West, and the mother, the woman, who was the centre and soul of the family, is losing her womanhood. The problem of present day civilization is social integration. Man is alone and bored, he is ‘organization man’, he is man ordered about and manipulated by forces beyond his kin and control—irrespective of whether it is a ‘democracy’ or dictatorship. The problem is to put man in touch with another man, so that they may live together in meaningful, understandable, controllable relationships. In short, the problem is to recreate the human community. Let me now turn to the community. Territorial contiguity of a number of families, while it is the starting point and a most important condition, does not in itself make a community. The present day Indian villages, for instance, are not proper communities. They were so at one time, but now are mere territorial settlements; life in them being individualistic rather than communal; mineral rather than organic. In the true community there is communion, i.e., sharing, participation, fellowship, as the dictionary puts it; there is identity of interest; a feeling of unity in the midst of diversity; a sense of freedom within the framework of accepted social responsibilities; differentiation of functions converging to the single goal of the good of the community and its members. Caste, class race, religion, politics—all these divide men into different, often conflicting groups. The community brings them together, unites them and harmonizes their interests. In the community agriculture, industry, capital, labour, skill, intelligence are not at loggerheads with one another, but are synthesized in the service of the community. Production and consumption are not two contradictory sides of an economic bargain manipulated by distant agencies, but an integrated process serving a single and direct purpose. The community is built up of personal relationships, and choice and free will have their play within the limits of selfimposed discipline and common culture. In the community there is understanding, participation by the members in all communal affairs; the community is a cooperative society, but the difference between it and the ordinary cooperative society is that cooperation in the community embraces the whole of life, rather than only its economic sector, and all the members of the community rather than only those who purchase shares. Every one in the community has a share in its fortunes and misfortunes. In its internal A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity 43 matters, the community is self-regulating and self-determining. Division is poison for the community, so the endeavour always is to seek the highest common denominator. It is interesting to recall here that in the Indian village communities, there were no elections to executive offices on the present majority-minority pattern, which is a divisive and disruptive process. Instead there was selection by general consensus of opinion, or sometimes, by drawing of lots. I do not mean to say by all this that such a community as described above ever existed before, or that it would automatically come about if only people began to dwell in small territorial areas. Had it been so, all the Indian villages would have become ideal communities. What I do, however, wish to say, and say it with all the emphasis at my command, is that such a community must be the ideal of future social reconstruction. Only then will the social nature of man and the great humanist ideals of modern civilization find fulfilment. Only then too will there be true democracy. For the heavily industrialized and the urbanized countries of the West, this might be a difficult task—though many thinking Western minds are already giving their serious thought to it. But we in India—and I believe the same is true for other countries of Asia that have not passed under totalitarianism—are very favourably situated to launch upon this venture. Before proceeding to consider the community further, it may be advisable to deal briefly with the question of science and its impact on social organization. It may be urged that small local communities might have fitted at one time into the rural pattern of life, but in this age of industrialism they have hardly any place except as odd specimens of a past civilization. Industrialization and urbanization, it may be said, necessarily go together. However, I completely reject this view. The choice is not between urban and rural life. The dichotomy between urban and rural is false and unscientific. Both industry and agriculture are essential for human life and its development. The question of industry should be looked upon from the point of view of the whole man: it should never be forgotten that industry is for man and not man for industry. Some people talk of science and technology as if they were like forces of nature, like an earthquake, let us say, about which nothing can be done except adjusting ourselves to it. Science and industry are products of the human mind and they should be bent to a human purpose. Indeed this is what has already happened; only the human purpose has not been an elevated and worthy one. Science and its offspring, technology, have been chiefly put to the service of private profit and power: the first represented by the capitalist system and the second by the modern centralized state, whether democratic or totalitarian. If man decided that instead of being herded together in large cities it was better to live in small communities; instead of being automatons it was 44 Jayaprakash Narayan better to be conscious human beings; instead of being a grain in the sandheap it was better to be members of a community, it should not be difficult for scientists to evolve the appropriate technology. Thus the society we are visualizing here will neither be ‘urban’ nor ‘rural’, it will be, if a name has to be given to it, communitarian. In other words, it will truly be society. Development of science has made it possible for the distinction between urban and rural to be abolished. The communities of the future will have a balance of agriculture and industry; they will be agro-industrial; they will make full use of science and technology so as to serve the ends of their life and no more. Owing to geographical and historical conditions agriculture may predominate in one and industry in another, but a balance between them will be the ideal of all. The present monstrosities, the big cities, will have to be decentralized as far as possible to relieve congestion and create healthy conditions of life; and for the rest, they will have to be reorganized as to be made federations of smaller-sized communities. To the extent this is not possible, the big cities will have to be endured, care being taken so that they do not become bigger, and no new big cities come up. The question may be asked how large the local or primary community should be. There cannot be a cut-and-dried answer; there is no mechanical measure. The primary communities are organic growths and, depending upon many factors, their size varies. Let it be said that they should not be so small that a balanced development of communal life and culture becomes difficult, nor so large that life in them becomes impersonalized. The ‘revenue village’ in India has a well-understood definition, and even though it usually consists of a number of hamlets, all the inhabitants of them do feel a sense of belonging to one another. So, in India the revenue village may be taken as the primary community. In states where the revenue village may be too large an artificial unit, a new demarcation may have to be made. We have so far discussed the local or primary community and shown how it is a creation of man’s social nature and the unit with which the structure of society has to be built. Let us now consider how this can be done. Should society be just a sum, a totality, of the primary units? It should be obvious that such a society would be as arithmetical and mineral, or nearly so, as the one, like the present Western society, that is made up of the sum of individuals. Just as in the primary community a number of families come together and cooperate to build a common life, so in order that there may be society, the primary communities must come together and cooperate with the other primary communities so as to tackle common problems and promote common aims. Such cooperation and coordination of activities will obviously be impossible between distant and very large number of primary communities: mutual intercourse is possible only between neighbouring A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity 45 communities. Therefore, the next step in the building up of an integrated society requires a number of neighbouring primary communities to come together and cooperate amongst themselves to build, let us say, a regional community. Each single primary community will do all that may be possible with its internal resources. But there will be many things that will be beyond the resources and competence of the primary community. For instance, each primary community might be able to provide for a primary school, primary health services, small irrigation works, like wells and village tanks, and village industries. But a number of primary communities must cooperate together in order to provide for a high school, an indoor hospital, a power station and servicing centre, larger industries, larger irrigation works, etc. Thus the regional community comes into existence by an organic process of growth. The community circle is widened. It will be seen from this that the regional community is not a mere sum of the smaller communities constituting them. It is an integrated community in itself. In other words, at the regional level there is an integration of institutions and activities of the primary communities: the village panchayats are integrated into the regional panchayat; the village cooperatives in the regional cooperative union; the primary schools in the regional high school; the village youth and cultural associations in the regional ones; the village plans in the regional plan, etc. Just as in its internal administration the primary community is autonomous, so in the spheres in which the primary communities have delegated their powers to the regional community, the latter is autonomous. (The need to delegate powers arises from the fact that the primary communities are unable by themselves to do everything that needs to be done.) The regional community, however, is not a superior or higher body that can control, or interfere with, the internal administration of the primary communities. Each in its sphere is equally sovereign. The regional community in its turn will do all that is within its competence. But, again, there will be many things which will be beyond its competence, such as running a techno-agricultural college, a major irrigation project, production of electricity, manufacture of machines, etc. In order that these tasks be tackled, a number of regional communities will have to come together to form a still larger community—the district community, let us say. The district community too will be an integrated community and its relationship with the regional communities will be of a similar pattern to that of the latter with the primary communities. In this manner the district communities in their turn would federate together to form the provincial community. The provincial communities would come together to form the National Community. A day might come when the national communities might federate together to form the World Community. 46 Jayaprakash Narayan Two conclusions follow from the above. It should be obvious, in the first place, that as we proceed from the inner to the outer circles of communal life and organization there is less and less to do for the outer communities, so that, when we reach the circle of the National Community it has only a few matters to attend to, such as defence, foreign relations, currency, interprovincial coordination and legislation. This being so, it should be obvious, in the second place, that such a social organization offers the utmost scope for the ‘people’—who are no longer an amorphous mass of human grains but organized in self-governing communities—to govern themselves. The communitarian polity that has been described above can alone guarantee the participatory democracy which is our ideal and which should be the ideal of all democrats. It will only be in such a society that the individual will be able to save himself from the fate of ‘robotism’ to which modern civilization has condemned him and find freedom and self-significance as a member of the community. Shortcomings of Parliamentary Democracy There is a formidable volume of literature on parliamentary democracy— including in this term systems akin to it, such as the American presidential democracy. There is also a vast literature on the party system which appears in the wake of this type of democracy. I believe it would be fair to say that even the most ardent defenders of parliamentary democracy agree that it has serious defects. But they console themselves with the thought (a) that there is no better alternative; and (b) that, within limits, it is possible to amend and improve it. No one will deny that the system is capable of much improvement and it is undergoing change all the time, though not always for the better. But no matter how much improved, its fundamental defects will yet remain because they are the very premises on which its entire structure has been raised. The fundamental defect, from which other serious defects emerge is that this form of democracy is based on the vote of the individual. We have already examined this situation and found that it is the atomization of society that is responsible for this kind of political system. But that does not alter the fact that the system is based on a false premise; the State cannot be an arithmetical sum of individuals. The people, the nation, the community can never be equated with the sum of individual voters. The partisans of parliamentary democracy claim that under it, the government is at least representative of the majority of the voters, if not of the people. First of all, this is not true. More often than it is commonly believed governments elected under universal adult suffrage are minority governments, A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity 47 in the sense that they represent a minority of the voters. Wherever there are more than two parties, this happens quite often, but even under two party systems, it is not a rare phenomenon.1 It will not do to brush aside, as it has been done in this country, such serious anomalies and glaring defects in the parliamentary democratic system by the smug remark that such things are inevitable under a multi-party system. If such things are inevitable and if we are serious about democracy, we must seriously set about to find a better type of democracy. The alternatives of plural constituencies, proportional representation, alternative vote cannot, even if there was general agreement about them, which there is not, take us far. The claim that parliamentary democratic governments at least represent a majority of the voters breaks down in a still more serious manner. Experience has shown that present day mass elections, manipulated by powerful, centrally-controlled parties, with the aid of high finance and diabolically clever methods and super media of communication, represent far less the electorate than the forces and interests behind the parties and the propaganda machines. It is not only in the totalitarian countries that the ‘rape of the masses’ happens. The basic difference is that in a democracy there is a competition between the violators, while there is no competition in totalitarianism. Here we are face to face with another serious defect of parliamentary democracy—demagoguery. The need to ‘catch’ votes creates an unlimited opportunity for indulging in half-truths, even outright lies sometimes; for exciting the passions, more often than not, the base passions; for arousing false hopes by making dishonest, but pleasing promises. Hardly any issue of public policy is presented to the people in its true light; everything gets distorted by partisan demagoguery. The consequence of all this is that the real interests of the nation are sacrificed, more often than not, at the altar of demagoguery. Perhaps the most serious fault of parliamentary democracy, from the point of view of democracy itself, is its inherent tendency towards centralism. At one extreme of its political spectrum is the nation state and at the other the individual voter, with a blank in between. The local bodies that may exist have (a) little self-government powers, and (b) no direct or indirect influence on the nation state. Add to this the complexities of a highly industrialized civilization that are beyond even the understanding of the ordinary citizen, and you have a central state of overwhelming power and resources and the individual voter reduced to abject helplessness. The ‘sovereign people’ being dispersed over the length and breadth of the country like particles of sand over the desert and having no other organized political force than the nation state itself to interpose between themselves 48 Jayaprakash Narayan and that state, the latter naturally becomes all powerful. The issue of power in such states is decided not by the fictitious ‘people’, but by a balance between political parties and such organized interests as the industrialists and bankers and powerful labour unions. The people represent a wholeness, while the organized interests are sectional. Even a sum of the sections cannot make up the whole. Only their organic integration can do so. Such integration takes place only in the community—at its various levels. In the communal or communitarian democracy that we are advocating, there is a natural decentralization and multi-central pluralistic state. A natural outcome of centralization of power and administration is bureaucracy. The central executive or cabinet is so overburdened with work that it is compelled to leave more and more to, and depend more and more upon, the permanent officials, who in course of time gather more and more power for themselves. This soon leads to a dangerous autocracy, the autocracy of the bureaucrat, which is difficult to fight because it ‘works in the shadows’ and is hard to get at. The only answer to the problem of bureaucracy is more and more decentralization so that the people directly participate in the administration of their affairs and control the civil servants who owe their jobs and are directly responsible to them. This is exactly what will happen in the communitarian democracy outlined here. The communal administrations might make mistakes and there might be inefficiency. But as they themselves will be the sufferers, they will learn and improve things. Moreover, during the British rule did we not say to ourselves repeatedly that good government was no substitute for self-government? Is that less true now? An inevitable concomitant of parliamentary democracy is the party system. So much has been written in criticism of this system that it seems unnecessary to dwell upon it here at any length. Some criticism of it has been implicit in what has been said above. It is clear that parliamentary democracy cannot work without parties. Parties of a sort will perhaps exist everywhere and at all times. Even in the family there may be ‘parties’. In the ancient Indian republics, which were aristocratic democracies, parties and factions were a common feature. But the highly organized, centralized mass parties of modern times are a far cry from the factions of old, whether of the ancient Indian republics or the Greek city-states. The old democracies were small and the factions and the people were not so far removed from one another. The people therefore could judge them and the issues that were raised with intimate understanding. The issues in those days were also simple enough. All this has changed now and parties have become a sort of state within the state. They are now the real arbiters of the people’s fate, whose control over them is fictional. The citizens who cast their votes for the parties have nothing to do with the running of the parties: they are complete A Plea for the Reconstruction of the Indian Polity 49 outsiders. Even the enrolled members of the parties have no say either in the policy-making or the inner administration of the parties. The parties are run by caucuses that are beyond democratic control. Party rivalries give birth to demagoguery, depress political ethics, put a premium on unscrupulousness and aptitude for manipulation and intrigue. Parties create dissensions where unity is called for, exaggerate differences where they should be minimized. Parties often put party interests over the national interests. Because centralization of power prevents the citizen from participating in government, the parties, that is to say, small caucuses of politicians, rule in the name of the people and create the illusion of democracy and self-government. No doubt the party system has its good points and because parliamentary democracy cannot work without it, those who swear by that type of democracy and see no alternative to it, are prepared to accept the evils of the party system as inevitable and satisfy themselves by pointing out their virtues. For my part, it is not the party system that is the main culprit, but parliamentary democracy itself, which gives it rise. In the communitarian democracy that I have proposed here, there may conceivably be parties, but they are likely to be local factions, and, in any case, their role in the state will be as commanding as that of the parties in the parliamentary system. Another serious fault of parliamentary democracy is the system of elections that it fosters and requires for its proper functioning. First of all, the system is very expensive and appallingly wasteful. The fabulous expenses involved have the effect of mortgaging democracy to moneyed interests or large sectional organizations like trade unions. As compared with this, elections in the communitarian system would cost practically nothing. It would have been a matter of some consolation if the huge expenditure had resulted in any public good. In fact, the result is just the contrary. A general election, as noted above, creates unnecessary passion and excitement; instead of educating and enlightening the people it befogs their mind; instead of resulting in the election of able and good men, it tends to favour demagoguery. Serious political and economic issues and other questions of policy, it is obvious, should be considered calmly and dispassionately and not in the heat of partisan warfare. That is why I hold that the practice of general elections should be abolished. The elected houses should be continuous in nature, with a part of them being renewed periodically. Note 01. In this way the ‘minority’ states were Bihar (Congress: 44.47 per cent); Bombay (Congress: 48.66 per cent); Kerala (Communist: 37.48 per cent); Madras (Congress: 50 Jayaprakash Narayan 46.52 per cent); Orissa (Congress: 40.01 per cent); Uttar Pradesh (Congress: 46.29 per cent); West Bengal (Congress: 49.20 per cent). References Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties. London: Methuen. Mayo, H.B. 1955. Democracy and Marxism. New York: Oxford University Press. 3 Politics without Party* M.N. ROY Having come to the conclusion, empirically as well as theoretically, that the system of several parties engaged in the struggle for power, to be captured either constitutionally or through armed insurrection, had debased democracy to demagogy, Radical Democrats and Humanists could no longer function as a political party. They were guided by the time-honoured dictum that charity begins at home, or that example is better than precept, and consequently dissolved their party in so far as it had been organized with the object of participating in the fight for power. But they never accepted either the anarchist view that politics is an evil, nor the Marxist utopia of a stateless society. They had defined politics as the theory and practice of public administration, and the state as the political organization of society. The corollary to the definition is that membership of civil society implies the responsibility of doing whatever is necessary to guarantee an orderly, equitable and just administration of public affairs; only the recluse can disown this responsibility. By resolving to dissolve their party, the Radical Democrats did not propose to retire into reclusories. The resolution simply was no longer to participate in a pattern of political practice which has done more harm than good, has soiled the fair name of democracy. It was to initiate other forms of public activities which would raise politics to a higher level. One of the many bad features of the party system is that it restricts the number of citizens participating in political activity. The membership even of * This article was originally published in Radical Humanist, 25 September 1949. We thank the Indian Renaissance Institute for permission to reprint this article. 52 M.N. Roy the largest mass party cannot embrace more than a small fraction of the people. The restriction logically results from the very term party. Indian terms, such as Congress, Sangh, Sabha, or Dal, do not alter the situation, because of the identity of purpose, namely to capture political power. No matter whatever may be the name, a political party is formed with the sole object of capturing control of the state, sooner or later. The object is justified with the argument that only in office a party can put its programme into practice. Therefore, by adopting one of the Indian terms for its name, a political organization does not cease to be a party, that is to say, only a part of the people or the class or the community it claims to represent. Otherwise, there would be no sense in the idea of representation. Since by its very nature, a party is bound to be exclusive, a minority organization, party politics cannot be democratic politics in the true sense of the term. Political practice is monopolized by a minority of professional politicians; and the bulk of the community are given no place in the practice; they are to follow one party or the other. Democracy therefore can never be practised through the intermediary of party politics, which by its very nature, reduces the demos to the status of camp-followers. Obviously, the rejection of party politics means a resolution to practise politics on a much wider field, so that the entire people may actively participate in it. Under the party system, the people can do no more than vote for this or that candidate who is nominated by respective parties. Political practice cannot be truly democratized unless the people can nominate as well as vote for a candidate. It is easy to see that parties will have no place in the latter form of political practice, which provides for sustained actual participation of the entire community. While not compelling them to do so, it allows all citizens to play an active and significant role in the State. It goes without saying that this change over cannot take place from today or tomorrow; nor will an entire country discard the old practice and adopt the new one all at once. It will be a process, and the process itself will be uneven. The change over from party politics to democratic politics will be brought about gradually by raising the intellectual level of the people, by quickening their sense of self-respect and self-reliance. Therefore, democracy is not possible without education. Those who will apply themselves to the initial task of laying down the foundation of a democratic social order cannot in the meantime be indifferent to the political conditions in which they will have to operate for quite a long time. These conditions may influence their work, for better or worse. In the transition period, parliamentary democracy, with all its manifest failures and inadequacies, will be obviously preferable to a dictatorship. Civil liberties will have a greater chance of survival so long as various parties alternate in power or contend for power, than under one party rule. Politics without Party 53 The control of the state by one party claiming to be the sole custodian of popular interest is antagonistic to democracy. Paternalism, even with the very best of motives, kills self-reliance in the people and fosters in them an authoritarian mentality, a predisposition to accept authority as the natural order of things. In backward countries, an undemocratic one party rule is fortified by the traditional credulity and lack of self-confidence on the part of the people, political backwardness and general ignorance. It will be reinforced by the illiteracy of an overwhelming majority of the enlarged electorate under the new Constitutions. Therefore, no realistic democrat can entertain the illusion that in India, for instance, the Congress could be dislodged from power in the near future. The object should be to encourage maximum possible resistance to its totalitarian ambitions, so that at least a semblance of parliamentary democracy and a modicum of civil liberties may be preserved while sustained efforts will be made to build up a democratic order from below. For these realistic considerations, Radical Democrats should have no objection to supporting parties which would challenge the system of one party rule and the totalitarian claim of the Congress. This attitude will be consistent with the rejection of party politics and scramble for power, because of the difference between voting and soliciting votes. Radicals should support, and ask others also to support, the most promising opposition party, not with the illusion that the situation would materially change if it replaced the Congress in power, but only to shake the foundation of one party rule, and provided that the opposition candidates are better even of proved integrity. The sincerity of the resolution to stand outside party politics will be demonstrated by refusing to be members of a party or to become their candidates for election. Cooperation with opposition parties at the time of election, however, does not exhaust the possibilities of the political practice of Radical Democracy. The most fundamental task is to educate the people. Election campaigns can be utilized for this task. Democracy will not be successful so long as the masses can be swayed by demagogy or appeal to emotions. On the eve of an election, when various parties will make big promises to catch votes, the electorate should be advised and helped to examine the promises and vote intelligently. That will mean political education. On the same occasion, the people should be told that they are not obliged to vote for this or that party; that they can just as well vote for a locally nominated candidate who will be their man, known to them, and therefore can be controlled more easily. The initial propaganda for the nomination of local candidates, instead of partymen, will lead to the formation of People’s Committees. The people will replace the party, and a long step towards real democracy will be taken. That will be political activity of fundamental 54 M.N. Roy importance, and active participation in the current politics of the country without engaging in the scramble for power. There are many other forms of non-party political activity designed to spread a spirit of independence and self-help in all day-to-day public affairs of a community. Those who conceived the idea of organized democracy must now put it into practice. People’s Committees are to be the basic units of an organized democracy; and it is easily imagined how the rise of People’s Committees will mean the beginning of the end of party politics. The experience of individuals working accordingly to this plan in selected places should be a source of general inspiration. Even existing Village Panchayats set up in some parts of the country can be built up as units of organized democracy, defying party control, even of the party in power. To transform the growing dissatisfaction into an informed and constructively directed opposition to one party rule can become an integral part in a larger scheme of political activity which will transcend the narrow limits of interested party politics. In the prevailing authoritarian atmosphere, one party rule is generally taken for granted. This is a dangerous tendency, which must be combated. Otherwise, a dictatorship with ‘democratic’ sanction may destroy all hopes of political freedom and social liberation. The cultural tradition of the backward countries being the breeding ground of the danger, it must be, in the first place, fought on the cultural front. Enlightenment, civic education, and spread of knowledge are the weapons. Experience also has a great educative value. Elections are part of that and they will show that in an atmosphere of political illiteracy of the bulk of the electorate and authoritarian mentality of the middle class, even formal parliamentary democracy is not possible. Many even in the ranks of the parties, today, deluded with the hope of coming to power at some time or other, may be expected to learn from the experience the lesson that democracy must be built up from below and, abandoning party politics, will turn to democratic politics. Meanwhile, the pioneers must show that politics without party is possible. The last Conference of the Radical Democratic Party marked the opening of a new chapter in contemporary political history with the decision to transform a political party into a broad and comprehensive social movement for the spread of education for democracy and the promotion of the ideal of freedom.1 The decision is probably unprecedented in the history of political institutions. Instances of political organizations having atrophied, decayed or decomposed may not be wanting, nor cases of organizations having dissolved their separate entity with a view to merging into another. But several hundred delegates possessed of political conviction and enthusiasm deciding after prolonged deliberations to transform a political organization of their own creation, is perhaps unique. It amounts at once to an assertion of man’s sovereignty and creativity. Politics without Party 55 The decision of the Conference at Calcutta was a logical deduction of the philosophy of New Humanism formulated by the Radical Democrats two years earlier. As a result, the Radical Democratic Party already had been engaged in developing a comprehensive social movement. Having abjured the aim of power, it had placed itself outside the scramble for it, the only sense in which politics seems to be understood in our times. The activities carried on by the party could not lend themselves to be measured by the standards generally applied to a traditional political party. A certain anomalous position had thus arisen between those activities and the designation of a party, which on occasions created confusion even in the minds of those who otherwise sympathized with and supported the cause of Radical Democracy. The Calcutta decision ends that anomaly and thus removes what constituted, in a way, a limitation on those activities. The Radical Democratic Party had the tradition of freedom and rationality in its own ranks. That enabled the Party to take such a decision. Throughout the period of its existence, it functioned as a school for the education of its members to develop into better human beings, and never as a collectivity with a transcendental significance, demanding the sacrifice of their individuality from its constituents. It had no existence of its own, over and above and independent of its constituents which could enchain its creators and reduce it to the position of subordination. It was an expression of the cooperative activity of Radical Democrats, inspired by a common ideal. As such, it was free from the organizational characteristics of political parties, many of which are necessary corollaries of their being engaged in coming to power. The discipline in its ranks was an expression of organizational ethics and never meant to be a code of conduct enforced with a whip. Responsibilities were voluntarily accepted and authority had mostly suggestive and directive significance. Built up in this manner, the Party never claimed a strong mechanical apparatus with huge mass membership which could be no more than a blind following in the prevailing atmosphere of cultural backwardness. But it did surpass any other group in the country in respect of its intellectual integrity and spiritual strength. These were often proved beyond doubt during the short period of its existence, when the Party had to struggle against overwhelming odds, and were recognized even by those who disagreed with it. In the successive waves of nationalist mass hysteria, Radical Democrats alone stood firm, reminding the people that so long as politics was based on emotion and prejudice, it could not bring them freedom. They went against the popular current because to them intellectual and moral integrity always counted for more than immediate and temporary success. Though the Radical Democratic Party was a comparatively small political party, its traditions and functioning gave it a cohesion that is rarely seen 56 M.N. Roy in any political groups. The decision of the Radical Democrats to cease functioning as a political party is an expression of that spirit struggling to expand beyond the limits of a closed group. Inspired by a democratic ideal and aiming at the construction of a political apparatus in which power would be effectively vested in the people as a whole, it could not and did not endeavour to function as an intermediary between the people and the state. The task it had formulated for itself was the diffusion of power, and meant to remove the gulf between the ruler and the ruled, which has so often proved to be destructive of democracy, even within the framework of formal representative institutions. The party could not therefore achieve its task through the capture of power, not even by the aid of the ballot box, much less through insurrectionary means. It was thus neither a constitutional nor a revolutionary party in the traditional sense. Sharing a common ideal, the Radical Democrats were united in an organization which worked for the diffusion of knowledge as the essential precondition for the diffusion of power and the building up of the institutions for a free and democratic society. Given this nature of their task and the activity which followed from it, it was difficult to see why they should remain a political party. The decision to cease doing so simply signifies a recognition of that difficulty and an endeavour to remove it. This difficulty was not one of their creation, but one which Radical Democrats had to face in the process of the development of their activities. Having abjured the aim of power and thus placed themselves by their own choice outside the game of power politics, there is no reason why they should have exposed their cooperative effort to be judged by rules and standards relevant to that game. Having been an entirely different kind of political party, there is no reason why they should have tied themselves to a name identified by a form of organization which they rejected as undemocratic. Engaged in activities to promote the freedom and well being of all, they were stultified by an organizational form which by its very nature is sectarian, and erects barriers against non-members. After all, the term ‘party’ has a meaning; it signifies a part of the people, sharing a particular ideal, and engaged in activities with the purpose of achieving it, which invariably imply its dominating the whole as an indispensable stage. Education of the citizens and gradual building up of a new political structure from below are the only guarantees against these dangers of the party system. Education will make people consistently self-reliant, rational, discriminating and hence capable of protecting themselves from being easy victims to mass hypnosis of one kind or the other, and only from among such people can a new institutional framework crystallize which will provide the guarantee against an individual or group of individuals dominating and exploiting them. The institutional framework of parliamentary democracy Politics without Party 57 with its inherent concentration of power in the hands of few through the political parties can hardly be expected to fulfil this need. It is not in the nature of political parties to function in this role. Leaving aside the obviously monolithic parties frankly aiming at the establishment of a dictatorial rule, even a constitutional party seeking to obtain the support of a majority through the ballot box in order to control the political state apparatus cannot make it its primary task to educate the people. Being involved in the game of power, it has to play it according to the rules, and objective political education of the people might be a means to defeat the end of coming to power. That a party comes to power backed by a majority is no proof and guarantee that it is democratic. And education of the people may also militate against its next objective of remaining in power. To have discarded the organizational form of a party does not in any way, even remotely imply that Radical Democrats will eschew politics. Those who cannot conceive of politics without the incentive of power, and therefore without a party, are not the best doctors for the maladies of our time. They themselves need to be cured. Political parties have been instruments devised mainly for the smooth functioning of the political apparatus of parliamentary democracy, which seldom went further than paying lip service to the sovereignty of the human being. In the contemporary context it does not guarantee even the continuation of that formality. The problem of democracy can therefore no longer be solved by political parties. It is a deeper and more comprehensive problem than one of institutional adjustments. It can be solved only by a comprehensive social movement, developed on the basis of the realization of the ultimate identity of political, economic and moral problems and inspired by a philosophy capable of suggesting solutions to them all. ‘New Humanism’, of which Radical Democracy is the political expression, is such a philosophy. Guided by this philosophy, Radical Democrats will now endeavour to develop a Radical Humanist Movement, and in consequence discard a form of organization which had become irrelevant to their task. Note 01. The Radical Democratic Party was formed in December 1940 and dissolved in December 1948. 4 The Congress ‘System’ in India* RAJNI KOTHARI In the study of party systems, attention has so far been given to two opposite phenomenon, the two party or the multiparty system on the one hand and the ‘one party system’ on the other. Until quite recently, discussion in this field has been dominated by a dichotomous (or trichotomous) division on these lines, the principle criterion being the availability of choice between alternatives. The two-party system provides such a choice, and so does the multiparty system though in a more complicated manner;1 the one-party system does not provide this choice. That, at any rate, is the rationalization behind the widely prevalent typology of party systems. To be sure, there is of late, an attempt to look more closely at the precise functioning of the various party systems, especially in some of the new nations such as those of Africa. There are also attempts at ‘behavioural analysis’, of the American and British party systems (Eldersveld 1964; Rose 1964). These studies are giving rise to new ways of looking at party phenomena and have made scholars aware of the shortcomings of the present typology. While such a discussion is going on, it might be useful to look at the Indian experience with political parties, which is one of the more successful party systems in operation and yet, is a system that cuts across the usual stereotypes and also calls into question the very criterion of political performance usually employed in the analysis of party systems. That it is the function of politics to offer a choice between alternative sets of policies and personnel may indeed be a gross oversimplification of political phenomena. Politics is not always reducible to who gets what, when and how. * Reprinted from Asian Survey, 1964, Vol. 4, No. 12, pp. 1161–73, with the permission of the Regents. The Congress ‘System’ in India 59 While the availability of multiple parties and the freedom to form parties gives an impression of similarity between India and the West, and while there actually are some similarities as well as an element of common heritage, two differences must be noted at the outset. In the first place, the ‘western’ model posits a criterion of alternation or replacement—the ideal of a ‘choice between alternatives’ and the assumption that the choice is exercized in that manner—which is not the critical factor in the working of the party system in India. Second, the western system implies a relationship between the government and the party organization in which the latter plays an instrumental and subsidiary role which is not true in India.2 Conceptualizing the Indian System The Indian system can be conceptualized as a system of one-party dominance (which, it may be noted, is very different from what is generally known as a one-party system). It is a competitive party system but one in which the competing parts play rather dissimilar roles. It consists of a party of consensus and parties of pressure. The latter function on the margin and, indeed, the concept of a margin of pressure is of great importance in this system. Inside the margin are various factions within the party of consensus. Outside the margin are several opposition groups and parties, dissident groups from the ruling party, and other interest groups and important individuals. These groups outside the margin do not constitute alternatives to the ruling party. Their role is to constantly pressurize, criticize, censure and influence it by influencing opinion and interests inside the margin and, above all, exert a latent threat that if the ruling group strays too far away from the balance of effective public opinion, and if the factional system within it is not mobilized to restore the balance, it will be displaced from power by the opposition. Both the idea of an in-built corrective through factionalism within the ruling party and the idea of a latent threat from outside the margin of pressure are necessary parts of the system of one-party dominance. It is an assumption of the system that the party of consensus, which is presumably the only legitimate instrument of power, is sensitive enough to public pressures and demands, but a safeguard is nonetheless provided through the operation of the latency factor, so that there is always available an identifiable group or groups which can be called into action for the preservation of competition and external control, if the normal mechanism provided by competing elites within the party fails to respond. The sensitivity of the entire system depends on the sensitivity of the margin of pressure, its flexibility and general responsiveness being a function of the elbow room it provides to factions, dissident groups and opposition parties in the making of critical choices and decisions. 60 Rajni Kothari It is the consensus system which operates through the institution of a party of consensus that is of central importance in this scheme of politics. In India, the Congress, which is the party of consensus, functions through an elaborate network of factions, which provides the chief competitive mechanism of the Indian system. I have considered elsewhere in some detail the main features of the factional system and the functions it performs (Kothari 1962). I have shown there how political change take place at each level in this system, and how in the process not only new people come to power but new kinds of people, bringing with them new attitudes and orientations to power, and new states of ideology and issue articulation. I will briefly recapitulate the arguments here. In 1947, the Indian National Congress transformed itself into a dominant political party of the nation. Although a number of opposition parties came into existence, it was recognized that the Congress was the chief party, representing a historical consensus and enjoying a continuing basis of support and trust. Under the circumstances, political competition was internalized and carried on within the Congress. There developed an elaborate system of factions at every level of political and governmental activity, and a system of coordination between the various levels through vertical ‘faction chains’ (Kothari and Shah 1963). Originating on the basis of individual competition between leaders, these factions were then built around a functional network consisting of various social groups and leader-client relationships. In the process, a system of patronage was worked out in the countryside, traditional institutions of kin and caste were gradually drawn in and involved, and a structure of pressures and compromises was developed. These were mediated through two new tiers of political organization, a managerial class of politicians occupying critical organizational positions in the state and the district Congresses, and a class of ‘link men’ in the field (Bailey 1963) through whom they operated. It was in the course of the working of this system that political competition was intensified, changes took place, new cadres of leadership drawn from a more diffuse social basis came to power, and an intricate structure of conflict, mediation, bargaining and consensus developed within the framework of the Congress. The system got aggregated at the state level where individuals who had risen to power in the Congress organization sometimes constituted the chief opposition to the government, provided an alternative leadership, exercized controls and pressures on it, and in many instances overthrew it from power and replaced it.3 In this process, elections in the organization played an important role, but also the general elections, and the selection of party candidates for the general elections. Finally, the system of mediation and arbitration as well as inter-level coordination in the Congress4 ensured active involvement of the central leadership in the factional structure. Then, starting some The Congress ‘System’ in India 61 time before Mr Nehru’s death, we found the same system in operation at the top, through the activization of the central executive of the party, and the latter’s firm and successful mediation in the determination of the governmental succession after Nehru.5 The upshot of all this is the critical importance of the party organization at all levels, the competitive relationship between the organization and the government, and between the factions within each of them. Structural Features Structurally, such a party system displays two features. There is plurality within the dominant party which makes it more representative, provides flexibility, and sustains internal competition. At the same time, it is prepared to absorb groups and movements from outside the party and thus prevent other parties from gaining in strength. It is a system that concentrates strength within the dominant party and then builds internal checks to limit the use of this strength. In this way, the party representing a historical consensus also continues to represent the present consensus. This ensures the legitimacy of the system and of the institutional framework under which it operates. The role of the opposition in such a party system has already been discussed. By posing as a constant threat, it ensures the mobility and life of the internal power structure of the Congress. On the other hand, its own strength is continuously conditioned by the strength of the Congress, gaining where the latter loses, and sometimes gaining substantially when the latter has lost its grip over the situation or its internal thermostat has failed.6 Such a position has its structural implications. Electorate-wise, the opposition can only hope to function effectively at the local and regional levels. Legislature-wise, however, it also functions at the national level and performs a very useful role in the maintenance of the system. It should be noted here that thanks to the heritage of parliamentary traditions, which are further reinforced by the conventions established by the leaders of the national movement in the Indian Parliament, the opposition is given importance, which is out of proportion to its size. This, in turn, helps sustain the morale and activity of the opposition in spite of there being a slender chance of its coming to power. Also, certain important leaders of the opposition are given considerable personal importance by the ruling group in the Congress, thus preventing frustration and bitterness from taking undesirable forms. At the same time, this creates a wide gap between the leadership and the rank and file in the opposition, shielding and protecting the former from the radicalism of the latter. Apart from this relationship within the national and political elite, however, the opposition in India is, for all practical purposes, a regional 62 Rajni Kothari phenomenon. Even the ‘national’ parties are loose coalitions of the state parties, which explains the great heterogeneity within opposition parties, and the constant problem of enforcing discipline from above. The second structural implication is that the opposition is fragmented and greatly divided. Because it consists of not parties of consensus but parties of pressures, it presents an inchoate front. This is another important reason why sectional parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the different tribal parties and the various language parties and coalitions, and certain parties that are essentially sectional and dependent on certain castes such as the Communists in Kerala and earlier in Andhra, and the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra Party in certain areas, are much more successful in opposing the Congress. Again, however, both the positive stimulation of parliamentary experience and the negative impact of the Congress weakening in parts of the country has set up a corrective trend to such a structure of pressure: the opposition parties too are found to contain a wide variety of social groups. There is also a greater secular involvement of sectional groups which is likely to help in the articulation of the opposition.7 But the emergence of a second party of consensus is not anywhere in the offing. I shall return to this point when I consider the emerging trends below. What I have discussed so far provides no more than a tentative definition and description of the one-party dominance system, as it operates in India. I do not propose here to provide an explanatory hypotheses for the emergence and development of such a system, as I am more concerned here with the logic of its operation and its consequent impact on the framework in which political and institutional development is taking place. However, I shall touch briefly upon the historical and environmental context in which the system has developed, as this may help in bringing out its more peculiar elements. Ideological Features It is important to bear in mind that the Congress took root and came to power not as a political party, but as a movement for independence and reform. What is important is the long duration and organization of the movement and the forms it took. Established in 1885, and passing through a long phase of intellectual agitation during which its goals were articulated, it was transformed during the 1920s and 1930s into a mass movement that acquired depth and tradition. This meant two things. Encompassing as it did all the major sections and interests of society, it acquired a stamp of legitimacy and came to represent what I have called a ‘historical consensus’. But this also meant that its structure was firmly laid out and the conditions of its competence determined. It was as a distinctive political elite organized in The Congress ‘System’ in India 63 the form of a well-knit movement spread in large areas and along a hierarchy of levels—district, pradesh and all-India—that the Congress acquired its identity. It was true that it was not built in the form of a modern bureaucracy as has been the case with various socialist and communist parties, but it remained nonetheless, a powerful movement with a discipline and a strong commitment to goals. It is this that determined the organizational ideology of the Congress, which still continues, and of which the ‘Kamaraj Plan’ is the latest and most characteristic echo. Second, the Congress was, from the beginning, committed to a democratic ideology, a stand from which it never wavered in spite of a good deal of ‘anti-western’ feeling and a certain speculative nostalgia for a utopia in the past. Even the latter underlined the democratic inclination of the leadership: it was not traditional kingship but panchayati raj (significantly translated later as ‘democratic decentralization’), that was the point of reference. Similarly, freedom of speech and tolerance of opposition (indeed the necessity of opposition) were cardinal principles of the movement’s ideology of political modernization. Non-violent nationalism and intellectual pacifism further underlined the same democratic orientation. All this ensured the democratic and competitive character of the intellectual climate in which the party system developed in India, again setting it apart from the ‘one-party’ models of many other countries. The model of one-party state was anathema to the Congress from the beginning. Historical reasons are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the efficacy of a political system. There is no doubt that in its character and depth, the Congress was an unparalleled movement for independence, and this has significantly contributed to the present place of the Congress organization in India. But it was the consolidation that followed Independence, which really determined the present features of the system. Moreover, there were peculiar environmental features that not only confirmed the Congress in a position of unrivalled power but considerably added to its strength and crystallized it in concrete terms. It is often said that with the coming of Independence, the Congress ceased to be a movement and turned into a political party. This is an incorrect reading of the reality of the Indian political situation, for even after Independence the Congress continued to be a movement. Having acquired independence from foreign rule, it had to build a nation. It is this character of modernization through nation building that has determined many of the present characteristics of the Indian party system. In this respect, it resembles the various official and movement parties found in the communist and non-communist developing nations, without, however, taking on their authoritarian features. It is in terms of a movement based on consensus developed through the operation of free institutions, while at the same time restraining the excesses of partisan struggle, that the Congress has achieved 64 Rajni Kothari its post-Independence character. Let us look briefly at the main features of the system as it operates today. Role of Government The Congress, when it came to power, assigned a positive and overwhelming role to government and politics in the development of society. Second, it made the power of the central authority the chief condition of national survival. This power was not only consolidated but greatly augmented. Third, it made legitimacy the principal issue of politics and gave to the government and the ruling party an importance of great symbolic value. ‘Only the Congress could be trusted’. This is why only the Congress was the party of consensus. The political system got legitimized through identification with particular leadership, and its agents and heirs. This made the symbolism of the Congress concrete and manifest. Fourth, the Congress in power made for a concentration of resources, a monopoly of patronage and a control of economic power which crystallized the structure of its power and made competition with it a difficult proposition. Fifth, by adopting a competitive model of governance, it made mobilization and public co-operation a function of political participation rather than of bureaucratic control and police surveillance. Only the Congress, with its huge organizational legacy, its leadership and its control of institutional patronage, could provide such a framework of participation. Similarly, the broadening of the social and ideological base of the Indian polity depended upon the broadening of opportunities within the Congress, as it would be suicidal for new sections and interests to join an opposition party and invite the hostility of the ruling party. Indeed, it has been repeatedly observed that even when the grievances of particular sections have been successfully ventilated through agitations launched by the opposition parties, the result has been that these elements have been absorbed into the ranks of the Congress which only stood to gain from the bargain: a truly tragic plight for the opposition.8 The fact that the consensus represented by the Congress has come not only out of historical legacy but also a continuing accommodation of interests is not out of any intellectual alertness or breadth of vision on the part of Congressmen. The Congress has been hard on many groups, has generally been conservative on the question of admitting new recruits, has given in only when it must, and has usually gained in the bargain. But the situation is such that it confirms that the Congress is more and more in its position of the party of consensus. In places where it has failed to accommodate entrenched or newly emergent groups, it has not occupied such a position and has been defeated by dissident groups or opposition parties.9 The Congress ‘System’ in India 65 Approach to Conflict A significant trend in political development in India is the growth of built-in constraints in the political system, which have led to a containment of conflicts at points where excessive conflict is likely to disrupt the intricate balance on which the Congress system is based. An awareness seems to have grown in the leadership that whereas the mechanism of factions to which the Congress has given rise to, serves to make for mobility and leads to a fresh balance when one is called for, neither factionalism nor partisan struggle can be allowed to become endemic, and should be held in restraint. There has developed over the years a conciliation machinery within the Congress, at various levels and for different tasks, which is almost constantly in operation, mediating in factional disputes, influencing political decisions in the states and districts, and not infrequently backing one group against another and utilizing the electoral and patronage systems in confirming the former in a position of power. Apart from resolution of conflicts and mediation in the outcome of conflicts, there is also a tendency towards avoidance of conflicts from taking an express form at certain levels, such as the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) or the general meeting of the Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC). This has been made possible by the growth of several buffers in the form of smaller executive committees, informal consultative committees, and ‘inner’ groups, in the leadership. The trend is also noticeable outside the ruling party. Thus, the significant development in the working of the Indian Parliament is the growing importance of the Congress Parliamentary Party (CPP) on the one hand and various functional committees on the other in legislative and political decisionmaking. Consultation between leaders of various parties on key business issues and the development of state committees and the CPP are further extensions of the pivotal role of the Committee system in the making of parliamentary consensus. Similarly, in the Council of Ministers, the latest trend is the appointment of experts and ‘non-controversial’ figures to key ministerial positions. Even among the politician ministers, conflict and controversy appear to have been restricted through the emergence of an inner group in the form of a ‘collective’ and the avoidance of abstract issues through the elimination of ‘ideologues’ from important positions. In other spheres, this has either already taken place or a demand is being made for autonomy and non-political functioning. Thus in civil-military relationships, the military is given more and more autonomy in its internal administration, as well as in the making of policy, thus making for a relationship of mutual confidence and trust for a high state of morale and respect for civilian authority. Similar pleas for autonomy and ‘professionalism’ are being made for the Planning Commission and the nationalized industries. These are all 66 Rajni Kothari developments leading to a limitation of the sensitive zone of factional politics, without any attempt to limit electoral participation, or restrict the right to criticize the government or articulate public opinion to censure it on particular failures or shortcomings. They constitute no more than in-built correctives to a highly politicized structure of institutions through which the Congress system operates. Such a position of the Congress has been further cemented by the policy of neutralizing some of the more important sources of cleavages and disaffection in the country. Thus, the removal of feudalism, the linguistic reorganization of states, the energetic infiltration by the Congressmen of labour unions coupled with protective legislation for labour, the removal of gross social inequalities by grant of special privileges to depressed sections of the community, and the firm suppression of all acts of violence, secession and disaffection—all this has succeeded in neutralizing the potential sources of political disaffection. All this has been part of the Congress drive for legitimacy on the one hand and transformation on the other. Together, these features add up to a considerable strengthening of the party of consensus and a correspondingly problematic position of the opposition parties. On the other hand, such an impressive consolidation of power in the hands of the Congress has not led to authoritarianism because of the free working of the electoral process, the crystallization of the factional structure within the party of consensus, the critical pressures exercized by the opposition, and the general tendency of the leadership to preserve democratic forms, to respect the rule of law, to avoid undue strife and to hold various elements together in some sort of a balance of interests. The Congress has also shown great sensitivity on the question of respect for minorities, including political minorities, accommodating them wherever possible, and in general, pursuing a broad-based consensus on national politics. I have discussed these points earlier and they need not be repeated, except to once again emphasize the fact that in the development and consolidation of the party of consensus, the role of the opposition has also been preserved, and that India has categorically rejected any authoritarian model of the party system in order to avoid dissidence and preserve unity. The one-party dominance as found in India is thus a dominance based on consensual authority and not simply on civil and military power. Role of Nehru In giving to the country and its institutions such strength and character, a critical role was played by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. Although it is easy to exaggerate his role and doubtful what he could have accomplished without the great inheritance of the national movement The Congress ‘System’ in India 67 and its organization to stand upon, there is no doubt that but for Nehru and his long tenure in office, it would have been difficult to consolidate the gains of independence in the manner in which this has been done. Nehru’s role has been two-fold. By the sheer force of his personality, he managed to hold the country together, to arrest disruptive forces, and take to the road of farreaching social change. By symbolizing the nation’s unity in one man (Gupta 1964) for such a long time, India avoided the painful convulsions through which less fortunate new nations have had to pass. But far more important was Nehru’s other and more concrete role of having given roots and legitimacy to the institutions adopted by the country as well as to the modern purposes to which they are put. He patiently and doggedly worked to this end. As I have argued elsewhere, the contribution of Nehru was not to have started a revolution but to have given rise to a consensus (Kothari 1964). He provided the country’s institutions with sufficient time to strike roots, and himself worked to that end by being the chief operator, and made acceptable to his countrymen certain critical values—of equality, the value of freedom, the value of the vote. Meanwhile, he concentrated power in himself and in his party and maintained some sort of balance, pinning his faith on the institutions of democracy but not allowing political conflict to take too sharp a form, in a sense drifting on and hoping for things to sort themselves out ultimately. Nehru was perhaps not too confident of the way things were shaping but his sense of power on the one hand and a sincere conviction about the efficacy of democratic institutions on the other were enough to allow India time to build a foundation. In a sense, the Nehru period was an exceptional period in India’s history, one that was so necessary, but not so normal. This had its effect on the working of the party system. While the Congress gained in strength owing to the various factors described above, Nehru in another way weakened the party by concentrating power in his own hands and through acting as if only he could hold the country together. Nehru allowed things to take their own shape in the states and at lower levels where the party organization often forced its way, but at the national level he stymied the growth of the organization. Such a discrepancy in institutional organization, however, could not last forever, especially in such a highly structured and powerful organization as the Congress. Towards the end of his tenure, therefore, Nehru agreed to a proposal, which, while it confirmed his own unbridled power, also restored power and prestige to the Congress organization. Kamaraj Plan This proposal was the Kamaraj Plan.10 While this scheme has attracted widespread attention and has been, in turn, made the subject of praise and 68 Rajni Kothari ridicule, its real role has not been understood. To consider the Kamaraj Plan in terms of its formally declared objectives is to misunderstand the purpose, as observers and columnists were not slow in seeing soon after the announcement of the Plan.11 At the same time, however, to have considered it simply in terms of the leadership purge, as was done by most of these writers, is also to have missed the point completely and to have taken an equally formal position. The importance of the Kamaraj Plan lay not in the immediate action taken, but in the sequel to it. It was not the removal ‘for party work’ of the Central Ministers and Chief Ministers but the induction of party managers into positions of power at the national level which proved of greater consequence. By putting state level party managers into power at the Centre, the Kamaraj Plan not only recognized their importance in national affairs but also restored to the central organization the prestige and importance it had lost over the years due to Nehru’s dominating presence. Seen in this light, the Kamaraj Plan was no coup staged by an adventurists; it was rather a ‘restoration’. To think that with the return to the government of people who had been ‘kamarajed’ (as happened after Nehru’s death) the purpose of the Plan was defeated is to misunderstand the nature of the succession after Nehru; it is also to misunderstand the nature of the change that has come once again in ministerial-organizational relations at the centre. That important leaders should leave the government and look after the organization was relevant in a situation where the organization had been weakened by those who were in government. It is no longer relevant when the organization is restored to its previous position and is granted its due place in the decision-making process of politics. It is this that has now come about after the death of Nehru. The struggle between Lal Bahadur Shastri and Morarji Desai over the succession issue was at the same time a struggle between two principles of party organization. In the outcome, the importance of the organization (alongside the Ministry) has been established as a cardinal principle of the system. It is a principle that is an essential part of the one-party dominance system as it operates in India, and one that distinguishes it from both the party system of western democracies, and the one-party systems found in many of the new nations, in both of which the party organization is considered instrumental to the executive. In the western democracies, the subsidiary role given to party organization ensures unity in the party and is functional to the two-party system. In the authoritarian and ‘solidarity’ regimes also, it ensures unity of the regime and keeps factionalism from going too far. In the Indian system, however, where a strong and potentially monolithic party must provide its own correctives to its power if it is to function democratically, the positive role of the party organization becomes a necessity. The Congress ‘System’ in India 69 The Basic Model We have now seen in detail the main features of the one-party dominance system and the historical and environmental conditions under which it developed. It is a system which provides, among other things, a comprehensive mechanism of change (unlike the western party systems, it is within the same party; unlike the ‘one party systems’, it is not through a coup d’état), a system of conflict articulation and resolution (through the operation of the margin of pressure, both internal and external), and a system of communications between society and politics (through the factional network). It has worked rather well so far. It has its problems too, some of them serious, for it is still an evolving system and greatly dependent at the present stage on performance in other spheres. As for the trends in operation, as mentioned earlier, it is quite possible that the opposition parties will gain from the Congress in certain areas, but this is an inherent and necessary part of the system. Where the Congress has really lost its grip, the opposition may even be able to form a government in one or more states. Only if this happens on a large scale, and percolates to the centre, however, can the system be said to have undergone a major change. Even in that case, the question remains whether the new party or coalition provides us with another party of consensus or is it just an expression of accumulated protest on the part of the public, which is likely to wither away after a short time in office. Lastly, there is the important theoretical question: what constitutes a stable party system? If still in transition, when does the real takeoff come? Is it necessary that an ‘alternative government’ in the form of another party of consensus should emerge? Or is stabilization of elite competition including smooth changes in government, as found in the Congress system in India, also a satisfactory condition of political organization? The one-party dominance system in India, with its factions and its support and communications networks, may yet well be a transitional system, suited to the special period of national growth, but one that would transform into a more ‘normal’ party system later on. This can be left as an open question. Either through a purposive coalition of dissident groups and opposition parties or through some sharp break within the Congress, or perhaps through the independent strengthening of one of the opposition parties, such a change may come in the future. Or, for all we know, the delicate balance on which the legitimacy and power of the Congress system rests may be rudely disturbed, and a more authoritarian system might emerge. Political systems do change in their nature over time, and there is no particular sanctity in one particular system. Meanwhile, the system of one-party dominance described by me here is an interesting addition to the 70 Rajni Kothari present typology of party systems, and one that is also, on Indian experience, a viable model of political organization.12 Notes 01. Neumann (1956) has introduced other distinctions to differentiate the multi party system as it operates in Europe. He distinguishes between the party of action and the party of platform, depending upon the degree of proximity to power. To this he adds a further distinction between the party of programme and the party of personages, broadly approximating to the distinction between institutional and personal government. 02. Robert McKenzie (1963) has popularized this formula. 03. The pattern of replacement of the government leaders by leaders controlling the party organization in the state began in Madras when Mr C. Rajagopalachari was replaced as Chief Minister by Mr Kamaraj, the State Congress President, in 1953. In UP, Mr C.B. Gupta first acquired control of the PCC and then brought about the fall of Chief Minister Sampurnanand in 1961, much against the wishes of Prime Minister Nehru. The Orissa Chief Minister, Harekrishna Mahtab was similarly replaced by Mr Bijoyanand Patnaik in 1962, when the latter, as Chief of the PCC, virtually organized an agitation against the Congress-Ganatantra coalition ministry that the former was heading and forced the central leadership to intervene in his favour. Likewise in Gujarat and Mysore the leaders who had gained control of the PCCs took over as Chief Minister in 1963. 04. The Central leadership has been able to play a considerable role in the rivalries between Congress factions in the states through such instrumentalities as the Central Parliamentary Board, the sub-Committees in the Working Committee that are appointed from time to time to look after the affairs of the PCCs where the conflicts are acute, and through the system of ‘Observers’ appointed to supervise, on its behalf, the organizational elections in the states. Possessing vast powers, ranging from the determination of the eligibility of primary members to vote to the conduct of the poll for election of PCC office-bearers, the ‘Observers’ have been able to help one or the other faction to gain control of the organization at the state level. The High Command itself has, in a few cases, been able to tilt the balance one way or the other, or bring about a rapprochement between rival factions through direct intervention, usually at the request of the local groups. 05. Mr Kamaraj as Congress President played an important role in the selection of the successor to Mr Nehru. With Lal Bahadur Shastri, Morarji Desai and Jagjivan Ram in the field, the task of determining the degree of support each enjoyed among the MPs, state Chief Ministers and PCC Chiefs was entrusted to Mr Kamaraj. After meeting them all informally he conveyed to the Parliamentary Party, over whose meeting he was requested to preside, his finding that Mr Shastri enjoyed the support of the majority among the other elements in the party. The Parliamentary Party accepted this finding and elected Mr Shastri as its leader by a unanimous vote. 06. The analogy with the thermostat underlines the absorbent, self-corrective and flexibility functions of factionalism. The Congress ‘System’ in India 71 07. For an account of the movement in which caste associations are getting involved in the total political process, see the article by Rajni Kothari and Rushikesh Maru (1965). 08. Thus, to give one instance, in the powerful agitation for linguistic states in Maharashtra and Gujarat, new cadres of workers were drawn into the political arena. Soon after the successful culmination of the agitation, however, the Congress absorbed a large number of the new entrants and succeeded in capturing full initiative in state politics. Similarly in Punjab, Congressmen who had left the party and organized a new opposition group during the agitation against Chief Minister Kairon have rejoined it following the formation of a new ministry under Mr Ram Kishen. 09. See, for instance, the articles on Farukkhabad Amroha and Rajkot constituencies in which the Congress was defeated in the 1963 by-elections by Bashiruddin Ahmed, Ramashray Roy and R.M. Maru respectively, with an introduction by me, Economic Weekly, 17 (21 to 24) 1965. 10. The Kamaraj Plan was adopted by the AICC on August 10, 1963. The resolution incorporating it was moved by Mr Kamaraj, who was then the Chief Minister of Madras and seconded by Mr S.K. Patil, the then Minister for Food and Agriculture at the Centre. The declared purpose of the Plan was to secure the voluntary relinquishment of their ministerial posts by senior Congressmen to enable them to devote all their time to the organizational work of the party so that the ‘unhealthy trend’ noticeable in the formation of groups and factions in the party and the consequent ‘loosening of the Congress organization’ could be arrested. Following the unanimous adoption of the resolution, all ministers at the Centre and the states submitted their resignations to the Working Committee which authorized Mr Nehru to decide which of the resignations would be accepted. On 24th August, Mr Nehru submitted to the Working Committee a list of six central Cabinet Ministers and six Chief Ministers who should be asked to take up organizational work. The Working Committee accepted his suggestion and recommended that the resignation of the 12 senior leaders be accepted. The central Cabinet Ministers to leave under the Kamaraj Plan were Morarji Desai, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Jagjivan Ram, S.K. Patil, B. Gopala Reddy and Dr K.L. Shrimali. Among the six Chief Ministers whose resignations the Working Committee accepted were K. Kamaraj of Madras, Biju Patnaik of Orissa, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed of Kashmir, UP’s C.B. Gupta, Bihar’s Binodanand Jha and B.A. Mandloi of Madhya Pradesh. 11. Bhatia 1963; Thapar 1963; Santhanam 1963; Editorial 1963. 12. For an earlier attempt at describing this system, see my ‘Party System’, op. cit. While sending this article to press, I notice that W.H. Morris-Jones (1964) has developed a similar concept of ‘one dominant party’. My analysis differs from his, especially in the characterization of the Congress as the party of consensus. References Ahmed, Bashiruddin. 1965. Economic Weekly, 17(21 to 24). Bailey. F.G. 1963. Political and Social Change. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bhatia, Krishna. 1963. ‘Congress Party Proposes a Major Toning Up’, Statesman, 15 August. Editorial. 1963. ‘Go Back to the People’, Eastern Economist, 41(10), 6 September: 6. 72 Rajni Kothari Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1964. Party System: A Behavioural Analysis. Chicago: Rand MacNally. Gupta, Sisir. 1964. ‘Some Aspects of the Problem of National Integration in India, Pakistan and Ceylon’, Parliamentary Studies, 8(1) and (2). Kothari, Rajani. 1962. ‘India’s Political Take-off’, Economic Weekly, Special Number, July. Kothari, Rajani. 1964. ‘The Meaning of Jawaharlal Nehru’, Economic Weekly, Special Number, July. Kothari, Rajani and Ghanshyam Shah. 1963. ‘Caste Orientation of Political Factions: Modasa Constituency—A Case Study’, Economic Weekly, Special Number, July. Kothari, Rajni and Rushikesh Maru. 1965. ‘Caste and Secularism in India: A Case Study of the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha’, Journal of Asian Studies, 25(1). Maru, R.M. 1965. Economic Weekly, 17(21 to 24). McKenzie, Robert. 1963. British Political Parties (second edition). London: Heineman. Morris-Jones, W.H. 1964. ‘Parliament and Dominant Party: Indian Experience’, Parliamentary Affairs, 17(3): 296–307. Neumann, Sigmund. 1956 (ed.). Modern Political Parties. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Rose, R. 1964. ‘Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain’, Political Studies, 12(1). Roy, Ramashray. 1965. Economic Weekly, 17(21 to 24). Santhanam, K. 1963. ‘Can Kamaraj Plan Provide All the Answers?’Hindustan Times, 14 August. Thapar, Romesh. 1963. ‘Congress Re-Birth or Hara Kiri?’ Economic Weekly, XV(35), 31 August: 31. 5 Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002: From Hegemony to Convergence* YOGENDRA YADAV and SUHAS PALSHIKAR The challenge of theorizing the party system in India at the state level has never been felt as acutely as it has been in the last decade or so. One reason for this is too obvious to miss. The 1990s have witnessed a sea change in the political arena in India. The map of Indian politics today appears strikingly different from what it was in the late 1980s. Professional students of politics have begun to see this change from the late 1980s to the 1990s as signifying a ‘reconfiguration’ of Indian politics: it is not just that the game has started yielding different and surprising results; in some ways the rules of the game itself have changed. (Yadav 1996: 95–104) The 1990s have unleashed several independent yet simultaneous trajectories. The intensity of electoral competition has increased with the rise in electoral volatility. This has been accompanied by something of a participatory upsurge. The level of politics has shifted from the ‘all-India’ level to the states. The ‘national’ electoral verdict appears no more than an aggregation of state level verdicts. These changes have been accompanied by a change in the idiom of politics. All this adds up to quite a messy picture. Messy, not only because many of these dimensions are intertwined, but also because we do not understand many of these very well and lack a frame to see their inter-connections. This chapter aims at defining this puzzle and situating it * This article was previously published as ‘From Hegemony to Convergence: Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002’ Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, XV(1 & 2), January–June 2003. 74 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar in a historical and comparative perspective. Historical, in that we need to trace the trajectory through which India’s party system evolved since democratic political competition was instituted after independence. Comparative, in that we compare different patterns of political competition obtaining in the different states of India. Both these exercises, especially the latter, are badly in need of academic attention in India. A word about the perspective that informs this reading of the party system may not be out of place here. We are interested in the party system because we are interested in the possibilities of social transformation in and through democratic politics. We are interested in mechanisms through which competitive politics opens or closes possibilities of expanding meaningfully the available range of options or the probability of the more effective options being taken up. The party system is a critical mediating factor in this possible relationship between democratic politics and social transformation. The party system defines the structure of political competition that shapes and constrains the political choices that a citizen can exercise. The party system thus forms the menu of choices that determine the possibility of social transformation through democratic means. To believe in this is to share the conviction that democratic politics opens the possibility of electoral choice being turned into a radical instrument of social change, of rearranging the composition of the power elite, of renegotiating the political agenda, of redefining the relations of power in society. At the same time this reading is tempered by the knowledge that the operation of structures of social and economic inequality works systematically against the realization of this possibility. Hence our insistence in this chapter on relating the party system to social and economic structures. This chapter begins with a brief review of the existing literature on state politics in India so as to trace the emergence of the discipline and its treatment of comparative study of party systems. In order to situate the present party competition in a historical perspective, we shall turn in Section II to a reassessment of the famous ‘Congress system’ argument, first developed by Rajni Kothari (Kothari 1964). Following this, Section III takes a theoretical detour to develop a model of the party system that might help us categorize the various types of party systems that developed in India after the demise of the Congress system. Our hope is that this model, which situates party systems along the two dimensions of the format of competition and the intensity of socio-political divisions, has greater validity for the Indian context and for our objective than other received models. This exercise yields a typology of the party system, developed in Section IV, that covers what we describe as the ‘two lives’ of the Congress system and thereafter. In Section V, we discuss the ‘moment of differentiation’—how different states, at different points of time and through different routes, broke away from the Congress system. Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 75 Various factors such as participatory upsurge, electoral volatility, etc., that contributed to electoral realignments and changes in the party system in the 1990s are outlined here. Section VI presents an overview of trends and patterns in state politics in the post-Congress polity. In Section VII we return to the starting point of this essay, namely the link between the party systems and transformative politics, by evaluating the social consequences of the various political routes taken in post-Congress polity. The final section gathers together the various strands of argument presented in this essay and tries to ask the big question: how should we characterize the changes in the party system in the last decade or so? And what does it mean for the possibility of social transformation through democratic politics? Emergence of State Politics as a Frontier Discipline One of the significant developments both in real politics and in the academic enterprise of making sense of politics has been the emergence of state politics as the centre of attention. Once upon a time, the study of Indian politics involved ‘national’ level politics alone. State politics was seen as a matter of detail and would be referred to only as an unavoidable appendage of ‘allIndia’ politics. Delhi, Nehru and the national level political competition used to constitute the fact of Indian politics and the subject matter of the study of Indian politics. Two unstated assumptions informed this observation: one, that state politics was different from national politics and two, that state politics from the perspective of state was a matter of interesting detail, but just that. For an earlier generation of theorists of Indian politics, this was perhaps a natural reaction in view of the background of the national movement and the task of ‘nation-building’ in which the national level political class was presumably engaged. In contrast, politics at the state level was about power, personal aggrandizement, parochial interests and their protection through lobbying, etc. Also, in the 1950s and the 1960s, one could understand a good deal of politics, by looking exclusively at the national level politics, national level leadership, policymaking and so on. Reference to states could be relegated to the margins of political analysis. Given the monotonous dominance of the Congress everywhere, state politics must have appeared a poor copy of national level politics. As political developments unfolded through the 1960s, the discipline of state politics emerged gradually. The inadequacy of analyses of Indian politics focusing exclusively on the national level became apparent as states actually started playing a crucial role in shaping the so-called national level politics. Thus, studies on individual states started taking place. 76 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar In fact, many studies of state politics were a response to the felt unintelligibility of national politics in the absence of state level analysis. The framework of national politics was supposed to be a given and whenever that ‘given’ was not strictly followed, scholars turned to the study of state politics to find out what was wrong with Indian politics and how it was likely to restore the ‘natural’ framework. As Indira Gandhi came to power and sought to redefine some aspects of the political game in India, observers were inclined to believe that it was the end of the ‘given’ framework. This gave rise to the language of crises, deinstitutionalization and restoration. Rajni Kothari’s analysis of the Congress system was stretched by many observers to mean that it was the state of equilibrium necessary for democracy to survive in India. The developments in the 1990s and scholarly response to them have contributed to the emergence of state politics as the frontier discipline essential for a nuanced understanding of Indian politics. However, this realization is yet to change the face of the discipline. Many of the studies of state politics rarely adopt a comparative perspective or ask questions that would lead to the theorization of Indian politics (Chhibber & Nooruddin 1999; Church 1984; Dreze and Sen 1998; Frankel and Rao 1989, 1990; Kothari 1970; Roy and Wallace 1999; Wallace and Roy 2003; Weiner 1968; Wood 1984). The usual practice is to review the politics of different states and stop there. Yet there are signs of a fresh beginning being made in the 1990s in the direction of a truly comparative study of state politics that could lead to a reappraisal of Indian politics. The growing literature includes three kinds of works. First, there are some studies that focus on a single state, but use it to develop a larger argument about Indian politics. These include Jaffrelot (1993) on Madhya Pradesh, Narendra Subramanian (1990) on Tamil Nadu, Zoya Hasan (1998) on Uttar Pradesh, D.L. Sheth (2002) and Ghanshyam Shah (2002) on Gujarat, Peter de Souza (1999) on Goa and some articles in the Economic and Political Weekly collection on electoral politics. Second, there are some studies that offer direct comparison of politics in more than one state (Jenkins 2004; Kohli 1987; Sinha 2005). Third, some analysts have attempted to offer an overview of the trends and patterns of party politics across a number of states (Jaffrelot 1993; Kumar 2000; Sridharan 2002; Yadav 1996, 1999). While Sridharan’s (2002: 475–503) detailed analysis ends by emphasising the structural more than the social aspect of political competition, Jaffrelot’s (1993) study focuses on the strategic alternatives available to the Congress after its decline had already begun. For instance, Sridharan (2002: 495–96) argues that ‘systemic properties’ explain most satisfactorily the changes in India’s party system. On the other hand, Jaffrelot (1993: 435–52) shows how the Congress Party in Madhya Pradesh moved from a ‘catch-all party’ to a more nuanced ‘coalition of extremes’ during the 1990s and that this paid Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 77 rich dividends. In other words, contemporary scholarship on party systems and electoral politics in India offers two entirely different approaches. A more ambitious and comprehensive framework for the study of state level party politics is offered by Harriss (1999). He pleads for differentiating state level party systems on the basis of the caste and class balance in the respective states. Our attempt here is to draw upon this growing literature and to contribute to it by looking back at the last 50 years of Indian politics, from the vantage point of the present moment in order to link the changes in the party system and electoral politics to the developments in the field of state politics. While there is a considerable amount of literature on state level electoral politics, this has not produced any new thinking on the party system in India. As a matter of fact, analyses of changes in India’s party system often stop at declaring the decline of the Congress and the arrival of the post-Congress polity. That these developments were taking place at the state level and not just at the all-India level is somewhat ignored. It may also be said that analyses of Indian politics do not take into consideration the issues of social change seriously. The party system and social change are seldom seen as interrelated. ‘Congress System’ Revisited Any attempt to understand the changes in the party system in contemporary India must begin by asking one elementary question: what is that original point with reference to which we seek to measure the change? An answer to this enables us to take the next logical step and ask: what has changed with respect to the party system? Implicit in the current readings of Indian politics, there often exists a map of Indian politics, which existed in the era prior to the contemporary cataclysmic changes. This map or picture informs the contrast that is often drawn. The party system is now said to be moving from a one-party dominance system to a multi-party competition, from social cohesion to fragmentation, from a stable pattern to fluidity, from order to chaos as the principle of party competition. In order to rethink the dominant picture of the party system as it exists today, it is necessary to revisit that point of departure itself. Since the 1960s a commonsense had evolved about the nature of party political competition through the first decade and a half of India’s democratic experience (Kothari 1961; Krishna 1967; Morris-Jones 1964). The most powerful formulation of this commonsense was, of course, captured by the term, ‘congress system’ (Kothari 1964, 1970). Developed in the mid1960s, this formulation served to summarize India’s competitive politics through the 1970s. It was a bold attempt to theorize the unique party system 78 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar that India had developed that did not fit the straightjacket of the one party system or multi-party competition. Kothari (1989) himself ‘revisited’ the idea of the Congress system in the mid-1970s and concluded that though some modifications needed to be made to the original formulation, the basic idea could be deployed for understanding the structure of party political competition in the 1970s and perhaps beyond. The ‘Congress system’ formulation contained the argument that in spite of an apparent one party dominance, inter-party and intra-party competition did take place (See chapter 6, ‘Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour: From Independence to the 1980s). This competition often took place within the confines of a consensus because the Congress Party was occupying the ‘centre’; opposition was allowed both within the margins of this centre, inside the Congress Party, and outside it. Apart from the structural features, Kothari’s formulation involved an ideological component. The Congress system was a system of legitimacy. The issue was establishment of a democratic authority. This was achieved in India on the basis of a historical consensus that was converted by the party system into ‘present consensus’ (Kothari 1989: 25). This was possible because the congress system encompassed all major sections and interests of society (Ibid.: 25). Kothari believed that the Congress system combined the efforts to gain legitimacy and the efforts towards social transformation. The system did so by inducting, perhaps neutralizing, all potential sources of disaffection. The Congress Party’s democratic background and the policies adopted by the Congress government were instrumental in achieving this objective. This model emphasized the role of the government in social change. Also, in Kothari’s initial formulation, Nehru’s leadership played a very important part in shaping this aspect of the congress system. The mid-1970s witnessed the initial challenge to the Congress system. In the 1980s, the Congress Party managed to return to power, though the Congress system was considerably weakened. Cataclysmic events since the late 1980s changed both the discourse and the framework of Indian politics. Yet, it is worth noting that analyses of these changes were often anchored to the framework of the Congress system. This points to the obvious strength of the idea of the Congress system argument. Instead of trying to fit India into the received images or models of party competition from the West, Kothari’s formulation sought to capture the specificity of Indian politics. It recognized the fact of one-party dominance without accepting the image of the authoritarian nature of politics associated with it. Refuting the implication that there was a closure in this form of political competition, the formulation drew attention to the oppositional role of the factions within the Congress, a feature that gave a competitive character to both inter- and intra-party politics. Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 79 These merits and strengths of the Congress system argument, or at least its popular versions, may have overlooked or underemphasized some aspects of the party system as it prevailed through the 1960s. In revisiting the Congress system, we need to have a quick look at these aspects. First of all, the formulation drew our attention away from the simple fact that anything between a quarter to a half of India was never covered by the Congress system. West Bengal (W.B.), Kerala, Tamil Nadu (T.N.), and Punjab are examples of states where the Congress system met with opposition early on or simply did not dominate. Besides, states like Orissa, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh (M.P.), and Assam were states where the Congress continued in power but was far from exercising dominance. Kothari himself points out that in the ex-princely states the Congress system was weak. But viewed in a totality, these exceptions are just too many and too significant to ignore. The only conclusion we can draw from these exceptions is that the Congress system was perhaps a description of the party system existing at the ‘national’ level more than the description of ‘Indian’ party system. Second, in Kothari’s formulation, the Congress system was presented as a ‘natural’ outcome of an unequal and de-centred society where a political centre was instituted. This invited the reader to think that the system had greater enduring capacity than it really did. Thanks to this formulation, the Congress system appeared as a regular and long-term phenomenon whose absence or erosion required explanation. In retrospect, it appears that Kothari may have read too much into what was a temporary political form of the first phase of competitive political mobilization. At a time when mobilization was rather limited, political competition could be conducted only in a circumscribed manner. In the Indian context, the existence of Congress as a movement, as a party, and as an instrument of government, combined with a towering and popular leader produced a particular structure of competition. There was nothing in this situation that ensured the continuation of the Congress system once the terms of popular mobilization changed. Third, the Congress system argument underlined the ‘catch-all’ and consensual nature of politics. This description was factually correct. However, it does not probe the inner logic of this consensus. Nor does the argument take notice of the play of dominant interests. The ‘catch-all’ character and the façade of consensus helped the Congress system in two respects. In the first place, the Congress system sought to make compromises with upper castes and allowed their domination in the political realm. A consensus about procedural democracy coupled with welfare-oriented developmentalism helped in de-emphasizing the claims of the lower castes. On the other hand, the catch-all character of the Congress Party won elections for it, without forcing any change in its policies or leadership pattern. The Congress Party was supported by the masses, which belonged to various social backgrounds. 80 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar This gave the party the famous tag of a ‘catch-all’ party. At the same time, the party and the Congress system worked to keep the Dalits, adivasis, peasants and workers, at a distance from positions of power. The Congress system was based on a trade off: the Congress Party would symbolically incorporate the various social sections, but the party’s upper class-upper caste leadership should be recognized as legitimate and as representative of the masses. In other words, the Congress system was not really as open as its theorists thought it was: it was as much about exclusion as it was about inclusion. Under the cloak of consensus, a distance was always maintained between the supporters and the beneficiaries of the Congress system. Perhaps, this was possible because, as Kothari himself points out, the political class as a whole came from a common social background and was not sensitive to these sociological dimensions of democracy. This consensual nature of the political elite and their common perception of the nation and development were the core of the consensus, rather than any socially agreed vision or consensus in the true sense of the term. There is also a tendency in Kothari’s argument to underplay the plebiscitary nature of politics right from the beginning of India’s democratic politics in the post-independence period. With hindsight, we can say that Kothari may have overstated the system dimension of party competition. The Congress, in spite of being a well-knit organization, depended quite happily on the charisma of Nehru for winning elections. It was a combination of state level organization and Nehru’s plebiscitary leadership that ensured the dominance of the Congress. The organization alone could not have brought the success which the Congress enjoyed for a long time. In fact, Indian politics in general and the Congress movement in particular, always had this plebiscitary character even in the pre-independence period. In the postindependence period, successive elections were turned into plebiscites. Just as the organizational dimension helped the Congress marginalize the opposition parties, the plebiscitary leadership style ensured that issues would be framed in a fuzzy manner, that the focus would be more on personal charisma than on concrete programmes or performances. As we know, this characteristic continued and played an important part in politics in the 1970s. This critique of the Congress system does not render the formulation obsolete. In fact, the label the ‘Congress system’ needs to be retained since it reminds us of the principal character of Indian politics in a particular era. Our purpose in developing this critique is two-fold. First, we wish to underline the point that the Congress system was necessarily a short-term response to the early phase of democratic mobilization following the opening up of the floodgates of universal franchise. This puts in perspective the oftexpressed nostalgia for the return of the Congress system: this nostalgia hides a desire to go back to a stage of democracy when the masses were Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 81 not politicized, when politics was still the game of the few. Second, the critique serves to remind us that the ‘consensus’ of the Congress system was a hegemonic construct: it did allow for incubation of democratic politics and for a safe experiment with social change, yet it could not have been the political form for a full-fledged engagement of competitive politics with social transformation. Very early in its long life, the Congress system had become a constraint on the possibility of transformative politics. A Model for Party System It is very common to invoke the term ‘party system’ in any discussion of Indian politics. But more often than not a discussion of the party system tends to be a loose and generalized way of discussing shared attributes of parties in a given political system. Or else, it is a simple numeric description of the number of relevant parties in a given polity: one-party systems, twoparty or bipolar systems and multi-party systems. Both these prevalent ways of discussing the party system lose sight of the basic point behind the idea of a party system: that it is a ‘system’ that conditions and constrains all the parties that operate within it, that it is ‘more than the sum of the parts’ (Mair 1997: 51). Therefore, we need to distinguish between changing fortunes of parties and changes in the party system. For instance, what we are looking for in this chapter is not so much an explanation for why the Congress came to lose power, but how and why it found itself facing a radically different pattern of political competition, and its implication for the existing parties and for popular mobilizations. Thus, the basic idea is to grasp that the configuration in which parties find themselves locked happens to be an independent factor that constrains what individual parties and voters can do. In this sense, this configuration provides a framework within which party competition and popular mobilization take place. The nature and structure of the competition determine how open or closed a party system is in processing societal claims, in allowing new entrants, in admitting unattended issues, etc. At an epistemic plane, the conventional thinking about party systems tends to be passive in that it is assumed that there is a correct classification of the party system that cuts across time and space. In that understanding the task of a political analyst is to identify the ‘right’ classification and place the polity under examination in the appropriate slot in a given typology. Epistemic commonsense and political wisdom requires us to move away from such a passive stance vis-à-vis the received classifications. For classifications and typologies are not ‘out there’; these are analytical constructs meant to put cognitive order on the material we seek to examine. Typologies are thus, not 82 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar ‘right’ or ‘wrong’; they are more or less helpful depending on how well they allow us to order the experience that we seek to categorize and in answering the questions that led us to this typology. On this understanding, the exercise of classification is dependent on our vantage point, our location, and our objectives. Therefore, this attempt to understand the role of the party system in democratic politics of social transformation cannot take up and simply deploy the received typologies of party systems. We must interrogate the received classifications from our vantage point: the experience of competitive politics in India in the second half of the 20th century and the search for democratic politics for social transformation. Once we foreground these concerns, it is clear that there has been something of a regress in thinking about the specificity of the party system in India after the decline of the Congress. Notwithstanding the limitations in the theorization of the Congress system, no one can deny that a lot of thought went into the understanding of the party system that operated in the first phase of democratic politics in India. The uniqueness of the political situation forced Indian political scientists to look beyond mechanical replication of the party system models received from the West. The decline of the Congress has removed that constraint and has produced a surface resemblance between the party system in India and its counterparts all over the world. This has led to a tendency to slip into the traditional classifications of the party system produced by old-style comparative politics (Blondel 1968; Duverger 1954; Rokkan 1968). We propose that classification suitable for India can be developed on the basis of two axes—format of party competition and the nature of political choices. Let us first look at these two dimensions separately before bringing them together to generate a typology of the nature of party systems. The first dimension retains the conventional focus in the party system literature on the number of relevant political actors or the format of party competition. The underlying insight here is that political choices are deeply influenced and conditioned by the rules of the game set by a specific type of competition. The established format of political competition—straight, triangular or multi-polar or a version of these—determines not only what kind of political choices will be made but also what kind of choices will be offered. This dimension lends itself to easy description through received categories. All we need to do is to adapt these categories slightly to the pattern witnessed in India in the last 50 years. The differences in this dimension can be placed on a spectrum that ranges from the supreme dominance of one party all over the state to multi-cornered contests in each seat resulting in the complete fragmentation of political competition into a large number of small parties and independents. Keeping the Indian experience in mind, it is useful to divide this spectrum into four categories. Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 83 Format of Party Competition ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE In this format the dice is already loaded very heavily in favour of the biggest political party. The Congress victory in the first two general elections to Vidhan Sabhas (Legislative Assemblies) in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra serve as apt illustrations of such dominance. However, in its Indian version, one-party dominance rarely translated into a similar dominance in terms of votes. Even in its heyday, the Congress rarely crossed the majority mark in terms of popular votes. Most of the overwhelming victories of the Congress were achieved not because the electorate voted overwhelmingly for the Congress, but because the opponents of the Congress were badly splintered. The first general elections to the Vidhan Sabha in Uttar Pradesh returned a complete dominance of the Congress in the assembly without any consolidation of votes in its favour. TWO-PARTY/BIPOLAR COMPETITION This type of competition is most familiar to students of party competition. There are two principal rivals who contest against each other over almost all the seats and divide all but few seats among themselves. Given the consolidation of votes between the two parties, both the parties poll anything between 80 to 90 per cent of the valid votes. In the Indian context, one has to include, under this category, the bipolar competition resulting from longstanding coalitions. The classic example is that of the UDF and the LDF in Kerala since 1980. The two coalitions now offer a neat bipolar choice to the electors in each constituency of the state and share around 90 per cent of the votes between them. If each coalition is treated as a party, the number of parties comes down to around three, as in classic two party competition. The DMK-AIADMK competition in Tamil Nadu and the Left Front’s competition with the Congress till the 1996 election also belong to the same category. It should be noted that a two-coalition competition is less restrictive in its options than a two-party competition. But often the shortterm constrains of both these types are not very different. ‘TWO-PLUS’ COMPETITION This type is less noticed though not entirely unknown in the literature on party systems. It involves a multi-party competition with two principal actors and one secondary actor. Punjab has been a classic instance of this competition: Akali Dal and the Congress are the principal contenders for power and the BJP has played the secondary role. This is not quite a triangular 84 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar contest, for the third party cannot offer competition in all parts of the state or among all sections of society and may often enter into an alliance with one of the major parties. During the 1980s, the Congress performed a similar role in Tamil Nadu. The enduring presence of a party of the indigenous people has had a similar effect on political competition in Tripura. The 1990s have witnessed a proliferation in this form of competition with the entry of the BJP into new states like Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. It is difficult to tell this competition type from a summary aggregate figure like the Effective Number of Parties; for the summary indicators for two-plus competition often mimic those of the two-party competition. By and large, this category has sheltered party competition in times of transition, for our electoral system has built-in disincentives for small parties. Often the third party tends to disappear. This category tends to persist only if there is an enduring regional or sectoral interest that is continuously ignored by the two leading formations. MULTI-PARTY COMPETITION This omnibus category contains within itself various kinds of cases, all involving states where three or more political parties have entrenched themselves in electoral competition. This could involve three or four cornered contests in each of the constituencies (e.g., Uttar Pradesh since 1991) or different parties involved in bipolar or triangular competition in different parts of the state (e.g., Bihar in 1990s before the creation of Jharkhand or Assam since 1985) or a mix of the two (Kerala in the 1960s and 1970s). These are levels of fragmentation one usually associates only with a proportional representation, not with our first-past-the-post system. But the simultaneous activation of regional and social cleavages can sometimes make majoritarian elections into mimicking proportional contestations. This category also contains another group of cases where political and electoral competition has never been crystallized along party political lines. A large number of political parties come up and disappear at regular intervals, parties change their labels regularly, and a large number of these manage legislative presence along with an unusual proportion of independents. This syndrome typically affects the smaller states like Goa, Haryana or the states of the North East. There have been several instances (involving Mizoram, Manipur and Pondicherry) in which the effective number of political parties in terms of votes went into double digits. Here party competition lacks a structure; in fact, it is not party competition at all. Having described the various categories of the first dimension of party system classification—the format of party competition—in some detail, it is time to turn to the second dimension that focuses on the substance rather than the form of choice. This dimension is critical to our basic purpose of judging Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 85 party systems by how they affect social transformations. Ordinary citizens cannot choose to bring about social change through electoral politics unless this option is available to them. While they can, in principle, and in the very last instance, shape the menu of choices that is offered to them, the resources, the skills and the luck required to bring this about rules this out as an effective strategy for most of the ordinary citizens in their lifetime. For all practical purposes, ordinary citizens are conditioned by the menu they have to choose from. Sometimes the voters get a wide range of substantial choices to choose from. But very often they have a rather narrow range of shallow options to choose from. A substantial choice refers to the presence of options that could make a difference to the conditions of ordinary citizens and thus bring about social change. The citizens may and often do choose privilege issues of collective/community dignity over those of material well-being. They might prefer the ‘populist’ route to that of structural transformation. While we may hold strong positions on these issues, we do not mean to make these an essential element of our classification. Nor do we link the substantial choices to any particular origins: these may come about through ideological politics of social change (e.g., that of the Communists or those of the Socialists or Ambedkarites) or may simply be a function of caste or ethnicity-based mobilization of a certain social group (BSP and SP in UP, AGP in Assam). These minimal considerations offer the following three-fold classification of the nature of political choices available to the citizens through party political competition. Nature of Political Choices SUBSTANTIAL AND/OR WIDE RANGE OF CHOICES This condition obtains when the different parties offer radically different policy packages that have perceived consequences for the lives of ordinary citizens. This often comes about at the time of the rise of a new political formation that challenges the existing political spectrum on issues of policy and practice (e.g., the rise of the Left Front to power in West Bengal through the 1960s and 1970s, the rise of DMK in Tamil Nadu in the 1960s) or in conditions of deep social upheaval and ethnic strife (UP and Bihar in the 1990s, Punjab in the 1980s, Assam during 1980–85) or both (Kerala in the 1950s). The voters choose between very different options with long-term consequences. This tends to be a short-lived phase, for periods of wide options are soon followed by a narrowing range of options. Either the original challenger dilutes its agenda (e.g., AGP in Assam) or the rivals adopt the new agenda (e.g., rise of AIADMK as a rival to DMK in Tamil Nadu) or there is a mix of the two (e.g., West Bengal since the establishment of the Left Front dominance). 86 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar MODERATE AND/OR LIMITED RANGE OF CHOICES This is the nodal category of bourgeois democracy often celebrated as the basis of moderation and stability and derided by its radical critics as offering fictitious choices. There are choices but within defined limits. The main parties do not offer anything that is substantially different except a certain brand image. Usually political competition takes place around rival claims of doing the same thing better than the other. Sharp ideological differences are avoided by the principal political parties. Much of the differences revolve around one or two highly publicized issues of symbolic significance or around major personalities. Rajni Kothari had pointed out that the Congress system, despite being dominated by one party, offered a moderate choice as a result of factional disputes and contestations within the ruling party. In contemporary times, the choice available in states dominated by the Congress-BJP contestation (Rajasthan, MP, Delhi, HP, Gujarat) offer a classic instance of this category. Both the parties do not even pretend to offer any different economic or social policy. Even on the question of communalism, that ostensibly divides them, both parties make sure that they are not at a great distance from the operational position of the other. The same is true of Congress-TDP competition in Andhra Pradesh or CongressJanata Dal contest in Karnataka. This category also includes instances of states where politics of radical choices in on the retreat. The difference between the UDF and the LDF in Kerala today or the choice available in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh or Bihar can only be described as a moderate choice. SHALLOW AND/OR NO CHOICE This category includes two very different types of cases. On the one hand there are instances where political choices were forcibly denied by use of undemocratic means (e.g., J&K and Nagaland) and imposition of regimes that lacked political legitimacy. On the other hand, there are cases where the absence of party structures means that there is virtually no systematic choice that the voters get to evaluate. Choice, if any, is available at the local and personal level, and not at the party political level. Democratic theory would have us believe that such instances are exceptions that will be eliminated once competitive mobilization passes initial stages. But the Indian experience shows that such maladies can get institutionalized. Having discussed the two dimensions separately, we can now discuss their interaction and the cumulative effect on the party system. Table 5.1 summarizes the interaction of the two dimensions and spells out the seven party system types that result from this. EXCLUSION J&K 1987 Assam 1983 Punjab 1992 One-party domination HEGEMONY Congress system Maharashtra up to 1978 UP, Bihar up to 1967 AP, Karnataka up to 1983 Left Front since 1982 Unipolar hegemony CLOSURE J&K, 1953–77 Closed one-party system Moderate and/or limited choices Shallow and /or no choice One-Party (Single Dominant Party) Wide and/or substantive choices Nature of Choices TRANSFORMATION Multi-Party (‘Two-Plus’ or ‘Four or More’) Kerala, 1960s and 1970s Bihar, 1989–95 UP, 1989–96 Competitive divergence CONVERGENCE FRAGMENTATION Kerala since 1980s UP since 1996 Gujarat since 1991 Bihar since 1995 HP since 1977 Assam since 1985 Rajasthan, MP since 1989 Tamil Nadu since 1996 Orissa, 1990–99 Multipolar convergence Karnataka 1983–96 AP, 1983–99 Punjab since 1997 Bipolar convergence FLUIDITY Haryana 1967–72 Goa in 1990s Manipur Arunachal Pradesh Mizoram before 1985 Systemless competition Tamil Nadu, 1960s West Bengal, 1969–82 Two-Party (Two-Party or Two Coalition) Competitive Format Table 5.1 Structure of Political Competition and Nature of Political Power in Indian States 88 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar The interaction of three categories on each dimension (the ‘two-plus’ category of competitive format has been merged with ‘bipolar’ for reasons of convenience here) would yield nine cells in all. But the merging of two possible cells with their neighbours has reduced the number to seven. Each of these seven cells represents a certain combination of competitive form and the range of choice available within that system. Each cell mentions the dominant characteristic of the nature of political power in that category. The cell also contains some illustrations that capture the characteristics of that system. Of the seven party system types that this classification yields, four can be said to belong to the ‘regular’ types of party systems that are prevalent in post-independence India. These are: 1. 2. 3. 4. System System System System of of of of unipolar hegemony bipolar convergence multipolar convergence competitive divergence Besides these, there are three ‘irregular’ system types, each of which is the product of special and unusual circumstances. These are: 5. 6. 7. System of one-party domination Closed one-party system System-less competition It cannot be overemphasized that each of these is an ideal type, illustrated by a few states and that too in a specific period of history. It is not necessary that each state must fit one of these categories neatly all the time. At any given time, a state may combine elements from different systems. A detailed analysis of these seven categories may help us appreciate this point better. System of unipolar hegemony The discussion of the Congress system in the previous section captured the structural attributes of the system of unipolar hegemony specific to India. It was a unipolar system in that political competition revolved around and was defined with reference to the one dominant actor. The hegemony of the Congress was sustained through its ‘catch-all’ character, through its capacity to forge a rainbow coalition of all kinds of social groups. The system depended on not allowing deep social or ideological cleavages to be politically activated. It is important to emphasize that unipolar hegemony of this kind does not depend on legal or actual elimination of rival political parties from the field of political competition. In that sense it is different from one party systems that came up in many Third World countries. More importantly, it Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 89 differs from these one-party regimes in that the Congress system allowed external critique and internal dissent. The various factions within the Congress performed the function of opposition. The options available to the citizen were no doubt severely limited, but the range was not much narrower than the one offered by moderate two-party systems in the advanced industrial countries. This category is so much intertwined with the Congress system that operated in India it is hardly surprising that most of the classical illustrations should come from it. We use the word ‘hegemony’ here by drawing upon the tradition of social scientific usage that distinguishes ‘hegemony’ from simple domination. While domination is exercized through the use of might, hegemony requires consent on the part of the ruled. In that sense the system of unipolar hegemony involved democratic legitimization and acceptance of the moral authority of the largest political party. At the same time, ‘hegemony’ reminds us that this system was not based on pure and spontaneous consensus as it is sometimes made out to be. As Gramsci reminded us, a system of hegemony routinely involves manufacturing of consent. We have mentioned the Left Front regime in West Bengal as an illustration of this system in order to draw attention to the fact that this category does not necessarily belong to the Congress or to the past. In many ways, the hegemony of the Left Front since 1977 surpasses that of the Congress in any state of India. Notwithstanding the appearance of a coalition, it is in the last instance the hegemony of a single party, the CPI (M). Notwithstanding the allegations, made often, of electoral fraud and strong-arm tactics, this regime does draw upon popular consent and legitimacy. It may well be that the Left Front regime offers a somewhat greater range of options than the Congress did, say in Uttar Pradesh or Maharashtra. But even the supporters of the regime will not claim that it is currently involved in ‘revolutionary’, transformative politics. On balance, it seems justified to view West Bengal under the Left Front to be an instance of unipolar hegemony. System of bipolar convergence Duverger’s famous formulation stipulated that first-past-the-post electoral system in single-member districts would yield a two-party system. Literature on the party system has emphasized that this type of political competition is bound to bring about political moderation and, in the long run, force both the actors to converge with each other. The Indian party system defied Duverger’s expectations for nearly two decades of competitive electoral politics. With the partial exception of Madhya Pradesh and Delhi, it was difficult to find instances of two-party systems in India till as late as the 90 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar 1980s. The sudden demise of the Congress system has witnessed a proliferation of bipolar or ‘two-plus’ competition. Either a straight two-party competition or a competition between two coalitions became the nodal category in the 1990s. India may have delayed the operation of Duverger’s law, but once bipolar competition arrived on the scene, it was, as expected, a system of convergence. Bipolar convergence in the Indian context involves homogenization and emptying of the political space. In most of the cases involving bipolar convergence, it was the outcome of a rapid expansion of a non-Congress Party (BJP in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh, Janata Dal in Karnataka and TDP in Andhra Pradesh) from some regions within the state to become a statewide party. In most of these cases, the bipolar competition is sustained by the catch-all character of leading parties. It is not that politics lacks social cleavages or that both the parties must gain equal proportion from all sections of society. Yet, the system depends on avoiding social polarization. On policy issues and agendas of governance, the system is marked by strong convergence of both the formations. In this category, it is not very useful to draw a distinction between the moderate and the narrow options, for there is a seamless continuum between the two. The very existence of two parties keeps up an appearance of contestation and rules out a situation that may be formally described as that of no options. Yet, the contest is often reduced to a friendly match. This applies not just to the Congress-BJP competition, where the two parties have to work hard to invent an issue that might differentiate them from the other in the eyes of the electorate. The LDF-UDF competition in Kerala is also marked by considerable reduction in policy differences between the two fronts. Bipolar convergence is characterized by a routine oscillation of governmental power between the two rivals, though it is not a necessary attribute of the system. System of multipolar convergence The received literature on party systems does not associate multipolar competition with convergence. Multipolarity is associated with deep cleavages, social fragmentation, political antagonism and governmental instability. The experience of Indian states does not confirm this picture. It is true that the rise of multipolar competition was associated with social fragmentations and sharp antagonisms. Yet, within a decade or so of its operation, the system seems to have settled for an unusual combination of social fragmentation and policy convergence. UP and Bihar saw intense caste polarization, while Assam experienced enduring ethnicization of politics. These polarizations have instituted social cleavages in the electoral arena that may continue for a very long period. Each of these witnessed sharp policy divergences for a brief Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 91 period. But very soon, all the differences were confined to the core ‘ethnic’ issue (implementation of SC/ST Atrocities Act in UP, Yadav dominance in Bihar, LTTE issue in Tamil Nadu and the foreigners’ issue in Assam), thus clearing ground for a convergence in economic and other policy matters. Part of this convergence was induced by the electoral system. The compulsion of manufacturing a majority in our system forced political actors to realize the limits of the politics of polarization. They were forced to seek support from those very sections that they had sought to exclude from political power (e.g., BSP’s and SP’s overtures to upper castes, AGP’s attempt to court the Muslims and the migrants). But a good deal of this convergence was forced from outside by the diminishing space for politics in a globalizing economy. System of competitive divergence We use this expression to describe a system where political competition, bipolar or multipolar, is used to offer substantial choices to the voters and becomes the basis of bringing about a change in the life situations of the ordinary citizens. The received literature on party system looks at this category with suspicion, for it represents antagonism and instability. Looked at from our vantage point, this category represents the principle of transformation and the possibility that democratic politics may become the vehicle of social change. The different instances listed under this category represent very diverse foci and political strategies of politics of social change. While the mobilization in Tamil Nadu was along the lines of language and caste, that in Kerala was along class and caste; Bihar and UP used caste as the master cleavage, while it was class in the case of West Bengal. The format of political competition varied. While Tamil Nadu and West Bengal achieved this in the process of moving from unipolar hegemony to bipolarity, the remaining three states—Kerala, UP and Bihar—took advantage of the opportunities offered by multipolar competition that replaced the Congress system. These different cases have had varying records of success of the change they attempted to bring about; none of these succeeded in sustaining the transformative impulse beyond a few years. With the possible exception of Bihar, all these states witnessed sharp radicalization and polarization when the party of change was still in opposition. Yet, all these cases have one thing in common: the common voter in these states used the ballot to change regimes in order to upset the existing social order and its hierarchies. System of one-party domination The ‘domination’ here stands in contrast to ‘hegemony’ in the first type of party system. This category is used to describe such deviant but theoretically 92 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar significant cases where the polity did have groups and parties that could have offered substantial choices on the questions that deeply affected the society (MUF in J&K, ongoing Assam movement in Assam and Badal’s faction of Akali Dal in Punjab), but the option was not made available to the people through the instrumentalities of the state. The result in each case was a deep sense of exclusion from the power that was handed over to a dominant party. The election lacked popular legitimacy and was perceived as a show of strength by the Indian state. Hence its description as ‘domination’. Closed one-party system This category would house the one-party democracies established in many Third World countries where the citizens had no choice. They either did not have a vote, or if they did it was of no consequence. Fortunately, the operation of democracy in India still does not offer too many instances of that. But the one-party rule thrust by the Central government on J&K between 1953 and 1977, a rule sustained by regular electoral fraud, could serve as an illustration of this possibility. Systemless competition The discussion of party system assumes the existence of a system in the first place. This involves the somewhat regular existence of the same or similar political parties across a span of time, at least rudimentary organizational structure of the parties, an established pattern of partisanship and party identification among the voters and social groups. But several states in India defy this minimal expectation and thus, require a new category where electoral competition is not bound by party political conventions. It is either pure individual entrepreneurship or loose and very short-term groupings that control the situation. It needs to be underlined that ‘systemlessness’ as defined here is not confined only to the states mentioned under this category. This malady is much more widespread and invites a separate inquiry into the systemic and external factors that bring it about and then sustain it. Two Lives of the ‘Congress System’ After this long but necessary detour, we can now resume our journey of the evolution of the party system in the Indian states and evaluate the usefulness of the revised typology of the party system offered above. We have already noted that the Congress system was a product of the specific context in which democratic politics unfolded and became institutionalized in postindependence India. In order to appreciate this point, one needs to be sensitive Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 93 to the historical contrast between the path of bourgeois democracy in the West and the trajectory of democratic politics in post-colonial societies. In the West, enfranchisement was a gradual process. As this process was in progress, social divisions were also taking shape. Thus, the final moment of enfranchisement was also the moment of freezing of party political divisions. This happened because mobilization along various social divisions and evolution of political organizations around these divisions had already taken place (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Broadly, the national revolution and the industrial revolution created structures of cleavages that formed political divisions. In India, the anti-colonial struggle that provided a platform for powerful and mass mobilization also foreclosed the entry of many social cleavages into competitive politics. Thus, the introduction of universal adult franchise took place in a situation where structures of cleavages had not evolved and thus, a large part of society was yet to be mobilized. This provided an extraordinary autonomy to politics in 20th century India, for it could activate, institute or mask various kinds of potential cleavages. The national movement played a crucial role in this regard. It was not that various competing cleavages dictated terms to this political movement; it was rather the national movement that played a decisive role in upholding certain cleavages and pushing some other to the background. At the moment of independence, quite a few social divisions were available for political mobilization. Even a cursory look at these would invite a question as to why many of these were never actualized in politics. At the micro level, the village community, the jati, locality, were the possible platforms of mobilization. At the macro level, caste blocs, communal divisions, regional divisions within and among states, could become some of the political cleavages. Also, the division between rural and urban interests, division between the agricultural and modern economic sector could have become the bases of political contestations. Or, ideological divisions on the basis of modern vs traditional and Left vs Right were also potential platforms for political mobilization. Mobilization could also take place along issue-based or class-based divisions. These potential cleavages were mediated by the imperatives of the design of modern democracy. The institutional arrangements adopted by modern democracy coupled with the background of the nationalist movement made it necessary to mobilize people on a macro scale. Political competition too, came to be conducted on the all-India basis. This meant that localized, micro level divisions would not gain relevance. The aggregative compulsions of a first-past-the-post electoral system did not encourage the formation of cleavage-based politics. Some social categories were recognized constitutionally thus providing space for mobilization on these groups (SCs, STs, OBCs) which some others, though not recognized, already existed (Muslims, for 94 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar instance). The system of reserved seats in joint or single electorates, however, limited the potential of these categories for exclusivist mobilization. Partition of the country foreclosed the possibility of mobilization on the basis of minority status (particularly in the case of the Muslim community). The minority category was accommodated by including minority rights in the constitution and postponing the issue of reform in personal laws of the minorities. Ironically, these very features were to later become the basis of mobilization both among the majority community and the Muslim minority. In the course of the freedom movement under the leadership of Gandhi, two other social divisions were accepted as more or less authentic. One was the rural-urban divide. The other was regional identity based on linguistic states. In the post-independence period, the rural-urban divide could not develop as a basis of political mobilization, for the Congress began with a support base that cut across this divide. Language did become a platform for mobilization but once again the Congress was well placed to tackle it. By accepting the demand for the reorganization of states on linguistic basis, the Congress rendered the language divide politically harmless. In the period immediately following independence, political parties attempted to cultivate social support by appropriating the different potential divisions. The map of the party system of this period reflected the different spaces available for mobilization during that period. It also reflected the map of political movements of the first half of the 20th century. The depth of support enjoyed by different parties corresponded to the way in which the Congress in the pre-independence period related to the various divisions in the Indian society. Thus, during the first decade of independence, Congress was quite strong in parts of north India where it had accommodated the upper caste landed interests within the scope of its nationalist rhetoric. It was also strong in the areas where, as in Maharashtra, it had amalgamated the middle peasantry castes with a moderate reformist appeal. In other words, the Congress cultivated different social sections in different parts of the country and put them together on the basis of the nationalist ideology. Hence, the nationalist ideology performed an aggregative function. The Congress sought to mobilize the people on the basis of the preindependence dichotomization based on the idea of the ‘nation’. This master cleavage put other more specific cleavage-based mobilizations in a position of disadvantage. The socialists were looking forward to an ideology-based political division and sought to take advantage of the legacy of the 1942 Quit India movement. The communists were quite strong in West Bengal and the Telangana region as also in Kerala. They pushed the class divisions to the forefront particularly in the context of landlordism. The legacy of the self-respect movement and land reform movement along with trade unions in industrial centres formed the bases of the communist mobilizations. The Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 95 Swatantra party made initial inroads in the ex-princely states while the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS), an offshoot of the RSS, sought to construct a Hindu constituency by capitalizing on the anti-Muslim sentiment among the upper castes. The social justice movement formed the basis of the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) in South India, while the Akali movement gave birth to the Akali party in the Punjab. This brief summary is indicative of the nature of most of the non-Congress parties that operated in the period immediately following independence. While these parties corresponded to the different potential divisions in the society, they stood in contrast to the aggregative character of the Congress Party. Also, the support base of these parties depended upon the extent to which these divisions were actually explored for mobilization in the course of the nationalist movement. Mobilizations which were either explored by the Congress itself, or which evolved in spite of the Congress (as in the case of the Social Justice movement), or had sympathisers within the Congress (as in case of the supporters of Hindu nationalism) stood some chance of being relevant in the post-independence period as independent political formations or as viable political issues within the Congress Party. ‘Congress system’ was the inevitable product of this period and this historical backdrop. The central cleavage instituted by the nationalist movement (colonial rule vs the Indian nation) was aggregative in nature and strong enough to override almost all other divisions. The Congress project was the creation of a national political community that cut across all divisions. This engagement with the ‘imaginary institution of India’ continued after independence (Kaviraj 1993). The Congress became a rainbow coalition precluding other cleavages from any significant space in the political arena. It must be noted however, that other cleavages were not, at least on the whole, denied legitimate existence; they were instead accommodated. We have already noted the accommodation of regional, linguistic cleavages. By a series of micro designs and localized coalitions, the Congress managed to hold together the macro design called the national political community. This gave the Congress a ‘catch-all’ character constituting cross cutting cleavages. To go back to our typology, the Congress system had the political form of a one hegemonic party that allowed competition, dissent and opposition. Its hegemony never allowed political divisions to be intense, either in terms of exclusiveness of the party structure or in terms of ideological persuasions. This did not mean that no section or state gave rise to a more intense division than the Congress system cared to allow. In the first ‘life’ of the Congress system itself, one can come across states and social forces over which the hold of the Congress system was at best moderate. We have already mentioned that many areas escaped the Congress system. These were 96 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar the under-mobilized areas such as the ex-princely areas in Rajasthan, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh as also the states in the north-east. Interestingly, the states having a comparatively over-mobilized background (Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Punjab) also remained outside of the Congress system. Similarly, challenges to the Congress system came both from the socially excluded (tribals, peasantry castes) and those who were firmly ‘included’ (such as the urban, educated, upper castes). As we shall see later, the map of these challenges anticipates the two different directions in which the party systems would develop once the Congress system gave way. During this first life of the Congress system, there were two failed efforts to challenge the Congress system, one by Lohia through a social coalition of lower and peasantry castes and the other by the communists through class divisions. The first serious challenge to the Congress system came in 1967 when reconfiguration of party competition took place across the states. The hold of the hegemonic party competition weakened and short-lived coalitions were formed in many states. It was a challenge to the Congress system also in the sense that the ability of the Congress Party to accommodate dissent within itself eroded considerably, forcing many groups to break away and form various state Congress parties in the states. The national political community, drawing its sustenance from the nationalist movement and the Nehruvian developmental dream, was threatened by the aspirations of disparate social forces. The second attempt to construct a national political community cutting across regional and social divisions marks the ‘second life’ of the Congress system. Indira Gandhi sought to explore the mobilizational potential of the issue of poverty in such a manner that cleavage-based politics produced a nationwide sensibility in support of the new national political community. Thus, a clear class appeal was employed to neutralize other competing cleavages. Another national political community was born. Indira Gandhi’s victory both over her intra-party opponents and competitors outside the Congress in 1971 and her quick comeback in 1979–80 had the signature of a reborn Congress system. Underlying this macro level issue-based cleavage, there was a careful reconstruction of the social coalition led by the Congress Party. It was still a rainbow alright, but thick at its edges. There were state-specific aspects to this reconstruction. In Karnataka, Devraj Urs brought to the forefront the lower OBCs, Gujarat witnessed the KHAM (Kshatriya Harijan Adivasi Muslims) coalition sidelining the Patidars, while in U.P., a Brahmin-Dalit alliance was put in place. The new social coalition of the Congress had spectacular success. It cut across all other cleavages and resulted in the masking of all inter-state differences. And yet, it is possible to see in retrospect that the state-specific reconstruction undertaken by Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 97 indirectly allowed for consolidation of the state as the main theatre for carving out social coalitions. This hidden aspect of the second ‘life’ of the Congress system was to play a crucial role in the formation of the ‘third electoral system’ later in the 1990s. Indira Gandhi’s political success hinged on the political architecture that was based on state-specific strategies but one which could hide these specificities in order for the macro cleavage to occupy the centre stage. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, Indira Gandhi’s macro mobilizational strategy was challenged mainly from two quarters. Charan Singh continued to press for the rural-urban cleavage as the principal division of India and uphold agrarian interests throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. The Jan Sangh and later the BJP sought to shape a counter-cleavage around the issue of Hindu nationalism (initially a narrow version, followed by the ‘integrated humanism’ of Deen Dayal Upadhyaya and Gandhian Socialism). These challenges however, remained on the periphery. Indira Gandhi’s defeat in 1977 came about through an entirely different route. NonCongressism was turned into an electoral platform producing the momentary displacement of the Congress Party. But this moment could not produce an alternative master cleavage for politics to stabilize around it. As a result, Congress could reassert itself electorally in 1980. In spite of the comeback of the Congress, the national community, artificially constructed during the second life of the Congress system, was developing cracks. Already, the states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal had evolved their separate political rhythm independent of the national political waves. Haryana, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh also redefined their respective state-specific patterns through the 1970s and early 1980s. This same period also witnessed major challenges to the national political community emanating from the states of Assam and Punjab. Thus, a large part of the nation was drifting away from the Congress system. The Congress system was being redefined during the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, both ideologically and in terms of the social basis of politics. Rajiv Gandhi extricated Congress politics from its vacuous rhetoric of socialism and instead brought issues of technology and globalization onto the centre stage of political discussions. The 1980s also witnessed the entry of new sections of Indian society into the political process. Rajiv Gandhi was successful in attracting the urban, middle-class sections into the process of shaping the political agenda. These sections now started dominating and legitimizing the agenda of politics and influenced the thrust of the decisions of the government. For all practical purposes, this redefinition of the Congress system anticipated the momentous changes in the economic policy that were to take place later. Rajiv’s efforts to resolve the Punjab, Assam and Mizo disputes also forced him to redefine the terms of political competition between the Congress and the regional political parties. In retrospect Rajiv’s attempt at redefinition of 98 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar the Congress contained within itself seeds of the erosion and decline of the Congress system. But no one thought so at that moment. The Moment of Reconfiguration and Differentiation The second life of the Congress system came to an abrupt end, an abruptness that could only be seen retrospectively. The last years of Rajiv Gandhi’s regime provided ample signs that the Congress system was increasingly becoming a closed system, devoid of any meaningful choices. The huge majorities enjoyed by the Congress in most of the states of north and west India in the wake of Mrs Gandhi’s assassination became a stone around its neck. By insulating the party against any pressure from within or outside, these massive majorities served to block the few remaining avenues of political learning and feedback. While on paper most of these states fell under the system of one party hegemony, the reality was somewhat different. The Congress system was developing elements of both the other possibilities inherent in situations of one-party dominance: that of exclusion and closure. The legacy of the last phase of Mrs Gandhi’s regime had turned it into a system of domination over the various minorities and ethnic nationalities. Rajiv Gandhi’s regime had the effect of making the regime appear as a closed one-party system, that left little for citizens to choose from. Towards the end of its second life, the Congress system desperately needed an overhaul; it needed nothing short of a third attempt to reinvent a national political community and in the process reinvent the Congress the way Mrs Gandhi did. Rajiv Gandhi was simply not up to this historic task. The hold of Rajiv Gandhi over the imagination of India’s middle classes began to slip after the Bofors’ exposure of 1987–88. The run up to the 1989 Lok Sabha elections indicated a stiff challenge to the Congress; the result was worse than the Congress feared. But even the defeat of the Congress in the 1989 Lok Sabha elections did not suggest a collapse of the Congress system. On the face of it, the election results of 1989 seemed to be the repetition of the familiar pattern of 1977: opposition unity, popular wave in north India against Congress Party, a repetition of the Lok Sabha results in the round of assembly elections held in 1990, disintegration of JD-BJP alliance reminiscent of the break-up of Janata Party, formation of a minority government by Chandrashekhar on the lines of the Charan Singh regime. All the details seemed to fit in the model of 1977–79. It was therefore, natural to expect the return of the Congress in the 1991 elections to the Lok Sabha. That did not happen, not even with the support of a sympathy swing after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination during the campaign. This, perhaps, was the moment of the demise of the Congress system. Ironically, the first government to be Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 99 formed in the post-Congress polity was a Congress government. But the rules of the game had now changed. This was demonstrated by a string of Congress defeats in the series of Assembly elections between 1993 and 1995. Transition from the Congress system to the post-Congress polity was neither gradual nor smooth. It was a product of a systemic shock, a cataclysmic transformation. It was not merely the change in the ruling party or a change in the political actors engaged in competition for power. The terms of political competition and the issues involved in this competition changed dramatically around this time. This period was marked by a fundamental reconfiguration of the party political space. While the decline of the Congress seemed like a crisis initially, it was also an opportunity to revitalize the democratic political competition and introduce greater substance in this. This reconfiguration of the structure of political competition was marked by the arrival of the three ‘Ms’ on to the national political stage: Mandir, Mandal and Market. This moment of sudden transformation deserves careful recall and scrutiny, if only to understand better the momentous consequences of some of the changes that happened almost overnight. The controversy over the disputed site at Ayodhya was revived by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and later picked up by the RSS and the BJP. This resulted in the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation, which witnessed high emotional mobilization among the Hindus and attempts at constructing a homogenized Hindu constituency across caste and region. However, the politics of Mandir brought into sharp focus questions about the plural character of Indian society and the resilience of the democratic political process. The Mandir controversy was associated with division of the society between majority and minority religious communities, series of episodes of communal violence and challenges to the institutional set up. With Advani and Govindacharya as the chief architects, the Mandir issue sought to shift the terms of political discourse from plural democracy to majoritarian politics. What began in the 1980s as an agitation by a small section of fanatics, turned into a major framework for conducting politics during the 1990s. Even before the actual demolition of the Babari Masjid in December 1992, the politics of Mandir had already occupied a central position in national politics. The BJP was catapulted to the centre stage by the events of 1989–91. First, the BJP propped up the V.P. Singh government so long as it suited the interests of the BJP. Then, the BJP came to power in the most crucial state, Uttar Pradesh. This was followed by the party’s spectacular performance in the Lok Sabha elections of 1991 that saw the BJP emerge as the main opposition party at the national level. But alongside these developments, this period also witnessed the unfolding of another process, the rise of Dalits and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in Indian politics. Politics of the backward classes has a long history. In the states of south India, the rise of the backward classes had taken place 100 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar in the 1960s. But both in north India and at the national level, the entry of the backward classes was stoutly resisted. The failure of the Congress to adapt to the ambitions of these sections in most parts of the country and especially in north India had cost it dearly in 1977–78. Yet, the party chose to ignore the recommendations of the Mandal Commission and let the report of the Mandal Commission become the symbol around which politics of the Other Backward Classes was built in north India. When the recommendations were actually accepted by the V.P. Singh government, clashes between the forward castes and the backward castes took place in north India. Both the Congress and the BJP sought to ride piggyback on this upper caste backlash. The politics of OBCs was already inaugurated. Sweeping the states of U.P. and Bihar, the Mandal issue brought into focus questions about not only the reservations and backwardness of the ‘lower’ castes, but also the question of share in political power. The Mandal factor instituted caste cleavage at the heart of north Indian politics. It set the tone for the discussions of social justice and symbolized the upsurge of the subalterns. The upsurge was not limited to the OBCs. The BSP, under Kanshi Ram’s leadership had shifted its emphasis from Punjab and Haryana to Uttar Pradesh and started scoring upsets quietly under the din of Mandir and Mandal. The BSP was to make deft use of the sudden opening in UP politics and surprise everyone by striking an alliance with the SP and winning the 1993 assembly elections in the state. UP has never been the same again. Although V.P. Singh may be seen as the chief architect of Mandal strategy, the ‘Mandalization’ of politics of north India could not have happened without Kanshi Ram, Mayawati, Laloo Prasad and Mulayam Singh. Soon, no party could afford to take this issue lightly. If Mandir and Mandal had their rise in the late 1980s, the third ‘M’ surfaced as the new decade unfolded. Yet, it may be noted that the beginnings had been made in the 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, the Indian state was following, somewhat surreptitiously, the programme of restructuring the economy. However, it was only in 1991–92 that bold justifications of the ‘market economy’ started emanating from the official discourse of the Indian state. Narsimha Rao and Manmohan Singh were its architects. Once it emerged, it went almost unchallenged by the political establishment amid the din over Mandir and Mandal. In any case, V.P. Singh was the finance minister in 1985–86 when Rajiv Gandhi took bold initiatives in this direction and the BJP said that the new initiatives were what it always wanted. Thus, there was little political resistance to the adoption of a new ideological position on the economic policy. But more than a state ideology, ‘Market’ ascended to become the ideology of the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, the civil society, as it were. A false or misplaced debate over ‘socialism’ quickly gave way to a more fashionable Nehru baiting. By the time the United Front Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 101 government came to power at the centre, all this was history. The new government quietly and willingly set about the task of continuing the economic policies initiated by its Congress predecessors. When the BJP finally came to power, it sped up the pace of changes, perhaps somewhat brazenly. The Market design of politics did not aim at producing a class cleavage. However, the project of letting loose the ‘middle class’ consumerist ambition and developing unbridled capitalism ended up instituting class cleavage. In retrospect, these three ‘Ms’ look like three projects: three new frameworks of politics trying to replace the old and tattered framework left by the Congress system. It is worthwhile to pause and note what they were actually trying to replace. In its first life, the Congress system drew strength from projecting a master cleavage: the nation vs the colonial power. This construction helped the Congress system build a ‘national’ or ‘all-India’ political community. This was to be the node around which Congress domination was carved out. In its second life, when the relevance of the earlier cleavage had declined considerably, Indira Gandhi sought to construct the ‘all-India community’ by exploiting the cleavage between the poor masses and the rich. Mandir, Mandal and Market should be seen as three projects to recreate the ‘national community’. The Mandir design aimed at establishing the national community with the Hindu community as its central pillar while the Mandal design privileged the OBCs as the core of the national community. The third design saw the middle class as the anchor of the reinvented national community. In doing so, these designs also tried to project a metacleavage around which competitive politics would be conducted. The Congress system collapsed both under the weight of its own weaknesses and the pressure of these new designs. The history of Indian politics since 1989, is the history of these three competing frameworks colliding at different points with unequal force and producing consequences no one person intended or anticipated. In the period of electoral volatility and governmental instability, collision and competition among these three powerful designs created unprecedented space for the reconfiguration of the party system. The complexities involved in the competition between the new forces emerging out of these new designs and the competition among these designs themselves define the moment of differentiation, the moment of shift away from the Congress system in the 1990s. Many states, through their separate trajectories, saw the break of the Congress Party in assembly elections in the 1990s and, by the mid-1990s, this trend appeared on the national political scene. Looking back at that moment after more than a decade, it is clear that none of these three frameworks have realized fully their own designs. In fact, the main architects of these frameworks, except Advani, are all on the 102 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar political margins or in the wilderness. And yet, all the three have transformed the conditions of political competition as well as the content of politics. The Mandal framework didn’t succeed in instituting an all-India backward-forward cleavage to serve as the basis of a new political formation or coalition. The rise of Dalit and OBC parties did achieve local success in instituting caste cleavage in some states, like U.P. and Bihar. Even there, the Mandal framework could not realize the unity of all backward castes, let alone a broader Dalit-OBC unity. Instead, it intensified caste awareness and political ambitions among the various backward and Dalit castes. The main success of the Mandal framework, however, lies in changing the social composition of the political elites within different parties. PostMandal, all major parties accommodated the ambitions of the backward classes and facilitated the entry of the leaders belonging to the backward castes both at the state level and the central level. Ironically, this success of the Mandal framework has meant that the aspiration of its chief protagonists to emerge as leaders of all backward castes has not been fulfilled and they (particularly Laloo and Mulayam) have been mostly confined to their respective states. Dalit upsurge has had more substantive achievements to its credit, than has the rise of the OBCs. At least in Uttar Pradesh the entry of the BSP into high politics has changed the texture of daily life and contributed to the dignity of the ordinary Dalit citizen. Notwithstanding all these achievements, the fact remains that the Mandal framework failed to realize its principal ambition of instituting an enduring all-India cleavage and in aggregating the gains of Dalit and OBC upsurge. Mandal was fragmented, localized and thus contained. The success and visibility of the Mandir framework has been a little more pronounced than the Mandal framework. Its objective of instituting an allIndia issue cleavage along Hindutva vs non-Hindutva line that would render other divisions obsolete did not succeed, at least not in the way the RSS family wanted. The attempt to create an all-India Hindutva community soon came up against regional and caste divisions. These limitations notwithstanding, the Mandir framework has been successful in three respects. First, it has successfully caught the imagination of the educated middle classes. Second, the communal cleavage has made its presence felt across the country in areas where the BJP or Jan Sangh did not have any space earlier. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Mandir framework has altered the terms of political discourse. It has pushed the secular democratic character of the nation-state into an arena of contestation. Though their immediate objective of constructing a temple at Ayodhya has not been fulfilled and the dream of becoming a natural party of governance in Uttar Pradesh on this basis lies in tatters, the architects of the Mandir framework have exploited its failures to shift the terms of political discourse about the nature of the Indian nation. Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 103 In that sense the fate of Mandir has been quite the opposite of Mandal: it has met with local failure but has succeeded in creating something of an issue cleavage at the national level. Market has been the least voluble or visible of the three projects, but it is perhaps the most successful of the three, in realizing its objectives. As mentioned earlier, its success mainly hinged on creating a subterranean convergence involving all the major political parties and thus insulating economic policies from the logic of democratic politics. Successive finance ministers shared the common policy space in the 1990s, making it possible for the Market project to be realized. The liberalization of the economy and its integration with global capitalism replaced the national vs colonial cleavage from the cognitive map of the politician and the middle class alike. The market project facilitated not only the integration of the Indian capitalist class with their global counterparts, it also provided the ground for an alliance between India’s capitalist class and the burgeoning middle classes. This alliance ensured that the economy would be insulated from the volatility of electoral verdicts. Thus, the Market project succeeded in delinking itself and economic policy decisions from party political competition. While politics would contest the social character of power and the ideological content of nation, economic policy making was ‘depoliticized’. Thus, Market succeeded in emptying democratic decision making of a significant range of choices. The choices were not available to the citizen, for the subject matter had been taken away from the arena of democratic politics. This is how, despite governmental instability, India witnessed remarkable continuity in economic policy. However, hidden in these successes of the Market project, have been many unintended consequences. As observed earlier, class cleavages have become sharper, the normalization of the workforce has been under-way and this has been altering the patterns of mobilization, the social location of the middle classes has moved farther from the poor and the disprivileged, civil societal sensitivity to poverty and suffering has declined, and so on. These developments have changed the ground for politics in the long run. The consensus on new economic policy cutting across the political spectrum has brought about a subtle shift in the party system. Whatever the format of electoral competition, and wherever their prior location on the two-dimensional map of party system space, all the states have moved downwards on the dimension of the nature of political choice. This collision of attempts at creating caste, communal and class cleavages may or may not have succeeded in creating any of its intended divisions, but it did certainly produce a lasting effect on the nature of party political competition that no one designed: the rise of regional- or state-based politics. Suddenly, in the 1990s, state boundaries became the real boundaries of the 104 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar political universe. State became the relevant unit at which politics was conducted and was intelligible as well. This takes us to one of the central puzzles of Indian politics at the turn of the century: how did three competing attempts to homogenize politics and to create a national political community end up creating quite the opposite, a political community differentiated at the state or regional level? To begin with, the existing party system constrained the extent to which these homogenization projects could be realized. Given the unevenness that had developed towards the end of the Congress system, the existing structure of political competition offered uneven opportunities to different projects in different parts of the country, creating an impression that the state was the theatre where this drama unfolded. There was, for instance, little space outside the Congress system for caste or communal projects to spread. This excludes West Bengal, A.P., Tamil Nadu and Kerala from the locations likely to be affected by the Mandal or Mandir projects. In many parts of south India, the caste issue had already been routinized and the Mandal project only effected an additional closure as far as terms of political competition were concerned. It was mainly in U.P. and Bihar where the Mandal project redefined the terms of political competition. In the rest of the north Indian states, it was not as successful, mainly because of the lack of a political carrier. In states like Maharashtra and Gujarat, issue space was fuzzy and a political carrier was lacking. For the Mandir project too, north India provided the main theatre because of the availability of both issue-space and political carrier. Gradually, the Mandir project penetrated those states where the Congress system was declining (for instance, Maharashtra and Gujarat). This led to a differentiated structure of opportunities and political competition. Initially, the occasion for differentiation arose out of the desire of the political actors to take advantage of uneven opportunities in different states. Later, the Mandal and Mandir projects attempted to restructure the opportunity space and the party competition itself. Second, a long-term change in political geography had prepared the ground for effective utilization of this unevenness. The politico-administrative structure had produced internal political homogenization of most of the states. The struggles for formation of a separate state (as in the cases of A.P., Punjab, Maharashtra, etc.), occasional rhetoric of regionalism or backwardness and discrimination (for instance in Tamil Nadu, or say, Bihar), separate political trajectories different from the Congress system (West Bengal, Kerala), were some of the factors responsible for creating opportunities of internal homogenization within the state. Besides, the existence of the states as units of federal governance had fostered the salience of state as a political unit. People of different states got used to the state as the scale of political choices. This had two implications. While people understood national politics through Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 105 the prism of the state, there was an unwillingness to recognize any other scale or unit of politics between the state and the central government. This contributed to the homogenization of the state. On the other hand, the emphasis on the state also means that any alternatives smaller than the state disappeared from the political consciousness of the people. Regions within states or districts, etc., became only administrative categories and lost much of their political salience. The cumulative effect of all these factors is the process of intra-state homogenization that has been slowly and gradually taking place almost since the 1950s. It has had an inverse relationship with the level of inter-state variation. Three patterns may be observed in this respect. Initially, just after the constitution of the Indian union, when inter-state variation was moderate, intra-state variation was very high. This was followed by a period, during the second life of the Congress, of low inter-state variation coupled with moderate intra-state variation. Finally, we are now witnessing a phase when inter-state variation has increased, but intra-state variation has become insignificant. This sums up the story of the rise of states as the authentic node around which political competition becomes intelligible. Third, the political and economic experience of the last five decades promoted the growth of states as the principal political unit. During India’s journey on the road of development, state governments became the loci of all day-to-day concerns and aspirations of the citizen. Simultaneously, the formation of states on a linguistic basis provided a common cultural platform. Now what Anderson (1991) calls the ‘print cultures’ of the regions coincided with the boundaries of the states. This strengthened the separateness and identity of the state. These factors ensured that the three ‘Ms’ discussed above were institutionalized in the party political space in a state specific manner. This explains the paradox of the drive for homogenization producing differentiation. Let us briefly sum up the nature and consequences of this differentiation for party political competition. It must be emphasized that what we are witnessing is not ‘regionalism’. Paradoxical though it may seem, the ascendance of the region or state to the centre stage of Indian politics is not an outcome of any conscious ideological mobilization or movement based on regional outlook or sentiment. Instead, it is a structural consequence that was largely unintended. Moreover, this ascendance of the states is not accompanied by the regionalist tendency. It is a shift of the ‘locale’ of politics and as a consequence, the filtering of the three frameworks of politics through statespecific configurations. Further, it will be a mistake to describe this development as rise of centrifugal tendency or mere ‘decentering’ of the nation, for the process has given rise to intra-state homogenization and in the process turned the state into a strong locus of power. 106 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar This process of differentiation has already had three long-term consequences for shaping the structure of political competition and in filtering the range of effective choices available to ordinary citizens. First, we witness the emergence of the state as the effective level of exercizing political choice. Contemporary politics in India has rendered lower levels as unviable and anything higher than the state is perceived as unconnected or remote. This means that national level electoral verdicts are mere aggregation of state level verdicts. It has also meant that national-level verdict becomes intelligible only when understood in its state-specific context. Second, there is now greater space and incentive for state-level political formations to emerge. In the period of decline of the Congress system, a number of ‘state-level’ parties have come to the forefront. Parties like the SP, RJD, INLD, TMC and the BJD, are some examples of this. Finally, the process of formation of new states has also become less contested than before. The relative ease with which Uttaranchal, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were added to the Indian union in November 2001 is a case in point. Wherever the project of intrastate homogenization encountered variations that resisted stream-rolling, new states could be formed without the anxieties previously associated with such decisions. From Hegemony to Convergence in Post-Congress Polity The period of transition from the ‘second life’ of the Congress system to the ‘post-Congress polity’ was marked by a very unusual historic moment around the beginning of 1990s, a moment of the reconfiguration of the party system and differentiation of the state-level political trends and patterns from the national level. As we have noted above, this moment was characterized by a confluence of long-term forces, cataclysmic events and historic personalities. The moment of reconfiguration and differentiation thus created different opportunity spaces in different states and for different social groups. The political story of the 1990s is the story of how different political actors— parties, leaders and social groups—came to utilize this differential and differentiated opportunity space depending on their skills, resources, vision, mobilizational capacity and, of course, sheer luck. The focus of social science reasoning on structures often leads us to underestimate the role of agency in such critical and fluid moments of ‘structuration’. Could, for instance, the Congress have had a ‘third life’ if Rajiv Gandhi had not been assassinated, or if he had been succeeded by a mass leader capable of transforming the party? More realistically, was Gujarat likely to develop a two-party system Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 107 if Chimanbhai Patel had not led the suicide of the Janata Dal? Would Bihar have witnessed the regime transition without the presence of Laloo Prasad? What, for instance, if Mulayam Singh had pre-empted Kanshi Ram in mobilizing Dalit voters and thus forged a Dalit-OBC unity from below? In particular, the story of the 1990s is the story of a radical opportunity opening up due to the end of Congress hegemony. There was a historic opportunity for freeing democratic politics of the closures and exclusions that the Congress system had come to apply and to open up political space for articulation and aggregation of interests and aspirations of the various social groups and regions that the Congress system found itself increasingly incapable of addressing. At a more general plane, the end of the Congress system opened the possibility of competitive politics providing greater room for substantive choices for ordinary citizens. The story of the last 15 years is the story of how this historic opportunity was missed and negated in and through the arena of competitive politics. At the level of the party system, it is a story of the transition from a system of one-party hegemony to a system of bipolar and multipolar convergence. While the format of political competition underwent a radical change, there was little corresponding change in the nature and range of choices available to the citizen. If anything, at the state level there has been a rolling back of the temporary expansion of the range of effective choices available to the citizens. In that sense, the story of the 1990s is the story of how the logic of structures of socio-economic inequalities worked as a constant ‘drag’ and finally overpowered and contained the democratic upsurge in the post-Congress polity. The opportunity opened up by the end of the Congress system was not available in equal measure and in similar measure to all states. Many had already broken away decisively from the Congress system before the critical moment of reconfiguration of differentiation. Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh had their ‘critical’ elections in 1983, reinforced by mid-term polls to the assembly in both the states, where the long established patterns of Congress partisanship were decisively broken to give way to what appeared like a two-party system. The Congress hegemony in Assam came to an end with the 1985 elections. The Congress hegemony in Haryana was always suspect, for ever since the formation of the new state the party could never develop enduring support among the dominant Jat community. Whatever remained of its hegemony was washed away in the 1987 electoral wave by Devi Lal. And then there were states like West Bengal, Kerala and Tamil Nadu that had broken free of Congress hegemony way back in the 1960s. The reconfiguration of the party system, especially at the national level, was to have some effect on these states too. In particular the logic of differentiation applied to these states with equal measure. But these states were not the principal sites of the effect of the end of Congress hegemony. 108 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar The principal sites that were open to radical reconfiguration were of course the states, mainly of north and west India that were still under the system of Congress hegemony till 1989 or so: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa and, in lesser measure, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi. The sudden demise of the Congress system created room in these states for the entry of new political forces or for rearranging the format of party competition. It created an opportunity for new issues and demands to be articulated effectively within the party political arena. It released, even if momentarily, the various subaltern communities and groups that were traditionally affiliated to the Congress, and opened for them the opportunity of political bargaining. In particular, it left the Congress vulnerable to aggressive sectional mobilization of these groups. This had implications for the political strategy of the Congress and its rivals. As the opponents of the Congress pursued successfully the path of sectional mobilization, the Congress found that its catch-all strategy was increasingly not viable. In response to the sectional mobilization by its rivals, the Congress too became more of a sectional party than ever before (Yadav 2003: 64–70). The states that broke away from Congress hegemony around or after 1990 followed three broad trajectories. In the first group are the states of north and west India—Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and possibly the new states of Uttaranchal and Chhattisgarh—that shifted from Congress hegemony to a neat bipolar convergence involving the Congress and the BJP. The second group of states include Uttar Pradesh and Bihar—and now Jharkhand—that utilized this opportunity in a more radical way by moving from Congress hegemony to a system of competitive divergence of a multipolar variety. However these states did not stay this way for a very long and moved towards a system of multipolar convergence. The third group of states—Maharashtra and Orissa—took a more ambiguous route involving a transition from Congress hegemony to multipolar convergence of sorts. Let us look at each of these routes closely. In terms of democratic possibilities of social transformation, the transition from Congress hegemony to Congress-BJP oscillation, is the least promising. The transition involved a mere reshuffling of the political furniture with little or no change in the range and the nature of choices available to the citizens. The principal change in the format of political competition here was the elimination of the third force from the menu of political options. It needs reminding that all these states had a significant presence of some version of the Janata Dal till as late as 1990: the Janata Dal of Rajasthan was well entrenched in the eastern and northern regions, especially among the Jats; the Janata Dal of Gujarat was in fact electorally stronger than the BJP; the Janata Dal and the Communists were weaker in Madhya Pradesh and Himachal, but not extinct; the rural outskirts of Outer Delhi had a strong Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 109 presence of Janata Dal. In all these states, the third force suddenly disappeared in the Lok Sabha elections in 1991 and the Assembly elections held subsequently. The BJP used its Ram-wave votes to become a statewide rival to the Congress in all these states. Ever since the emergence of a neat twoparty system in this group of states, there has been a distinct ‘dumbing down’ of the political discourse. While the Congress has a distinctly lower caste, lower class profile in terms of its support, this is not reflected in its policy postures or actions. Power oscillates between the two parties—regularly in Himachal, Rajasthan and Delhi and less regularly in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh—but without much change in the agenda of politics. The high entry barrier set by the bipolar system enables both the parties to push any serious challenger—the BSP in Madhya Pradesh, the HVC in Himachal and the various Uttarakhand groups in Uttaranchal—below the threshold of electoral viability. In many ways the choices and bargaining opportunities available to the citizens have been reduced since the emergence of the two-party system. Arguably, Gujarat may not have gone the way it did in 2002 but for the elimination of the third force and the neat bipolar choice. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the demise of the Congress system was accompanied by the sharp decline of the Congress Party. In Bihar, the Congress never fully recovered from the Socialist challenge in the 1960s and continued to lurch in the state while it had a vibrant second life all over the country. In Uttar Pradesh, it was less a case of inherited weaknesses than of inability to respond to the multi-pronged onslaught from the BJP, the BSP and the JD (later SP) between 1989 and 1991. The very sharp decline of the Congress Party in both these states opened a huge opportunity for its rivals, unlike the states in the first group where the space released was very limited. The BJP’s famous victory in the 1991 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh barely concealed a fundamental change in the rules of the game: electoral contests all over the state had become triangular, if not quadrangular. The BJP took away a slice of the upper-caste and lower OBC vote of the Congress, but created a new constituency for itself. The SP consolidated the traditional peasant base of Socialist parties and combined it with the Muslim vote snatched from the Congress. The BSP’s Dalit vote came principally at the cost of the Congress. Attacked from all the sides, the Congress was left with no section of its own and was reduced to a rump. The fragmentation of party political space and the competitive politics of caste-community polarization opened spaces for regions, issues and groups that had no voice during the Congress hegemony. The issues of Dalit dignity and atrocities against Dalits have forced themselves on to the political agenda. The Muslim vote cannot be taken for granted. Demand for regions like Uttaarkhand, Harit Pradesh and Poorvanchal have been placed on the political agenda. And, the competition for the lower OBC vote has improved their bargaining capacity. 110 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar Uttar Pradesh did not stay in the system of competitive divergence for very long. Once the three big players had reached a point of saturation of their respective caste-community support, they started looking for strategies to go beyond their ‘natural’ constituency. This imperative of manufacturing a stable majority in this electoral system combined with the lack of an economic agenda of the SP and BSP and their inability to come together has meant that the major players are involved in an unfinished search for points of convergence. Their antagonism has turned more personal than political, more episodic than policy-driven. It seems that the possibility of the system of competitive divergence producing transformative social and economic policies has receded in Uttar Pradesh. Bihar has reached a similar state through a different route. Here the space vacated by the Congress and the absence of a strong Ram lehar (wave) or a Dalit formation around 1990 was ably utilized by Laloo Prasad to create an enduring social bloc that has ensured the continuous rule of this party. Here again, the fracturing of party political space has opened up many democratic possibilities: the strangle-hold of the upper caste over positions of power has been eased, the demand for Jharkhand was conceded, the voice of backward communities within Muslims is being recognized. But the continuous electoral dominance of the RJD despite a dismal track-record on development has meant the disappearance of developmental issues from the political agenda. The citizens of Bihar do have a wider range to choose from, but may not have any substantial choice on the menu. The party system in the newly formed state of Jharkhand is yet to crystallize. As of now, the competitive format lies somewhere between the ‘two-plus’ and the multipolar types of contestation. It is more likely that it will move straight into multipolar convergence, with the crucial issue of the control of adivasis on natural resources being kept outside the political domain. But there is an outside chance of a bipolar convergence between Congress and the BJP at the cost of the JMM. The third route is more varied but the destination is not very different from that of the first two. It involves moving from Congress hegemony to multipolar convergence with a brief halt at bipolar competition. The longest lasting and perhaps the most intricately worked out system of Congress hegemony came to an end in Maharashtra in 1995. Since then the competitive structure is basically bipolar, though the presence of the BJP as the Shiv Sena’s smaller partner and the split in the Congress gives political competition a quadrangular appearance. Since the Congress hegemony in this state had not become a system of exclusion and closure as it did in many others, it is not clear if the bipolar or quadrangular competition has added much to the menu of choice. In Orissa, the institution of first a bipolar (Congress-JD) and then a triangular (Congress-BJD-BJP) competition has added little to Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 111 the political agenda except the question of regional discrimination. In this state, untouched by Mandal, Dalit upsurge or class mobilization, the choices available to the electors are perhaps one of the narrowest in the country. Similar patterns of change in the competitive format characterizes Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Assam, though these have been accompanied by a marginal expansion of the range of choices available. In all these states, the entry of the BJP has changed the competitive format. In Karnataka, it happened first in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections, but the BJP has stagnated since then. Despite its many splits and unities, the JD has maintained a significant presence especially among rural agrarian classes. The TDP, especially under the leadership of Chandrababu Naidu, built on the opportunity it gained in 1983, in a way in which the Janata Dal of Karnataka failed to. The TDP replicated the catch-all character of the Congress in social term and was in fact, one of the few non-Congress parties to develop an enduring support among the poor and the very poor. Naidu also used deftly the opportunity provided by coalitional politics to prevent third-party inroads into an essentially two-party system. With a strong challenge to the established parties from the Telangana Rajya Samiti, the state may be headed for a ‘two-plus’ or even multipolar competition. Despite a one-party rule currently, Assam is more mutipolar than any other major state of India. The AGP’s inability to hold on to its social constituency or build enduring social coalitions has opened the space for the BJP’s entry into the state. More than the BJP’s entry, it is the fractionalization of the party political space along ethnic lines that may be the defining characteristic of Assam’s party system for some time to come. This fragmentation has created room for articulation of the demands of smaller groups and ethnicities, but it is not clear if this expansion has any transformative implications. The states that had broken away from the Congress system in the 1960s have not been affected by the demise of the system, though some changes have come about in these due to other factors. Kerala is the one state that has seen virtually no change in its party system in the last 20 years. In the period since 1990, the bipolar competition between the UDF and the LDF has continued as in the past with some minor adjustment among the UDF partners. This tight bipolar competition has left no space for the BJP or any outsider to gain a toehold. The end of the Congress system has not meant a decline of the Congress Party in Kerala. The overall tendency is for the two alliances to come closer to each other on the issue space in Kerala politics, though it is not quite a case of full convergence. In West Bengal, the dominance of the Left Front and within it the growing dominance of the CPI (M) continued uninterrupted in the 1990s. But the party system was influenced by the logic of differentiation and reconfiguration. In the period of the Left’s rise to power, West Bengal was a clear instance of competitive divergence leading 112 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar to transformative politics. In the last decade, two developments have changed the categorization. The continued and overwhelming dominance of the CPI (M) and the splintering of the opposition make West Bengal the only case of one-party hegemony in contemporary India. Over the years the Left has diluted its original agenda, its opponents have taken up some of its issues and thus, the divergence has come down. In the case of Tamil Nadu, it was not so much the demise of the Congress system as the decline and split of the Congress Party in the state that triggered party system reconfigurations. The last decade has seen the rise of many region and community based parties in Tamil Nadu, as has been the case in U.P. and Assam. In that sense there has been a move towards multipolarity that has ensured more space for smaller formations and interests. The recent practice of creating two grand alliances, on the lines of Kerala, under the leadership of DMK and the AIADMK would institutionalize the role of smaller parties. This would also bring the system one more step in the direction of convergence, now that the DMK has given up its old ideological positions. That leaves the last category of states that have seen system-less competition in conditions of continued political fluidity. Haryana stands on the fringe of this category and its position seems to move from election to election. At the moment it appears less unstructured than before, but in the absence of any stable voter-party and leader-party relationship, it could change. The entry of BJP in Goa seems to have reduced the level of fluidity and introduced an element of competitive divergence in the state. But if the state settles for a Congress-BJP bipolarity, the long-term trend may be for a convergence. The BJP’s entry in some hill states of the northeast may have increased the role of national parties in the region, but has done little to change the conditions of fluidity. Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh continue to be the most fluid states in terms of their party system, while structures of competitive politics are emerging in Meghalaya and Mizoram. Tripura has had a stable ‘two-plus’ system of competitive divergence that does not show signs of convergence on the ethnic question. Holding a fair and largely free election in Jammu and Kashmir and then in Nagaland may allow a system to develop in these places, but it is too early to comment on these states. Conclusions This preliminary overview of the evolution of the party system at the state level brings to our attention a paradox. Our insistence on classifying the party system in the Indian context along the two dimensions of the competitive format and the nature of the choice set helps us define this paradox. On the one hand, there is a trend towards opening of the competitive format: Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 113 single-party dominance is now an exception rather than the rule; a large number of states have shifted to a two-party or two-plus party competition and there are many more multipolar systems than before. On the other hand, there is no clear trend of a corresponding expansion in the range and deepening of the nature of the choice set available to the citizens. If anything, the overall impression is that of stagnation or shrinkage in the choice set. Electoral politics does provide occasions for radical choices to be placed on the political menu. But such choices do not stay there for very long. The analysis offered above suggests something of a systemic ‘drag’ towards what we have called ‘convergence’, the tendency for the major players in the party political arena to become like one another and the gradual disappearance from the political agenda of issues with transformative potential. A tension between these two dimensions of democratic politics has existed for quite some time. But the developments of the last decade in Indian politics have sharpened this contrast. The sudden collapse of the Congress hegemony opened a radical possibility of electoral political competition becoming an instrument of social transformation through effective use of the expanded choices that it was expected to offer. Experience has not borne out this expectation. The emergence of state as the effective unit of political choice and the development of trends and patterns of state politics independent of one another did open up the stagnant party system for a reconfiguration. As a result of this reconfiguration, party political competition has become more intense. In some cases this new competitiveness has helped marginalized social groups get access to a voice or register their presence. On balance, however, it looks like a case of more and more competition about less and less. Attempts at transformative politics either do not get to cross the entry barriers or are contained in a short span of time through various mechanisms of ‘emptying’ the party political space of its content. Are we dealing here with a practical failure or is it a systemic outcome, something that is written in the logic of our kind of democracy? If it is a failure of political practice, what is the mechanism of incentives and disincentives that produces such a collective outcome? If, on the other hand, we are talking about a systemic phenomenon, which system are we talking about—the electoral system or the socio-economic system? What are the institutional constraints that account for the systemic ‘drag’? We leave these questions for students of comparative democratic experience to examine. References Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition, London and New York: Verso. 114 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar Blondel, Jean. 1968. ‘Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies’, in Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1(2). Chatterjee, Partha and Gyanendra Pandey (eds). 1993. Subaltern Studies. Vol. VII. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chhibber, Pradeep and Irfan Nooruddin. 1999. ‘Party Competition and Fragmentation in Indian National Elections 1957–98’ in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Church, Roderick. 1984. ‘Conclusion: The Pattern of State Politics in Indira Gandhi’s India’, in Robert A. Dahl (ed.). 1966. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press. De Souza, Peter Ronald. 1999. ‘Pragmatic Politics in Goa: 1987–99’, Economic and Political Weekly, 34(34–35). Dreze, Jean and Amartya Sen (eds). 1998. India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties, New York: Wiley. Frankel, Francine and M.S.A. Rao (eds). 1989 and 1990. Dominance and State Power in India: Decline of a Social Order. Vols I & II, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Harriss, John. 1999. ‘Comparing Political Regimes Across Indian States, A Preliminary Essay’, Economic and Political Weekly, 34(48), 27 November. Hasan, Zoya. 1998. Quest for Power: Oppositional Movements & Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. ———. (ed.). 2002. Parties and Party Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Jaffrelot, Christopher. 1993. The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s. New Delhi: Viking. ———. 2003. India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India. New York: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, Robert. 2004. Regional Reflection: Comparing Politics Across India’s States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1993. ‘The Imaginary Institution of India’, in Partha Chatterjee and Gyanendra Pandey (eds), Subaltern Studies. Vol. VII. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kohli, Atul. 1987. The State and Poverty in India. Mumbai: Cambridge University Press, in association with Orient Longman. Kothari, Rajni. 1961. ‘Form and Substance in Indian Politics’, The Economic Weekly, 3 June. ———. 1964. ‘The Congress System in India’, Asian Survey, 4(12), December. ———. 1970. Politics in India. Boston: Little Brown. ———. 1989. ‘Politics and the People’, in Search of a Humane India. Vol. 1, New Delhi: Ajanta Press. Kothari, Rajni, Gopal Krishna, Ramashray Roy, Tarun Sheth, Ghanshyam Shah, Bashiruddin Ahmad, and Rushikesh Maru. 1967. Party System and Election Studies. Mumbai: Allied Publisher. Krishna, Gopal. 1967. ‘One Party Dominance: Development and Trends’, in Rajni Kothari et al. (eds.), Party System and Election Studies. Mumbai: Allied Publisher. Kumar, Pradeep. 2000. The Uttarakhand Movement: Construction of a Regional Identity. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers. Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002 115 Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (eds). 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. New York: Free Press. Mair, Peter. 1997. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. New York: Oxford University Press. Morris-Jones, W.H. 1964. The Government and Politics of India. London: Hutchinson University Library. Narain, Iqbal (ed.). 1964. State Politics in India. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan. Rokkan, Stein. 1968. ‘The Growth and Structuring of Mass Politics in Smaller European Democracies’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10(2). Roy, Ramashray and Paul Wallace (eds). 1999. Indian Politics and the 1998 Elections: Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. Shah, Ghanshyam. 2002. ‘Contestation and Negation: Hindu Sentiments and Temporal Interests in Gujarat Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly, 37(48), 30 November. Sheth, D.L. 2002. ‘Politics of Communal Polarisation: A Precursor to the Gujarat Carnage’, Manushi, 129. Sinha, Aseema. 2005. The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan. Bloomington: Indian University Press. Sridharan, E. 2002. ‘The Fragmentation of Indian Party System, 1952–99’, in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India. New Delhi: Orient Longman, pp. 475– 503. Subramanian, Narendra. 1999. ‘Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties’, Citizens and Democracy in South India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Wallace, Paul and Ramashray Roy (eds). 2003. India’s 1999 Elections and 20th Century Politics. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Weiner, Myron (ed.). 1968. State Politics in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wood, John R. (ed.). 1984. State Politics in India: Crisis or Continuity. Boulder co: Westview Press. Yadav, Yogendra. 1996. ‘Reconfiguration in Indian Politics: State Assembly Elections, 1993–95’, Economic and Political Weekly, 31(2–3), January, pp. 95–104. ———. 1999. ‘Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India’s Third Electoral System, 1989–99’, Economic and Political Weekly, 34(34–35), August, pp. 2393–99. ———. 2003. ‘The New Congress Voter’, Seminar, No. 526, June, pp. 64–70. 6 Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour: From Independence to the 1980s* MYRON WEINER Only a handful of countries in the Third World have sustained democratic institutions and practices. By democratic we mean countries that meet the following conditions: 1. 2. 3. 4. Government leaders are chosen in competitive elections in which there are opposition political parties. Political parties, including opponents of the government, have the right to openly seek public support. That is, they have access to the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Governments defeated in an election step down; losers are not punished by the winners, nor are defeated leaders punished unless in the act of governance they have broken the law, and their punishment is based on due process. Elected governments are not figureheads; they exercise power and make policies and they are accountable to the electors, not to the military, the monarchy, the bureaucracy or an oligarchy. * A slightly different version of this study appears in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun (eds.) Competitive Elections in Developing Countries. N.C. Duke University Press for the American Enterprise Institute, 1987, pp. 37–76. This study, written before the eighth parliamentary elections, includes data only up to the 1980 elections. Relevant references to developments after Mrs Gandhi’s death have been added to what is primarily an overview of electoral and political trends till the early 1980s. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 117 Applying these criteria, 19 developing countries (13 with populations exceeding one million) qualified in 1983. They included India, Nigeria, Turkey, Colombia, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Portugal, Greece, Papua New Guinea, the Dominican Republic, and six smaller countries. Had the list been prepared several years earlier, other countries would have been included. Several countries on the list in 1983 would not qualify in 1987, while several additional countries, mainly in Latin America and the Philippines, should be added. A review of those developing countries that have sustained democratic institutions for an extended period permits a number of generalizations concerning the determinants of democracy in the Third World, all but one of which are applicable to India:1 1. 2. 3. 4. The British model of tutelary democracy has been more successful than other models in sustaining democratic institutions and processes in newly independent countries. That model has had two features: (a) it provided for the creation of institutionalized central authority— a bureaucracy, a judiciary, a police force and an army—institutions that gradually became indigenous; and (b) it provided for the creation of representative institutions and periodic elections. The United States, it should be noted, played a similar role as an occupying power in creating a system of central authority and representative institutions in post-war Germany and Japan. The transition from non-colonial authoritarian military government to democracy has most often occurred when there was an earlier experience with political parties, elections and democratic rule; the transition almost always requires the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the military. The institutional framework for democracy helps create conditions for its own persistence by (a) making possible the emergence of social classes attached to these institutions that have an interest in their maintenance and (b) nurturing popular attitudes that are supportive of democratic procedures. It is in this connection that time becomes important. It takes time to create the journalists, academics, lawyers and party activists who are committed to a free press, an independent judiciary, an autonomous university system, political parties and voluntary associations. And it takes time to create larger publics supportive of those institutions. The characteristics and strengths of the individual political parties and the nature of the party system are decisive in whether a democratic system persists. There are striking similarities in the kinds of parties and the party systems that now exist in democratic developing 118 Myron Weiner 5. countries. One such similarity is that the cleavages among parties do not fully mirror a country’s class, ethnic, religious and regional cleavages. Another is that at least one national party or a stable coalition of parties wins a majority of seats in Parliament and one or more opposition parties are able to win substantial electoral support. The party system is not so fragmented as to preclude the creation of a stable government, or so centralized as to preclude electoral competition. Among members of the political elite there is an agreement that adversarial politics takes place within certain procedures. This agreement may spring from many years of experience with a democratic system; it may be the consequence of a period of violence or authoritarian rule that leads members of the elite to set boundaries to their own disagreements; or it may be the result of formal consociational agreements to bridge sharp subcultural cleavages. Except for the second proposition concerning the transition from military to democratic rule, which is obviously inappropriate for India, these generalizations are applicable to India. An examination of the role played by the British in creating the institutional framework for electoral politics, the circumstances under which political parties developed in India, the determinants of political participation, and the social bases of party support helps us understand some of the fundamentally stable elements in the Indian party system as well as some of the forces for change. The Origins of the Electoral Process The British introduced the elective principle into local bodies in India in 1884 and into provincial councils in 1892. In England and in India, support for both the introduction of the electoral process and for the expansion of the powers of local government came from the Gladstone liberals who saw the introduction of an elected local government as a first step leading eventually to national self-government. The central question to these liberals was what proportion of municipal and other local boards and provincial councils were to be elected rather than nominated. Indian liberals were eager to move toward national self-government as quickly as possible. The issue of the size of the electorate was of secondary importance. Many English officials, however, believed that the principle of elections was inappropriate for India. They argued that the various social cleavages in India made the country incapable of maintaining representative government. Lord Salisbury, Britain’s Prime Minister, said that elective or representative government was ‘not an Eastern idea’ and that its introduction into India Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 119 would put an ‘intolerable strain’ on a society divided into hostile sections. Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for India said that ‘the notion of parliamentary representation in so vast a country, almost as large as Europe, containing so large a number of different races, is one of the wildest imaginations that ever entered the minds of men.’ A.J. Balfour said: We all admit that representative government . . . is the best form of government when it is suitable but it is only suitable . . . when you are dealing with a population in the main homogeneous, in the main equal in every substantial and essential sense, in a community where the minority are prepared to accept the decisions of the majority, where they are all alike in the traditions in which they are brought up, in their general outlook upon the world and in their broad view of national aspiration (Coupland 1986: 26). The conservative view was that an electoral system along British lines— one person, one vote; territorial representation; and majority rule—would be disastrous for India’s Muslims. Conservative concern for India’s largest religious minority was based less on an abstract notion of justice than it was on the awareness of the need to sustain Muslim support for British rule in India. Since the liberals had won on the issue of whether the elective principle should be introduced into India, the conservatives turned their attention to the issue of how best to ensure representation for the Muslim minority. The issues and the decisions that resulted from ensuing debate had a decisive impact on the subsequent development of India’s political parties, on the forms of social and political conflict, and, ultimately, on the number of states to be carved out of British India. Few policy decisions in 20th century India were as important. The debate was joined by John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, a liberal, and Lord Minto, the Viceroy, a conservative, who together had responsibility for recommending constitutional reform to the British Parliament. Lord Minto put the issue starkly in a letter to Morley: I am firmly convinced as I believe you to be that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement, regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent. . . . The Mohammedan community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safe-guarded by an administrative re-organization with which I am concerned (Wolpert 1967: 26). Morley opposed making religious affiliation the basis for electoral representation and preferred protecting the Muslims through some form of 120 Myron Weiner territorial representation. Minto, however, argued that only communal electorates, in which Muslims could vote for their own candidates, could assure them of effective representation. To the British the religious cleavage between Hindus and Muslims was analogous to the historic schism in Europe between Protestants and Catholics, manifested in Britain by the persistent, festering quarrel between the two religious communities in Ulster. Many English people believed that the Muslims were in a position comparable to that of the Protestant minority in Ireland. Though most Hindus opposed Minto’s proposals for separate electorates, many Indian liberals agreed to accept his proposal as a practical solution for India. Indian liberals turned their attention not to the principle of communal representation itself, but to the question of whether Muslims should be represented in direct proportion to their population or ‘overrepresented’, as demanded by Muslim political leaders. The Muslim view—one ultimately supported by British authorities—was that the Act of 1892, which extended elections to provincial legislatures, threatened their position. The Muslims argued that their representation should be ‘commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defence of the Empire.’2 The British, recognizing the link between Muslim loyalty and their demand for ‘weightage’, that is, more seats than they were entitled to by virtue of their numbers, agreed both to the principle of communal electorates and to the principle of overrepresentation. In 1909 the Morley-Minto reforms were introduced. They provided an extension of the elective principle to the legislative councils in the states. Suffrage was extended, though it remained limited, and the system of communal electorates was introduced into all elected bodies. The Act of 1909 thus freed Muslim leaders from dependence on Hindu votes. Thereafter, neither Hindu nor Muslim politicians needed the support of the other community. Had Muslim candidates been dependent on Hindu votes, then candidates who sought to bridge differences between the two communities would have had the prospect of electoral victory. Communal electorates assured Muslim leaders that they could win elections solely by appealing to the interests and loyalties of the Muslims. The system of communal electorates thus guaranteed that two party-arenas, one for the Muslims and the other for the Hindus, would develop. Since each religious community could choose its own representatives, India now had a system of political dualism in which social cleavages were institutionalized. The MorleyMinto reforms thus created the electoral framework for two-party systems— not for a two-party system. Within each community there could be competitive parties, but parties seeking support within one community could not win support within the other. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 121 Thus, the Morley-Minto reforms confirmed the electoral principle, established communal electorates, extended the principle of representation and allowed for representative government in the provinces. The reforms also provided the basis for a further debate on three political and constitutional issues: whether suffrage should be extended, whether the principle of elected representation should be applicable to all members of legislative bodies, and, most controversial, how much power the elected provincial governments should be given. The Montague-Chelmsford reforms dealt with each of these issues at the close of World War I. These reforms, approved by the British Parliament in 1919, extended the suffrage to include more property-tax payers, persons with educational qualifications, and landholders. The landless and urban workers were still not included; in most municipal areas the electorate was about 14 per cent and in the rural areas it remained a tiny 3.6 per cent (Tinker 1954: 148). The reforms did, however, increase Indian representation in provincial councils. But the most important feature of the reforms was that local and provincial governments were given greater power in what the British described as a system of dyarchy. Selected powers were transferred to state governments with departments run by elected ministers responsible to provincial legislatures with elected majorities. The reforms of 1919 established the federal structure. No longer were provinces the administrative agents of the central government, for they had substantial powers of their own. Thus, two major transformations in the political process had occurred: the decentralization of power from the centre to the provinces, and the growth and extension of the principle of elections and representation. Together these two principles and the institutional changes that accompanied them had a powerful influence on the kinds of political parties and the party system that emerged in modern India. The Emergence of Political Parties Political parties and organizations in India are an outgrowth of an historical process, not a foreign transplant. Even before the British introduced the elective principle into India, there were already two influential groups of political organizations. One group represented the interests of the landholders and included organizations such as the British Indian Association and the Zamindar Association of Calcutta. The other group represented the interests of the new urban middle classes. The organizations in this group were concerned with achieving greater equality with the British in India with respect to appointment in public services, civil status, and representation in public 122 Myron Weiner bodies. The Indian National Congress, founded in 1885 from several such urban groups, was the most important of these middle class associations. The Indian National Congress was itself divided into various interests and ideologies. There were the moderates, with their liberal ideology and commitment to social reform, and there were radicals, less committed to constitutionalism, but often socially conservative on matters of Hindu social customs. In the main, the moderates tended to be an upper middle class group, whereas the radicals came from the lower middle classes. Many British officials in India hoped that the establishment of elective bodies and the expansion of Indian representation would strengthen the moderates and weaken the radicals. Much of the early history of the Congress revolved around internal political struggles among groups that differed on how best to wrest power from the British—whether constitutional tactics should be employed, whether Indians should or should not take part in elective bodies, and what position they should take on matters of Hindu social reform and on economic issues. Until 1902, these debates were confined to the middle and upper castes in India’s expanding middle classes. Whereas Hindu leaders had every reason to advocate a broader suffrage and an expansion of representative government, Muslim leaders resisted both. Muslims were not attracted to the Indian National Congress. From the beginning of organized political life in modern India, Muslims formed their own organizations. In 1906, the first major national Muslim organization, the Muslim League, was formed. Unlike the Congress, which had its roots in the middle classes, the League had its roots in the landholding aristocracy. The League leadership thus had two reasons for opposing the electoral process, reflecting both their communal (religious) and class origins. Muslim leaders regarded elections both as an instrument by which the Hindu majority would dominate the Muslim minority and as an attack by the Hindu middle classes against the Muslim aristocracy. Stirred by the introduction of elections to legislative bodies, the Congress began to take on the characteristics of a political party, with provincial and district offices, dues-paying members, internal elections, and fund raising. In the early 1920s, Mahatma Gandhi began to turn the Congress into a mass movement by his appeals to the peasantry and to industrial labour. In 1920 he launched his first satyagraha or non-cooperation, the Civil-Disobedience Movement. Other political movements also sought mass support. In 1924, the Communist party opened branches in several major cities. In Madras a nonBrahmin party, the Justice party, was formed. There was hardly a state that did not have a regional party competing for control over the newly elected provincial governments. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 123 The Congress was divided on the question of whether it should contest provincial elections. The Moderates, as the Gladstonian liberals were called, formed a party of their own, the National Liberal Federation, which won elections in the two large provinces of Bombay and the United Provinces. Supporters of Gandhi, who called themselves Swarajists, arguing that the Montague-Chelmsford reforms did not go far enough, boycotted the 1920 provincial elections. But 1n 1923, partly because of the victory of the liberals and with the intention of destroying dyarchy by opposing the financial measures of the administration, the Swarajists contested the provincial elections. Some Swarajists argued that they should contest elections but should not form ministries if they won, whereas others argued that they should take power whenever they could. For many nationalists the electoral process was a device for attracting popular support, not a mechanism for taking power, for they wanted to do nothing that might legitimize British authority. These nationalist Congressmen viewed the adversarial electoral process as a means of mobilizing the electorate, strengthening the party organization, and asserting their own personal leadership. But because the franchise remained limited—in most states it was only 3 per cent of the total population—mass politics was not yet part of the electoral scene. What was important, however, was that the electoral process changed the structure of organized groups. Parties had to form local organizations; a machinery for choosing candidates had to be established; and party leaders had to be selected, platforms prepared, funds raised, and electoral campaigns conducted. In short, the 1920s was the decade in which parties learned how to engage in electoral politics. That the electorate was small and the power of those who were elected was still limited was, in retrospect, less important for the future of the parties than the fact that the parties participated in the electoral process. Several studies have called attention to the development of peasant, tribal and other non-urban, non-middle class movements that emerged outside the framework of political parties and electoral politics in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. A.R. Desai, a Marxist sociologist, wrote that ‘the Indian rural scene during the entire British period and thereafter has been bristling with protests, revolts and even large-scale militant struggles involving hundreds of villages and lasting for years (Desai 1979: xii).’ Kathleen Gough, a Marxist anthropologist, counted 77 revolts reflecting an extraordinary variety of local discontent (Desai 1979, Gough 1979: 85–126). Peasant and tribal movements were directed against government tax authorities and against landlords. There were also a number of social reform movements and religious revitalization movements that remained outside the framework of political parties and electoral politics. Religious 124 Myron Weiner movements were divided between those that wanted to rescue and revitalize religious traditions and those that sought the reformation and modernization of traditions. And among the lowest castes were some who advocated a radical social transformation, whereas others sought to change the status of their group within the social hierarchy by obtaining greater education and employment. The revolutionary potential of these movements was never realized. Most were short-lived protests, and others were absorbed by political parties. Typically, educated middle-class members of a social movement led their group into a political party and electoral politics. B.K. Roy Burman, a scholar of tribal India, wrote of one movement among the tribals of Bihar that ‘an agrarian movement that started with a bang ended with a whimper of middle class opportunist politics with a frill of philanthropism. More or less same is the story of the Jharkhand movement in Chotanagpur proper, the plain tribals movement in Brahmaputra valley, and the tribal youth movement of Tripura’ (Roy Burman 1979: 110). The Government of India Act, passed in 1935, further expanded the realm of Indian political participation, not only at the provincial level but also in the central legislature. Once again there were sharp divisions among nationalists as to how far they should participate in a government created by an imperial authority whose removal was their central political objective. But Jawaharlal Nehru concluded that ‘under the circumstances we have no choice but to contest the elections to the new provincial legislature. . . . We should seek elections on the basis of a detailed political and economic program, with our demand for a Constituent Assembly in the forefront. I am convinced that the only solution of our political and communal problems will come through such an assembly, provided it is elected on an adult franchise’ (Phillips 1962: 248). The 1936–37 elections proved to be a watershed in the development of Indian political parties. The Congress won a majority of seats in six of the eleven legislative assemblies. In all, it won 706 out of 1,585 Legislative Assembly elections. Many small regional parties were virtually wiped out. The elections were a major triumph for the Congress Party: a measure of the importance of nationalism, an indication of how effective the Congress Party organization was in reaching the electorate, and a tribute to Gandhi’s and Nehru’s appeal. The Congress formed ministries in seven out of the 11 provinces. The socialist wing of the Congress opposed taking office anywhere, a position that proved costly because it deprived the socialists of the patronage and popularity associated with officeholding. Many of the Congress leaders who assumed positions in the provincial governments in 1937 became senior figures in the state and national government after Independence. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 125 But the issue was not only whether (and when) the British would leave India and turn authority over to elected Indians, but whether India would be one country, as advocated by the Congress, or two, as proposed by the Muslim League. In the next decade these two struggles took place side by side. In 1939 when the British went to war against the Germans, units of the Indian army were sent to strengthen British forces. The Congress opposed the British policy of bringing India into the war without the consent of India, and in 1939 the Congress ministries resigned. In August 1942, the Congress launched the ‘Quit India’ movement, calling for the complete withdrawal of the British from India. Gandhi, Nehru and other Congress leaders were arrested, and for most of the war years the nationalists were either in jail or taking part in an underground movement against the British. Electoral politics was suspended. The Muslim League had not fared well in the 1937 elections. In no province did the League win a majority of the reserved Muslim seats. But, as Independence approached, the League’s demand for safeguards for Muslim minorities, then its call for a Muslim state, won popular Muslim support. At a historic meeting in Lahore in 1940 the League passed its famous resolution calling for the partition of India and the creation of an independent state of Pakistan in the northwest and the eastern regions of India. The Congress remained committed not only to one country but to a strong unitary, central government. In the 1946 elections the country was polarized. The League won 428 of the 492 provincial seats reserved for Muslims and in the elections for the central assembly the League won all 30 reserved Muslim seats. Similarly, the Congress won a majority of the non-reserved seats in both the state and central assembly elections. The political cleavage between Hindus and Muslims was now complete. The Muslim League, a weak elite organization until as late as 1937, won so much support from the Muslim electorate in 1946 that it became a force that could no longer be ignored either by the Congress or by the British. When the British withdrew from India in 1947, they left behind an army, a judiciary, an administration predominantly staffed by Indians, and a federal structure with power distributed between the states and central government. The British also left behind a political party that had led (and won) the struggle for Independence and led (and lost) the struggle for a single country. The leadership of the Congress was in the hands of those who had won the battle within the party over whether they should take part in electoral struggles. They were men who had built an electoral organization and had had experience as ministers running provincial governments. Like other nationalist movements, the Congress had fought for Independence. But, unlike many other nationalist movements, it had done so through an electoral process as well as through civil disobedience. The country was governed by a 126 Myron Weiner leadership committed to parliamentary institutions, representative government, electoral process, and political parties. Neither the history nor the commitment guaranteed the future of democratic institutions for India but they did provide a more promising framework for the development of competitive electoral politics than any that existed in neighbouring Pakistan or in many other newly independent countries in the Third World. A cabinet mission sent by the British to India at the end of the war attempted to bring the League and the Congress together over various constitutional arrangements for the transfer of power. But proposals by the British to decentralize power went too far for the Congress leadership, which was committed to a united India with a strong centre, and did not go far enough for the League. Politics soon moved to the streets, with violent clashes in Calcutta and in the Noakhali district in East Bengal. Some political organizations created private armies of young people, civil war erupted, and the country appeared to be on the verge of a cataclysmic upheaval. In early August 1947, the British transferred power to two governments, one in India led by the Congress Party, and the other in Pakistan led by the Muslim League. The British, by now with support from both parties, had created two new nations. Religion, a false consciousness to Marxists and a sideshow for what many believed (and hoped) would be the more fundamental division of class, proved to be the great divider. Parties in Post-Independence India The Constitution of 1950 reconfirmed the federal, parliamentary, and democratic structure. Suffrage was made universal for all men and women 21 years of age and older, with neither property nor literacy requirements. The system of communal electorates was abolished. The constitution provided that the Parliament and state assemblies were to be elected at least once every five years. An independent election commission was created with the responsibility of delimiting more than 500 parliamentary and more than 3,000 state assembly constituencies. The commission was also responsible for registering all eligible voters, for recognizing state and national parties, for establishing procedures for the nomination of candidates, and for managing all elections. India’s first election for the national Parliament was held in 1952. Subsequent elections were held in 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, and 1984. State assembly elections were held simultaneously with the parliamentary elections from 1952 to 1967 and separately thereafter. The election commission has recognized several parties as national, but only one, the Indian National Congress, has actually contested seats in all the Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 127 states and in almost every constituency. The Congress has won every parliamentary election and most of the state assembly elections, except those in 1977. Two communist parties have been recognized as national parties, and, for most elections, one or two socialist parties and one Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, have been recognized. A conservative party, the Swatantra Party, flourished for a while but eventually merged with other parties. On several occasions the Congress Party split, and each part claimed to be the true successor; but only one, Mrs Indira Gandhi’s Congress, has retained a national following. National recognition by the election commission does not mean that a party competes in all constituencies, or even in all states; it only means that the party has received a large enough percentage of their national vote to be recognized by the election commission. In fact, each of these national parties has had support in only a few states or a single region. Communist strength has been largely confined to West Bengal, to the small neighbouring states of Tripura and Manipur, and to the southern state of Kerala, with pockets of strength in Assam, Bihar and Andhra. The socialist parties have had support in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Bombay. And the Jana Sangh’s strength has been limited largely to the Hindi-speaking states. Several other parties are significant only in a single state. Two parties in populous Tamil Nadu—the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and its splinter, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)— received so many votes that their percentage of the national vote legally entitles them to recognition as national parties. In Punjab, the Akali Dal and, in Kashmir, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference are parties that alone, or with others, have controlled the state government. In several smaller states, especially in the northeast, local parties have been quite powerful. It is useful to distinguish, then, between the national party system and the state party systems. Although the Congress, before its defeat in 1977, overwhelmingly dominated the electoral scene, won two-thirds of the seats in most parliamentary elections, and controlled most of the state assemblies, opposition to the party varied greatly from state to state. Moreover, the level of competition was very high in some states; indeed, there were few states in which Congress won elections with a majority of the vote. More often the fragmentation of the opposition parties enabled the Congress, with a bare plurality of votes, to win a solid majority of seats. For example, in 1980 in the 15 major states (those with 10 or more seats in Parliament) the Congress won a majority of the vote in six states, a plurality in seven states, and lost one state (elections were not held in one state). The closest competitors to the Congress were the Janata Party in seven states, the Lok Dal in three, the Communist Party of India (Marxist, or CPI [M]) in two, and the AIADMK and the Akali Dal in one state each. In the 10 state assembly elections held in 1980 the pattern was quite different. The Congress won a majority of votes 128 Myron Weiner in only one state, a plurality in seven states and lost two states. The Janata was its closest competitor in only one state; the Bharatiya Janata Party, which split from the Janata, was the closest competitor in two states. The Lok Dal was the closest competitor in three states, and the CPI (M) was the closest in one state. The Congress (U), which broke away from Mrs Gandhi’s Congress, the AIADMK, and the Akali Dal were the closest in one state each. Political Participation States have been categorized as being strong or weak, hard or soft, but to understand why people participate in politics, perhaps a more useful dichotomy for states is: active or passive. The more active a state is, that is, the more its actions intrude upon the lives of its citizens, the more likely it is that citizens will in turn attempt to influence government. In India, government and politics affect the daily lives of very large numbers of people. Consider some of these more characteristic examples: 1. 2. Most Indians depend upon the government for their livelihood. To open a shop or business, to import, to export, to start a school or college, to form a cooperative society, and sometimes to get into a college or obtain admission into a government hospital, one needs government permission. A large part of the middle class is employed by state or local governments. Whether these workers get a job, where they work, whether they are transferred to another locality or not, whether they can obtain a loan from the government, whether they can obtain government housing, and, if so, what kind, and whether they get promoted, all depend on the decisions of other government officers. Businessmen can do hardly anything without government approval. Large firms cannot expand without government permission. Textile factories are limited to a specified number of looms. The amount of cement, steel, coal, and electricity a factory gets is a matter of government approval. Public sector monopolies—railroads, airlines, coal, iron and steel, electricity, cement, telephones—control all essential services. One must have influence to deal with the public sector, sometimes even to obtain an airline ticket. Peasants depend on the government for their seeds, fertilizers, electricity, diesel fuel and irrigation. The government decides what farmers shall pay, and, by setting procurement prices, what they shall be paid for their produce. Peasants obtain credit from government-run banks and cooperatives. And some of the marketing and warehousing is handled by government agencies. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 129 3. 4. 5. 6. The government decides whether a village gets a school, a road, a fair-price shop for buying food at government-fixed prices, irrigation facilities, tubewells for drinking water, and a dispensary. The state-run public transport company decides whether a bus will stop in a village, and the state-run electricity board decides whether the village will have electric power. The irrigation department decides whether an irrigation canal should be built from the main canal, how much water the village should receive, when the village will receive it, and at what price. There are rules about leaving the country. Government regulates how much foreign exchange can be taken out. Professors and other government employees must obtain permission from the government before accepting an invitation to attend a conference abroad. Research institutions must obtain permission before accepting contracts or awards from foreign institutions. Much research funding comes directly from government agencies, and the funding agency must grant permission before any findings can be published. The press is free, but newspapers depend on government for allocations of paper and for government advertising. Radio and television are run by government departments, and films must be reviewed by a board of censors before release. Former untouchables and other low-income groups receive government-financed housing sites, employment through rural works, and special access (through reservations and financial assistance) for their children in schools and colleges. Government is thus a provider and regulator. It is, to use the Hindi term, a Mai Baap—a mother and a father. Good government is not one that governs least but one that provides the most. Good government, it is widely believed in India, ensures proper conduct in a world in which, without such restraints, individuals would act only to benefit themselves and their families without regard for others. Without proper authority, relationships would fall apart and conflicts would erupt into violence. Persons in authority also bestow status. In a social order in which individual status is largely determined by the social group to which the individual belongs, with each group marked by a position in the social hierarchy, the struggle for individual power is also a struggle for group status. As the Indian economy and social order have become more politicized by state intervention, groups have seen more clearly that political action is necessary for their economic well-being and social status. For example, when one group obtains more education than another and agriculture technologies improve the income of one group more than that of 130 Myron Weiner another, long-standing group relations are disrupted. The political arena provides groups with an opportunity to correct what they perceive as an imbalance in the social order. For example, Backward Castes—as they are widely designated, as distinct from the Scheduled Castes (former untouchables) below, or forward castes above—that have prospered from agricultural development may seek political power to improve this social status, to increase their access to education, or to influence government pricing policy. A higher caste, fearful of losing its social status, may fight back by using its political influence to undermine land reform or to gain access for its children into higher education or into positions in the bureaucracy. The more the state has to allocate, the more the incentive for groups to attempt to influence who gets what. The most widespread form of political participation is through direct contact with local officials, members of the State Legislative Assembly, members of Parliament and local party leaders. Access may be direct or through a village patron who has connections within the government. To get what one wants, one may appeal to friendship or to ties of blood, caste or community; one may have to pay a bribe or promise a vote. For most voters and politicians, politics is not a matter of ideological principles and policies but one of patronage and administration. The local Congress Party organizations provide groups with direct access to government administration. Patronage is what the Congress Party offers and what local communities and groups seek. Members of the State Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) are among the most sought-after elected officials since they are in direct contact with government administration. In a few states where substantial resources are given to elected district councils, the elected members of the councils are influential because of their access to patronage. Turnout for district council elections and for state legislative assembly elections is often higher than for parliamentary elections, and the coat-tail effect carries members of Parliament into office, quite the opposite of the American electoral pattern. Elected politicians, most often from the Congress Party, are in a position to arrange for a road here or a school there, to get a permit or license for a local businessman or merchant, to fix up admission into the local college for the child of a voter, and to help a sugar cane grower obtain a loan from local authorities. Politicians are concerned not with social transformation but with the delivery of services. As long as services are delivered, the policies of the state governments and of the national government seem to be of little importance to the local party or to voters. Rival village factions, various castes, and assorted interests have sought to control the local Congress Party. In the 1950s and the 1960s, party elections for local, district, state and All-India Congress committees were as Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 131 intensely contested as the state and national elections. This was because the group that won the party elections would control the nominations for seats to the State Legislative Assemblies and to the Parliament. Paradoxically, the struggles within the Congress Party often strengthened the party as each faction attempted to mobilize more of the populace to enrol some party members. Local village factions and castes that wanted greater access to the government were encouraged by dissident groups within the Congress to join the intra-party struggles. As a result, new social groups and new local elites joined the party. From the first parliamentary election of 1952 through the election of 1967—before the Congress Party split in 1969—turnout increased. The struggles within the Congress and the effect these conflicts had on the broader community were only two of several factors that increased the turnout. Politics became pervasive. Almost all significant institutions in public life—the schools and universities, the cooperatives, the voluntary associations, the administration, and later the courts—were permeated by political conflicts, often along party lines. Participation in the electoral process grew. In the 1952 elections, 46.6 per cent of the electorate participated. Participation continued to rise in 1957 and 1962, and it reached its peak in 1967 with 61.1 per cent of the electorate. It has not reached that level since. In 1980, 57 per cent of the electorate, or 201.7 million Indians, voted in the parliamentary elections (see Table 6.1). Turnout has varied substantially from one state to another, but some states have consistently had a higher turnout than the national turnout, and some have consistently had a lower turnout. The turnout in the four southern states— especially in Kerala—has been generally higher than that in the rest of the country. In the north, Punjab and Haryana have had a high turnout. The less developed regions of the country have had the lowest turnout. In the 1980 elections only 47 per cent of the electorate in Orissa voted, ten percentage points below the national average. Other states with consistently low turnout Table 6.1 Indian Parliamentary Elections (1952–80) Year Seats Candidates Electorate (in millions) Polling Stations 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 489 494 494 520 518 542 525 1,864 1,519 1,985 2,369 2,784 2,439 4,611 173.2 193.7 217.7 250.1 274.1 321.2 345.0 132,560 220,478 238,355 267,555 342,944 373,908 437,166 Source: Weiner (1980: 146). Votes Polled Turnout (in millions) (in per cent) 080.7 091.3 119.9 152.7 151.5 194.3 201.7 46.6 47.1 55.1 61.1 55.3 60.5 57.0 132 Myron Weiner are Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Bihar—all states with below-average literacy levels, poor transportation, widely dispersed populations, and relatively inaccessible polling stations. But even in these states, turnout has risen since 1952. The differences between an urban turnout and rural turnout have narrowed, and in some states have disappeared entirely. For example, in 1980 the turnout in Calcutta, Bombay, Hyderabad and Bangalore was actually less than that in the rural areas of their states, whereas in Delhi, Madras and Ahmedabad the turnout was slightly above that of their rural hinterland. Rural-urban differences were comparatively large in the 1950s and early 1960s and have since become smaller. India’s constituencies in the cities have been more politicized than those in the countryside; but since the earliest elections, turnout in rural areas has increased more rapidly than that in the cities. For example, in 1957 the turnout in urban areas was 55 per cent and in rural areas was 46 per cent. By 1972 urban turnout had risen five percentage points to 60 per cent, but rural turnout increased twelve percentage points to 58 per cent.3 India’s population of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes has become increasingly politicized. India’s election law provides for the establishment of reserved constituencies for the former untouchables (called Scheduled Castes) and for the tribal population (Scheduled Tribes). In reserved constituencies, only members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may run, but all adults within the constituency irrespective of caste and community may vote. Before 1977, the turnout in the Scheduled Caste constituencies was significantly below that of the states in which they were located. For example, in 1971 in Uttar Pradesh, turnout in the 18 reserved constituencies was 39.1 per cent compared with the statewide turnout of 46.1 per cent, and in Bihar in the eight reserved constituencies turnout was 43.4 per cent compared with the state turnout of 49 per cent. In the 1977 elections, however, these differences were much smaller, and in Bihar and West Bengal the turnout in the reserved constituencies was actually higher than that in the rest of the state. In 1980, in both states the turnout in reserved constituencies continued to exceed the statewide turnout. Of the Indian population, 14.6 per cent belongs to the Scheduled Castes. In Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh they form a fifth of the population. Their increased politicization accounts for a significant portion of the increase in voters’ turnout. Unlike the Scheduled Castes, which are widely dispersed, India’s tribal population is mostly concentrated. Tribals form 5.9 per cent of the population, approximately 47 million people; but they are a majority in the small states of Nagaland, (89 per cent), Meghalaya (80 per cent) and Arunachal Pradesh (79 per cent) in India’s northeast, and they are a substantial portion Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 133 of Manipur (31 per cent), Tripura (29 per cent), Orissa (23 per cent), and Madhya Pradesh (20 per cent). In the tribal majority states, turnout in 1980 surpassed the national turnout. In the reserved tribal constituencies in the larger states, turnout in 1980 remained below the statewide turnout, though in some states—namely, Gujarat, Rajasthan, and West Bengal—the differences were small. One feature of the rising turnout, however, remains puzzling. As we have seen, the turnout has increased throughout the country; and there has been a growing convergence of urban and rural, reserved Scheduled Caste, and tribal constituencies. At the same time, however, differences among the states remain as large as ever. Whatever factors have led to an increase in turnout— more polling stations, more effective mobilization on the part of the political parties, or a general increase in political awareness as a result of greater exposure to government or to the media—they seem to have affected all states more or less equally. And yet differences among the states remain. Elections are only one form of political participation. Indians have perfected the art of protest; and, as one journalist wrote, Indians have as many native words for protest as Eskimos have for snow. There can be satyagraha, or civil disobedience; gherao, or forcibly locking an official in his office; dharna, or general strike; morcha, or march; and there can be fasts, black flag demonstrations, work-stoppages, slowdowns, strikes, one-day walkouts, silent marches and long marches across the state to the Legislative Assembly or the government secretariat. These forms of collective protests take place for many reasons, not the least important of which is that they are ways in which parties mobilize supporters in anticipation of elections. These protest movements are based on the assumption that elected officials will be responsive because they fear losing votes. The existence of an electoral system, therefore, facilitates non-violent protests. India’s brief experience with authoritarian government from June 1975 to January 1977 shows some of the effects of suspending the electoral process, and, indirectly, some of the effects of having an electoral process. At that time, citizens were unable to press politicians to restrain bureaucrats. When government officials bulldozed Muslim-populated squatter settlements in Delhi and imposed compulsory sterilization on many low-income villagers in north India, elected officials did not restrain the government. The government soon lost contact with public sentiment. The government was not aware of the magnitude of discontent among the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes. The resumption of elections in February 1977 revealed which groups most resented the loss of political rights. Contrary to the widespread belief that the westernized middle classes would be the only groups opposing the Emergency, the Scheduled Castes, Muslims, and the Scheduled Tribes turned against Mrs Gandhi and the Congress Party. 134 Myron Weiner In the 1977 elections, voter turnout soared in some areas. Evidently the restrictions on political participation and the repressive acts of government motivated those who had previously not taken part in electoral politics. Voting turnout increased more among the lowest income groups than in the general constituencies. In Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, for the first time, the average turnout in Scheduled Caste constituencies actually exceeded the turnout of the state as a whole. Similarly, north Indian constituencies, in which Muslims constituted 20 per cent or more of the population, experienced turnout well above that of statewide voting. In Uttar Pradesh, for example, turnout in the 23 Muslim constituencies was 61 per cent as against a statewide turnout of 56.4 per cent. Though turnout did decline in the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Muslim constituencies in the 1980 parliamentary elections (though no more than in other constituencies), it still remained well above pre-1977 levels. Evidently, the increased politicization stimulated by the Emergency has persisted. The Social Bases of Voter Alignments In any consideration of India’s social cleavages, voter alignments, and party systems, it is well to keep in mind that India is a vast subcontinent with more than 700 million people, a population equal to that of Africa and western Asia combined. It is slightly more populated than all of Europe including the European portions of the Soviet Union, and has the diversity to match. At least 10 languages, particularly Hindi and Bengali, are spoken by as many people as are the major languages of Europe. Hinduism, with its many sects and castes, is the dominant religion; but Islam has 75 million adherents, giving India more Muslims than any middle eastern country. Even in a world of multi-ethnic states, India stands alone in its diversity. Most significant social cleavages can be found in India. There are conflicts between peasant proprietors and their tenants and agricultural labourers; between the middle class and the business community; and between one caste, religious community, tribe, or linguistic group and another. Hardly a day passes that newspapers do not report violent clashes somewhere in the country—a struggle between the Assamese and Bengalis one day or between the Scheduled Castes and high caste Hindus on another. Outsiders point readily to a conflict in one part of India as a forerunner of a national political schism. In the early 1950s, an outburst of linguistic regionalism in several states was interpreted as the beginning of a period of national disintegration. In the early 1970s, reports of a protest movement among agricultural labourers in a district of Tamil Nadu led some observers to predict rural warfare Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 135 between peasants and agricultural labourers, or the Green Revolution’s turning red. The religious, regional, ethnic and class conflicts that are often sequential in other countries, are all present simultaneously in India. The task of analysis is to map out the various cleavages and to show how and why they vary from one region to another, how they are manifest in party alignments and electoral behaviour, and under what conditions they change. Partisanship Variations in voter preferences from one election to another have been relatively small, suggesting that many parties have a core of partisan supporters.4 The vote for the Congress in six of the seven parliamentary elections ranged from a high of 47.8 per cent in 1957 to a low of 40.7 per cent in 1967. Only in the post-Emergency election of 1977 did the vote for the Congress fall lower—to 34.5 per cent. The vote for the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), varied from 9 per cent to 10 per cent from the 1957 to 1971 elections, then dropped to 7.1 per cent and 8.5 per cent in the 1977 and 1980 elections respectively. The two communist parties have been consistently strong in West Bengal and Kerala (see Table 6.2). Table 6.2 Congress Party Results in Parliamentary Elections (1952–80) Election Percentage of Vote 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 45.0 47.8 44.7 40.7 43.7 34.5 42.7 Seats in Number in Per cent 357 359 358 283 352 153 351 73 73 73 54 68 28 67 Source: Weiner (1983: 157). The Jana Sangh is the one national party that has shown steady growth in the parliamentary elections. Starting with a miniscule 3.1 per cent of the national vote in 1952, it garnered 5.9 per cent in 1957, 6.4 per cent in 1962, and 9.4 per cent in 1967. Its vote dropped to 7.4 per cent in 1971. The Jana Sangh did not stand as a separate political party in 1977 and 1980 because it had been absorbed into the Janata Party, but in both these elections, candidates of the party pulled a sizable vote (see Table 6.3). The Jana Sangh (under the new label, Bharatiya Janata Party) again became an independent party in the state elections of 1980, when it won 30.3 per cent in Madhya Pradesh (compared with 28.7 per cent in 1972, when it stood last in the state assembly 136 Myron Weiner elections) and 18.6 per cent in Rajasthan. The party has been consistently strong in six states: Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The Socialists also ceased to be a separate political party in 1977, but their electoral position had been declining since the mid-1960s. The two major socialist groups, the Samyukta Socialist Party and the Praja Socialist Party, and their earlier incarnation, the Socialist Party, collectively won 10.6 per cent of the vote in the first parliamentary election, 10.4 per cent in 1957, 9.3 per cent in 1962, 8 per cent in 1967, and then plummeted to a mere 3.5 per cent in 1971, with a following mainly in Bihar. Several state parties have demonstrated an enduring base of support. In Tamil Nadu, the DMK won 35.8 per cent in 1967, 33.9 per cent in 1971, and with its splinter AIADMK, 48.7 per cent in 1977 and 48.4 per cent in 1980. The vote of each of these Dravida parties in Tamil Nadu was sizeable enough to give the two parties 4.7 per cent of the national vote in 1977 and 4.5 per cent in 1980. In Punjab, the Akali Dal, a regional party of the Sikhs, has won a fifth to a fourth or more of the vote—24 per cent in the state elections in 1952, 20.7 per cent in 1962 (it did not contest in 1957), 20.5 per cent in 1967, 29.5 per cent in 1969, and 26.9 per cent in 1980. From 60 to 65 per cent of the electorate has consistently voted for the three major national groups—the Congress, the Communists, and the Jana Sangh— and the two major regional groups—the Dravida and the Akali parties. These parties evidently have partisan supporters. The remaining vote, a third to two-fifths of the electorate, has been cast for independent candidates and for a scattering of small regional parties, some of which have also developed a solid base of electoral support. What we know about the attachments of various groups of voters to particular political parties is based largely on an ecological analysis of electoral returns,5 some intensive anthropological field investigations of particular constituencies, and reports by journalists. In India, there are no large-scale national surveys of voters comparable to the surveys in Europe or the United States, though there are some surveys of particular regions and communities for particular elections that supplement our other data.6 The most rigorous statistical data we have is derived from state assembly rather than from parliamentary elections. With only 542 parliamentary seats, the parliamentary constituencies are too large (average number of eligible voters per constituency is 650,000) for most ecological analyses. But there are approximately 3,500 state assembly seats, each with about 100,000 eligible voters (with an average turnout below 60,000). By sorting these constituencies for some regions of the country into categories—rural-urban, Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste, size of landholdings, and religious and caste composition—it has been possible to infer how certain social and economic groups in India vote. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 137 Table 6.3 Parliamentary Election Results (1971, 1977, and 1980) Party Congress (I) Congress (U) Janata1 Congress (O) Jana Sangh Swatantra Socialists Bharatiya Lok Dal CPI CPI (M) DMK AIADMK Akali Dal Independents Other Parties Total 1971 Seats Won Percentage of Valid Vote 352 – – 16 22 8 5 2 23 25 23 – – 14 28 518 43.7 – – 10.4 7.4 3.1 3.5 3.2 4.7 5.1 3.8 – – 8.3 6.8 100.0 1977 1980 Seats Won Percentage of Valid Vote Seats Won Percentage of Valid Vote 153 – 298 – – – – – 7 21 1 18 8 9 24 539 34.5 – 43.2 – – – – – 2.8 4.3 1.7 3.0 1.3 5.7 3.5 100.0 351 13 31 – – – – 41 11 35 16 2 1 8 16 525 42.7 5.3 18.9 – – – – 9.4 2.6 6.0 2.1 2.4 0.7 6.5 3.4 100.0 Notes: Dash-indicates that the party did not run. 1 Seats won in 1971 by groups later forming the Janata Party totalled 53; percentage of valid votes for the groups in 1971 was 27.6. Source: Weiner (1983: 149). Ethnic Based Parties The organization of the political parties around linguistic, religious, tribal and caste affiliations has a long history in India. As we have seen, the system of communal electorates established in 1909 enabled Muslim organizations to appeal exclusively to a Muslim electorate. The existence of separate electorates probably exacerbated communal cleavages by making it impossible for non-Muslim parties to appeal to Muslim electorates. It has been argued that elections and parties intensify linguistic, religious, tribal, and other ethnic cleavages precisely because political leaders can use ethnic loyalties to mobilize voters and hence may deliberately exacerbate cleavages to rally support. If, however, political parties succeed in crossing ethnic lines, if ethnic and class cleavages are cross-cutting rather than mutually reinforcing, then tension is reduced, bargaining among groups becomes possible, and more stable governments are likely. An examination of the major ethnic political parties in India may enable us to consider the impact of the electoral process on intensifying or modifying group conflict. 138 Myron Weiner Hindu Nationalism: Bharatiya Jana Sangh At the time of Independence the Muslim League was by far the largest, most powerful ethnically based political organization in India, but with the creation of the state of Pakistan the League virtually closed down in India. The Hindu Mahasabha, first formed in Punjab in 1907 and then reorganized as an all-India party in 1915, was initially formed as a reaction against both the Muslim League and the Indian liberals. It was equally hostile to liberal, secular ideas imported from the West and to Muslim communalism. Its membership, strongly Brahmin, opposed social reform legislation and devoted much of its effort to discouraging low caste Hindus from converting to Islam or Christianity. With the demise of the Muslim League in post-Independence India and with increased secularization and westernization among the highest castes, the Mahasabha declined as a political force. The party won four seats in the first Parliament but had less than 1 per cent of the national vote, and it faded away thereafter. One other Hindu communal party, the Ram Rajya Parishad, sought support on a platform of Hindu revivalism, unsuccessfully. Clearly, there has thus far been no electoral support in India for Hindu revivalism or for an explicitly anti-secular, anti-western political party. Perhaps the absence of a religious tradition of exclusivity—which marks Christianity, Islam and Judaism but not Hinduism—or the absence of a hierarchical clerical class has prevented the emergence of the kinds of religiously based Hindu parties comparable to such movements in Western Europe, Iran, Israel, and elsewhere in the Middle East.7 Because the Hindu religious tradition does not prescribe any universal behaviour, no political organization has campaigned for the enforcement of a sabbath, the establishment of rules determining who is a Hindu, or the imposition of religiously sanctioned penalties for criminal behaviour. There has been no active campaign on issues of abortion, birth control, divorce or usury, or on religiously prescribed norms of conduct that characterize other religions. As Will Rogers once quipped that he belonged to no organized political party for he was a Democrat, so, too, many Indians could say that they belong to no organized religion for they are Hindus. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh comes closest to being a Hindu party. It was formed in 1951 as a party committed to Bharatiya Sanskriti (or Indian culture), which for many of its members and supporters meant Hindu nationalism. Much of its organizational impetus came from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a paramilitary organization founded in 1925 and concerned with the regeneration of India as a Hindu nation. The RSS had been banned after a Hindu assassinated Gandhi in 1948. When the ban was lifted, the RSS leadership decided to enter active politics by supporting a former president of the Hindu Mahasabha and creating a new political Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 139 party, the Jana Sangh. The new party, although eschewing an anti-Islamic position openly, took positions that were loosely identified with a Hindu perspective: support for cow protection, promotion of Ayurvedic or traditional medicine, advocacy of Hindi as the country’s official language and opposition to the use of Urdu, the language of India’s Muslims, and advocacy of a more powerful defence with nuclear capability. The Jana Sangh’s entrance into electoral politics suggested that these positions lacked popular support. The party won only three seats in Parliament with 3.1 per cent of the vote. In subsequent elections its vote and seats increased. In the 1967 elections, its electoral high point, it had 35 seats in Parliament, making it the third largest party, with 9.4 per cent of the popular vote. As the party has grown, it has moved towards the political centre. It has taken a less strident posture towards Muslims and Pakistan, and it has even nominated Muslims for state assembly and parliamentary elections, but it still remains avowedly more militant and more nationalist than other parties, on matters of defence and nuclear policy. Its strength has been largely in the six states of the Hindi region: Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. Except for a slight downturn in state elections in 1969 and in the parliamentary elections of 1971, it has shown impressive growth. It has been more successful in cities than in the countryside, except in Madhya Pradesh, and it has grown more rapidly in urban than in rural areas. In urban areas it has received support from shopkeepers and merchants and from the lower middle classes, particularly those who are in government employment. In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh it has support from the Rajputs, the traditional martial caste that is attracted to the Jana Sangh’s militant nationalism. The party also attracts many urban students, and its student organization, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidhyarthi Parishad, is one of the largest student organizations in the country. The Jana Sangh played an important role in forming the Janata Party in 1977. A Jana Sangh leader, Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Minister of External Affairs in the Janata cabinet. The Jana Sangh participated in five coalition governments in the Hindi states between 1967 and 1971, and after the Janata took power, the Jana Sangh group took control of Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi. The Jana Sangh remained within the Janata after the party split in 1979, but after the 1980 elections, the Jana Sangh members withdrew to form their own party once again, now renamed the Bharatiya Janata Party. The party did well in the state assembly elections in mid-1980 and again in 1982, and emerged as the second-largest party in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. In the last few years, the Jana Sangh has been winning rural support in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Like the Congress Party, the Jana Sangh draws its 140 Myron Weiner support from the upper castes, the Brahmins, the Rajputs, and Kayasthas, and from the merchant castes, the Vaishyas, in the towns. Its strength in Uttar Pradesh is substantial in the central districts of Oudh, where it won the support of the talukdari, or former landlord families. It has recently sought to extend its influence to portions of the middle peasantry, the backward cultivating castes. Its support for Hindi and its opposition to the use of Urdu have attracted newly educated Hindus to the party, who see English and Urdu as the language of social classes competing for positions in government bureaucracy. Much of the organizational strength of the Jana Sangh derives from its close affiliation to the RSS. This paramilitary organization is more explicitly militant and Hindu than the Jana Sangh. It is organized into paramilitary units whose members pay a great deal of attention to physical fitness through gymnastics. As the Jana Sangh broadened its electoral base and began to compete with other groups within the Janata Party—especially the Lok Dal, the party of the middle peasantry—its opponents within the Janata Party demanded that the Jana Sangh break its ties with the RSS. But the Jana Sangh leaders refused, recognizing that without the RSS ties they would be organizationally weakened. Some Indians view the Jana Sangh as an important counterfoil to the Communists, since both parties appeal to newly educated urban youth. The Jana Sangh offers a radical right appeal with elements of Hindu revivalism, equality with the West through armed strength, and a strong national centre. The Communists offer the radical left appeal of social transformation, struggle against the propertied classes, and anti-Americanism. Although they both appeal to educated youth, their main appeal is to different social strata. The Jana Sangh’s appeal has been to those who held authority in the old social order—the former maharajas in Madhya Pradesh, the Rajput-warrior castes of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the former talukdar landlord classes—and to the middle-propertied strata, particularly the merchants and, in some areas, the middle peasantry and the newly urbanized lower middle classes. The Jana Sangh has little influence upon the lowest social strata, either in the cities or in the countryside, and, except for a few pockets of support in Karnataka and Kerala, it has yet to break out of its regional standing as a party of the Hindi-speaking region. Cultural Regionalism: The Dravida Parties The two Dravida parties of Tamil Nadu, which together have been the dominant political parties in the state since 1967, provide an interesting example of how a political movement initially based on an appeal to caste, Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 141 successfully broadened itself into a regional nationalist movement. The Dravida movement has its origins in the historic social cleavage between Brahmins and the non-Brahmins. Brahmins dominated the administrative services and the newly created urban professions in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century. Opposition to the Brahmins came initially from ‘forward non-Brahmins’, largely landowning groups with dominance in rural areas. At the turn of the century, the Brahmin urban middle classes in India, as the urban middle classes elsewhere, took the lead in advocating Home Rule and then Independence. Brahmins dominated the administration, the universities and the nationalist movement. In the 1920s, the Brahmins were challenged by the newly formed South Indian Liberal Federation (later renamed the Justice Party), a non-Brahmin organization that emphasized its Dravidian (south Indian) identity and an anti-Brahmin ideology. The Justice Party drew its political strength from the newly urbanized nonBrahmins. These non-Brahmin elites, wrote Marguerite Ross Barnett, ‘rejected Home Rule and territorial nationalism, emphasizing the primacy of Dravidian cultural authenticity, a common non-Brahmin identity, and an incipient Dravidian cultural nationalism’ (Barnett 1975–77: 29). But behind the rhetoric was the straightforward class interest of the non-Brahmins that they be given greater representation in the British bureaucracy and that their social status be elevated. (The more radical wing of the non-Brahmin movement called itself the ‘Self Respect League’). The non-Brahmins proved so effective at mobilizing the numerous backward castes that in the 1920s they defeated the Congress Party and took control of the provincial government. But, with the growing popular appeal of nationalism in the 1930s, the Justice Party declined as a political force and did not revive until after independence. By then the Tamil Nadu Party itself fell under the control of non-Brahmin castes. In 1949, several Dravidian groups joined to form the DMK under the dynamic leadership of C.N. Annadurai, a young nationalist who had supported the movement for Independence and opposed the separation of south India from the north (as advocated by some of the Justice Party leaders), but who was committed to the cause of the nonBrahmin castes and to Tamil nationalism. In the late 1950s, the DMK appealed to the Backward Castes and to the young people in the urban areas with its attack against Hindi imperialism and northern domination. The DMK became one of the first political parties in India effectively to use mass media and popular culture. It attracted support from film stars and Tamil poets, staged parades and mass rallies, and had its speakers use popular rather than bookish Tamil. A major transformation occurred in the middle and the late 1960s, when the party dropped its anti-Brahmanism and declared its identification with all Tamil-speakers. By becoming so explicitly the party of Tamil nationalism, by directing the region against northern 142 Myron Weiner domination, by asserting the claims of the state against the centre, the DMK was able to undermine the position in the state of the Congress Party, which had identified itself with all-India nationalism. The DMK most effectively damaged the Congress Party in Tamil Nadu by its campaign against the use of Hindi as an official language. It was an issue that appealed not only to Tamil nationalist sentiment but also to the practical interest of young people, who saw the growing use of Hindi in the central government as undermining their access to jobs in the national civil service. The great political breakthrough for the DMK took place in the 1967 state assembly elections, when the DMK won 138 and the Congress won 50 out of the 234 seats. The victory was made possible by an alliance between the DMK and the Swatantra Party led by C. Rajagopalachari, an elder, former Congress leader, who was the leading Brahmin politician in the state. This alliance once and for all legitimized the DMK’s claim that it was the party not of the non-Brahmins but of Tamil nationalism. The DMK reconfirmed its position with its electoral victory in 1971. Following the death of its leader, Annadurai, the DMK split; but the two parties, the AIADMK and the DMK, represented merely two rival versions of Tamil nationalism. Throughout the 1970s the two parties dominated Tamil politics, squeezing out the Congress and other parties. The DMK governed the state through 1976, and the following year it was replaced by the AIADMK. In the 1977 elections the Janata Party allied itself with the DMK, whereas the Congress Party of Mrs Gandhi allied itself with the AIADMK. The AIADMK won 30.6 per cent of the vote (and 18 of the 39 parliamentary seats), and Mrs Gandhi’s Congress won 22.3 per cent (and 14 seats). The DMK won 18 per cent of the vote. In 1980, the alliances were reversed: the Congress Party joined with the DMK, and the governing AIADMK formed electoral alliance with the Janata Party. Once again the coalition around Mrs Gandhi’s Congress won: her party won 31.6 per cent of the vote with 20 seats, and her ally, the DMK won 23 per cent of the vote with 16 seats. Each of the two parties allied itself with a national party in an effort to get support for the state assembly elections. Although the AIADMK failed to win popular support in the parliamentary elections, it demonstrated its electoral power in the state assembly elections several months later when it emerged as the largest party in the state, with 38.7 per cent of the vote. The Congress vote declined from 31.6 per cent in the parliamentary elections in January to 20.5 per cent in the state assembly elections in June, whereas the AIADMK reversed its position from 25.4 per cent to 38.7 per cent. A substantial portion of the Tamil electorate seems to have distinguished between its preferences for the national government and those for the state government. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 143 Religious Regionalism: The Akali Dal Punjab has a significant regional party known as the Akali Dal, but unlike the DMK parties it has not made the transition from the party of an ethnic group to the party of regional nationalism. Once again, it should be noted that, like many other parties, Akali Dal has its roots in pre-Independence politics. A political movement exclusively of the Sikhs, it was first organized to establish popular community control of the Gurdwaras, or Sikh shrines. In 1925, the Akali Dal succeeded in placing the Gurdwaras under the control of a committee elected by universal adult suffrage. Because the Gurdwaras have substantial endowments, the Akalis gained access to considerable patronage. The Akalis subsequently became a significant force in Punjab in the struggle with the Muslims over the control of the state. In 1947, when India was partitioned, Punjab, too, was partitioned. The Sikh population living in west Punjab, in Pakistan, fled to Delhi and to the Indian Punjab, with the result that the concentration of the Sikhs in the Indian portion of Punjab sharply increased. The Akali Dal vote in the state assembly elections ranged from a fifth to a quarter of the population. In the predominantly Sikh areas the Akalis received nearly half of the Sikh vote. A majority of the Sikhs supported the Congress Party. Many Sikh leaders were concerned with strengthening the cohesion of the Sikh community and arresting the movement of young Sikhs into secular life or to Hinduism. Sikh leaders organized their own schools, emphasized the need to write the Punjabi language in the Gurmukhi script (the script of the Sikh scriptures), and sought to draw young people into the life of the Gurdwaras. Sikh leaders wanted to sharpen the boundaries between Hindus and Sikhs, and political action seemed an appropriate way to proceed. The Akalis called for the creation of a separate Sikh state carved out of the Sikh majority areas of Punjab. Territorial division, the Akalis hoped, would not only strengthen their own political power but also create solidarity within the community. Their electoral influence was substantially undermined by Pratap Singh Kairon, a Sikh and a leader of the Congress Party who successfully forged an alliance between Hindus and a substantial portion of the Sikh community. Moreover, as Paul Brass writes: Although the boundaries between Hindus and Sikhs have become more sharply defined during the past century, there remain Hindu and Sikh sects and individuals in both religions who do not consider the differences between the two creeds to be substantial. . . . Allegiances of many of the low caste or scheduled caste groups in the Punjab, who comprise 144 Myron Weiner more than 20 per cent of the population of the state, are by no means clear. . . . Moreover, the language division between the Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab is more symbolic than real. . . . Finally, factional politics and personal political opportunism have often cut across both communal and ideological differences among the parties and have provided a basis for movement, communication, and alliances of individuals and groups across party lines (Brass 1975–77: 41). In short, the Akali effort to segment the two communities through party politics and electoral struggles did not succeed in the 1960s. The Akalis, however, succeeded in persuading the central government to partition Punjab into predominantly Sikh and Hindu States. The central government agreed to the demand, partly because it had already acceded to the principle of linguistic states elsewhere in the country, and the Akalis had redefined their demand for a Sikh majority state to a Punjabi-speaking state; partly because the growing popularity of the demand among the Sikhs threatened to erode the position of the Congress Party, and the Congress Party itself was divided on the issue; and partly because the centre recognized that a violent clash between the central government and the Sikhs could disrupt the Indian army, a substantial portion of which is recruited from the Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus. The movement for a Punjabi-speaking state was suspended during the war with Pakistan in 1965, and then acceded to by the Congress at the close of the war. In the 1969 elections the Akalis emerged as the single largest party in the Punjab assembly, with 41 per cent of the seats, and formed a non-Congress coalition government. Akali support was confined almost entirely to the Sikh community, and its main strength was among the Jat Sikh peasants, the landowning class. The Akalis did poorly among the Sikh Scheduled Castes. Moreover, a substantial number of urbanized Sikhs voted for the Congress Party. The Akalis thus remained a significant regional party with the capacity to form governing coalitions with other groups when support for the Congress was on the wane. Because the Akalis opposed the Emergency, they were natural allies of the Janata Party in 1977 and they were subsequently able to form a coalition government in the state. Class divisions among the Sikhs, and the readiness of the Congress Party to reach out for Sikh as well as Hindu support, prevented the Akalis from exacerbating religious cleavages. In this respect the situation has changed in the last few years, which we shall examine below. Nor were the Akalis willing, as were the Dravida and several other regional parties, to move from an exclusive base within a single social group to the larger community, using regional rather than religious nationalism as the basis for their appeal. The Akali Dal and the Dravida parties thus stand at opposite ends of the pole. Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 145 Other initially narrow-based parties have sought a broader base of social support with varying degrees of success. In the mid-1950s several parties starting with a narrow social base won substantial public support for the reorganization of states along linguistic lines, but most of these parties faded away as the new states were created. In the city of Bombay an anti-foreign party, the Shiv Sena, won substantial support in its campaign for employment for Marathi-speaking people, but it never succeeded in winning support outside Bombay; even within the city its support has dwindled. In southern Bihar the Jharkhand party, a party of the local tribal population, has from time to time tried to broaden its base by calling on all the residents, both tribals and non-tribals, of southern Bihar to support the demand for regional development or a separate state. However, it has not attracted support from the non-tribal population. Several small tribal-based parties in the northeastern states, on the other hand, have built coalitions of tribes around regional nationalism. What one sees in India is a well-known phenomenon in countries with competitive electoral politics: small ethnically-based political parties, too small to win power by themselves, either seek coalitions with others or attempt to broaden their appeal to include other ethnic groups. In India, these attempts focus on regional nationalist identities. Clearly, not every party will attempt to do so. Those that choose not to do so remain small sectarian parties or, alternatively, eschew electoral politics and turn to militant methods for achieving political power. In 1981 the Akalis, excluded from power by their electoral defeat a year earlier and their electoral appeal arrested a quarter of the population, split. One faction, taking a militant position, called for a separate nation, Khalistan. The other faction called for the redress of their grievances (the inclusion of Punjabi-speaking areas of neighbouring states, more representation in government services, and central government support for creating more industries in the state) through collective action on the part of Hindus and Sikhs in the state. By 1983 the pro-Khalistan Sikhs had attracted substantial support within the state. A decision by Mrs Gandhi’s government to send armed forces into the Sikh holy temple at Amritsar after it had been occupied by armed militants, led to many deaths and an increasing radicalization of the Sikh population. Mrs Gandhi herself was assassinated by two of her Sikh guards, and in the days following her death, the city of Delhi was torn by violence. Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs Gandhi’s successor as Prime Minister, took steps to win back the moderate elements in the Sikh community, and in 1985, elections were held in Punjab bringing the moderate section of the Akali Dal back to power. By now, however, the moderates are out of power too, and President’s Rule has replaced the Akalis. 146 Myron Weiner Middle Peasant Caste Politics: The Lok Dal Only one of the regional parties, the Lok Dal, has been able to convert its power at the state level into a significant share of power at the centre. The Lok Dal originated in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, in the mid1960s as a party of the middle peasantry. In 1967 a Congress leader, Charan Singh, broke from the Congress to organize his own party, the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD), to speak for the middle farmer and individual ownership, representing especially the Jat caste of peasant proprietors to which he belonged. In the state assembly elections in 1969, the party emerged second with 21 per cent of the vote and, as a result of factional conflicts within the state Congress, Charan Singh formed his own coalition government. Eight years later, Charan Singh’s party (renamed the Lok Dal), combined with the Jana Sangh, the socialists and the Congress dissidents to form the Janata Party. Charan Singh, convinced that his party played a decisive role in defeating Mrs Gandhi, especially in the states of Uttar Pradesh (where the Janata won 68 per cent of the vote); Bihar (65 per cent), Haryana (70 per cent), Rajasthan (65 per cent), and Orissa (52 per cent), believed that he, not Morarji Desai, should be the leader of the Janata Party and Prime Minister of India. In mid-1979, Charan Singh led his party out of the Janata Party and brought down the Janata government and Morarji Desai. By holding the balance between the Janata and the Congress, Charan Singh was able to become India’s Prime Minister, as the head of an interim coalition government. And by refusing to form an electoral coalition with the Janata in the 1980 parliamentary elections, Charan Singh’s party contributed substantially to the reelection of Mrs Gandhi and the Congress Party. What gave the Lok Dal such extraordinary influence? Why has it built up a strong and loyal following among the peasants of northern India? The middle peasantry grew in importance in Uttar Pradesh with the abolition of the zamindari (landlord system) and the transfer of title to new ownercultivators who paid land-revenue taxes directly to the government. With the introduction of the Green Revolution technology, the economic situation of the middle peasants improved. The middle peasants became a class of small capitalist farmers producing grains and other commodities for a commercial market. They sought agricultural supplies at low cost and wanted agricultural procurement prices that would ensure them a profitable return on their investment. Because almost everything they needed in agriculture—credit, diesel fuel, tubewells, storage facilities, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation and new varieties of seeds—involved dealing with the government or quasigovernment institutions such as banks and cooperatives, an elaborate system of state patronage developed. The middle peasants in Uttar Pradesh were dissatisfied with the Congress government, which did not pay enough Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 147 attention to their interests and which was dominated by Brahmin and Rajput castes who controlled much of the patronage. Most of the middle peasants belong to the middle and backward castes. The Jat caste is the largest and most influential of the middle castes, and the Ahirs (or Yadavs) and Kurmis are the principal backward cultivating castes. The middle and the backward castes are as concerned with their social advancement as they are with their economic interests. The social identification of the upper caste Brahmins and Rajputs is with Congress while their traditional rivals in the middle and backward castes—Jats, Ahirs and Kurmis—identify with Charan Singh’s Lok Dal. On the eve of the 1980 elections, Charan Singh’s interim government proposed that 25 per cent of all jobs in the central services be reserved for the backward castes. It was a blatant caste appeal to peasants who wanted government jobs for their educated sons and daughters. With the formation of the BKD in 1967, Charan Singh brought together the middle peasants into a formidable political force. The party proved to be particularly strong in western Uttar Pradesh, which is the most agriculturally prosperous region of the state and is the centre of the Jat community. Though Charan Singh’s party commanded only a fifth of the vote, the decline in the vote for the Congress (from 53 per cent in 1952 to 46 per cent in 1957, 38 per cent in 1962 and 33 per cent in 1967) placed the new party in a pivotal position in the state. Moreover, given the pivotal position of Uttar Pradesh in Parliament (Uttar Pradesh holds 16 per cent of the seats), Charan Singh was able to play a significant role in national politics. Though in 1980 Charan Singh’s party won only 9.4 per cent of the national vote, it won 41 seats, second only to the Congress, and continued to demonstrate its strength in Uttar Pradesh and in several other north Indian states. It won 29 per cent of the vote in Uttar Pradesh (second only to the Congress), a third of the vote in Haryana (making it larger than the Congress), 19.5 per cent in Orissa, 16.6 per cent in Bihar, and 12.1 per cent in Rajasthan. In the 1980 elections Mrs Gandhi rebuilt the electoral coalition in Uttar Pradesh that had made the Congress the winning party in 1971 and earlier— the Brahmins and Rajput landowning castes, the Muslims and the landless labourers, especially the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. But the Congress failed to win the vote of the middle peasantry. Elsewhere in India, especially in the southern states of Andhra and Karnataka, the Congress had more success in winning support from the middle peasants and the middle castes. Charan Singh himself was so strongly identified as a regional (and caste) leader that dissatisfied peasant proprietors in the non-Hindi-speaking states have not been attracted to the Lok Dal. But the continued weakness of the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh and in neighbouring states assures the 148 Myron Weiner middle peasant castes (whether in the Lok Dal or in some other political party) an important independent political role in the Hindi region and perhaps in national politics. In an analysis of the elections in Uttar Pradesh, Paul Brass concludes that there has been ‘politicization and increased cohesion of the middle castes of peasants. . . for the Lok Dal of Charan Singh in 1980’ and that ‘the principal underlying conflict in the north [is] between the middle peasantry and all other social forces’ (Brass 1981: 41). Given the pivotal role that elections in northern India have played in national politics, Brass argues that the future of the Indian parliamentary system itself will be determined by the outcome of that conflict. This might seem like a bold generalization after the Lok Dal defeat in the 1984 elections. But the subsequent Lok Dal victory in Haryana despite the party split after the death of its founder and leader, Charan Singh, suggests that the social cleavages in northern India described by Brass remain a central determinant of electoral behaviour and party conflict. The Social Bases of Congress Support India’s largest multi-ethnic, multi-class party is, of course, the Congress Party. The only party that ever defeated the Congress nationally, the Janata Party, was similarly diverse, though ultimately it failed to remain united as a single party. In view of this occurrence, two important questions can be addressed. One is the question of what communities, classes, and regions have made up the winning coalition for the Congress in the seven elections in which the party won 40 to slightly over 50 per cent of the electorate. The second question is how a party with such diverse and even conflicting social support has been able to cope with its internal differences. In the 1980 parliamentary elections the Congress won 351 seats with 42.7 per cent of the popular vote. Support came from a broad spectrum of the populace: from the very rich to the very poor, from Brahmins to former untouchables, from well-to-do businessmen and government bureaucrats to tribal agricultural labourers and Muslim weavers. For example, the Congress won 50 of the 79 reserved Scheduled Caste constituencies and 29 of the 37 Scheduled Tribe constituencies, but it also carried the prosperous sections of New Delhi. Mrs Gandhi won the support of the class and caste extremes in the social structure, ironically with a centrist programme. The Congress also did better than other parties among religious minorities. It won a majority of the vote in the predominantly Sikh state of the Punjab, carried the Christian-populated constituencies of Kerala, and won a plurality of seats in which Muslims constituted at least 20 per cent of the population. A breakdown of India’s population in terms of religion and caste Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 149 indicates the extraordinary electoral advantages to a political party with substantial bloc support from religious minorities, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Muslims form 11.2 per cent of the national population, Christians 2.6 per cent and Sikhs 1.9 per cent. Scheduled Castes account for 15 per cent; Scheduled Tribes 7.5 per cent. Although ecological analyses confirmed by field reports indicate that these groups provide the Congress with a larger share of their vote than does the rest of the electorate, no hard data are available to indicate what the percentage of the Congress vote in 1980 or earlier was from each of these communities. But if the Congress won only 50 per cent of the vote of these minorities, then it needed to win the support of only 35 per cent of the remaining caste Hindu population to net a national vote of 40.7 per cent. And if the Congress won 60 per cent of the minority vote, then with the support of 35 per cent of the remaining electorate, the national Congress vote would be 44.5 per cent. The simple arithmetic goes a long way towards explaining why the Congress won only 34.5 per cent in the elections of 1977. With the large-scale defection of the Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from the Congress as a result of the Emergency, a major increase in the vote for the Congress among caste Hindus would have been needed for the party to have won. If the minorities had simply dropped their vote for the Congress to the same levels as that of the vote of the rest of the country—35 per cent, to use a hypothetical number—that would account for the 1977 results. Urban-rural differences do not figure significantly in the vote for the Congress. In the 1980 parliamentary elections, the Congress won 43.3 per cent of the vote in the urban constituencies and 42.6 per cent of the vote in rural constituencies. An analysis of voting in state assembly constituencies from 1952 to 1972 shows that with the exception of 1967, the Congress performed slightly better in urban than in rural constituencies (see Table 6.4). Table 6.4 The Vote for the Congress in Urban and Rural Constituencies: All India (1952–72) (in per cent) Urban Rural 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 45.6 43.2 46.8 45.1 45.3 43.4 38.2 41.6 48.7 46.2 Source: Weiner and Field (1977: 32). From 1952 to 1967 the Communist parties and the Jana Sangh, which won a larger portion of India’s urban vote than of the rural vote, grew in the cities. In recent years, however, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) seems to have reversed this trend by growing substantially in the Bengal countryside while losing in Calcutta. Similarly, in the Kerala villages the 150 Myron Weiner strength of the Communists seems to have increased. The Jana Sangh, however, continues to be a primarily urban-based party. Both the radical right and radical left grew not at the expense of the Congress but at the expense of independent candidates and other opposition parties. Also, the struggle, in the main, has not been between the radical right and the radical left but between each radical party and the political centre. In 1977 when many of the opposition parties consolidated into the Janata, the conflict in most of the constituencies shifted to a contest between the Janata and the Congress, the two parties of the centre. The Janata swept the urban constituencies in 1977, winning 25 of 39 seats in the 19 cities with a population of a million or more. In 1980, the results were reversed: the Congress won 25 of the 39 constituencies (compared with only seven of the 39 in 1977). The Janata’s national vote was only 18.9 per cent, but the party won nearly 30 per cent of the vote in urban constituencies. Cities remained polarized, no longer between the centre and the left or the right, but between the two parties of the centre. The Congress apparently wins more support among the lower income groups in the urban areas (in most cities the squatter areas vote for the Congress rather than for leftist or rightist parties) than among the middle classes. Both the Jana Sangh and the Communists seem to do well among the urban middle classes. As far as the working class is concerned, the picture is mixed, too. India has only a few industrial labour constituencies, and these are split. The Communists have a foothold in some: Madurai, Coimbatore, Alleppey, Calicut, Palghat, and Kottayam in the south, Jamshedpur, some sections of Bombay, Calcutta, Howrah, Asansol and Dum Dum in the north. The Congress is generally the largest party in the remaining industrial constituencies, including several of the non-Bengali working-class constituencies in and around Calcutta. The Congress does well in rural constituencies with few Muslims, Scheduled Castes, or Scheduled Tribes and does worst of all in those constituencies of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Bihar with a substantial proportion of middle peasants. In these three states, the Congress won, respectively, only 36 per cent, 29 per cent and 36 per cent of the vote in 1980. A constituencyby-constituency analysis in Uttar Pradesh for the 1980 elections reveals that wherever the peasant-cultivator class was most numerous, the Congress did poorly. To generalize from the Uttar Pradesh-Bihar-Haryana data to the rest of the country would be a mistake, however. Among the dominant peasantcultivator classes elsewhere, the Congress has held its own. In earlier elections the Congress attracted support from the Reddis in Andhra, from a variety of middle and backward castes in Karnataka, from the Maratha caste in Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 151 Maharashtra and from the Patidars in Gujarat. Even in the elections of 1977, the Congress did substantially better in these states than the rest of the country; and in the 1980 elections the Congress won a majority in all four states. As long as there are prospects of victory, sections of all castes and communities give support to the Congress. With so much patronage available to the winning party, propertied classes are particularly reluctant to turn their backs on a party that has a good chance of winning. Much of the business community, irrespective of its ideological preferences for other parties at various times, has provided the Congress with financial support. Among the dominant agricultural castes in any village, at least one faction almost always backs the Congress candidate. Even in the 1977 sweep against the Congress in the Hindi-speaking region there were few constituencies in which the party failed to get a fifth or more of the vote. Given the heterogeneity of support for the Congress, how has the Congress Party kept internal conflicts in check? The answer to that question today is considerably different from what it was before the Congress split in 1969. Though the continuity exists in terms of electoral support and a national leader, in an organizational sense there have been two Congress parties—the party from 1952 to 1969 and the party since 1969. In the 1950s and the 1960s, much of the power within the Congress was in the hands of state party bosses who ran party machines based on control over patronage. Party factions, sometimes a single caste but often a multi-caste group, fought for power within the party organization to win nominations for elections to State Legislative Assemblies and Parliament. Local leaders sought to mobilize their supporters to win power within the party organization at the taluka and district level. Winners and losers of local party elections would then battle once again for control over the Pradesh (state) Congress Committees. Those who lost one round of party elections might try to win another. Some losers would desert the party in elections to the legislative assembly and to Parliament but then return to the party to fight once more. Out of this process—inchoate, interminable, and opportunistic—emerged leaders who knew how to build coalitions within the party, to influence the local bureaucracy, to use the patronage of the state to maximize their support, and to bargain with the central authorities for resources. The best of them also knew how to run state governments. The Congress lost considerable electoral support in the 1967 elections. It was defeated in several states, and fragile coalition governments took power. Mrs Gandhi had not yet demonstrated that she had the kind of personal popularity that her father had or the skill to bring together diverse interests and factions within the party. The old Congress Party—the party of patronage, party bosses, multiple power centres, consensual leaders and ideologically centrist politics—seemed to be coming to an end. When it appeared as if 152 Myron Weiner some of the party bosses might try to replace Mrs Gandhi, she broke with the party leadership and formed her own Congress Party. Mrs Gandhi then launched a leftist campaign against the syndicate or party bosses, against the former maharajas, and against sections of the business community. In the 1971 elections she campaigned to eliminate poverty and won back much of the support, especially in the urban areas, that the Congress had lost in 1967. Mrs Gandhi correctly sensed that her father’s centrist emphasis on development was not sufficient and that an emphasis on income distribution would win greater electoral support. The Congress Party that emerged out of the victorious 1971 campaign was more centralized. Fearful of threats from state party leaders and chief ministers, Mrs Gandhi sought to prevent new independent centres of power from rising ever again within her party. State party organizations and state governments were made subservient to the centre. Democracy within the party declined. Meetings of the All India Congress Committee and the Working Committee, two important organs within the party, became infrequent. Intra-party elections were no longer held, nominations for state assembly seats were controlled by the centre, and the Prime Minister chose the chief ministers. Even municipal governments were often superseded, and municipal power shifted into the hands of officials appointed by the state or central governments. Mrs Gandhi succeeded in reducing political threats to her own power, but the result was that she weakened local and state Congress Party organizations and made the state governments weaker, and from 1972 to 1975, less stable. The growing instability at the state level affected the centre. The Prime Minister devoted more time and effort to dealing with political problems in the states. Both inside and outside the party, groups opposed to a particular leader who controlled the state focused their attacks on the centre, for only the centre could change the state government. Local protest thus became nationalized. Agitations in Bihar and Gujarat, for example, were attacks not simply against the state governments but against the centre. The regime became increasingly unable to cope with the widening protest against the government, and the party itself was torn by dissidence over Mrs Gandhi’s centralizing tendencies. It is in this context that one must understand Mrs Gandhi’s decision to declare a national emergency that gave her the power to arrest not only opposition leaders but also members of her own party. All those remaining independent of the centre of power both in and outside the party, were eliminated. Opponents were jailed, press censorship was imposed, and chief ministers became subservient to the Prime Minister. The Congress Party that won again in 1980 was a highly centralized party with a weak party organization, with state leaders dependent on the centre, and with a weak cabinet; the members of which had no independent political Party Politics and Electoral Behaviour 153 stature. Many of the functions that the Congress performed before 1969— mobilizing local support, accommodating itself to local factions, providing opportunities for competing political elites, transmitting to state and central governments information about the local scene, and most importantly, managing social conflict—were no longer well-performed by the party. Though Mrs Gandhi’s party controlled two-thirds of Parliament and all the major states except West Bengal, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, and though Mrs Gandhi had successfully restored the electoral coalition that had so consistently provided the party with its electoral victories, the structure of the party remained weak. Many of the state governments had politically ineffectual chief ministers, and the Prime Minister spent much of her time dealing with political dissension within the states and correspondingly gave little attention to issues of public policy. Paradoxically, in her effort to prevent powerful state leaders from emerging, Mrs Gandhi had created a party structure that made for unstable state governments, which then required her political attention. Mrs Gandhi’s legacy to her son, Rajiv, was thus a weak party organization, state party leaders with little popular support whose political power rested upon support from the centre, and a party with few figures of national stature. Rajiv Gandhi’s overwhelming electoral victory in 1984 gave the appearance, as did Mrs Gandhi’s similar electoral victory nearly five years earlier, that the Congress Party and its leaders were in effective control of both the national and the state governments. How shallow was the victory was made clear by the subsequent defeat of the Congress Party in one after another state election, and the difficulties encountered by the Prime Minister in building a coalition that could effectively govern. Rajiv Gandhi’s political weakness is matched only by the divisions among the opposition parties. The fragility of the governing Congress Party, the fragmentation of the opposition, and the risks of governance, in a country that remains torn by regional movements, ethnic and religious strife, represent a major long-term threat to the stability of India’s democratic political order. Notes 01. Based on ‘Empirical Democratic Theory’, ibid., pp. 31–32. 02. Statement by the Muslim deputation to Lord Minto in October 1906, c.f. Coupland (1986: 34). 03. These urban-turnout data are from state assembly elections. 04. Two useful studies containing data on partisanship in India are Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Bashiruddin Ahmed, Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, and John O. Field, Consolidating Democracy: Politicization and Partisanship in India, New Delhi: Manohar Book Service 1980. 154 Myron Weiner 05. For and ecological analysis of elections, I have drawn from the following studies: FSDS (1967a, 1967b); Dasgupta and Morris-Jones (1975); Weiner and Field (1975– 77: Vols 1–4); Roy (1973). 06. The CSDS Lokniti programme has however been conducting cross-sectional surveys in both state and general elections across India since 1996. 07. This article was written in 1987 before the rise of the BJP from a marginal party to one that now has a real all-India presence and is the national alternative to the Congress. Its politics is based on anti-secular rhetoric and on a form of Hindu majoritarianism. References Barnett, Marguerite Ross. 1975–77. ‘Cultural Nationalist Electoral Politics in Tamil Nadu’, in Weiner and Field (eds), Electoral Politics in the Indian States. Vols 1–4, New Delhi: Manohar Books. Brass, Paul R. 1975–77. ‘Ethnic Cleavages in the Punjab Party System, 1952–1972’, in Myron Weiner and John Osgood Field (eds), Electoral Politics in the Indian States. Vols 1–4, New Delhi: Manohar Books. Brass, Paul R. 1981. ‘Congress, the Lok Dal, and the Middle Peasant Castes: An Analysis of the 1977 and 1980 Parliamentary Elections in Uttar Pradesh’, Public Affairs, Vol. 54, pp. 5–41. Centre for Developing Societies. 1967. Party System and Elections Studies, Bombay: Allied Publishers. Centre for the Study of Developing Societies. 1969. Context of Electoral Change in India: General Elections 1967. Bombay: Academic Books. Coupland, Reginald. 1986. The Indian Problem, 1833–1935. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dasgupta, Biplab and W. H. Morris-Jones. 1975. Patterns and Trends in Indian Politics. Bombay: Allied Publishers. Desai, A.R. (ed.) 1979. Peasant Struggles in India. Bombay: Oxford University Press. Eldersveld, Samuel J. and Bashiruddin Ahmed. 1978. Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Field, John O. 1980. Consolidating Democracy: Politicization and Partisanship in India, New Delhi: Manohar Books. Gough. 1979. ‘The Foundations of Local Self Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma’, in Hugh Tinker (1954), London: The Athlone Press. Phillips, C.H. (ed.). 1962. The Evolution of India and Pakistan: 1858 to 1947, Selected Documents. London: Oxford University Press. Roy Burman, B.K. 1979. ‘Challenges and Responses in Tribal India’ in M.S.A. Rao (ed.), Social Movement in India. Vol. 2, New Delhi: Manohar Books. Roy, Ramashray. 1973. The Uncertain Verdict. New Delhi: Orient Longman. Tinker, Hugh. 1954. The Foundations of Local Self Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma. London: The Athlone Press. Weiner, Myron and John Osgood Field (eds). 1975–77. Electoral Politics in the Indian States. Vols. 1–4, New Delhi: Manohar Book. Wolpert, Stanley. 1967. Morley and India, 1906–1910. Berkeley: University of California Press. 7 The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism: The Bharatiya Janata Party in Contemporary Indian Politics* BRUCE D. GRAHAM The Origins of the BJP The BJP is often discussed as if it were a direct descendant of an earlier Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh,1 which was formed in 1951 and built up a significant following within the first phase of India’s multi-party system. In 1977, the Jana Sangh joined with a number of other parties to form the large and amorphous Janata Party, which took power at the Centre and in a number of states. However, the pressures bearing upon this new party were considerable, and in 1979 it began to lose strength and direction. In April 1980, the former members of the Jana Sangh eventually broke away from what remained of Janata and almost immediately formed the BJP. However, this was not simply a matter of returning to 1977 and reviving their original party; the BJP was, in one respect, seen as a means of keeping alive the ideals of the original Janata Party. In short, the BJP has been shaped by two separate experiences; that of the Jana Sangh as a party in opposition to the Congress (apart from brief periods when it shared power * This article was previously published as ‘The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism: The Bharatiya Janata Party in Contemporary Indian Politics’, Hull Papers in Politics No. 40, Department of Politics & International Studies, Hull: University of Hull, October 1987. We thank the Editor, Professor The Lord Norton of Louth for permission to reprint the article. 156 Bruce D. Graham in state Governments in the late 1960s) and that of the Janata Party as a party of government after the Emergency period of 1975–77. I shall consider each of these experiences in turn. The first leader of the Jana Sangh was Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, a prominent Bengali politician who resigned from the Central Cabinet in April 1950, because he considered that the Government of India had been too lenient in its policies towards Pakistan during the period of communal riots in East and West Bengal. Having settled on the idea of forming a new party, he discussed his plans with Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, the head of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), a volunteer organization with a Hindu nationalist outlook, and was promised support in the form of new workers who could assist in laying the groundwork for state and local units. With their help, Mukherjee built up the new party during the autumn of 1951, and it was launched straight into the campaign for the first general elections of 1951–52. Mukherjee died unexpectedly in June 1953, while being held in detention near Srinagar during the agitation against the special constitutional status for Jammu and Kashmir, but his young RSS lieutenants, headed by Deendayal Upadhyaya, eventually took control of the party and guided it through the politics of the late 1950s and the early 1960s. The party’s basic philosophy is derived from the Hindu nationalist writings of the 1920s and 1930s. It claimed that Indian nationalism was essentially Hindu in character, and that the Indian nation would soon reject the Congress Party with its secular and pluralist philosophy. It therefore treated the tension between India and Pakistan as one with religious and cultural overtones, and believed that Pakistan would one day become part of united India, or Akhand Bharat. Within India it stressed the need to respect Hindu traditions and to foster the solidarity of the community, or Hindu Sanghathan. For this reason it advocated the cause of Hindi as the national language, opposed the granting of concessions to religious and cultural minorities, and supported proposals to abolish cow slaughter. Its social and economic policies took account of the interests of small businessmen and traders, but the liberal themes in its economic philosophy were balanced by corporatist themes regarding the role of the state in curbing big business, ensuring stability and order in industrial relations, and mediating between different producer groups, such as grain traders and cultivators. In agrarian politics, it accepted from the outset, the need to abolish landlordism, and strengthen the mass of peasant proprietors. During the British period, Hindu nationalism was expressed through a number of regional traditions emphasizing common themes and symbols, but it remained very much a party of the North, strongly associated with the cause of Hindi as a potential national language. Yet, even in the North it failed to make headway in elections against the very powerful State The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism 157 Congress units, such as those in the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Its best results were achieved in 1967, when it won 9.35 per cent of the votes in the Lok Sabha elections, returning 35 members to the House, and 8.77 per cent of the votes in the Legislative Assembly elections; it confirmed its relative strength in the northern states, and actually gained control of the Municipal Corporation and the Metropolitan Council in Delhi. However, by this stage the Jana Sangh was drawing closer to several of major non-Congress parties, including the conservative Swatantra Party and the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), and it joined in a number of coalition governments after the 1967 elections. Following the split of the Congress Party in 1969, it found itself a part of a virtual bloc of parties aligned against Mrs Gandhi’s Congress (R) (or Ruling) Party, but lost much ground in the Lok Sabha elections of 1971 and the State elections of 1972. Subsequently it participated in the agitations against Congress rule in Bihar and Gujarat and was one of the principal units in what came to be known as ‘JP Movement’, the campaign of demonstrations led by Jayaprakash Narayan to place pressure on Mrs Gandhi’s central government. However, this movement was smothered during the period of emergency, which began on 25 June 1975, and the Jana Sangh found itself placed under heavy constraints at this time; many of the central and state leaders were detained without trial, and its public activity was reduced to a minimum. When Mrs Gandhi announced, on 18 January 1977, that the Lok Sabha was to be dissolved and fresh elections to be held, she was in fact confronting the opposition parties with the prospect of a short campaign and possible defeat. Responding to the challenge, the Opposition Congress, Congress (O), the Jana Sangh, the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), the Socialist Party and some Congress rebels agreed to form a Janata Party which, in combination with a Congress breakaway group known as the Congress For Democracy (CFD), won the Lok Sabha elections of March 1977 by a large majority, 298 seats in a House of 542. The Congress (O) leader, Morarji Desai then formed a central government which included several Jana Sanghis, most notably Atal Behari Vajpayee as Minister for External Affairs and Lal Krishna Advani as Minister of Information and Broadcasting. The Janata Party was formally established at a convention in New Delhi on 1 May 1977 and at that point the Jana Sangh ceased to exist. Its former members were in a minority in the first National Executive of the new organization, but they constituted sizeable and identifiable groups in the party’s northern units and, after the Janata Party gained control of a number of legislative assemblies in the special state elections of June 1977, they were acknowledged to be the dominant influence in several of the state governments which were then formed. Three Chief Ministers, Shanta Kumar in Himachal Pradesh, Kailash Chandra Joshi 158 Bruce D. Graham in Madhya Pradesh, and Bhairon Singh Shekhawat in Rajasthan, had been members of the Jana Sangh. Despite hopes that it would gradually break down the differences between its constituent groups and become a united body, the Janata Party remained a huge coalition, subject to severe internal divisions and conflicts. It virtually fell to pieces in the course of 1979 and when defections obliged Morarji Desai to resign as Prime Minister on 15 July, his former lieutenant, Charan Singh, found himself unable to build up a majority support around his government. Acting on Charan Singh’s advice, the President of India then decided to dissolve the Lok Sabha and called for fresh elections. These were held in January 1980 and resulted in a sweeping victory for Mrs Gandhi’s Congress Party, which had been formed in January 1978 and was known as Congress (I) (for Indira). The Jana Sangh group had remained loyal to Morarji Desai throughout the ministerial crisis and had fought the election campaign as a part of the reduced Janata Party. However, it had been attacked on the grounds that its members owed two loyalties, one to the Janata Party and the other to the RSS. On 19 March 1980, the Janata Party’s Central Parliamentary Board adopted the principle that no legislator or office bearers of the party should take part in the daily activities of the RSS, a decision later endorsed by the party’s National Executive. Offended, the Jana Sangh group and its supporters held a convention in Delhi in April 1980 and decided to establish Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The gap between the formal dissolution of the Jana Sangh in April 1977 and the formation of the BJP in April 1980 was a mere three years, and resemblances between the two parties were strong. At the leadership level, Vajpayee, the first President of the BJP, had been President of the Jana Sangh between 1968 and 1973, and his team of Vice Presidents included such prominent Jana Sanghis as Smt. Vijaya Raje Scindia, Sunder Singh Bhandari, and Jaganathrao Joshi; amongst the party’s General Secretaries were Lal Krishna Advani, who had been the President of the Jana Sangh from 1973 to 1977 and Yagya Dutt Sharma, a former General Secretary of the Jana Sangh unit in the Punjab. The pattern of outside connections was similar in the two cases: like the Jana Sangh, the BJP developed close informalities with the RSS, and it inherited from the Jana Sangh a close relationship with the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, a trade union organization formed in the 1950s. However, closer examination reveals that the brief and turbulent period during which it belonged to the Janata Party had affected the Jana Sangh group in many ways. In the first place, the BJP had attracted new and influential leaders, such as Ram Jethmalani, a prominent lawyer from Maharashtra, and K.S. Hegde, a former Speaker of the Lok Sabha, both of whom were appointed as Vice Presidents of the new party. In the second place, the BJP The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism 159 was noticeably more moderate and liberal in its policy statements than the Jana Sangh had been; one gets the strong impression that its experience in government, both in Morarji Desai’s central administration and in a number of state administrations, had given it a more mature and reasoned outlook on Indian affairs. To some extent, indeed, it had cast itself in the role of the true successor of the Janata movement. It was placing less emphasis on Hindu nationalism, and more on the characteristic conservatism of the late 1970s, which looked back to the 1950s as a period when the Indian political system was working effectively and democratically. The Doctrine and Policies of the BJP In the Jana Sangh’s later stages, its doctrines and policies were set out in a hierarchy of documents, of which the basic one was a text entitled Principles and Policies, which had been approved by the Central General Council in 1965 and which reviewed the party’s essential views on the central issues of that period. It was associated with a philosophical statement entitled Integral Humanism, also published in 1965, in which the then General Secretary, Deendayal Upadhyaya, had set out his humanistic views about the nature of society. The party’s election manifestos were consistent with the Principles and Policies, but were necessarily tied more closely to a specific context and debates. The series of policy resolutions published by the party were more in the nature of a commentary on current events and on possible solutions to problems than a basic statement of purpose. The BJP could have accepted these texts and practices without any change but in fact, it chose to use its new organization to justify a fresh approach. The party’s formal structure was as follows: at the central level there was a National Executive consisting of the President and 60 members nominated by him, a large National Council, biennial plenary sessions of delegates, and the remaining layers in the hierarchy are provided by the State Councils and the State Executives, District Committees, Mandal Committees and local Committees.2 However, as is the case with most Indian political parties, doctrine and policy are generated mainly by the central leadership, rather than by an upward flow of proposals from the ordinary members meeting within the primary units of the organization. The first definite sign that the BJP’s leaders wanted to separate themselves from the Jana Sangh’s position was the decision to produce an entirely new set of policy documents. The earliest and the most fundamental of these was a text known as Our Five Commitments, which laid down five basic principles which were intended to produce a national consensus. The 160 Bruce D. Graham first was specified as nationalism and national integration, and presented the theme of Hindu nationalism in careful but unmistakable terms: India is one nation and Indians are one people, constituting and mutually accommodating plurality of religious faiths, ideologies, languages and interests etc. BJP believes that people of different faiths and different ideologies should be able to coexist in peace and harmony with one another. National Consensus will be possible when the development of one social group leads to the development of other social groups. Those who have external or extra territorial loyalties or are engaged in anti social activities cannot be by definition expected to contribute to national consensus and therefore will have to be kept out.3 The second principle was a commitment to democracy and fundamental rights; the third was ‘positive secularism’, involving an acceptance of the need to protect fully the life and property of minorities; the fourth was ‘Gandhian Socialism’, entailing the replacement of both capitalism and statism ‘by the principles of cooperative system and trusteeship in all fields of economic activity’; and the fifth was ‘value based politics’, which meant a rejection of poverty and exploitation and an acceptance that ‘social and political life should be guided by a set of norms and values’.4 In rhetorical terms, this text presented the BJP as a progressive party with liberal and humanitarian concerns, implicitly laying claim to the mantle of the Janata Party and as a further move, to the social and political ideal which Nehru’s Congress Party had proclaimed in the 1950s. Thus, the commentary on the five commitments or principles suggested that Mrs Gandhi’s Congress Party had ‘lost its historical role’ and that it had embarked on the destruction of those constitutional, judicial and administrative institutions, which in another incarnation, it had created in the aftermath of independence.5 As far as economic policy was concerned, Our Five Commitments did endorse the Jana Sangh’s earlier interest in small industries and argued that ‘further expansion of the consumer industry for domestic consumption must be restricted to small and medium scale sectors’ but it also acknowledged the need for a strong public sector.6 However, the party’s general economic and social approach was the subject of a later document, the Economic Policy Statement, which was approved by the BJPs first National Convention held in Bombay from 28–30 December 1980. The specific proposals were consistent with a social democratic philosophy in the sense that the State was seen as having a duty to intervene in economic and social affairs in order to bring about a greater measure of equality. Both in this sense and the subsequent policy resolutions the BJP portrayed itself as a party which The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism 161 had broadly accepted the policies of the earlier Five Year Plans and it was from this position that it attacked Mrs Gandhi’s government for its alleged failure to deal with problems, such as price inflation, an extensive black economy and administrative corruption, which were undermining effective planning.7 The reasoning behind these documents is clear. While the BJP was prepared to accept a Hindu nationalist orientation, and therefore to be associated with the RSS, as far as social and economic policies are concerned it was aiming at capturing what it took to be the central ground of the Indian opinion. It was seeking to discredit Mrs Gandhi’s Congress as the party, which despite its change of name, had imposed the emergency of 1975–77, and had therefore, shown itself unwilling to allow democratic processes to take their effect, and also as the party that was allowing inflation and corruption to undermine the fabric of the country. The BJP in Indian Politics, 1980–87 The BJP faced its major electoral test in the state elections of May 1980, one month after its formation. On this occasion, there were contests for nine Legislative Assemblies and in eight of these the Congress (I) gained clear majorities, the one exception being in Tamil Nadu, where All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) was the victor. The BJP’s performance may be judged from the following table. Table 7.1 Number of Seats and Proportions of Votes Obtained by the BJP in General Elections to State Legislative Assembly, 1980 State Bihar Gujarat Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh Total Seats 324 182 320 288 147 117 200 234 425 BJP: Number of Seats (a) Contested and (b) Won 246 127 310 145 28 41 123 10 400 21 9 60 14 0 1 32 0 11 BJP: Percentage of Valid Votes 8.41 14.02 30.33 9.83 1.36 6.48 18.60 0.07 10.76 Source: Election Commission of India, Report on the General Elections to the Legislative Assemblies 1979–80, Vol II-A (Statistical) (New Delhi, 1983), Part III (State Wise Tables), pp. 35–50. 162 Bruce D. Graham It can be seen that the party achieved its best results in Madhya Pradesh, where it gained 18.75 per cent of the seats with 30.33 per cent of the votes, and in Rajasthan where it obtained 16 per cent of the seats with 18.60 per cent of the votes. This degree of support compared favourably with that which had been obtained by the Jana Sangh in these two states in 1967 but it was significant that in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP’s share of the vote (10.76 per cent) was much smaller than might have been expected and generally at the level of those obtained in Gujarat and Maharashtra (14.02 and 9.38 per cent respectively). As further elections were held in 1982 and 1983, it became clear that the BJP, working alone, did not have sufficient strength to push aside Congress (I), even in those States where the Jana Sangh had been a major force in the Janata period. In May 1982, the BJP failed to gain a majority in the Himachal Pradesh Assembly (it won 29 seats in a house of 68) and in February 1983, the Congress (I) defeated it in the contests for the Metropolitan Council and the Municipal Corporation in Delhi, which the Jana Sangh had captured in 1967. The party lost further ground in June 1983, when it was displaced by the Congress (I) as the major force in the Jammu region in the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, which were won by the National Conference. As its prospects for an electoral breakthrough thus receded, the BJP had to place more reliance on combinations with other parties, and in August 1983, it formed a National Democratic Alliance with the Lok Dal, a northern party led by Charan Singh and based mainly on the middle and the backward castes of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. However, this alliance remained separate from the other large combinations of non-Congress groups known as the United Front, which was headed by the Janata Party. Neither grouping proved to be stable. In October 1984, Charan Singh effectively ended the National Democratic Alliance by agreeing that the Lok Dal should form a part of a new party known as the Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party (DMKP). Until that time, the opposition parties had assumed that they could win the expected parliamentary elections by a loosely coordinated attack on Mrs Gandhi and her policies, but the whole political climate was altered by her assassination on 31 October 1984. Shocked by this event, Indians reacted by showing considerable sympathy for Rajiv Gandhi, who became Prime Minister in his mother’s place, and when elections for the Lok Sabha were arranged in the end of December, the opposition parties faced a double disadvantage; not only was the electorate much less disposed to countenance attacks on the governing party, the Congress (I), than had been the case before Mrs Gandhi’s death, but there was nothing that could be presented as the alternative programme of a united opposition. The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism 163 The BJP was unable to reach any agreement with the other major opposition parties about a division of labour so far as the constituencies were concerned, and it fought the election campaign on its own. Its manifesto stressed the need for national unity, advocated ‘positive secularism’ and claimed that it would strengthen the position of the states in relation to the Centre. The party promised reforms in various parts of public life, such as the electoral system, policing and justice, and pledged itself to: take all steps necessary to achieve full employment, maximize production, stabilize prices and pull more and more millions above the poverty line, until nobody is left poor in the country.8 However, the elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Congress (I), which won 403 of the 513 seats in contention; as Table 7.2 shows, the opposition groups were greatly weakened in the new Lok Sabha: Table 7.2 Results of the Lok Sabha Elections, December 1984 Parties Congress (I) DMKP BJP Janata Communist Party of India—Marxist (CPI-M) Communist Party of India (CPI) Telugu Desam AIADMK Independents and Other Parties Vacant Total Seats Before Dissolution (November 1984) Seats After Election Percentage Shares of Valid Votes 339 23 16 21 403 3 2 10 49.17 5.91 7.71 7.03 36 22 5.80 13 2 3 6 30 12 2.73 4.12 1.72 66 25 544 25 31 544 15.81 – 100.00 Source: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, XXXI (1985), pp. 33464–65. Note: The first phase of polling in 508 constituencies was held on 24, 27 and 28 December 1984, and a second phase, for an additional 5 constituencies, took place on 28 January 1985. Analysis of the regional results revealed that the ruling party had been held at bay in Andhra Pradesh (where the Telugu Desam had won 30 of the 42 seats) and in West Bengal (where the CPI-M had won 18 of the 42 seats) but that it had virtually decimated the opposition in the states of the Hindi heartland, taking 83 of the 85 seats in Uttar Pradesh, all the 40 seats in Madhya Pradesh, all the 25 seats in Rajasthan, all the 10 seats in Haryana, and all the 164 Bruce D. Graham 7 seats in Delhi itself. The BJP took only two seats, one in Gujarat and the other in Andhra Pradesh, and its President Vajpayee, who was defeated in the contest for the Gwalior seat in Madhya Pradesh, admitted that divisions within the opposition had contributed to its defeat.9 The party’s National Executive was somewhat reassured to find that the BJP candidates had come second in 102 contests and that the party had obtained higher proportion of votes than any other of the opposition parties, for there had been some speculation that the RSS had reduced its support to the BJP and had thus contributed to its relative setback. While the party’s General Secretary Lal Krishna Advani rejected the idea that the BJP’s electoral performance had been adversely affected by the call for the RSS cadres to support Rajiv Gandhi made during the campaign by Nana Deshmukh, a former Member of the Jana Sangh’s Central Secretariat,10 a different view was expressed by an RSS official, who claimed that the BJP now lacked cadres ‘as most of its active workers, who were RSS people, generally preferred the Congress (I) in the elections’.11 As can be seen from Table 7.3, the results of the subsequent elections to a number of Legislative Assemblies held in March 1985 were also disappointing for the BJP. Although several important states including West Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Haryana, Tamil Nadu and Kerala did not go to the polls on this occasion, enough territories were involved to provide some measure of how the opposition parties were recovering in the immediate wake of the Lok Sabha elections. The victories of the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh and of the Sikkim Sangram Parishad were to be expected, but it was significant that the Janata Party retained control of Karnataka and that the opposition groups in the Hindi heartland states of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh were beginning to recover some of the grounds that they had lost. The BJP could draw some encouragement from its performance in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, but the results in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar were particularly discouraging from its point of view. However, although this outcome could be regarded as satisfactory for a party expecting to build up its strength over a long period, it was well short of the expectations, which had been aroused when the BJP was formed in 1980. As if to challenge his critics to claim openly that his liberal policies were to blame for the failure of the party to gather more support, Vajpayee asked his National Executive to consider whether the defeat should be attributed to the Jana Sangh’s decision to merge with the Janata Party in 1977 and then to leave it in 1980; he also asked it to consider the possibility of reviving the Jana Sangh. In response, the National Executive decided that it wished to retain the party’s identity as the BJP and to confirm its faith in the five principles, which it had adopted in 1980.12 Speculating as 292 319 182 68 224 320 288 145 198 32 422 30 30 (b) Contested 294 324 182 68 224 320 288 147 200 32 425 (a) Total Number of Seats 15 49 192 149 58 66 250 162 117 113 1 266 Cong (I) 0 8 15 11 7 2 58 16 1 38 0 16 BJP 0 0 46 0 1 1 0 0 0 27 0 85 DMK Notes: a—including Telugu Desam 202. b—including Congress (Socialist) 56 and Peasants and Workers Party 12. c—including Sikkim Sangram Parishad 30. d—including AIADMK 6 and DMK 5. Source: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, XXXI (1985), pp. 33735–37. Andhra Pradesh Bihar Gujarat Himachal Pradesh Karnataka Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Rajasthan Sikkim Uttar Pradesh Union Territory Pondicherry States 2 2 12 14 0 139 5 20 19 10 0 19 Janata Party Seats Won by 0 11 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 2 CPI-M Table 7.3 Results of the General Elections to Legislative Assemblies, March 1985 0 11 13 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 6 CPI 13d 211a 40 8 2 10 7 86b 7 9 31c 28 Others 166 Bruce D. Graham to why Vajpayee had raised these questions, the Statesman reflected that he was: Generally believed to have steered the party away from the old Jana Sangh line and made it follow the path of a somewhat ill defined ‘Gandhian Socialism’. As long as the party was doing reasonably well, this policy was never seriously questioned. But ever since the BJP suffered setbacks in Jammu, Delhi and some other areas in 1983, the wisdom of the Vajpayee line has reportedly been challenged by some members. The recent electoral reverses may have deepened inner-party differences, especially after doubts arose about the RSS’s attitude towards the BJP. Mr Vajpayee’s line may have received fresh endorsement, but the last has probably not been heard on this matter.13 In 1980, there had been a tendency, within and without the BJP, to explain its characteristics by reference to past models, whether that of the Janata Party or that of the Jana Sangh, but by 1985, the party was being assessed in its own terms. Writing in response to an editorial comment, J.P. Mathur, one of the most experienced Jana Sangh workers to have been recruited by the BJP, maintained that the new party ‘still holds that it has the potential to replace the ruling party. It can grow into an alternative over a period of time.’ Referring to the party’s internal affairs, he said: Dividing the BJP into a Right and Left on the pattern of the other Indian parties is too simplistic. The BJP is still better organized and more united than most Indian parties. It need not depend on RSS cadres. Apart from the fact that most BJP leaders and a great number of its workers have an RSS background of which they are quite proud, there is no link between the two. The leaders and workers of the two organizations continue to have friendly relations.14 Mathur was justified in making the point that dividing the BJP ‘into a Right and Left’ was ‘too simplistic’, but it is the case that the party does face serious problems of strategy. It is not surprising, therefore, that a working group set up by the National Executive in March 1985 to prepare a five year plan on the party’s organization and programme soon found itself raising questions of basic principle. Judging from what was revealed to a press conference in July 1985, the group formed the view that the party should maintain its separate identity and that its relations with other parties should be based on ‘mutuality and reciprocity’; as far as electoral strategy was concerned, it envisaged contesting all Lok Sabha constituencies in the next general elections with the aim of attracting 40–42 per cent of the votes. The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism 167 Equally significant was the indication given at this conference that, in terms of regions, the party would not be concentrating on the Hindi heartland but on a group of territories extending from southern part of that region to the Deccan—Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi, Maharashtra and Gujarat—and on Himachal Pradesh in the northern hills; Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar were not mentioned, presumably because the group had decided that the party’s chances of achieving power in those states was not remote.15 The working group must also have reviewed the content of the basic policy documents, which the party had adopted in 1980 and made various suggestions for change, which were considered at meetings of the National Executive and National Council in October 1985. Directing attention to ‘Gandhian Socialism’, one of the original five commitments, it proposed that the term should be replaced by a reference to the ‘Gandhian approach to the socioeconomic system’; it also recommended the approval of Upadhyaya’s doctrine of integral humanism, which had been referred to in the Economic Policy Statement of 1980, but had not been mentioned by name in the account of the five commitments. Although the National Executive accepted these proposals, the National Council while approving the emphasis that had been given to integral humanism, nevertheless considered that the term ‘Gandhian socialism’ should be retained.16 These decisions were variously interpreted. Balraj Madhok, who had been expelled from the original Jana Sangh in March 1973 and who is now the President of a new party with that name, welcomed what he took to be a slogan to the return to integral humanism as evidence that ‘the BJP has begun its retreat to the Jana Sangh and Humanism’. In his view the party had two clear options: Either it must rejoin the Janata Party or return to the Jana Sangh. India needs a broad-based, Hindu-oriented party like the Jana Sangh more than ever before. The return of the BJP to the Jana Sangh name, flag and ideology, will pave the way for its re-emergence as a national alternative to the Congress Party, otherwise it has no future. . . .17 There is no doubt that 1985 is a period of intense reflection for the BJP and the renewal of interest in integral humanism saw it reaching back to the traditions of the Jana Sangh. The party’s national leadership is still heavily weighted towards those who were Jana Sanghis before the onset of the Emergency in 1975, and includes people such as Advani (who succeeded Vajpayee as the party’s President in March 1986), Bhai Mahavir and Smt. Vijaya Raje Scindia, and there is as yet little sign that a new generation is asserting itself within its top councils. For the time being, the BJP remains at the centre of the political spectrum, although its ties with the RSS still expose it to the 168 Bruce D. Graham accusation of being a ‘reactionary’ and ‘communal’ party and limit its scope for making alliances with parties whose outlook is more pluralistic. The BJP’s Electoral Prospects One of the most interesting trends in recent elections has been the inability of the BJP to build up its electoral strength in the three states which span the upper and the middle regions of the Ganga valley—Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The failure in Uttar Pradesh was especially significant; with a population of 111 millions at the time of the 1981 census, representing 16.2 per cent of India’s total population of 685 millions, it makes up the core of the Hindi-speaking heartland, and in electoral terms, it is, by far, the largest bloc of voters so far as the Lok Sabha elections are concerned. The Jana Sangh’s basic strategy was to concentrate on Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh to the south and to a lesser extent on the Punjab and on Rajasthan to the west. Had this strategy succeeded it would have become the dominant party of the Hindi heartland, and expansion into the Deccan would have followed as a matter of course. To achieve this success in Uttar Pradesh was essential, and at first, the prospects for the party appeared good. From 6.43 per cent in the first elections in 1952, its share of votes in the Assembly elections built up to 9.84 per cent in 1957, to 16.46 per cent in 1962 and to 21.67 per cent in 1967, when it captured 98 seats in a house of 425. It was after the 1967 elections that a long period of Congress rule at the Centre ended, following the defection of a group from the governing party, and the Jana Sangh joined in a coalition government under Charan Singh. This government broke up in February 1969. On this occasion, the Jana Sangh’s share of votes fell to 17.93 per cent and its total of seats to 49. Five years later, in February 1974, its vote share was 17.12 per cent and the number of seats was 61. In 1980, as we have noted, the BJP secured only 10.78 per cent of the votes and 11 seats; in 1985 its tally of seats was 16. Assuming a degree of electoral continuity between the two parties, we have the problem of explaining why the trend was a steady increase in electoral strength to 1967, followed by a steady decline thereafter. The first point to consider is that the party had to compete, in the 1950s and the 1960s, with the Congress Party that was well established and well entrenched in Uttar Pradesh society. The United Provinces had been one of the main centres of Congress activity in the British period and it had recruited its district leaders from local professional groups and from the ranks of wealthy peasants, while opposing the landlords (the taluqdars and zamindars) who formed the base of British rule in this territory. At election The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism 169 times, the Congress in Uttar Pradesh could mobilize considerable financial and organizational support and could easily smother the campaign of the other minor parties, forcing them to survive precariously by compensating for losses by making gains of other seats. Like the other non-Congress parties in the state, the Jana Sangh tried to adopt itself to this type of electoral politics and by 1967 it was able to win about one-fifth of the seats by machine-like tactics, but it did not succeed in building up a secure regional base during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1980s, neither could it nor could the BJP point to a set of districts or towns in Uttar Pradesh where it controlled mostly local authorities, cooperative organizations or voluntary associations: in other words, an area which could be regarded as its own region. A second and related point is that the Jana Sangh began life in Uttar Pradesh as a party whose leaders were mainly recruited from the upper castes of the state, viz., the Brahmans, the Rajputs, the Banias and the Kayasthas. In this respect it resembled the Congress Party of the time and its elite bias did not prevent it from mobilizing support in reasonable numbers at elections times, but in retrospect we can see that one of the untapped sources of power in the state’s politics has been the considerable layer of middle or backward castes, such as Jats, Ahirs, Kurmis, Yadavas, Lodhas, and Koeris, who are largely peasant cultivators at odds with upper castes and at the other end of the social hierarchy, with the great mass of the Scheduled Castes, the beneficiaries of the privileged educational and job reservations. It is probable that a number of non-Congress parties including the Praja Socialist Party, the Samyukta Socialist Party and the Jana Sangh, were trying to win over regional segments of the layer of backward castes in the late 1960s but were frustrated by the rise of Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD), formed in 1967 by Charan Singh. He had the advantage of his own Jat following in the western parts of the state. His party won 21.29 per cent of the votes in its first election in 1969. Its modern counterpart, the Lok Dal, is now firmly established as a party of the backward castes not only in Uttar Pradesh but also in Haryana and Bihar. In Uttar Pradesh, therefore, the BJP has much less scope for electoral growth than was open to the Jana Sangh in the early 1960s. In the towns and cities, its middle constituency of small traders, civil servants and professional people provides a limited social base and is rarely able to ensure an electoral victory. In the countryside, its Hindu nationalism has aroused the distrust of the Muslim communities, and the growth and the consolidation of the Lok Dal has set a firm limit to electoral expansion, especially in the western part of the state. By contrast the Jana Sangh was able to establish itself as a credible rival to the Congress Party in certain northern regions which belonged to the princely states in the British period and which were therefore, less exposed 170 Bruce D. Graham to Congress penetration than regions in the former provinces. In the western part of the present day Madhya Pradesh, in the Gwalior and Malwa regions, and in sections in eastern Rajasthan, such as Kota, the Jana Sangh was able to build up connections with a number of localities and the BJP has inherently inherited these concentrations of relative strength. It was in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, and also in Himachal Pradesh that state Janata governments under Jana Sangh leadership in 1977–80 period were able to offer the kind of interest in regional development which, given more resources and a longer period in office, could well have consolidated the party’s reputation for sound administration and the defence of the states’ rights against the Centre. In such regions, the BJP’s chances of returning to power depend on what kind of issues become prominent in the years ahead. Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have not been seriously affected by the anti-reservation disputes which have hardened the divisions between the caste layers in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and to the extent that politics shifts towards developmental requirements, such as better roads and bridges, better storage facilities in rural areas, improved agricultural extension services and so on, the advantage of the BJP over the Congress increases. Although its regional bases within these two states are restricted, a turn of the electoral tide could leave it once more the dominant unit in a non-Congress coalition arrangement. On the other hand, it is difficult for the party to prevent its regional groups from losing their discipline and coherence during long periods in opposition, and the Madhya Pradesh unit in particular has been affected by disputes at the leadership level. The BJP’s electoral difficulties can be set in broader perspectives if we take stock of the problems of strategy that affect the Congress (I). It is now much more possible for state governments to appeal to the cultural and the developmental needs of the local regions that was the case in the 1950s, and at the time of writing (August 1987) non-Congress governments are in power in a number of important states. Thus, in the south, Andhra Pradesh is controlled by the Telugu Desam, Kerala by the Left Democratic Front ministry which took over power in March 1987, and Karnataka by the Janata government under Ram Krishna Hegde; only in Tamil Nadu does the Congress (I) have indirect access to power, by virtue of its alliance with the AIADMK government which has been in office from February 1985. In the east, the Left Front coalition headed by Jyoti Basu in Bengal and the Asom Gana Parishad ministry under Prafulla Mahanta in Assam are firmly in control of the respective territories. In the northwest, Punjab is under President’s Rule and in Jammu and Kashmir, the Congress (I) enjoys influence mainly because of its alliance with the National Conference. Thus restricted, the Congress (I) is trying to become very much a part of northern and middle The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism 171 India, and it is conceivable that it may strengthen its identification with the cultural and linguistic traditions of this very large core region. If this happens, the BJP will probably be driven into two forms of opposition; where it is strongest, as in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, it can be expected to offer itself as the vanguard of an alliance of parties committed to develop the communications and service infrastructure of those states and where it is relatively weak, as in Uttar Pradesh, it will probably assume a secondary role, leaving the local groups of the Lok Dal to lead the attack on the ruling party. The latter was the approach adopted by the party in the Haryana state elections of June 1987, when the BJP accepted a modest place in an election front known as the Sangharsh Samiti, in which the main component was the local unit of the Lok Dal (B) (for H.N. Bahuguna) led by veteran politician, Devi Lal. His front had no difficulty in gaining control of the 90 member Legislative Assembly, winning 79 out of the 87 contested seats and reducing the Congress (I) representation to 5 members; within the majority, the Lok Dal (B) was credited with 59 seats and the BJP with 15 but Devi Lal acknowledged the importance of his principal ally by according it a place in his first cabinet.18 In the immediate future, the BJP can be expected to prepare carefully for the sequence of the state elections which lie ahead (including those in Delhi in 1988) and to concentrate, in the run up to the next general elections (which may take place at the end of 1989 or in 1990) on those states (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh) where it has a good chance of taking power in its own right. The more attention the BJP gives to building up its strength in these target states, the more importance it will attach to pragmatic development policies and the less it will be concerned about creating a generalized rally in the name of Hindu nationalism. While the BJP undoubtedly retains nostalgia for the independence and the forthrightness of the early Jana Sangh, its main interest is now in regional power, and that is the factor most likely to absorb its organizational energies in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Notes 01. On the Jana Sangh, see Baxter (1969); Jhanglani (1967). I would like to thank Dr Subrata Mitra (Department of Politics, University of Hull), for his criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. Some of the material for this study was gathered in New Delhi in May 1984, during a brief visit funded by the Nuffield Foundation, for whose support I am grateful. 02. See Bharatiya Janata Party, Constitution and Rules, (as amended by the National Council up to 7 January 1984 at Indore) (n.d.). 03. Bharatiya Janata Party, Our Five Commitments (n.d.), pp. 3–4. 172 Bruce D. Graham 04. 05. 06. 07. 08. 09. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Bharatiya Janata Party, Our Five Commitments (n.d.), pp. 4–5. Ibid., pp. 6–8. Ibid., p. 12. Bharatiya Janata Party, Economic Policy Statement (as approved at the First National Convention of the Party held at Bombay on 28, 29 & 30 December 1980) (n.d.). Bharatiya Janata Party, Towards a New Polity: Election Manifesto, Lok Sabha Elections, 1984 (n.d.), p. 8. Statesman, Delhi, 5 January 1985, p. 7. Ibid, 7 January 1985, pp. 1 and 7; See also editorial, ‘Bases of BJP Support’, Statesman (Weekly), Calcutta, 22 December 1984, p. 8. Statesman (Weekly), 12 January 1985, p. 13. Statesman, 18 March 1985, p. 7. Editorial, ‘BJP at the Crossroads’, Statesman, 25 March 1985, p. 8. Letter to the Editor, from New Delhi, 4 June 1985, Statesman (Weekly), 15 June 1985, p. 10. The writer was referring to the editorial, ‘BJP in the Doldrums’, Statesman, 9 November 1985, p. 10. Ibid., 27 July 1985, p. 6. Ibid., 19 October 1985, p. 7; Letter from J. P. Mathur from New Delhi to the Editor, 21 October 1985. Statesman, 9 November 1985, p. 10. Ibid., 19 October 1985, p. 13. Ibid., 27 June 1987, p. 5. The election results are taken from Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), XXXIII, p. 35247. References Baxter, Craig. 1969. The Jana Sangh: The Bibliography of an Indian Political Party. Philadelphia. Bharatiya Janata Party. n.d. Constitution and Rules. ———. n.d. Our Five Commitments. ———. 1980. Economic Policy Statement. ———. n.d. Towards a New Polity: Election Manifesto, Lok Sabha Elections, 1984. Jhanglani, Motilal A. 1967. Jana Sangh and Swatantra: A Profile of The Leftist Parties in India. Bombay. 8 Communalization of the Indian Polity* ACHIN VANAIK The Historic Decline of the Congress Virtually every major political development in recent times bears the stamp imposed by a basic structural malady expressed in a double dilemma. There is the historic decline of the Congress Party and the simultaneous inability of any political formation to replace its historical role. The overall result is an unprecedented political and ideological vacuum, and a politics of extreme flux as competitors strive to cannibalize the space hitherto occupied by the Congress. Whatever the partial or temporary successes enjoyed by one competitor or the other, these have proved neither stable nor significant enough to make any single force the new fulcrum of Indian political life in the way that the Congress was for so many years after independence. The evidence for the existence of such a decisive historical conjuncture is unmistakable. Electorally speaking, centrist dominance by the Congress had a distinct social and geographical cast. Socially, Congress pre-eminence rested on its ability to combine solid upper caste support with enduring loyalty from the ranks of the ‘core minorities’ or Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and a large proportion of Muslims in many parts of the country. The rise of the backward or intermediate castes and the consolidation of their votes weakened the electoral impact of the traditional pattern of Congress support. But what really undermined the Congress was the progressive abandonment by those sections, which had long supported it. * This essay was originally published as ‘The Communalization of the Indian Polity’ in Achin Vanaik Communalism Contested: Religion, Modernity and Secularization, New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1997. 174 Achin Vanaik Upper caste (Brahmins and forward castes) loyalty was most important in the north, especially in the all-important state of Uttar Pradesh, which provides the single largest number of seats (85) to the national Parliament, the Lok Sabha. About 12 per cent of the population of Uttar Pradesh are Brahmins, who also make up some 40 per cent of the country’s Brahmins. Together with the forward castes they constitute about 25 per cent of the electorate in the state. Generally, dominance at the Centre has required dominance in the northern states, whose order of importance is first in Uttar Pradesh, then Bihar, followed by Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. There were periods in the 1980s when the Congress could compensate for loss of support in the north by gains in the south. But this only disguised the seriousness of Congress’ declining support among upper castes because they took place in the context of wave elections. With that era now receding, its dilemma is revealed in its truer and starker proportions. Certainly in Uttar Pradesh the upper castes have shifted overwhelmingly to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This is true to a lesser but still significant extent in the other three states in the north—Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. But it is the eroding hold on the core minorities that has dealt a body blow to the Congress claim of being the country’s true national party. Today the electoral behaviour of these groups is characterized by considerable volatility, with non-Congress alternatives more often than not preferred. After the demolition of the Babri Masjid and with the Congress ever more willing to accommodate itself to Hindu communalism, Muslim alienation from the Congress is greater than ever. But even besides this, one of the most important developments in recent times is the remarkable new ferment that is taking place within the Muslim community. The enormous political pressure Hindutva has exerted on Muslims has heightened internal frustrations. The failure of the traditional (usually religious) authorities to provide necessary protection and succour has been cruelly exposed. The overall result is a greater willingness than ever to reject or outflank the traditional leadership elements of the Muslims. This new willingness to question the traditional leaderships and the norms they have laid down for how Muslims must organize their lives is a major development in Indian political life. It does not yet amount to a major self-assertion of Muslims in the larger context of Indian politics. But it does mean a new independence in political thinking reflecting itself in a much greater willingness to change political alignments from what they have been in the past. The social base for this new upsurge of reform has been, of course, the emergence and consolidation of a sizeable Muslim middle class substantially making up for the vacuum in north India created by the earlier migration of this stratum to Pakistan after Partition. There is now a significant layer of young Muslims born 20–25 years after independence for whom the Communalization of the Indian Polity 175 issues of the pre-Partition era or the traditional concerns of the Muslim leadership mentally formed in that period and in the first decades of independence seem increasingly irrelevant. They constitute an important reservoir from where activists for social and political reform can be found. The Muslim middle class began to flex its muscles in the early 1970s, pressing towards secular issues of reform which could help their social, educational and economic advancement. Thus, issues such as preserving the status of Urdu (which for various reasons related to the communalization of north Indian politics for over a century had come to be seen symbolically as a ‘Muslim’ issue) were of much less concern to them than the promotion of measures which, symbolically or otherwise, led not to a politics of selfconscious isolation and separateness, but towards greater integration in the secular institutions of market, polity and higher education. This secularizing thrust was a setback, to the benefit of the traditional leadership pursuing its usual politics of the ‘Muslim community’, precisely because of the upsurge of communal Hindu politics from the middle and the late 1970s onwards. A Muslim politics otherwise has little raison d’être in a country so diverse and varied as India in which the shared cultural characteristics amongst the members of a local community (Hindu and Muslim) or region are far greater and deeper than those supposedly shared between members of a single religious community across such localities and regions. Two factors stand as the prime obstacles to the steady dismantling of such a politics of Muslimness—the defensive self-consciousness and fear amongst the Muslims created by the growth and impact of Hindu communalism (especially the polarizing effects of communal riots); and the ‘unifying’ issue of Muslim Personal Law. Precisely because political Hindutva has launched such a major onslaught on Muslim Personal Law, demanding its replacement by a Uniform Civil Code, this has made an issue of gender equality and social reform into one of ‘Muslim identity’.1 Finding how best to deal with the issue of community based Personal Laws, where these communities can be religious, tribal, sect, etc., has become an important part of the current struggle to decommunalize Indian society and politics. For the Scheduled Castes, the Congress no longer stands for anything with which it can identify. Other regional formations are as capable of pushing a vote catching populism, and of doing so with greater credibility. The very fact that the Scheduled Castes gave their loyalty to the Congress for so long makes the Congress failure to adequately address their needs all the more reprehensible and is now a powerful barrier to Congress efforts to reclaim such support. Moreover, the recent phenomenon of Dalit assertion as never before also threatens to transform the parameters of Indian electoral politics as hitherto understood. The Congress has suffered most from this recent upsurge of Dalit power and independence. 176 Achin Vanaik Even support from Scheduled Tribes whose numbers are around half of the country’s dalits, has proved to be impermanent. In states like Gujarat with disproportionately higher numbers of tribals, the Congress base has been greatly eroded, with the BJP gaining at its expense. In other states too, other parties, whether regional or those having nationalist pretensions, have gained ground. The historically accumulated prestige of Congress among the core minorities was an asset that many observers felt could not be easily squandered even by a reckless leadership. But that is exactly what has happened. It is what makes the crisis of the Congress so acute, and its revival on newer terms so urgent if it is to restore its status as a major actor impossible to ignore in the organization of Indian political life. Ideological Disarray The ideological disarray of the Congress has been the inevitable corollary of its political and electoral decline, part cause and part consequence. There is now an ideological vacuum at the heart of Indian politics. The old Nehruvian consensus has collapsed but there is no other consensus available for, or capable of, replacing it. That consensus was based on a loose acceptance of four principles—socialism, democracy, secularism and nonalignment. Domestically, socialism represented a form of social democracy, i.e., a state-driven capitalism and a limited paternalist welfarism. But it also embodied a serious value commitment to social justice and greater equality, which acted as a benchmark for judging policies—their selection and effects. Secularism meant, at a minimum, a commitment (despite various interpretations of secularism) to preserving a non-denominationalist, non-religiously affiliated state. Externally, non-alignment represented the effort to maximize national independence in foreign policy by avoiding formal or serious informal alignments with either bloc in the Cold War era. The collapse of the Nehruvian consensus owes more to the failure to adequately implement these principles than to the recent doubts entertained about the value and feasibility of the principles themselves, or to the impact of changes in the international context. In that sense India’s experience is only a particular expression of the widespread disillusionment created by the failed promise of developmentalism in most of the Third World countries in the post-colonial era. The specific internal reasons for the collapse of the Nehruvian consensus, i.e., for Congress decline, include the following factors and processes: Communalization of the Indian Polity 177 • The rise of rich farmers looking for political expression outside the Congress and of a much larger category of aspiring capitalist farmers who followed their leadership. • The rise of significant tensions between the industrial and agrarian elites. • The growth and consolidation of an industrial elite lacking commitment to the development of an indigenous industrial base and strong technological self-reliance, and on the look-out for greater collaboration with, and subordination to, foreign capital. • The shift within the dominant coalition with the big bourgeoisie becoming more powerful and successful in imposing its strategic vision on India’s desirable future. • The support for this elite by a small but crucial section of the bureaucracy. • The rise of a criminalized lumpenized business class linked to the black economy, tax evasion and speculation. • The steady transformation of the urban middle class and professionals who lost progressivist inclinations as they became more self-centred, hedonistic and consumerist in their aspirations. • The rise of a lumpen political elite. • The generational change in the Congress leadership. • The rising (but unmet) expectations and the increasing electoral volatility of the core minorities. • The growing federalist pressures in the Indian polity leading to the rise of all kinds of non-Congress political formations. • The increasing lopsidedness of the Indian economy with its uneven growth pattern, sectorally and geographically. • Finally, the ever starker inability of the Indian economy to meet adequately the basic needs of the poor, whose absolute numbers have risen. Ideologically, then, the Congress has simply drifted. It has accommodated itself to winds whose force and direction have had sources outside its own control. In two fundamental areas—secularism and the economy—the Congress has shifted significantly to the right and in doing so pushed the centre of gravity of Indian politics as a whole in that direction. On the issue of secularism, it is the BJP that has made the running and there is little doubt that the Congress, to its shame, has pursued a perspective that is accurately characterized as ‘pale saffron’, saffron being the emblematic colour of the political Hindutva. This has been more than just occasional Congress use of the ‘Hindu card’, a practice that surfaced significantly with Mrs Gandhi in regard to Punjab, 178 Achin Vanaik Kashmir and elsewhere. Under Narasimha Rao, the Congress for the first time in its history organized de facto alignment with the BJP (before the destruction of the Babri Masjid) to stabilize its rule at the Centre. This further legitimized Hindutva politics and encouraged the forces of political Hindutva in its Ayodhya campaign. Indirectly, the Congress bears a great deal of the blame for the destruction of the Babri Masjid. It could see what was coming, could have done much more to prevent it, and to legally and politically punish those responsible for these communal crimes, including the unleashing of widespread anti-Muslim pogroms that followed in the wake of the demolition.2 That it did none of these things reflected its inordinate concern not to go against what it perceived were widespread pro-Hindutva sentiments among Hindus. The politics of expediency and cowardice were of greater consequence than any politics of principles precisely because the old Congress ideology had ceased to have any guiding relevance. The New Economic Policy (NEP) inaugurated by the Congress in 1991 was not the outcome of a wide internal debate within Parliament, the Press or the general public. It was a fait accompli brought about by a narrow circle of top politicians and high-level bureaucrats in conjunction with key decisionmakers within the IMF and World Bank. The NEP did not merely represent a rightwing shift in economic thinking but was inspired by the most conservative form of neo-classical economic thinking—neo-liberalism. A Congress leadership anyway bereft of all ideological moorings and further disarmed by the collapse of the communist world, and therefore presumably of the socialist paradigm, responded to an immediate balance of payments crisis by endorsing a ‘long-term solution’ to this essentially short-term problem. This proposed ‘solution’ was itself highly ideological—a triumphalist neo-liberalism, which in the Indian case demanded rapid privatization of the public sector, removal of strategic control over the domestic operations of the market by the state, external liberalization and removal of controls over all kinds of foreign capital flows, devaluation, reduction of trade barriers and renewed emphasis on exports (especially of primary commodities), reduced taxes and a decline in ‘unproductive’ (social welfare) government expenditure. The ideological recoil from bad socialism was so strong that it has led to the widespread endorsement of bad capitalism. Searching for a New Centrism The only serious attempt to establish a new strategic foundation for Indian centrism in this situation of political and ideological disarray in old centrism (dominated by the Congress) was made by V.P. Singh, the former Prime Minister of the short-lived (1989–90) Janata Dal minority government. Communalization of the Indian Polity 179 He had the acumen to realize the nature of the problem and to propose the most feasible solution. But he lacked the organizational ability to institutionalize a coherent force or party capable of carrying out this politics of a new centrism. However, he remains the one Indian political leader of any stature in recent times who had such a strategic vision because he understood the implications of what are perhaps the two most important developments in Indian politics to have emerged over the last two decades. This is Dalit assertion as never before; and the ‘forward march’ of the backward or intermediate castes, or Other Backward Classes (OBCs), as they are also called. Admittedly, these OBCs are led for the most part by their upper layers. V.P. Singh’s platform of ‘social justice’, as symbolized by mandalism, however much of an anathema it was for the Indian elite and the urban middle classes and professionals, was one expression of this new strategic vision. Though he and his party were brought down, the mandalization of Indian politics was effected. No political party today, regardless of what this or that ideologue might say, can openly oppose mandalism and what it represents, except to their grave disadvantage. The forward march of the backwards and the new assertiveness of the Dalits are indisputable factors of great importance which any political party wishing to expand its authority and power must now take into account and try to come to terms with. What V.P. Singh and his Janata Dal sought to do but did not succeed in doing was to consolidate a new electoral and social foundation for centrism. No longer should it rest, as the old Congress did, on an amalgam of upper castes and core minorities but on backwards and core minorities, and in doing so provide a more stable foundation for new centrism than that enjoyed even by the old centrism. The principal strategic problem is that the category of backwards is socially differentiated and electorally heterogeneous. Ultimately, the most stable and powerful foundation for a new centrism whose fulcrum would correspond to the natural centre of gravity of Indian politics—left-of-centre— would have to rest on the non-antagonistic alliance of core minorities and the very sizeable lower and middling sections of the backwards. Instead, what has emerged has been an electoral alignment of sorts between the upper sections of the backwards and sizeable sections of the core minorities. This is an unstable situation because the social and class relations between the two groups, particularly between the upper backwards and the Dalits, who are, all too often, highly antagonistic. The upper sections of the backwards are in class terms usually rich farmers or aspiring capitalist family farmers coexisting uneasily with tenants and agricultural labourers coming for the most part from the core minorities and the lower sections of the OBCs. The project of constructing a new foundation for Indian centrism is, 180 Achin Vanaik and will be, very much on the cards but its successful accomplishment is still a matter for conjecture. The direction that a new centrism has to take is clear. Whether it will reach there is uncertain. To put it another way, while the natural centre of gravity of Indian political life is left-of-centre, the actual centre of gravity has rarely been so, and need not be so in the future. Social tendencies and pressures are not the same as political tendencies and pressures. The former determine the natural centre of gravity, the latter the actual. The direction a society takes is never decided by its average consciousness, i.e., the consciousness of the people as some amorphous mass, but above all by the consciousness of its leading strata and elements, i.e., the articulate, the mobilizers of the mobilized, and secondarily of the minority among the masses who are mobilized. This is precisely why capitalist and elitist development has taken place in India although the objective terrain is so favourable to socialism and egalitarianism. Political mobilization and struggle decide the direction a society takes, so while the votes of rural India decide which force comes to power, urban and semi-urban India decide, by and large, what that force stands for and does. Unless the forces that represent this natural centre of gravity successfully fulfil their political responsibility, there is no good reason to believe that the fulcrum of Indian politics will come to rest where it should—at a leftof-centre position. This requires more than just an actual or purported leftof-centre force or coalition coming to power. It also requires them to carry out a successful socio-economic and political transformation, the institutionalization of what would be a New Social Democracy. This would be superior in its egalitarian thrust to the Old Social Democracy upheld by the Congress till the early 1970s as its formal ideal, even if was not followed in practice. This Social Democracy would differ from the old one in its social base, organizational forms, and programmatic perspectives. What will happen if this fails to emerge is that the general thrust towards regionalization of Indian politics that has been operating for some time now will most likely be further reinforced. This assumes that a BJP-led authoritarian transformation of India’s political structure does not take place, either because the BJP does not stabilize itself in central power, or because, even if it does, it cannot properly carry out its programme. The historical decline of the Congress first had its most obvious and sharpest expression at the level of the states. Rivals to the Congress emerged, came to power and in some cases displaced the Congress as the natural party of governance or natural pole of reference. In any case, a host of other factors have led (despite more laws justifying central intervention in the states, and despite inadequate decentralization of economic and financial powers) to a more federalist and decentralized practice of politics. Regional leaders and regional parties have begun to exercise Communalization of the Indian Polity 181 greater national-level influence. Shifting coalitional arrangements and elected state governments failing to last their full term of office have already become commonplace features. Given the results of the 11th Lok Sabha elections in 1996 and the formation of a United Front government comprising numerous regional parties, they seem to have made their appearance nationally. It is in this wider framework that we must situate the rise of the BJP and of the forces of political Hindutva. The Rise of the BJP and of the Sangh Combine A distinction must be maintained between the party expression of political Hindutva—the BJP, and the wider array of forces comprising of organized Hindu communalism. The BJP’s fortunes have fluctuated and can do so in the future. Hindu communalism’s impact and that of the ideology of Hindutva have had a more uniform upward trajectory. There have been periods of stasis, where the graph of its movement showed prolonged plateaus. But it is difficult to perceive any serious slump in its fortunes once the country got over the trauma of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, for which Hindu communal organizations and attitudes were held directly or indirectly responsible. But despite the steady if slow rise of organized Hindutva (above all of the RSS) since 1950, it is only in the last 10 years that the Sangh combine (the RSS controlled or influenced group of organizations like the BJP, the VHP, the Bajrang Dal etc.) has risen to seriously menacing proportions. Indeed, though the cadre strength of the RSS since its birth in 1925 has steadily risen, by the early 1980s this growth was so far short of its historical expectations that the RSS had lost much of its élan, and was suffering from serious internal organizational problems. Its actual impact, culturally, politically, or organizationally, on that Hindu society and India it was committed to totally transforming was still remarkably limited. The narrative of the rising menace of Hindutva and Hindu communalism must undoubtedly pay attention to its roots in colonial India (the first stirrings of cultural nationalism), the various currents of Hindu nationalism in the national movement, the slow spread of the RSS after independence, as well as to the triumphs and vicissitudes of previous political incarnations of the BJP such as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. But the major factors behind the dramatic growth of political Hindutva belong to the last 15–20 years. These factors are extrinsic and intrinsic. The external, contextualizing factors have been and continue to be more important. It is not an accident that a whole array of movements representing various forms of the politics of cultural exclusivism have arisen all over the world in the last 15–20 years 182 Achin Vanaik (Vanaik 1997a). Everywhere the general explanatory principle is that these political movements of cultural exclusiveness have been responses to the failed promise of modernization in capitalist or socialist forms and the ideological disarray attending on this failure. In India, failed developmentalism is obvious enough at the socio-economic level. Its major political reflex has been systemic instability, while ideologically it is symbolized by the collapse of the hegemony of the Nehruvian consensus. The BJP and the forces of Hindu communalism have benefited most from the ensuing ideological and political vacuum partly because of certain intrinsic strengths. They possess the most ideologically coherent, organized and disciplined cadre force in the country in the shape of the RSS.3 The RSS, moreover, has steadily burrowed its way into the pores of civil society in many parts of the country. The BJP and the Sangh ideology can claim some degree of legitimacy and continuity from the cluster of ideological values that guided and informed the national movement. Most of all, the BJP has benefited from being a coherent political and ideological alternative to the Congress. The Left has also been such an alternative but its more regional character and identification has been a handicap. The BJP has been more nationally dispersed, and has always been a more significant factor in the heartland of Hindi-speaking states, which have been disproportionately more important than other regions for determining the shape of national level politics. In brief, it has been so positioned as to be the most likely beneficiary of the decline not just of the Congress but of the politics of old centrism. What is new is not the Sangh combine’s ideology and message but the receptivity to an old and otherwise shopworn message and ideology. However, the Sangh combine has to be credited with the ability to take advantage of the new, more favourable political environment in which it found itself. As we shall see subsequently, the political trajectory of the BJP and of its earlier incarnation as the Jana Sangh was not without fits and starts, detours and diversions since the mid-1970s. But first a look at the structure of Sangh ideology. Deconstructing Sangh Ideology Hindutva has already been structurally dissected (Vanaik 1997b). It is the wider, more intellectualized and abstract construct to which the ideology of the Sangh combine is related, but not congruent with. The ideology of the Sangh, though deriving inspiration and guidelines from Hindutva, has to have a simpler, more concrete and politically directed structure and content. It has to be capable of mobilizing on a large scale and therefore of arousing Communalization of the Indian Polity 183 passions/emotions or identifications of self-interest in ways which Hindutva proper would find more difficult. The fundamental premise of Sangh ideology is that Indian resurgence/ salvation can only be brought about by the self-conscious unit of Hindus as a religious cultural grouping. How, then, to unite Hindus given the peculiar character of Hinduism? There are only two ways and both have been pursued. One establishes a principle of coherence and unification that is either internal to Hinduism or either external to it. The only halfway plausible candidate for the first approach is the construction of a loose and more accommodating Brahminism. But this kind of construction of a more singular Hinduism can only take the Sangh combine so far. As a sought-after principle to cohere all Hindus, it is weak, and because of tensions with the more popular forms of practice and worship suffers from too many problems to be effective social glue. The other approach—to establish an external principle of coherence—is more promising because it does not intervene within Hinduism to make choices but posits an opponent for all Hindus regardless of their variant beliefs and practices. This approach is absolutely central to the Sangh combine’s task of constructing the desired Hindu unity. Hindus can now hopefully be united not by what they are supposed to share but what they oppose, even to the point of hostility. Indeed, the more strongly emotional the common opposition to the external ‘Other’ or ‘enemy’, the stronger is the desired unity likely to be. The only feasible candidate for this status as the hostile ‘Other’ to Hindus, given India’s history, are Muslims and Islam. But the logic does not ends here. How, after all, is this hostility to be constructed among Hindus in 20th century pre- and post-independence India? For the last 150 years, and particularly after 1947, it is impossible to argue that Muslims have directly dominated and oppressed Hindus and Hinduism. The ideological strategies for constructing such hostility are limited. First, there is the stratagem of pushing a particular historical interpretation of the past. After all, some kind of case can be made with some degree of plausibility about Muslim persecution of Hindus and denigration/desecration of the symbols and institutions of Hinduism in the past, provided the distinction between Muslim rulers and ordinary Muslims can be soft-pedalled or elided. That is to say, responsibility of some sort for past ‘crimes’ is transferred to today’s Muslims and to the community as a whole. Hence the argument that today’s Muslims must acknowledge the presumed iniquity of Babar at Ayodhya by themselves agreeing to its replacement by a temple. By refusing to endorse this, they themselves become ‘guilty’ of disrespecting and antagonizing today’s Hindus who want to right this putative historical injustice. 184 Achin Vanaik What can be said to unite elite Muslim rulers and ordinary Muslims either in the past or now? It is Islam. Culpability, then, resides in the character of Islam and the way in which it constructs Muslimness and influences Muslim behaviour in India. Islam is not usually directly attacked. The Sangh combine can even genuflect to the positive aspects of Islamic doctrine and life. But the charge against it is always there in disguised or undisguised forms. One decisive difference between the attitudes of Mahatma Gandhi and of the Sangh combine to the Muslims of India is important and educative. The Sangh insists that it is not against Muslims. How can it be? After all, Muslims are by birth and blood Hindus. (For those Sangh ideologues who believe that culture is tied to matters of birth and blood, this is tantamount to saying that the ‘true’ culture of Muslims is Hindu.) In the view of the Sangh combine, it is then said to be ‘unfortunate’ that Muslims refuse to recognize this, and what it entails. The Sangh, therefore, ‘respects’ Muslims not because they are Muslims and believe in Islam but because in a more fundamental sense, they are not Muslims! Where the Sangh combine ‘respects’ Muslims inspite of Islam and Muslimness, Gandhi respected Muslims because he respected Islam and Muslimness. An interpretation of India’s past stressing its essential Hinduness and the iniquities wrought by Muslims can arouse a level of emotional hostility and a desire to construct a Hindu ‘unity’ but it can only go so far. A politics of historical revenge is certainly a part of the Sangh’s current politicalideological armoury. But among contemporary Hindus, the cultivation of a strong sense of anger against Muslims must be based primarily on issues of the present. Since it is difficult for even the most diehard RSS cadre to argue that Muslims directly dominate Hindus today, how is this to be done? The Sangh can try to arouse a sense of fear or a sense of deprivation among Hindus. But given the subordinate position of the overwhelming bulk of Muslims in Indian society, this is more difficult and less successful than trying to arouse a sense of grievance or righteousness among Hindus against Muslims. Given the absence of direct dominance by even a small section of the Muslims, this can best be done by shifting the angle of attack. Muslims are not attacked for being directly oppressive of Hindus, just as racist whites do not attack the minority black community in Britain for being directly oppressive of whites. In both cases, the Hindu communal and white racist attack is launched against the state/government for favouring Muslims and blacks respectively. The necessary sense of grievance or indignation is cultivated by invoking the principle of ‘unfairness of treatment’ by the state/government vis-à-vis a ‘majority’ community and a ‘minority’ community (communities) for which partial responsibility is transferred not just to the leaders of the minority Communalization of the Indian Polity 185 community (communities) or to those in or outside the community (communities) in question who would justify such ‘unbalanced treatment’, e.g., secularists or white anti-racists, but also to the ordinary members of the community (communities). What angers here is not that Muslims benefit from such ‘favouritism’ but simply the fact of supposed favouritism. Thus, L.K. Advani has no difficulty in arguing that the absence of a Uniform Civil Code or the general policy of ‘minoritism’ (as he calls it) by India’s secular state doesn’t help the Muslims but perpetuates their backwardness. He can also don the mask of being a ‘more sincere friend’ of Muslims than their so-called secularist and progressive allies. The structural logic of Sangh ideology demands that the notion of minorityism and ‘appeasement of Muslims’ become central to the strategy for uniting Hindus psychologically and emotionally and therefore, it is to be hoped, culturally and politically. What remains, then, is to make the accusation persuasive through the selective appropriation and treatment of those issues wherein a plausible case of sorts can be constructed to show the state or particular parties guilty of minorityism. Hence, the constant (and often innovative) search by the Sangh combine for issues through which this basic message can be pushed. The Trajectory of the BJP Until the 1977 elections, the Jana Sangh was peripheral in Indian politics. When the Jana Sangh became part of an anti-Congress, non-Left coalition, temporarily welded into a single centrist party called the Janata Party, it made a decisive break from its hitherto undistinguished political past. In fact, the role of the RSS in resisting Emergency (a role they were literally pushed into by Mrs Gandhi’s attack on them in order to give the Emergency a ‘progressive’ image), and before that its cadre participation in the anticorruption 1974–75 JP Movement (named after its leader, a revered Gandhian, Jayaprakash Narayan), helped the Jana Sangh to secure the single largest share of parliamentary seat allotments within the Janata Party.4 When the Janata Party broke up over the issue of affiliation of Members of Parliament to the RSS, it was clear that if a centrist party was to be genuinely centrist, then it could not countenance the kind of political and organizational loyalties by its MPs to such an extra-party entity as the RSS which was not subject to the control of the Janata Party itself. In the elections of 1980, which swept Mrs Gandhi back to power, all the former components of the Janata Party, now split into various formations, were marginalized. The Jana Sangh between 1977 and 1979 was able, for the first time, to place its own people in many sections of the central bureaucracy, 186 Achin Vanaik and to use state resources to benefit itself and its parent organization, the RSS. But the 1980 election results were a grave shock. The lesson its leadership drew from this debacle was that the pattern that had brought it into the framework of an anti-Congress centrist alternative needed to be further pursued, i.e., it needed to move towards the centre of the political spectrum. This was how it had gained widespread legitimacy and managed a share of central power before the contradictions within the Janata Party split asunder the experiment. Between 1980 and the next Lok Sabha elections in 1984, the Jana Sangh consciously pursued a ‘moderate’ line, downplaying the RSS connection, seeking greater independence from it, and electing a leadership opposed to aggressive Hindu nationalist posturing. Its declared ideological perspective was now ‘Gandhian Socialism’. The dilemma of the Jana Sangh (and later the BJP) has been characterized as its uncertain oscillation between wanting to be the party representing the Great Hindu Rally/Rassemblement and wanting to represent a wider cross-section of support by diluting its strong Hindu cultural nationalist identification (Graham 1990). The 1980–84 interregnum was a self-conscious effort by the Jana Sangh to present itself as more of a centrist political force willing to be more pragmatic in its alignments and its ideological commitments. The 1984 electoral rout of the Jana Sangh effectively put paid to this strategy. There was a change of top leadership (A.B. Vajpayee was replaced by L.K. Advani, who was closer to the RSS) which meant a reassertion of tighter control by the RSS over the party and a rejection of ‘Gandhian Socialism’ for traditional Sangh ideology, only this time propagated and pursued much more aggressively than ever before. From 1984, the JS/BJP was a party looking for issues on which to peg its messages. It would now seek to extend its social and political base by moving right, actively pursuing the politics of polarization on the issue of secularism and the cultural self-definition of the Indian nation and state.5 Moreover, the pivot of ‘mainstream’ Indian politics was open to being shifted quite considerably. Indeed, deeper social transformations had fertilized the ground for certain kinds of cultural-religious activities and identifications that could benefit the Sangh combine. The BJP was aware of this but the shift in its political strategy after 1984 was determined more by the failure of the alternative politics it had pursued between 1980 and 1984 than by any deep-seated and calculated analysis it made of the political dividends to be garnered by making such a strategic shift. Moreover, the 1980–84 failure greatly strengthened the control and influence of the RSS over the party, naturally pushing it towards a more communal politics. Nonetheless, the underlying social transformations were important. Of these, the most important was the rise of the intermediate castes, now Communalization of the Indian Polity 187 seeking greater economic and political power, and upward cultural mobility. One avenue of such upward cultural mobility is not just Sanskritization but identification with and reworking of a wider Hindu identity. This was reflected in the great appeal of a series of processual religious(Hindu)cultural events and activities, the various yagna yatras that took place through the late 1970s and early 1980s. These long, trans-state processions and religious cavalcades and pilgrimages linked up rural with semi-urban and urban India around common symbols of reverence and loyalty. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or World Hindu Council originally set up, as another front organization of the RSS, was instrumental in organizing such yatras. The VHP, as it grew in power and strength, spectacularly so in the 1980s, also developed a considerable authority of its own separate from that of the RSS. It is now seen as more aggressively cultural nationalist and explicitly antiMuslim in its attitudes than the RSS. The rise of the OBCs has had immensely complicating effects on the Indian polity. Though the search by the upper layers of OBCs for religiouscultural mobility makes it in some ways receptive to a more Hinduized politics, its rise also imposes serious obstacles to the Sangh combine’s particular brand, which has strong associations with Brahmanical and upper caste Hinduism. This problem for the Sangh has surfaced most clearly in the 1990s after V.P. Singh’s successful mandalization of north Indian politics. In the mid-1980s, however, the BJP was beginning to make its mark as ‘the party of the future’. In a context of deepening uncertainty and flux, the BJP and the Sangh combine were the one collective force that had the organizational means, the ideological clarity and the inclination to pursue the politics of sustained mass mobilization. The aim was not simply to search for events and issues to mobilize around. There have been many such mass mobilizations since 1947. It was a search to highlight or create those events and issues, which were, or could be, exemplary expressions of an already pre-conceived perspective and ideology for which there was now an environment of greater receptivity. Major mass mobilizations and mass campaigns like the 1974 Railway strike or the JP Movement (1974–75) or the electoral campaign to reject Emergency rule (1977) or V.P. Singh’s anti-corruption(Bofors) campaign (1989) were issue or event based activities which essentially defined the character of the participants. The combatant parties could derive some overall ideological colouring but this was necessarily of a very loose kind. The politics of such mass mobilizations, defined primarily what the instigators and organizers were against, not so much what they stood for, certainly not in any broad programmatic or ideological way. This was not the case with mobilizational politics of the Sangh combine. As their acolytes and ideologues have repeatedly asserted, theirs was, for 188 Achin Vanaik the first time since the national movement, an ideological politics of mass scope, an attempt, partly successful, to alter the mainstream agenda itself. For once they were right. Far Left insurgency movements have also pursued intensely ideological politics, but these have operated at the margins of general political life. In a narrowly partisan sense, the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi Ayodhya campaign did for the Sangh combine and the BJP what the Dandi Salt March did for the Congress-led national movement. But where the latter helped unite the country against colonial rule, the former polarized and divided the country as never before. Whatever the damaging consequences for the Sangh of the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the Ayodhya campaign itself (before the act of demolition) was a massive political ‘success’. It propelled the BJP and the Sangh to national prominence and undoubtedly extended their mass support far beyond what they had hitherto achieved. Apart from the Ayodhya campaign, the BJP has sought to capitalize on a number of issues. It has waxed eloquent about Article 370 in Kashmir.6 It has called for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC). It has tried to make political capital about the issue of illegal Bangladeshi migrants.7 Even as the BJP seeks to construct a monster-sized Hindu vote bank, it has cried itself hoarse over minority (read Muslim) vote banks and ‘appeasement’.8 The issue of a uniform or common civil code, in particular, promises to be a long-running sore. It has been a prime obstacle to weakening the ‘politics of Muslimness’. At the time of independence, the government was prepared to subordinate issues of women’s rights to considerations of national unity. This affected its understanding of how to deal with the question of a UCC. Perceiving national integration as integration of communities, it did not press for a UCC since it felt that the key communities of the Hindus and the Muslims were not ready for it. Had it done so, however, protests from conservatives within the Hindu and the Muslim communities would most likely have been containable. Even an imperfect common civil code, not sufficiently advanced in ensuring full gender equality, would still have set a baseline for further reform in the future. Today the issue has become so deeply communalized that secular progressives have become divided and ambivalent about this vexed issue. Part of the reason why the BJP has successfully peddled the view that the absence of a UCC is a sign of ‘appeasement’ of Muslims and indicates their disloyalty to a united nation which should have uniform laws is because national unity was the basic prism through which even the Indian judiciary has viewed the UCC issue. Moreover, by constantly evoking the issue of a UCC in judgments concerning disputes over Muslim personal law but rarely in disputes over Hindu personal law, the judiciary reinforced the communal view that Hindus have reformed their laws setting a standard for others while Communalization of the Indian Polity 189 minority communities not carrying out such reform are somehow antinational. The central issue of gender justice across all religious communities has been obscured. The emphasis was on uniformities across all religious communities not on uniformity of legal support for women everywhere. Political Hindutva has no commitment to a genuinely gender-just UCC. The kind of common civil code acceptable to it would be based on Hindu codes interpreted in a loosely Brahmanical fashion. In such a situation not surprisingly, the very idea of a common civil code is seen by large sections of the Muslims as motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment. Among progressives, there are currently four different perspectives: 1. 2. 3. 4. Have a compulsory common code irrespective of what it is called— a UCC, a common civil code, a gender-just code, or whatever. The anti-women aspects of all personal laws should be done away with while certain inoffensive customary and cultural practices can be retained. All persons will be governed by such a code. Provide a UCC which would be optional not compulsory. In a first variation, the civil code exists alongside personal laws and there can be access to it at any time in one’s adult life. A second variation assumes everyone is born into a common civil code but can at any time opt to be governed by a particular personal law. A third variation assumes persons are normally governed by personal laws but can opt for civil code provisions at a time of dispute, when secular laws will prevail. Here, the focus is on amending the existing personal laws in line with gender equality. Formulating a common civil code should be avoided. And these amendments should emerge from within the community in question when they are able to arouse widespread support. The fourth perspective is not to do away with personal laws, not to have one common civil code, but to have a number of laws cutting across personal laws in specific areas, e.g., a common matrimonial property act applicable to everyone. A start in this direction can be made by taking up those areas where personal laws have nothing to offer, e.g., access to matrimonial property, matters of domestic violence, compulsory registration of marriages, etc. Not all these positions are exclusive. One might want ultimately a compulsory UCC but prefer an optional UCC for the time being. Or one might prefer a phased piecemeal legislative approach rather than a package legislation. The common ground is that all progressives agree on changes in gender-unequal provisions whether in personal or in existing secular laws. This emphasis on having the ‘best’ secular and personal laws also 190 Achin Vanaik undermines the perspectives of political Hindutva, which cannot tolerate such a dramatic transformation of Hindu codes, although these have been reformed to a greater extent than Muslim Personal Law. There is less disagreement about how such laws and provisions can be formulated—the active involvement of feminists/progressive women’s groups, women disputants with respect to personal laws, legally skilled personnel. There is more disagreement about how such laws—the agencies and the manner (phased or otherwise, scale of application)—are to be brought into force. While all movements of social reform within a religious community should be encouraged, can this alone determine the availability and scope of best secular laws? The answer seems obvious—it cannot. If current circumstances make a compulsory common civil code communally counter-productive, as a transitional measure there certainly can be the institutionalization of a ‘best’ optional civil code whether legislated piecemeal or in a single package. Anyone can opt for it at any time, its provisions holding over personal laws or tribal custom at a point of dispute. Such an approach is politically practical in the short term and a significant secular advance on what exists today.9 It is a perspective that the Left and progressive parties, for example, could be brought around to support and mobilize for. But the ultimate goal of a common civil code applicable to all must be maintained. Religious and customary laws (which are community based), beyond a point, cannot be reformed to be compatible with modern notions of equality and liberty without losing their character as recognizably religious-traditional laws. Nor should the diversity and plurality of Indian society be made an excuse for justifying the existence of a permanent plurality of personal laws. A universally applicable body of democratic law governing family life, gender and interpersonal relationships within a country can be progressively made more open, tolerant and accommodative of changing social mores. But this is a process of constant reform of a body of democratic law already made available and universally applicable because it has replaced the bulk of religious and customary laws. One cannot achieve such a ‘body of law’, i.e., an open-ended, tolerant and plural legal structure, through some other process of stitching together various personal laws, which can somehow each be reformed as to be compatible with modern democratic principles of jurisprudence. This is an illusion. Undertaken in the name of preserving plurality and diversity, it will rationalize and disguise the existence of the principles of hierarchy and patriarchy that found all non-modern systems of community laws and codes. But none of these issues—Article 370 on Kashmir’s autonomy, Bangladeshi migration, and a Uniform Civil Code—could have had the Communalization of the Indian Polity 191 political charge that the Ayodhya campaign carried. The temple-mosque issue did what no other issue could—it directly connected an admittedly constructed but nonetheless strong and widespread (pan-Indian) belief and desire among a significant section of Hindus to a notion of Muslim intransigence purportedly abetted by the state. Ayodhya could be presented as explicitly and centrally a Hindu-Muslim issue. With the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992, the Sangh fulfilled its professed goal and maximized the political benefits to it of that campaign. Had it timed its demolition closer to the 1996 general elections might it not have made more gains? This is uncertain. Sustaining such a campaign for so long at the same level of intensity was problematic. In fact, the accelerating intensity of the campaign throughout 1992 had already made further procrastination difficult. In short, there are too many imponderables to allow for confident speculation that the Sangh combine did make a serious mistake in carrying out the demolition when it did. What is clear is that the BJP and the rest of the Sangh combine had to fulfil its promise at some time or else risk a serious erosion of its credibility. The actual demolition and the developments that followed in its aftermath revealed both the threat of the Sangh combine as well as some of the obstacles to its further expansion. The Threat of the BJP Whatever the fascist characteristics in the BJP’s ideology and organization (or that of the Sangh combine), the danger it represents is not of a fascist takeover but of the coming to state power of a reactionary rightwing and authoritarian yet populist political party (Vanaik 1997a). Whether it will come to power and stay there and what it can do if it does are still subject to a number of imponderables.10 But it is the only political party in India that promises a new project, a comprehensive break with the past. It rejects not simply the Nehruvian consensus as ineffective but the foundational principles of the consensus itself. Domestically, there were three such principles— socialism, democracy and secularism. The first was consciously undermined by the Rao Congress, a process initiated by the Rajiv Congress. The NEP constitutes a conscious rejection of the idea of a pattern of economic growth that puts social justice as an evaluative norm (however much economic practice may depart from this norm) in the forefront. It represents a dramatic rightward shift in capitalist economic thinking itself. The social values associated with this shift run counter to the social democratic aspirations of the Nehruvian consensus. 192 Achin Vanaik The BJP has carried out the assault on democracy as a governing principle and value by seeking to redefine it as a species of majoritarianism, i.e., the fulfilment of the wishes and potential of a supposedly natural majority, the Hindus. It thus seeks to destroy the fundamental underpinning of political democracy—the concept of an Indian citizenship which must necessarily be abstracted from the possession of any particular attribute (religion, race, language, etc) that is not in principle universally available and achievable regardless of specific communitarian loyalties. One of the crucial checks to prevent such ‘natural’ majorities from achieving undue influence is institutionalization of minority rights. The BJP, however, attacks the very principle of minority rights as an unwarranted privilege. It is not specific abuses of such rights that is attacked, which is reasonable enough, but the very principle itself. Therein lies a clear warning of what minorities, specifically Muslims, have in store, should the BJP ever stabilize itself in power at the centre. Similarly, the BJP’s assault on secularism and the secular state is also sought to be carried out through redefinition. Once secularism is redefined as tolerance, then the truly secular state comes to mean the truly tolerant state. From here it is an easy step to advocating a Hindu rashtra, and implicitly a Hindu state, or one, which in some basic sense affiliated to the ‘majority religion’. After all, Hinduism, it is claimed, is the most tolerant of all religious systems and therefore most conducive to true secularism. Those who oppose the idea of a Hindu rashtra or a Hindu state but propose a redefinition or reinterpretation of secularism as tolerance provide powerful legitimacy to the overall project of the BJP and the Sangh combine, even if they would themselves be shocked by the political denouement favoured by them. Never before has there been such a comprehensive and single minded assault on the founding principles of the Indian Constitution and the State. Meanwhile the efforts of the Sangh combine to transform civil society through constructing a Hindu monolithism go on. Precisely because the Sangh’s project is new, it arouses so much passion. People tend to be passionately for or against it. It arouses committed support and committed hostility, although the size and segmentation of Indian society is such that it can only come to power through the electoral route if it is able to gather a significant degree of support from the uncommitted. While the BJP has benefited the most from the historic decline of the Congress, this is still not enough. In a basic sense, the future of the BJP lies not so much in its hands as in the factors external to it, and therefore in what its rivals do or not do. It is not the strengths of the BJP but the weaknesses and failures of its opponents that can propel the BJP to national power. Communalization of the Indian Polity 193 The Obstacle to BJP Politics What pushed the BJP to put so many of its ideological eggs in the Ayodhya basket was its reaction to the emergence of another kind of ideological politics which it saw as a serious danger. This was V.P. Singh’s turn to Mandalism after his Janata Dal government came to power in 1989. The BJP’s decision to embark on the fateful rath yatra or re-enactment of Lord Rama’s chariot march through a number of states culminating in a massive rally to be held at the site of the monument in Ayodhya was directly motivated by hostility to Mandalism. Mandal politics was seen by the Sangh combine as highly divisive of the ‘Hindu community’ because it pitted lower castes against upper, and because caste identity is more strongly felt than religious identity. The BJP launched the rath yatra in defiance of the government, thereby signalling its determination to bring the minority government down (the Janata Dal depended for its survival on both BJP and Left support) if it stopped the yatra. The yatra was halted but only after passing through many states causing bloodshed and riots in its wake, arousing communal passions and religious hysteria on a scale and to a depth that had not been seen since the Partition holocaust. The Janata government, of course, fell and was replaced by Chandrasekhar minority government totally dependent on Congress support. In due course, the Congress forced the 1991 elections and came to power. The Rao government’s subsequent behind-the-scenes hobnobbing with the BJP gave a boost to the latter’s Ayodhya campaign. But the Mandal genie once out of the bottle could not be put back in. It is true that the BJP was the only non-Left party that had pursued a coherent and systematic ideological alternative in a general situation of ideologicalpolitical vacuum. However, V.P. Singh and the Janata Dal had seized on an issue—Mandalism—that could be the van of a more coherently organized and systematized ideological politics—the politics of ‘social justice here and now’. That V.P. Singh and the Janata Dal have, so far, not been able to go beyond Mandalism to work out such a systematized programme and then actively pursue it through mass mobilization reflects that party’s political and organizational weaknesses. Yet, such has been the power of Mandalism that no party wishing to be a major all-India force can openly oppose it. This power comes from the rising strength of the social forces behind it—the backwards and the Dalits. If the BJP is to continue its forward march it must work through and besides these forces, accommodating and outflanking, not directly confronting them. Insofar as in the key northern state of Uttar Pradesh the BJP is widely seen as a party of the upper castes, then despite their consolidated support (assuring 194 Achin Vanaik it of a major electoral presence), it must find ways to win over sizeable sections of backwards and/or Dalits, or neutralize the opposition based on these forces. Though the backwards, particularly the upper echelons, are susceptible to calls for Hindu identification and cultural unity, this is firmly subordinated to the politics of backward caste mobilization. The former can provide psychological and emotional upliftment. The latter can provide direct access to representative political power. Thus, the ‘Hinduization’ of the intermediate castes can never be a simple Brahmanization or strongly Brahmanized form of Sanskritization. The BJP, then, has a major problem. It posseses an ideological distinctiveness that is its greatest asset. Insofar as it must stand for a certain kind of Hinduism and Hinduness and cannot simply be a purely anti-Muslim force, then it is the political expression of a Brahmanical, upper caste Hinduism even as it makes this Brahmanism looser and more accommodating. This sets limits to its appeal. How far can the BJP go in diluting its upper caste character? Backward caste and Dalit power understandably enough seeks independent representation and forms of organization. There are also tensions within the Sangh combine of three kinds—within the BJP, between the RSS and the BJP, within the RSS itself. Though the BJP has made its gains by lurching to the right towards aggressive communal politics, it now faces serious problems. The demolition of the mosque deprives it of any comparable mobilizational focus to what it possessed prior to the demolition. It is much more difficult to arouse mass passions for building a Ram temple then for destroying a hated symbol. The 1993 assembly elections in the north shocked the BJP and exposed the limits of Ayodhya-type politics. The BJP barely retained Rajasthan, got nowhere in Bihar, was ousted in Madhya Pradesh by the Congress, and most importantly, lost out in Uttar Pradesh to a Dalit-backwards-Muslim alliance symbolized by the coalition government of the Samajwadi Party (SP) or Socialist Party led by Mulayam Singh Yadav and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) or the party of the Plebeian Majority led by Kanshi Ram. Unless the BJP extends its influence to sizeable sections of the backwards and/or Dalits, how is it to assure itself of power? A large part of the internal tensions within the BJP are related to this problem. The median point of Indian politics has shifted closer to the Sangh ideology, but the old dilemma of whether or not the BJP, to expand, should move towards the centre, still persists. It would then have to dilute its Hindutva politics and be more critical of the NEP. There are significant differences within the BJP on how far to go in these respects. The urban professionals and middle-middle and upper-middle classes (often highly westernized) are a new acquisition for the BJP, giving it a modernist aura and a new legitimacy. Communalization of the Indian Polity 195 The BJP is loath to lose this newly acquired support base, which gives it a new public image no longer, simply that of a petty bourgeoisie or trader party. Opposition to the NEP is not the way to consolidate its support amongst these layers of the population. Nor is even a highly diluted or merely rhetorical mandalism. But how is the BJP to acquire wider influence unless it takes up perspectives of relevance to backward and lower caste aspirations? On this terrain, however, the BJP loses its singular asset—its ideological distinctiveness. It must compete on a political-ideological terrain defined by other forces which have operated longer and with greater credibility. Moreover, in searching for new pastures may it not lose out where it has already consolidated? The existing relationship of forces within the BJP suggests that if left to itself, a majority would like to move the party socially towards a greater pragmatism, i.e., pursue a more ‘centrist’ inclined politics of cross-caste, cross-class mobilization, but economically towards endorsing the NEP. But the BJP is not left to itself. Overlying this internal tension is that between the RSS and the BJP. This pressure pushes the BJP in the opposite direction. The RSS is more hostile to any dilution of the BJP’s ideology caused by social or caste pragmatism. It takes Sangh ideology much more seriously, is more committed to Brahmanical Hinduism as the ideal to be striven for, and to a paternalistic relationship to lower castes. Strong economic nationalism (swadeshi) is the natural correlate of its stronger commitment to cultural nationalism. The differences between the BJP and the RSS centre on two questions. (1) How much control and influence should the RSS have on the BJP? The latter wants various benefits of this link but also wants the flexibility to independently decide most of its programmes and tactics. (2) What is the degree of ideological and programmatic pragmatism that is allowable? It is the difference between the defining goals and values of a party formation wanting the quick route to electoral power, and the ideological-transformative purposes that form the raison d’être and the inspirational basis for a cadre-based, non-party formation like the RSS. The latter has always been the force that is supposed to represent idealism beyond the hypocritical compromises of conventional electoral and party politics. The effectiveness of the RSS as an inspirational and highly disciplined cadre organization rests on the mystique of the Pracharak system, the self sacrificing, ascetic and committed character of the pracharaks—the spinal cord of the whole organization.11 The values associated with economic liberalism, such as consumerist aspirations, relative unconcern for indigenous values, and dilution of nationalist control and sovereignty, are incompatible with the nationalist commitment that is supposed to guide and inspire RSS 196 Achin Vanaik cadres. The BJP may be able to make the necessary contortions to justify cultural nationalism and economic liberalization, not the RSS. The tensions within the RSS and in its cultural fronts have emerged largely as a result of its very success in broadening its appeal and catchment area for recruitment. As its political clout has grown, and it seems closer to power than ever before, there has been a mass influx into the RSS and its cultural fronts of the kind of elements which are always attracted to power and form the ugly ‘underbelly’ of conventional politicking. This represents a great dilution of the ideological standards demanded by the RSS of its members (not so much for the VHP, which is neither as disciplined nor as concerned with ideological training). The RSS is faced with pressures for internal transformation that could in time, if they persist, significantly alter its historical character. Certainly many of its top leaders who have long been associated with the RSS have been worried by these trends. The very growth in power and influence of the BJP and the Sangh combine has created new and serious problems, contradictions and obstacles to its further qualitative advance. The consolation is that certainly these are preferable to the dilemmas of an earlier situation when the BJP was politically of marginal importance and the RSS and its various non-party fronts were in something of a cul-de-sac. The independent assertion of Dalit power also poses a difficult problem for the BJP. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Political Hindutva would like a Uniform Civil Code compatible with what it believes should be the fundamental principles governing Hindu family life and gender relations. The Congress government and BJP produced ‘White Papers’ which, as expected, absolved the Congress and the BJP/Sangh combine respectively of responsibility for the demolition. For the only independent judgement of the event by three respected retired senior judges, see the report of the Citizen’s Tribunal on Ayodhya, New Delhi, May 1994. The judgement found the Sangh combine guilty of pre-meditated conspiracy in destroying the mosque, and the congress central government guilty of failing to prevent this demolition when it had been forewarned by its intelligence agencies. Serious studies of the RSS have been surprisingly rare. The most up-to-date attempt at a comprehensive study is W.K. Andersen and S.D. Damle (1987). The CPI and CPM now lag behind the RSS as organizations with an ideologically trained cadre force. The CPM has been particularly corrupted by unbroken rule since 1977 in West Bengal. Close to 90 out of the Janata Party’s total tally of 297 Lok Sabha MPs. That the BJP advanced by moving to the right refuted the principal thesis concerning its future growth prospects proposed by Graham (1990). However, Graham was Communalization of the Indian Polity 197 not wrong in pointing out the existence and continuity of the basic tension between wanting to represent the Great Hindu Rally and wanting to dilute this thrust in search of central power. 6. The BJP and its predecessors have opposed Article 370, which constitutionally provides for Kashmir’s autonomy, from its very inception. It has always been anathema since the Hindu nationalist ‘loyalty test’ for the Muslim majority province of Kashmir was that it should not claim special rights of autonomy. The BJP’s hostility is not the outcome of frustration at the exercise of rights given by Article 370. In fact, such rights as assured have already been whittled down in practice and by dubious special legislation. The BJP has never been as hostile to the special autonomy given to the Christian northeast states. 7. The overwhelming bulk of illegal Bangladeshi migrants into India have come to escape economic deprivation. The spokespersons for the Sangh combine have sought to give false patriotic colouring to this problem by calling illegal Muslim migrants ‘infiltrators’ and demanding that the government expel them. Prominent Hindu ideologues like Arun Shourie and Swapan Dasgupta, who, as journalists, are fully aware of the ways in which language can be distorted, have repeatedly used the term ‘infiltrators’. The connotations of such a label go beyond expressing mere illegality of presence to suggest intentions and acts of betrayal on the part of these entrants. Such deliberate attempts at whipping up emotions against these Muslim migrants through linguistic misuse is a standard technique deployed by Sangh ideologues. Illegal Hindu migrants from Bangladesh are referred to as ‘refugees’ and according to the Sangh combine should be allowed to stay in India. 8. The idea of a Muslim vote bank which supports the Congress has been of limited accuracy for many parts of the country, e.g., West Bengal. Muslims have often preferred non-Congress regional or national alternatives. Moreover, the effort to establish secure vote banks is a standard practice in democratic politics everywhere, e.g., black support for Democrats in the USA or for Labour in the UK. The BJP does not highlight the most important form of vote bank electoral politics in India, which is not of religious communities but caste. This is because the BJP itself engages (like all other parties) in such vote bank politics, and because if it criticized this as a form of ‘appeasement’, it would alienate those caste sections, undermining its efforts to build a monolithic Hindu vote bank. 9. ‘Reverse optionality’, i.e., assuming that one is born into secular family and personal laws but having the right to ‘opt out’ for religious personal laws, would legitimize a reactionary choice, whereas the conventional notion of optionality would recognize that a person, despite being an Indian citizen (and therefore possessing a secular birthright), is involved subject to regressive community laws but can opt out of its ambit. Moreover, it is not at all clear how workable ‘reverse optionality’ is. There would seem to be all kinds of technical-legal problems. Nor is it likely to get much popular and political support from progressive forces. 10. After the 1996 elections, the BJP, as the single largest party, though well short of a majority, was invited to form the government. It lasted two weeks before resigning, since, despite efforts at political horse-trading, it could not muster enough support from other parties, which continued to treat it as a pariah (Vanaik 1997a). 11. A few thousand pracharaks or full-time organizers dedicate their lives to make the RSS function. They must be bachelors whose family is the RSS. They must be ideologically totally committed and have a Spartan, ascetic existence since they are not 198 Achin Vanaik just the key organizers but the living exemplars of the ideals of the RSS itself, its ‘new men’. They are supposed to be the best and the most dedicated of cadres and become pracharaks through the most careful selection. However, social transformations inside and outside the RSS have reduced the quality of potential recruits to this status as well as made the attractions of self-sacrificing pracharak-dom far less. Even the upsurge in RSS popularity over the last ten years has not been able to overcome this internal crisis of the pracharak system. This crisis is one of the betterkept secrets in the ‘brotherhood in saffron’. References Andersen, W.K. and S.D. Damle. 1987. The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. Graham, B.D. 1990. Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vanaik, Achin. 1997a. ‘Situating the Threat of Hindu Communalism: Problems with the Fascist Paradigm’ in Achin Vanaik (ed.), Communalism Contested: Religion, Modernity and Secularization. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. Vanaik, Achin. 1997b. ‘Communalism, Hindutva, Anti-Secularists: The Conceptual Battleground’, in Achin Vanaik (ed.), Communalism Contested: Religion, Modernity and Secularization. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. 9 The Communist Parties in India VALERIAN RODRIGUES There is a perceptible slackening of interest in the study of the communist movement in India since the mid-1990s. However, the earlier studies have discussed a range of issues, some specific, some general, which give us a sense of the communist movement. These range from the appeal of the communist ideology, particularly in Asia, the link between anti-imperialism and nationalism, the rapid strides earlier made by socialist countries specifically in industrialization and technological development, the widely held assumptions which linked the redressal of poverty by socialism and revolution, the politics of the cold war, the non-class cleavages and contradictions in India and their relation to the class question, the performance of the well-developed capitalist sector in India, a nationalist movement with a strong mass base and a complex nationalist ideology, the range of revolutionary strategies that came to be employed in India, the proximity of India to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the presence of large communist parties operating within the ambit of parliamentary democracy, the combination of elections and mass-struggles as strategies for revolutionary transformation, the presence of the communist influence in civil society and in the wider arena of social and cultural life and the influence that communists came to exercise on government policies through alliances and coalitions, are undoubtedly some of the important ones. The communists themselves believed that they held the key to the future and many others outside the fold were in agreement with them.1 Although there have been no noteworthy theoretical and strategic innovations that can be credited to the communist movement in India,2 it anticipated several major tendencies that came to be manifest in the international communist movement well in advance.3 200 Valerian Rodrigues Because of the above reasons, a vast body of empirical scholarship and reflection is available on the communist parties in India. This complicates the task here of writing on them particularly since the Communist Party formations are next only, in age to the Congress Party in their historical presence in India in the 20th century. This paper, necessarily therefore, sets out the following: the major phases of the communist movement, the ideological positions and contestations that resulted in the emergence of many Communist Parties, their organizational structure, their electoral performance and presence in civil society and their contribution to coalition politics in India. Background The state of class relations and the ideological contestations at the juncture of the formation of the Communist Party in India were to significantly shape the course of the development of the party. The later part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th witnessed profound changes in the economy worldwide and particularly in India.4 Capitalism is supposed to have assumed a specific form variously termed as finance capital, monopoly capital or imperialism. It displayed several distinctive features: large scale production resulting from the merger of firms and units; concentration of finance capital; export not merely of commodities but of capital as well; search for colonies and their closer integration into the vortex of capital; heightened competition between large conglomerates both within and beyond national boundaries and the greater role and intervention of the state not merely in the economy but also in the civil society. In India, these developments resulted in making the existing relations and identities critical and assumed forms of expression that factored in the specificities of the social formation. There was the rise of large scale industry, a better organization of capital and the emergence of a stratum of rich peasantry in the countryside. Modern professions, and the corresponding institutions, made their appearance. Agricultural labour as a distinct social category, began to make its presence felt. Castes and communities sought to express themselves in more modern and articulate forms and reached out to larger horizons in search of their kind. Languages and identities began to demarcate themselves into distinct formations from their earlier fuzzy moorings. Premonitions of a radical turn to nationalist struggle were there in the rise of revolutionary platforms including the formation of the Ghadar Party in 1913. There was a distinct working class which could no longer be ignored as witnessed in the waves of strikes that broke out in 1918–21.5 There emerged widespread peasant unrest in India, which began to express itself in concrete The Communist Parties in India 201 organizational and agitational forms. In fact, leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and scholars such as Dr B.R. Ambedkar were to note the shifts that were taking place in the social map of India and they thus, began to reach out to hitherto unrepresented constituencies in the nationalist tapestry.6 There were no established ways to respond to these changes. The regimes in the Western world attempted to consolidate their nationalist planks and reformulated the relations between state and society afresh with very different outcomes; in Britain these led to the entitlement of labour, in Germany to the rise of fascism and in the United States to the fashioning of the ‘great’ society. While certain colonial powers resorted to more intensified forms of repression in their colonies, the British Raj in India along with repression took to periodic but steady constitutional reforms. At the same time, the colonies and large social groups within and outside them began to imagine a social existence for themselves different from the existing dominance. Mahatma Gandhi, for instance, attempted to fashion an identity for India that took into account not merely the anti-colonial and nationalist dimensions but a broader critique of modernity itself.7 Lenin, however, put the socialist revolution on the agenda in response to these changes not merely in the Western countries but in backward countries as well. He argued that capitalism has become imperialism and the prevailing conditions were their expression. It involved intensified rivalry within capitalism organized as national capitals, striving for colonies and greater encroachment and exploitation of existing colonies.8 These would result in the intensification of class struggle and nationalist struggles against colonialism. Capitalism under imperialism has entered into a terminal crisis. Such an analysis prompted Lenin to perceive socialist struggles in capitalist countries and nationalist struggles in the colonies as being complementary.9 Eventually the tremendous resources of the Soviet State and of the organized Communist Parties were to be placed at the disposal of this formulation. Following Plekhanov, Lenin had distinguished between the early bourgeoisie, who led the masses against feudalism and state absolutism, and the bourgeoisie under late-capitalism who took shelter under the state at the time, when the proletariat as a class, was making its historical presence felt. Under such conditions, he argued, the task of leading even the liberal revolution fell on the proletariat. Within his understanding of imperialism and nationalism in the colonies, Lenin suggested a third type of bourgeois i.e., who mobilized the masses in the name of nationalism against imperialism. This category of the bourgeoisie, nationalist and anti-imperialist, was to have a profound impact in the thinking of the communists in India, as elsewhere, and the character of such a bourgeoisie vis-à-vis revolutionary transformation has been one of the most important issues on which conflicts and splits were to occur in the communist movement in India. In the second Congress, 202 Valerian Rodrigues Lenin presented a set of theses on the colonial question. Making the distinction between the oppressor and oppressed nations, he argued that the communists must support the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement in the oppressed nations while maintaining the independence of the proletarian movement: The communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward countries, but should not merge with it, and should under all circumstances uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in its most embryonic form (Lenin 1960–80: 145–51). Lenin, therefore, explicitly recognized the bourgeois democratic movement in the colonies as being progressive. M.N. Roy, a delegate at the second Congress, from India, but incidentally representing the communist party of Mexico, disagreed with Lenin. He distinguished two strands in the national movement of oppressed nationalities: ‘One is the bourgeois democratic nationalist movement, with a programme for political independence and the other is the mass action of the ignorant and poor peasants and workers’.10 Roy argued that the masses are not with the bourgeois nationalist movement but ‘moving towards revolution independently of the bourgeois nationalist movement’.11 From this Roy drew the conclusion: In India the Communist International should assist the creation and development of the communist movement alone, and the Communist Party of India should occupy itself exclusively, with organizing the broad popular masses to fight for their own class interests.12 In fact, M.N. Roy was suggesting a model for India that Lenin upheld for Russia in the 1890s,13 the difference being, while in Russia the bourgeoisie had taken shelter under Tsarism, in India they had done so under the colonial power. Following the deliberations on Roy’s alternative thesis, which was amended and appended as a supplementary to Lenin’s draft theses, Lenin changed the phrase ‘bourgeois democratic’ to ‘national revolutionary’ because Lenin now made the distinction between the ‘bourgeoisie of oppressed countries’ fighting against ‘revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes with certain degree of agreement with the imperialist bourgeoisie’ and ‘bourgeois freedom movements in the colonial countries’ that are ‘really revolutionary’ whose ‘representatives are not opposed to us training and organizing the peasantry in a revolutionary way’.14 In this reformulation, except in the extreme cases, it became difficult to decide whether the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations has sided with the imperialist bourgeoisie or not and what truly constituted the alignment in practice. More important, The Communist Parties in India 203 however, was the understanding regarding nationalism. Till then, only Lenin had come to formulate a sensible understanding on nationalism within Marxism,15 but it was telescoped, primarily, to handle the class question and that too with the Russian experience as the background. But ‘oppressed nationalisms’ constructed themselves not merely relationally but substantially too. In Lenin’s formulation at that stage, the question of oppressed nationalisms was primarily the peasant question.16 In India, the peasant question was definitely a substantive issue of the national question, not merely in terms of economic relations, but in relation to their participation in collective decision making, their traditions and lore. But there were other larger questions associated with nationalism such as it’s specificity and its relation with identities, communities, castes and cultures, which were simultaneously formulating themselves and the national movement was constrained to make a place for them. There is no evidence to suggest that the communists paid much attention to these gestures. Further, the communists did not think it necessary to work their conception of the ‘good’, be it nationalism or socialism, through the grid of liberties, which was something that non-communist socialists were attempting in India during the period.17 Given the privileging of liberties in the national movement in India, Indian communists were in an ideal setting to look at these issues. Unfortunately, they did not have the theoretical wherewithal to bind these diverse elements into a coherent framework which would yield forms of specific interventions. They lived within the imperatives of these questions, sometimes tinkering with them here and there, but rarely consciously taking them on board for reflective formulation. They attempted to bend social relations to their designs. To the extent these attempts synchronized with the former, their achievements were to be spectacular. The other issues simply escaped them. Conversely, when identities, communities, castes and cultures discreetly or in differential combinations were the response or perhaps a reaction to the issues that the communists raised, then they found themselves helpless in understanding the significance and ramifications of their responses in practice. The Major Phases of the Communist Movement in India The periodization of the communist movement in India has been shaped by the differing perspectives on it. Those who privileged the guiding role of the Comintern have seen the major stages of the movement according to the shifts and changes in the ideology and policies of the Comintern. Those 204 Valerian Rodrigues who have emphasized on the aspect of strategy have seen the movement in terms of the differential impact of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) and Communist Party of China (CPC) on it. Sometimes the national movement in India, and even elections, are employed to demarcate the stages. We will distinguish the movement into the following major stages: (i) from 1920–35, (ii) From 1935–47, (iii) From 1947–51, (iv) From 1951–64, (v) From 1964–69, (vi) From 1969 to the present. This periodization is based on the decisive changes in the ideology and practices of the party from one period to the next, which resulted in intense intra-party debates, sometimes even leading to splits within the party. From 1920–35 This was the formative period of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in India. Its initial grooming was conditioned by the larger context of the international communist movement during this period and the surveillance exercised by the British Raj over the transactions between the Soviet Union and Indian revolutionaries on one hand, and between the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the CPI on the other.18 Although socialist literature started appearing in India from the latter part of 19th century and small radical groups avowing socialism appeared on the eve of the October Revolution,19 systematic communist mobilization with a specific understanding of the social relations, prevailing in India as a whole, began only after the Second Congress of the Communist International. Following his role in the Second Congress of the International, Roy was coopted as a member of the executive committee of the International as well as a member of its newly formed Central Asiatic Bureau (Roy 1964: 391–92). He played a major role in bringing together in 1920 in Tashkent, the first group of Indian communists in exile to formally set up the Communist Party of India on 17 October 1920. It had no base in India yet, but it was in its name that M.N. Roy began to contact the nationalists and socialists in India and egged on the Indian National Congress (INC). He also brought out a fortnightly called the Vanguard of Indian Independence.20 Although in the Second Congress of the International, Roy had conceded to Lenin’s position overall, he continued to insist on the central role to be played by workers and peasants.21 He wrote in India in Transition, in 1922, ‘Bourgeois nationalism will end in a compromise with imperial supremacy and the liberation of India will be left to the political movement of the workers and peasants, consciously organized and fighting on the grounds of class struggle’ (Roy 1971: 240). In the early 1920s, communist groups emerged in different parts of India led by Shaukat Usmani in Benares, Ghulam Hussain in Lahore, Muzaffar The Communist Parties in India 205 Ahmad in Calcutta, S.A. Dange in Bombay, and Singaravelu Chettiar in Madras. Several magazines and journals came up suggesting socialism as the solution to India.22 For instance, S.A. Dange began publishing a weekly Socialist from Bombay from August 1922. The British Raj, apprehensive about this sudden spurt of radical activity, launched the Peshawar Conspiracy Case (1922–23), the Kanpur Bolshevik Conspiracy Case (1924) and subsequently the Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929). As the prospects of revolutionary transformation began to wane in Western capitalist countries, the Comintern, in its Third Congress in 1921, suggested a strategy of ‘United Front from above’ i.e., that the communist parties should join hands with social democratic parties to conduct united struggles so that revolutionary masses would not be divided. This strategy however, did not take off. In the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in 1922, the strategy of the ‘United Front from below’ was suggested, which called upon communist parties to win over the masses who were with the socialist parties. However after 1927, the position of the International came to be deeply influenced by factors such as the break up between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC),23 and the reluctance of the Russian peasantry to fall in line with the demands of the Soviet State.24 Although M.N. Roy was intimately involved in these issues, particularly the former, it is difficult to say to what extent these debates influenced the situation on the ground in India.25 During this period, the INC allowed a wide spectrum of internal debate within it and the communists addressed themselves both to the INC and the masses within their reach. Further, the communists in India worked together with Congressmen in front organizations such as the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). In 1925, Satya Bhakta, a journalist and a leader of the Kanpur-based Indian Communist Party, issued invitations to all the communist groups in India to attend a conference in December of that year to found a Communist Party of India. The conference was held on 26 December 1925. It was chaired by Singaravelu Chettiar of Madras. It elected a central executive committee made of Muzaffar Ahmad, Singaravelu Chettiar and K.N. Joglekar and S.V. Ghate and J.P. Bagerhatta as General Secretaries.26 In the years 1926–28, Workers and Peasants Parties (WPP) were set up first in Bengal, then in Bombay, the Punjab and the United Provinces. The leadership of these organizations was held by communists and the revolutionaries. The first All India Congress of the Workers and Peasants Parties (WPP) was held in 1926. WPPs were conceived as mass organizations of the party and worked in close association with the INC. Their formation led to the development of a left wing within the INC. This left wing, however, was a loose formation made of ideological elements drawn from democratic socialism, Marxism of the Second International and Marxism-Leninism. 206 Valerian Rodrigues A major transformation in the CPI was precipitated with the left-turn announced by the Communist International in 1928 at the Sixth Congress held from 17 July–1 Sept. 1928. It argued that post-war capitalism had entered a period characterized by ‘the most severe intensification of the general capitalist crisis’.27 It called upon communist parties to expose social democratic parties and leaders and similarly to contend against bourgeois nationalist organizations. M.N. Roy was criticized for holding the view that India was being industrialized and decolonized.28 After this Congress, the CPI came directly under the Comintern, without such intermediaries as Roy and the Communist Party of Great Britain. This shift in the understanding and strategy of the International pitted the CPI against the INC and the national movement that it led. It called upon the working class and its party, the CPI, to take over the national movement in India directly under its aegis. Mass organizations in which communists were functioning alongside others came to be split to form those exclusively under the direction of the communists. Communists broke away from the AITUC to form the Red Trade Union Congress. The WPPs came to be denounced. It led to the isolation and eventual fragmentation of the Party. As a consequence: The CPI was actually reduced to a number of small local circles functioning without a centre, continuously fighting one another and even denouncing the old leadership confined at Meerut.29 During the crucial years, from 1929–35, which were to decisively shape the contours of the Indian nationalism, the CPI was busy denouncing the INC. In 1934, it was declared illegal. From 1935–47 From 1935, however, the communists started working mainly from within the fold of the Indian National Congress (INC), involving themselves in mass work and mass movements with a distinctively different understanding of the situation and of their tasks. Besides in 1935, the membership of the CPI was less than a thousand. In 1943, when the first Congress of the party was held, it had gone up to 16,000.30 During this period, the CPI looked towards a broader alliance of parties and interests, called United Front and People’s Front, with certain immediate objectives in view. Internationally, the pursuit of such a line of action was facilitated by the shift in the position of the Comintern, following the triumph of Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, at its Seventh Congress. At the end of this period, in spite of the acknowledged distortions and deviations, the CPI had emerged as a major force in India. The policy of United Front suggested, ‘the defense of the immediate economic and political interests of the working class and defense of working The Communist Parties in India 207 class against fascism’ (Dimitrov 1938: 36). Dimitrov (1938) argued at the Congress that once a united front of working class parties was established, they should approach non-working class parties to from an anti-fascist People’s Front. While this was the strategy for industrialized and politically plural societies, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, this report called for an ‘anti-imperialist united front’. For India, what this policy shift meant was to be clarified by what is known as the Dutt-Bradley line, as it was formulated by the British communists, R.P. Dutt and Philip Bradley. It suggested that the anti-imperialist line was to unite ‘Congress socialists, trade unionists, communists and left congressmen’, as well as to unite nationalist organizations such as the INC (Seth 155). The CPI took a long time to accept this radical alteration in the orientation of the party. It suspected it to be of the same kind as the one advocated by Bukharin and even Roy, which was denounced at the Sixth Congress of the International. This new orientation led to intense ideological debate and conflict within the party before it came to be accepted by it. There was a profound shift in the perspective and tactics of the CPI during the United Front period. The change of strategy resulted in uniting Red Trade Union Congress with the AITUC in 1935 and with National Trade Union Federation in 1938. The communists came to work with the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) that was formed in 1934. The presence of the socialists in the peasant movement, particularly in the Bihar Kisan Sabha led by Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, facilitated this process. In 1936, the All India Kisan Sabha was formed with the active persuasion and participation of the CPI. There was renewal of labour militancy in 1935.31 Further there was a perceptible shift of Nehru towards socialism during these years, which created apprehensions among capitalists.32 During this period, the CPI started working closely with the INC. However, there was a great deal of tension between CSP and CPI. While the CSP conceived itself as the vanguard of the revolutionary transformation, the CPI never recognized it as a working class party but a platform of socialist unity. In 1940, communists were expelled from CSP. The CPI walked away with a significant section of CSP, including the entire Kerala unit33 and a large chunk of the members of the Tamil Nadu and Andhra units. This period also witnessed the unity and struggle of the CPI with the INC. Communists became office-bearers in Congress organizations in many places and at several levels. The CPI also attempted to build close ties between CSP, Royists and Subhas Chandra Bose’s newly formed ‘Forward Bloc’. The Comintern declared World War II, which broke out in 1939, as an imperialist war. In tune with this declaration, the CPI in India declared its determined opposition to the war. It called for ‘striking for their own freedom and weakening British Imperialism’ (Ghosh 1939). The understanding that 208 Valerian Rodrigues the Comintern put forward was that the war was an expression of interimperialist contradictions and under such conditions, as Lenin had suggested,34 the revolutionaries should demand the overthrow of their own governments. There was a fundamental mistake in this analysis, as it ignored the character of fascism which was not merely a version of imperialism. This distorted analysis of the situation, however, had beneficial results for the CPI in India. It brought pressure on the INC to declare non-cooperation with the Raj and forged its bond with the former. The Congress position finally culminated in the Quit India Movement, the biggest non-violent struggle known in history. The CPI which initially goaded the INC for non-cooperation changed its position and came to extend full cooperation to the British rule in India following the attack of Nazi Germany on Soviet Union in July 1941. The CPSU declared that the war, from then onwards was converted into a war between socialism and fascism, and Stalin went a step further and declared the war as defence of fatherland. In India, communists called it a patriotic war too on the plea that Soviet Union was the socialist fatherland. The communist movement in India has been subjected to a lot of slander for the kind of position that it adopted in December 1941, but often for wrong reasons. It is not often acknowledged that Nehru was very close to the communist position and many nationalists collaborated with the war efforts by advancing defensible reasons. The position that the CPI adopted could not be justified, however, on other grounds. In a way this position was characteristic of the way it understood Marxism. What was wrong with it was not its nationalism, but its Marxism. It basically saw socialism as a universal and homogenous process taking hold of the world on the demise of capitalism. A set of inexorable laws was at work everywhere irrespective of context and conjuncture. The communists, of course, acknowledged that the stance they adopted was ‘a serious mistake’ (Krishnan 1990: 378). The reason they gave, and continue to give, was that they ignored a factor that had to be taken into account. But it was not merely a substantive omission but an epistemological one. This becomes clear from the way E.M.S. Namboodiripad formulated the distortions involved. He said that the communists, in 1942, ‘Underestimated the national factors in working out the tactics of the revolution’ (Subramanian 1989: 40–41) and failed ‘to realise that the communists in a colonial country can fulfil their tasks only if they take proper account of the national aspirations of the people’. There were two significant formulations that were made by the CPI during the 1942–45 period. The first was to characterize India as a multinational state and the second was the extension of support to the demand for Pakistan on the ground of national self-determination. What was interesting in such formulations was the recognition of certain realities such as The Communist Parties in India 209 identities and religious communities. However they employed for this purpose, a language which not merely distorted the issues involved, but attempted to transport to the Indian context a set of relations which could not be formulated in this fashion. The way they were formulated made their consequences so forbidding that the party was not to repeat these formulations officially in the subsequent period. After the end of the war, the CPI effortlessly shifted to the opposition. It participated in the post-war anti-imperialist struggles, called for a joint front of the Congress, Muslim League and the CPI, and demanded that power be immediately transferred to a national government of INC and the Muslim League. From 1947–51 This was a crucial period for the CPI, as it had to reformulate its position in the context of British withdrawal from India and to develop an understanding of the new regime and the class bloc that sustained it. There were to emerge four major stances within the CPI during this period and they contained, in a nutshell, the kind of differences that arose later and led to the eventual split of the communist movement. In a way this was unfortunate because all these questions revolved centrally on the nature of the national bourgeoisie in India, and by posing questions this way several other significant questions were simply ignored, or came to be relegated to the background. • As soon as the Mountbatten plan was announced in June 1947, the CPI passed a unanimous resolution extending support to popular governments in India and Pakistan against ‘remnants of imperialist rule and against the betrayal of reactionary elements in the country’.35 This position saw the post-independent regime as progressive but under the influence of imperialism and feudalism. Such a stand was to be reiterated by the CPI after the split in 1964. • Within a few months after announcing the above position there was a revision of this understanding in December 1947, that were greatly influenced by the official responses emanating from the Soviet Union and China regarding the nature of Indian independence. This revision argued that the Mountbatten award was not an advance but is the culmination of the betrayal of the revolutionary struggle by the INC and the Muslim League leadership. It felt that the bourgeois vacillation during the nationalist movement had led to capitulationism. It saw Indian independence as mere sham and the Indian state as nothing but a supplicant before imperialism. The tactical line of the party stated that the Indian bourgeoisie was the most active partner in the 210 Valerian Rodrigues imperialist-feudal-bourgeoisie combine (Namboodiripad 1963: 18). Given this capitulation of the bourgeoisie, it was announced that the conditions for a revolutionary uprising are imminent in India. The revolutionary path considered suitable for India under the conditions was the path of armed insurrection as pursued in Russia during the October Revolution. Accordingly, a call was issued for armed seizure of state apparatuses all over India accompanied by mass uprising. This position came to be known as the ‘Ranadive line’, after the then General Secretary of the party, B.T. Ranadive. The government let loose massive repression on the uprising. As a result, a large number of the rank and file of the party were put behind bars and there was a precipitous fall in the strength of the party. While the membership of the party was 89,263 in 1948 it came down to 20,000 in 1950. This stance soon came to be denounced by the party as left-deviation. • Meanwhile, in the Telangana region of the Nizam ruled Hyderabad State, under the leadership of the local unit of the party, the communists had advanced a very different kind of understanding of the situation. They had not shown much enthusiasm for the Ranadive line, outlined above. They argued that the path to be followed in India should be different from Russia and akin to that of China. This line of argument was to find support from Soviet Russia too. This position argued that feudalism is the principle contradiction in India. It is the social base of imperialism. The so-called independent regime in India is compradore in character i.e., it is in the service of both imperialism and feudalism. The class that is the mainstay of the Indian revolution, although led by the working class, is the peasantry. Radical agrarian revolution is the primary task of the revolution and only through such a revolution, production relations in the countryside can be overhauled and conditions for the development of productive forces can be initiated. The strategy for such a revolution cannot be an armed uprising, but protracted armed struggle, employing guerrilla methods of combat and establishing base areas leading to liberated areas. This position came to be known as the ‘Andhra thesis’. Pursuing this line of action, the party succeeded in establishing its base in a large part of the Nizam’s state and brought about basic agrarian reforms in the villages coming under it.36 The revolutionaries held out even against the Indian army that was moved into the area after the police action for accession of the state to the Indian Union. This line was pursued elsewhere too, particularly in Tripura.37 However, it was opposed by those who privileged urban work and looked to the parliamentary mode of governance and constitutional mobilization as keys to the revolutionary transformation of India. Besides there was little support The Communist Parties in India 211 that came forth for this line from elsewhere in India. The Soviet Union too did not come to privilege this strategy in the context of the emerging cold war. • The 1951 Programme and Policy statement suggested major changes both in the understanding of the new situation and the policies to be pursued. It emphasized on the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal character of the Indian national movement. Emphasis at that juncture in India, should be on fighting imperialism, feudalism and the collaborators of imperialism. It argued that the communist party, in the first instance, was pursuing a democratic revolution in India leading to the establishment of people’s democracy and not socialism. The former is based on the ‘coalition of all democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces’. Such a democracy will guarantee the rights of the people, give land to the peasants without compensation to landlords, protect national industries against competition by foreign goods, ensure industrialization of the country, secure a high standard of living for the working classes, remove unemployment and, thereby, place ‘the country on the wide road of progress, cultural advancement and independence’.38 The statement of policy that accompanied it further specified the direction to be pursued for practice. It rejected the mechanical application of either the Russian or the Chinese paths to India and consequently rejected the Calcutta (Ranadive) and Andhra theses as overemphasizing the role of workers and peasants respectively. While not denying the necessity of revolutionary violence in principle, it did not specify its forms and thereby, effectively placed it in abeyance. It felt that there was still mass support for the Nehru government in spite of the crisis it was caught up in and the growth of the mass movement was not commensurate with the mass discontent with the government. It called for a ‘broad democratic front’ based on ‘simple democratic programme’ (Karnik 1957: 61). Namboodiripad wrote: The struggle in India today is not between capitalism and socialism but between imperialism and feudalism on one hand and the mass of the people on the other and in this struggle the capitalist class has a role to play (Namboodiripad 1952: 27). This position opened the door for the participation of the party in the ensuing general elections. From 1952–64 The CPI was happy with its performance in the general elections of 1952 when it emerged as the third largest party in the Parliament. It was next only 212 Valerian Rodrigues to the Congress in Madras and West Bengal.39 Although its elected representatives made claims that they would make the legislatures as sites of struggle or even went further to say that they were there to ‘wreck them from within’ they did nothing of the sort. It was a little premature to say who would be wrecking whom! They displayed their wit, rhetoric and a close understanding of the economic plight of the poor and the exploited as to evoke admiration across the board. The ideological disagreements within the party, however, were to persist and began to be expressed sometimes overtly and at other times covertly. For instance, in the Third Party Congress (end of 1953 and beginning of 1954), the Andhra communists targeted British Imperialism in order to attack Nehru, while the rightist group tried to line up behind Nehru by targeting the growing American menace.40 The rightist position in the party was to be consolidated due to several measures employed by the Nehru Government such as the declaration of socialist pattern of society as the policy of the Congress at the Avadi Congress in 1955, Nehru’s visit to USSR and China, the coming of Nikita Khruschev and Bulganin to India in 1955, and the refusal of the government to join the military alliances that the USA was fashioning worldwide to contain communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. There were several factions within the Congress Party which were pulling in different directions and questions came to be asked which faction suited the communists the most.41 The CPI devised a subtle formulation to align itself with the government as a whole rather than with any one of the factions. It argued that there were no two sections within the bourgeoisie, progressive and reactionary, but vacillation is the characteristic of the national bourgeoisie as a whole (Ghosh 1955: 16–25). The party conceived its role as a checkmate to contain the vacillation and see to it that the government pursues a pro-people policy. Its slogan of the period was ‘struggle and support’. There were two distinct tendencies that were visible in the party during this period, the first avowing ‘Democratic Front’, that is a political alliance of opposition to the Congress and another ‘National Front’, a political alliance inclusive of the Congress. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, when Nikita Khruschev as the Secretary of the Party announced the policies of peaceful co-existence and ‘deStalinisation’, did not provoke the CPI to any significant extent although it shook the communist world to its foundations, heralding the first major ideological confrontation between the CPSU and the CPC. The right wing within the party, however, was soon to latch on to the catchy slogans of ‘non-capitalist path’ and peaceful transition to socialism. In 1957, the CPI came to power in Kerala, a major state in India; it was the first time that a Communist Party had done so through the route of the The Communist Parties in India 213 ballot anywhere in the world. Elsewhere too, the CPI had done well in the elections and it had emerged as the second largest party in the Parliament.42 In Kerala, the Communist government instituted certain major reforms particularly with respect to agrarian relations and educational institutions. They provoked powerful vested interests, particularly the Catholic Church and the Nair elite, identities that had little place in the theoretical reflections of the CPI except as commonsense. Within 28 months of coming to power the government was overthrown by invoking the constitutional provisions of President’s rule. This action, which deservedly met with widespread condemnation not merely by the CPI but by the concerned intelligentsia in India,43 did not provoke the party to develop any serious engagement with bourgeois constitutionalism and revolutionary transformation something of the kind that Lenin, for instance, engaged in State and Revolution.44 During this period the CPI was confronted with two other major problems: The first was the growing ideological conflict between the CPC and CPSU. The former questioned the path of socialism pursued in Soviet Russia and attempted to work out an alternative path symbolized by the ‘Let hundred flowers blossom, let thousand thoughts contend’ and the ‘Great Leap Forward’ movements. The CPI did not engage with the ideological issues raised in this debate but called upon both the parties to sort out their differences amicably.45 Within the CPI, however, this conflict was to intensify the existing differences. The second was the Indo-China border dispute, which heated up from 1959. Initially the CPI argued that Socialist China did not have any war-like design on India. It felt that US imperialism was egging India on against China. It did not suspect that the ideological dispute between CPC and CPSU had anything to do with the conflict either.46 However, these issues cannot be considered as the causes leading to the split of the CPI. Both these issues exasperated and streamlined the existing differences within the party that eventually led to the split. For instance, to contain the growing ideological appeal of the CPC, the CPSU argued for national democracy and non-capitalist path as a line for colonies and newly independent countries. It emphasized the unity of the working class with the national bourgeoisie as the core of the national democratic front. This position boosted the position of the right wing in the party. When the party met in 1961 for its Congress, even before the Sino-Indian war, there were already major disagreements in the party that were indicated by two programme drafts and three draft political resolutions. At this juncture one could distinguish three distinct positions contending within the CPI: 1. The official line, which did not regard the Congress Party to be reactionary. Its approach was to oppose reactionary policies and to support progressive policies of the government. 214 2. 3. Valerian Rodrigues The leftist line, which argued that the Congress was reactionary in character. It privileged confrontation and struggle for the establishment of people’s democracy. This line was represented by leaders like Harekrishna Konar, P. Sundarayya and A.K. Gopalan. The centrist line, which suggested that the Congress had two sections, one beholden to monopoly capitalism and landlordism and the other, that was anti-imperialist and anti-feudal. These disagreements, however, came to the fore with the beginning of the Sino-Indian war on 20 October 1962. Within 10 days of the start of the war, the CPI adopted a resolution branding China as aggressor. On the other hand, the leftist section criticized the leadership for not stressing peaceful negotiation and took the Nehru government to task for resorting to a military solution of the problem. It criticized the right faction of the party for its total capitulation to the government and for welcoming military help from Western imperialist powers. The arrest of the leading members of the leftist line, and the role played by the rightist faction, further aggravated the differences between them.47 However, it was crucial for either of the factions to get the help of the centrists, such as that of E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Jyoti Basu and Bhupesh Gupta, to obtain a majority support in the Party. In the final count, the first two were to join hands with the left and the third went with the right. The parting of ways came in 1964 with the holding of rival party congresses by the CPI in Bombay and by the breakaway group, to be christened the CPI (M), in Calcutta. There was an interesting split in the social bases of the party. The organizations of the poor peasantry and agricultural labour stood by the CPI (M) while the trade unions particularly in the organized sector and the professions went with the CPI. A large number of intellectuals associated with the party, popularly called ‘fellow travellers’, were to stay with the CPI. Further, where the party had a wider base among poor peasantry and agricultural labour, such as in Kerala, West Bengal and to some extent in Andhra Pradesh, there the majority section of the party was to shift its allegiance to the CPI (M), while state units elsewhere sided with the CPI. Region-wise, these equations were to confine them, particularly the CPI (M), to where the split had left them evolving a mode of discourse that was easily palatable to the local identity but unable to break the cordon sanitaire. The success of the CPI (M) was partly on account of its entwinement with some regional identity or the other, and its failure was its inability to break through such an identity.48 From 1964–69 At the time of the split, there were different ideological strands within the CPI (M). What united them all was their disagreement with the rightist The Communist Parties in India 215 position rather than what was to be their own shared agreement. Further, it was not the case that a set of people agreed on all issues across the ideological spectrum and others differed. While there were ideological differences, there were not distinct ideological constituencies as yet. Further, party leaders did not conceal the fact that there were differences within the party on several issues.49 We can identify the following major positions, loosely knit, in the party at this stage: 1. 2. 3. It argued that the Indian state is dominated by the big bourgeoisie and big landlords. There were, however, contradictions in this bloc, which could and should be utilized by the party. The Congress Party was the main representative of the dominant bloc although dominant classes might throw up other parties. The cleavages in the political representation of the classes offered some scope for the intervention of the revolutionary party. Although there were many lacunae in the parliamentary system in India, it had much to commend. Similar was the case with Indian constitutionalism and rule of law. Although elections could not be the sole strategy of the party and extra electoral struggles were necessary, elections continued to be the strategic ways of mobilization and enablement, at least in the immediate run. This position was better disposed towards decentralization of power particularly with the experience of 1959 behind it. It refused to take sides on the ideological debate between Soviet Union and China. This position, while arguing that the Indian State was dominated by the big bourgeoisie and big landlords, identified feudalism as the main contradiction in India. The peasantry should be mobilized to seize land, rather than employ the constitutional methods and rule of law approach for changes in agrarian relations.50 The votaries of this position felt that elections were tactical rather than strategic. Therefore, one might have to resort to revolutionary armed struggle at any juncture. They therefore argued for an underground existence for the party. However, they strongly stood by mass action and mass struggles. They did not wholly subscribe either to the CPSU or the CPC positions but were more inclined towards the latter. The third position argued that the principle contradiction in India is feudalism. A protracted armed struggle alone was the strategic path for the liberation of India and the masses were already geared up for it. Social relations in India were akin to that of China, immediately prior to the revolution. The party must be underground and the work of the mass organizations should be synchronized with the revolutionary strategy of the party. Elections held out the danger of capitulation. 216 Valerian Rodrigues These positions remained within the party and they were not debated as to forge any consensus on the major issues of division. The party acted in such a way hoping that in course of time these issues would be resolved. There were other pressing concerns calling forth the immediate attention of the party. There was the massive drought and near famine conditions in large parts of the country and both the parties, the CPI and the CPI (M), launched themselves into the food movement in 1965.51 In fact, they collaborated with each other extensively in the course of the movement.52 At the same time in Kerala the parties had to prepare themselves for the elections. Although the CPI proclaimed that it would walk away with the decisive left mandate, it was proved wrong in the 1965 elections held there. The CPI (M) received the bulk of the left vote winning 20 per cent of the popular vote and 40 seats out of a total of 133 in the assembly while the CPI scored only 8.2 per cent of the popular vote and 3 seats. The Congress, however, formed the government by welding a coalition. Following the 1967 state elections in Kerala, the CPI (M) led a seven party coalition government called United Front.53 It secured 51.6 per cent of the vote and gained 113 of the 133 assembly seats. After 31 months of tenure, this government had to resign as the CPI, the Muslim League, the Indian Socialist Party (ISP) (a splinter from the SSP) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party withdrew their support to the government. Achutha Menon, then a CPI member of the Parliament succeeded in cobbling together a coalition that included the Muslim League, the ISP, the Kerala Congress and, after the 1969 Congress split, Congress (Indira) supporting from outside. In West Bengal, in 1967, a United Front of parties in which the CPI (M) was the dominant partner came to power. However, within three months of the front assuming power, there broke out a peasant uprising in Naxalbari, in the Silguri sub-division of Darjeeling district where crops and lands were not merely seized under the leadership of the local unit of the CPI (M) but landlords were also tried in peasant courts. In a way, this struggle was making a mockery of the elected government by positing a situation of dual power. When the mediation with the local unit of the party did not succeed, the UF government resorted to police action on the peasant partisans. The reaction against the police action was quick within the CPI (M). Large scale desertions took place from within the party, not merely in West Bengal but in other states as well. These deserters from the party who were in support of the Naxalbari uprising constituted themselves into state-level coordination committees of communist revolutionaries. The largest of the group to split itself off from the party was the Andhra group under the leadership of T. Nagi Reddy, who was the leader of the opposition in the State legislature at that time. Soon a coordination committee of these units called All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was established. The Communist Parties in India 217 Ideologically, the West Bengal unit led by Charu Mazumdar was to dominate the AICCCR. He gave the call for pursuing the line of annihilation of class enemies and almost exalted it to a strategic position as if to suggest that it was to be the one point programme of the armed struggle in India. Given the imminence of the revolution, as per this analysis, a call was issued for the formation of a revolutionary party and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI(ML)] came to be constituted at the end of April 1969 and, following it, a rally was held in Calcutta, on 1 May 1969. The United Front government in West Bengal was removed in November 1967, mainly as a result of the infighting among the different constituent units of the party. As the alternative government, the Progressive Democratic Front that was formed by P.C. Ghosh did not survive, President’s rule was imposed and mid-term elections were held in the beginning of 1969. Again the United front came to power with the CPI (M) making appreciable progress as compared to the elections of 1967. However, the rivalry among the partners of the United Front did not assure stability of this coalition either. The government fell in early 1970. The bitterest rivals within the front were the CPI and the CPI (M). Commenting on it, Profulla Roy Choudhury says: The only permanent antagonism within the UF was that between the two communist parties. Not that the two parties did not sit in the same group to resolve conflicts within the UF but such periods of harmony were short.54 From 1969 to the Present During this period there were two major communist parties in India, and umpteen splinter groups of the CPI(ML). Besides, there were several other parties who avowed some form of Marxism, sometimes along with their allegiance to something additional or a specific interpretation such as the Revolutionary Socialist Party of India (RSP), the Forward Bloc (FB), the Socialist Unity Centre of India (SUCI), etc. The focus, however, continued to be on the two parties and the splinter groups of the CPI(ML). Initially, the CPI(ML) established its foothold in West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, Kashmir and some parts of Uttar Pradesh. The line of annihilation without mass support was to expose its cadres directly to the wrath of the landlords and the state repressive state apparatuses. In Bengal and Kerala, they confronted the larger and betterorganized CPI (M) units too. The new pockets that came to be opened up such as Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh and Mushahari in Bihar provided some hope to the party but by early 1970s they were fully vanquished. The Andhra revolutionaries who broke away from the CPI (M) and did not join the CPI(ML) continued to insist on the priority of mass work. In Bengal, 218 Valerian Rodrigues those cadres of the party, mainly hailing from urban backgrounds, who got frustrated with their revolutionary adventure with the peasantry, resorted to urban violence, which burst out uninterruptedly, or intermittently particularly in Calcutta, till 1973.55 By 1970, there were major reactions against the annihilation thesis of Charu Mazumdar leading to splits. Further splits were occasioned on the basis of the developments in China such as the emergence of the CPI(ML) pro-Lin Piao group. Once the splits became endemic, then groups arose whose purported task became to bring the splinters together. There came up, reorganizing committees, unity centres, coordination committees, Maoists’ centres, etc. However, without ensuring any of those promises, they were to become independent parties by themselves over a period. The Andhra group too split itself into different factions, specifically on the issues of the relation of armed struggle to mass movement, rural work and urban work and the larger question of the class blocs. The major CPI(ML) groups that have survived today are the People’s War Group operating mainly in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar which have pursued armed struggle, boycotted elections and rejected the parliamentary path to power; the CPI(ML) Liberation group, with its base in Bihar and to some extent in Uttar Pradesh, Tripura and West Bengal, which after many years of underground work has begun to privilege mass work and participation in elections although it has kept its underground network intact and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) operating in Bihar and some parts of West Bengal which has rejected participation in elections and pursued the armed struggle. Following the split of 1964, the CPI (M) laid a great deal of emphasis on building up a strong peasant base of support and in developing new forms of struggle such as gherao. Further, both the CPI and CPI (M) attempted to form coalitions with other parties in accordance with their ideological orientations. However, these strivings created a great deal of tension between them. The emphasis on mass struggles and the fears that other partners in the coalition may erode their bases of support led to the collapse of the UF governments in 1969 and again in 1970 in West Bengal. After 1980, however, we find that the CPI (M) generally fine-tuned the struggles keeping in view the stability of the coalitions it participated in and to strengthen its own local power base. It was only with respect to industrial policy and general economic demands that all India struggles came to be mounted. In Bengal from 1972, the state let loose massive terror on the CPI (M). Faced with this onslaught, the CPI (M) remained immobilized till 1977 when the Emergency was lifted, as it had effectively dissolved the underground organization, which could have provided it some breathing space during the The Communist Parties in India 219 dark days of 1972–77. In Kerala, the CPI-led Achutha Menon government was in power during the Emergency and it did not resort to the kind of repression that prevailed in Bengal. After the withdrawal of Emergency, the CPI (M)-led Left Front came to power in West Bengal and has been in power there continuously, in which the CPI too, has been one of the partners, albeit a junior one. In Kerala from the 1980s, the CPI (M)-led Left Front alternated with the Congress-led United Democratic Front almost after every successive state election. The other state where the CPI (M) has wielded power, has been Tripura where it has increasingly come to face tribal insurgency, reflecting its inability to negotiate across strongly embedded identities. The commendable measures that the CPI (M) has taken both in Kerala and West Bengal have been land reforms and decentralization of power. However, the initial situation being different, there have been different consequences in these states. In West Bengal, under ‘Operation Bargav’, the CPI (M) has been able to accord legal recognition of ownership and tenancy rights over agricultural lands, rational distribution of production inputs and of land that is above ceiling. Such an operation was undertaken by mobilizing the village community as a whole or at least its prevailing part as far as the reforms was concerned. Together with land reforms, the government has succeeded in mobilizing large resources for rural development and has utilized the same through locally elected bodies. The agrarian reforms and Panchayati Raj measures have been complementary. These reforms have led to the stabilization of a great deal of support for the CPI (M) in the countryside. It has greatly facilitated the spread of the Green Revolution in the state. In Kerala, the land reforms acts from 1957 onwards, led to the stabilization of the tenants initially conferring on them the titles of land. Surplus land was appropriated and redistributed. Further, agricultural labour has been able to get possession over their homestead lands. In fact, it was the CPI-led government, which came to power in Kerala from 1969 onwards that brought a model act on agricultural labour following the footsteps of the CPI (M)-led ministry earlier. There was not much of a sharecropping in Kerala. Taking their cue from their colleagues in West Bengal and by engaging several radical NGOs, novel experiments on decentralization were underway in Kerala in the 1990s, wherein local bodies would map out the resources available to them by involving the local community and develop appropriate local plans as well. In both the states, either of the parties has not contested the basic structures of organization of power. At the most they have called for placing federalism on a better footing. In the process, they seem to suggest that their conception of National Democracy or People’s Democracy, as the case may be, does not involve a massive restructuring of the apparatuses of state but a better government within the ambit of the existing laws and institutions. 220 Valerian Rodrigues It is important to note the growing role that the CPI and the CPI (M) came to play at the all-India level after 1969. The CPI as a well-organized party was present at the central level in three capacities even prior to 1964: 1. 2. 3. As an ideological ally of the Congress. As the anticipated future: Although the CPI may not have been a major political force in terms of the numbers in Parliament, it came to be regarded as a potentially major force by numerous actors on the scene. The communists themselves acted as if they were the heralds and midwives of a non-iniquitous and glorious future. Such prolepsis was not merely the presence of an absence. It demonstrated itself occasionally through dramatic interventions such as demonstrations, rallies, profession of support from scholars and the intelligentsia, the devotion it evoked in young minds etc. It looked sure of a future that others were deeply agonized about. Its affiliation with the communist world in general and CPSU and Soviet Union in particular. This access to a big world held the key to numerous aspirations. Besides the three factors mentioned above, the Congress Party which ran a minority government from 1967–71, came to be crucially dependent on the CPI and to some extent on the CPI (M). A small part of the patronage, which any government can bestow, was always on offer to these parties. The relative asceticism of the party leaders did not make it seem as if it was squandering public assets. As a consequence, by 1969, these parties, particularly the CPI, had built up huge assets, both material and human. Some of these assets, of course, were deployed for personal gain and others presented as impersonal such as scholarships to dependents who were otherwise ‘meritorious’. Both the parties came to command a big presence in the world of the media, the fine arts, and to some extent in the academia. The traditional austerity that their leaders clothed themselves in and the inaccessibility to levers of power of the rank and file, often camouflaged the bounties available to the upper echelons of the communist leadership in India. The CPI continued to be in the good books of the Congress till late 1976. The Congress utilized the CPI for several purposes: internally, to project a progressive face; to wield a counterweight to popular agitations such as the one led by Jayaprakash Narayan in 1973–74; to provide a controlled outlet to mass unrest etc., and externally to have a second channel to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the communist world. In the post-emergency dispensation, however, the CPI (M) was to emerge as a major political player at the central level without, however, joining any The Communist Parties in India 221 government directly. Unstable and coalition regimes at the Union level have helped buttress the strength of the CPI (M) enormously as was the case between 1989–91 and from 1995–99. After all, governance is not merely the number of members a party has in the Parliament or the ministries it holds. It is the larger presence a party possesses which becomes significant during politically crucial and testing periods. It also helps explain the larger than life presence of the CPI, although it is a small party if one goes by numbers. The avowal of national integrity has become a major plank in the discourse of the communist parties particularly in the last two decades. They offer a justifiable rationale: if national unity were undermined it would place in grave danger rights, democracy, public institutions and the livelihood of the masses. It would have a deleterious impact on mass institutions built over the years through popular struggles. But while arguing thus, they seem to forget that communists always see the nation as a contested terrain. In a way, their nation is always something to be constituted rather than one that already exists. However, the entrenchment of the Communist parties at the Union level has made the recognition of certain questions unacceptable to them. They do not want to interrogate the nationalism of the nation that they uphold. As this is not a reflected and deliberated terrain, they are not able to engage effectively with the obscurantist and reductionist versions in circulation, in an effective and programmatic way. Ideological Positions Communist parties derive their strategies and programmes of action from their ideology. Ideology, in communist parlance, is theory in the general use of the term, but a theory that concretely relates itself to practices, both explanatory and normative. These practices run into the entire spectrum of human existence—the personal, social, political, economic, cultural and even spiritual. Certain formulations of this theory, as those in the key texts of Marx and Engels or elaborations accepted as resting on them, are widely accepted propositions in the socialist movement. There is space for contesting and combating those propositions or ignoring some and exalting the others but the rationale for the same, need to be drawn from within the tradition and negotiated across significant sections of those who consider themselves as belonging to this tradition and its social practices. There are other formulations which are elevated to the status of ideology or theory although the concepts informing them are relative to social formations, such as for instance, the conception of the Indian State. Several other concepts from the general theory of Marxism may have to be deployed to construct the complex determinations of this conception. One might be clearer on concepts 222 Valerian Rodrigues such as class, bourgeoisie, proletariat, state etc., involving fewer determinations but might be highly confused on the conception of the Indian State. There are disciplines such as social sciences which, by employing certain conceptual frameworks and appropriate methodological tools, generate a good deal of complex understanding regarding specific formations. Communist parties in general, and the communist parties in India in particular, have not felt the need to engage with those understandings unless they fall in line with issues of their concern. There is no evidence to suggest that in states such as West Bengal and Kerala, where communists have been in power for long, they have adopted measures to engage with their social science establishments. Except for large generalizations, such as class, class struggle etc., which are themselves contestable, the ideological positions of the communist parties in India are diffuse and are susceptible for a range of interpretations. They allow a great deal of scope for the leading bodies of the concerned parties to cast their own interpretation on them. Given the rich data that thousands of party workers gather from their experiences, in a relatively open system, communist parties in India could have looked anew at several dimensions of their ideological baggage. The leading bodies of the communist parties in India have been wary of undertaking such a task and have endlessly repeated established and acceptable interpretations, ad nauseam, unless such a discursive calm was shattered by deep stirrings from below or directives from above. The latter probability has been more often the norm. The ideological parameters of the communist parties have mimicked the categories that are given to them, courtesy, the Comintern and later by the debate in China. In this sense, the communist parties in India have been ideological parasites. Given this unwillingness to engage with the specific situation theoretically, common sense often fills the vacuum. It is, however, rarely recognized that common sense remains ad-hocist and is generally infected by the dominant ideologies of the particular social formation. As a result, whole domains of social experience remain immune from any reflective consideration. In spite of the profound changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and the communist world in recent years, communist parties in India still employ the erstwhile conceptual or ideological language as if nothing has happened. Similarly, the whole phenomena of globalization and information technology, which have brought about profound changes in the organization and reproduction of capital, do not seem to have stirred these parties to perceive anything new or different.56 To be fair to them, the party journals of the CPI, the CPI (M) and the CPI(ML) carry these days, strident campaigns against communalism and globalization but without feeling the need to reformulate their conceptual frameworks. There are of course, tactical The Communist Parties in India 223 adjustments here and there, but the justificatory ideology or theory still remains unchanged. The formulations that we have outlined here below were devised in an earlier period but have not been significantly reformulated. Character of the Indian State The CPI considers the Indian State as the organ of the national bourgeoisie as a whole. It upholds and develops capitalism and capitalist relations of production in India.57 However, it is weighed down and constrained in its operation by imperialism, led by the USA, and reactionary interests such as landlords who prove major obstacles in this pursuit. The CPI (M) thinks that the Indian state upholds the interests of the large bourgeoisie, landlords and comprador capital. Foreign monopoly capital exerts its deep influence on the Indian state. The pre-capitalist relations in agriculture are yet to be destroyed. Caste, communal and tribal institutions profoundly affect social relations in India58 but their solution lies in transforming class relations rather than pursuit of these identities. The CPI(ML) sees social relations in India as semi-feudal and semicolonial over which the Indian state presides. The state guards the interests of imperialism, feudalism, the compradore bourgeoisie and compradore bureaucratic capitalism. Among them feudalism is the principal enemy of the masses.59 Indian Capitalism The CPI thinks that the national bourgeoisie in India is developing an independent capitalist base for India, a process that is underway in both industry and in agriculture. Planning is an appropriate mechanism for the same. The public sector in India serves the interests of the broad masses and is a counterweight against imperialism and vested interests. The CPI (M) sees a growing crisis in the economic systems of the world, which is reflected in the bourgeois policies, and ideology in India. The Indian bourgeois does not possess the technical base to build up big industry. It is heavily dependent upon imperialism. Capitalism in India has been superimposed on pre-capitalist relations. The transformation of these relations is a basic necessity to release the productive forces in India. The CPI(ML) considers Indian capitalism as primarily compradore in character. The public sector is no different except its bureaucratic form. It basically serves the interests of imperialism. In agriculture, there is a stranglehold of feudalism over social relations which does not let capitalist relations to develop. This feudalism constitutes the social base of imperialism i.e., if 224 Valerian Rodrigues the former was not prevailing then imperialism would not have had a foothold in India. It should be noted here that CPI(ML) believed that in the Soviet Union capitalism came to be restored under Khruschev and it acted as an imperialist power towards India, as it did towards the rest of the world. Most of the CPI(ML) groups today believe that capitalist restoration has taken place in People’s Republic of China or it is on this road. Nature of Indian Democracy The CPI thinks that Indian Democracy is a great advance over the imperialist bureaucratic rule that prevailed in India under British colonialism. It has facilitated popular interventions for peace, national freedom and democracy. It provides an arena for the expression of rights and demands of the broad masses. Parliament can be transformed into a genuine instrument of people’s will for effecting fundamental transformations in the economic, social and state structures by combining parliamentary activism of the national bourgeoisie with that of the working class supported by mass movements. The CPI (M) argues that parliamentary democracy is nothing but a camouflage for the dictatorship of the bloc of dominant classes in India. It decries democratic rights even to oppositional elements. It has displayed anti-democratic attitude the towards the non-Congress regimes. Opposition and compromise with imperialism are in-built into it. The repressive state apparatuses enjoy primacy here. Elections cannot bring about revolutionary transformation but are useful to open the eyes of the masses and expose the misdeeds of the ruling classes. The base of parliamentary democracy is weak in India and there is a constant threat of dictatorship. At the same time it feels that the constitutional order and the popular rights it upholds particularly universal franchise are great resources to struggle against the dominant classes and for the furtherance of popular democracy.60 The CPI(ML) feels that parliamentary democracy is a tool to befool the masses in India and to keep them divided. Therefore, elections and parliamentary ‘cretinism’ have to be rejected. It has led to the evil of ‘tailism’ in the communist movement, i.e., to act as a tail of one bourgeoisie party or the other. However, those groups that have started working within the framework of democracy have argued that it provides to them an important avenue for mass mobilization and to combat the hold of the dominant ideology on the masses. Attitude to the Congress and Other Political Parties From the time of independence till the later half of the Emergency, up to the end of 1976, the CPI regarded the Congress Party as a force of progress and The Communist Parties in India 225 called upon the masses to rally against the reactionary and right wing leadership of the party. It has always considered the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and its later manifestation the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the representative of communalism, landlordism, American imperialism and reaction in India. Except the BJS and BJP and such other outfits as the Swatantra Party, Ramarajya Parishad and the Shiv Sena, it has worked with other national and regional parties on the basis of a minimum programme. In the 1980s and 1990s, it generally extended its support to a Third Front at the central level that excluded the Congress and the BJP. With the entrenchment of the BJP at the central level, it has been once again began to veer around to support the Congress at least tactically. In the states, it has worked to isolate political parties supporting communalism, landlordism and big capital. Although it has resented the ‘big-brotherly’ attitude of the CPI (M), it has generally tended to form common platforms with it. There are, of course, many instances when it was pitted against the CPI (M) both at the central and state level party coalitions. The trend, however, is for CPI and CPI (M) to coalesce together. Till recently the CPI (M) regarded the Congress as the party of landlords and the bourgeoisie led by the big bourgeoisie. Its stress was to win over the masses behind it. Towards other parties, it called for an approach of ‘separating and supporting the democratic essence of the various demands put forward by these parties and to fight the anti-democratic twists given to them by the leadership’. This led it to form coalitions with such parties as the Muslim League. In early 1980s, however, it reviewed and rejected its stance of aligning with minority communalism to isolate majority communalism. It saw no major difference between Congress (O) and Congress (I). It extended qualified support to the J.P. movement for the defence of civil liberties, reform of the electoral system, struggle against corruption etc. Unlike the CPI, it opposed the Emergency. It has striven to consolidate all those political forces that call themselves communist, socialist and radical democrats against the Congress and communal forces.61 While it has joined coalitions of parties to isolate and defeat a party/parties that it considers its primary enemy, it has been much more reticent about joining the government. Since the 1980s and 1990s, it has become a staunch supporter of a Third Front that can isolate the BJP and the Congress. However, within the Third Front it has argued for the autonomy of the Left Front, made up of left and radical parties, which it has successfully wielded together during this period. With the emergence and growth of the BJP from the late 80s, it perceives a grave danger to the secular polity in India and has veered round to support the Congress in the fight against communalism. Its party alliances in the states too are mainly geared to fight against communalism. The CPI(ML) is a recent entrant into the electoral arena. Except for isolated instances of successfully contesting an election or two in other states, 226 Valerian Rodrigues the only state it has made some dent in terms of electoral politics, is Bihar. So far it has not established a stable policy of party alliances except to enlist the support of those parties active among the downtrodden and the exploited and isolate parties identified with communalism, landlordism and corruption. India’s Foreign Policy The CPI strongly supported the policy of non-alignment and saw it as complimentary to socialism. This policy was in consonance with its stance on the national bourgeoisie, which it felt primarily stood for peace, anticolonialism and defence of the interests of the broad masses. It is imperialism led by American imperialism that has been the cause of turmoil in the world. It felt that the petite bourgeoisie deviation and left-adventurism of the CPC has played into the hands of US imperialism. In recent years, it has been strongly opposed to globalization and the growing role of the World Bank and other multi-lateral agencies in the Indian economy. It is still to make a public assessment of the causes that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc and the implications it has for its own understanding of the world. The CPI (M) has considered Indian foreign policy as vacillating: there is both opposition and compromise with imperialism. Therefore, there is a dire need to build up mass pressure on the making of foreign policy in India. It has been apprehensive about the growing militarization of the Indian economy and India playing second fiddle to imperialist interests. It is opposed to globalization and the growing inroads of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the Indian economy, as they facilitate the entrenchment of monopoly capital. Like the CPI, the CPI (M) is still to make a public assessment of the factors that led to the demise of USSR and the Socialist Bloc. The CPI(ML) thinks that Indian foreign policy has been the sub-agent of American and Soviet imperialism. India has not pursued an independent foreign policy. Towards its smaller neighbours, India’s approach has been hegemonistic, if not downright imperialistic. Militarism is on the rise. India is already caught in the debt trap. The World Bank and IMF have been dictating terms to India. Globalization will lead to the further entrenchment of monopoly capital in India thereby affecting the livelihood of the masses deleteriously. The Alternative The CPI argues for a national democracy led by the joint leadership of the working class and the national bourgeoisie, while the CPI (M) argues for The Communist Parties in India 227 people’s democracy, which is led by the working class and supported by the peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. The CPI (ML) is for New Democracy, akin to the one established in China in the course of the protracted revolution. It is led by the working class relying on poor and landless peasantry. The middle peasants and the petite bourgeoisie are their reliable allies. The rich peasantry and the national bourgeoisie, although vacillating, have to be brought into the united front of the people. They have to be either neutralized or relied upon only tactically, being kept under a watchful eye. Strategy and Tactics The CPI suggests a United Front of workers, peasants, middle classes and the national bourgeoisie to achieve the alternative it seeks. It calls for the joint leadership of the national bourgeoisie and the working class for the constitution of such a front, which would create the conditions for a peaceful transition to socialism. It favours parliamentary work and mass movements to strive towards such an objective. The CPI (M) calls for the constitution of a United Front against bourgeois-landlord classes led by the big bourgeoisie. It subscribes to a fourfold alliance of classes for the purpose: workers, peasants, the petite bourgeoisie and the small bourgeoisie, led by the working class. The rich peasants and the small bourgeoisie are the vacillating fractions in this alliance. Although it considers parliamentary work as very important, it thinks that the present Parliament cannot be made into an organ of the working class and its allies. Therefore, it lays stress on extra-parliamentary struggles along with parliamentary work. It does not subscribe to armed struggle any longer, although there was some ambivalence in this regard in the early stages of the formation of the party. After 1972, the party has wholly resorted to open work. The CPI (ML) works for a United Front led by the working class, relying on poor and landless peasants, taking along middle peasants, urban petite bourgeoisie, small and middle bourgeoisie, although businessmen and bourgeois intellectuals may prove vacillating and unstable. There are differences within it on how such a United Front could be constituted: should mass struggles precede, accompany, or follow armed struggle. Most of the Marxist-Leninist groups would subscribe to the need of armed struggle to see the revolution successfully through, but there are major disagreements on the relation between mass work and armed struggle and mass work and electoral mobilization. There are also deep disagreements within the groups on the precise role of contesting elections, work in cities and trade unions, annihilation of class enemies, tactics of guerrilla warfare and their appropriate mixture. 228 Valerian Rodrigues Organizational Structure In What Is To Be Done, Lenin had argued, in 1902, that for communists the organizational issue was a central political concern. The Bolshevik Party and subsequently the Communist International paid a great deal of attention to this question. The organizational expression of a communist party mirrors to a great extent the kind of politics it pursues. The CPI was organized as a cadre party on the principle of democratic centralism as per the Comintern’s principles of party organization until 1958.62 With the gearing of the party towards winning of elections, the organizational orientation of the party underwent changes from the early 1950s onwards. The basic units known as cells became branches, heralding the transition from insurrectionary perspective to open work. The Central Committee and the Politburo were renamed as National Council and Central Executive Committee respectively. The period of probation to become a full member was reduced to only six months. The state councils were given power to constitute lower committees and were empowered to decide state level issues. The membership of governing bodies was increased. These changes were authoritatively formalized at the Amritsar Congress in 1958.63 Following it, the strength of the National Council was fixed at 101 members and that of the Central Executive Committee at 25 and the Party Congress was expected to be held once in two years. After the split of the party, in 1964, the CPI increasingly tended to be a mass party. State units were given greater discretion. The period of candidature, to be a member, was done away with. Presently, the leading bodies of the party are made of a nine member Secretariat, with a General Secretary, which looks after the day-to-day affairs on behalf of the Central Executive Committee (CEC), consisting of 31 members. The CEC is elected by the National Council, which consists of 125 members. The National Council is elected by the Party Congress made up of over 1,000 delegates. The delegates to the Party Congress are elected by State Councils on the basis of one representative for 500 members. At the state level similar structures are constituted. After the split, the CPI (M) reverted to the Comintern model. Bodies such as General Secretary, Politburo, Central Committee and State Committee were reintroduced. The lowest unit, branch, however was retained and there was no reversal of the cadre basis of the party. Aspirants to the party and its bodies had, however, to serve a period of candidature. For some time there was an attempt to maintain a parallel underground network along with open work but soon the underground network was given up. At present, ‘the organizational differences between the CPI (M) and CPI are more a matter of degree than of kind’ (Nossiter 1988: 29). While theoretically the principle of The Communist Parties in India 229 democratic centralism is still evoked, the state-level party units, particularly the large ones, function in a federal way. That the central organs find it very difficult to chastise a recalcitrant state unit, if it is large, was proved with respect to the West Bengal State Unit on the eve of the 1964 split (Mallick 1994) . In fact, the official pronouncements of the CPI and CPI (M) have often drawn attention to what they consider as the malaise of federalism ‘which ends up in each state functioning more or less, as an independent body’.64 All the communist parties in India, except a couple of extreme CPI(ML) groups greatly, privilege mass work. They perceive the masses as classes, fractions or strata.65 In recent years, the gender and ecological issues have become significant in the agenda of these parties as well. Further, the communist parties do not see mass work as merely advancing a set of interests of certain social segments within a given social order. They wish to bring about radical transformation of the order with the active initiative and participation of the masses. There has always been certain tension between mass work including electoral mobilization and the goals and objectives of the party. Mass work often tends to confine the movement within the existing order, a tendency that Marxists describe as economism, leading to the entrenchment of various vested interests. Elections require seeking a majority, which in turn may call for alignments and compromises. It may have to target resources which transformative politics might find inimical. Trade unions and peasant organizations may merely confine themselves as pressure groups, missing the wood for trees. Mass organizations have often seen electoral engagements of their parties as parliamentary opportunism, and parties have seen mass organizations as shops that do not take cognizance of the wider objectives of the movement. Till 1934, the membership of the CPI was very limited, a bare 150 members only. In 1942, under the popular front policy, it went up to 5,000 members. By 1948, it had reached 89,263. Faced with the consequences of the Ranadive line, it declined to 20,000 in 1952. At the time of the split in the party in 1964, CPI claimed a membership of 1,753,000 members and CPI (M) 82,670. By 1985, CPI had a membership of 480,000. Enrolment to CPI (M) was on a low key between 1972–77, but subsequently it registered a steady growth to reach 367,828 in 1985. At the time of the formation of the party, the CPI(ML) claimed a membership of about 33,000. However, soon it was to decline and get dissipated. The extent of membership of a party, is not necessarily an indicator of its strength. Several other factors have to be taken into account including the terms and conditions of membership. Relative to the CPI, the CPI (M) still asserts fairly rigorous terms for party membership including a period of probation. Similar has been the case 230 Valerian Rodrigues with the CPI(ML) groups who have to work within the constraints of an underground organization. The CPI(ML) alone has reverted to the cadre basis of the party and reintroduced the cell as the basic unit of the party. There is a great deal of regionalization particularly within the CPI (M) and CPI(ML). The CPI(ML) activity in India has been confined to certain states such as West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and some parts of Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab and Kerala. Today it is effectively limited to Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Tripura, and to the tribal belt of Maharashtra, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. In 1985, two CPI (M) units, West Bengal with 1,370,000 members and Kerala with 122,000 members, made up 70 per cent of the total membership of the party. In 1982, CPI (M) membership was only 28,000 in the entire Hindi belt. Apart from West Bengal and Kerala, the other states with sizeable CPI (M) presence are Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Tripura. Compared to the CPI (M), the CPI has more uniform but thinner spread across Indian States. Still its membership is mainly concentrated in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Punjab. There is a fairly large turnover in the membership of these parties. In 1986, CPI claimed this was 20 per cent annually. The branches of the party too have their ups and downs. This is true about the CPI (M) as well. Repression takes its toll among CPI(ML) groups, apart from surrenders and voluntary withdrawals. The social bases of the parties are not as stable as it seems to be. There is also an increased feeling in both the CPI and the CPI (M) that the middle peasantry has come to dominate the party in the countryside and the middle classes in the cities.66 Both the parties are caught in the age trap. The average age of the delegates at their Congresses is increasing (Nossiter 1988: 35). The middle classes and university graduates have come to predominate in them. Delegates from the agricultural labour background, working class, poor peasantry and women continue to remain insignificant, although the CPI (M) scores better in this regard as compared to the CPI. The failure of the CPI and CPI (M) to organize the agricultural labour and the unorganized sector, and the weakening of the significance of the organized sector under conditions of globalization and liberalization would have a great bearing on the mass organizations of these parties, affecting their long-term orientation in a decisive way. Coalition Politics and Communist Parties in India A United Front of classes is basic to communist conception of social transformation. However, classes do not automatically translate themselves into The Communist Parties in India 231 political parties. In a plural party system, a political party always attempts to maximize its leverage to power either by attempting to cultivate an interclass bloc or by defining its constituency in non-class terms. In such a party system, seeking allies among like-minded political parties and cementing solidarity across them for reasonable periods is essential for communist parties, if they wish to wield a bloc of classes politically and pursue their transformative politics as governing parties or as the opposition. This presents to them an intricate challenge, as every political party would wish to strive for political power on its own terms and beyond it to promote a conception of good life that it cherishes. Such conceptions as the United Front and People’s Front were inscribed in the lexicon of the CPI much before independence. It attempted to pool together such platforms in India, particularly after 1935. It also became familiar with the complex webs of inclusion and exclusion of political forces in associational and coordinated activity and what issues are appropriate for common consideration and at what levels. The complexity in the social relations in India, the federal arrangements and the profound changes in the political scene in India over the years, however, have posed intricate challenges in this regard as there is no ‘socialistically desirable coalitions’ (Nossiter 1988: 84) ready-made in the political market place. Electoral alliances were formulated by the CPI with friendly parties even prior to the sixties. It was, however, from 1967 onwards that coalitions with a view to form governments were to be the name of the game. When the CPI formed the government in Kerala in 1957, it did so on its own with the support of a few independents. Although in Tripura the CPI formed a Left Front government in 1952, Tripura was then a union territory and the government was overwhelmingly dominated by the CPI.67 The CPI (M) attempted to form a United Front with the CPI and the Revolutionary Socialist Party in the 1965 assembly elections in Kerala but it did not take off as the CPI (M) wanted to bring in the Muslim League into it and the CPI wanted to exclude it. Communist parties have sought coalitions at four levels: (i) supporting candidates of other parties in the electoral fray and enlisting their cooperation in this regard; (ii) extending legislative support without participating in government; (iii) participation in government without assuming the responsibility of leading the government and; (iv) coalitions that sought a leading role for the party in government. While these decisions are influenced by the ideological positions of the concerned parties, both the communists and those they ally with, they are also influenced by the strategic option of the concerned communist party to election and the social transformation envisaged therefrom. Ideological options get interjected by strategic considerations. 232 Valerian Rodrigues The ideological positions of the CPI and its conception of transitional regimes provide a great deal of clarity and flexibility for its coalition ventures. It has also equated political parties and expressions very closely with social classes. Since it identifies imperialism, landlordism, reaction and communalism, as being inimical to the pursuit of National Democracy, it has kept aloof from any coalition with parties such as BJS/BJP, Swatantra, Congress (O) and Ramarajya Parishad, whom it identifies as representing or upholding one of these interests or tendencies. Conversely, it has not entered into association with any party that it has labelled with one of these tags. However, there is a lot of distinction in extending support to a candidate and leading a government. In the former case, support to a candidate might be justified on the basis of supporting a lesser evil among contending political forces. While participating in government, however, greater care is taken to ensure consistency with stricter ideological codes. The only government that the CPI has led hitherto is the National Democratic Front in Kerala, forming a coalition with the Muslim League, RSP, PSP, the Congress and later the Kerala Congress,68 from 1969 to 1977. Although it was a constituent of the CPI (M)-led United Front government formed in 1967, it broke away from the latter accusing it of sectarianism, dogmatism, opportunism, corruption and nepotism. This rift was not merely a local issue as the CPI was to break-off from the CPI (M) in West Bengal too in 1971. The CPI did not feel comfortable with the CPI (M) as it thought that its ideological understanding is correct and as per this understanding, the communists needed to align with the Congress, the representative of the national bourgeoisie par excellance. The CPI (M) of course, was dead set against a coalition with the Congress. Its ideology and experiences in Kerala, West Bengal, Tripura and elsewhere corroborated it. The CPI, therefore, formed a mini-front with the SSP and Muslim League and enlisted the support of the Congress from outside from 1969 to 1970. The CPI became much more comfortable with the Congress after its break from the Congress (O) and in its association with it during the period 1970–77, since it saw itself as representing the workers and the Congress as representing the national bourgeoisie. The forces opposed to it were branded with choice diatribes reserved for class enemies. When it came to participating in government and not leading it, the CPI has generally gone along with CPI (M)-led governments and those led by the Congress till 1979. It participated in the Congress-led regimes in Kerala, following the Emergency, but severed its connections with the government once the atrocities committed during the Emergency were exposed. In its legislative support to a governing party, the CPI has extended support to a number of parties, except those representing the antagonistic class forces and their allies. For the purpose, it has formed both pre-electoral and The Communist Parties in India 233 post-electoral alliances with a number of parties. This has been the case with the DMK in Tamil Nadu, Devaraj Urs-led Congress in Karnataka, the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh and in later years, alliances with the Socialist Party, Janata Dal etc. However, once these parties aligned themselves with what were considered as class enemies, the CPI has broken away from them. In a way, one can anticipate which political party the CPI would not go with, and even if does, to what extent, although it would be difficult to say with whom it would align positively particularly in extending electoral and legislative support. This is especially the case given the blurring of the picture on class forces in the context of globalization and its inability to locate where to place the Congress in the post-emergency period. The CPI (M), however, has developed a much more complex understanding regarding coalition politics. It has also over the years, excluded certain political parties and forces from its coalitions, with whom it was associated earlier. In 1985, the CPI (M) decided to severe its ties with the Muslim League and the Kerala Congress with whom it had a love-hate relationship for the previous 20 years. Further, the coalition politics of the CPI (M) has taken the conjunctures seriously, specified in accordance with its ideological perspectives, leading to dramatic breaks and alliances which although seem opportunistic, proceed from a conjunctural analysis. Such shifts, however, create a great deal of trauma when social bases of support have to be welded together. For instance, the CPI (M) has considered the Congress as its primary target. But after the consolidation of the BJP in the 1990s, the CPI (M) has been reassessing its ties with the Congress and there has been a noticeable shift in its approach to the Congress Party in 1998. This has great implications on their social bases of support in Kerala and Tripura, as well as in West Bengal, where its principal political adversary is the Congress. The CPI (M) has formulated three types of united fronts in its attempts at coalition formation: the United Fronts, Left-Democratic Fronts and Left Fronts.69 But unlike the CPI, it has not participated in a government without having a decisive say in the overall policy of that government whether it led the government or not. When it felt that it would not have such a say, it has kept itself outside the government and contented itself to provide legislative support to the coalition of which it was a part.70 There has been a certain looseness in the use of the terms ‘fronts’ and the CPI (M) itself cannot be wholly excused from its confused use either. But the party has maintained a clear distinction between different kinds of fronts. A United Front, simpliciter, is directed against a main enemy and is an enabling device to bring the masses on a common platform and to attend to their immediate pressing grievances. It strives to ensure that the masses are not hegemonized, corporatized or pulverized by the dominant forces. It 234 Valerian Rodrigues accepts that there are all kinds of contradictions among the masses. Political relations in the United Front are likely to be very unstable and there might be sudden reversals. However, to the extent that the unity among the masses is forged and the enemy is weakened, it feels that relatively clearer lines of alliances will emerge in the future. The CPI (M) has joined governing United Fronts in West Bengal in 1967 and 1968, although it did not lead them, and it led the United Front government in Kerala for 31 months from 1967 to 196971 in alliance with the CPI, the Samyukta Socialist Party, the Muslim League, the RSP, the KSP and the KTP. A Left-Democratic Front is ideologically more cohesive compared to the United Front.72 It is clearly located on the left, as its prefix suggests, and is in tune with the CPI (M)’s conception of working class leadership at the stage of transition to People’s Democracy. Its emergence is likely to consolidate the forces of the opposition into a rival alliance. Certain parties, such as the Muslim League and the Kerala Congress, might have been taken into the alliance during the stage of the United Front in order to utilize the contradictions in the ruling classes, but they cannot be integral to the LDF pursuits.73 The UF has only a minimum agenda. It cannot provide a stronger alternative. On the other hand, the LDF is expected to pursue a denser agenda, although in practice there might be several imponderables. But LDF governments have shown, hitherto, greater endurance. It is interesting to note that while none of the UF governments, either in Kerala or West Bengal, were able to complete their terms, the LDF governments both in Kerala and Tripura have displayed remarkable stability. In terms of the composition of its units, although the LDF has remained relatively flexible as compared to the Left Front, it has not been as accommodative as the UF. Further, the core nucleus consisting of the CPI (M), CPI and RSP have persisted in the LDF, from 1980–2000, while they went their separate ways during the UF phase in Kerala during 1965–80. The Left Front is ideologically much more homogenous compared to the other fronts that the communists have envisaged, hitherto. It has been in power in West Bengal from 1977 onwards in an uninterrupted way and has been running the government for the longest period after independence in Tripura, although with some interruptions in between. So far the LF model, wherever it has been tried, has succeeded in ensuring comfortable majorities too, although it is needless to add that the political conditions necessary for the constitution of such alliances may not be available in most of the states. At the central level, the LF has acted as a cohesive bloc, for about two decades now, and has survived a range of political trials. However, perceptions of the CPI (M) and CPI still markedly differ in several states.74 With the breakdown of the one-party dominant system from the latter half of the 1980s, the CPI (M) and CPI have rallied for the promotion of The Communist Parties in India 235 a Third Front, at the Union level, that would exclude the Congress and the BJP and if both of them cannot be excluded, to isolate the more dangerous of the two. After the destruction of the Babri Mosque in December 1992, the communist parties have identified the BJP as the more dangerous enemy. At the same time, the communist parties, particularly the CPI (M), do not preclude the possibility of the BJP and the Congress to collude together as in Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura when other radical forces emerge on the scene. With the consolidation of the BJP in 1998 and its ability to wield a durable alliance of political parties, both national and regional, the communist parties have also begun to feel the need for tactical alliances with the Congress. The Third Front that the communist parties have envisaged at the Central level is articulated in the imagery of the United Fronts in Kerala and West Bengal in the 1960s and the 1970s. The 50 plus Members of Parliament that the Left Front has commanded in Parliament, over the years of deep instability at the Centre, have formed an anchoring base for an alternative. However, the CPI (M) has hitherto refused to join the government in such a front. The ostensible ideological reason has been the overwhelming preponderance of non-left parties in such a front and consequently the weak political presence of the working class in such an alliance. Given the archaic ideological formulations that govern the considered choices of the communist parties, particularly the CPI (M), they have to construct a set of new formulations to participate in such a front given the inability of the CPI (M) or the Left Front to boost their political prospects at the Centre to form governments on their own for the foreseeable future. In the coalition politics pursued so far, communist parties in India, and particularly the CPI (M), have shown great dexterity and sensitivity although they have been accused of having a ‘big-brotherly’ attitude. While in the governments it has participated in, the CPI (M) has bargained for key ministries, it has also sacrificed sometimes its own share of office, for the sake of continuing and reinforcing the alliance.75 The CPI (M) claimed initially that the United Fronts governments were specific forms of struggle to win more and more people and allies to the causes of People’s Democracy. They were termed as instruments in the hands of people rather than as governments.76 B.T. Ranadive said the task of the United Front governments was ‘to unleash the discontent of people rather than to give relief’.77 Over the years, such language has increasingly been recognized as political positioning rather than actual practice. These governments have functioned primarily within the ambit of the bourgeois rule of law in India. There are few instances when they have attempted to test the limits of these laws. 236 Valerian Rodrigues The Communist Parties and Civil Society in India There are problems in marking the boundaries of civil society in India and in identifying an autonomous arena of rights, liberties and civic institutions that can be demarcated from ascriptive structures on one hand and the authoritative pronouncements of the state on the other. However, the legacies of the national movement, the imagining of a plural and contested past, constitutionalism, judicial interventions, a free press, the operation of relatively free institutions and the realm of public opinion that they have nourished over a period have definitely given rise to a non-state arena which we can call the civil society in India. The communist parties have undoubtedly played a major role in shaping this arena and in its defence. Working class struggles and trade unionism antedates the formation of the Communist Party of India. However, in the first major wave of working class struggles from 1918–20, militants oriented towards socialism and communism were very active. The First All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) was founded in 1920. It was a broad based platform of militant trade unions. Eventually the communists came to dominate this apex body of unions. It set a bench mark against which other activists defined their union agendas for long, such as Mahatma Gandhi (Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh or Textile Labour Association), the Indian National Congress (Indian National Trade Union Congress), M.N. Roy (Federation of Indian Labour), the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh), the socialists (Hindustan Mazdoor Sangh and Hindustan Mazdoor Panchayat), the CPI (M) (Centre for Indian Trade Unions), Socialist Unity Centre of India (United Trade Union Congress) etc. The peasant movement in India had made a big headway before communists had become active in them. Swami Sahajanand Saraswati formed the Bihar Kisan Sabha in 1929 before he came into active contact with the communists.78 However, communists were active in the formation of the All India Kisan Congress (later, the All India Kisan Sabha or AIKS), in 1936, along with the Congress Socialists. Some of the most militant movements in the agrarian front, till the mid-1970s,79 in India, were led by the communists. The leadership of the Tebhaga (1943–47), the Telangana (1946–50) and the North Malabar movements was clearly in communist hands. It made the communists a major political force in their respective states subsequently. After independence, the communists along with socialists have been in the forefront of the struggles for agrarian transformation and the single most important reason for the entrenchment of the CPI (M) in rural Bengal has been the measures that it came to adopt for agrarian transformation (Bhattacharya 1999). The CPI(ML) may not have blazed a trail of political The Communist Parties in India 237 success but, as P.C. Joshi (1975) has argued, it placed the agrarian issue on the mainstream national agenda and thereby created a situation for the launch of the Green Revolution in India. The vast mass of agricultural labour in India is little organized as yet. The two communist parties, the CPI and CPI (M) have not succeeded much in this daunting task except in Kerala and to some extent in West Bengal, through the Bharatiya Kisan Mazdoor Union (BKMU) and the All India Agricultural Workers’ Union (AIAWU) respectively. Among the many problems in organizing agricultural labour, their economic dependence on rural propertied classes and their personal dependence on them are significant. The communist parties, however, face a different order of problems in organizing them in several parts of the country, and particularly in those areas where they have a sizeable mass base. Earlier, the tenants, sharecroppers and poor peasants were mobilized by the communists and they benefited enormously from such mobilization. There are conflicts of all sorts between these strata and the agricultural labourers today. The communist parties will have to pay a heavy price if they set about organizing the latter affecting the interests of the former. Further the vast mass of agricultural labour in India is drawn from the low and polluting castes and tribes and, of course, women. Communists in India have rarely succeeded in breaking the invidious nexus between caste and patriarchy, although they may not uphold them publicly and consciously. Social existence is deeply embedded in their being and they have not, by and large, shown a reflexive and transformative practice with respect to caste and patriarchy. These realities infuse their households, kinship ties, festivals, food habits, the acknowledgement of their dead and the social relationships of deference and support. A few of them might succeed in rising above them but it would be foolhardy to expect the vast mass to do so especially in the absence of a realistic alternative. In this regard the record of the CPI(ML) seems better but its practices are so localized that it is difficult to draw any generalisable conclusions from them. One of the most important arenas that the communists have left their mark on is civil and democratic rights and gender relations. They have built, over the years, a myriad of institutions for the purpose particularly with respect to students, the youth and women. The All India Students Federation (AISF), the All India Youth Federation (AIYF) and National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) are affiliated to the CPI, the Student Federation of India (SFI), Democratic Youth Federation of India (DYFI) and All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA) are with the CPI (M) and organizations such as the Progressive Democratic Students’ Union (PDSU), Radical Students’ Union (RSU) and All India Students’ Association (AISU) are affiliated with one or the other CPI(ML) groups or their platforms. The CPI(ML) groups have also set up a number of mass organizations for 238 Valerian Rodrigues democratic struggles, which work, in close tandem with underground organizations such as the Jana Natya Mandali of People’s War group and Jana Pratirodh Sangharsh Manch of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). Besides, there are mass organizations representing professional groups of all kinds—lawyers, doctors, journalists, bankers, teachers, artists, writers etc. These organizations have raised issues specific to the professional groups as well as issues of common interests affecting rights and liberties. They have agitated for reforming educational institutions and brought pressure on the state to promote quality education at different levels and democratize them at the same time; they have called attention to the rampant unemployment prevailing in society and demanded resources for the pursuit of one’s profession. Further, although the communists have not succeeded much in carving out a space for women in India, including in their own organizations, their record in this respect seems far better than others. In a way, communists have been the conscience-keepers of India, at least till recently. They represented the voice not merely of the poor and the downtrodden but of equal liberties and democracy as well. This moral space that communists carved out was highly sought after for political legitimacy, particularly by Indira Gandhi. One of the domains of civil life that communists came to exert great influence on was knowledge production and dissemination, the media and the press, theatre and the arts. Undoubtedly, the communists profoundly influenced the contemporary field of social sciences and humanities including creative writing in India as they did in several other societies. In social sciences, they advanced a set of concepts and methodologies to construct and develop the disciplines. Some of the most creative historical writings to emerge in post-independent India have been by scholars deeply influenced by Marxism and sympathetic to the communist movement. In humanities, they proposed not merely alternative cultural perspectives but also related the domain of culture and literature to the other levels. In creative writings, the impact of Marxism was to herald entirely new periods of literary constructions in most of the Indian vernacular literatures. In cinema, theatre and painting, a number of new experiments came to be deeply influenced by Marxism. One of the major areas that communists opened up was on mass theatre often linking it with the traditional forms. They threw up a number of organizations for the purpose.80 Those who undertook the task of popularization of science and attempted to bridge the relation between science and society were influenced by the communist parties to a great extent particularly in the early days of such endeavours. State level organizations came up for the purpose in several regions of India. Communists invested a great deal in the press and the media. They started a chain of journals and magazines in English and the vernacular languages. The Communist Parties in India 239 There were also the official organs of the party both at the all-India and state levels. In some of the states, such as in West Bengal and Kerala, the party ran daily newspapers. Apart from the media at the behest of these parties, a large number of journalists shared the ideological perspectives of these parties. There are millions of workers who are members of the mass organizations enumerated above. It would be a daunting task to undertake a comprehensive inventory of the organizations involved and their membership, here. The number of the members of the CPI (M) affiliated DYFI alone is placed at 11 million.81 There are, however, major limitations of these organizations to shape the dynamics of Indian civil society as a whole. They are primarily concentrated in states and regions under the influence of communist parties. A disproportionately large proportion of membership of several of these organizations is located in Kerala and West Bengal. The ideological commitment of most of the mass organizations is low and their ideological invigoration is rarely undertaken. It is highly uneven across the organizations too. Besides, in recent years, there is a slide towards urban based middle class organizations in relation to unorganized labour, poor peasantry and agricultural labour. Identities have emerged as major players in civil society, particularly in recent years. Sometimes, Communist Parties in India attempted to throw up organizations representing identities as a whole such as the Gana Mukti Parishad of Tripura. In this state, the CPI and later the CPI (M) strove to handle the local tribal identity threatened by Bengali influx quite dexterously. It also helped to set up the Tribal Area Autonomous District Councils and the Tripura Upjati Juba Samiti (TUJS) in 1967. However, after the Bengali influx of 1967 and 1971, the tribals felt threatened as their land was alienated and their identity was increasingly under a question mark. Tribal militants came to project the CPI (M) as upholding the interests of the Bengalis who came to constitute the overwhelming majority in the state in 1990s from being just about half in early 1940s. In 2000, the Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT), composed of various splinter groups from TUJS and the student wing of TUJS, the Tripura Students Federation, supported by the National Liberation Front of Tripura, has succeeded in terrorising the CPI (M) and winning majorities in the Autonomous District Councils. The Amra Bangali, a racist Bengali front, through armed retaliation against the tribals has increased the pitch of the conflict. In the context, the CPI (M)-led government in Tripura had to plead with the central government to rush security forces to the state, not a pleasant situation for a communist party to face under any circumstances. In a way, the communist parties in India have miserably failed in relating themselves to identity formations of all kinds. Castes, ethnic identities and communities, which have emerged as major players in civil society, speak a 240 Valerian Rodrigues language, which has remained largely non-negotiable for communist parties in India. For long, communist parties in India have deployed the language of class to understand and mobilize low castes and untouchables while helplessly watching other parties swallowing them up. To what extent the communists have succeeded in redrawing the map of civil society in India is difficult to say. The kind of values and beliefs that they have fostered, the struggles that they have led, the kind of institutions that they have built and the creativity and initiative that they thrown up are integral aspects of the making of the civil society in India. They will have a deep and long term impact on constituting social relations. However, the communist parties have definitely failed in bringing agricultural labour, the dalits, the lowly castes, the identity formations of various kinds and women to the fore of the civil society. In the other domains, the organizations that they have thrown up, being centralized, have allowed mobility to those who had certain social reach and linguistic competence, marginalizing the vernacular and lowly placed social strata in the organizations. Without intending so, the upper castes and the English-speaking activists have enjoyed an edge over the rest. The role played by mass organizations at the behest of the communist parties in shaping educational institutions cannot be exaggerated and the media, in India, has definitely remained with the bourgeoisie. The communists in India have succeeded little in countering the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the civil society. Communist Parties and Elections in India The CPI and CPI (M) have both adopted elections as their principal strategy for political power. Till the early 1970s, the communists, especially the CPI (M), emphasized other strategies, particularly extra-electoral mobilization to put pressure on governments and to restrict their choices. Mass movements and extra-electoral struggles are still their language of the day but now such mobilization is carefully dovetailed to suit the electoral prospects of the party. If mobilization affects the stability of the party’s electoral prospects or those of their governments then they are sidetracked, if not directly frowned upon. The CPI (M) has succeeded in roping in its trade unions, particularly in West Bengal, on this plea. Election results alone, even when the percentage of votes is taken into account, are not an indicator of the strength of political parties, especially of the small ones. The small parties are not able to put up candidates in several or the majority of the constituencies although they may have pockets of support in many of them. On the other hand, support for big parties may involve strong and weak voter approvals. In some of the constituencies, if The Communist Parties in India 241 there was an alternative for many a voter, they might have gone to other smaller parties. Although alliances and joint publicity help in providing an explanation and rationale and thereby transfer votes from existing preferences to the alliance partners, the scope of such exchanges is quite limited. At the all-India level, the percentage of the cumulative votes of the CPI and CPI (M) has varied between 7–10 per cent from 1957 onwards. Although there are interesting variations across the period, these parties, taken as a whole, have not witnessed the dramatic rise and fall of their fortunes as those of many other parties (See Table 9.1). These parties have obtained about 5–9 per cent of the seats in Parliament during this period. After the stabilization of the Left Front from 1980 onwards, however, except for 1984,82 the number of seats that the communist parties have obtained and their percentage of votes as a whole have been between 9–10 per cent. At the regional level, there are only three states where the communist parties have made their electoral headway in India–Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura. In Kerala, the electoral support of the communists as a whole peaked in 1957 and 1962, securing 37.5 per cent and 35.5 per cent of the votes cast respectively. Subsequently, the combined vote of the CPI and CPI (M) has hovered around 30 per cent, rising up to the earlier level only in 1971 (35.3 per cent). Only in West Bengal, the support that both the communist parties have garnered in 1980s and 1990s has been near about and even above 40 per cent of the votes cast and that of the left front as a whole nearer or even beyond 50 percent.83 In Tripura, the fortunes of the CPI (M) have waxed and waned as it is caught at the vortex of identities that violently erupt, between the indigenous population, the early Bengali émigrés and the recent Bengali refugees. Where old blue prints are available, such as with respect to peasant and working class struggles, communists in India have shown a good deal of ingenuity to execute them, but when they are confronted with new problems they have shown little ability to imaginatively engage with them. In terms of electoral prospects, the other states can be grouped into three types: First, there are some states such as Bihar and Manipur where the combined support of the communist parties has remained relatively high and steady. There are however, no prospects that the CPI and the CPI (M) can together make much of a headway, in these states, in the immediate run, unless they make a profound reevaluation of their ideological perspectives. In Bihar, the backward castes have carved out a major political plank for themselves. There is a strong assertion of identity politics in the form of the Jharkhand parties in Southern Bihar and it is quite possible that the rest of Bihar might be caught in its web too, once Jharkhand is separated from the rest of Bihar as an independent state. There are also powerful far-left groups CPI 9.5 19.0 29.4 09.1 10.5 06.5 04.3 03.8 03.9 03.8 03.8 03.6 03.5 04.0 Year 1951 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 – 37.5 35.5 08.0 09.1 10.4 04.1 07.4 06.2 08.1 08.2 08.3 07.6 07.9 CPI – – – 24.6 26.2 20.3 21.5 22.3 22.9 20.7 21.2 21.0 27.9 31.5 CPI(M) Kerala 1. 2. 3. 4. 61.3 45.1 51.3 – 06.8 02.2 – – – – – – – – CPI – – – 41.8 43.5 34.1 47.5 50.5 41.7 06.5 52.4 49.0 56.2 68.8 CPI(M) Tripura 00.4 05.0 06.4 10.0 09.9 05.6 07.3 08.2 07.9 07.5 05.1 03.4 02.7 01.2 CPI – – – 0.3 0.8 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.8 CPI(M) Bihar Excludes the figures of the elections in Assam and Punjab that were held in 1985. Excludes the figures of the elections in Assam and Punjab that were held in 1985. Excludes the figures for the elections in Punjab that were held in 1992. Excludes the figures for the elections in Punjab that were held in 1992. Note: All figures have been rounded up. Source: Election Commission of India, www.eci.gov.in. – – – 15.7 34.3 26.2 40.0 36.0 38.4 36.2 36.7 35.4 35.6 38.6 CPI(M) West Bengal State – 12.0 21.0 12.7 06.0 02.6 03.7 01.9 02.0 01.9 02.4 02.6 01.3 01.3 CPI – – – 6.2 2.9 4.7 3.6 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.9 1.4 1.0 CPI(M) Andhra Pradesh Table 9.1 Statewise Vote Share of the Communist Parties in Lok Sabha Elections (in per cent) 03.3 09.0 10.0 05.1 04.8 02.8 02.5 02.71 02.6 02.53 02.0 01.8 01.5 01.4 CPI – – – 4.3 5.1 4.3 6.2 5.92 6.6 6.14 6.1 5.2 5.4 5.7 CPI(M) All India The Communist Parties in India 243 such as the CPI(ML)—Liberation, Maoist Communist Centre and Marxist Communist Party of India who have carved out their own pockets of support throughout the state. In Manipur, the demand for secession is gaining attention particularly in 2004. Even if the Indian state becomes successful in coopting such secessionist forces, they would electorally reap the benefits of their earlier secessionist activities rather than let the communist parties to do the same. In the second type of states such as Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Assam, Karnataka and to some extent in Maharashtra too, communist support has declined. In some of these states, the decline has been precipitous and in some states it has been slow and gradual. In all these states strong regional forces have emerged that have appealed to issues of identity and contended against the growing centralization of power. Third, there are some states such as Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh where there is little presence of communist parties at all. In these states, political parties appealing to identity such as the Bahujan Samaj Party are growing or existing parties are increasingly reaching out to identity clusters. In their given articulation, the communist parties are left with little space to induct themselves in these states. There are no states where communist parties are making a steady growth as witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s in Kerala and West Bengal. Along with this if we combine the trends in the social composition of these parties discussed earlier, then it undoubtedly shows them as aging. The strident calls for electoral coalitions by the CPI and CPI (M) need to be seen against this background. Coalitions have helped them to eliminate the dispersal of their strength, as was the case after the split in 1964. In the 1967, 1971 and 1977 elections when both these parties were in competition with each other they together put up 168, 172 and 148 candidates respectively. However, with the strengthening of the left front, in 1980, 1984 and 1989 their candidates in the electoral fray were restricted to 111, 130 and 113 for the corresponding years. If through wider coalitions these arrangements can be made with larger number of parties, the communists might be able to garner a few more seats than they do at present. Coalitions will bring not merely electoral dividends but help these parties enhance their strength in civil society and, conversely, help reflect their strength in civil society on their electoral prospects. Alliances will help the communist parties to maximize their electoral dividends. But alliances are devices to garner better outcomes even when the concerned party’s social base of support has not witnessed much growth; they are not suicide pacts. In Kerala and West Bengal, alliances succeeded because the allies stood to benefit from them. If the communist parties have no base of their own, then their utility as alliance partners will not be much 244 Valerian Rodrigues for the other contenders on the scene. In the longer run, if these parties want to push ahead with alliance politics at the central level, they would be successful only to the extent that they enhance their social base of support. By Way of Conclusion Existing studies on the communist parties in India, have unfortunately focussed their attention on the ideological contestations within the communist movement; their link with the international communist centres, be they the Comintern, Moscow or Beijing; the electoral performance and support of these parties; their regional configuration and their spectacular and heroic roles. Rigorous rational scrutiny of the formulations, normative and empirical, that the communist parties have advanced, are rare. Many studies concentrate on the differences between them. While they are worth taking note of, adequate attention is not paid to the fact that all of them acknowledge a common worldview, epistemological perspectives, a body of concepts and theories, moral valuations and the need to engage with the world. There is hardly a study that attempts a comprehensive stocktaking of the engagement of communist parties in the different domains of Indian public life. A critical evaluation of the performance of communist-led governments is yet to be made. There is little material on the organizational functioning of these parties and the relation between central, state and lower levels on one hand and the mass organizations and party centres on the other. The achievements of the communist parties in India are not negligible. With their mass organizations they, taken together, constitute one of the largest communist formations in the world. The track record of their sacrifices, heroism and endurance, under extremely trying circumstances, and across a long span, are comparable to their best counterparts elsewhere in the world. They have led mass movements involving hundreds and thousands of people. The governments that they have led have undertaken some of the most farreaching reforms and executed them with a degree of efficiency that other governments have rarely matched. They have taken up several progressive measures on behalf of the disadvantaged groups and set standards for others to follow. They have ensured stable coalition regimes without they being less efficient. Through the legislatures, media, public platforms and mass movements, they have brought pressure to bear on governments and state apparatuses to adopt pro-people policies. Their presence in civil society has helped nurture support for rights and liberties. They have not been mired in corruption and criminal charges and have inspired a relatively ascetic personal way of life among leaders and party members. They have sustained an intellectual curiosity among its members that is uncommon in the mass of the population. The Communist Parties in India 245 What have been their major lacunae? They have advanced an agenda for social transformation in India with little reflective thought on the specificity of the Indian social formation. For the Indian communist parties, their arena of engagement happened to be India; it could have been anywhere else, without any major changes in their ideological baggage. There is something deeply non-materialist and vedantic about the universal categories that constitute their reason, a refusal to engage with the concrete conditions of the concrete situation. The sensuous, labouring, situated and struggling masses, who while making the world make themselves in turn, have rarely been central to their imagination except as classes in a narrow sense. Communist parties in India have been adept at offering universal blueprints and not conjunctural analysis of the situation, where concepts and theories from their ideological baggage provide tools to construct the situation, rather than offer an understanding of the situation itself. This aloofness from soiling their hands by engagement with the concrete conditions is manifest in the way they have handled issues of tradition, identity, culture, communities and castes. In the construction of Indian nationalism, these realities played a major role. They have attempted to bypass these realities in their theoretical reflections, by inducting categories from their ideological baggage for the purpose, waiting for reality to adjust to these categories. The self-understanding of the masses themselves has rarely been a factor in such considerations. In their political practices and mass activities, however, communists have often taken these issues overboard. It would have been difficult to make much headway in these activities without extending due consideration to them. The lived life of the vast multitude of party members is mired in them. Further, their inability to theoretically engage with these issues have led the communist parties to embrace a formal territorial nationalism, which is vacuous and therefore, can easily collapse into a conception of homogenous cultural nationalism, or be synonymous with a regime of rights and liberties making national identity superfluous. A communist in India lives a life full of contradictions. Theoretically she subscribes to a sensuous, materialist basis of social existence, its joys and sorrows, its challenges and limitations, but she publicly positions herself as an ascetic and renouncer; she advocates a range of liberties and rights which are the basis of the mass movements she is involved in that throw open social relations to new encounters and reformulations, but she embraces strong puritanical stances in her personal life which in their turn reinforce the prevalent dominant values in society inimical to such liberties and rights. The refusal to engage with social sciences, which are expected to keep themselves abreast with the changing social profile and ignoring the rich experience of party members to recast the ideological understanding of the party, are symptoms of a larger malaise in the communist parties. They 246 Valerian Rodrigues embody a belief that the ideology they uphold is trans-historical and should not be allowed to be contaminated by worldly trends and shifting public opinions. Communists in India are concerned with political power, as are communists everywhere. However, they have understood political power of their adversary against whom they have to contend in a very narrow sense of governance, its loci being state apparatuses, particularly the executive, and the coercive might of landlords in the countryside. Since they ignore the other sites of power, their ability to contend against the hegemony of the dominant classes or to wield appropriate transformative alliances becomes limited. The failure to engage with the spectrum of power relations as a whole both conceptually and in transformative practices has made the communist parties to perceive bourgeois constitutionalism in India in a classneutral way. In fact, communists in India, barring the far Left groups, have come to reproduce it no differently from the other parties, except for some emphases here and there. Notes 01. Writing on the communist movement in Kerala in the early 1970’s John Osgood Field says, ‘There are many who assert that, in politics as in economics and social dynamics, what has been true of Kerala in the 1950s and 1960s maybe increasingly true of India generally in the 1970’s and beyond’ (Weiner and Field 1975: 163). 02. K. Raghavendra Rao inveighs against the pedantic attitude of the communist movement in India in stronger terms: ‘Call it colonialism, call it imperialism, transcending scholarly sophistries and equivocations, the reality of our history, of our enslavement tends to stamp many of our artefacts with the sign of slavery’ (Rao 1989). 03. The decisive option to the multi-party parliamentary path and the split occasioned by Sino-Soviet rivalry could be cited in this regard. 04. See Ambedkar (1923), Bagchi (1975), Bukharin (1972), Colletti (1972), Chandra (1966), Dobb (1947), Hobson (1902), Markovits (1985). 05. See Choudhury (1971), Chatterjee (1984), Dutt (1940). 06. For M.K. Gandhi’s reaching out to the peasants, workers and Muslims in India, see Judith Brown (1972). For Ambedkar’s analysis of the impact that these developments had on the British Power in India see B.R. Ambedkar (1925), particularly Chs. X, XI and XII. 07. See Antony Parel (1997). 08. See Lenin (1975). 09. ‘Lenin’s theory of Imperialism, then, was something of a tour de force. With it the East was “incorporated” into Marxist theory in such a manner that the importance of the East to the socialist revolution came to be seen as very direct and immediate’. (Seth 48–49). The Communist Parties in India 247 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. For Ray’s draft see Adhikari (1971–82: 178–88). Ibid. Ibid. See Lenin (1967), Harding (1977). Adhikari (1971–82: 111). For Lenin’s understanding of nationalism, see Lenin (1976), Lowy (1978). See Harding (1981). For an introduction, see Chaudhuri (1993). The CPGB played a major role in the making of the CPI in India. By 1926, it had replaced M. N. Roy to become the main channel of communication to India. A succession of British Communists, including, Shapurja Saklatvala, the Dutt brothers (Clemens P. Dutt and Rajni P. Dutt), Philip Spratt and Ben Bradley came to actively engage themselves with the communist activities in India. The latter two were arrested under the Meerut conspiracy case in 1929. The position on the antiimperialist people’s front advocated by the Comintern in 1935 was to be clarified by R.P. Dutt and Ben Bradley to a deeply cautious and divided CPI. For an overview, see Singh (2000: 4–6, 12–13). Published from 1922 to June 1924. Seth. See Cecil Kaye (1971: 26). See F. Claudin (1975: 271–88). See Shanin (1972); also see Carr (1969–1978). See Damodaran (1974). For minutes of the meeting see Adhikari (667–68). See Jane Degras (1951–53: 487). For Roy’s perceptible shift in his position from what he had held at the period of the Second International, see Seth (77–107). CPI (1974: 36). Krishnan (1990: 398); for the membership of the party from 1934 to 1959, see Overstreet and Windmiller (1960: [Table II] 357). See Chandra Sen (1977: 345–48). See et al. (1988). It was E.M.S. Namboodiripad who was the leader of the CSP in northern Malabar where it had the strongest base built with the support of the peasant movement. See Brass and Franda (1973: 119–27). Lenin advanced this position at the Zimmerweld Conference in September 1915. See Dutt (1964: 123–52). See E.M.S. Namboodiripad (1963: 17). See Sundarayya (1972). Bhattacharya and Nossiter (1988: 156–58); also see Debvarma (1986). See Sen (1971: 9); see also Namboodiripad (1963: 24–28). As the party was banned in Travancore-Cochin and Hyderabad, it contested the elections under the banner of the Socialist Party which emerged as the second largest party in both the states. See Mohit Sen (1971: 284). This phenomenon led Rajni Kothari to formulate the concept of the ‘one-party dominance system’, which was to play a major role in explaining the working of the Indian political system in the early years of Indian independence. 248 Valerian Rodrigues 42. See Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1989: 72). 43. Article 356 of the Indian Constitution that provided for this central intervention, has generally provoked the ire of communists subsequently. 44. In fact, the constitution was to receive the unstinted praise of E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the most important theoretician of the communist party in India at the juncture of 50th year of Indian independence. 45. For this engrossing debate, see Sinha, D.P. (1963) The Great Debate, Selected Writings on Problems of Marxism-Leninism Today, New Delhi: People’s Publishing House. 46. See, The India-China Border Dispute and the Communist Party of India, New Delhi: 1963, pp. 14–15. 47. See Mallick (1994: 24–69). 48. The issue of identity has to be seen integrally with the mass support base and not independently from it. In Kerala and West Bengal, the CPI (M) succeeded in incorporating the regional identity due to its mass base in both the states. It had to cater to their needs in their language, adopt their ways, deploy their symbolisms, develop appropriate regional literature etc. 49. See Namboodiripad (1966: 1–2). 50. See Basavapunniah, Ramamurthi and Surjeet (1964: 19). 51. For the role of the parties in the food movement in W. Bengal, see Roy Choudhury (1977). 52. For the reasons of this collaboration, see Fic (1970: 325–30). 53. This front consisted of the CPI (M), CPI, Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), Karshaka Thozhilalai Party (KTP), Kerala Socialist Party (KSP) and the Muslim League. 54. Roy Choudhury (1977: 205). 55. For an account of the CPI(ML), see Ram (1969) and Banerjee (1980) and (1984). 56. A standard left journal in India, such as Social Scientist, will definitely discuss some of these themes by taking up polemical postures. Such stances when they reach the corridors of party forums, however, turn into assertions of the hallowed positions of the party. 57. Namboodiripad (1966: 51). 58. See Programme and Statement of Policy, CPI (M), 1971. 59. See The Programme of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), May 1970. 60. In the context of the golden jubilee of India’s independence E.M.S. Namboodiripad wrote, ‘the greatest achievement of which we Indians can be proud during the last 50 years is the Republican Constitution framed in 1950, enabling the working people led by the working class to organize themselves and fight not only for their immediate economic demands but also for political advance’ (1998: 58–59). 61. See Namboodiripad (1970: 16–18). 62. Comintern, Principles of Party Organization, Calcutta: National Book Agency, 1973. 63. See Constitution of the Communist Party of India, adopted at the Extraordinary Party Congress, Amritsar, April 1958, New Delhi: CPI, 1958. 64. See for instance, CPI (M), Documents of the Eleventh Congress of the CPI (M), 1982, p. 140. The Communist Parties in India 249 65. For the distinction between them, see Poulantzas (1972). 66. See CPI, Documents of the Thirteenth Congress of the CPI, p. 135; see Aditya Nigam ‘Logic of Failed Revolution, Federalisation of CPI (M)’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, pp. 263–65 and Dwaipayan Bhattacharya, ‘Ominous Outcome for Left in West Bengal’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20 November 1999, pp. 3267–69. 67. Tripura became a state within the Indian Union only in 1972. 68. Initially the support of the Congress to this government was from outside. After the split of the Congress, in 1969, the CPI thought that the Congress (R) would be its ideal ally. After the election in 1970, Congress (R) joined the government. The Kerala Congress, which had a loose alliance with the CPI (M) from 1970, deserted the latter and joined this government from 1975. 69. There have been various other names that have been coined for the purpose. 70. This has been the case, for instance, when it refused to accept the offer of the leadership of the Third Front to Jyoti Basu, which would have catapulted him to the Prime Ministership of India in 1996. 71. In 1967 there were two United Fronts: People’s United Left Front (PULF) made of CPI, Forward Bloc (Bose), the Bolshevik Party, the PSP, Loksevak Sangh and the Gorkha League which secured 77 seats out of 280 and United Left Front (ULF) consisting of Forward Bloc (Marxist), the RSP, RCPI, the SSP, the Socialist Unity Centre and the Workers’ Party along with the CPI (M). In 1969, a combined United Front was formed. In 1971, CPI (M) led a six party United Front of the Workers Party, Biplab Bangla Congress, RCPI, FB (M) and Bolshevik party and the CPI led an eight party alliance. In 1972, the CPI joined the Progressive Democratic Front of the Congress and the front won 254 out of 280 seats. The CPI (M) led left front secured only 19 seats out of 280. 72. This cohesiveness itself was something that was built up over the years. When the LDF was first constituted it included CPI (M), CPI, RSP, Kerala Congress (M), Kerala Congress (P), All-India Muslim League and Congress (Urs). 73. Such a stand was not easy for the CPI (M). A. Raghavan, one of its important leaders broke away from it insisting on such an alliance. 74. This has been the case in the assembly elections of Bihar in 2000 when the CPI (M) struck an alliance with the Rashtriya Janata Dal while the CPI decided to align with the CPI(ML)—Liberation. 75. See Nossiter (1988: 104). A recent case in point is the threat of the CPI to walk out of the LDF in Kerala, as its nominee was not given the Rajya Sabha seat. The CPI (M) let its own seat to forego, for half of the term, to accommodate the demand of the CPI. See Hindustan Times, 17 June 2000. 76. See Political Organizational Report of the Eight Party Congress of the CPI (M), December 1968: 178. 77. Quoted in Subramanian (1989: 86). 78. See Rasul (1974). 79. From 1970’s there emerged the non-party peasant formations, which took away the storm from the communist affiliated peasant associations. The former have wandered into different parties subsequently, some of them still persisting in mirroring themselves as new social movements. 80. See Prasad (1999). 250 Valerian Rodrigues 81. People’s Democracy, 16 April 2000. 82. This election was held following the assassination of Indira Gandhi when the Congress Party obtained an unprecedented mandate, winning 415 seats out of the 517 contested and securing 48.1 per cent of the votes polled. 83. Recently, however, fears have been expressed that this impressive record may be difficult to maintain in the coming years. See Aditya Nigam, op. cit. and Dwaipayan Bhattacharya, op. cit. References Adhikari, G. (ed.) 1971–82. Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India (Vols. 1,2,3A, 3B and 3C). Vol. I. New Delhi: PPH. Ambedkar, B.R. 1923. The Problem of the Rupee. Westminster: P.S. King & Co. ———. 1925. The Evolution of Provincial Finance in India, A Study in the Provincial Decentralisation of Imperial Finance, Westminster: P.S. King & Co. Bagchi, A.K. 1975. Private Investment in India, 1900–1939. Madras: Orient Longman. Banerjee, Sumanta. 1980. In the Wake of Naxalbari, A History of Naxalite Movement in India. Calcutta: Subarnarekha. Basavapunniah, M., P. Ramamurthi and H.S. Surjeet. 1964. The Draft Programme of the Communist Party of India. New Delhi: The National Marxist Association. Bhattacharya, Dwaipayan. 1999. ‘Ominous Outcome for Left in West Bengal’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20 November, pp. 3267–69. Bhattacharya, Harihar and T.J. Nossiter. 1988. ‘Communism in a Micro-State: Tripura and the Nationalities Question’, in T. J. Nossiter (ed.), Marxist State Governments in India, Politics, Economics and Society. London: Pinter Publications. Brass, Paul and Marcus Franda (eds). 1973. Radical Movements in S. Asia. Cambridge: MIT Press. Brown, Judith. 1972. Gandhi’s Rise to Power, Indian Politics, 1915–1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bukharin, N. 1972. Imperialism and World Economy. London: Merlin Press. Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy. 1989. India Decides, Elections 1952– 1989. New Delhi: LM Books. Carr, E.H. 1969–78. Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926–1929, Vols 1–3. London: The Macmillan. Chandra, Bipan. 1966. The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House. ———. 1988. ‘Indian Capitalists and the Nationalist Movement’, in Bipan Chandra et al., India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947. New Delhi: Viking. Chatterjee, Rakhahari. 1984. Working Class and Nationalist Movement in India: The Critical Years. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Chaudhuri, Chitvita. 1993. Rammanohar Lohia and the Indian Socialist Thought, Calcutta: Minerva. Choudhury, Profulla Roy. 1977. West Bengal—A Decade, (1965–1975), Calcutta: Pripatra. Colletti, Lucio. 1972. ‘Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International’, From Rousseau to Lenin. London: NLB. The Communist Parties in India 251 Choudhury, Sukhbir. 1971. Peasants’ and Workers’ Movement in India, 1905–1929. New Delhi: PPH. Claudin, F. 1975. The Communist Movement, From Comintern to Cominfor. Part I. New York: Monthly Review Press. Comintern. 1973. Principles of Party Organization. Calcutta: National Book Agency. CPI. 1974. The Guidelines of the History of Communist Party of India. Central Party Education Department, August. CPI. Documents of the Thirteenth Congress of the CPI. CPI (M). 1982. Documents of the Eleventh Congress of the CPI (M). Damodaran, K. 1974. ‘The Past’, Seminar, Vol. 178, June. Debvarma, Desartha. 1986. Gana Mukti Parishad in Building the Peasant Movement in Tripura. New Delhi: All India Kisan Sabha and Golden Jubilee Publications. Degras, Jane. 1951–53 (ed.). ‘Theses on the International Situation’ in Communist International 1919–1943: Documents (3 Vols), Vol. 2. London: Oxford University Press. Dimitrov, G. 1938. The United Front. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Dobb, Maurice. 1947. Studies in the Development of Capitalism. London: Merlin Press. Dutt, R. Palme. 1940. India Today. London: Left Books. ———. 1964. The Internationale. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Fic, Victor M. 1970. Kerala, Yenan of India, Rise of Communist Power, 1937–1969. Bombay: Nachiketa Publications. Ghosh, A.K. 1939. ‘What True Internationalism Demands’, WF. 22 October. Ghosh, Ajoy. 1955. Some Questions of Party Policy. New Delhi: PPH. Harding, N. 1977. Lenin’s Political Thought. Vol. I. London: Macmillan. ———. 1981. Lenin’s Political Thought. Vol. II. London: Macmillan. Hobson, John A. 1902. Imperialism: A Study. London: Allen & Unwin. Joshi, P.C. 1975. Land Reforms in India, Trends and Perspectives. New Delhi: Allied. Karnik, V.B. 1957. Indian Communist Party Documents (1930–56). Bombay: Democratic Research Service. Kaye, Cecil. 1971. Communism in India. Calcutta: Editions Indian. Krishnan, N.K. 1990. ‘The Communist Party of India’, in V. Grover (ed.), Party System and Political Parties in India. Delhi: Deep and Deep. Lenin, V.I. 1967. Development of Capitalism in Russia, Moscow: Progress Publishers. ———. 1975. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Moscow: Progress Publishers. ———. 1976. The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Moscow: Progress Publishers. ———. 1960–80. Collected Works, Moscow: FLPH. Vol. 31. Lowy, Michael. 1978. ‘Marxism and the National Question’, in Robin Blackburn (ed.) Revolution and Class Struggle. London: New Left Books. Mallick, Ross. 1994. Indian Communism, Opposition, Collaboration and Institutionalization. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Markovits, Claude. 1985. Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931–1939: The Indigenous Capitalist Class and the Rise of the Congress Party. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Namboodiripad, E.M.S. 1952. The Agrarian Question in India, New Delhi: PPH. ———. 1963. Revisionism and Dogmatism within the CPI. New Delhi: CPI. ———. 1966. The Programme Explained. Calcutta: CPI (M). ———. 1970. ‘Independent Political Force’, Seminar, No. 127, March. 252 Valerian Rodrigues Nigam, Aditya. ‘Logic of Failed Revolution, Federalization of CPI (M)’, Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. XXXV, No. 5: 263–65. Nossiter, T.J. 1988. Marxist State Governments in India, Politics, Economics and Society. London and New York: Pinter Publications. Overstreet, Gene D. and Marshall Windmiller. 1960. Communism in India. Berkeley: University of California Press. Parel, Antony (ed.). 1997. Hind Swaraj and Other Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Poulantzas, Nicos. 1972. Social Classes and Political Power. London: NLB. Prasad, M. Madhava. 1999. ‘The State in/of Cinema’, in Partha Chatterjee (ed.), Wages of Freedom, Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-State. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Radhakrishnan, N. and N. Vasudevan (eds). 1998. A Nation in Transition, India at 50. New Delhi: Gandhi Media Centre. Ram, Mohan. 1969. Indian Communism, Split within a Split. New Delhi: Vikas. Rao, K. Raghavendra. 1989. ‘Instead of Forward: Situating a Situation’ in K.S. Subramanian, K.S. (ed.). 1989. Parliamentary Communism: Crisis in the Indian Communist Movement. Delhi: Ajanta. Rasul, M.A. 1974. A History of the All India Kisan Sabha. Calcutta: National Book Agency. Roy, M.N. 1964. Memoirs. Bombay: Allied Publishers. ———. 1971. India in Transition, Bombay: Nachiketa Publishers. Sen, Mohit (ed.). 1971. Documents of the History of CPI. Vol. VIII. New Delhi: PPH. Sen, Sukomal. 1977. Working Class of India: History of Emergence and Movement. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi. Shanin, Teodor. 1972. The Awkward Class: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society, Russia, 1910–1925. Oxford: Oxford University press. Singh, Surjit. 2000. ‘The 20th Century: A Journey with Surjeet’, People’s Democracy, 2 January, Vol. XXIV, No. 1. Sundarayya, P. 1972. Telengana People’s Struggle and Its Lessons. Calcutta: National Book Agency. Weiner, Myron and John Osgood Field (eds). 1975. Electoral Politics in the Indian States, Party Systems and Cleavages. New Delhi: Manohar. 10 Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?* SUHAS PALSHIKAR There is probably only one party in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that shares the ideological position of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). It has also been one of the earliest allies of the BJP: the Shiv Sena of Maharashtra. Formed in 1966, as a small Mumbai-based outfit to pursue the interests of the Marathi speaking job seekers of that city, the Shiv Sena has indeed come a long way being one of the more indispensable partners of the BJP and in fact the senior partner in the politics of the State. The story of the Shiv Sena can therefore, be told of in terms of the growth of a parapolitical outfit into a State level political player, the dexterous movement from the metropolis of Mumbai to the rural terrains of Maharashtra, the skilful journey between regional identity and communal identity, the interesting institutionalization of the popularity of the founding leader and the setting up of a complex organization, the packaging of a semi-fascistic appeal in the crafty covers of regionalism, nationalism, and electoral pragmatism. The expansion of the Shiv Sena took place in the 1980s and it shot to prominence at the national level in the 1990s. The last two decades have witnessed the rise of the Shiv Sena as an important political force in the State of Maharashtra. This paper seeks to trace this evolution of the Shiv Sena over a period of time and address two broader questions: what is the political and organizational context in which the Shiv Sena operates? Second, is it * This article was originally published as ‘Shiv Sena: A Tiger With Many Faces?’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIX, Nos 14 and 15, 3–9/10–16 April, 2004. 254 Suhas Palshikar just another regional/State level party or does it represent a trend towards the rising non-democratic tendencies in the Indian polity? The Electoral Arena When the Shiv Sena was formed, the founder leader, Bal Thackeray pledged that the organization was only a social forum and had nothing to do with politics (Purandare 1999: 41). Scholars who have studied the Shiv Sena have rarely tried to explain this fact. It has only been mentioned how the Sena departed from this avowed non-political stand within one year of its formation and started participating in city elections of Thane and Mumbai from 1967 onwards. It is necessary to note that in the first ever rally of the Shiv Sena in Mumbai, prominent Congress leader Ramrao Adik was present and the Shiv Sena leadership could not have taken a ‘political stand’ while courting friendship with one section of the Congress. (In this connection, the appeal of an anti-political stance among sections of urban middle classes also needs to be taken into consideration. Also, it is useful to remember that an anti-political stance is one of the characteristics of fascistic politics.) Between 1967 and 1972 the Shiv Sena emerged as a prominent party in both Thane and Mumbai. Its popularity in these cities derived from two factors: an unconventional, near-violent espousal of the ‘sons-of-soil’ policy and an informal network of social service activity based on the principle of neighbourhood circles of youth. The Shiv Sena also earned publicity for its involvement in many riots against the south Indian establishments and nonMaharashtrian officials. Besides, the Shiv Sena was actively engaged in anticommunist propaganda and violence. The Shiv Sena effectively destroyed the trade union movement of Mumbai, which was under the control of the left and the socialists. The anti-communism of the Shiv Sena reached a flashpoint when a CPI MLA was murdered in 1970, allegedly by youth belonging to the Shiv Sena (19 Sena workers were arrested and tried and 16 sentenced). Ironically, the Shiv Sena’s first entry into the State legislature was from the seat vacated by the murder of Krishna Desai, the CPI MLA, when the Sena candidate defeated the widow of the murdered MLA (October, 1970). The 1970s saw the Shiv Sena involving itself in electoral politics on a more regular basis. In 1971, it allied with the Congress (O) and fielded three candidates for Lok Sabha from Mumbai and Konkan, losing in all the three constituencies. In 1972, the Shiv Sena fielded 26 candidates for the Assembly election and could win only one seat from Mumbai city. The Shiv Sena had declared its support to the emergency proclaimed by Indira Gandhi’s Shiv Sena 255 government and thus, it was logical for it to support the Congress in the elections that followed, although it did not field its own candidates in the Lok Sabha election of 1977. In 1978, when attempts to enter into alliance with the Janata Party failed, the Shiv Sena allied with the Congress (I) and fielded 33 candidates for the assembly election, losing in all constituencies. Again, in 1980, the party did not contest from any seats but supported the Congress (I). In 1984, the Shiv Sena allied with the BJP for the Lok Sabha polls and contested two seats from Mumbai losing both in the process. This put brakes on its alliance with the BJP. At the time of the Assembly elections of 1985, the Shiv Sena was not accommodated in the front led by Sharad Pawar [Progressive Democratic Front (PDF), consisting of Pawar’s Congress (S), Janata Party, PWP, BJP and the left]. The Shiv Sena contested 33 seats on its own and managed to win only one seat from Mumbai city. On the eve of the 1989 Lok Sabha polls, the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance took shape again. In the meantime, the BJP’s national level ambitions had grown and the Shiv Sena, too, had come out of Mumbai city and become popular in many parts of Maharashtra. Sharad Pawar had returned to the Congress Party deserting the PDF experiment. These developments produced a more congenial atmosphere for the Sena-BJP alliance to shape as a more serious political force in state politics. Since then, the two parties have remained steadfastly in alliance, contesting all Lok Sabha and Assembly elections together. In fact, they have also contested most of the local elections as alliance partners. The formula adopted by these parties for seat sharing is realistic and reflects the scope of political ambitions of both: for the Lok Sabha, the BJP gets a larger number of seats, and for the Assembly, the Shiv Sena contests more seats than the BJP. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 give the details of the Sena’s performance in the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections respectively. The Sena’s alliance with the BJP took place at a time when the Shiv Sena had already started spreading to the areas outside of Mumbai and this is reflected in the regional composition of its MPs: two out of the four seats it won in 1989 were from the Marathwada region and in 1991, three were from that region. Thus, the Shiv Sena had struck roots in a new region. There is a consistency in the Sena’s performance in the Marathwada region over the entire decade of 1989–99. In the 1999 elections, the Shiv Sena has gained in the North Maharashtra region as well. Thus, the most distinguishing feature of the Shiv Sena’s electoral performance in the 1990s has been its expansion outside of Mumbai while retaining its hold over the regions of Mumbai and adjoining Konkan. So far, the Shiv Sena has not succeeded in gaining a stronghold in the sugar belt i.e., in the western and southern regions of the state (See Tables 10.3 and 10.4). Another limitation to this electoral expansion has been the inability of the party to repeat a similar kind of 256 Suhas Palshikar success at the level of local elections for the Municipal Councils and Zilla Parishads. In the 1992 elections of the Zilla Parishads, the Sena managed to win a mere 56 seats in the entire state out of a total of over 1,500 members, and in 1997, when it was in power at the state level, it could win 251 seats out of around 1,800 seats (Kulkarni 1997). In the local elections held in 2001–02, the Shiv Sena won 270 seats in the ten municipal corporations out of a total of 1,164 seats (a little over 25 per cent) and won 14 per cent seats in the 192 municipal councils winning presidentship in 28 councils. In the Zilla Parishads, Sena candidates won 19 per cent seats of the 1641 seats all over the state (Palshikar and Deshpande 2003: 97–122). Table 10.1 Shiv Sena in Lok Sabha Elections Year Seats Contested Seats Won 1971 1985 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 3 2 6 17 20 22 22 – – 4 4 15 6 15 Votes (%) NA NA 10.2** 9.5 16.8 19.7 16.9 Table 10.2 Shiv Sena Performance in Assembly Elections Year 1972 1978 1985 1990 1995 1999 Seats Contested 26 35 33 183 169 161 Seats Won Votes (%) 1 – 1 52 73 69 1.8 1.8 2.0 15.9 16.4 17.3 Notes: 1. Did not contest the elections in 1977–78 and 1980. 2. Till 1990, Reports of the EC mention Sena candidates as Independents. ** Eckert (2003: 303). Source: Palshikar, Suhas 2003. Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, Special Issue, January–June; Statistical Appendix and data collected by the author from newspaper reports. At the Assembly level, the Shiv Sena’s success has been more evident. It emerged as the largest opposition to Congress in 1990 and finally wrested power from the Congress Party in 1995, installing its own leader as the Chief Minister. Its alliance with the BJP ensured that when the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) came to power at the centre, the Shiv Sena shared power at the centre as well. Shiv Sena 257 Table 10.3 Region-wise Performance in the Lok Sabha Elections in the 1990s Region Mumbai Konkan N. Maharashtra Vidarbha Marathwada W. Maharashtra 1991 1996 1998 1999 1 – – – 3 – 3 3 1 3 4 1 2 3 – – – 1 2 3 1 4 4 1 Table 10.4 Region-wise Distribution of Sena MLAs: 1990–99 Region Mumbai Konkan N. Maharashtra Vidarbha Marathwada W. Maharashtra Total 1990 1995 1999 Total Seats 15 11 2 9 11 4 52 18 15 5 11 15 9 73 11 15 10 8 16 9 69 34 31 36 66 46 75 288 Source: Palshikar and Deshpande (2003: 97–122). Organizational Dynamics Entry into the electoral arena and bargaining with a national party like the BJP had certain organizational implications. So also did the decision to expand beyond Mumbai. Since its formation in 1966, the Shiv Sena had only an informal organizational structure. Under its founder and undisputed leader, Bal Thackeray, the Shiv Sena evolved a ward-wise structure in Mumbai and later in Thane, for purposes of better coordination. Within the first five years of its formation, the Shiv Sena functioned through around a 100 ‘branches’ (Joshi 1970: 970–71; Morkhandikar 1967: 1903). By the end of 1988, it had about 40,000 branches spread all over Maharashtra.1 But even before the Shiv Sena set out on its state level expansion, it had already put in place a large number of front organizations that were functioning in different fields and creating a base for the Sena in the urban centres of Mumbai and Thane. A quick look at the list of these front organizations is enough to convince us that the Shiv Sena was seriously trying to occupy the socio-political space in the cities of Mumbai and Thane while most of the press was focusing exclusively on its unconventional and violent tactics. In the field of trade unions, the Shiv Sena operates through the Bharatiya Kamgar Sena, the Shramik 258 Suhas Palshikar Sena, the Cotton Workers’ Sena, the Shramjivi Kamgar Sena, the Municipal Workers’ Union, the Co-operative bank Employees’ Union, the S.T. Workers’ Union, the BEST Employees’ Union, the Cine Workers’ Union, and so on. Much of the Shiv Sena’s base in Mumbai and Thane can be explained in terms of the work of these organizations, because they cater to the vast sections of workers in various sectors of the economy. Besides, the Shiv Sena also floated a consumer protection front (Shiv Sena Grahak Samrakshan Kash), a women’s front (Shiv Sena Mahila Aghadi) and a students’ union (Vidyarthi Sena). As an organization that began with the issue of the rights of the Marathi-speaking job seekers, the Shiv Sena has also been running the Sthaniya Lokadhikar Samiti, an organization that protects the rights of the ‘locals’ in employment. This means that the Shiv Sena maintains a record of job-seeking Marathi speaking youth and manages to get them jobs either through negotiations or intimidation. In any case, this activity endears the Sena no end to the job-seeking youth. As noted earlier, the Shiv Sena chose to support the emergency and also supported Indira Gandhi in the elections in 1977–78. In the anti-emergency atmosphere, this move backfired and the Shiv Sena was considerably isolated both from the anti-Congress parties in the state and the public in general. The Shiv Sena survived mostly through its astute control over the middle class sections of Mumbai and friendly relations with sections of the State Congress, especially, Antulay, who became the Congress Chief Minister in 1980. In the 1980s, the Shiv Sena came out of this hibernation by adopting a set of strategies: it severed its links with the Congress and adopted a strident anti-Congress stand which was its characteristic in the earlier period. Second, it sought to ally with the opposition forces in the state, particularly Sharad Pawar, who was then the main opposition leader in the state. Third, the Shiv Sena took up a more aggressive position on Hindu-Muslim issues as compared to the BJP and the RSS. Finally, for the first time since its formation, the Shiv Sena made a serious attempt to expand outside the Mumbai-Thane belt. It already had some base in the adjoining Konkan region. Now, the party set out to woo the voters of the Marathwada and Vidarbha regions as well. It may be said that the latter two were strategies adopted with a calculated move to win a new social base, while the first two strategies were incidental. Thackeray and the Shiv Sena were never exactly pro-Congress although they always benefited from internal fighting within the state Congress. Now the Sena set out to project itself as the main antiCongress force in the state. Attempts to expand at the state level involved certain organizational changes. The Sena is famous for its annual rally in Mumbai held on Dussera day. Often, major positions are announced at this rally. The Shiv Sena has in the past not had any regular meeting of the party cadres except this rally. Shiv Sena 259 During the 1980s, the Shiv Sena started institutionalizing its functioning in many respects. This effort included the holding of annual ‘adhiveshan’ or session of the leaders and cadres of the party from all over the state. The first such session was held in 1984 in Mumbai. It was decided at this session that the Shiv Sena would now devote itself to the issues of the entire state of Maharashtra. This was reiterated at the second session in 1985 held in Mahad town of Konkan region where the turn to Hindutva was confirmed (Akolkar 1998: 123). The real impetus to the expansion of the Shiv Sena came from its careful efforts to highlight the communal cleavage as the most salient one. Since the late 1970s, Maharashtra has been witnessing the rise of Hindu communal organizations, which hold some appeal to youth belonging to the nonBrahman castes (Vora and Palshikar 1990: 213–43). The Shiv Sena has exploited this situation to the maximum. In 1984, Thackeray took the initiative in this direction and mooted the idea of a Hindu Mahasangh to protect the Hindu interests. Although the BJP ignored this initiative just as many other Hindu organizations also did the same, this move helped in galvanizing the Sena workers giving them a sense of purpose and direction. It also gave the Shiv Sena an ideological space to enter the rest of Maharashtra, where the issue of sons-of-soil would not have clicked with the masses. Once the initiative was announced, the Shiv Sena went about it in a vigorous and systematic manner. It engaged with the Muslim community in different places, at Mahad and Kalyan to begin with. It also took up the issue of the inclusion of Dr Ambedkar’s critical writings about Hindu religion (Riddles of Hinduism)2 and mobilized the caste Hindus. When the Shah Bano issue erupted, the Shiv Sena jumped into the fray by attacking the central government for ‘Muslim appeasement’ (Purandare 1999: 229–47). The Ramjanmabhoomi agitation of the RSS-VHP was already creating an atmosphere favourable to Hindu mobilization and the Shiv Sena could easily claim that it was the protector of the Hindu interests. Another factor that went in favour of the Shiv Sena was the decision of Sharad Pawar to merge his Congress (S) with the Congress (I) in 1986. This created a vacuum as far as the Marathwada region was concerned and facilitated the Sena’s entry in that region while giving at the same time an opportunity to the restless youth of the region to latch on to the militant and anti-Congress Party. In a sense therefore, the Shiv Sena was only occupying the oppositional space vacated by Sharad Pawar but in doing so, it was transforming that space into the base for a militant, anti-Muslim communalism. This communalism was later to become the centrepiece of the Shiv Sena’s distinctiveness as a political party, which even the BJP has found difficult to match. The Shiv Sena, which had literally grown out of the Marathi weekly devoted to cartoons, the ‘Marmik’ (Thackeray had started this weekly in 1960), 260 Suhas Palshikar now spreads its message not only to its followers, but the lay public as well through its mouthpiece, a Marathi daily, ‘Saamana’ started in 1989. It is no more a party of the urban-based lower middle classes alone, but attracts a strong and devoted following from all regions of the state. It also claims to have branches in many other states, although the structure is pretty loose and control of the leadership shaky over these branches. One may perhaps ignore the Shiv Sena’s claim of having spread all over the country (In 1995, after it came to power in the State, the Shiv Sena organized its ‘all-India’ session in Mumbai; it has also appointed its state coordinators;3 the Delhi unit of Shiv Sena came to the limelight when it dug up the cricket pitch in Delhi to sabotage the India-Pakistan match, and so on. The main distinction, though, is that for the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, ‘Shiv’ symbolizes Shivaji, whereas for its northern followers, ‘Shiv’ represents the deity, Lord Shiva. It is doubtful, if the Shiv Sena can really expand outside Maharashtra, though Hindutva is the main link between the sensibilities of the Sainiks of Maharashtra and their north Indian counterparts). One thing however, is clear though. It is difficult to ignore the outcome of its campaign started in the 1980s, to open a Sena shakha (branch) in every village of Maharashtra transforming it into a statewide political force and facilitating its entry onto the electoral scene of the state from 1989 onwards. The expansion brought about by and during its Hindu ‘avatar’ (Sardesai 1995: 127–46) and the electoral successes of the 1990s changed the organizational dynamics of the Shiv Sena. Apart from the leaders who are responsible for the functioning of various front organizations, a new category of leaders has now been introduced. These are the ‘Sampark Pramukhs’, chief contact persons, for each district. This ensures that no single leader would be able to dominate the Shiv Sena branch at the district level. The Sampark Pramukhs are directly responsible to the Senapramukh, Balasaheb Thackeray. (Earlier, he used to be described as the Senapati, literally meaning the Commander of the Army, but since the 1980s, Sena literature refers to him as the Sena Pramukh, i.e., Chief of the Shiv Sena.) With the Sena Pramukh and the Shiv Sena becoming a partner in the ruling coalition between 1995–99, a little more collegial structure of leadership has arisen but Thackeray never allowed any doubts to be raised as to his pre-eminent position in the party. Though the Shiv Sena continues to be led by the founder as the undisputed leader, the Shiv Sena organization has now become somewhat bureaucratic. It has also witnessed dissidence, tensions and stiff competition for control over the organizational apparatus. In spite of Thackeray’s tremendous appeal and authoritarian style of functioning, there have been instances of minor dissensions when individual leaders left the party, but these had little effect on the party. The Shiv Sena has never taken kindly to detractors, and in one instance, a corporator who had allegedly voted against the party’s Shiv Sena 261 decision was soon killed (Shridhar Khopkar in 1989). As the organization grew in the late 1980s and the 1990s, local level leaders tried to retain their control at the local level. This often led to local rivalries and in some cases, confrontations with the top leadership. Morershwar Sawe from Aurangabad, Ganesh Naik from Raigad, are some examples of leaders who left the party after such differences. In the 1990 Assembly, the Shiv Sena bagged the post of leader of the opposition and this post was given to a senior leader, Manohar Joshi. Chhagan Bhujbal, who was instrumental in the expansion of the party in the Marathwada and Vidarbha regions of the State, felt sidelined by this and left the party to join the Congress along with a few MLAs (November, 1991). In the Shiv Sena’s history of the last 40 years, this has been the only instance of a major organizational crisis. In the aftermath of this crisis, Sena’s relations with the BJP also became sore over the issue of the post of the leader of the opposition. The year 1992 also witnessed another challenge to Thackeray. Top leaders of the Sena were uneasy over the increasing power of the two young members of the Thackeray family, Raj, nephew of Bal Thackeray and Uddhav, his son. Perhaps in complicity with the Marathi press, a whispering campaign against ‘dynastic rule’ ensued. Thackeray reacted swiftly by announcing that not only his family members but he too would henceforth keep away from the Shiv Sena. This had the dramatic effect of enraging the ordinary Sena activists who gathered at the residence of Thackeray to press for the withdrawal of his ‘resignation’. Senior leaders were heckled, attacked and manhandled, because it was evident to the ordinary workers that the senior leaders had ganged up against the young Thackerays and by implication, against the founder leader as well. The short drama ended with Thackeray agreeing to continue to work for the Shiv Sena ‘as long as the Sainiks had faith in him’. The episode reminded the senior leaders who was the boss and also reconfirmed the ‘emotional’ bond between Thackeray and the followers. His hold over his followers is a good illustration of the Weberian model of the plebiscitary leader. It also reconfirmed the power of histrionics that Thackeray has repeatedly exercised (Purandare 1999: 228–34). More than anything else, this episode helped to establish the leadership of the two young members of the Thackeray family. Soon, they fell out and a muted warfare between the two leaders ensued over the leadership of the Shiv Sena. Both had been working in the Sena since 1989-90, but Raj was more popular among activists and also seen as more flamboyant and aggressive in his public speeches. Since 1999, however, the star of the son began to rise dramatically. This was partly due, perhaps, to the fact that senior leaders felt more comfortable with Uddhav and also found him more relevant for the longterm expansion of the party. In the distribution of tickets in the 1999 elections, and later on in organizational matters, the Shiv Sena continued to depend 262 Suhas Palshikar more and more on Uddhav. In the elections to local bodies (2001–02), Raj was kept away and Uddhav was given a free hand. In the case of Mumbai Corporation, many of the followers of Raj tried to rebel or sabotage,4 but the Shiv Sena won comfortably. This controversy has not died down entirely, but Uddhav has been nominated as the ‘working president’ of the Shiv Sena, a position that hitherto did not exist in the organization. Given the nature of loyalty evolved by the Sena leadership among its followers, it is unlikely however, that the rift between the two Thackerays would have any serious repercussions for the party in the near future. Bal Thackeray has shown that he can transfer his popularity from one region to another (Mumbai to rural Maharashtra), and also from himself to another leader (earlier his nephew, and now, his son). Therefore, Uddhav Thackeray can inherit a substantial part of the senior leader’s popularity without much difficulty. Besides, in collaboration with many senior leaders, Uddhav has also been working hard to set the Sena on a firm organizational footing, downplaying its image as only a militant organization. This institutionalization of the Shiv Sena has far reaching implications, but we shall turn to them only in the last section. Nature of the Shiv Sena’s Appeal The Shiv Sena came into being when the Congress Party and the ‘Congress system’ were firmly in place. The Shiv Sena managed to carve out a niche for itself in the political set up in which most non-Congress parties were finding it difficult to survive. Later, when the decline of Congress set in, the terms of political competition changed and along with this change, the actors in politics also changed. New actors occupied the political space. In this changed context, instead of fading into oblivion, the Shiv Sena reinvented itself and grabbed the centre stage of state politics. This feat was possible mainly because of the continued appeal of the Shiv Sena. As mentioned earlier, the Shiv Sena started as a Mumbai based organization upholding the rights of the local Marathi speaking people to obtain jobs in the commercial, industrial and public sector concerns on a priority basis. This demand was accompanied by a cultural-political package: the Shiv Sena sought to inherit the legacy of the emotional appeal mobilized by the movement for the formation of the Marathi speaking state of Maharashtra. It claimed that Mumbai ‘belonged’ to Marathi people and therefore, the city must bear the imprint of Marathi culture and society. As the name of the Sena suggests, it is the ‘army of Shivaji’, thus, invoking the fond memories held by most Marathi speaking people of the 17th century Maratha king, Shivaji. In Shivaji’s name, the Shiv Sena claimed to represent the interests, not merely of the residents of Mumbai, but all the Marathi people and not merely their employment interests, but Shiv Sena 263 cultural (or to use a more contemporary phrase, identitarian) interests and anxieties. Thus, the Shiv Sena’s ‘nativism’ (Gupta 1982) or its insistence on ‘preferential policies on ethnic basis’ (Katzenstein 1979), contained a strong element of regionalism, even though that was not and could not be employed by the Sena throughout the state. ‘Nativism’ was the expression of this regionalism mainly in the city of Mumbai. The Shiv Sena’s regionalism was a queer mix of many appeals. Apart from focusing on the plight of the jobless Marathi youth of Mumbai and generally invoking the spirit of the Marathi identity, the Shiv Sena’s regionalism was also characterized by a strong element of nationalism. The Sena’s regionalism never juxtaposed the region versus the nation. The jingoism of the Shiv Sena always accommodated the region within the confines of the nation. This dovetailing of the two made the Sena immensely popular and it also allowed the Sena to appropriate the Shivaji symbol. In Maharashtra, Shivaji is seen as both a great national hero and the symbol of native pride of the Marathi society. The Shiv Sena projected itself precisely on this combined platform of national cause and regional pride. Much of its anti-communist activity and campaign went down well mainly because of this ‘nationalist’ stand and the projection of the communists as ‘anti-nationalists’ in the light of the stand taken over the issue of the Sino-Indian dispute. The communists were also shown in poor light for their stout espousal of the Soviet line. Moreover, nationalism also meant rapid progress and discipline as far as the Sena was concerned and therefore, the communist propaganda against the capitalists and the frequent strikes were seen and shown as anti-national. The Shiv Sena’s nationalism had one more element right from the beginning. The nation consisted of the Hindus. Therefore, it was Hindu nationalism that the Sena was upholding right from the beginning and it never made a secret of its impatience with minorities and minority rights. Of course, it is true that the Shiv Sena did not emphasize its Hindu nationalism in the early years, but equally, it did not hide it either. It is possible to argue that the Sena’s appeal hinged on the adroit combination of nativism, regional identity and a communal construction of nationalism. Since 1984, the Shiv Sena projected itself as a Hindu nationalist force. This was for two reasons. In the first place, the decision to expand the activity of the party beyond Mumbai necessitated the shift of emphasis from the regional to the national in order for the Sena’s appeal to be relevant in the rural environs of Maharashtra. Second, the Sena could not have been blind to the potential of the militant Hindutva appeal in non-urban areas of the state. Since the late 1970s, anti-minority and anti-Dalit mobilizations were gaining ground in the state. While the BJP was a nonforce in the state, the Ayodhya issue was showing the potential as a weapon for communal mobilization.5 Thus, the mid-1980s saw the Sena relying more on the Hindutva appeal. Muslims were targeted and Hindu religious 264 Suhas Palshikar sentiments were mobilized by indulging in communal propaganda and exploiting the sensibilities of the Hindus in the course of many small but a few vicious communal conflagrations. Critics of the Shiv Sena as also inquiry commissions have pointed to the complicity of the Shiv Sena in many of these instances of communal violence. At least, it is easy to see a pattern: a communal flare up would follow the Sena’s attempts to start the Shiv Jayanti celebrations in small towns and villages (Palshikar 2000) and on the heels of such communal incidents, the Shiv Sena would become popular in the concerned localities. The Shiv Sena’s nationalism thus took a pronounced militant Hindu shape and Shivaji was once again brought into the discourse, this time not as a regional-national hero but as a ‘Hindu’ king who put the brakes on ‘Muslim’ expansion. Just as in the regional mobilization, Hindutva was an incipient element; the Hindu communal mobilization of the Sena continues to retain regional identity and nativism as its subterranean elements. Again and again, whenever the Hindutva appeal was thought to be inadequate, Marathi pride was revived. For instance, in elections to the Mumbai corporation in 2002, the Shiv Sena relied heavily on the question of Marathi pride and managed a comfortable victory. Since then, the issue of ‘outsiders’ has been kept alive at least in the case of large cities like Mumbai, Thane, Pune and Nasik. Thus, the success of the Sena’s ideological appeal lies in its skill to combine the regional with the national. One more factor needs to be considered for a better appreciation of the nature of the Shiv Sena’s appeal: the style of the Shiv Sena’s ideological mobilizations. Two characteristics quickly attract the attention of the observer in this connection. First, there is a surprising ‘plausibility’ and ‘simplicity’ in the arguments put forth by the Shiv Sena. The amazing ability of its ideological positions to ‘uncomplicate’ issues and present them to the public as amenable to quick solutions is an important ingredient of it’s style. This makes the ideological position ‘plausible’, although, for an observer the same may appear to be wanting in logic and appreciation of complexity. The second is the strong element of action-orientation. The Shiv Sena’s ideological positions are not interested in explanations, but in action. The ordinary Sena worker is exhorted to take action, be it social service, neighbourhood activity or strong-arm tactics and violence. Thus, if injustice to the Marathi people is detected, ‘direct action’ in the form of looting and intimidating the south Indian hoteliers would be one form of ‘action’, while starting street-side eateries, the famous ‘vada-paav’ stalls, would be another form of action. Similarly, if Muslims are identified as the ‘enemy’, then anti-Muslim violence can be one form of action, while celebrating Hindu festivals with gusto would be another form of action representing assertion. This action-orientation in conjunction with the simplified plausibility of the ideological position gives the Shiv Sena’s appeal an ‘easy-to-serve-easy-to- Shiv Sena 265 consume’ character. Examples of Sena actions, like threatening a boycott of the Sikhs in protest against the killings of Hindus in Punjab by the terrorists,6 digging the cricket pitch in order to sabotage the India-Pakistan cricket match,7 the organization of ‘Maha-aratis’ in January 1993, the campaign to detect and deport the ‘Bangla Deshis’ hiding in Mumbai,8 disturbing the Gazal Mehfil of Gulam Ali,9 prove the point that more than the ideological appeal, or at least as much as it, the possibility of being a part of the action and thereby relate meaningfully to the ideological position constitutes a very significant aspect of the Sena’s appeal. These actions, sometimes planned, sometimes spontaneous, channelize the emotional energies unleashed by the Sena’s ideological mobilization. This action-orientation is often born out of the urge to function as monitors of society’s morality and also to determine what constitutes that morality. The Shiv Sena has always facilitated realization of this urge. Thus, for example, it allows its cadres to be opposed to the India-Pakistan cricket match in India, but does not mind India playing Pakistan in a third country; or organizes a concert by Michael Jackson, but allows its cadres to declare a ban on the Valentine Day celebrations. The obvious inconsistencies are not relevant here. Of significance is the fact that the Shiv Sena allows sections of its followers to be arbiters of social mores and manners. Many times, the actions taken by local Sena workers have only a thin link with the pronounced ideological positions. This situation produces local networks of bosses who lord over their small territories. But it also gives the local workers a sense of importance as holders of public conscience. Social Space Occupied by the Shiv Sena The foregoing discussion suggests that the ideological appeal of the Shiv Sena has to be understood in terms of its sociological base. Given the nature of its initial stand regarding sons-of-soil, it was quite natural that lower middle class youth should form the bulwark of Sena’s supporters and active followers. This situation continued for some time. In addition, a section of Marathi intellectuals were also attracted to the Shiv Sena. The legacy of Samyukta Maharashtra Movement (a movement for the formation of a Marathi speaking state) was still alive and the supporters of that movement saw in the arguments of the Shiv Sena an extension of that agitation. They saw the Shiv Sena as an organization interested in the espousal of regional pride for which the state formation movement had fought. By extension, the support of this intellectual section also ensured a sympathetic press and sympathetic middle class in general. Even the strong-arm tactics of the Shiv Sena were seen as an inevitable effect of the apathy of the state government to the ‘just’ 266 Suhas Palshikar demands and expectations of the Marathi youth. Soon after its formation, the Shiv Sena was busy destroying the trade union movement of Mumbai. In doing this, the Shiv Sena itself attempted to organize the industrial labour force. This created a considerable following in the Marathi speaking industrial work force of the Mumbai city. In a sense, the support base of the Shiv Sena had extended from the Dadar, Girgaum, Parle and other typical Marathi middle class localities to Lalbaug-Parel areas dominated by the industrial workers of Mumbai. The Shiv Sena soon entered the slums of Mumbai through its neighbourhood activity and efforts to organize the workers from the informal sector. Two additional factors should be noted in the context of this varied support base of the Shiv Sena. One is the populist appeal that the Shiv Sena offered to its followers. This attracted social groups of different nature and evolved an emotional bond between each group and the organization. Thus, the Shiv Sena could comfortably combine the support of the urban white-collar middle class and the underclass from the slums. Second, the Sena’s frequent resort to collective violence as a means of putting pressure on its opponents provided activists from the slums with the opportunity of entering the arena of public action. Those involved in collective violence also got an opportunity to settle private scores and make some private gains. This led to charges of extortion and the Shiv Sena has never been able to convincingly shake off these allegations. In any case, these complex opportunity structures made the Shiv Sena popular among a large variety of social groups from Mumbai and nearby areas of Thane and Kalyan. As the Shiv Sena got entangled in violent clashes with the Dalits of Mumbai in the early 1970s, it gained popularity among the sections of caste Hindus that were opposed to radical Dalit politics. This was another potential constituency for the Sena, which was exploited to the full only in the late 1980s by the party. In the 1980s, as the Shiv Sena started spreading across the rural parts of Maharashtra, its social base became more complex. Here, it presented itself as anti-Muslim and anti-Dalit. But even in this projection, a couple of subtexts existed. The Shiv Sena presented itself as distinct from the Brahmanical RSS brand of Hindutva. As in the case of Mumbai earlier, the Shiv Sena offered a populist version of Hindutva, which was far more fiery and militant. Second, the Shiv Sena’s anti-Dalit stance was also nuanced. Initially, it declared itself as opposed to the ‘Namantar’, i.e., naming of the Marathwada university of Aurangabad after Dr Ambedkar. This endeared it to the vast sections of people from that region since no party was openly opposed to the move to change the name of the university, although there was a popular agitation against the move. The Shiv Sena also made it clear that it was particularly opposed to the Buddhists ostensibly because they were monopolizing all the benefits of reservations, but people could not miss the fact that Shiv Sena 267 this opposition was more for having deserted the Hindu-fold. The Shiv Sena’s stand regarding the Buddhists ensured that it got a considerable following from the non-Buddhist Dalit communities, notably the Charmakar and Matang communities. At the beginning of its entry into rural Maharashtra, the Shiv Sena also spoke against the Marathas for having cornered all positions of power in the state. This led to a misplaced belief that Shiv Sena ‘represented’ the OBCs. As it started gaining ground in rural areas, the Sena suspended its anti-Maratha criticism. In fact, many observers have pointed out that the young Maratha followers of Sharad Pawar who were themselves opposed to entrenched Maratha leadership, joined the Shiv Sena once Pawar went back to the Congress Party (Akolkar 1998: 119; Latpate 1990: 10). As a result, the main following of the Shiv Sena in the Marathwada region was the Marathas. This consisted of two distinct groups: those who were anti-Dalit and opposed to the ‘Namantar’, and new entrants who saw no opportunity in the established Congress set-up and turned to the Shiv Sena. It was in the Vidarbha region where some OBC following could be won over by the Shiv Sena, mostly due to the efforts of Chhagan Bhujbal. Table 10.5 Party Preference among Various Social Sections: 1996 and 1999 (Row percentages) Congress Shiv Sena BJP NCP 1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999 1999 Age Groups Up to 25 years 26–35 years 36–45 years 46–55 years 56 years and above 31.4 34.9 39.8 33.3 36.7 25.0 27.0 39.8 33.3 36.7 21.6 25.6 18.7 25.6 21.8 22.0 18.0 18.3 23.8 16.8 15.5 12.1 15.2 8.5 11.6 17.3 18.0 12.5 14.0 11.7 18.5 17.3 21.0 18.9 31.6 Education Non-literate Up to Middle School Up to college Graduate and above 37.5 36.3 34.3 22.4 29.3 30.9 23.0 19.3 26.8 24.3 25.8 14.3 17.9 18.4 20.9 23.5 11.3 9.0 17.6 24.5 8.3 14.7 32.8 23.5 28.0 20.6 13.8 15.1 Residence Rural Urban 38.6 27.3 26.3 28.9 24.3 15.2 19.8 18.7 12.4 14.2 11.6 21.3 24.3 15.2 Sex Women Men 37.8 32.4 30.4 23.9 22.6 22.5 18.8 20.0 11.2 18.6 10.0 15.8 21.9 20.6 Note: Row percentages do not add up to 100 because other parties are not included in the Table. 268 Suhas Palshikar Table 10.6 Party Preference among Caste/Community Groups: 1996 and 1999 (Row percentages) Caste/Community SC ST OBC (non-Kunbi) Kunbi Maratha Muslim Other Congress Shiv Sena BJP NCP 1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999 1999 27.7 37.2 37.2 26.0 37.8 56.0 38.2 50.0 31.3 21.4 15.2 22.6 45.9 30.7 8.3 3.7 25.5 34.1 36.0 1.8 12.0 7.0 6.0 24.3 30.3 25.1 1.2 14.6 8.3 18.5 15.6 13.8 4.3 1.8 16.1 3.5 11.9 17.9 15.9 11.9 – 30.7 20.9 13.4 15.7 26.5 28.4 30.6 13.1 Note: Row percentages do not add up to 100 because other parties are not included in the Table. Table 10.7 Caste Composition of Voters of Main Parties: 1996 and 1999 (Column percentages) Caste/Community Maratha Kunbi OBC (non-Kunbi) SC ST Other Congress Shiv Sena BJP NCP 1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999 1999 20.5 10.6 28.4 6.6 6.6 27.7 19.6 7.1 21.4 15.4 7.5 28.9 30.4 21.6 30.4 3.0 1.0 13.4 30.5 20.0 34.0 3.0 2.0 10.5 6.3 15.3 32.4 5.4 9.0 31.5 19.0 13.7 32.7 2.0 5.2 27.5 31.5 16.0 20.0 8.2 4.1 20.2 Source: Compiled from Palshikar and Deshpande, 2003 and Palshikar, 1999. Electoral Base Survey data for the 1990s throws a little more light on the composition of the Sena supporters in terms of its voters. It may be said that the overall profile of the voters of the Shiv Sena approximates that of the Congress voter. Tables 10.5 to 10.7 present the details of the structure of Sena’s newly found voter base in the 1990s in comparison to the voter base of the Congress. There are obvious differences in terms of the support among Muslims, SCs and STs. But apart from that, the Shiv Sena’s voter base has more in common with the Congress than with the BJP. If we take into consideration the fact that the Shiv Sena continues to be popular in the urban centres of Mumbai and Thane, much of the difference between the Shiv Sena and the Congress in terms of support among different educational categories can be easily explained. Barring these differences, the Shiv Sena is taking up the social characteristics Shiv Sena 269 of the Congress and thus, providing the voters with a ‘similar but different’ alternative. It is similar in the sense that the pattern of power sharing would not be drastically different under a Shiv Sena dispensation. Like the Congress, the Shiv Sena would also provide an umbrella for all—almost all— social sections. The movement of the Shiv Sena from a party only of the urban residents to a party enjoying support in rural areas as well has meant that now many sections can easily relate themselves to the Shiv Sena. When the expansion of the Shiv Sena began, it appealed to both the Marathas and the OBCs. The Shiv Sena’s strong anti-Dalit posture endeared it to these sections. More particularly, the Shiv Sena’s argument that all power in the state had always gone to the Marathas opened up possibilities for the OBCs. At the same time, its opposition to Mandal reservations made it popular among the Marathas. The contradictions in these positions notwithstanding, they gave a clear message about the accommodative approach of the Shiv Sena. These moves indicated that the Shiv Sena would adopt the same accommodative approach towards most major social groups like the Congress did successfully in the past. One recent instance of this is the attempt of the Shiv Sena to make friends with the Dalit forces in the state. In 2003, Uddhav Thackeray took the initiative and called for an alliance between Shiv shakti (forces represented by Shiv Sena, but also a euphemism for caste Hindu forces) and Bhim shakti (Dalit forces having allegiance to Dr Ambedkar, the various factions of the Republican Party, RPI). This move was calculated to attract the young activists of the RPI. More specifically, this call also signalled the readiness of the Shiv Sena to accommodate the Buddhists. In the same year, Uddhav Thackeray launched an initiative called ‘We, Mumbaikars’, in which the definition of Mumbaikar—one belonging to Mumbai city—was made so flexible as to include non-Marathi people who have settled in Mumbai long ago, the Gujaratis, Sindhis etc. In effect, this strategy was adopted in view of the growing numbers of non-Maharashtrian population in Mumbai. Needless to say, moves like these make it possible for the Shiv Sena to strike new electoral combinations, but they also make it look more like the Congress. The difference, of course, lies in the espousal of open communalism on the one hand and constant encouragement to direct action on the other. This ‘similar but different’ alternative has attracted the youth from Maratha and OBC caste groups of the rural areas to the Sena. As is clear from Table 10.7, the Shiv Sena has now become a balanced combination of the MarathaKunbi and OBC communities in the state. The data regarding the electoral base also shows that there is considerable stability to the Shiv Sena’s support base. In a period when electoral support of many parties has been shaky, the Shiv Sena has managed to retain its base between 1995–96 and 1999. The formation of the NCP representing the Marathas did make some difference to the Sena’s base among the Marathas, but otherwise, the Sena has received 270 Suhas Palshikar consistent support from various social sections. One major limitation of this support base of the Shiv Sena is that it is regionally fragmented. Its Maratha votes come mostly from the Marathwada region, while its OBC votes come from the city of Mumbai and the Vidarbha region. Konkan and Vidarbha provide its Kunbi votes. The link between region and community support has implications for the future of the Shiv Sena not only in the electoral arena but also in the field of mobilizational and movement based politics as well. The Shiv Sena’s skill in transcending these regional barriers will decide its statewide role in the future. Multiple Trajectories of the Shiv Sena A careful look at the career, appeal and social base of the Shiv Sena makes it clear that the Sena’s tiger (Sena’s mascot) has many faces and multiple voices. The Shiv Sena’s journey from a small Mumbai-based outfit to a dreaded organization with a penchant for ‘direct action’ (Eckert 2003) to a party spread all over the state indicates that there are many trajectories in the life of the 40-year-old organization. We shall attempt to situate the Shiv Sena in terms of four trajectories: first, the ‘Congress connection’, second, the structure of electoral competition in the 1990s, third, the institutionalization of the party structure as opposed to youthful spontaneity and the fourth is the anti-democratic dimension of the Shiv Sena. Blessings of the Congress The Shiv Sena emerged in the aftermath of the agitation for the formation of Marathi speaking state of Maharashtra with Mumbai, then Bombay, as its capital. The agitation over Bombay was especially bitter because of the opposition from a section of the Gujarati traders and industrialists. The image of the Maharashtra Congress was considerably tarnished and within the Congress, there was an ongoing rivalry between the Marathi/Maratha leadership and the Mumbai based leadership. Almost every study of the Shiv Sena has recorded this aspect of the growth of the Shiv Sena (Akolkar 1998; Gupta 1982: 162–65; Lele 192; Morkhandikar 1967: 1903). Both, the Marathi/ Maratha faction and the Mumbai faction used the Shiv Sena for their purposes and in turn, helped the Shiv Sena in gaining ground in the city of Mumbai. Thus, if the Shiv Sena was at one time called ‘Vasantsena’ (meaning the army of Vasantrao Naik, who was the State Chief Minister between 1963 and 1974) (Akolkar 1998: 5), implying that it was an instrument of the Marathi faction, the Shiv Sena also supported the leader of the Mumbai Congress, Murli Deora, in the mayoral election in 1977. Later, in the 1975–77 period, Shiv Sena 271 the Shiv Sena supported the leadership of Indira Gandhi and the authoritarian measures adopted by her. The Shiv Sena was also very friendly with Antulay, who became the Congress (I) CM in 1980 and in fact actively participated in his election campaign (Purandare 1999: 212–13). In 1985, the then CM, Vasantdada Patil, in his ongoing battle with the central leadership, made a statement in the state legislature that the ‘conspiracy’ to take away Mumbai from Maharashtra by making it a union territory would not be tolerated. This gave the Shiv Sena a perfect election issue for the city municipal election. The Shiv Sena could come out of its political isolation of the 1978–85 period by winning the Mumbai corporation election that year and from that point on, started expanding in the rest of the state since 1986 (Palshikar 1999). In 1995, the Sena-BJP alliance was short of a majority in the state assembly, but managed to form a government because MLAs who were elected as Congress rebels supported the alliance and joined the ministry. Many Congress leaders have since then actually joined the Shiv Sena or received its support (prominent among them have been Shalinitai Patil, who later joined NCP, Vilasrao Deshmukh, Congress CM from 1999 to 2002, who got support from the Shiv Sena for his election to the legislative council in 1996, the Vikhe-Patil father and son, Babasaheb Bhosale, Congress CM in 1982). It may be said that at each stage of the Shiv Sena’s growth, the Congress connection has been a contributory factor. As was already noted, when the Shiv Sena decided to ‘gallop in the entire state of Maharashtra’ (1986), it benefited from the decision of Sharad Pawar to merge his Congress (S) with Congress (I). In the 2002 elections to the Mumbai corporation elections, the Congress Party turned down the proposal of the NCP to have a coalition for defeating the Sena-BJP alliance. The division of Congress-NCP votes cost these parties 41 seats and majority in the corporation (Bhosale 2004: 251). This long story of the Shiv Sena’s links with the Congress is relevant for two reasons. One is the simple matter of organizational expansion and electoral arithmetic. But more than that, the Congress connection shows that there was some acceptability to the Shiv Sena’s regionalist stand among Congress leaders (Akolkar 1998: 74). By allowing the regionalist rhetoric, the Congress allowed that rhetoric to gain legitimacy. The Congress connection also shows the inability of the Congress leadership in the state to appreciate the dangers in the Shiv Sena type of regionalism and the Shiv Sena style of politics. Or, if they did, then they did not mind it. Electoral Competition The Shiv Sena’s alliance with the Congress did not matter much so long as the Congress was dominant in the electoral arena. The division in the Maratha 272 Suhas Palshikar leadership and the anti-Congress atmosphere in the country in 1977–78 created a challenge before the Congress Party in the state (Vora and Palshikar 1996). The split in the Congress at the all-India level in 1978 resulted in a hung assembly in 1978 and the two Congress factions came together to form a coalition government. Since then, the structure of political competition in the state underwent a change. Politics in the state now experienced a strong opposition in the form of the Janata Party and later in the form of the Congress (S). This internal factionalism of the Congress Party spilled outside of the party and the Congress system developed cracks. The ability of the state Congress to arbitrate between the claims made by the different factions and the various social forces declined. A split among the Maratha leaders further added to the competitiveness of electoral politics. The quick decimation of the Janata Party and the inability of the BJP to capture the space in the rural parts of the state ensured a vacuum which was first filled by the agitation of the farmers’ movement (Shetkari Sanghatana) led by Sharad Joshi and later by Sharad Pawar’s Congress (S). The split among the Maratha leadership further meant that there was now space available for political formations not necessarily originating in Maratha politics. All these factors changed the nature of electoral competition in the state and facilitated the entry of the Shiv Sena outside Mumbai. The traditional electoral dynamics changed because politics based almost entirely on the interests of the Maratha leaders—involving issues of sugar cane growers, sugar cooperatives, other rural cooperatives—lost primacy. Caste identity, religious identity, urban anxieties, corruption, etc., became the dominant themes in the political process of the state. The Congress apparatus was not used to these themes and did not know how to handle them. As the dispenser of political opportunities, the Congress was reticent in allowing newcomers to the arrangement of power sharing in the state. In most cases, the families of the established leaders controlled all opportunity structures at the local level, leaving little room for the new entrants to politics. The Shiv Sena benefited from these developments. The oppositional space opened up by the Shetkari Sanghatana was not being translated into electoral politics, a new generation of politically ambitious youth was awaiting opportunities to ‘make it’ in politics and the Congress was unable to address these developments. Most importantly, since it did not have any existing organization in the rural parts of the state, the Shiv Sena could accommodate a large number of new aspirants both as its activists and as candidates in the legislative elections of 1990 and 1995. In 1990, for instance, 150 of the 180 odd candidates of the Shiv Sena were new entrants to politics. Even in 1995, 42 of the Sena’s 73 MLAs were firsttimers and 29 had no previous political experience worth the name, thus making the Shiv Sena a fast-track for rising politically as far as the new entrants to politics were concerned (Palshikar 1999: 16–17). Shiv Sena 273 Institutional Stability The Shiv Sena has almost successfully handled two stages of its organizational transformation. One was the move from ‘regionalist exclusivism’ to ‘communal exclusivism’. This movement was not very difficult for the Sena to make because it had already developed a sensibility of opposition among its followers towards ‘outsiders’ or ‘Others’. The regional explanation of the plight of poor job seekers was mostly incidental to the exclusivist sensibility that the Sena underscored. More than the content of the regionalist-nativist rhetoric it was the strategy of drowning public reason in the din over an ‘enemy’ that was crucial to the Sena’s success. Second, keen followers of the Sena could not have missed the implicit anti-Muslim trend in the Sena’s early rhetoric as well. As Manohar Joshi put it, after all, a south Indian is an Indian, but the Muslim always thinks of Pakistan (Gupta 1982: 150). Therefore, this transition from one exclusivism to another was not very difficult. Another transition that the Sena underwent in the late 1980s was much more complex. It related to the territorial expansion, as a result of which the composition of the Sena followers changed considerably. It now consisted of peasant OBCs (in addition to its service OBC caste following in the city of Mumbai), and thereby for the first time, sections of the Maratha-Kunbi caste group became Sena’s followers. This expanded its social base beyond the white-and-blue-collar following, giving it a rural presence. It was indeed very difficult for the second ranking leaders of the Sena who were entirely from the urban background to relate themselves to the rural following, but they went about it valiantly, and finally succeeded. In the almost two decades of this new expansion of the Shiv Sena, most of its state level leadership has remained with the Mumbai based leadership and those from outside of Mumbai have had to be content with a district level role. However, we have already seen that most of the new entrants to the Shiv Sena in the 1980s were also new entrants to politics itself. Therefore, for them, even the district-level leadership positions were more than enough. Only in cases where leaders of stature defected from the Congress that the question of their role arose. The Sena either packed them off as central ministers (Balasaheb Vikhe from Ahmednagar district) or had to witness them returning to the Congress as Vikhe-Patil did recently (February, 2004). Finally, Thackeray’s popular appeal has been the Sena’s main weapon of overcoming the crisis arising out of its expansion. His leadership and popularity would always silence or marginalize all internal dissidence and work as a link for the entire following. The third transition involved the issue of leadership. This is a matter that the Shiv Sena has been facing for some time and has only uncomfortably and tentatively settled so far. We have already noted that the conflict between 274 Suhas Palshikar Manohar Joshi and Bhujbal took an ugly turn and resulted in the desertion by Bhujbal. However, that does not mean that Joshi was anointed as a future leader of the organization. In fact, he was unceremoniously replaced from chief ministership of the State in early 1994 and Narayan Rane was made the Chief Minister. But the rise of the two members from Thackeray’s own family has complicated matters for the Sena. The organization has not settled this matter successfully. Today, there are virtually two camps in the Shiv Sena, one belonging to Raj Thackeray and another owing allegiance to Uddhav Thackeray. It appears that the senior Thackeray has settled in favour of the son, Uddhav Thackeray. But the fact that Raj has a formidable following can make things difficult for the organization. Organizations like the Shiv Sena, which are based on one authoritarian leader, often run the risk of fading into oblivion once the key leader departs. The Shiv Sena has definitely outgrown this stage. In a very skilful manner the popularity of the leader has been transformed to the newer leaders. Besides, authoritarian control of the organization has also been transformed from the senior leader to the new leader. This institutionalization of the party structure is the most remarkable feature of the Shiv Sena’s organizational trajectory. However, it is precisely this success that can create certain difficulties in the future journey of the party. The Shiv Sena has always lived on its image as a lively, spontaneous, militant organization. Organizational expansion and institutionalization of the structures can halt its militant march and soften the image of the party. While this may make the party more electorally acceptable, can the Shiv Sena sustain a staid, run-of-the-mill image? One scholar has recently argued that the Shiv Sena’s success hinges on its image as a party of ‘direct action’ and that the Shiv Sena has been able to retain that image even after its expansion (Eckert 2003: 26–280). It is true that compared to many other parties, the Shiv Sena allows greater space for its activists to engage in direct action while at the same time trying to gain electorally through its newly found base. However, there is a tension between the two and the Sena is currently experiencing that tension. Since the Sena lost power in the assembly election of 1999, there has been a period of comparative lull in the activities of the Sena involving ‘direct action’. As the Congress-NCP government came to power in 1999, its Home Minister and the Sena’s bête noire, Chhagan Bhujbal tried to outsmart the Shiv Sena on a number of issues. He even attempted to arrest Thackeray, giving a much-required ‘cause’ to the Sena to indulge in direct action. Later, Sainiks from Mumbai attacked the official residence of the Home Minister, galvanizing its cadres. But a lacklustre performance in the local government elections in 2001–02, the ongoing war of inheritance between Raj and Uddhav, confusion over the extent to which the issue of regional identity should be emphasized in contrast to the communal issue, have all produced a halt to the vivacity of the Shiv Sena 275 Sena’s direct action strategy. This is not to say, however, that the Sena has weakened. Far from it. As the major opposition party in the state, the Sena is well-placed to face the elections and is in an upbeat mood about its chances of replacing the Congress-NCP government. Uddhav Thackeray has been labouring untiringly to ensure the electoral victory of the party. But electoral arithmetic implies moderation and routinization of popularity. Eckert believes that the key to the Sena’s success lies in its ability to avoid ‘routinization’, while the activities of the Sena over the last 10 years (1995– 2004) indicate the turn to routinization. This was the worry of some Sainiks in as early as the late 1980s (Heuze 1996: 213–47). The Sena’s pet issue of Marathi identity in the Mumbai municipal election of 2002 has also been characterized as routinization (Masselos 2002: 61–82). Katzenstein et al. (1998: 230–34) have also emphasized the strength of the institutional network of the Shiv Sena and pointed to the organizational contradiction it faces. The dilemma of the Shiv Sena’s organizational trajectory lies here: to win elections on a regular basis the party needs to turn to institutionalization of its popularity. But this robs it of the spontaneity and space for ‘direct action’ representing anti-establishment sentiments. Anti-Democratic Elements This takes us to the final trajectory of the Shiv Sena. What does the Shiv Sena stand for? Is it a narrow, parochial, ‘Marathi’ organization? Is it a militant Hindu communal organization? Does it represent the revolt of the lower middle classes? Is it a network of culture guards, or as Heuze (1996: 213–47) puts it, an expression of cultural populism? We can classify the critical assessments of the Shiv Sena in two broad groups. Let us begin with the personal popularity of Balasaheb Thackeray. Thackeray’s popularity is based on the spoken word and the written word. Large crowds throng Thackeray’s public rallies. Early in its career, the Shiv Sena came to be equated with massive rallies, rousing speeches, and stray attacks on ‘outsiders’ by the dispersing crowds. Thackeray, the cartoonist, was quickly transformed into a demagogue. As the response to Thackeray’s speeches grew, he carefully cultivated the art of arousing emotions, and also the art of creating an atmosphere of expectancy and emotional excitement. Chanting of slogans and a motorcade precede the arrival of Thackeray on the scene of the rally evolving a surcharged atmosphere. The speech is almost always laced with strong expletives against the ‘enemy’, aggressive warnings, unadulterated criticism, mimicry, abuse and simplification of complex issues. The listeners are quickly turned into a hysterical, unthinking mass. The fact that Thackeray himself has never held any public office adds 276 Suhas Palshikar to the mystical attraction and the crowd is often reminded of this. Since 1988, when Thackeray gave a call for a boycott of the Sikhs and received threats from some terrorist outfit, a large security contingent accompanies him. Taking advantage of this, Thackeray reminds his adoring followers how he is facing harassment due to the security cover and says that he is putting up with this only because he wants to serve the cause (of nationalism). The security cover is thus, transformed into a ‘suffering’ indicating a sacrifice on the part of the leader. These minor, but carefully thought out strategies evolve an image of Thackeray as the great leader, in fact someone who is above politics. This image helps him in convincing his audience (and reader) about the authenticity of what he is saying. The following aspects of Thackeray’s demagogy are worth a mention. First is his skill in simplifying issues and showing how they can be easily resolved. Second, is the projection of Thackeray as the unselfish, renouncing kind of a leader. Third, Thackeray’s demagogy thrives on the creation of the ‘other’ as the enemy, whose villainy is the cause of all the troubles. Fourth, he often exhorts the audience/readers to take action and in doing this, justifies violence as a just means. There is a clear espousal of physical force and masculinity. One or two illustrations from the speeches of Thackeray would perhaps suffice. In one of his speeches in the campaign of 1995, he promised that if his party was elected to power in the centre (the election was for the state assembly!) Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will be wiped out in a matter of few days. Since he was speaking in the area dominated by the naxalites, he implored the naxalite and Tamil terrorist ‘boys’, to effect bomb explosions in Pakistan. He also assured that if he ever became the Prime Minister of India, even for one week, he would resolve the Kashmir issue!10 Such claims, instead of creating doubts in the minds of the listeners/readers, make them wonder why other parties have never done this. Distortions and the use of stereotypes are two other features of his demagogy. Thackeray’s speeches and writings are rarely lacking in these. In the early phase, when south Indians were the targets, he popularized the epithet ‘lungiwalas’ for the south Indians (a reference to the dress of the average south Indian male person). In the latter phase, Thackeray evolved an image of the ‘nation’ that excludes the Muslims. He leaves the audience in no doubt about the clear divide between the ‘we’ and ‘they’. For instance, he says, ‘I shall only tell one thing to Muslims living here—stay as our Hindustan’s citizens. Do not stay as our enemies.’11 Or, ‘. . . Here onwards, we shall not die at the hands of these people in our own motherland. . .’.12 Another constant refrain in Thackeray’s speeches is the exhortation to act. He pours ridicule on moderation, inaction, discussion, etc. Militancy and aggression are upheld as ‘manly’, as masculine virtues. Those opposing ‘direct action’ are branded as effeminate or worse. Shiv Sena 277 Thackeray’s art of building up hysteria is often accompanied by mimicry and very effective histrionics. The element of drama adds to his larger than life image. The strategy of indulging in histrionics was effectively used when Thackeray got wind of the attempts by some senior leaders to oppose the younger Thackerays. As noted earlier, he simply announced his ‘resignation’ from the Shiv Sena thereby creating a stir among the Sainiks and forcing the senior leaders to vow allegiance to him and all his decisions. The point he wanted to hammer in was that he had nothing to gain by remaining the leader of the Shiv Sena and in fact, it was merely because of the love of the thousands of his followers that he was grudgingly working as the leader of the Sena. This was the theme he had already offered to his audience in 1995: ‘. . . For whom am I doing all this? Is it not for you?. . . . I want your blessings alone, nothing else. See, think of it. . . . I am a “sanyasi” (renouncer). Nothing will happen to me (if you do not give your votes). . . as for you, whatever is in your lot, you will have to bear with it. . . .’13 Needless to say, such demagogy would have an appeal across different social sections. Therefore, when the Shiv Sena started spreading into rural areas of Maharashtra, Thackeray’s demagogy was its main weapon. The response received by the Shiv Sena in rural areas of Maharashtra and its electoral success have made the task of analyzing its character all the more difficult. It is possible to argue that the Sena’s evolution as a Mumbai based organization fighting for the cause of the Marathi people and its evolution as a political force in rural Maharashtra are two entirely different journeys. Both Jayant Lele (1996) and Gerard Heuze (1996) in their separate analyses of the Shiv Sena draw attention to the conditions obtaining in the urban areas of Mumbai and Thane. It was in these cities that the Shiv Sena first rose to popularity among the lower middle classes and later penetrated among the lower classes. The Shiv Sena appeared on the scene when the ambivalence of the lower and middle classes was becoming acute. Their contradictory location in a city of riches, lumpen or near-lumpen conditions obtaining in Mumbai’s cramped chawls, the impoverished cultural existence both as a socio-linguistic group and as members of the workforce, coupled with the unbridled advance of the rich and the neo-rich ensured that the lower and middle classes would be available for demagogic appeals and populist mobilizations. A romantic idea of Marathi-Mumbai appealed to them and they also liked the idea of identifying somebody as responsible for their wretched condition. The urge to function as the protectors and arbiters of culture and social mores is also more pressing in the environs of such cities. The attraction of ‘direct action’, as Eckert (2003) calls it, is also a characteristic of the complexities of city life. Through Thackeray’s demagogy, the Shiv Sena was instrumental in expressing these urges and providing both a political shield and polemical defence of ‘direct action’ and hence 278 Suhas Palshikar its popularity over a long time in Mumbai and adjoining areas. This combination of demagogy, direct action and the ambivalences of urban life among both lower and lower middle classes shaped a semi-fascist tendency in the political and civil life of Mumbai and to a lesser extent the adjoining cities. However, the moot question is what is the meaning of the Shiv Sena’s spread in rural areas? The Shiv Sena captured the rural terrain of Maharashtra riding on the magic of Thackeray’s demagogic speeches and writings in the Saamana. It is also incontrovertible that in order to expand in the new areas, the Shiv Sena communalized the social situation and created anti-Muslim and anti-Dalit sentiments. Thus, in spite of the difference in the nature of the social base of the Shiv Sena in Mumbai and the rest of Maharashtra, the attraction of the demagogic appeal and the construction and articulation of the communal sensibilities are two common features of the Shiv Sena all over the state. It is possible to make a distinction between the two ‘Shiv Senas’ in terms of social base, propensity to direct action and the political economy of its support. However, the following features are common to both: communal understanding of the self and an exclusionary image of the nation, belief in the efficacy of physical force for the solution of all problems, anti-politics sentiments, and dependence on populist leadership. These features inevitably point to the anti-democratic tendencies implicit in the politics of the Shiv Sena. Thus, the Shiv Sena has a double life: as a political party operating in the arena of competitive politics and as a social force representing and exacerbating the anti-democratic tendencies prevalent in the society. These two ‘avatars’ of the Shiv Sena are not exactly mutually exclusive. Its electoral avatar benefits from the mobilization gained from its anti-democratic avatar and its anti-democratic avatar gains legitimacy from its electoral achievements. As the Shiv Sena transforms itself under the new leadership of Uddhav Thackeray, it faces the challenge of retaining its identity as an organization of ‘direct action’ (essentially representing the antidemocratic elements) and at the same time offering the voters an alternative as a party of governance. Riding two horses simultaneously is always a risk, but more so when you know that the two horses gallop at different speeds. However, the Shiv Sena will keep trying to ride the two horses and take the risk involved, first, because it has created an image that it is a party of anti-establishment. Second, its electoral success is dependent on its ability to appropriate the anti-democratic sentiments and convert them into an electoral base. More importantly, the political economy of the state has produced anxieties and uncertainties in which the anti-democratic appeal holds an attraction across classes and castes. In a sense, therefore, just as the Shiv Sena has been a factor shaping state politics in the 1990s, the social and politicoeconomic conditions prevailing in Maharashtra have made it possible for the Sena to ride the two horses without falling in between. At least so far. Shiv Sena 279 Notes 01. Marmik, special issue, 1–7 January, 1989: 5. 02. These writings were to be included in Collected Writings of Dr Ambedkar to be published by the Government of Maharashtra. 03. Loksatta, Pune, 30 November 1995. 04. Maharashtra Times, Mumbai, 10, 19, 20, 23, January, 23 February 2002. 05. For a detailed discussion of this rise of ‘neo-Hinduism’, see Rajendra Vora and Suhas Palshikar (1990, 213–43). 06. Maharashtra Times, Mumbai, 6 March 1988; incidentally, this threat was never implemented. 07. Maharashtra Times, Mumbai, 23 October 1991. 08. Loksatta, Pune, 21 November 1994. 09. Sunday Times of India, Pune, 3 May 1998. 10. Report in Daily Saamana, Pune, 31 January 1995. 11. Ibid. 12. Report in Loksatta, Pune, 25 January 1995. 13. Report in Saamana, Pune, 4 February 1995; translation of this and the passages in the preceding paragraph are mine, emphasis added. References Akolkar, Prakash. 1998. Jai Maharashtra (Marathi). Mumbai: Prabhat. Bhosale, Harshad. 2004. ‘Mumbai Mahanagarpalika Nivadnuk’, in Suhas Palshikar, and Nitin Birmal (eds), Maharashtrache Rajkaran (Marathi). Pune: Pratima. Eckert, Julia. 2003. The Charisma of Direct Action. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Gupta, Dipankar. 1982. Nativism in a Metropolis: Shiv Sena in Bombay. New Delhi: Manohar. Heuze, Gerard. 1996. ‘Cultural Populism: The Appeal of the Shiv Sena’, in Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner (eds), Bombay: Metaphor for Modern India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 213–47. Joshi, Ram. 1970. ‘Shiv Sena: A Movement in Search of Legitimacy’, Asian Survey, 19(11), November: 969–78. Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod. 1979. Ethnicity and Equality: The Shiv Sena Party and Preferential Policies. Bombay. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod, Uday Singh Mehta, and Usha Thakkar. 1998. ‘The Rebirth of Shiv Sena in Maharashtra: The Symbiosis of Discursive and Institutional Power’, in Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli (eds), Community Conflicts and the State in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 215–38. Kulkarni, Suhas. 1997. ‘Sthanik Shasansamstha Nivadnuk’ (Marathi), Loksatta, Sunday Supplement, 16 March: 1–5. Latpate, Sundar. 1990. Shiv Senecha Dhoka (Marathi). Pune: Sugava. Lele, Jayant. 1996. ‘Saffronization of the Shiv Sena: The Political Economy of City, State and Nation’, in Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner (eds), Metaphor for Modern India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 185–212. 280 Suhas Palshikar Masselos, Jim. 2002. ‘Routines and Routinizations: Moving Towards Municipal Elections in Mumbai 2001–02’, South Asia, 25(3), December: 61–82. Morkhandikar, R.S. 1967. ‘The Shiv Sena: An Eruption of Subnationalism’, Economic and Political Weekly, 21 October: 1903–06. Palshikar, Suhas. 1999. Shiv Sena: An Assessment, Pune: Dept. of Politics and Public Administration, University of Pune. ———. 2000. ‘Politics of Marginalized Groups’. Pune: Report Submitted to the UGC under Major Research Project, Dept. of Politics, University of Pune. ———. 2002. ‘Triangular Competition and Bipolar Politics: Elections to Local Bodies in Maharashtra’, Economic and Political Weekly, 30 March: 1273–80. Palshikar, Suhas and Rajeshwari Deshpande. 2003. ‘Challenges Before the Congress System’, Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, 15(1) and (2): 97–122. Purandare, Vaibhav. 1999. The Sena Story, Mumbai: Business Publications. Sardesai, Rajdeep. 1995. ‘Shiv Sena’s New Avatar: Marathi Chauvinism and Hindu Communalism’, in Usha Thakkar and Mangesh Kulkarni (eds), Politics in Maharashtra, Bombay: Himalaya, pp. 127–46. Tamhane, Chandrakant. 1998. ‘Shiv Senecha Samna Nikali Tharnar?’ (Marathi), Sahyadri Weekly, 5 January: 5. Vora, Rajendra and Suhas Palshikar. 1990. ‘Neo-Hinduism: A Case of Distorted Consciousness’, in Jayant Lele and Rajendra Vora (eds), State and Society: Changing Social Bases of Indian Politics. Delhi: Chanakya: 213–43. Vora, Rajendra and Suhas Palshikar. 1996. Maharashtratil Sattantar (Marathi), Mumbai: Granthali. 11 Telugu Desam Party* K.C. SURI The emergence of an alternative political party that could end the Congress dominance, a process that began in several states of India in the 1960s, was much delayed in Andhra Pradesh (AP). This is surprising because the antiCongress opposition, and the electoral support it enjoyed during the 1950s, was much stronger in the state when compared to most others. Even after 1967, it did not follow the example set by the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu but had to wait until the second round of the emergence of the state parties during the 1980s. As if to make up for the delay, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) was formed by N.T. Rama Rao (NTR) a famous Telugu cinema actor in March 1982, who came to power in January 1983, all in a matter of nine months. This is perhaps a record in the history of political parties in India and probably in the world too. At a time when the non-Congress opposition in the state presented a dismal picture, of hopeless division and decay, the TDP rose like a tidal wave sweeping the listless Congress out of power in the 1983 Assembly elections. Unlike the Shiromani Akali Dal, the National Conference, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the Asom Gana Parishad, the Shiv Sena, etc., the TDP did not emerge as a result of any antecedent struggle or sustained social movement. When it was launched, it had no leaders trained in any ideology nor many leaders who had honed their skills in the rough world of politics. It had no party organization worth the name. In the initial days, some thought that the TDP was an aberration in state politics, or at best a * This article is an updated version of the article that was published as ‘Telugu Desam Party: Rise and Prospects for Future’ in Economic and Political Weekly, XXXIX (14 & 15), 3–10 April 2004. 282 K.C. Suri transient phenomenon, but it proved to be enduring. It went on to become the single largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha after the 1984 parliamentary elections, surpassing all other so-called national parties. It was defeated in the 1989 elections, but regained power in 1994 to lose again in the 2004 elections (see Table 11.1 for details). Thus, it had lived through state politics both as a ruling party as well as the main opposition in the Assembly during the past two decades. Those who believed and hoped that the TDP would die with its founder leader were proved wrong. Even NTR believed that this would be the case when he said: ‘TDP came with me and will go away with me.’ However, it continued, not merely as a political party, but as the ruling party in the state even after his death. In August 1995, NTR was deposed from the leadership of the legislative wing, in an ignominious way, by the very legislators who had won the election in his name and further he was removed from the Presidentship of the party by the very leaders who rode to power on the waves of his charisma. In January 1996, 73-year old NTR died as an unhappy man, but the party happily continued in power, consolidated, and won the 1999 assembly elections without him. It did not disintegrate due to the consequent splits and desertions, claims and counter claims of those seeking to inherit his legacy. Attempts to institutionalise another state party by splitting the TDP, a la Tamil Nadu, were not successful in AP. Table 11.1 Seats Won/Contested and Percentage of Votes Polled by the TDP and Other Parties in the Vidhan Sabha Elections in A.P. Since 1983 Year/ Name of the Party TDP BJP Congress Left Parties Other Parties Independents Note: 1983 1985 1989 1994 1999 2004 198/289 46.3 3/80 2.8 60/294 33.6 9/76 4.8 2/173 2.6 22/904 9.9 202/250 46.2 8/10 1.6 50/292 37.5 22/27 5.0 3/19 0.9 9/1374 8.8 74/242 36.6 5/12 1.8 181/287 47.1 13/34 5.1 5/188 2.9 15/945 6.5 216/251 44.1 3/280 3.9 26/294 33.9 34/37 6.4 3/404 3.1 12/1953 8.7 180/269 43.9 12/24 3.7 91/293 40.6 2/93 3.3 4/663 3.8 5/762 4.8 47/267 37.5 2/27 2.7 185/234 38.5 15/26 3.4 34/472 11.4i 11/870 6.6 i. Includes 26 seats and 6.8 per cent votes of the TRS, an ally of the Congress; and 4 seats and 1.1 per cent vote secured by the AIMIM. Source: CSDS Data provided as Statistical Supplement in the Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, Vol. XV, Nos 1 and 2, January–June 2003, pp. 323–38; 381–83. Telugu Desam Party 283 Apart from entrenching itself firmly in the state, the TDP played an important role in shaping power-sharing arrangements at the national level during the 1990s. The TDP had the distinction of being the largest state party in India, both in terms of seats and votes and the largest party in the National Democratic Alliance, after the BJP in the 13th Lok Sabha. As far the state politics is concerned, the 22-year old TDP remains a major force, and the national parties are compelled to co-exist with it, as either partners and friends or contenders for power in opposition to it. Despite its defeat in the 2004 elections, it continues to be a major party in the state. The emergence of the TDP heralded a new era in AP politics. It effected far-reaching changes in the political imagination of the people as well as the nature of political competition. AP politics ceased to be merely an arena for the warring factions of the Congress Party. Congress leaders could no more take the people of the state for granted. People’s interest in politics saw a revival, as the mood of political indifference, if not cynicism had greatly diminished due to fierce party competition. A bipolar electoral contest and a veritable two-party system had come to stay within a few years of the emergence of the TDP. It made the polity more democratic, in the sense it provided an opportunity for the electorate to choose between political parties truly competing for their mandate. The TDP also posed a challenge to the old political elite, as a new band of relatively better educated, dynamic young men and women, including a large number of graduates, engineers, lawyers, doctors, professors, etc., entered the political arena to become leaders and people’s representatives. Why and how state parties come into existence, consolidate and thrive, how they co-exist or fight with the national parties, how they articulate a different perspective of Indian polity, what interests they represent and their implications for the future of the Indian Union have engaged the attention of political analysts for quite some time now.1 An attempt is made in this paper to examine some of these aspects in relation to the TDP. The paper focuses on the emergence of the TDP, its nature, different phases of its evolution, periods of crises and turning points, leadership styles, shifts in the party’s policy paradigms, its relation with other parties and its future prospects. The Emergence of the TDP The sensational victory of the TDP in 1983 in a state long considered the citadel of the Congress Party startled many politicians and political analysts. Several competing interpretations for the emergence and rise of the TDP to power were offered. Each of these interpretations emphasizes one or the 284 K.C. Suri other aspect of, or factors in, the emergence of the TDP, but the problem arises as each of them claim to offer a comprehensive explanation. A somewhat detailed discussion of these different interpretations would be useful since most of them dominate the discussion about the TDP even now. The most popular explanation harps upon the age-old theme of the supposed rivalry between Reddis and Kammas, the two main peasant communities in the state. Somehow this thesis, since the time of Selig Harrison (1956), remained an attractive one for the commentators on Andhra politics, although political scientists like Carolyn Elliot (1970) and Rasheeduddin Khan (1969) argued to the contrary with sufficient evidence. The argument goes like this: from the time the state was formed, Reddis gained control over the Congress Party, and since the Congress Party ruled the state continuously from 1956, the year of its formation, Reddis always had the political sway. Kammas tried to come to power through the Communist party initially, and later through other parties, but without success. So they were thirsting for power for a long time. Since the chances for a Kamma to become the Chief Minister were bleak, so far as the Congress ruled the state, the Kammas backed the TDP to see their man, NTR as the Chief Minister (Kohli 1988: 991–1017, 1991; Kumar 1994: 151–59). This is, however, a simplistic analysis. While it may be true that more than a majority of the Reddis identify with the Congress, while a large proportion of the Kammas identify with the TDP, the support from the Kammas, who constitute about 5 per cent of the state population, is hardly sufficient for the TDP to win elections. If we look at the caste composition of AP society, most of the voters do not belong to this sentimentally attached group of hardcore supporters for these parties among these two communities. We do not find an unchanging caste-based polarization of voters in the state. The TDP secured votes in a significant proportion from most of the castes and communities. We also do not find any significant increase of Kammas or decline of Reddis in terms of their representation in the Assembly or the Ministry before and after the TDP came to power,2 although one might argue that the locus of power largely remained with the Reddis and the Kammas under the Congress and the TDP rule respectively in the state. Another interpretation was that the alliance between the Kammas and the numerically large peasant and backward castes (BCs) was responsible for the victory of the TDP and its consolidation later. Some of the TDP leaders also say that the vote of the BCs has been the mainstay of the party, including its success in the 1983 election. This interpretation runs along the following lines: many who belong to the peasant and backward castes were alienated from the Congress Party from 1970 onwards due to the political strategies followed by Mrs Gandhi. Land reform and pro-Dalit rhetoric had alienated the peasant classes from it. Indira Gandhi’s political strategy of Telugu Desam Party 285 forging alliances of national upper castes and the Dalits to undermine the hold of provincial leaders hailing from the intermediate castes and to tighten her grip over her own party and government, and the people at large, proved to be counter productive and ultimately boomeranged on her. An overwhelming majority of the BCs, who constitute about 40 per cent of the total population of the state, supported NTR because of the feeling, prevalent among them, that the policies of Mrs Gandhi were mainly aimed at capturing the votes of the Dalits. This alienation was accentuated by the feeling that little was done by the Congress for the welfare of the BCs, even though the proportion of the disadvantaged and the needy among the BCs was considerably high. Increased representation from the BCs in the Assembly, after the TDP’s emergence, was an outcome of the party’s strategy to challenge the Congress by coopting the backward communities.3 A third interpretation focuses on the decay of the Congress Party and the issue of self-respect: the centralization of power during Mrs Gandhi’s rule had not only undermined the autonomy of the state, in both party and governmental matters, but also wounded the self-respect of the Telugus. The way the Congress High Command encouraged factionalism in the state party to keep the state leaders weak and dependent on it, and changed Chief Ministers at will especially during 1978–82 was outrageous. The state Congress leaders came to be viewed as factionalists and sycophants, who would stoop to any level to curry favours from the central leaders. The repulsion among the people to these puppet shows enacted on the AP stage from Delhi by the central leaders was a major factor in the TDP’s victory. There is some merit in this interpretation. Much of NTR’s campaign during the 1983 elections was centred on the issue of Telugu nationalism and self-respect. He called upon people to hold high Telugu jaÌ„ti gowravam (nation’s honour) and ätma gowravam (self-respect) by defeating the Congress Party and teaching a lesson to its leaders.4 A fourth interpretation takes a political economy approach. According to this analysis, a class of neo-rich and regional bourgeoisie had emerged in the state since Independence, although some date it to colonial times, primarily by siphoning off agrarian surpluses and using political power at the state level. The interests of these classes came into conflict with the policies of the central government, which catered to the needs of the all-India bourgeoisie call it national or big bourgeoisie. This interpretation seeks to posit the tensions in centre-state relations and the demands for state autonomy to this clash of interests between the national and regional bourgeois classes, which prompted the regional bourgeois to embrace the TDP. Some went further and argued that this regional bourgeoisie mainly belonged to the Kamma community, as it was the members of this community that grew economically strong by accumulating agrarian surplus, and then using it to invest in 286 K.C. Suri industry, cinema, hotel and liquor businesses, etc., and that an asymmetry grew between their newly acquired economic strength and their marginal role in politics (Baru 2000: 215–18; Haragopal 1985: 70–71; Kumar 1994: 158–62; Upadhya 1988: 1376–82). The political economy approach, like the Reddi-Kamma rivalry thesis is not only attractive, but also sounds scholarly and sophisticated. But hardly any data had been furnished by any one so far to show how the members of the regional industrial and business classes behaved, what their social background was, and in what proportions they supported or opposed the Telugu Desam at that time. Mere citing one or two names does not help us very much, as we find regional industrialists and businessmen were either divided between the Congress and the TDP or had preferred neutrality. If we consider the occupational background of the elected people’s representatives as an indicator to gauge the situation, the percentage of businessmen among the MLAs was much higher for the Congress in 1985 and 1989, while the difference was not very large in 1983 and 1994. There could be yet another interpretation to the emergence of the TDP, on the lines argued by Pradeep Chibber (1999) at all-India level. It says that the formation of these parties is less due to the mobilization of new social groups onto the political arena, but more due to the desertion of certain groups from the Congress Party, which had hitherto supported it. True, some sections that supported the Congress, especially among the BCs, broke away from it in 1983. But the success of the TDP was due more to its ability to weld the vote bases of the non-Congress parties—erstwhile Swatantra, Lok Dal, Socialist parties and later the Janata Party, than to its ability to cause desertions from the Congress rank and file. The non-Congress vote had always been substantial in AP since 1956. The unity of this historical non-Congress vote bloc explains the TDP’s success in the 1983 elections. It also points to how the TDP could later consolidate itself and remain a major party in AP politics. Each of these interpretations discussed above however contain some truth although each one, when taken independently, is flawed. As I have stated earlier the above explanations are not mutually exclusive. A combination of them, and perhaps some thing more, explains more satisfactorily the TDP phenomenon. One thing, however, is clear. NTR launched his party at the most opportune time. The Congress Party was in complete disarray. The Congress electoral support base had already shrunk to dangerous levels by the time of the 1978 assembly election. With the destruction of local level leadership structures, and the self-serving leaders holding the reigns everywhere, its organization grew very weak over time. People were extremely dissatisfied with the Congress misrule, corruption, inefficiency, and rampant factionalism. But the non-Congress opposition too was fragmented. Their leaders were too mired in their own old thinking to inspire people, lacked the will to rule, Telugu Desam Party 287 and too exhausted to take on the Congress. It appeared as if the state was looking for an alternative new political formation. NTR appears to have fairly grasped the situation, seized the opportunity and persuasively articulated the people’s sentiment. In addition to the objective situation prevailing at that time, the charismatic appeal of NTR was the crucial factor in the TDP’s success in 1983. People reposed great faith in him, as someone who could deliver the state from Congress misrule. He also worked with great zeal and conviction. His idealism, determination, cine popularity, and hard work mesmerized many. He was looked upon with admiration and awe, as a leader with superhuman capacities. He was a great public speaker. He knew that people hardly care for what the speaker says but are only interested to see how the leader speaks. He spoke in chaste Telugu. The histrionics were perfect. The delivery was excellent. His exhortations fell on receptive ears. NTR, the cine-idol for millions of people, known more for his excellent performances in mythological films, especially in the divine roles of Rama and Krishna, used his celluloid image most effectively to carry his political message to the people. The newspapers, especially the Eenadu, gave good publicity to his campaign. The Congress leaders dismissed all this as a stunt with a calculation to deceive people. But the people did not care. Leadership Styles When we think of the evolution of the party over these years, we find two distinct phases: one was when NTR headed the party during 1982–95 and the other, when after Chandrababu Naidu (hereafter Chandrababu), his younger son-in-law assumed leadership. During the first phase, the party relied mainly on the charisma of NTR. It had mobilized support based on the sentiment of Telugu nationalism, the demand for more autonomy to the state and populist welfare policies. In the second phase, Chandrababu made an attempt to bring about a shift in favour of good governance paradigm, in tune with the changing times. The party tried to mobilize support by showcasing the performance of the TDP government. The two leaders of the party during these two phases—NTR and Chandrababu—presented contrasting styles in leading the party and the government, which I shall examine now. NTR strode the party and government like a colossus. He was as powerful as any populist leader could be in the world. He strongly believed that the TDP won the election in 1983 solely because of him and his hard work. He said that he was on a god-sent mission to serve the people of AP. He thought himself to be infallible. His opinion was the opinion of the party, since he 288 K.C. Suri was the party; his commands were law, since he was the embodiment of the will of the people. He was the party patriarch. All party leaders and activists were his brothers (tammullu) and sisters (ada paduchulu). He was addressed in private conversations or public gatherings as anna garu (elder brother). In 1989, he declared himself räjarshi (philosopher-king) and began to wear the robes of a sanyasi. Really, there was some kind of divine madness in his thinking and political practice. Some treated him an enigma, while others regarded him as a bundle of contradictions (Rao 1988: 15–19). In him the two contradictory elements of the theory of divine origin and democratic theory were united to give birth to the new hybrid of autocracy. One problem we notice in Indian democracy is that the one who comes to power in the name of protecting and promoting democracy tends to become over time autocratic. How autocracy derives its sanction through democracy remains a big riddle in politics. Is it due to the ubiquitous gap between the idea of democracy and its practice? Is it a paradox of mass politics? Or is it that anarchy and inefficiency of the preceding regime paves the way to authoritarianism? Do the masses and their leaders have a different notion of democracy than the cosmopolitan elites and intellectuals? Is it the way democracy is possible in tradition-bound developing country like India? The evolution of the TDP as a party also showed how a democratic upsurge among the people could be used, in the name of mass democracy, to establish an autocratic regime. Although NTR had the opportunity to build a party on democratic lines, he moved in the opposite direction. He thought that the party organization at best was an extension of his self, and other leaders were unimportant for him to continue in power, because in the eye of the people it was he who mattered, not any one else. He declared that there is number two either in the party or in the government. That there cannot be any one above him or on a par with him was understandable. But he said there was no one below him too because any such admission, that there is some one next to him in position or authority, would make his position only relative, only one of degree, which was unthinkable for him. NTR decried the Congress for lack of inner-party democracy in it. But he was guilty of the same charge. He was declared president of the party for life. The president nominated all its top functionaries, including the members of the polit bureau, executive committee and the heads of other party wings. The president nominated the party functionaries at the district levels too, although they were formally elected at the general bodies by consensus on the suggestion of the observer deputed by the president for this purpose. It was exactly the way the Congress High Command nominated the leaders of the Pradesh Congress Committee and the Congress Legislature Party, although the farce of election was nominally enacted. Telugu Desam Party 289 Leaders who were critical of NTR had to either keep quiet or leave the party. There was no other option. Especially, those who considered themselves number two in the party could not continue for long. N. Bhaskara Rao, who was the cofounder of the TDP, split the party in 1984 to become the CM for a short while, with the support of the Congress Party. Out of the splinter group, he founded the Democratic Telugu Desam Party (DTDP), but soon it went into oblivion after 1985 elections when the TDP led by NTR won a massive mandate. In 1987, N. Srinivasulu Reddy also had to leave the party since he was suspected of harbouring ambitions for number two position. Srinivasulu Reddy levelled serious charges against NTR and Chandrababu for running the party like family property. Some important leaders who supported NTR in the initial years got gradually disenchanted. P. Upendra, the leader of the TDP in Parliament, Mudragada Padmanabham, an influential leader from Kapu community, K. Jana Reddy, Vasanta Nageswara Rao, Renuka Chowdhury and so on left the TDP or were expelled from the party for ‘anti-party activities’. NTR’s style of functioning in the government was no different. No sooner did he come to power then he took a decision to reduce the retirement age of government employees from 58 to 55, without giving them reasonable time to reconcile to the decision. He dismissed all his ministers in February 1989, just before the Assembly elections in that year and constituted a new Ministry with all new faces, saying that there was no dearth of suitable persons in the party to hold positions in the government. All these issues became favourite topics for the opposition to attack the TDP. NTR did not care much for these happenings. He believed in himself. People too thought he was a man they could trust. People seem to have a tendency to forgive the heroes (or heroines) of their eccentricities or ‘follies’. TDP once again won a massive victory in the 1994 Assembly elections, as the Congress recorded its worst ever electoral performance since the formation of the state (see Table 11.1). TDP went through its worst crisis in August 1995, when NTR was removed from power and party position in a revolt against him within the party. He could never recover from this ‘palace coup’. The ouster of NTR was the tragic outcome of NTR politics itself. Although NTR lambasted the Congress for perpetuating family rule over the country, he pursued the same thing much more vigorously in AP. Supremacy of a single leader and the grooming and anointing of family members as heirs seem to be the general trend with most of the parties in India; but this seems to be more true in case of the state parties. Once NTR designated his actor-son, Balakrishna, to be his political successor, two of his sons-in-law, who occupied crucial positions in the Party, would not relish this dynastic wish. The inheritance of power became an issue during the lifetime of NTR itself (Balagopal 1995: 2482–84). 290 K.C. Suri The immediate reasons given out by the rebellious leaders for ousting NTR were that he permitted his wife, Lakshmi Parvati, to play a prominent role in public affairs and that her interference in party and governmental matters was intolerable and it was causing much damage to the party’s image and functioning of the government.5 Unlike on the earlier occasion in 1984, when the overthrow of NTR led to a mass agitation to ‘Save Democracy’, this time in 1995 there was much pity but no mass upsurge. NTR toured the state wailing over the treachery and imploring the people to fight for his restoration, but to no avail. NTR’s political career should remain an example as to how autocrats in democracies come to grief or bring their own ruin. Left forlorn and worn down by humiliation, NTR died soon a broken-hearted man. In all his celluloid life spanning 35 years and 300 films, NTR preferred not to act in tragedies. Ironically enough, his real life ended as a tragedy. The removal of NTR within a few months of his massive victory in December 1994 elections, which he termed as the ‘silent revolution’, was a big paradox in AP state politics. It was again a paradox that Chandrababu, who played a crucial role in ‘guarding’ the TDP MLAs from deserting NTR during the ‘coup’ against him in 1984, for which NTR publicly expressed his gratitude, was the central figure in this revolt against NTR this time. Lack of popular response to the ouster of NTR could be due to several reasons. First, the entire episode was perceived essentially as a family affair, since most of his sons, daughters and sons-in-law were ranged against him. In fact, they spearheaded the campaign. In addition to this, one of his sons-in-law, Chandrababu, became the CM. Second, given the shifting policy environment in the country, there was also a growing resentment among the elites, who supported the TDP, against his ‘populist’ schemes that they now thought were burdensome, unproductive and anti-development. They saw in Chandrababu, the Revenue and Finance Minister in NTR’s Cabinet, a prudent and pragmatic leader with views commensurate to the emergent global paradigm of economic development. Third, most MLAs and ministers were unhappy that they were reduced to non-entities under NTR’s dispensation. Their grouse was that they were denied opportunities to use their power to maximize their own interest or to bestow patronage on their supporters. No wonder, out of the 216 MLAs of the party, about 190 supported Chandrababu in his game plan. Most of the district and local level party leaders also sided with Chandrababu in this event. The removal of NTR, and the assumption of the twin offices of the CM and the party president by Chandrababu, was a major turning point in the history of the TDP. It marked the end of an era of the politics of charisma, populism, and Bonapartism, and the beginning of a new phase, characterized by the politics of pragmatism, economic reform and performance. Before he Telugu Desam Party 291 became the CM, Chandrababu was known more for his organizational abilities—as ‘an outstanding back-room organizer’ (Ninan 2000). Unlike the older generation of political leaders, he represented the new type of politician. He described himself as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the state. A postgraduate in economics from Sri Venkateswara University, he was known from his student days for his ‘organizational’ abilities. As a Congress leader and minister he had an inside view of how the Congress Party functioned. As the General Secretary of the TDP for a long time, he built the party organization and most of the key functionaries were those who enjoyed his confidence. He has a tremendous memory and can call most of the local party activists by name. Unlike NTR, he is a realist. His theory and practice of democracy are different from that of NTR. He thinks that a leader has to keep his ideas and political practice in tune with the changing times and circumstances. Thus, he perceives himself to be a dynamic leader. His decisions were not impulsive. He allowed sufficient time and public debate before he took decisions or enacted public policies on the lines he wanted them to be. Unlike NTR, he mustered support of the MLAs and ministers by offering them relevant motivators. Unlike NTR, Chandrababu gave more importance to civil servants than to his own party functionaries. But he kept a rigorous control over the bureaucracy. He also took care to keep the social balance in the party and the government in such a way that no one could blame him of favouring any community. He took sufficient care to remain in focus always. He made himself visible in the media everyday by launching janmabhoomi 6 activities, surprise visits to government offices, face-to-face programmes with the CM telecast every week on the TV, etc. He had put the information technology and electronic media to good use to this end. In a way, the personalized attacks of the Congress Party against Chandrababu also helped him to remain the central figure in state politics. Chandrababu is not a charismatic leader like NTR. But he compensated this in ample measure by gaining a firm grip on the governmental machinery and functioning as well as the party organization, hard work and down-to-earth approach to people and their problems. Chandrababu had another advantage, which NTR never had. NTR, throughout his tenure as the CM, had to face the hostile Congress government at the centre, while Chandrababu always had the benefit of a favourable non-Congress government. He remained a key figure in the central government both during the period of the United Front (UF) Government and later the BJP-led government. He was the convenor of the UF. When the UF government was defeated, he supported the BJP in order to prevent the Congress from coming to power at the centre. His close association with the NDA government enabled him to get support of the central government, especially securing funds for the state. Several large-scale schemes were 292 K.C. Suri implemented during his tenure, with funds and loans flowing from international funding agencies or the central government. A class of neo-rich, who had benefited from government contracts and patronage, grew in their support for the party thus making it financially sound. Organizationally, there is an inbuilt advantage for any state party. The top leader is not answerable to any one above him, unlike the Congress leaders in the state who have to rush to Delhi to explain things. The TDP’s pyramid stops in the state itself, unlike national parties where the central leaders foster factionalism below or warring factions at the state level look for support from the central leaders. In the TDP, all the factions and faction leaders at the district level have to be loyal to the party chief at Hyderabad, unlike in the Congress where factions in the state party are always at loggerheads each claiming to have the blessings of some or the other leader at the centre. Despite the distinct leadership styles of NTR and Chandrababu, we find one common aspect: power in the party and government under both of them was highly centralized (Manor 2002: 51–72). If it was democratic dictatorship under NTR, it is democratic centralism under Chandrababu. Under Chandrababu, like under NTR earlier, the TDP continues to revolve around one leader, whose authority is hardly disputed. There is no number 2 in the party. Most MLAs and ministers command very little authority. Earlier people asked the question, after NTR who? Today more or less the same situation prevails. Actually, the TDP is no exception in this matter. Power in most parties in India—think of Jayalalitha, Bal Thackeray and Laloo Yadav—is highly centralized in one person with weak organizational structure. In partial modification of Michels’ iron law of oligarchy, in India ‘whosoever speaks of party leadership should speak of iron law of autocracy’. This could be a product of the social and cultural conditions: if power is not centralized, party and administration goes out of control. A leader who is liberal and takes the path of consensual politics is looked upon as a soft leader unable to deliver the things. But as power is excessively centralized, the party’s ability as a medium for the mobilization of popular support and articulation of people’s aspirations gets undermined, often leading to the erosion of electoral support it enjoys, and in some instances, resulting in the defeat of the party in elections. Most of the parties in India seem to have been caught in such a trap. Chandrababu successfully marginalized his rivals in the party or those who posed a potential threat to him. The claim of his party as the true continuation of the original TDP is generally accepted now. The death of NTR in January 1996, within five months of his ouster, came as a blessing for Chandrababu. With the rallying point against him gone, it was not difficult for him to quickly settle matters with all those who claimed the legacy of NTR and tried to rival him for supreme position in the TDP. The 1996 Lok Sabha elections settled the competing claims between the NTR Telugu Telugu Desam Party 293 Desam Party (Lakshmi Parvati) [NTRTDP(LP)] led by Lakshmi Parvati, widow of NTR, and that of TDP led by Chandrababu, for the legacy of NTR (Srinivasulu 2003: 145). Even though the leaders of the BSP and the Janata Dal sided with the NTRTDP(LP), it secured only 10.6 per cent votes, but failed to get any seat. On the other hand, the Chandrababu group polled 32.6 per cent votes and won 16 seats (see Table 11.2). The marginalization of NTRTDP(LP) was complete in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, by which time most of the leaders who remained with NTR when he was toppled, shifted their allegiance to Chandrababu’s party. Some joined other parties. Another rival, the elder son-in-law of NTR, had to leave the party as he felt that there was no hope of gaining any prominent place in the TDP now or in the future. He went to NTRTDP(LP), then moved to the BJP and later joined the Congress Party. Chandrababu settled the matter with another splinter group, called Anna TDP, a feeble imitation of Anna DMK of Tamil Nadu. It was led by NTR’s flamboyant son, Harikrishna, another pretender to the throne of Chief Minister from NTR’s family and the one who played an aggressive role in toppling his father in 1995. Initially there was some curiosity whether this outfit would emerge as a rival TDP in the state. Some believed that the Anna TDP would certainly rally sufficient support in a way that would damage the prospects of Chandrababu’s TDP. But after losing the 1999 Assembly elections badly, it went into oblivion. All those TDP leaders who fell out with Chandrababu campaigned that Chandrababu is a traitor and trickster and that he does not believe in keeping his word. But the TDP voters and supporters were unimpressed. Chandrababu, as Chief Minister and party president, has demonstrated his leadership qualities in outwitting his rivals in inner-party struggles, managing the party affairs, and keeping the Congress out of power. He entrenched himself in power not just because he was the son-in-law of NTR, although it gave him a great initial advantage vis-à-vis his rivals in the party when NTR was alive, as he commanded free access to NTR and NTR relied on him for advice and assistance. Unlike G.M. Shah of Kashmir, he emerged as a leader in his own right later. Chandrababu still uses the old NTR rhetoric of Telugu pride, garlands NTR’s statues and photos, uses the portraits and cut outs of NTR at public meetings, but mainly appeals for support on the basis of the performance of the TDP government after he assumed power. However, the leadership style and functioning of Chandrababu in the party and government seem to have alienated traditional party leaders and workers at the local level. Mere organizational abilities are not sufficient to mobilize votes during elections. The defeat of the TDP in 2004 elections showed that the TDP as a party has grown weaker as it gained a pro-rich image with the stress on economic reforms and development and the political entrepreneurs gaining an upper hand in the party. 294 K.C. Suri Policy Shifts What is more interesting is how the TDP, since 1995, had moved away from the policies adopted during its NTR regime and how his successor, Chandrababu, sought to gain legitimacy for them. Actually, the TDP never had any well worked out ideology. When NTR formed the party he offered a motley of policies that appealed to different classes and sections of society. Among other things, the TDP manifesto for the 1983 elections promised to provide a clean, corruption-free and efficient government and policies that were oriented to liberal industrial growth and pro-peasant agricultural development. It sought to ‘remove the meaningless and unrealistic restrictions on industrialists and thus attract capital from outside the state and encourage the enterprising industrialists within the state’. The TDP called the Congress pro-merchant and anti-peasant for its failure to give remunerative prices to the agricultural products and to supply electricity for the peasants at subsidized rates. It was a strange mixture of social democracy and pro-market philosophy. NTR borrowed heavily from the experience of neighbouring Tamil Nadu. His role model was M.G. Ramachandran (MGR). Just like MGR, he too launched some populist schemes such as mid-day meals for school children. Other schemes, such as supply of rice, cloth, construction of pucca houses for the poor and backward communities, and supply of electricity to the farmers at subsidized rates were implemented on a large scale during 1983– 89. The Congress and other parties accused him of spending public money for political gain. It is a different matter that the TDP lost badly in the 1989 Assembly elections, despite the excellent work it had done by the way of implementing these schemes. It was clear that all those who were benefited by these schemes did not vote for the TDP. Although the TDP manifesto in 1983 called for deregulation and downsizing of the state, NTR launched a trenchant attack on the liberalization policies introduced after 1991 by the Congress Party at the centre and in the state. In the 1994 Assembly elections he promised to restore the rice Rs 2 a kilo scheme, supply electricity to farmers at subsidized rates and prohibit the sale of liquor in the state. For the Congress Party, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao took the major responsibility of carrying on the election campaign in the state. He kept the focus on the liberalization policies, since he thought that he would get support in his home state for what he was doing at the national level. He counterposed development and welfare, saying that development would suffer if the populist welfare schemes as promised by NTR were implemented. He contended that NTR’s two rupees a kilo rice scheme was a mere dole and would only perpetuate Telugu Desam Party 295 poverty. On the other hand, NTR maintained that it was the responsibility of the government to provide the basic needs, namely food, clothing and shelter, to the people. He questioned the theory of development that opposes the welfare schemes for the poor. He claimed that development for him was the welfare of the poor, while development for the Congress meant enrichment of the rich and the party leaders. Although NTR was one of the richest persons in the state, he could project himself as the champion of the interests of the poor, disadvantaged and the weaker sections. The Congress Party was no match for NTR’s populism. Once again, it was a NTR wave. If Mrs Gandhi had upstaged her rivals with the slogan of garibi hatao and her radical postures, NTR upstaged the Congress with the slogan of providing the ‘basic needs to the poor’. If the Congress always exploited the rich-poor divide and talked about the poor without hurting the rich, NTR proved to be one-up in this game to beat the Congress. Being the master of rhetoric, he repeatedly said: ‘Society is my temple and people are my god.’ ‘I am waging a war for the welfare of the common man,’ he thundered. It is interesting to note that immediately after it came to power in the 1994 Assembly elections, the TDP pursued the same liberalization policies with more gusto, the very policies it attacked while in opposition. As soon as it came to power, the TDP government invited private investments and quickly entered into MoUs with several companies for power production, including the one’s it had opposed earlier. It declared that markets should be given a large place by reducing the extent of government involvement, encourage private initiative in infrastructure building, and that it would consider the option of privatization seriously.7 Chandrababu, as Finance and Revenue Minister, was largely responsible for this twist, and he might have had a clandestine understanding with the international financial agencies bent upon thrusting the so-called reforms on the state, as is evident from the language of his budget speech in March 1995. This change in the direction of policies in favour of liberalization and market-reforms became complete with Chandrababu assuming office of the CM in August 1995 (Srinivasulu 2003: 145). He appealed for a ‘paradigm shift in our thinking on growth and development’ [Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP 1999)]. The TDP government said that the huge expenditure on welfare programmes, subsidies, salaries and losses in public sector undertakings had made the state finances precarious, diverted scarce public resources away from productive use in economic and social infrastructure and had consequently inhibited private investment and curtailed growth (GoAP 1996a, 1996b). Chandrababu wanted to transform the role of government from being primarily a controller of economy to that of a facilitator of private sector activity and investor-friendly environment; from that of a provider of welfare to that of an enabler. Commentators described it 296 K.C. Suri variously as an attempt to sail with the times (Balagopal 1999: 1654–58) or a different kind of populism in the era of neo-liberalism (Reddy 2002: 871–83)). A large loan was taken from the World Bank for economic restructuring of the state.8 His critics accused him of toeing the line of the World Bank to the detriment of the interests of the state and its people. But he told the Congress that he was only following the policies initiated by Manmohan Singh and that Congress governments in other states were also going the same way. To the Left’s criticism, he replied that he was only following the Chinese path and Jyoti Basu’s policies in the state. During the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, he openly debated with the opposition parties about the need for these reforms and the TDP’s performance was reasonably good in that elections (see Table 11.2). However, Chandrababu has always maintained that vigorous pursuit of market reforms would not mean abandonment of welfare programmes. During the few months prior to the 1999 elections, all of a sudden he introduced a number of schemes, outclassing even NTR, purportedly for the welfare of the backward castes, Dalits, tribal people, minorities, women, handicapped etc., every conceivable section of the electorate. If he appeared pragmatic in his advocacy of fiscal prudence and downsizing the government earlier, he appeared equally pragmatic in his fiscal profligacy on the eve of elections. The Congress and the Left parties, which had hitherto attacked the TDP for giving up or diluting welfarism, found themselves at their wit’s end. They lampooned him for trying to beguile people with his Table 11.2 Seats Won/Contested and Percentage of Votes Polled by the TDP and Other Parties in the Lok Sabha Elections in A.P. since 1984 Year/ Name of the Party 1984 TDP BJP Congress Left Parties Other Parties Independents 30/34 44.8 1/2 2.2 6/42 41.8 2/5 3.7 2/2 2.2 1/214 5.3 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2/33 34.5 0/2 2.0 39/42 51.0 0/4 4.4 1/45 3.8 0/139 4.3 13/35 32.3 1/41 9.6 25/42 45.6 2/4 4.3 1/84 4.1 0/403 4.1 16/36 32.6 0/39 5.7 22/42 39.7 3/6 5.3 1/114 13.1 0/1226 3.6 12/35 32.0 4/38 18.3 22/42 38.5 2/6 5.5 2/62 4.0 0/207 1.7 29/34 39.9 7/8 9.9 5/42 42.8 0/13 2.7 1/86 3.3 0/102 1.4 5/33 33.1 0/9 8.4 29/34 41.5 2/2 2.4 6/87 10.4i 0/114 4.2 Note: i. Includes 5 seats and 6.8 per cent vote of the TRS; and 1 seat and 1.2 per cent vote secured by the AIMIM. Source: CSDS Data Unit, Delhi. Telugu Desam Party 297 ‘scheme gimmicks’ and trying to buy votes with public money. But Chandrababu claimed that his attempt was to balance development and welfare. Of course, there was a difference between NTR’s populism and Chandrababu’s welfarism. NTR did not have any well worked out policy framework. He just responded to the situation and assumed himself the saviour of common people. Welfare schemes for Chandrababu were only a matter of political expediency—taking a step backward or sideways from logic of economic market to meet the compulsions of the electoral market (Suri 2003: 45–77). Regarding centre-state relations also there was a difference between NTR and Chandrababu. NTR went to the extent of saying that the centre was a ‘conceptual myth’. The relationship between the centre and the state were highly confrontationist during the time of NTR, and this could be largely due the fact that the Congress was in power at the centre during his period. Chandrababu had always a friendly government at the centre. Chandrababu believed in bargaining federalism, where he could get maximum benefit from the central government by maintaining friendly relations with it. But one thing should be said here. TDP, despite its emphasis on Telugu culture and pride, never entertained the idea of secession like the DMK or the Akali Dal in their early years. The Telugu people have exhibited this tendency, since the beginning of the 20th century of finely mixing the Telugu national pride with that of Indian nationalism. NTR said that the TDP was a ‘regional party with a national perspective’. For some time he even entertained the idea of becoming the Prime Minister of the country, by floating an all-India party called Bharata Desam. A detailed study of these shifts in policy framework, changes in public policies and the way they are articulated and legitimated would be interesting. The way changes in policies were effected, in contradictory directions by the TDP leadership at different periods, and the way the leaders managed these switches showed that public policies do not merely emanate from objective conditions. Political leaders have a large role to play in articulating a specific course, among the available ones under the given circumstances, and shaping the policy framework depending upon their own perceptions, electoral compulsions, and the status of their parties, i.e., whether the party is in power or in opposition. Relations with Other Parties Another aspect that should be of some interest to us is the way in which the TDP maintained its relations or forged alliances with other parties in the 298 K.C. Suri state. Initially, the Congress Party did not take the fledgling TDP seriously. Mrs Gandhi scoffed at NTR as a political joke being played in AP by one who did not know any thing about politics but had jumped into the election fray. Some state leaders of the Congress tried to paint it simply as a Kamma party, as they dubbed it kamma desam. But once overwhelmed with the defeat in 1983, Congress leaders realized the gravity of the situation. The central and the state Congress leaders, who had dominated the political scene in the state for more than three decades, could not easily reconcile to the changed reality. Encouraged by the central leaders, as the Congress was ruling at the centre, and using the institutions of the Governor and judiciary, they tried their best to put hurdles in the functioning of the TDP government, to embarrass, defame and create troubles for NTR. It successfully used the caste and sub-regional divisions against the TDP, especially in weaning away the Kapu community. Naturally, the TDP and the Congress held divergent views on the place and role of regional parties. The Congress harped on the same old theme that regional parties are dangerous to the unity of the country, as they represent fissiparous tendencies. On his part too, NTR was hostile to the Congress. His language against it was always caustic and vituperative. NTR attacked the Congress for depriving the states of both powers and finances for the development of their economy and for the promotion of their welfare. He maintained that a regional party alone was capable of fulfilling the aspirations of the people. NTR incurred the wrath of the central Congress leadership for convening a conclave of all the opposition parties ranging from the BJP to the Communist parties in May 1983 at Vijayawada. This was the first of its type in Indian politics. The Congress Party encouraged and abetted the dissident TDP leader, Bhaskara Rao, in splitting the party, used the Governor to pull down the NTR’s government, and installed the rebel leader as the CM in August 1984. This was the first major crisis for the TDP as a party and government. But it helped NTR to emerge much stronger. The TDP and the non-Congress parties launched a ‘Save Democracy Movement’. NTR called it dharma yuddham, a war against the authoritarian and autocratic Congress rule at the centre. Frightened at the massive anti-centre, anti-Congress upsurge, the Congress gave up its attempts to prop up the rebel TDP government, recalled the Governor, and finally reinstated NTR in office. It was the only instance in the political history of India when a dismissed CM was reinstated, in the face of an angry but peaceful mass agitation. Relations between the TDP and the Congress during Rajiv Gandhi days continued to be bitter. Rajiv Gandhi maintained that regionalism posed a threat to the unity of the country and called upon the people to join back the national mainstream. NTR accused the Congress of destroying the federal Telugu Desam Party 299 framework and of fomenting troubles in states where it was not in power. He urged the people to ‘get rid of Congress culture and vindicate Telugu pride vis-à-vis the arrogant centre’. The TDP-Congress relations remained unchanged even after Chandrababu became the CM. The very genesis of the TDP lies in its opposition to the Congress and its continuation depends upon its ability to keep itself as the only alternative to the Congress Party in the state. But Chandrababu was not as emotional as NTR in his dealings with the Congress Party and its leaders. He had a Congress background and he is as shrewd as the Congress leaders. He could ward off the attacks from that party or managed to silence some of the Congress leaders by offering relevant motivators to render them harmless. Unlike Karunanidhi and Jayalalitha in Tamil Nadu, who do not want to see each other’s face, in AP, Chandrababu and Rajasekhara Reddy, the top leaders of the TDP and the Congress respectively, are on talking terms. Like the Congress, the non-Congress opposition parties, especially the Left parties, could not initially fathom the significance of the emergence of the TDP. The Communist Party of India (CPI) criticized NTR for raking up a vulgar and vicious type of Telugu chauvinism, while the Communist Party of India-Marxist [CPI (M)] felt that NTR’s entry had polluted politics. In 1980–81, they had visions of emerging as an alternative to the Congress Party, but with the rise of the TDP their hopes had withered away. However, after the 1983 elections they saw a strong anti-Congress force in the TDP and moved closer to it. The TDP and all the non-Congress parties had the golden era of friendship during the years 1984–85. NTR performed the superb feat of forging electoral alliances with both the BJP and the Left parties. In those happy days, they were called mitra pakshalu (friendly parties). However, the relations with the non-Congress parties turned sour soon. In 1986, the CPI fell out with NTR, as it felt that the consecutive electoral victories in 1983, 1984, and 1985 elections made him extremely arrogant and intoxicated with power. It called him a representative of the bourgeoislandlord forces and characterized his government as anti-people and antidemocratic. It came to an ‘irrevocable’ conclusion that NTR was a reactionary, obscurantist and tyrannical leader. Some CPI leaders even suspected him of being a CIA agent. The BJP too became critical of the TDP as it saw no distinction between the Congress and the TDP. NTR too paid back the criticism in the same measure saying that these parties merely survived on the crumbs thrown by him. He felt that all other parties, except the Congress, became irrelevant in AP. A major change in TDP’s relation with the non-Congress parties came in 1998, when Chandrababu chose to support the BJP after the Lok Sabha elections as he wanted to prevent the Congress from forming the government at the centre. The Left parties were inclined to support the Congress to avert 300 K.C. Suri the BJP from coming to power. This was not acceptable to the TDP, since the Congress was its principal adversary. While the Left could fight the Congress in West Bengal and Kerala, but cooperate with it at the centre, such an arrangement was difficult for the TDP since it is a single-state party. Further, Chandrababu was piqued because the Left parties did not even care to consult him, the convenor of the UF, before making any move to extend support to the Congress. The TDP supported the confidence motion in favour of the BJP. That ended the 15-year-old journey of the TDP and the Left parties together in the state. On the other hand, the BJP, which fought together with the rival TDP faction led by Lakshmi Parvati against Chandrababu’s TDP in the 1998 elections, and its leaders, who came out with 100 charges against Chandrababu’s government and even threatened to institute an enquiry into the corruption scandals of the TDP regime if the BJP came to power at the centre, became friendly with the TDP. Probably, Chandrababu felt that it was better to sail with the BJP, which was emerging stronger nationally at that time and jettison the fragmented UF and the weak and wavering Left. He also thought that the best way to contain the potential growth of the BJP in the state was to align with it. In view of the shift in the policy framework of the TDP and its advocacy of economic reforms, Chandrababu also found it difficult to continue the alliance with the Left parties. Any way, the blame for breaking the alliance with the Left was not on him, as it was the Left parties that threatened to break the alliance if he supported the BJP and when he did, they snapped their ties.9 Chandrababu’s break with the Left as well as the UF, which was so divided and fragmented, and forging friendship with the BJP came at the right time. TDP victory in 1999 Assembly elections can be largely attributed to this alliance with the BJP. If the BJP had gained at the central level, TDP gained heavily at the state level, and that was what mattered to both of them (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). The relations between the TDP and other non-Congress parties, which are national parties, were basically determined by the considerations and compulsions of national politics, rather than state politics. For instance, the state unit of the CPI was extremely critical of the TDP till the announcement for the 1989 Lok Sabha elections came, but once the national leaders decided to have a tie up with the UF, the state unit had to fall in line and support NTR. Similarly, the state BJP leaders were very harsh against Chandrababu before and during the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, but turned friendly once the equation was set right at the national level. But the loss of friendship with the Left parties in the states seems to have made a dent in the TDP image. The Left parties, especially the CPI (M), launched a vigorous campaign against the TDP policies, criticizing the party for carrying out liberalization policies at the behest of the World Bank and Telugu Desam Party 301 other international financial agencies. Together with the Congress Party, they launched agitations against the TDP government for almost two years prior to the 2004 election, which were partly responsible for the defeat of the TDP in 2004 elections. Defeat in the 2004 Elections The TDP lost badly in the simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and Andhra Pradesh Assembly held in April 2004 (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). Chandrababu suddenly opted for the Assembly elections, immediately after he survived the deadly landmine blast planted by the People War Group naxalites near Tirupati. He had a comfortable majority in the Assembly. There was no one to challenge his leadership in the party. He had a firm relationship with the central government, with the TDP being an important partner in the NDA. Yet he decided to go for an early election, because he thought that the attack had generated sympathy for him, and he wanted to capitalize on this ‘sympathy factor’. However, the Election Commission refused to oblige him for an early election in February 2004. Meanwhile, the BJP too wanted to hold early elections to the Lok Sabha, and so the state went to simultaneous polls to the Lok Sabha and the Assembly. Thus, the state witnessed a highly prolonged election campaign this time, for nearly six months. Chandrababu once again harped on his achievements in making AP a model state in India by balancing delicately the economic reforms and welfare programmes. As usual, he sought to project himself as the representative of the forces of progress and development and the Congress as a party of self-seekers and representing regressive forces. The TDP’s election campaign was mainly based upon three issues: development, peace and order in the society, and the need to keep a unified state. The first issue aimed at claiming credit for whatever development had taken place, the second was to counter the growing threat of the naxalite movement, and the third was to counter the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS), which entered the election fray in a big way with a single agenda of securing a separate state for the Telangana region.10 Naxalite movement and the demand for separate Telangana were linked to the issue of development as the TDP sought to project these two as major obstacles to the development of the state. However, none of the three themes worked in the way the TDP leadership expected. Although there was sufficient evidence that his first generation reforms saw the state sliding down on several development indicators, such as poverty levels, growth rates in agriculture and industry and even IT industry, about which the TDP government made tall claims, he proclaimed his resolve to go ahead with the second generation reforms. 302 K.C. Suri Chandrababu sought to rekindle the spirit of Telugu pride and selfrespect, which was the main plank of NTR in his victory in 1983. He accused the Congress leaders of the state for surrendering the self-respect of the Telugus to its central leaders, especially to a foreigner. He also accused the Congress leaders of entering into an opportunistic alliance with the separatist TRS. He said that a strong, unified and large state alone could have the bargaining power with the centre, to get its due share from the central funds. He said that the attempts to divide the state would go against the sacrifices made by the makers of the greater Andhra, small states were no means to the development of the Telugu people, and the demand was aimed at fulfilling the self-serving interests of the disgruntled leaders only. The TDP hoped that since the Congress entered into an alliance with the TRS, it would suffer a backlash in coastal Andhra, on the assumption that people of this region favoured a unified state. But this did not happen. The Congress could easily counter TDP’s propaganda by saying that the TDP itself had alliance with the BJP, which was responsible for fostering the demand of separate Telangana in recent times, and whose leaders publicly favoured bifurcation of the state. The final election results show that the Congress alliance won more seats and votes in coastal Andhra than in Telangana region. For a long time the TDP had an alliance with the CPI and the CPI (M) in the state. To some extent this helped the party to keep a progressive image, even when it was fighting the Naxalites. The estrangement of the communist parties in the wake of Chandrababu Naidu’s support for the BJP government at the centre after the 1998 elections, coupled with the reforms agenda gave the TDP a pro-rich image. He ridiculed the communists for hanging on to the outdated ideology of communism. He proclaimed that all ‘isms’ are now dead, and the only relevant ‘ism’ to our times is tourism. He came down particularly heavily on the naxalites, saying that they did not believe in democracy and were impeding development activities of the government. He sought a renewed mandate from the people of the state to firmly deal with the naxalites. But even those who were not exactly sympathetic to the theory and practice of the naxalites wondered whether the powers he enjoyed in the legislature and government were insufficient to deal with the naxalite problem. As he sought to project the naxalites as number one enemy of the people, the naxalites too naturally vowed to do everything in their capacity to defeat the TDP. The naxalites’ opposition helped the Congress to win in 1989 and so once again their resolve to defeat the TDP-BJP alliance helped the Congress to some extent in winning elections in 2004. The political situation was also different this time from the previous election in 1999. For the first time, two alliances fought against each other making it the most intensely fought elections in a polarized situation after nearly 20 years. The Congress forged alliances with the Left parties, which had Telugu Desam Party 303 been in the forefront of campaigns and agitations against the economic and governance reforms of the TDP government. While the CPI renewed its alliance with the Congress after a gap of more than 25 years, this was the first time that the CPI (M), which always took a strident anti-Congress position since its inception in 1964, had a seat adjustment with the Congress in the state. The common factor that brought the Congress and the CPI (M) was their resolve to unseat the TDP from power, although such a resolution stemmed from divergent reasons. The alliance with the TRS generated a momentum in Congress favour, although from hindsight one might say that the Congress would have won the elections even without such an alliance. The calculation of the TDP chief to catch the Congress off-guard by announcing sudden elections to the Assembly did not pay. Actually, much before the election announcement came, the Congress was making assiduous efforts to stage a comeback in the state. The leaders realized that it was a do or die battle for the party. This was felt more than any one else by the Congress legislature wing leader and a long-time aspirant for Chief Minister’s post, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy. He worked hard to rally the people against the TDP government. Hand in hand with the Left parties, he conducted a sustained campaign against the reforms implemented by the TDP government. He undertook a 1,500 km-long padayatra (marching on foot) across Andhra Pradesh in May 2003. During his campaign, he called Chandrababu Naidu an agent of the World Bank and argued that the reforms pursued by the TDP government had landed the state in a debt trap and produced underdevelopment. He charged that millions of rupees brought as loans from international agencies were spent on unproductive sectors, and that a good portion of it had been pocketed by the Telugu Desam functionaries at different levels. The Congress Party made several promises to woo the electorate, especially aimed to wean away farmers, women, poor and youth from the TDP. Free electricity to agriculture, subsidies on crop loans, more funds for irrigation projects, relief package to the families of the farmers who committed suicides, loans to women self-help groups at 3 per cent interest per annum and the sanction of revolving fund to all DWACRA groups which complete six months of existence, 250,000 jobs for the youth by lifting the ban on recruitment in government services, enhancement of old-age pensions with money delivered at their door steps, revival of subsidized cloth scheme, etc., were some of the schemes announced by the Congress. NTR could ride to power a decade ago exactly by making such promises and the Congress repeated the same to beat the TDP now. Chandrababu Naidu said that the Congress was making fantastic promises that could not be implemented by anyone in power and that it was resorting to these populist promises to deceive the voters. And he added that the international financial agencies, such as the World Bank would not approve free electricity to agriculture sector, 304 K.C. Suri which would mean the stoppage of loans to the state. The Congress immediately termed the TDP government as anti-farmer and pro-World Bank. Chandrababu Naidu was never able to counter the image that he was toeing the World Bank line for his personal or party benefit, although he desperately asserted that he opted for loans from the World Bank because they were coming at low rates of interest. His welfare schemes appeared to be merely an apology for the deprivation caused by the economic reforms. The Left parties and the Congress launched a concerted campaign to expose the ‘misrule’ of the TDP government. They pointed out that no new major industry had come to the state since Chandrababu became CM, while several public sector industries were either closed down or sold away to private parties at low prices. No new major irrigation project was completed, although several millions of rupees were taken as loans. Despite high-level propaganda showcasing AP as one of the desirable destinations for flow of foreign direct investments, what the state actually got was very meagre. While the CM waxed on his IT schemes, discotheques, and Formula 1 races in Hyderabad, the people of the state cried in suffering and misery. The claims of development brought by the TDP government was merely a hoax as is evident from the growth of unemployment and poverty in the state.11 They could argue with some persuasiveness that what Chandrababu Naidu was doing was a sham, that he merely parroted the phraseology of the World Bank and acted at the behest of the international financial agencies and the reforms as well as the welfare programmes of the TDP either enriched the yellow shirts (after the yellow shirts worn by party functionaries of the TDP) or served as instruments of propaganda for the Chief Minister. For the first time, the Congress in the state launched a powerful attack on economic reforms of Chandrababu Naidu, in the same vein NTR did against the Congress in 1994. In the process, it gained the much-needed pro-poor, pro-women, pro-peasant image, which the TDP enjoyed during the NTR’s regime. It is not to argue that all who voted against the TDP, voted after a considered evaluation of the implication and results of the economic reform policies of the government. Nor can one say that all those 40 per cent voters who voted in favour of the TDP alliance were in favour of reforms. Different factors, severally or in combination, shaped the voters’ decision. It would be ideal if political science could develop a methodology to assess the relative weights of each of the factors in determining the voting behaviour. But we simply do not have that tool available to us now. However, it is difficult to rule out the results of the economic reforms and the image that Chandrababu Naidu voluntarily assumed as an ardent liberaliser as one factor for the defeat of the TDP in this election. The global business community, the international funding agencies, the captains of industry and the pink press in India might have hailed Chandrababu Naidu for boldly implementing economic Telugu Desam Party 305 reforms. His image outside the state might be one of an able and dynamic Chief Minister. But there seemed to prevail in the state a general feeling that the economic policies of his government were pursued at the behest of the international financial agencies that benefited only a few neo-rich, while they failed to improve the situation of the poorer sections of the society. The grandiose visions and the development rhetoric designed to impress the World Bank, the Davos giants, leaders such as Bill Clinton or business magnates such as Bill Gates were seen as failing to address the more immediate problems of the people of the state. The astute alliance-building by the Congress, and the ability of the Congress leadership to give a pro-farmer and pro-poor image to the party and exploit the dissatisfaction with the government was another factor that helped the Congress to win by huge margins. Not only those who carefully watched the electoral scene in the state felt that the TDP would lose this time, given the strong array of social forces behind the Congress and its allies and the narrow gap that Congress needed to recover from the 1999 situation. Even the inner circles of the TDP sensed the impending defeat of the TDP. The Congress and its allies won by a whopping margin of about nine percentage points in the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections. The Congress alliance secured more votes than the TDP-BJP alliance in all the three regions of the state. The Congress and the Left parties secured a majority of votes in the coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions in the Lok Sabha elections, where the TRS factor did not matter. As the post-poll survey conducted in Andhra Pradesh in April 2004 by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) showed, the Congress alliance had reversed the advantage held by the TDP over women voters in the previous elections. The TDP also lost its traditional edge among the poor, as more than a majority of them voted for the Congress alliance. There has been a subtle realignment among the major social groups in the state. The BJP continued to exert its appeal over the upper caste voters, while the Reddys and Kammas showed their usual alignment with the Congress and the TDP respectively. However, the extent of support the TDP had among other major communities earlier was not evident in 2004 elections. The Congress alliance evenly shared the vote among the Kapus, who have proved to be an important group that can swing voters in the recent past. Also the TDP was unable to retain its traditional strong support among the backward communities. Whatever advantage the TDP had derived by subcategorization of the Scheduled Caste reservations seems to have evaporated. Both the Madigas and Malas voted in large numbers for the Congress alliance, while more than a majority of the adivasi voters also favoured the Congress alliance. The TDP-BJP alliance secured about one-third of the Muslim voters this time, a little lower than the 40 per cent share it got in 1999, according to the CSDS survey.12 306 K.C. Suri Regional parties have not lost their salience in Indian politics and the party system. Hence, the TDP will continue to be a major party in the state. Its defeat in the 2004 elections does not mean that the party has been wiped out. It secured about 38 per cent of the vote share, which makes it a viable opposition party aspiring for power. With sustained effort, it can keep its place in the political arena of the state so far as it does not concede the antiCongress political space to any other political party. The survival and success of the TDP would depend on several factors: its ability to institutionalize within itself the processes of internal democracy, to throw up leaders who can mobilize people in support of the party, to play the role of a vigorous opposition to the Congress government, to maintain an image as the upholder of the Telugu pride, and as a representative of the interests of the broad spectrum of the Telugu people working for the development of the state. Its future also depends upon the continuation of the unified state of Andhra Pradesh, in view of the strong demand for the bifurcation of the state and its favourable consideration by most of the other parties. Notes 01. The English term ‘regional parties’ used generally to describe the state level political formations, is itself problematic, since it is not easy to say what is a region and what is a nation in the Indian context, as India is not a nation-state in the sense as is understood in the European context. The term regional party may be objectionable to the founders and leaders of some of these parties, who regard them as parties that give expression to their cultures and nationality aspirations. For instance, people in Delhi may call the TDP as a regional party, but its founder always felt that it is a party of Telugu nation in the country called India. NTR called his party Telugu Desam. The word desam in Telugu signifies several ideas: territory of a country, country itself, or a nation. The difficulty is partly because India consists of several large states, as large as most of the nation-states of Europe, each having its own well-developed language, culture and history, especially in the non-Hindi speaking states. Boundaries of the language and state boundaries are the same. The term state party, as the Election Commission designated such parties, may be a more appropriate one. 02. Representation of Reddis and Kammas in the Assembly and the Ministry before and after TDP came to power (in percentage). Table 11.n.1 Representation of Reddis and Kammas in the Assembly and the Ministry Before and After TDP Came to Power (in per cent) Year 1978 1983 Representation in the Assembly Composition of Ministries Reddis Kammas Reddis Kammas 24.1 25.9 14.6 16.0 27.3 26.7 15.2 20.0 Source: Vaugier-Chatterjee, 2004 Telugu Desam Party 307 03. The proportion of the BC MLAs (20.7 per cent) was the highest in the Assembly formed after the 1983 elections, compared to any other Assembly before and after that. 04. Andhra Pradesh has a long history of Telugu nationalism during the 20th century, in both the regions ruled by the British as well as the Nizam of Hyderabad. Congress leaders of the Andhra movement argued in favour of a strong and autonomous state in a true federation, which they called ‘United States of India’. The Communists too were not far behind in championing the glory of the Telugu nation and culture. After a gap of 25 years, Telugu nationalism once again became the main theme for the TDP. NTR generated euphoria over the slogans of ‘Restoration of self-respect to the Telugus’ and ‘Humiliation of the Telugus by a system of imposing the CMs from Delhi’. He berated the Congress leaders as eunuchs and for mortgaging Telugu selfrespect in the Delhi durbar. He exhorted the people to regain their pride and prestige which the Congress leaders surrendered to Mrs Gandhi and her son, ‘whose feet they kept on touching for offices and tickets’. 05. NTR lost his first wife in 1983. Later, at the age of 70, he married his biographer Lakshmi Parvati in 1993. NTR, along with his wife, campaigned in 1994 elections, and the TDP won the elections with a massive mandate. So we cannot say that people did not like his marriage at an advanced age. But the growing authority of his wife perturbed his other family members and some senior leaders of the party. One reason for the revolt could be that his two sons-in-law were aggrieved because they were sidelined in the party and government. 06. A programme launched in January 1997 with an objective to redefine the ‘peoplegovernment interface’. It has three main components: shramdanam (voluntary contribution of labour), prajala vaddaku palana (taking the government to people) and micro-planning (to encourage people’s participation in planning and execution of development works at the local level). About 20 rounds of it, each of 10 days duration once every six months, were conducted with great fanfare, which were finally reduced to occasions for the distribution of welfare benefits to the women and the old people. 07. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1995. Budget Speech of AP Finance Minister in the Legislative Assembly while presenting the Budget for the years 1995–96. Available from www.andhrapradesh.com 08. In tune with the reform strategy, the TDP government took several measures. The issue price of rice supplied through the public distribution system was raised to Rs 3.50 a kg. in July 1996 and to Rs 5.25 in July 2000. Water and electricity charges were raised. Several industrial units in public and cooperative sector have been either closed or privatized. 09. In 1983, the Left parties adopted the strategy of taking the side of the TDP, so that they would not be crushed in the fight between the two giants—Congress and the TDP. They wanted to take advantage of the situation when the TDP becomes weak. But they were too weak to take an advantage of that sort. Instead, their growth was stunted under the shadow of NTR, who stood like a Banyan tree over them. When they came out of the alliance, it dawned upon them that it was they who in fact grew weaker. 10. It is now customary to view Andhra Pradesh in terms three sub-regions, namely Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal districts (often referred to as Andhra). The inter-regional disparities and the politicization of the regional identities, especially 308 K.C. Suri in the Telangana region, have affected state politics and elections since its formation. The state witnessed two militant and violent agitations for the bifurcation of the state during 1968–73 and there were doubts about the survival of the state, as there are today. 11. In AP, the promise of prosperity and employment due to economic reforms did not turn out to be true in the 1990s. The employment growth recorded a drastic decline during the period 1993–94 to 1999–2000 compared to the period 1983–84 to1993– 94—0.29 per cent per annum from 2.4 per cent for rural areas and 0.01 per cent from 4.28 for urban areas. The work participation rates also declined very significantly after 1994—from 57.6 per cent in 1993–94 to 54.2 per cent in 1999–2000 for rural areas and from 44.4 per cent to 41.7 per cent in urban areas. The problem of unemployment was more severe for the educated and the youth. Casualization has increased over time. Rural AP stands second in terms of percentage of casual labourers in the country. The growth of real wages in rural areas declined significantly in the 1990s. Although the official estimates (by Experts Group and Planning Commission) of poverty show that the proportion of rural poor has declined from 15.92 per cent in 1993–94 to 11.05 per cent in 1999–2000, the alternative estimates (Deaton and Dreze: 2002) put it at 26.2 per cent. In terms of incidence of poverty AP stood in ninth rank, below Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. The agricultural growth of AP (2.47 per cent) in the post-reform period was below the all-India growth rate (2.73 per cent), which itself was low compared to the 1980s. The state experienced a decline in capital formation in agricultural sector. Area under public sources of irrigation declined in the 1990s due to deceleration in public investment. The growth rate of crop output in the state decelerated from 3.4 per cent in the 1980s to 2.3 per cent in the 1990s. The growth rate of total factor productivity in the crop sector declined from 1.58 per cent to 1.05 per cent over the same period. The share of primary sector in the net State Domestic Product came down to 25 per cent by 2000–01, and if we take only agriculture it was alarmingly low, forcing the agrarian population to share the increasingly dwindling incomes. Prices became unremunerative, lands were left fallow, and the debt burden of the farmers had mounted. There was palpable agrarian distress in almost all the districts of the state. Since 1997, AP reported the largest number of suicide deaths by farmers in the country (the number ranged from 1,000 by official estimates to 3,000 by media, other organizations and the opposition parties). However, the death cries of the farmers failed to move the government to address the despair among the farmers, if not to redress the situation, as it was steeped in the IT and BT (biotechnology) hype. Even growth rate in industry has slowed down from 7.36 per cent in the 1980s to 6.2 per cent in the 1990s. The literacy rate in the 1990s has increased in the state (61.11 per cent in 2001), but it still remained below the national average. The state expenditure on education stagnated at about 3 per cent. The public health care system had weakened, and the corporate hospitals grew rapidly with little access for the poor. The National Human Development Report (2002) shows that the human development index of AP was lower (0.416) than all India (0.472). Among the major 15 states of India, the relative rank of AP on the Human Development Index slipped from ninth position in 1991 to tenth in 2001 (Rao and Dev, 2003: 1–80). Although the government expenditure on social services did not see much decline during Chandrababu Naidu’s regime, much of it was election oriented, Telugu Desam Party 309 without caring for their sustainability and durability. As a result the welfare schemes were unleashed on the eve of elections, only to be forgotten soon after the elections. 12. The Hindu, 12 May 2004. References Balagopal, K. 1995. ‘Politics as Property’, Economic and Political Weekly, 30(40): 2482– 84. ———. 1999. ‘The Man and the Times’, Economic and Political Weekly, 34(26): 1654– 58. Baru, Sanjay. 2000. ‘Economic Policy and the Development of Capitalism in India: The Role of Regional Capitalists and Political Parties’, in Francine Frankel et al. (eds), Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press: 207–30. Chibber, Pradeep K. 1999. Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications. Deaton, A. and J. Dreze. 2002. ‘Poverty and Inequality in India: A Reexamination’, Economic and Political Weekly, 7 September. Elliot, Carolyn M. 1970. ‘Caste and Faction Among the Dominant Caste: The Reddis and Kammas of Andhra’, in Rajni Kothari (ed.), Caste in Indian Politics. Delhi: Orient Longman. Government of Andhra Pradesh. 1995. ‘Budget Speech of AP Finance Minister in the Legislative Assembly while presenting the Budget for the years 1995–96’. Available from www.andhrapradesh.com. ———. 1996a. Pattern of Expenditures on the Welfare Sector. Hyderabad. ———. 1996b. State Finances: The Actual Position. Hyderabad. ———. 1999. Vision 2020. Hyderabad. Hanumantha Rao, C.H. and S. Mahendra Dev (eds). 2003. Andhra Pradesh Development. Hyderabad: Centre for Economic and Social Studies. Haragopal, G. 1985. ‘A Socio-Economic Study of Modern Andhra’, Social Science Probings, 2(1): 37–77. Harrison, Selig A. 1956. ‘Caste and the Andhra Communists’, American Political Science Review, 50(2): 378–404. Khan, Rasheeduddin. 1969. Political Participation and Political Change in Andhra Pradesh (mimeo), Hyderabad: Osmania University. Kohli, Atul. 1988. ‘The NTR Phenomenon in Andhra Pradesh: Political Change in a South Indian State’, Asian Survey, 28(10): 991–1017. ———. 1991. Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krishna Reddy, G. 2002. ‘Neo-populism and Liberalization: Regime Shift under Chandrababu Naidu in AP’, Economic and Political Weekly, 37(9), 2–8 March: 871– 83. Manor, James. 2002. ‘Democratic Decentralization in Two Indian States; Indian Journal of Political Science, 63(1): 51–72. Narasimha Rao, C. 1988. N.T. Rama Rao: A Psycho-political Analysis (in Telugu), Vijayawada: Nani International. 310 K.C. Suri Ninan, Sevanti. 2000. Plain Speaking. New Delhi: Viking, Penguin. Prasanna Kumar, A. 1994. ‘Caste and Political Leadership’, in A. Prasanna Kumar (ed.), Andhra Pradesh: Government and Politics. New Delhi: Sterling. Srinivasulu, K. 2003. ‘Party Competition and Strategies of Mobilization: An Analysis of Social Coalitions in Andhra Pradesh’, in Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds), India’s 1999 Elections and 20th Century Politics, New Delhi: Sage: 141–66. Srinivasulu, K. and Prakash Sarangi. 1999. ‘Political Realignments in Post-NTR Andhra Pradesh’, Economic and Political Weekly, 34(34–35): 2449–58. Suri, K.C. 2001. ‘Andhra Pradesh: Setback for the TDP in Panchayat Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly, 36(41): 3892–94. ———. 2002. ‘Democratic Process and Electoral Politics in Andhra Pradesh’, Overseas Development Institute, London, Working Paper No. 180. ———. 2003. ‘Andhra Pradesh: From Populism to Pragmatism’, Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, 15(1&2), January–June: 45–77. Upadhya, Carol Boyack. 1988. ‘The Farmer Capitalists of Coastal Andhra Pradesh’, Economic and Political Weekly, 2 July: 1376–82 and 9 July: 1433–42. Vaugier-Chatterjee, Anne. 2004. ‘Andhra Pradesh: A Two-dominant Caste Sociopolitical System’, in V.B. Singh and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), forthcoming. 12 Parties, the Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections: A Comparative Perspective on Possible Options* E. SRIDHARAN Introduction It has long been common knowledge in India that raising funds for elections is a pressing imperative for politicians and this, in turn, is one of the most powerful motive forces behind political corruption. The hawala scandal (payoffs to politicians of most major parties via illegal foreign exchange * This article was first published as ‘The Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections: A Comparative Perspective’, The Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 1990. We thank the Editor for permission to reprint this article and the IRIS Center of the University of Maryland at College Park for financial support; many key leaders from major political parties including Congress, BJP, Janata Dal and CPM, and the many industrialists and industry association officials who gave me generously of their time and knowledge in confidence; the Confederation of Indian Industry for their cooperation, particularly Tarun Das, Sushanta Sen and Deepak Roy; Deepak Singh, industrialist and chairman of the CII’s Public Policy Committee and R.C. Bhargava, Chairman of the CII Task Force on Financing of Democracy and Election; Douglas Verney and Jorgen Dige Pedersen for invaluable support; diplomats of numerous embassies in New Delhi for current information on their countries; V.B. Singh and Yogendra Yadav for associating me with the National Election Study 1996; Kimberly Brickell and L.P. Singh for written comments on earlier drafts; K. Ganesan for useful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. 312 E. Sridharan transactions) that broke in January 1996 focused public attention on both corruption and the underlying imperative for politicians of raising election funds for their parties and themselves. It highlighted the need for reform of election finance, including the possible option of state funding of elections. Such reforms are clearly linked to the process of economic liberalization. There will be no incentive for politicians to move toward deregulation without electoral finance reform, because that would limit their capacity to misuse office to raise election funds. Political finance reform is also linked to the stability of democracy itself because if election funds are raised by corrupt means, cynicism about parties and politicians can become widespread. This chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, which follows, we summarize the main points in the history of political finance reform in long-standing democracies. In the second section, we survey the history of political finance reform in India. In the third section, we outline what we have been able to glean from fieldwork about election expenditures, fundraising, and the effectiveness of electoral finance reform in India’s 1996 general election with available information on the 1998 elections. In the fourth section, we pull together the lessons drawn from international and Indian experience and derive six possible policy options for India and their implications. In the final section, we assess the prospects for electoral finance reform including, centrally, the option of state funding of elections. A Summary of the Main Points in the History of Political Finance Reforms in Democracies There are a variety of arrangements determining political, including election, finance around the world.1 Most involve one or more of the following: limits on expenditures, limits on contributions to parties and candidates, systems of reporting and disclosure, and public subsidies of election expenses for parties and/or candidates. Some are systems of party funding (rather than only election funding), in which political parties are funded for activities not limited to election campaigns. Political parties need funds for three activities: election campaigns, interelection maintenance of their organizations and political activities, and support of research and information infrastructure for the parties. In most cases, election campaigns are the primary visible activity requiring funds. Historically, this has made political parties excessively dependent on big business, its intermediary organizations and wealthy individuals, especially parties of the right and centre. Parties of the left became dependent on the collective contributions of workers, often channelled through affiliated trade unions. Such interests, typically, seek rents as a quid pro quo for political donations. Such Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 313 dependence, especially with candidates who do their own fund-raising, has made access to money and support of wealthy donors increasingly critical. This was so throughout the democratic world in the post-war boom of the 1950s and 1960s as election campaigning costs rose steeply. There were—and still are—many corruption scandals associated with campaign fund-raising in many countries, despite political finance reforms. The origins of election finance reform have three roots: corruption scandals, rising campaign costs, and public concern for equal opportunity of political participation. In India and elsewhere, it was widely felt that a freefor-all system of election fund-raising in capitalist societies gave excessive power to wealthy individuals and big business—not only over left-of-centre parties, but even pro-business parties and politicians. This was an important contributing factor to the introduction of public subsidies to political parties in Norway and Germany (Paltiel 1981). In Norway in the late 1940s, the shipping industry lobby, which was a major contributor to non-socialist parties, alienated them by trying to influence their choices of leaders, candidates and policies. In Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, the attempts of political sponsor organizations to determine candidate lists and veto certain coalition arrangements prompted the introduction in 1959 of public funding for parties by the conservative Christian Democratic Adenauer government. The introduction of public funding was, in some cases due to politicians’ need for autonomy from financial supporters as well as their desire to reduce costs. An important point for the Indian case is the fact that the type of party system prevailing at the introduction of public party or election funding in all countries was, typically, one without a perennially dominant party. Most of Europe had multi-party systems without a perennially dominant party or two-party or two-plus party systems like in the United States, Canada or Australia. Rules regarding party and election finances often existed prior to public funding. The thrust of political finance reform across numerous countries in the 1960s and 1970s had four main characteristics: (i) limits on expenditure including sub-limits on particular expenditures; (ii) limits on contributions from individuals and organizations; (iii) public funding, full or partial, of elections and/or parties; and (iv) reporting and disclosure of election, party and candidate finances in some form as an administrative pre-requisite for implementation of any or all of the above. Limits on Expenditures and Contributions Limits on expenditures have been applied more frequently than limits on contributions to parties/candidates. Expenditure limits have been applied to 314 E. Sridharan election campaigns, usually limited to the formal period of the campaign, rather than to general party expenditures. The goal is to reduce costs for all contestants, thus indirectly address the issue of equality of political opportunity. Usually the limits apply to the amounts that candidates and/or parties may spend on election campaigns. Within these overall maxima there are often limits on the amounts that may be spent on particular items, for example, broadcasting, advertising, wall posters and billboards. Contribution limits by individuals and organizations have been introduced primarily to address the problem of equality of opportunity by lessening dependence on a small number of wealthy donors, and making candidates more responsible to the grassroots. Ceilings on contributions may apply both to donors and recipients, that is, recipient parties and candidates may face limits on amounts they receive from certain categories of donors and/or from any single donor, forcing them to broad base their fund-raising efforts. Potential donors may face limits on how much they can contribute per candidate, per party or per year. In some countries, like the United States, there may be bans on certain organizations (like corporations and trade unions) from making election contributions to parties or candidates. However, intermediary organizations, like political action committees (PACs) in the United States, may be allowed to receive and channel corporate political contributions, though they too may face limits on amounts per donor as recipients and amounts per candidate as donors. These contribution limits attempt to reduce the disproportionate influence of big money and narrow interests on the electoral prospects of candidates and parties. In most countries these have been less effective than expenditure limits because contributions can be channelled through intermediaries or evaded through loopholes. Public Funding It is important to draw a distinction between public subsidization of parties and the subsidization of election campaigns. The former is less common, confined largely to Europe until recently. Public subsidization of parties can be directly to central (Italy) or lower-level offices (Sweden), to parliamentary caucuses, or party foundations (West Germany after 1967). In most of these countries, there is also public subsidization of elections funded separately or included in party subsidies. Subsidization of parties is the norm in Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany, Italy and Israel. In several other countries like the USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France and Japan (until 1994) there is no public subsidization of parties, only of elections, wholly or partially, using a variety of mechanisms. Such funding is usually channelled through parties, except in the USA. Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 315 Public funding of elections and/or parties was introduced from the mid1950s (Costa Rica 1954, Argentina 1955), and among stable democracies in Germany in 1959. In 1966 party funding was struck down as unconstitutional in Germany, and from 1967 only election funding was permitted directly to parties from the state in the form of reimbursement of a part of election expenses calculated as a fixed amount per vote. However, party foundations continued to receive non-campaign funding from the state, which could be used for political education and information from a party perspective, and other activities. Countries which followed suit were Austria (1963), France (1965), Sweden (1966), Finland (1967), Denmark (1969), Israel (1969), Norway (1970), the Netherlands (1972), Italy (1974), Canada (1974), United States (1976), Japan (1976), Spain (1977) and Australia (1984).2 Public funding, full or partial, can be organized into four categories, which exist in a variety of combinations in different countries. These are: first, direct grants/reimbursements to political parties/candidates not tied to particular expenditures; second, specific grants earmarked for particular items of expenditure; third, provision of certain services, free or subsidized, by the government or government-owned organizations; and fourth, indirect subsidies such as tax incentives and reliefs. Direct funding of parties or elections can be in the forms of grants to parliamentary groups (caucuses); direct grants to parties for inter-election purposes; or election funding. The criteria for allocation of public funds can be on the basis of seat or vote share in the last election, usually on the basis of complicated formulae. In some cases where election expenses are reimbursed, it can be on the basis of performance in the recent election. In such cases where the party is funded for elections on the basis of a per seat or per vote formula based on the previous election, an adjustment in the reimbursement occurs depending upon whether the party gets more or less seats/votes than its share of the funding, subject to eligibility thresholds. In the case of the USA, the federal government subsidises only presidential primaries and elections by a matching grant system. Specific grants for particular items are also a common form of public subsidization. The most common forms of such direct public subsidies are wall posters, nominating conventions, press and information bureaux, and party educational and research foundations (as in Germany and Austria). Services provided free or subsidized include radio and television time on the state-owned broadcasting media, postage for election campaign materials, subsidized telecommunications, provision of meeting halls in public buildings, and voter registration. Indirect subsidies include tax deductions to donors for donations to political parties or election campaigns of parties/candidates, and tax exemption to political parties and candidates as recipients of such donations. 316 E. Sridharan Reporting and Disclosure A variety of systems of reporting and disclosure have been implemented simultaneously with limits on election expenditures and/or political contributions, and public subsidies to parties/candidates. This necessitates the institutionalization of legal requirements for disclosure of party/candidate income and expenditures. The general trend is towards a greater transparency. Who is required to report varies. In the UK, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand, which traditionally do not recognize political parties, it is the candidate who is required to report. In most other countries it is the party or both party and candidate. In the USA, PACs also have to report. Reporting is usually to the appropriate minister, speaker of the legislature concerned, or the election commission. In some countries, like the older members of the Commonwealth and Ireland, it is to the electoral officer, a lower-level functionary. The reporting interval is every campaign (especially in countries which subsidize or regulate elections rather than parties), and/or annual. Expenditures are required to be reported in all cases and, in most cases, contributions. Audit of accounts of political parties’ and/or candidates’ campaigns is commonly, but not always, required. Most countries have the further requirement of disclosure, that is, it is not sufficient to file audited statements of accounts to the appropriate public authority in confidence (similar to the filing of income tax returns). These records must be made publicly available, including the press and political rivals. This is an increasing trend generated by public pressure in many countries due to corruption scandals. However, this need not lead to total transparency since, in many cases, while contribution limits must be respected, the donor’s identity need not be disclosed to the public; for example, in France, even after the post-1988 reforms, donors can make anonymous contributions; however, without a receipt they will forgo tax deductions. Patterns of Regulation The examination of electoral and party finance regulation reveals three patterns upon which one can draw to devise a system of political finance regulation for India. One is a minimalist pattern, another a maximalist pattern and in between are various mixed patterns. The minimalist pattern obtains where only elections are partially subsidized, usually through specific grants or state-rendered services. Candidates Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 317 are accountable to the public authority for observance, reporting, and disclosure of limits on, mainly, expenditures for the limited election period. Transparency of income, expenditures and functioning is mainly due to party membership pressure rather than legal requirements. The UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Canada are examples of the minimalist pattern. The US pattern is a variant of this minimalist pattern, even since the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the 1974 amendments limiting contributions (Alexander 1994: 41–49). Election funding is private and candidate-centred, but subject to strict reporting, disclosure requirements, and limits on contributions. Japan also falls into the traditionally minimalist pattern before and after the 1994 reforms, despite limited party financing (Shiratori 1994: 201–04) other than for elections. The maximalist pattern of state funding focuses on political parties, rather than elections, whether to parties, parliamentary groups, or party foundations. Under this pattern, public funding is not merely for elections, but for other party activities, and it is the primary source of party finance. ‘Maximalist’ systems are commonly characterized by multi-level party funding wherein national, regional and local governments fund corresponding party units as in Sweden (Gidlund 1994: 113) and Germany (Nassmacher 1989: 247, 250–51). This pattern is also associated with less detailed regulation of contributions and expenditure, including of election expenditure limits, because parties are largely dependent on state support. Legal requirements force internal democracy (Germany) and general transparency (as in Scandinavian countries) making formal reporting requirements less necessary. In between are a variety of mixed patterns, for example, France (Avril 1994), the Netherlands (Koole 1989: 208–09; Koole 1994: 128), and among relatively recent democracies, South Korea (Park 1994: 175–78). These are not mainly state-subsidized party and electoral systems. In France, there are per candidate election expenditure limits and partial public funding for elections on a reimbursement basis up to 50 per cent of spending limits for all elections, with the exception of presidential elections. Parties are entitled to partial public funding on the basis of the percentage of votes received in the previous parliamentary elections. Submission of campaign accounts is a requirement for candidates. Since January 1995, company donations to parties and candidates are prohibited; individual donations are encouraged through tax incentives for political party dues and donations. In the Netherlands, state funding is available only against matching funds to be raised by the parties, making state funding a maximum of 50 per cent of total spending, thus forcing parties to keep themselves active at the grassroots to be able to raise funds on their own. In all three patterns, parties and candidates are allowed to raise private contributions in addition to state funding, but must observe regulatory 318 E. Sridharan requirements on expenditure and contribution limits, reporting and disclosure, and other matters. An important question from the Indian point of view is whether expenditures by the party or independent expenditures by candidate supporters are calculated into the limits on expenditure. In the UK, there are strict rules defining election spending, with private spending in aid of a particular candidate with or without authorization considered for the limit, and the latter being held illegal. However, there are no limits on party expenditure if it is not promoting a particular candidate’s election. In the USA, there are no limits on ‘independent expenditures’ by individuals and groups including PACs, such expenditures do not count as political contributions and are, therefore, not subject to contribution limits. In Japan, until 1994, legal loopholes have enabled politicians and businesses to evade virtually all the legal restrictions on contributions and expenditures. For example, while there have been limits on contributions to any one political organization (koenkai) of a political party, faction or politician, a faction or politician may set up any number of such political organizations, each of which can raise funds upto the limit (Hirose 1994: 155–60). Political finance reform has, in many countries, had unanticipated consequences and this has prompted further rounds of reform. The effectiveness of political finance reform can only be assessed by taking a long-range view on the evolution of regulation of political finance in the context of the political system as a whole. In the United States (Alexander 1989c, Bartels 1992 and Muste 1992), the combined effect of the FECA amendments of 1974 (limited contributions) and the Supreme Court judgement of 1976 (Buckley versus Valeo) striking down expenditure limits for independent spending (not in consultation with candidates and their campaigns) by individuals and groups, was that the sources of funds were capped but the costs were not. In a country where electioneering became increasingly television-intensive, the lack of expenditure limits led to competitive spending for greater exposure, hence spiralling the costs. The net effect was a mushrooming of PACs to bypass the contribution limits and bans on direct corporate funding. In Japan’s candidate-oriented electoral system, the Political Funds Regulation Law of 1975, which limited contributions, made it more difficult for candidates to rely on party or factional leaders to raise and redistribute huge sums from large contributors. It threw the burden of fund-raising directly on the candidates, making fund-raising their main preoccupation (Curtis 1992). How Effective Have Political Finance Reforms Been? Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the literature. First, public funding has not frozen party systems either by preventing alternation in power or Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 319 by preventing the entry of smaller new parties, as in Germany, Austria, Italy and Sweden (Nassmacher 1989, Alexander 1989a). Second, public funding does not necessarily reduce election spending. In several countries like Italy (1976–80) (Ciaurro 1989: 166–68), Spain (Del Castillo 1989), Finland, Austria (1978–85), and Israel (1981–88) (Mendilow 1992: 110–11), election spending rose despite public funding of parties, including of elections. This was traced to increased political rivalry combined with the fact that private funds could be raised alongside public funding. Furthermore, parties could agree among themselves to increase the level of public funding as in Austria, Israel. Third, if state funding is routed directly to candidates, bypassing the central party leadership, then lower level leaders and party factions are strengthened and can demand policy changes or even threaten secession. Parties can come under pressure to decentralize and democratize. New parties can emerge from factional secession. Fourth, public party/election subsidies and limits on expenditures and contributions do not necessarily eliminate corruption and wrong doing. If, as in the USA and Japan, the net effect is to greatly increase candidates’ imperative to raise funds, then evasion of legal restrictions becomes common. These conclusions stress the key role of design in whether political finance reforms lead to reduced campaign costs, less corruption, and greater equality of political opportunity. Is there to be public subsidy of parties or elections only? Are there to be limits and sub-limits on expenditures, contributions, both or neither? Are public subsidy levels realistic in relation to campaign costs? Are public subsidies to be based on vote or seat shares, paid in cash or kind, in advance or reimbursed, to central party leaderships, regional/local leaderships or candidates? Are additional private funds to be allowed? Will party and supporters’ spending count as election expenses? Will donor identities have to be disclosed? We shall discuss various possible options for political finance reform in India after reviewing the Indian case. A Brief History of Political Finance Reform in India Traditionally, political parties in India financed themselves through private donations and membership dues.3 Company contributions to political parties were legal, subject to certain restrictions, and had to be declared in the company’s accounts. There were limits on election expenditure since the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 1951. Talk about political finance 320 E. Sridharan reform began in the context of the debate on black money generation in the 1960s, the nexus between black money and political fund-raising being mentioned in the Reports of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1964) and the Wanchoo Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee (1971). Company donations to political parties were banned with effect from 1969. An important development was the amendment of the RPA in 1975 to nullify the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Kanwar Lal Gupta versus Amar Nath Chawla case that party spending on behalf of a candidate should be included in election expenses for the purposes of the ceiling. Explanation 1 to Section 77(i) of the RPA was appended, by which party and supporter expenditure not authorized by the candidate did not count in election expenses, in total contrast to the UK position. This made the limit on election expenditure farcical. Political parties were exempted from income and wealth taxes from April 1979 provided they filed annual returns including audited accounts and identities of donors. The main development in the 1980s was the amendment of the Companies Act in 1985, which by Section 293A, once again allowed company donations to political parties and individuals under certain conditions, most importantly, a ceiling of five per cent of average net profit over the previous three years, subject to approval by the board of directors and disclosure in the profit and loss account. However, the overwhelming majority of the contributions have continued to be by the black money route, since utilizing the provision means revealing party identification and possible problems with shareholders. In 1990, the National Front government set up the Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms to look into the matter including election financing. Its Report did not advocate state funding except limited support in kind for vehicle fuel (usually the main campaign expense), hire charges for microphones, issue of voter identity slips and additional copies of the electoral rolls. It did not include spending by independent supporters in the election expenditure limit, but made such unauthorized spending a penal offence. It also advocated a ban on company donations to political parties. The Report therefore, left an uncovered gap in the necessary election finance requirements of parties because, while banning company donations it did not provide adequate state funding. The bill was introduced in Parliament on 30 May 1990 but lapsed, and an attempt at fresh legislation in 1994 came to nought, because of strong opposition. In 1993, Indian industry became publicly concerned about this issue for the first time. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) set up a Task Force, which recommended that corporate contributions be made taxdeductible and that board decisions should be required to be confirmed by Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 321 shareholders. The CII has also recommended state funding of elections, the funds to be either raised by a cess on excise duty or by contributions by industry to an election fund pool managed by the state, from which money should be distributed to parties by formula, in effect, an election tax on industry. The motivation behind the CII’s initiative was threefold.4 First, two hugely expensive elections of 1989 and 1991 were about to be followed by state assembly elections in northern India in November 1993, 10 state assembly elections in 1994–95, and another general election by mid-1996. Industry was concerned about the mounting demands being made on them. Second, by late 1993 there was concern about whether the demands for political funds being made on Indian companies would disadvantage them vis-à-vis multinational firms. The latter could opt out of India if demands became excessive but the former could not. Third, there was concern that if parties remained dependent on funds extorted, in effect, by the exercise of regulatory powers and hence a controlled economy, deregulation would soon reach its limits. Two important developments took place in 1996. The first was the Supreme Court’s notices to political parties in January, to file returns required by the Income Tax and Wealth Tax Acts by 20 February in response to a public interest petition filed by a private citizens’ group, after the parties did not respond to notices issued by the Income Tax Department. This forced parties, none of which had filed for all the years since 1979 as required, to do so. However, they did only for 1994–95, with the Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Janata Dal declaring a suspiciously low combined income of under Rs 170 million!5 In the future, this will place some transparency constraints on parties’ finances. The second important development was the Supreme Court’s order of 4 April 1996 shortly before the general elections held in late April and May, interpreting Explanation 1 to Section 77(i) of the RPA such that election expenditure by a political party would not be clubbed with that of a candidate for the purposes of the spending ceiling only, if the party had submitted audited accounts of its income and expenditures, something that no party had done. This constrained conspicuous party spending on behalf of the candidate during the 1996 campaign. Coupled with the Election Commission’s determined efforts to enforce the spending limits during the campaign, which included the extensive use of videography and the submission of daily expenditure accounts by candidates, these orders had the effect of deterring pressure on donors. As for the 1998 election, the RPA Amendment Bill passed in July 1996, by the United Front government, based on the Goswami Committee’s recommendations, did not touch upon the key issues of public funding and 322 E. Sridharan limits but did facilitate cost reduction by reducing the campaign period from 21 to 14 days. The expenditure limit, which had been kept artificially low at Rs 150,000 for Lok Sabha and Rs 50,000 for State Assembly constituencies in most major states, until it was revised to Rs 450,000 and Rs 150,000 respectively, for most states, in 1994, and was the limit in the 1996 elections, was revised upwards on 31 December 1997 to Rs 1,500,000 and Rs 700,000 respectively, for major states. However, Explanation 1 to Section 77(i) of RPA was not amended. The other important development in the 1998 elections was the partial state subsidy in the form of allocation of free time for seven national and 34 state parties on the state-owned television and radio networks, totalling 61 hours on each of the two media, which had been limited in 1996 to one television and two radio broadcasts of 15 minutes to each of such parties, on the basis of a formula based on a certain minimum time topped up by additional time in proportion to vote share in the last elections (Election Commission of India, Press Note: 15 January 1998). Reporting requirements of candidates were made more stringent on the basis of the April 1996 Supreme Court orders, candidates now having to furnish details of the expenditure incurred by their party and supporters. One is forced to conclude that election finance reform to reduce costs, corruption and the nexus between black money and political parties, has totally failed. Mounting election expenditures have made a mockery of limits, which were farcical anyway because of the non-inclusion of party and independent supporter spending. Patterns of Fund-Raising and Expenditure by Major Political Parties in 1996 An assessment of actual expenditures and modes of fund-raising compared to earlier elections yields the following picture.6 As regards fund-raising by the major parties, the traditional pattern had been as follows. For the Congress, membership dues always played a small part. As early as the 1960s, donations from large industrial houses played the major part. An increasingly large part of this came from the black money economy which grew rapidly under the public sector-led, import-substituting industrialization model. The Congress Party, at that time, had certain leading politicians in charge of collecting party funds, such as S.K. Patil and Atulya Ghosh in the 1960s, L.N. Mishra, Umashankar Dikshit and Rajni Patel in the 1970s. These individuals would liaise with businessmen and collect funds, largely in cash or, at election time, in kind, primarily vehicles. Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 323 Congress Party With the centralization of the Congress Party after the 1969 split, Mrs Gandhi, being both the Prime Minister and party President, began to directly oversee fund collection. Bank nationalization in 1969 further enhanced the government’s regulatory powers over the business community. The ban on company donations in 1969, coupled with the lack of state funding to compensate, left no legal source of adequate political finance. Thus, the nexus with the black money economy was greatly strengthened, especially as the need for funds increased in the inflationary 1970s, fuelled by the post-1967 emergence of growing challenges to the Congress Party. The major change was the resort, since 1980, to relatively large kickbacks from foreign firms on a relatively few public sector defence and infrastructure equipment import deals. This reduced the necessity of approaching domestic businesses and represented a centralization of fund-raising at the top of the party. Certain businessmen close to the top leadership became conduits for fund collection. Much of the money collected was held outside the country in secret bank accounts. Consequently, the need to maintain active and expanding state and local party units that could raise money from diversified sources declined. The relegalization of company donations since 1985 did not change this picture. There was no incentive for business to go via the legal route because it meant revealing party identification, possible shareholder problems and because political donations were not tax deductible or allowable as a business expense. The result was that the system of fund collection for elections and other party activities became dependent on the corrupt exercise of discretionary controls over imports, licensing (of entry into economic activity), public sector contracting and administered prices (Kochanek 1987). The whole system depended on an intricate web of personal connections and unwritten understandings on the quid pro quo for donations. Approaches to donors were usually made by party persons or candidates’ agents known to the donor. Donations in cash were collected by trusted middlemen; in the case of large donations to a candidate, an audience with the candidate was usually arranged for the donor so as to confirm receipt and cement the understanding on the quid pro quo. The Congress until the 1990s raised and spent more money than all other parties put together. BJP For the BJP, the traditional pattern was one of contributions from their principal social base, the small and medium businesses in retail and wholesale 324 E. Sridharan trade, mostly collected by local party units in small amounts from a large number of donors. Before the major expansion of the BJP in the 1990s, it was also largely locally spent as the party contested only a minority of seats. The growth of the BJP in the 1990s has changed the picture. The proportion of party finance coming from large industry has increased greatly, especially in the BJP’s stronghold states in the North and West. Nevertheless, it is still significantly less than half the total. Small and medium trade and industry and other small donors still made up the bulk of the BJP’s election finances in 1996. Although the BJP has not had much opportunity to make money by corrupt means, it has been deeply enmeshed in the black economy.7 This is because tax evasion has always been pervasive in its traditional core base, small business, as compared to the salaried stratum whose incomes are taxed at source. In 1996, an ‘unhealthy trend’, according to a top BJP source was that an increasing share of contributions came from the corrupt incomes of contractors and bureaucrats. Lastly, expatriate Indian contributions to the BJP-affiliated Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) have found their way to the BJP. The top leadership of the party was kept informed of the donors and amounts and had to approve all deals, but it did not involve themselves directly in the transactions. In 1991 and 1996, seven or eight party leaders from Delhi, Bombay, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh were the principal links with industry for fund-raising and usually collected the money personally or supervised it closely. Sometimes two or more persons were deputed to make the actual collection to prevent misappropriation. Party funds were under the control of state party offices. The central party office would aid the ‘deficit’ states by transferring funds from the centrally collected fund pool. The states that produced the transferable ‘surplus’ for the central office in 1996 were Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Delhi. Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh were self-sufficient, the other states were in ‘deficit’. A sizeable proportion of the funds are collected by the constituency-level party offices and the candidates themselves, and more importantly, payment of election costs by supporters at the constituency level is significant. Other Parties As for other parties, the Janata Dal and regional parties have operated in essentially the same way as the Congress in the states where they have been in power. Funds have been raised by manipulation of administered prices on commodities like sugarcane, molasses, tendu leaves, and the like, in concert with trade and industrial lobbies, with a cut going to the party/politicians in power, by corrupt kickbacks in government departments of power and Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 325 irrigation and by the use of regulatory powers in concert with real estate lobbies in cities. In some states like Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, illegal activities like smuggling and the liquor trade (because of prohibition) are sources of political finance. The exceptions have been the Left parties, particularly the CPM, which despite two decades in power in West Bengal and long spells in Kerala and Tripura, have been much less involved in large-scale corruption than the Congress and other parties. While receiving varying levels of Sovietbloc subsidies in a variety of ways until the late 1980s, they raised their very limited finances primarily by trade union help in West Bengal and membership dues including mass collection drives and charges on the salaries of MPs and MLAs. While trade unions do not contribute directly to the CPM, industry contributions to the CPM in states where the party is in power are believed to be negotiated with the help of trade unions. The 1996 Election The 1996 election was a departure from established patterns of fund-raising in certain small but significant ways. For the first time, a significant number of major companies were not approached for donations, including those who had contributed in earlier times. Even when approached, the attitude was more one of ‘friendly persuasion’ than pressure. Even more significant, for the first time (a small minority of) contributions by cheque were accepted, and receipts were given by both the Congress and the BJP. Sums of Rs 1–1.5 million were mentioned as being paid by cheque to the BJP. In some cases, receipts were given for cash contributions by both parties. However, fundraising by traditional methods still overwhelmingly predominated. In 1993, when the BJP had first asked for donations by cheque, closely followed by the Congress, the response was virtually nil.8 On the election expenditure side, 1996 departed somewhat from the past. The Election Commission was very strict in enforcing the spending limits. Taken together with the Supreme Court’s orders of January and April 1996, and the fallout of the hawala scandal, political parties and candidates were significantly deterred from overt overspending on conspicuous items like visual publicity and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers. The fear was that the election might be cancelled if violations were too blatant. The Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan had cancelled or interrupted at least 20 elections in the past five years. The 1996 election saw the ‘Seshan effect’ curbing visible overspending that was first seen in the 1994–95 State Assembly elections. The biggest single expenditure item was transport in most constituencies especially rural as in earlier elections. 326 E. Sridharan Even business sources generally tend to confirm lesser expenditures from the pattern of fund-raising and bearing of expenses by them on behalf of candidates and parties. One can conclude that spending has not climbed at the earlier rate between elections; indeed, it has been checked. However, while the spending limit was an unrealistically low Rs 450,000 for most constituencies, and independent estimates put the figures at between Rs 2 million and Rs 20 million per constituency for the leading party candidates, including candidate, party and supporter (but not government machinery) expenditures. Government spending on conduct of the elections, has been estimated to have been Rs 5,180 million, a substantial increase from the under Rs 3,000 million spent in 1991.9 An important reason for this would surely be the increased costs of monitoring, including videography and transport. Preliminary forecasts of expenditure during the 1998 election indicate that the elections may cost the government about Rs 7,000 million and political parties, candidates and their well-wishers may spend an additional Rs 15,000 million.10 One significant point needs to be noted. Interviews with industry sources consistently yielded far higher expenditure estimates for constituencies on average and in aggregate, especially for the Congress Party, both in 1989 and 1991, than party sources. A similar pattern held for the BJP. Industry sources mentioned figures of Rs 15–20 million for leading party candidate expenditures (usually Congress or BJP) on average for 1991, including party and supporter expenditures, implying Rs 8,000–11,000 million for either of those parties in aggregate in 1991, especially the Congress. Party sources named much lower figures even including party and supporter expenditures, typically ranging from Rs 2–10 million. One possible explanation for this discrepancy in perceptions is that only a fraction of the funds raised, are actually spent on elections. ‘Election funds’ may actually be an excuse for corruption, as many industrialists believe. If this is the case, then, needless to say, the reduction of election costs will not reduce corruption much or facilitate deregulation and transparency in government. Comparing these rough estimates, the basic lesson of the 1996 general election is that spending limits, if strictly enforced, can have an effect on curbing high-visibility expenditures. Especially if the party-spending loophole is plugged as it was de jure (but not de facto!) by the April Supreme Court order. The preliminary estimates of election expenditure in 1998 indicate that the pressure on politicians to be less ostentatious in campaigns is partly systemic (shorter campaign period, the April 1996 Supreme Court order) and partly due to continuing strict implementation of the rules (including more pro forma for declaring expenses), thereby not dependent on individuals like Seshan. Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 327 Policy Lessons and Options for India At the outset it needs to be emphasized that election finance reform in India involves two related but distinct issues. One is the cost of elections per se. The other is politicians’ imperative to raise election funds and, hence, the temptation to abuse power. In theory, it is possible to reduce the cost of elections without reducing the imperatives of politicians. It is also possible, in theory, to reduce considerably the imperative to abuse power to raise election funds without reducing the cost of elections. In the first case, even if the cost of elections were reduced they would still cost something not inconsiderable and that money would have to be raised from private contributions. If a major party or coalition contests 400 seats, with a spending limit of Rs 1.5 million each, it would need Rs 600 million. This would still lead to strong pressures to raise money by illegal means while in office even if the amount were frozen or reduced, making it difficult to effect any real deregulation in the government. In the second case, it is possible to greatly reduce the imperatives for corruption, to the extent that they arise from the need for election funds, even without reducing election costs if state funding of elections is instituted. State funding will provide a financial floor to parties and candidates. Fund-raising will no longer be a political life-or-death imperative. This opens up the possibility of greatly reducing corruption as well as moving towards genuine transparency in economic administration. While the two issues are complementary, we make the point to underline their distinctiveness. The link between these two issues is that both kinds of reduction increase equality of political opportunity, an important objective for democracy in a poor country. However, international experience shows that state funding and other political finance regulation can have unanticipated consequences. Understanding the impact of political finance regulations on politicians’ incentives is critical for minimising these. Deriving policy mixes from actual and possible variants of the three broad international patterns of election finance reform, i.e., minimalist, maximalist and mixed, there are, broadly speaking, the following six options that are available for India in increasing order of magnitude of their distance from the status quo. Private Funding with Strict Expenditure Limits The first option would be a minimalist pattern of state regulation on the present U.K. model. It would consist of limits on candidate spending but no 328 E. Sridharan state funding. Party spending would be allowed without limits if there is no mention of any candidate, but will be clubbed with candidate spending and deemed authorized by the candidate whether it is so or not, if it identifies candidates. Private spending in aid of a candidate’s election will be deemed authorized by the candidate whether it is so or not and will be illegal. Under this option there will be no limits on contributions to political parties except that of 5 per cent of average net profits over the past three years under Section 293A of the Companies Act. This option has several potential problems. One is that if there are no limits on party expenditure so long as parties do not campaign for identifiable candidates and/or if they submit audited accounts, the latter being the present position, then there are no effective limits on campaign spending. Closely contested elections in an era of multi-party politics will make it difficult to restrain spending. Hence, the imperative to raise funds by corrupt means will remain. Second, in a federal country like India, major parties have units at the central (national), state, district/constituency and lower levels. If the requirement of audited accounts and transparency of expenditures is not applied down to the lowest levels of parties, transparency will not be achieved. Both expenditures and fund-raising can take place at lower levels of the party hierarchy. In fact, the BJP and the CPM among the major parties both raise and spend election funds in a major way at the constituency level. In Italy too, since the transparency regulations did not apply to the local level from 1974 to the late 1980s, actual expenditures are estimated to be much higher than the official. If this loophole of levels is left open, election expenditure limits will remain ineffective and corrupt fund-raising will continue. Private Funding with Separate or Clubbed Party and Candidate Expenditure Limits The second option would be an extended minimalist option consisting of the above with either separate limits on party expenditure in addition to limits on candidate expenditure, or clubbed party and candidate expenditure with revised limits, disallowing independent private spending. This would introduce more effective limits on election spending and help restrain costs, provided there is strict monitoring of election expenditure, as well as more stringent reporting and disclosure laws covering not only the election period for parties and candidates, but requiring annual audited accounts covering incomes and expenditures at all levels of the party organization. Detecting independent private spending will still be very difficult. Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 329 Private Funding with Expenditure and Contribution Limits A third option would be the same as the second but with limits on contributions, based on the US model. It would introduce limits on contributions by amount per donor for different categories of donors, all of which will have to be disclosed. This option will also face severe practical problems. For one thing, limits on contributions in the absence of state funding of elections let alone parties, will work only if expenditure limits are effectively implemented. The lesson of the US and Japanese experience is that limits on contributions per donor do not work in the absence of effective capping of election expenditures since costs are not capped while sources of funds are. Indeed, they generate more pressure for fund-raising from a larger number of donors, especially where parties or faction leaders are weak and candidates have to bear the burden of fund-raising. This is what led to several corruption scandals in these countries and approximates the Indian situation where several major parties are essentially loose coalitions of opportunistic faction leaders with no organizational machinery to speak of. Additionally, limits on contributions will be extremely difficult to monitor in India, the bulk of contributions being made from unaccounted cash reserves and/or in kind. Unless political contributions are made tax deductible or allowable as a business expense, to which there can be other objections on grounds of public interest and principle, and unless businessmen are less vulnerable to discretionary regulatory decisions, there will be no incentive to shift to payment by cheque. A major deterrent to the latter is the fact of a still highly regulated economy where business donors do not want to get identified with any political party and possibly offend other parties. The problem with modified minimalist options that do not include state funding is that politicians will still have to raise sizeable funds privately even if expenditure limits reduce costs. In a still largely rural and illiterate society with very large parliamentary constituencies averaging million-plus voters each, electioneering involves an unavoidable amount of transport and visual publicity expenditure in contrast to fully televised, urban societies. Unrealistic expenditure limits will be unenforceable while realistic expenditure limits will mean that much more fund-raising will be necessary. Given the realities of discretionary regulation and the existence of a large black economy, it will be very difficult for political donations to be enforced through company contributions under Section 293A even with tax incentives. Party and supporter expenditures will be extremely difficult to monitor even if they are declared includable in candidate spending or illegal respectively. Thus, modified minimalist options will be ineffective in reducing corrupt fund-raising, leaving state funding as the only serious option. 330 E. Sridharan Partial State Funding of Elections The fourth option is the introduction of partial state funding of elections along with limits on expenditures as in the second option above, representing a mixed option. This would partially reduce the pressure on political parties to raise funds, including by corrupt means, and would therefore contribute to deregulation and transparency in economic policy and administration. Comprehensive State Funding of Elections The fifth option is an extension of the fourth to one of comprehensive state funding of elections. The issue that will remain is whether parties will be allowed to raise additional private funds for elections. As long as state funding covers only elections and not the inter-election activities of political parties, the latter will have to raise funds for such activities from private contributions. It will be very difficult to check the use of such funds for elections in addition to state support. A complementary measure would have to be a ban on company donations to political parties and candidates for elections. The reporting and disclosure, and related internal democracy, transparency and accountability, requirements for political parties and candidates, will have to be more stringent as will have to be the monitoring of election expenditures by the Election Commission as in 1996. The fourth and fifth options of partial and full state funding of elections raise a number of issues. The fourth option has several inherent difficulties in the Indian context, although it is, in fact, close to the Goswami Committee recommendations of partial state funding in kind only. First, it needs to be emphasized that state funding in cash or kind must be comprehensive, covering all major electioneering requirements, to be effective in removing the imperative to raise political funds in corrupt ways. Second, state funding of any kind raises the crucial issue of who is to be funded, parties or candidates, the related issue of the transparency of party accounts, and the even more critical issue of intra-party democracy. Unlike in most European countries, parties in India are not institutionalized, many of them being merely loose alliances of faction leaders without a party organization functioning according to a party constitution and keeping accounts of incomes and expenditures. Party funding implicitly assumes this. Parties have little or no internal democracy, being top-down clientelistic organizations, the doings of top leaders and party finances not being transparent to the rank and file. The best indicator of this is the fact that candidate nominations for elections are, typically, decided by the national party leaderships, even for state assembly elections. Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 331 Funding parties will only strengthen the powers of leaderships, most of which will probably be unwilling to accept statutory regulation of their affairs, internal democracy and transparency.11 But these features are essential for the financial accountability necessary for state funding. Therefore, for the viability of even partial state funding in cash and/or in kind, reporting and disclosure requirements will have to go beyond audited accounts of incomes and expenditures down to the lowest units of the parties, to encompass the adoption of party constitutions, internal elections and clear responsibilities. This will meet with strong resistance from party. If state funding of elections is introduced for parliamentary elections in a federal country, it will also have to be introduced eventually for state assembly elections if the objectives of reducing election expenses of parties and reducing political corruption are to be achieved. State level leaders of all parties are bound to insist on distribution of funds to their level directly, for state assembly if not parliamentary elections; or else they will become even more dependent on national party leaderships. Another issue will be the eligibility criterion for state funding. Past performance is the usual basis with a qualifying cut-off. However, if based partly on the results of the election to be contested, overpaid parties will have to reimburse, and underpaid parties be reimbursed by the state after the election. If independents are eligible, subject to cut-offs, then aspirants or sitting MPs who do not get nominations but qualify by past vote percentage criteria in their constituencies, may secede and contest as independents, undermining parties. Another issue will be the basis on which state funds are to be allocated to parties. In a plurality-rule election system with seat-vote disproportionality and much larger fluctuation in seat than vote shares, seat shares will not be acceptable to most parties. Nor may vote shares be fully acceptable in an era of flux. Also, funding on a reimbursement system as in Germany or Italy will not work since money is needed in advance; if not available then it will inevitably be raised by corrupt means. These are issues to be thought through since any system of state funding will have unanticipated first and second order consequences since it alters the style of functioning of, and power relationships within and between parties. State Funding of Political Parties A sixth option is the public funding of parties on the maximalist pattern. This can be either comprehensive funding of parties for all their activities including elections, or on a matching grant formula basis against funds raised 332 E. Sridharan by the parties themselves, as in the Netherlands and, since 1994, in Japan. The other requirements of this option would be the same as for the fifth option. This option will be the most expensive. More fundamentally, political parties are not constitutionally recognized entities unlike in, say, Germany, not to speak of not being institutionalized, with all the difficulties for any kind of state funding that implies. As emerged in German Constitutional Court judgements, it is debatable in principle whether full state support to political parties is justified. Political parties are free associations of citizens for political purposes, and such free associations should be able to prove their independent viability by raising the bulk of their own funds; or so it can be argued. State support for political parties may only encourage the proliferation of fund-seeking parties. In India, it could encourage the break-up of existing parties by ambitious faction leaders. It also should be remembered that public party funding did not reduce election expenses in several countries in the short run as parties can collude to raise the level of public funding. This option is thus unworkable in the Indian situation, especially when the party system is fluid. The Political and Economic Feasibility of Collective Action for State Funding of Elections Any viable reform of political finance has to be not only in the public interest but also in the interest of existing political parties. It can be conceptualized as a collective action problem between parties. The conditions for collective action did not exist, we argue, in the single predominant party system that existed until 1989 since the predominant Congress Party would have no incentive to constrain its superior fund-raising potential. The partysystemic changes that have been in progress since 1989 leading to the emergence of a still evolving multi-party system without a dominant party have arguably created some of the enabling conditions for collective action on state funding. This is so for three reasons. First, the cost of contesting elections has been rising inexorably. Second, while mounting election expenditures over the past three decades in a highly regulated economy may, at first glance, be expected to benefit the incumbent party, this has not been the case. This period has seen the decline of the predominant party system and the increasingly rapid turnover of incumbents (Butler, Lahiri and Roy 1996). Therefore, mounting expenditures do not necessarily deliver victory while they do increase costs for politicians. The present system of political finance is an increasingly highcost, high-risk proposition for politicians, creating incentives for the consideration of the state-funding alternative.12 Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 333 Third, as party strengths are more balanced in a multi-party system, and victories are increasingly uncertain, two broad possibilities arise. One is that of intensified competition including a downward spiral of more and more recklessly competitive economic, religious, caste and regional populism. The other is that of collective action, including on the issue of introducing state funding of elections to reduce costs and risks for all parties (and large donors). In the light of the foregoing analysis we would argue that comprehensive state funding of elections only, complemented by the limits on expenditure and reporting and disclosure requirements as in the fifth option, would greatly reduce though not eliminate the imperative for corrupt fund-raising, and help democratize and make transparent the functioning of political parties. It would be the best of the options available. Having outlined the collective action incentives for state funding, it is important to ask what the collective action problems are. The main collective action problem, we argue, is the fact that while state funding will reduce risks and costs for party leaderships, it will simultaneously reduce their control within their parties by forcing internal democracy and accountability.13 Political party leaders are faced with a trade-off. A pessimistic view, held by industrialists, is that while all parties pay lip service to the idea of state funding, they are not serious about it because most politicians are in politics for money, and are quite happy with the present system despite its mounting costs and risks, since it is not their own but donors’ money that they are risking.14 Nevertheless, it was largely agreed, in principle, by both, the parties and the industry that a system of state funding will be in the collective interest of both.15 The Supreme Court orders of January and April 1996 will weaken the power of leaderships and force a degree of transparency, reinforced by the fact that no party enjoys a parliamentary majority resulting in state-level leaderships becoming increasingly powerful in all parties. What is important for political finance reform in this context is the exploitation of the unanticipated first and second-order consequences of various systems of state funding that can lead to stabilization of the system over time. What are possible unanticipated consequences of the fifth option? If funds are channelled through central party leaderships it will only reinforce their powers. If channelled through central and state party leaderships it may help to strengthen the latter vis-à-vis the former and thus ‘federalize’ the internal structure of parties. While this will be a major step forward in the internal democratization, it will not necessarily make parties more democratic below that level. If, however, state funding is wholly or largely channelled directly to the candidates after nomination, with separate funds for partylevel electioneering as a sub-option, the latter disbursed both at central and 334 E. Sridharan state levels for both parliamentary and state assembly elections, it will be revolutionary. It will empower candidates and weaken the national and state leaderships of all parties (which is why such a suggestion may well be resisted). It will greatly intensify the struggle for nominations and, with a lag, lead to demands for intra-party democracy and transparency so that nominations are made on a democratic and transparent basis. A further lagged consequence will be threats of secession by disgruntled factions, unless the nomination process and, by extension, party functioning as a whole, is democratized. Even at other times top leaderships will have to deal democratically with lesser leaders since factions can secede, form a new party and claim state funding. Thus, if the fifth option is implemented by combining internal regulation of parties with channelling of funds to candidates after nomination for elections, with separate funds for party-level election expenditures channelled to central and state-level leaderships, a process of logical consequences could be set in motion that would reinforce internal democracy and accountability and stabilize the system, making rentseeking politics more difficult. Since party nominations, with the process democratized, will precede state funding disbursements to candidates, it would not lead to a candidate-centred system, weakening parties and programmatic politics. The other issues are of party eligibility and state-funding formulae. If parties are to be disbursed funds per candidate, it will only encourage parties to run more candidates, unless there is a cut-off below which the money will have to be reimbursed. The criteria for party and for independents’ eligibility should strike a fine balance between reducing political competition by making the emergence of new and minor parties more difficult on the one hand, and encouraging a proliferation of state fund-seeking parties on the other. Most countries use cut-offs based on vote share in the previous (or on a reimbursement basis, the current) election of 1.5 per cent to 5 per cent at national, state and constituency levels, with lower shares for independents. Roughly similar percentages could be used, higher for parties, lower for independents, with some system of equivalences between national, state and constituency level performances for the purposes of state-funding eligibility. For example, a party can be considered eligible if it gets below the cut-off point in the national vote share but is above a higher cut-off point (say 20 per cent) in a certain minimum number of parliamentary constituencies, reflecting a significant regionally concentrated political force. Alternatively, state funds could be distributed on the basis of vote and/or seat share. In a plurality-rule system both could create problems because of seat-vote disproportionality and regional concentration. In principle, vote share is a better indicator of popular support. If parties are to be given state funds, distributed at multiple levels, based on vote share (by formula, with Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 335 equivalences between levels to deal with the problem of localized strength), with funds being channelled mainly directly to nominated candidates, they would lack an incentive to run non-serious candidates, since the funds would have to be distributed to candidates in adequate amounts. Either a single formula or a combination of the above formulae could be used to distribute state funds for elections. Comprehensive reporting and disclosure of incomes and expenditures of parties and candidates, both for the election period as well as annually, at all levels, and some degree of internal democracy, should be the eligibility conditions. Without these requirements neither election expenditure nor corrupt fund-raising may be controllable. The primary purpose of state funding, in the Indian context, should be not only to reduce the cost of elections per se but also to reduce the imperatives and opportunities for rent seeking. In doing so it will both reinforce the legitimacy of democracy, and reinforce deregulation and transparency in economic administration. About financing such a state fund there are currently two suggestions, both originating from the CII, a cess on excise duty and a fund pool to which industry can contribute on a voluntary or ‘election tax’ basis. The latter is flawed in principle since it means the creation of an official nexus between industry and election funding when elections are a public good which, if state-financed, should be financed from general revenues not from taxes or contributions that specifically fall on industry. Second, sections of industry do not agree with the idea of an ‘election tax’ because when additional private fund-raising is allowed, there will be further demands on them. Also, if voluntary, the fund pool may face the classic free rider problem, viz., each firm will leave it to others to contribute.16 Lastly, the very idea of company donations, as allowed currently under Section 293A (if not utilized because of company and politician aversion to transparency), is potentially flawed and damaging to democracy because it politicizes companies. This is very dangerous in the already heavily regulated Indian economic environment. Nearly all important companies in India are dependent on central and/or state public financial institutions as lenders and/or shareholders. Will these institutions’ representatives on boards be politically neutral between ruling and other parties when political donation proposals are to be cleared? What about the shareholders? Can managements and boards use corporate funds belonging to a diverse mass of shareholders to support any particular party or candidate? The basic point is that political contributions are not like any other business expenditure and that long-term and unhealthy politicization of industry could take root. There is, however, another way of raising a state fund without imposing a burden on the exchequer. Currently, the nearly 800 MPs of both houses 336 E. Sridharan of Parliament are entitled to Rs 10 million annually for Local Area Development expenditure in their constituencies, or close to Rs 40,000 million over a five year period. This is proposed to be increased to Rs 20 million per MP. This scheme is wrong in principle and politically unfair. Wrong because it takes away some of the responsibility for development activity from both the state and local initiative and makes it a matter of individual patronage. It is politically unfair because it gives an advantage to the incumbent (of whatever party) over his rivals by giving him a discretionary expenditure purse of Rs 50 million over a term. If this scheme is abolished and a part of the funds are used for state funding of elections, it could actually be a considerable net public saving, and would be the best way of financing state funding of elections. Notes 01. We are heavily indebted to the work of Alexander (1989b, 1989c), Bartels (1992), Butler and Ranney (1992), Charlot and Charlot (1992), Ciaurro (1989), Curtis (1992), Del Castillo (1989), Esaiasson (1992), Foster and Muste (1992), Gunlicks (1988), Hirose (1994), Hughes (1992), Kaase (1992), Kavanagh (1992), Koole (1989), Levitt (1995), Linton (1994), Mendilow (1989, 1992), Mitchell and Bretting (1993), Nassmacher (1989), Paltiel (1980, 1981, 1989), Pinto-Duschinsky (1989) in the academic literature and to the cooperation of several countries’ embassies in New Delhi. 02. See Alexander 1989b: 14, Table 1, for the above information. This is an inclusive list, i.e., including countries were public subsidization of parties or elections has been introduced at any level of government or for election to any office, howsoever limited this subsidization may be. Thus it includes, for example, France 1965 although France is not generally considered a country with public funding of election, until after the 1988 reforms. Similarly, party funding in Japan really began only in after the 1994 reforms on a matching grant basis. 03. This account is indebted to the pioneering work of Acharya et al. (1986); Confederation of Indian Industry (1993); Government of India (1990); Jain (1994); Manor (1992); Panandiker and Roy (1977, 1994); Singh (1986) and to several confidential interviews with politicians, industrialists and industry association executives both before and after the 1996 elections, press reports and relevant reports and Press Notes of the Election Commission of India. 04. Interview with R.C. Bhargava, then chief executive officer of one of India’s largest companies, Maruti Udyog, and chairman of CII’s Task Force, 8 December 1995, and CII sources. 05. Press reports, January–May 1996, for the material in this paragraph. 06. This account is based on pre- and post-election interviews with leading industrialists, industry association officials and political parties, and press reports. The topic of election finance is so sensitive because of the prevalence of black money and corruption in fund-raising that all interviews were given in strict confidence, precluding identification or attribution. Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 337 07. Except as part of the Janata Party in 1977–79, the BJP had not been in power at the national level before March 1998, except for 13 days in May 1996, and likewise not in the states before 1990. 08. Congress treasurer Sitaram Kesri’s circular letter of 6 October 1993 to industrialists is appended to Confederation of Indian Industry (1993). 09. Interview with Deputy Election Commissioner, Subhas Pani, 2 and 6 April 1998. This includes travel/daily allowance for government staff on election duty, costs of transport of staff and deployment of security forces specifically for elections, but not the regular pay of either, and all other election-related expenses. 10. Rakesh Bhatnagar, ‘Ordinance soon on raising poll expenses limit’, Times of India, 12 December 1997; government spending figure confirmed to be roughly accurate by Deputy Election Commissioner, Subhas Pani, interviews, 2 and 6 April, 1998. 11. A point emphasized by industrialists and politicians across parties was that one of the most contentious issues in state funding will be the question of to whom in parties will state funds by given to and placed under the control of. 12. See Geddes (1991) for an analogous argument that more equal competition between parties improved the prospects for administrative reform in Latin American countries as it facilitated collective action. 13. This is the author’s strong impression gained from interviews with politicians, in and out of power, before and after the 1996 elections. 14. This was emphasized by several industrialists, especially those associated with the CII’s dialogue with political parties on the issue of election finance reform, upto the end of 1995, before the landmark Supreme Court orders. 15. Interviews with party functionaries and veteran politicians. 16. Interview with a former industry association president, 17 June 1996. References Acharya, Shankar et al. 1986. Aspects of the Black Money Economy in India. New Delhi: National Institute for Public Finance and Policy. Alexander, Herbert E. (ed.), 1989a. Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1989b. ‘Money and Politics: Rethinking a Conceptual Framework’, in Herbert E. Alexander (ed.), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 9–23. ———. 1989c. ‘American Presidential Elections Since Public Funding 1976–84’, in Herbert E. Alexander (ed.), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 95–123. ———. 1994. ‘American Presidential Elections 1976–1992’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press. pp. 41–56. Alexander, Herbert E. and Rei Shiratori (eds). 1994. Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Avril, Pierre. 1994. ‘Regulation of Political Finance in France’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 85–96. 338 E. Sridharan Bartels, Larry M. 1992. ‘The Impact of Electioneering in the United States’, in Butler and Ranney (eds), Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 244– 77. Butler, David, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy. 1996. India Decides. New Delhi: Living Media. Butler, David, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney (eds). 1981. Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. Butler, David and Austin Ranney (eds). 1992. Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Charlot, Jean and Monica Charlot. 1992. ‘France’, in David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 133–55. Ciaurro, Gian Franco. 1989. ‘Public Financing of Parties in Italy’, in Alexander (ed.), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 153–71. Confederation of Indian Industry. 1993. The Financing of Democracy and Elections, New Delhi: Confederation of Indian Industry. Curtis, Gerald L. 1992. in David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 222– 43. Del Castillo, Pilar. 1989. ‘Financing of Spanish Political Parties’, in Herbert E. Alexander (ed.), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 172–99. Esaiasson, Peter. 1992. ‘Scandinavia’, in David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 202–21. Foster, Jody and Christopher Muste. 1992. ‘The United States’, in David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 11–42. Geddes, Barbara. 1991. ‘A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies’, in American Political Science Review, 85: 371–91. Gidlund, Gullan, M. 1994. ‘Regulation of Party Finance in Sweden’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 105–14. Government of India. 1990. ‘Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms’ (Goswami Committee Report). New Delhi: Ministry of Law and Justice. Gunlicks, A. 1988. ‘Campaign and Party Finance in the West German Party State’, Review of Politics, 50: 30–48. Hirose, Takako. 1994. Two Asian Democracies: A Comparative Study of the Single Predominant Party Systems of India and Japan. New Delhi: Konark Publishers. Hughes, Colin A. 1992. ‘Australia and New Zealand’, in David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 88–109. Jain, R.B. 1994. ‘The Reform Efforts in India’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 159–72. Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections 339 Kaase, Max. 1992. ‘Germany’, in David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 156–72. Kavanagh, Dennis. 1992. ‘The United Kingdom’, in David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 70–87. Kochanek, Stanley A. 1987. ‘Briefcase Politics in India: The Congress Party and the Business Elite’, Asian Survey, 27(12): 1278–1301. Koole, Ruud. 1989. ‘The “Modesty” of Dutch Party Finance’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 200–19. ———. 1994. ‘Dutch Political Parties: Money and the Message’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), A Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 115–32. Levitt, Steven D. 1995. ‘Policy Watch: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(1): 183–93. Linton, Martin. 1994. Money and Votes, London: Institute for Public Policy Research. Malbin, Michael J. (ed.). 1980. Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Law. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. Manor, James. 1992. ‘India’, David E. Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Electioneering: A Comparative Study of Continuity and Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 110–32. Mendilow, Jonathan. 1992. ‘Public Party Funding and Party Transformation in Multi-Party Systems’, Comparative Political Studies, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 25(1): 90–117. ———. 1989. ‘Party Financing in Israel: Experience and Experimentation 1968–85’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 124–52. Mitchell, Neal G. and John G. Bretting. 1993. ‘Business and Political Finance in the United Kingdom’, Comparative Political Studies, 26(2): 229–45. Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. 1989. ‘Structure and Impact of Public Subsidies to Political Parties in Europe: The Examples of Austria, Italy, Sweden and West Germany’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 236–67. Paltiel, Khayyam Z. 1980. ‘Public Financing Abroad: Contrasts and Effects’, in Malbin (ed.), Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Law. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute: 354–70. ———. 1981. ‘Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms’, in David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney (eds), Democracy at the Polls. A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute: 138–72. ———. 1989. ‘Canadian Election Expense Legislation 1963-85: A Critical Appraisal or Was the Effort Worth It?’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 51–75. Panandiker, Pai, V.A. and Ramashray Roy. 1977. ‘Financing of Elections’, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. Park, Chan Wook. 1994. ‘Financing Political Parties in South Korea: 1988–91’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 173–86. 340 E. Sridharan Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael. 1989. ‘Trends in British Political Funding 1979–84’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 24–50. Reddy, Agarala Easwara and D. Sunder Ram. 1992. Electoral Reforms in India, New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House. Reddy, G. Krishna. 1992. ‘The Role of Money Power in Elections’, in Reddy and Ram (eds), Electoral Reform in India. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House: 195–216. Shiratori, Rei. 1994. ‘Political Finance and Scandal in Japan’, in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori (eds), Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies. Boulder CO: Westview Press: 187–206. Singh, L.P. 1986. Electoral Reform. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House. 13 Selection of Congress Candidates: The Formal Criteria* RAMASHRAY ROY General Elections are important not only because they determine the outcome of inter-party competition for the control of the power apparatus of the society, but also because they are instrumental in renewing the citizens’ sense of responsibility and legitimacy by refreshing their ties with the political system. Elections set forces in motion which have far-reaching implications for all the competing parties participating in the contest. The decision to fight elections entails not only that the party accept the ‘rules of the game’ but also that it goes through all the procedures that culminate on the polling day in converting public sympathy into party preference and voting decisions. Among all the procedures that make up the final electoral process, the selection of candidates is by far the most important. The reasons for this are not too far to seek. In the first place, considering the number of seats to be contested both at the state and the national level,1 the party needs an elaborate organizational machinery in order to cope with the heavy task of processing applications, scrutinizing them, interviewing and screening candidates. Moreover, the process of selection necessitates streamlining of the party organization because it not only involves the entire organizational machinery but also requires the completion of the process in a short time in order that the party may be able to devote itself to other essential matters pertaining to canvassing of support, etc. * This article was originally published as ‘Selection of Congress Candidates: The Formal Criteria’, Economic Weekly, 1(2), 31 December 1966. 342 Ramashray Roy Activates Dynamic Forces In the second place, the selection process activates the dynamic forces that provide sustenance to the party. We refer here to claims and the counterclaims that are advanced and vigorously pressed for consideration in regard to the selection of candidates. Here, we encounter a phenomenon which indicates the congruence between the party objectives and the perspectives of the party components. The party may emphasize and resolve to select the best-qualified candidates who will contribute significantly to the working of representative institutions. But against its pledge to select the ‘best’ candidates, personal, sectional and parochial claims for representation arise and the party may be compelled to compromise or reconcile the principle of qualifications and acquiesce to parochial claims in order to retain the support of those who advance these claims. The selection process thus brings to the surface all the conflicting interests that compose a party. For instance, the prospect of being elected as a representative constitutes for some a reward for past services and loyal support to the party. For others, it constitutes an opportunity for social prestige, status and power. There are also those who consider it their duty to represent the voters because of their experience, competence, ideological stance and commitment to greater causes. Also, some social and economic interests use the occasion of the selection of candidates in order to advance their own claims for representation and attempt to get persons of their choice selected as candidates. In short, selection of party candidates offers the first series of skirmishes between conflicting interests which grope for political articulation and control. If the party fails to adjust and reduce the intensity of these conflicting claims, it will go to the final battle bruised and battered with saboteurs and rebels active in its rear and on its flanks. A party which does succeed in managing conflict over its candidates effectively is not automatically ensured success at the polls; it is however, probable that such an accomplishment would allow the party organization to act concertedly without fear of sabotage from within. The selection process is a crucial test of the party’s flexibility and adaptability in coping with the pressures and counter-pressures that impinge upon it from both within and without. Authority Structure Revealed In the third place, the selection process brings into sharp relief the authority structure and the nature of relationship between different hierarchies within Selection of Congress Candidates 343 the party organization. Here we may refer to two contradictory tendencies: the tendency of centralization of command and the concentration of decision-making powers into the hands of higher level organs due to the necessity of injecting order and rationality into a process, which is highly vulnerable to the pushes and pulls of parochial claims. Opposed to this is the tendency towards fragmentation of authority, which reflects the pressures from below for autonomy and power. These two tendencies pull the organization into two different directions. However, for a party functioning in an open polity and dependent on the support of a wide cross-section of society, the necessity to defer to local leadership, initiative, opinion, and tradition becomes great. ‘. . . [T]he desperate need in all parties for votes which are scarcely mobilized at the apex of the hierarchy.. .’ creates a pragmatic necessity to keep in view ‘varying local milieus of opinion, tradition and social structure’ which encourages the recognition and acceptance of ‘local leadership, local strategy, local power.’2 If the higher echelon of the party fails to take cognizance of variations in local situations, it may be accused of taking decisions which have little or no relevance to local problems. The persistence of this phenomenon may give rise to resentment. In as much as the local activists think themselves to be the best judges of local conditions and consequently, in a better position to devise ways and means to cope with the situation, any prescription from above may be resented as being undue interference, if it conflicts with the judgment of the activities at the base. In case of excessive pressure, disobedience or indifference may result. Sanctions, of course, are available to the upper echelons of the party hierarchy, but excessive use of sanctions may affect the viability of the organization itself. The conflict between these two tendencies becomes most visible at the time of selection of candidates, and the party is faced with the necessity of achieving a workable balance between these two conflicting tendencies in order to safeguard the cohesiveness of the organization. Enables Political Recruitment In the fourth place, selection of candidates offers an opportunity to political activists to enter the ranks of the political elite and open fresh avenues for them to realize their ambitions for power and service. The competition for being selected as official candidates is usually very stiff. For instance, there is the claim of accumulated experience which underscores the necessity of continuity; there is also the claim that fresh blood should be given opportunities of gaining experience and maturity. There are other claims pertaining 344 Ramashray Roy to the representation of diverse socio-economic interests which compose the party. The selection process thus symbolizes the process of recruitment and promotion. Latent Conflicts Surface This aspect of the selection process pertains to the social base of the party and is indicative of the relationship between the party and its environment. The importance of the process of selection of candidates for the understanding of the nature and functioning of a political party thus becomes clear. The process brings all the latent conflicts to the surface and the party is faced with the task of channelling, muting, resolving or deferring these conflicts in order that it may count upon the support of the multiple interests that it represents for the achievement of control over the formal apparatus of government office. It is, finally, a process, which, after opening up conflict between broad party goals and particularistic perspectives, attempts to reassert consensual harmony in the party. Obviously, the selection process is of great significance to the party as an organization. It concerns the members of the party community in as much as it affects intimately their aspirations for access to the sources of power. It affects, moreover, their commitment to the party, their loyalty to the party’s goals, and their sense of identity with the party community. As in the case of citizens in general elections, the nomination process becomes an occasion for the members of the party community to renew their bonds of identification and satisfaction with the party. The Arrangement In the light of these considerations, the analysis and evaluation of the candidate-selection process, insofar as they throw light on the party’s recruitment, representation and integration functions, assumes central importance. The present paper analyzes the experience of the Congress Party in selecting its candidates during the general elections of 1957 and 1962. We first describe the criteria employed and the procedures adopted for selecting candidates, and examine their actual operation. We then discuss the pressures and cross-pressures that the party faces at the time of selection of candidates as well as the mechanism of coping with these pressures. Third, we identify in demographic terms, the characteristics of those who sought nomination as Congress candidates, which may offer some clues about the nature Selection of Congress Candidates 345 of the support structure that the party has built over the years. Finally, we describe and evaluate the type of internal authority structure in the party that is revealed by our examination of the selection process. The data for this paper is drawn only from two states, Bihar and Rajasthan. The paper is based primarily upon state Congress Party documents, including biographical data of applicants for Congress tickets, observers’ reports, reports of District Congress Committee (DCC) presidents. For both the 1957 and 1962 general elections, the Central Election Committee (CEC) issued to the Pradesh Congress Committees (PCCs), circulars which explained in detail the principles which were to govern the selection of candidates as well as the procedures to be followed. The CEC emphasized therein that the subordinate bodies while making recommendations must conform to the standards delineated in the circular. In general, the yardstick to be applied in the selection of candidates was ‘the integrity and ideological loyalty of the candidates’. But conscious of the necessity of facilitating the entry into the Congress of those elements, who have failed so far to come into the country’s political mainstream, the CEC circular in 1957 emphasized that: We have still to assimilate in the organization vast scores of people who are not even politically conscious, for instance, people from tribal areas, Scheduled Caste, from backward communities, from women and other denominations. In their case also we should be satisfied with a person who is otherwise well spoken of in the community and has a reputation of honesty and decent social behaviour.3 Exceptions to the General Criteria This is not the only instance, where the CEC speaks of making exceptions to the general criteria; there are others to which we will return later. Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that the general rules framed by CEC are intended as guidelines to help subordinate bodies in their deliberations. They are not intended to exclude those whose services may prove useful to the party. In other words, the party intends to retain its ‘outstanding ability’ without any reference to procedural matters. The formal criterion of eligibility in the party rules provides that a candidate must be an active Congress member with two years standing as a primary member in order to be considered for selection. But here also the circular stipulates that ‘the Congress President has the authority to relax the terms of two years primary membership in suitable cases’.4 This exception is to 346 Ramashray Roy be made not only in the case of ‘persons with outstanding ability whose services (may be) needed for the country’ but also in the case of those political groups or parties which have recently joined or rejoined the Congress. The relaxation of the condition of two years primary membership is also applicable in the case of women and minorities as well as persons coming from other political groups who have joined the Congress recently. Apart from the requirement that the applicant for Congress ticket should be an active member with two years standing as a primary member, there are other conditions that the applicant must fulfil. These requirements pertain to the applicants social, cultural, economic, and political outlook and his past record of service in the areas of constructive work and legislative bodies. It is desired that the applicant must hold progressive views on social, economic, and political questions. The circular specifically mentions the applicants outlook towards untouchability, land reforms, labour welfare, and economic justice. In the field of constructive work, the CEC suggested that constructive work not be interpreted in a rigid, narrow sense but broadly to include participation in the activity of the Bharat Sevak Samaj, Sarva Seva Sangh, Khadi and Village Industries Board, Harijan Sevak Sangh, Adimjati Sevak Sangh or in Community Projects, National Extension Service, Social Welfare Boards, Adult Education or any other constructive programme. Party Discipline Clearly, inclusion of such a wide range of activities in the area of constructive work gives an applicant wide scope to support his candidature by mentioning his experience in one or more areas of constructive work. Similarly, legislative work includes the applicant’s experience in local bodies, such as gram panchayats, panchayat samitis, municipal and district boards. However, lack of experience in parliamentary work or in local bodies does not debar a Congressman from being selected as a candidate. In addition to these, an applicant must have an untarnished record by any anti-party work. If he has violated the discipline of the party in any way, such as opposing the Congress in any election on being refused a Congress ticket, then his candidature would be unacceptable. Similarly, persons who have openly defied the clear mandate of the Congress in the matter of fundamental importance, who have shown greater propensity to look to the interest of their own group at the cost of the Congress ideology and the peoples’ welfare, persons who have tried to tamper with Selection of Congress Candidates 347 the stability of the government in their area by combining with opposition groups or forces and persons similarly situated . . . must be considered as having worked against the party.5 The CEC also emphasized that sufficient scope should be given to new members and fresh blood so that they may acquire sufficient experience and maturity in order to be able to contribute significantly to the cause of the party. Moreover, the promotion of fresh blood was felt necessary because it would lend vitality to the party. In the case of sitting members, the CEC suggested the additional criteria of the sitting members’ contact with their constituency and regular payment of contribution to the party. No Major Change in 1962 As far as the 1962 general elections are concerned, no major change in the principles of selection is noticeable. The emphasis on the applicants outlook on social, cultural, economic, and political problems remains the same as in 1957. Similarly, participation in constructive work and experience in parliamentary work or in local bodies are to be considered while making the selection. Where the criteria adopted for selecting candidates for the 1962 general elections diverge from those in 1957, they essentially relate to the admission of new candidates and fresh blood and giving adequate representation to minority and special groups. The CEC circular specifies that ‘as far as possible, one third of the members of the Congress Party in Legislature, both States and Central, should retire.’6 But it also provides that it will not be applicable in the case of those whose continuance ‘is considered necessary in public interest and in the interest of the organization.’7 In the case of minorities, the circular provides that they should receive adequate representation in the allotment of seats, both in the states and at the centre. As a general rule for guidance, it stipulates proportional allotment of seats to the minorities in accordance with their population ratio.8 About 15 per cent of seats in the legislature are reserved for women. Insistence on observance of discipline is as in the 1957 elections. In addition, the CEC emphasizes that preference should be given to those Congressmen who have adequate background and record of Congress service so as to enable them to function effectively as parliamentarians. In the case of the sitting member, in addition to his contact with his constituency and payment of subscriptions to the party, it is further required that he furnish a statement of his assets, income and expenditure.9 The CEC further stipulates that no candidate will suffer because of group considerations. 348 Ramashray Roy Four Points It will be apparent from the above that as far as the principles that should guide the selection of candidates are concerned, the Congress has so far emphasized four inter-related points. The first concerns the applicant’s record as a party man. Since the applicant is required to be an active member with two years standing as a primary member, an individual must have shown more than usual interest in party affairs to have waited patiently for two years to be admitted into the ranks of the ‘chosen’. But just interest in party affairs is not enough; devotion to the party is necessary. That is why there is so much insistence on observance of party discipline. Observance of discipline is treated as an index of commitment to party objectives and decisions. The CEC emphasizes that individual or sectional interests must not be allowed to conflict with party goals; they should be subordinated to party interests. The second point relates to the outlook of the applicant on social, economic and political questions. Considering that the Congress has embarked upon establishing a socialist society in the country through democratic institutions, it is natural that applicants for Congress ticket be required to demonstrate their commitment to the Congress programme. The requirement of ideological loyalty on the part of ticket-seekers is, from the Congress point of view, a way of anticipating and avoiding conflicts in the future when nonprogressive views may jeopardize the prospects of achieving the new society. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Congress expects prospective representatives and policy-makers, both state and national, to hold progressive views on problems of social, economic and political matters. The third point relates to the applicant’s activities in constructive and developmental fields as well as his experience in legislative bodies. Verbal commitment to party objectives is not enough to sustain a Congressman’s aspiration to the party ticket; this commitment must have been translated into activities in the areas of constructive and development work. Such activities not only add to the Congressman’s experience and knowledge of the real problems that confront any endeavour at nation building but also promote the interests of the party. In other words, through their activities in the areas of constructive and development work, Congressmen not only help solve problems that confront the people but also endear their party to the people. The influence of Gandhian philosophy, which emphasizes service as a means of winning the people’s hearts, is clearly noticeable here. But more than this, such activities are a practical necessity—‘for a proper mass contact for organization of people, apart from any other considerations, constructive work is a special necessity’.10 Similarly, experience in parliamentary work is thought to be desirable, though not an essential quality in the applicant. Selection of Congress Candidates 349 The fourth point concerns the nature of the Congress Party. Being the ruling party, the Congress represents many socio-economic interests and in order to stay as a dominant party it has increasingly become clienteleoriented. As such, it seeks to broaden its support base by assimilating new groups. In other words, the Congress does not intend to erect barriers which may prove insurmountable for those who want to join its ranks. When group support is sought and no conflict is perceived with party goals, Congress lowers its drawbridge of regulations governing membership of the party. That is why the Congress permits flexibility in the application of the rule of two years standing as a primary member for being selected Congress candidate. The party wants to assure adequate representation of minority as well as special groups. The Selection Procedures The principles governing the selection of candidates on their face value seem rational enough. They are intended to guide the lower levels of the Congress organization in selecting best candidates from the activists who vie among themselves to be nominated as the official candidates. A typical Congress candidate, according to these criteria, is one who is an active Congress worker, is devoted to the party’s policy, has demonstrated his capacity to support party interests and represents groups that the party wishes to attract into its ranks. The CEC, in addition to suggesting general principles in regard to the selection of candidates, has also outlined the procedures to be followed in selecting candidates. While the CEC reserves to itself the right to have the final say in the selection of candidates, the Congress has not yet made up its mind about the appropriate organizational stratum below the national level, which should be primarily responsible for initiating the selection process and for receiving applications from candidates. Three alternative procedures have been suggested. First, it has been suggested that the candidates themselves should apply for Congress tickets. This practice was prevalent before 1957 and has been again adopted for 1967 elections.11 But here also the question arises whether the candidate should apply to the DCC or the PEC. In other words, the debate over which organizational level should make the initial decisions or proposals is not yet settled. Moreover, it is realized that ‘permitting candidates themselves to apply will result in modest individuals keeping themselves back although eminently fitted for this work.’12 Second, it has been suggested that since the DCC has to carry the burden of fieldwork in the elections, the primary choice should rest with the DCC. 350 Ramashray Roy This procedure, which was utilized in the 1952 elections, tended to create group tensions and ‘unseemly canvassing resulting in the weakening of the District Organization at the time when it should be tight and cohesive’.13 Third, it has been suggested that the PEC itself should initiate the proposals. But considering the importance of the district organization in elections, it cannot be overlooked or ignored. It has, it is recognized, to play a vital role but whether it is to play an advisory role or the role of initiating proposals has not yet been finally settled. It seems that the Congress has not yet arrived at a final determination of the best arrangement for selecting its candidates. It has adopted three different procedures for the 1957, 1962, and 1967 elections. The inability of the Congress Party to agree on the appropriate mechanism for selection of candidates, results, as we have hinted earlier, from a conflict between two tendencies. The first tendency concerns the desirability of centralizing the decisionmaking process in order to get away from the pushes and pulls of narrow, local considerations. Centralization is also rationalized by the argument that it allows dispassionate consideration of issues in terms of their own merits, speed in arriving at decisions and making of rational decisions. At the same time, centralization of decision-making is deeply resented and resisted by the lower strata of the party organization as an attempt to usurp their legitimate function to make decisions in the light of local situations. The second tendency concerns the pressures of the lower strata for more power than what is given to them by the party constitution. In view of the fact that votes are mobilized at the base and it is mostly the local activists that organize, carry out and bear the major responsibility and burden of election campaigns, it is natural for them to claim local initiative, decision, and power in the selection of candidates. Concerned more with winning elections, the party organization at the base thinks itself the most appropriate organ to judge the merits of the candidates. But, the grant of autonomy and power to take initiative and decision at the lower strata, accelerates group rivalry and adversely affects the party unity. As the ultimate objective of the contending groups is to hold effective political power, each group attempts to utilize the selection process for its own benefit. The result is that conflict and controversy dominate the selection process leading to animosity and tension in the party which ultimately influence the election results. Unable to Resolve Conflict It is obvious that the Congress Party caught between the cross-pressures of these two conflicting tendencies, finds it difficult to reconcile them and evolve Selection of Congress Candidates 351 a procedural arrangement which will combine the benefits of centralization and democratization. The experience to date suggests that the party High Command conceives the role of the lower strata in terms of advisory bodies as far as the selection process is concerned. Equally obviously, the lower strata of the party are still not content with such a role. The selection procedure adopted in 1957 represented a compromise between the tendencies we have described. The procedural arrangement for 1957, according to CEC, reflected a via media: ‘the proposal will come from below, the members of the DCC will have their say, (and) the PEC will have the benefit of their advice. . . .’14 The procedure envisaged the PEC inviting all the members15 of the DCC to give their suggestions on the candidates to be put up in different constituencies. While making suggestions the DCC members were to suggest one name for each constituency and furnish a note on qualifications of the proposed candidate along with the proposal. After the proposals were received, the PEC, in consultation with the representative of the CEC, would choose its own representatives who will visit different areas for ascertaining local opinion.16 The PEC representative would first have discussions with the members of the DCC Executive Committee regarding suggestions made by the members individually. He would, then, invite other members of the DCC and have discussions with them. The PEC representative could also see other persons in the district, if he thought it necessary. After assessing the view-points of the members of the DCC and others, the PEC representative would prepare a panel of names not exceeding five in each constituency and forward it to the PEC. While forwarding the panel, the representative would indicate the reasons for his recommendations and point out how far the individuals recommended give representation to the minorities, women and persons working in the labour field. The procedure for selection of candidates for parliamentary seats was slightly different from that suggested for state assembly seats. For the parliamentary seat, 10 members of the DCC were to propose one name and the PEC representative was to suggest a panel of three names after assessing the opinions in a joint meeting of the members of the DCC or DCCs within whose jurisdiction the parliamentary constituency lay. After receiving recommendations from representatives, the PEC would consider the panel for each constituency. The All India Congress Committee (AICC) representative, appointed particularly for observing the selection process at the state level, would participate in the meetings of the PEC. While making recommendations to the CEC, the PEC would send a panel of names indicating reasons for its choice. In case there was no unanimity in the PEC on the choices, the views of those who disagreed with the majority were also to be forwarded to the CEC. It was also stipulated that 352 Ramashray Roy the PEC could consider names not included in the panel received from its representatives in order to give due representation to women, minorities, persons working in the labour field, and persons of outstanding ability. The CEC reserved to itself the authority to make the final selection. It was also competent to include persons not recommended or considered previously by the PEC. It is apparent from the above that the PEC representatives have been given the key role of making recommendations to the CEC, while the role of the DCC has been conceived only in an advisory capacity. Moreover, it is not sure whether the PEC will honour the advice rendered by the DCC. In comparison to the 1957 procedures, the procedures adopted for the 1962 general elections give more importance to the lower echelons of the party organization. The 1962 procedures are more elaborate and are intended to bring the lower levels into the selection process more effectively. For instance, for purposes of selecting candidates for the 1962 general elections, the members of Mandal Congress Committees (MCCs) as well as Panchayat Samities owing allegiance to the Congress are to be consulted about the candidates. Thus, the 1962 procedures attempt to make the selection process broad-based. After the applications have been received, the PEC would, as far as possible, unanimously appoint an observer or observers for each district who, along with the president or an office-bearer of the DCC, would attend the meetings of the MCCs in each constituency in order to ascertain the viewpoints of MCC members. If the MCCs failed to unanimously agree on a candidate, other names proposed in the meetings were to be noted down by the observer. Also, the members of the Panchayat Samities owing allegiance to the Congress were also to be consulted in a similar fashion. The results of such consultations were to be separately reported to the PEC by the observer and the DCC President. Next came the stage of consultations at the district level. After recommendations from the constituencies were received, the Executive Committee of the DCC was to meet in the presence of the PEC observer and consider the recommendations. It would then communicate to the PEC its opinion with regard to all names. However, the DCC Executive was allowed to disagree with the recommendations received from the constituencies. In such a case, the Executive Committee would send to the PEC a panel of names with its own observations. The PEC, in its turn, would consider the recommendations received from the constituencies and submit its own reactions and viewpoints to the CEC. In case the PEC did not agree with the recommendations from the constituencies, or there was difference of opinion in the PEC in the case of a constituency, it was to forward to the CEC a panel of names. The deliberations Selection of Congress Candidates 353 of the PEC were to take place in the presence of a CEC representative who, in turn, would submit his own report to the CEC. CEC, the Final Authority The CEC, as usual, reserved to itself the authority to make final choices. It was also competent to select a person even if he had not applied for a seat or whose name was not recommended in the prescribed manner. Under the 1962 procedures, the recommendations from the lowest unit of the party, the MCCs in a constituency, formed the basis on which the higher echelons of the party based their recommendations. Contrary to the previous practice, the selection process was brought down to the grass roots of the party organization and a concerted attempt was made to ascertain the wishes of the activists at the base. Thus, the 1962 procedures may in a sense be taken as an apotheosis of the democratic tendency in the party which insisted that the organizational echelon that has most to do with the winning of elections, should have a considerable say in regard to the selection of candidates. But it does signify the anxiety of the Congress High Command to assign a meaningful role to the organization at the base in the selection of candidates. Trend Reversed The procedures recently adopted for the 1967 elections,17 however, go a long way in reversing the trend that manifested itself in the 1962 elections. The CEC assigns the crucial role in the selection process to the PEC, which will receive applications from the intending candidates directly.18 It is obligatory for the PEC to consult the DCCs but the methods of consultation and screening the applications are to be determined by the PEC itself. The new procedural arrangement does not contemplate consulting the party organization at the base, as in 1962. The explanation given for this omission refers to the avoidance of ‘unseemly controversies’.19 Our discussion of procedures followed in different elections clearly shows that the Congress is still groping for an arrangement to stabilize relationships between the organizational levels of the party. The tug-of-war between the upper strata and the lower ones regarding the distribution of power in the party, is a crucial characteristic of an open membership party functioning in a political system where electoral competition is the arbiter of party fortunes. In this tug-of-war, as Samuel J. Eldersveld (1964: 9–10) has stated,20 354 Ramashray Roy one possible outcome is diffusion of authority and exercise of power, with the lower strata of the party hierarchy gaining autonomy. . . . It must be emphasized here that although the Congress top command has shown willingness to defer to the opinions of the lower strata, it has at the same time demonstrated its apprehension about ‘unwarranted and unseemly controversies’ that such difference gives rise to. In other words, the Congress top command is distrustful of the capability of the lower strata to immunize themselves from the pressures and counter-pressures of personal and parochial nature that impinge upon the selection process and take rational decisions, which serve the larger interests of the party. It is the conflict between these two tendencies, which prevents the Congress from sticking to a particular procedural arrangement. We may also add here that it is clearly indicated that the top command is willing to leave it to the PCCs to determine the manner in which they intend to consult the lower strata of the party regarding selection of candidates. Contrary to the previous practice of the top command prescribing the way in which the lower strata of the party were to be consulted, the 1966 procedures authorize the PCCs to themselves determine the manner of consultation. Notes 01. The number of seats to be contested in 1952 was 489 for the Parliament and 3,373 for the state legislatures; in 1957, 494 for the Parliament and 3,102 for the state legislatures; and in 1962, 494 for the Parliament and 3,121 for the state legislatures. 02. Eldersveld (1964: 9). 03. Letter from Congress President to PCC Presidents dated 23 June 1956. 04. Ibid. 05. Ibid. 06. AICC letter to PCCs dated 30 March 1961. The criteria of selection were decided by the Working Committee in its meeting on 18 February 1961. 07. Ibid. 08. Ibid. 09. This requirement has been retained for the sitting members applying for Congress ticket for contesting in 1967 general elections. See Hindustan Times, 19 July 1966. 10. ‘Note on Constructive Work’ in Proceedings of the Meetings of the Presidents and Secretaries of the Pradesh Congress Committees, 30–31 March and 1 April 1957, New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1957, Appendix VII. 11. See Hindustan Times, 19 July 1966. 12. Letter from Congress President to PCC President dated 23 June 1956. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. DCC members in this case also included the associate members of the DCC. Selection of Congress Candidates 355 16. The CEC suggested one representative for each of the districts. However, in the case of big districts where population exceeds 1.5 million, it provided for the appointment of one more representative. 17. For details see Hindustan Times, 19 July 1966. 18. For the 1962 general elections, the intending candidates were required to apply to through the DCCs. 19. Hindustan Times, 19 July 1966. 20. Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Chicago: Rand McNally and Co, 1964, pp. 9–10. References Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1964. Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. ———. 1957. ‘Notes on Constructive Work’ in Proceedings of the Meetings of the Presidents and Secretaries of the Pradesh Congress Committees. 30–31 March and 1 April. New Delhi: Indian National Congress. 14 ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas: Deghettoizing Women’s Politics and Enhancing Their Representation in Legislatures* MADHU PURNIMA KISHWAR Political corruption and the crying need for electoral reforms have been the key issues on the national agenda for nearly a decade now. The countrywide lionization of T. N. Seshan, who as the Chief Election Commissioner tried to curb electoral malpractices, demonstrates how much urgency even the ordinary citizens attach to this subject. It is one of the most hotly debated issues in our public life. It speaks of the serious marginalization of women lobbyists for the women’s reservation bill that none of them is actively involved with struggle over this issue. No meaningful suggestions for changes have come from them in the ongoing public debate on electoral reforms. The zenana dabba mentality cannot take women too far. The ghettoizing of women’s concerns to narrowly defined issues will keep them forever marginalized. Why should the task of thinking through meaningful, overall electoral reforms be left to men, while women confine their attention only to securing a share of the pie without examining whether the pie is worth eating at all? Are we then not accepting that the rules of the game will * This essay is abridged from my other articles: ‘Out of the Zenana Dabba: Strategies for Enhancing Women’s Political Representation’, Manushi, No. 96, September–October 1996; ‘Women’s Marginal Role in Politics’, Manushi, No. 97, November–December 1996; ‘The Logic of Quotas: Women’s Movement Splits on the Reservation Bill’, Manushi, No. 107, July–August 1998 and ‘Enhancing Women’s Representation in Legislatures: An Alternative to the Government Bill for Women’s Reservation’, Manushi, No. 116, January–February 2000. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 357 inevitably be set by men? Women would only appear as bit players—that too in the ‘reserved’ category. Some Feminist Myths The whole debate on reservations centres on the following myths: • That a greater presence of women will be a step towards empowerment of Indian women. • That women’s larger presence because of this bill will change the very nature of politics, make it less corrupt, more sensitive to women’s needs and generally more democratic and compassionate. Reserving one-third of the seats in our legislatures would undoubtedly bestow special powers and privileges on the approximately 180 women who would make it to Parliament and many more to state legislatures on the strength of the quota system. It would also create new aspirations among women at large. But I fail to understand, how it will ‘empower’ ordinary women citizens. Has the presence of 500 plus male legislators in Parliament empowered the men of India? If most men in this country have not benefited from the preponderant presence of male parliamentarians, why should we naively believe that 180 women in Parliament would change the fate of women in India? So far, in India, we have not witnessed women politicians bringing a superior vision into politics. In the last 50 years, there is no evidence that women politicians have taken a stand any different from that of their party bosses on any issue of importance or introduced any new worthwhile issues on the political agenda, apart from making noises to get a bunch of ineffective or harmful laws passed ostensibly for the protection of women. For instance, no woman politician from the Congress Party opposed the imposition of the Emergency. No Congress woman politician (worth her name) condemned, either within or outside the party, the massacre of Sikhs carried out at the behest of the Party High Command in 1984, or the various antiMuslim riots instigated by the party as part of it’s electoral strategy. Similarly, no BJP woman leader stood up to condemn the bloodshed that accompanied Advani’s rathyatra. None of the BJP’s female stalwarts has taken a stand any different from the most jingoistic of the male BJP politicians on the nuclear weapons issue. Nor have any of them raised the banner of revolt against the growing corruption and criminalization of their party. 358 Madhu Purnima Kishwar The record of women from the Janata Dal and the various communist parties is no better, perhaps worse. In what way then is the larger presence of women in Parliament going to bring about greater accountability in our political system? A major reason for women’s weak position in electoral politics is that women politicians rarely come to each other’s support within their respective parties. For example, when a popular mass leader like Gowri Amma who had emerged as a viable chief ministerial candidate in Kerala was unceremoniously thrown out of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), women did not rise to defend her. Likewise, when Uma Bharati is sidelined and put down by her own party bosses despite her being one of their most effective mass leaders, many of the leading BJP women play an active role in her humiliation. Women politicians of India rarely act as a concerted lobby within their parties. Instead they vie with each other for the patronage of powerful male leaders of their party. Those who argue that a large presence of women will cleanse politics need to be made aware that women, unfortunately, have not been bestowed with any divine powers or magic wands whereby their very presence would improve things. In our subcontinent, at least, we have seen women outdoing men in corruption, crime and authoritarian politics. Even in the police, bureaucracy and professions, women have taken to corruption with ease and gusto. Before women made a substantial entry into public life, many people naively believed that women’s entry into public life would help cleanse it, because it was believed women were intrinsically more honest and compassionate than men. Unfortunately, we have been disabused of such naïve and romantic notions by looking at their actual conduct in positions of power. Women appear more moral only when they are under special familial and social constraints, which deny them wider opportunity for corruption. But when they are acting in unison and are partners in corruption with men of their family, they are not affected by social opprobrium of the kind that women indulging in immoral practices on their own initiative get to experience. Most important of all, if winning an election to Parliament or state legislatures involves spending a few million rupees, it is inevitable that such persons will try to get returns on their investment through dubious means since as legislators they are denied legitimate ways of making money. Women have succeeded in playing a creative role in politics only in those societies where political parties already function more or less according to established norms and traditions, where there is a substantial measure of accountability in public life. But where the overall politics is criminalized, women tend to join the men in corruption and crime with ease rather than attempt to establish new norms. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 359 Quotas within Quotas The whole reservation debate has acquired many absurd and comic dimensions. The groups that are resisting it most—male leaders of certain backward castes—are the ones most likely to benefit from women’s reservations in comparison to most other groups and parties. They began by first trashing the very idea of women’s reservation on the ground that it would strengthen upper caste hold over politics alleging that only the upper caste, upper class women would benefit from the quota because of the social and educational advantages they have acquired. Since their opposition was expressed in rather crude and derogatory terms (yeh par kati mahilaon ko hum dekh lenge which roughly translates to ‘we will teach these high-flying women a lesson,’ sort of rhetoric), it led to widespread condemnation of the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) leaders for what was rightly seen as their uncouth behaviour and nasty male chauvinism. They retreated for a while but regrouped with a fresh offensive demanding a quota within a quota for OBC women as their strategy. They were soon joined by a section of Muslim male leaders demanding a similar quota for Muslim women as well. Even the Scheduled Caste leaders are demanding a share of quota for SC women unmindful of the fact that the provision for the latter already exists in the proposed Bill. Or perhaps it is a strategy to corner extra seats for SCs from the women’s quota rather than yield seats for women of their communities from the existing SC quota. In characteristic style, the pro-reservation lobby has reacted with pious outrage declaring: ‘Please do not try dividing us. Women are all one; their interests are common.’ By polarizing the issue on gender lines, the pro-reservationists have actually exposed the weakness in their own ranks. They claim to speak on behalf of all of India’s women. Yet OBC and Muslim women prefer to go along with their men’s politics, no matter how chauvinist, no matter how dishonest, than with the feminist lobby. When the Bill suffered a humiliating defeat in Parliament, amidst very ugly scenes by OBC and Muslim MPs, none of the OBC or Muslim women leaders stood up to defend the Bill or claim solidarity with the pro-women’s reservation lobby. However, within a very short period, even within the so-called autonomous women’s movement, strong voices have arisen from among Muslim and OBC women echoing the stance of OBC male leaders that there should be a caste and community based quota within the women’s quota. Otherwise they will oppose the Bill. Still more interesting, certain important voices within the Muslim community are arguing that the Muslim women’s quota be further reserved for the lower castes among Muslims. 360 Madhu Purnima Kishwar Logic of Quotas Muslim leaders from non-elite backgrounds have a fairly legitimate argument as far as the logic of reservations go. They claim that caste is as deep-rooted and entrenched among the subcontinent’s Muslims as among the Hindus. They allege that so far Muslim politics has been dominated by upper castes among Muslims who promote fundamentalist politics, which has kept the Muslim community trapped in backwardness and illiteracy, in addition to jeopardizing their safety by taking very obscurantist positions on various issues; thus pitching the scales of confrontation with the right-wing Hindu community leaders to deadly levels. Therefore, they are demanding that the benefit of Muslim women’s quota should go to the lower caste Muslim women so that the most oppressed among them get to be heard and represented. This demand for ‘reservations within reservations’ demonstrates how the very logic of reservations can be stretched endlessly, especially given a situation of high fragmentation within our society, existence of gross inequalities within every group and the general dysfunctionality of democratic institutions, so that virtually every group feels aggrieved and powerless. The manner in which this issue has divided women’s organizations, and whatever goes by the name of a women’s movement in India, shows that on most issues women’s loyalty to their caste and community is far stronger than their commitment to gender-based solidarity. Even without being physically present in women’s organizations, men easily dominate women’s thinking and perceptions on most issues. How else does one explain the fact that the demand for a quota within the women’s quota has gone only as far as the limits so far set by men? If the logic is that the oppressed groups among women should have special provisions, why just talk of the OBC women? Why not the women of those OBC groups be listed as Most Backward Castes (MBCs)? Why not extend the reservations to still more marginalized and oppressed women of those communities whom the British viciously branded as ‘criminal tribes’ simply because they had a long history of resistance to British rule? Even today these ‘criminal tribes’ are treated worse than a subhuman species and face the most brutal forms of violence and exploitation. Why not have a quota for physically handicapped women, as well as for women who are afflicted by leprosy, for they are treated worse than pariahs? For women beggars? For prostitutes? The list of marginalized groups, is indeed endless. Yet, why are women’s organizations debating only the representation of OBC and Muslim women? The answer is simple. Men of these communities have put the issue on the agenda. So far women’s organizations in India ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 361 echoed the politics of left parties in its broad contours, because they claimed to be the progressive voices of society. Now with caste and minority politics of a certain hue having become another fashionable issue, women’s organizations are split vertically along those lines. Ignoring Internal Fragmentation It is noteworthy that those who are raising the issue of a quota for the OBC women are altogether silent on a quota for the OBC men. The reason is simple. Because of their numerical strength, OBCs have today come to dominate most state legislatures as also our Parliament. In the Parliament, their number exceeds 50 per cent. If there was to be a population-based quota, the OBCs would have reduced representation in legislatures or not qualify for a quota at all because the heterogeneous castes that get clubbed under the OBC nomenclature constitute 52 per cent of our population. Thus they cannot claim to be a political minority even while, as a socially and educationally deprived group, they do qualify for a job quota in the bureaucracy. No wonder they don’t raise the issue of OBC quota for men in legislatures. OBC women are without doubt among the most socially deprived women in India. However, the OBC women’s primary battle lies within their own families and communities. The women from various OBC castes in rural areas live under the most crippling restrictions, especially in North India. While certain upper caste groups like Brahmins and Kayasthas have initiated widespread internal social reform movements ever since the 19th century in order to improve the status and rights of women within their communities, very little internal reform work has been undertaken by OBC groups or by the SC and ST communities in relation to women’s rights. As a result their social and political culture remains far more hostile to women’s participation in public affairs within their villages and communities. That is why these caste leaders are more likely to capture the women’s quota through their wives and daughters who can then be used as puppets and rubber stamps. In electoral politics, OBC women would have a definite advantage over upper caste women because of the numerical strength of their community. It is altogether unlikely that upper caste women would be able to win from OBC dominated constituencies. Therefore, there really is no merit to the demand for a separate quota for the OBC women. The Muslim quota case is the very opposite. The proportion of Muslims in our Parliament and state legislatures does not match their numerical strength in the population. But then the whole idea of communal electorates was rejected by the Indian leadership because that demand had culminated in the 362 Madhu Purnima Kishwar partition of the subcontinent. In any case, can we consider a quota for Muslim women without conceding a quota for Muslim men? It is obvious that Muslim male leaders are bringing in the issue of religion based quotas through the backdoor using their women as a sword rather than fighting their battle on their own strength. The idea of a women’s quota is based on a secular principle that historically women have had specific disabilities imposed on them as a group, no matter which caste or community they belong to. To inject the idea of caste and communal quotas into a women’s quota is essentially to delegitimize the idea that women as a group have common interests. Thus, the very demand for a women’s quota becomes infructuous. Women Deserve Special Measures All this is not to deny the urgent need for special measures to enhance women’s participation in politics. No democracy can stay healthy if it cannot create a favourable, inclusive atmosphere for women to participate in politics. Most countries in the world have failed to give due space and representation to women in their political life. Women are moving in the direction of near equal participation in only a handful of countries, such as Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. In these societies too special measures had to be institutionalized in order to make politics women-friendly. Thereafter, women have begun to seriously alter the very nature of politics, making enduring, and substantial gains in every field. However, in all other countries, including the supposedly advanced democracies of western Europe and North America, where women exercise certain freedoms and have acquired the wherewithal for economic independence, female presence in legislatures remains small and relatively insignificant. In India the problem for women is more serious for several reasons: 1. While in many other countries women are inching forward bit by bit, in India the participation of women in politics has actually declined since the days of the freedom movement, both in quantity and quality. There were many more outstanding women leaders and workers in the Congress Party at all levels during the freedom movement than are at present in all parties put together. In states like Maharashtra and Gujarat, virtually every neighbourhood and most villages could boast of at least one effective woman leader, even into the 1950s. But as politics became more centralized as well as criminalized, which also undermined all other institutions of civil society, women were pushed out of leadership positions to function on the margins, and at ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 363 2. 3. best relegated to the domain of social work at the local level. Even that tradition eroded from the 1970s onwards. Government and politics are more important factors in the economic, social, and power structures in India than in most other countries with stronger civil societies, and so the effect of women’s marginalization in politics is even more detrimental here. The increasing violence, sexual harassment and victimization of women at the ground level in many of our political parties have made their participation increasingly hazardous in recent decades. The setback to women’s participation is even more severe at the state level than in the Lok Sabha (See Tables 14.1 and 14.2). This is clearly evident in Bihar, which had 14 women elected to the Vidhan Sabha in 1952, 31 women in 1957, and 26 women in 1962. But in the 1967 elections, women won only 11 seats. Their number declined to 4 in 1969. Thereafter, it reached a plateau, levelling at a mere 13 during the last State Assembly elections. The representation of women in the Lok Sabha has basically remained stagnant. It reached a ‘high’ of eight per cent in 1984. This figure has not been crossed since then. Thereafter, it has showed some decline rather than register an increase. This despite the fact that every major national party in recent years has declared in their manifestos, that they would implement a 33 per cent reservation for women in all legislatures. One of the most puzzling features of this depressed level of women’s political representation in our legislative bodies is that it seems to have no direct correlation with literacy and other seemingly related indicators. A comparison between the states of Kerala and Rajasthan, whose literacy rates are at opposite ends of the spectrum, demonstrates this clearly. In Kerala, the overall literacy rate is reportedly 90 per cent, with 86 per cent female literacy. By contrast, in Rajasthan, female literacy is a mere 20 per cent and only 12 per cent of females are literate in rural areas. Kerala has a matrilineal tradition in which women have a much larger measure of autonomy and freedom of movement. Kerala’s women also tend to marry at a much later age compared to women in other states. Most women in Rajasthan live far more restricted lives in aggressively patriarchal communities that still practice purdah and perform child marriages. But the cultural and educational advantage that women in Kerala have, does not translate into higher political participation as compared to Rajasthan. The percentage of women in the legislative assemblies of both states is low. In Kerala it rose from less than one per cent in 1967 to six per cent in 1991. However, in Rajasthan, the representation of women was four per cent in 1967 and reached eight per cent in 1985–90, slightly more than in Kerala, but not significantly greater. Since then it has been going down. 1952 2.9 **** 0.5 3.6 **** **** **** 0.0 **** 2.0 0.0 2.1 1.9 **** **** **** **** 9.6 2.2 0.0 **** 0.3 **** State Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar Goa Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Sikkim Tamil Nadu Tripura 3.7 **** 4.6 9.4 **** **** **** **** **** 8.7 4.8 10.8 6.3 **** **** **** **** 3.6 5.8 5.1 **** 5.9 **** 1957 3.3 **** 3.8 7.9 **** 8.4 **** **** 0.0 8.7 3.9 4.9 4.9 **** **** **** **** 1.4 5.2 4.5 **** 3.9 **** 3.8 **** 4.0 2.2 6.7 4.8 7.4* 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.8 3.4 3.3 **** **** **** 0.0 3.6 1.0* 3.3 **** 1.7 0.0 9.1 **** 7.0 3.8 3.3 3.2 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.1 1.5 5.4 9.3 0.0* 1.7 0.0 **** 1.4* 5.8 7.1 **** 2.1 3.3 3.4 0.0 0.8 4.0 3.3 **** 4.4 1.5 1.3 4.0 0.7 3.1 2.8 **** 1.7 3.3 **** 4.8 2.6 4.0 **** 0.9 1.7 4.1 3.3 0.8 3.7 0.0 2.7 7.8 4.4 0.0 0.9 3.2 5.6 6.6 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 3.4 5.1 5.0 0.0 2.1 6.7 3.4 6.7 4.0 4.6 0.0 8.8 5.6 4.4 1.3 3.6 5.7 9.7 5.6 0.0 3.3 2.5 1.7 6.1 3.4 8.0 0.0 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.3 4.0 2.8 5.0 2.2 6.7 5.9 **** 4.5 5.7 3.4 2.1 1.7 **** 0.0 **** 4.8 5.1 5.5 6.3 9.0 **** 2.7 3.3 4.8 3.4 10.0 1.1 4.4 4.4 2.3 3.1 9.3 3.8 3.8 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 5.4 6.0 4.5 3.1 3.8 1.7 9.5 1.7 **** **** 5.0 2.2 **** 8.8 **** 2.3 **** 8.1 4.2 **** 5.0 0.0 **** **** **** 7.0 3.1 **** **** (contd.) 4.6 3.0 3.2 4.3 4.4 4.0 6.2 4.2 1.5 4.3 3.6 5.4 4.6 0.3 2.2 1.2 0.5 4.0 4.0 5.0 2.5 3.6 3.0 1960–65 1967–69 1970–75 1977–78 1979–83 1984–88 1989–92 1993–97 1998–99 State Avg. Table 14.1 Declining Representation of Women in State Legislatures 1952–97 (per cent of Women MLAs) 1.2 0.8 4.2 **** 1.8 Uttar Pradesh West Bengal Delhi Pondicherry Period Avg 5.8 3.6 **** **** 6.3 1957 4.4 4.8 **** 6.7 4.9 2.8* 2.9* **** 3.3 2.9 5.9 1.6* 7.1 0.0 4.4 2.6 1.4 7.1 0.0 2.8 5.6 2.4 7.1 3.3 3.8 7.3 4.4 **** 3.3 5.3 3.3* 7.1 **** 1.7 4.5 4.0* 6.8 4.3 3.3 4.0 **** **** 12.9 **** 6.0 4.1 3.4 7.3 2.6 4.1 1960–65 1967–69 1970–75 1977–78 1979–83 1984–88 1989–92 1993–97 1998–99 State Avg. Notes: Table entry stands for percentage of women MLAs elected to state legislature in the relevant elections (****): States did not exist/no elections held in that year/period; (*): Two elections held during this period. The figures given here are an average of the two. The figures given here are based on name recognition and hence liable to under-reporting of women representatives. Source: CSDS Data Unit 1952 State (Table 14.1 contd.) 366 Madhu Purnima Kishwar Table 14.2 Women’s Representation in the Parliament 1952–98 Year 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 Average Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha Seats Women MPs % of Women MPs Seats Women MPs % of Women MPs 499 500 503 523 521 544 544 544 517 544 543 543 527 22 27 34 31 22 19 28 44 27 39 39 43 31 4.41 5.40 6.76 5.93 4.22 3.49 5.15 8.09 5.22 7.17 7.18 7.92 5.91 219 237 238 240 243 244 244 244 245 245 223 245 239 16 18 18 20 17 25 24 28 24 38 19 15 22 07.31 07.59 07.56 08.33 07.00 10.25 09.84 11.48 09.80 15.51 08.52 06.12 09.11 Source: CSDS Data Unit. Similarly, the state of Manipur, which has a tradition of women playing a dominant role in both the family and the community (again due to a matrilineal heritage), never produced a single woman legislator till 1990—when it elected its first. Nagaland and other North-eastern states which have less repressive cultures for women have similarly low levels of women’s representation. By contrast, take the proportion of women in politics in UP, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. Though these states are known for their low education levels and repressive cultural norms for women, they have not only sent a relatively larger proportion of women to the Lok Sabha than those from the North-east, but have also elected relatively more female MLAs. In independent India, pervasive gender discrimination has resulted in sidelining even veteran women politicians. It is difficult for women to establish a foothold without patronage from powerful men in the party—that too through close personal relations, as wives, daughters and sisters. This is indeed a matter for serious concern because the level of political participation among women in any society acts as a reliable barometer of the health of its democracy. It is significant that stagnation and/or decline in women’s political participation rates run contrary to trends in many other fields. Women in India have made major inroads in various male-dominated professions, including the governmental bureaucracy. In the fields of business, medicine, engineering, law, art, and culture, women who were given opportunities to acquire the necessary skills and education have proven ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 367 themselves capable of holding their own, without availing of any special measures to facilitate their entry. But they have failed to gain ground in the field of politics. Moreover, the agenda of women’s empowerment seems to have lost the kind of moral and political legitimacy it enjoyed during the freedom movement, as was evident from the ugly scenes in the aftermath of tabling the Women’s Reservation Bill in Parliament. Such a response would have been inconceivable in the India of the 1920s to the 1940s. All these trends indicate that women’s representation in politics requires special consideration, and cannot be left to the forces that presently dominate our parties and government. Problems with the 85th Constitutional Amendment Bill However, there are many serious flaws in the 85th constitutional Amendment Bill which had to face long drawn hostility and sabotage before it was introduced in Lok Sabha in December 1999. Its key provisions are as follows: 1) One-third of all seats in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas shall be reserved for women. 2) Such reservation shall also apply in case of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). 3) There shall be rotation of seats so reserved for women. 4) Such rotation shall be determined by draw of lots, in such a manner that a seat shall be reserved only once in a block of three general elections. This Bill mechanically provides for entry of women members to fill onethird of vacancies in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas. The mechanical reservation and rotation of women’s reserved seats will cause the following problems: 1) It will automatically result in two-thirds of incumbent members being forcibly unseated in every general election; the remaining onethird will be left in limbo until the last moment, not knowing whether or not their constituency will form part of the one-third randomly reserved seats and thus requiring them to scramble at short notice for another seat to contest elections. 2) There is already resentment about reserved seats for SCs and STs being frozen in the same constituencies over a long period of time. Inevitably, there will be vociferous and justified demands for rotation of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, and in some cases 368 Madhu Purnima Kishwar Scheduled Tribes, where their population may not be very large. This will trigger off further instability in our polity. 3) The population of Scheduled Casts and Scheduled Tribes is now estimated to be around 16 per cent and 8 per cent respectively, on an all-India basis. In certain states, their combined population is much higher, reaching 35 per cent or more. In the event of rotation of all reserved seats (women plus SCs, STs) with one-third seats reserved for women, every single seat will be rotated in every general election. This means that practically every member of a legislature will be unseated in every single general election (See Table 14.3 and Pie Chart). 4) Such compulsory unseating violates the very basic principles of democratic representation. It jeopardizes the possibility of sensible planning to contest and nurture a political constituency for both male and female candidates. In most functioning democracies politicians are expected to develop and nurse a constituency. However, an unpredictable and rotating reservation policy, already implemented at the zilla parishad level, has resulted in killing women’s incentive to build Table 14.3 Rotation of Seats Now (%) From 2001 (%) Reservation for SCs Reservation for STs 15.0 07.5 22.5 16.0 08.0 24.0 Balance Seats Reservation for Women 33.30% Open for Men 77.5 26.0 76.0 25.4 51.5 50.6 Women General 25.4% Open 50.6% SC/ST 24% Women SC/ST ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 369 their own constituencies because politicians have no way of knowing which one’s will be declared as reserved constituencies next election. A similar set-up for legislatures will result in women candidates becoming even more dependent on their respective party bosses, rather than working within their own constituencies to win elections. Even after being elected in a particular area, there will be no pressure to responsibly serve that constituency, because if in the next draw of lots that constituency is de-reserved then these women will have to shift elsewhere for the next election. This will lead to even more irresponsible politics in general, as well as among women. A man may have worked hard in his constituency after being elected. But he will not be sure of being able to stand from the same one if the lottery system decides that constituency is to be earmarked for women. This will inevitably produce a backlash from men and damage the legitimacy of women’s participation in politics. 5) As legislators do not have the incentive to seek re-election from the same constituency, politics of plunder will get further boost, and politics will be even more predatory and unaccountable. This will contribute to a more unstable political process, and make it difficult for women to build their long-term credibility as effective representatives, since they will not be able to contest twice from the same constituency. 6) If seats are reserved exclusively for women in every election through territorial constituencies, voters in such reserved constituencies would have no choice but to elect women only, violating the basic principles of democratic representation. 7) In such a situation, there is likely to be greater resentment against women, undermining the very objective of the Bill. Those men who get pushed out of their constituencies or who see their allies sidelined will either sabotage female contenders in revenge, or spend much of their political capital helping their own female relatives in cornering these reserved seats. Such proxies would be expected to keep the seat ‘safe’ for the men until the next election, when they would again try to reclaim their seats. Such women would lack legitimacy in the eyes of the voters. At the panchayat level, biwi-betibahu (wife-daughter-daughter-in-law) brigades can still serve the useful purpose of getting men used to including women in village debate and decision-making, even if the women are totally lacking in political experience and are used as puppets. The tasks expected of a panchayat or corporation member are relatively simple, often concerned with organizing civic amenities in the locality with which most villagers have close familiarity. Therefore, a woman who may 370 Madhu Purnima Kishwar initially enter village politics as someone else’s wife does not necessarily require much time to become a fully functioning panchayat leader provided some of her family restrictions are removed. But the presence of such proxy figures in the Parliament and state assemblies is not only counterproductive, but also actually harmful. Political socialization of such women legislators into the parties, required for being an effective member of state assemblies and the Parliament, cannot take place smoothly when women members remain filially attached to and politically dependent on the male party leaders. Reproduction of kinship groups within existing caste groups in the parties in the Parliament and state legislatures, is likely to further contribute to the breakdown of our party system and of representative democracy. Many argue that if sons and nephews can enter politics on the strength of family connections, if such useless men, who are members of mafia and criminal groups, can be selected to represent us in the Parliament and state assemblies, why do we have such exceptionally high expectations from women? There is nothing inherently wrong in women using family connections in politics to gain an advantage, as happens in other professions. The problem arises only when women are used as proxies—a position which even untalented male kin do not allow themselves to be forced upon them. Parliament ought to be a forum for the most seasoned, thoughtful, and well-informed individuals. It is supposed to perform the awesome responsibility of legislating and policy-making at the macro level for nearly a billion people. It is no place for political novices to learn their first lessons in Parliamentary democracy. 8) Women elected in reserved constituencies will be contesting against other women only, and will lack the legitimacy and opportunity needed to prove their ability and acceptability. Leadership acquired in such a manner will be seen as unnatural, artificial and foisted. As it is, women in India have deeply imbibed the notion that ‘women are women’s worst enemies’ because of the way they are pitched against each other in the family structure. Their dependence on men estranges them from other women because men mediate women’s relations with the outside world. Therefore, political solidarity among women is hard to build. If even in the political realm, women are constantly pitched only against other women, there will be far less possibility of their working together as a concerted lobby cutting across party lines, at least on some crucial women-related issues. It will strengthen the tendency to view other women as permanent rivals rather than possible allies. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 371 9) Women legislators, when elected, will not be able to nurse their constituencies on a long-term basis, and thus will be deprived of a strong political base and will forever be regarded as lightweight politicians. This in effect will make their presence in legislatures ornamental, and will not lead to a more effective participation in politics. 10) This 85th Amendment Bill does not address the more fundamental issue of inadequate participation of women in politics and their much greater marginalization within the political parties. 11) While this Bill provides for election of SC and ST women as legislators, it does not adequately address the issue of participation of backward castes (BCs) and minorities. As parties have no choice about the seats reserved for women, they will be unable to nominate women candidates from these under represented sections in constituencies where they stand a reasonable chance of success. 12) Even though there will be no legal bar on women standing from general constituencies, it is highly unlikely that any women will obtain party tickets to run for office outside the reserved constituencies. This same pattern is evident with SCs and STs who have been permanently ghettoized to fixed reserved constituencies. This trend is already evident at the panchayat and zilla parishad level, in most states party bosses do not give tickets to women to contest from general constituencies—which are assumed to be reserved for men. Only in Karnataka and West Bengal have women managed to go beyond 33 per cent. For our state legislatures, it will be much harder for women to secure tickets beyond the stipulated quota because of intense competition at this level. 13) This Bill is completely silent about women’s representation in the Rajya Sabha and the Legislative Councils. The reservation quota for all other groups such as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes has been determined on the basis of their numerical strength in the overall population. Not so for women who have been arbitrarily offered a 33 per cent quota. Why not 13 or 43 or even 73 per cent? In India the proportion of women as compared to men is a little less than 50 per cent. So why not 49 per cent reservation for women? This is not at all to suggest that 33 per cent reservation is a small amount. Even in Sweden, a country considered the most advanced democracy with the highest percentage of women in positions of political power anywhere in the world, women occupied 40 per cent of elected parliamentary seats in 1994. This after nearly a century of effort and struggle. The figures for other ‘leading’ democracies are pretty dismal. According to a survey done in 1994, women occupied nine per cent of parliamentary seats in the UK; 11 per cent 372 Madhu Purnima Kishwar in the USA’s House of Representatives; seven per cent in India (which dropped to six per cent in 1996); six per cent in France; eight per cent in Australia; four per cent in Thailand; three per cent in Japan; and two per cent in Egypt and Turkey. Thus by reserving one-third of the seats in legislatures, India will be ensuring a quantum leap. The very presence of 181 women in the Lok Sabha will make them much more visible, a drastic difference from their miniscule presence today but it does not represent a move in the direction of equality or proportional share of power. But this also places women in a separate ghetto (zenana dabba) and puts a permanent, artificial ceiling of 33 per cent on their representation. Given these serious infirmities, it is necessary to design better models for enhancing women’s representation in legislatures. Therefore, we present an alternate model which will address many of the flaws listed above. What Works Better Fixed quotas in legislatures exist only in a few countries like Nepal, the Philippines, and the erstwhile Soviet Union. None of these are great success stories for women’s political participation. The Scandinavian and other European countries which arrived at a relatively high level of female representation did so without reserving seats in the Parliament. Rather than freezing women’s representation at a quota ceiling, these countries have moved in the direction of equal (and sometimes more than equal) participation in a steady and enduring fashion. Women in these countries are especially active in local institutions of governance. In Sweden, 48 per cent of those elected to county councils in 1994 were women and 41 per cent of municipal council members were women. This broad based participation at the lower levels provides a rich training ground for intervention at the very top levels, as well, as evidenced by the rising proportion where international affairs are sorted out. However, in all of these countries these gains have not been made without special efforts. Widespread pressure was created by women’s movements which succeeded in organizing female voters around pro-women programmes and policies. Second, most of the political parties committed themselves to a quota system within their parties in which a certain percentage of candidates for all elections have to be women. Even within the party, decision-making for a certain percentage of posts are reserved for women by voluntary commitment, rather than legislative coercion. In Sweden, the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, and the Green Party have committed themselves to a 50 per cent quota for women while the Liberal Party has a 40 per cent quota. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 373 In Germany, according to the statutes of the Green Party, at least one half of the party’s posts must be held by women and on electoral lists, women must be represented with a minimum share of 50 per cent. In the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the quota for appointed candidates is 40 per cent for both men and women. All the parties in Norway have adopted a 40 per cent minimum quota for women for each party’s governing bodies, as well as for elections to the legislature. The New Labour Party of New Zealand as well as the Green Party has 50 per cent quotas for women. In the Netherlands, it varies from 26 per cent in the Christian Democratic Party, 33 per cent in the Socialist Party to 40 per cent in the Green Party. In all these countries, internal party quotas have yielded a higher representation of women in legislatures without needing to reserve seats because these parties themselves function democratically with financial and political accountability. In our country, even the best of our women parliamentarians feel sidelined and powerless within their respective parties. The few women leaders who exist in various parties have not been able to facilitate the entry of greater numbers of women in electoral and party politics, and therefore, are an ineffective minority within their own respective parties. The very same male party leaders who compete with each other in announcing special quotas for women have shown little willingness to include women in party decisionmaking or even to create an atmosphere that is conducive for women’s participation in politics. The representation of women within the decision-making fora of various political parties is even lower than their representation in the Parliament, as Table 14.4 illustrates. Unless change occurs within each of these parties, women’s participation cannot be enhanced because under the present system, parties are the only platform for political socialization for electoral purposes. If women are not allowed to play an active role in the day-to-day functioning of the parties, it becomes far easier for powerful male politicians to corner the women’s quota by presenting their own wives and daughters for ticket allocation at election time. Two Alternative Proposals The first serious alternative proposal was put forward by farmers’ movement, Shetkari Sangathana of Maharashtra in its Aurangabad Conference of 1993 on seat reservation for women. This proposal was formulated after the Sangathana carried out a review of the results of the one-third reservation quota for women at the panchayat and zilla parishad level. 374 Madhu Purnima Kishwar Table 14.4 Women’s Presence in Top Decision-Making Committees, 1996 Party Committee No. of Women Total Members CPI (M) Politburo Central Committee Secretariat National Executive National Council Political Affairs Committee Parliamentary Board National Executive Steering Committee Parliamentary Board Election Committee Working Committee 0 5 0 3 6–7 i 0 0 ii 11 0 1 2 2 15 70 9 31 125 15 15 75 15–17 iii 9 17 19 CPI JD UF BJP Congress % of Women 0 7 0 10 5 0 0 15 0 11 12 11 Notes: i The seventh member is a candidate member who participates in discussions but does not vote. ii Normally the State President of the JD’s women’s wing is invited to attend and offer suggestions, but she does not have a vote. Even this invitation depends upon the wishes of the party President or of the President of the Parliamentary Board. iii Total number of members varies due to visitors. Shetkari Sangathana’s Alternative Proposal Shetkari Sangathana advocates the creation of multi-seat constituencies, with one-third of the seats reserved for women. For instance, three constituencies could be clubbed together to make one and these clubbed constituencies can be represented by three people, one of whom must be a woman. The first two seats would go to the two candidates who poll the highest number of votes—whether the candidate is a man or a woman. The third seat would go to the woman who polls the highest number of votes among the women candidates. This same principle of guaranteed representation for women of at least one-third of all seats could also be extended to a 50 per cent reservation for women. In that case, each constituency would be represented by two members in the Parliament—one man and one woman. This could be done while maintaining our current ‘first-past-the-post’ system, or even if we adopted a proportional representation system. There are several advantages of this system: • Every constituency will be represented by at least one woman but it would not be limited to one if women candidates manage to win general seats as well. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 375 • All the voters in every constituency would get a chance to vote for a woman candidate, if they so desire, as opposed to the presently proposed quota system, in which voters of only one-third constituencies will get an opportunity to elect women candidates. • Women would be able to opt for the constituency where they have built support, rather than be shunted around from one constituency to the other. • Men would not feel forced out of their nursed constituencies, but simply asked to share space with women. All candidates, regardless of sex, would have an opportunity to win one of the first two seats if they are able to garner enough votes. If a party does not wish to field women candidates, it could choose to put up only two candidates. It would not have to draw a blank in a constituency simply because it did not have eligible women or simply did not want to put up women candidates. • Women would get an opportunity to team up with two other colleagues to cover their joint constituency on behalf of their party, so they would not be confined to the zenana dabba. • In multi-seat constituencies, voters will have the choice to elect leaders from more than one party. If the three winning candidates are from different parties, they are likely to act as a check on their colleagues and compete with each other in serving the constituency. It may well be argued that clubbing three constituencies together will make them unduly large and unwieldy. But then three candidates of the same party are required to campaign and serve it jointly. This may promote a measure of team spirit among our legislators. Moreover, a big constituency is a disadvantage only for those who step into the electoral fray at the last minute and have no real roots in that area. They have to ‘cover’ the entire constituency in the few weeks given for the election campaign. Those who have nurtured their constituencies by prior hard work would not be so handicapped. Manushi’s Alternative Proposal A second Alternative Bill was drafted by Manushi in collaboration with Loksatta, Lokniti and Lokayan. The important provisions of the proposed Alternative Bill are as follows: 1) A law should be enacted amending The Representation of the People Act, 1951, to make it mandatory for every recognized political party to nominate women candidates for election in one-third of the constituencies. 376 Madhu Purnima Kishwar 2) Each party can choose where it wishes to nominate women candidates, duly taking local political and social factors into account. 3) Among the seats reserved for SCs and STs also, one-third of the candidates nominated by recognized parties shall be women. 4) To prevent a party from nominating women candidates only in states or constituencies where the party’s chances of winning election are weak, and to ensure an even spread of women candidates, the unit for consideration (the unit in which at least one out of three party candidates shall be a woman) for the Lok Sabha shall be a state or union territory; for the State Legislative Assembly, the unit shall be a cluster of three contiguous Lok Sabha constituencies. 5) In the event of any recognized party failing to nominate one-third women candidates, for the shortfall of every single woman candidate, two male candidates of the party shall lose the party symbol and affiliation and all the recognition-related advantages. 6) A law amending Articles 80 and 171 of the Constitution should be enacted providing for women’s reservation of one-third of the seats, elected or nominated, to the Rajya Sabha or Legislative Councils. Corresponding amendments need to be made in the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution and, the Representation of the People Act, 1950. ADVANTAGES OF THIS MODEL 1) Parties will be free to choose their female candidates and constituencies depending on local political and social factors. Parties will nurture women candidates where they can offer a good fight rather than in pre-fixed lottery based constituencies, where they may or may not have viable women candidates. Thus, there is flexibility and promotion of natural leadership. 2) Though seats are not reserved, there will be a large pool of credible and serious women candidates in the fray. This is so because the real contest in elections is only among candidates nominated by recognized parties. Table 14.5 clearly shows that the role of Independents in our elections is marginal and declining. In Lok Sabha elections, as many as 99.7 per cent of Independents are in fact losing their caution deposits. 3) A woman candidate will be contesting both against female and/ or male candidates of rival parties. Therefore, the democratic choice of voters is not restricted to compulsorily electing only women candidates. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 377 Table 14.5 Independents Elected to the Lok Sabha in Successive General Elections Year No. of Seats Filled No. of Independents Elected % of Independents Who Lost 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 489 494 494 520 518 542 529 542 529 534 542 542 38 42 20 35 14 09 09 05 12 01 09 06 66.6 60.1 79.0 86.2 94.0 97.2 98.9 99.7 98.9 99.5 99.7 – 4) As women members are elected in competition with other candidates—without reserving seats—they will be seen as legitimate representatives in the eyes of the public and not just beneficiaries of charitable measures. 5) A winning woman candidate will have been elected on her own strength, backed by party support. She will not be a mere proxy or political lightweight. 6) There will be no need for rotation of reservation. Therefore, the elected women and men can nurture their constituencies and emerge as major political figures in their own right, with an independent power base. 7) At the same time, in the absence of reserved seats, there will be healthy competition for nomination for a particular seat between male and female politicians. 8) Parties will be able to nominate women from Backward classes (BCs), minorities and other communities for elective office in areas where there is electoral advantage to them. This obviates the need for a quota within quotas—an issue which has blocked the existing bill. Those who are concerned about BC representation need not settle merely for one-third quota for BC women within the 33 per cent women’s quota as they are demanding now. They can field as many BC or minority women as they think appropriate. 9) This method is most likely to find favour with political parties and incumbent legislators, as there will be no fear of being uprooted at short notice by draw of lots. Both compulsory reservation and regular rotation are avoided. 378 Madhu Purnima Kishwar 10) This model also provides for reservation of seats for women in the upper houses. 11) Unlike the lottery system of reserved constituencies, in which women’s presence is likely to get ossified at 33 per cent since there would be resistance to letting women contest from non-reserved constituencies, this model allows for far greater flexibility in the number and proportion of women being elected to legislatures. If women are candidates for one-third of all seats contested by each party, theoretically they could even win the vast majority of seats—all on merit. However, given the present state of affairs, it is likely that, to begin with, about one-third of the contested seats will be won by women. But this percentage is likely to grow over time as women gain more confidence and strength. It also ensures that their presence in legislatures reflects their actual electoral strength so that they are not seen as mere recipients of charitable measures. Plugging Possible Loopholes 1) A party may be tempted to nominate women from constituencies where it is weak. However, by making the unit of consideration the state or union territory for the Lok Sabha, and a cluster of three Lok Sabha constituencies for the Legislative Assembly, this risk is avoided. Parties will be compelled to nominate women in all states and regions. No serious party seeking power can afford to deliberately undermine its own chances of election on such a large scale. It is also mandatory to nominate women in one-third of the constituencies because otherwise twice the number of male candidates of the party will lose party nomination. 2) In the absence of actual reservation of seats, there could be fears that women may not be elected in one-third constituencies, as the voters may prefer a male candidate over a female candidate on account of gender bias. However, evidence so far suggests that women candidates of parties have not suffered any gender discrimination at the hands of voters. In fact, very often, the percentage of success of woman candidates is higher than that of male candidates. Table 14.6 shows that the success rate of women candidates in Lok Sabha elections has been uniformly higher than that of their male counterparts in every general election. It is possible to argue that the few women who contest are more often party candidates, and therefore, their Table 14.6 The Gender Advantage 1,874 1,518 1,985 2,369 2,784 2,439 4,620 5,570 6,160 8,699 13,952 4,750 Contestants Available 489 494 494 520 520 542 542 542 529 521 543 543 Total No. of No. of Seats – 1,473 1,915 2,302 2,698 2,369 4,478 5,406 5,962 8,374 13,353 4,476 52,806 Contested Notes: – Gender-wise data for 1952 not Available. Source: 14 September 1999, Times of India, New Delhi. 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 Total Year – 467 459 490 499 23 14 500 502 492 504 500 5,450 Elected Male – 31.7 24.0 21.3 18.5 22.1 11.5 9.2 8.5 5.9 3.8 11.2 10.32 % Winning – 45 70 67 86 70 142 164 198 325 599 274 2,040 Contested – 27 35 30 21 19 28 42 27 39 39 43 350 Elected Female – 60.0 50.0 44.8 24.4 27.1 19.7 25.6 13.6 12.0 6.7 15.7 17.16 % Winning Though the number of women elected to the Lok Sabha has not been very impressive, their success rate (% of contestants getting elected) has always been higher than the male aspirants. Total Party 1,394 1,523 2,319 2,269 1,964 9,469 Candidates Contested 510 498 516 530 488 2,542 Elected 36.59 32.70 22.25 23.36 24.85 26.85 Percentage 1,327 1,437 2,160 2,153 1,831 8,928 Contested Male 489 474 479 493 451 2,366 Elected 35.34 32.99 21.97 22.90 24.63 26.50 % Winning 87 86 139 116 133 541 Contested Female 41 24 37 37 37 176 Elected Source: Compiled by Lok Satta from ‘Statistical Reports on General Election’, Election Commission of India, New Delhi. 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 Total Year Table 14.7 Performance of Candidates of Recognized Parties in the Lok Sabha Elections—Gender-wise 61.19 27.91 26.62 31.90 27.82 32.53 % Winning ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 381 success rate is exaggerated. However, Table 14.7 clearly shows that even among candidates of recognized political parties, the success rate of women candidates is higher than that of men. While 32.53 per cent of women candidates of recognized parties have been elected to the Lok Sabha since 1984, the success rate of male candidates is only 26.50 per cent. This trend is seen in all general elections since 1984, except in 1989. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that women will be elected in large numbers, and that, in fact, their presence in the Lok Sabha will exceed one-third in many cases. In any case, past evidence suggests that in at least a quarter of the constituencies, women are likely to get elected if recognized parties nominate them in at least one-third constituencies. Other Necessary Measures for Enhancing Women’s Participation While it is necessary to institute a system of reservation for women as spelt out above, this or any other system of ensuring women’s presence in legislatures is not by itself sufficient if our objective is to make women equal partners in democratic politics. The problem is not just that women in the political arena are denied tickets by political parties. The fundamental problem is that given the nature of electoral politics today, the system itself creates insurmountable obstacles for women. Proposals for reservation for women must therefore be a part of a larger package of general reforms in electoral politics. The following general measures of electoral reform would go a long way towards making politics less intimidating for women. Measures to Check the Criminalization of Politics (a) The list of offences where a conviction leads to disqualification from contesting election should be expanded as per the recommendations of the Law Commission. (b) Disqualification should not be conditional upon final conviction. It should come into operation as soon as the judge has framed charges with references to offences specified above. (c) A candidate should be required to make a declaration of all the cases pending against him or her, involving charges of criminal conduct or corruption, at the time of filing nominations. This declaration should be made public. False declaration should be a ground for disqualification. 382 Madhu Purnima Kishwar The Political Parties: All the Recognized (National or State) Political Parties Should Be Required to Include in Their Respective Constitutions (a) Rules governing the membership of party and a register of current members that is open for inspection by any member or the representatives of the Election Commission of India. (b) Provisions for a periodic and democratic election of all the office bearers and the highest executive body by the members of the party. (c) Procedures for selection of party’s candidates for elections to legislatures. (d) Procedures for deciding upon various policy documents including the party’s election manifesto. (e) Internal mechanism for adjudicating any dispute, including those concerning the interpretation of the party constitution. ( f ) The Election Commission shall review the party constitutions for their compliance with the above mentioned requirements, and also serve as a court of final appeal against any decision of the internal adjudicating authority in every party. The failure to comply with the Election Commission’s instructions or decisions will lead to the de-recognition of the party. Measures to Curb the Influence of Black Money in Politics (a) Every candidate shall make a declaration of his/her income and property at the time of nomination. False or incomplete declaration shall invite disqualification. (b) All citizens and corporations shall be exempted, upto a certain limit, from paying income tax on donations made to registered political parties. (c) The candidates and political parties shall be required, after the completion of election, to file a detailed statement of account. Nondisclosure or false declaration should result in disqualification for candidate and de-registration for political parties. (d) While the current ceiling on electoral expenses needs to be revised, certain items of expenditure (direct inducements in cash or kind to the voter, or expenditure to bribe officials or hire hoodlums) shall be considered illegal. ‘No’ to Zenana Dabbas 383 (e) Every candidate who secures two per cent or more of the valid votes polled in a constituency shall be reimbursed a reasonable sum of say Rs 10 for each vote secured. ( f ) It shall be compulsory for all registered political parties to get a statement of their income and expenditure audited annually. This statement shall be a public document. Measures to Curb Electoral Malpractices (a) The local post office shall be in charge of maintaining and revising electoral rolls on a regular basis. At present most citizens have no access to electoral rolls, and the procedure for additions, deletions and corrections are ineffective in reality, though the law is eminently sensible. There is evidence to suggest that in urban areas the electoral rolls are flawed up to 40 per cent. (b) It should be mandatory for the Election Commission to provide Voter Identity Cards to every citizen who figures on the electoral rolls. Once this process is completed, the voter identity card or other means of identification should be made compulsory for voting. (c) If the proportion of ‘tendered’ votes in a polling booth is greater than one per cent of the total electorate, a re-poll shall be ordered in the booth. A tendered ballot is given to a voter in whose name a false vote was already cast, and who establishes identity. Therefore, a tendered vote is indisputable proof of impersonation and rigging. At present a tendered ballot is kept in a separate cover and is not counted, while the false vote cast is counted! If this re-poll provision is incorporated and publicized, people will then avail the facility of tendered vote, and rigging will be self-limiting for fear of a re-poll. 15 Political Nomadism and the Party System in India: The Struggle between the Fence and the Field* PETER RONALD DESOUZA Political Nomadism as a Democratic Puzzle Indian democracy, in a sense, constitutes a challenge of democracy to democracy. This rather cryptic comment is meant to convey the idea that the working of democracy in India produces political and moral puzzles, which cannot be read so easily through an old democracy lens. These puzzles need to be broken up into their constituent parts that then have to be reassessed with reference to the core principles of democracy. The unstated observation behind this statement is that the transformation processes, produced by democracy in India, result in the reordering of earlier political institutions and the subversion of the older ways of doing politics. Students of democracy, hence have to make sense of these new political practices. How are these to be evaluated? Are they expressions of domestication of democracy in India or of it’s perversion? Are they indications of the limitations of established conventions, as a result of the process of democratic deepening, and * An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Democracy Club, University of Westminster, on 21 June 2005. I would like to thank John Keane and other participants at the meeting for their important comments on representation. I would also like to place on record my gratitude to Edzia Carvalho for her invaluable research assistance. She has sustained this study through long periods of inactivity. In putting this together I have borrowed from on my articles on this issue published earlier in Seminar and the Economic and Political Weekly. Political Nomadism and the Party System in India 385 hence reminders that new rules need to be forged to accommodate such expansion? Or are they distortions that emerge as a result of the struggle between the new and the old order? Emergent questions such as these need to be addressed in a study of the working of the party system in India and of its relationship with other systems. One practice, that has caused much concern in the political discourse in India, since the early years, which has persisted across all the states of India, is the practice of political defections. In this chapter, I have referred to it as political nomadism. The justification for this different nomenclature will become clearer, as I proceed with the text. Defections in India refer to the phenomena of elected representatives who, after an election and during the term of the house, cross-over from the party on which they have been elected to another party in the house. The reasons for this change of affiliation can be many and range from a desire to weaken the hold of party bosses, to an assertion of the candidate’s social base in an attempt to give it more prominence than it had previously enjoyed, to a bargaining for the spoils-ofoffice, to a celebration of the new brand of identity politics, to perhaps a statement of political principle. Defections in India have been a political concern from the earliest decades of Independent India and even motivated the Parliament to set up a committee to recommend ways by which it can be curtailed. The then Home Minister Y.B. Chavan described ‘defections’ as a ‘national malady’ which was ‘eating into the very vitals of our democracy’ (Kashyap 2003: 2). Different institutional responses have been attempted to deal with this problem, which is seen as having grave implications for the party system in a parliamentary democracy, and these have involved actions by the Legislature, the offices of the Speaker and the Governor, the Courts, and even the office of the President. Constitutional Amendments have been enacted, like the 52nd Amendment, and changes to them have been introduced in the 91st Amendment, and these can be seen as institutional attempts to regulate the political behaviour of elected representatives. This dialectic between institutions and behaviour, is what I have termed ‘the struggle between the fence and the field’ where the field keeps trying to break out of the fence that in turn keeps trying to keep it in. This chapter will try and show how what may appear to be a fairly straightforward issue has in fact several aspects to it, which are of relevance to democratic politics and need to be analyzed if we wish to assist in the process of the democratization of Indian polity and society. Political Nomadism across the World There are several terms used across the world to describe this phenomenon. While in India it is called defections, in the USA it is described as ‘party 386 Peter Ronald deSouza switching’ (Miskin 2002–03) in New Zealand, ‘waka or canoe-hopping’, in Ecuador, ‘Camisetaza or change of shirt’ (Mejia-Acosta 1999), in Australia ‘party jumping’, and in Morocco ‘political nomadism’. The Speaker of the Moroccan Parliament, Abdul Waheed Radi in June 2005 at Geneva said at a meeting of the Inter Parliamentary Union Committee on ‘Parliaments and Democracy in the 21st Century’ that ‘there is a wanderlust among parliamentarians that needs to be curbed since such political nomadism produces instability of government and is not good for democracy’. My preference of ‘political nomadism’ over the other words, to describe this change of party affiliation, is because it is the least normative of all the words on offer and hence allows the analysis and evaluation to develop without a predetermined value-orientation. The fact that there are so many words to describe political nomadism confirms that it is not an uncommon behaviour of political representatives across the globe. In Papua New Guinea it was so prevalent that it threatened the stability of the party system. A law had to be passed to curb it, titled the Integrity and Political Parties and Candidates Law 2000 (Reilly 2002: 701– 18). The implications of such nomadism, for representative government, are brought out forcefully by the ex-Speaker of the Zimbabwean Parliament Cyril Ndebele in his account of the situation in Trinidad and Tobago. . . . the election results of the 1995 general elections produced a 17–17–2 outcome in a 36 Member House. The Leader of the opposition formed a coalition government with the minority party with two seats. . . . the events that followed show to what extent independents can be used in the political power game. One of the two independent members was nominated as the President of the Republic. Just before the President was elected, thus creating the need for a by-election, one of the Members declared himself independent and was that same day appointed Minister. Three weeks later, another Opposition MP defected and was appointed in the Prime Minister’s Office. A by-election was held a few months later for the vacancy created by the election of one Independent Member as President. The newly elected MP was also appointed to the Cabinet (Ndebele 1999: 41). Reflecting on incidents such as these Ndebele goes on to pose some questions that, although asked in the context of Africa, are relevant for many democracies. Do the risks of political opportunism, by way of floor crossing pose a greater threat to democracy and participatory governance than the limitations to freedom of conscience and expression by elected members in the House? . . . Is it not possible that an opportunistic or misguided Member Political Nomadism and the Party System in India 387 in defecting from his political party, whose programme has the support of the Member’s electorate, may thus not merely fail to represent the constituents but actually work against their interests? Conversely, is it not possible that Members who become disenchanted with their party would best serve the interests of their constituents by crossing the floor and joining forces with other like minded members rather than vacating their seats’ (Ndebele 1999: 41). Faced with the regularity of such behaviour of MPs, democracies have had to decide on how to respond to it. Should the appropriate response be legal or political? In other words, should it be fought in the domain of politics, by recourse to a normative discourse that portrays such behaviour as opportunistic and unacceptable, or should it be fought in the domain of law where legal rules are enacted proscribing such behaviour as harmful to parliamentary democracy? There appears to be no unanimous agreement on what should be the response with even neighbours adopting differing positions. New Zealand opted for a legal route, enacting a law Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act, in December 2001 while Australia, in contrast, preferred a more political route. Although these questions can be adequately addressed by using examples from across India I shall confine myself to the political history, of the last three decades, of Goa, to develop my argument. But before I shift to an analysis of the democratic implications of political nomadism in India, and Goa, let me pose a further question. Is such political nomadism a problem which is peculiar to the democracies of the global south or is it a global problem that finds expression everywhere? Posing the question in this way allows us to explore the difference between ‘mature’ and ‘young’ democracies, to determine the extent to which the ‘rules, norms and strategies’ (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 582–600) that make up the institutional order are able to constrain political behaviour and whether such constraint is greater in mature democracies, because they have been at it longer, and less in younger democracies because they are relatively new to the game and thus have still to make its rules a part of their lifeworld. A brief survey shows cases of party crossing in all polities whether they be young and mature. For example, in the United States, since 1990, 12 members of the House of Representatives and the Senate have either switched to another party or become independents. In the United Kingdom, there have been eight jumps since 1990. In Australia the number for the same period is 17: eight senators and nine members of the House of Representatives have defected (Miskin 2002–03: 4) . More recently in Canada in March 2006, David Emerson, a Liberal MP from Vancouver Kingsway decided to leave the Liberal Party and sit as a member of the ruling Conservative Party. Prime Minister Stephen Harper 388 Peter Ronald deSouza did something similar to the case described earlier in Trinidad and Tobago. He appointed Emerson to the cabinet as minister of International Trade with responsibility for the Pacific Gateway. The case was placed before the Ethics Commission where Commissioner Bernard Shapiro ruled that nothing wrong was done by this act of floor crossing. While there was a public outcry in Canada the ruling was clear: no impropriety had been committed. These cases of political nomadism require analysis at two levels: at the causal level to determine when and why MPs leave one party to join another, and examine the consequences of such acts of exit for the party system as a whole,1 and at the normative level to evaluate the extent to which such behaviour conforms or deviates from the norms of democracy. At the causal level we would have to look at several aspects of the political system. The first aspect would be in terms of the internal dynamics of the party organization. Using Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty as an analytical frame, to establish when MPs prefer exit to voice, we would need to look at the threshold point at which exit becomes preferable to voice since it give us an understanding of the working of the party as an organization, of the relationship between members and leaders, of the hold of ideology, and of the place of loyalty. We could examine several of the options2 that become available between exit and voice, for example, (i) silent exit, where the representative leaves the party without trying to change its policies since leaving gives higher pay-offs, or (ii) non-exiting voice, where the representatives stays and tries to move the party towards the goals s/he wants, or (iii) silent non-exit, where the representative accepts the party position without murmur, and (iv) exit plus voice, where the representative leaves and justifies his/her exit by criticizing the party. The case that I shall be discussing later in the chapter, of political nomadism in the Poinguinim constituency in Goa, belongs to this fourth option. The second aspect is with respect to the electoral system and would involve an examination of the new calculus that enters MPs behaviour with the privileging of the condition of ‘winnability’ over all else including ideological affinity, or record of political service and loyalty to the party, while making the choice of candidates. The third aspect looks at the logic of cabinet government where the spoils of office are distributed in accommodating the new aspirant. At the normative level we would have to address some of the questions listed by Hanna F
