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Course Companion denition
The
IB
Diploma
designed
to
Programme
students
of
an
way
IB
an
and
opportunities
for
books
and
mirror
Each
book
students
a
variety
are
core
given
IB
are
each
what
subject
and
the
IB
the
IB.
encourage
wider
will
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the
help
study
content
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in
reect
deep
issues
materials
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from
presenting
of
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resource
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expected
while
and
philosophy
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wide
the
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required
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service
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their
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of
connections
approach;
resources.
in
a
requirements,
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of
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activity,
can
of
of
making
mindedness,
creativity,
in
purpose
critical
whole-course
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the
approach
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of
international
study
Companions
throughout
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a
of
illustrates
subject
Course
students
understanding
Diploma
that
each
course
gain
philosophy
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support
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encouraged
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materials
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draw
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indeed,
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reading
research
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on
addition,
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honesty
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the
specic
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course
protocol.
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assessment
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requirements
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authoritative
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prescriptive.
IB mission statement
The
International
knowledgable
more
To
peaceful
this
end
education
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IB
to
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caring
world
the
organizations
Baccalaureate
and
through
works
develop
rigorous
programmes
active,
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their
with
aims
to
people
develop
who
intercultural
schools,
challenging
inquiring,
help
to
create
understanding
governments
programmes
of
and
a
better
and
and
respect.
international
international
assessment.
encourage
compassionate,
people,
young
and
students
lifelong
differences,
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learners
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who
world
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understand
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other
right.
iii
The IB learner Prole
The
aim
who,
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of
all
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programmes
recognizing
planet,
strive
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help
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to
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create
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develop
humanity
better
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internationally
and
more
shared
peaceful
minded
people
guardianship
world.
IB
of
learners
be:
Inquirers
necessary
learning.
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to
conduct
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sustained
develop
inquiry
actively
throughout
Knowledgable
and
global
and
develop
their
They
and
enjoy
their
natural
In
research
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and
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this
love
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will
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curiosity.
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ideas,
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balanced
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local
knowledge
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disciplines.
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creatively
reasoned,
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in
applying
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thinking
complex
express
more
than
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with
integrity
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take
one
skills
critically
problems,
ideas
and
language
effectively
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and
make
information
and
and
in
a
variety
willingly
in
and
are
individuals
evaluating
a
honesty,
dignity
of
with
the
for
a
strong
individual,
their
own
sense
of
groups,
actions
and
the
them.
understand
histories,
and
the
responsibility
accompany
other
and
the
understand
respect
They
that
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in
approach
others.
communities.
consequences
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creatively
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collaboration
fairness,
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decisions.
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condently
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appreciate
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perspectives,
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view,
and
cultures
values,
are
are
and
accustomed
willing
to
to
grow
experience.
They
and
feelings
and
act
to
show
of
empathy,
others.
make
a
They
positive
compassion,
have
a
and
personal
difference
to
the
respect
towards
commitment
lives
of
others
to
the
needs
service,
and
to
the
environment.
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with
explore
new
defending
and
emotional
and
others.
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limitations
and
understand
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in
ideas,
balance
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experience.
unfamiliar
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situations
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and
uncertainty
independence
They
are
brave
of
and
spirit
to
articulate
in
beliefs.
They
and
approach
forethought,
roles,
their
Balanced
iv
They
courage
give
are
order
to
thoughtful
able
to
the
importance
achieve
to
of
and
their
intellectual,
well-being
consideration
assess
support
personal
to
their
understand
learning
and
for
own
their
physical,
themselves
learning
strengths
personal
and
and
development.
A note on academic honesty
What constitutes misconduct?
It
Misconduct
is
of
vital
importance
appropriately
when
After
have
that
all,
credit
to
the
information
owners
property
of
is
used
ideas
rights.
acknowledge
owners
To
of
in
your
(intellectual
have
an
and
result
information
in
Misconduct
work,
it
must
be
based
on
your
original
ideas
with
the
Therefore,
work
all
of
others
oral,
own
used
completed
language
or
for
and
referred
assessment
expression.
to,
whether
must
Where
in
or
paraphrase,
such
or
the
use
your
is
work
sources
form
of
sources
are
Words
assessment
plagiarism
dened
of
as
the
another
some
and
support
and
or
may
unfair
component.
collusion.
representation
person
as
your
of
own.
the
The
of
the
ways
to
avoid
plagiarism:
are
ideas
one’s
of
another
arguments
person
must
be
used
to
acknowledged.
direct
must
Passages
that
are
quoted
verbatim
must
be
be
appropriately
more
in,
an
written
●
quotation
or
results
gaining
fully
assignments,
●
or
one
that
student
piece
following
acknowledged.
any
individual
ideas
and
behaviour
or
includes
Plagiarism
of
is
you
advantage
work.
property)
authentic
in,
enclosed
within
quotation
marks
and
acknowledged.
acknowledged.
●
How do I acknowledge the work of others?
CD-ROMs,
Internet,
treated
The
the
way
that
ideas
of
footnotes
you
acknowledge
other
and
people
is
that
through
you
the
have
use
email
and
in
the
at
the
●
The
sources
of
illustrations,
bottom
of
a
page)
to
be
from
(placed
provided
another
information
not
is
need
part
of
to
a
at
the
when
end
you
document,
provided
provide
‘body
of
in
a
of
a
quote
or
document)
or
another
footnote
for
knowledge’.
is,
●
the
You
information
That
Works
of
theatre
do
all
not
need
to
be
footnoted
as
they
are
that
and
based
should
should
that
you
include
magazines,
resources,
that
part
of
include
a
formal
list
you
used
all
in
CDs
your
resources,
newspaper
and
should
forms
of
information
your
work.
data,
material
graphs,
must
be
they
are
not
your
own
work.
whether
or
be
of
visual
music,
lm,
dance,
a
part
arts,
of
a
and
where
work
takes
the
place,
is
dened
student.
as
This
supporting
misconduct
by
includes:
works
of
●
including
articles,
use
one
of
Internet-
art.
the
presentation.
You
work
as
can
to
how
nd
the
a
reader
same
bibliography
is
compulsory
in
work
to
be
copied
or
submitted
assessment
by
another
student
duplicating
work
components
for
and/or
different
diploma
assessment
requirements.
‘Formal’
forms
of
misconduct
include
any
action
several
must
or
your
The
gives
you
an
unfair
advantage
or
affects
the
provide
of
another
student.
Examples
include,
viewer
unauthorized
material
into
an
examination
information.
room,
A
art,
arts,
allowing
taking
of
maps,
of
results
full
be
the
that
accepted
if
acknowledged.
Other
means
similar
must
for
resources
books,
must
journals.
denitions
●
listing
the
knowledge.
Bibliographies
the
and
programs,
use
another
assumed
books
photographs,
creative
Collusion
do
as
on
media
are
summarize
document.
sites
or
paraphrase
closely
way
computer
acknowledged
endnotes
web
electronic
used
of
bibliographies.
(placed
other
same
audio-visual,
Footnotes
messages,
any
the
extended
misconduct
during
an
examination,
and
essay.
falsifying
a
CAS
record.
v
Contents
2.3
Your guide for Paper 1
Italian
What
factors
policy
Case study 1: Japanese expansionism in East Asia
in
Italian
1.1
The
on
impact
Japan’s
of
nationalism
foreign
policy:
and
the
Why
origins,
Japan
1.2
in
of
in
did
Italy
was
in
in
South-east
of
Why
did
Italy
Italy
and
the
Changing
expansion
Manchuria,
The
the
results
turmoil:
The
of
the
descent
international
Manchurian
League
into
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Dark
response
to
of
response
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USA
’s
Nations’
of
the
of
German
response
to
events
and
Europe
to
response
the
German
to
events
after
Japanese
actions
to
events
in
Europe
to
the
post-war
1933–1938
155
alignments
in
Europe
to
the
post-war
USA
change
its
the
1938–1940
post-war
170
settlement
after
1937
the
Treaty
of
Versailles:
The
liquidation
Czechoslovakia
policy
expansion:
Poland
towards
international
the
reaction
of
the
USA
to
the
May
alignments:
The
Pact
of
1939
attack
outbreak
of
war
Harbor?
the
Mussolini’s
International
was
of
fascism
origins,
rise
the
to
on
Italian
Foreign
1870–1933
82
was
power
impact
of
it
How
the
First
World
War
in
on
was
was
What
Fascism?
did
First
support
World
for
Fascism
grow
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Italy
of
was
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What
consolidate
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to
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by
of
192
appeasement
Britain
affected
in
the
the
why
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response
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and
to
aggression
weaknesses
of
the
Nations?
the
impact
of
response
US
to
foreign
the
policy
on
expansionist
the
powers?
after
War?
the
did
policy
international
1930s
League
1915–18?
the
pursued
the
responses
1935–1940
international
How
alignments
expansion,
What
the
War
1938?
impact
Why
1939?
1933–38
2.1
is
World
challenges
aggression,
What
April
1937–38
2.6
Italy,
Second
diplomatic
Case study 2: German and Italian expansion
What
in
1931–37
The
policy:
Albania
1932
Steel,
The
invade
expansion,
Changing
was
Sudetenland
to
German
Pearl
the
in
of
on
during
1938?
1933
Beyond
What
role
60
League
China
response
after
War
1932
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Japan
Civil
1933–38
Challenging
did
Spanish
Japanese
2.5
Why
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1931–36
after
USA
’s
in
Valley”
1931–1941
response
The
intervene
challenges
settlements,
events
1935–39
diplomatic
Germany's
The
foreign
crisis?
after
Manchuria
Italy’s
1933
Changing
expansion,
The
on
1931
2.4
1.3
policy,
Italy’s
settlements,
Years
impact
Asia,
29
were
an
September
Germany’s
What
had
1930s?
foreign
crisis
after
Events
the
1920s
expansion
1931–1941
Causes
129
1936–39
What
1990
the
Japanese
in
14
after
1933–1940
militarism
1853–1930
Japan
expansion,
1
was
the
impact
international
of
Soviet
response
to
foreign
the
policy
on
expansionist
power?
powers?
What
factors
inuenced
Mussolini’s
foreign
policy?
What
How
successful
was
Mussolini’s
foreign
policy
was
Italian
the
international
invasion
of
response
Abyssinia
in
to
the
1935–36?
1920s?
The
2.2
the
in
The
impact
of
Nazism
on
German
2.7
policy:
the
origins,
end
of
appeasement
1918–1933
did
support
for
Nazism
grow
The
after
the
What
Italy
international
response
to
German
1933–1940
213
First
The
World
Mussolini’s
110
aggression,
Why
of
foreign
Second
World
War:
The
historical
debate
War?
factors
allows
Hitler
to
become
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dictator?
Writing the internal assessment for IB History
The
historical
debate:
Did
Hitler
have
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Extra
plan
for
achieving
his
foreign
policy
goals
vi
took
power
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1933?
help
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Historiography:
Why
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attack
Nationalism
Pearl
Harbor
in
1941?
How
successful
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Militarism
Mussolini’s
Perspectives
foreign
Economic
Why
and
did
Hitler's
actions
lead
and
crises
The
limitations
policies
in
security
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to
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war
pressures
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policy?
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policy
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of
communism
concepts
appeasement
responsible
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Why
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war
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move
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style
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a
of
government?
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individuals
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most
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significant
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shaping
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impact
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Read the following comment on sources and then answer
could marshal in a lifetime. It is vital, therefore, that
the questions that follow.
students of history become aware of the scope of
historical sources, and the methods which historians
“ The practice of history begins with evidence and with
use to order them.”
sources. The availability of sources is often the key
determinant of what becomes most popular, because
Black J and Macraild, D M. 2007. Palgrave
some areas, for example nineteenth-century France,
Study Skills – Studying History.
benet from a greater volume of documents than
3rd edn, page 89. Macmillan. Basingstoke, UK
others, such as ancient Germany. Whereas historians
1
According to Black and Macraild, what makes cer tain
of early modern and medieval popular culture face
historical subjects more popular than others?
a constant battle to nd material ... those concerned
2
with modern political history face a veritable forest
of ocial documents – more than any one person
2
What problems do contemporary historians face?
T H E
M O V E
T O
G L O B A L
L TA
Communication skills
W A R
TOK
Following the catastrophe of the First World War the new Bolshevik government
Following on from your discussions
in Russia published all the Tsarist documents relating to the outbreak of the war.
for question 3 and 4, get into small
This led to other European governments publishing volumes and volumes of
groups and consider what is the role of
documents – in what became known as the “colour books” – but in most cases
the historian? To what extent do you
attempting to demonstrate how their country had not been responsible for
agree that the key role of historians is to
causing the war. Historians have subsequently had vast quantities of documents
bring us closer to historical truth? Or do
to use as more government and military sources were declassied and released.
historians, selection of evidence and use
However, as recent historiography has revealed, there is still no consensus
of language tell us more about their own
among historians as to the key causes of the First World War.
eras and societies than those of the past?
3
In pairs discuss whether each generation of historian can move closer to
“historical truth” and can be more objective because they are fur ther away in
time from an event and have more sources to work from.
4
Listen to this discussion on the historiography of the causes of the First World War:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03srqz9?p_f_added=urn%3Abbc%3Aradio%
3Aprogramme%3Ab03srqz9
What dierent interpretations do historians have on the causes of the
First World War? What factors have aected their interpretations?
What can you expect on Paper 1?
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majority
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will
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from
syllabus:
Case studies
Material for detailed study
Case study 1:
Causes of expansion
Japanese expansion in
●
The impact of Japanese nationalism and militarism on foreign policy
●
Japanese domestic issues: political and economic issues, and their impact on foreign
East Asia (1931–41)
relations
●
Political instability in China
Events
●
Japanese Invasion of Manchuria and Nor thern China (1931)
●
The Sino-Japanese War (1937–41)
●
The Three Power/ Tripar tite Pact; the outbreak of war; Pearl Harbor (1941)
Responses
●
The League of Nations and the Lytton Repor t
●
Political developments within China – the Second United Front
●
International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the
US and Japan
3
Pa p e r
1
Case study 2:
Causes of expansion
German and Italian
●
Impact of fascism and Nazism on the foreign policies of Italy and Germany
●
Impact of domestic economic issues on the foreign policies of Italy and Germany
●
Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe; the end of collective security; appeasement
expansion (1933–40)
Events
●
German challenges to the post-war settlements (1933–1938)
●
Italian expansion: Abyssinia (1935–1936); entry into the Second World War
●
German expansion (1938–1939); Pact of Steel, Nazi–Soviet Pact and the outbreak
of war
Responses
The
be
four
a
sources
selection
of
on
the
both
●
International response to German aggression (1933–39)
●
International response to Italian aggression (1935–36)
●
International response to German and Italian aggression (1940)
examination
primary
and
paper
will
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sources.
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3-mark
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length
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750
words
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will
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5
Pa p e r
1
L TA
Thinking skills
Consider the following provenance:
analysing Japanese history in this period. (Remember
to research Pyle’s credentials as a historian of Japan.)
Kenneth
in
the
Japan
Pyle,
a
academic
professor
book,
The
of
History,
Making
of
writing
Modern
2
How would a school history textbook dier in
value and limitations compared to the work of
(1996)
a historian?
1
Using the points on the previous page, consider the
value and limitations of this source for a student
L TA
Communication and thinking skills
T
ask 1
T
ask 2
Find a biography of one key gure from the period of history
What questions would you ask about an autobiography to
that you are studying. With reference to the questions above,
assess its values and limitations to your research
analyse the value and limitations of the source in providing
extra insight into the role and impact of this individual.
L TA
Thinking skills
Read the following extract:
source: it typies the milieu (social setting) of the
young Tory Radicals of the day [of whom Disraeli was
Par t of the problem for historians is dening what
one] …
a source is. Although primary sources are usually
closest, or indeed contemporary, to the period under
Black J and Macraild, D M. 2007. Palgrave Study Skills –
observation, and secondary sources those works
Studying History. 3rd edition, page 91. Macmillan.
written subsequently, the distinction is actually quite
Basingstoke, UK .
blurred. Once we move away from simple cases [such
Note: Disraeli was a 19th-century British Conservative
as politicians’ diaries, or cabinet minutes] which are
Par ty leader, and British Prime Minister from 1874–80.
clearly primary, diculties do arise. Take Benjamin
Disraeli’s novel of 1845, Sybil; or the Two Nations.
This is rst and foremost a piece of ction … For
historians … however, Sybil is something of a primary
Examiner’s
evaluation,
to
a
historians
hint:
source
just
Note
has
that
no
because
it
for
more
is
the
or
purposes
less
primary
of
intrinsic
or
value
secondary.
Question
What is the problem with trying to dene sources as
“primary” or “secondary”?
Always
source
not
L TA
●
statements be considered invalid by examiners?
to
on
the
specic
whether
give
this
it
is
origins
primary
distinction
in
and
or
purpose
secondary.
your
of
a
You
do
answer.
A limitation of this source is that the translation could
This source is limited because it doesn’t tell us what
A value of this source is that it is an eyewitness
account.
●
be inaccurate.
●
need
not
Communication and thinking skills
Read the following statements. Why would these
●
focus
–
This source is only an extract and we don’t know what
he said next.
●
This is a primary source and this is a value.
●
As it is a photograph, it gives a true representation of
happened before or after.
●
This source is limited because it is biased.
●
This textbook was written over 70 years after the event
took place so it is unlikely that the author had rst-
hand experience. This is a limitation.
6
what actually happened.
T H E
Refer
back
to
the
Examiner's
Source
Private letters
hint
on
page
5
regarding
this
M O V E
T O
G L O B A L
W A R
table.
Values
Limitations
These sources:
These sources:
●
●
can oer insight in to personal views
or opinions
only give individual opinion, not
a general view or government
(audience – the recipient)
perspective
●
can indicate the aects of an event or
Diaries
era on an individual
●
may give an opinion that changes
(audience – personal not
due to later events or may give a view
●
can suggest motives for public
public at the time of writing)
not held in public
actions or opinions
●
●
might have the motive of persuading
can, through tone, use of language
the audience (in the case of private
and expression give insight into
letters) to act in cer tain way
perspective, opinion or emotions
●
may have limitations because of
tone, use of language and expression
Memoirs to be published
●
can oer insight into personal views,
●
may revise opinions with the
suggest motives for public actions
benet of hindsight, i.e. now the
and might benet from hindsight – an
consequences of actions are known
(audience – public)
evaluation of events after the period
●
●
might be written because the author
might show how the individual wants
wants to highlight the strengths of
his or her motive or actions to be
his or her actions – to improve the
viewed by the public
author ’s public image or legacy
●
may have limitations because of
tone, use of language and expression
Newspapers, television or radio
●
repor ts
could reect publicly held views or
●
popular opinion
could be politically inuenced or
censored by specic governments
or regimes
Eyewitness accounts
●
●
might oer an exper t view
●
may only give “overview” of a situation
●
might only give a one-sided narrow
can give insight into contemporary
opinion
perspective
●
could emphasize only a minor par t
of an issue
●
may have limitations because of
tone, use of language and expression
(Note that eyewitnesses are not useful
just because they are at an event; each
eyewitness will notice dierent aspects
and may miss key points altogether,
which could be a limitation)
Novels or poems
●
could inform contemporary opinion
●
might oer insight into emotional
●
could provide a “dissenting” voice,
i.e. not popular opinion
responses and motives
●
could exaggerate the impor tance
of an event or individual
●
could have political agenda
●
may have limitations because of
tone, use of language and expression
7
Pa p e r
1
Statistics
●
can oer insight into growth and
●
decline
●
(e.g. political, economic) and could be
deliberately distor ted
might suggest correlations between
indicators, e.g. unemployment and
●
voting patterns
●
might suggest the impact of an event
●
might suggest incorrect correlations;
there could be another causal factor
●
make comparisons easier
●
can give a sense of a specic scene
not included in some sets of statistics
●
or event
●
might relate only to one location or
time period
or its results over time
Photographs
are gathered for dierent purposes
are limited as we cannot see beyond
the “lens”
can oer insight into the immediate
●
impact of an event on a par ticular
place, or people’s immediate
might distor t the “bigger ” picture
because of their limited view
●
might be staged
●
might reect the purpose of the
response
●
might oer information on the
photographer; what did he or she
environment
Car toons or paintings
●
want to show?
can inform public opinion as
●
car toonists often respond to
popularly held views
●
could be censored and not reect
public opinion
●
can por tray the government’s line
often play on stereotypes
(par ticularly car toons) and
when there is censorship
exaggeration
●
could be limited to the viewpoint and
experience of the car toonist or ar tist
(or the publication the car toon
or painting appears in)
●
may have limitations because of
tone, use of language and expression
Government records and
●
Speeches
might show the government’s
●
position on an issue
documents
●
often do not oer insight into the
results of policies and decisions
can oer insight into the reasons
●
for decisions made
might not reveal dissent or divergent
opinion
Memoranda
●
might reveal the motives for
government policies
●
●
might not show public opinion
●
can be used to keep sensitive
can show what the public has been
told about an event or issue by the
information classied for many years
●
government
●
may not explain the motives for a
decision or political purpose
might be a well-informed analysis
●
may have limitations because of
tone, use of language and expression
L TA
8
Research skills
Find primary sources of the types listed in the grid above
For the sources that you have assessed, also look at
for the topic that you are currently studying. Using the
the content and the language being used. How does the
notes in the grid above, analyse the values and limitations
tone, style or content help you to assess the value and
of each of these sources.
limitations of the sources?
T H E
Third question
This
will
sources.
and
ask
ideas
in
differences
total
of
you
Your
6
two
Examiner’s
to
aim
compare
is
to
sources,
between
and
identify
and
them.
It
contrast
similar
to
is
also
than
two
You
themes
as
identify
marked
out
of
this
are
a
one
key
this
three
question
is
linkage,
i.e.
be
expected
to
discuss
the
sources
for
a
talk
your
running
about
response.
commentary.
one
source
The
At
no
without
hint:
Note
attempt
6-mark
points
of
points
of
must
than
six
This
comparison
there
you
more
identify
question.
However,
two
that
and
to
W A R
one
points
might
and
might
make
not
comparison
be
and
contrast.
of
linkage
mean
three
more
there
points
balance
four
of
–
there
points
or
four
points
of
comparison
and
two
of
points
together
of
throughout
G L O B A L
you
contrast,
are
a
difference.
marks.
to
is
T O
comparison
should
could
The
M O V E
examiner
time
is
should
relating
it
to
contrast.
looking
you
the
How to draw comparisons/show similarities
other.
“End-on
accounts”
–
where
you
write
about
Both Source A and Source B …
the
of
content
the
of
second
one
source
source
–
do
followed
not
score
by
the
content
well.
Source A suggests … ; similarly, Source B suggests …
Source A suppor ts Source B …
How do you approach this question?
You
This
one
are
must
is
nd
best
for
both
similarities
presented
comparisons
some
as
two
and
and
separate
one
for
Like Source B, Source A says …
differences.
paragraphs
contrasts.
–
Here
In the same way that Source B argues … , Source A
points out that …
tips:
How to draw contrasts / show dierences
●
You
could
highlight
colour
practice
the
and
using
highlighter
similarities
the
in
differences
each
in
pens
source
another
–
in
one
Source A suggests … ; however, Source B says …
colour.
Source B disagrees with Source A regarding …
●
You
must
sources
you
make
in
are
sure
every
that
you
sentence
demonstrating
is
mention
you
write.
both
The
skill
Source A claims … as opposed to Source B which
asser ts …
linkage.
Source B goes fur ther than Source A in arguing … while
●
Always
be
clear
about
which
source
you
are
A focuses on...
discussing.
●
Find
both
the
differences,
specic
more
and
“obvious”
then
comparisons
go
on
and
similarities
to
identify
and
the
more
contrasts.
Examiner’s
of
this
different
the
●
Deal
with
similarities
in
your
rst
differences
in
your
Ensure
that
each
point
this
If
brief
support
you
–
quote
quote
your
you
from
only
make
is
Do
not
the
two
sources,
or
three
not
full
words
to
It
is
answer
or
attempt
a
wastes
●
Do
not
conclusion.
you
question
not
to
sources
to
is
look
not
do:
are
at
the
asking
The
similar
focus
or
content
you
of
why
be
similar
or
the
different.
use
This
is
not
grids,
charts
or
bullet
points
–
always
write
paragraphs.
not
a
necessary
full
in
mentions
valid
one
that
contrast
source
…
but
played
a
to
identify
not
the
role,
what
other
is
(i.e.
whereas
simply
“Source
Source
B
to
does
reach
might
mentioned
your
the
make
point.
introduce
asking
This
what
clearly
A
●
is
–
how
second.
in
stated.
it
is
paragraph
Do
●
–
source.
sources
and
hint
question
not
mention
this”
is
not
developed
linkage).
and
time.
waste
time
explaining
what
each
source
says.
●
Do
not
discuss
why
the
sources
are
similar
or
different.
9
Pa p e r
1
Question
content.
Three
The
will
be
assessed
markbands
using
generic
markbands,
as
well
as
exam
specic
indicative
are:
Marks
Level descriptor
5–6
•
There is discussion of both sources. Explicit links are made between the two sources.
•
The response includes clear and valid points of comparison and of contrast.
•
There is some discussion of both sources, although the two sources may be discussed separately.
3–4
•
The response includes some valid points of comparison and/or of contrast, although these points may
lack clarity.
1–2
•
There is supercial discussion of one or both sources.
•
The response consists of description of the content of the source(s), and/or general comments about the
source(s), rather than valid points of comparison or of contrast.
0
•
Examiners
The response does not reach a standard described by the descriptors above.
will
apply
the
“best
t”
to
responses
and
attempt
to
award
changing
Four th question
grid
This
It
this
of
is
worth
requires
question
material
required
the
you
to
most
to
is
that
from
marks,
write
an
each
synthesize
a
9
of
the
mini-essay.
essay
is
source.
total
The
required
However,
material
from
the
–
of
key
not
you
your
own
knowledge
in
your
a
●
as
is
recommended
you
would
any
that
you
essay
plan
is
that
you
will
use
evidence
Then
add
events,
are
your
be
well
as
from
your
own
detailed
statistics
When
you
only
brief
The
●
a
When
●
your
First
and
group
which
from
the
a
brief
them
the
plan
into
point
suggest
them
10
open,
the
to
the
such
views
of
as
grid.
This
dates,
historians.
writing,
sentence
as
the
of
you
will
need
to
write
introduction.
sources,
Source
A,
refer
Source
E
to
the
and
them
so
on.
You
can
quote
briey
from
the
sources
sources
knowledge
the
essay
but
quoting
two
or
three
to
an
in
based
either
the
on
the
is
sufcient.
those
essay
alternative
●
Use
●
Include
●
Write
which
title
e.g.
under
themes
“Examine
the
if
and
the
sources.
own
detailed
a
brief
conclusion
for
which
should
answer
or
question
and
question
reasons
knowledge
those
argument,
the
all
sources
you
is
the
difference
the
group
to
arguments.
make
support
sources
knowledge
knowledge
and
start
using
directly
answer
words
support
own
detailed
throughout
as
the
below.
sources
●
here
Add
possible.
essay.
your
question.
alliances...”.
shown
should
list
How do you approach this question?
It
wherever
25.
to
●
with
as
credit
the
have
given.
be
in
line
with
the
evidence
T H E
M O V E
T O
Sources that suggest X
Sources that suggest other factors
Source A
Source B
Own knowledge: events, dates, details
Own knowledge: events, dates, details
Source D
Source C
Own knowledge: historian
Own knowledge: events, dates, details
Source E
G L O B A L
W A R
Source A makes more than one point,
can be used to suppor t more than one
argument or theme
Own knowledge: events, dates, details
▲
Planning grid for the four th question – mini-essay
The
Fourth
well
as
question
exam
specic
will
be
assessed
indicative
Marks
Level descriptor
0
•
using
content.
generic
The
markbands,
markbands
as
are:
The response does not reach a standard described by the
descriptors below.
1–3
•
•
The response lacks focus on the question.
References to the sources are made, but at this level these
references are likely to consist of descriptions of the content of the
sources rather than the sources being used as evidence to suppor t
the analysis.
•
No own knowledge is demonstrated or, where it is demonstrated, it
is inaccurate or irrelevant.
4–6
•
The response is generally focused on the question.
•
References are made to the sources, and these references are
used as evidence to suppor t the analysis.
•
Where own knowledge is demonstrated, this lacks relevance or
accuracy. There is little or no attempt to synthesize own knowledge
and source material.
7–9
•
•
The response is focused on the question.
Clear references are made to the sources, and these references are
used eectively as evidence to suppor t the analysis.
•
Accurate and relevant own knowledge is demonstrated. There is
eective synthesis of own knowledge and source material.
Examiners
credit
will
apply
wherever
the
“best
t”
to
responses
and
attempt
to
award
possible.
11
Pa p e r
1
Here is a summary of the key points for each question
Third question
with the kind of language that is useful when answering
This is designed to assess your cross-referencing skills.
each question.
When comparing two sources you could use the following
First question, par t a
structures:
Remember you have to show your understanding of the
Sources A and B agree that …
source and come up with three points. Here are some
Moreover, the two sources are also similar in that …
useful sentence star ters:
This is suppor ted by … in Source A and … in
This source says that …
Source B …
Secondly …
For a contrasting paragraph:
It also suggests that …
Source A diers from Source B in that Source A
says … while Source B argues that …
First question, par t b
Always star t with your key point.
Another dierence between the two documents
is that …
One message of this source is …
Moreover, Source B goes fur ther than Source A when
This is suppor ted by … here refer to specic details
it suggests/says that …
in the source.
Four th question
Another message of the source is ...
This is a mini-essay and is assessing your ability to
You need to make a separate point, not an elaboration
synthesize sources with your own knowledge as well as
of the rst point: you need two clear points about the
your ability to give suppor ted arguments or points that
message of the sources.
address the specic essay question.
Second question
Use your essay writing skills and vocabulary for this
This question is assessing your ability to analyse a
question.
source for its value and limitations by looking at its origin
In addition, as you are using sources as well as your own
and purpose and content.
knowledge, you could use the following to help tie in the
Make sure that you use the words “origin”, “purpose”
sources to your own knowledge:
or “content” in each of your sentences to ensure that
As it says in Source C …
you are focused on what the question needs, e.g.
This is suppor ted by the information given in
A value of the source is that its author …
Source …
A value of the purpose is that it …
Source A suggests that … and this is suppor ted by
The language of the content of this source indicates
the fact that in the Soviet Union at this time …
that …
Historians have argued that … This viewpoint is
The content also seems to focus on, or use, examples
which are ...
On the other hand, there are also limitations to using
this source for nding out about … This is because
(explain here how origin and purpose can cause
problems for the historian) or
A limitation of the origin is …
A limitation of the purpose is …
The content of this source makes it less valuable
because …
12
suppor ted by the information in Source E
concerning …
T H E
M O V E
T O
G L O B A L
W A R
How should I distribute my time in the Paper 1
examination?
A
key
the
issue
efficiently
time
to
most
You
you
marks
will
allowed
to
this
to
the
on
have
the
one
you
write
recommend
read
through
understanding
sources.
Read
through
the
paper
If
you
could
answer
examination
We
for
examination.
is
do
run
managing
not
out
fourth
work
of
time.
question;
your
time
through
Yo u
after
must
all
effectively
the
allow
this
in
questions
is
enough
worth
the
p a p e r.
hour
have
to
complete
ve
minutes
the
paper.
reading
At
time
the
beginning
when
you
are
of
the
not
anything.
that
the
of
you
use
your
questions
what
through
you
the
five
first.
are
minutes
This
looking
questions
will
for
and
reading
time
give
you
an
when
you
read
then
begin
to
initial
the
read
sources.
How much time should I spend on each question?
Some
examiners
question
answer
could
could
have
be
suggested
based
receive.
on
The
the
that
the
time
maximum
following
is
a
you
number
rough
spend
of
on
marks
each
that
the
guide:
First question, par ts a and b
10 minutes
5 marks
Second question
10 minutes
4 marks
Third question
15 minutes
6 marks
Four th question
25 minutes
9 marks
13
1
J A PA N E S E
I N
1.1
E A S T
E X PA N S I O N I S M
A S I A
The impact of nationalism and militarism
on Japan’s foreign polic y: the origins,
1853–1930
Conceptual understanding
Key concept
➔
Causation
➔
Signicance
Key questions
➔
Assess the origins of Japanese nationalism and militarism.
➔
Examine the reasons for Japan following an expansionist foreign
policy in the 19th century.
▲
General Tojo bowing to Emperor Hirohito,
1940
Commodore Perry arrives in Japan
1853
The Treaty of Kanagawa is signed between
1854
Japan and the USA
The emperor ’s powers are restored
1867
1871
The Sino–Japanese War
1894
1902
The Russo–Japanese War
The Treaty of Tientsin is signed with China
The Anglo–Japanese Alliance
1904
The Russo–Japanese War ends with the
1905
Treaty of Por tsmouth
Japan annexes Korea
1910
Japan seizes German possessions
1914
in Shandong
The “ Twenty-One Demands” are made on
1915
China
14
C H A P T E R
1 . 1 :
T H E
I M P A C T
O F
N A T I O N A L I S M
A N D
M I L I T A R I S M
O N
J A P A N ’ S
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
1918
O R I G I N S ,
18 5 3 – 19 3 0
The Siberian Expedition
The Treaty of Versailles conrms Japan’s
1919
war gains
1921
The Washington Conference
1925
The Peace Preservation Law
1926
Hirohito becomes emperor
What were the origins of Japanese nationalism
and militarism?
In
order
to
look
to
understand
the
events
of
the
1930s
in
Asia,
it
is
important
Nationalism
at
the
roots
of
Japanese
nationalism
and
militarism,
which
When the people of a country strongly
started
in
middle
of
the
19th
century.
suppor t the interests of their own nation,
Several
factors
contributed
to
the
growth
of
Japanese
possibly to the detriment of the interests
nationalism:
of other nations.
●
the
determination
which
was
linked
to
to
transform
the
desire
Japan
for
into
a
equality
Western-style
with
Western
power,
powers
Militarism
●
Japan’s
●
the
belief
in
its
destiny
as
the
leader
of
Asia
When a government or the people of a
need
to
obtain
raw
materials
and
to
secure
markets
in
East
Asia,
country believe that it is necessary to
and
to
stop
other
countries
from
doing
this
have a strong military in order to both
●
the
need
●
the
actions
●
growing
for
strategic
defend and to promote the interests of
security
their country.
The
impact
Japan
but
policy
as
of
these
to
Japan
militarism
the
popular
also
nationalist
taking
of
support
factors
link
took
goals.
that
over
and
powers
for
was
other
Japanese
making
militarism
not
only
nationalism
Nationalism
because
action
Western
Asian
in
to
expansionism
promote
with
an
expansion
also
in
nationalism
pursuit
became
was
within
imperialist
territories
Japan
political
and
linked
dependent
on
Japan.
in
foreign
of
its
with
The Shogun
the
Since 1192, Japan had been ruled by
military
a feudal military dictatorship called the
decisions.
bakufu. Although the emperor was still
Japanese
nationalism
began
in
the
second
half
of
the
19th
century
ocially the ruler, in practice the power
when
Japan
had
its
rst
contact
with
the
West.
Up
until
this
time,
it
lay in the hands of the Shogun who was a
had
been
isolated
from
the
outside
world
in
an
attempt
to
shield
its
military dictator. Beneath the Shogun were
civilization
from
the
perceived
threat
posed
by
Christianity.
This
had
the daimyo or feudal lords, and under the
been
the
policy
of
Japan’s
rulers,
the
shogun,
who
had
effectively
ruled
daimyo were the samurai or warriors.
the
country
since
1192.
15
1
L TA
Communication skills
Copy out this mind map. As you read through this chapter, identify motives and events that suppor t each of the ve
factors given below. Add this evidence to your mind-map.
Desire
for
with
equality
the
Need
West
Growth
of
19th
in
a
destiny
leader
in
the
century
as
Need
Popular
the
strategic
Japanese
nationalism
Belief
for
security
materials
for
for
raw
enthusiasm
of Asia
militarism
and
markets
and
expansionism
However
in
Matthew
Perry,
steamships.
demands
mindful
to
resist
1853,
He
for
of
The
the
began
now
most
or
in
all
a
areas:
were
Japan’s
military
a
led
new
navy
of
a
gave
ports
▲
16
A representation of a factory in Meiji, Japan
with
to
Japan,
China
and
to
to
with
cry
unity
of
“rich
of
the
Islands,
a
negotiate
large
a
the
same
system
Meiji
the
strong
the
also
The
military”.
army
established
results
positioning
and
Korean
of
of
War
itself
as
Shimonoseki
Liaodong
independence
to
and
took
perhaps
the
patriotism;
Treaty
indemnity,
commercial
known
Sino–Japanese
thus
The
of
Yoshinobu,
Political
and,
Japan
the
and
attempted
reforms
time,
country,
British.
In
US
US
1854.
feudal
Major
and
to
government
fashion
Formosa
recognized
pay
in
modernizing
China,
empire.
had
series
became
His
tactics.
signicant.
a
up
Ships”,
immense.
who
the
included
help
USA
democracy.
At
“Black
sign
several
open
Tokugawa
the
were
with
to
which
to
emperor.
military
an
China
education,
defeated
Pescadores
Peninsula
obliged
the
were
Japan
power
the
the
Perry’s
Shogun,
Commodore
Japan
Japan
forced
national
reforms
with
1894–95,
world
with
to
get
emperor,
military.
German
modernization
by
Japan
of
industry,
the
to
ofcer,
of
dismantling
form
promoted
adapting
the
Japan,
limited
reforms
and
to
on
“enlightened”
signicantly,
government
ruling
naval
shores
been
Kanagawa
treaty
modernizing
establishing
place
of
had
the
returned
Meiji
the
happened
and
this
on
Intimidated
treaties,
of
American
determined
had
Treaty
effects
power
as
the
trade.
West
humiliating
signed
was
what
the
an
arrived
open
treaty.
and
additional
C H A P T E R
1 . 1 :
T H E
I M P A C T
O F
N A T I O N A L I S M
A N D
M I L I T A R I S M
O N
J A P A N ’ S
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
18 5 3 – 19 3 0
Source skills
Source A
An
by
extract
from
Ubukata
who
was
a
a
memoir,
Toshiro,
a
teenager
Sino–Japanese
written
in
put
1931,
police
journalist-novelist,
at
the
start
of
upon
it
the
Everybody
agreed
that
it
would
be
all,
to
held
capture
huge
Pyongyang,
British
since
cannons.
August,
the
Japanese
with
so
army
little
effort
a
disappointing
–
and
the
enraptured.
My
home
that
it
to
system
the
back
police
Japanese
town
then.
before
the
it,
thanks
to
a
had
post
ofce
and
News
of
the
imagination.
times
was
as
over
big
as
200
to
our
leader
30
in
million.
Li
It
had
Hongzhang…
was
of
a
our
rst
country
war
with
supported
a
foreign
moreover
by
British.
the
Everyone
women
–
–
adults,
talked
children,
about
war
the
and
victories
else,
day
and
night
…
no
one
ever
newspaper
telegraph
police
thirty
check
no
line
station.
All
been
as
happy
as
when
we
learned
of
between
the
the
to
people
had
received
beyond
population
compared
this
nothing
came
ran
excitement
the
almost
aged,
telephone
was
children
The
of
overpowered
the
were
its
competent
country,
was
was
front
the
and
Pyongyang
China
we
day.
in
However,
such
in
people
and
million,
city
a
board
very
Japan,
difcult
and
times
Japanese
War.
message
station,
several
After
...
the
news
fall
of
Pyongyang...
was
Source B
A
Japanese
artist
depicts
Chinese
ofcials
surrendering
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
excited
to
Source
about
the
A,
why
victory
were
over
naval
ofcers
in
1895.
Second question – 4 marks
the
China
to
Japanese
in
1895?
so
With
reference
assess
for
the
to
values
historians
its
origin,
and
purpose
limitations
studying
the
of
impact
and
content,
Source
of
A
the
First question, par t b – 2 marks
Sino–Japanese
What
is
the
message
of
Source
War
of
1895.
B?
17
1
The eects of the First Sino–Japanese War on nationalism
TOK
and militarism
In pairs consider the skills you have used
to answer these source based questions:
Germany,
interpreting the message of each source;
and
extrapolating information and evaluating
Peninsula
the provenance and content of a source.
Japan’s
Discuss how these are similar to the
Germany
methods used by historians to gain
Britain
knowledge.
various
its
this
Russia
impact
in
in
as
took
the
with
forced
the
the
over
of
to
the
concerned
whole,
known
control
and
seen
a
then
advantage
pretexts
be
as
was
Russia
secured
took
France,
Asia
what
fury,
can
and
on
Triple
weakened
sources
their
to
growing
give
up
Intervention.
Liaodong
Shandong
expand
Japan’s
Japan
Peninsula
Province.
China
spheres
to
of
the
Much
for
to
itself,
France
seize
power
Liaodong
and
port
inuence.
while
Great
cities
The
on
impact
of
below.
Source skills
Source C
An
Source D
extract
ofcial
from
Hayashi,
following
the
Japanese
written
Triple
government
in
June
John
1895
Hunter
American
of
must
continue
Western
considered
build
is
methods
if
inadequate
now;
if
must
be
to
study
…
necessary
them;
need
the
we
be,
If
we
and
new
must
start
entire
use
warships
must,
organisation
our
make
at
of
any
our
are
was
cost,
it
will,
from
Japan
ke e p
ca lm
an d
so
as
to
her;
lull
s us p i cio ns
during
thi s
her
national
pow e r
and
emulate
the
the
we
must
be
watch
in
the
a nd
wai t
O r i e nt
one
day.
decide
her
Whe n
ow n
thi s
fa te;
for
that
not
only
to
p ut
i nto
who
seek
to
d ay
a nd
a rr i ve s
s he
the i r
me dd le
will
even
of
to
be
ab l e ,
medd l e
It
had
the
to
to
Japan
played
was
a
had
by
that
thing
if
learned
victim,
the
they
rules.
were
the ir
rules,
but
they
imperialism.
were
Now,
the
in
it
found
that
it
was
Japan’s
reviled
he r
this
sloganeering
in
the
and
imperialist
denied
club.
equal
Japanese,
J a pa n
w il l
pl ace
in
s hould
in
of
victory,
yellow-peril
those
who
had
been
most
enthusiastic
be
Western
models,
became
convinced,
as
the
Jensen
writes,
that
international
law
and
affai r s;
modernization
alone
would
never
be
bring
necessary,
fair
rules
institutional
she
down
amount
of
you
weren’t
s u re l y
Marius
powers
came
we
and
what
the
w il l
about
able
“Say
enough.”
West.
particularly
even
will
it
didn’t
standpoint
membership
come
strong
life.
because
What
justice
the
psychologically
this
journalist
Intervention
conso li da te d;
by
opportunity
of
countrymen,
Triple
found a t ion s
moment
and
The
nurtur ed
ti me
m us t
him
rest
enough.
his
the
happened
established
of
Japan:
si t
not
against
had
weren’t
From
tight,
the
of
that
transform
sincerity
you
mus t
it
strong
system
changed.
present
to
many
wrote
dominate
army
rectifying
military
for
Tokutomi
to
At
Modern
(1993).
Intervention.
Speaking
We
Boyle.
Nexus
full
respect
and
equality
from
the
West.
affa i r s.
Third question – 6 marks
Compare
and
contrast
Source
and
Source
C
Japanese
The
military
also
the
encouraged
reinforced
successful
powers
18
as
a
the
that
world
and
to
kept
a
of
a
and
and
drawn
military
up
to
and
defend
from
presence
at
expressed
the
the
gaining
to
a
militarism
against
military
the
upper
heart
of
land
the
other
the
of
of
and
power,
Japan.
Japan
to
It
be
Western
expansion
ranks
of
in
for
representatives
the
of
Western
necessary
itself
in
views
countries.
land
also
was
Japanese
ministerial
only
War,
some
military
Russians.
1905,
be
give
nationalism
strong
power
the
to
views
regarding
Western
Sino–Japanese
having
growth
idea
now
This
of
at
against
1895
were
forces.
the
the
and
between
navy
success
frustration
towards
the
D
increased
the
the
army
armed
government.
and
C H A P T E R
There
1 . 1 :
T H E
was
a
production
iron
and
huge
I M P A C T
steel.
the
Japanese
N A T I O N A L I S M
determination
soared
as
The
amounts
society,
O F
of
River
expansion
on
was
were
to
J A P A N ’ S
Japan
to
on
was
O N
become
told
spent
Society,
the
M I L I T A R I S M
strengthen
sought
population
money
Amur
to
Japan
A N D
in
less
all
army
established
on
through
and
to
P O L I C Y:
respects.
reliant
“endure
the
F O R E I G N
T H E
A
promote
18 5 3 – 19 3 0
Industrial
imports
of
hardship”
navy.
O R I G I N S ,
as
patriotic
the
idea
of
mainland.
Japan after 1900
How did international events contribute to the growth
L TA
of nationalism and militarism?
Japan’s
position
was
further
strengthened
by
the
signing
of
an
Thinking skills
alliance
The Russo–Japanese War
with
Britain,
the
Anglo–Japanese
Alliance,
in
1902.
This
not
only
ended
An ex tract from Kenneth B.
Japan’s
diplomatic
isolation
but
was
also
the
Western
and
a
rst
time
a
military
alliance
Pyle, 199 6. The Making of
had
been
signed
between
a
non-Western
nation.
Modern Japan, page 191.
When
Japan
and
Russia
clashed
over
their
interests
in
Korea
and
The [Russo–Japanese] war
Manchuria,
Japan
went
to
war,
with
a
surprise
attack
against
the
required an unprecedented
Russians
in
1904.
It
was
successful
in
its
land
battles,
although
with
great
mobilization of the nation’s
loss
of
life;
however,
it
was
the
war
at
sea
that
was
decisive.
The
Russian
resources. The government
eet
sailed
halfway
round
the
world
from
its
base
in
the
Baltic
Sea
to
mobilised one-fth of the
Vladivostok.
When
it
arrived
in
the
Tsushima
Strait,
it
was
destroyed
by
male working population for
Admiral
Togo
and
the
new
Japanese
eet.
some form of war service
and sent 1 million men to the
MANCHURIA
Vladivostok
front. Casualties amounted to
Mukden
Liaoyang
more than 100,000 and the
lf
u
G
f
o
g
n
o
d
o
ia
L
nancial cost was immense.
Port
Its cost was ten times that of
Arthur
the Sino-Japanese War and
stretched the economy to the
Inchon
N
limit. To sustain so heroic an
KOREA
A
eor t, the war was justied as
P
a great popular under taking.
Tokyo
A
Shimonoseki
J
Nothing in the nation’s history
Sasebo
(Naval
Battle
B
u
R
▲
s
s
ia
a
ic
lt
t
e
le
F
Japanese
naval
Japanese
land
had so heightened political
attacks
base)
of
awareness as this war.
oensives
Tsushima
The
Battle
of
Yalu
River,
1904
n
Questions
The Russo–Japanese War, 1904–05
1
According to this source,
what eects did the Russo–
Japanese War have on
Why was Manchuria so impor tant to Japan?
Japan?
Manchuria
Japanese
it
Manchuria
the
the
islands,
provided
growing
was
it
also
from
of
was
impor tant
China
closest
agriculturally
oppor tunities
offered
Japanese
threat
area
the
for
possibility
population
and,
to
rich
the
of
Japan.
with
Four
mineral
supply
of
providing
strategically,
times
it
larger
resources.
resources
living
could
space
act
as
to
This
the
meant
Japan.
for
a
than
the
rapidly
buffer
2
Discuss how Pyle has used
language to present his
argument.
against
Russia.
19
1
L TA
The
Russians
were
forced
to
accept
the
Treaty
of
Portsmouth.
Many
Thinking skills
Japanese
An ex tract from Kenneth B.
led
Pyle, 199 6. The Making of
much
Modern Japan, page 19 6.
rights
to
were
expect
of
disappointed
much
South
in
more.
the
However,
Manchuria,
Manchuria
with
along
terms
Japan
including
with
the
Port
of
this
gained
treaty
control
Arthur.
southern
half
as
It
also
of
they
of
had
Korea
gained
Sakhalin
been
and
railway
Island.
Japanese imperialism
The
war
earned
Japan
not
only
the
respect
of
the
West
but
also
the
was driven by continuing
admiration
of
other
Asian
countries,
who
saw
the
Japanese
as
a
role
preoccupation with strategic
model
for
how
they,
too,
might
take
on
the
West
and
win.
It
also
advantage and a peculiar
afrmed
Japan’s
own
belief
in
its
destiny
as
leader
of
Asia.
combination of nationalist
Some
Japanese
were
worried
about
the
impact
that
such
imperialism
pride and insecurity … This
was
having
on
Japanese
society.
The
cost
of
the
wars
had
an
impact
on
pursuit of empire and status
its
economy,
and
the
need
to
defend
its
new
territories
brought
with
it
as a great power coloured
the
demand
for
a
stronger
for
a
less
army
and
eet.
However,
the
voices
of
those
all other aspects of Japan’s
who
argued
ambitious
foreign
policy
were
overwhelmed
by
national development …
those
who
wanted
to
improve
Japan’s
position
in
Asia.
If the drive for industry and
empire was to be sustained,
national loyalties would have
How did Japan benet from the First World War?
to be continuously reinforced
The
First
World
War
gave
Japan
the
opportunity
to
expand
its
inuence
and every eor t made to
in
Asia
further.
Japan
demanded
German
colonial
territory
in
China
and
overcome the forces of
when
this
demand
was
ignored,
Japan
declared
war
on
Germany,
seizing
disintegration.
Germany’s
in
1914.
military
bases
Meanwhile,
its
on
the
navy
Shandong
occupied
Peninsula
Germany’s
in
the
South
north
Pacic
of
China
possessions.
Question
What are the implications of
Pyle’s assessment of Japan by
1906?
With
One
to
the
Allies
the
Japanese
commercial
more
sharp
Japanese
from
supplying
markets
Japan
that
also
produce
Another
from
the
in
originally
Civil
on
forces
mistrust
Japan
of
the
of
had
in
prestige
and
the
of
and
unable
Japan
1917.
to
an
was
also
to
to
Japan
not
such
by
it
agree
lease
supplying
a
within
only
to
modied.
First
World
orders
exports
developed
caused
those
stood
were
the
any
political,
actions
Thus,
to
demands
angered
of
“Twenty-
extra
to
accept
These
demands
full.
as
also
also
advantage
the
of
withdraw
USA
to
War
Asian
ourished.
industries
to
1922.
cost
control
government
war
of
to
the
the
and
The
though
men.
whole
home,
The
the
were
which
The
they
British,
defeated
there
in
had
expedition.
the
in
had
Japanese
venture
intervention
the
with
Whites
Bolsheviks.
after
they
the
even
7,500
army,
during
Bolshevik
withdrawal
support
of
At
the
Brest–Litovsk
Whites,
only
Britain.
the
to
however,
in
and
of
civil
with
Russian
of
Army
the
send
the
the
force
Red
support
Ultimately,
came
Treaty
invading
would
end
expand
the
they
failure
was
that
Following
signed
to
the
grant
the
China
imported.
because
the
take
to
and
the
with
required
Japan.
USA,
result,
to
Allies
against
to
and
believed
a
men
the
China
self-sufcient
had
left.
government
independently
20
after
and
in
sent
that
As
were
for
War
had
Bolsheviks
on
it
70,000
agreed
stayed
French
the
more
Allies
sent
who
and
from
the
China
these
powers,
sent
and
able
previously
after
the
Russian
also
to
Russia
war,
Japanese
other
Allies
opportunity
Germans,
the
goods
became
Revolution
to
advisers
was
issued
of
Shandong
Manchuria.
reputation.
the
goods
in
Britain
Japan
then
in
government
Japan’s
Japan
important
remaining
military
Economically,
by
most
territory
and
reaction
damage
The
privileges
coastal
nancial
the
distracted,
Demands”.
US
by
and
the
encouraged
were
attacks
Russia,
largely
the
loss
acted
C H A P T E R
1 . 1 :
T H E
I M P A C T
O F
N A T I O N A L I S M
A N D
M I L I T A R I S M
O N
J A P A N ’ S
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
18 5 3 – 19 3 0
The results of the First World War for Japan
Japanese immigration
At
the
Versailles
Conference
that
followed
the
First
World
War,
Japan
to the USA
secured
the
former
German
Pacic
islands
as
a
mandate
and
Germany’s
The ow of Japanese
former
economic
privileges
on
the
Shandong
Peninsula
of
China.
These
immigrants to the USA
gains
rmly
established
Japan
as
an
important
economic
power
on
the
increased substantially after
Asian
mainland
and
as
the
main
naval
power
in
the
Western
Pacic.
1900. They worked mainly
However,
Japan
“Western
the
Club”
Charter
Britain
of
and
Japanese
was
by
the
the
reminded
its
failure
League
USA
immigration
to
of
were
that
get
of
their
was
racial
Nations.
afraid
into
it
not
equality
This
the
fully
was
a
clauses
because
implications
countries
member
(see
for
the
included
leaders
this
right
of
discrimination in all areas.
in
would
more
in unskilled jobs and faced
in
A growing fear of “the yellow
have
for
details).
peril”, perpetuated by the
US press, drove various anti-
Japanese laws; the Japanese
L TA
Social skills
were not allowed to become
US citizens and in states such
Look back at the six factors, listed on page 15, that contributed to the growth
as California were prevented
of Japan’s nationalism after 1853. In pairs or small groups, copy out the spider
from owning land. The 1924
diagram and work together to add evidence from pages 15–21 to suppor t
Immigration Act discriminated
these factors.
against Japan by making it the
only country not to be allowed
Japan in the 1920s
any quota of immigrants into
the USA.
How peaceful was Japan in the 1920s?
Inuenced
in
1921
to
a
to
develop
by
and
foreign
relations
seek
policy
economic
Thus
Japan
the
the
to
was
be
a
This
in
the
this
treaty
in
Italy,
respect
integrity
Shandong
USA
and
ratio.
massive
These
that
of
Wa sh i ng t on
J a pa n
1 920 s.
wi t h in
cha n g ed
T hi s
k ee pi ng
a nd
a im e d
g ood
c on t i n ui n g
th e
and
together
Japan
Japan,
or
Treaty,
to
fr a m e wo rk
of
be
the
was
by
Japan
Treaty
setting
France
and
the
agreed
First
ratio
Italy
opposed
by
to
to
the
the
as
signed
the
the
1922.
▲
and
Shidehara Kijuro
and
German
War.
for
in
Britain,
be
abandon
Treaty
as
February
territorial
each
international
four
well
competition
Navy
that
Four-
France
of
return
5:5:3
would
Washington
committed
to
a
integrity,
the
World
of
Navy
in
and
and
by
Treaty,
Portugal
restricted
a
and
any
concluded
the
Imperial
deeply
of
independence
during
Naval
USA
Nine-Power
and
insisted
replaced
possessions
A
agreements.
Americans
independence
China”.
formed
was
the
should
Pacic.
Japan’s
was
international
Netherlands
the
carriers
required
1902
seized
respectively.
treaty
treaties
the
m e a ns :
bu t
to
1 929 –3 1,
pa r t n er,
1921,
Chinese
Five-Power
aircraft
expansion
indicated
the
the
and
Japan
This
the
“sovereignty,
in
of
of
Four-Power
to
several
rights
the
concessions
battleships
a m ba ss a dor
a nd
dur in g
China ,
Britain,
the
administrative
Meanwhile,
in
to
Alliance
should
the
undertook
respect
wa s
peac e fu l
tra di n g
Conference
threatened
of
vi a
k ey
signatory
Belgium,
signatories
a
adv a nce me nt
confer
China,
who
19 24– 27
agree me nt.
Treaty;
countries
to
e co nomy
Anglo–Japanese
agreed
in
i nte r na ti ona l is m
US A,
Washington
Power
by
the
Kij ur o,
mi ni ste r
of
Japan’s
with
international
At
Shi d e ha r a
foreign
the
allowed
a
its
for
plans
General
System
1.75
a
Staff.
and
cooperation
in
1920s.
21
1
The Washington Treaty System
Four-Power Treaty:
Five-Power Naval Treaty:
Nine-Power Treaty:
This ended the Anglo–Japanese
This limited the tonnage of the US,
Japan, the USA, Britain, France, Italy,
Alliance. The USA, Britain, France and
British, Japanese, French and Italian
China, Por tugal, Belgium and the
Japan were to confer if there was a
navies.
Netherlands were to respect China’s
crisis in the Pacic.
integrity and independence and abide
by “open door ” principles.
This
change
supported
liberal
and
referred
for
the
a
a
Taisho’s
prime
was
signicant
1925,
and
all
of
and
the
Minister
Hara’s
and
it
leading
of
that
The
term
Taisho
to
be
their
that
the
to
the
those
the
Diet
now
electorate
vote.
it
the
than
was
Society
a
was
more
years
of
became
leader
in
to
democracy”
latter
gaining
rather
affairs
point
“Taisho
to
the
experience
given
foreign
democracy,
given
the
in
seemed
during
controlled
meant
of
of
common
one
1920s.
of
political
because
extended
became
the
This
power
they
were
until,
more
in
open
inuential.
government
economic
government
the
that
were
Hara’s
of
part
Meanwhile,
more
social
membership
world’s
elite.
males
approach
instituted
position
because
media
introduced
As
parties
because
adult
mass
Prime
so
Japan.
reforms
reign.
political
members
of
minister’s
main
doing
international
developments
democratic
series
two
were
more
internal
more
to
Emperor
to
by
led
Council
lasted
reforms.
Japan
into
showed
from
The
the
that
1918
League
it
to
military
was
of
1921
was
and
contained
Nations,
accepted
as
where
one
of
its
the
powers.
What problems did Japan face in the 1920s?
Despite
1920s,
the
society,
The
came
democratic
law
links
of
together
system
the
in
no
addition,
and
problems
in
the
in
1930s
extension
Party,
laws,
right
one
had
the
engage
internationalism
Japanese
to
lead
in
the
government
Japan
towards
and
a
fear
This
was
open
ruling
the
also
of
also
down
for
country’s
saw
on
aimed
franchise
the
big
the
scandals
political
and
parties.
business
public’s
as
to
radicalism.
the
in
the
cities
suspicions.
1920.
and
the
who
at
The
much
a
year
via
opposed
the
of
limiting
dilemma
political
that
the
saw
Peace
Japan’s
Communist
passing
other
indicated
how
The
government,
anyone
particularly
in
discussion,
circles
Financial
deepened
left-wing
established
the
fragile.
support
respect.
franchise
been
in
a
clamping
extending
government’s
either
inspired
was
structure.
which
to
of
with
public
countryside
longer
Law,
remained
eroded
party
the
there
Preservation
political
reforms
violations
each
landlords
The
22
democracy
dictatorship.
election
In
towards
underlying
A fragile democracy
Japan’s
or
were
which
military
1.
moves
there
these
the
in
two
public’s
the
freedom
Meiji
to
allow.
C H A P T E R
2.
1 . 1 :
T H E
I M P A C T
O F
N A T I O N A L I S M
A N D
M I L I T A R I S M
O N
J A P A N ’ S
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
18 5 3 – 19 3 0
Opposition to Shidehara’s internationalism and the growing
inuence of the military on foreign policy
Many
Conservative
questioned
it
as
for
betrayal
example,
from
an
a
The
expanding
of
the
150,000
of
the
along
in
Washington
226).
and
to
see
‘iron-ring’
They
with
Treaty
destiny
army,
seeing
System,
preventing
continued
Japan’s
the
relations,
to
as
Japan
advocate
being
the
the
the
a
of
bill
Shidehara’s
limiting
specically
page
21).
protest
other
Tai s ho
a
This
was
the
slap
in
opponents
di e d,
r e v i v al
revi v a l
excluding
from
provocation
of
of
policies
by
the
the
was
immigration
“Asiatics”
very
of
face”.
to
countries
the
the
who
played
Shidehara’s
the
(see
Japanese
called
into
policies,
to
quota
it
the
a
hands
who
saw
the
West.
com in g
ide a
press
It
all
from
offensive
Japanese
the
conrmed
from
of
na ti ona l is m
of
the
and
n ew
E m pe ro r
empe ro r
the
id e a
as
of
a
Hir oh i t o
l ivin g
J a pa n ’s
wa s
go d,
s pe ci al
wo r l d .
A growing economic crisis
The
economic
1921,
boom
when
of
Europe
the
and
strike
Japan’s
cities
paralysed
and
caused
by
workers
the
rural
tried
police.
crushed
zaibatsu
crisis,
the
(big
left
Indeed,
foreign
the
by
and
the
repression
end
the
the
than
a
imported
to
be
in
1920s,
the
the
of
following
government
the
in
a
middle
markets.
1921,
a
bitter
price
were
rice
and
suppressed
political
The
the
of
farmers
associated
global
a
between
falling
they
landlords.
USA
in
When
with
intimately
the
the
lost
divide
rice.
politically,
and
and,
large
from
until
back
developed
was
outbreak
Crash
only
take
dissatisfaction
seemed
the
and
suffered
cheap
companies)
Japanese
rather
There
themselves
with
lasted
revive
unrest
increased
Street
of
years
farmers
and
that
came
Wall
crises,
and
organize
again
business
however,
following
docks.
harvests
to
This
to
industrial
areas,
good
war
began
Unemployment
of
2001:
“deliberate
as
with
with
on
and
bill
Emperor
destiny
of
and
and
military
celebrated
The
Anglo-Saxon
China
dislike
strong
insult”
When
(Bix,
in
passed
box
immigration
3.
interests.
as
along
international
Asia.
provoked
“grave
government,
to
“ an
abroad”
year,
information
the
seen
policy
USA
a
in
approach
Japan’s
conservatives’
when
and
of
was
aggressive
leadership
groups
Shidehara’s
system
with
real
by
that
the
economic
depression
1929.
series
would
of
come
domestic
down
on
and
the
side
democracy.
What was the role of political instability in China in
encouraging Japanese nationalism before the 1930s?
China’s
political
competition
Korea
and
on
instability
its
was
mainland
key
and
in
encouraging
preventing
imperial
Japanese
expansion
into
Manchuria.
23
1
During
the
century,
Sea
competed
of
course
as
of
the
European
to
gain
19th
powers
colonies,
Okhotsk
had
been
forcibly
S
China
a
RUSSIA
opened
up
for
trade
by
the
k
Russia
a
h
to
il
1858
n
West.
MANCHURIA
Although
this
had
MONGOLIA
1900–05
autonomous
to
After
1912
Russian,
1905
also
Japanese
been
the
case
for
Japan,
Russia
Vladivostok
1864
following
Sea
of
Perry’s
managed
Beijing
to
turn
arrival,
this
it
had
situation
Japan
to
its
advantage,
borrowing
JAPAN
Tokyo
Yellow
Western
Yokohama
CHINA
ideas
to
become
a
Sea
TIBET
strong
Nanjing
country
after
1868.
autonomous
East
1912
China
PACIFIC
N
E
However,
N
P
China
went
on
Sea
A
OCEAN
L
BHUTAN
Pescadores
Islands
W
to
E
TAIWAN
country
.
to
Japan
semi-colonial
Following
China’s
1895
BURMA
Bay
a
s
Guangzhou
INDIA
become
Colonial
Spheres
of
possessions
influence
defeat
Opium
British
of
by
the
British
Wars
in
the
(1839–42
and
Philippine
French
Bengal
SIAM
Sea
1856–60),
European
powers
German
PHILIPPINES
Japanese
to
South
gained
extraordinary
economic,
U.S.
Russian
1898
China
Qing
Empire,
military
1850
and
legal
privileges
on
Sea
0
300
600
Chinese
Miles
soil,
especially
along
BRUNEI
INDIAN
the
BRITISH
SARAWAK
OCEAN
NORTH
SINGAPORE
0
300
600
coast
Ofcially
,
was
▲
in
the
treaty
ports.
Kilometers
BORNEO
still
the
an
Chinese
Empire
independent
power,
A map depicting how colonial powers car ved up China, 1850–1910
but
in
mercy
reality
of
it
was
other
at
the
powers
and
Source skills
their
A
French
from
political
cartoon
treaties,
power.
In
which
addition,
were
backed
Christian
up
by
“gunboat
missionaries
diplomacy”
ooded
into
the
or
armed
country
1898.
As
we
West
have
which,
ambition
for
East
of
they
Japan
(see
a
quick
dynasty.
China;
18)
defeat.
A
However,
prevented
the
they
it
by
1920s,
Nationalist
Party
at
the
the
of
who
as
the
“a
in
in
political
which,
would
and
powers
that
of
dagger
Japan’s
other
in
remained
fought
at
the
weak
of
the
lose
out
having
heart”
depended
of
on
Sino–Japanese
Korea,
and
and
was
toppled
among
out
would
Japan
1911
markets
powers
The
in
drive
help
Strategically,
security
inuence
Meiji
the
also
the
thrust
areas.
The
sharing
they
modernized
China
had
this
the
encourage
mainland.
such
over
national
(GMD)
on
with
colonies.
to
materials
possibility
country
main
raw
newly
revolution
the
Naturally,
that
fought
to
helped
concerned
(seen
equality
acquiring
European
inuence
was
kind
the
the
the
believed
warlords
any
meant
claims
Korea
achieve
country”
were
stake
compared
dominated
see
alarmed
in
to
mainland.
benets:
dominant
page
also
could
and
also
and
weakness
By
the
also
control
having
War
not
wished
“rst-class
on
China
was
Japan)
course,
a
Japan
did
political
its
of
be
Japan
economic
Asia.
spoils
it
to
expansion
provide
if
seen,
China’s
evident
the
divided.
themselves
in
Manchu
It
was
and
unity.
force
after
in
China
1925,
was
was
led
the
by
Guomindang
General
Jiang
First question, par t b – 2 marks
Jieshi.
What is the message of this car toon with
up
regard to China in the 19th century?
cause
in
will
24
However,
1921.
The
further
read
in
the
Communist
rivalry
instability
the
next
between
in
China
chapter.
Party
these
in
of
China
two
the
(CCP)
political
late
1920s
had
groups
and
been
was
1930s,
set
to
as
you
C H A P T E R
1 . 1 :
T H E
I M P A C T
O F
N A T I O N A L I S M
A N D
M I L I T A R I S M
O N
J A P A N ’ S
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
L TA
Research and thinking skills
1
18 5 3 – 19 3 0
TOK
Add more evidence to your spider diagram (see page 16) on factors that had
After you have discussed the review
contributed to the growth of Japanese nationalism by the end of the 1920s.
questions consider the following:
Which of these factors do you consider to be the most impor tant?
Did your class agree on which events
were most signicant? How might your
2
Identify the factors that encouraged the inuence of the military to grow in
choice of events impact the conclusions
Japan during this period.
you draw about historical events?
3
In pairs, discuss the role of China in encouraging Japanese expansionism in
Now discuss more generally who decides
this period. Be ready to feed back your discussion to the class.
which events are historically signicant
and how this impacts our understanding
of the past.
to
Source help and hints
our
30
leader
You
need
to
nd
three
clear
points
to
answer
part
Question
1
on
the
document
paper.
When
Li
war
the
source
it
is
a
good
idea
to
rst
these
points
before
writing
them
and
competent
a
foreign
this
country,
was
a
our
country
moreover
children,
the
by
the
aged,
British.
the
Everyone
women
–
–
talked
out.
no
First question, par t a – 3 marks
war
one
and
ever
learned
page
a
or
about
(See
such
reading
underline
adults,
highlight
had
Hongzhang…
with
supported
through
It
a
rst
of
in
million.
of
nothing
had
the
been
fall
of
else,
as
day
happy,
and
as
night
when
…
we
Pyongyang.
17.)
Cited in Modern Japan, A History of Documents.
According
to
Source
A,
why
were
the
Japanese
so
J.L . Human, OUP
, 2004
excited
about
the
victory
over
China
in
1895?
Once
you
have
found
three
clear
points,
it
is
an
easy
Source A
process
An
extract
from
a
memoir,
written
in
to
write
Ubukata
Toshiro,
a
was
a
teenager
at
the
start
of
according
about
agreed
that
it
would
be
to
capture
Pyongyang,
since
held
huge
British
cannons.
August,
the
Japanese
army
with
so
disappointing
little
–
and
effort
the
of
so
Pyongyang
little
thought
enraptured.
My
home
that
it
to
system
received
the
it,
the
post
put
upon
back
police
it
town
then.
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and
times
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people
China
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to
a
had
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population
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day.
was
thirty
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station.
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in
children
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Secondly,
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and
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was
good
this
made
the
Finally,
victory
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seem
were
even
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more
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rst
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news
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to
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country.
newspaper
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police
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station,
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its
thanks
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all,
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people
foreign
came
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they
telephone
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bigger
remarkable.
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effort”,
it
Japanese
much
leader;
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Japanese
China
overpowered
so
Pyongyang
the
However,
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in
A,
over
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had
city
Source
victory
very
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capture
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answer:
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by
your
check
of
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imagination.
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Japan,
million,
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to
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comment:
you
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25
1
Note
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content
1930s.
assess
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values
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impact
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War
of
its
origin
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look
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35
the
source.
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origin
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years
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point
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War.
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note
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journalist
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26
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written
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is
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purpose
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be
seen
in
the
happy”.
journalist
comment:
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has
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limitations,
answer
purpose
and
the
and
refers
deals
to
the
with
origin,
content.
author
and
the
values
in
the
A
event,
childhood:
both
1895.
is
Memoirs
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forgotten
published
language,
answer
source
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source
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purpose.
introduction
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source
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insight
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it
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into
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expressions
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possible
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C H A P T E R
1 . 1 :
T H E
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A N D
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P O L I C Y:
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in
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18 5 3 – 19 3 0
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place
Japanese
O R I G I N S ,
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C
T H E
contrast
questions,
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annotate
Source D
the
sources
when
you
read
them
to
help
you
pick
out
the
John
comparisons
and
contrasts.
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can
do
this
in
Hunter
The
colours.
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will
make
it
easier
to
write
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as
an
example,
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of
the
comparisons
are
in
blue
and
green;
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contrast
is
shown
in
for
rest
of
happened
from
Japanese
Hayashi,
written
in
June
the
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of
must
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build
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now;
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Japan
so
as
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during
this
the
power
watch
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suspicions
time
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and
calm
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nurtured
foundations
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wait
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to
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sincerity
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Japan
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you
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rules,
by
victim,
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had
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it
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were
in
was
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reviled
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rules.
were
Now,
that
sloganeering
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the
they
they
imperialism.
learned
equal
Japanese,
enthusiastic
models,
writes,
became
that
convinced,
international
as
law
modernization
alone
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never
we
in
full
respect
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Western
sources
refer
methods.
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Western
methods
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the
plan
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talks
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rules
bring
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her;
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membership
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life.
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about
tight,
journalist
Intervention
psychologically
established
by
changed.
present
this
came
emulate
are
even
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countrymen,
Triple
Intervention.
methods
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justice
weren’t
We
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the
1895
and
following
of
that
government
What
ofcial
many
wrote
transform
the
Source C
extract
Japan:
(1993).
purple.
to
An
Nexus.
picked
Tokutomi
out
Modern
American
answer
.
Speaking
Below,
Boyle.
different
methods
…
keep
calm
and
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tight
the
…”.
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Source
B
focuses
on
the
fact
West”.
●
that
Both
sources
are
also,
however,
critical
West’s
intervention.
Source
C
Western
accuses
belief
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interfering
in
Japanese
affairs,
D
says
that
Japan
had
found
by
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West
or
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imperialist
sources
by
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focus
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Japanese
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bitterness
●
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tone
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felt
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accuses
the
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Source
West
the
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this
positive
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sense
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that
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and
C
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“opportunity”
own
fate”
will
for
Japan
denitely
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“decide
come,
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Source
D
is
much
future,
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more
negative
about
the
this.
sources
as
and
however
Triple
Source
C
of
B
with
quotes
not
the
playing
regard
to
the
achieve
it
will
be
very
difcult
to
equality.
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journalist
by
that
uses
ever
such
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humiliation
following
war
copied
respect
Connected
her
Intervention
they
“full
that
faced
worked
club”.
is
Both
haven’t
Japanese
itself
●
“reviled”
the
while
get
Source
among
the
much
West
methods
of
the
the
who
rules.
27
1
Examiner’s
six
points
you
in
three
of
the
comment:
similarity
answer).
similarities.
between
and
This
could
However
,
similarities
and
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and
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contrasts,
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student
has
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“linkage”
here,
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which
the
student
has
compared
the
sources
key:
do
should
student
the
is
China
It
is
a
For
as
is
very
Queen
The
in
the
common
of
cartoon
annotations
John
has
to
this
cartoon
get
used
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you
with
regard
in
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cartoon,
cartoons.
is
interpreting
caricatures
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revolutionary
Victoria,
caricature
you
countries,
with
of
Third
also
has
points
countries
been
know
France
rosette
or
Pyle,
K.
1996.
annotated
you
write
USA
Toshiro,
1931.
U.
Japanese
OUP
28
York,
The
Lexington,
War”.
Each
should
be
both.
good,
Review
short
the
quotes
to
markbands
for
Does
this
answer
best
t
the
top
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slice
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China
shown
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racist
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weakness
to
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symbols
these
shown
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cartoons.
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on
Britain
sometimes
Modern
New
It
as
is
as
hat;
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the
Bull.
help
1993.
on
sources.
source
end.
Western
here
an
for
answer
you.
to
Use
the
the
question.
cut
up
into
pie
slices
References
JH.
both
each
the
marks?
the
being
Jovanovich.
some
made.
Question.
competing
China
Boyle,
to
at
century?
use
example,
woman
this
that
often
represent
are.
19th
important
Cartoonists
to
message
the
about
China
24.)
the
in
talk
throughout
Western
What
refer
commentary
First question, par t b – 2 marks
page
not
comparison
means
boundary
(See
do
the
versa.
the
that
point
running
support
The
is
then
be
The
only
every
This
and
Japan:
The
Making
of
Modern
“Promulgation
Modern
American
Nexus .
Harcourt
Brace
USA
Japan,
A
of
Japan .
the
History
DC
Heath
constitution
of
Documents,
and
and
J.L.
Company.
the
Sino–
Huffman,
2004.
Japan
on
watching
sidelines
with
interest
1.2
Japanese expansion in S outh-east A sia,
1931–1941
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Causation
➔
Change
➔
Perspective
Key questions
➔
Assess the impact of nationalism and militarism on Japan’s foreign policy
in the 1930s.
➔
Examine the impact of economic factors on Japan’s foreign policy.
➔
Discuss the impact of the political instability within China on Japan’s actions
in Manchuria and mainland China.
▲
Japanese forces in Manchuria, 1931
Japan bombs Chinese districts
The Manchurian crisis
1931
of Shanghai
1932
Army ocer revolt
Prime Minister Inukai is assassinated
Manchukuo is created
1933
The repeal of the naval treaties
Japan signs the Anti-Commintern Pact with
1934
of Washington and London by the
Germany
Japanese navy
1936
Election results in the Minseito Par ty
in government
An attempted coup takes place in Japan,
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident
1937
The beginning of Sino–Japanese War
in favour of Kodo-ha
The National Mobilization Bill
The star t of Tosei domination of government
1938
A proposal for the East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere is announced
The Imperial Rule Assistance Association
1939
is formed
Japan sets up Wang Ching Wei as the
All political par ties are banned in Japan
puppet ruler of Manchukuo
1940
Japan signs the Tripar tite Pact with
Japan signs the Non-Aggression Pact with
Germany and Italy
the Soviet Union
1941
July: Japan invades the rest of Indo-China
Japan demands access to bases in
Vietnam from the French
December: Japan attacks Pearl Harbor
29
1
Between
by
the
that
1931
growth
you
read
deteriorating
attack
on
There
are
the
USA
●
It
a
was
be
only
be
1.1.
from
the
through
used
also
be
for
Asia,
was
willing
to
achieve
In
it
addition,
actions
of
and
the
the
could
Britain
of
to
the
led
of
to
to
be
in
China,
the
global
the
dened
military
intervention
ultimately,
be
1930s ,
Asia.
war;
as
its
that
a
Japanese
war.
war
had
as
that
be
between
in
in
planned
the
the
region
region
international
possible.
Japan
be
was
contain
to
because
negotiation.
for
If
However,
if
war.
forced
for
plan
was
avoided.
prepared
aims
did
This
through
to
Japan
to
an
inevitable.
legitimate
determined
war
although
was
had
aims
delay
objectives
powers
argued
to
not
to
Japan
Japan’s
therefore,
long
was
needed
Japan
were
war
major
Japan
USA.
to
what
early
argued
in
failed,
continued
power
development
negotiations
expansion
with
led
and,
regarding
empire
war
the
dominating
Japan
could
This
West
and
policy
growing
Pacic:
that
of
the
the
1941
achieved
their
it
with
the
aim
negotiation
USA
Chapter
in
foreign
and
its
possible,
●
the
to
However,
in
argued
inevitable.
Japan
Japan’s
perspectives
Japan
with
expand
in
Harbor
different
response
●
about
Pearl
could
could
1941,
nationalism
relationship
and
war
and
of
into
the
war
region.
by
the
The
Japan.
Causes of expansion
RUSSIAN
(USSR)
By
EMPIRE
the
1930s,
Japan
had
fully
1922
modernized
towards
MANCHURIA
West.
and
gone
achieving
The
forces
a
long
equality
of
way
with
nationalism
the
and
SAKHALIN
(1931)
OUTER
militarism
had
taken
hold
and
were
(1905)
MONGOLIA
MANCHUKUO
popular
with
the
Japanese
people;
(1932)
.
JEHOL
I
INNER
these
forces
had
been
given
a
boost
by
S
E
I
(1933)
L
)
R
MONGOLIA
in
wars
against
China
and
5
U
7
K
8
1
(
Mukden
successes
Russia,
which
had
established
Japan’s
Beijing
Sea
LIAODONG
KOREA
PENINSULA
Por t
(1905)
Ar thur
position
of
Japan
in
Japanese,
mainland
by
the
China.
1930s,
Most
saw
Japan’s
(1910)
E
position
I
as
essential,
not
R.
Japan
1898–1914
because
E
1914–1923)
and
strategic
only
reasons,
they
believed
it
was
but
Japan’s
Nor th
E
Yellow
S
Pacic
Nanjing
Sea
JA
Hankou
economic
M
(Germany
for
P
Qingdao
Ho
Asia
R
CHINA
Hw
an
g
in
A
P
N
destiny
to
be
the
leader
of
the
region.
Ocean
.
R
Shanghai
Throughout
the
1930s,
the
impact
of
e
t
z
East
g
militarist
s
I
n
a
y
Japan
k
nationalist
continued
to
be
thinking
important
in
in
u
Sea
and
u
China
y
R
Pescadores
encouraging
(1895)
an
expansionist
foreign
1895
OKINAWA
policy.
(1874)
Canton
Furthermore,
crises
at
home
in
1910
the
government
and
in
the
economy
TAIWAN
Treaty
HONG
(FORMOSA)
KONG
(1895)
of
1905
allowed
Manchuria
upper
”Manchukuo“
(BR.)
South
PHILIPPINE
China
( TO
USA
encouraged
Growth of Japan’s Empire
30
forces
to
Another
have
key
the
factor
Manchukuo
an
expansionist
that
foreign
1933
1898)
policy
▲
hand.
1932
IS.
To
Sea
these
1931,
was
instability
the
that
continuing
existed
in
political
China.
C H A P T E R
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
Political instability in China
By
the
late
situation,
1920s,
economic
crisis
Encouraged
China,
the
to
end
forced
By
by
in
new
Chinese
1921,
a
to
This
grown.
by
Jiang
included
treaties
the
concerning
had
led
emerged
strength
precipitated
outrage
(GMD),
had
growing
that
nationalism
unequal
China
the
Japan,
unication.
the
situation
with
public
Guomindang
national
a
combined
that
the
The
in
of
behaviour
Nationalist
Jieshi,
great
It
began
a
this
and
crisis
of
the
of
1931.
foreigners
Party
in
campaign
rhetoric
powers,
was
military
Manchurian
anti-foreigner
the
China.
the
and
including
in
China,
of
demands
Japan,
had
sign.
new
political
party,
the
Communist
Party,
had
been
set
up
The warlords
in
China.
Jiang
Initially,
Jieshi
“Northern
wrest
and
to
1927,
form
Communists,
the
Expedition”
power
the
the
from
the
Communists
directed
Communists
the
United
to
Front.
warlords.
were
to
than
the
Mao
central
in
an
focus
of
Zedong,
United
However,
clash
and
by
The
consolidate
energies
rather
led
Front
joined
launched
government
ultimately,
all-out
Jiang
civil
The warlords were local or
a
control
the
war
towards
with
regional military leaders that
and
had their own armies. They
Nationalists
which,
defeating
would rule areas of China as
from
their own territories. Rivalries
the
and competition between
Japanese.
warlords meant that at times
This
changing
situation
in
China
was
to
have
an
impact
on
the
actions
of
they were at war with each other.
the
Japanese
government
and
military.
Japanese domestic issues before 1932: Political crises
and the growing inuence of the military
The
Northern
with
the
the
Japanese
Manchuria,
and
for
Expedition,
Communists,
government.
Zhang
attempted
Jiang.
interests
If
in
which
was
to
Zuolin.
expand
Jiang
The
been
with
Japanese
However,
into
defeated
had
regarded
had
Zhang
Northern
Zhang,
launched
some
this
backed
had
China,
could
by
degree
Jiang
of
the
become
which
impede
Jieshi
concern
warlord
very
made
Japan’s
by
in
powerful
him
a
target
special
Manchuria.
The Kwantung Army
The
Japanese
Kwantung
Army,
Manchuria
GMD
have
However,
be
China
so
forced
wanted
that
to
was
while
the
Japan
and
on
4
to
use
and
by
leaders
to
take
from
1928.
this
to
Some
act
to
interests
that
halt
would
Manchuria,
retreat
policy
They
Kwantung
provide
the
let
to
Jiang’s
Manchuria.
should
Jinan.
the
back
to
themselves.
at
the
was
in
Zhang
action
of
in
him
The
its
thought
to
army
force
on
Expedition
June
its
Jiang.
focused
decided
Northern
fallout
conquer
Zhang
defeated
Kwantung
leniently
Zhang
planned
disarm
he
Jiang’s
assassinated
believed
to
before
some
treated
they
government
Manchurian railway had been
guarded by the Kwantung
garrison, which in 1919
not
First,
then
assassins
excuse
Since 1906, the southern
they
developed into the Kwantung
Army. The Kwantung Army
became a stronghold of the
radical Kodo-ha or “Imperial
Way” faction, with many of
Manchuria.
its leaders advocating the
Japan’s
Prime
Minister
Tanaka
was
instructed
by
the
emperor
to
violent over throw of the civilian
enforce
discipline
in
the
army.
However,
despite
Tanaka’s
anger
at
this
government to bring about
interference
by
the
Kwantung
Army
in
government
policy,
the
General
a military dictatorship (see
Staff
were
unwilling
to
punish
the
perpetrators
as
they
claimed
it
would
page 39). They also advocated
weaken
the
prestige
of
the
army.
In
July
1929,
Tanaka
was
forced
to
a more aggressive and
resign
as
he
was
unable
to
implement
the
emperor’s
wishes.
Therefore,
expansionist foreign policy.
as
early
as
the
summer
of
1929,
it
was
clear
that
the
army
could
ignore
31
1
the
government
democracy
The
leader
minister
of
but
majority
his
in
in
the
corruption.
did
Minseito
had
to
of
for
unhappy
agreed
the
both
with
to
the
started
funds
the
this
civil
to
limit
in
military
forced
him
won
made
with
1930
the
at
naval
was
undermined
April
and
so
sectors.
In
by
as
(see
he
liberal
The
have
the
on
end
of
to
the
Hamaguchi
government
were
Hamaguchi
Disarmament
of
the
1930,
right-wing
in
an
impact
military
Criticism
died
a
public
and
the
when
Naval
prime
below).
cut
outraged
he
not
from
November
a
and
did
faltered
economy
growth.
1931
he
became
disarmament
London
grew.
shot
as
soon
then
the
Yuko,
majority
China,
industry
were
circles,
in
in
sound
military
but
Japan’s
resign
a
affect
help
and
Hamaguchi
to
Hamaguchi
election
to
to
decisions
when
fundamentally
government
move,
particularly
head
an
He
his
Conference
a
This
Party,
relations
However,
have
salaries
call
good
Depression
not
impunity.
parliament.
manifesto
Great
with
Japan.
government,
things
radical.
His
came
to
injuries
August.
Japanese domestic issues: Economic crisis
The
global
Street
economic
USA
economic
Crash
and
in
the
order.
other
crisis
USA
This,
which
called
in
turn,
democratic
started
into
cast
in
1929
question
doubts
nations,
and
the
on
on
following
whole
the
the
Wall
international
trustworthiness
Japan’s
own
of
the
parliamentary
government.
Japan
was
countries
Hawley
Tariff
brought
on
dependent
put
in
worst
hit
had
fallen
to
hit
than
particularly
production.
The
trade
protect
into
by
as
law
was
badly
result
the
silk
of
since
was
by
its
own
as
in
US
industry.
over
fell
drastically
The
Herbert
Hoover
peacetime
as
Smoot–
in
industry.
1930,
Duties
200%.
what
desperate
exports
industries.
President
tariffs
much
one-fth
and
their
protective
rose
industry
less
world
to
signed
highest
goods
The
on
tariffs
Act,
the
Japanese
were
up
it
half
By
had
of
1932,
been
them
poverty
as
the
in
price
1923.
relied
on
of
silk
Farmers
silk
unemployment
rose
to
3million.
The
of
responsibility
the
liberal
internationalism,
to
In
become
this
dire
important
had
in
the
rights,
and
Manchuria
Japan.
In
Matsuoko
“our
only
If
could
fact,
very
of
Port
it
gain
also
a
means
of
to
a
possibly
wa s
have
in
li vi ng
read
as
the
by
M i nis t e r
the
shoulders
Taisho
anyway,
Boyle,
of
1.1,
railway
Russo–Japanese
(coal,
the
it
iron
fo r
th e
in
about
and
Japan
and
War
timber)
deprivations
would
an
were
1993
more
Chapter
manufactured
sp ace
on
even
in
control
suffering
de pi c ted
Fo re i gn
—
became
Manchuria
its
and
doomed
depression.
resources
for
squarely
democracy
well
Japan
market
s ur viv al ”.
as
of
over
pr ov ide
b e ca m e
you
Russia
wealth
took
placed
Manchuria
As
defeated
enticing
and
world
Arthur,
Ma nchuri a
(who
the
was
Taisho
robust
of
situation,
Japan
also
plight
1920s.
interests.
when
increasingly
the
victims
Manchuria’s
depression.
resources
32
Japan’s
control
Japan’s
of
never
more
economic
1904–05.
were
two
to
gained
mineral
for
reforms
control
of
these
goods.
ove r-p opu l at ed
d ipl om a t
194 0)
as
a
Yo su k e
“ li fe li n e ”
a nd
C H A P T E R
Security:
buffer
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
to
Raw
Russia
The
attraction
to
help
of
coal,
timber
of
lifeline”
withstand
Living
impact
19 31 – 19 4 1
materials:
iron,
Manchuria, “a
Markets,
A S I A ,
space
for
global
Four
times
Japan’s
larger
population
depression
than
Japan
Source skills
rural
Source A
areas.
service
A
graph
showing
Japanese
exports
For
was
1934–36
=
rural
escape
youths,
from
military
poverty
and
1926–38.
degradation.
Yen-denominated;
many
their
100
such
as
the
Military
Imperial
leaders
and
Reservists’
organizations
Association
210
promoted
the
idea
that
the
“soldiers
were
the
Textiles
190
arms
170
and
legs
of
than
civilians.
men
struggling
It
the
empire
stated
to
that
survive
…”
and
young
better
peasant
“consider
it
to
be
the
150
greatest
honour
attainable,
once
they
enter
130
the
Commodity
army
to
become
a
private
superior
class.”
exports
110
total
Source C
90
Herbert
Bix,
an
American
historian
who
70
1926
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
specialises
academic
in
Japanese
book
history,
Hirohito
and
the
in
an
Making
of
I. Yamazawa and Y. Yamamoto. 1978. Estimates of
Modern
Japan
(2000).
Long-term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868. 14:
Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments.
Thus
ideas
justify
advanced
their
actions
by
in
Japan’s
leaders
Manchuria
to
gained
Source B
reinforcement
Contemporary
observation,
1929.
capitalism,
blocs,
In
this
climate
of
economic
despair
and
decline,
the
military
emerged
as
shining
and
pure
example
of
spirit
of
the
nation.
Aided
in
of
indoctrination,
the
part
most
fervent
support
in
the
domestic
and
of
global
trade
military
ideology.
In
a
systems
lecture
of
delivered
before
Hirohito
and
his
entourage
at
on
January,
1932,
former
army
minister
by
Minami
emphasized
national
security,
found
raw
its
contending
and
General
decades
monetary
the
28
true
emergent
breakdown
a
court
seemingly
the
and
politics
political
from
materials,
and
the
need
for
territory
to
down-trodden
explain
the
army’s
creation
of
an
independent
33
1
Manchurian
state.
management”,
he
“Japan-Manchuria
told
the
emperor,
joint
First question, par t a – 3 marks
would
According
enable
Japan
to
“withstand
an
a
blockade
from
“indenitely
of
Manchuria
solve
the
decade
a
in
great
its
Japanese
providing
people,
abroad”
as
space
whose
were
for
and
entirety
The
would
“population
Japan’s
expected
by
to
particular
Source
appeal
B,
for
why
the
did
the
military
Japanese
have
peasants?
continue
power”.
numbers
to
economic
also
problem”
rapidly
the
reach
According
to
important
for
Source
C,
why
was
Manchuria
by
Japan?
increasing
end
70
First question, par t a – 3 marks
acquisition
of
First question, par t b – 2 marks
the
million.
What
is
the
message
of
Source
A?
Second question – 4 marks
With
reference
assess
the
historians
Despite
aims
The
Japan’s
of
the
Kwantung
destabilize
fullled,
who
the
as
aimed
to
himself
difcult
a
of
was
China,
that
the
Jiang.
in
to
the
over
by
clear
ght
to
his
the
While
principles
taking
would
Japan
Indeed,
militants
of
became
succeeded
of
of
son,
Zhang
Army
would
for
the
would
was
not
Xueliang,
Nationalists
rallied
government
Japan’s
Kwantung
Manchuria
given
control
Japanese
maintain
C
Manchuria.
Zhang
Chinese
the
content,
crisis.
that,
for
seize
and
Source
Manchurian
assassination
for
propaganda.
peaceful
it
purpose
limitations
the
China
allow
origin,
position
were
in
still
the
concerned
become
more
achieve.
group
Manchuria
L TA
Prime
and
with
objective
to
Manchuria,
hope
warlord
follow
their
Thus,
Army’s
anti-Japanese
North-East
that
for
its
and
studying
Expedition,
situation
the
allied
behind
plans
Northern
to
values
of
Kwantung
once
Minister
and
for
all,
Wakatsuki
Army
ofcers
against
was
the
warned
hatched
policies
of
the
of
a
plot
their
plan
by
to
seize
own
government.
Japanese
consul
Social skills
ofcials
In pairs or groups, use the
in
minister
Manchuria.
of
war,
He
General
informed
Minami,
to
the
emperor,
restrain
the
who
ordered
Kwantung
the
Army.
sources and the information in
Minami
responded
by
writing
an
urgent
letter
to
the
commander
of
this section to assess the impact
the
Kwantung
Army,
but
this
letter
was
intentionally
held
back
by
the
of the economic crisis on
general
●
the political situation in Japan
●
the position of the military
●
the overall foreign policy
plan
tasked
before
against
the
Hirohito
would
delivering
receiving
Chinese.
and
seize
with
his
the
top
the
As
The
emperor’s
the
palace
it.
…
therefore
command
historian
advisers
plotters
Herbert
never
initiative,
completely
overturn
emperor’s
authority ”
(Bix,
to
P
.
cancel
Bix
imagined
the
executed
any
writes:
that
Minseito
the
their
action
“ [Emperor]
Kwantung
cabinet’s
army
policies,
and
of Japan.
undermine
the
2000).
Events in Manchuria, 1931
The impact of nationalism and militarism
on Japan’s foreign policy
On
the
evening
explosion
on
Immediately
railway
that
34
the
had
a
of
18
September
section
of
afterwards,
been
blown
perpetrators
the
were
near
Mukden,
Japanese-owned
ofcers
up
1931,
by
of
the
the
Chinese.
members
of
South
Kwantung
the
there
was
an
Manchurian
Army
However,
Kwantung
claimed
there
is
Army.
Railway.
that
the
evidence
C H A P T E R
The
Kwantung
forced
the
Kwantung
Army
Wakatsuki’s
policy
of
had
to
began
its
to
entered
declared
victories
that
Kwantung
the
Manchurian
from
of
did
not
would
ignored
the
Within
to
to
the
but
the
hours,
The
back
to
S O U T H - E A S T
the
Japanese
following
control
the
day,
orders
the
coming
the
railway
and
and
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
had
the
declared
Kwantung
24September,
government
I N
north.
regain
heed
On
fall
E X P A N S I O N
Mukden.
hostilities”,
territory.
army
Army
“excuse”.
attempted
and
more
J A P A N E S E
Changchun
government
seize
its
retreat
“non-expansion
relishing
It
Army
Chinese
1 . 2 :
Army
from
Tokyo.
government
zone,
pushed
a
was
but
further
again
into
the
the
countryside.
Source skills
The
Source A
army
troops
An
extract
from
Kenneth
B.
from
Making
of
Modern
Japan ,
page
189
weakness
of
the
Korea
government,
gone
of
decision-making
confusion
the
and
uncertainty
and
foreign
domestic
is
that
an
opportunity
for
turmoil
–
resolute
the
Kwantung
conquer
all
of
Army.
It
pushed
Manchuria
and
puppet
and
state,
was
Manchukuo.
replaced
by
a
headed
by
Inukai
party
government
in
am
Tsuyoshi.
pre-war
It
was
Korea
you
without
the
He
Tanaka
said,
cabinet
“Well,
the
[1927–
dispatched
gathered
he
without
had
not
imperial
foreseen
all
…
under
these
any
circumstances
quite
can
powerless
his
to
majesty’s
restrain
military
the
act
military.
without
sanction?
be
What
talking
to
can
you
I
do?
like
Maybe
this,
but
I
should
can
you
do
the
…
I
am
in
serious
trouble.
Japan.
page
Wakatsuki’s
from
Wakatsuki
Source B
Minister
have
can
Seiyukai
Cited
Prime
soldiers
authorization?”
were
I
at
anything?
last
may
“How
a
not
cabinet
him:
ahead
establish
his
resigned
of
during
troops
How
Japanese
rebuked
action
I
to
I
all
problem
by
they
in
attending
sanction.”
created
indeed,
send
the
29]
both
“We’ll
the
power,
fact
general
in.”
dispatch
government
diffuseness
…
me,
(1996).
allow
The
told
Pyle,
already
The
minister
appeal
in
Hirohito
236,
by
and
the
Herbert
P
.
Making
of
Modern
Japan ,
Bix
to
First question, par t a – 3 marks
the
secretary
of
the
respected
Prince
Saionji
According
Kinmochi
in
Army
I
am
not
Foreign
I
have
Cabinet
forces
more
we
by
kept
or
warned
Secretary
in
informed
the
two
only
minister,
chance,
haven’t
you
are
so
hundred
ten
“What
your
you
and
…
Chief
The
Mongolia
thousand
thousand.
are
you
challenge
anticipated
either
Ministry
through
Kawasaki
some
by
Army
them
Manchuria
than
have
army
being
Ministry
just
to
Source
A,
why
was
the
Kwantung
1931.
–
outnumbered
According
the
do
if,
something
something
you
to
can’t
control
of
Manchuria?
Wakatsuki
to
Source
face
in
B,
what
problems
responding
to
did
events
in
Manchuria?
while
asked
going
causes
seize
First question, par t a – 3 marks
of
number
[sic]
to
the
…
Chinese
I
able
that
given
Third question – 6 marks
Compare
and
Source
regarding
B
government
contrast
during
the
the
the
views
in
weakness
Source
of
Manchurian
the
A
and
Japanese
Crisis.
stop?”
L TA
Thinking skills
In pairs, identify the factors in Japan and China, which led to the Mukden Incident
in Manchuria.
35
1
What were the results of the Manchurian crisis?
The results for Japan’s international relations
To
the
outside
seemed
The
breakdown
fully
as
of
J a p a n ’s
its
army
control
proclamations
continued
over
the
to
of
peaceful
expand
Kwantung
there
relations
the
followed,
between
o t h e r.
in
the
Japan
Although,
on
as
1930s,
the
you
a
one
will
marked
hand
read
Source skills
Army
troops
in
the
marching
into
a
the
the
September–October
Chinese
town,
USA
The
crisis
cautious,
force
for
the
as
a
seemed
was
Indeed,
isolation
have
the
only
by
by
the
resolutions
were
Triple
First question, par t b – 2 marks
Uchida
of
in
no
seen
as
way
as
conicts
holding
upholding
allowing
the
1930s,
Germany
contrast,
and
a
the
own
from
there
which
the
Nine-Power
legitimate
this,
had
a
and
also
threat
as
degree
Soviet
Japanese
region.
law
imperialist
was
new
territorial
1930s,
in
on
the
the
the
international
their
Following
with
back
to
only
the
walked
Japan,
viewed
the
it
go
military
out
of
the
with
its
Soviets
concerned
suited
and
not
but
also
Manchurian
to
of
the
1895
(see
Minister
“ Recognition
Manchukuo]
the
racist
West
was
reasons,
themselves
and
unchallenged.
more
League
was
their
the
for
of
law
League’s
that
1895,
Japan
of
in
key
power
Japan
both
interests
as
by
the
[of
and
System.
League
Foreign
state
within
regime
Treaty
compared
gained
admiration
communist
Increasingly
when
to
abandoned
The
on
in
to
now
attacked
claimed
As
of
led
it
military
and
new
Treaty ”.
needs
actions
of
the
as
Intervention
page18)
photograph?
point”
it
the
were
politicians.
crisis
Nations.
international
West
for
to
cooperation
Japan,
Nations,
of
“turning
to
Japan
Japan
Kenneth
Washington
Within
36
the
1931
Manchurian
international
the
of
caused
the
Japan.
Japan’s
this
to
in
nevertheless,
League
sees
crisis
of
Britain
c h a p t e r,
response
historian
Pyle
message
in
and
condemnation
leave
the
been
1931.
using
is
not
Manchuria,
its
What
had
next
We s t ’s
rather
circa
intent
Manchuria.
deterioration
and
Manchurian
Japanese
in
appreciated.
Thus
on
world,
deceitful,
for
Nations.
an
in
Nazi
In
ideological
Manchuria.
potential
relationship
By
the
opponent
between
C H A P T E R
China
and
the
Comintern
1936.
Italy
with
However,
and
leading
or
Soviet
Pact
the
cabinet
World
it
is
Germany,
1 . 2 :
Union,
Nazi
J A P A N E S E
Japan
important
government
to
never
nor
governments,
signed
Germany
Japan
did
even
in
a
the
that
S O U T H - E A S T
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
Anti-
unlike
Fascist
abandon
during
I N
November
note
had
it
E X P A N S I O N
the
Party
elections
Second
War.
The results for Manchuria and China
By
the
under
beginning
the
control
Manchuria
set
the
rule
puppet
and
In
called
the
January
between
The
city
was
bombing
of
Chinese
against
landed
Pu
over
that
the
had
the
wholly
The
Japanese
government
emperor
also
Chinese
by
the
of
the
in
under
China)
as
a
of
casualties
world
in
and
intensied
opinion
Japanese
stationed
widespread
intense
residential
of
result,
turn
out
Shanghai.
with
The
populated
thousands
helped
in
Japanese
divisions
navy
broken
forces
districts.
created
and
last
was
“Manchukuo”.
densely
Four
assist
(the
Chinese
with
outrage
to
and
were
Japan.
Yi
state
ghting
the
forces.
independent
bombed
of
Chapei,
refugees
of
Manchuria
Japanese
an
new
1932,
1932
of
up
Japanese
devastation
area
of
troops
Shanghai.
After
▲
six
weeks,
Chinese
forces
were
forced
to
Smoke rises from buildings in Shanghai’s native business
withdraw.
district, where Japanese troops launch an attack against
defending Chinese, 1932.
L TA
Thinking skills
Ex tract from Herber t P. Bix , Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, page 251
(20 0 0).
Neither army nor navy drew any conclusions from the heavy losses they incurred
in this rst large battle with a modern Chinese army. They continued as before
– utterly contemptuous of the Chinese military and people, whom they saw as a
rabble of ignorant, hungry peasants, lacking racial or national consciousness, that
could easily be vanquished by one really hard blow.
Quesion
What point is Bix making regarding the attitude of the Japanese military in China?
The results for the Nationalist Par ty in China
China’s
of
response
Nations.
focused
on
involved
in
Jiang
to
the
Jieshi,
defeating
another
Manchurian
the
the
leader
Chinese
conict.
He
of
crisis
the
was
to
Communists
knew
call
Nationalist
that
he
and
was
on
the
Party,
did
League
was
not
unlikely
now
want
to
to
get
receive
37
1
L TA
Thinking skills
the
kind
of
support
nevertheless
that
he
he
needed
could
from
gain
the
time
to
Western
powers,
organize
his
but
hoped
defences.
He
also
did
I. Hsü, The Rise of Modern
not
directly
negotiate
with
the
Japanese
government.
This
combination
China, page 550. Published
of
“non-resistance”,
no-compromise
and
non-direct
negotiation
was
in 1995 by O xford Uni versity
unlikely
to
benet
the
Chinese
position
(see
historian
Immanuel
Hsü’s
Press, O xford, UK
view
to
the
left).
In retrospect, one cannot help
Although
Jiang
was
reluctant
to
confront
Japan
directly,
the
Chinese
feeling that such a negative
people
responded
with
fury
at
Japan’s
actions.
There
was
a
boycott
of
approach could hardly
Japanese
products,
which
had
an
impact
on
Japan
as
it
reduced
sales
of
achieve positive results.
its
goods
in
China
by
two-thirds.
This
did
little
to
stop
Japan’s
actions,
If the government had
however,
or
to
change
Jiang’s
priorities
in
dealing
with
the
Communists
authorised the Northeastern
rst
before
dealing
with
the
Japanese.
Thus,
following
the
bombing
army to resist the invader,
of
Shanghai
and
Japan’s
continued
expansion
in
the
north,
China
the glamour of aggression
continued
to
cede
territory.
Japanese
control
of
Manchuria
was
accepted
might have been dimmed,
in
May
1933
of
parts
in
the
Treaty
of
Tanggu.
Jiang
further
agreed
to
the
seizure
thus providing a chance for
of
inner
Mongolia
and,
in
June
1935,
agreed
to
remove
all
the more moderate civilian
troops
from
Hebei
province.
Jiang’s
strategy
against
Japan
derived
from
government in Tokyo to
his
belief
that,
given
the
size
of
China,
Japan
would
exhaust
itself
in
have had a greater voice in
the
process
of
trying
to
occupy
it.
He
believed
that
the
Japanese
“were
the China aair. Moreover,
a
disease
of
the
skin
while
the
communists
were
a
disease
of
the
heart”;
if Nanking [Nanjing] had
thus,
he
considered
“selling
space
to
buy
time”,
a
viable
strategy.
pursued an active policy
of negotiations with Tokyo,
The results for the Japanese government
it might have reaped
Japan
beneted
economically
from
the
occupation
of
Manchuria.
more positive results.
However,
the
mainland
to
cost
of
maintaining
a
sizeable
army
on
the
Chinese
Unfortunately, it followed
some
extent
negated
the
benets
and
there
was
an
increase
neither course. Instead it
in
taxation
back
home
in
Japan.
Indeed,
by
going
it
alone
internationally
placed its reliance on protests
and
also
declaring
its
responsibility
for
maintaining
peace
in
Asia
through
to Tokyo and on appeals to
the
“Asia
Monroe
Doctrine”,
Japan
was
potentially
overstretching
itself.
the League of Nations.
It
needed
navy,
to
According to Hsü, how could
US
events have been dierent if
Manchuria
China had been more active in
of
solving the Manchurian issue
nationalist
be
and
able
also
and
to
to
protect
make
Northern
decision-making
by
sentiment
the
army
had
against
Chinese
China.
the
that
itself
This
Soviet
government
precarious
rather
been
the
than
the
growing
in
Army
accept
situation
and
its
position
was
government
the
the
and
in
result
of
the
Japan.
itself?
Following
would
was
the
regain
further
actions
in
Manchurian
the
upper
undermined
China.
There
crisis,
hand.
by
was
there
Indeed,
public
a
was
the
support
celebration
little
hope
Japanese
for
of
the
the
that
the
government
government’s
Kwantung
“heroes”
of
position
Army’s
Manchuria;
The Monroe Doctrine was a
the
embarrassed
Japanese
government
had
to
go
along
with
the
wave
of
19th-century US policy, which
popular
opinion
and
accept
the
conquests
rather
than
demonstrate
the
loss
set out to prevent the European
of
control
it
had
over
the
army.
Foreign
criticism
and
condemnation
also
powers expanding their colonial
galvanized
Japanese
nationalist
sentiments.
interests in Nor th or South
America. Japan’s version of
L TA
the Monroe Doctrine would
Communication skills
be a policy limiting European
Go to the link www.youtube.com/watch?v=OExOfMNK-R4, or search “Evidence of
inuence in Asia.
Japanese accusation at WW2 #1”, to watch Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka at
the League of Nations , February 1933, defending Japan’s China Policy
38
C H A P T E R
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
Source skills
Saburo
Ienaga,
academic
1931–45,
a
book
page
Japanese
The
129
Pacic
historian,
War
in
(Taiheiyo
started,
an
quest
Senso)
Imperial
was
presented
war
escalates
elusive
uncontrollably
in
the
victory.
(1968).
How
The
a
for
Army’s
as
an
march
act
of
into
That
Manchuria
self-defence
could
was
China
an
be
brought
intractable
to
its
knees?
problem.
to
First question, par t a – 3 marks
guard
“Japan’s
acquired
the
at
lifeline”,
great
cost
Sino-Japanese
Next,
North
in
and
China
which
blood
had
and
been
treasure
Russo-Japanese
and
Inner
Mongolia
What
in
had
points
impact
wars.
of
are
made
Japan’s
by
Ienaga
takeover
of
regarding
the
Manchuria?
to
Second question – 4 marks
be
controlled
to
guard
Manchuria.
Protecting
With
these
areas
required
further
advances
reference
assess
the
heartland
of
China.
This
pattern
of
the
values
a
truism
military
about
operations
international
its
and
origin,
purpose
limitations
of
and
this
content,
source
for
ever-
historians
expanding
to
into
studying
the
Manchurian
crisis.
conrmed
conict:
once
Years of turmoil: The descent into “the Dark Valley”
After
1932,
there
the
politicians
the
political
call
of
a
“the
division
within
situation
establishment
Japanese
was
but
at
the
the
military
Dark
not
only
military
time
and
between
itself.
would
government
and
This
the
military
further
ultimately
the
lead
descent
and
destabilized
to
into
the
what
the
Valley”.
Japanese domestic issues
Military
after 1932
RADICAL
MODERATE
Political crises and the growing
inuence of the military
Although
some
generals
did
not
want
Koda-ha
to
replace
the
government
with
Way
military
junta,
momentum
there
behind
groups
that
did.
groups
that
wanted
for
military:
the
was
the
There
Imperial
faction
ha
or
were
were
two
key
inuence
Koda-ha
Way
faction,
and
Control
faction.
Both
imperialist
expansion.
was
generally
two.
The
and
or
the
the
more
Koda-ha
the
Tosei-
dictatorship
groups
wanted
However,
Legal
with
emperor
means
military
in
government
of
the
believed
in
a
=
enemy
USSR
that
get
Japanese
radical
faction
dictatorship
to
inuence
Koda-ha
USSR
military
or
faction
growing
Military
Imperial
Tosei-ha
Control
militarist
more
the
or
a
would
=
good
deliver
relations
state
socialism.
viewed
main
the
enemy.
Soviet
Union
conquest
of
Its
Soviet
leading
Union
They
as
saw
war
inevitable
Manchuria
ofcers
as
as
Japan’s
with
and
the
the
the
rst
Spiritual
step
towards
national
this.
“spirit”
They
over
emphasized
material
of
training
army
Modernization
of
army
force.
39
1
The
Tosei-ha
were
against
government.
They
wanted
and
inuence
Soviet
Union
over
as
Soviets.
the
modernization
As
the
Their
whole
part
of
this
army
One
and
trial
actions
of
of
Therefore,
the
a
the
power
struggle
However,
Saito
and,
a
ha
leader
to
There
a
as
it
May
did
force
foster
not
see
to
war
good
in
which
China,
as
well
remove
military
maintain
a
the
rm
banks,
took
over
as
with
the
relations
would
the
the
power
with
require
mobilization
sympathy
in
the
of
ruling
of
its
against
1934)
the
discovered,
of
police
killed.
for
their
parties.
enhanced
democratic
Saito
army
and
Admiral
played
out
its
factions.
seemed
into
to
high
Kodo-ha’s
he
and
support
the
leaders
and
the
political
Tosei-ha
1932–July
and
known,
the
1932
number
Admiral
which
the
major
shot
widespread
during
July
1934.
promoting
a
young
the
During
the
Kodo-ha
ofcers,
General
for
was
became
and
a
ofcers
undermined
three
was
when
Inukai
governments
stance
When
Tosei-ha,
it
three
between
favour
radical
promoted
a
the
positions.
factions
member
of
war.
publication
his
as
further
(May
Japan,
party
with
Koda-ha
him
of
in
1932,
Minister
appointed
against
of
in
governments,
economy.
the
was
of
to
government
Incident”,
and
subsequent
minister
control
of
15th
took
Okada
the
keeping
to
demonstrated
government
plot
produced
control
use
industry
disillusionment
between
faction,
Tosei-ha
They
power
the
Prime
army
interim
Saito’s
Admiral
the
The
for
attacked
Tokyo.
“May
of
were
the
the
means
conquest
and
place
conspirators
Okada
after
army
took
general
government.
Kodo-ha
was
contest
ofcers
in
the
inuence
Admiral
and
legal
wanted
destabilized
these
navy
and
the
internal
plots
headquarters
The
and
objective
of
use
nation.
assassination
1936.
to
government.
inevitable
the
of
the
terrorism
a
idea
his
leadership,
that
minister
Kodo-ha
the
was
army
sacked
ofcer
the
Kodo-
should
for
not
assassinated
the
Nagata.
assassin,
Aizawa,
at
his
trial
but
he
was
L TA
Communication
found
guilty
and
executed.
In
response,
a
group
of
young
Kodo-ha
skills
ofcers
Go to: www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yDv8NxGv9Yg, or
search for “ The Road to War –
attempted
marched
ofce,
police
brutally
coup
into
a
and
many
around
the
to
seize
took
headquarters
murdered
went
revolt
Tokyo
power
over
and
the
ofcials.
the
in
February
parliament
prime
News
minister’s
of
their
1936.
1,500
buildings,
the
residence.
attempted
soldiers
war
They
and
bloody
world.
Japan”.
Watch the Pathé News clip,
star ting 22.30 minutes into the
video. Make notes on how the
coup was repor ted.
Fifteen
ha
of
the
faction
faction
meant
were
that
Admiral
became
and
Okada
prime
had
programme
support
with
40
the
Hitler
resigned
In
to
to
May
in
on,
developing
now
take
attempted
the
start,
1936,
army,
he
agreed
which
Hirota
Manchuria.
November,
1936.
he
including
ofcers.
agreed
also
When
coup
the
later
and
weak
shot.
the
of
the
National
a
for
this
Koki
to
a
make
strong
the
army
seven-point
control
expand
and
had
pursue
to
Kodo-
country.
Hirota
and
The
Tosei-ha
the
ministers
agreed
signed
the
to
handed
to
of
planning,
agreeing
that
He
and
control
was
basically
He
army
rmer
the
military,
secret
members
after
military.
in
in
tried
then
From
serving
the
the
army
in
the
be
from
government
would
minister.
were
From
important
army
with
policy.
navy
conspirators
discredited.
most
the
compromises
foreign
key
was
arms
of
the
production
and
Anti-Comintern
Pact
Diet
alarm
declared
its
C H A P T E R
at
the
direction
the
1 . 2 :
military
J A P A N E S E
was
taking,
E X P A N S I O N
the
I N
government
S O U T H - E A S T
was
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
brought
down.
The
government
and
June
of
General
Hayashi
was
in
power
between
February
Class discussion
1937.
attempted
divided.
and
the
it
was
would
be
the
was
the
military’s
Prince
that,
Tojo
with
his
only
instrument
power.
Konoye
However,
Fumimaro
long
took
political
of
its
power
left
politicians
over
as
prime
experience,
he
that
were
Discuss possible reasons for
minister
could
Japan’s decision to sign the
unite
Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi
in
six
the
Germany in November, 1936.
restrain
to;
the
China
Hideki,
Within
ordered
to
able
expansion
1937.
Diet
politically.
wanted
not
General
had
limit
June,
hoped
nation
Konoye
and
to
In
The
the
was
their
became
weeks
army,
Tosei-ha
of
invasion
of
it
was
was
objective.
Chief
Konoe
but
faction
of
Staff
taking
China.
A
to
apparent
leading
the
power,
Konoe
soon
dominant
was
in
that
the
Tosei-ha
Kwantung
Japan’s
powerless
to
general,
Army
army
he
government
in
July
commanders
halt
it.
Year
Prime Minister
Features of the period
1931
Wakatsuki
Par ty Cabinet; undermined by the Kwantung Army taking over Manchuria
1931–32
Inukai
Par ty Cabinet; assassinated in 1932
1932–34
Admiral Saito
Moderate
1934–36
Admiral Okada
which
admirals;
resulted
military
in
control
power
the
over
struggle
supremacy
between
of
the
Tosei-ha
Tosei-ha
and
and
paved
the
factions,
way
for
more
government
1936–37
Hirota Koki
1937
General Hayashi
1937–39
Prince Konoe
1939
Baron Hiranuma
1939–40
General Abbe
Japanese expansion in China and South-East Asia
1940
Admiral Yonai
Tripar tite Pact
1940–41
Prince Konoe
Diplomatic activity with the USA ; fails to control militarists
1941
General Tojo
Attack on Pearl Harbor
▲
Kodo-ha
Growing militarism; concessions to the army
Unable to control the military; war with China star ts
Summary of the political changes, 1931–41
Source skills
ideals
Source A
Watch
a
1936
cartoon,
Evil
Japanese
Mickey
of
the
nation
principles
are
1.
must
…
The
described
fundamental
below:
anti-American
attacks
Japan :
Japan
aggressive
strive
to
policies
eradicate
of
the
the
great
powers,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=icVu-acHlpU
and
Source B
based
and
Hirota
share
Koki’s
government
adopted
on
principles
of
national
must
become
the
stabilising
East
to
contribute
Asia
both
Japan
and
at
in
name
and
in
the
peace
and
welfare
the
same
time
Way
This
is
joy
of
the
which
is
co-existence
spirit
of
the
…
must
complete
fact
so
armament
to
her
protect
national
her
defence
national
as
and
development.
In
this
way,
the
of
position
mankind
principle
co-prosperity.
security
to
the
force
and
in
true
Asia
policy:
2.
Japan
the
East
the
Imperial
following
with
manifest
of
the
Empire
as
the
stabilizing
the
41
1
force
in
name
3.
The
East
and
policy
Asia
in
can
be
secured
both
For
in
fact.
toward
the
continent
must
rather
of
1933
of
a
kind
on
the
following
factors:
in
Manchukuo’s
healthy
order
to
stabilise
Soviet
to
the
Japan-Manchukuo
threat
Union,
promote
from
must
our
be
the
no
abatement
must
the
prepare
United
against
States
collaboration
and
China.
In
the
must
relations
4.
Japan
pay
with
Great
Britain
about
Japan,
execution
plans
to
due
other
development
especially
in
the
her
in
there
of
Japanese
political,
in
the
interference,
affairs
And
at
a
Tokyo
press
of
Northern
conference
Ministry
spokesman
in
enunciated
1934
what
appeared
to
“Monroe
Doctrine”,
be,
despite
disclaimers,
warning
a
Japanese
foreign
powers
their
of
off
to
China.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
this
are
the
to
key
points
made
in
Source
B
policy,
Japanese
policy
in
Asia?
friendly
First question, par t b – 2 marks
racial
the
outerlying
hands
Manchukuo,
attention
economic
peace
But
and
close
powers.
promote
spring
order
regarding
Japan
Japan.
the
was
the
in
What
and
and
from
there
development,
bring
between
and
Foreign
keep
we
China
years,
1937,
national
north,
eliminated;
economic
of
development
a
defense,
four
to
China.
and
than
summer
between
economic
promote
the
be
was
based
more
to
South
South
What
and
Seas,
Seas
is
Source
the
overall
message
of
the
cartoon
in
A?
area.
Second question – 6 marks
“Fundamental Principles of National Policy”,
With
reference
to
its
origin,
purpose
and
content,
11 August 1936 in Lu, David J., 1997. Japan:
assess
the
values
and
limitations
of
Source
C
for
A Documentary History, pages 418–20.
historians
the
Source C
Richard
Storry,
academic
book
a
professor
Japan
and
of
the
history,
Decline
in
of
an
the
Asia
1894–1943,
page
149
the
Second
World
War
in
Pacic.
Third question – 4 marks
West
Compare
in
studying
and
contrast
the
views
given
in
(1979).
Sources
actions
B
and
C
during
regarding
this
Japanese
aims
and
period.
The Sino–Japanese War of 1937
At
the
Marco
Japanese
Mukden
in
into
Tokyo.
deployed
set
from
Kor e a
conta i n
is
on
Ko re a
of
wa r
a nd
the
B eij i ng ,
7
l imi te d
Jap anes e
mini s te r
from
to
by
nea r
fo rce s
the r e
up
China
The
attempted
B r i d g e,
Chine s e
Incident,
deliberately
forces
Polo
and
Ju ly
 g h t in g
193 7.
evi de nc e
fo rce s,
wi thout
a rmy,
t h at
a l t h ou gh
br oke
t h at
and
t h is
the
a rmy
d ra wn
go v e r n m e n t
we re
P ri n c e
we re
the
wa s
ha d
fo rc e s
a lt h ou g h
b e t we e n
to
cla s h
the
m or e
r e info rc e m en t s
ou t
co n t ra s t
c on su l t in g
d ema n de d
Ma nchuri a ,
In
sent.
Kon o ye
This
le d
to
Class discussion
the
full-scale
war
wi th
Chi na .
Why was the Japanese
By
the
end
of
July,
Japanese
forces
had
taken
Beijing,
and
the
government unable to prevent
following
month
there
was
ghting
in
Shanghai.
Japan
was
engaged
a full-scale war developing with
both
in
the
north
and
in
and
around
Shanghai,
and
was
thus
ghting
a
China in 1937?
war
on
two
Although
fronts.
the
of that earlier
have
42
Marco
event
concluded
that
Polo
Bridge
Incident
has
often
been
described
as
a
repetition
which led to the Manchurian Incident, reliable postwar studies
the
1937
incident
was
not
the
result
of
prearranged
planning
C H A P T E R
by
If
Japanese
historians
Bridge
affair
,
created
could
authorities
have
by
have
actions
escalate
–
excused
they
its
1 . 2 :
into
a
an
J A P A N E S E
either
those
Japan
not
in
from
climate
of
eight-year
Tokyo
the
exonerated
E X P A N S I O N
it
or
charge
from
animosity
in
those
of
the
on
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
the
scene
premeditating
more
China
in
serious
which
19 31 – 19 4 1
…
the
Marco
charge
a
A S I A ,
that
triing
Polo
it
incident
war
.
JH. Boyle. 1983. “Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45” in Kodansha ncyclopaedia of
Japan, Vol. VII, page 199
The
Japanese
was
brutal,
devastating
forces
the
ed
drove
to
that
this
largest
inland
river
refugees
Some
suggested
amounted
human
along
and
interior.
have
Their
to
the
exodus
history.
The
The
Rape
of
Chinese
capital
the
had
to
abandoned
this
fell
Japanese
and
that
the
and
subjected
atrocities.
Akira
‘rape
of
make
it
Japan
Chinese
the
all
historian
writes,
Nanking’
to
but
still
were
appalling
As
Iriye
December,
days
civilians
to
but
as
the
13
followed,
soldiers
also
advanced.
to
on
during
moved
Nanjing,
Japanese
Nanjing
Nanjing
nationalist
government
its
more
raids.
Chinese
the
historians
in
air
Yangtze
terrorized
attack
with
“The
would
impossible
be
accepted
for
as
Infamous photograph of South Station in Shanghai, China, 28 August 1937
▲
a
respectable
member
international
(Iriye,
the
community”
1987).
There
followed
among
the
Japanese
the
defeated
storm
victims,
of
much
of
of
30,000;
city
who
in
of
and
died
on
that
after
fugitive
12,000.
of
terror
modern
entered
cruelty
the
at
period
rst
troops
and
a
history
whom
civilians
the
the
Chinese
violence
at
murdered
Nanjing
in
troops,
many
observers
in
worst
the
a
of
the
the
city
on
helpless
has
few
repeated
soldiers
Robbery,
and
destruction
warfare.
For
December
Chinese
parallels.
assaults,
killed
were
wanton
that
almost
13,
were
rape
estimated
destruction
at
and
on
population
female
estimated
rank
weeks
unleashed
civilian
The
must
seven
by
foreign
30,000;
arson
left
ruins.
Spence, J. 1990. The Search for Modern China.
43
1
Source skills
Source A
Source C
Japanese
Chinese
soldiers
vendors,
purchasing
Nanjing,
items
from
Corpses
China.
on
Nanjing,
the
shore
China,
of
the
December
Yangtze
River,
1937.
Source B
Japanese
Nanjing,
troops
China,
rounding
16
up
December
Chinese,
1937.
L TA
Research skills
3
Refer back to the photograph on the previous page
showing the baby on the railway tracks in Shanghai.
Research the controversy surrounding this photograph.
L TA
Thinking skills
4
With reference to Sources A–C, discuss the
challenges facing historians using photographs as
1
In
pairs
2
What
discuss
the
message
of
Source
A.
evidence.
is
the
message
of
Source
B?
What were the results of the Sino-Japanese War for Japan?
As
the
the
the
historian
army
Japanese
rather
than
escalated,
the
44
Staff
army
the
has
as
had
as
a
you
campaign
to
written,
wanted ”
been
Chinese.
(partly
Japanese,
all-out
Pyle
General
war
p.
of
read
“annihilate”
for
once
Jiang
in
the
the
with
198).
preparing
However,
result
will
a
(Pyle,
a
the
Jieshi’s
next
China,
Indeed,
major
Marco
new
not
a
war
until
this
war
with
the
Polo
Konoe
regime.
Soviets
to
called
that
time,
incident
commitment
chapter)
nationalist
“ was
up
had
resist
for
an
C H A P T E R
The
hope
was
that
China
Japanese
leadership
extent
Chinese
the
of
Rape
of
1 . 2 :
in
a
J A P A N E S E
would
new
quickly
Asian
nationalism
and
E X P A N S I O N
capitulate
order.
the
This
outrage
I N
and
view
S O U T H - E A S T
would
by
19 31 – 19 4 1
accept
underestimated
caused
A S I A ,
such
the
events
as
Nanjing.
Source skills
A
cartoon
the
UK
The
by
David
newspaper
cartoon
labelled
Low
the
depicts
“Jap
Evening
the
industry”
“Further
deeper”
Standard,
Japanese
and
and
“Jap
19
military
politics”,
published
January
leading
into
in
1938.
two
men,
China.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
on
is
Low’s
Japan
Thus,
in
despite
message
this
regarding
the
impact
of
the
invasion
of
China
cartoon?
their
defeats,
the
lack
of
effective
weapons
and
industrial
TOK
support,
Japan
This
the
had
led
Chinese
another
one
of
to
to
becoming
Chinese
ght
supply
more
the
on
to
push
agree
the
becoming
vulnerable
to
Zedong
intensively
terms
Chinese
one
in
for
peace.
further
overstretched
Chinese
developed,
Mao
most
and
lines
resistance
under
refused
guerrilla
under
Jiang
north-west
bombed
cities
and
into
the
Jieshi
the
meant
the
T
wo
at
that
centres
Chongqing
thus far. Look at the historians’
for
views and the primary accounts
and
would
World
have looked at in this chapter
forces
Chongqing
Second
In pairs review the sources you
interior.
Japanese
attacks.
China.
of
This
become
and photographs. When
historians work on developing
War.
their accounts of historical
In
November
1938
the
Japanese
government
declared
the
creation
of
a
events how do they select
new
political,
cultural
and
economic
union
between
Japan,
Manchukuo
their sources? How do they
and
China
–
a
New
Order
in
East
Asia.
Prince
Konoe
had
publicly
select what events and actions
declared
Japan’s
aim
of
creating
this
union,
which
would
mean
a
new
are signicant? Discuss the
level
of
political,
economic
and
cultural
“cooperation”
between
Japan,
dierence between selection
China
and
Manchukuo.
Jiang
rejected
this
idea
for
a
new
union,
and
and bias
continued
The
in
key
its
the
problem
favour.
terms,
war.
It
decisive
for
Japan
pursued
military
a
over
the
number
victory
of
and
next
few
years
strategies
the
setting
was
including
up
of
an
how
to
end
the
compromised
alternative
war
peace
Chinese
45
1
regime
that
would
Bix
concludes
and
[would]
II,
and
agree
that
end
Japan’s
war,
only
after
ultimate
terms
“set
with
the
stage
having
defeat”
them.
for
given
(Bix,
the
seed
None
of
triumph
to
these
of
Japanese
methods
Communism
involvement
worked.
in
in
China,
World
War
2000).
L TA
Thinking skills
An ex tract from Max Hastings. 20 07
. Retribution: The
among subject peoples of the European empires.
battle for Japan 1944–45, pages 5–6. Published by
This vanished, however, in the face of the occupiers’
Alfred A K nopf. New York , US A
behaviour in China and elsewhere. Japanese pogroms
of Chinese in South East Asia were designed par tly to
Inaugurating its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
win favour with indigenous peoples, but these in turn
Sphere”, Japan perceived itself merely as a latecomer
soon found themselves suering appallingly. The new
to the contest for empire in which other great nations
rulers were inhibited from treating their conquests
had engaged for centuries. It saw only hypocrisy and
humanely, even had they wished to do so, by the fact
racism in the objections of Western imperial powers
that the purpose of seizure was to strip them of food
to its bid to match their own generous interpretations
and raw materials for the benet of Japan’s people.
of what constituted legitimate overseas interests.
Such a view was not completely baseless. Japan’s
What are the key points made by the historian Hastings
pre-war economic diculties and pretensions to a
regarding Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
policy of “Asia for Asians” inspired some sympathy
in this source?
Why did the conict deepen after 1938?
The militarists take control
Prince
in
he
Konoye
December
created
which
was
control
unity
joined
the
Indeed,
Rule
a
returned
1938.
party
by
multi-party
in
Konoe
as
still
prime
called
most
minister
aimed
to
the
limit
in
Imperial
political
July
the
parties.
1940
power
Rule
of
having
the
Assistance
However,
he
resigned
military
and
Association
again
failed
to
militarists.
Assistance
were
He
total
politics
was
Association
control
resigned
and
when
was
suspended
replaced
in
all
October,
replaced
by
in
1940
political
1941,
General
when
parties.
Prime
the
The
Imperial
military
Minister
Prince
Tojo.
The impact of the war in Europe
With
Hitler’s
were
drawn
1940,
have
Japan
troops
conquest
swift
to
areas
pressured
and
of
victories
new
Europe
conquest
occupied
airelds
South
in
of
East
in
in
–
France
the
into
Indo-China.
Asia.
Similar
summer
Europe’s
of
permitting
This
would
attempts
to
1940,
colonies.
be
In
the
Japan’s
the
pressurize
military
November
forces
rst
the
stage
to
of
Dutch
its
failed.
Events 1940–41
The Three Power/Tripar tite Pact and the Neutrality Pact
In
September
Yosuke,
Italy
the
would
Axis
colonies
pact
powers
in
with
clashed
46
the
the
Asia
twice
could
defeat
be
was
Soviet
with
Axis
Europe
could
Japan
the
Japanese,
Tripartite
dominate
Furthermore,
a
1940,
signed
the
and
the
easily
able
Union.
Soviet
under
Pact
leave
by
secure
During
Union
over
to
that
Matsuoka
Germany
dominate
democracies
in
East
and
Asia.
Europe
If
their
Japan.
its
the
Minister
agreed
Japan
Western
seized
to
Foreign
which
northern
war
with
border
border
China,
disputes
after
signing
Japan
–
rst
had
in
1938
C H A P T E R
and
again,
Nazi
April
This
1941
was
forces
in
Indeed,
for
for
Soviet
Europe
the
take
From
East
Japan
region
In
and
1941,
Japan
Indies.
It
has
froze
to
a
in
been
a
all
this
to
East
that
plan
of
war,
with
engaged
in
attacked
Western
assets
for
to
to
no
colonies
in
end
its
China
brought
(see
Greater
it.
to
in
into
November
its
and
the
southern
Japanese
foreign
Indo-
and
the
move,
trade
defences
in
the
1.3).
victories
Asia
in
Europe,
Co-Prosperity
this.
the
Indeed,
the
early
East
in
Soviets.
south.
Malaya
their
Chapter
impressive
entered
into
this
19 31 – 19 4 1
opportunities
France
(Thailand),
this
the
further
A S I A ,
The
concentrate
great
at
1939.
with
forces
moved
alarmed
included
end
could
strengthened
the
be
Japan
how
in
of
However,
Pact
Britain,
Siam
S O U T H - E A S T
Japan.
created
forces
and
they
Hitler’s
was
move
of
I N
summer
for
Union
Europe
Britain,
Jiang
ambitions
Asia
could
threaten
and
by
Soviet
in
the
Neutrality
colonies
addition,
aid
in
a
Japanese
could
USA
In
suggested
clear
July,
fostered
its
Nazis
E X P A N S I O N
set-back
into
the
Asian
Japanese
halt.
part
the
they
The
as
a
Japanese
the
24
increased
South
without
of
on
there
expanded
Sphere;
the
period,
been
entered
benecial
over
and,
had
also
and
J A P A N E S E
protracted
1939
victories
to
immediately
with
of
Matsuoka
Netherlands
Dutch
more
mutually
Japan
China.
a
Pact
1 . 2 :
war
Japan
conict
in
with
was
sight,
China
still
fully
when
it
1941.
L TA
Social skills
ARTICLE 3
The Tripar tite Pact
Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-
operate in their eor ts on aforesaid lines.
The Government of Japan, Germany and Italy
They fur ther under take to assist one another
consider it the prerequisite of a lasting peace that
with all political, economic, and military
every nation in the world shall receive the space to
means if one of the three Contracting
which it is entitled. They have, therefore, decided
Powers is attacked by a Power at present
to stand by and cooperate with one another in their
not involved in the European War or in the
eor ts in the regions of Europe and Greater East Asia
Japanese-Chinese conict.
respectively. In doing this it is their prime purpose
ARTICLE 4
to establish and maintain a new order of things,
With the view to implementing the present
calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and
pact, joint technical commissions, to be
welfare of the peoples concerned.
appointed by the respective Governments
of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet
It
is,
fur thermore,
the
d es ire
of
the
three
without delay.
Governments
in
other
direct
for
spheres
their
the
world
to
extend
of
effor ts
purpose
of
th e
co- operation
w orld
along
w ho
lines
realis ing
are
similar
their
to
natio ns
inclined
to
their
u ltima te
to
ARTICLE 5
Japan, Germany and Italy arm that the
above agreement aects in no way the
own
political status existing at present between
object ,
each of the three Contracting Par ties and
peace.
Soviet Russia.
Accordingly, the Governments of Japan, Germany and
Italy have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 6
The present pact shall become valid
immediately upon signature and shall
ARTICLE 1
Japan recognises and respects the
remain in force ten years from the date on
leadership of Germany and Italy in the
which it becomes eective.
establishment of a new order in Europe.
Lu, David J. 1997. Japan: A Documentary History,
ARTICLE 2
Germany and Italy recognise and respect the
pages 424-25. M.E. Sharpe Armonk , NY, USA
leadership of Japan in the establishment of a
new order in Greater Asia.
47
1
In pairs or small groups discuss and agree a response to the
2.
following questions. Present your answers to the class.
1.
How might the Western powers perceive this
agreement?
How might the terms of this treaty facilitate Japanese
3.
foreign policy ambitions?
How signicant is this agreement in demonstrating
Japanese intentions in the region?
Source skills
Source A
A
cartoon
UK
▲
.
by
Mars,
Sidney
“the
“George”
God
of
War”,
Strube
has
published
masks
in
labelled,
the
Daily
China,
Express,
Spain
15
July,
1937.
London,
Abyssinia.
“So is he going back to that old mask - again”
prepared
Source B
to
Kenneth
B.
Pyle.
The
Making
of
Modern
avoid
for
2nd
edition,
page
198
the
war
summer
with
General
most
time
China.
Staff
able
aware
of
that
to
of
it
total
would
develop
industrial
was
wanted.
the
and
structure
To
them
it
concentrate
was
on
a
critical
effort
to
develop
Japan’s
fully
economy
(1996).
1937
It
war.
and
Japan .
…
In
all-out
hostilities
coordinated
48
and
Japan
not
The
war
a
war
truth
that
is
an
Japan
army
even
were
considerably
integrate
into
the
that
planners
require
before
blundered
acutely
more
effective
would
the
be
by
In
June
Saionji
Konoe
old
to
was
noble
succeed
the
1937
weak
in
and
widely
He
prime
the
spoke
domestic
Fumimaro
might,
was
and
achieving
affairs,
ineffectual
gure
it
country
of
was
minister.
respected
who
uniting
military.
justice”
become
a
family,
in
Konoe
but
leader.
he
chosen
Prince
from
an
thought,
restraining
“social
proved
a
C H A P T E R
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
Source C
From
No
and
Kawakami.
Aims
one
against
can
Japan
in
China:
Her
According
(1938).
doubt
China
…
Japanese
that
Japan
During
the
has
last
a
grave
ten
country
veritable
to
reverberated
hymns
destroy
case
of
hate,
Japanese
with
war
in
Chinese
is
cities
were
no
the
the
residents.
No
China
longer
longer
…
Using
of
go
security.
handle
the
Japanese
part
of
Chinese
who
the
who
had
safe
could
for
friendly
or
social
murdered.
hatred
of
combustion,
the
Nationalist
with
of
a
relations
the
sources
paper,
start
or
but
a
of
and
you
“In
the
into
that
in
country
not
conagration
Government
you
the
like
for
1930s?
cartoonist
your
agree
own
with
summer
war
with
hint:
need
writing.
clear
with
whole
–
do
Examiner’s
on
blackmailed,
Japan
life
the
in
Source
A?
knowledge,
the
to
following
of
1937
Japan
China.”
sense
not
reprisal
Japan
This
was
during
for
organizations.
to
what
the
would
fear
intimidated,
with
spontaneous
homes
merchants
anti-Japanese
even
aame
by
their
goods
were
were
assaulted,
ignited
of
business
Japanese
was
out
Chinese
C,
China
message
extent
blundered
Japanese
in
Four th question – 9 marks
troops
statement:
Japanese
Source
songs,
exhorting
interests
to
people
First question, par t b – 2 marks
what
Most
19 31 – 19 4 1
years
What
the
A S I A ,
First question, par t a – 3 marks
K.K.
Motive
S O U T H - E A S T
to
Plan
paragraphs
is
the
what
the
sources
that
than
three
to
page
79
for
a
it
as
and
the
out
support
you
will
manage
sample
in
fourth
your
you
two
question
to
Remember
For
plan
would
sides
question
answer
to
an
the
requires.
on
before
essay,
with
argument
Use
the
your
own
knowledge.
four
sources
plan
examination.
for
a
fourth
if
evidence
have
the
the
you
rather
(See
question.)
itself.
Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of war
0
1500
km
CHINA
7
December
1941: Without
Captured
warning
25
December
US
Pearl
Harbor
aircraft
Invaded
1942;
2
15
carriers.
JAPAN
January
killed,
Captured
May
Naval
base
of
1941
4
1942
US
from
Over
4
others
attacked
Japanese
2300 Americans
battleships
damaged
aircraft
by
carriers
sunk,
but
are
all
at
the
sea
Invaded
and
3
January
escape
1942
11
Invaded
December
1941
MIDWAY
captured
ISLANDS
8
December
1941
by
Japanese
Pearl
Captured
HONG
WAKE
KONG
Harbor
23
INDIA
Captured
December
British
1941
ISLAND
HAWAIIAN
BURMA
10
December
6
May
1942
ISLANDS
1941
battleship
PHILIPPINES
Prince
and
of
battle
Repulse
GUAM
Wales
MARSHALL
cruiser
sunk
by
ISLANDS
MALAYA
Japanese
bombers
NEW
BORNEO
Invaded
SINGAPORE
GUINEA
7
March
1942
SUMATRA
Key
15
February
1942
Major
Singapore
surrenders
Japanese;
to
DARWIN
soldiers
taken
greatest
military
▲
British
by
Japanese
Japanese
extent
of
conquests
defeat
20
in
Maximum
prisoner;
Bombed
“the
battle
JAVA
130,000
history”
February
1942
AUSTRALIA
Japanese expansion, December 1941–May 1942
49
1
Why did Japan attack
Pearl Harbor on
7 December 1941?
Again,
policy
Japan’s
in
the
1941–42
was
domestic
the
increasing
the
military
blockade
on
of
its
long
the
and
ensure
only
of
resources
option.
from
the
no
ambitions.
retreat
Negotiations
1941.
and
to
under
of
its
the
Some
and
did
the
control.
wanted
continued
to
view
and
the
an
Japan
to
agree
its
“open
not
August
USA
despite
to
by
trade
these
the
the
their
to
to
gain
be
the
question
its
Others
danger
throughout
the
territorial
peaceful
policy
in
means
the
conditions
efforts
in
The
withdraw
real
respect
policies
door”
agree
a
result
sustain
if
the
lifted.
continued
to
on
could
as
not
seemed
embargo
US
Indo-
fatal
China
divided
a
Japan.
conquest
colonies
Japan
the
as
into
be
for
in
the
embargo
could
of
the
economic
concerns
would
war
war
was
that
get
pursue
could
into
Japan
argued
Japan
maintain
Japan
in
USA
neighbours,
to
European
thus
not
a
that
of
Prince
areas
and
the
Konoe
negotiate.
While
negotiations
alternative
Japanese
4
its
continue
deadlock
to
between
Therefore,
opinion
and
Wa s h i n g t o n
integrity
plans.
cabinet
September,
Our
attain
demands
decide
to
–
the
USA
Japanese
and
after
will
[1]
for
preparations
measures
to
with
The
continued,
navy
some
the
presented
debate,
the
military
its
plan
in
for
following
Japan
war
was
to
made
the
agreed
on
1941:
Empire
complete
vis-a-vis
our
the
met
commence
by
the
for
[3]
the
purpose
war,
USA
objectives.
being
Netherlands.
50
w a r.
to
off.
from
Indo-China
wanted
their
cut
H o w e v e r,
expanding
forces
were
by
case
on
from
Japan
term
Japanese
supplies
the
expansion
China
of
Japan.
economic
on
had
and
arising
placed
this
control
now
Economic
war
in
concerns
The
year
determined
issues;
government
key
foreign
crucial
[2]
and
In
hostilities
Great
the
rst
of
self
Britain
event
ten
defence
concurrently
days
against
that
of
the
and
take
and
there
October
United
self-preservation
all
possible
thereby
is
no
…
prospect
we
States,
diplomatic
endeavour
will
of
our
immediately
Britain
and
the
C H A P T E R
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
L TA
Thinking skills
Saburo Ienaga. 1968. The Pacic War (Taiheiyo Senso)
Japanese troops be withdrawn from China. Tojo Hideki,
1931–45, page 133. Iwanami Shoten, Japan (translation
army minister in the third Konoe cabinet, spoke for
Random House, New York, USA)
the military: “ The army’s position is that there can be
no compromise on the stationing of troops in China. It
The United States and Japan were inexorably moving
aects military morale … Troop withdrawals are the
toward a bloody collision in the Pacic. Several
hear t of the matter. If we just acquiesce to the American
individuals and groups tried to stop the drift toward war
demand, everything we have achieved in China will
and stimulate productive Japan-US talks. Through the
be lost …”. Tojo found these compelling reasons not
eor ts of Bishop James E Walsh, a Catholic Maryknoll
to budge on China. Premier Konoe, however, “thought
priest, and others who had close contacts with
it manifestly unwise for Japan to plunge into an
Japanese leaders anxious to aver t war, negotiations
unpredictable war at a time when the China incident is
began in Washington between Ambassador Nomura
still unresolved”. He resigned on October 16, 1941.
Kichisaburo and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. By
this time in 1941, however, Japan had only two grim
According to this source, what was the key issue over which
alternatives: reach a compromise with the US or take
the Japanese military were not prepared to compromise?
the gamble of going to war. The American government
was in no mood to compromise and insisted that
Even
and
then,
the
Washington
same
force
the
time,
a
base
November,
Council
to
made
is
in
President
up
as
with
the
with
negotiations
mission
Americans.
sent
to
However,
was
at
the
attack
fail.
nal
for
an
naval
political
nal
of
from
our
hand
we
we
let
continue.
present
of
have
our
accept
On
the
If
to
dictation.
all
the
the
other
present
we
opportunity
will
American
the
and
to
demands.
cannot
situation
Privy
summed
present
situation
American
the
Hara
self-preservation,
war,
a
follows:
impossible,
standpoint
the
continued
Japanese
task
stalled,
Conference,
matter
It
nal
terms
negotiations
American
A
Hawaii.
Imperial
the
naval
were
the
government
USA.
agree
secretly
should
on
the
to
negotiations
in
2
try
huge
preparations
attack
with
to
prepared
USA
When
On
Japanese
diplomacy
miss
to
go
submit
to
to
Therefore,
I
▲
recognize
that
it
is
inevitable
US Navy le photo showing a small boat rescuing a USS West Virginia crew member from the
that
water after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 7 December 1941
we
must
against
I
will
in
the
decide
the
put
difculties
start
United
my
early
to
trust
part
as
the
of
a
war
States.
in
what
the
war
I
war;
have
and
progresses,
been
that
told,
namely
although
there
is
some
we
that
will
prospect
things
will
experience
of
go
well
increasing
success.
President Hara quoted in Jansen, MB. 2002. The Making of Modern Japan, page 630.
51
1
On
7
December
installations
eet.
If
to
resist
consolidate
The
its
on
90%
badly
its
of
for
would
Japanese
Pea r l
the
carrier
manoeuvres
this
in
in
bombers
an
have
to
rendered
expansion.
South
attacked
attempt
East
the
Japan
Asia
US
destroy
ships
the
USA
could
before
Pacic
temporarily
then
the
and
US
conquer
USA
had
and
time
to
capability.
damaged.
aircraft
Japanese
Harbor
control
naval
attack
with
1941,
Pearl
successful
helpless
rebuild
at
Ha r bo r
Ho we v e r,
cap a b i l i ty.
and
di d
mi d - P acic
were
incur
a ir
the
a nd
hi t.
ha d
s e ver a l
T his
l os se s
p ower
Jap a n es e
I nde e d,
no t
hu g e
se a
f or
n ot
la t e r
US A ,
d e str oye d
d e str oye d
c a rr ie r s
w o ul d
the
e i t h er
had
th e
be e n
pr ove
a
ou t
fa t a l
or
US
on
m i st a ke
Japan.
The
US
government
was
outraged
by
the
attack
on
Pearl
Harbor
Class discussion
which
was
described
Look back at the newspaper
duplicitous
headline on page 50 from the
simultaneously
New York Herald Tribune. Why
as
might the details in this primary
and
source be inaccurate?
declaration
entirely
nature
However,
attack
on
of
1,178
of
the
conducting
and
US
war
an
was
Harbor
Roosevelt
as
negotiations
attack
eet
treacherous.
military
across
The
personnel
“dastardly”.
in
the
brutal
and
the
USA
Pacic
air
was
assault
civilians
The
while
as
seen
killed
before
2,403
any
made.
Japanese
Pearl
President
sending
deceiful
injured
by
historian
was
not
Michiko
in
line
Hasegawa
with
Japan’s
argues
that
long-term
the
planning
Hull’s last Note (see source
and
was
caused
by
the
oil
embargo
which
forced
Japan
into
war.
below)
Revisionist
This was America’s nal proposal
provoked
historians
Japan
into
go
as
far
making
as
an
to
argue
that
Roosevelt
deliberately
attack.
before the attack on Pearl
As
they
attacked
Pearl
H a r b o r,
Japan
simultaneously
attacked
Hong
Harbour. It was delivered to the
Kong
and
Singapore.
Japanese
forces
then
went
on
to
attack
the
Japanese ambassador by the US
Dutch
East
Indies,
the
Philippines
and
Malaya
on
8
D e c e m b e r.
By
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.
the
end
of
D e c e m b e r,
Japan
had
seized
control
of
Guam,
Hong
Kong
One of its conditions demanded
and
Wa k e
Island.
They
also
had
sunk
two
important
British
warships
the complete withdrawal of all
–
the
Prince
of
Wa l e s
and
the
Repulse.
Japan
had
taken
Indo-China,
Japanese troops from French
Siam,
the
Dutch
East
Indies,
Malaya,
Singapore
and
the
Philippines
Indochina and China.
by
mid-1942.
Source skills
Richard
West
in
Storry.
Asia
Japan
1894–1943
and
the
Decline
of
the
the
and
When
the
blow
was
struck
at
Pearl
7
December
the
reaction
in
Prince
Japan
it
was
the
Empire
hostile
the
of
astonishment,
general,
was
powers,
if
relief
irrational,
encircled
that
by
Hull’s
a
last
ring
and
belief
the
box]
noose.
justied
as
The
an
tremendous
the
52
Pearl
had
been
resort
act
of
to
of
Note
further
war,
of
strike,
the
the
rst
of
the
Wales
–
airelds,
then
sinking
of
the
Repulse
no
less
appeared
to
underline
than
the
inevitability
plunge
into
the
Second
World
of
War.
so
it
seemed,
was
on
her
side.
that
grimly
First question, par t a – 3 marks
[see
tightening
then,
self-defence.
successes
Harbour
a
Philippine
joy.
According
glossary
the
was
Heaven,
For
on
Malaya,
rectitude
Japan’s
compounded
in
Harbour
the
on
Boeings
landings
(1979).
seemed
days
destruction
the
reaction
of
the
–
of
source
above,
home-front
on
Harbor?
fully
Moreover,
few
to
what
was
the
of
the
Pearl
in
Japan
to
the
attack
C H A P T E R
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
L TA
Social skills
Write some notes outlining your response to the question on page 52.
Now swap your response with a par tner. Mark each other ’s response out of 3 marks.
Give each other feedback.
war
Perspectives
in
the
Ienaga
Pacic.
was
also
The
Japanese
critical
of
historian
Japan’s
role
in
Saburo
causing
Historiography
the
Left-wing
of
the
Japanese
war
in
the
historians
Pacic
as
date
1931
–
the
beginning
with
war
militarism
Incident.
The
left
in
Japan
tend
the
“militarist
capitalist
clique”
Japanese
Japan
a
“15-year
war”.
The
indoctrinated
The
right-wing
December
East
Asia
Japanese
Japan
was
Western
without
there
1941
in
had
oil
Japan,
the
Many
freeing
movements
the
the
public
in
for
Rape
of
from
the
invasion
no
region
in
into
idea
at
was
a
of
on
the
that
the
they
these
“Great
was
time,
The
ction.
period.
the
even
Other
Japan’s
actions
at
USA
China
the
right
(Hayashi)
have
called
in
that
the
in
that
was
in
fact
a
100-year
as
the
addition,
bombing
or
following
the
arrival
of
the
the
War
orthodox
began
incident.
in
causing
Crimes
of
1937
Japan
expansion.
the
after
waged
This
war
was
the
Pearl
aggression
Convention.
a
Japan
in
the
struggle
of
on
one
was
in
USA
the
with
Polo
Japan’s
was
key
breach
wholly
the
of
asserts
the
the
war
oil
was
US
historians,
of
as
it
did
generally
the
US
Hawaii
eet”
primarily
act
as
Roosevelt
states
warnings
as
to
Japan
had
of
in
actions.
identify
Japan
knew
ensure
(Boyle,
Some
Japanese
that:
that
aimed
resist
Boyle
Americans
so
to
provoking
Boyle
argued
corruption.
not
such
in
suppressed
in
were
encouraged
key
as
Vietnam,
into
about
broken
the
their
“[Roosevelt]
military
a
successful
surprise
1993).
role
of
the
in
and
actions
at
in
for
the
that
no
he
historians
that
he
Seagrove,
to
stop
Japanese
been
of
the
to
wanted
submit
writing
pre-war
disputed.
emperor’s
book
The
emperor
expansionists
war
to
the
after
Hirohito
aggressive.
his
the
not
expansionism.
the
L TA
Research skills
that
was
in
that
Japanese
but
often
suggest
argues
had
choice
Revisionists,
but
Tokyo
Geneva
responsible
had
1989,
evidence
the
in
also
role
1853.
Pacic
the
has
the
and
role
emperor
“Holy
Bridge
aggression
presented
Harbor
and
the
Hasegawa
historians
war
Americans
Marco
war
perspective
Tribunal.
Japan’s
historians
for
Western
Harbor;
attack
argue
For
and
1968).
because
in
1941
USA
historian
even
the
war
revisionists
role
commanders
on
to
from
attack
The
ignored
up
1930s,
Traditionalist
West
war
point
US
the
Pearl
Japanese
policies
War”
Michiko
to
Revisionist
the
Asia
that
Roosevelt’s
codes.
by
right
argue
purging
The
on
1941.
during
In
that
territories
extreme
Tanaka,
i.e.
independence
with
the
went
starting
writing
suggest
of
argue
post-war
war
(Ienaga,
had
exploitation
the
a
Masaaki
Nanjing
for
successful
Historians
example
the
Furthermore,
forced
embargo.
point
imperialism
education.
identify
propaganda
been
the
been
Japan
support
Asia
Japanese
have
in
pre-war
starting
Japanese
would
Japan
as
colonialism.
the
their
historians
War”.
presented
by
factors
historian
only
December,
been
key
Japanese
responsible
embargo.
for
were
that
to
that
hold
argues
the
The
Manchurian
and
was
The
but
was
Hirohito’s
not
a
force
but
he
in
passive
Sterling
Dynasty,
supporting
have
did
death
simply
historian
could
had
militarists.
Yamamoto
He
he
not
intervened
want
to.
TOK
In pairs research other historians’ perspectives on Japan’s foreign policy
In small groups investigate fur ther into
in the 1930s. Try to nd historians from dierent regions and historians
the background and work of the historians
writing in languages other than English.
named in the perspective box above
and those that you nd in your research.
You should spend two hours on this activity. Discuss with your teacher
Discuss how the context within which
how to reference your sources and provide a brief list of works cited.
historians live (time, place and culture)
may impact their knowledge, understanding
and views of historical events.
53
1
Conclusions
The
historian
Japan
Kenneth
paid
a
Abandoning
Japanese
nearly
3
The
million
left
of
traditional
expansion
the
Japanese
the
history
–
of
the
and
of
the
realism
nation
its
the
bold
that
entire
the
Communism
an
war
in
leaders
conict
empire,
irony.
by
War
ideology
in
Japan’s
its
buildings,
Asia,
and
1941.
cost
it
houses.
in
to
Japan
of
of
the
wanted
rst
had
preserve
vehemently
that
for
lives
Generations
to
social-democratic
–
the
destruction
trauma.
sought
that
in
the
sentiment
and
a
and
and
actions:
characterized
that
the
that
order,
brought
China,
enemy
a
scarred
political
inuence
Instead,
of
of
traditionally
into
overseas
historic
Japanese
Bolshevik
by
had
equipment,
with
impact
gamble
entered
ultranationalist
of
occupation
up
psychologically
heavy
an
Empire.
rise
for
machines,
values
the
home,
its
by
price
Japanese,
was
impelled
sums
cautious
physically
outcome
been
the
diplomacy,
one-quarter
were
terrible
Pyle
the
opposed
establish
revolution
time
in
at
Japan’s
force.
Pyle, KB. 1996. The Making of Modern Japan, page 204
Full document question: The USA’s actions with regard to Japan, 1930–41
The
Source A
July
1941
imposed
A
cartoon
by
David
Low.
“Dogs
of
by
in
the
Evening
Standard,
31
October
on
and
Japan
asset
–
freeze
Roosevelt’s
diplomatic
action
in
the
months
London.
before
UK.
embargo
U.S.
War”
clumsiest
published
oil
the
Pearl
Harbor
–
was
partly
designed
to
1941
deter
Tokyo
from
Barbarossa.
Yosuke
states
Japan’s
Matsuoka,
because
attack
his
…
…
Japan
The
provides
best
of
shared
interest
rooted
in
Like
Italy
1941
in
.
was
.
that
1940,
the
Europe
.
Japan
his
in
two
in
powers
their
to
was
victory.
December
colonial
exposed
of
planning
German
sought
The
unrelated
Japanese
old
sake
pleas
manifestation
Japan
to
fascist
Japanese
own
conduct.
pursued
of
alike
and
its
month
urgings
rejecting
obvious
that
minister,
same
were
for
nation’s
only
June
decided
properties
for
assumption
in
difculties
war
however,
The
an
rejected
reason
either
partners,
ambitions.
the
German
making
Operation
foreign
in
Germany
common
the
mitigation
bellicose
and
to
Hitler’s
resigned
government
commitment
Axis
joining
remoter
seize
access
to
Source B
vital
Max
Hastings.
1944–45
Retribution:
The
Battle
for
Japan
for
oil
and
mass
raw
materials,
migration
from
together
the
home
with
space
islands.
(2007).
Source C
A
Japanese
assault
on
the
Soviet
Union
in
Kenneth
1941–42,
taking
the
Russians
in
the
rear
B.
Pyle.
The
Making
of
Modern
Japan.
as
(1996).
they
have
struggled
yielded
Stalin
was
to
stem
Hitler’s
important
terried
of
invasion,
rewards
such
an
for
the
might
Axis.
eventuality.
The
dilemma
struggled
Incident
54
that
with
now
Japanese
ever
since
became
diplomacy
the
still
had
Manchurian
more
difcult,
for
as
C H A P T E R
the
China
the
less
conict
prepared
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
expanded,
to
deal
the
with
E X P A N S I O N
nation
the
was
Soviet
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
the
Manchurian
border
and
the
Source D
Japanese
in
the
Pacic.
A
succession
of
with
the
Red
Army
Hirohito,
revealed
of
the
Kwantung
was
Army;
at
…
a
time
the
resolute
U.S.
Navy
program
was
of
now
building
in
the
Pacic.
By
the
Japanese
navy
General
of
America’s
crash
program
had
its
An
would
life
…
gaining
1942,
naval
the
oil
cope
of
of
the
with
1940
Pact
and
supremacy
Japan
Dutch
[Matsuoko]
with
Germany
attacked
pledged
by
a
European
in
signed
to
aid
in
one
in
In
the
Italy,
not
or
…
from
a
serious
without
a
danger
of
a
an
gradual
operation,
still
while
offer
it
might
some
be
hope
Army
General
Staff
was
of
in
saving
favour
putting
hope
but
…
in
in
diplomatic
the
case
of
negotiations
failure,
a
to
the
decisive
Pacic
access
order
the
would
have
to
be
performed.
to
to
Quoted
autumn
page
in
Richard
Overy.
2009.
The
Road
to
War,
342
Tripartite
in
which
another
currently
the
alone
result
the
have
Indies
power
and
power
war
must
East
American
signatories
the
that
was
would
the
operation
by
suffering
left
concluded
nish,
in
be
1940
of
that
he
embarked
spring
Staff
patient
additional
his
the
a
there
dangerous,
strength
the
the
decline.
on
like
Should
operation,
same
to
1941
the
illness
vulnerability
Nagano
September
border
Japan
skirmishes
Admiral
American
Emperor
eet
19 31 – 19 4 1
army
The
on
A S I A ,
First question, par t a – 3 marks
the
if
involved
ghting
in
in
According
to
Source
at
of
1941?
the
end
D,
why
did
Japan
take
action
China.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
Matsouka
States
thus
thereby
and
hoped
dissuade
opening
the
it
to
from
way
for
isolate
conict
Japan
to
the
United
with
seize
Japan,
What
message
is
conveyed
in
Source
A?
the
Second question – 4 marks
European
resources
off
colonies
it
Chinese
in
needed
supply
Southeast
for
Asia,
grasp
self-sufciency
lines.
and
the
cut
With
reference
assess
the
to
values
historians
its
and
studying
origin,
purpose
limitations
the
causes
of
of
and
content,
Source
war
in
D
the
for
Pacic.
Third question – 6 marks
Compare
Source
B
and
and
contrast
Source
the
C
views
expressed
regarding
Japanese
in
polices.
Four th question – 9 marks
Using
the
analyse
Pearl
sources
the
and
reasons
Harbor
in
your
for
the
December
own
knowledge
Japanese
attack
on
1941.
55
1
Review task
L TA
Communication and research skills
In small groups use the sources in this chapter, and/or other
3
Using the sources and your own knowledge examine
sources you research online to draft your own version of a
the validity of the claim that “in creating the Greater
Paper 1 examination. You could use the questions in the box
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan perceived itself
here to help you rene the “theme” of your paper.
merely as a latecomer to the contest for empire”.
4
Remember:
Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what
extent do you agree that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor
●
You will need four sources.
●
One source will need to be a non-text source, for
was the result of its expansionist foreign policy?
5
Using the sources and your own knowledge examine
example a car toon, photograph or some statistics.
the role of the failure of Japan’s policies in its decision
●
You need to ensure that the total word count of your
to attack the USA in 1941.
sources does not exceed 750 words.
6
“Japan’s failure to bring about a victory in the war with
Here are some ideas for your four th question.
China ultimately led to the Second World War in the
1
2
Using the sources and your own knowledge analyse
Pacic.” Using the sources and your own knowledge
the reasons for the Manchurian crisis in 1931.
assess to what extent you agree with this statement.
Using the sources and your own knowledge analyse
Using the sources and your own knowledge assess the
extent to which Japan was acting defensively when it
scale war between Japan and China in 1937.
attacked Western interests.
Using
policy
the
of
Overall,
information
each
Nationalism
Militarism
Political situation in Japan
Economic situation in Japan
Situation in China
Actions of the West
(You will need to ll this in after
you have read the next chapter.)
Conclusions
of
which
inuencing
56
7
why the Marco Polo Bridge incident escalated into a full-
the
factor
Japan’s
in
this
factors
or
chapter,
on
the
factors
foreign
review
left-hand
do
you
the
impact
side
of
consider
to
the
be
on
Japan’s
following
most
foreign
table.
important
in
policy?
Causes of the Mukden
Causes of the
Causes of Japan’s attack
incident 1928–32
Sino-Japanese War 1933–37
on Pearl Harbor 1938–41
C H A P T E R
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
A S I A ,
Yen-denominated;
Source help and hints
19 31 – 19 4 1
1934–36
=
100
210
Textiles
First question, par t b – 2 marks
190
(See
170
page
What
is
33.)
the
message
of
Source
150
A?
130
To
answer
this
question,
you
need
to
work
out
what
you
Commodity
can
learn
from
the
graph.
Read
the
details
carefully.
In
exports
110
total
this
case,
you
can
nd
out
the
following.
90
●
The
total
number
of
exports
fell
dramatically
70
27
1926
after
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
1929.
I. Yamazawa and Y. Yamamoto. 1978. Estimates of
●
Exports
began
to
rise
again
from
1932.
Long-term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868. 14:
●
Textiles
had
been
a
major
part
of
Japan’s
Foreign trade and balance of payments.
exports.
Second question – 4 marks
(See
page
33.)
●
It
has
●
It
is
the
benet
written
Hirohito’s
With
reference
to
origin,
purpose
and
the
value
and
limitations
of
Source
C
to
studying
the
Manchurian
question
is
asking
you
to
evaluate
have
the
It
is
book,
important
at
the
date
that
of
you
look
the
and
understanding
and
insights
on
so
is
the
of
Japan
at
this
time.
The
style
of
the
content
suggests
an
objective
historian’s
carefully
publication
interesting
politics
approach
work.
of
Japan
crisis.
●
This
purpose
modern
for
internal
historians
the
in
hindsight.
content,
likely
assess
for
role
of
any
at
the
title
in
use
of
language
and
analysis.
of
information
Limitations
on
the
historian
as
these
will
guide
you
as
to
the
value
of
●
the
source
for
the
particular
purpose
being
asked
The
focus
Hirohito
Here
are
some
points
you
could
the
The
a
●
It
source
was
so
it
book
social
was
professional
written
may
written
in
in
this
title
the
and
political
the
content
elites,
and
is
on
therefore
by
an
academic
who
may
and
not
fully
economic
address
non-personal
factors.
is
eld.
2000
provide
the
and
consider.
Values
●
of
about.
which
good
access
is
fairly
to
recent
recent
scholarship.
●
First question, par t a – 3 marks
There
was
a
lack
of
clear
a
general
a
sense
decision-making
power.
(See
page
35.)
●
According
to
Source
A,
why
were
the
There
in
army
able
to
seize
be
able
control
of
should
to
nd
the
atmosphere
of
confusion
Japan.
Manchuria?
●
You
was
Kwantung
following
There
was
of
domestic
and
foreign
points:
turmoil.
●
The
Japanese
government
was
weak.
57
1
First question, par t b – 2 marks
(See
page
What
is
36.)
the
message
of
this
photograph?
●
The
Japanese
are
●
The
Japanese
forces
●
There
appears
in
to
be
control.
are
well
little
ordered.
support
for
Japanese
forces.
As
with
the
carefully
people
could
at
in
picture
dress,
the
draw
in
Chapter
expressions
photograph.
the
following
1.1,
and
From
you
need
to
demeanour
this
look
of
the
photograph,
●
There
you
seems
for
depth.
The
perspective
page
reference
content,
Source
the
to
assess
A
for
the
the
a
origin,
values
historian
Manchurian
purpose,
and
that
the
page
of
The
crisis.
may
many
of
the
points
are
similar
to
the
57
date,
have
–
but
possible
the
date
here
is
key
for
allowing
you
the
of
the
benet
of
It
the
is
that
writing
hindsight.
and
researched.
analyses
source
historian,
academic
may
is
years
focused
1931–45,
is
the
1968,
Also,
therefore
also
it
in
the
be
on
work
who
more
1968,
focus
are
purpose
objective
the
which
other
The
from
key
points
Japanese
points
are
as
Japanese
powers
as
replace
them
made
policy
available
as
more
once
wartime
documents
classied
era
the
depth
of
were
its
released,
interpretation.
on
the
Pacic
to
War
include
may
the
mean
impact
the
of
this
event
regions.
allow
●
To
in
protect
Manchukuo,
wanted
to
the
Japanese
eliminate
in
Source
the
Soviet
the
threat
an
build
to
inuence
with
up
Union.
B
Japan
wanted
to
prepare
against
Britain
and
Asia?
remove
the
USA
to
promote
its
own
economy.
Japan
planned
a
in
South
East
“co-prosperity
government
believed
its
armaments.
to
promote
its
racial
and
great
Asia
sphere”.
that
development
in
South
East
Asia.
and
Examiner’s
get
from
hint:
this
There
source
Japan
three
58
least
follows:
aimed
Japanese
must
at
actions.
well
can
The
its
limitation
the
limit
economic
●
in
and
●
●
Japanese
is
the
key
a
seen,
a
and
region
may
of
●
The
is
42.)
the
regarding
a
become
neglects
from
What
defensive
is
government
page
indicate
that
has
First question, par t a – 3 marks
(See
may
conict
to
in
value
the
limitations.
Values
Japanese
content
on
could
source
A
Japanese
answer
The
identify
to
Limitations
of
impact
which
on
resistance
and
limitations
studying
as
documents
Notice
no
39.)
initially,
With
be
conclusions:
Second question – 4 marks
(See
to
forces.
to
gain
3
marks.
–
are
but
several
you
only
points
need
that
to
you
explain
C H A P T E R
1 . 2 :
J A P A N E S E
E X P A N S I O N
I N
S O U T H - E A S T
A S I A ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
References
Bix,
HP
.
New
2000.
York,
Boyle,
JH.
1983.
Encyclopedia
Boyle,
JH.
of
Knopf.
Hsü,
I.
Japan
Iriye,
S.
A.
Boston
2007.
The
1968.
1987.
MB.
MA,
London,
The
Japan .
Harper
Perennial.
War
of
1937–45”
Kodansha.
Japan:
The
Tokyo,
American
in
Kodansha
Japan.
Nexus .
Harcourt
Brace
USA
of
The
Modern
Pacic
Battle
China,
War
Random
Origins
2002.
KK.
J.,
for
Japan
1944–45 .
Alfred
A
page
550.
Oxford
University
Press,
(Taiheiyo
House.
of
the
Senso)
New
Second
York,
World
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Iwanami
Shoten.
USA)
War
in
Asia
and
the
Pacic .
UK
The
1938.
1997.
Overy,
R.
2009.
1996.
Company.
J.
Making
Japan
R.
Japan:
NY
,
The
of
Modern
Japan .
Harvard
University
Press,
in
China:
Her
motives
and
aims .
John
Murray.
The
A
Documentary
History ,
pages
418–20.
M.E.
USA
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to
Making
Lexington,
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Storry,
Modern
USA
Armonk,
New
of
UK
David
Spence,
VII.
Retribution:
Rise
The
Sharpe
K.
Making
USA
London,
Kawakami,
Pyle,
the
UK
Routledge,
Lu,
York,
(translation
Jansen,
Vol.
Modern
York,
1995.
Ienaga,
Japan,
New
M.
New
Oxford,
and
“Sino-Japanese
1993.
Jovanovich.
Hastings,
Hirohito
USA
The
War.
of
MA,
Vintage
Modern
Books.
Japan .
2nd
London,
edn.
DC
UK
Heath
and
USA
Search
for
Modern
China .
WW
Norton
and
Company.
USA
1979.
Macmillan.
Japan
London,
and
the
Decline
of
the
West
in
Asia,
1894–1943 .
UK
59
1.3
The international response to Japanese
aggression, 1931–1941
Conceptual understanding
➔
Consequence
➔
Signicance
▲
Franklin D Roosevelt, US president from 1933
The League of Nations decides to set
1931
up a Commission under Lord Lytton to
The USA issues Stimson Non-Recognition
investigate the Mukden incident
Doctrine
1932
The Lytton Commission publishes
its repor t
1933
Japan leaves the League of Nations
Second United Front established
1936
between the GMD and the CCP in China
China appeals to the League of Nations
after the Marco Polo incident
1937
USS Panay is sunk by the Japanese
1938
The USA gives loans to the GMD
The USA starts an embargo on Japan
1939
July–September: the Burma Road
and the trade deal is cancelled
is closed
1940
In September Churchill reopens the
Japan occupies southern Indo-China.
Burma Road following the Tripar tite Pact.
The USA freezes Japanese assets. A total
1941
July
trade embargo is imposed by ABD powers
A total oil is embargo imposed on
1941
November
Japan by the USA
Japan attacks Pearl Harbor
60
1941
December
C H A P T E R
1 . 3 :
T H E
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
The League of Nations’ response to events in
Kellogg-Briand Pact
Manchuria 1931–36
This pact was signed in 1928 and
the signatory states promised
Japan’s
action
in
the
Mukden
Incident
was
the
rst
signicant
not to use war to resolve
challenge
by
a
major
power
to
the
new
international
system
that
had
“disputes or conicts of whatever
been
set
up
in
Europe
after
the
First
World
War.
This
international
nature or of whatever origin they
system
centred
around
the
concept
of
collective
security
–
that
states
may be, which may arise among
would
take
joint
action
to
deal
with
aggression.
To
facilitate
such
them”. Instead, it called for the
action,
the
League
of
Nations,
a
body
where
all
states
could
be
peaceful settlement of disputes.
represented,
was
established
in
1919.
In
addition,
various
treaties,
such
Japan signed this pact in 1928
as
the
Washington
Conference
System,
the
Nine-Power
Treaty
(see
along with 14 other nations.
page
22)
and
the
Kellogg-Briand
Pact
reinforced
the
idea
of
peaceful
Ultimately, the pact was signed
international
cooperation.
by 62 nations.
Source skills
Source A
Extract
Second
Source B
from
World
Akira
War
Iriya.
in
Asia
The
and
Origins
the
of
the
Pacic
A
in
cartoon
published
in
Outlook,
a
US
magazine,
1931.
(1987).
The
term
system”,
short,
nor
“the
or
was
was
it
Washington
“the
not
in
current
subsequently
well-dened
legal
immediately
after
much
talk
of
conference”,
Asia
tended
it
furthered
it
expressed
co-operate
stability
gradual
It
was
“the
and
to
or
be
the
the
opposed
such
Rather,
an
of
as
a
the
in
as
rapid
Asian
order
that
in
of
was
in
whether
spirit.
…
to
maintaining
China’s
modern
state.
wholesale
international
advocated
Chinese
and
there
behaviour
and
being
process
a
less,
Washington
terms
International
of
1920s,
the
assisting
a
for
as
willingness
and
Washington
peace,
the
another
was
number
evolutionary
ensure
one
the
None
country’s
powers’
to
Communist
increasing
of
judged
region
transformation
the
a
in
conference
spirit
transformation
relations,
use
concept.
the
system”
recognized
undermined
with
in
Conference
Washington
and
by
an
nationalists.
powers
of
by
would
change
so
stress
as
to
stability.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What,
the
according
Washington
to
Source
A,
were
the
aims
of
System?
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
is
Japan’s
the
message
actions
in
of
Source
B
concerning
Manchuria?
61
1
The organization and aims of the League of Nations
The
League
Council
of
all
of
action
The
out
League.
states;
consisted
four
most
Nations
the
member
council
plus
of
of
other
the
a
Covenant
how
the
cooperation
The
met
the
of
the
League
and
yearly
in
of
to
was
and
by
Assembly
the
of
maintaining
it
its
was
was
aims
international
the
of
the
The
the
of
vote.
Italy
to
that
document
and
the
The
Japan
made
could
take
war.
promoting
peace
and
council
body
and
representatives
one
France,
resorted
League
the
had
assembly.
who
Nations
of
up
state
Britain,
League
achieve
made
each
particular
the
League
was
the
powers
elected
decisions;
member
of
assembly
major
members
key
against
of
it
consisted
which
set
international
security.
L TA
Social skills
Read these ar ticles of the Covenant of the League which
this Ar ticle the award of the arbitrators or
set out how the League should solve international
the judicial decision shall be made within a
disputes and so prevent war.
reasonable time, and the repor t of the Council
shall be made within six months
In pairs discuss the following questions. Listen carefully to
after the submission of the dispute.
each other ’s ideas and agree a joint response.
Ar ticle 13
1
The Members of the League agree
What actions could the League take against aggressor
that whenever any dispute shall arise
states?
between them which they recognise to be
2
Which of these actions do you think would be most
suitable for submission to arbitration or
eective in solving disputes?
judicial settlement and which cannot be
3
Can you identify ways in which these methods might
satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they
not be eective?
will submit the whole subject-matter to
arbitration or judicial settlement …
Ar ticle 10
The Members of the League under take to
respect and preserve as against external
For the consideration of any such dispute, the
aggression the territorial integrity and existing
cour t to which the case is referred shall be the
political independence of all Members of the
Permanent Cour t of International Justice …
League. In case of any such aggression or in
The Members of the League agree that they
case of any threat or danger of such aggression
will carry out in full good faith any award or
the Council shall advise upon the means by
decision that may be rendered, and that they
which this obligation shall be fullled.
will not resor t to war against a Member of the
Ar ticle 11
Any war or threat of war, whether
League which complies therewith. In the event
immediately aecting any of the Members
of any failure to carry out such an award or
of the League or not , is hereby declared a
decision, the Council shall propose what steps
matter of concern to the whole League, and
should be taken to give eect thereto.
the League shall take any action that may be
Ar ticle 15
If there should arise between Members of
deemed wise and eectual to safeguard the
the League any dispute likely to lead to a
peace of nations …
rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration
Ar ticle 12
62
The Members of the League agree that if
or judicial settlement in accordance with
there should arise between them any dispute
Ar ticle 13, the Members of the League
likely to lead to a rupture they will submit
agree that they will submit the matter to
the matter either to arbitration or judicial
the Council. Any par ty to the dispute may
settlement or to enquiry by the Council,
eect such submission by giving notice of
and they agree in no case to resor t to war
the existence of the dispute to the Secretary
until three months after the award by the
General, who will make all necessary
arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the
arrangements for a full investigation and
repor t by the Council. In any case under
consideration thereof …
C H A P T E R
Ar ticle 16
1 . 3 :
T H E
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
Should any Member of the League resor t to
between the nationals of the covenant-
war in disregard of its covenants under Ar ticles
breaking State and the nationals of any other
12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed
State, whether a Member of the League or not.
to have committed an act of war against all
It
shall
be
the
duty
of
the
Council
in
other Members of the League, which hereby
such
case
to
recommend
to
the
several
under take immediately to subject it to the
Governments
what
effective
military,
naval
severance of all trade or nancial relations,
or
air
force
the
Members
of
the
League
the prohibition of all intercourse between their
shall
severally
contribute
to
the
armed
nationals and the nationals of the covenantforces
to
be
used
to
protect
the
covenants
breaking State, and the prevention of all
of
the
League.
nancial, commercial or personal intercourse
What actions did the League take in response
to the Mukden incident?
Following
the
Mukden
incident,
Source skills
China
of
of
appealed
Nations.
one
the
This
member
another;
taken
and
Article
16
However,
meetings
should
were
to
be
(who,
member
invited
to
the
on
of
to
next
Japanese
on
the
While
the
to
the
to
Manchuria
from
railway
zone.
League
Lytton
to
During
this
throughout
last
were
now
up
to
the
Daily
Japan?”.
in
the
was
the
position
crisis.
government
and
of
the
Pu
a
Yi
to
send
In
its
a
the
state
ruler.
Chinese
to
army
March
troops
message
role
in
took
of
the
this
cartoon
Manchurian
was
under
able
months
its
to
control
Japanese
report
was
of
claimed
led
to
on
continue
Manchuria
the
withdraw
commission
several
complete
1932,
The
should
fact-nding
months
Kwantung
puppet
from
Japanese
commission
several
as
is
Nations’
concerning
the
League
crisis?
a
This
Manchuria.
–
of
that
decided
time,
What
over
League
then
First question, par t b – 2 marks
with
continued
deance
the
free
newspaper
stand
a
out
army
then
emperor,
UK
source
sets
inuence
Manchukuo
the
league
action
and
Manchuria.
Manchuria
out
cooperating
in
request
of
The
the
its
in
the
meetings
not
League,
Japanese
League,
“Will
representatives
page
be
published
1931,
Japanese
government’s
expand
The
the
Manchurian
seemed
Low
acted
China
council).
the
David
November
invoke
set
what
although
the
by
17
action
as
These
by
send
on
several
discuss
in
to
cartoon
Mail
attacking
League
held
attended
A
example
Covenant.
taken.
government
USA
the
It
an
get
Japan
the
League
collective
thus
of
cautiously.
was
hoped
of
against
the
state
China
principle
security
to
to
by
that
Lord
arrive
the
in
situation.
expanding
declared
Japan
the
with
the
the
state
China’s
Manchurians
domination.
63
1
Source skills
Japanese
24
Government
September
placed
statement,
act
For
some
years
in
jeopardy.
imminent
1931.
past…
unpleasant
disaster
swiftly…
The
taken
place
in
the
regions
of
Mongolia,
in
special
in
which
Japan
is
degree…
Amidst
the
anxiety
to
a
detachment
the
tracks
of
of
the
be
viewed
Chinese
superuous
South
attacked
18
in
the
our
vicinity
railway
September.
A
of
Mukden,
guards,
clash
at
troops
then
thousands
of
Japanese
place…
Japanese
●
attacks
in
to
no
other
repeat
that
light…
the
It
may
Japanese
harbours
no
territorial
designs
and
reference
the
to
value
the
and
origin,
purpose
limitations
of
and
this
content
source
for
were
year
after
the
published.
Japan
force
did
by
It
in
the
Mukden
stated
fact
●
Japan
●
Manchukuo
and
should
was
up
not
as
Manchuria
should
the
Manchurian
Lytton
Incident.
Commission’s
Report
following:
special
and
the
its
interests
takeover
of
in
Manchuria
the
whole
of
but
the
use
Manchuria,
of
was
unjustied.
give
recognized
studying
incident,
the
have
army,
unacceptable
●
[South
wanton
Manchuria.
historians
was
SMR
against
Hundreds
residents
One
the
Second question – 4 marks
on
assess
and
to
Japanese
and
midnight
between
took
the
troops
With
Chinese
of
an
had
Manchuria
on
Railway
guard
Railway]
government
destroyed
endeavours
army
atmosphere
be
of
forestall
interested
should
a
to
Japanese
Manchuria
Manchurian
and
order
incidents
Government
have
In
the
the
an
territory
and
independent
withdraw
state
and
its
forces.
could
not
be
such.
become
independent
but
under
Chinese
sovereignty.
The
Commission
stressed
that
the
problem
of
Manchuria
could
only
TOK
be
Look at the sources on
pages 64–66. Make a note
of the following:
solved
by
a
general
recommended
railway
and
a
zone,
trade
a
the choice of language
b
the selection of events and
and
suppor ting details.
members
Such
that,
the
improvement
following
two
China;
Sino-Japanese
withdrawal
should
negotiate
of
a
relations.
troops
It
back
to
non-aggression
the
pact
agreement.
not
prepared
were
after
Japan’s
countries
recommendations
was
in
ignored
to
hypocritical
all,
had
not
the
fact
compromise.
in
the
their
British
that
Japan
attitude
and
Japan
wanted
declared
towards
French
that
Manchuria
the
Japanese
established
League’s
actions
their
in
enclaves
Discuss in small groups in
there
by
force?
Japan
did
not
accept
the
report
and
withdrew
from
the
what ways the sources contain
League
in
protest
in
March
1933.
The
US
Ambassador
to
Japan,
Joseph
bias. Do some sources seem
C
Grew,
reported
that:
to be more objective? Which
sources seem the most biased?
The
military
themselves,
and
the
public
through
military
propaganda
are
Feedback to the class. In pairs
fully
prepared
to
ght
rather
than
surrender
to
moral
or
other
pressure
from
attempt to write a brief account
the
West.
The
moral
obloquy
[condemnation]
of
the
rest
of
the
world
serves
of the Manchurian Crisis that
only
to
strengthen
not
modify
their
determination.
is without “bias” - attempt to
be as objective as possible.
Why did the League not take stronger action against Japan?
Discuss as a class the extent to
No
further
action
was
taken
against
Japan.
Why?
France,
as
one
of
the
which it is possible to describe
key
members
of
the
League,
felt
that
it
had
no
real
reason
to
fall
out
historical events without bias or
with
Japan.
As
the
colonial
power
subjectivity.
gain
64
from
a
weakened
China.
in
Indo-China,
it
also
had
much
to
C H A P T E R
Britain
the
was
ruling
security
were
In
should
not
at
Great
either
in
also
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
cautious
be
both
In
any
its
it
or
countries
military
meant
Russia
in
was
the
them
Japan
to
act
from
there
Moreover,
the
viewed
as
its
means
to
A G G R E S S I O N ,
were
principle
when
the
hesitant
was
J A PA N E S E
the
military
suffering
actions.
Far
that
unwilling
lacked
TO
Although
believed
made
that
the
it
were
which
R E S P O N S E
response.
who
case
countries
Depression
communist
in
Party
upheld,
stake.
economic
both
T H E
Conservative
addition,
the
1 . 3 :
some
of
spend
fear
an
of
ally
interests
resist
economic
in
collective
own
to
19 31 – 19 4 1
Japan.
effects
resources
of
on
communism
in
containing
East.
Source skills
On
Source A
of
Extract
from
Alan
Farmer.
Britain
the
one
Soviet
1919–39
action
was
to
be
taken,
US
support
was
that
support
was
not
forthcoming.
British
although
interests
immediate
in
a
the
danger.
northern
potential
Far
East,
Indeed
threat
was
risk
of
of
China
could
Japanese
areas
Ronald
War
an
(for
be
seen
expansion
example,
sanctions
The
as
enforce
Royal
a
in
other,
were
Navy
trade
biggest
would
unlikely
was
not
embargo,
to
not
policy
from
Cameron,
Akira
War
the
trading
partner,
with
to
support
therefore
takeover
the
are
any
seemed
to
of
Japanese
Manchuria
threat
did
it
the
to
and
Asia
The
and
Origins
the
of
Pacic
the
(1987).
for
China,
it
so
the
international
strongly
it
turned
for
help,
identied
was
itself
through
beginning
a
major
of
the
crisis
world
of
another
depression.
sort;
Those
clear
action.
be
not
and
USA,
made
League
rule.
enough
that
had
constructed
and
preserved
The
international
system
–
advanced
industrial
accept
to
–
were
in
the
midst
of
a
severe
hope
crisis.
that
which
Appeasement
Iriya.
in
which
which
economics
Japan’s
of
Communist
achieve
strong
and
under
Asia).
the
best
provinces
(1991)
World
powers
it
of
more
Southeast
the
Japan’s
chaos
reducing
going
to
menace
Source C
and
much.
the
expansion
system
Economic
ve
tortured
Unfortunately
sensitive,
dark
to
not
Japanese
in
to
Second
the
four
being
Extract
in
the
other
Japanese
Road
imperialism,
see
the
vital,
Cited
but
On
(1996).
now
If
they
Foreign
China,
Affairs,
side
Russia.
Between
1929
and
1931
industrial
develop.
production,
prices,
employment,
purchasing
power
commodity
–
all
such
indices
Source B
of
Winston
Churchill
speaking
in
the
House
economic
17
February
is
I
must
very
word
for
of
her
something
sympathy
policy,
national
of
say
unfashionable.
but
for
for
difculties.
Nations
would
I
be
plummeted,
with
incomes
cut
to
nearly
one-half
in
1933.
the
Now
had
of
national
Commons,
health,
I
am
to
Japan,
her
do
you
going
not
which
to
The
a
and
think
well-advised
the
to
States,
situation
interactions,
necessarily
position
not
say
United
whole
…
her
words,
League
when
Germany,
severely
and
thus
affected
the
international
had
the
already
and
their
world
economic
economy
co-operation,
begun
Manchurian
elsewhere.
to
break
Incident
in
as
a
other
down
broke
out.
quarrel
First question, par t a – 3 marks
with
in
Japan.
Europe
Japan
Swiss
Sea
…
than
and
…
I
The
League
there
there
is
no
would
Czechoslovak
hope
we
in
has
great
more
be
in
use
to
shall
to
do
affronting
ordering
navies
England
work
the
try
the
Yellow
What,
why
according
Britain
against
to
failed
Source
to
take
A,
any
were
the
further
reasons
action
Japan?
to
Four th question – 9 marks
understand
a
little
the
position
of
Japan,
Using
an
ancient
State,
with
the
highest
sense
the
examine
national
honour
and
patriotism,
and
with
population
and
a
remarkable
why
the
and
your
League
own
of
knowledge,
Nations
did
not
take
a
stronger
teeming
sources
of
action
to
deal
with
the
Manchurian
crisis.
energy.
65
1
What was the impact of the League’s failure
to take action over Manchuria?
The
failure
that
Japan
of
the
was
contributed
to
League
able
to
to
respond
continue
Mussolini’s
to
with
decision
the
its
to
Manchurian
expansion;
invade
it
incident
may
Abyssinia
in
also
meant
have
1935.
Source skills
Source A
Extract
World
from
War
R.J.
Overy.
Origins
of
the
other
Second
of
(2008).
powers
inuence
Chinese
In
1933
Japan
left
the
League
and
the
Far
East
from
the
system
There
security.
In
1934,
in
violation
agreements
to
preserve
an
policy
in
China,
the
on
Japanese
the
Amau
Doctrine,
a
is
no
at
doubt
home
to
go
otherwise
Japan’s
with
of
technical
aid
that
Japanese
leaders,
by
the
further
military,
after
1932
cartoon
Standard,
by
19
David
Low,
January
“The
warning
have
done
because
than
of
from
the
major
Doormat”,
published
to
in
the
UK
powers.
newspaper
1933.
L TA
according
Source
A,
was
the
result
of
Communication skills
the
By examining the language he
Manchurian
crisis
for
Japan’s
future
actions
in
China?
uses, can you identify Overy’s
First question, par t b – 2 marks
opinion in Source A on the
results of this crisis?
What
66
is
the
message
of
Source
B?
they
the
to
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What,
to
were
Source B
A
sphere
the
government
response
announced
provision
as
trade
“open
might
door”
China
abandon
of
encouraged
international
the
to
of
spurred
collective
and
regard
effectively
them.
removed
to
and
the
Evening
weak
C H A P T E R
1 . 3 :
T H E
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
The response of the League and Europe
to events after 1932
China
again
Bridge
Japan
now
for
Britain
Britain
In
to
last
that
the
League
bombing
of
Nine-Power
could
France
repeatedly
no
to
the
the
and
and
of
Nations
Shanghai.
Treaty
of
after
The
1922
take
little
practical
were
now
preoccupied
asked
the
USA
for
joint
the
Marco
League
but
action
to
by
in
reality
help
events
diplomatic
Polo
condemned
it
was
China.
in
In
any
Europe.
pressure
on
Tokyo
avail.
November
the
and
breaking
impotent
case,
but
appealed
incident
time
1937,
in
hostilities
Japanese
the
Nine-Power
Brussels.
be
It
Treaty
condemned
suspended
but
it
Conference
the
actions
produced
no
of
convened
Japan
measures
and
to
for
urged
stop
aggression.
The response of China to events after 1932
The establishment of the Second United Front
Jiang’s
insistence
Japanese
he
had
lost
to
of
middle
of
troops
charge
a
acting
of
the
the
Enlai,
ew
Japanese.
his
Second
was
United
be
a
up
The
over
of
Front
was
Party;
“war
of
of
not
sign
CCP
a
a
civil
rst
between
war
was
involved
against
agreement,
and
in
and
the
Zhou
the
he
changed
Japanese.
Nationalist
suspended
placed
northern
Japanese
the
the
the
been
communist,
before
the
had
the
alliance
formal
in
kidnapped
other
became
joint
was
were
most
while
Xue-liang,
like
on
1933
were
the
1936,
prominent
Communists
national
policy,
In
who
There
Zhang
focusing
the
Fujian
Zhang
but,
the
party.
Jiang
Zuolin.
the
and
formed
the
Japanese
December
campaign
be
at
Japanese.
General
negotiate
did
the
in
of
should
to
his
than
own
troops
the
Zhang
leaders
Jiang
his
rather
his
Communists,
orders
release
(Sian)
to
Then,
the
son
Jiang
attacking
Communist
to
the
and
Jiang’s
Xi’an
of
against
that
Although
priority
the
felt
over
to
1935.
within
among
stand
Beijing
Communists
from
anti-communist
Communists.
negotiations
to
in
under
warlord
the
even
uprising
in
was
campaign
commanders,
not
an
failure
which
Manchurian
in
his
demonstrations
serious
by
at
ghting
support
suppress
protesting
also
on
him
Party
instead
A
and
there
resistance”.
China’s actions following the Marco Polo Bridge incident
Following
incident,
and
that
guilty
was
of
“If
we
unpardonable
held
to
to
By
of
“total
apparent
of
the
1938,
Japan
one
included
policy
Jiang’s
Chinese.
allow
which
a
establishment
fallen
full-scale
announced
an
declared
Despite
Japan’s
Jiang
inch
both
new
of
of
the
of
our
against
after
by
territory
our
the
approach
race.”
to
the
Marco
had
be
had
we
Bridge
reached”
shall
be
conference
Nationalists.
Japanese
the
lost,
national
the
Polo
been
Mao
nation”.
war
Ghangzhou
government
to
A
and
whole
Front,
Shanghai,
the
endurance
Communists
United
GMD
China
limits
more
resistance
Second
the
“the
crime
Beijing,
and
invasion
that
to
following
went
and
badly
Nanjing
withdraw
the
for
the
had
their
all
capital
Chongqing.
67
1
Republic
of
Nevertheless,
USSR
China
Japan
occupies
Manchukuo
in
Japanese
of
1931,
Empire
and
creating
Jehol
a
puppet
Province
in
state
of
the
war
United
the
Front
drew
India
Japanese
into
a
conict
Indo-China
PEOPLES’S
REPUBLIC
that
MANCHUKUO
British
by
1934.
the
French
escalation
caused
Manchuko,
Chinese
British
the
September
Irkutsk
OF
Colonies
Harbin
7
July
the
1937,
Marco
Japanese Troops
Polo
Bridge
and
for
did
which
not
they
want
did
and
not
have
cross
invade
the
China
they
MONGOLIA
resources.
By
1940,
Japan
proper.
Vladivostok
had
committed
over
750,000
Mukden
JEHOL
ground
troops
to
the
struggle.
Beijing
And
Port
CHINA
despite
the
lack
of
any
Seoul
Tokyo
Tianjin
Ningbo
international
Arthur
Japanese
Nanjing
Zhengzhou
19
win
falls
December
the
opposition,
could
war.
not
They
the
quickly
were
forced
1937.
Suzhou
to
try
to
consolidate
their
Nanjing
Brahmaputra
Shanghai
July
Chongqing
1937
Shanghai
Japan
but
lands
fails
to
Ningbo
up
until
late
position
by
adopting
of
off
a
policy
in
link
1938.
living
the
land
with
the
INDIA
help
Imphal
of
puppet
governments.
Wenzhou
Burma
Kunming
Okinawa
The
most
was
led
was
a
and
rival,
important
of
these
Fuzhou
Zhangzhou
road
BURMA
YUNNAN
by
Wang
Jingwei
who
Guangdong
PROVINCE
Manadalay
former
GMD
colleague,
Shantou
Nanning
Hanoi
October
Hong
1938,
Japan
seizes
Kong
Guangdong
Haiphong
Chinese
Hainan
and
Ports
in
to
to
Jiang.
Believing
stop
that
aid
of
major
order
Nationalist
China
could
never
win
forces.
Island
against
Rangoon
the
Japanese,
Wang
FRENCH
THAILAND
agreed
INDO-CHINA
in
1940
to
become
the
PHILIPPINE
Bangkok
Manila
head
ISLANDS
of
0
Miles
of
“the
China”.
New
This
Government
regime
was
600
recognized
by
Manchukuo
Saigon
and
▲
the
three
Axis
powers
but
Map showing Japan’s advance
not
by
any
of
the
Western
powers.
Thus,
by
1938,
China
was
divided
into
into China, 1931–1938
three
based
main
in
areas:
Shaanxi
Nationalist
and
China
based
Japanese-occupied
in
Chongqing,
China
in
the
Communist
east
and
China
north.
L TA
Thinking and social skills
nature that jeopardise the peace and welfare
The puppet government of Wang JingWei in
of their countries.
central and nor thern China signed a treaty
The
Governments
of
the
two
countries
with Japan on 30 November, 1940
shall,
in
order
to
accomplish
the
purpose
Identify the key terms of this treaty, and highlight
mentioned
in
the
preceding
paragraph,
which points would be par ticularly resented by Chinese
eliminate
communistic
elements
and
nationalists. In pairs or small groups compare and
organisations
in
their
respective
time
co-operate
territories,
contrast your responses. Oer feedback where your
and
at
the
same
closely
par tner or a member of your group has missed a point.
concerning
with
Basic Relations Treaty
information
reference
communistic
ARTICLE 2
to
the
and
propaganda
defence
activities
against
…
The Governments of the two countries shall
closely co-operate for cultural harmony,
creation and development.
ARTICLE 5
The Government of the Republic of
China shall recognise that Japan may, in
accordance with previous practises or in
ARTICLE 3
The Governments of the two countries
order to preser ve common interests of the
agree to engage in joint defence against
two countries, station for a required duration
all destructive operations of communistic
its naval units and vessels in specied areas
68
C H A P T E R
1 . 3 :
T H E
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
within the territory of the Republic of China,
the Yangzi River and the rationalisation of the
in accordance with the terms to be agreed
demand and supply of goods between Japan
upon separately between the two countries.
on the one hand and Nor th China and the
Mongolian Federation on the other.
ARTICLE 6
The Government of the two countries shall
eect close economic co-operation between
The Government of Japan shall, with respect
the two countries in conformance with the spirit
to the rehabilitation and development of
of complementing each other and ministering
industries, nance, transpor tation and
to each other ’s needs, as well as in accordance
communication in China, extend necessary
with the principles of equality and reciprocity.
assistance and co-operation to China through
consultation between the two countries.
With reference to special resources in North
China and Mongolian Federation, especially
ARTICLE 7
… the Government of China shall open
mineral resources required for national defence,
its territory for domicile and business of
the Government of the Republic of China shall
Japanese subjects.
under take that they shall be developed
The terms of the Treaty were added to in an Annexed
through close co-operation of the two
Protocol, 1940.
countries. With reference to the development
ARTICLE 3
When general peace is restored between the
of specic resources in other areas which are
two countries and the state of war ceases to
required for national defence, the Government
exist, the Japanese forces shall commence
of the Republic of China shall aord necessary
evacuation with the exception of those which
facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects.
are stationed in accordance with the Treaty
The Government of the two countries shall
Concerning Basic Relations between Japan
take all the necessary measures to promote
and China signed today and the existing
trade in general and to facilitate and rationalise
agreements between the two countries and
the demand and supply of goods between
shall complete it within two years with the
the two countries. The Governments of the
rm establishment of peace and order.
two countries shall extend specially close
Treaty concerning basic relations between Japan and
co-operation with respect to the promotion
China, 1940, in Lu, David J. 1997.
of trade and commerce in the lower basin of
Japan: A Documentary History, pages 420–22.
Despite
the
tensions
United
between
Front,
Source skills
the
Chinese
Nationalists
and
civilians
bombing
Communists
high
and
1941
near
shelter
Chongqing,
China,
in
a
cave
circa
during
a
was
of
when
First question,
a
relations
par t b – 2 marks
Jiang
What
attacked
the
on
Pearl
with
USA
that
ultimately
What
a
of
against
realized
the
Harbour
declaration
had
the
Japan
and
the
against
message
this
photograph?
the
the
Jiang
would
defeated.
been
Second
by
Japan,
be
became
the
attack
and
war
essentially
Sino-Japanese
now
is
Communists.
of
However,
Japanese
1939.
remained
there
deterioration
in
seeking
the
conict
part
of
World
global
War
struggle
aggression
and
totalitarianism.
69
1
The USA’s response to Japanese actions 1931–37
The
of
USA
’s
main
“isolationism”.
did
not
affect
crisis
own
want
them.
only
the
the
force
it
of
the
–
of
1930s
many
disputes
1929
United
in
and
to
we re
US A
w a nt
the
mean
the
State
kind
indecisive
to
response
as
of
the
had
othe r
tr a de
“ the
i n cr ea se d
of
the
the
in
an
be
a re a
Ma n c hu ri a ”
USA
did
out
words,
felt
not
that
they
directly
economic
of
not
the
on
its
Nel s on
a nd
o t he r
Chie f
K
ser ved
T
the
t he
(Boyle,
of
US A
area
Fa r
fa r
the
more
in
No
to
credible
back
up
naval
any
force
threats
US
Ja p a ne se
g o o ds
The reasons for the USA’s isolationism
non-
doctrine
t ha t
w i ll
D ivi si on
ke p t
ha d
i nv o l v e d
no
tr ul y
in
v it a l
17 9 ) .
issue
Secretary
a
of
non-recognition
State
Great
Henry
depression
need
and
Stimson
e n vo y
i nd ust r ia l
to
focus
issues
interests
security
not
affected
doctrine
Stimson)
–
on
isolationism
recognition
m ore
com m e n t e d
w e re
domestic
Japan
t a ke
J a pa n
C hi n es e
Eas t e rn
S ta te s
to
in
u nd er
fur t h e r
J a p a ne se
US A
had
was
naval
limits.
la rg e r
m a nuf a ctu re d
U n it ed
to
the
Am er ic an
t he
took
naval
i nt e r e st s
mu c h
this
fo r
of
1993:
was
bring
were
door”
threatened
credible
J o hn s on ,
Hor n be c k
if
whe re
after
the
the
Hoover
Treaty
for
in ve st m e nt
a
to
London
wit h
which
“open
administration
funds
i n de ed
the
directly
lacked
se l f- in t e r es t s
and
The
Doctrine
and
actions
of
President
USA
development
government
Stimson
also
were
refused
than
Sta nl ey
be s t
US,
focus
the
Japan’s
directly
70
stay
other
ensuing
US
▲
to
concentration
and
opp ort un it y
m a chi ne r y
17 9 ) .
the
Treaty
Ja pa n
tha t
an
US
the
case,
Amba s sa do r
might
the
by
security
je op ar di ze ;
w i th
1993:
strugg l e
such
called
ha d
Depar tme nt,
interests
and
any
Washington
ti e s
(Boyle,
In
and
Congress
commente d
of
–
as
addit i o n,
may
sell
“ US
incident
by
integrity
advocated
quarrels
with
in
which
States’
concerned
interests
the r e
not
was
territorial
crisis.
The
US
Trade
was
interests;
First
no
involvement
European
the
the
own
War,
into
Crash
in
its
World
again
Street
been
the
trade
In
needed ”
interests
Impact
to
did
be
(also
First
USA
US
Britain,
China,
plants
the
had
account.
enterprise
The
concern
pursue
reinforce
Chinese
Pacic
up
Republic.
World War
of
the
important
an
to
economic
with
that
the
to
dragged
Manchurian
in
which
to
policy
and
Wall
action.
strength
into
The
which
minimal
As
get
although
policy
on
After
to
served
violation
by
crises
issues.
Thus,
a
foreign
international
C H A P T E R
on
7
1 . 3 :
January,
T H E
1932
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
in
which
the
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
USA
Source skills
declared
any
that
that
policy
This
law
or
that
the
but
When
uphold
also
to
continued
outside
took
in
to
David
November
Low,
the
“Silence”,
Evening
published
Standard ,
in
London
on
1938.
allowed
committing
of
was
the
Japan.
to
“New
the
of
Meanwhile,
inaugurated
the
strategic
was
economic
Deal”
policies
Hitler’s
USA
’s
USA
he
limited
attention
the
USA,
the
1933,
same
His
solving
his
most
export
door
by
newspaper
Pact.
doctrine
March
with
on
through
11
UK
international
avoid
Roosevelt
focused
open
cartoon
the
sanctions.
president
response
A
China’s
integrity
Kellogg-Briand
non-recognition
economic
recognize
violated
against
the
to
not
administrative
went
or
Hoover
as
would
agreement
territorial
or
it
crisis
and,
policies
attention.
continued
materials
to
to
Japan
The tex t reads, “League of Nations; Foundation stone of a New Order, laid 1918;
▲
throughout
the
1930s.
The
British
Peace hath her sacrices”
ambassador
in
Washington
[Roosevelt’s]
nothing
[the]
the
to
be
question
avoid
is
done
Japanese
ultimate
to
view
that
at
reported:
there
present
government
can
only
inability
anything
of
be
that
to
and
solved
Japan
to
would
First question, par t b – 2 marks
is
stop
What
that
Doctrine?
by
is
the
message
of
the
cartoonist
regarding
the
Stimson
the
stand
tend
the
to
strain
relieve
any
that
longer.
His
policy
would
be
strain.
Source skills
Richard
West
in
But
Storry.
Asia
the
Japan
and
1894–1943
Hoover
the
Decline
of
the
the
(1979).
far
any
from
Administration
kind,
economic
contemplating
in
was
not
muscle
China,
and
to
use
Japan.
sanctions
by
the
America’s
Moral
the
only
“non-recognition”
weapon;
and
if
one
exacerbated
of
advanced
no
practical
America’s
nationalist
help
own
to
interests
can
no
way
at
all.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
force,
according
to
Storry,
was
the
impact
of
policy,
the
was
it
was
of
What,
exemplied
that
Japan,
Washington,
military
prepared
against
remains
in
in
so
fact
feeling
USA
’s
“moral
force”
response
to
Japanese
scarcely,
aggression?
in
fairness,
especially
blame
in
the
Stimson
year
of
for
making
presidential
use
of
it,
elections,
Class discussion
The USA’s response to events 1937–38
The
the
a
hesitant
fact
threat
that
to
launched
In
the
in
addition,
following
and
the
approach
Japan’s
USA.
1936,
the
their
whole
of
the
military
Japan’s
upset
the
economic
military
concept
Americans
and
ambitious
balance
of
of
penetration
invasion
the
continued
economic
naval
into
door”
after
were
building
power
in
north
threatened
“open
actions
US
the
and
now
despite
becoming
programme,
western
central
interests
policy.
1937
in
Pacic.
China,
those
regions
Review question
Refer back to Source A on page 65.
What are the similarities between
the motives for the USA’s lack
of action and the motives for
Britain’s lack of action over the
Manchurian incident?
71
1
Roosevelt
had
some
sympathy
with
China’s
position,
as
did
the
US
Neutrality Acts
media.
1935 – If there was a war then
the USA would not supply arms
to either side.
1936 – No loans could be
made to belligerents.
aid.
Roosevelt,
However,
between
for
none
and
participation
conict
in
July
any
the
and
case
USA
’s
along
to
of
with
this
other
translated
November
in
a
joint
make
limited
a
1937,
offer
show
by
isolationist
prominent
several
stance
of
of
into
the
laws
by
political
USA
in
strength.
called
the
US
ten
nancial
Indeed,
British
appeals
Sino-Japanese
Roosevelt’s
Neutrality
preventing
gave
intervention.
rejected
mediation
naval
Americans,
Acts
actions
which
involvement
in
were
enforced
conicts
1937 – Warring countries could
that
did
not
specically
involve
the
USA.
only purchase arms from the
USA if they were paid for and
A
taken away by the purchaser.
could
potential
gunboat,
the
L TA
Communication
skills
crisis
have
led
the
Yangtze
December
offered
had
which
to
Panay,
river,
1937.
was
actually
direct
which
US
was
bombed
However,
compensation,
been
did
more
escorting
and
when
many
involve
US
intervention
sunk
the
three
by
a
were
small
oil
Japanese
Japanese
Americans
interests
and
developed
quickly
relieved
so
when
a
tankers
aircraft
US
on
on
apologized
that
a
12
and
conict
avoided.
Watch the bombing of USS
Panay at:
Public
7
out
opinion
of
10
in
1937
Americans
was
in
overwhelmingly
favour
of
a
in
favour
withdrawal
of
of
US
isolation
citizens
with
from
http://www.criticalpast.com/
China
in
order
to
avoid
the
possibility
of
a
confrontation
with
Japan.
video/65675061828_USSThe
USA
sent
representatives
to
the
Brussels
conference
in
1937
(see
Panay_Japanese-dive-bombers_
page
67)
but
showed
itself
unwilling
to
go
beyond
verbal
condemnation
manning-machine-guns_motoragainst
Japan.
In
one
speech
in
1937,
Roosevelt
seemed
to
promise
sampan, or go to
more
than
this
when
he
called
for
a
“quarantine”
on
aggressors
to
put
www.criticalpast.com and
a
stop
to
the
“world
of
disorder”.
This
“quarantine
speech”,
seemed
to
search “Japanese bombers
indicate
a
willingness
to
impose
sanctions
against
Japan.
However,
if
attack
this
was
his
intention,
Roosevelt
had
to
quickly
back
down
in
the
face
USS Panay”.
of
public
In
fact,
with
not
only
Japan
against
a
outcry
40%
of
did
until
China.
major
from
the
1939
The
supplier
Japan’s
isolationists.
USA
of
oil,
total
USA
not
played
a
bought
scrap
needs
impose
key
large
iron
for
economic
role
in
quantities
and
metals,
sanctions,
supporting
of
automobile
cotton
and
its
Japan’s
Japanese
silk
parts.
It
wood
pulp.
trade
war
also
effort
and
met
was
nearly
Why did the USA change its policy towards Japan
after 1938?
During
1938,
towards
isolationists
and
victim
chose
not
active
change
The
of
to
the
the
did
in
to
carry
not
Neutrality
1938,
using
Neutrality
Minister
a
the
Acts
to
aggressive
sentiments
which
China
starting
HH
more
with
Kung
of
treated
presidential
Acts
nationalists,
Finance
out
share
an
aggressor
powers,
and
to
oil
correctly
policy
the
Roosevelt
give
loan
saw
more
of
$25
this
as
can
be
a
policy:
$25
lot
began
the
Thus
apply
C h i n a ’s
expected
72
alike.
to
USA
Roosevelt
regarding
support
million.
her
the
Japan.
million
…
and
this
was
is
cannot
a
only
the
political
beginning,
loan
w i t h d r a w.
…
further
America
large
has
sums
definitely
thrown
in
C H A P T E R
Why
did
1 . 3 :
T H E
America
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
now
start
to
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
resist
Source skills
Japanese
Japan
in
that
East
page
expansion?
it
wished
Asia”
45).
concern
In
in
was
US
overtures
from
in
this
order”.
invincible
factor
the
USA
did
the
Soviets
the
their
also
The
not
to
in
victories
US
in
end
join
An
order
American
policy
(see
the
thus
China.
in
the
put
US
entered
European
Italy.
This
power
favour
was
The
and
for
to
of
if
Jiang,
support
increasing
opinion
Roosevelt’s
laws.
key
for
German
summer
Japanese
1959).
two
Axis
into
then
fear
In
in
of
of
1940
their
First question, par t b – 2 marks
“missing
September
that
that
the
if
the
is
the
war
in
aid
in
Pact
the
Europe
and
impose
of
this
source
sanctions
on
concerning
any
Japan?
with
or
European
victim
to
and
Germany
the
message
1940,
Germany
Japan,
would
the
Tripartite
powers
engaged
powers
Americans
a
fascist
stated
not
no-sanctions
in
attempt
the
a
them
Japan
that
public
neutrality
spring
the
aid
their
further
context
policies
(Hayashi,
Japan
supporting
Japan.
respond
with
What
bus”
poster
against
growing
possibility
enough
attitudes.
encouraged
expansionist
new
might
would
increase
swing
international
changing
had
the
give
might
to
to
“a
point
was
Jiang
This
Nationalists,
campaign
there
Japan
was
inuence
began
create
by
position.
Another
for
announcement
turning
that
to
an
to
the
addition,
the
“new
The
of
Italy
War
the
the
was
or
attack.
war
attacked
the
in
China
This
Asia
by
any
War,
the
convinced
were
the
third
other
many
same
war.
L TA
Communication and thinking skills
If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the
“Fireside chat”; a radio broadcast to the
continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the high
people of the US A by Franklin D Roosevelt on
seas – and they will be in a position to bring enormous
29 December 1940
military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It
… Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock
is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas,
has our American civilisation been in such danger as now.
would be living at the point of a gun – a gun loaded with
explosive bullets, economic as well as military.
For, on September 27, 1940, by an agreement signed in
Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in
… We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For
Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the
this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must
United States of America interfered with or blocked the
apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution,
expansion program of these three nations – a program
the same urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and
aimed at world control – they would unite in ultimate
sacrice as we would show were we at war …
actions against the United States.
1
… Does anyone seriously believe that we need to
What message is Roosevelt attempting to convey to
the American people in this radio broadcast?
fear attack anywhere in the Americas while a free
2
With reference to the origin, purpose and content of
Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbour in
Roosevelt’s “reside chat”, assess the values and
the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the
limitations of this source for examining American
other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers
attitudes towards the international situation.
were our neighbours there?
73
1
Sea
of
Japanese
SOVIET
Empire
in
1870
Okhotsk
UNION
Kuril
Is.
Acquisitions
until
1932
(1875)
Additional
occupation
by
1937
Additional
occupation
by
1938
Additional
occupation
by
1939
Additional
occupation
by
1940
Additional
occupation
by
1942
Southern
Sakhalin
(1905)
MANCHURIA
(1905,
1932
puppet
state)
Harbin
MONGOLIA
Vladivostok
JEHOL
Sea
of
JAPAN
Japan
INNER
1933
KOREA
MONGOLIA
(1905
Beijing
protectorate,
1910
Shandong
SHANXI
Pen.
(1915–1917)
Yellow
annexed)
Seoul
Tsushima
Sea
Stark
Shikoku
KIANGSU
CHINA
Hankary
Ningbo
(1937)
INDIA
RYUKYU
Is.
BURMA
Nanchang
(1872–1879)
Daito
Road
East
China
Is.
Sea
(1876)
Taiwan
TONGKING
BURMA
Macao
Hong
Kong
(1895)
Hanoi
Guangdong
PACIFIC
(1937)
OCEAN
Rangoon
THAILAND
Hainan
(1942)
(allied
(1939)
1941)
Philippine
Sea
FRENCH
Andaman
Manila
INDOSea
South
China
(1942)
Sea
PHILIPPINES
CHINA
Phnom
Gulf
Penh
of
Saigon
Thailand
The advance to war: US pressure on Japan
American
reaction
to
the
Tripartite
Pact
was
…
unexpectedly
–
In
January
parts
of
1939
sales,
the
and
same
suspended.
fuel
and
year
A
“a
in
moral
embargo”
February
a
year
1939
long-standing
later
high-grade
a
partial
melting
was
credit
trade
trade
scrap
placed
to
on
Japan
embargo
was
put
in
planes
was
agreement
strong
Pyle,
with
on
and
stopped.
Japan
aviation
1996:
201
aviation
In
July
was
and
motor
place.
The Burma Road
Throughout
The Burma Road is a road
of
linking Burma with the
Road
southwest of China. The road is
to
717 miles (1,154 kilometres)
were
long and runs through
the
dollars
of
1940
aid
supply
China
route
and,
sent
USA
to
and
to
by
1941,
China.
to
the
China
put
in
summer
replenish
also
as
Japan
Following
the
October
of
1941,
depleted
economic
advanced,
the
1941,
a
on
the
air
USA
gave
closure
USA
hundred
Chinese
pressure
the
temporary
P-40
force.
of
agreed
US
millions
the
Burma
more
ghter
loans
planes
Simultaneously,
Japan.
mountainous country. Par ts of
In
July
1941,
when
Japan
moved
south
rather
than
moving
north
to
attack
it were built by approximately
the
Soviets,
the
USA
responded
by
freezing
all
Japanese
assets.
It
then
200,000 Burmese and Chinese
imposed
a
trade
embargo
in
November
which
included
oil.
Britain
and
labourers between 1937
the
Netherlands
also
imposed
a
total
trade
embargo.
As
Japan
was
totally
and 1938. The British used
dependent
on
imported
oil
from
the
USA,
this
created
a
crisis
for
the
the Burma Road to transpor t
Japanese
government
who
now
believed
that
the
Western
powers
were
materials to China before 1941.
attempting
74
to
encircle
Japan
and
destroy
its
“rightful
place”
in
the
world.
C H A P T E R
If
its
oil
1 . 3 :
reserves
T H E
ran
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
out,
Japan
R E S P O N S E
would
be
TO
unable
J A PA N E S E
to
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
continue
TOK
the
war
There
USA.
in
followed
agreed
be
that
to
a
agree
Japan
removing
that
a
to
get
war
the
of
to
and
forces
conquest
they
was
this
happening.
diplomatic
over
the
China.
southern
military
resources
a
risk
from
from
its
the
not
stalled
withdraw
withdrawal
to
could
agreement
unacceptable
order
Japan
negotiations
However,
insisted
not
China.
from
and
that
Japan
China
needed
as
this
Japanese
the
(see
In small groups investigate current inter-state
the
tensions. How has the global community
USA
responded? Which nation seems to be the
have
but
aggressor? Explore if the UN has responded,
could
has there been a crisis or issue referred to at the
would
people.
Japanese
page
to
the
may
Indo-China,
the
necessary
mission
fact
Security Council and was there a UN resolution?
In
Feedback your ndings to the class. Consider
decided
the international response to Japan’s action up
49).
to 1941. As a class, debate the extent to which
we learn from history.
Source skills
Source A
The
in
US
Source B
Ambassador
1939,
offering
reaction
to
his
to
Japan,
Joseph
assessment
of
Grew,
Max
Japan’s
for
Hastings.
Japan
treatyless
exasperate
anything
which
war.
far
in
plus
Japanese
could
Japanese
a
are
mood
retaliation,
which
counter-retaliation.
to
weigh
that
our
counsel
every
the
ultimate
dignity
particularly
interests,
from
and
reasonable
a
of
we
in
our
turn
power
of
…
In
I
and
approach
the
ght
battle
use
point,
of
however,
sentiment
without
to
interests,
declare
assault
cultural
war
on
problem
United
in
have
the
German
with
into
It
1941;
occupying
the
and
by
absence
the
U.S.
Indochina
Tokyo
Congress
national
East
wished
enter
the
remains
allowed
British
Dutch
have
deciding
powers.
American
subsequent
in
its
excluded
December
imposed
whether
would
been
certainly
advance
factor
western
to
events
and
aggression
embargo
Japan’s
in
along
would
how
U.S.
had
itself
Japanese
oil
tipping
the
the
plans
Burma,
Roosevelt
following
was
war
conned
and
the
if
dependency
confront
–
speculation,
evolved
Japanese
Tokyo
war
themselves
own
this
constructive
to
stop
the
have
Indies.
think
and
our
are
lead
not
fascinating
Malaya
sanctions,
conciliation
commercial
and
in
had
certainly
would
would
…
from
for
and
that
almost
forbearance
means
should
realistic
temper
Japan
principle
our
constituted
a
Philippines
incidents
call
is
might
people
might
consequences
moderation,
sacrice
so
would
where
serious
which
would
to
point
American
and
intimidating,
a
embargo
even
the
and
an
to
happen,
iname
such
from
bring
the
endurance
The
now
situation
could
beyond
The
(2007).
sanctions.
It
A
Retribution:
1944–45
the
of
a
a
and
public
president
direct
interests
declaration
to
moot
of
or
war
the
on
the
States.
standpoint.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What,
why
according
sanctions
to
Source
against
A,
Japan
were
were
What
the
a
reasons
bad
US
key
policy
points
are
towards
Japan.
8
on
Pearl
Congress
December
Churchill
with
who
only
B
regarding
December
1941?
Some historians have suggested that
Harbor
agreed
Source
to
Class discussion
on Pearl Harbor?
attack
in
up
idea?
What was the reaction of the USA to the attack
The
made
Japan
to
the
Roosevelt’s
one
condently
united
dissenting
American
request
vote.
people
for
This
a
for
a
war
Declaration
was
wonderful
of
against
War
news
on
for
Churchill and Jiang had both gambled
on the USA entering the war in
Europe and the Pacic. Both leaders
aimed to hold out until US military
remarked:
and economic force would win the
Hitler’s
fate
was
sealed.
Mussolini’s
fate
was
sealed.
As
for
the
Japanese,
global war. From the evidence in this
they
would
be
ground
to
powder.
All
the
rest
was
merely
the
application
of
Chapter, how far do you agree that
overwhelming
force.
this was Jiang’s position?
75
1
L TA
Thinking and social skills
President Roosevelt’s speech to the United
yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the
United States have already formed their opinions and
States Congress on 8 December, 1941
well understand the implications to the very life and
Yesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will
safety of our nation.
live in infamy – the United States of America was
As commander in chief of the Army and Navy, I have
suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air
directed that all measures be taken for our defense.
forces of the Empire of Japan.
Always will we remember the character of the
The United States was at peace with that nation and,
onslaught against us.
at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation
with the government and its emperor looking toward
No matter how long it may take us to overcome this
the maintenance of peace in the Pacic.
premeditated invasion, the American people in their
righteous might will win through to absolute victory.
Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons
had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese
I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of
ambassador to the United States and his colleagues
the people when I asser t that we will not only defend
delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a
ourselves to the uttermost, but will make very cer tain
recent American message. While this reply stated that
that this form of treachery shall never endanger us
it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic
again.
negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or
Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that
armed attack .
our people, our territory and our interests are in grave
It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan
danger.
makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned
With condence in our armed forces – with the
many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening
unbounding determination of our people – we will
time, the Japanese government has deliberately sought
gain the inevitable triumph – so help us God.
to deceive the United States by false statements and
I ask that the Congress declare that since the
expressions of hope for continued peace.
unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on
The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian islands has
Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed
caused severe damage to American naval and military
between the United States and the Japanese Empire.
forces. Very many American lives have been lost.
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/franklin-delanoIn addition, American ships have been repor ted
roosevelt/pearl-harbor-speech-december-8-1941.php
torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco
and Honolulu.
Question
Yesterday, the Japanese government also launched
an attack against Malaya.
Last night, Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.
Last night, Japanese forces attacked Guam.
Last night, Japanese forces attacked the Philippine
Islands.
In pairs examine the key points made by President
Roosevelt in his response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
You can also watch Roosevelt’s speech here: http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=lK8gYGg0dkE
See an annotated draft of par t of the speech at http://www.
archives.gov/education/lessons/day-of-infamy/images/
infamy-address-1.gif
Last night, the Japanese attacked Wake Island.
Listen to the radio address here: http://www.archives.gov/
This morning, the Japanese attacked Midway Island.
education/lessons/day-of-infamy/images/infamy-radio-
Japan has, therefore, under taken a surprise oensive
extending throughout the Pacic area. The facts of
76
address.wav
C H A P T E R
1 . 3 :
T H E
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
Full document question: USA’s actions with regard to Japan, 1930–41
Source A
Source C
Memorandum
Henry
in
handed
Stimson
Washington
to
the
on
22
by
Secretary
Japanese
of
State
Stimson
ambassador
September
response
situation
morally,
number
matter
into
legally
of
of
Manchuria]
and
nations.
concern
question
provisions
Power
[in
at
of
politically
It
to
is
not
Japan
once
the
Treaty
of
of
to
a
such
February
6,
Japan’s
that
considerable
authoritative
China.
as
of
a
It
pact
lacked
We
that
might
the
only.
Pact.
of
use
We
the
American
Government
is
condent
has
not
been
the
intention
of
the
to
create
or
to
be
a
creation
the
applicability
of
a
situation
party
treaty
which
not
or
wish
in
to
taking
The
be
a
American
hasty
in
position.
feels
that
Government
formulating
However,
a
very
exists,
which
no
its
the
thus
Japanese
responsibility
with
regard
largely
for
to
upon
It
is
conclusions
embarrassing
would
determining
the
ending
Japan
of
the
Berryman
Roman
from
the
this
seem
course
that
(Laocoon
statue
on
refers
which
a
moral
reach
what
will
catch
should
but
duty
to
meant
those
who
condemnation
the
second
you
do
him?
If
half
with
we
an
had
easily
that
have
answer
found
escaped
the
us
catch
the
criminal
and
for
it
such
war.
Our
offence
was
thus
that
who
passed
by
on
the
other
side.
Source D
of
situation
an
P
.
Bix,
an
academic
Modern
American
Clifford
to
this
a
is
book
Japan
events
rests
The
of
historian
Hirohito
and
the
writing
Making
(2000).
massacres
the
USS
forgotten,
by
not
a
We
the
…
1938
we
man
Kennedy
and
nor
Nanjing]
were
…
press
sinking
front-page
of
classical
rare
momentarily
raised
stimulating
wave
Chinese
Since
had
late
tended
eld
to
for
the
President
projection
goodness
sanctions
against
economy
came
movement
Japanese
to
never
the
the
of
in
Asian
their
as
to
sale
abated.
as
a
a
proper
idealism
foreign
criticism
the
pro-
Americans
only
also
relations.
impose
vulnerable
boycott
news
tensions,
entirely
not
refusal
under
in
massacres
century,
but
or
received
The
China
Roosevelt’s
China
anti-Japanese,
exploited
essential
of
Panay
that
view
in
international
of
sinking
depression-racked
reports
nineteenth
to
be
the
quickly
either
the
attention.
sentiment
the
market
and
a
–
In
the
based).
and
neither
forgiven
States
States,
the
[of
Panay
United
United
cartoon
condemned
was
you
end.
to
Source B
US
–
when
it,
choice
the
A
did
Kellogg-Briand
must
unfortunate
doubt
Government.
we
it
the
international
American
of
the
and
But
the
war
was
does
in
situation
with
the
One
enforce
into
Herbert
Government
it
of
War
to
brings
provisions
of
consideration.
agreed
it.
World
courage
to
a
of
after
decision
answer,
implied
the
Manchuria.
Japanese
right
Government
in
America’s
that
reached
it
about
action
the
question
aggressor
The
1947
aggressive
renounced
Nine-
and
we
world.
brings
certain
the
1922,
happened
concern,
exclusively
and
meaning
agreements,
Kellogg-Briand
is
to
in
1931:
What
This
speaking
Japanese
from
of
a
new
imported
goods.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
should
the
to
Stimson
USA
Manchurian
not
in
Source
directly
A,
why
intervene
in
the
crisis?
77
1
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
the
is
the
USA
’s
message
of
isolationist
Source
B
Third question – 6 marks
with
regard
to
position?
Compare
and
contrast
Source
and
Source
A
response
to
the
the
C
view
expressed
regarding
Manchurian
the
in
USA
’s
crisis?
Second question – 4 marks
With
reference
assess
the
to
values
historians
origin,
and
studying
isolationist
position
purpose
limitations
the
in
reasons
the
and
of
for
Four th question – 9 marks
content
Source
the
C
for
USA
’s
Using
the
examine
1930s.
attitude
sources
the
and
reasons
towards
your
for
Japan
own
the
knowledge
USA
’s
between
change
1931
and
of
1941.
L TA
Thinking skills
Here
are
wider
question
sources
in
in
questions
the
this
source
that
paper.
chapter,
you
could
Using
discuss
the
each
get
for
a
four th
information
question
with
2
and
determining Japan’s actions between 1931 and 1941.
a
3
par tner,
set ting
out
your
arguments
for
and
against .
you
use
to
Examine the impor tance of the actions of the West in
To what extent did events in China contribute to
Japan’s expansionist policy between 1931 and 1941?
What
sources
in
this
chapter
could
help
you
4
answer
each
Discuss the reasons for the changes in US policy
question?
towards Japan between 1931 and 1941.
1
“The League of Nation’s failure to take stronger action
over the Manchurian crisis encouraged the Japanese
to go fur ther in its expansionist policy.” To what extent
do you agree with this statement?
Source help and hints
A
a
cartoon
US
published
Magazine,
in
in
Outlook,
First question, par t b – 2 marks
(See
page
61.)
1931.
What
is
Japan’s
the
message
actions
Examiner’s
used
in
the
hint:
cartoon
–
Manchuria
into
China,
the
you
it
“open
Kellogg-Briand
B
concerning
symbolism
use
interpret
is
also
not
your
a
only
suggests
door”
pact.
the
always
to
violating
Source
Note
gateway
to
help
of
Manchuria?
knowledge
going
78
in
being
contextual
source.
Here
showing
that
principle
as
Japan
well
the
Japan
is
as
the
C H A P T E R
1 . 3 :
T H E
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
Second question – 4 marks
Limitations
(See
●
page
64.)
This
is
only
the
government
With
reference
to
origin,
purpose
and
the
value
historians
and
studying
limitations
the
of
this
Manchurian
source
of
to
consider
include
the
of
not
what
view
the
from
military
,
the
so
was
going
on
at
it
is
only
the
one
time.
for
●
incident.
The
date
of
1931
investigation
Points
point
and
content,
perspective
assess
19 31 – 19 4 1
is
before
could
have
a
thorough
been
carried
out.
following.
●
As
this
is
a
speech
given
to
the
League
of
Values
Nations,
●
It
is
an
value
ofcial
for
position
government
showing
at
the
the
time
statement,
Japanese
of
the
so
it
has
government’s
incident
It
was
presented
international
Japanese
think
at
the
forum,
so
government
was
League
this
of
Nations,
shows
wanted
the
of
the
to
evidence
innocence
what
Linked
an
the
world
to
damning
the
to
happening.
of
out
Four th question – 9 marks
…
and
the
the
sources
League
to
and
your
own
knowledge,
deal
of
Nations
with
Examiner’s
did
not
take
the
for
a
hint:
Manchurian
Structure
standard
introduction
question.
the
essay.
and
Your
question
is
addition,
your
This
clear
opening
and
make
Integrate
evidence
the
answer
means
as
parts
you
writing
of
paragraphs
linked
of
for
essay
question
sentences
should
to
is
the
the
the
it
clear
sources
the
so
purpose
that
they
the
points
structure
shown
of
that
you
are
that
you
League
the
Japan
could
use
to
with
quote
your
from
own
Source
A
knowledge
in
it
Commission
of
Nations
ndings,
in
give
not
strength).
A
and
Source
B
of
US
Source
isolationism
A
B
and
quote
…
(explain
the
relevant
…)
2
and
were
more
France,
members
on
as
of
self-interested
two
the
Japan.
China.
had
As
growing
its
a
spread
of
of
the
League,
France,
much
Source
concerns
greater
As
the
League
up
the
and
try
to
reasons
most
not
as
to
the
put
too
colonial
to
C
gain
from
highlights,
a
about
the
there
Soviets
threat
part
of
several
reasons
result
(here
Source
you
was
could
seen
to
and
quote
be
the
C).
of
3
the
the
economic
crisis
facing
Europe
demanded
withdraw
Japan
why
…
which
ndings
a
territory
force
communism
that
its
to
the
it
did
Wall
Street
Crash
meant
that
the
it
powers
were
more
focused
on
their
forces.
do
internal
concerns,
rather
than
dealing
with
this
international
are
Source
Vietnam,
also
relevant
reported
on
incident.
Manchuria
did
military
answer
own
not
problems.
(Develop
with
your
own
take
knowledge
stronger
the
making.
European
taken
there
Chinese
below.
Mukden
should
of
pressure
following
and
of
Therefore
the
of
Lytton
Commission’s
However,
tracks”.
for
“atmosphere
provide
Finally,
had
it
issue
there
Britain
Paragraph
regarding
that
detachment
the
quite
make
link
Introduction
back
unavoidable,
incidents”,
is
to
a
the
1932,
seem
language
intends
to
were
In
“a
the
clearly
relevant
of
Source
weakened
this
refer
objective.
a
both
relevance
power
kind
not
crisis.
much
The
and
not
lack
important
paragraph.
extra
may
stronger
for
to
it
world
aggression.
point,
and
actions
develop
Secondly,
the
above
destroyed
Paragraph
brief
so
the
assess
the
would
convince
Japan,
Japanese
China
(include
then
highlight
action
to
65.)
In
why
of
is
“unpleasant
anxiety”
regarding
Using
the
Japanese
content
page
of
of
example
troops
(See
purpose
(1931).
●
●
its
and
Source
D.)
action.
Conclusion
Paragraph
1
In
Firstly,
Europe
did
not
have
the
means
to
conclusion
question
Japan
into
withdrawing.
As
Source
A
…
(make
sure
you
answer
the
force
clearly).
points
79
1
●
First question, par t a – 3 marks
demonstrated
would
(See
page
the
according
USA
’s
to
“moral
Storry,
force”
was
the
response
impact
USA
’s
to
“moral
force”
●
increased
●
did
response:
●
failed
not
to
73.)
The
president’s
opinion
reference
Roosevelt’s
US
to
the
origin,
“reside
limitations
of
government’s
this
purpose
chat”,
assess
source
attitude
in
and
the
indicating
towards
●
events
the
in
The
of
date
The
remarks
President
and
come
directly
therefore
actions
from
American
the
origin
the
Chief
has
value
are
from
Executive
policy
broadcast
Europe
had
and
position
at
the
at
Roosevelt
in
December
been
taken
therefore
the
the
USA;
is
talking
the
he
1940
over
gives
the
examples
the
the
when
by
the
insight
the
means
that
it
lacks
of
the
“chat”
is
to
of
the
position
get
Axis
and
Americans
powers
Roosevelt
is
to
will
see
that
affect
trying
to
the
lead
so
could
be
making
the
US
situation
to
than
“shock”
he
thinks
the
it
actually
American
is
–
he
is
people.
This
last
point
is
backed
up
by
the
style
of
the
most
Roosevelt
is
trying
to
make
clear
the
Axis
into
the
of
to
in
the
the
that
the
world
faces,
using
rhetorical
US
the
aggression
in
of
shows
shape
the
public
the
to
on
public
the
setting
focus
on
be
and
powers
is
he
no
out
what
intervention
thinks
example
living
at
appealing
and
opinion.
Axis
that
for
Europe
how
speech
of
people
public
events
support
source
used
American
getting
impact
attempts
emphasize
to
of
needs
therefore
President
80
reect
government.
could
happen
if
time.
purpose
understand
The
not
region.
time.
there
●
origin
neutral
and
questions,
and
the
worse
dangers
powers
the
may
the
the
of
“chat”;
with
in
in
as
●
●
comments
Therefore
trying
of
interests
the
seem
comments
was
of
their
opinion
It
US
everyone
purpose
shift
USA.
●
Japan
in
Values
the
in
1940.
the
These
feeling
hindsight.
to
●
USA
resist
content
values
●
Europe
the
to
China
support
●
page
nationalist
help
Limitations
and
that
sanctions
Japanese
(See
of
Japanese
actions
Second question – 4 marks
With
the
economic
of
aggression?
The
to
use
71.)
their
What,
not
a
to
the
“all
US
of
point
us
of
public
in
a
the
gun
Americans’
sacrice”.
and
using
will
metaphors
understand,
Americas
…”.
“spirit
He
of
is
would
also
patriotism
C H A P T E R
1 . 3 :
T H E
I N T E R N AT I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
TO
J A PA N E S E
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 31 – 19 4 1
References
Boyle,
JH.
1993.
Jovanovich.
Cameron,
R.
Kilmarnock,
Farmer,
A.
Hastings,
Knopf.
Iriye,
Lu,
M.
A.
Storry,
The
American
Nexus .
Harcourt
Brace
Appeasement
and
the
Road
to
War .
Pulse
Publications.
Britain
2007.
York,
Foreign
Retribution:
Affairs.
The
Hodder.
Battle
for
London,
Japan
UK
1944–45 .
Alfred
A
USA
The
Origins
of
the
Second
World
War
in
Asia .
Longman.
UK
David
J.
1997.
NY
,
R.
Harlow,
Japan:
USA
UK
1987.
Armonk,
Overy,
York,
1991.
2006.
New
London,
Modern
New
Japan:
A
Documentary
History,
pages
424–25.
M.E.
Sharpe
USA
2008.
Origins
of
the
Second
World
War.
2nd
edn.
Pearson
Education.
UK
R.
1979.
Macmillan.
Japan
London,
and
the
Decline
of
the
West
in
Asia,
1894 –1943.
UK
81
2
G E R M A N
A N D
I TA L I A N
E X PA N S I O N
2.1
The impact of fascism on Italian foreign
policy: the origins, 1870–1933
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Causation
➔
Signicance
Key questions
➔
Examine the reasons for the growth of suppor t for Fascism and Mussolini in
Italy after the First World War
➔
▲
To what extent did Fascism inuence Italian foreign policy in the 1920s?
Benito Mussolini
Mussolini once said of Fascism:
“action and mood, not doctrine”.
Giovanni Giolitti is prime minister
1903–14
1910
Red week . There is widespread unrest
Mussolini joins the Socialist Par ty
1914
The First World War begins
Mussolini is expelled from the Socialist
1914 August
Italy remains neutral
Par ty for his stance on the war
Mussolini sets up the newspaper Il Popolo
d’Italia
82
November
CHAPTER
2 .1 :
THE
IM PA C T
OF
FA S C I S M
ON
I TA LI A N
FOREIGN
P O L I C Y:
THE
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
Italy is promised major gains by the
1915 April
Entente. Treaty of London
Italy enters the war against Germany and
May
Austria-Hungary
1917 October
Italy is defeated in the Battle of Caporetto
Italy wins the Battle of Vittorio Veneto
1918 October
1919 March
Mussolini founds a Fascist par ty
The Versailles Settlement does not give
June
Italy major gains
The Italian nationalist d’Annunzio seizes
September
the por t of Fiume
Italian elections are held and the Socialist
Par ty and Catholic Par ty gain the majority
November
of votes but fail to form a government
1919–20
There is widespread socialist unrest
There is widespread Fascist violence
1920–22
against opposition groups
The Fascist Par ty is established under the
November
control of Mussolini
The king appoints Mussolini prime minister
1922 October
1923 August
Italy gains the Fiume
1924 January
1925 October
Albania becomes an Italian protectorate
Italy bombards Corfu
Italy signs the Locarno Treaties
1926
Mussolini encourages Croatian separatists
1927
who want to break away from the newly
created state of Yugoslavia
Mussolini encourages Arab nationalists who
1928
challenge the British and French Empires
Mussolini encourages Macedonian
1929
separatists in Yugoslavia
83
2
Italy
Italy
in
had
only
become
a
unied
state
in
1861.
1815
Before
this
it
had
consisted
of
a
number
SWITZ.
of
independent
combined
Milan
of
the
states.
diplomatic
prime
It
was
and
minister
of
through
military
the
actions
Piedmont
Sardinia,
VENEZIA
LOMBARDY
Turin
Trieste
Cavour,
and
Italian
patriot
Giuseppe
Fiume
Venice
PIEDMONT
FRANCE
Garibaldi,
PARMA
that
Italy
could
be
unied
in
M
O
D
E
N
A
Genoa
1861,
San
with
Rome
and
the
Papal
States
nally
Marino
joining
the
new
Italian
Kingdom
in
1870.
P
A
P
Florence
unication,
Italian
society
after
L
A
Despite
1870
remained
divided
across
geographical,
Sea
religious
and
weakened
social
Italian
lines.
These
governments
divisions
and,
along
Rome
with
the
discontent
and
unrest
caused
by
Bari
Italy’s
KINGDOM
OF
SARDINIA
involvement
in
the
First
World
War,
THE
helped
Naples
facilitate
the
rise
to
power
of
Mussolini
TWO
and
SICILIES
his
Once
Fascist
in
foreign
Party
power,
policy
number
of
in
1922.
Mussolini
that
factors.
was
pursued
inuenced
These
an
by
Italian
a
included:
Palmero
●
Italy’s
geographical
economic
AFRICA
200
▲
position
and
●
the
●
nationalist
Versailles
Settlement
views
on
the
destiny
L TA
●
earlier
●
the
●
Fascist
foreign
policy
humiliations
changing
international
context
As you read through the next
ideology.
section consider how each of the
(Fascist
ideology
will
be
explored
in
detail
later
–
see
page
89.)
a role in helping to formulate
Mussolini’s foreign policy. Add
evidence to a copy of the spider
diagram below.
Fascist
ideology
resources
Nationalist
Factors
views
inuencing
Mussolini’s
foreign
policy
Versailles
settlement
Earlier
International
84
of
Italy
to
become a great power and to have an empire
Thinking skills
Economic
limited
miles
Map showing Italy before it was unied
factors identied here played
its
resources
situation
humiliations
CHAPTER
2 .1 :
THE
IM PA C T
OF
FA S C I S M
ON
I TA LI A N
FOREIGN
P O L I C Y:
THE
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
Mussolini’s rise to power
What were the long-term weaknesses of Liberal Italy?
The
the
period
between
inherent
1870
weaknesses
and
that
1923
is
an
era
undermined
known
Italy
as
during
Liberal
this
Italy
period
and
would
Liberal democracy
ultimately
facilitate
the
development
of
a
Fascist
dictatorship.
Nevertheless,
it
This describes a government
was
not
inevitable
that
the
style
of
government
to
replace
liberal
democracy
which is based on both the ideas
would
be
Fascist
rather
than
socialist
or
an
authoritarian
monarchy.
of democracy and of liberalism.
Lack of national identity
Thus, people of the country
can choose the government in
Despite
the
recent
unication
of
the
Italian
state,
Italy
lacked
a
coherent
open and free elections, and the
sense
of
an
Italian
identity.
Piedmont
had
been
the
dominant
state,
and
its
individual rights of the people
laws
and
political
systems
were
imposed
on
the
other
states.
Regionalism
are protected by law.
remained
towns
and
limited
strong
cities,
support
divisions
the
a
force,
particularly
in
this
between
south
living
with
the
in
area.
in
the
There
north
abject
many
and
Italians
south.
were
the
poverty
feeling
The
whilst
with
the
to
their
capital
in
Rome
new
economic
south,
loyalty
as
well
the
as
had
political
majority
industrialized
home
of
peasants
north
in
prospered.
The Catholic Church
The
breakdown
begun
was
during
in
exacerbated
Indeed,
up
relations
unication
by
until
the
1914,
between
also
anti-clerical
the
Church
continued
Vatican
to
policies
had
and
State
divide
of
urged
which
Italy.
the
This
liberal
Catholics
had
division
governments.
not
to
vote.
Working-class protest
The
middle
franchise
all
men
and
(the
over
existed
growing
strike
19th
in
1914.
and
One
prime
by
work
also
in
the
was
the
idea
of
largest
Italiano
or
time
down
to
gain
in
and
and
upper
in
win
to
Italian
and
and
support
socialists
to
classes
rapprochement
to
in
in
of
offer
Party
only.
in
the
parties
pre-war
electoral
with
the
the
late
unrest
as
period,
with
the
as
Giovanni
and
and
to
general
founded.
such
was
masses
a
from
was
that
and
led
into
growing
1911–14,
the
when
This
Italy
(PSI)
the
the
corruption
fermented
banning
politics
as
1930,
governments
for
grown
respond
1906–09
the
had
system,
until
liberal
which
Socialist
unions
elites
reputation
and
Italian
were
initially
economic
Giolitti
was
such
with
an
able
the
issues
the
PSI
successful,
were
pursued
to
seize
imperialist
continued
were
a
unrest,
wanted
political
many
movements
trade
a
The
had
middle
the
wealthy
was
willing
welfare
Church
by
reform.
allowing
schools.
policies
working
War
dominated
to
the
vote.
the
moderate
at
liberals
parties
1892,
1911–12.
appalled
the
the
1903–05,
them
of
of
wanted
nationalists
PSI
from
who
Giolitti’s
war
World
to
working-class
the
education
undermined
Turkish
in
at
attempted
Although
the
Working-class
Giolitti
religious
Italian
and
closing
man
with
needs
dominated
limited
given
First
and,
minister
Giolitti.
He
the
politicians
force,
to
the
classes
was
were
peasant
century,
Most
PSI.
30
before
representing
upper
vote)
liberal
after
and
this
under
from
and
the
First
Catholic
on
War,
Party
by
the
Italian–
from
However,
the
parties.
World
recession
pressure
Turkey.
many
parliamentary
the
serious
compounded
war
Libya
war
a
left
The
move
when
( Partito
the
rejected
the
away
two
Popolare
PPI).
85
2
S
S
Nationalist opposition
R
C
U
The
Italian
had
been
Nationalist
Association
FRANCE
Black
Sea
founded
in
1910.
A
poet,
y
SPAIN
Filippo
Marinetti,
also
established
TURKEY
the
aisinuT
Gibraltar
Futurist
movement
Malta
Movement.
gloried
This
war
and
Alexandria
criticized
the
weakness
governments
Suez
for
of
failing
liberal
to
Canal
ALGERIA
become
LIBYA,
a
“Great
Power”,
which
1912
EGYPT
Marinetti
have
believed
been
Italy’s
unication.
The
also
believed
was
unnished
should
destiny
after
nationalists
that
unication
SUDAN
Adowa
SOM.
regions
Wal
of
and
Trieste
under
Austrian
rule
possessions
a
naval
base
Italian
naval
base
0
500
despite
i
l
a
t
I
British
1000
of
miles
containing
Italian
large
speakers.
numbers
These
were
KENYA
known
▲
Trentino
Wal
remained
Italian
the
d
BR.
ABYSSINIA
because
Italy’s empire in 1914
as
the
terre
“unredeemed
In
addition,
nationalists
also
wanted
an
empire
to
irredente
or
lands”.
compete
with
Britain,
L TA
Thinking and
France
and
the
new
Germany.
However,
Libya
apart,
the
Italians
had
communication skills
made
1
What factors undermined
liberal rule before the First
World War?
2
only
minor
Somaliland
Abyssinia
the
(in
in
gains
1889).
1896;
Abyssinians
in
Africa,
They
indeed,
at
the
also
the
with
Eritea
failed
in
Italians
infamous
their
were
Battle
(in
of
1885)
attempt
and
to
part
of
conquer
humiliatingly
defeated
by
Adowa.
Work in pairs to create a
mind map to show the
What was the impact of the First World War on
diculties faced by the
Italy, 1915–18?
liberal governments after
1870.
Italy’s reasons for joining the Entente Alliance
In
1914,
the
Europe
Triple
Germany
were
First
and
deeply
World
right-wing
block
the
of
The
War
Futurists.
the
and
or
of
the
initially
and
that,
and
PSI
a
since
if
Italy
of
the
and
support
who
opposing
the
III,
as
was
on
an
this
neutral.
1907),
the
his
in
both
left;
they
groups”
were
during
October
The
signed
back
PSI
di
up
was
the
arguing
it
others
would
azione
by
a
Treaty
and
against
but
that
fasci
set
the
the
was
war”,
believed
The
gain
1915.
to
the
the
alliance
would
Empire.
and
after
However,
Nationalists
Mussolini
opinion
by
(the
they
April
“imperialist’s
Benito
but
action
and
with
politicians
developed
persuaded
by
Entente
Alliance
Italy’s
that
Entente
in
revolution.
action
war.
war,
the
Russia
because
foster
changed
the
and
division
could
crisis
remained
supported
conict
Triple
Triple
Austro–Hungarian
favoured
intervention
the
the
however,
joined
France
was
Italy
of
established
Emmanuel
the
1882;
rst
Salandra,
caused
alliances,
member
intervention
at
“revolutionary
to
two
Russia
Britain,
Victor
Italy
interventionists
crisis,
the
intervention
viewing
Liberal
member
with
supported
rivoluzionaria
into
been
territories
Intervention
left
destroy
86
hoped
Antonio
king,
intervention,
on
out,
France
ofLondon
Italian
during
broke
liberals
Britain,
London,
had
Austria–Hungary
divided
minister,
Treaty
divided
Italy
Italian-speaking
prime
of
was
Alliance.
left-wing
leading
intervention
in
favour
CHAPTER
of
2 .1 :
intervention.
editorship
of
Giolitti
and
war,
did
to
THE
as
gain
a
liberals,
Catholic
entering
fellow
FA S C I S M
was
newspaper,
many
the
OF
Mussolini
its
from
against
IM PA C T
the
I TA LI A N
expelled
from
FOREIGN
the
PSI,
P O L I C Y:
and
THE
from
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
his
Avanti!
including
Church.
Catholic
ON
war,
state,
most
The
while
of
the
liberals
the
Chamber,
saw
Church
that
did
opposed
Italy
not
had
relish
the
little
a
war
Austria.
Austria-Hungary
B
a
ra
n
ya
Zagreb
S
Trieste
la
SUBOTICA
Bačka
v
o
n
ia
Banat
REKA
Istria
a
t
i
a
Sava
o
r
C
Bosnia
Don
av
a
B
ZADAR
D
rz
e
g
o
v
in
a
i
Split
r
e
g
H
l
b
a
a
a
t
i
u
a
l
m
a
Italy
Sofia
Montenegro
Cetinje
V
a
r
d
a
r
state
M
border
division
line
to
Italy
to
Serbia
between
ainablA
country
split
▲
border
Serbia
and
a
a
Montenegro
Land oered to Italy, Serbia and Montenegro in London, 1915
Source skills
The
Treaty
France,
of
Italy
London,
and
ARTICLE
signed
Russia
on
by
26
Britain,
April
1915
maintenance
in
the
of
a
partition
the
future
receive
the
Southern
treaty
district
Tyrol
up
of
peace,
Italy
of
Trentino;
to
its
the
natural
is
of
which
is
the
Bremner
in
the
district
to
balance
her
a
of
rights,
share,
power
in
case
equal
to
of
Trieste;
the
Gradisca;
the
entire
of
the
Mediterranean.
entire
ARTICLE
11
geographical
Pass;
the
is
to
get
a
Country
of
share
in
the
war
indemnity
city
to
the
magnitude
of
her
Gorizia
sacrices
and
and
Turkey,
basin
corresponding
and
political
to
Italy
frontier,
the
4
theirs,
By
of
Mediterranean,
and
efforts.
Istria.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
ARTICLE
9
What,
France,
Great
Britain
and
Russia
admit
expect
principle
that
fact
of
Italy’s
interest
in
according
to
the
Treaty
of
London,
did
Italy
in
to
gain
by
entering
the
First
World
War?
the
87
2
Far thest
advance
of
the
Allies
SWITZERLAND
Central
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Central
Powers
into Italy
Powers
International
Far thest
boundar y
Allied
in
advance
1914
into
Major
battle
Austria-Hungary
Trentino
Trentino
Oensive
Tar visio
Caporetto
May
1915
Piave
R.
Oct
Trento
1917
Isonzo
Vittorio Veneto
R
Eleven
October
of
the
June
Asiago
Lake
Sept
Piave
Oensive
Garda
May
Battles
1918
Isonzo
1915–
1917
River
1918
1916
Venice
Verona
Trieste
3rd
seized
on
November
1918
ITALY
Adige
Po
Istria
0
0
▲
R.
River
50
50
miles
Adriatic
Sea
kilometers
Map of the Italian front during the First World War
The impact of war
The
Italians
and
the
Germans
Northern
the
Italy.
Western
Belgium,
most
the
of
war
Battle
the
Italians
end
of
Italy
at
Battle
the
Austrians.
cost
of
more
and
the
of
the
than
in
huge
war,
at
the
1917,
losses
back
in
by
who
October
achieved
had
for
100kilometres.
Vittorio
of
and
engagement
Germans,
a
victory
Veneto
the
been
600,000
on
and
October
However,
war
hundreds
of
in
case
However,
than
nally
front
France
pushed
and
more
1918,
the
▲
were
a
the
years
static.
Austrians
the
in
suffered
they
Austrians
developed
Caporetto
advanced
At
was
Front
three
was
the
across
As
trenches
the
of
when
the
fought
men
against
human
horrendous:
were
thousands
dead
wounded.
Italian troops killed in an Austrian chlorine gas attack
The
that
for
war
their
war
in
that
The
the
increased
increasingly
88
Italy
its
more
army
politically
were
mismanagement
stance.
meant
an
made
served
of
workforce
number
of
membership
militant
by
the
was
war.
the
trade
end
of
Many
resenting
Many
mobilized
industrial
of
divided.
politicized,
to
also
the
war.
a
grew.
and
the
the
5
million
liberal
resented
ght
workers
unions
of
the
the
“total”
In
PSI,
and
PSI’s
war,
turn,
men
government
anti-
which
this
both
led
to
were
CHAPTER
2 .1 :
THE
IM PA C T
OF
FA S C I S M
ON
I TA LI A N
FOREIGN
P O L I C Y:
THE
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
L TA
Research skills
Go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GpZi84oVUrY, or go to criticalpast.com
and search “Austro-Hungarian troops advancing...”.
Watch Austro-Hungarian troops advancing after the Battle of Caporetto.
L TA
Research and social skills
In pairs or small groups, research in more depth the Italian front in the First World War.
You should allow two hours for this task. You might want to focus on: specic battles
or campaigns; the use of technology; the role of military leaders; conditions on the
front lines; propaganda.
You need to review how to reference your sources and provide a list of works cited.
As a pair or in your group, give a 10-minute presentation on your research to the class.
What is Fascism?
Fascism
itself
did
not
differently
nationalism,
empire
easier
against
and
it
was
clear
and
war.
fascio
or
doctrine,
In
dictator,
Nevertheless,
what
Fascism
anti-communist
was
and
against
and
general,
one-party
it
could
by
it
manifested
Fascism
be
argued
considering
against
the
multi-party
promoted
government,
class
liberal
that
what
it
it
is
stood
struggle,
democracy
pacism.
growth
War.
founding
countries.
leader
internationalism,
Fascism’s
called
a
different
understand
against
World
in
strong
building
to
against:
a
have
in
Europe
Mussolini
di
set
was
up
his
fostered
rst
by
Fascist
the
impact
units
in
of
the
March
First
1919,
combattimento .
Nationalism
•
View
its
a
of
the
culture
nation
and
unifying
Militarism
state,
history,
•
Promotion
political
as
war
force
as
a
of
violence
method
and
of
Key
revitalizing
features
of
•
Desire
to
foreign
society
remove
influences
•
Violence
seen
as
Fascism
necessary
•
Own
nation
seen
in
order
to
as
progress
superior
to
other
•
nations
Development
of
paramilitary
organizations
Class discussion
Social
Social
unity
Authoritarianism
Look at the characteristics
Darwinism
•
Opposes
divisions
•
The
belief
that
class-based
in
evolved
to
has
the
influence
or
state
of Fascism. In pairs or small
control
groups, discuss what kind of
collective
over
all
aspects
of
as
national
superior
and
Totalitarian;
races
promotes
have
society
•
other
society
foreign policy you would expect
society
races
to see from a state following
•
•
“Survival
of
the
The
people
fittest”
subservient
•
Mussolini:
not
▲
are
to
the
state
this ideology.
“
obedience
discussion
”
Fascist symbol
89
2
Fascio
sticks
means
or
Mussolini
ties
“group”
fasces
which
probably
between
his
and
would
Roman
intended
men
in
the
become
magistrates
the
associated
used
symbolism
militia
as
to
a
with
the
symbol
suggest
bound
of
ofce.
strong
bonds
or
units.
Why did support for Fascism grow in Italy after
the First World War?
Following
the
war,
Italy
entered
into
German-speaking
New
Brenner
Brenner
a
AUSTRIA
period
of
political
crisis.
The
liberal
frontier
Pass
governments
lose
SOUTH
control.
of
1918–22
began
As
the
franchise
extended,
the
liberals
to
had
TYROL
SWITZERLAND
Tarvisio
(ALTO
been
ADIGE)
badly
in
the
elections
of
fared
1919
and
Croat-speaking
gained
TRENTINO
fewer
chamber.
than
half
the
Subsequently,
seats
none
in
of
the
the
Settled
political
by
Italian-speaking
of
parties
were
able
to
form
a
Pact
coherent
Rome.
coalition
government.
The
Trieste
1924
result
Lake
was
short-term
governments
Garda
Fiume
and
this
undermined
the
credibility
of
ISTRIA
ITAL
Y
the
democratic
Moreover,
Adriatic
parliamentary
support
for
the
system.
government
Sea
Key
declined
North-east
boundary
of
Italy
in
in
further
liberal
Prime
it
became
Minister
clear
Vittorio
1919
Emmanuelle
▲
when
1914
that
Boundary
Orlando
had
not
obtained
Italy’s territorial gains
the
the
defeated
primarily
the
for
Istrian
also
got
a
However,
also
Austro–Hungarian
territorial
peninsular,
port
in,
and
although
expected
to
gain,
the
the
not
gain
empire.
received,
port
of
port
stated
of
Italy,
as
Trieste
protectorate
clearly
the
territory
in
had
having
promised,
and
over,
Fiume
Italy
the
and
the
claimed
joined
the
the
from
war
province
Dodecanese
of
Tyrol,
islands.
It
Albania.
Treaty
of
London,
Italy
had
Dalmatia.
Territory claimed by
Territory promised at the
Italy
Treaty of London, May
Territory Italy received
in the Treaty of
1915
St Germain in 1919
South Tyrol
*
*
Trentino
*
*
Istria
*
*
Fiume
▲
Dalmatia
*
Colonies
*
Italy and the peace settlement
Prime
Minister
conservative
willing
90
to
Orlando
foreign
renounce
was
accompanied
minister,
Italian
Sydney
claims
to
to
Versailles
Sonnino.
Dalmatia
by
Orlando
in
return
his
had
for
been
the
port
of
CHAPTER
Fiume,
were
2 .1 :
but
THE
his
foreign
exploited
by
either
territory.
There
was
rate
for
As
men
Britain.
The
a
not
of
Fascist
based
groups
strict
law
World
In
the
a
Italy
was
actually
forces
were
of
at
the
end
the
their
Italians
outcome
Italian
higher
poet,
of
casualties
thousands
than
casualties
and
the
and
P O L I C Y:
THE
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
differences
were
not
given
resign.
earlier,
hundreds
nationalist
beneted
clear
across
and
in
noted
to
In
FOREIGN
injured.
the
Versailles
The
casualty
compared
Gabriele
the
were
to
more
than
casualty
rate
for
35.8%
for
D’Annunzio,
deemed
the
order
and
it
from
doctrine
class
after
gave
or
the
divide.
the
its
post-war
theories
Italians
violence
members
situation.
could
appeal
embraced
on
the
it
the
its
streets
As
to
fascism
a
wide
demands
following
opportunity
to
for
the
regain
was
range
a
First
sense
of
pride.
1921
Catholic
(newly
its
powers
forced
disgust
I TA LI A N
disagreed.
great
was
ON
victory”.
Party
on
War,
national
of
Italian
“mutilated
The
minister
and
forces
39.1%
FA S C I S M
other
been
killed
Italian
OF
Orlando
has
Britain:
it
the
widespread
Settlement.
600,000
IM PA C T
elections,
Party
and
founded
35
138
in
seats
seats
1921).
went
to
the
Italian
to
the
Fascists
Socialists
politics
and
was
(PNF),
the
108
to
the
Communists
polarizing.
What was the impact of D’Annunzio and the Fiume aair
on Fascism?
In
September
Fiume
by
to
hand
to
remove
in
December
Italian
1919,
force
the
in
port
Gabriele
protest
over
to
D’Annunzio
1920.
democratic
the
Yugoslavia.
until
The
D’Annunzio
against
Giolitti
whole
affair
led
Italian
2,000
ex-soldiers
government’s
The
government
was
returned
undermined
as
the
to
occupy
agreement
proved
prime
too
feeble
minister
credibility
of
the
system.
Source skills
The
Source A
war
left
included
Video
clip
of
D’Annunzio
and
his
a
major
for
legacies.
justice
(“land
They
for
the
forces
peasants”)
in
other
thirst
and
a
transformed
economy.
The
Fiume:
war
also
produced
tens
of
thousands
of
new
http://www.britishpathe.com/video/dannunzio-at-umeofcers,
drunk
with
patriotism
and
greedy
to
aka-italian-army-review-at/query/AMERICAN+TROOPS+INS
command.
They
had
won
the
war,
and
did
not
PECTION+ON+MARCH
intend
Source B
M.
Clark.
to
Modern
Italy
1871–1982
(1985).
Denis
Italians
had
been
divided
by
November
divided
than
“shirkers”,
against
forget
it.
Mack
1919
ever:
government
against
No
could
were
“combatants”
peasants
defeatists.
they
them
a
Italian
British
history,
historian
in
an
who
academic
all.
Modern
Italy
–
A
political
history
(1997).
more
against
workers,
conceivable
suit
Smith,
in
before,
book.
but
anyone
Source C
specialises
The
let
patriots
form
of
Support
of
for
Fiume)
who
had
signature
for
such
“the
this
was
no
at
escapade
obtained
intention
Versailles,
people
Yugoslavs
when
are
(the
from
of
honouring
and
in
occupation
many
Orlando’s
D’Annunzio
November
excited
patriots
by
a
he
savage
spoke
stated:
spirit
91
2
of
domination
quarrel
or
with
shock
when
troops
been
war
had
talk
A
godsend
to
for
the
it
of
a
The
cloak
and
of
them,
…
in
such
and
the
Fiume
to
war
and
arditi
the
was
in
use
be
the
…
the
eja,
the
arditi
shouted
eja,
example
were
the
alala.”
sketch
of
copied
without
the
for
to
be
future
Here,
an
…
seen
fascist
too,
“corporate
was
fascism
in
cry
seen
All
by
as
“A
the
this
acknowledgement
black
Fiume
war
was
state”.
inspiration
The
noi
rst
was
later
Mussolini.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What,
encouraged
possible
of
its
rehearsal
a
obvious
favour
affair,
dress
people
The
under
a
shirts
there
…
would
was
solidify
the
détat
people
opinion
to
circles
coup
of
ridiculous
perpetual
dangerous
such
patriotism
and
public
Fiume
avoid
black-shirted
especially
military
government
annexing
cannot
continuation
respectable
by
were
accustomed
force.
place
we
demobilized,
had
of
and
them”…
the
of
according
First
World
to
Source
War
on
B,
was
the
impact
of
Italy?
international
First question, par t b – 2 marks
repercussions
[A]
were
completely
member
of
the
D’Annunzio
in
Fiume
Nitti]
boasted
of
royal
family
…
giving
disregarded
[The
…
paid
Prime
government
…
visits
to
Minister
money
What
is
News
in
the
message
Source
of
the
images
from
Pathé
A?
to
Second question – 4 marks
help
it
keep
meant
the
articial
nothing
indiscipline
was
to
revolt
him
or
alive
the
unpunished
…
king
and
apparently
that
even
With
military
reference
analyse
rewarded.
the
historians
D’Annunzio’s
for
over
a
“Regency
year.
of
Although
Carnaro”
it
was
a
to
its
values
origin,
and
studying
purpose
limitations
Italy
in
the
and
of
content,
Source
C
for
1920s.
lasted
petty
and
L TA
Social skills
Share your response to the second question (above) with a par tner. Peer assess
each other ’s response to this question and award a mark out of 4. Discuss how
and why you gave the marks awarded, and suggest how your par tner might
improve his or her response.
What was the impact of economic factors on the rise
of Fascism?
The
post-war
High
with
savings.
situation
the
In
southern
to
and
to
a
of
the
believed
the
and
that
There
restrain
fear
was
the
not
of
the
had
industrialists
opposition
Blackshirts
in
on
peaked
and
but
from
the
their
in
the
also
Indeed,
and
use
police
excesses.
Fascists
as
the
prepared
the
the
and
the
to
the
gained
the
Fascists
support
offered
confront
to
army,
the
Party
conservatives
Fascists
as
attempted
however,
Fascists
to
had
1919
known
socialists
passed
meant
poverty.
1917,
1921;
This
that
Between
Communist
support
Fascism.
1919.
their
became
January
and
of
October
the
Italian
landowners,
were
escape
that
21
and
Mussolini
physically.
from
The
formed
end
of
classes
immigration
to
time
rise
middle
Europe.
Italy
this
the
the
on
Russia,
across
in
the
by
America
During
manipulate
complicity
million
in
revolution.
was
Communists
was
to
unrest
already
could
2
and
restrictions
revolution
Rosso).
factor
workers
to
US
emigrate
Communists.
they
important
soared
new
extensive
Italiano )
left
an
communism
(Biennio
ideological
Socialists
ends.
could
by
Bolshevik
wealthy
only
also
xed-wage
Russian-style
opposed
from
92
the
Comunista
strength
not
poor
Years”
catalyse
was
the
exacerbated
there
Red
(Partito
who
both
widespread
1920
“Two
hit
Unemployment
was
addition,
led
economy
ination
initially
their
who
own
did
not
CHAPTER
Fascism
2 .1 :
was
signicant
saw
the
Fascists
1922,
that
had
unable
stable
also
IM PA C T
as
force
a
therefore,
to
to
in
by
the
Italy.
of
ON
I TA LI A N
Catholic
Pope
Pius
improving
FOREIGN
Church
XI
the
P O L I C Y:
which
backed
position
THE
was
the
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
a
Mussolini
of
ORIGINS ,
as
he
Church
and
relations.
there
bring
contain
post-war
FA S C I S M
means
church–state
failed
OF
supported
political
cementing
By
THE
was
about
violence
a
a
on
loss
of
faith
“victors”
the
in
Italian
peace
streets
and
state
institutions
settlement,
had
failed
to
seemed
establish
a
economy.
Source skills
at
Source A
running
that
An
extract
from
Mussolini’s
speech
to
the
the
of
the
Milan
fascio
in
March,
interests
have
the
impression
that
the
present
Italy
has
failed.
It
is
clear
to
everyone
that
crisis
now
sensed
today
the
we
exists.
During
inadequacy
know
that
of
our
the
the
war
us
all
of
to
the
virtues
of
the
intelligence
and
was
must
future
not
nature
determined.
regime
ready
is
to
the
take
are
piazzas
the
of
Italian
ability
of
the
its
be
act
people,
its
will
cry
who
If
this
organs
be
the
out,
“The
pushed
defend
should
receive
not
They
only
agreed
of
Fiume
Tyrol,
but
with
the
Entente
Trentino,
should
also
be
in
Istria
and
given
the
parts
city
the
the
us,
over
the
to
the
border
States
Fiume,
we
rush
in
to
into
denied
lived
are
of
on
of
of
Istria.
When
America
the
Britain
refused
grounds
there,
sacrices
and
we
population,
of
the
new
blamed
it
that,
and
To
them,
had
won
Liberalism
apparent
in
not
so
Italy
the
vital
to
despite
had
a
to
state,
that
few
share
Africa,
only
was
was
weakness.
because
would
colonies
it
Yugoslav
Liberal
became
Dalmatia
German
outraged.
the
country
addition,
be
be
into
because
Italian
economy
Nationalists
be
must
large
the
creativity
right
to
is
reason,
to
on
United
not
present
we
of
ready
belongs
that
system
fast.
For
as
to
conference.
leaders.
now
superseded,
place.
succession
ones
political
fasci
that
and
hearted,
must
to
the
agitation
political
faint
We
going
establishing
and
be
peace
due
its
We
the
Italy
(southern
Dalmatia),
hand
to
convinced
fail
government;
victory
the
that
of
and
solely
at
territories
1915,
a
now
would
regime
those
in
were
1919.
demanded
I
war
rst
Italian
meeting
the
government
in
the
When,
Italy
would
Italians
the
division
nationalists
been
were
cheated.
“mutilated
Her
victory”,
culprit!
war
First question, par t a – 3 marks
and
led
it
to
victory!”
What,
Cited
in
C.F
.
Delzell
(ed).
1971.
the
Fascism,
1919–45:
Selected
according
to
Source
A,
is
the
problem
with
Mediterranean
documents ,
page
existing
Italian
government?
10
First question, par t a – 3 marks
Source B
Why,
Mark
Robson.
Italy:
Liberalism
and
that
1870–45
according
to
Source
B,
did
Italians
believe
Fascism
they
had
been
cheated
after
the
war?
(2004).
Second question – 4 marks
It
was
not
only
over
the
issue
of
the
supposed
With
“socialist
threat”
that
the
right
reference
assess
the
government.
Nationalists
who
had
the
Liberals
weak
its
origin,
purpose
and
content,
the
and
values
and
limitations
of
Source
A
for
always
historians
considered
to
condemned
studying
Italy
in
the
post
war
period.
incompetent
L TA
Thinking, communication and social skills
In pairs or small groups, consider the following statement:
One student (or half your group) should prepare to argue for
the assertion, the other (or other half of your group) against.
“Italians were justied in viewing the Versailles Settlement
Review the evidence presented on each side and together
as a mutilated victory.”
draw a conclusion based on the weight of your arguments.
93
2
How impor tant was the March on Rome, October 1922?
Source skills
A
photograph
the
March
on
of
Mussolini
Rome,
with
black-shirted
Fascists
before
1922.
Go to www.britishpathe.
com/video/march-on-rome
Watch Mussolini’s March on
Rome.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
By
is
the
1922,
the
vulnerable;
they
were
whether
a
weak
control
In
could
ready
1922,
restore
and
on
means,
led
Socialists
now
1922,
willingness
the
had
he
to
how
rst
led
by
and
was
time
The
Italian
and
that
question
was
not
take
socialist
This
Facta
and
come
would
1922.
Luigi
weak
had
key
they
to
that
support
expelled
was
that
power.
prime
The
minister,
followed
was
seize
called
a
by
unable
general
Mussolini
it
and
his
clear
he
in
a
that
wanted
increasing
and
to
councils
there
also
in
as
in
to
Fascists
in
negotiations
prime
several
would
be
explore
pressure
strike,
his
speech
engaged
appointment
Socialist
rumours
under
only
made
monarchy,
to
from
a
towns
Fascist
legal
his
own
power.
continued
would
offer
Communists
Mussolini
was
Ras,
that
Italy.
February
widespread
talks
their
Mussolini
the
However,
the
in
but
believed
order.
backed
though
that
violence.
squads
government
in
politicians
been
bosses,
by
coalition
and
he
Rome.
October
some
94
had
even
regional
new
law
Fascist
there
march
In
the
conservative
minister.
Italy
collapsed
classes
that
control
lead
increasing
government
believed
take
should
middle
September
with
to
photograph?
democratic
conservative
the
this
Fascists
Bonomi,
the
of
government,
August
and
liberal
the
they
coalition
Ivanoe
message
with
include
Fascists
regard
Fascists.
cabinet
to
the
formation
Although
posts,
there
Mussolini
of
a
was
would
not
CHAPTER
accept
2 .1 :
anything
with
leading
seize
power.
On
24
less
a
(“to
three
Fascists
squads
attempted
central
Italy.
Rome.
not
He
taken
asked
the
Fascist
and
On
29
king
to
urgent.
proceed
Mussolini,
prime
the
and
rst
with
III,
of
so
he
in
panicked
the
of
the
Rome.
army
Fascist
north
and
reports
Facta,
was
then
to
planned
October,
1922,
that
but
27
on
the
Minister
before
imitation
march
of
met
right
chanted
buildings
sent
Prime
was
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
back
who
asked
could
had
to
stay.
crush
changed
his
mind
a
telegram
Mussolini,
Rome
as
he
Milan.
wishes
from
H.M.
to
the
confer
the
king:
King
with
asks
you
you
—
to
King
Victor
1922
leader
had
who
agreed,
received
priority,
to
law
to
10,000
night
In
shirts
ORIGINS ,
Mussolini
time
Naples.
Black
THE
Mussolini.
Mussolini
Top
the
Fascists
king
the
intention
but
martial
the
in
Rome,
ofcials,
the
October,
government
resigned,
declare
At
On
of
16
P O L I C Y:
of
only
a
party
35
that
members
had
of
regularly
parliament,
participated
was
offered
in
the
post
of
minister.
On
30th
him
October,
Prime
march
given
on
to
than
all
in
Rome
with
the
to
legions
been
subsequently
His
squads
had
asked
let
them
arrival
to
books.
form
and
the
Denis
a
the
But
arrive
the
was
civil
soon
this
in
to
to
launched
and
their
Smith,
of
the
place
long
private
in
of
In
up
of
to
cars:
of
the
there
whom
they
men.
to
hours
power
government
had
on
no
fewer
arms
troops
policemen
Rome.
after
had
picture
These
a
satisfaction.
Pugliese
waiting
he
reached
amused
General
400
so
of
were
had
garrison
indeed,
winning
myth
Mussolini
the
before
3,000
appointed
something
‘ultimatum’
reality
with
were
the
an
twenty-four
after
fascism
loss
develop
many
stand
until
Emmanuel
with
invented
armoured
only
to
enforce
was
Rubicon.
Rome
and
needed
trains
in
Victor
satised
march,
unable
and
and
not
photographers
war
took
Mack
to
fascist
admitted
not
the
ready
government
myth
after
martyrs”
—
a
through.
insurrection
“fascist
did
up
He
legend
across
quite
Rome
was
fascists
a
machine-guns
Mussolini
fascist
armed
eventually
hold
in
leader
appointment.
militiamen
have
their
sufcient
arrived
fascist
300,000
and
fascist
would
The
royal
by
leading
and
proved
a
King,
30,000
at
as
Rome
the
horseback
Mussolini
Minister.
unspectacular
to
local
held
their
FOREIGN
that
40,000
outside
control
On
agreed
was
assemble.
against
immediately
Emmanuel
violence
to
side
October,
Very
to
seize
I TA LI A N
role.
and
declared
miles
terried
revolt.
decided
20
action
major
ON
Garibaldi,
government
rm
the
a
congress
and
to
FA S C I S M
Milan
leader,
began
This
The
in
each
50,000
to
than
Rome”)
places,
OF
Fascist
unication
Roma
At
IM PA C T
Fascists
October,
Italian
A
THE
by
orders
their
an
3,000
sponsored
he
armed
ctitious
history
1983.
L TA
Self-management and social skills
In pairs or small groups, use the information in this chapter and in the source
above to identify the key factors that led to Mussolini’s appointment as prime
minister in 1922.
Which of these factors do you consider were the most impor tant?
95
2
How did Mussolini consolidate his power?
At
rst,
the
Mussolini
4
out
on
of
the
move
●
In
Fascists
was
12
the
ministers
part
of
both
towards
was
to
administration
●
In
February
●
In
July
party
be
given
●
In
April
from
to
May
On
3
the
11
local
●
days
in
OVRA.
permitted
include
a
parties.
which
series
Mussolini
won
powers
joined
was
an
seats
after
increase
later
the
to
the
passed,
election
in
a
vote
reform
Fascist
which
would
parliament
a
campaign
their
Giacomo
of
was
only
actions
able
to
of
condence
the
Party.
stated
that
the
automatically
to
make
of
strong
intimidation
representation
by
as
1925,
in
and
parliament
death,
powers
and
action
the
Most
Law
on
The
1926
and
speech
revulsion
took
members
in
He
in
the
was
Italy
responsibility
of
Mussolini
by
and
a
of
the
of
powers.
press
for
parliament
now
was
now
January
secret
were
the
Head
moved
to
Government
parties
strictly
1927
police
the
without
was
Elected
Party
founded:
trial
gave
trade
ofcials.
Fascist
was
penalty
and
controlled.
government
increased,
death
of
Political
appointed
new
arrest
scope
against
of
Powers
executive
of
wave
a
violence.
Fascists.
Mussolini
However,
replaced
repression
a
gave
Fascist
Duce
the
banned.
were
ex-squadristi
following
Il
Matteotti
condemning
Fascists.
November
The
in
deputies
signicant
were
increased
the
opposition.
ofcials
Between
to
1925,
of
December
unions
parties,
government
Law
votes
liberal
of
himself
Mussolini
through
in
system.
Matteotti’s
violence
establish
In
the
January
withdrew
other
political
cabinet
66%.
1924,
concerning
new
Fascists,
able
chamber
murdered
●
the
were
In
other
However,
Nationalists
of
with
coalition
emergency
Acerbo
most
and
a
dictatorship:
in
the
of
possible.
1924,
7%
a
tax
two-thirds
violence,
Italian
●
the
power
Fascists.
the
vote
and
won
government
●
up
1923,
1923,
that
share
minister
Mussolini
1922,
able
to
were
setting
November
and
had
prime
the
jury
expanded
was
to
authorities.
Did Mussolini create a totalitarian state?
A
totalitarian
over
all
social.
and
or
Under
comply
criticism
Employees
96
state
aspects
of
one
and
the
this
the
in
which
citizen’s
Mussolini,
with
of
is
a
Italians
state’s
was
State
life:
had
laws.
enforced
had
to
the
government
political,
to
There
by
swear
conform
could
the
an
has
economic,
be
secret
oath
to
of
total
Fascist
no
control
cultural
overt
police
and
loyalty
to
and
expectations
opposition
militia.
the
regime
and
CHAPTER
the
2 .1 :
young
cult
THE
were
developed
totalitarian
with
IM PA C T
mobilized
around
nature
powerful
Mussolini
Church
retained
gained
landowning
totalitarian
in
1938
limited
World
of
total
and
them.
Mussolini
Fascist
control
of
of
was
He
Hitler
turn
hardly
never
a
regime.
as
the
laws
systematic
the
by
in
the
in
This
the
had
the
urged
it
to
of
the
in
the
Fascism
and
the
the
was
and
involved
had
while
with
Also,
implemented
Hitler
form
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
compromised
Church
contrasts
1930s.
ORIGINS ,
King.
addition,
the
A
limitations
monarch
In
where
THE
movement.
and
Italy.
P O L I C Y:
were
Fascists
became
after
Steiner
youth
there
The
were
Italy
only
FOREIGN
Vatican
power.
Germany
Zara
developed
the
south
their
until
then
Fascist
However,
dismissed
racial
Jews
even
I TA LI A N
inuence
over
Hitler’s
Historian,
Kampf.
be
ON
the
such
still
anti-semitic
–
join
maintained
persecution
impose
the
could
nature
War
to
Mussolini.
considerable
elites
that
FA S C I S M
non-Fascists,
Indeed,
never
OF
there
the
more
only
was
Second
Mussolini
to
writes:
thinker
.
singular
He
and
wrote
no
equivalent
all-embracing
to
Mein
ideology
that
Source skills
allowed
First question, par t a –
nor
the
to
did
his
same
There
could
his
programme
impact
always
not
fearsome
on
of
that
or
racial
and
doctrines
claims
totally
expansionism
regeneration
Hitler’s
competing
abolish,
of
“domestic
Italians
remained
ignore,
doctrine
and
destroy.
radical
made
loyalties
—
into
on
in
Steiner,
political
reality,
revisionism”
the
Italy
German
that
make
people.
3 marks
According
Mussolini
was
2005
to
Steiner,
Mussolini’s
different
to
that
how
ideology
of
Hitler?
What factors inuenced Mussolini’s
foreign policy?
To
make
Unlike
policy
Italy
Hitler,
goals
great,
Mussolini
already
programme
respected
of
in
action
did
and
not
place.
which
take
—
Benito
power
However,
included
with
after
the
a
1925,
Mussolini
clear
set
of
Mussolini
following
foreign
developed
a
aims:
L TA
●
increase
●
consolidate
●
revise
●
dominate
the
Balkans
●
dominate
the
Mediterranean
●
build
national
feared.
pride
Self-management and
thinking skills
domestic
support
for
the
regime
Review the factors identied on
the
post-war
settlement
of
1919–20
pages 84 that had an impact
on Mussolini’s foreign policy.
Add to your spider diagram
any evidence from pages 84
an
Empire
territories
●
foster
These
the
aims
more
to
spread
Fascist
this
Roman
vision
of
Italy
Fascism
product
as
of
was
national
force
with
in
its
Mussolini’s
Empire.
of
a
increase
ideology,
was
vitale
or
“living
space”);
expand
its
in
other
various
key
pride
helps
and
expansionist
of
heir
that
the
of
countries.
factors.
and
The
to
make
international
belief
Control
“the
onwards to suppor t the impact
of these factors.
Settlement
signicant
spazio
Africa
were
Versailles
wanted
to
the
in
(gain
disappointment
explain
Italy
(and
why
over
Mussolini
himself)
a
much
politics.
aims,
Fascist
was
Italy
Mediterranean
also
could
important.
be
Empire
the
was
Linked
second
key
to
his
Rome”.
97
2
Domestic
considerations
consolidate
the
support
economic
controlling
space
for
needs
the
the
for
of
were
his
important,
regime
Italy.
and
These
Mediterranean
too.
he
factors
and
Mussolini
also
needed
inuenced
setting
up
an
needed
to
his
empire
to
address
goals
with
of
living
Italians.
What impact did economic issues have on Italian
foreign policy?
In
a
speech
I
in
consider
me,
foreign
economy.
consolidate
make
an
Italy
the
had
a
In
order
far
supposed
a
society
of
Mussolini carries an armful of grain
as he helps with the harvesting on a
farm near Rome
probably
but
in
be
and
in
a
the
control
state
submitting
(known
as
were
to
the
as
of
war
fate,
Fascist
militarist
Italy
had
than
on
…
not
To
live,
even
to
for
…
our
people
not
system,
state.
raw
other
to
also
and
These
north.
in
only
but
autarky”)
limited
the
strengthening
aimed
“achieving
a
to
reliant
therefore
and
economic
term
on
big
the
all
and
class
helped
to
of
nor
was
the
to
to
aims
materials
The
have
were
and
Italians
also
industrialized
their
conict
keep
the
Mussolini
the
cost
intent
of
promoted
to
increase
consumer
development
the
of
in
the
be
cease.
forces
and
their
lose.
this
In
be
of
sum,
goods
area,
idea
from
the
was
alternative
system
it
envisaged
would
based
work
on
would
all
of
causing
system
a
serve
the
would
Corporate
political
has
system
and
interests
the
to
neither
capitalism
regulated,
The
This
an
They
economy
would
advantages
would
exploited
in
would
disadvantages.
State”.
economy,
that
system
the
would
Italy,
“Corporate
workers
have
at
the
believed
divergent
was
the
This
of
described
classes.
involved
economy
labour
fund
organizing
good.
would
the
to
working
people
without
merely
favoured
Fascists
national
and
was
idea
way
weaknesses
that
taxation
the
socialism.
which
but
been
be
State
problems,
called
an
fraud”.
achieve
initiatives:
and
policies
compared
employers
practice
help
permanent
not
industrialized
high
new
interest,
“elaborate
To
a
ambitions
industry
Mussolini’s
for
protected
in
…
materials.
however,
the
also
corporations,
national
be
supporting
vague
burden
to
socialism
▲
a
capitalist
together
a
Heavy
was
capitalism
the
of
rate
address
was
However,
policy
less
literacy
to
there
to
said:
nations.
productivity.
which
raw
political
“productivism”,
and
in
Mussolini
tenacity
economic
achieve,
low
nation
risk,
capable
was
European
1925,
self-sufcient
to
south
His
his
economy
difcult
Italian
struggle,
deciency
Mussolini’s
the
the
means
so-called
December
the
economic
Battle
“Mussolini
for
greatness,
Grain
Law”
in
in
Mussolini
1925;
1928,
the
which
also
Battle
set
out
a
launched
for
the
three
Lira
programme
in
key
1926;
of
land
reclamation.
These
an
policies
increase
in
improvement
olives.
98
The
had
little
grain
in
area
output
that
success.
production
came
saw
the
The
and
at
the
most
Battle
for
imports
cost
of
negative
Grain
fell
by
other
did
key
impact
lead
75%,
but
crops,
was
the
to
this
such
as
south,
where
CHAPTER
the
soil
2 .1 :
was
challenge
IM PA C T
pound,
as
they
for
also
Overall,
pursuit
continued
to
cut
an
of
to
and
pay
the
more
in
the
lira
was
for
FOREIGN
The
state
poverty
from
not
154
a
by
also
in
lira
P O L I C Y:
the
to
10%.
goods
In
THE
failed
90
lira
due
general
ORIGINS ,
When
to
the
benet
to
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
to
south.
corresponding
imported
1927
to
tariffs.
the
land
failure.
assertive
of
wheat.
there
expensive
weakness
I TA LI A N
redress
of
wages
an
ON
growing
value
fell
had
also
was
the
the
exports
government
the
FA S C I S M
landowners
reclamation
by
OF
suitable
big
increased
consumers
The
not
the
Mussolini
British
THE
fascist
foreign
Mussolini’s
policy
was
hampered
economy.
Source skills
Source A
Antonio
writer,
central
Source B
Cippico,
in
his
Italian
book
problem
of
of
the
politician
lectures,
and
Italy:
Mediterranean
Robert
The
Second
Mallet.
World
1920
industrial
During
strikes
1923,
industrial
In
there
and
the
strikes
December,
unemployed;
took
in
189
rst
in
of
the
reduced
there
October
Italy
1,881
agricultural
year
were
1921,
place
were
1924,
200
...
to
régime,
The
of
to
new
anarchy
citizens
Fascist
government
order
reigned;
security
governments,
sometimes
A
really
of
in
where
of
for
of
the
giving
life
Mussolini’s
…
Despite
is
been
rare
this
so
a
the
had
a
task
Sea
the
industrial
impediment
towards
the
supremacy.
conclusion
Great
and
serious
drive
Red
dictator’s
that
Britain
allowed
in
Rome
foreign
capital,
and,
permitted
greater
spending
Italy
to
of
a
war-debt
1926,
greater
an
access
as
a
consequence,
in
power,
has
in
the
never
history
before
of
a
and
What,
which
years
like
coal
armaments,
on
imported
and
petroleum
...
according
Mussolini’s
to
Source
foreign
B,
are
the
key
issues
policy?
Source C
that
it
Meakin.
“Mussolini’s
Fascism:
accomplished.
civilized
occurred
has
materials
on
reliant
First question, par t a – 3 marks
for
almost
raw
heavily
the
…
half
remained
staple
property
undertaking
and
the
maddest
parliaments,
two
government
short
nancial
further
and
agreement
in
extent
achieved
Italian
Fascism
represented
nations,
that
of
triumph
so
of
style
over
substance”.
History
Italy,
Review,
that
of
had
a
has
the
weak
a
projected
with
What
and
as
agreement
Thomas
It
Origins
541,000
back
and
magistrates
immense
Fascism,
has
the
117,000…
restoring
of
acted
Mediterranean
to
fallen
unenviable
position
strikes
Fascist
to
and
(1983).
(1926)
Italy’s
During
Mussolini
War
much
number
59
(2007).
in
In
time.
an
the
effort
needs
to
of
adapt
a
the
future
Italian
war,
the
economy
Fascist
to
Party
First question, par t a – 3 marks
attempted
What,
of
according
Mussolini’s
to
Source
economic
A,
are
the
achievements
policies?
on
in
to
imports.
1925,
foreign
reduce
The
Battle
imposed
cereal
Italian
high
goods,
for
dependence
Grain,
tariffs
whilst
on
launched
imported
government
Second question – 4 marks
subsidies
With
reference
content,
Source
Italy
in
to
analyse
A
for
the
its
the
origin,
value
historians
purpose
and
and
limitations
studying
the
of
Mussolini’s
1920s.
In
by
Examiner’s
hint:
Refer
to
page
107
for
ideas
the
75
to
answer
this
decade
per
of
available
machinery
from
cent,
and
achieved
cereals.
1925
by
wheat
1940
complete
However,
to
and
these
the
assist
in
fertilisers.
imports
fell
country
self-sufciency
economic
gains
on
came
how
made
purchasing
almost
in
were
at
a
great
price,
as
exports
fell
and
the
question..
importation
of
fertilisers
failed
to
keep
pace.
99
2
The
the
by
propaganda
Battle
a
and
for
decline
a
in
further
especially
in
The
third
of
was
the
and
Grain
the
agricultural
were
quality
reduction
the
soon
poorer
of
in
benets
malaria,”
of
outweighed
the
Italian
standards
of
diet,
1938,
In
reality,
mixed
living,
the
increase
Battle
the
demonstrate
1923.
The
Huge
uninhabitable
areas
such
of
as
and
the
d es ig ne d
a g r icultur a l
d ynami s m,
of
was
ma l ar ia l
ne w ly
a nd
and
In
to
ma r sh
the
te xtbo ok
of
the
s che me
8 0 , 000
one - s i x th
st a t e ” .
ha d
o n ly
hecta r e s
the
a r ea
of
were
I t al y,
as
i ns i s te d .
economic
into
in
Fascist
resulted
propaganda
dire
unwise,
la n d
Ma rs he s
S a ba udi a
Fa s ci st
duty
the
Onl y
not
a
ne w
howeve r,
government
total,
the
pr ovid e
introd uc ed
cre a te d
the
success.
economy
la n d,
pr ev io usl y
P o nti ne
th e
Latina
of
s che me
swa ths
whilst
Aprilla,
Ma r shes ,
is
ba t t l es
intervention
in
some
victories
situation
unplanned,
economics
did
from
not
brought
and
in
gains…
the
However,
reect
about
disorganised
1925
the
by
forays
onwards.
w e re
L TA
drained,
the
Fasc i s t
employment.
in
of
e co nomi c
availa b i l i ty
“it
reclaimed,
south.
Muss o l i ni ’s
proclaim e d
in
citi es
won
Thinking skills
the
In pairs discuss the points made in Source C regarding
regime
internatio na l
p r a is e .
“F as cis t
l a nd
Mussolini’s economic policies.
reclamation
is
no t
o nl y
d efe nce
a g ai ns t
Class discussion
Which aspects of Mussolini’s economic policies aected his foreign policy aims?
Following on from your class discussion, add more information to your spider
diagram (page. 84) on the factors inuencing foreign policy.
How successful was Mussolini’s foreign policy in
the 1920s?
Many
the
had
in
to
the
of
and
by
character.
European
other
with
after
foreign
Italy,
foreign
previous
work
place
used
in
of
aims
he
was
Mussolini
powers
to
ministers
the
1930s
at
to
on
page
the
to
one
peace;
bureaucrats
minister.
policy
have
a
hand,
on
97
Indeed,
consolidate
foreign
appeared
On
and
prime
1920s
Italy’s
promote
attempts
outlined
administrations.
appointed
in
cooperation.
undermine
aims
Italian
many
policy
the
policy
the
were
who
had
However,
his
become
contradictory
seemed
other
hand,
to
he
to
initially
remained
Mussolini
domestic
would
he
similar
Mussolini
control
more
approach
work
acted,
with
at
in
Fascist
to
the
times,
to
cooperation.
Ambitions in the Balkans
The
aspiration
Africa
was
invaded
the
the
Greek
action
an
100
held
Greek
with
to
use
its
the
did
of
50
“Corfu
in
the
Italian
Corfu
Albania.
navy
the
many
of
that
payment
Although
inuence
by
island
demanded
demanded
Greeks.
gaining
border
and
threatened
also
of
aim
after
The
an
Italian
League
Italians
million
of
Mediterranean
agree
lire
was
of
In
to
1923,
ofcial
Nations
withdraw.
Mussolini
Affair”
Eastern
nationalists.
Only
was
as
when
withdraw,
a
killed
condemned
compensation
seen
and
great
in
Mussolini
on
this
Britain
but
he
from
success
the
in
CHAPTER
2 .1 :
THE
Italy,
Mussolini
bully
smaller
IM PA C T
had
OF
FA S C I S M
learned
that
ON
he
I TA LI A N
could
FOREIGN
P O L I C Y:
THE
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
only
Source skills
powerful
went
on
states;
states
to
he
such
develop
could
as
a
not
Britain.
good
intimidate
In
fact,
more
Mussolini
relationship
with
Source A
the
A
British
Foreign
Minister
Austen
cartoon
UK
The
following
foreign
the
policy
disputed
commander
the
to
he
undermine
destabilize
Also
in
took
power
train
treaty
of
1926,
Italian
over
it.
and
success
he
In
an
in
the
the
in
in
Albanian
friendship
through
Zog’s
there.
such
He
Low
published
in
the
This
the
Albania
to
two
in
August
1923.
of
to
and
to
groups
Croats.
Ahmed
and
led
Star,
him
tried
leader,
The
Rome,
led
the
newspaper,
military
ceded
ethnic
as
regime
between
which
of
was
Yugoslavia’s
army.
a
Yugoslavs
funding
on
David
a
control
sent
Balkans
the
Italian-backed
Albania,
had
Pact
port
the
inuence
by
gained
having
intimidate
country
invested
the
when
Mussolini
independence,
1924,
Mussolini
1924,
Fiume,
in
could
the
wanted
in
rule
gave
French
who
to
of
Mussolini’s
believe
in
victory
port
Yugoslavs
Italy.
to
year,
by
Chamberlain.
Zog,
border.
helped
an
ofcial
states
became
an
protectorate.
Relations with Western European powers
Mussolini’s
actions
undermined
backed
the
Romania
in
France’s
Little
and
Yugoslavia
position,
Entente
clearly
as
France
alliance
Czechoslovakia.
of
had
Yugoslavia,
Indeed,
Mussolini
First question, par t b – 2 marks
was
hostile
to
France
for
several
reasons:
What
●
Italy
had
Corsica,
●
claims
Nice
Mussolini
●
Mussolini
territory
However,
Britain,
seven
and
Germany,
normalize
prevent
Although
in
the
Locarno
future
is
the
message
of
the
cartoonist
in
Source
A?
of
Africa
control
in
inuence
and
been
and
he
Tunisia
in
the
France
ushered
as
to
get
had
in
the
a
The
the
the
met
supported
and
Morocco
Balkans
Locarno
in
the
the
and
the
and
leaders
of
part
with
in
the
This
its
also
and
eastern
signed
Belgium.
Austria
included
meetings.
cooperation
Spirit”.
left
was
France
border
The
settlement
conrmed
but
Pact
in
from
Switzerland.
post-war
Belgium,
key
Balkans,
moderation
agreements
Germany,
a
in
for
with
Rhineland
period
“Locarno
force
secure
Italian
played
new
a
The
France
negotiation.
he
at
to
Germany.
between
as
Mussolini
aimed
with
aggressive
himself
1925,
with
failed
known
had
present
borders
Treaties,
Treaties
peace,
French
resulted
conict
Mussolini
Locarno
North
French
actions
to
Belgium
future
future
territories
Adriatic.
relations
for
French
to
October
that
western
open
of
replace
his
In
agreements
border
to
the
wanted
Europe.
Germany’s
to
aimed
French
Sardinia
jealous
around
still
the
movements
although
Mussolini
Western
and
was
opposition
over
and
culminated
The
hope
in
for
the
101
2
Kellogg–Briand
Pact
of
1928,
which
denounced
the
use
of
war
as
a
Class discussion
means
to
resolve
Discuss the extent to which
to
Italian foreign policy in the
State
1920s was consistent with
Mussolini
fascist ideology and Mussolini’s
“so
the
disputes.
declaration,
Frank
has
sublime
which
Kellogg
been
that
it
and
Italy
had
the
quoted
should
be
was
been
more
up
Foreign
saying
called
of
drawn
French
as
one
that
by
than
US
signatories
Secretary
Minister
the
60
Aristide
Kellogg–Briand
of
Briand.
Pact
was
transcendental ”.
stated aims.
Nevertheless,
only
funded
German
In
pilots
addition,
Africa.
He
French
in
brutally
TOK
Reect on the role of Mussolini
of
also
direct
in
Mussolini
continued
crushed
had
signed
a
of
groups
a
pursued
to
the
in
Treaty
of
Germany
violent
revolt
force
treaty
a
Versailles,
but
in
of
in
he
expand
also
Mussolini
secretly
and
executions.
not
trained
conquest
with
empire
highlighted
In
was
In
Italy’s
movements
were
1922–28.
war,
“friendship”
of
to
methods
Libya
mass
aims
independence
full-scale
and
ambitions
his
support
His
become
massive
long-term
breach
Italy.
Morocco.
campaign
use
in
right-wing
a
1928,
only
cynical
Abyssinia
in
when
the
put
in
against
the
he
“pacication”
down
move,
1928,
with
the
Mussolini
despite
his
there.
as leader of Italy in the 1920s.
By
the
end
of
the
1920s,
Mussolini
was
becoming
frustrated
with
the
Discuss in small groups the
failure
of
traditional
diplomacy,
but
had
to
support
the
disarmament
extent to which his role was
efforts
of
armed
forces.
the
League
of
Nations
due
to
the
weaknesses
of
the
Italian
signicant in shaping Italian
In
1927,
he
ominously
informed
the
Italian
Parliament
foreign policy and events in
that
he
would
expand
the
Italian
air
force
until
it
could
“blot
out
Europe in the 1920s. Does
the
sun”.
your study of Mussolini in
In
the
1930s,
once
the
failing
of
his
corporate
state
had
become
apparent,
this chapter suppor t the view
and
after
Hitler
had
come
to
power
in
Germany,
Mussolini’s
foreign
policy
that the role of individuals are
became
more
assertive.
He
looked
for
opportunities
to
demonstrate
that
signicant in history?
Italy
was
virile
a
major
states
British
and
such
power.
as
French
He
then
Germany
and
argued
not
that
with
the
the
future
old,
lay
liberal
with
and
new
decadent
empires.
Relations with the Soviet Union
Italy
had
Union
along
a
broken
when
with
pragmatic
going
to
Soviet
over
Union
Union
European
1921,
when
it
to
once
Italy
could
powers.
Italy.
seized
it
was
be
a
the
clear
that
trade
useful
tool
and
October
in
1917.
regime
However,
adopted
was
government
agreements
Mussolini
with
and,
saw
diplomatic
interested
Bolshevik
Soviet
government
new
gaining
also
the
arrangements
Union.
were
with
Lenin’s
the
commercial
Soviets
Germany
two
Soviet
in
Mussolini’s
“recognized”
develop
The
relations
power
powers,
negotiated
recognized
with
diplomatic
Bolsheviks
wanted
other
relations
102
In
formally
Soviet
formal
approach
fall.
Mussolini
Italy
the
other
off
Russia
in
not
in
in
that
1924,
the
leverage
fostering
had
the
Moscow.
signed
better
the
CHAPTER
Rapallo
to
the
the
and
the
at
in
FA S C I S M
which
the
into
when
the
Soviets
the
did
Soviet
ON
they
First
the
I TA LI A N
FOREIGN
renounced
World
Rapallo
post-war
communist
Even
murdered,
Mussolini
Italy
with
Italy
1922,
OF
following
draw
1920s.
IM PA C T
in
claims
dissatised
Fascist
THE
Treaty
nancial
wanted
2 .1 :
War
all
and
alignment.
P O L I C Y:
THE
territorial
the
After
Soviet
all,
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
and
Union
Italy
was
also
settlement.
Russia
Italian
not
remained
socialist
cancel
the
on
good
leader
dinner
terms
Matteotti
they
were
throughout
was
holding
for
embassy.
L TA
Communication skills
Patricia
82.
K nigh t.
Routledge.
20 03. Mussolini
London,
and
Fascism,
page
but
UK
also
Italian
desirable,
people
“tendency
…
Mussolini’s
style
and
methods
were
Italy’s
from
those
economic
impulsive,
of
and
his
predecessors.
military
inconsistent
and
He
he
satisfied
more
than
unless
anything
was
leading
role.
making
grandiloquent
to
live
lamb”,
one
and
He
he
day
was
as
a
to
else
the
and
than
that
war
a
was
such
as
thousand
was
not
of
the
fighting”.
diplomacy
With
through
a
the
of
a
newspaper
editor ”,
he
aimed
at
spectacular
gestures
without
resulting
in
a
much
foreign
thought
policy
that
for
consequences,
has
a
fond
In
of
“bet ter
years
only
“by
turn
ambivalent ,
futile
and
been
described
malignant”.
never
playing
increasingly
statements
European
by
valued
limelight
become
lion
declaring
in
character
was
as
prestige
“the
moulded
Ignoring
weaknesses,
erratic.
view
be
quite
eyes
different
to
adding
must
as
pairs,
policy
a
discuss
Mussolini’s
in
chapter
the
to
the
style
descriptions
and
1920s.
suppor t
methods
Can
the
you
in
with
find
asser tions
this
source
regard
to
examples
made
in
of
his
from
this
foreign
this
source?
inevitable
L TA
Thinking and self-management skills
1.
Look back at Mussolini’s broad foreign policy aims on page 97. Discuss the
extent to which he had achieved these aims by 1929.
2.
Put the following events under the appropriate heading, either “Cooperation” or
“Aggression”:
Locarno, 1925
The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928
Corfu, 1923
The crushing of the Libyan revolt, 1922–28
Fiume ,1924
The Treaty of Friendship with Abyssinia, 1928
Albania, 1926
3.
How far do you agree with Mack Smith in Source B on the next page that
in foreign policy in the 1920s Mussolini “was concerned less to reduce
international animosities than to foster them”?
4.
What long-term view of fascism does Mussolini express in Source A on the
next page?
103
2
Source A
Benito
Rise
Source B
Mussolini
and
Fall
in
his
autobiography
My
Denis
Mack
Despite
I
am
I
always
strict
with
of
I
read
I
know
the
its
purity
times
on
e x ce s se s
r e v e a le d.
I
am
a nd
i nte r e sts.
the
virtue
of
the
soundne s s .
and
r ace .
wi ll
p ut
of
are
a
the m
and
false
w i th
it
vi c e
down .
abroad,
by
id e al is m
its
so -
to
of
talk
1925
strength
and
energy,
about
new
it
existed
p l a nt e d
was
in
and
vibrate
The
loftiest
this
which
It
is
in
living
I
feel
thought.
self
the
I
its
vigor
I,
sky
national
its
goal,
great
long
have
interest:
to
in
my
innite
and
people
animates
and
the
civic
my
I
the
most
today
of
his
away
he
the
was
international
the
began
“Protestant
By
April
parties
countries,
Already
up
their
spoke
fascist
shirts
as
fascism
Europe.
that
different
black
used
extend
northern
of
an
Soon
well
setting
propagandists
estimated
Hyderabad.
forming
which
to
sweeping
forty
Mussolini’s
people
am
in
and
as
instance
set
message
and
sent
as
a
far
possibility
was
being
anti-communist
discussed.
Italy!
of
springtime.
work
annihilated
like
this
embassies
for
the
shine
vision
new
labors.
of
of
Italian
that
Mussolini
spreading
mission
consignment
as
on
propaganda.
his
movement
leads
(1983).
pretence
export,
companies
civilization”
of
away
light,
store
“everywhere”
of
and
of
for
channels,
for
openly
o t h er
th e
not
trade
prots
realities.
Air
Mussolini
outward
using
unofcial
in
T he
at
di ve st e d
id ea l is m
the
and
a ppe ar a n c e
a nd
its
to
bea t s .
pr obe
his
was
considerable
bogus
cre a te d
fa l l a cio us
des tr o y e d
Fascism
I
i ts
ght
ins ti tuti ons ”
because
phrases
will
I
to
fascism
a nd
ne ar
aspiratio n
and
of
whe re
fo ll ower s .
l is te n
“Liberal
forces
fa ithful
a nd
protection
their
are
mos t
masse s
degeneracy
called
my
intervene
intemperance
heart
Smith.
(1998).
too
forty-ve
and
devoted
bully
he
more
my
myself
the
abroad,
rather
rmly
than
believed
advantageous
foreign
all
style
policy
international
he
that
to
was
as
at
the
be
home,
in
politics
feared
than
less
to
that
and
it
than
concerned
animosities
was
negotiator
here
was
liked.
to
foster
In
reduce
them…
of
First question, par t a – 3 marks
citizens,
beat
of
my
people.
I
feel
place
I
upon
heart,
service
proclaim
that
all
myself
to
myself
Italians
and
on
the
their
every
What,
Italian
export
servant.
understand
and
according
to
Source
B,
did
Mussolini
do
to
fascism?
love
Second question – 4 marks
me;
I
know
that
only
he
is
loved
who
leads
With
without
weakness,
without
deviation,
reference
content,
with
disinterestedness
and
full
done
of
I
the
Italian
historical
is
destined
Capo
volume
104
to
race,
has
make
century
Press.
New
Curtis
Mussolini,
B.
what
Fascism,
an
I
have
being
met
and
and
so,
a
already
creation
will
meet
unconquerable,
indelible
impression
on
history.
York,
incorporating
Autobiography
and
over
that
necessities,
twentieth
Da
going
know
USA
(combined
Mussolini,
Publishing,
1948.)
assess
the
the
origins,
value
and
purpose
and
limitations
of
Source
faith.
A
Therefore,
to
and
B.
1928.
New
My
York,
USA;
for
historians
studying
Italy
under
Mussolini.
CHAPTER
2 .1 :
THE
IM PA C T
OF
FA S C I S M
ON
I TA LI A N
FOREIGN
P O L I C Y:
THE
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
Source A
Source help and hints
(See page 94)
Source C
A
photograph
of
Mussolini
with
(See page 92.)
black-shirted
Second question – 4 marks
With
reference
assess
the
historians
make
publication
you
to
its
and
studying
Examiner’s
work,
to
values
in
When
you
look
the
of
of
reviewing
the
title
the
out
the
possible
and
Rome,
before
the
march
1922.
content,
Source
C
for
1920s.
carefully
and
work
purpose
limitations
Italy
hint:
sure
origin,
on
Fascists
work
values
a
at
historian’s
the
as
date
these
and
of
will
help
limitations.
Values
●
A
a
value
of
the
professional
origin
is
that
historian
Mack
and
an
Smith
expert
is
on
Mussolini.
●
The
date
of
publication
and
access
to
recent
First question, par t b – 2 marks
sources
holds
value
as
the
author
had
the
What
benet
●
The
of
title
focuses
would
of
on
the
the
offer
fascism
is
in
book
suggests
political
insight
that
history
into
the
of
the
A
value
an
message
Italy
political
Examiner’s
work
pose
and
context
of
out
the
look
Italy.
and
of
the
academic
content
analysis
is
of
that
the
it
seems
situation
to
in
hint:
position
message
also
details
●
the
of
Source
A?
hindsight.
of
at
the
the
Look
in
of
this
the
carefully
photo
are
photograph.
people
at
to
to
him.
support
to
Refer
your
his
working
Remember
surrounding
photograph
Mussolini:
key
to
the
points.
be
the
Example answer
1920s.
The
Limitations
●
As
a
may
British
not
overall
Mussolini
historian,
have
perspective
of
a
full
it
is
possible
insight
into
that
the
who
he
Italian
events
There
may
also
be
a
limitation
in
that
the
this
by
the
fact
that
a
broad
study
that
considers
the
of
the
whole
modern
era
the
be
a
lack
of
focus
on
him
condent
he
everyone
that
he
in
Italy.
is
in
the
looking
for
photograph
is
leading
leadership.
and
deant
middle
at
him.
of
is
that
these
We
pose,
the
men,
can
and
photo
has
a
lot
of
Another
supporters,
and
message
that
many
these
Mussolini’s
supporters
are
war
heroes
as
they
are
There
wearing
may
to
this
and
political
of
history
his
of
control
book
is
is
in
looking
see
with
●
are
message
is
Italy
medals.
in
1920s.
105
2
Work in pairs on the following questions. These sources relate to Mussolini’s foreign policy
in the 1920s.
Source A
Martin
Blinkhorn.
Mussolini
and
Fascist
Italy
*Austen
from
(1984).
Chamberlain
1924–29.
Chamberlain,
A
combination
of
boldness
and
negotiation
in
[Mussolini]
Italy;
the
to…
terms
of
achieve
Fiume’s
Mussolini’s
Yugoslavia
consigned
hinterland
and
Fiume
to
isolation
but
Italian
was
patriots
Mussolini’s
Greek
island
especially
Having
more
of
ecstatic…
impetuous
Corfu,
British
learned
powerful
were
economic
pressure
that
he
with
from
than
Less
forced
himself,
him
not
yet
in
decade
Italy’s
with
trod
more
position
Britain
alliance
warily,
through
while
system
in
to
maintaining
working
to
this
strategy
to
according
of
Italy’s
In
pairs,
the
and
evacuate.
his
friendly
Chamberlain*,
one
of
for
rst
read
Source
with
through
question,
examiner’s
How
those
Great
A,
were
Britain
up
the
to
key
features
1926?
tips
many
part
below.
marks
Source
a.
A
Check
Do
would
you
you
and
your
have
have
draft
a
response
response
three
been
with
clear
to
the
points?
awarded?
almost
good
Europe.
relations
●
British
out
France’s
hint:
of
pressure
many
forced
Mussolini
to
pull
Corfu.
Crucial
relationship
the
to
relations
Britain
was
more
powerful
than
Italy,
so
with
Mussolini
Austen
of
strengthen
undermine
south-eastern
was
minister
First question, par t a – 3 marks
●
to
prime
Minister
Neville
its
the
defy
Mussolini
seeking
became
of
1937
Examiner’s
a
Foreign
successful
of
international
could
British
half-brother
stagnation,
occupation
which
who
the
the
incorporation
agreement
What,
consequent
was
was
enabled
Britain
him
He
had
to
comply
with
Britain’s
European
wishes.
conservatives
who
admired
the
Duce’s
anti-
●
Bolshevism
and
Chamberlain’s
acquiescence
protectorate
imposition
benevolence
in
the
over
of
internal
ensured
establishment
Albania
in
1926
of
“order”.
British
an
and
the
cession
to
Italy
of
two
wanted
with
Britain
alliance
Italian
small
pieces
maintain
good
Mussolini’s
special
relationship
Chamberlain
was
key.
territory.
cartoon
on
106
29
by
David
November
Low
1927.
the
system.
Source B
A
relations
undermining
of
Austen
African
to
while
made
●
possible
Italy
published
in
the
UK
newspaper,
the
Evening
Standard,
with
French
CHAPTER
2 .1 :
THE
IM PA C T
OF
FA S C I S M
ON
I TA LI A N
FOREIGN
P O L I C Y:
THE
ORIGINS ,
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
First question, par t b – 2 marks
Examiner’s
What
is
the
message
of
the
cartoonist
in
Source
●
Look
at
Source
question,
part
B
b.
and
draft
Check
a
your
response
response
to
the
with
Mussolini
rst
tips
on
the
right.
Do
you
have
(or
How
many
marks
would
you
was
out
of
control
or
the
two
Italy
does
not
have
take
participation
at
clear
conferences
points?
Italy)
misbehaving.
●
examiner’s
hint:
B?
seriously;
childish
behaviour
is
been
shown.
awarded?
Are
there
points
that
you
had
not
noticed?
●
France
is
appears
●
The
turning
away
concerned
USA
is
by
ignoring
from
its
Italy
and
behaviour.
Italy’s
behaviour.
Source C
Examiner’s
Antonio
writer,
central
Cippico,
in
his
Italian
book
problem
of
of
the
politician
lectures,
and
Italy:
Mediterranean
and
The
also
second
(1926).
Check
have
This
enormous
work
of
internal
renovation
accomplished
in
only
two
and
a
half
foreign
Italian
In
proof
policy
of
Government
its
is
no
less
worthy
attachment
has
signed
to
eight
your
clear
examples
Draft
response
points
content
have
on
a
with
the
given
response
the
tips
value
of
1
of
to
of
this
how
this
answer
question.
below–
the
to
book
do
origin,
you
purpose
of
the
been
source?
awarded?
How
Are
many
there
marks
points
in
would
the
of
mark
mention.
the
Chapter
years.
you
Mussolini’s
at
questions.
Review
has
and
been
look
hint:
peace
scheme
that
you
had
not
noticed?
the
commercial
Example answer
treaties
and
arbitration
amongst
out
of
other
with
the
the
a
exemplary
large
number
European
seventeen
agreements
Powers,
of
states.
has
conventions
based
She,
signed
on
alone,
twelve
submitted
by
Values
●
A
value
Italian
International
Labor
Bureau
of
Geneva.
(She
is
of
the
European
nation
that
desired
that
both
legally
sanction
the
obligation
of
the
and
day.).
By
the
episode
of
the
It
was
bombardment
she
her
will
her
great
treaties
of
her
to
be
with
world
respected
In
Fascist
the
in
all
proof,
parts
During
Yugoslavia
will.
the
high
the
moderation.
good
Nations
the
gave
her
she
the
has
in
which
of
the
long
given
relations
government
consideration
beside
with
of
to
●
therefore
written
than
a
year
ago,
she
gave
me
the
of
announcing
at
the
of
the
League
Institute
for
at
the
established
at
auspices
the
Geneva
the
unication
Rome
at
offer
Italy’s
of
A
founding
private
expense
law,
to
the
under
which
into
a
means
view
it
from
the
time
rule.
suggests
in
Italian
his
at
that
Geneva;
knowledge
policies
the
foreign
and
author
policy
as
therefore
and
played
a
a
value
understanding
conditions
in
the
1920s.
of
the
issues
purpose
in
the
is
that
it
is
an
Mediterranean
at
assessment
may
put
events
into
a
broader
the
time
context.
Limitations
the
Source
was
rule
the
1926
C
was
written
in
1926,
which
means
League.
reference
historians
in
an
be
Second question – 4 marks
assess
be
value
that
With
experienced
Assembly
●
of
have
hand.
honourable
General
of
role
Italian
and
of
may
when,
of
change
rst
insight
content
key
would
display
it,
an
representative
of
●
less
Italy
Mussolini’s
The
a
proof
League
holds
was
of
tedious
ample
the
wished
she
that
world,
and
author
of
of
Corfu
the
eight-
provides
hour
that
houses
●
should
is
the
Mussolini’s
only
origin
the
to
values
its
and
studying
origin,
purpose
limitations
Italy
in
the
of
and
the
author
written
over
at
lacks
an
hindsight
early
stage
of
on
events.
It
Mussolini’s
Italy.
content,
Source
C
for
1920s.
107
2
●
Mussolini’s
over
time,
perspective
particularly
may
have
when
his
changed
Contrasts
policies
●
shifted
●
The
in
the
content
positive
terms
seems
view
of
its
Source
of
use
focused
on
Mussolini’s
of
language
presenting
regime,
and
both
a
●
The
selection
the
author’s
previous
role
government
is
suggests
that
Source
C
a
over
too
Italy
representing
at
Geneva
one-sided
in
may
favour
bully
of
Italy’s
peace
actions
SourceD
upset
the
community.
suggests
that
may
be
justifying
the
or
compliance
with
Corfu,
showed
Italy
was
whereas
behaving
moderation
Source
over
D
like
suggests
Corfu.
mean
Source
the
C
claims
highest
that
Italy
regard
and
held
the
League
supported
its
author’s
work
support
pursued
the
in
or
Italy
whereas
of
●
source
regime,
that
League,
evidence.
Mussolini’s
the
claims
through
international
in
●
supporting
C
1930s.
while
Source
D
suggests
that
Italy
was
it.
sabotaging
its
work.
Source D
Four th question – 9 marks
Denis
Mack
Smith.
Mussolini
(1983).
Work
The
League
someone
of
bent
Sometimes
he
Nations
on
could
upsetting
condemned
not
the
it
much
world
as
“a
appeal
to
community.
holy
and
the
on
style
the
plutocratic
nations”
against
smaller
countries
such
as
Italy.
Later,
of
a
those
smaller
countries
expressed
Read
response
fourth
the
through
to
the
question).
sources
when
extent
all
four
following
You
have
sources
again
question
25
(in
minutes.
do
and
you
your
agree
own
with
knowledge,
the
to
statement:
many
“Mussolini
of
own.
full
and
what
poorer
a
alliance
Using
of
your
write
outrage
at
pursued
an
aggressive
foreign
policy
in
the
his
1920s”?
bullying
over
Corfu,
he
used
the
almost
opposite
Here
argument
barbarian
whereas
not
all
he
in
too
many
nations”
they
interfere
Though
do
that
went
his
claimed
should
with
representative
on
at
learn
their
power
small
Geneva
voice
their
civilized
foreigners
support
was
the
it,
●
and
work,
and
Italy
remained
a
he
would
he
realized
voice
otherwise
being
be
that
to
help
you
without
This
some
to
suggests
degree
with
the
over
use
of
force,
negotiation
British.
undermine
aggressively
the
of
the
Fiume
French
and
and
Mussolini
and
acted
Corfu.
sabotaging
member
international
resolved
A:
also
worked
his
Source
B:
Mussolini’s
actions
were
chaotic
and
only
of
line
with
the
actions
of
other
powers.
conicts
His
would
points
compromise
out
because
some
Source
but
neighbours.
League,
actively
in
place
●
its
are
“semi-
equal
keep
more
telling
to
an
to
and
an
policies
were
causing
alarm
to
the
French.
Italian
heard.
●
Source
the
C:
Mussolini
international
acted
in
the
community
interests
and
of
worked
Third question – 6 marks
Compare
and
regarding
contrast
Italian
the
foreign
views
policy
expressed
in
Sources
C
and
with
the
over
issues
League.
such
He
as
had
shown
moderation
Corfu.
D.
●
Example answer
Source
the
D:
Mussolini
League
policies
of
that
used
Nations
showed
and
and
he
manipulated
pursued
was
intent
aggressive
on
Comparisons
sabotaging
●
Both
Sources
discuss
Italy’s
relationship
These
the
League
of
the
League’s
work.
with
are
some
points
you
could
bring
in
from
your
own
Nations.
knowledge
●
Both
Sources
discuss
●
Both
Sources
suggest
Italy’s
actions
in
Corfu.
●
that
Italy
openly
Mussolini
had
community
its
support
for
at
Locarno
with
in
the
international
1925,
and
had
Geneva.
signed
up
to
renounced
●
However,
port
108
worked
stated
of
the
war
Kellogg–Briand
as
a
tool
Mussolini
Fiume
from
had
of
Pact,
diplomacy
used
force
Yugoslavia
in
to
which
in
1928.
gain
1924,
the
and
CHAPTER
he
2 .1 :
had
when
THE
IM PA C T
previously
met
with
occupation
of
OF
FA S C I S M
demanded
British
Corfu
ON
FOREIGN
P O L I C Y:
compensation
opposition
in
I TA LI A N
over
Mussolini
had
promoting
ORIGINS ,
Morocco
his
and
18 7 0 – 19 3 3
destabilizing
its
alliance
partner,
Yugoslavia.
1923.
●
●
THE
provoked
the
independence
French
Mussolini’s
by
movements
actions
in
Libyan
in
aggression
Africa,
revolt
up
in
to
was
the
most
brutal
marked
crushing
in
of
his
the
1928.
References
Carocci,
G.
1974.
Cippico,A.
University
Clark,
M.
Delzell,
1926.
Press.
1985.
C.
(ed).
Macmillan.
Knight,
P
.
Italian
Italy:
New
The
1971.
2003.
Italy
CT,
Mediterranean
and
D.
1983.
Mussolini.
Mack
Smith,
D.
1997.
Modern
Press.
New
R.
Meakin,
1983.
T.
in
Mussolini,
B.
1998.
volume
Robson,
His
M.
Stoughton.
Steiner,
Z.
Own
2004.
2005.
of
Yale
UK
Selected
Documents .
–
A
Books.
Political
London,
London,
History .
UK
UK
Yale
University
the
My
Fascism:
over
History
Rise
and
York,
Italy:
of
the
Second
Review,
Da
and
Straus
Liberalism
extent
and
St
number
Capo
Mussolini,
USA;
Farrar,
What
substance”.
Fall.
incorporating
Story.
Origins
World
War,
1933–
40 .
UK
style
with
New
Oxford,
London,
1919–45:
Routledge.
Paladin
Italy
“Mussolini’s
triumph
Publishing.
Mussolini:
and
London,
association
(combined
Curtis
a
Mediterranean .
USA
Mussolini
2007.
represented
Oxford,
CT,
Macmillan.
the
Longman.
Fascism,
Fascism.
Smith,
Palgrave
of
UK
USA
1871–1982.
Mack
Mallet,
Problem
Harmondsworth,
UK
Mussolini
Haven,
Penguin.
Central
Haven,
Modern
London,
Fascism.
Giroux.
Fascism
New
1928.
Mussolini,
and
Fascism
College,
59
Press.
B.
Italian
Hugh’s
B.
My
York,
1948.
New
1870–45 .
USA
Autobiography.
The
York,
Fall
of
USA
Hodder
and
UK
The
Lights
that
Failed.
Oxford
University
Press.
Oxford,UK
109
2.2
The impact of Nazism on German
foreign policy: the origins, 1918–1933
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Causation
➔
Perspectives
➔
Continuity
Key questions
➔
Examine the reasons for the growth in suppor t for Nazism after
the First World War.
➔
To what extent did Hitler have clear foreign policy objectives
before he came to power?
▲
Car toon by Daniel Fitzpatrick, St. Louis Post-
dispatch, October 19th, 1930
Germany signs armistice to end World
Kaiser Wilhelm abdicates; Eber t takes over
1918 November
War One
as president of the new Weimar Republic
1919 January
Spar tacist uprising
The Treaty of Versailles is signed by
June
Germany
September
Hitler joins the German Workers’ Par ty
The German Workers’ Par ty is renamed the
1920 February
National Socialist German Workers’ Par ty
(or NSDAP).
March
French troops occupy the Ruhr
1923 January
1923
Beer Hall Putsch
The Dawes Plan is implemented
1925 October
1926
110
Germany faces hyperination
November
September
The Locarno Treaty
The Kapp Putsch
Germany joins the League of Nations
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
I M PA C T
O F
N A Z I S M
O N
G E R M A N
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
19 18 – 19 3 3
1928
Germany signs the Kellogg–Briand Pact
The Young Plan
1929
The Wall Street Crash in the USA
1929 October
The death of Stresemann
The Nazi Par ty gains 18.3% of the vote in
1930 September
the Reichstag elections
1931
Unemployment reaches 4.9 million
The Nazi par ty gains 37.4% of the vote in
1932 July
the Reichstag
Hitler is appointed Chancellor of Germany
Nazism
took
rise
to
roots
the
refers
power,
power
in
the
the
and
of
German
and
was
his
and
Once
thus
into
or
in
the
his
the
was
to
a
take
policy
had
Treaty
of
that
Hitler’s
their
World
War,
of
1929
attain
become
able
foreign
the
to
Party
1933.
policy
Crash
Hitler
to
in
First
and
Street
vote
Hitler
in
1918
allowed
German
action
foreign
defeat
Wall
Socialist
Germany
German
November
which
the
National
leader,
on
was
Chancellor,
put
Nazi
its
in
it
Depression
of
1933 January
Germany’s
signed
enough
the
as
views
of
However,
Great
politics.
of
Hitler
indeed
that
achieve
Germany
policies
Adolf
1919.
ensuing
thus
the
circumstances
Armistice
Versailles
to
with
elections
and
popularity
force
total
in
control
of
aims.
What was the impact of the First World War and
defeat on Germany?
Kaiser
Wilhelm
expecting
German
swift
equally
in
1917,
then
been
near
up
the
the
in
a
Germany
which
before
war
of
At
with
victory
for
nally
up
peace.
from
same
German
on
the
seemed
In
the
gains
had
the
it
in
of
Front)
population
for
On
expected
1914
achieve
a
expectation.
Front,
in
in
an
Germany.
the
the
On
Revolution
Litovsk,
managing
which
in
the
Front.
Brest
by
of
to
this
involved
Russian
(supported
Eastern
Western
Russia.
was
ended
was
War
failure
intended
sight
the
World
the
Eastern
Treaty
from
who
offensive
the
on
First
Russia,
time,
following
Ludendorff,
an
Germany
attrition
the
the
However,
attacking
Russia
territorial
launched
into
victorious.
Bolsheviks,
sued
The
by
Allies.
conict
freed
and
Plan,
General
Paris.
taken
France
substantial
German
effort,
had
short
1917,
Front,
October
to
ended
facing
However,
secured
over
bloody
Eastern
II
be
Schlieffen
trenches
had
to
victory
Germany
the
it
Germany
Western
the
victory.
Front,
German
German
pushed
the
of
the
Even
war
troops
that
Alllies
back
when
this
▲
Kaiser Wilhelm II
111
2
hope
was
crushed
as
the
Allies
pushed
back,
German
defeat
was
not
Kaiser Wilhelm II
certain.
Germany was ruled by Kaiser
In
Wilhelm II. The political system
fact,
areas
By
at
of
November
this
point,
Eastern
1918,
the
Germany
Europe
(see
Allies
still
the
had
not
controlled
map
invaded
most
of
German
Belgium
territory.
and
large
below).
was authoritarian, with power
Nevertheless,
Germany
had
lost
its
best
troops
this
was
not
in
the
1918
offensive;
morale
held by the Kaiser and his
was
low
as
they
retreated,
and
helped
by
an
outbreak
of
the
chancellor. The power of
deadly
Spanish
Inuenza.
Ludendorff
was
convinced
that
the
German
the German parliament, the
army
could
not
carry
on
ghting
and
that
Germany
would
be
defeated
in
Reichstag, was limited. Germany
the
spring
of
1919.
He
also
hoped
that
Germany
would
receive
less
severe
had only become unied in
terms
if
the
government
asked
US
President
Woodrow
Wilson
for
a
cease
1871, the work of the German
re
based
on
Wilson’s
14-point
programme
(see
next
page).
Asking
for
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck,
an
armistice
before
Germany
was
invaded
would
also
preserve
the
army’s
who fought a war against Austria
reputation.
and a war against France (1870)
to achieve this. In the war of
Believing
1914–18, Germany fought with
Ludendorff
Austria–Hungary against the
Baden.
Allies: Britain, France and Russia.
with
France hoped to gain revenge for
armistice
that
better
handed
Negotiations
Wilson
terms
over
over
demanding
could
be
could
power
the
the
be
to
a
gained
armistice
Kaiser
from
government
be
then
a
lasted
removed
civilian
led
by
for
from
government,
Prince
several
power
Max
of
weeks,
before
an
signed.
its defeat in the war of 1870–71.
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1
9
1
Ju
16
March
7
1
9
1
Sept
Paris
Central
Powers
Allied
Major
offensives
battles
1918
Farthest
Neutral
of
Central
German
blockade
submarine
1914–1917
The ex tent of German territory in 1918
zone
advances
Central
Powers
Powers
Stabilized
front
FRANCE
112
naval
nations
Stabilized
▲
British
war
Feb–Dec
y
a
M
1914
Powers
Verdun
Marne
6–9
Allied
g
u
A
1918
March
offensives
front
1917
1916
RE
19
14
April
E
GREEC
AM
1
9
1
7
A
ug
Baghdad
25
YN
D
e
c
.
EMPIRE
Gallipoli
ALBANIA
Armistice
line
OPO
TA
NIA
C H A P T E R
At
2 . 2 :
this
T H E
point
political
German
the
the
in
a
who
never
lost
developed,
of
the
Germany
new
had
severe
Kaiser
This
G E R M A N
sailors
drastic
government
fact
socialists
the
shock.
O N
faced
from
causing
Germans
was
theory
when
also
Germany,
many
had
back”
in
N A Z I S M
mutiny
was
socialist
armistice
army
a
which
imminent
O F
Germany
unrest,
blockade
For
I M PA C T
the
to
to
on
the
and,
The
were
to
Thus,
of
11
agreeing
idea
of
to
winning
19 18 – 19 3 3
the
Allied
civil
war
a
new
armistice.
the
that
an
war,
the
or
by
the
German
“stab
defeat
the
O R I G I N S ,
November,
the
Germany’s
of
with
winning
the
T H E
strikes,
impact
Dolchstosslegende
for
point
the
on
terms
rise
explained
government
been
they
P O L I C Y:
problems:
and
shortages.
the
give
war.
which
Kiel,
abdicated
thought
was
domestic
at
food
agreed
F O R E I G N
in
the
blaming
armistice
just
war.
L TA
Thinking skills
Study the source below showing Wilson’s 14 points.
1
What do you consider to have been Wilson’s overriding aims for a European
peace settlement?
2
Based on these points, what kind of agreement do you think Germany was
hoping to obtain?
Wilson’s
14
9
points
All
Italians
borders
1
No
more
secret
agreements
(“open
arrived
Free
be
allowed
“along
to
clearly
live
in
Italy.
Italy’s
recognisable
lines
nationality”
at”)
10
2
to
be
covenants
of
openly
to
navigation
of
all
Self-determination
for
all
those
living
in
seas
Austria–Hungary
3
Removal
of
economic
barriers
between
11
Self-determination
and
guarantees
of
countries
independence
4
Reduction
consistent
in
armaments,
with
domestic
“to
the
lowest
points
Balkan
Colonial
to
6
the
The
problems
interests
German
of
to
be
settled
colonial
army
to
be
Evacuation
8
France
of
with
The
reference
the
peoples
evacuated
Turkish
Turkish
Turkish
from
Russia
13
recover
for
the
of
should
an
have
should
be
govern
independent
access
to
governed
Non-Turks
the
in
by
the
old
themselves
Poland,
which
sea
Belgium
be
fully
liberated
and
Establishment
of
a
League
of
Nations
allowed
to
to
people
government.
Empire
Creation
14
should
allowed
states
should
7
be
safety”
12
5
should
guarantee
the
political
and
territorial
Alsace–Lorraine
independence
of
all
states
What was the impact of the Treaty of Versailles?
The
armistice
was
drawn
work
of
Lloyd
The
three
George
aims
of
could
to
be
set
at
men:
of
up
a
in
up
Palace
Prime
Britain,
and
held
followed
the
these
Clemenceau
aimed
was
up
of
Minister
and
lasting
place
were
As
you
and
by
an
a
peace
just
treaty,
outside
have
of
Woodrow
very
different,
seen
system
of
international
signed
Paris
Clemenceau
President
statesmen
Wilson.
with
Versailles
from
and
France,
Wilson
his
14
the
1919.
from
USA.
aims
of
Wilson
relations
of
the
Minister
the
the
points,
League
This
mainly
Prime
particularly
international
body,
in
was
that
Nations.
113
2
L TA
However,
Clemenceau
it
had
caused
France,
In pairs, study Source A and
sufciently
Source B below. Discuss the
anxious
following questions.
empire.
Lloyd
but
to
1
had
to
to
and
prevent
preserve
on
from
Britain’s
George
take
it
also
to
was
board
to
make
Germany
that
threatening
naval
more
the
ensure
pay
for
Germany
the
France
supremacy
inclined
to
anti-German
again.
and
damage
in
weakened
Britain
hoped
leniency
feeling
was
than
to
was
enlarge
the
Clemenceau
Britain.
Which aspects of the Treaty
of Versailles were most
Given
likely to anger Germans?
2
wished
Thinking and social skills
these
different
peacemakers
not
On what evidence do you
surprising
Versailles]
think Steiner bases her
that
argument that Germany
…
makers”
it
a
was
to
as
solve
great
a
aims,
and
that,
failed
remained
defeat
“remained a great power ”?
faced
the
the
of
along
speed
with
at
historian
problem
power
bundle
(Steiner,
the
despite
of
the
the
which
Zara
both
four
compromises
multiplicity
it
was
Steiner
writes,
punishing
years
that
fully
of
of
drawn
and
“ [the
it
is
and
none
its
of
the
perhaps
Treaty
conciliating
ghting
satised
problems
up,
a
of
country
military
the
three
peace
2011).
Source skills
Source A
Key
articles
of
the
Treaty
of
Versailles,
1919.
Ar ticle number
1–26
42
Description
The Covenant of the League of Nations was established; Germany was not allowed to join.
The Rhineland was demilitarized; the German army was not allowed to go there.
The Allies were to keep an army of occupation in the Rhineland for 15 years.
45
The Saar, with its rich coalelds, was given to France for 15 years.
51
Alsace–Lorraine was returned to France.
80
Germany was forbidden to unite with Austria.
87
Lands in eastern Germany, the rich farmlands of Posen and the Polish Corridor between Germany
and East Prussia, were given to Poland.
100
Danzig was made a Free City under League of Nations control.
119
All Germany’s colonies were taken and given to France and Britain as “mandates”.
160
The German army was restricted to 100,000 men.
181
The German navy was restricted to six battleships and no submarines.
198
Germany was not allowed to have an air force (though the military inspectorate that oversaw the
military clauses was withdrawn in 1927).
231
Germany was responsible for causing all the loss and damage caused by the war. This was known
as the War Guilt Clause.
232
Germany would have to pay reparations, to be decided later. It was eventually set at 132 billion
gold marks in 1921. (However, in reality, only a trivial amount of this sum was actually paid.)
114
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
I M PA C T
O F
N A Z I S M
O N
G E R M A N
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
19 18 – 19 3 3
Source B
Map
showing
Germany
the
after
territorial
World
War
losses
of
economic
One
of
its
left
Territorial
losses
of
Germany
amounted
to
intact,
of
approximately
Geran
ls
13%
Nr 
of
the
Slesi
with
capacity
However,
a
and
about
Germany
population
which
10%
was
was
still
almost
the
double
loss
production
population.
the
population
of
France.
country’s
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A
Source skills
Ruth
War,
Henig.
pages
The
4–5,
Origins
of
the
Second
preventing
World
glorious
(1985).
Social
Here
was
the
rst
major
post-war
had
lost
the
First
World
War,
but
important
sections
of
Democratic
post-war
responsibility
Germany
which
tried
accept
which
that
defeat
followed
German
it
as
and
a
government
fair
in
the
or
the
peace
nal
to
allied
treaty
1920s
demands
could
as
a
of
Poland,
result
without
public
“war
included
hostility.
guilt
lie”,
These
were
in
back”
“the
Enduring
and
alleged
shame
“the
to
of
and
strikes
by
in
fermenting
German
The
signing
advocate
the
peace
some
diktat
measure
with
its
terms,
lost
electoral
of
support
…
It
is
signicant
Czechoslovakia
that
and
the
new
Romania
states
were
to
to
in
die
Germany
within
a
as
Saisonsstaaten
single
season:
–
states
annuals
than
perennials
like
Germany
or
France.
the
criminals”.
“stabbed
of
to
nationalist
First question, par t a – 3 marks
Germany
What,
the
grasp.
shouldered
readily
Versailles”,
November
have
the
incurring
rather
themes
which
its
No
born
widespread
Party,
winning
within
settlement
outcome.
referred
agree
from
nearly
did
compliance
not
so
large
and
and
army
problem:
the
Germany
her
victory
according
to
this
source,
was
the
attitude
demonstrations
industrial
areas,
of
the
German
of
Versailles?
population
towards
the
Treaty
thus
115
2
What was the impact of the First World War on Hitler ’s
foreign policy?
The
defeat
followed
Hitler’s
fought
the
in
of
the
foreign
in
the
German
the
war,
So
it
all
death
of
fully
groups
the
“the
of
two
could
the
the
in
authorities
L TA
German
Anton
of
In
Party
and
they
the
ideas
all
at
the
by
War.
an
Versailles
that
development
by
He
birth
and
heard
injury
sacrices.
hearts
for
a
this,
In
he
vain
did
so
diktat,
and
socialists
First
our
the
had
that
a
the
of
had
news
of
received
hours
duty.
gang
had
of
he
that
the
War.
was
been
it
In
of
in
vain
wretched
his
to
on
Germany
been
Weimar
decision
Working
sent
of
conservative
had
new
founded
suspected
and
imposed
inuence
World
agent,
was
we
nationalist
was
helped
which
which
from
our
died
held
the
the
of
the
Austrian
World
consultation,
–
in
fatherland?
Versailles
intelligence
Worker’s
vain
treaty
after
First
Treaty
key
writing:
on
no
the
the
the
was
recovering
Had
criminals”
an
Drexler,
the
of
were
Hitler
clutching
hands
with
politics
as
vain.
fear
Treaty
with
impact
1919
in
while
millions.
lay
war
disgust
involved
army
in
mortal
November
Hitler’s
Thinking and
been
in
horried,
embraced
that
end
was
the
war
objectives.
German
with
and
the
policy
and
criminals
Hitler
of
surrender
had
which,
the
Germany
end
for
signed
Republic.
to
the
plotting
January
become
army
investigate
in
at
by
the
1919
left-wing
by
revolution.
communication skills
In
Study the source below. Make
bullet point notes answering
the
a
it
was
an
extreme
working-class
soon
the following questions:
1
fact,
over
becoming
National
new
its
leading
Socialist
symbol.
nationalist
support.
The
Hitler
member.
German
party
He
had
Workers’
Sturmabteilung
which
accepted
the
Party
(SA),
or
was
Drexler’s
party
and
attempting
invitation
renamed
gave
it
the
“Stormtroopers”,
to
to
to
win
join,
become
swastika
as
(see
On what grounds did Hitler
page
120)
was
established
as
a
paramilitary
group
led
by
Ernst
condemn the Treaty of
Röhm,
who
recruited
thousands
of
ex-soldiers
into
its
ranks.
The
Versailles?
party
2
was
based
on
similar
extreme
ideas
as
Mussolini’s
Fascist
Party,
What other foreign policy
with
the
same
strands
of
nationalism,
militarism,
Social
Darwinism,
aims can be seen in
authoritarianism,
and
a
hatred
of
communism,
socialism
and
trade
Hitler ’s speech that are
unions.
However,
some
historians,
such
as
Klaus
Hildebrand,
would
unrelated to the Treaty of
argue
that
it
was
so
dominated
by
Hitler’s
personal
ideas
that
it
cannot
Versailles?
be
tted
into
the
overall
category
of
European
Fascism.
Source skills
A
speech
by
Versailles,
Adolf
17
April
Hitler
on
the
Treaty
moment
of
because
1923.
eyes
With
of
its
the
armistice
Germany.
Germans,
The
who
foes
116
stand
you
are
ght
now
fanatical
but
the
had
of
the
Republic
appealed
to
the
last
enemies
of
Republicans.
this
to
Up
not
the
the
and
resist
then
they
because
was
it
So
of
is
the
of
Republic
Today
Republic
day
must
Germany
discredited
turn
a
foe!
you
millions
would
are
the
Republic
founded
at
long
as
this
resurrection
country:
expects
breath,
the
so
was
the
regretfully
humiliated,
new
ag
toward
that
the
old
men’s
ag.
humiliation
on
Republic
your
Republic
because
the
together!
Fatherland,
that
be
If
foundation
begins
when
it
the
reform
made
their
But
it
of
in
any
those
formulated
the
to
and
who
At
Treaty
kind
order
deaths
aside.
of
its
stands
German
is
possible!
bring
to
20
ruin
made
the
our
be
no
no
social
Treaty
was
Germans
German
Treaty
demands:
can
The
million
the
foundation
three
there
people;
to
nation.
cannot
set
Movement
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
I M PA C T
1
Setting
2
Unication
O F
aside
N A Z I S M
of
the
O N
Peace
G E R M A N
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
An
Treaty.
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
anvil
beaten
of
all
Land
our
and
soil
[Grund
und
Boden]
to
movement
which
There
task
the
his
is
of
could
since
caused
Republic,
it
it
was
the
did
thus
this
formulate
not
War,
not
one
it
sign
thing
once
Fatherland
everything
It
has
the
it
more
shall
else.
our
of
the
that
anvil
we
anvil
will
fashion
be
a
hammer,
a
German
once
sword!
not
made
Peace
is
to
National,
stand
for
to
to
the
cartoon
chapter
on
page
110.
at
cartoon
concerning
What
the
is
start
the
of
this
message
him
rst
With
make
refe rence
content,
using
above
our
Treaty
of
of
this
Versailles?
Second question – 4 marks
that
teach
the
the
Treaty.
the
desires
desires
back
these
Movement
which
Movement:
German
out
and
First question, par t b – 2 marks
nation.
demands,
until
today,
feed
Refer
Our
are
Germans.
more
3
we
19 18 – 19 3 3
this
policy
to
assess
i ts
the
source
o r i gi n,
v a l ue
as
p urp os e
a nd
e v i de nce
an d
l imi tation s
of
Hi tl er ’s
of
for e ig n
aims.
people
Third question – 6 marks
to
understand
saying:
bean
He
afresh
who
will
the
not
truth
be
a
of
the
old
hammer
Compare
must
page
anvil.
made
The
speech
prison
out
(see
his
ideas
Semitism.
to
above
page
also
Hitler
1.
the
put
had
given
wide
Treaty
in
foreign
of
bulk
of
Hitler
wrote
range
the
forward
clear
by
Hitler
of
a
issues;
the
Versailles
Mein
policy
in
Kampf,
Also
called
German
book
was
aims
1923.
book
was
indicating
before
1923,
policy.
other
that,
This
actually
this
points
Treaty
of
made
by
Versailles
Henig
to
on
those
speech.
in
His
anti-
desire
important
unlike
in
the
the
set
nationalism,
foreign
but
Hitler
while
Kampf.
unity,
on
stressed,
well
in
Mein
by
contrast
regarding
ideas
Mussolini,
attaining
power.
A “Gross Deutschland”
Also
had
For
known
been
and
Pan-Germanism,
important
this
foreign
Germans
Versailles),
that
as
an
Hitler,
Austrian
2.
a
However,
overturn
were
on
was
120),
and
115
were
but
now
aim
policy
with
also
the
under
of
the
aim
rule
of
of
creating
mean
(which
unication
of
nationalists
would
Germany
the
idea
German
was
the
states,
Gross
the
Deutschland
19th
unication
forbidden
Germany
other
a
in
with
by
the
German
notably
century.
not
only
Treaty
of
of
minorities
Czechoslovakia
Poland.
Race and living space
Linked
to
political
would
the
ideas
last
include
race,
which
Such
views
towards
the
point
were
only
“pure”
combined
on
the
end
of
was
dened
the
in
Germans
“robust
existence
the
issue
terms
19th
of
of
who
muscular
of
a
race;
race.
power
with
of
the
fact,
new
were
hierarchy
century
in
A
of
all
the
with
races
belief
of
Hitler’s
Greater
rst
had
in
Germany
superior
class
Aryan
intellect”.
become
Social
popular
Darwinism.
117
2
This
held
that
human
life,
like
animal
life,
was
subject
to
the
natural
The Third Reich
laws
The Third Reich was a term
this
used by Adolf Hitler in the
of
theory
need
1920s to describe the
as
1,000-year empire he intended
selection
in
more
far
as
and
Mein
space
the
only
the
Kampf.
ttest
He
further
(Lebensraum)
Ural
mountains.
Russians,
Ukrainians,
The
“inferior”
Poles
would
and
This
and
survive.
argued
that
this
would
other
that
the
should
involve
“inferior”
Hitler
developed
Aryan
come
race
from
dispossessing
nations
or
would
the
the
East,
Slavs,
untermenschen
to create. The First Reich (or
most
people,
according
to
Hitler,
were
the
Jews.
Here
Empire) was the Holy Roman
Hitler
was
reecting
the
anti-Semitic
views
which
had
been
prevalent
in
Empire which had existed
Europe
for
hundreds
of
years,
but
his
rhetoric
and
actions
towards
the
from the time of Charlemagne
Jews
were
to
reach
new
and
hitherto
unimagined
extremes
of
violence.
to 1806. The Second Reich
His
view
was
that
if
Jewish
inuence
was
left
unchecked,
it
would
result
was the German Empire of
in
“national
race
tuberculosis”.
This
meant
that
the
German
race
must
be
1871–1918 created by Otto
protected
against
contact
with
inferior
blood,
such
as
that
of
the
Jews,
if
von Bismarck .
it
was
Once
to
become
the
living
foundations
the
dominant
space
would
for
the
have
force
in
Germans
been
laid
for
Europe.
had
the
been
secured,
“Third
the
Reich”.
Source skills
An
extract
Hitler
in
from
Mein
Kampf,
written
restoration
by
absurdity
1923.
towards
Germany
has
an
annual
increase
in
nearly
900,000.
The
difculty
of
feeding
of
new
citizens
must
increase
from
year
and
ultimately
end
in
and
means
catastrophe
are
found
…
Nature
be
her
…
favourite
industry
…
she
confers
child,
Only
a
the
the
strongest
sufciently
in
right
earth
can
ensure
the
courage
large
space
independent
of
a
nation
species
of
obligation
…
As
members
humanity
…
[to]
on
…
of
this
full
the
The
land
and
soil
[must
be]
the
foreign
policy
…
The
we
for
The
colossal
dissolution.
the
Jewish
domination
in
And
Russia
end
of
Russia
as
a
state
…
Today
will
to
achieve
a
position
as
a
we
world
we
must
ght
for
the
existence
of
our
fatherland,
for
daily
of
bread
the
our
unity
of
our
children.
If
nation
we
and
look
the
around
allies
from
this
England
point
and
of
view,
only
two
states
Italy.
a[n]
First question, par t a – 3 marks
to
Hitler,
why
must
Germany
expand
to
of
east?
the
Natural enemies and allies
you
can
country
fact,
see
led
by
In
addition,
in
the
of
First
the
not
the
Britain,
of
an
was
age-old
of
admiration
similar
a
racially,
in
In
dream;
seen
the
for
but
as
a
Ruhr
the
a
a
the
as
a
was
because
1923
in
of
role
1923,
natural
also
of
dominated
ally,
(see
partly
he
what
in
a
enemy
of
communist
and
was,
had
happened
the
Hitler
destruction
potential
because
it
communism
France’s
Europe
British,
also
of
speech
in
and
in
Jews.
enemy
wants
Russia
loathed
were
because
it
saw
Russia
Hitler
natural
and
Versailles.
was
Hitler
Jews
Bolsheviks
War,
occupation
great
all
reparations;
however,
France’s
being
France
of
source,
many
Bolsheviks.
that
Treaty
the
were
World
want
fullment
had
from
There
convinced
does
118
for
on
have
Germany.
up
ripe
acquisition
demand
As
is
existence
objective
3.
…
political
and
the
our
East
a
eyes
no
According
of
the
is
our
highest
earth,
…
East
struggling
remain;
of
1914
on
for
this
in
of
turning
unless
knows
master’s
the
the
power;
boundaries
land
are
year
are
ways
in
end
also
to
frontiers
…
this
the
army
the
the
We
population
empire
of
of
…
by
120).
because
admired
he
said,
“France
Germany,
especially
page
drawing
after
In
saw
their
the
France.”
it
fact,
opposed
Hitler
them
empire
as
and
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
the
way
the
world.
in
I M PA C T
which
Italy
sympathetic
a
O F
N A Z I S M
small
was
nature
also
of
O N
nation
seen
as
G E R M A N
had
an
Mussolini’s
been
ally
F O R E I G N
able
to
because
P O L I C Y:
control
of
the
so
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
much
19 18 – 19 3 3
of
ideologically
government.
Source skills
An
extract
written
from
by
Mein
Hitler
in
Kampf,
pages
And
564–66,
of
Anyone
present
arrive
who
undertakes
alliance
at
the
an
possibilities
conclusion
Italy,
further
1923.
examination
for
that
Germany
the
last
of
remains
with
England
…
we
superior
on
eyes
the
to
part
Germany
the
of
no
fact
that
England
longer
a
must
in
necessary
the
exists
…
not
must
England’s
policy
from
directed
an
that,
on
more
and
unlimited
more
drive
to
for
year
an
desire
a
position
Europe.
to
Hitler,
why
would
Britain
and
Italy
alliance
with
Germany?
of
Second question – 4 marks
the
to
year
reference
obstruction
hegemony
to
its
origin,
purpose
and
content,
must
the
value
and
limitations
of
using
this
of
extract
France’s
not
French
interest
assess
be
will
the
First question, par t a – 3 marks
With
contrary,
in
of
close
annihilation
today;
power
and
practicable
want
our
cannot
the
According
tie
too,
reinforcement
of
Mein
Kampf
to
identify
Hitler’s
foreign
…
policy
aims.
Why did support for Nazism grow after the
First World War?
The Weimar Republic: Years of crisis
The
National
many
were
years
challenges
as
●
well
In
Socialist
extreme
as
of
political
internally
from
1919,
a
a
the
●
In
of
of
Although
the
evidence
the
1919
354
Many
were
and
of
the
by
was
1922
judiciary,
still
Its
judges.
of
looked
the
were
that
ed
of
These
faced
occupation,
in
army
the
went
putsch
the
the
via
strike
in
extremists
assassinations.
was
Of
unpunished–
German
the
that
Treaty
assassinations.
assassins
of
to
claimed
on
by
ex-soldiers.
collapsed.
went
who
members
of
down.
crushed
right-wing
326
right-wing
replace
up
Kapp,
political
and
Rosa
President
rebellion
also
detested
politicians
376
by
attempted
the
politicians
to
made
disbanded,
many
the
were
Berlin
and
Rathenau,
left-wing
put
Wolfgang
after
led
rebellion.
Freikorps
assassins
these
to
groups
again
were
a
Germany
the
then
Walther
the
one
Republic
French
Spartacists,
left-wing
including
to
of
workers
there
Weimar
from
launched
leader,
Kapp
right-wing
conservatives,
the
Freikorps
of
strong
against
sympathy
one
the
members
units
attack
was
Republic.
crisis:
parts
when
the
right,
paramilitary
government,
(NSDAP)
Weimar
and
and
called
and
other
Germany
conservative
minister,
in
some
were
crisis,
left
Party
new
Liebknecht,
government.
their
the
and
party
However,
the
in
economic
army
Freikorps
continued
these,
who
make
Versailles.
Between
the
1920,
would
support
●
in
Workers’
both
Karl
uprisings
overthrow
he
and
Freikorps
March
unrest
from
communist
called
Left-wing
groups
severe
Luxembourg
Ebert
German
political
got
from
foreign
assassinated.
civil
service
democratic
and
system.
119
2
●
In
January
heartland
1923,
of
reparations
ordered
various
huge
owed
“passive
to
quantities
existed
10%
its
of
worth
on
xed
wiped
of
and
raw
to
by
The
able
In
Many
alienated
do
the
1920,
the
1923
one
affected
the
had
them
the
German
to
this
their
French
government
they
ination
mark
classes
savings
the
printed
that
was
pre-1914
middle
from
industrial
pay
government
denying
exacerbated
January
This
particular.
further
be
the
to
German
thus
materials.
and
invaded
Germany
the
strikes,
which
but
troops
force
hyperination.
marks.
in
which
to
response,
and
workers
value,
paper
incomes
out,
In
money,
into
1914
2,500
the
Belgian
Ruhr,
them.
goods
pay
already
to
and
the
resistance”
German
continued
French
Germany,
worth
mark
and
and
Weimar
was
those
pensions
Republic.
Source skills
Mary
Fulbrook.
Germany:
The
Fontana
1918–1990,
page
34
History
conrming
of
which
(1991).
was
distress,
The
savings,
and
aspirations
hopes,
plans
were
…
swept
Even
away
when
huge
and
in
the
a
chaotic
of
over,
the
whirlwind
material
psychological
was
to
have
democracy,
with
fear
of
economic
the
shock
longer
of
economic
instability.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
impact
of
to
Fulbrook,
what
was
the
impact
of
the
the
experience
equated
heightened
of
people
According
was
a
dislike
assumptions
numbers
worst
deep-seated
thereafter
and
possibility
of
a
lasting
hyperination
of
1923?
effects,
What was the impact of the Munich Putsch of 1923 on the
The SA and the SS
The SA (Sturmabteilung or “Brown
success of Nazism?
Shir ts”) was the paramilitary wing of
With
the Nazi Par ty. Initially, it was made
catastrophe,
up largely from the Freikorps and ex-
By
soldiers. They wore brown uniforms,
was
following the lead of Mussolini’s
tactics
Fascist Blackshir ts in Italy. The SA
looking
protected par ty meetings, marched
by
in Nazi rallies, and physically
Ludendorff
assaulted political opponents, thus
of
playing a key role in Hitler ’s rise to
Bavarian
power in the 1920s and 1930s.
takeover,
this
1923
an
backdrop
he
Hitler
had
against
for
a
Bavaria
the
of
his
leader,
then,
from
to
the
last
leader
taking
on
a
of
Berlin.
that
in
he
he
into
impressed
hero
von
the
down.
which
coordinate
General
winning
Ritter
police
to
also
War
support
backed
economic
government.
Hitler
was
involved
government,
and
Kampfbund,
created
1922.
would
the
pushed
Gustav
he
over
the
power;
that
minute,
Bavarian
occupation
take
groups
Rome
plan
on
indicated
at
the
to
involvement
to
March
marching
had
French
bid
right-wing
This
support
then
own
political
solution
successful
and
but
the
Republic.
unrest,
his
militant
military
gave
support
political
become
association
Mussolini’s
no
of
launched
control
Kahr,
the
attempted
Despite
or
army,
SA
men,
having
Hitler
The Schutzstael (or SS) was formed
decided
to
go
ahead
anyway
and,
with
about
600
tried
to
take
in April 1925 as a section of the SA and
over
government
buildings.
The
result
was
disastrous;
armed
police
functioned as a personal bodyguard
opened
re
and
killed
16
Stormtroopers.
Hitler
was
arrested
and,
along
for the NSDAP leader, Hitler. The SS was
with
Ludendorff,
tried
for
treason.
considered to be an elite force and
membership was restricted to those
who were pure Aryan Germans. Under
Himmler ’s leadership, the SS was used
to carry out the killings on the “Night of
the Long Knives”. It ultimately became
one of the largest and most powerful
organizations in the Third Reich.
120
However,
the
publicity
and
provided
the
was
acting
a
as
he
received
he
served
December
Mein
the
less
of
the
with
trial
free
German
lightest
sentence:
than
It
a
year
was
of
this
during
turned
Hitler
publicity.
patriotic
1924.
Kampf
Nazis
and,
ve
although
years’
sentence
this
time
in
into
Hitler
a
national
claimed
he
was
that
found
imprisonment.
and
was
prison
released
that
he
gure
he
guilty,
Moreover,
in
wrote
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
I M PA C T
O F
N A Z I S M
O N
G E R M A N
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
19 18 – 19 3 3
What was the impact of Stresemann?
Following
his
release
constitutional
means
relaunched
1925
he
did
also
not
in
secure
reorganized;
Schutzstaffel
employed
(or
as
from
to
with
total
SS)
Hitler
was
and
as
in
to
decided
over
the
leader
use
The
or
legal
Nazi
and
Party
Führer,
party
until
1926.
were
established
propaganda
Nazi
ideas
to
a
was
although
groups
Modern
spread
to
Germany.
overall
women’s
created.
aimed
Hitler
power
control
youth
Hitler
prison,
take
The
party
and
techniques
wider
was
the
were
audience.
Economic recovery in the 1920s
However,
in
experienced
the
Nazi
party
chancellor
was
following
Under
foreign
currency
and
the
Hitler’s
recovery
limited.
then
The
mark,
years
economic
was
and
halted.
Renten
the
an
Gustav
minister
was
Dawes
release
which
was
prison,
that
1924–29,
with
the
Germany
electoral
Stresemann,
during
stabilized
Plan
from
meant
who
the
acted
with
rst
for
as
hyperination
introduction
negotiated
support
the
of
the
USA.
This
plan
▲
froze
German
reparation
payments
for
two
years,
scaled
down
the
Gustav Stresemann, who was
level
foreign minister between 1924
of
German
repayments
demanded
by
the
Treaty
of
Versailles
and
also
set
and 1929
up
loans
for
regenerate
Young
A
Germany
the
Plan,
German
by
which
much-reduced
spread
over
from
the
USA.
economy.
the
scheme
next
the
50
USA,
of
These
This
was
agreed
to
repayments
were
important
followed
give
for
up
further
in
helping
1929
loans
reparations
in
was
to
with
to
the
Germany.
established
to
years.
The changing international situation
Stresemann
other
ways.
position
in
brought
In
fact,
Europe
Germany
back
Stresemann’s
and
to
revise
into
the
foreign
the
international
policy
Treaty
of
aims
to
Versailles
community
restore
were
in
Germany’s
not
dissimilar
The Rapallo Treaty
to
Hitler’s.
that
However,
cooperation
these
aims.
with
France
between
and
of
Britain
joined
Pact,
Treaties
Versailles.
with
Germany
Kellogg–Briand
Locarno
Stresemann
which
1925,
and
the
that
was
key
Germany
and
France
cooperation
to
had
and
as
was
of
the
nationalist
best
Nations
in
war,
in
1928.
agreed
to
uphold
been
bringing
known
pragmatic
France
Germany
Belgium
a
League
outlawed
Locarno
European
was
it
the
established
about
ushered
Locarno
a
a
to
the
in
of
period
Another key treaty that
signed
in
western
the
believed
achieve
and
Meanwhile,
degree
in
way
1926
who
Treaty
the
the
borders
hope
was the Rapallo Treaty. This
was signed on 16 April 1922
by representatives of the
of
rapprochement
of
Germany signed in the 1920s
governments of Germany
and the Soviet Union at a
for
world economic conference
Spring.
at Genoa in Italy. The treaty
Given
the
economic
recovery
and
the
new
international
standing
of
their
re-established diplomatic
country,
many
Germans
were
not
interested
in
extreme
politics
and
the
relations, renounced the
Nazi
Party
was
Nazi
support
unable
to
make
any
electoral
breakthrough.
Although
nancial claims that each
grew
in
rural
and
protestant
areas
in
the
1920s,
it
seems
country had on the other and
that
it
did
not
pose
a
substantial
threat
to
the
Weimar
government.
pledged future cooperation.
Secret clauses to the
What was the impact of the Great Depression on the
treaty allowed Germany to
manufacture aeroplanes and
Nazi Par ty?
ammunition forbidden by
The
dependence
of
Weimar
on
US
loans
made
its
recovery
dependent
the Treaty of Versailles in the
on
US
stability,
and
the
Wall
Street
Crash
of
1929
had
a
catastrophic
Soviet Union; German ocers
impact
on
Germany.
This
would
be
key
to
explaining
German
support
also trained in Russia.
for
Hitler’s
foreign
and
domestic
policies.
121
2
The
USA
called
in
its
loans
stopped.
Unemployment
in
grew
1929,
later.
included
more
losses.
in
industrial
and
particular
the
parties
the
economic
restating
the
“November
with
of
right
was
and
that
and
Hitler’s
that
as
the
also
who
Hitler’s
still
parties,
Plan
aims
crash
promises,
of
did
not
both
a
year
policies,
wage
fell
and
began
the
It
which
cuts
and
small
to
fold
and
be
change
domestic
as
a
the
and
and
Weimar
the
back”
jobs
of
the
Along
policies
those
the
Meanwhile,
on
Treaty
beneted
Nations,
these
in
Republic,
by
by
of
far-
Hitler
government.
only
because
paying
However,
food
believed
Versailles.
the
Socialists.
acceptance
League
politics.
on
Stresemann’s
was
to
opposed
German
the
in
Treaties
the
of
on
Weimar
criticized
join
in
provide
“stabbed
West.
Treaty
were
in
was
million
million
National
attacks
Locarno
not
2.8
Communists
the
would
his
the
should
1929.
the
amounted
the
the
Germany
policy
the
that
should
also
polarization
been
also
with
policies
Young
that
a
dominated
Hitler
6
prices
Banks
parties:
up
Europe
50%.
that
had
to
resulted
food
including
stepped
enforcing
the
to
party
Germany
believed
for
fact
foreign
German
far-right,
Germany
and
followed
made
He
that
led
and
to
already
deationary
This
affected.
extreme
collaboration
They
the
the
cuts.
over
was
1931
pursued
suffered;
by
situation
Stresemann’s
that
Plan
accepted
badly
more
Party
right-wing
responsible
Dawes
the
crisis.
also
support
which
February
dropped
criminals”
Versailles.
French
Nazi
myth
friendship
the
of
other
by
Brüning
were
on
nancial
expenditure
economic
to
all
Germany,
Agriculture
turned
portrayed
the
million
Heinrich
production
extreme
Germans
left
5
government
job
farmers
This
to
Chancellor
and
in
the
which
the
agreements
reparations.
result
acute
foreign,
of
the
Depression
economic
more
crisis
attractive
to
the
people.
Source skills
Stephen
Lee.
1918–1945,
The
page
European
153
fanatical
Dictatorships
policy,
(1987).
most
Taking
advantage
of
the
unpopularity
Nationalism.”
guaranteed
of
the
political
Versailles
Settlement,
Hitler
was
able
upon
the
national
the
deep
like
“November
Criminals”
and
of
in
the
détente
people
back”.
pursued
must
confusion
educated
of
be
He
also
by
from
international
consciously
slammed
Stresemann:
delivered
and
spectrum,
was
across
anti-
Finally,
he
undercurrent
made
of
effective
use
anti-Semitism
the
making
the
Jews
a
scapegoat
for
in
all
the
of
“stab
mainline
seriously
consciousness
Germany
terms
taken
to
of
implant
Another
be
of
Communism.
the
to
the
Germany’s
evils.
policy
“our
First question, par t a – 3 marks
hopeless
convictions
According
to
support
his
Stephen
Lee,
how
did
Hitler
gain
and
systematically
in
election
campaign?
to
Class discussion
In pairs, discuss the links between economic prosperity and political stability, and
economic crisis and political radicalization.
1
What conclusions can you draw from your discussion?
2
What examples can you nd from Japan, Italy and Germany to support your
conclusions?
122
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
I M PA C T
O F
N A Z I S M
O N
G E R M A N
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
19 18 – 19 3 3
L TA
Self-management skills
Japan
Italy
Germany
Japan, Italy and Germany
all signed up to international
League of Nations (date of entry/
agreements that suppor ted
depar ture)
international cooperation in
Washington Conference 1921–22
the 1920s. Compare their
involvement by copying and
Rapallo Treaty, 1922
completing the table to the
Dawes Plan, 1924
left. Identify which country or
countries signed each treaty and
Locarno Conference, 1925
state their involvement in each
Kellogg–Briand Pact, 1928
case.
Young Plan, 1929
What factors allowed Hitler to become a dictator?
When
Brüning
decided
to
call
for
unscheduled
elections
in
TOK
1930,
Consider the factors that
this
gave
the
Nazis
a
chance
to
break
into
mainstream
policies.
They
million
votes.
fostered suppor t for the ideas
increased
their
seats
from
12
to
107,
winning
almost
6
In
of the National Socialist Par ty
the
1932
presidential
elections,
Hitler
stood
for
the
Nazis
against
General
in Germany. Investigate
Paul
Von
Hindenberg
and
gained
11
million
votes
(30%
of
the
vote)
in
radical political par ties and
the
rst
round
and
13
million
votes
(36%)
in
the
nal
round.
movements in your region
Hitler’s
electoral
nationalist
politicians
summoned
army
able
by
leader
Chancellor
have
control
Hindenburg
Von
of
Papen
able
it,
in
In
to
the
the
plan.
“framed
with
secure
only
his
in”,
two
of
a
believed
they
creating
was
a
a
Nazi
of
it
von
idea
be
that
Hitler
misjudgment.
members
in
was
between the factors that led
be
useful
they
people to suppor t radical
to
would
be
President
could
In
the
to
the
be,
as
position
cabinet,
suppor t these ideas? Are there
any similarities or dierences
including
government,
that
Hitler
Papen,
would
believed
stable
the
party
dictator
government,
Franz
today. Why do some people
right-wing
government.
that
also
serious
and
strong
German
However,
as
leaders
nobleman
side;
other
position
the
They
their
hope
form
and
1933.
on
army
to
of
Schleicher
party
him.
put
to
his
agreed
chancellor,
was
von
wanted
members
Germany
and
impressed
who
leading
Kurt
of
Hitler
to
following
Hitler
par ties in the past and the
reasons people are attracted to
these groups today? Feedback
to the class. Discuss the extent
to which studying History helps
you to better understand the
Germany.
present.
Steps to dictatorship
Hitler
called
Reichstag.
down.
A
decree
of
new
27
election,
February
communist
Reichstag
a
a
On
and
was
Nazis
passed
association.
imprisoned.
the
called
Van
Nazis
to
the
der
claimed
suspending
Leading
The
hoping
1933,
it
Lubbe
was
a
43.9%
and
of
a
Nazi
was
majority
building
found
communist
freedom
communists
won
gain
Reichstag
of
the
inside
plot.
press,
socialist
the
in
was
of
the
a
Research fur ther the actions
result,
speech
politicians
Thinking skills
burnt
the
As
L TA
1
and
were
of von Papen, von Schleicher
and President Hindenberg
1932–1933. To what extent can
it be argued that Hitler ’s position
vote.
of power by 1933 was caused
2
Hitler
then
passed
the
Enabling
Act,
which
gave
him
the
power
by “the scheming and intrigue
to
pass
laws
without
the
Reichstag’s
consent.
This
change
in
the
of unscrupulous careerists
constitution,
for
which
Hitler
needed
two-thirds
of
the
vote,
was
and extreme right-wing
achieved
by
preventing
the
communists
from
taking
their
seats,
and
sympathizers” (Henig, 1997)?
by
winning
Centre
Party
support.
123
2
3
The
rest
of
abolished,
the
Communist
By
4
In
July
join
the
This
not
for
to
5
SA
was
both
When
and
any
the
the
president,
As
early
Dachau
soon
as
to
Germans
those
of
Thus,
Nazi
were
Aryan
less
aims,
clear
of
of
the
rst
in
and
and
he
took
of
from
having
become
control
in
in
a
on
to
of
all
he
of
oath
During
as
of
been
of
of
citizens
clear
by
to
of
German
to
1934
and
the
Nazi
Nazi
voteshare.
hope:
40%
Nazi
vote
share
30%
20%
Unemployment
10%
0%
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
124
is
the
message
of
Source
A?
1930
1932
poster
Hitler”.
of
with
at
and
Aryan
Jews.
full
Only
politicalrights.
was
enforcing
position
out
how
1932:
all
enemies
his
to
“Our
was
foreign
achieve
126).
election
and
Hitler.
Source B
unemployment
of
SS
von
chancellor
Source skills
Source A
the
Jehovah’s
Hitler’s
plan
Night
enemies.
pure
with
carry
the
did
support
established
and
1934
life.
Hitler
used
political
1935,
to
control.
its
August
loyalty
was
wanted
his
Paul
of
in
relationship
position
Hitler
other
and
had
Laws
of
and
Röhm,
leaders.
General
category
Germany
a
Ernst
Röhm
needed
ofces
homosexuals
aspects
had
page
rid
the
camp
any
he
abroad.
Germany,
The
were
Party
themselves.
under
army
killed
get
German
strong
under
as
Republic,
personal
Roma,
dissolved
both
the
army
were
Nuremberg
whether
discussed
a
also
merged
enemies.
the
could
was
Weimar
Hitler
Führer
ideology
though
(as
the
keep
expansion
and
parliaments
Socialist
state.
which,
and
and
people
the
embarrassment.
regular
SA
Jews,
in
total
SA,
an
concentration
include
blood
and
the
political
forbidden
the
and
state
and
parties
one-party
the
200
the
Other
Hitler
to
1934,
forces
with
was
doctrines
policy
in
Meanwhile,
unassailable
is
armed
to
to
Nazied:
down,
together
security
died
1933,
Hitler
both
leaders
a
against
army
becoming
deal
was
threat
some
was
shut
banned.
challenge
President
extended
Witnesses.
the
Knives,
Hindenberg,
German
moved
potential
internal
Long
purge
were
alarming
want
the
a
were
Germany
Hitler
becoming
system
unions
Party
1933,
1934,
political
trade
last
these
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
I M PA C T
O F
N A Z I S M
O N
G E R M A N
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
in
First question, par t b – 2 marks
T H E
a
O R I G I N S ,
welter
economic
What
is
the
message
of
Source
of
19 18 – 19 3 3
egotistical
interests,
political
and
opinions,
ideological
conicts.
B?
…
But
the
misery
of
our
people
is
terrible!
The
Source C
starving
Summary
of
Hitler’s
election
promises
industrial
in
the
Sydney
Morning
Herald,
and
paupers.
Herr
Hitler
is
the
last
hope
of
a
people
everything
has
been
taken.
The
If
the
that
remains
is
the
belief
that
he
restore
their
honour,
their
this
freedom,
bread.
collapse
Herr
Hitler
denotes
there
salvation,
a
fearlessly
German
dead,
the
last
who
will
did
not
of
the
present
slow
die
destruction
in
of
a
better
German
future.
the
war
man,
ghts
for
because
them.
he
He
of
of
German
youth,
Hitler
understands
represents
striving
for
shall
also
be
faced
proportions.
collapse
human
around
is
is
involved
with
For
a
in
not
only
a
that
Reich,
inheritance
of
the
but
highest
culture
and
civilization.
us
symptoms
an
portending
unparalleled
effort
this
of
of
brute
force
the
Communist
will
method
them
the
a
are
With
the
madness
is
trying
as
a
last
resort
to
poison
stern
and
will
farmer
for
of
and
whole
but
and
people’s
the
made
and
Germany,
Herr
we
vast
will
breakdown.
for
while
been
2,000,000
All
the
of
2000-year-old
works
fulls
German
have
and
also
their
millions,
class
alone
case,
can
their
only
catastrophe
thing
in
artisan
from
in
whom
become
1932.
middle
…
have
as
unemployed
appeared
proletariat
new
undermine
an
inwardly
shaken
and
form
uprootednation.
of
life.
Herr
Hitler
is
the
aming
torch
of
those
The
wanting
a
new
future
for
task
before
which
Source D
living
has
faced
memory.
condence,
Adolf
Hitler’s
“Appeal
to
the
German
radio
address
made
on
31
January
its
fourteen
years
have
passed
blinded
and
day
by
when
the
promises
abroad,
forgot
German
made
the
by
since
past,
of
the
Reich,
middle
freedom,
Since
has
those
and
days
highest
of
its
withdrawn
Discord
and
thereby
of
his
at
values
honour
lost
treason,
blessing
hatred
have
the
deepest
men
and
our
see
the
Examiner’s
markbands
with
your
unity
hint:
on
pages
of
For
10
the
the
and
from
nation
values.
our
Farmers,
nation
workers,
and
and
class
must
wherewith
to
unite
build
to
the
contribute
new
the
Reich.
and
contrast
promises
to
Sources
the
C
German
and
D
regarding
people.
in.
Draft
a
response
all
to
this
question:
Filled
of
the
the
walks
sources
and
your
own
knowledge,
best
the
reasons
why
Hitler’s
foreign
policy
of
were
popular
with
the
German
people.
disintegrating
third
and
11
assess
to
in
in
unbounded
Four th question – 9 marks
nation.
aims
life
believe
have
of
Almighty
from
millions
women
all
and
examine
German
we
we
everything.
the
moved
distress,
But
Third question – 6 marks
home
Using
with
difcult
statesmen
people,
those
Hitler’s
its
most
that
Compare
our
for
eternal
bricks
unhappy
the
1933.
the
Over
is
German
People”,
in
a
us
Germany.
fourth
a
questions
partner’s
above,
work.
use
Share
the
your
feedback
partner
.
1
How
could
your
2
How
could
you
partner
have
improve
improved
his
or
her
responses?
yours?
The historical debate: Did Hitler have a clear plan
for achieving his foreign policy goals when he
took power in 1933?
Hitler’s
the
overall
Zweites
foreign
Buch
policy
(written
in
aims,
1928
as
but
laid
out
in
Mein
unpublished
in
Kampf
his
and
in
lifetime),
125
2
seem
very
clear,
and
he
returned
to
them
again
and
again
in
speeches
TOK
between
Review the historians’ views
in
and sources you have read
became
1928
briengs
and
and
xed
in
at
1933.
He
letters
an
early
also
after
continued
he
stage
took
and
to
power,
never
make
references
indicating
really
that
to
his
them
views
altered.
in your case studies thus far.
However,
did
he
actually
have
a
clear
plan
as
to
how
he
was
to
achieve
How can we assess historical
these
accounts?
aims
when
he
took
power
in
1933?
Draft some ideas in
pairs and share with your class.
Historians
What methods or criteria for
Mommsen,
assessing historical accounts
achieve
do you agree on?
economic
seized
are
his
divided
have
objectives.
pressures
each
over
argued
and
of
and
Hildebrand,
Klaus
expansion
and
ending
of
Britain
and
third
such
and
as
argue
the
Treaty
phase
Hitler’s
area
past.
Hitler’s
War;
aims
in
of
aims
Versailles.
In
be
the
aim
were
to
such
as
had
phases.
and
such
the
a
be
to
as
AJP
the
and
of
determined
Nazi
Party,
Hans
how
and
to
by
he
him.
Andreas
denite
rst
the
of
Hillgruber
programme
phase
of
an
defeat
Russia.
globalists,
take
Taylor
blueprint
usually
The
conquest
known
a
formation
would
was
as
have
within
Hitler
phase
the
German
the
to
rule
over
However,
of
Fritz
those
Stephen
however,
it
is
of
the
would
of
be
alliance
of
the
with
France.
The
Intentionalists
go
further
USA
and
of
clearly
obvious
that
to
and
thus
the
II
Europe,
refutes
whether
break
argued
in
Russia.
his
is
radical
claimed
Weimar
regard
a
Wilhelm
much
the
policy
or
historians
fragmented
with
Lee
War,
Kaiser
over
a
policy,
Fischer
between
Hitler
foreign
foreign
World
over
continuity
those
retrospect,
Second
historian
hegemony
and
Hitler’s
German
similar
words,
and
regarding
earlier
Germany
stressed
policy
debate
of
were
other
Greater
have
the
from
clear
Hauner,
ultimate
Following
However,
would
and
actions
school,
Versailles
second
not
presented
that
with
Some,
did
domination.
continuation
the
argue
of
The
Hildebrand
Another
was
intentionalist
Italy.
world
his
demands
that
conquest
nal
that
achieve
a
the
issue.
Hitler
Rather,
opportunity
Historians
this
that
the
in
the
the
latter
continuity
latter.
First
that
World
of
a
historians
Republic’s
this
was
1960s
creation
Other
revision
the
late
it
from
of
foreign
the
Treaty
of
argument:
between
the
diplomacy
Source skills
of
First question,
the
point
Weimar
which
domestic
Republic
showed
and
that
counterpart
the
Nazi
was
that
Third
foreign
Hitler
Reich
policy
saw
can
be
was
as
misleading.
The
revolutionary
revisionism
merely
as
a
crucial
as
its
step
towards
par t a – 3 marks
projects
According
to
Stephen
which
Although
how
did
Hitler’s
aims
differ
to
the
politicians
ruthlessness,
of
They
also
beyond
the
politicians
ambitions
had
a
of
strong
the
Republic’s
element
of
statesmen.
opportunism,
they
did
respected
not
the
share
Hitler’s
traditions
of
Social
Darwinism
European
and
diplomacy
racialist
and,
under
the
Stresemann,
Weimar
well
Republic’s
those
vision.
of
the
foreign
even
policy
were
Lee,
contributed
much
to
international
co-operation.
One
of
Hitler’s
Republic?
aims
was
which
to
had
smash
been
the
multinational
carefully
built
up
agreements,
during
the
like
1920s.
the
—
Locarno
Lee,
Pact,
1987
Class discussion
L TA
As a class, discuss the dierent
Communication and social skills
perspectives on Hitler and
Divide into two groups, A and B. Prepare for a debate on the following motion:
whether he was a planner or an
“Hitler had a well-dened and distinct foreign policy that had little in common with
oppor tunist. Use the material
that of his predecessors.”
and sources in this chapter to
126
discuss which view you agree
Group A will argue for the motion, whereas group B will argue against the motion.
with most.
You should synthesize the source material as evidence in your arguments.
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
T H E
I M PA C T
O F
N A Z I S M
O N
G E R M A N
F O R E I G N
P O L I C Y:
T H E
O R I G I N S ,
19 18 – 19 3 3
First question, par t b, 2 marks
Source help and hints
(See
page
124)
Second question – 4 marks
(See
page
With
reference
consider
source
the
as
What
117)
to
its
value
evidence
Examiner’s
consider
are
of
hint:
listed
origin,
and
purpose
limitations
Hitler’s
Some
and
of
foreign
points
the
message
of
Source
B?
content,
using
this
policy
that
is
you
aims.
could
below.
Values
●
A
value
himself
of
the
origin
explaining
is
his
that
it
aims
is
from
Hitler
regarding
foreign
policy.
●
A
value
that
took
●
of
the
Hitler
had
date
(1923)
these
aims
is
that
10
it
shows
years
before
us
he
power.
Regarding
aims,
content,
such
as
Hitler
getting
rid
refers
of
the
to
several
Treaty
of
▲
Versailles,
more
unifying
land
overview
and
of
all
soil,
what
so
he
Germans
it
is
a
and
Nazi election poster of 1932: “Our last hope, Hitler ”
getting
comprehensive
wanted
to
Examiner’s
achieve.
posters
Limitations
●
With
will
regard
comments
and
●
A
a
he
in
could
limitation
speech
win
to
origin,
1923
have
of
the
through
support
for
exaggerating
Hitler
(before
he
amended
purpose
which
his
made
certain
power)
aims
is
that
is
trying
he
ideas
took
his
and
aspects
so
of
it
by
1933.
was
The
point
content:
above
the
exaggerated,
hammer
can
also
language
and
is
e.g.
using
the
anvil.
be
seen
very
the
run
Your
to
you
be
to
you
part
simple,
of
by
but
be
get
the
with
studied
Nazi
Josef
very
the
As
on
visual
the
Goebbels;
and
knowledge
point.
Germany
they
sources,
details
machine,
are
that
Posters
usually
were
which
quite
effective.
is
important
Here,
is
for
message.
propaganda
clever
main
all
carefully
understand
contextual
to
Depression
key.
the
For
for
impact
this
helping
of
the
poster
,
Great
consider:
ideas.
●
●
key
is
could
his
a
these
need
help
hint:
in
strong
imagery
in
the
way
the
and
and
of
the
that
the
German
background,
the
way
they
people
including
are
are
their
portrayed
expressions
standing
the
●
the
message,
●
the
choice
●
the
size
of
of
“Our
colour
the
font
last
to
hope”
reinforce
for
the
message
“Hitler”.
127
2
Third question – 6 marks
Contrasts
(See
●
page
125)
Source
causes
Compare
and
contrast
Sources
C
and
D
D
of
is
promises
to
the
German
more
specic
distress,
as
to
talking
the
about
regarding
“treason”
Hitler’s
much
Germany’s
and
mentioning
communists
as
being
people.
responsible,
whereas
Source
C
is
more
general.
Comparisons
●
●
Both
talk
about
Germany
being
in
a
desperate
Source
the
state.
D
particularly
Source
●
Both
is
say
that
Hitler
is
the
only
hope
also
problems
C
much
facing
the
more
economic
focuses
on
specic
Germany
the
at
as
that
problems,
past
to
time,
whereas
problems
of
for
losing
the
war.
Germany.
●
●
Both
say
that
Hitler
will
create
a
new
Source
D
discusses
the
terrible
situation
Germany.
Germany
recovery,
future
is
in
without
whereas
and
the
the
Source
hope
that
promise
C
focuses
Hitler
of
on
the
brings.
References
Fulbrook,
Fontana.
Henig,
M.
1991.
London,
R.
1985.
The
Fontana
History
of
Germany:
1918–1990.
UK
The
Origins
of
the
Second
World
War .
Routledge.
London,
UK
Hitler,
Lee,
S.
A.
1987.
Rogers,
history.
1925.
P
.
Aspects
Z.
Kampf.
European
of
The
Oxford
New
Eher
Verlag.
Dictatorships
Western
Hall.
2011.
1933–1999.
128
The
Prentice
Steiner,
Mein
Civilization,
York,
Triumph
University
of
Berlin,
Germany
1918–1945.
Volume
II:
Methuen.
Problems
and
London,
source
in
USA
the
Dark:
Press.
European
New
York,
International
USA
History
UK
2.3
Italian expansion, 1933–1940
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Change
➔
Continuity
➔
Perspective
Key questions
➔
Examine the reasons for Italy pursuing a more
expansionist foreign policy in the 1930s.
➔
To what extent was there continuity in Italian foreign
policy in the 1930s?
➔
Discuss the consequences of foreign policy in the
1930s for Italy.
After a 13 year campaign, the Italian
1932
colony of Libya is subdued
1933 January
Mussolini proposes the Four Power Pact
Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany
July
1934 June
Mussolini meets Hitler in Venice
Italy sends troops to its border with
Austria to prevent Hitler ’s attempts
July
at Anschluss
1935 April
Italy invades Abyssinia
The Stresa Conference
October
1936 May
Italy conquers Abyssinia
Mussolini initiates talks of an Axis
October
agreement with Hitler
Italy intervenes in the Spanish Civil War
Hitler ’s Germany also sends assistance
July
to Franco
Italy joins Germany in the Axis
1936 October
agreement
An unocial agreement is made with
1937
Britain accepting the status quo in
Mediterranean
Mussolini is impressed by Hitler on a
September
visit to Germany
Italy joins the Anti-Comintern Pact with
November
Germany and Japan, an anti-Soviet
alliance
129
2
Italy withdraws from the League of
December
Nations
Italian and British agreement: Britain
1938 April
recognizes Italian Abyssinia
Hitler visits Mussolini
May
Anti-semitic laws are passed in Italy
September
The Munich Conference
Mussolini announces his long-term
1939 February
programme
April
Italy and Germany sign the Pact of
Italy invades Albania
May
Steel military alliance
Italy declares itself a non-belligerent
1 September
when Germany invades Poland
Mussolini declares war on Britain
1940 June
and France
September–
Italy invades Egypt and Greece
October
1941 June
Italy declares war on the Soviet Union
December
Italy declares war on the USA
What factors had an impact on Italy’s foreign
policy in the 1930s?
1.
The impact of fascism
The
character
of
the
Italian
people
must
be
moulded
by
—
In
the
1930s,
factors
Italian
and
Italian
identied
foreign
that
he
on
foreign
page
policy
pursued
was
a
policy
84.
directed
more
continued
However,
by
clearly
to
be
historians
Mussolini
Fascist
inuenced
generally
during
foreign
this
policy
ghting.
Mussolini
by
the
agree
that
period
from
the
L TA
Self-management and
mid-1930s:
glorication
of
war
for
its
own
sake,
pursuit
of
imperial
thinking skills
expansion,
and
a
move
away
from
diplomacy
and
cooperation.
Refer back to the diagram on
During
this
period,
he
more
Mussolini’s
methods
became
more
assertive
and
page 89 which identies the key
was
aggresive
diplomatically.
He
continued
to
assert
anti-
characteristics of Fascism. As
French
territorial
claims,
but
he
moved
away
from
his
relatively
good
you read through this chapter,
relationship
with
the
British,
instead
fostering
closer
ties
to
Hitler’s
identify where Fascist ideology
Germany.
This
led
to
a
series
of
Italo–German
agreements
including
the
appears to have shaped
Rome–Berlin
Axis
and
the
Pact
of
Mussolini’s foreign policy.
in
130
Abyssinia,
Spain
and
Albania.
Steel.
Mussolini
also
engaged
in
wars
C H A P T E R
The
road
Mussolini
to
the
of
Germany.
2.
Italian
entry
the
on
in
Second
the
1930s
World
would
War
in
I T A L I A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
ultimately
1940
as
an
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
lead
ally
The impact of domestic economic isues
As
with
by
the
the
the
other
Great
lira
USA
were
was
million.
The
bailouts
for
collapse
when
the
of
Industriale
banks.
As
this
Industry
of
nancial
major
set
up
result,
were
declined
and
The
in
1933
up
of
to
brought
and
took
developed
the
was
banks
under
on
and
the
grew
of
public
the
to
2
including
brink
industries.
Istituto
the
by
of
Italiano
government
shares
from
affected
Mobiliare
The
over
badly
affected
overvaluing
intervention,
Italy
largest
also
by
unemployment
Istituto
increased.
was
Investment
also
more
the
support
was
industries
Italy
with
Bank
set
Italy
caused
crisis.
farmers
responded
materials
Japan,
problems
worldwide
Italian
government
gave
and
economic
industrialists.
the
was
a
prices.
raw
control
by
and
government
which
allocation
direct
grain
countries
The
exacerbated
withdrawn,
in
1931,
European
Depression.
collapse
in
embarked
into
2 . 3 :
per
The
control
la
companies
sector
and
Ricostruzione
in
TOK
and
Europe,
Discuss in pairs the extent to
excluding
the
Soviet
Union.
Indeed,
by
the
end
of
the
1930s,
the
which economic forces are the
government
controlled
20%
of
the
capital
of
key
companies.
Wages
that
main driving force for historical
had
already
fallen
before
the
depression
were
cut
further.
change. You should consider
There
Great
ban
were
on
upheaval
to
The
the
would
result
further
of
as
that
the
this,
works
Mussolini
depression
Nevertheless,
the
Italian
need
to
be
however,
undermined
by
the
public
“revolutionary”
now
provided
public
Indeed,
that
power.
distract
fostering
policy
such
emigration.
retained
needed
by
measures
Depression,
political
he
some
was
programmes
managed
to
that
he
dynamic
that
from
and
and
of
the
removal
the
social
in
that
the rst case study on Japan
of
the
and
Europe
problems
espoused.
in the 1920s and 1930s as
well as considering this case
and
Mussolini
economic
fascism
Foreign
study on Italy. Make notes from
your conversation and add to
these as you read through this
chapter.
inspirational.
1936
emphasis
the
meant
internal
and
impact
elsewhere
crisis
Italy’s
the
prevent
precipitated
from
Mussolini’s
from
economic
spirit
more
relief
the
on
Italian
autarky,
economy
and
the
was
costs
of
Autarky
Il
Duce’s
wars.
Thus,
domestic
economic
factors
may
have
been
a
factor
Economic independence, or
in
Mussolini’s
decision
to
invade
Abyssinia
and
intervene
in
the
Spanish
self-suciency.
Civil
War;
economy.
budget
nonetheless,
Even
decit
political
though
of
impact
28
and
these
taxes
billion
wars
were
lire
by
undermined
came
at
a
high
increased,
1939.
This
support
for
the
price
wars
led
ultimately
the
for
to
had
regime
Who controlled Italian foreign policy in
the
a
from
Italian
an
annual
negative
the
elites.
In 1936, Mussolini appointed his son-in-law, Count
Galeazzo Ciano to work on foreign policy. Ciano had
the 1930s?
initially suppor ted closer links with Germany. However,
When he came to power in 1922, Mussolini wanted to
Ciano then became disillusioned with Hitler and argued
control Italian foreign policy himself. In 1929, once his
against the Pact of Steel, signed in May 1939. Ciano
authority seemed secure, he appointed Dino Grandi as
advised Mussolini to create a buer zone in the Balkans
foreign minister. Grandi was a committed Fascist who
against Germany and he suppor ted the invasion of
favoured a “strong” foreign policy. He wanted to move
Albania. Ciano lost favour with Mussolini for his antiaway from Anglophile policies and demonstrate Italian
German stance when Hitler swept victoriously across
strength, and ultimately ready the armed forces for the
Europe. Ciano ultimately relented and suppor ted Italy
“coming war ”. Grandi believed that Italy should not trust
joining the war with Germany in June 1940.
the League of Nations. Never theless, Mussolini still
directed foreign policy and in July 1932 he moved Grandi
to the position of ambassador in Britain.
131
2
Source skills
J.
Calvitt
Italy
Clarke
against
and
Hitler:
Rapprochement
of
C.
The
the
Foust.
Russia
could
and
1930s
of
the
its
mid-1930s,
imports
passed
by
through
Italy
sea,
the
received
and
of
86
these,
Dardanelles,
Suez,
Gibraltar.
Italy
of
its
and
Hence
must
either
Nostro
70
the
percent
fascist
dominate
17
Mare,
the
the
the
Danubian
and
to
any
other
Mediterranean’s
Balkan
(including
Austria
areas.
percent
First question, par t a – 3 marks
percent
key
points
are
made
in
this
Source
through
conviction
or
–
Hungary)
concede
in
percent
13
What
through
willingly
hegemony
hinterland
(1991).
and
In
Italy
power
Bolshevik–Fascist
be
the
inuence
on
economic
needs
and
their
Italian
foreign
policy
in
the
1930s?
prisoner
Nor
Examiner’s
in
the
hint:
In
pairs,
identify
three
of
the
following
points.
Highlight
source.
●
Italy
●
The
●
Italy
had
●
Italy
could
3.
Italian
that
Mediterranean.
them
regarding
was
dependent
majority
to
of
on
imports
dominate
not
imports
allow
came
the
from
the
through
sea.
Gibraltar.
Mediterranean.
another
power
to
dominate
the
area.
Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1933
Extract
I
have
asked
searched
found,
“new
from
myself
“allies”
order”
not
in
in
a
the
action
revolutionary
for
for
Europe,
only
international
Grandi’s
why
breathlessly
for
Pontiff
Dino
the
Boss
the
last
diary,
is
so
ten
new
order
spiritual
founded
but
taken
years
revolutionary
a
1932
with
or
so,
foreign
of
also
in
He
the
on
they
destined
considers
material
the
[Mussolini]
wherever
policy
which
exclusively
Hitler.
Party,
might
to
the
be
create
himself
sense
on
has
…
a
supreme
An
Regime,
on
a
ideology.
L TA
Social skills
Discuss the following question with a par tner.
What does the quote from Grandi’s diary (above) suggest Mussolini wanted to
gain from potential “allies”?
To
demonstrate
held
an
Four
in
a
meeting
alternative
Power
Rome.
It
in
to
Pact,
set
France,
Germany
League’s
or
out
relations,
never
central
Rome
the
Power”
parliament
132
Italy’s
in
1933.
League
of
that
smaller
and
their
Italy
ratied
the
European
Mussolini’s
The
Locarno
for
Pact,
nations
role
signed
it.
in
Nations
Quadripartite
unlike
covenant,
role
at
the
intention
European
was
signed
should
the
diplomacy,
of
agreement,
signatories
Treaties
the
15
to
less
say
Nations.
to
develop
July
although
agreed
and
was
diplomacy.
on
have
League
Mussolini
The
1933
in
“Great
Britain,
the
adhere
to
French
the
Kellogg–Briand
Pact.
C H A P T E R
The
resulting
Four
Power
cooperation,
though
dismissed
the
success
by
for
in
other
Pact
reality
allowed
this
powers.
In
for
pact
further
had
Italy,
2 . 3 :
little
I T A L I A N
“Great
it
was
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Power”
meaning
however,
E X P A N S I O N ,
and
was
heralded
as
a
Mussolini.
Nevertheless,
in
1934,
Mussolini’s
actions
were
seen
as
signicant,
not
Class discussion
only
domestically,
promoted
War
and
an
so
unication
on
the
25
to
the
In
of
independent
July
was
to
because
Italy
quo
in
Europe.
met
in
the
of
the
the
Stresa
of
to
This
However,
the
Germany.
No
had
been
Britain
would
Nevertheless,
frighten
the
impression
France,
Only
he
two
had
later,
Britain
without
action
Hitler’s
had
consent
June
Germany
condoned
consulting
ended
the
it
Stresa
its
work
also
did
aims
a
this
to
not
by the Western democracies
This
as key to containing an
the
the
and
expansionist Germany?
rest
status
France
Declaration
aimed
to
reafrm
Austria.
breach
violation
prevent
the
of
the
any
The
Treaty
of
Treaty
future
214–215.)
even
specically
agreed.
stance
Hitler.
In
fact,
regarding
None
lead
demands.
Most
in
of
the
name
Italy
Germany;
signatories
Britain
signed
the
page
German
The
to
be
Stresa
signicantly,
Italian
with
Britain
in
broke
Anglo–German
214).
By
signing
Mussolini
also
got
and
Abyssinia.
the
Naval
this
rearmament
allies.
more
Front
Mussolini
control
apparently
naval
Front
would
them
working
expand
(see
Germany
could
that,
to
Stresa
alarming
of
1935. Why might Italy be seen
troops
intervene.
Britain
pages
were
rm
Anschluss.
“Final
to
his
Germany.
1935,
when
1935,
resurgent
talks
The
Hitler’s
to
Anschluss.
Stresa
in
a
that
Italy,
government in Germany up to
Austrian
guaranteeing
attempts
offend
of
was
towards Hitler ’s new
When,
the
not
independence
territorial
from
Stresa
April
and
adopt
to
to
1935.
(See
their
that
and
Italian
their
with
this
knew
France,
gained
at
to
key
against
invasion
the
agreement,
so
actual
during
agreed
14
further
vague
not
did
Discuss Mussolini’s attitude
Austria’s
mobilized
achieve
policies,
agreed
uphold
protection
Agreement
done
was
be
had
World
to
aims).
murdered
Hitler
Italy
First
given
Hitler’s
to
and
the
settlement.
Britain
towards
months
principles
Front”
concerned
and
more
resist
protested
to
Mussolini
Britain
Italy
than
on
the
immediately
April
conrm
to
they
Hitler’s
signed
to
agreement
accommodating
gave
and
of
rearmament
to
in
powers.
name
of
Hitler
Hitler’s
perceived
“Stresa
an
by
1935
methods
sanction
Mussolini
Stresa
end
(the
supporters
by
agreed
more
Nazi
Germany
to
the
one
deter
European
keener
was
was
to
Conference”,
the
since
attempt
of
European
Anschluss
which
response
Together,
Versailles.
changes
any
town
also
other
Austria
Dolfuss,
now
Treaties
powers
Versailles.
In
Italian
Locarno
three
was
the
Austrian
deter
sufcient
addition,
Europe,
1934,
by
opposed
Germany,
Engelbert
border
action
also
Mussolini
with
Chancellor
but
and
had
believed
that
agreement.
Source skills
Robert
Mallet,
a
academic,
in
an
the
of
the
Origins
British
historian
academic
Second
book
World
and
Mussolini
War ,
settlement
and
1933–40,
(1983).
Germany,
of
Mussolini’s
the
long-term
…
Hitler’s
to
overturn
Italy,
anticipated
and
stressed
Red
to
if
for
Sea
allied
the
to
creation
Balkans,
empire.
Hungarian
As
prime
avowed
minister,
determination
fascist
possibilities
long
Mediterranean
Mussolini
In
offered
clear
the
Gyualia
Gömbös,
that
same
spring,
Versailles
133
2
he
did
an
Italian
after
the
not
intend
Ethiopia
expansionist
taking
Ethiopia
he
British-controlled
and
the
Africa
the
Sudan,
uninterrupted
Indian
from
the
linking
those
empire
the
limit
the
also
territories
with
Italy’s
be
On
would
thereby
possessions
continent.
to
drive.
of
express
the
of
north
east
Mediterranean
to
their
the
recently
Ocean.
requested
But
in
the
immediate
short
term
for
to
face
domestic
Ethiopia.
The
anxiety
fear
that
over
Hitler
attempt
a
coup
against
deployed
Africa
could
large
remained
Austria
not
move
numbers
of
widespread,
without
once
which,
by
mid
troops
and
to
foreign
ministry,
were
although
British,
had
dictator
that
April
at
French
Stresa,
and
in
Italy
…
If
Mussolini
had
wanted
to
anxiety
within
ofcial
German
circles,
he
succeeded.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
Italian
to
this
source,
what
were
Mussolini’s
mounting.
key
The
the
that
staffs
East
Mussolini
quelling
1935,
orthodox
Italy
According
anxieties
give
his
had
had
of
to
wisdom
fact,
rumours
general
conversations,
meeting
the
to
might
sow
well
Amid
to
actual
elected
try.
Austrian
statesmen
northern
plans
last
In
from
priority.
continued
reservations
…
defence
absolute
Mussolini
Italian
continued
a
future
an
military
already
and
held
its
be
enterprise
one
German
to
Italian
own
had
diplomacy
the
the
Mussolini’s
Mussolini
of
stretch
consider
incursions
Meanwhile
Egypt
would
should
German
conquer
Italian
to
policy
of
contrary,
having
motives
for
engaging
in
the
Stresa
Front
given
agreements?
support
to
emphatic
remain
Mussolini’s
in
an
its
Africa
demands
independent
policy,
that
remained
Austria
state.
A
should
detailed
Second question – 4 marks
report
With
on
the
current
European
situation
of
2nd
of
concluded
that
Austria
amounted
to
reference
Italy’s
this
source,
zone”,
and
that
Italian
as
this
is
a
“to
L TA
that,
hint:Remember
origin,
its
purpose
values
and
and
content
limitations
studying
Mussolini’s
foreign
policy
for
in
defence
the
Examiner’s
the
assess
own
historians
“demilitarised
to
April
1920s.
Self-management, social and thinking skills
what
In pairs, discuss and make bullet point notes on the following question.
extent”
identify
points
question,
points
that
assertion
foreign
you
that
agree
disagree
that
policy
should
with
and
the
“Mussolini’s foreign policy had only limited success up to 1935.” To what extent
do you agree with this statement?
Mussolini’s
had
only
limited
Italian foreign policy, 1935–39
success
up
to
1935.
Mussolini’s
key
in
Italy
turning
1935–36,
This
action
sanctions
on
its
feeling
were
in
and
in
which
was
relations
positively
was
point
at
war
Italian
would
take
condemned
imposed.
with
Italy.
this
the
The
in
What were the domestic inuences on Italian
continuously
foreign
by
Italy’s
the
between
was
foreign
League
Although
Western
conquest
turn
policy
its
the
policy
of
of
aggression
Abyssinia
had
the
led
Mussolini
on
Nations
democracies,
encouraged
1935
to
and
invasion
to
a
new
and
a
course.
negative
surge
further
The
Abyssinia
limited
invasion
a
1939.
of
was
of
acts
impact
received
nationalist
of
aggression.
agriculture had not fullled Mussolini’s goal of autarky
and the economy would not be able to sustain a general
foreign policy in 1935–39?
war. The limited war in Abyssinia and the intervention in
There was a lack of suppor t from the political elites,
Spain would be a drain on Italian resources. These factors
including the King, for a shift in Italian foreign policy that
had to be borne in mind while Mussolini still aspired to
had traditionally suppor ted Britain. These groups were
control the Mediterranean and maintain the momentum of
generally hostile to the Germans. The economic situation
“Fascistization” that had followed the war in East Africa.
also inuenced foreign policy. Italian industry and
134
C H A P T E R
2 . 3 :
I T A L I A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Why did Mussolini invade Abyssinia in October 1935?
Source skills
Source A
A
Source B
speech
public
Mussolini
the
day
made
before
to
the
the
Italian
Italian
Patricia
invasion
The
Abyssinia,
October
Knight.
is
not
only
objective,
army,
all
commit
Italy’s
the
her
promises
victory
than
in
the
fate
Italy
one
table
of
the
crumbs
of
march
to
its
invasion
with
status
that
others
try
injustice,
taking
away
When,
the
brought
that
marches
Let
sun.
with
million
the
alert.
made?
dead,
that
Italians
and
blackest
were
670,000
army
million
united
place
united
of
44
our
and
Fascism
(2003).
of
Ab y s s i nia
was
und er ta ke n
1935.
primarily
It
Mussolini
of
Allies,
To
ght
her
how
the
scene
troops
in
aspects
Italy
to
many
of
doing
the
1896.
of
any
intended
to
contribution
sun”
rival
we
they
more
went
gave
us
to
only
gains
the
in
African
Mussolini
fertile
of
a nd
form
of
oil,
for
for
Ita l i a n
co al
fa il u re
gl or ie s
of
the
“pl a ce
in
the
Fur t h e r
econo m i c
a nd
gold
Ital ia n
of
It al ia n
Mus s ol in i
F ra nce .
the
thoug ht
a
of
of
Ital y’s
the
po we r
fru s t r at i n g
and
a chi e ve
p r o s pe ct
recruits
area
mor e
b ee n
r e cr e a te
gr e at
Ad owa ,
de fe at
the
ha d
and
the
also
a ve ng e
co l oni es
Brita i n
were
of
booty.
to
motives
Ital y’s
di s a s tr ous
O ne
ne w
Empire
and
so,
Versaill e s
acquire
now
in
Roman
When
peace
and,
demo ns tr a te
common
disabled
wounded.
colonial
1915,
supreme
480,000
odious
in
the
to
to
Ea st
and
a r m y.
Afri ca
s e ttl eme nt,
as
a
g ive n
the
First question, par t a – 3 marks
expected
What,
the
according
invasion
of
to
Source
A,
were
the
reasons
for
Battle
Abyssinia?
the
increase
for
only
Births.
in
Ab y s s i ni a
remaining
territory
and
p o pula tion
wa s
fr om
in
uncol onized
seeme d
an
ea s y
the
any
c a se
Afri ca n
ta r ge t ,
gi ven
Second question – 4 marks
Italy’s
With
reference
to
the
origin,
purpose
and
Source
A,
historians
assess
studying
Examiner’s
again.
In
values
and
●
its
Would
the
hint:
response
the
have
and
Italian
Read
to
limitations
you
values
the
provenance
second
given
found
limitations
invasion
question,
of
of
neighbouring
Source
consider
values
i ts
p re s en c e
Er i tr e a
a nd
So mal il a n d.
Abyssinia.
A
for
the
the
have
invasion
related
what
same
a nd
for
below.
the
sup e r i o r i ty
content
in
of
mi litary
to
Italians
and
at
what
the
saw
as
the
time.
It
Italian
offers
important
in
public
an
would
insight
October
into
1935.
Limitations
and
limitations?
●
●
Which
●
Do
ones
had
you
not
thought
Mussolini
may
of?
not
Italy
you
have
any
comments
to
at
needed
be
to
justify
representing
the
his
the
policies
wider
publicly
views
held
and
in
time.
add?
●
The
date
of
the
speech
may
be
a
limitation,
as
Values
it
●
A
value
dictator
policy.
of
of
The
invasion
●
A
value
how
the
the
Italian
origin
Italy
of
of
is
that
himself,
author
had
it
and
is
a
speech
Mussolini
planned
and
made
by
directed
ordered
the
it
the
the
public.
As
it
is
is
that
it
offers
presented
a
speech,
at
it
insight
the
will
time
give
into
to
●
the
that
Mussolini
used
to
justify
the
The
of
rally
A
value
Italian
of
the
content
government
is
that
believed
it
to
reveals
be
the
Indeed,
to
rally
lacks
and
as
would
hindsight
this
Other
public
as
is
a
motives
support
not
it
Mussolini
be
was
speech,
for
for
the
his
revealed.
given
on
the
eve
invasion.
The
content
focuses
on
the
justications,
mainly
invasion.
what
key
as
dictatorship,
historical,
●
support.
invasion
propaganda.
such
speech
the
the
the
●
reasons
to
before
probably
personal
purpose
was
is
day
invasion,
Abyssinia.
invasion
the
needs
foreign
for
is
the
reasons
for
Italian
one-sided
perspective
elaborate
on
the
expansion.
of
specic
Italy’s
aims
It
presents
position
of
Il
and
a
highly
does
not
Duce
135
2
L TA
L TA
Thinking skills
Refer back to the terms of the
Thinking skills
In pairs, discuss the following questions.
Treaty of London on page 87,
1
What key factors motivated the Italian invasion of Abyssinia according to
and the gains Italy attained from
Source B on page 135?
the Paris Peace Settlement on
2
Attempt to nd evidence from the sources and this chapter that suppor t:
page 90. In pairs or small groups,
discuss the validity of Mussolini’s
•
economic motives for the invasion
•
ideological motives for the invasion
•
changing diplomatic alignments in Europe as a factor in the invasion.
claim that Italy had been given
“only the crumbs of colonial
booty” (Source A page 135).
M u s s o l i n i ’s
had
not
L TA
nationalist
Communication skills
foreign
yet
imperial
been
policy
ambitions
power
objectives
colonized,
like
to
build
Britain
in
invading
originated
an
and
in
empire
France.
the
and
He
Abyssinia,
l o n g e r- t e r m
to
also
become
a
aspired
to
which
Italian
great
an
empire
Draw a mind map that
akin
to
the
classical
Roman
Empire,
which
had
controlled
large
summarizes the reasons
swathes
of
African
t e r r i t o r y.
for Mussolini’s invasion of
The
Abyssinia.
political
personality
for
its
would
It
in
own
also
In
for
be
was
also
economic
an
revenge
addition,
forces
the
Duce)
Mussolini
also
1896.
military
(Il
sake
give
would
reason
cult
by
invasion
and
an
to
Mussolini
drawing
reasons
for
on
of
victory
Italy’s
to
the
as
would
colonial
conquering
behind
Fascist
Abyssinia
ignoble
be
defeat
able
troops.
to
the
corporate
the
Great
for
and
not
the
bolster
from
state
and
to
Italian
war
modernized.
his
own
there
the
and
to
War
this
Abyssinians
Mussolini
order
emigration
market
was
Depression.
in
regime.
ideal,
to
attention
targeted
Mussolini’s
the
However,
Abyssinia.
divert
ERITREA
consolidate
support
element
easy
for
was
rally
were
needed
the
of
impact
Abyssinia
gain
to
failings
territory
provide
goods.
an
of
was
for
export
Mussolini
Blue
also
hoped
to
nd
oil.
Nile
When
De
FRENCH
Bono
Hitler
announced
rearmament,
Mussolini
German
briey
SOMALIA
hesitated
did
not
in
his
want
invasion
to
leave
plans
himself
as
he
too
BRITISH
SOMALIA
exposed
in
Europe
when
he
was
at
Addis
war
in
Africa.
However,
the
Stresa
Ababa
ABYSSINIA
Graziani
Conference
nothing
had
convinced
France
an
ITALIAN
territories
SOMALILAND
to
would
expansion
territory.
Italian
led
had
his
plans
him
not
to
of
think
the
that
Italian
Italy’s
to
Britain
also
and
strongly
control
in
wanted
power
Mussolini
clear
he
meetings
object
Mussolini
demonstrate
Nevertheless,
Italian
him
fear;
to
did
Britain
the
to
Germany.
not
and
to
make
France
advances
as
an
he
did
area
not
possessions
▲
136
Map of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–36
want
where
to
they,
(see
provoke
too,
map).
had
them
in
colonial
C H A P T E R
2 . 3 :
I T A L I A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
The events – What happened?
L TA
As
you
see
acquired
from
the
colonial
map
on
territory
the
on
previous
the
border
page,
of
Italy
had
Abyssinia.
skills
already
The
Communication
border
itself
Go to www.youtube.com/
lacked
clarity,
and
this
lack
of
clarity
gave
Mussolini
the
opportunity
to
watch?v=op-dD3oUMh0, or
manufacture
an
incident
that
would
lead
to
war.
search for “ The Abyssnia Crisis,
It
was
in
Italy
1923
that
and
had
(as
backed
you
read
Abyssinia’s
on
page
entry
102)
the
into
two
the
League
countries
of
had
Nations
signed
1935–6”.
a
This clip from “ The Road to
treaty
of
friendship
in
1928.
However,
Italy
drew
up
a
plan
to
annex
War: Italy” shows the Italians’
Abyssinia
in
1929
and
an
invasion
plan
in
1932.
Then,
in
December
motives and actions in
1934,
Italian
forces
clashed
with
Abyssinians
at
the
disputed
Wal
Wal
Abyssinia.
oasis,
which
apology
and
Selassie,
Il
secret
Duce
made
an
not
the
a
huge
modern
September
death
of
investigation
his
the
forces
commitment
totalling
weapons,
1935,
30
Italians.
compensation;
entertain
instructed
personnel
without
In
would
order
support
in
considerable
requested
Mussolini
a
resulted
by
to
500,000
were
the
League
the
Wal
the
idea
to
the
of
the
soon
Emperor
League
a
“total
war,
East
in
of
League
attain
to
Mussolini
of
demanded
Abyssinia,
Nations.
sending
Africa.
an
The
Haile
However,
investigation,
conquest”
an
of
army
and
in
Abyssinia.
with
Abyssinians,
retreat.
resolved
that
neither
side
could
be
Class discussion
held
responsible
disputed.
then
on
On
6
and,
of
four
put
During
point
and
to
and
half
Laval
of
this
pressured
by
On
of
9
on
May,
Italian
the
full-scale
Adowa.
the
had
had
there
aggressor
on
Assembly
sanctions,
been
invasion,
This
defeated
Nations’
these
between
France
the
and
its
to
was
in
7
Why was the conquest of
and
historic
1896.
The
to
war
and,
Ashangi.
1936,
Abyssinia
Africa
Abyssinia impor tant to
Mussolini? Consider the role
of ideology as well as other
October
voted
although
to
the
on
6
secret
press,
impose
limited,
factors such as economics and
the impact of events outside
Emperor
Eritrea
and
the
by
Samuel
to
would
the
and
the
Italy.
It
to
offer
France
were
2.6).
army
capital,
ed
In
Hoare
crisis.
Chapter
Abyssinian
took
Selassie
annexed
and
the
(see
bases.
with
Germany.
which
Britain
deal
nally
Haile
Hitler’s
ministers,
pact
crisis
naval
relations
resolution
1936,
forces
large
good
contain
swift
April
formerly
with
a
a
reached
two
foreign
withdraw
Italian
and
was
to
to
up
Britain
had
retain
French
about
leaked
opinion
to
Front
drew
bring
and
Britain
wanted
Stresa
British
Italy
where
respectively,
May
East
as
area
Italy.
and
plan
Lake
5
of
the
was
Addis
L TA
Ababa,
at
been
Italy
November,
its
captured
had
League
tensions
public
continued
defeated
18
Abyssinia
However,
Italy
the
maintain
1935,
Pierre
Italy
forces
Mediterranean,
Britain
December
forces
as
effect.
war,
the
its
incident
launched
condemned
later,
the
into
However,
Italy
On
as
Wal
Italy
Italian
Italy
Nations
the
in
to
days
sanctions.
were
October,
October,
importance
League
3
for
Self-management skills
Britain.
became
part
Summarize Mussolini’s actions
in Abyssinia on a detailed
Somaliland.
timeline. Place Mussolini’s
Mussolini
had
his
great
conquest.
The
war
had
the
desired
impact
actions above the timeline.
domestically,
with
a
surge
in
nationalist
sentiment
that
was
further
After reading Chapter 2.6, you
encouraged
by
the
League’s
condemnation
and
economic
sanctions.
can add the actions of Britain
Even
the
Italian
Queen
Mother
had
supported
the
war
effort,
and
and France below the timeline.
participated
ring
to
the
in
the
call
to
fund
the
war
by
donating
her
gold
wedding
government.
137
2
L TA
Thinking skills
with a Golden Rose.
Source A
Mussolini now enjoyed a new role as conqueror and
R. Overy and A . Wheatcroft. The Road to War:
imperialist; his reputation in Italy reached its highest point.
The Origins of World War II, pages 220–21 (20 09).
The threat of sanctions united public opinion behind
Source B
Mussolini. There developed a strong anti-British
Ex tracts from Mussolini’s telegrams to a commander in
sentiment. In cafes, zuppa inglese was re-christened
Abyssinia, 1936–37
.
zuppa imperiale. The war was popular at home. Women
5 June 1936
exchanged their gold wedding rings for iron substitutes
to swell the national bullion reserves. The Queen was
All rebels made prisoner are to be shot.
the rst of 250,000 Roman women to oer her ring in
8 June 1936 [SECRET]
a ceremony held at the War Memorial in Rome. A total
To nish o rebels as at Ancober use gas.
of ten million were collected nationwide. When the
war began to go Italy’s way in February 1936, the new
8 July 1936
commander, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, became a national
I repeat my authorization to initiate and
hero. But the victory was won only with a massive war
systematically conduct policy of terror and
eor t, using all the modern weapons of war against
extermination against rebels and populations in
Ethiopian tribesmen armed with ries and spears. By
complicity with them. Without the law of ten eyes
May 1936 there were over 400,000 Italian and native
for one we cannot heal this wound in good time.
troops in Ethiopia, and a war that was supposed to cost
21 February 1937
1.5 to 2 billion lire in total ended by costing 1 billion lire
every month. To speed up occupation the Italian air force
Agreed that male population of Goggetti over
used gas bombs on Ethiopian soldiers, both mustard gas
18 years of age to be shot and village destroyed.
and phosgene, a total of 1521 canisters, which killed and
Questions
maimed an unknown number of soldiers and civilians. In
In pairs or as a class, discuss what the telegrams in
May the whole of Ethiopia was annexed and on the 9th
Source B suggest about the nature of the Italian war in
King Victor Emmanuel was declared Emperor. The King
Abyssinia. In what ways do these telegrams suppor t the
received the news, Mussolini recorded, with “tears in his
points made by Richard Overy in Source A?
eyes”. The Pope presented the new Empress of Ethiopia
What were the results of the Abyssinian War?
Speech
Italy
by
Mussolini,
has
tokens
her
of
the
civilisation
tradition
empire
will
and
of
May
at
and
last;
of
the
humanity
Rome,
who,
1936
a
Fascist
power
for
after
all
empire
of
the
victory,
the
because
Roman
populations
associated
it
bears
lictors
of
the
…
the
An
Abyssinia.
peoples
indestructible
empire
That
with
is
their
of
the
destiny.
— Lowe, C and Marzari, F. 1975.
The results of the Abyssinian War for Italy
By
in
May
1936,
creating
relatively
had
quickly
empire.
Giovanni
a
an
new
had
won
East
and
a
was
Italy”.
in
war.
cost
be
the
Mussolini
empire.
only
military
to
Fascist
empire
the
African
had
Italian
This
Gentile,
founded
created
138
Italy
Italian
demonstrated
Italian
just
an
1,000
might
peak
He
has
had
war
Italian
and
of
philosopher,
Ethiopia.
The
his
he
been
casualties.
had
foreign
claimed:
made
succeeded
had
won
Mussolini
expanded
policy
“ Mussolini
something
more.
the
success.
…
has
He
not
has
C H A P T E R
Nevertheless,
scare”
and
Mussolini
navy
but
was
In
and
risen
from
lira
trade
The
reputation
it
had
not
with
take
that
on
and
a
initiated
Admiral
the
naval
British
ally
war
and
the
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
warned
Italian
modernization
Royal
Britain
billion
of
shift
and
for
to
to
League
at
16
to
by
great
lire
which
due
to
Finally,
forced
in
to
lifted
Navy.
A
was
naval
possible,
would
hit
by
for
a
the
The
war,
occupying
the
ght
sanctions
price.
during
250,000
perpetrated
brutality.
British
Nations
economic
billion
Germany
were
of
high
40%,
atrocities
the
a
maintaining
Italians
fell
the
the
middle
sanctions
Italian
Italy,
the
war
had
once
again
and
mean
classes
war
gave
did
July,
was
October
hard.
by
not
the
1936,
League.
a
really
war
had
Italian
the
them
guerrilla
the
decit
there
In
imposed
forces
drawn-out
in
budget
troops.
in
end
in
Abyssinia
1941.
The results of the war for collective security
The
Cavagnari
Yugoslavia,
with
E X P A N S I O N ,
“Mediterranean
Indeed,
building
their
a
Domenico
Britain.
unnished
France,
come
devalued
to
The
had
2.5
ferocity
until
to
could
cautioned
cost
was
had
1936.
Staff
tension
due
and
although
victory
continued
the
it
Abyssinia
of
I T A L I A N
defeat.
addition,
Italian
raising
Italy
Cavagnari
on
Chief
incomplete
between
certain
assault
Naval
against
programmes
war
the
the
2 . 3 :
exposed
the
Source skills
weakness
Source A
of
the
League
of
Nations,
which
had
been
utterly
An
ineffective
in
its
response
to
Italian
aggression.
Italian
nally
also
caused
with
Indeed,
6
Italy
Britain
it
is
January
Then,
the
on
that
22
German
meant
Italy
obligations.
the
that
impact
it
he
a
that,
no
must
of
no
page
of
Mussolini’s
had
its
from
May
1936,
“Italy
Empire”.
relations
the
war,
on
German
objections
He
to
stressed,
independent.
the
agreed
Rhineland;
uphold
for
has
Germany.
Mussolini
longer
162
the
good
to
satellite.
remain
rearmament
would
during
longer
1936,
from
closer
told
German
February
(See
away
and
Mussolini
becoming
however,
move
France,
signicant
1936,
ambassador
Austria
to
and
poster
It
its
further
actions
on
to
this
Locarno
discussion
of
Germany.)
139
2
Source B
A
cartoon
on
15
by
David
February
Low
published
in
the
UK
newspaper,
the
Evening
Standard,
1935.
First question, part b – 2 marks for each source
Second question – 4 marks
What
With
and
is
the
message
of
the
artists
in
Sources
A
B?
reference
assess
the
historians
to
values
its
origin,
and
studying
purpose
limitations
the
Italian
of
war
and
content,
Source
with
B
for
Abyssinia.
L TA
Thinking skills
1
Discuss, in pairs or small groups, the key dierences in how Source A and B
each get their ‘message’ across to the viewer. Which source is more eective
in achieving this?
2
In what ways could the Abyssinian crisis be seen as a turning point in
international relations?
Source skills
b
Four th question – 9 marks
Using
the
discuss
Here
you
are
some
could
Paper
1
examples
expect
set
on
for
the
of
the
the
style
Fourth
Italian
of
in
on
Abyssinia
in
Using
the
sources
and
your
own
Abyssinia:
c
Using
sources
the
what
the
reasons
for
the
Italian
invasion
140
in
1936.
own
Italian
knowledge,
invasion
of
1936.
extent
policy
of
to
Abyssinia
your
the
and
do
you
your
own
agree
that
knowledge,
“Mussolini’s
knowledge,
foreign
examine
of
a
to
a
and
results
question
question
expansion
sources
the
1936”.
was
wholly
successful
up
C H A P T E R
2 . 3 :
I T A L I A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
L TA
Communciation and social skills
Write a brief plan for the “own knowledge” par t of each of the questions a, b
and c on page 140.
Share your plans with a par tner. Give feedback on each other ’s plans by answering
the following questions.
1
Have you and your par tner structured your plans to meet the command terms
TOK
of each question?
Spend 30 minutes reviewing
2
Are there key points that your par tner has missed?
3
What points has your par tner included that you have not?
the primary sources in the case
studies you have covered thus
far. With a par tner discuss how
far you agree with the following
Why did Italy intervene in the Spanish Civil War
statement:
in 1936–39?
“Sources from the time are
Mussolini’s
military
quickly
Fascist
hoped
in
success
greatness
decided
ideals
to
for
the
by
the
bases
Roman
Italian
central
in
the
and
look
out
in
Spain
military
role
had
to
broke
of
Balearic
action
war
and
Islands
aspirations
in
Mussolini
rebels
in
Taking
intervention
to
had
help
made,
right-wing
Republic
war
him
was
further
in
in
society.
from
to
for
1936,
line
always biased and give an
he
with
Follow up on your discussion by
Mussolini
General
re-establish
incomplete picture of events.”
considering how the limitations
Franco
the
of sources pose a challenge for
historians. Feedback to the class.
Empire.
ideology;
to
encouraged
civil
intervene.
Mussolini
connections
when
assistance,
militarist
socialism.
Spanish
to
his
Nevertheless,
from
and,
naval
Mediterranean
motivated
Abyssinia
regarding
gain
return
in
ght
as
groups
1931.
He
the
Spanish
responded
he
in
against
had
to
in
since
stop
Civil
War
requests
liberal
done
Spain
wanted
to
was
for
democracy
Germany,
the
also
assistance
and
Spanish
of
a
Spain
and
to
prevent
communists
from
attaining
a
The
Spanish
was
a
war
position
at
the
mouth
of
the
the
rationale
for
Mediterranean.
intervention
to
the
continuing
struggle
against
Marxism.
Italian
Finally,
he
Republican
Indeed,
public
as
who
also
part
democratically
of
intended
left-wing
to
coalition
weaken
France,
part
of
his
wider
foreign
policy
objectives,
as
supported
he
elected
the
Popular
close
and
the
links
with
the
left
Popular
Front
government
that
were
attempting
to
overthrow.
Thus,
Mussolini
France
from
gaining
inuence
in
a
left-wing
Spain,
and
his
own
strategic
position
in
the
Steiner
highlights
another
reason:
right-wing
saw
in
the
Spanish
War
an
included
supporters
the
Mussolini
opportunity
to
fashion
the
“new
“the
new
Duce
Italian”.
claimed,
“to
“There
have
is
ever
only
one
greater
way
masses
to
create
who
a
have
warlike
waged
The
masses
who
want
to
go
to
war”.
—
Steiner,
and
not
have
there
unlike
a
clear
clear
during
plan
Italy
any
sent
Franco
than
he
anticipated.
had
when
“nationalist”
population.
his
he
goals
more
other
invasion
sent
that
of
his
assistance,
country
forces
and
to
appeal
the
war
Mussolini
Spain;
to
including
church,
the
royal
Nationalists,
by
General
to
Franco,
seize
had
power
2011
Abyssinia,
could
the
and
ever
in
However,
fascists,
people”,
war
attempted
greater
groups.
Italy”
led
the
of
military
family.
and
who
Mediterranean.
These
Zara
forces
conservative
would
and
strengthen
Spanish
would
supported
prevent
and
Franco
Nationalist
generals
Front
France
government
had
War
between
spreading
the
presented
Civil
fought
strategically
forces,
important
War
new
Spanish
in
Civil
1936–39
close
installation
communism
The
the
nor
raged
on
far
Italian
troops,
longer
a
coup
civil
were
wider
70,000
did
to
than
the
war
in
July
Nationalist
failed
to
Madrid,
1936.
developed,
take
and
remained
forces
the
half
loyal
A
when
capital,
the
to
army
the
government.
141
2
What were the results of intervention in the Spanish
Civil War?
Although
the
forces
had
it
not
was
were
●
intervention
aligned
generally
mainly
economic
half
its
to
popular
negative
The
14
for
cost
foreign
around
was
themselves
with
the
by
the
Roman
Italians.
Church
Catholic
Indeed,
the
as
Franco’s
Church
in
Spain,
consequences
Italy:
had
been
currency
billion
supported
with
lire
high;
reserves.
and
it
the
The
led
to
lira
was
total
Italy
devalued
cost
of
the
increasing
and
war
its
it
lost
amounted
trade
with
Germany.
●
One
Italy
the
third
had
Brigades
L TA
1
forces
ghting
for
Italian
submarine
General
Italy
Italy
and
Franco
an
drew
stocks
a
Italy’s
1937.
become
●
Italian
arms
secure
side,
March
between
●
Italy’s
helped
winning
example,
●
of
were
the
closer
on
France
roundly
at
supply
and
satellite
regime
weakness
Republic
attacks
to
consumed
right-wing
military
maintained
Italian
were
in
led
been
by
Battle
ships
the
war.
Europe,
had
defeated
the
by
of
to
Although
and
was
exposed.
the
on
For
International
Guadalajara
increased
in
tension
Britain.
his
independence
and
Spain
did
not
state.
Germany.
Thinking skills
What does the extract below from the historian Richard
or
Overy suggest about:
now
France.
bore
From
sole
depar tments
●
1937
onward
responsibility
in
the
Italian
Mussolini,
for
the
who
three
government ,
ser vice
began
the economic impact that Mussolini’s wars in
to
authorize
substantial
new
programmes
of
Abyssinia and Spain had on Italy
rearmament
●
…
The
great
weakness
of
the
the impact of domestic economic weaknesses on
Italian
strategic
position
was
the
economy.
Italy
Italian foreign policy?
was
heavily
War had become an addiction for Mussolini. His
materials,
conversation had always been spiced with a
was
vocabulary of conict, but after Ethiopia and Spain,
the
he came to see himself as a great war leader. In
Mussolini
March, 1938, jealous of the King’s position as formal
sufficiency
head of the armed forces, he appointed himself and
the
his monarch as “First Marshals of the Empire” to
like
create a spurious equality between them. Yet without
utilization.
expanding and modernizing Italy’s armed forces,
country’s
future warfare was in jeopardy … The limited eor t
a
very
real
war
on
foreign
par ticularly
vulnerable
means
state
in
reliant
to
play
declared
…
To
By
the
1939
arms
economy
the
and
the
a
the
over
a
Italy
raw
ore,
She
power.
of
strategy
the
owned
was
and
lacked
great
policy
self-
worked,
economy
investment ,
state
of
iron
…
of
for
that
trade,
capacity.
in
par t
need
controls
on
oil
blockade
ensure
extended
Germany,
coal,
to
sources
and
80%
labour
of
the
transformed
into
peacetime.
in Ethiopia and Spain forced Italy to spend almost as
Overy, R and Wheatcroft, A . 2009. The Road to War: The
much of her national income on armaments as richer,
origins of World War II, pages 222–23.
industrialized Germany, and twice as much as Britain
Random House. London, UK
142
C H A P T E R
2 . 3 :
I T A L I A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1936
The new relationship between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany
One
he
of
the
now
the
key
results
committed
Rome–Berlin
agreement
Minister
of
Axis
between
Galeazzo
the
himself
Spanish
to
a
Alliance
Italy
and
Civil
formal
on
25
War
alliance
October
Germany
was
for
Mussolini
with
1936.
drawn
was
Germany
This
up
that
by
signing
coalition
by
Italian
Foreign
Ciano.
Source skills
A
public
Berlin
1
speech
Axis
by
November
This
is
axis
the
history
Rome–
the
Mussolini,
line
between
around
which
Rome
all
the
and
animated
by
the
will
for
the
are
train
in
peace
can
collaborate.
It
surprise
that
today
we
have
our
in
common
have
National
everywhere
of
the
but
same
they
the
is
not
hoist
many
a
will
of
history
people,
as
nations
…
whom
courage,
resistance,
we
love
the
fatherland,
the
…
and
Germany
contempt
and
Italy
for
follow
easy
the
same
matter
ag
elements
[world
view].
Socialism
same
master,
have
their
in
life
in
the
sphere
of
economic
autarky.
of
economic
independence
the
political
…
Weltanschauung
only
the
European
independence
We
of
young
discipline,
Without
anti-Bolshevism
force
on
believe
in
collaboration
goal
of
based
Both
power
Berlin
living
and
common.
driving
Both
of
states
in
determining
and
1936.
vertical
an
announcing
Benito
the
many
and
enemies,
Third
the
of
nation
is
doubtful.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
service
life
to
Mussolini’s
International,
conceptions
a
of
Not
Fascism
in
of
in
this
Italy
source,
and
what
Hitler’s
key
factors
Germany
do
have
common?
and
The end of Italian par ticipation in Collective Security
Third International
Italy
joined
and
Japan.
and
stated
The
that
signatories
interests”.
that
as
a
key
1937
regard
and
to
in
the
the
a
he
in
measures
the
in
key
policy
to
the
Axis
foreign
with
Communist
the
Soviet
states
Pact
Italy
is
policy.
their
now
the
by
Indeed,
the
drawn
some
in
This was also known as the
Communist International or
Comintern. It was an association
common
formed
had
seen
Germany
International,
Union
“safeguard
Although
already
independence
shift
by
member
Germany
have
successfully
a
the
1937,
of national Communist Par ties
group
closer
founded in 1919.
to
historians
December
Nations.
with
thus
November
against
Powers.
of
you
in
attack
Italian
accepted
been
shift
Axis
Mussolini
major
an
Pact,
for
Germany,
had
Mussolini’s
had
1936
on
League
As
of
mid-1930s,
Austrian
he
1938
Austria
the
relationship
represented
of
consult
the
Pact
directed
case
point
Austria.
with
in
the
become
Indeed,
and
was
joining
left
new
directly
in
during
However,
it,
By
protected
War.
Pact
turning
Italy
Italy’s
Anti-Comintern
would
would
Germany
the
told
the
Anchluss
was
since
not
the
Hitler
that
when
of
the
invaded
on
Italy
no
at
First
in
to
World
1934.
deal
longer
protect
Austria.
Austria.
with
promoted
Anschluss
would
Hitler
for
popular
end
off
apparent
had
government
Italy
position
gain
starkly
Mussolini
Austrian
Italian
strategic
most
read,
warned
implying
the
was
The
Versailles,
This
creation
and
domestically.
143
2
Source skills
Source A
Denis
Mack
After
the
Smith.
Nazis
Mussolini
reasons
victory
had
for
of
with
won
arms
power
ideological
closer
Hitler
immediate
Mussolini
ties
is
also
comment:
and
as
a
money
January
well
as
victory”
victory
and
he
which
1933,
pragmatic
Germany.
our
Italian
relied
to
upon
of
creating
a
“The
was
had
German
back
his
helped
raised
The
to
the
Hitler
sent
him
with
admiration,
new
other
with
of
replace
positive
in
North
France
Germans
encouragement
as
the
achieve
and
the
dominant
encouragement
for
a
thought
for
agreement.
The
put
out
to
sincere,
Tentative
see
agree
here
Vienna
was
in
and
to
conne
the
Baltic,
the
feelers
whether
their
the
Mediterranean
would
to
such
an
and
axis
the
possible
Italy
in
dispose
of
Austrian
the
problem
method
would
be
for
Berlin
Hitler’s
of
a
to
treaty
settle
of
their
relations
friendship
in
practice
bring
Austria
…
into
wake,
foreign
so
…
policy
that
she
than
could
one
pursue
parallel
no
with
to
free
Balkans
was
to
were
of
Germany.
If
Austria,
as
a
formally
quite
in
state,
were
thus
in
practice
to
One
become
obstacle
be
Germans
ambitions
leaving
and
the
themselves
form
independent
the
now
improvement
a
that
Poland
his
January
If
other
would
would
relations
namely,
simplest
Germany’s
therefore
it
fundamental
dispute,
which
basis
in
Italy
Mediterranean.
was
Mussolini
power
…
this
reports
were
and
Africa
Italy
Ministry
homage
…
to
to
Foreign
1936.
only
ready
be
Rome-Berlin
messages
and
could
invasion.
the
German-Italian
and
support
German
Ambassador
German
conversation
to
axis.
a
Source B
[Mussolini]
possibility
military
prevent
(1983).
in
with
suppressed,
a
German
satellite,
he
would
raise
no
ideas
objection.
about
racial
obstacle
the
to
Nazi
inequality
an
entente
ambition
to
…
A
with
annex
more
serious
Germany
Austria,
was
Source C
whereas
A
Mussolini
had
condently
promised
to
cartoon
line”,
his
country
against
“Prussian
barbarism”
Italy
the
144
times
and
Nazi
in
given
and
1933,
a
Dollfuss
clear
socialist
was
promise
parties
in
brought
that,
if
to
both
Austria
David
Low,
“European
published
in
the
UK
clothes-
newspaper,
…
Evening
Three
by
defend
were
Standard
on
9
May
1933.
the
C H A P T E R
2 . 3 :
I T A L I A N
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
of
to
dispute
Source
between
A,
what
Italy
and
were
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Second question – 4 marks
the
key
areas
With
Germany?
of
reference
Source
this
B,
source
to
the
assess
for
a
origin,
the
purpose
values
historian
and
and
content
limitations
studying
of
Mussolini’s
First question, par t b – 2 marks
position
What
is
the
message
of
Source
on
Austria
in
the
1930s.
C?
L TA
Thinking and self-management skills
1
In pairs, discuss the reasons for the change in Mussolini’s position towards
Austria by 1938.
2
How far was the alliance between Mussolini and Hitler an alliance of equals?
What was Italy’s role during the Sudetenland
See page 178 for a full account
of the Sudetenland Crisis.
crisis in September 1938?
During
the
prole.
He
a
general
the
wanted
war.
a
of
peace.
Hitler;
it
in
was
invaded
the
In
rest
The
Munich
and
Mussolini
1938,
he
Corsica,
war
itself
be
after
at
he
was
and
had
now
the
Tunis
France,
desperate
to
as
a
1938,
great
Chamberlain’s
meetings
this
He
time
simply
1939,
in
was
put
broker
of
failure
hailed
in
broke
gain
Europe
was
Hitler’s
the
a
helping
peace,
Mussolini
Mussolini
forward
assumed
peace,
to
Germany,
that
Hitler
Mussolini
as
own
Munich
high
to
avert
deal
stepped
the
now
a
over
in
architect
subservient
plan
for
the
Agreement
and
Czechoslovakia.
instructed
against
seen
by
March
of
September
Munich.
Agreement
Nice
in
two
clear
fact,
Sudetenland.
a
to
“peacemaker”
However,
crisis
Following
Sudetenland
as
to
Munich
highlighted
determined
Italian
from
and
do
prevent
a
the
to
weakness
take
parliament
to
demand
France.
Mussolini
so
German
with
war,
at
almost
of
Britain
advantage
the
believed
support.
any
of
and
this.
In
France,
November
annexation
that
he
Britain
of
could
had
win
shown
price.
Source skills
The
Source A
bars
Malta,
Mussolini’s
speech
to
the
Fascist
of
February
is
surrounded
by
an
inland
sea
which
to
the
the
oceans
by
the
Suez
Canal
by
the
straits
of
Gibraltar,
dominated
a
guns
of
Great
therefore
oceans;
Italy
does
not
therefore
Mediterranean
powerful
suffer
from
she
her
Corsica
of
Italy;
to
all
western
Tunisia,
prison
is
a
pistol
are
pointed
while
our
Malta
positions
and
in
Cyprus
the
Mediterranean.
Greece,
central
Turkey,
by
are
all
have
is
free
actually
access
a
to
the
and
the
more
prisoner
and
states
ready
becomes
the
complete
encirclement
of
Italy
the
to
link
up
political
with
and
Great
military
…
in
From
this
situation,
you
can
draw
the
populated
following
and
this
Britain.
…
the
Suez.
heart
Britain
Italy
and
threat
Egypt
the
of
…
and
and
Corsica,
is
are
connected
are
guards
1939.
at
Italy
prison
the
Grand
Gibraltar
Council,
the
Cyprus;
more
she
conclusions:
will
imprisonment.
145
2
1.
The
task
and
does
of
Italian
not
continental
initially
to
policy,
have
Europe
break
which
territorial
except
the
bars
for
of
presented
cannot
aims
the
in
Albania,
the
map
genuinely
is
West.
prison.
was
2.
Once
the
bars
have
been
broken,
has
only
one
direction:
to
march
Libya
ocean?
to
The
Ethiopia
Ocean
Indian
Ocean,
through
through
the
connecting
Sudan,
French
or
North
not
cases,
we
come
up
against
opposition.
It
is
stupid
to
pose
a
Africa.
German
rap
for
problem
the
the
time
enough
“change
policy
approval
he
to
down
knew
risk
of
that
war
militarily
weakened
without
covering
Continent.
Axis
important
thus
The
caters
policy
historical
for
try
our
of
this
same
the
Italy
with
in
Africa
economy,
aware
threat
confessed
settlement
that
to
powers
On
that
he
the
Britain
as
Italy
if
Germany.
he
would
other
and
could
not
hand
France
get
“give
a
Mussolini
they
had
been
in
the
were
1920s.
not
His
resolve
of
the
old
empires
as
decadent
and
backs
the
rst
formulated
in
1935,
seemed
Rome-
truer
Berlin
of
to
Italian
Anglo-
spineless,
on
a
the
Musso”.
analysis
this
same
Tied
with
Chamberlain
the
the
French
state.
Spain,
was
both
the
strong
make
ocean.
Atlantic
In
at
yet
major
did
Which
to
to
and
the
weakness
world”,
independent
But
not
Western
the
Italian
a
policy
by
of
after
Munich.
fundamentally
question.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What,
Source B
according
policy
Richard
British
Overy
and
professors
Andrew
of
history,
aims
for
to
Source
Mussolini’s
A,
are
key
foreign
Italy?
Wheatcroft,
in
an
academic
Second question – 4 marks
book
The
Road
to
War:
The
Origins
of
World
War
With
II
reference
to
its
origin,
purpose
and
content,
(2009).
assess
After
Munich
narrower
desire
to
Mussolini’s
still.
The
share
options
German
with
Hitler
Class discussion
became
success
the
fed
the
values
historians
his
the
and
studying
limitations
Mussolini’s
of
Source
foreign
B
for
policy
in
1930s.
opportunity
Why did Italy invade Albania in April 1939?
Hitler
broke
the
terms
of
the
Munich
Agreement
in
March
1939
when
Read Source A again.
he
invaded
the
rest
of
Czechoslovakia.
Nazi
Germany
had
now
gone
Discuss the following
beyond
revision
of
the
Treaty
of
Versailles
and
had
seized
control
of
a
questions:
sovereign
1
What continuity was there in
informed
Mussolini’s foreign policy in
the
state.
of
Mussolini
the
initiative
conquest
and
had
not
after
emulate
the
Hitler’s
been
fact.
consulted
Mussolini
by
Hitler.
now
He
wanted
was
to
only
regain
success.
the 1930s?
On
2
7
April
What changes had occurred
of
by 1939 in Mussolini’s
time
foreign policy objectives?
assert
Albania
a
satellite
Italian
intimidate
Adriatic.
the
146
made
state
(see
Grandi
paths
of
of
the
Britain
the
a
punitive
meaningless
in
Yugoslavia,
threaten
domination
Italy
rather
strength
Dino
ancient
and
1939,
was
page
claimed
“with
to
that
his
loss
its
the
east
naval
Mediterranean ”.
Italy
and
invasion
some
wanted
Albania
the
bases,
for
our
of
to
expansion,
dominating
of
to
The
been
successful
of
conquest
in
Albania.
had
Mussolini
Hitler’s
ambition
the
of
on
country
However,
conquests
the
assault
the
imitate
pursue
Roman
Eastern
101).
order
and
as
the
would
“ open
Mussolini ”
complete
C H A P T E R
▲
2 . 3 :
I T A L I A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Italian forces landing at Durazzo, Albania
How did Italy take over Albania?
King
Zog
from
Italy
of
Yugoslavia.
sent
to
occupation
had
was
5
did
Mussolini
Albanians
to
not
sent
to
resist
also
the
to
keep
the
King
Zog
Zog
the
the
be
25
the
with
when
Greece
and
Mussolini
Mussolini
agreement
birth
anti-Italian
over
and
broadcast
March,
ultimatum
of
Tirana
mobilization
ofcers
independence
to
sent
the
an
Italian
refused.
demonstrators
a
some
agreements
intimidated
on
Italian
y
assert
demanding
distraction
to
to
trade
When,
widespread
but
Albanian
to
Tirana,
although
Italian
signed
King
planes
submit
he
region.
prevent
100
attempted
refused
capital,
even
Then,
many
had
1934
Albania,
and
Nevertheless,
would
had
the
of
Italians.
issued,
in
attempted
leaked
April
the
He
warships
ultimatum
Zog
Albania
when
a
a
dropping
baby,
leaets
demanded
of
However,
royal
demonstrations
the
government
public
secret.
of
ofcials
address
to
on
his
to
6
the
people
on
April.
the
ght
reserves
ed
news
heir,
telling
weapons
Albanian
the
his
was
country.
stating
he
occupation.
147
2
Source skills
consideration
Source A
of
G.
Bruce
Strang.
On
the
Fiery
March:
Albania
as
for
war
had
of
been
considering
annexing
some
The
Anschluss,
also
threatened
while
disquieting
for
Yugoslavia.
He
mused
[Yugoslav
Prime
for
friendship
Minister]
Stoyadinovic’s
ahead
might
mean
prime
minister
that
would
be
independence
an
Italo-Yugoslav
order
saying
that
alliance.
he
was
a
war,
“as
long
as
we
get
tricky,
and
relationship
Ciano
early
a
ordered
April.
naval
The
to
from
with
their
Berlin,
the
operation
invasion,
bombardment
brought
precipitated
also
poured
to
which
widespread
of
the
port
of
condemnation,
yet
scorn
another
on
crisis
in
Mussolini’s
Whitehall.
declaration
Mussolini
prepared
peaceful
Albania”.
Italian
intentions
during
his
to
meeting
face
gain
to
of
agreed,
Determined
immediate
prepared
in
It
later
Adriatic.
of
the
and
Albania’s
if
in
Durazzo,
secure
the
form
need
included
sacrice
invasion
Italian
that
go
to
outright
Italy,
Mussolini
Yugoslavian
an
securing
Albania.
developing,
Italian
to
of
(2003).
secure
Ciano
given
means
Mussolini
domination
prepares
be
a
with
Chamberlain
in
January.
Ciano’s
Third question – 6 marks
tour
had
of
Albania,
preceding
represented
mission;
information
their
a
kind
Mussolini
to
project
of
and
visit
to
Italy,
reconnaissance
Ciano
determine
was
Hitler’s
needed
whether
desirable
or
better
or
and
contrast
Source
and
Source
for
not
feasible.
Compare
A
invading
Albania
return,
Ciano
submitted
a
report
Mussolini’s
expansionist
had
excellent
of
wrote,
coal,
full
list
On
the
and
agricultural
though
of
had
no
very
one
Albania’s
yet
potential
side,
there
completed
mineral
were
the
economic,
would
of
In
the
wake
cultural,
reach
into
inuence.
subsequent
A
and
the
rm
of
former
annexation
of
copy
of
the
pens
above
to
text,
identify
the
following
underline
or
comparisons
Comparisons
a
wealth.
Mussolini
had
for
been
some
considering
annexing
time.
German
●
There
●
The
were
strategic
reasons
for
annexing
Albania.
tentacles
Austrian
warning
a
coloured
several
Anschluss,
political
Take
different
contrasts.
Albania
advantages.
1939.
deposits
●
strategic
April
in
motives
potential,
extensive
had
in
Italian
desire.
and
Ciano
hint:
Using
highlight
Albania
expressed
that
sources.
encouraged
views
regarding
Upon
Examiner’s
his
the
B
from
sphere
Italy
Albania
and
Italian
inuenced
relationship
Italy’s
with
decision
to
Germany
invade.
would
Contrasts
prevent
any
further
German
penetration
there.
●
Source
A
highlights
the
role
of
the
Italian
Foreign
Source B
Minister
Robert
Second
Mallet.
World
Mussolini
War
and
the
Origins
of
than
a
regime
month
Albania.
in
after
Hitler
took
The
Balkan
Source
B
highlights
Source
B
focuses
Rome
idea
ordered
of
an
the
outright
invasion
state
had
been
Mussolini
Rome.
It
since
had
the
also
time
been
of
the
discussion
by
the
naval
seen,
the
of
the
had
of
148
as
Cavagnari
Italian
greater
of
staff
focus
whole.
had
from
As
urged
Hitler’s
subject
staff
whereas
role
of
the
Italian
Navy.
his
very
in
the
Mediterranean
we
in
have
the
rst
the
of
motive
Source
of
A
dominating
focuses
to
Source
suggests
be
made
in
on
the
Albania.
of
A
the
increasing
invasion
was
to
the
prevent
area,
Italy
Source
B
suggests
attempting
to
that
gain
it
from
was
its
motivated
developing
with
Germany.
already
give
in
charge
staff
aftermath
1935,
in
the
to
days
inuence
visit
Adriatic
naval
immediate
crisis
the
of
and
Bagoglio
position
Subsequently,
demanded,
the
a
strategic
navy.
invade,
consideration
relationship
chiefs
on
gains
by
some
the
whereas
economic
whereas
to
to
of
annexation
under
Adriatic,
Germany
by
decision
Prague,
●
the
the
the
the
the
in
(1983).
●
Less
Ciano
that
●
Source
A
whereas
only
considers
Source
specically
the
B
also
impact
the
reasons
considers
on
the
relations
for
the
invasion,
results,
with
Britain.
C H A P T E R
On
7
April,
led
by
General
Alfredo
Guzzoni,
2 . 3 :
Italy
I T A L I A N
invaded
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Albania
Class discussion
with
a
faced
force
them
trained
in
the
by
of
100,000
had
the
only
equipment.
were
in
On
April,
15,000
Italians.
mountains,
By
but
the
Italian
men
and
badly
King
Zog
Italian
The
of
King
aircraft.
equipped
had
agents
afternoon
hands.
600
hoped
The
troops
to
very
and
his
rst
which
ght
sabotaged
the
Albanian
the
day
family
a
army
had
war
of
ed
ghting,
to
In small groups, discuss the
been
impact of Fascism on Italian
resistance
Albanians’
of
that
foreign policy up to April 1939.
limited
all
Does everyone in your group
ports
agree on the impact of fascism
Greece.
on foreign policy?
8
Italian
government
deposed
forces
buildings.
King
Zog
in
entered
Then,
on
absentia
Tirana
12
and
and
April,
voted
seized
the
to
control
Albanian
unite
with
of
all
What conclusions can be drawn
parliament
Italy
in
from your discussions?
“personal
union”.
Albania
Italians
withdrew
then
Albanian
set
foreign
the
Albanian
the
ofcial
already
invasion
a
was
creation
would
of
of
League
of
was
merged
put
the
on
under
Italian
use
28
of
Nations
government
Ethiopia,
later
Greece
the
Fascist
ofce
army
Emperor
Mussolini
from
up
with
the
Italian
as
a
Italian
and
crowned
Albania
October
15
King
King
base
April
Shefqet
from
The
The
ministry
Mussolini
Victor
of
1939.
Verlaci.
foreign
command.
Empire
was
on
under
and
declared
Emmanuel,
Albania.
which
to
launch
an
1940.
Italy and the Second World War
Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1939
The
Pact
Italy
the
of
and
rst
was
nations;
the
economic
the
and
Steel,
Pact
a
the
minister,
between
only
a
had
wanted
for
Pact
of
the
told
the
trust
the
and
to
apparent
negotiated
and
cooperation
the
focus
of
the
show
the
days
to
of
Britain
of
the
two
include
and
and
Japan
in
whereas
France.
Italy
(See
Steel.)
Hitler
Pact
page
before
between
sections:
military
anti-Soviet,
unity,
(see
signed
two
between
union
Nazi–Soviet
Germany
two
at
Pact
of
a
been
be
aimed
was
comprised
fostered
had
discussion
Union
Alliance,
Pact
intention
agreement
agreement
and
The
protocol,
wanted
Steel’s
Soviet
about
of
1939.
original
more
Ribbentrop,
Friendship
May
secret
The
Japan
181–182
Despite
of
22
declaration
policies.
but
Pact
on
second,
Germany
pages
or
Germany
it
in
183).
was
and
his
August
foreign
1939
Mussolini
was
signed.
Source skills
Richard
Road
to
Overy
War:
and
The
Andrew
Origins
of
Wheatcroft.
World
War
II
The
(2009).
dangerous
strongly
showed
Now
in
that
Mussolini
Albania
by
“dynamism”,
had
matching
he
began
restored
German
to
his
approach
to
with
economic
crisis
an
alliance
which
he
was
to
with
call
Mussolini
knew
the
the
“Pact
There
inside
was
Italy,
strong
even
resistance
from
the
to
ranks
his
own
such
of
The
generals
were
hostile
to
and
of
had
of
opposition
link
to
to
Germany
war,
…
that
he
was
increasingly
resented
anti-German
the
humiliating
sentiment.
something
to
do
with
No
his
doubt
decision
an
In
May
he
sent
Ciano
to
Berlin
with
senior
authority
Fascists.
the
of
…
idea
and
offer
honour
Blood”.
wave
was
reports
a
evidence
of
growing
opinion
police
Italian
contemplate
Germany
a
public
Secret
prestige
on
unilateral
commitments;
anti-German.
to
sign
an
immediate
agreement
further
149
2
with
in
Hitler
the
On
pledging
event
22nd
of
May
full
German
the
military
agreement
might
assistance
involvement
was
in
over
war.
neutralize
the
threat
from
the
West
Poland.
signed;
First question, par t a – 3 marks
Mussolini
teutonic
“Pact
surprised
though
changed
and
of
its
name
Steel”.
enough
the
German
suspicious
pleased
to
at
more
leaders
Mussolini’s
that
Italian
According
were
there
move,
Steel
promises
to
Overy
resistance
with
in
and
Italy
Wheatcroft,
to
the
idea
why
of
a
was
Pact
of
Germany?
Why did Italy remain a non-belligerent in 1939?
TOK
When
Hitler
invaded
Poland
on
1
September
1939,
he
unleashed
a
In pairs consider how the
general
European
War.
During
negotiations
over
the
Pact
of
Steel,
Pact of Steel may have been
Mussolini
had
suggested
that
Italy
would
not
be
ready
for
a
general
perceived internationally
war
until
1943.
Thus,
when
Hitler
ignited
war
over
Poland,
Mussolini
when it was signed. Why might
declared
Italy
a
It
seem
non-belligerent.
historians view the agreement
dierently to contemporaries?
would
in
September
society
the
L TA
that
Thinking skills
was
Italian government
had
in
an
his
of
1936
path
De
of
war
asserts
as
(De
Paolo
for
that
fascism.)
to
the
of
Hitler.
the
was
not
alliance
Felice
has
for
However,
a
nation.
fate
the
of
It
Italy,
case
and
by
be
argued
in
also
against
argued
from
then
Italian
on
he
historian
Mussolini
France
against
left-wing
to
Europe
militarized
have
that
and
sympathetic
could
war
was
the
and
Britain
criticized
too
of
“warlike”
historians
However,
been
it
a
with
being
outbreak
creating
Some
Germany.
this
an
Alatri,
aims
sealed
Nazi
consider
1940.
with
had
by
his
strengthened
Steel
Mussolini
to
response
against
that
directed
until
apologist
was
Pact
Felice
such
Mussolini’s
view
the
continued
Italy,
historians
Mussolini
that
and
Mussolini
Lire (millions)
was
1931
a
Germany
defence, 1931–40
Year
from
on
Renzo
expenditure for
and
terms
that
1939
being
realistic
in
not
joining
the
war.
Italy
had
been
waging
war
for
4,890
several
1932
4,880
1933
4,300
1934
5,590
1935
12,624
and
years,
could
not
in
Africa
afford
and
to
in
join
a
Europe,
general
and
the
country
European
was
war
weary
conict.
Why did Italy join the war in June 1940?
Despite
having
Mussolini
1936
Not
13,272
1938
15,028
1939
27,732
to
join
Fascist
his
●
Italy
58,899
the
leader;
portrayal
Mussolini
staying
1940
declared
keep
Italy
out
non-belligerent,
of
the
war
for
it
was
several
difcult
for
reasons:
16,573
●
1937
to
April
war
it
of
did
1940,
he
something
contrary
condent
not
neutral;
was
was
want
he
did
said:
and
Italy
not
“To
to
an
to
a
be
people
doctrine
leadership
become
to
embarrassment
Fascist
decisive
want
make
of
his
a
lesser
[the
Il
rank
“another
great
as
and
for
at
the
odds
power
by
Switzerland”.
country]
with
Duce
must
In
be
sent
into
battle”.
Overy, R and Wheatcroft, A .
2009.
●
The
war
regime
could
and
to
give
Mussolini
remove
the
the
opportunity
inuence
of
to
radicalize
conservatives
and
the
the
Church.
In pairs discuss what the table
above suggest about Italy’s
●
defence spending.
If
Italy
be
remained
dominated
because
●
The
war
it
by
had
could
a
and
Germany
remained
bring
Mediterranean.
150
neutral
Germany
that
won
would
be
the
war,
hostile
Europe
towards
would
Italy
neutral.
territorial
gains
and
perhaps
control
over
the
C H A P T E R
However,
in
June
buyer
of
million.
This
sea.
In
in
the
1940
Italy’s
Italy
food
coal
March
June
the
and
–
motives
textiles,
German
two
1940,
1940,
Italian
predominantly
received
German
In
end,
were
thirds
Britain
Mussolini
joining
economic.
and
coal
of
for
by
in
the
declared
all
war
1939
and
it
I T A L I A N
Second
had
supply
–
had
coal
Britain
and
E X P A N S I O N ,
World
been
owed
became
German
on
the
Germany
August
return
Italian
blockaded
2 . 3 :
a
Italy
be
War
principal
US
dependent
to
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
$40
on
it.
delivered
by
ports.
France.
Source skills
Source A
Source B
Mussolini’s
France,
declaration
June
of
war
on
Britain
and
1940.
A
1941
text
After
having
solved
the
problem
of
frontiers,
establishing
break
are
45
the
million
access
This
is
the
in
is
the
and
our
not
two
it
of
arms
We
military
own
truly
is
of
For
the
Japanese,
attacking.
new
social
The
order,
civilization”.
to
chains
A
“Victory!
Italian,
soldiers
in
want
sea.
free
only
our
young
ones
is
up
reads
showing
Italian
that
nation
unless
it
of
has
ocean.
struggle
sterile
taking
frontiers.
development
decline;
and
to
struggle
against
of
us
souls
gigantic
logical
are
sea
territorial
strangling
free
we
our
and
our
for
land
poster
German
the
who
one
and
fertile
stand
struggle
phase
revolution
on
of
…
the
it
peoples
the
between
verge
centuries
ideas.
Delzell, C. 1971.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What
are
Source
the
key
points
made
by
Mussolini
in
A?
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
is
the
message
conveyed
by
Source
B?
151
2
suppor t. Mussolini continued to follow this plan until his
Perspectives
decision to enter the Second World War in June 1940.
Italian historiography
The British historian AJP T
aylor
In general, “left-wing” historians in Italy asser t that
Taylor suggests that Mussolini had expansionist goals,
Mussolini had an over tly aggressive foreign policy and
but that there was a lot of conict between the foreign
expansionist aims. The “right-wing” historians, such as
policies of Hitler and Mussolini. He argues, however, that
Renzo De Felice (Mussolini’s Italian biographer), argue
Mussolini thought Hitler would agree to leave Austria
that Italy did not have large-scale expansionist plans. De
independent and that Italy could then play France and
Felice views Mussolini’s foreign policy in the context of
Germany o against each other while gaining concessions
the policies pursued before 1914 by the liberal Italian
from both. The problem was that Hitler intended to achieve
government. He argues that, from the 1920s up to at least
Anschluss
1935, Mussolini wanted to get France’s agreement to
establish Italy as a great power with an expanded empire
The German historian Gerhard Schreiber
in Nor th Africa. To this end, he was advised to pursue
Schreiber sees Mussolini’s foreign policy as dependent
the “policy of the pendulum” or, in other words, to be the
on socio-economic domestic policy. In his view, foreign
decisive weight in European relations. In addition, the
policy was used for propaganda purposes, and its real
right-wing historians generally claim that the alliance
aim was to gain domestic consensus and limited imperial
with Hitler ’s Germany was not sealed in order to pursue
expansion. He claims that Mussolini had no clear strategy
imperialist objectives. Britain’s pressure on France to
aligned to Nazi Germany, and was more a victim of his
follow sanctions over Abyssinia may have fostered a
own public promises to his people that he would create a
new course. Felice suggests that Mussolini remained
Fascist empire. By the summer of 1940 he therefore had
equivocal about Hitler, and hoped to attain his objectives
no choice but to join Germany in a general European war.
by making one side and then the other pay for his
Mussolini’s actions in the war up to 1941
TOK
Following
Mussolini’s
declaration
of
war,
there
were
some
limited
air
In small groups review the
raids
and
skirmishes
between
Italy
and
France
before
an
armistice
came
sources by historians in this
into
effect
on
25th
June
1940.
chapter and investigate other
historians who have written
Mussolini
on Italian foreign policy in the
into
expanded
1930s. Where possible, nd
of
historians writing in dierent
However,
both
languages and at dierent times.
response.
Mussolini’s
North
Libya,
both
the
Africa.
whilst
the
another
of
Balkans
war
Italian
these
and
in
forces
Italian
Italian
failures
North
Europe
in
invaded
force
invaded
offensives
meant
Africa.
the
Mediterranean
Egypt
from
the
Greece
failed
due
from
to
and
Italian
the
Hitler’s
forces
were
German
forces
took
colony
Albania.
British
drawn
into
Yugoslavia
What dierent viewpoints can
and
Greece
in
April
1941,
and
forced
an
evacuation
of
British
forces.
you nd?
Hitler’s
forces,
under
General
Rommel,
had
pushed
the
British
back
Consider the origin and purpose
and
advanced
as
far
as
El
Alamein
in
Egypt
by
June
1942.
of the publications you gather.
Discuss the extent to which the
L TA
historian’s views seem to be
Self-management skills
inuenced by preoccupations
Consider Mussolini’s foreign policy aims:
at the time of writing.
●
increase national pride
●
dominate the Mediterranean
●
consolidate domestic suppor t for
●
build an empire, gain spazio
Do you agree with the idea that
historical accounts are developed
his regime
by individual historians rather
vitale(living space), and expand
territories in Africa
than through collaboration
●
revise the settlement of 1919–20
●
dominate the Balkans
between historians? How
●
foster the spread of Fascism.
does this compare with the
152
methodology in other subjects
For each of these aims, identify the extent to which it had been achieved by 1941
such as the natural sciences?
and give evidence for your conclusions.
C H A P T E R
2 . 3 :
I T A L I A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Full document question: Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia
will
Source A
be
no
need
declaration
La
domenica
del
Corriere,
of
the
Italian
della
Sera,
depicting
in
action
emphasise
of
January
the
ofcially
any
purely
operations.
against
raise
any
case
for
we
a
must
No
defensive
one
difculties
in
Europe
provided
the
Abyssinian
prosecution
forces,
in
Italian
would
Blackshirts
and
newspaper
character
Corriere
whatsoever
war
weekend
always
supplement
of
of
operations
resulted
rapidly
1936.
in
an
accomplished
declare
to
interests
England
would
be
fact.
and
It
would
France
sufce
that
to
their
recognised.
Source C
Ruth
War
Henig.
The
1933–41
Since
his
Fascist
ascension
leader
ambition
power
Origins
to
by
had
raise
strong
the
to
Japan,
term
to
military
but
for
least
in
of
glorious
he
at
World
it
a
as
of
a
and
the
European
around
its
onset
in
expansion
a
of
and
more
the
cheap,
Abyssinia,
or
France
and
short,
him
short
agreement,
Britain
of
for
the
on
expense
glorious,
the
empire.
lacked
harder
aimed
the
the
his
well-equipped,
even
he
inclined
of
1922,
Mussolini
and
the
of
in
secret
expanding
needed
was
prospect
war
Thus
no
inuence
forces,
consent,
Mussolini
the
base
Africa
that
tacit
by
made
them.
seek
possibly
Second
status
its
however,
Depression
secure
the
power
Italy’s
and
economic
effective
to
made
increasing
Mediterranean
Unlike
of
(1985).
more
at
…
towards
triumphant
conquest.
Source D
Martin
Blinkhorn.
Mussolini
and
Fascist
Italy ,
(1984).
Source B
The
Memorandum
of
General
from
Staff
to
Marshal
Badoglio,
Mussolini,
Chief
December
1934.
been
a
The
problem
of
Italian-Abyssinian
conquest
Mussolini’s
an
Italian
century.
very
recently
shifted
from
a
to
one
which
can
be
solved
by
…
The
object
…
is
nothing
more
Neither
then
the
Abyssinian
Abyssinia.
complete
army
In
no
and
destruction
the
other
total
way
of
Empire
…
The
speedier
conquest
can
we
our
nor
likely
will
it.
Existing
be
In
the
the
danger
of
Japanese
problems
African
groups
for
of
had
half
the
interests
were
colonies
the
millions
of
beloved
of
fascist
of
certain
sufcient
were
failing
to
to
potential
propaganda,
emigrants
proving
unrewarding
and
were
of
to
the
few
thousand
build
action
actually
settled
there;
moreover,
their
the
policing
and
economic
diplomatic
infrastructures
complications.
the
pressure
administration,
less
what
the
who
the
the
of
dream
or
attract
less
nationalist
force
dictate
alone
represented
diplomatic
industrial
plane
Ethiopia
relations
depression
has
of
accomplishment
fashion
constituted
a
considerable
there
drain
on
the
Italian
treasury.
The
explanation
153
2
for
the
attack
fascism
and
on
its
Ethiopia
Duce.
The
thus
lies
fascist
in
First question, par t b – 2 marks
need
for
What
excitement,
perfectly
and
conict
and
personied
sanctied
by
in
the
dramatic
success
Mussolini
puerile
of
cult.
Other
dictators
such
as
Franco
and
Salazar
in
Portugal
reference
the
cults
and
of
lack
personality
rendered
on
the
appeal
excitement.
nor
such
the
a
the
artist
in
Source
A?
its
origin,
and
purpose
limitations
of
and
content,
Source
B
for
constructed
of
studying
the
Italian
invasion
of
Abyssinia.
stability
Neither
psychology
thing
to
values
historians
personal
of
in
assess
Spain
message
the
With
Duce
the
Second question – 4 marks
himself
machismo
is
was
Third question – 6 marks
Mussolini’s
of
fascism
conceivable.
Compare
and
contrast
Source
and
Source
B
motives
for
invading
the
C
views
expressed
regarding
in
Mussolini’s
Abyssinia.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
invasion
to
of
Source
B
Abyssinia
how
be
should
an
Four th question – 9 marks
Italian
executed?
Using
the
the
sources
reasons
for
and
the
your
Italian
own
knowledge,
invasion
of
analyse
Abyssinia.
References
Class discussion
Blinkhorn,
M.
1984.
Mussolini
and
Fascist
Italy .
Methuen.
London,
UK
Source B was written in 1934.
Which events does it refer to
Calvitt
when it says: “in the Japanese
Bolshevik-Fascist
Clarke,
J
fashion there will be no need for
USA
and
Foust,
C.
1991.
Rapprochement
of
the
Russia
1930s .
and
Italy
against
Greenwood
Hitler:
Press.
The
New
York,
a declaration of war...” What links
De
Felice,
R.
1981.
Mussolini
il
duce:
Lo
Stato
totalitario
(1936–40).
Einaudi.
are suggested here between
Turin,
Italy
events in Asia and Japanese
expansionism and Italian
expansionist plans?
Delzell,
C.
1971.
Macmillan.
Henig,
R.
London,
Knight,
Lowe,
Mack
1985.
C
2003.
and
R.
Palgrave
1983.
1983.
R
Random
Strang,
Mussolini
F
.
of
the
and
Second
Fascism.
1975.
Italian
and
Z.
G.
Westport,
House.
The
Oxford
2003.
Selected
Documents .
World
War
1933–41 .
Routledge.
Routledge.
Foreign
London,
Policy,
UK
1870–1940 .
Routledge.
A.
the
Fiery
210.
Origins
2009.
Triumph
the
page
of
Paladin
the
Books.
Second
London,
World
War,
UK
1933–40 .
UK
London,
University
On
USA
and
London,
Wheatcroft,
2011.
CT,
Mussolini,
Mussolini
Macmillan.
1933–1999.
154
D.
War
Steiner,
Origins
Marzari,
Overy,
II.
1919–45:
UK
Smith,
Mallet,
The
Fascism,
UK
UK
P
.
London,
Mediterranean
London,
of
The
Road
to
War:
The
Origins
of
World
UK
the
Dark:
Press.
March:
European
New
York,
Mussolini
International
History
USA
Prepares
for
War.
Praeger.
2.4
German expansion, 1933–1938
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Causation
➔
Consequence
➔
Continuity
Key questions
➔
Examine the ways in which Hitler challenged the post-war settlement.
➔
Discuss the consequences of Hitler ’s actions for the international situation.
▲
Hitler becomes German Chancellor
Adolf Hitler, taken in 1933
1933 January
Hitler introduces a programme of
February
Hitler leaves the Disarmament Conference
rearmament
and announces the intention to withdraw
October
Germany from the League of Nations
Germany signs a non-aggression pact with
1934 January
Poland
Saar Plebiscite
1935 January
March
Stresa Agreement
Anglo–German Naval Treaty
June
Italian invasion of Abyssinia
1936 March
Germany remilitarizes the Rhineland
Hitler sends military suppor t to Franco’s
July
nationalists in Spain
August
Hitler ’s Four Year Plan is drafted
Anti-Comintern Pact is made with Japan
Rome–Berlin Axis
November
1937
Hossbach Memorandum
155
2
As
we
was
have
to
out
seen,
destroy
alongside
and,
in
the
outbreak
Hitler’s
the
rearmament.
process,
of
main
Versailles
the
general
This
stage
war
in
foreign
Peace
was
was
policy
aim
Settlement,
achieved
set
Europe
for
in
after
which
achieving
had
between
further
to
be
1933
territorial
power
carried
and
1938
claims
and
the
1939.
Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe
after 1933
The
be
response
key
for
Germany’s
the
of
Britain
Hitler
and
position
constraints
international
of
and
his
in
the
France
goal
of
Europe
Treaty
situation
after
was
of
to
his
actions
overturning
still
after
1933
Treaty
vulnerable
Versailles.
1933
the
and
Fortunately
worked
to
his
of
it
would
Versailles;
remained
for
Hitler,
under
the
advantage.
Britain
Britain
by
was
events
expansion.
priority
also
the
Its
being
redress
Britain
sympathy
safety
the
of
not
East,
resources
were
of
Treaty
also
with
afraid
Hitler,
from
of
with
it
was
already
the
the
Empire.
Versailles
they
to
be
saw
as
its
and
also
main
politicians
supported
right-wing
buffer
but
Japanese
British
dictator,
a
crisis
with
Many
unfair
Many
communist
also
about
overstretched,
British
the
economic
worried
grievances”.
of
who
the
only
where
“legitimate
were
communism
Far
the
considered
some
in
pre-occupied
in
politicians
Stalin,
to
the
and
had
spread
of
East.
The Little Entente
France
This was a series of
France
was
very
concerned
by
the
possible
German
threat
but
was
too
treaties between Romania,
weak
to
act
on
its
own,
especially
after
politically
divided,
the
failure
of
its
1923
intervention
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,
in
the
Ruhr.
It
was
also
following
a
series
of
weak
which were concluded from
governments,
and
had
major
economic
problems.
Lacking
support
from
1920 to 1921, and aimed to
the
USA
or
Britain
in
the
task
of
preserving
the
Versailles
settlement,
it
prevent Austria and Hungary
built
a
defensive
line
of
fortresses
along
the
Maginot
Line
between
1929
from regaining territory lost
and
1938.
It
also
developed
alliances
with
countries
on
Germany’s
eastern
after the First World War.
borders:
Poland
Romania
and
and
“The
Little
Entente”
countries
–
Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia.
The USA
The
economic
concerns
Other
●
and
factors
The
156
The
also
worked
rather
memories
of
this
war
to
prevent
meant
unlikely
international
insularity
●
depression
was
in
the
Hitler’s
First
the
its
was
focused
on
domestic
stance.
favour:
was
encouraging
national
security.
World
War
determined
war.
USA
isolationist
situation
collective
many
another
that
change
economic
than
of
made
to
were
to
take
still
any
acute,
and
measures
the
horror
necessary
C H A P T E R
●
The
need
to
weakness
●
Britain
and
dealing
●
The
avoid
of
France
with
League
with
of
revision
and
France
However,
as
of
the
of
the
allowing
a
speed
for
and
predecessors
reinforced
this
to
by
the
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 3 8
military
time.
agree
on
a
common
policy
for
—
to
the
of
the
failure
Manchuria
League
Versailles
Rhineland
were
deal
a
effectively
blow
to
both
the
itself.
had
in
effectively
to
was
already
1929–30
cancelled
begun;
and
at
Britain
German
the
Lausanne
1932.
historian
with
in
Treaty
payments
even
at
perceived
and
evacuated
Conference
was
unable
expansion
System
The
war
France
were
Nation’s
Japanese
reparation
and
G E R M A N
Hitler.
Washington
●
another
Britain
2 . 4 :
the
Zara
Steiner
breakdown
ultimate
Steiner,
of
purpose
2011:
writes,
the
international
that
clearly
regime,
distinguished
Hitler
him
moved
from
his
95
Germany’s challenges to the post-war
settlements, 1933–38
Although
had
a
to
the
be
cautious
and
his
he
worked
worked
to
Italy.
his
and,
of
the
dictatorship
and
of
to
that
he
potential
France
by
Hitlerwas
the
within
aims,
He
desired
opposition.
to
prestige
peace,
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security:
commitments
alliances
he
that
existing
with
effectively
and
still
followed
only
undermining
able
he
thus
collective
multilateral
henegotiated
increase
Germany
Hitler’s
backlash.
undermined
from
time,
actions,
and
any
years
isolated
same
these
Versailles
he
claimed
defuse
ve
Germany
action,
at
favoured
international
Hitler
to
next
withdraw
situation
an
Publicly,
the
Alongside
Treaty
avoid
carefully
over
limit
alliances,
to
policy.
actions
might
international
careful
power
Britain
and
challenge
of
his
the
own
Europe.
Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: Withdrawal from the
Disarmament Conference
Article
that
with
8
of
the
national
Covenant
armaments
national
safety”.
of
be
However,
international
disarmament
international
conference
When
1933,
the
achieved.
threat
Disarmament
there
of
was
France,
Nazism
Manchuria
were
Furthermore,
way
that
arguing
it
in
on
was
to
make
was
be
prior
that
nally
on
in
it
demanded
point
consistent
implementing
took
until
to
convened
how
events
to
Britain
to
would
difculties
treated,
concessions
had
lowest
1932
to
thinking
and
disarm
unfolding
at
about
France
with
in
an
for
Geneva
disarmament
unwilling
The
conducive
that
Nations
the
an
organized.
borders.
clear
of
to
meant
consensus
should
Germany
the
Conference
not
governments
that
be
particular,
its
League
policy
to
little
also
Germany
prepared
German
still
the
“reduced
did
Britain
could
with
the
in
be
the
new
same
time
in
disarmament.
not
agree
indicating
about
that
it
the
was
Germany.
Hitler
had
participate
requested
only
if
parity
other
of
armaments,
countries
reduced
157
2
their
to
armaments
theirs.
When
in
1933,
of
Nations,
Hitler
with
the
of
pulled
to
keep
1933,
Germans
“victors”.
Germany’s
claiming
conspiracy
November
to
France
out
that
he
of
that
the
gave
allowed
the
and
launch
an
95%
had
the
last
and
assault
of
on
rearm
League
of
a
French
self-defence.
for
stood
the
the
to
Conference
the
part
approval
at
talks
and
were
incapable
Hitler
from
Germany
Disarmament
Conference
Germany
withdrawal
to
or
at
organizations
weak
plebiscite
needed
this
both
these
Germany
rejoicing
Hitler’s
freedom
a
level,
refused
his
up
to
League
rest
of
In
actions,
the
gave
the
him
Treaty
Versailles.
Source skills
in
Source A
the
month,
disarm
A
speech
by
Hitler,
14
October
cannot
degradation
tolerate
the
of
the
nation
discrimination
the
withholding
by
which
the
end,
are
the
rights
which
are
granted
as
course
at
to
present
nothing
other
in
nations
the
leaders
common
…
The
every
of
with
1918.
Like
decent
every
traitors
to
our
service.
Fatherland
We
are
not
and
we
feel
we
for
status
what
must
do
in
the
time
of
his
had
and
for
what
we
our
for
lives
the
have
innite
love
for
our
was
to
so
wholeheartedly
nations
…
but,
every
own
way.
done.
We
for
us
to
conditions
be
that
of
are
to
which
devoid
Since
it
of
a
sense
of
been
made
of
only
and
of
certain
to
Great
not
of
prepared
Germany
to
at
consider
14
it
is
impossible,
her
position,
her
company
for
in
view
Germany
us
from
real
we
upon
other
of
to
it
and
reluctant
level,
could
To
this
yield,
all
seek
kind
by
that,
to
since
reduce
controls
actual
of
the
the
their
must
equality
be
in
intransigence
British
insisting
could
some
were.
to
and,
nd
October
its
the
government,
on
a
waiting
period
prove
indication
its
of
good
what
This
gave
Hitler
the
its
excuse
brushing
a
aside
compromise,
an
he
Italian
announced
1933
that
participation
in
Germany
the
was
conference
ending
and
membership
that
the
League
of
Nations,
an
of
that
he
had
Germany’s
always
second
regarded
class
as
status
a
and
of
whose
members,
including
the
German
decided
indignity
continue
the
they
equality
have
of
the
ones,
that
powers
equality
…
Powers
present,
that
to
for
rights
enough
were
give
needed
symbol
were
not
Germany
institution
declarations
other
institutions
bearable
honour
clear
the
insisted
is
its
has
years
he
with
it
both
those
ve
that
we
honour,
members
which
affair
Geneva
have
on
under
that
He
supported
attempt
impossible
at
honest
understanding
men
Sudeten
country’s
people
an
as
by
he
at
he
other
sure
Germany’s
that
intentions
desire
those
war
faith
such
purpose
our
in
distress
the
demands
accept.
powers
refused
man
his
Englishman
all
placed
responsible
responsible
in
made
not
French,
but
effected
foreshadowed
of
its
its
be
Germany
the
decent
Frenchman,
that
reasonably
lifted
duty
to
men
forces
and
Hitler
employ
he
other
November
seen
a
of
have
be
in
would
who
must
to
perpetuation
consists
was
of
part
tactics
later:
matter
France’s
intention
deliberate
would
a
an
cause”.
using
of
of
1933.
In
Germany
lack
broadcast
the
on
on
“the
to
he
privately
felt
contempt.
of
force
nations.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What,
according
attitude
towards
to
Source
A,
international
is
Germany’s
cooperation?
Source B
Third question – 6 marks
Gordon
book
It
A.
Craig,
Germany
was
writing
1866–1945
necessary
to
in
an
academic
(1978).
avoid
appearing
Compare
and
contrast
Source
and
Source
A
of
[Hitler’s]
158
the
piece.
foreign
When
minister
the
told
rupture
came,
Nadolny
later
views
expressed
regarding
the
Disarmament
villain
the
B
Conference.
Hitler
in
and
the
C H A P T E R
Examiner’s
contrasts
two
full
sources
in
hint:
the
sources
paragraphs
and
Highlight
giving
as
shown
showing
brief
the
below.
clear
quotes
comparisons
to
Then
linkage
support
2 . 4 :
G E R M A N
and
in
write
the
honour”
points.
In
Source
to
A,
Hitler
●
Source
of
a
Germany
member
of
A
looking
the
about
degradation
discrimination”
seeing
about
Source
for
talks
League
talks
Germany.
B
itself
of
as
Source
“second
Source
B
of
class”
says
of
rights”
that
●
for
Germany
the
that
Nations.
“equality
also
a
and
●
and
Source
A
the
language
“indignity”,
shows
Hitler’s
was
blames
Germany
“deliberate
“devoid
feelings
be
“the
Source
A
claims
great
powers”
for
looking
for
great
for
of
a
sense
of
Germany’s
powers”
Conference,
doing
villain
that
actions,
“intransigence”
“certain
“certain
was
to
countries’
“equality”.
blames
A
Disarmament
appear
was
●
where
Contrasts
“perpetuation
refers
A,
19 3 3 – 19 3 8
treatment.
Similarities
●
Source
degradation”,
between
your
E X P A N S I O N ,
this
of
only
the
so
is
of
Germany
“excuse”
that
the
Source
an
for
Source
it
the
B
failure
says
would
not
piece”.
Germany
whereas
but
and
to
B
victim
talks
claims
leave
the
of
of
that
other
the
Hitler
League
of
not
Nations.
allowing
Germany
Source
specically
B
“refused
to
to
be
on
names
an
equal
France
footing
as
a
and
country
●
that
In
yield”.
Source
with
he
●
Source
B
talks
of
the
for
League
of
Nations
“contempt”
that
Hitler
other
did
not
and
this
tone
is
Hitler
says
nations”,
want
an
he
wants
whereas
“an
Source
understanding
understanding
B
but
implies
was
that
putting
had
forward
the
A,
demands
“that
the
other
powers
would
not
present
accept”.
Undermining collective security: The Non-Aggression Pact
with Poland
Germany’s
of
withdrawal
collective
particularly
Germany
the
unwilling
had
he
take
was
system
1921
For
in
the
his
had
that
had
had
the
of
further
undermining
at
rapprochement
the
It
had
to
also
concept
was
to
stop
Pact
out
of
as
the
part
of
Hitler.
and,
an
the
security
had
even
by
with
He
The
pact
and
system.
was
unable
the
with
he
Locarno
pact,
security
Poland
Germany’s
diplomatic
it.
the
been
1925
France’s
on
of
were
though
signing
alliance
pressure
on
clauses
Poland
Stresemann
Czechoslovakia
collective
the
Germany
weakened
signed
keep
The
recreate
suited
stage
impose
between
for
border,
failure
surprise.
of
pact
this
would
to
by
France
this
broken
West’s
Locarno,
with
France
setback
Non-Aggression
land
borders
at
a
eastern
1934.
world
frontier.
this
the
German
Poland
now
at
10-year
January,
attempted
chance
a
however,
Europe.
Germany
French
into
eastern
eastern
hoped
alarmed
border
against
was
Germany’s
Germany;
the
moment,
Eastern
and
in
League
on
given
western
action
securing
borders.
that
the
any
the
took
had
guarantee
the
in
Pact
that
resented
to
accepted
Treaty.
to
government
Treaty
particularly
and,
entered
Non-Aggression
Versailles
from
Poland,
vulnerable
rearming,
German
The
security.
in
eastern
encirclement
also
ended
Poland,
Moreover,
any
thus
as
this
was
Class discussion
an
unpopular
international
convince
move
in
Germany,
community
Britain
and
like
others
the
an
that
act
Non-Aggression
of
Pact
statesmanship;
Germany
was
a
it
looked
could
peaceful
be
to
the
used
to
What do Hitler ’s actions in
the years 1933–34 over
nation.
disarmament and Poland reveal
Of
course,
Hitler
had
no
intention
of
keeping
to
this
agreement.
Hitler
about his tactics for achieving
preferred
bilateral
agreements
to
collective
security
agreements,
as
his foreign policy objectives in
these
could
more
easily
be
broken.
He
declared
privately
that
“All
our
these years?
agreements
with
Poland
have
a
temporary
signicance”.
159
2
Changing diplomatic alignments: Mussolini and Austria
In
June
was
not
would
the
1934,
a
success;
not
agree
unication
important
part
to
persuade
of
Germany.
keep
was
also
as
Party
organized
Englebert
The
that
in
July,
of
the
1934.
a
Tyrol,
which
Hitler
and
as
a
been
a
an
tried
“satellite”
he
wanted
and
been
had
and
Hitler
become
had
meeting
Anschluss,
Germany
Settlement,
the
always
however,
between
in
the
would
of
This
force
coup
Nazis.
of
the
Italy.
gained
to
He
by
substantial
to
with
back
right-wing
terrorism,
be
the
Nazis
which
Chancellor
rst
concern.
and
Germany,
down
Austrian
Austrian
step
of
a
coup
Germany.
troops
with
the
The
Austrian
international
border
to
and
intended
union
100,000
forced
The
was
caused
Italy’s
supporting
Frauenfeld.
intimidation
the
mobilized
was
was
Eduard
assassination
Dollfuss.
pass,
Hitler
Alfred
campaign
Hitler
Austrian
South
Versailles
had
aims,
should
this,
by
Austria.
policy
Austria
state
on
Austria,
rejected
Austria,
by
attempted
Brenner
that
and
However,
unimpressed
foreign
that
buffer
the
in
immediately
Hitler and Mussolini meet in Venice in 1934
Germany
Hitler’s
a
was
position
of
as
led
culminated
d’état
Hitler’s
met.
minority.
Meanwhile,
Nazi
Mussolini
to
Mussolini
of
Mussolini
of
aware
part
German
and
Mussolini
Austria
Italy
▲
Hitler
and
politician
moved
in
to
a
Mussolini
them
show
disown
Kurt
von
of
to
the
strength
the
actions
Schuschnigg
Coup d’état
took
over
and
stabilized
the
Austrian
regime.
This is a sudden and violent
take over of government,
usually by a small group of
people. A putsch is another
word for a coup (for example,
At
this
point,
regarding
whose
therefore,
unication
support
reassured
he
Hitler
with
would
Mussolini
that
was
forced
Austria.
need
to
play
a
He
did
not
against
the
Western
Austria
would
not
waiting
want
be
to
game
alienate
Mussolini,
democracies,
and
he
annexed.
Hitler ’s attempted Munich
putsch in 1923)
The growing strength of Germany: The Saar plebiscite,
January 1935
In
accordance
territory,
under
to
held
French
return
to
agreement
This
and
was
so
a
This
fairly,
period
the
of
160
been
in
The
the
for
and
of
1919
result
Hitler.
the
result
the
and
of
The
was
This
that
was
the
now
Saar
voting
to
of
Saar,
It
opportunity
popularity
of
the
was
an
the
to
by
given
growing
Nazi
Germany.
the
that
nevertheless
the
been
overwhelming
return
supervised
was
coal-rich
given
surprising
reinforce
small
had
should
was
not
a
Germany
plebiscite
the
was
the
area
German.
propaganda
and
Versailles,
1935.
vote)
territory
Nazi
a
League
the
great
power
regime.
entire
and
Historian
writes:
with
which
beginning
extreme
differences
the
of
Germany
success,
marked
had
the
for
Craig
Treaty
since
Germany.
of
opportunity
Gordon
control
triumph
population
of
the
plebiscite
(90.9%
done
strength
with
a
of
the
able
European
in
of
the
a
other
new
vulnerability
other
the
Powers,
course
security
of
system.
Powers
phase
in
made
his
unscathed,
his
two
—
own
policy.
and,
tactical
years
Craig,
to
no
free
1978
attempt
to
He
survived
thanks
skill,
had
to
and
himself
the
a
interfere,
good
from
the
distractions
the
deal
of
and
luck,
restraints
of
C H A P T E R
2 . 4 :
G E R M A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 3 8
Source skills
A
poster
the
Saar
foot
from
1934,
plebiscite.
read
“To
in
the
The
lead
words
up
at
to
the
Germany”.
L TA
Communication
skills
Go to http://www.britishpathe.com/video/hitler-acclaimed-in-saar-
news-in-a-nutshell
Watch the Pathé News clip showing Hitler ’s arrival in the Saar. How
does Hitler use this event to show his growing power?
L TA
Thinking and self-management skills
Look back at Craig’s assessment of Hitler ’s situation by the end of
1935. He identies several reasons for Hitler ’s success:
●
Hitler ’s tactical skill
●
luck
●
the distractions and dierences of the other powers.
Find examples from the period 1933–35 to suppor t each of these
factors.
Which of these factors do you consider to be the most signicant
in explaining Hitler ’s success? (You may want to review your
answer to the question on page 159, identifying the dierent
tactics that Hitler used.)
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
is
the
message
of
this
poster?
Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: Rearmament
Joachim von Ribbentrop
As
early
as
February
1933,
Hitler
told
his
generals
that
rearmament
was
Ribbentrop star ted o as
the
most
pressing
priority:
“the
next
ve
years
must
be
devoted
to
the
defence
Hitler ’s adviser on foreign
capacity
of
the
Germany
people”.
In
fact,
Germany
had
always
ignored
the
policy. In 1935 he negotiated
rearmament
clauses
of
the
Treaty
of
Versailles.
With
the
cooperation
of
the Anglo–German Naval
the
Soviet
Union
under
the
Rapallo
Treaty
(see
page
121),
Germany
had
Agreement, and in August 1936
continued
to
build
aircraft
Hitler
continuing
and
to
train
and
expand
its
army.
In
this
sense,
he was appointed ambassador
was
what
had
already
been
started
by
previous
German
to Britain. He hoped to arrange
governments.
However,
he
now
increased
the
pace
of
rearmament
an alliance with Britain but
dramatically.
ultimately failed in this goal; he
By
1935,
was
the
introduced
over
half
a
ministers,
had
army
needed
2,500
be
increased
same
men.
revealed
that
to
the
million
around
grounds
in
had
the
In
the
March
Hitler
Britain
and
able
protect
to
year;
existence
planes.
from
France
7
army
1935,
of
the
itself
21
divisions.
increased
Hermann
Luftwaffe,
justied
had
to
this
failed
against
to
the
level
to
Conscription
36
Göring,
which
of
disarm
divisions
one
by
of
this
growing
that
Soviet
Hitler’s
on
was not helped by his arrogant
behaviour. After this, he became
negative towards Britain, seeing
it as weak . In 1938 he became
time
rearmament
and
and
the
Germany
foreign minister, a post he kept
until 1945.
Army.
161
2
Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: The remilitarization of
the Rhineland
Early
in
1936,
Rhineland.
East
under
the
Hitler
This
turned
area
terms
of
had
the
his
been
Treaty
attention
to
the
demilitarized
of
Versailles.
In
Prussia
order
to
provide
installations
left
Poland
bank
bank
of
or
or
security
garrisons
within
the
River
50
for
France,
were
no
military
permitted
kilometres
of
the
on
the
right
Rhine.
Germany
Belgium
For
Hitler,
the
Rhineland
remilitarization
would
be
an
of
the
important
step
in
his
Rhineland
plans
France
be
Saar
for
able
strengthening
to
build
Germany;
fortications
he
there
would
to
prevent
ia
an
attack
from
France.
Rhineland
Austria
Austria
The
timing
of
Hitler’s
actions
in
1936
was
Hungar y
Sudetenland
led
Danzig – Free
City
both
by
domestic
international
Italy
considerations.
food
▲
and
shortages
In
Germany,
were
causing
rising
prices
unrest
and
among
Disputed territories around Germany, 1935–38
the
attention
from
provided
British
ties
an
and
with
the
ideal
Hitler,
and
excuse
Franco–Soviet
ratied
on
Locarno
4
Pact
for
he
to
crisis
that
page
moving
not
he
troops
He
threatened
Hitler
to
by
he
oppose
was
break
crisis
distract
seeking
and
of
the
closer
of
the
the
crisis
with
takeover
advantage
this
to
Abyssinian
now
Hitler’s
take
both
the
Mussolini’s
that
could
needed
the
fact
fallout
that
from
204).
back
Assistance
1936.
action.
meant
distracted
and
Internationally,
take
agreed
(see
Mutual
and
this
knew
were
March
Pact
so
also
France
Hoare–Laval
Hitler’s
over
and
Hitler
problems.
opportunity
French
Rhineland.
Britain
economic
population
into
Treaty
argued
that
Germany
the
(see
this
with
Rhineland
page
214),
violated
was
the
which
the
was
spirit
of
the
encirclement.
Source skills
A
speech
To
a
this
by
Hitler,
[the
March
Locarno]
contribution
7
Pact
which
But
1936.
Germany
represented
a
should
because
frontier
while
with
steel
France
and
and
Bolshevik
International,
it
as
to
imposed
of
complete
upon
us
on
heavily,
,
not
but
had
not
Western
concluded
this
Russia
is
power
the
of
no
exponent
Treaty
political
and
political
creed
signicance
of
a
philosophical
new
the
or
means
that
a
non-aggression
be
taken
orders
This
with
two
…
…
be
different
issued
states
from
…
not
in
Paris
but
in
one
Moscow.
gigantic
mobilisation
Europe
is
of
opposed
the
not
East
only
against
to
the
a
but
to
the
spirit
of
the
Locarno
Pact.
Soviet
revolutionary
system
in
would
was
Frontier.
letter
European
of
a
Central
France
this
and
defencelessness
our
…
section
which
aggression
headquarters,
condition
then
a
fortied
concrete
garrisoned
…
be
made
…
armaments,
would
great
would
her
happen
state
decision
sacrice
this
Bolshevik
Cited
in
Norman
H.
Baynes.
1969.
Its
First question, par t a – 3 marks
It
cannot
will
162
not
be
be
is
…
world
foreseen
victorious
revolution.
whether
…
in
this
France
philosophy
as
well.
According
the
spirit
to
of
Hitler,
the
how
Locarno
has
France
Pact?
gone
against
C H A P T E R
Both
Hitler’s
about
likely
to
decided
the
generals
marching
provoke
to
take
a
Abyssinian
effective
the
48
hours
my
life.
If
to
withdraw
troops
intelligence
action
was
warnings
weak
The
successful
was
again
peace
and
challenge
the
on
to
to
returning
in
to
that
despite
to
was
into
and
the
hesitant
action
However,
disarray
France
19 3 3 – 19 3 8
from
Hitler
caused
taking
by
any
that
or
the
on
the
about
British
were
the
most
Rhineland,
we
nerve-wracking
would
have
had
legs.
and
7
March
French,
to
happen.
the
French
Germans
accompanied
Hitler
look
of
Britain
as
new
of
as
by
and
well.
The
1936.
who
In
had
stop
invaded
fact,
received
However,
to
security
peace
and
offer
France
He
a
though
Britain
settlement.
frontier
League
were
dangerous
France.
Rhineland
our
was
attention
negotiating
the
the
Rhineland
fact
a
E X P A N S I O N ,
no
the
with
a
force.
post-war
the
the
as
diplomatic
Britain
British
this
make
the
into
the
Ofce
it
and
G E R M A N
said,
marched
the
the
providing
of
later
the
either
that
between
into
to
invasion
the
had
Foreign
viewing
Britain
prevent
he
tails
military
divert
sides
interested
by
intended
Rhineland,
their
our
moved
taken
from
march
French
surprise
remilitarization,
relatively
would
the
German
hoping
However,
with
not
the
Rhineland,
response
after
this
and
the
gamble,
the
German
a
a
crisis
action.
of
was
into
2 . 4 :
also
pacts
offer,
he
was
France
his
of
from
his
demilitarizing
similar
suggested
with
man
away
included
created
which
a
that
zones
he
was
neighbours
and
Nations.
Source skills
Examiner’s
many
the
following
The
is
marks
overall
that
of
the
and
by
the
faces
and
are
to
This
the
also
ags
the
were
German
be
the
citizens
giving
troops.
that
every
German
can
both
are
seen
on
the
soldiers
who
owers
The
Nazi
ying
building
here
occupants
expressions
of
the
the
the
about
action.
give
answer?
Rhineland
happy
How
you
message
both
troops
hint:
would
from
would
also
First question, par t b – 2 marks
indicate
What
is
the
message
of
this
photograph?
support
for
the
remilitarization.
163
2
L TA
Thinking and communication skills
Read the views of historians Kershaw and Craig on the
Source B
impact of the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Identify and
Gordon
A.
Craig.
Germany
1866–1945
(1978),
make notes on:
page
●
691.
why this success was impor tant to Hitler ’s position in
With the [invasion of the Rhineland] … Hitler
Germany
had eectively destroyed the post-First World
●
why it changed the international situation.
War security system. The German remilitarisation
of the Rhineland was a victory not merely in
Source A
the sense that it enhanced German prestige. Its
Ian
Kershaw,
Hitler
(1991),
page
124.
psychological eect was to reveal the exclusively
The remilitarisation of the Rhineland was impor tant in
defensive nature of French strategical thinking,
the context of rearmament; it matched the revisionist
and this had devastating consequences among
expectations of the traditional conservative-nationalist
France’s allies. Before the year was out , the
elites; and it was hugely popular among the masses
King of the Belgians was seeking release from
of the population – even in circles otherwise distinctly
the obligations incurred by the treaties of 1920
cool about the Nazi regime. As the re-establishment of
and 1925, and his government had abandoned
German sovereignty over territory which no one disputed
the intention of extending the Maginot Line into
was Germany, it would have been on the agenda of any
Belgium and had set a course back towards strict
nationalist German government. And given the well-
neutrality. There were tremors in the Little Entente
known divisions between Britain and France in their
as well, where politicians with an eye to the main
stance towards Germany, it was an issue which more
chance began to weigh the advantages of getting
than most stood a likely chance of success. But precisely
on to Hitler ’s bandwagon. All in all, the Führer had
the manner in which Hitler achieved his notable triumph
good reason to exult , as he viewed the disarray of
was guaranteed to give a massive boost to his leadership
French for tunes, “ The world belongs to the man
position. He had been proved right again, in the teeth of
with guts! God helps him”.
Foreign Oce hesitancy and military anxiety. And his
popularity among the masses … had never been higher.
Increasing the inuence of Nazism: The Spanish Civil War
L TA
Communication
Spain
became
the
battleeld
for
a
European-wide
struggle
between
the
forces
skills
of
Go to http://www.britishpathe.
communism
other.
—
and
Henig,
socialism
on
the
one
hand
and
the
forces
of
Fascism
on
the
1985
com/video/scraps-of-paper
Mussolini
and
Hitler
were
pushed
closer
together
when
they
both
Watch the Pathé News clip
intervened
in
the
Spanish
Civil
War
on
the
side
of
Franco.
showing Hitler ’s invasion
As
you
will
have
read
in
the
previous
chapter,
the
Spanish
Civil
War
of the Rhineland. What
began
in
1936
with
a
nationalist
revolt
led
by
the
army
against
the
impression does the footage
republican
Spanish
government.
and the commentary give about
Germany at this time?
Both
sides
conict.
appealed
General
Germany
and
to
the
Franco
Italy,
international
led
while
the
the
community
Nationalists
Republican
and
he
for
help
asked
government
in
for
hoped
this
help
to
from
get
TOK
support
from
Britain,
France
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Review the historian’s accounts
Germany
did
not
send
ground
troops
but
played
a
key
role
in
transporting
in Source A and Source B above.
Franco’s
troops
from
German
bombers
Morocco
to
Spain
at
the
start
of
the
conict,
and
Discuss the use of reason in
of
the
Condor
Legion
caused
havoc
by
attacking
civilian
the accounts given by each
centres,
most
notoriously
Guernica
in
April
1937.
German
submarines
historian. To what extent are
also
attacked
government
ships
in
the
Mediterranean.
Nevertheless,
in
their views inuenced by
contrast
to
Mussolini
(see
expectation and hindsight?
German
164
involvement.
page
141),
Hitler
placed
limits
on
the
extent
of
C H A P T E R
Hitler
●
had
He
several
wanted
Spanish
intervening
government
resources
and
in
also
in
this
Spain
civil
that
provide
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 3 8
war:
would
military
supply
bases
for
submarines.
would
attacks
for
G E R M A N
be
on
able
to
civilian
test
out
his
air
force
and
see
the
effects
of
air
L TA
He
friendly
mineral
German
●
a
reasons
2 . 4 :
Self-management
populations.
Refer back to Chapter 2.3.
●
He
was
able
to
pose
as
the
defender
of
European
civilization
against
Compare and contrast the
the
Communist
threat.
impor tance of involvement in
●
A
pro-Fascist
French
government
in
Spain
would
further
undermine
the Spanish Civil War for the
security.
foreign policies of Mussolini
and Hitler.
What were the results of this conict for Hitler ’s position
in Europe?
●
The
●
It
war
reinforced
and
the
Fascist
●
It
dragged
for
suspicions
Soviet
Union
three
years,
between
on
the
polarizing
Britain
other,
and
thereby
opinion
France
in
on
preventing
Europe.
the
a
one
hand
strong
anti-
alliance.
distracted
(see
on
page
the
217)
opposition
to
West,
led
and
Hitler
expansion
Britain’s
to
in
believe
Eastern
failure
that
he
to
take
would
any
strong
not
face
action
further
Europe.
Changing diplomatic alignments: The Rome–Berlin Axis
and the Anti-Comintern Pact
The
most
important
alignments
Hitler
of
was
the
recognized
Abyssinia”
update
the
and
in
approval,
Hitler
principle
that
German
The
new
in
Austria
in
in
out
the
their
Comintern
of
Pact
On
the
of
cooperation
was
of
the
In
with
as
British
a
Mussolini.
“Emperor
initiative
opposition
1936,
pursue
be
diplomatic
and
the
with
Chancellor
to
to
a
side,
on
Hitler
Italy
July
It
consisted
year
directed
between
Rome–Berlin
interests
same
of
prevent
promised
herself
War
a
German
Mussolini’s
Schuschnigg
policy
German
to
to
state ”
“ based
in
of
on
the
return
for
non-intervention.
1936.
mutual
the
III
Italian
agreement
to
signing
to
removed.
acknowledges
October
November
Italy
Civil
between
Emmanuel
now
an
Spanish
relations
Schuschnigg
atmosphere
Mussolini
setting
was
commitment
culminated
the
with
Treaties.
signed
whereby
of
Victor
worked
Austria
Austria,
a
King
Locarno
inuence
result
improved
by
(see
an
against
of
a
page
Germany
Axis
series
143).
agreement
the
and
between
of
secret
This
with
Communist
was
Italy
Hitler
and
protocols
followed
Japan;
the
up
Anti-
International
and
Class discussion
stated
that,
in
the
case
of
an
attack
by
the
Soviet
Union,
the
signatories
To what extent had Hitler
would
consult
on
measures
to
“safeguard
their
common
interests”.
The
succeeded in removing the
militant
nature
of
this
agreement
indicated
the
beginning
of
the
openly
most impor tant restrictions of
aggressive
phase
of
Hitler’s
foreign
policy.
the Treaty of Versailles by the
Hitler
was
delighted,
as
these
agreements
demonstrated
that
Germany
end of 1936?
was
no
longer
isolated
but
an
important
player
on
the
world
stage.
165
2
The impact of the economy on Hitler ’s foreign policy:
Source skills
The Four Year Plan
Ruth
of
Henig.
the
page
Second
30
The
Origins
World
War,
By
1936,
the
(1985).
butter
In
the
process
Four
and
Year
was
to
of
foreign
effort
to
produced,
wide
synthetic
materials,
trade
and
in
eastern
with
and
south-eastern
Europe
whereby
and
raw
in
food
materials
supplied
to
armaments.
a
less
The
on
economics
armaments
encouraging
believed
that
acquisition
autarky,
to
of
bringing
prepare
for
introduced
would
no
that
minister,
in
foreign
of
Indeed,
shortages
raw
of
materials
order
to
Dr.
Hjalmar
enable
Schacht,
more
exports
to
trade.
Germany’s
more
the
war.
in
Kershaw
By
this
cause
doubt
that
land
economic
and
living
problems
space.
He
could
decided
only
to
be
go
economy
more
closely
under
party
control,
all
in
This
was
September
to
be
1936
done
under
via
the
a
Four
Year
leadership
Plan,
of
which
Göring.
end
of
providing
the
Romania
of
target
own
the
the
make
was
the
crisis,
now
in
year
1930s
power
[1936],
pace
of
rearmament
Schacht
a
strong
with
anti-Comintern
renewed
contours
latter
would
economic
Hitler
democracies,
and
an
resigned.
position.
too
fast
However,
As
the
and
that
there
historian
is
Ian
writes:
the
creation
for
particular
German
because
it
were
manufactures
for
the
Believing
Germany
exchange
was
imports
Hitler.
by
bilateral
agreements
states
vital
for
were
essential
Hitler
concluding
of
there
materials,
stockpiling
raw
thus
Hitler
by
for
order
by
enough
range
out
of
shortages
fast
struggle:
by
solved
a
as
to
become
self-supporting
developing
well
exchange.
spending
However,
more
as
progressing
starting
make
be
every
meat,
not
was
Plan],
favoured
Germany
was
economy
[of
and
the
rearmament
consumer
and
of
evidence
the
growing
were
all
position
of
German
the
pact
the
And
had
out
emerged
Japan,
passivity
economy
international
set.
German-Italian
with
of
and
the
uncertainty
committed
tension
the
and
various
buttressed
axis
full
an
tilt
to
Civil
of
the
the
all
western
arms
crises
reinforced.
…
War
preparation
escalating
interwoven
and
secured
Spanish
—
of
for
race
1936,
war
,
in
the
Hitler’s
Kershaw,
1991
advances
she
could
The impact of Nazism on Germany’s foreign policy:
supply
vitally
needed
The Hossbach Memorandum
supplies
of
oil.
The
conference
marks
the
point
at
which
the
expansion
of
the
Third
Reich
First question, par t a –
ceased
to
be
latent
and
became
explicit.
—
Wiliamson,
1995
3 marks
On
According
to
Henig,
5
top
what
ways
did
November,
Hitler
generals
make
Germany
his
called
war
a
special
ministers:
meeting
Hermann
that
was
Göring
attended
(air),
by
Werner
his
von
(army),
Erich
Raeder
(navy),
Werner
von
Blomberg
(defence)
and
prepared
Foreign
for
and
plan
Fritsch
to
Hitler
in
Minister
Konstantin
von
Neurath.
Hitler
told
the
meeting
that
war?
what
We
he
was
know
and
Hossbach,
L TA
Communication, thinking
and social skills
At
the
say
about
written
without
to
this
down
from
having
and
to
be
meeting
ve
notes
been
conference,
situation
was
days
regarded
because
later
by
he
made
seen
by
Hitler.
Hitler
gave
an
several
“his
the
at
the
that
will
of
and
points
military
time.
overview
actions
last
main
Hitler’s
that
proposed
as
The
were
compiled
assistant,
Colonel
document
Germany’s
now
testament”.
needed
was
led
international
to
be
taken.
The
Read the full text of the
following
extracts
are
taken
from
Hossbach’s
memorandum:
Hossbach Memorandum at:
avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/
hossbach.asp
The
aim
racial
of
German
community
question
for
foreign
and
Germany
to
policy
enlarge
was:
was
it.
where
It
to
make
was
could
secure
therefore
she
achieve
a
and
to
preserve
question
the
of
greatest
the
space.
gain
at
The
the
Make bullet point notes on the
lowest
cost?
German
policy
had
to
reckon
with
two
hate
inspired
antagonists,
key points made.
Britain
In pairs or small groups, discuss
the signicance of this meeting.
166
a
of
thorn
force.
and
in
If
France,
the
the
esh
to
…
resort
to
whom
a
German
Germany’s
force
with
colossus
problem
its
could
attendant
in
the
only
risks
is
centre
be
of
solved
accepted
Europe
by
…
the
was
use
there
then
C H A P T E R
remains
still
to
be
answered
the
questions
2 . 4 :
“When”?
G E R M A N
and
E X P A N S I O N ,
“How”?
In
19 3 3 – 19 3 8
this
Source skills
matter
Case
1:
there
were
Period
three
contingencies
to
be
dealt
with.
Second question –
1943–5
4 marks
After
that
expected
which
date
…
Our
would
Führer
was
problem
of
only
a
change
relative
then
still
space
by
the
strength
have
living
for
been
it
would
carried
was
1943–5
worse
his
at
for
decrease
out
by
the
unalterable
the
our
latest
point
in
of
view
relation
rest
of
the
to
could
the
world.
determination
to
be
rearmament
…
solve
If
With
reference
purpose
the
Germany’s
assess
and
the
values
limitations
…
of
internal
strife
in
France
should
develop
into
such
a
domestic
crisis
as
Hitler’s
absorb
the
against
Case
French
army
Germany,
Hossbach
then
completely
the
time
and
for
render
acting
it
incapable
against
the
of
Czechs
use
for
would
foreign
evidence
after
policy
1937.
war
have
come.
3
France
should
“proceed”
position
to
our
threat
be
against
rst
overthrow
the
If
as
to
plans
If
origin,
2
of
If
its
and
the
Memorandum
Case
to
content,
embroiled
objective,
our
plan
made
use
in
of
in
For
in
Czechoslovakia
to
Germany
so
Germany.
the
this
with
of
our
Austria
possible
war
to
another
improvement
event
and
any
war
the
of
being
state
our
embroiled
simultaneously
operation
settle
the
that
against
Czech
in
the
and
she
could
not
political-military
in
war,
order
to
must
be
remove
West.
Austrian
question,
it
Class discussion
was
to
be
assumed
that
Britain
–
herself
at
war
with
Italy
–
would
decide
not
Refer back to Hitler ’s foreign
to
act
against
Germany.
policy ideas in Mein Kampf
While
none
of
the
military
leaders
objected
to
the
planned
destruction
(see pages 117–118). What
of
Czechoslovakia,
Blomberg
and
Fritsch
were
unhappy
about
a
policy
continuities are there in his
that
could
lead
to
war
with
Britain
and
France
before
Germany
was
aims as set out in 1923 in Mein
sufciently
prepared.
However,
all
those
who
were
hesitant
about
Kampf and those as they appear
Hitler’s
aims
–
(Blömberg,
Fritsch
and
Neurath)
were
ruthlessly
removed
in the Hossbach Memorandum?
from
power
in
February
1938
when
Hitler
appointed
himself
Supreme
What change in attitude do you
Commander
of
the
German
army.
These
changes
were
accompanied
by
see concerning Britain?
the
retirement
of
16
high-ranking
generals
and
the
transfer
of
44
others,
In pairs, review Italy’s position
thus
removing
anyone
who
might
be
less
than
committed
to
Hitler’s
on a potential naval war with
goals.
As
Kershaw
writes,
“ Following
the
Reichstag
Fire
and
the
Rohm
crisis
Britain. What would be the
[Night
of
the
Long
Knives],
the
Blömberg-Fritsch
affair
was
the
third
great
Italian view of the “cases”
milestone
on
the
way
to
Führer
absolutist
power ”
(quoted
in
Darby,
2007).
discussed in this meeting?
How signicant is the Hossbach Memorandum as evidence of
Hitler ’s foreign policy objectives?
A
copy
of
Hossbach’s
minutes
of
this
meeting
were
used
at
the
Nuremberg
The Nuremberg Trials
Trials
as
evidence
of
Hitler’s
planning
for
war.
However,
AJP
Taylor
points
A series of military tribunals,
out
that
the
memorandum
is
only
a
copy
and
indeed
only
a
fragment
of
held by the Allied forces after
a
copy
of
the
original,
which
has
disappeared.
Taylor
also
argues
that
the
World War II. Key members
purpose
of
the
meeting
was
not
actually
to
discuss
foreign
policy
aims
but
to
of the political, military, and
convince
conservative
military
and
nancial
experts
of
the
need
to
continue
economic leadership of Nazi
with
the
rearmament
programme,
and
to
isolate
Schacht,
who
opposed
it.
Germany were put on trial
Taylor
states
that
“Hitler’s
exposition
was
in
large
part
day-dreaming
and
unrelated
charged with crimes against
to
what
followed
in
real
life”
(Taylor,
1969).
peace and crimes against
However,
as
a
road-map
Hitler’s
enlarge
and
other
central
it”.
It
Hitler’s
historians
for
war,
goal:
also
“to
made
sense
of
the
would
still
Hossbach
make
clear
secure
this
that,
while
Memorandum
and
Hitler’s
urgency;
argue
to
preserve
war-like
was
all
and
taken
the
it
did
cannot
clearly
racial
set
used
by
humanity.
out
community
expansionist
seriously
be
and
intentions
those
present.
167
2
TOK
Think about what a historical fact actually is. Write a brief denition of what a fact
in history is. Share your denition with a par tner. How is this similar to or dierent
from a fact in the natural sciences. Discuss as a class what could be considered
the “historical facts” in this chapter. Does your discussion suggest anything about
the methods of, and challenges faced by, historians?
Full document question: Hitler ’s remilitarization of the Rhineland
Source A
A
Source B
British
armed
against
We
report
services
Germany
would
question
were
as
would
at
be
regards
be
in
…
Force,
already
drawn
As
Services
to
in
the
such
reinforcements
country
we
dispatching
proper
these
take
and
At
forces
in
the
even
the
the
an
the
March
published
in
Punch
magazine
on
1936.
an
in
e x tent
a ir.
the i r
the
in
our
f or c e s
ther e
that
quite
the
coast
modernisation
to
a
th os e
this
br ing
tw o
of
of
the
large
any
h om e
…
wou ld
mo n t hs
defence
to
ha ve
t wo
unti l
e q uip ment
ca s e
the
p ro vi s ions
pr ovi di n g
To
a rmy
vis -à -
a nd
i ncap able
or
the
wh i c h
the se
r e turned
the
of
e xte nt
of
to
on l y
na va l
Med ite rr a ne an
F o r ce
Fiel d
we
As
coul d
d e fensi ve
a
longer
cartoon
18
Ge r m a ny,
Ar my
re s o ur ce s
with
A
war
Me di te rr a ne a n
p o si ti on
be
moment
requires
to
o ur
ha v e
case
a
an y
w hil e
a ga i ns t
should
defence
tha t
the
w e a k ening
pure l y
made
upon
…
d ange r ous .
rega r d s
the
three
ght
commi tte d
req ui r e me nts
jeopardise
Italy
in
ope r a ti o n
Mediterrane a n
would
Air
he a v il y
thoroughl y
by
the
to
Ge r many
hosti l i ti e s
out
of
ability
e mphas i se
w i th
present
of
heads
1936.
once
minimum
the
the
their
in
war
naval
carried
vis
at
of
possibility
our
by
on
Air
…
Fo rc e .
artillery
extent,
Source C
we
have
number
the
no
of
our
number
searchlights
the
air
anti-submarine
of
is
threat
most
our
important
anti-aircraft
quite
from
defences
inadequate
for
ports,
guns
to
a
and
and
deal
with
Ruth
an
Henig,
academic
World
War
a
academic
The
Origins
historian,
of
the
in
Second
(1985).
Germany.
On
7
March
marched
was
1936,
into
announced
the
that
which
Senate
posed
had
…
challenge
just
The
to
token
German
Rhineland
the
remilitarizing
Germany
168
British
book,
it
by
and
German
because
the
been
government
of
the
threat
Franco-Russian
ratied
by
remilitarization
the
forces
Hitler
Versailles
the
was
to
alliance
French
a
further
settlement
and
to
the
C h a p t e r
British
government’s
and
orderly
revision.
had
already
gone
Hitler
that
German
of
a
ministers
general
include
League
of
once
of
an
again,
preferred
in
to
the
its
were
some
British
willing
the
of
In
government
of
agree
to
as
and
Now
return
the
to
had
policies
objectives
by
a
its
well
new
of
action
rather
than
by
as
multilateral
diplomatic
that
of
many
that
this
the
have
no
have
been
…
1936
plunging
he
and
point
challenged,
could
Europe
not
into
be
be
the
to
in
German
conclude
of
a
After
for
deemed
for
states
system
three
of
years,
German
concluded
…
all,
we
claims
are
to
make
aware
that
in
all
the
In
resulting
either
from
erroneous
commentators
at
which
and
that
provisions
stopped
or
from
the
disproportion
Hitler
the
size
of
its
population
and
after
Lebensraum
March
can
…
struggle
territorial
Above
between
should
ready
creation
Europe
the
longing
between
participating
discussions.
politicians
was
rights
itself
doubt
measures,
unilateral
territorial
claimed
today
these
respected,
the
for
beyond
of
unalterable
Europe
for
misinterpretation
establish
its
of
declares
I
any
character
equally
security
tensions
retrospect,
and
avoid
to
express
agreements
Europe.
in
to
rights
equality
he
and
pacication
believe
to
defensive
peaceful
We
military
intentions
purely
real
19 3 3 – 19 3 8
however,
government
the
shown
that
order,
equal
of
return
Hitler
as
part
which
revision
e x p a n s i o n ,
the
to
Rhineland
measures
rearmament
his
to
G e r m a n
peaceful
indicate
German
frontiers
achieve
to
peaceful
colonies.
his
secure
way
of
air-pact,
eastern
German
to
package
Nations,
Germany’s
former
For
out
remilitarization
more
might
wish
2 . 4 :
can
never
be
solved
by
wars.
from
First question, par t a – 3 marks
war.
According
to
Source
A,
why
would
it
be
difcult
Source D
for
A
speech
by
following
the
Rhineland,
The
Hitler
Saturday
German
its
7
March
the
to
arising
of
the
their
and
other
What
1936.
has
continuously
negotiations
observe
from
the
side
to
as
replied
offers
the
maintain
essential
regarded
has
contracting
and
of
the
full
Rhine
and
to
can
Germany’s
Pact
pact.
fullled
assurances
Rhine
parties
the
condition
being
of
through
resist
German
aggression
in
1936?
First question, par t b – 2 marks
the
all
Pact
no
by
were
so
This
repeated
peace
a
by
military
message
of
Source
B?
Compare
and
contrast
Source
and
Source
the
views
expressed
in
the
C
D
regarding
Hitler’s
motives
long
ready
longer
the
Second question – 4 marks
his
actions
in
1936.
on
Third question – 6 marks
obvious
France.
is
last
for
as
to
Reichstag
government
during
readiness
obligations
the
remilitarization
emphasised
years
to
Britain
be
With
France
reference
assess
friendly
for
infringing
a
the
to
value
historian
its
and
origin,
studying
remilitarization
of
purpose
limitations
the
the
of
and
content,
Source
reasons
for
C
the
Rhineland.
alliance
Four th question – 9 marks
with
the
against
the
Soviet
Union
Germany.
Locarno
meaning
In
Rhine
and
directed
this
Pact
ceased
to
exclusively
manner,
has
lost
exist
Using
however,
its
these
examine
inner
the
…
sources
the
and
reasons
Rhineland
in
for
your
own
Hitler’s
knowledge,
remilitarization
of
1936.
References
Baynes,
H.
N.
Fertig.
Craig,
G.
New
1978.
Darby,
G.
Henig,
R.
Kershaw,
Steiner,
1969.
York,
1985.
Z.
The
1991.
Wiliamson,
DG.
Hitler:
of
the
Triumph
The
of
and
Second
Longman.
University
1995.
Oxford
Appeasement
Origins
The
Adolf
1866–1945.
Hitler.
Oxford
of
April
1922–August
1939 .
USA
Hitler,
2011.
1933–1999.
Speeches
Germany
2007.
I.
The
the
the
Road
World
London,
Dark:
Press.
Third
University
War .
War .
New
Hodder,
Routledge.
York,
USA
UK
London,
UK
UK.
European
New
Reich.
to
Press.
York,
International
History
USA
Longman.
London,
UK
169
2.5
German expansion, 1938–1940
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Causation
➔
Change
➔
Perspective
Key questions
➔
Examine the ways in which Hitler went fur ther than challenging the post-war
settlement after 1937.
▲
German troops march into Poland
➔
To what extent was Hitler successful in carrying out his foreign policy aims?
➔
Discuss the consequences of Hitler ’s actions for the international situation.
following the star t of hostilities
on 1 September 1939
Anschluss declared with Austria after
1938 March
German troops march into Austria
The Sudeten crisis
September
Germany occupies the rest of
Czechoslovakia
1939 March
Lithuania gives up the por t of Memel to
Germany
Anglo–French guarantee of Poland
31 March
Conscription introduced in Britain
27 April
The Pact of Steel
May
12 August
Anglo-French mission to Moscow
Nazi-Soviet Pact
24 August
Anglo-Polish Treaty
25 August
Germany invades Poland
1 September
3 September
Britain and France declare war on Germany
Following
Hossbach
in
his
next
foreign
was
revision
pursue
170
the
shake-up
Conference,
the
of
his
policy.
The
takeover
the
of
post-war
goal
of
of
his
Hitler
military
was
rst
of
in
a
these
was
Sudetenland.
settlement
Lebensraum
in
command
position
These
and
the
the
also
East.
to
in
1937
start
takeover
actions
put
after
taking
of
the
more
Austria;
completed
Hitler
in
a
risks
the
the
position
to
C H A P T E R
2 . 5 :
G E R M A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
Challenging the post-war settlement after 1937
Anschluss, 1938
Between
1938
and
1939,
Hitler
was
able
to
achieve
the
aims
that
he
Class discussion
had
set
out
at
the
Hossbach
Conference
in
1937:
the
annexation
of
Discuss the events that were
Austria
and
the
dismemberment
of
Czechoslovakia.
However,
had
indeed,
this
was
happening in Asia at this time.
not
achieved
in
the
way
that
Hitler
anticipated;
historian
What expansionist moves had
Alan
Bullock
sees
Anschluss
as
“a
striking
example”
of
Hitler’s
ability
Japan made by early 1938? Do
to
combine
“consistency
in
aim,
calculation
and
patience
in
preparation
with
you think events in Asia had any
opportunism,
impulse
and
improvisation
in
execution ”
(Bullock,
1967:
204).
inuence on the international
Despite
his
failure
to
take
Austria
in
1934,
Hitler
had
already
made
response to German expansion?
much
progress
1936,
an
in
establishing
Austro–German
Nazi
inuence
agreement
had
in
been
the
country.
signed,
In
which
July
agreed
the
following:
●
Germany
●
Both
●
Austria
reafrmed
powers
would
“German
In
addition,
to
the
was
an
actions
attack
in
the
a
interfere
foreign
gave
the
Austria’s
in
each
policy
independence.
other’s
consistent
internal
with
it
affairs.
being
a
prominent
to
take
Chancellor
activities
Hitler.
of
the
However,
Berchtesgaden
Austrian
Nazis,
such
as
Arthur
government.
opportunity
Austrian
the
with
“The
treason.
now,
all
raise
whole
That
paradox
be
to
of
on
12
over
Kurt
Nazis
and
Schuschnigg
February
directly
Schuschnigg.
Austrian
when
Austria
1938,
due
Schuschnigg
he
requested
arrived
Hitler
arose
at
launched
the
into
an
onAustria:
Hitler:
of
clauses
role
of
by
interview
in
a
1938
alarmed
meeting
not
conduct
secret
in
recognition
state”.
Seyss-Inquart,
However,
agreed
its
Herr
this.
his
was
must
history
so
now
in
the
reach
Schuschnigg,
The
voice
crushed…
German
if
I
it
Austria
past,
its
I
Reich
its
and
am
is
just
no
is
the
one
one
of
the
today.
And
I
The
can
determined
Great
problems
most
interrupted
better
end.
absolutely
border
chosen
is
long-overdue
that
settles
have
of
…
difcult
Powers,
Who
road
is
to
of
you
here
make
and
an
me
and
end
nobody
with
any
high
historical
tell
not
that
act
will
will
German
ever
took…”
Schuschnigg:
“Herr
everything
remove
Hitler:
I
am
I
have
to
“That
going
blown
only
to
is
to
obstacles
what
solve
to
bits
Reichkanzler,
give
…
you
the
the
say,
to
I
am
quite
better
Herr
so-called
order
a
Schuschnigg.
Austrian
and
willing
your
to
believe
understanding,
But
problem
ridiculous
I
one
as
am
way
defence
far
it
…
as
telling
or
We
will
possible
the
you
▲
Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria
that
other
mechanism
do
…”
…
will
be
”
Chancellor Schuschnigg’s recollection of the conversations at Berchtesgaden,
12 February 1938, written shor tly afterwards from memory
171
2
Source skills
Second question – 4 marks
With
reference
limitations
historians
of
to
its
studying
Examiner’s
hint:
Here
points
are
some
origin,
purpose
Schuschnigg’s
the
that
account
Austrian
you
could
and
of
crisis
content,
his
of
consider
assess
meeting
the
with
value
Hitler
and
for
1938.
in
your
answer:
Values
●
A
value
and
●
so
of
the
would
Schuschnigg
so
●
it
would
The
is
that
the
been
of
which
is
saw
as
as
was
knowledge
conversation
fresh
value
he
Schuschnigg
rst-hand
wrote
have
purpose
meeting
origin
have
in
his
of
present
what
down
soon
at
the
was
said.
after
the
meeting
meeting
mind.
Schuschnigg
made
a
record
of
the
important.
Limitations
●
Schuschnigg’s
he
is
unlikely
precisely
●
His
support
After
being
agree
to
a
agitators,
Inquart
of
war
were
of
be
of
would
Schuschnigg
for
L TA
Communication skills
13
not
they
united
that
to
the
afterwards
to
remember
ban
is
from
the
memory,
so
conversation
so
by
Hitler
very
hours
These
his
treatment,
Hitler’s
here
is
reasonable
of
abuse,
included
the
attack
very
tone
so
on
it
is
Austria.
aggressive
which
Party
were
economic
demands
was
told
Schuschnigg
releasing
Nazi
Pro-Nazis
the
for
exaggerate
could
exaggerating.
against
and
sympathy
to
used
that
minister.
and
also
to
systems
would
that
if
all
appointing
be
of
made
the
two
effectively
he
did
was
forced
imprisoned
not
to
pro-Nazi
Seyss-
the
ministers
countries
end
Austrian
agree,
Hitler
Austria.
attempted
1938,
Austria”.
gain
he
Schuschnigg
wanted
able
want
two
demands
into
March
to
language
assimilated.
march
written
Schuschnigg’s
nance,
independence;
be
might
idea
interior
was
been
here.
submitted
lifting
and
to
to
the
list
as
he
the
contrast
is
have
would
that
Certainly,
in
it
purpose
possible
●
as
account
to
a
in
a
desperate
which
“free
and
Austrians
last
Austrians
German,
could
action:
were
he
to
independent
only
answer
announced
vote
and
“yes”
on
social,
or
a
plebiscite
whether
or
Christian
“no”;
given
and
the
In pairs review Chapter 2.3
wording,
along
with
the
fact
that
Schuschnigg’s
own
political
party
and then discuss the reasons
was
in
charge
of
the
plebiscite,
there
was
a
good
chance
that
a
Yes
vote
for the change in Mussolini’s
could
be
secured.
This
would
then
give
him
a
chance
to
break
free
of
his
position on Anschluss by 1938.
agreement
Hitler,
gave
on
172
decided
assurances
his
Italy,
12
Hitler.
therefore,
his
mobilized
from
with
army.
Britain
March
that
When
or
1938.
to
he
act
before
would
not
this
Schuschnigg
France,
he
could
object
to
found
resigned.
happen.
Anschluss
that
Hitler
no
Mussolini
and
help
marched
Hitler
was
into
coming
Austria
C H A P T E R
On
13
March,
moment
to
his
the
home
town
was
of
Linz,
of
Historian
in
Klaus
a
a
spur
an
the
conrmed
Fischer
sums
G E R M A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
the
visit
announced
into
plebiscite
of
emotional
Hitler
Austria
subsequently
population
in
following
incorporation
This
the
apparently
decision
2 . 5 :
Reich.
by
on
10
up
the
99%
of
April.
impact
of
Anschluss:
The
it
Anschluss
about
had
had
gambled
convinced
politics
the
weary
his
been
Hitler’s
international
Anschluss
policy
again.
of
had
He
and
in
the
and
Hitler
became
power
that
his
opponents.
belief
brought
ruthless
against
blackmail
also
that
consequences.
strategy
vacillating
reinforcing
methods
vindicated
effective
and
the
successfully
that
had
only
and
far-reaching
it
was
war-
Aside
from
effectiveness
intimidation,
far-reaching
of
the
consequences
Austrian crowds greeting Hitler after Anschluss
▲
in
the
eld
friendship
Mussolini,
of
the
With
of
of
diplomacy.
the
and
Anschluss
Vienna
at
south-eastern
Hungary
and
two
this
promoted
Fascist
further
was
his
It
that
–
polarised
Germany’s
disposal
Europe.
tyrants
From
Yugoslavia.
Hitler
Hitler
and
European
strategic
had
Vienna
—
the
it
position
acquired
was
Fischer,
powers.
only
direct
a
Another
was
greatly
access
footstep
consequence
to
to
the
enhanced.
whole
of
Czechoslovakia,
1995
L TA
Thinking and communication skills
Use Fischer ’s analysis of Anschluss to add detail to your own copy of this mind map.
Germany's
Hitler ’s
position
strategic
in
Germany
position
The
of
impact
Anschluss
Changing
international
Hitler ’s
tactics
alignments
L TA
Communication
skills
Go to www.britishpathe.com/video/hitler-annexes-austria
Watch this Pathé News clip of Hitler entering Austria.
According to the commentary, what made it hard for anyone (inside or outside of
Austria) to oppose this move?
173
2
The Sudeten crisis
Hitler’s
action
diminished
than
After
he
the
against
only
by
deserved.
success
Czechoslovakia.
the
—
of
Czechoslovakia
fact
that
Craig,
were
a
virtuoso
antagonists
performance,
made
things
Austria,
several
Hitler
reasons
turned
for
his
●
Germany
for
him
attention
to
this:
Hitler
N
Annexed
easier
1978
annexing
There
his
was
considered
by
Slavs
(1938)
POLAND
SUDETENLAND
to
be
untermenschen
(racially
Terezin
Annexed
Prague
by
Poland
and
socially
(1938)
inferior).
Lidice
BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(Germany
●
Many
protectorate, 1939)
1933
Czechs
had
BOUNDARY
resisted
rule
in
Austrian
the
old
SLOVAKIA
(1939)
Austro–Hungarian
Uzhgorod
Banská
Annexed
by
Germany
Empire
Munkacs
Bratislava
and
had
Bystrica
(1938)
fought
Annexed
by
during
Hungar y
(1938–39)
GREATER
GERMANY
0
HUNGARY
for
Russia
the
First
World
War,
rather
than
100
for
MILES
Austria.
▲
Par tition of Czechoslovakia, 1938–39
●
Czechoslovakia
by
the
and
was
Versailles
had
the
only
Settlement;
therefore
proved
successful
it
that
independent
consisted
of
ethnically
many
diverse
state
created
different
people
peoples
could
live
together.
●
One
of
These
and
the
ethnic
Germans
now
bordered
lived
groups
had
in
the
Germany
●
Czechoslovakia
●
Czechoslovakia
area
(see
was
in
the
formally
an
was
new
lived
known
its
as
location
enthusiastic
allied
to
Czechoslovakia
in
the
the
on
Sudetenland,
the
map
supporter
France
and
was
German.
Austro–Hungarian
of
Empire
which
above).
the
League
of
Nations.
Russia.
L TA
Thinking and social skills
In pairs, consider how each of the bullet points above would contribute to Hitler ’s
hostile attitude towards Czechoslovakia.
The Sudeten Germans
The
Sudetenland
had
been
strong
given
frontier
further
a
mountainous
Czechoslovakia
and
to
strengthened
Czechoslovakia
174
–
to
had
ensure
this
a
its
rich
order
prosperity.
frontier
strong
area,
in
arms
by
in
to
The
building
industry
mineral
give
the
Czechs
defences.
and
a
resources
new
had
In
state
–
a
then
addition,
well-organized
army.
C H A P T E R
However,
had
not
the
Sudeten
accepted
Austrian
Imperial
regarded
themselves
impact
of
the
grievance
The
ruling
Great
leader
of
the
for
for
1935,
from
to
up
Initially,
in
the
however,
“in
clear
plan
and
3.5
As
their
E X P A N S I O N ,
million
part
loss
of
of
discrimination.
high
the
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
people,
the
former
status
With
unemployment,
told
too
how
warned
presented
of
various
was
him
was
and
the
their
that
the
that
sense
of
the
Czech
German
Party,
encouraged
government
and
subversion.
government
Programme;
with
these
and
On
his
demands
rights.
to
use
he
but
did
was
force
would
achieved.
Germany
the
Hitler
Czech
Czech
Karlsbad
future”,
be
the
became
to
Sudeten
agitation
reluctant
to
the
on
of
Heinlein,
demands
Germany.
special
Heinlein
distant
this
the
for
led
Nazi
demands
form
and
Konrad
and
He
by
programme
Hitler
He
not
on
Germans,
continual
autonomy
issue
resented
Czech
discontent
funded
Heinlein
Czechoslovakia.
generals
was
relentless
Demands
included
Depression
of
some
Czechoslovakia.
they
self-government.
make
a
24April1938,
Eight
victims
Sudeten
which,
keep
as
themselves,
in
nation,
Sudeten
government
to
position
G E R M A N
grew.
mouthpiece
Heinlein
Germans
their
2 . 5 :
not
In
not
against
solve
the
commit
addition,
ready
for
Sudeten
himself
many
a
war
of
at
to
any
Hitler’s
this
stage.
▲
Konrad Heinlein, leader of the
Sudeten German Par ty
The May Crisis, 1938
Hitler
changed
his
Czechoslovakia
rumours
started
preparations
warnings
In
fact,
to
the
involved
had
decision
as
to
the
He
justice
the
to
a
the
the
taking
action
May
Germans
border.
of
apparent
this
British
action
and
Green,
summer
the
of
by
As
a
against
Crisis.
were
result,
and
Sudeten
On
20
making
the
Britain
May,
military
Czech
and
France
his
military
to
feeling
of
all
as
in
On
tell
the
5
was
“ It
showing
is
near
in
Hitler,
the
sent
of
the
by
only
the
in
my
what
he
was
unalterable
future ”.
the
Sudetenland
increased
the
Hitler
to
Germans
reject
conquest
German
and
their
Czech
Sudeten
pictures
powers
were
though
in
September,
told
Meanwhile,
as
May,
increased
from
interested
by
to
looked
28
generals:
demands
Sudeten
it
On
action
tensions
Heinlein
was
Germans.
anti-Czech
told
had
Czechoslovakia
threats.
government.
Hitler
Hitler
attack
instructions
agreed
ill-treatment
and
humiliating,
1938,
However,
that
to
French
Hitler
on
Czech
Beneš
proving
the
unfounded
preparations
Germans,
Edvard
frenzy
to
so-called
mobilization,
Czechoslovakia
against
for
Czech
were
found
smash
thus
regard
the
that
partial
such
self-government.
offer,
up
the
Operation
President
for
no
Sudeten
violence
to
rumours
Throughout
as
of
Germany.
responded
known
with
result
ordered
that
underway.
a
circulating
near
government
mind
as
and
press
lm
this
not
in
whipped
footage
of
Germans.
175
2
L TA
Thinking and communication skills
Speech
1938
made
at
the
by
Hitler
annual
on
12
This may be a matter of indierence to the democracies
September
Nuremberg
… but I can only say to the representatives of the
Rally.
democracies that it is not a matter of indierence to us,
I am speaking of Czechoslovakia. This is a democratic
and I say that if these tor tured creatures cannot obtain
State founded on democratic lines by forcing other
rights and assistance by themselves they can obtain
nationalities without asking them into a structure
both from us …
manufactured by Versailles. As good democrats they
We can quite understand that the French and British
began to oppress and mishandle the majority of the
defend their interests in the world. I can assure the
inhabitants …
statesmen in Paris and London that there are also
If
this
were
a
mat ter
foreign
to
us
…
we
would
German interests which we are determined to defend
regard
the
case
as
so
many
others,
merely
as
an
in all circumstances … You will understand that a
interesting
illustration
of
the
democratic
conception
Great Power cannot suddenly submit … to such a
of
self-determination,
and
simply
take
note
of
it .
base attack … What the Germans demand is the right
But
it
is
something
most
natural
which
compels
of self-determination which other nations possess …
us
Germans
to
take
an
interest
in
this
problem.
if the Democracies, however, should be convinced that
Among
the
nationalities
being
suppressed
in
this
they must in this case protect with all their means the
S tate
there
are
3,500,000
Germans.
That
is
about
oppressors of the Germans, then this will have grave
as
many
persons
of
our
race
as
Denmark
has
consequences.
inhabitants
…
unbearable
is
were
their
robbed
right
people
to
were
handed
over
That
conditions
generally
in
the
in
known.
name
of
a
this
nation
3,500,000
cer tain
Mr
are
Wilson
self-determination.
Economically
deliberately
and
to
a
slow
ruined
process
of
In pairs, read Hitler ’s speech and consider what evidence
people
this document provides of:
of
these
●
Hitler ’s political views
●
Hitler ’s tactics with regard to taking over the
after wards
extermination.
The
Sudetenland
misery
of
the
Sudeten
Germans
is
without
end.
They
●
are
being
manner
oppressed
and
treated
in
in
an
an
inhuman
and
undignified
intolerable
way
Hitler’s
the nature of Nazi propaganda.
…
speech
Sudetenland,
government,
at
but
the
Nuremberg
this
which
was
Rally
brought
declared
caused
under
martial
more
control
by
unrest
the
in
the
Czech
law.
L TA
Communication
skills
Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=hprV2nQRvbc, or search for “ The German
people persecuted at Sudetenland”.
Watch this German propaganda lm. According to the lm, how are the Sudeten
Germans being persecuted?
176
C H A P T E R
2 . 5 :
G E R M A N
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
Chamberlain’s inter vention
It
of
was
at
this
this
However,
ew
point
that
involvement
Britain
are
Chamberlain
three
times
to
decided
discussed
in
desperately
meet
Hitler
Berchtesgaden,
to
15
to
more
act.
wanted
try
to
The
detail
to
make
in
full
avoid
a
deal
September
reasons
the
a
next
war,
over
and
the
this
was
so
now
Sudetenland.
meeting,
agreed
Sudeten
of
it
the
German
be
areas
transferred
Germany.
persuaded
and
to
that
Czechoslovakia
should
the
this
nally
days
his
Cabinet
French
deal.
to
The
agreed
of
to
Chamberlain
agree
Czechs
after
two
persuasion.
Chamberlain arriving at Berchtesgarden
▲
Godesberg,
Chamberlain
to
tell
but
He
Hitler
Hitler
with
an
demands
the
He
and
should
that
be
now
As
on
seemed
terms
Soviet
They
a
that
Hungarians
to
28
as
be
▲
troops
occupy
Chamberlain leaving Godesberg
the
September.
the
war
French
previously,
that
they
in
also
though
and
not
the
territory
hoped
Union,
of
German
mentioned
army.
for
should
allowed
Sudetenland
Hitler’s
news,
insisted
the
for
Czechoslovakia
met,
1938
Godesberg
excuse
of
Poles
September
furious.
handover
Sudetenland.
and
to
good
Czechoslovakia,
peaceful
the
22–23
ew
the
was
wanted
war
It
nature
1938
At
a
and
chapter.
the
with
could
was
said
inevitable.
they
Czechs
the
resist
a
help
The
would
had
of
good
their
German
Czechs
support
defences
allies,
rejected
Czechoslovakia.
and
France
a
strong
and
the
attack.
177
2
Munich,
29
September
1938
With
now
Britain
prepared
own
to
war,
further
ght,
not
Hitler
yet
agreed
in
as
a
out
his
that
ready
to
a
Mussolini
mediator
war,
and
Conference
Munich.
were
with
pointing
was
prevent
Power
they
and
conference.
stepped
to
France
that
generals
Germany
for
and
showing
Here,
a
a
Four
was
plan
held
in
presented
Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and
▲
Mussolini at the Munich Conference
by
Mussolini
by
Hitler!)
(though
was
written
agreed
on.
The plan included the following points.
•
The
German
occupation
international
The
•
international
Czechs
would
(neither
the
•
Poland
•
Hungary
•
was
be
be
to
along
the
get
to
nor
given
determine
would
leave
the
also
and
would
a
supervise
Germans
transfer
of
take
place
provisional
by
new
plebiscites
allowed
populations
to
in
join
actually
1
October
frontier
by
areas
the
and
10
of
an
October.
dispute.
Sudeten
territories
happened).
Teschen.
South
with
Sudetenland
would
commission
allowed
plebiscites
to
was
Germany,
of
commission
the
Slovakia.
other
powers,
guaranteed
the
independence
of
the
rest
of
Czechoslovakia.
Neither
invited
this
the
to
Czech
the
Munich
agreement
though
France
therefore
had
Following
which
he
war
they
had
no
the
“liquidation
of
receive
guaranteed
option
to
Hitler,
against
Beneš
Conference.
would
but
conference,
agreed
consultation.
his
President,
settle
to
the
the
all
Czech
of
21
Czech
told
Britain
borders
at
got
Hitler
a
that
or
few
to
not
he
to
if
they
The
days
a
Czechs
later.
in
through
deprived
gave
resisted
even
statement
interest
be
were
France,
sign
international
October,
Stalin
Locarno.
resigned
determined
On
the
of
leader,
were
from
Beneš
matters
was
Soviet
Czechs
help
Chamberlain
however,
remainder
The
no
agree.
Czechoslovakia.
the
nor
orders
of
for
the
state ”.
Source skills
Gordon
A.
Craig.
Germany
the
1866–1945
as
(1990).
Munich
he
seemed
could
do
no
to
convince
wrong,
and
Hitler
his
country’s
it
could
betrayed
an
impatience
it
earlier.
In
that
it
possible,
seemed
had
repair
search
for
178
to
economic
restrain
factors
him,
for
no
it
was
was
of
disinclined
as
good
domestic
in
any
case,
to
that
take;
and
conquests
longer
was
clear
deciencies.
of
Hitler’s
Moreover,
campaign
the
against
the
new
had
at
the
that
end
of
1938
contributed
to
the
the
mounting
power
war
not
Jews
triumphs,
he
for
measures
policy
that
his
without
discipline
acceleration
characterised
readiness
that
might
now
be
pace
of
his
external
policy.
One
C H A P T E R
of
the
complaints
government
Jews
in
of
that
he
made
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia
were
against
was
still
2 . 5 :
G E R M A N
the
that
E X P A N S I O N ,
and
“the
the
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
destruction
connected
in
his
of
Jewry
were
inextricably
thoughts.
poisoning
First question, par t a – 3 marks
the
nation”
have
to
be
objectives,
against
dealt
it
is
Germany
with.
clear
As
that
he
the
and
would
turned
to
conquest
According
new
of
Munich
space
to
Craig,
what
Conference
Czechoslovakia
L TA
Beyond the Treaty of Versailles: The liquidation of
on
was
the
impact
of
the
Hitler?
Thinking and social skills
1
According to Craig in the
source above, what factor
L TA
linked Hitler ’s domestic and
Communication skills
foreign policies?
2
With a par tner, discuss what
conclusions Hitler might
now draw as to the attitude
of the West regarding any
future action he might take.
German troops enter Prague in March 1939
▲
What does this photo suggest about the attitude of the citizens of Prague towards
the takeover of the rest of Czechoslovakia?
As
its
a
result
heavy
of
the
Munich
industry,
a
mountainous
defences
Sudetenland.
Slovakia
internal
Clearly,
affairs,
Hitler
liquidation
1939,
Hitler
complete
Tiso,
As
who
with
when
of
Slovakia
and
head
new
to
Hitler
Czech
crush
independence
of
for
this
the
He
Slovaks
was
given
agitation.
and
to
the
Emil
asked
controlled
as
“a
for
by
of
the
from
in
this
to
the
early
and
by
for
Prague.
stone
From
disruption
to
Hachá,
of
stepping
173).
helped
excuse
70%
natural
self-government
People’s
Prompted
lost
the
fortications
cause
Slovak
both
given
1999:
willingly
fascist
was
and
ultimately
Agreement
President,
Slovakia
were
(Stackelberg,
the
the
man-made
still
Munich
Czechoslovakia
population
Ruthenia
state ”
encouraged
was
its
were
independence.
Austria,
the
the
Czech
of
and
though
saw
the
Conference,
third
to
ask
Father
for
Jozef
Party.
directly
moved
Hitler,
German
get
troops
Tiso
involved
into
proclaimed
full
protection.
179
2
In
the
This,
and
hope
of
of
Moravia
15
March
On
16
March,
Germany;
18
action
March,
placed
on
Czechoslovakia,
a
mistake;
1939,
German
Bohemia
and
led
and
was
to
Ruthenia
to
a
of
the
troops
Hachá
was
now
forced
an
was
in
told
assurances
occupied
Moravia
be
change
Chamberlain
any
Hachá
asked
to
to
sign
see
over
Hitler.
Bohemia
Hitler.
Slovakia
Germany
This
was
to
On
of
saving
course,
were
independent
occupied
British
the
the
given
by
by
state
Nazi
Czechoslovakia.
protectorate
under
towards
Cabinet
the
of
a
Hungarian
policy
British
rest
declared
of
protection
troops.
Germany.
that
leaders ”
the
“ no
On
reliance
(see
page
could
be
223).
German expansion: Poland
It
MEMEL
was
been
LITHUANIA
Baltic
Sea
now
target
18th
clear
would
be
tha t
dismantled
century
Hitle r ’s
P o l a nd.
as
and
a
ne xt
P ol and
co untry
p a r ti tio ne d
ha d
in
th e
be twe e n
DANZIG
Prussia,
EAST
Russia
However,
PRUSSIA
and
following
self-determination
ALLENSTEIN
been
the
recreated
as
Wi ls on’s
at
a
Austri a n
Ver s ai ll e s,
na ti on.
Empi re .
ai ms
It
it
wa s
of
ha d
th is
N
part
of
the
Treaty
of
Ve r sa i ll es
tha t
wa s
MARIENWERDER
probably
as
West
to
allow
most
res e nte d
Prussia
had
by
been
the
Ge r ma n s,
gi ve n
to
P ol a nd
POZNANIA
GERMANY
POLAND
WEST
splitting
UPPER
Transferred
Poland
EAST
0
50
100
mi
Germany.
as
the
to
This
Polish
the
Prus s i a
s ea ,
off
p i e ce
Corri d o r,
the re by
f ro m
of
the
l a nd,
a ls o
re s t
k nown
incl uded
th e
to
of
Danzig,
whi ch
b eca me
a
“free
by Treaty
of Versailles
city”
Voted
to
allowing
Polish
(1921)
become
UPPER
use
Voted
access
of
city
SILESIA
it
East
to
run
it
as
by
the
both
a
sea
L e a g ue
Pol a nd
of
a nd
Na ti ons,
Ger ma ny
to
por t.
remain
SILESIA
0
50
100
km
German
(1921)
Less
of
▲
than
a
Prague,
week
the
after
the
Germans
occupation
proposed
to
The Polish Corridor after the
Poland
that
Danzig
should
have
should
be
returned
to
Germany,
and
that
Germany
First World War
road
the
and
German
Germany
minister
Polish
direct
rail
link.
claim
before
access
This
to
the
Colonel
the
East
Prussia
actually
a
World
refused,
War.
seeing
via
more
Sudetenland,
First
Beck
to
was
a
German-controlled
legitimate
which
had
However,
this
as
not
demand
been
Poland’s
the
start
of
than
part
of
foreign
an
attack
on
territory.
Britain’s guarantee to Poland
In
March
Memel.
from
East
in
180
Russia
Prussia
no
four
1939,
Hi tl e r
Lithuania
in
position
days
19 1 9 ;
that
to
later.
a s ke d
wa s
ha d
a
Meme l
a
s ta nd
the
Ba ltic
Li thu a n ia n
s tate
wa s
a
s ubs ta ntia l
up
to
t ha t
c it y
a nd
Ger m an
Hi tl e r
a nd
g ov e r nm e nt
h ad
the
be en
s t r ip
m a de
of
l a nd
pop ul a t io n.
l a nd
wa s
to
h an d
over
in de pe n de n t
bor de r in g
Lit h u a n ia
h an de d
ov e r
wa s
C H A P T E R
Britain
now
Poland
to
decided
to
act
and,
on
30
March,
a
2 . 5 :
G E R M A N
guarantee
E X P A N S I O N ,
was
offered
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
to
TOK
give
help
in
the
event
of
a
German
attack:
You have already reected
In
the
event
of
any
action
which
clearly
threatened
Polish
independence,
and
on the role of the individual
which
the
Polish
Government
accordingly
considered
it
vital
to
resist
with
in history when considering
their
national
forces,
His
Majesty’s
Government
would
feel
themselves
bound
Italy’s foreign policies under
at
once
to
lend
the
Polish
Government
all
support
in
their
power.
They
have
Mussolini. In pairs consider
given
the
Polish
Government
an
assurance
to
this
effect.
the role of Hitler in shaping and
I
may
they
add
that
stand
in
the
the
French
same
Government
position
in
this
have
authorised
matter
as
do
His
me
to
make
Majesty’s
it
plain
that
Government.
directing events. Intentionalist
historians view the role of
individuals and personalities as
The
Anglo–Polish
Treaty
failed
to
make
Hitler
more
cautious
in
his
key forces of historical change.
actions.
Indeed,
he
was
furious
about
this
opposition
to
his
plans,
To what extent do you agree
commenting,
“I’ll
cook
them
a
stew
that
they’ll
choke
on ”.
Two
days
after
the
with this idea. Refer to your
British
guarantee
to
Poland,
Hitler
responded
by
declaring
the
Anglo–
study of German expansion in
German
Naval
Agreement
invalid
and
ending
the
1934
Non-Aggression
the 1930s. Other historians, and
Pact
with
Poland.
He
then
ordered
his
Chief
of
Staff,
Keitel,
to
prepare
par ticularly Marxist historians
for
the
attack
on
Poland.
This
was
known
as
Operation
White,
and
argue that economic forces
the
plan
was
for
a
limited
war
on
Poland
rather
than
for
a
wider
war
are the key factor. Investigate
involving
Britain
and
France.
historians’ views on German
expansion in the 1930s. How
Changing international alignments: The Pact of
far can you identify political
or cultural perspectives of the
Steel, May 1939
historians from their accounts?
Pact of Steel
International
of
Albania
Mussolini’s
increase
tens i o ns
(see
attemp t
his
thislooked
own
like
Thus,Britain
Greece
The
and
that
Britain
Germany,
if
it
for
writes,
the
needed
he
another
Nevertheless,
the
supported
the
“War
‘mission’”
ri s e
wi t h
this
M u s s oli n i’s
a ct io n
ind ep e nd en c e
imp or t a n c e ,
a ctio n
to
bet we en
i mme di ate ly
i s su e d
for
it
or
of
[Hitler]
towards
(Kershaw,
power
wary
clear
was
of
H it le r
Br it a in
the
in vas i on
c au s ed
by
a nd
a nd
to
F ra n c e
di ct a t or sh i ps .
gu a r an t e e s
to
bo t h
was
of
getting
of
at
an
to
and
hostile
Pact
come
to
its
involved
that
Italy
immediate
Steel,
the
rst
he
of
his
told
suitable
conventional
fullment
1991:
to
the
“contrary
Hitler
on
Pact
no
sign
Albania,
the
of
the
Steel
aid
wishes
in
a
Mussolini
reaction
of
the
and
not
other
desires”.
full-scale
would
of
with
be
conict,
ready
for
years.
Poland
the
to
in
given
agreed
to
intent
the
attack
agreed
four
action
support
hostilities
was
was
signing
step
thus
in
three
to
Mussolini’s
each
made
Hitler
decision:
decisive
his
Hitler’s
He
Mussolini
war
after
F r a nce
involved
privately
with
show
co o r d i na te d
whereby
and
day
a
France.
became
However,
to
to
Al thoug h
i nte r natio na l
and
he
and
conti nue d
1 4 7) .
Roma ni a .
Germans
found
pa g e
war
his
Poland.
generals:
opportunity ”.
military
‘idea’,
with
the
conict.
It
“ we
As
The
are
left
Kershaw
represented
accomplishment
of
his
134).
181
2
Source skills
Contracting
Source A
Party
The
Italo–German
Alliance,
22
May
Pact
of
order
to
the
Emperor
come
the
close
Reich
King
of
has
which
Chancellor
of
Italy
Ethiopia,
to
confirm
relation
exists
Germany
of
Firmly
through
that
a
time
solemn
friendship
Fascist
If
the
and
National
pact
affinity
it
bound
unity
of
hopes
also
in
this
one
of
and
them
Socialist
through
future
to
Italian
support
threat.
Powers,
stand
of
side
the
their
by
it
against
with
other
step
with
the
Contracting
involved
another
to
its
its
side
in
as
military
or
Party
an
that
military
power
Contracting
all
wishes
Parties,
ally
might
other
will
and
on
will
land,
the
and
people
the
becomes
immediately
ideologies
solidarity
the
happen,
of
complications
I t a l y.
together
their
comprehensive
German
threatened
III.
should
and
at
inner
the
diplomatic
His
Albania,
consider
between
and
and
and
support
…
afford
and
Steel).
German
Majesty
will
political
remove
ARTICLE
The
Party
full
1939
in
(the
its
sea,
and
in
the
air.
the
interests,
are
side
the
Berlin
determined
and
22
Fascist
May
1939
in
the
X VII
yea r
of
th e
Era
to
Source B
strive
of
with
their
united
Lebensraum
maintenance
for
in
them
a
by
world
carry
out
come
to
the
an
vital
Parties
that
the
Parties
the
Italy
making
culture
photograph
following
the
taken
in
signing
Berlin,
of
the
May
Pact
of
1939,
Steel.
wish,
to
safe
…
A
the
have
terms:
remain
each
in
other,
of
all
in
order
common
situation
common
be
as
a
enter
Should
one
of
threatened
of
into
necessary
of
interests
jeopardized
happenings
interests.
interests
be
of
will
with
European
immediately
Parties
and
the
prescribed
whole.
II.
international
these
and
way,
disintegration,
understanding
the
event
regarding
space]
this
following
contact
Contracting
will
and
securing
I.
or
ARTICLE
In
the
the
Germany
European
Contracting
interests
In
assignment
of
upon
permanent
to
unrest
for
[living
peace.
history,
the
ARTICLE
The
of
of
foundations
agreed
effort
any
kind,
the
from
the
they
consultation
measures
the
of
through
to
security
According
unite
Italy
to
Source
and
A,
what
common
factors
Germany?
preserve
or
other
Contracting
outside,
First question, par t a – 3 marks
the
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
is
the
message
of
Source
B?
other
L TA
Thinking skills
Look at the ar ticles of the agreement. Who do you consider would benet the
most from this alliance?
182
C H A P T E R
2 . 5 :
G E R M A N
The Nazi–Soviet Pact
In
the
summer
democracies
Union
for
an
communist
East,
was
an
highly
thus
In
alliance.
secure
the
had
growing
collective
joined
still
signed
to
a
a
proposal
the
ultimately
The
with
in
the
stage
Poland,
to
the
and,
hoped
prevent
an
Soviet
alarmed
that
Hitler’s
democracies
French
alone
Soviet
in
had
had
Union
1935,
were
and
in
but
this
Agreement.
the
and
Nazis,
alliance
each
of
favoured
Nations
the
with
negotiations
distrusting
“Little
RidingHood”.
West
the
(see
seemed
renewed
the
with
other
what
he
a
following
democracies
Chapter
2.7).
Hitler’s
dragged
occupation
on,
Meanwhile,
both
Stalin
of
Communication and
L TA
However,
called
and
with
government
Agreement
military
1939,
Soviets
1934,
had
rearmament
to
this
the
war
In
Western
Munich
Munich
a
work
Hitler.
capitulation
of
of
Hitler,
the
a
at
France,
initially
League
pact
in
France.
communist
German
after
the
Stalin
Prague.
a
appease
to
collapsed
to
of
and
Herblock,
conict.
had
of
loathing
Lebensraum
prevent
by
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
Soviet
Union
Britain
would
defensive
response
Despite
the
power
for
Soviet
would
and
However,
suspicious
worked
It
Union
security
aggression.
the
the
cartoon
Goldilocks
Western
Hitler’s
neutrality
Britain
by
the
plans
two-front
Soviet
with
Union
the
a
his
with
Soviet
preventing
fact,
with
alliance
both
approached
Despite
and
desirable.
an
alliance
1939,
Hitler
Russia
alliance
forming
would
of
and
A
E X P A N S I O N ,
sides
had
social skills
also
made
and
as
it
clear
to
the
Germans
that
he
would
welcome
an
agreement
In pairs or small groups,
a
result,
on
24
August
1939,
Germany
pulled
off
one
of
the
most
discuss the meaning of the
controversial
and
cynical
alliances
in
modern
history:
the
Nazi–Soviet
Pact.
car toon above.
Under
this
Non-Aggression
Pact,
the
Soviet
Union
and
Nazi
Germany
Why was an agreement
each
pledged
to
remain
neutral
in
the
event
of
either
nation
being
between the Soviet Union and
attacked
by
a
third
party.
In
addition,
the
pact
included
a
secret
protocol
Nazi Germany so surprising and
dividing
Northern
and
Eastern
Europe
into
German
and
Soviet
spheres
of
shocking to Poland, and also to
inuence:
the
Baltic
states
and
Bessarabia
in
Romania
were
to
be
in
the
the rest of the world?
Russian
sphere,
and
Poland
was
to
be
divided
between
the
two
powers.
Source skills
Source A
The
Nazi–Soviet
Pact,
23
August
Article
I.
The
Government
of
the
German
The
Government
of
the
Union
obligate
themselves
Reich
of
Republics
each
peace
desirous
between
of
any
U.S.S.R.,
and
provisions
of
from
the
concluded
reached
Germany
in
the
and
April,
following
the
either
individually
or
jointly
II.
Should
one
Parties
of
the
become
High
the
object
of
action
by
a
third
Power,
the
other
Neutrality
Contracting
Party
shall
in
no
manner
1926
lend
between
of
attack
the
High
Agreement
act
any
and
belligerent
fundamental
any
and
strengthening
Germany
proceeding
from
action,
Powers.
Contracting
the
desist
aggressive
other,
other
Article
of
to
Parties
Soviet
with
cause
Contracting
and
on
the
High
1939
violence,
Socialist
Both
U.S.S.R.,
its
support
to
this
third
Power.
have
Agreement:
183
2
Article
III.
The
Contracting
continual
purpose
contact
of
Article
shall
with
on
in
in
problems
of
the
one
consultation
information
common
Governments
Parties
the
two
future
another
order
to
affecting
The
High
for
an
the
IV
.
grouping
should
determined
Neither
of
the
shall
powers
two
In
High
participate
whatsoever
in
that
any
this
any
or
event
indirectly
arise
over
V
.
Should
between
aimed
at
shall
disputes
the
problems
parties
of
the
other
High
one
settle
or
Contracting
kind
these
or
to
conicts
through
opinion
or,
if
establishment
friendly
Article
for
a
that,
this
The
period
in
Parties
the
VI.
so
of
far
or
does
shall
ve
Article
VII.
Agreement
is
of
how
only
be
further
both
of
such
a
denitely
political
these
both
this
it
Governments
means
of
a
will
friendly
resolve
agreement.
III.
With
regard
attention
its
in
is
to
called
Southeastern
by
Bessarabia.
complete
the
The
political
Soviet
side
German
disinterest
side
in
areas.
IV
.
is
Moscow,
High
one
period,
concluded
the
This
as
protocol
strictly
shall
be
treated
by
secret.
August
23,
1939.
Source B
proviso
Contracting
year
the
automatically
parties
the
commissions.
with
the
by
prior
validity
be
to
of
extended
for
years.
The
within
ratications
of
advance
of
and
can
course
of
exchange
Treaty
years,
one
not
another
ratied
present
as
State
bounded
the
interests
maintenance
conicts
through
arbitration
ten
expiration
Treaty
necessary,
of
Polish
both
interest
declares
Parties
another,
disputes
its
both
of
the
the
party.
Article
exclusively
whether
is
Europe,
Article
be
in
question
Article
directly
of
desirable
developments.
parties
of
make
independent
state
exchange
their
interests.
contracting
question
parties
maintain
present
the
shall
shall
treaty
shortest
be
exchanged
enter
shall
possible
into
in
force
be
time.
The
Berlin.
as
soon
The
as
it
signed.
The
section
above
was
Secret
was
additional
Article
and
below
not
Estonia,
I.
In
the
to
the
Latvia,
event
of
a
the
time
the
territorial
Baltic
of
Lithuania
boundary
of
the
and
interest
of
In
Lithuania
areas
(Finland,
northern
represent
inuence
this
in
the
the
shall
spheres
U.S.S.R.
of
in
States
Lithuania),
boundary
Germany
at
protocol
politicalrearrangement
belonging
the
published
announced.
the
of
connection
the
Vilna
area
is
▲
recognized
by
each
The signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact
party.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
Article
II.
In
the
event
of
a
territorial
and
According
political
rearrangement
of
the
areas
be
to
the
Polish
state,
the
spheres
of
to
Source
A,
what
measures
inuence
followed
to
maintain
peace
between
of
countries?
Germany
and
the
approximately
by
U.S.S.R.
the
line
shall
of
be
the
bounded
rivers
Narev,
First question, par t b – 2 marks
Vistula
and
San.
What
184
were
to
belonging
is
the
message
of
Source
B?
the
two
C H A P T E R
For
Hitler,
this
that
he
could
raw
materials
expedient
For
●
to
there
It
would
it
faced
was
purges
the
the
war
could
on
two
Union.
plans
He
for
considerable
Soviet
the
he
war
Soviet
also
in
always
in
that
a
long-term
the
threat
other
strongest
the
were
keep
a
meant
ghting
his
Stalin’s
There
each
from
due
Stalin,
after
●
alliance
avoid
Union
East
(see
hope
and
out
from
that
that
have
fronts.
clearly
of
a
G E R M A N
free
hand
could
regarded
war.
and
in
also
it
as
Lebensraum
advantages,
as
This
the
E X P A N S I O N ,
Poland
get
a
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
and
valuable
short-term
in
the
East.
follows.
was
army
important
was
as
weakened
box).
Germany
the
a
He
attaining
Japan,
glossary
2 . 5 :
Soviet
and
the
Union
West
would
would
weaken
emerge
as
the
Stalin’s purges
nation.
During the 1930s, Stalin killed
●
He
got
considerable
territorial
gains
from
the
pact:
half
the
Baltic
of
Poland
and
or “purged” anyone considered
the
opportunity
to
take
over
Finland
and
States.
to be a threat . This included
●
The
Soviet
Union
could
keep
trading
with
Germany:
Germany
was
peasants, workers, political
to
send
mechanical
goods
to
the
Soviet
Union
in
return
for
raw
opponents and even senior
materials
and
foodstuffs
(see
Source
B
below
for
the
importance
of
military ocers. In fact , approx
this
to
Germany).
35,000 ocers were either
shot or imprisoned.
Two contrasting views of the Nazi–Soviet Pact
L TA
Thinking and communication skills
Source A
Source B
Molotov ’s comments to the Supreme Soviet on the
Comment by Dr Julius Schnurre, Head of the Economic
ratication of the Non-Aggression Pact, 31 August 1939.
Policy Division of the German foreign ministry,
24 October 1939.
The chief impor tance of the Soviet-German non-
aggression pact lies in the fact that the two largest
The Agreement means a wide open door to the East for
States of Europe have agreed to put an end to enmity
us. The raw material purchases from the Soviet Union
between them, to eliminate the menace of war and to
and from the countries bordering the Soviet Union can
live at peace one with the other …
still be considerably increased. But it is essential to
meet the German commitments to the extent required.
Only the instigators of a general European war … can
In view of the great volume this will require a special
be dissatised with this position of aairs …
eor t. If we succeed in expanding expor ts to the East
It is really dicult for these gentlemen to understand
in the required volume, the eects of the English
the purpose of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact,
blockade will be decisively weakened by the incoming
on the strength of which the USSR is not obliged to
raw materials.
involve itself in war either on the side of Great Britain
against Germany, or on the side of Germany against
Great Britain.
Questions
1
ways in which the Soviet Union and Germany viewed
Is it really dicult to comprehend that the USSR
this pact?
is pursuing and will continue to pursue its own
independent policy based on the interests of the
What do Sources A and B indicate about the dierent
2
peoples of the USSR and only these interests?
Does this pact suppor t the idea that Hitler did not, in
fact, have a clearly planned foreign policy, but was
taking advantage of situations as they arose?
3
Which country do you consider gained most from this
pact?
185
2
Source skills
A
cartoon
on
20
by
David
September
Low,
“Rendezvous”,
published
in
the
Evening
Standard
newspaper
1939.
The tex t reads: (Hitler to Stalin) “The scum of the Earth, I believe?”; (Stalin to Hitler)
▲
“The bloody assassin of the workers, I presume?”.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
is
the
message
Examiner’s
that
two
the
the
cartoonist
key
points
greetings
Stalin
hint:
are
that
giving
this
making
What
Hitler
one
source?
The outbreak of war
Note
is
here.
of
do
and
Despite
that
Britain’s
they
Roderick
about
the
true
their
relationship?
the
signicance
of
a
could
not
militarily
the
assurance
has
the
on
come
ground,
about
meeting
between
186
the
the
or
as
a
which
result
of
“rendez-vous”
two
assurances
action
at
all,
to
let
Poland,
alone
Hitler
declare
did
war.
not
As
believe
historian
writes:
conceive
strong
that
and
Britain
and
democratic
France,
having
Czechoslovakia
a
failed
year
to
ght
before
of
Soviet
aid,
would
now
ght
to
save
a
militarily
despite
weak
and
dead
undemocratic
body
any
What
the
is
Stackelberg
France’s
nature
for
of
and
take
another
Hitler
indicate
would
dictators?
Poland
without
the
prospect
of
Soviet
aid”.
—
Stackelberg,
1999
C H A P T E R
Hitler
had
was
Mussolini
his
therefore
signed
a
full
on
division
to
trying
reach
give
was
On
31
the
peace
any
its
make
who
1
bombed
On
3
received
the
dressed
in
the
and
they
left
German
he
the
and
had
uniforms
the
uniforms,
used
gave
further
was
by
invaded
not
lethal
Poland
be
held
that
the
by
and
to
war.
wait
one
Poles.
To
criminals
injection
for
this
to
attack.
convicted
excuse
Britain
However,
attacked
of
and
that
prepared
staged
to
last-minute
claimed
been
delayed
Hoping
negotiation.
should
bodies
the
thus
Empire
Corridor.
had
killed
as
a
Poland
condition
Germany
border
troops
on
Hitler
British
Polish
war
behind
was
also
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
time,
September.
the
E X P A N S I O N ,
and
same
war.
1
refused
evening,
Polish
attack
for
Britain
the
conference
wanted
Polish
in
the
a
At
until
also
that
same
Polish
Polish
1939,
September,
on
near
ready
Poland,
Poles
Hitler
dressed
not
disarmament
The
that
guaranteeing
Danzig
That
heard
August.
August
and
on
he
25
G E R M A N
and
At
German
4.45am
planes
Warsaw.
Germany
war
However,
so-called
26
proposed
authentic,
September
in
Britain.
stations
on
was
for
Britain
hand
soldiers
been
This
he
agreement
by
when
involved
initiatives.
appear
had
shot.
on
it
SS
This
Mussolini
crisis.
wireless
reality,
that
planned
free
up
August,
for
In
a
taken
resolve
of
an
back
alliance
between
Britain.
Germany
not
him
Poland
proposal
to
taken
military
informed
attack
cause
a
2 . 5 :
to
by
call
this
Poland
most
the
off
time,
is
Second
reluctance
lusted
1939.
War
with
after
No
himself
war
into
the
—
France
localized
time.
not
Watt,
the
it,
As
events
Hitler’s
wanted
presented
11.00am.
everybody
though
else
it.
in
a
all
that
which
war,
one
is
of
by
and
remain
extraordinary
World
government
attack
Britain
would
destructive
What
British
the
When
declared
affair;
historian
which
will
else
war
though
in
for
led
with
war.
Hitler
he
Donald
to
was
approached
France
Mussolini
ultimatum
response
fact,
up
war
an
no
the
able
it.
and
that
the
unleashed
Watt
concludes:
outbreak
of
the
overcome
Hitler
came
been
hoped
had
to
to
had
willed,
Britain,
at
perilously
the
desired,
least
close
not
to
in
talking
2001
Hitler ’s actions after the declaration of war
Following
Poland.
so-called
to
of
the
British
Subjected
defeated,
Pact
the
and
to
declaration
a
“blitzkrieg”
Germany
and
the
Ribbentrop–Molotov
1939.
The
of
Germans
war,
style
USSR
line
were
as
Hitler
of
had
now
war,
divided
to
the
up
been
able
launched
an
Poles
were
Poland
agreed
transfer
attack
quickly
along
in
the
most
on
the
Nazi-Soviet
of
their
forces
west.
The phoney war
In
October
in
Britain
there
was
months.
1939,
now
no
This
Hitler
trusted
direct
was
offered
Hitler,
action
the
from
period
peace
and
proposals
these
Hitler
known
were
against
as
“the
but
not
the
very
taken
West
phoney
few
up.
for
people
However,
the
next
few
war”.
Hitler takes over Europe
The
calm
events,
●
of
Hitler’s
in
the
phoney
war
was
broken
in
April
1940.
These
are
the
key
1939–40:
troops
April
occupied
Denmark
and
landed
at
the
Norwegian
ports
1940.
187
2
●
10
May,
Germany
simultaneously.
surrendered
troops
had
German
●
After
the
captured
The
Germans
To
secure
English
the
bombing
the
was
which
from
point
Soviet
would
ensuring
would
Hitler
that
ensure
would
a
the
of
war
eventually
be
as
Dutch
British
the
invading
southwards;
the
22nd
Paris
June.
Atlantic
coast;
under
Marshal
the
RAF
,
cities.
1941,
nale,
would
in
go
during
air
over
the
Hitler
switched
break
in
the
a
the
was
the
summer
Luftwaffe
to
off
for
that
Soviet
of
the
much
in
the
case.
his
Thus,
Union
Britain.
of
of
the
start
the
one
East.
Soviet
speedy
not
to
the
morale
still
back
the
invasion
on
marked
anticipated
nish
the
called
the
fought
turn
Hitler
to
of
Force
This
this
to
against
end
Britain
Air
lebensraum
return
invasion
control
Britain.
decided
would
to
for
would
undefeated.
victorious
that
this
Barbarossa
able
The
May.
government
Royal
British
middle
Union
of
1940
planned
of
defeating
Hitler
and
needed
Battle
coast
that
June
moved
own
the
British
achieving
still
be
in
other
France
independence
the
the
of
the
aims:
to
the
hoped
Britain
the
as
and
by
real
end
surrendered
France
its
Germans
led
in
Germans
France
Britain
the
verge
Operation
he
no
the
and
victories.
France.
allowed
above
Hitler
this
with
against
the
policy
launched
1941
1940
skies
however
at
foreign
of
of
This
London
Blitz.
British,
It
on
of
had
lion”,
the
and
swift
at
Dunkirk
northern
was
defeat
Sea
Channel.
Although
of
it
Belgium
from
left,
Belgium
achieved
through
occupied
the
in
days;
June
France
autumn
planes
●
had
14th
however
“Operation
and
swept
British
was
Petain;
four
Holland,
Hitler
evacuate
troops
unoccupied
●
after
to
attacked
Again,
June
the
attack
defeat,
after
However,
Soviet
longer
main
Hitler
far
Union
and
that
defeated.
L TA
Self-management and thinking skills
T
ask one
T
ask three
Return to the question on page 161.
How far had Hitler fullled his foreign policy aims?
What new examples to explain Hitler ’s success in
In Chapter 2.2, we identied Hitler ’s aims were to:
achieving his aims can you add to these headings?
●
●
●
●
destroy the Treaty of Versailles
●
unite all Germans
●
gain more Lebensraum (living space) for the Germans
●
gain Britain and Italy as allies.
Hitler ’s tactical skill
Luck
The role the distractions and dierences of the other
powers played
For each of these aims, identify the extent to which it was
What other factors played a role?
achieved and give evidence for your conclusions.
T
ask two
T
ask four
Review Hitler ’s actions between 1933 and 1939.
You have read about the pacts and treaties signed by
Decide how far you agree with Bullock’s claim that
Japan, Italy and Germany between 1933 and 1939. Copy
Hitler was able to combine “consistency in aim” with
and complete the following table to consolidate your
“oppor tunism and improvisation” in how he conducted
understanding of these agreements.
his foreign policy.
188
C H A P T E R
Agreement
2 . 5 :
G E R M A N
Countries involved
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
Eect/impact of this
Reasons for the outcome
treaty
Non-Aggression Pact, 1934
Stresa Front, 1935
Anglo-German Naval Treaty, 1935
Rome–Berlin Axis, 1936
Anti-Comintern Pact, 1936
Pact of Steel, 1939
Nazi–Soviet Pact, 1939
Anglo–Polish Treaty, 1939
T
ask ve
Comparing and contrasting case studies.
a
In pairs, compare and contrast the aims and methods
of Mussolini’s and Hitler ’s foreign policies in the 1930s.
c
In small groups compare and contrast the aims,
methods and results of the foreign policies of the
expansionist states in Europe and Asia.
b
In pairs, compare and contrast the successes and
failures of Mussolini’s and Hitler ’s foreign policies in
the 1930s.
Full document question: The outbreak of war, September 1939
to
Source A
both
sides
would
foundbetween
Germany’s
received
The
reply
at
to
Britain’s
11.20am,
German
3
and
For
Germany
nor
had
the
she
refuse
to
demands
receive,
in
the
accept,
let
ultimatum
by
our
many
war.
Since
rst
and
to
the
since
again
to
time
German
Socialist
the
there
year
remove
when
to
a
had
for
the
the
Versailles
Treaty
the
was
Government
tried
peaceful
again
worst
…
breaches
of
of
The
British
run
of
The
Reich
those
which
intention
of
demanded
articles
already
also
of
the
those
justice
Government
who,
took
the
by
their
chief
part
of
practical
The
revision.
of
the
have
at
the
reasonable
solution
…
being
and
the
also
economic
The
this
in
therefore
nation
and
British
as
and
great
Europe.
the
understanding
blame
peaceful
Cabinet
for
interests
for
revision
policy
…
like
people
and
Britain,
their
intend
Government
to
dominate
the
been
in
but
they
are
determined
to
defend
own
liberty,
their
independence,
and
frustrating
all
their
life
…
we
shall
therefore
the
any
aggressive
action
on
the
part
Government
of
a
a
Dictate
intransigent
Without
British
for
political
German
not,
answer
intervention
unbearable,
that
this
above
every
by
nations
prevented
with
their
attitude,
all
of
negotiations
world,
among
of
Eastern
lies
and
formulation
described
entire
having
do
treaty.
the
impossible
pieces,
settlement
of
been
long
2.
the
…
Poland.
revision
statesmen
condition
Governments.
1933
by
has
reigned
Germany
peaceful
all
National
has
frontier
already
tore
every
refused
The
eastern
months
Treaty
all
the
demands
Government.
On
of
have
the
the
time
1.
not
alone
made
Versailles
British
did
raised
German
only
full,
been
Poland.
1939.
annihilating
people
have
and
ultimatum,
September
Government
certainly
Germany
doing
England
with
the
same
weapons
and
in
justice
the
same
form.
189
2
The
Source B
relationship
unbearable
A
cartoon
by
David
Low
published
in
newspaper,
the
Evening
Standard,
October
Poland
proposals
has
to
become
Poland
by
England’s
intervention.
were
Poland
on
has
21
with
My
the
frustrated
UK
…
changed
her
tone
toward
us.
A
permanent
1939.
state
to
of
initiative
others
the
West
risk
France
is
only
1.
a
of
supply
West
in
in
my
position
it
will
and
We
the
to
to
must
…
not
The
have
2.
West
against
because
sources
Attack
Line:
I
and
which
effective
we
Europe.
Maginot
…
the
[S]pecial
ghting
be
that
take
England
full
for
pass
great
obligations
because
Eastern
from
still
view.
possibilities
autarky
is
determination
me
Blockade:
our
this
in
allowed
intervene.
undertaken
two
of
the
not
fortify
be
probability
ruthless
have
neither
has
The
will
with
reasons
us:
…
cannot
in
consider
impossible.
Source D
Hitler’s
speech
Obersalzberg,
Our
our
strength
with
a
and
light
great
party
heart.
founder
utters
word
one
only
I
in
to
of
shoot
I
East
in
I
place
and
in
millions
knowingly
sees
in
him
have
And
have
with
so
put
the
of
and
only
given
everyone
criticism.
the
sent
death
States.
shall
formations
quickness
Khan
History
of
at
1939.
our
children
and
head
in
Genghis
command
present
leaders
August
lies
brutality;
women
the
to
22
the
who
for
my
the
death-
command
Source C
relentlessly
Hitler’s
speech
to
his
August
death
have
of
the
called
you
political
together
situation,
to
in
give
order
you
a
that
picture
you
gain
some
insight
into
the
individual
which
I
have
based
my
decision
origin
the
and
living
be
sure
a
to
act
order
is
to
easy
nothing
…
strengthen
for
to
[O]ur
experienced
your
condence
us
to
lose,
make
we
economic
decisions.
have
We
everything
situation
is
such
have
to
gain
that
blockade.
hold
out
more
than
a
few
We
have
no
other
choice,
we
and
more
must
will
be
risking
a
great
deal
only
a
little.
inconceivably
who
are
masters,
great.
below
no
Britain’s
Our
average.
men
of
stake
in
enemies
No
action
a
act.
thus
need
we
can
…
situation
has
arisen.
and
war
have
those
in
poor
worms
Munich.
They
Daladier
will
be
and
too
attack.
Against
raw
Theywon’t
that
go
wehave
beyond
our
a
autarchy
materials.
will
be
depopulated
and
settled
with
My
pact
with
the
Poles
was
time.
As
merely
Our
of
as
a
gaining
of
for
the
can
gentlemen,
the
fate
of
Russia
will
be
is
exactly
the
same
with
in
the
case
he
a
as
I
am
now
going
through
leaders
personalities.
of
Poland.
After
Stalin’s
death
–
No
is
very
sick
man
–
we
will
break
the
Soviet
…
Union.
Then
German
190
Only
we
years
rest,
gain
to
Russian
conceived
opponents
that
we
Germans.
…
send
of
…
Poland
cannot
to
children
and
cowardly
It
and
language.
space
new
Chamberlain
in
women
factors
I
on
many
may
To
have
compassion
1939.
Polish
I
without
commanders-in-chief,
into
22
and
rule
there
of
will
the
begin
earth.
the
dawn
of
the
C H A P T E R
2 . 5 :
G E R M A N
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
the
to
outbreak
Source
of
A,
how
hostilities
in
had
E X P A N S I O N ,
19 3 8 – 19 4 0
Third question – 6 marks
Britain
September
caused
Compare
1939?
Hitler’s
and
contrast
motivations
Sources
for
the
First question, par t b – 2 marks
Four th question – 9 marks
What
Using
is
the
message
of
Source
B?
the
examine
sources
the
and
reasons
your
for
A
and
attack
own
Hitler’s
on
C
regarding
Poland.
knowledge‚
attack
on
Poland
Second question – 4 marks
in
With
reference
assess
A
as
the
to
values
evidence
of
its
origin,
and
purpose
limitations
Hitler’s
aims
in
of
and
using
September
1939.
content‚
Source
1939.
References
Bullock,
A.
University
Craig,
G.
1967.
Press.
1978.
Oxford,
UK
Fischer,
K.
Watt,
D.
R.
2001.
and
Oxford,
Germany
1995.
Stackelberg,
Hitler
Nazi
1999.
How
the
Origins
the
Second
World
War .
Oxford
UK
1866–1945.
Germany:
Hitler’s
War
of
A
Oxford
New
Germany.
Came.
University
History .
Constable.
Routledge,
Pimlico.
Press.
London,
UK
UK
London,UK
191
2.6
The international response to Italian
aggression (1935–1940)
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Consequence
➔
Change
➔
Signicance
Key questions
▲
➔
Discuss the reasons for the British and French policy of appeasement.
➔
Examine the response of the international community to Italian aggression.
Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister
of Britain 1935–37
The League of Nations formally comes
1920 January
into being
Japanese invasion of Manchuria:
1931 September
condemned by the League of Nations;
weak sanctions are imposed
World Disarmament Conference
1932–34
Franklin D Roosevelt is elected
1932 November
president in the USA
Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany
1933 January
Italy sends troops to its border with
1934 July
Austria to prevent Hitler ’s attempts at
Anschluss
The Stresa Conference
1935 April
The Neutrality Act passed (expires in
August
Italy invades Abyssinia
six months)
Roosevelt invokes the Neutrality Act,
October
preventing the supply of arms to either
The Council of the League declares
country
7 October
Italy to be the aggressor in Abyssinia
The League’s Assembly votes to impose
11 October
sanctions
November
The Hoare–Laval Pact
192
December
Limited sanctions are applied
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
1936 January
The USA passes new Neutrality Acts
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
The French Popular Front wins the election.
February
May
Italy conquers Abyssinia
The League ends sanctions on Italy
Italy and Germany intervene in the
July
Spanish Civil War
Britain and France set up Non-Intervention
August
Committee
The USA passes a joint resolution
1937 January
outlawing the arms trade in Spain
Neville Chamberlain becomes Prime
May
Minister of Britain
Italy withdraws from the League of Nations
December
In an Italian and British agreement, Britain
1938 April
recognizes Italian Abyssinia
Mussolini now accepts Anschluss
May
The Munich Conference: Mussolini, Hitler,
September
Chamberlain and Daladier meet
Hitler invades areas of Czechoslovakia,
1939 March
breaking the Munich Agreement
April
Italy invades Albania
Italy declares itself a non-belligerent when
1 September
Germany invades Poland
Mussolini attempts to set up a conference
3 September
to avoid war
Mussolini declares war on Britain and
1940 June
France
September–October
USA passes the Lend–Lease Act
Italy invades Egypt and Greece
1941 March
193
2
What was the policy of appeasement and why was it
pursued by Britain in the 1930s?
Appeasement,
policy
of
policy
is
1930s,
to
in
making
most
in
particular
prevent
the
In
Britain,
the
▲
in
the
of
war
and
outbreak
tradition
were
of
came
to
of
in
seen
be
to
seen
settle
reasons
to
a
a
diplomatic
conict.
policy
as
and
Hitler
1939.
as
was
avoid
in
Appeasement
Mussolini
war
was
to
foreign
1938.
encouraged
trying
many
of
both
which
context,
order
Britain’s
crisis
allowed
appeasement
there
with
in
to
ask
disputes
a
late
failed
weak
to
and
get
away
continuously
However,
positive
follow
a
Hitler
The
the
for
idea,
most
and
as
of
part
for
the
of
a
peacefully.
policy
of
appeasement
in
1930s:
Neville Chamberlain, prime
minister of Britain, 1937–40
1
Public opinion
The
Franchise
from
8
were
given
to
take
Act
million
Thishuge
the
of
this
should
be
by
in
“This
prevent
tell
no
The
on
in
the
British
the
rst
1928,
this
was
meant
which
number
time,
lowered
that
was
of
women
voters
over
to
the
politicians
against
war
in
the
age
were
and
in
Britain
age
of
of
30
21.
more
favour
likely
of
war
earth
bomber
be
public
a
that
protect
always
faith
fully
him
the
than
in
supported
…
from
in
being
League
appeared
and
to
League
its
the
street
to
on
week
of
realise
people
may
that
of
Nations
war.
peace
Union
1935.
The
show
that
to
need
House
maintain
in
voted
effect
believed
of
seen
the
the
Whatever
rst
Nations
a
the
widely
the
supporters
which
League
in
bombed.
in
showed
told
that
destruction
devastating
man
was
of
even
a
The
1937
was
society
highlighted
Baldwin
the
It
in
and
feeling
feeling
debating
Country”.
have
for
400,000
the
air
London
was
1935,
anti-war
Spain
the
through ”.
There
more
in
widespread
Union
Stanley
well
a
and
clearly
As
as
get
in
ballot”
King
from
casualties
security.
had
is
This
Oxford
Guernica
would
it
created
wars”.
for
mainland.
can
put
of
had
the
attack
think
will
“peace
public
to
150,000
which
out
“I
all
ght
aircraft
war
1932,
end
when
not
London
British
on
to
1933,
War
Union
the
principles.
The demands of the dictators seen as justied
Many
and
British
that
caused
there
by
was
all
had
there
the
to
grievances
In
was
a
for
business
these
that
the
Treaty
grievances
belief
the
particular,
do
of
felt
genuine
powers,
support
treaty.
possible
politicians
Hitler
Increasingly,
the
the
electorate
World
would
collective
Britain,
2
of
in
British
carried
“the
the
would
through
increased
for
opinion,
First
bomber
power
him,
there
the
another
Commons
that
had
from
the
public
House
German
civilians
and
in
February
vulnerability
to
1918
million;
security.
horror
that
of
21
vote,
of
The
clearly
to
increase
notice
collective
194
It
historical
nations
Munich
demands,
years,
long-standing
the
policy.
resulting
inter-war
and
to
associated
outbreak
territorial
more,
political
closely
dishonourable
with
this
concessions
not
that
just
idea
of
the
by
with
First
Versailles
the
and
rationally
and
was
First
War
her
and
to
harsh
War.
been
allies,
punitive
without
too
World
had
mistakenly,
Hitler,
and
the
more
believed,
Mussolini
to
World
Germany
revising
Chamberlain
countries
of
relating
and
thus
clauses
that
sort
recourse
it
out
to
of
was
the
war.
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
In
addition,
as
more
3
many
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
conservative
dangerous
than
the
R E S P O N S E
politicians
threat
of
saw
T O
I T A L I A N
the
threat
A G G R E S S I O N
of
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
communism
fascism.
The lack of an alternative policy
Support
was
no
for
supported
4
appeasement
clear
alternative.
was
found
anti-appeasement
The
Labour
collective
Party,
security
in
party
which
but
did
all
to
political
provide
was
not
the
a
parties
political
support
and
coherent
there
political
party
in
opposition,
rearmament.
Economic pressures
There
were
Already
was
its
also
Britain’s
facing
made
be
it
able
to
balance
to
of
It
it
was
It
was
For
not
following
First
if
it
that
with
that
further
high
welfare
many
defence
still.
the
By
were
These
of
no
appeasement.
Great
the
too
3
order
quickly
imports
of
million
difculties
would
to
nance
would
cause
machinery
rearmament
spending
Britain
overtaking
government
in
Depression
1930s,
economic
benets
rearming
too
policy
unemployment:
1930s.
although
a
War,
that
armaments;
cut
reasons,
World
countries
early
on
feared
1937
for
faced
the
crisis,
these
until
other
also
in
support
also
the
situation
money
payments
materials.
1932,
spend
maintain
rearmament.
raw
from
unemployed
hard
by
economic
production.
were
reasons
severely
competition
industrial
people
economic
weakened
worsened
a
T H E
started
increased
and
again
in
dramatically.
The Anti-Appeasers
Some individuals did speak out against appeasement:
Foreign Secretary Anthony
Winston Churchill called
Eden resigned in
for rearmament to be
February 1938 because
stepped up and
he disagreed with
vehemently opposed
Chamberlain’s policy
concessions to Germany
of appeasement of Italy.
(though he did not oppose
the appeasement of
Mussolini over Abyssinia).
He suppor ted the idea of
a Grand Alliance of the
Anti-Fascist powers.
Du Cooper was
You will have seen
Secretary of State for
plenty of David Low’s
War (1935–1937) and
car toons in this book .
then First Lord of the
These appeared
Admiralty in Chamberlain’s
in the Evening Standard
government until he
newspaper and were
resigned in protest at
consistently critical of
the Munich Agreement
appeasement throughout
in September 1938.
the 1930s. Low was
attacked in the right-wing
press as a “war-monger ”
and his car toons were
banned in Germany.
195
2
Britain
was
in
a
weak
military
position
and,
by
1937,
with
threats
from
TOK
Japan,
Italy
and
There have been many critics of
dangerous.
the policy of appeasement as
rearmament
pursued by Britain and France
policy
in the 1930s. As you have read
January
here, those involved at the time
forces
seem to have had a dierent
against
to
As
Germany,
a
result,
was
reduce
1938
will
be
strong
position
British
of
enough
to
and
it
“We
of
Staff
be
our
main
This
foresee
territory,
increasingly
concluded
the
enemies.
cannot
safeguard
Japan
becoming
should
Britain’s
statement:
Italy
was
Chiefs
advanced,
number
this
Germany,
the
further
the
in
this
the
was
time
trade
that,
aim
of
reiterated
when
and
until
foreign
vital
our
in
defence
interests
simultaneously”.
view and this perspective was
5
Global commitments
suppor ted by public opinion.
In pairs discuss the extent to
Britain
which history looked dierent
obligations
had
to
in the past. Create a poster:
most
“History itself looked dierent
European.
Preservation
in the past” outlining your
essential
Britain
ideas. Include references to the
priority.
material you have covered in
they
to
consider
politicians
if
worldwide
countries
considered
was
However,
were
its
European
British
and
to
Britain’s
becoming
a
of
League
the
great
imperial
increasingly
the
interests
defence
remain
commitments
and
to
be
difcult
to
Indeed,
global
was
power,
commitments
its
Nations.
more
Empire
world
alongside
of
held
which
were
administer
now
and
than
to
be
was
so
its
vast
that
defend.
this book .
In
addition,
Empire,
1937
L TA
Thinking skills
as
Imperial
another
6
the
such
Dominions
Canada,
Conference
European
(the
self-governing
Australia
that
and
they
New
were
parts
of
Zealand)
not
the
British
made
prepared
to
it
clear
help
at
the
Britain
in
war.
Defence priorities
Worried
about
pressure
on
the
the
cost
of
Foreign
its
expenditure,
Ofce.
In
1937,
the
the
Treasury
Treasury
was
put
also
putting
forward
a
report
What does the foreign
on
defence
expenditure
in
which
the
priorities
for
defence
were
to
be,
in
oce repor t on defence
order
of
importance:
expenditure show about
Britain’s expectations for a
●
military
●
the
preparation
sufcient
to
repulse
air
attacks
future war? How might France
preservation
of
trade
routes
for
the
supply
of
food
and
react to this repor t?
rawmaterials
●
the
defence
of
the
●
the
defence
of
Britain’s
7
The impact of Neville Chamberlain
Clearly,
the
comments
he
from
became
follow
with
also
a
nancial
policy
Germany
had
an
very
but
in
a
much
Hitler.
196
to
Italy.
He
to
up
of
in
to
his
to
hope
he
peace.
and
the
his
He
that
he
take
and
war
achieve
little
own
lead
broke
a
ran
Sir
faith
in
out,
“general
the
when
but
personal
to
diplomacy
distrusted
the
and
to
confrontation
determined
adviser,
had
choice
than
Chamberlain
chief
USA;
should
could
little
rather
was
Empire
Chamberlain,
have
negotiation
of
of
Chamberlain’s
Cabinet.
and
that
would
Europe.
moment
that
maintain
meant
war
use
of
aid
Britain
the
commitments
conciliation
However,
the
France
that
Staff
detested
and
with
the
1937,
for
settlement
allies,
Right
Europe
looked
consulting
believed
continued
Chiefs
tension
alone,
without
he
and
peaceful
Britain’s
and
that
allies.
pressures,
Minister
impact.
international
about
the
Prime
Empire
to
the
bring
foreign
Horace
in
the
views
resolve
policy
Wilson,
League
Soviet
negotiating
Union,
with
Chamberlain
settlement”
or
of
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
L TA
Communication
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
Class discussion
skills
How might the policy of
Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=gR8lSozEbcs, or search for “Why Appeasement?”
appeasement encourage
expansionist states?
Watch a summary of the reasons for Britain’s policy of appeasement. Make notes
on the rst 10 minutes of this video clip.
Add notes to the points above on the reasons behind Britain’s policy of appeasement.
Why did France align its foreign policy to Britain’s policy
of appeasement in the 1930s?
France
certainly
Germany
1920s
after
that
the
from
the
invaded
loss
wanted
When
join
some
harshly
The
of
in
Foreign
In
an
allies
with
1924,
attempt
as
in
France
against
impact
franc
In
a
the
in
(1920),
and
“Little
1932,
a
Edouard
replaced
redress
by
of
the
Edouard
and
defence
France
of
the
exports
socialists
economic
Daladier.
by
and
a
can
at
this
terms
and
seen
and
the
then
to
Britain
been
also
treated
apparent
settlement.
of
the
period
be
also
the
treaty
by
occupation
of
in
appeasement
the
Dawes
evacuation
1925),
agreement
of
he
Daladier
did
and,
what
won
any
coupled
forced
not
and
conicts
action
with
stagnated.
the
The
increased.
general
but
to
bring
(1924),
became
ideological
the
other
1920s
alliance.
take
Minister,
was
nd
Romania
unemployment
radicals
issues
to
economy
and
Prime
in
this
and
unable
ended
to
the
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia,
French
fell
tried
through
supported
was
elected
been
French
When
post-war
the
government
it
meant
permanently
the
had
However,
France
(1927).
that
the
1925
to
1930.
reparations
initially
of
laid
society,
Versailles
agreements
(1920
Depression,
was
this
position,
changes
meant
German
coalition
its
in
bilateral
mutual
overvalued,
Herriot
to
a
followed
debts
costs.
appalled
uphold
been
had
and
the
resources.
and
France
1914
huge
in
economically
had
French
Germany
1923.
Briand;
Rhineland
Entente”.
1930s
Great
was
to
in
to
of
of
faced
10%
abandoned.
that
were
Agreements
of
felt
guarantee
Ruhr
and
Poland
frequent
been
the
all
Treaty
view
French
Yugoslavia
signed
the
the
the
Aristide
series
the
It
regarding
indication
suffered
punished
and
at
views
no
agricultural
attack.
1870
French
attempted
strengthen
Germany.
of
had
failure
to
had
the
However,
the
Locarno
the
German
ratify
about
and
trauma
Germany
the
with
France
from
(1926)
Yugoslavia
known
for
Minister
signed
Belgium
to
occupied
the
troops
Romania
rst
Nations,
land;
had
Germany
between
Anglo–American
defeat
and
of
its
was
appeasement.
resultant
future
Britain’s
there
Britain,
industrial
wanted
resurgent
failed
they
under
French
a
subsequently
when
of
any
on
of
and
of
unlike
on
the
Germany
Versailles,
ended
Plan
and
many
policy
ghting
sympathy
at
French
force
by
the
a
and,
impact
life,
with
Versailles,
population
League
collapse
the
prevent
USA
of
War
an
prevent
the
the
of
twice
to
showed
too
to
of
had
French
agree
follow
World
impact
weakened
not
Treaty
would
which
huge
that
it
did
the
First
the
waste,
The
and
due
resign
election.
to
his
and
stability,
was
however,
▲
Edouard Daladier, the French
Prime Minister in 1938
197
2
and
there
problems
were
emulated
unity
wing
led
parties.
L TA
Leon
different
the
Mussolini’s
and
victory
six
fostered
in
the
In
the
Blum.
to
Cabinets
growth
of
Fascists.
general
of
1936,
Blum’s
the
the
elections
However,
less
Right-wing
formation
January
in
right-wing
than
activity
Popular
Popular
under
the
two
leagues,
an
won
leadership
government
was
Economic
of
whom
galvanized
Front,
Front
years.
some
a
of
left-wing
alliance
of
left-
resounding
Prime
criticized
by
Minister
the
right
Thinking and social skills
for
expensive
In pairs compare and contrast
have
the British and French reasons
rm
been
for pursuing a policy of
Minister
appeasement towards the
as
rearming.
aggressor states in the 1930s.
continual
Are there more similarities or
in
how
In
addition,
its
military
stance
he
domestic
against
in
May
moved
to
to
deal
Blum
1938
and
right
in
with
when
was
internal
the
changes
reforms
also
Fascist
to
for
a
meant
France
his
Daladier
establish
supported
government
believed
criticized
threats.
managed
and
they
huge
that
attempts
returned
some
in
to
as
political
arms
there
should
take
stability
spending.
was
little
a
Prime
These
continuity
Hitler.
more dierences?
L TA
Self-management skills
Eastern
some
there
was
planning.
Europe,
offensive
a
conict
Despite
which
a
would
capability,
its
between
series
have
of
France’s
required
military
foreign
guarantees
to
France
planning
in
to
the
policy
the
states
and
of
demonstrate
1930s
was
entirely
Review Chapter 2.3 on
defensive.
This
was
in
contrast
to
its
offensive
action
in
the
1920s,
Mussolini’s expansion in the
and
most
clearly
seen
in
the
building
of
the
Maginot
Line,
a
chain
of
1930s. Consider the extent to
fortresses
along
the
Franco–German
force
ineffectual
border.
Furthermore,
France’s
air
which a policy of appeasement
was
and
its
army
limited.
As
a
result,
the
French
became
would have encouraged
increasingly
dependent
on
Britain.
When
Britain
decided
on
a
policy
of
Mussolini’s aggression.
appeasement
in
the
1930s
France
had
to
follow
its
strongest
ally’s
line.
How was the international response to aggression
in the 1930s aected by the weaknesses of the
League of Nations?
The
international
response
to
acts
of
expansion
and
aggression
in
the
1930s
Refer back to Chapter 1.3,
should
have
been
dealt
with
through
the
mechanism
to
facilitate
collective
page 62, to review the aims
security:
the
League
of
Nations.
However,
the
League
had
many
limitations:
of the League.
●
It
lacked
the
●
Its
key
organ
France,
three
Italy
of
The
Soviet
●
The
League’s
●
It
was
the
and
decisions.
rst,
of
power
and
Union
economic
Mussolini’s
the
with
power
Council,
Germany
“revisionist”
was
time
in
it
France
to
a
and
face
to
and
of
which
joining
powers
Britain
little
Hitler’s
member
who
until
organization
of
act
the
its
founding
was
in
led
by
1926.
wanted
effectively
the
was
in
the
Germany.
was
it
power
League’s
inclined
faith
September
aggressive
diplomatic
uphold
had
or
the
failed
economic
France
Italy
not
structure
However,
while
was
Japan,
were
impotent
each
Without
Britain
and
nation,
Britain,
The
to
latter
revise
the
Versailles.
●
and
credibility
countries
Treaty
198
the
USA.
inefcient.
military
lost
of
more
the
look
League’s
fascist
after
it
and
its
ability
states,
authority.
USA,
resolutions
to
1934.
was
own
to
up
enforce
to
its
interests
contain
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
What was the impact of US foreign policy on
the international response to the expansionist
powers?
As
has
been
Nations
period.
in
in
its
1919
The
globally
discussed
and
own
wished
War
also
In
a
the
the
to
to
be
avoid
impact
of
in
the
policy
to
being
of
drawn
Great
minds
passed
the
not
in
into
trade
the
Memories
of
the
Neutrality
in
the
and
US
of
of
inter-war
were
and
by
the
League
investment
that
and
affairs
Act
the
1930s
of
Americans.
in
join
conicts
during
Depression
anti-war.
the
did
isolationism
engage
non-involvement
USA
USA
continued
the
staunchly
of
a
1.3,
free
policy
fresh
policy
1935,
pursued
This
was
remained
advocated
Asia.
by
which
it
Chapter
wanted
interests.
strengthened
opinion,
and
USA
in
not
was
public
First
World
isolationists
both
designed
Europe
to
keep
and
the
Franklin D Roosevelt, US president
▲
USA
out
of
a
possible
European
war
by
banning
the
sale
of
armaments
from 1933
to
belligerents.
Source skills
A.J.P
.
War
Taylor.
The
Origins
of
the
Second
supply.
World
moral
(1961).
which
American
isolationism
completed
the
Europe.
Academic
commentators
that
the
problem
of
the
two
be
“solved”,
if
the
two
hands
would
Russia
and
the
United
World
into
European
affairs.
States,
This
a
desire,
would
from
have
across
not
a
policy.
grasped
the
Atlantic.
at
This
United
States
were
was
unarmed
not
backing
on
Pacic;
impossible
and
for
neutrality
them
to
except
legislation
act
even
It
only
thing
dealing
with
Hitler
would
and
tie
Mussolini;
against
ready
to
the
make.
concessions
Great
which
Britain
and
had
they
already
lacked
too
was
much
moral
material
capital;
strength.
as
forthcoming
from
the
United
None
States.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
offer.
a
according
to
AJP
Taylor,
was
the
impact
of
in
the
the
feared.
very
statesmen
material
What,
The
provide
the
observation
Western
eagerly
was
were
was
was
statesmen
could
Powers,
what
drawn
in
work
were
France
Soviet
this
dictators
they
would
Western
and
observed,
it
rightly,
Roosevelt
isolation
their
of
President
exhortation;
made
base
USA
’s
policy
of
isolationism?
it
of
What was the impact of Soviet foreign policy on
the international response to the expansionist
powers?
Western
to
Italian
off
in
hostility
all
1917
and
and
hostile
economic
concerned
scare”
in
Russia
the
until
its
the
1927,
in
an
was
end
potential
not
the
restore
to
1920s
of
from
in
the
Lenin,
some
diplomatic
links
the
Paris
had
remained
communism
had
cut
government
robbers”.
when
Britain
response
overthrow
included
band
its
democracies
Vladimir
“a
affected
Bolshevik
attempt
made.
threat
the
not
leader,
of
were
also
Western
with
foundation,
the
did
Union
The
ties
USSR
Bolshevik
on
agreements
with
Soviet
aggression.
but
Russian
Nations,
the
economic
invaded
failed,
the
of
remained
“red
had
This
and
League
and
German
diplomatic
regime.
talks
and
towards
new
Peace
called
the
Relations
diplomatic
links
particularly
and,
until
following
a
1930.
199
2
Source skills
A
Soviet
poster
by
D.
Melnikova,
produced
Moscow,
Soviet
June
The
in
in
the
Union,
1930.
text
reads
“Proletarians
of
all
countries,
Unite!”.
First question,
par t b – 2 marks
What
is
the
message
artist
in
of
the
this
poster?
L TA
Thinking and social skills
Look at the details of this
Soviet poster. In pairs or groups,
discuss how the Western
democracies of the 1930s
might have reacted to this
Soviet propaganda.
The
Soviet
Union
under
Stalin
(from
1929)
wanted
to
build
“socialism
in
one
L TA
Communication
country”,
which
meant
that
it
would
not
commit
to
exporting
the
revolution
and social skills
until
the
process
Work in pairs. Create a diagram
the
Communist
to show the factors inuencing
Stalin’s
the policy of appeasement that
when
the
France and Britain took towards
Japan
in
Mussolini and Hitler in the 1930s.
of
foreign
Europe
Stalin
Latvia,
the
mutual
the
by
to
Hitler’s
expense
Poland
towards
Soviet
assistance
in
in
of
and
the
Union
pacts
the
aim
from
joined
of
a
the
France
by
alarmed
hostility
the
acquiring
was
a
League
and
towards
1931
the
tangible
shift
in
Czechoslovakia
in
in
the
of
East
1932,
Soviet
fascism.
1934
in
West
Lithuania,
against
Nations
of
policies
and
Finland,
Front”
of
activities
democracies.
Lebensraum
Between
“Popular
the
the
expansionist
Afghanistan,
There
of
Asia
Union.
with
France.
pursuit
with
away
Soviet
pacts
Nevertheless,
and
threatened
stated
the
USSR.
Europe
shift
became
non-aggression
policy
end,
began
Union
and
Estonia,
foreign
this
at
signed
complete
policy
Soviet
Asia,
was
International
and
To
signed
1935.
Class discussion
However,
the
aim
of
forming
a
Popular
Front
against
fascism
failed
Should the Western
because
Britain
and
France
were
following
a
policy
of
appeasement.
democracies have worked with
It
was
clear
to
the
Soviet
Union
during
the
Spanish
Civil
War
that
the USSR to form a “Popular
Britain
in
particular
feared
communism
more
than
fascism.
The
nal
Front against Fascism”? What
catalyst
for
the
Soviet
Union
to
abandon
its
attempts
to
work
with
the
advantages would this have
British
and
French
in
order
to
contain
the
fascist
aggressors
came
at
the
had? Why were the Western
Munich
Conference
in
September
1938.
Despite
its
assistance
pact
with
democracies reluctant to ally
Czechoslovakia
and
the
territorially
strategic
importance
of
that
country
with the USSR?
to
200
the
Soviet
Union,
Stalin
was
not
invited
to
the
Munich
Conference.
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
What was the international response to the
Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935–36?
Both
side
the
as
a
French
key
German
ambitions
described,
in
March
that
they
Foreign
and
1935.
At
would
only
the
to
three
unite
this
had
an
meant
were
had
in
As
French
gave
expansion
French
in
as
at
to
the
could
French
not
have
Front
impression
French
go
ahead
interests
condoned
point
on
contain
Stresa
the
Africa.
Italy
this
to
chapters
form
Mussolini
the
had
believed
Mussolini
specically
East
that
Abyssinia,
the
keep
previous
together
suggested
Mussolini
his
Britain
silent
plans
would
concerned
the
The
demonstrated
British
plans
when
1935,
and
with
a
plan
compensate
via
British
accommodate
further
them,
reinforced
When
Mussolini
widespread
League
favour
of
of
a
November
November
by
the
1935,
that
1935.
League
public
League.
a
there
military
they
would
had
However,
proved
there
at
the
as
an
and
the
ineffective
will
in
was
the
the
all
dealing
with
of
foreign
Abyssinia.
was
from
more
to
in
the
and
in
Britain
important;
secure
sequence
the
to
was
British
election
the
the
the
invasion
government
from
to
wanted
perception
there
general
time
see
1935,
June
Abyssinia
invasion
against
a
expansionist
access
condemnation
National
you
from
action,
in
of
Britain
This
Italian
was
was
Italian
with
that
plan.
October
opinion
opinion
helped
saw
this
Italians
navy.
Rome
region
hoped
The
military
Italian
to
Ogaden
the
French.
appease
went
Mussolini
Mussolini
to
the
“acquired”
outrage
As
the
Abyssinia
resist
in
to
now
had
not
public
attack
the
rejected
Italy
as
Eden
Selassie’s
Italians
they
when
response
to
wanted
Italy
Abyssinia
public
stance
British
they
would
British
attitude
Anthony
give
Abyssinia
Conference.
threaten
The
report
Britain
invaded
same
Haile
so
international
action
the
would
and
by
that
Nations.
pro-League
that
of
Stresa
potential
Emperor
stating
the
Secretary
that
matter
the
could
Somaliland.
ofce,
below,
British
Foreign
the
have
about
the
on
during
as
in
Italian
Although
particularly
a
come
the
to
settlement,
Austria.
had
inuence
country,
been
mentioned
in
with
Laval
attempted
resist.
Britain
sea
had
post-war
meeting,
Pierre
political
the
the
countries
economic.
of
British
of
tolerate
Minister
takeover
not
the
acquire
were
and
guarantor
of
power
events
crisis.
Source skills
convey
Source A
in
Laura
Fermi,
political
in
1938
Jewish-Italian
activist,
to
who
escape
writer
emigrated
from
to
Mussolini’s
The
the
nearly
a
quarter-million
“To
as
cast
he
an
recalls
army
ower
of
men,
embodying
of
the
Italian
manhood,
upon
a
barren
in
two
thousand
in
view
of
the
coming
goodwill
“peace
ballot”,
and
public
opinion,
embraced
an
all-out
of
favor
of
the
miles
League
of
nations.
At
Churchill
economic
Nations
the
end
spoke
in
of
sanctions
September
London
and
whole
from
home,
world
and
against
without
sea,
what
and
may
then
well
in
be
this
a
position
series
of
policy
and
on
against
a
people
and
in
regions
the
which
of
the
upon
campaigns
imposition
the
the
embark
government
of
elections,
command
in
Mussolini”,
(1966).
England,
the
to
Storm:
USA
Italy,
the
In
warning
and
shore
Mussolini
a
Gathering
no
conqueror
in
four
thousand
years
aggressor
ever
thought
give
hostages
it
worthwhile
to
subdue,
is
to
Winston
“tried
to
fortune
unparalleled
in
all
to
history.”
201
2
It
is
tempting
these
if
he
words
read
did.
The
this
late
chance
date,
of
his
of
money
own
for
by
as
the
s p e nt
him.
Morning
( To
Post,
was
pre-war
believe
ha v e
that
nothing?”)
the
tha t
2
–
ha v e
that
on
the
in
d ri v e
a sk ed
s pe nt
this
–
to
of
why
arms
“C an
so
su m
war,
at
…
of
on
so
to
arms
to
of
to
the
sea.
sanctions
the
It
France
through
is
only
said
that
condence
could
not
procure
needed
then,
embargo
France
with
Djibouti,
But
policies,
Ethiopia
pathetic
he
buy.
unofcial
down
the
justice,
difcult
the
assuring
connived
from
placing
to
against
League’s
water
and
equipment
desperately
the
port
British
was
and
the
try
the
Selassie,
it
for
unofcially
Abyssinia
traditional
1 00
position
imposed,
control
Haile
fr om
c os t
would
if
a
and
was
embargo
access
wa r n in g
l ir e
she
an
up
war
Britain
Italy,
the
am ou n t
the
bil li on
a nd
Great
he
und e r t ak in g ,
this
taking
Ethiopian
at
to
fa tal is ti c
the
s a id
dollars
tha t
wa s
inte rvi e we r
already
we
he
a ll owe d
an
he
be l ie ve d
and
in
While
ef fect
Mus s ol in i,
ne g li g ibl e
b o th
had
on
C hurchi ll
s e e ms
would
preparation
you
as
wha t
had
determi na ti on
he
dissuade
million
ha v e
commi tte d
war
Mussolini
the
s p e cul a te
them,
Ethiopian
to
to
may
was
in
understand
the
and
modern
was
during
lifted,
trying
the
in
part
least.
Source B
A
cartoon
by
David
Low,
published
in
the
UK
newspaper,
Evening
Standard,
July
▲
The tex t reads “On the throne of justice. See no Abyssinia; Hear no Abyssinia; Speak no Abyssinia”.
What
is
the
message
of
the
cartoonist
Second question – 4 marks
in
With
Source
on
1935.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
reference
to
its
origin,
purpose
and
content
B?
assess
the
historians
the
202
the
24
values
and
studying
Abyssinian
limitations
the
crisis
in
of
Source
international
1935–36.
A
for
response
to
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
L TA
Thinking and social skills
In pairs or groups, discuss the key points made in Source A regarding British
policy in the lead up to the Abyssinian crisis.
The response of the League, Britain and France
●
On
6
December
Abyssinian
arbitrate;
side
●
On
however
January
Italian
●
On
tacitly
17
11
On
on
20
Talks
Despite
via
June
for
the
of
an
Eden
July
arms
to
“unfriendliness”
supplies
end
of
relations
pressure
(see
of
committee
page
Nations
found
137),
to
neither
a
agreement
France
status
do
as
large
he
to
a
Italian
the
special
and
living
in
of
return
of
in
French
Tunisia
Abyssinia.
Italian
to
In
parts
the
mobilization
League
League
Italy
pleased
directly
made.
Italy
Italians
build-up
appealed
The
of
was
gave
forces
in
League,
East
as
a
continued
and
again.
session
to
discuss
observers
be
Abyssinia
the
sent
broke
to
crisis
the
down
and
region.
at
and
as
to
for
shipping.
he
also
limited.
oil,
and
It
enabled
of
on
arms
also
it
and
was
25
to
July,
The
its
to
the
British
in
would
free
response
be
warships
have
attempts
from
perhaps
Abyssinia
Mussolini
British
clear
conquest.
removed
again
to
asked
mobilize
declaration
of
the
to
decided
to
not
for
his
war,
and
impede
they
in
of
not
and
actually
Italy
neutral
poorly
Italian
seen
from
the
movement
observers,
equipped
forces
had
the
key
Stresa
but
and
invaded
League.
close
Suez
to
Germany
increased
rallied
war
and
to
Italian
all
to
a
the
Italy.
and,
such
domestic
as
members
of
harsh
also
good
under
signicant
to
Italian
sanctions
The
as
the
the
maintain
was
Africa,
ignored
effort
and
implement
Canal,
East
exports
Italian
to
by
government
the
supplies
began
slow
materials,
out
Front
the
to
war
wanted
British
and
was
carried
the
Nazi
fact
not
not
aggressor
process
embargo
for
the
the
this
were
revive
authority
troops
USA
chapter,
did
However,
Hungary
little
found
however,
sanctions
wanted
Britain
The
duly
government
Mussolini.
Austria,
previous
war
sides
of
Selassie
They
the
British
Britain
did
Italy.
Mussolini
resolution,
a
both
sales
sanctions;
Mussolini’s
therefore,
on
began
a
League
uphold
completely.
appease
wanted
which
Without
The
with
to
peaceful
October.
the
were
Nevertheless,
the
incident
League
Africa.
imposing
League.
sanctions
act
September,
3
a
towards
of
on
steel
route
from
that
East
October,
sanctions
the
held
Italy
to
army.
Abyssinia
coal,
an
September
outdated
7
to
requested
efforts
assertion
Mediterranean,
process
appealed
embargo
as
On
support.
nd
that
Mussolini’s
28
ofcial
Selassie
ofcials
to
the
the
League
Anglo–French
declared
on
its
Selassie
between
Anthony
At
the
Hague.
beginning
of
Wal
arbitration
Hitler,
following
Haile
Selassie
May,
19
The
Wal
asked
Franco–Italian
contain
Mussolini
1935,
state,
May
a
to
allowed
Emperor
member
●
the
Selassie
League’s
improved
March
Africa,
on
the
1935,
support
Somaliland,
and
following
Haile
responsible.
7
for
1935,
Emperor
sanctions,
discussed
support
in
behind
Mussolini.
203
2
Even
when
failed
to
the
take
Italians
further
used
chemical
weapons
in
Abyssinia,
the
League
action.
The Hoare–Laval Pact
In
their
attempt
Germany,
end
the
French
Hoare
by
in
foreign
drew
up
him
However,
both
and
Laval
(1935)
and
bordering
tension
of
was
France
for
forced
was
to
up
outraged
denounce
this
the
to
pacify
press.
Samuel
access
to
the
opinion
duplicity
British
and
to
Mussolini
Public
apparent
The
pact
plan
1935,
counterpart,
receive
French
by
resurgent
December
sought
policy.
a
appeasing
and
sanctions
French
continued.
resigned.
The
e
t
D
In
would
the
League’s
an
British
which
Selassie
in
against
with
caused.
and
Pact,
leaked
the
had
Laval
Abyssinia.
support
were
Pierre
Front
came
it
Hoare–Laval
plan
and
Hoare – Laval
proposal
ANGLO-
S
E
a
r
o
t
A
e
t
e
t
EGYPTIAN
a
r
I
I
S
T
R
e
d
(
o
t
)
H
P
n
YEMEN
I
the
Stresa
c
T
A
L
the
the
British
countries
o
r
I
and
secretary,
Hoare
R
E
Abyssinia
and
the
Britain
and
maintain
most
demanded
governments
to
French
conict
giving
sea.
the
c
SUDAN
I
e
t
T
A
L
B
o
r
I
A
P
YEMEN
A
n
N
N
e
E
E
d
R
I
R
I
E
R
E
Adowa
T
R
T
A
A
Adowa
Aden
Aden
Asab
FRENCH
Djibouti
(French)
Djibouti
SOMALILAND
BRITISH
BRITISH
Addis
Addis
Ababa
Ababa
SOMALILAND
SOMALILAND
ABYSSINIA
Ogaden
ABYSSINIA
Deser t
INDIAN
INDIAN
OCEAN
OCEAN
I
Mogadishu
T
Mogadishu
UGANDA
KENYA
KENYA
Lake
Victoria
0
TANGANYIKA
BRITISH
300
TANGANYIKA
FRENCH
ITALIAN
Assigned
Italian
to
economic
Italy
sphere
inuence
204
of
km
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
L TA
Thinking and communication skills
Read this source. Discuss the key impact of the Hoare–Laval Pact on domestic
politics in Britain and France.
Using this source, identify political opposition to appeasing Mussolini that existed
in Britain and France.
A .J.P. Taylor. 19 61. The Origins of the Second World War (19 61) pages 126–127
.
Early in December Hoare took the plan to Paris. Laval welcomed it. Mussolini,
warned by his equally erring exper ts that the war was going badly, was ready
to accept it. The next step was to present it at Geneva; then, with the League’s
concurrence, to impose it on the Emperor of Abyssinia – a beautiful example,
repeated at Munich, of using the machinery of peace against the victim of
aggression. But something went wrong. Hardly had Hoare left Paris on his way
to Geneva than the so-called Hoare-Laval plan appeared in the French press.
No one knows how this happened. Perhaps Laval doubted whether the National
government were solidly behind Hoare and therefore leaked the plan in order to
commit Baldwin and the rest beyond redemption. Perhaps Herriot, or some other
enemy of Laval’s, revealed the plan in order to ruin it, believing that, if the League
were eective against Mussolini, it could then be turned against Hitler. Maybe
there was no design at all, merely the incorrigible zest of French journalists …
At any rate the revelation produced an explosion in British public opinion. The
high-minded suppor ters of the league who had helped to return the National
government felt cheated and indignant … Baldwin rst admitted that the plan
had been endorsed by the government; then repudiated both the plan and Sir
Samuel Hoare. Eden took Hoare’s place as Foreign Secretary. The Hoare-Laval
plan disappeared. Other wise nothing was changed. The British government
were still resolved not to risk war.
The results of the international response to the
Abyssinian crisis
The
It
Hoare–Laval
had
been
drawn
the
away
from
Rhineland
complete
French
pact
exposed
his
in
sealed
as
East
not
the
sham.
Africa
March
conquest
would
a
and
1936.
in
of
any
the
closer
for
League
attention
France
return
support
fate
The
to
was
his
further
of
of
home
when
prepared
support
action
Nations
Britain
to
and
Hitler
let
against
regarding
in
1935.
France
was
remilitarized
Mussolini
Hitler,
and
the
sanctions.
Source skills
Telegram
of
from
Nations,
6
Haile
May
Selassie
to
the
League
its
efforts
and
1936.
that
to
it
territorial
We
have
decided
unequal,
our
age,
most
and
to
bring
unjust,
have
to
most
chosen
an
end
the
barbarous
that
our
and
in
order
and
in
peace
people
to
to
will
the
road
not
consecrate
the
be
to
war
exile
assumed
sovereignty,
independence
...
we
recourse
to
the
League
of
Nations
the
covenant,
recognize
exercise
resulting
from
of
an
the
armed
force
and
to
illegal
numerous
in
of
violations
of
international
agreements.
wholly
First question, par t a – 3 marks
our
now
according
should
to
Haile
Selassie,
should
the
demand
League
that
or
the
to
of
What,
empire’s
extensions,
for
not
exterminated
ourselves
preservation
respect
decide
most
other
order
secure
should
of
Nation’s
do
in
response
to
Italian
continue
aggression
in
Abyssinia?
205
2
Selassie
ed
on
2
May,
and
the
Abyssinian
capital,
Addis
Ababa,
fell
to
L TA
Thinking and
Italian
forces.
However,
there
was
no
ofcial
surrender
by
Abyssinia
and
social skills
a
guerrilla
support
Go to www.youtube.com/
war
from
journalists,
watch?v=oyX2kXeFUlo, or
prophetic
League of Nations”.
Watch Haile Selassie’s speech
Despite
at the League of Nations,
League
June 1936.
new
in
the
Selassie’s
“Italian
Britain
its
and
to
and
on
powerful
Italian
He
us
its
France
June,
moved
its
own
recognized
to
jeering
international
a
resolution
concluded
will
be
his
you
lifted
Japan
control
the
with
on
of
of
Italian
Italian
deny
the
ominous
and
tomorrow”.
resolution
were
to
of
for
the
by
Italian
pleas
the
occupation
recognise
made
despite
which
recognized
of
Selassie
criticizing
for
He
It
speech,
sanctions,
was
refused
30
Italians.
speech
today.
impassioned
end
the
conquest.
is
recognition
USSR
against
inaction.
Empire”
for
and
a
statement,“It
voted
return
USA
of
League
made
for
recognition
Selassie of Ethiopia addresses
the
he
community
search for “Emperor Haile
continued
failed;
on
18
the
on
4
15
July.
July,
November
Manchuria.
Abyssinia,
the
The
1936
In
1938,
although
the
Empire.
Source skills
raised
Source A
with
Article
from
the
UK
newspaper,
3
October
Mussolini’s
Abyssinia
of
the
as
at
dawn
young
they
and
invasion
his
African
adventure
afternoon
his
to
in
the
the
“A
ofce
in
solemn
the
hour
Palazzo
is
about
of
yesterday,
Italian
crossed
began
of
Rome.
break
history
of
our
fatherland,”
he
with
The
wheel
of
fate
had
begun
to
turn
and
infantrymen
the
border
heavy
slog
not
be
stopped.
from
In
Eritrea
balcony
in
could
cheering
on
Wednesday
Venezia,
said.
thousands
on
1935.
long-expected
began
curtain
speech
The
from
Guardian,
the
a
up
London,
the
British
cabinet
held
a
two-
the
hour
meeting
on
the
crisis
in
the
morning,
valleys.
and
Italian
bombing
planes
roared
in
the
service
striking
rst
at
the
border
town
of
of
Italy’s
humiliating
defeat
at
is
of
the
Abyssinians
in
chiefs
being
1896.
Two
bombers
were
reported
to
be
piloted
sons,
Vittorio,
aged
19,
and
18,
Count
while
a
Galeazzo
third
had
Ciano,
as
his
be
the
Italian
force,
de
Bono
and
Eritrean
advancing
on
12
miles
by
General
from
held
of
under
numbering
by
soldiers,
40-mile
Adowa.
is
is
100,000
and
rain-soaked
but
to
army,
mounting
Somaliland,
is
tracks
Abyssinian
Ministry
of
the
League
denouncing
the
Italian
of
the
League
a
to
be
by
Sir
the
rst
drive
north
to
be
…
I
do
not
Nations
on
moment
Affairs
in
as
there
for
a
government
206
hospital
bearing
the
Red
But
do
the
anything
recently
reached
to
Hoare,
the
British
League
at
Geneva,
that
to
the
will
fulll
in
the
ever
speech
of
they
that
was
…
a
On
United
be
of
behalf
to
the
the
difcult
of
Kingdom,
second
within
history
more
none
the
I
can
in
measure
their
of
their
has
the
obligations
which
the
Covenant
Geneva,
a
upon
them.
The
League
stands,
and
breach
country
stands
with
it,
for
the
collective
Abyssinians
Adowa
Cross.
of
the
Covenant,
struck
acts
a
not
1935.
suppose
Assembly
say
Foreign
The
bombs
they
Samuel
Secretary,
maintenance
that
France.
will
be
within
commanded
reported
aggression
Covenant.
accord
September
my
claim
with
they
men,
lays
of
saying
the
capacity,
telegraphed
Street.
Britain
Italy.
intention
The
by
General
reported
front
Another
Graziani,
Italian
up
a
Downing
action
Source B
pilot.
11
including
to
any
son-in-law,
Foreign
Emilio
coordinated
are
upset
Speech
Tonight
called
that
Bruno,
with
aged
were
stressed
by
to
Mussolini’s
and
of
French
the
ministers
the
must
hands
key
Adowa,
It
scene
afternoon
overhead,
Mussolini
of
unprovoked
aggression.
especially
to
all
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
Article
Source C
16
security?
Extract
from
speech
by
Haile
Selassie
to
…
of
Nations,
June
Haile
Selassie,
Emperor
of
Abyssinia,
am
to
of
claim
and
that
the
justice
assistance
which
is
due
promised
to
to
it
ago
when
had
fty
international
was
given
who
had
nations
asserted
breach
to
prevent
noted
three
of
the
conict
that
conict
with
power
full
to
on
in
of
as
and
their
Hitler’s
had
security:
it
is
the
Nations.
It
is
the
very
is
was
Germany.
of
no
for
It
Thus
to
small
be
states
that
respected
their
and
it
In
is
a
the
principle
word,
it
is
of
the
equality
international
of
morality
is
at
stake.
key
criticisms
Crisis
of
are
the
League’s
made
in
response
Source
to
the
C?
Second question – 4 marks
…
With
value
to
and
route
the
crisis
Mussolini
the
the
with
Britain
they
had
crisis
aggressor
believed
take
shifted
now
the
move
origin,
purpose
limitations
the
of
and
content,
Source
international
B
for
reaction
to
crisis.
had
a
Thinking and social skills
the
states.
after
to
its
and
studying
undermined
could
to
values
Abyssinian
Abyssinian
fatally
would
the
historians
of
had
reference
assess
dealing
France
only
…
…
Abyssinian
that
meaning
response
the
advantage.
What
guilty
undertakings
body
Both
made
independence
First question, par t a – 3 marks
nations
surprise
the
and
undertaken
diplomacy.
credible
appeasement
of
of
assistance
aggressor?
absolutely
Front.
League
that
violation
fty-two
the
practice,
a
real
without
as
in
Government
international
Stresa
with
the
Rome
European
Germany’s
alliance
by
considered
the
Nations
ended
but
Covenant
effect
What
Covenant
grief,
the
L TA
League
the
triumph
then,
doubt,
profound
also
the
What,
Without
the
the
with
…
Ethiopia
powers
under
…
of
committed
treaties
declared
of
I
to
been
collective
my
that
aggression
collective
of
eight
states
months
of
promises
ensured
people
is
and
here
integrity
today
It
Covenant
1936.
value
I,
the
the
existence
League
of
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
It
this
avoid
balance
towards
a
of
a
In pairs or small groups, read
Source A and discuss the key
points it makes. Discuss the
reasons it gives for British
hesitation. To what extent do
you agree that France’s position
Hitler.
held Britain back?
Source skills
A
cartoon
man
by
David
who
Low,
took
the
published
lid
off”.
on
4
October
1935,
L TA
“The
Research and
communication skills
In pairs, research headlines and
press repor ts on the invasion
of Abyssinia from around
the world in October 1935.
Make sure you reference your
sources appropriately and
include a correctly formatted
works cited list.
Present your headlines and
press repor ts to the class
and assess whether there
was international consensus
against the Italian action.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
What
is
the
message
of
the
cartoon?
207
2
How did the USA respond to the invasion of
TOK
Abyssinia?
In small groups explore a range of
historians’ accounts on the Abyssinian
President
Crisis. Discuss what distinguishes a
1935.
better account from a more limited one.
the
Is it the range and quality of the sources
a
He
Roosevelt
stated
failure
to
calamity
arrive
and
sent
that
the
at
would
a
Mussolini
US
peaceful
lead
a
personal
government
to
and
settlement
adverse
message
people
in
effects
East
for
all
on
18
August
believed
Africa
that
would
be
nations.
used in the account and the depth of
However,
the
United
States
would
not
take
any
direct
action,
as
suppor ting evidence? Is it the time
was
made
clear
in
a
radio
address
by
Secretary
of
State
Hull
on
6
and context it was written in? Is it the
November
1935.
In
this
broadcast,
he
said
it
was
the
USA
’s
duty
language and expression used by the
to
remain
aloof
from
disputes
and
conicts
with
which
it
had
no
historian? Does your group agree on
direct
concern.
which accounts are better?
Source skills
The
Secretary
States
of
State
Delegation
Washington,
October
8
daily
p.m.
to
the
Geneva,
October
15,
possible,
at
17
It
United
peace,
by
object
1935,
is
telegram,
important
newspaper
the
6.00pm.
that,
rumors
and
if
Europe
about
the
attitude
or
Government
policy
toward
some
reports
are
that
just
controversy,
phase
foreign
about
to
and
of
this
of
it
can
or
will
key
or
another,
or
agencies
shall
knows
our
extent
be
that
chief
…
agencies
minimized
prior
Every
to
purpose
the
was
with
in
to
leading
aid
in
the
are
US
made
in
response
this
to
the
source
Italian
with
invasion
reference
one
the
of
to
its
origin,
purpose
and
content,
foreign
the
values
and
limitations
of
this
source
for
way
studying
the
international
response
to
greatest
ofcial
outbreak
to
into
Second question – 4 marks
the
possible
chief
…
points
to
historians
or
our
drawn
Government
cooperate
peace
began
being
Abyssinia?
assess
Governments
avoid
the
With
whether
hostilities
to
especially
governments
inquire
be
of
of
Italo-Ethiopian
after
will
First question b – 3 marks
regards
this
war
and
reports
What
from
whereas
is
Italian
invasion
of
Abyssinia.
abroad
the
war
preserving
The end of the appeasement of Mussolini’s Italy
How did Britain and France respond to the Italian invasion
of Albania, 7 April 1939?
Britain,
as
Italy
along
had
was
a
and
now
turning
support.
Royal
Navy,
at
France,
point
went
as
but
the
as
had
condemned
guaranteed
for
far
Churchill
surprised
208
with
previously
the
Chamberlain.
to
guarantee
urged
Chamberlain
appeasers’
a
more
did
the
He
no
Greek
direct
not
Italian
invasion
sovereignty
to
longer
borders
the
with
by
Mussolini
Greece.
of
Albania
Balkans,
trusted
response
agree.
commitment
of
the
dictators
British
sending
was,
and,
this
military
in
the
however,
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
L TA
Thinking skills
G. Bruce Strang. On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares
Axis aggression was eroding. Chamberlain wrote to
For War, page 247 (20 03).
his sister, “Mussolini has behaved like a snake and
a cad.” Chamberlain thought the invasion showed
Italian leaders were ignorant of the real British
Mussolini’s “complete cynicism”. The Prime Minister
reaction. Despite the comparatively muted protests,
had reached the conclusion that “any chance of
the aggressive nature of Italian policy did provoke a
future rapprochement with Italy has been blocked
response. The foreign policy committee decided on
by Mussolini just as Hitler has blocked any German
10 and 11 April to issue a guarantee to Greece, and,
rapprochement”. Mussolini’s decision to invade
under intense French pressure, agreed to extend
Albania may have brought potential gains in Italy’s
one to Romania, while making a concer ted eor t to
strategic situation but at the cost of fur ther alienating
bring Turkey into an eastern Mediterranean security
the Chamberlain cabinet and fur thering the division
arrangement. Greece accepted its guarantee, although
of Europe into two competing blocks. By the middle of
it refused in the rst instance to join in guaranteeing
April, British strategic intelligence listed Italy amongst
other countries independence. In Turkey, the Inonii
Britain’s likely enemies. British planners also shifted
government cited constitutional diculties, and,
the emphasis in war planning to concentrate the British
more seriously, concerns about its own security in
eet in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of
the absence of a British guarantee. Never theless, on
the commitment to the Far East, a clear signal that
13 April both Chamberlain and Daladier issued public
resistance to Axis aggression had assumed a higher
statements in their respective parliamentary chambers
priority after Mussolini’s attack .
guaranteeing Greece and Romania against aggression.
Although the issuing of guarantees would in the end
Question
be signicantly less than an ironclad, interlocking
In pairs, and with reference to the source above, discuss
security system against Axis aggression, it did signal
the extent to which the invasion of Albania in 1939
that the patience of the Western democracies with
marked a turning point in British policy towards Italy.
What was the reaction of Britain to Italian expansion in 1940?
As
you
1940
The
have
British
Operation
Beda
been
the
read
Mussolini’s
then
feared
British
in
by
eet
then
Chapter
2.3,
invaded
when
Egypt
counter-attacked
Compass
Fomm
Italian
in
forces
and
Libya
the
in
in
pushed
Italian
navy
harbour
occupied
at
Italian
them
February
Italy
and
(as
you
Taranto
forces
out
1941.
of
The
in
Egypt,
the
the
war
Greece
North
British
have
on
joined
invaded
in
June
from
Africa
defeating
Navy,
them
which
read
earlier),
11th
November,
Albania.
in
had
at
had
sunk
1940.
half
The
Crete.
L TA
Communication and thinking skills
From Andrew Rober ts. The Storm of War : A new History of
against a force four times his size, concentrating on
the Second World War, (20 09) page 120–121.
each for tied area in turn. Operation Compass had
close suppor t from the Navy and RAF, and, aided
In mid-September Mussolini, fancying himself a second
by a collapse in Italian morale, by mid-December
Caesar, sent [his] Tenth Army to invade Egypt with
O’Connor had cleared Egypt of Italians and 38,000
ve divisions along the coast, taking Sidi Barraini. He
prisoners were taken.
stopped 75 miles shor t of the British in Mersa Matruh,
while both sides were reinforced. It was a nerve-wracking
Question
time for the British in Egypt… On 8th December 1940,
In pairs discuss what this source suggests about how
Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor, commander of the
the Italians were pushed back in Nor th Africa in 1940.
Western Deser t Force [numbering only 31,000 men, 120
guns and 275 tanks], counter-attacked ercely
209
2
Therefore,
for
the
the
initial
Italians.
German
forces
and
been
had
June
military
However,
arrived.
pushed
response
the
The
back
British
British
by
by
the
were
in
evacuated
German
British
turn
forces
Greece
to
led
to
pushed
El
in
reversals
back
May
Alamein
when
1941
in
Egypt
by
1942.
Full document question: The international response to Italian aggression, 1935–36
Source A
Extract
Source C
from
Nations,
the
Covenant
of
the
League
of
1919.
Sir
Samuel
delivered
London,
Article
resort
under
to
16
to
in
12,
members
severance
of
between
and
an
of
all
15,
it
of
to
or
shall
war
It
deemed
all
hereby
to
the
between
the
their
all
any
business
other
involving
our
a
member
of
the
League
or
mind
shall
such
be
cases
the
to
governments
duty
of
the
Council
recommend
concerned
to
the
one
the
naval
or
air
what
force
the
League
shall
contribute
to
to
be
used
to
protect
a
in
full
attack
…
would
clear.
of
would
of
Let
We
of
us
…
no
fear
threats.
should
was
in
our
that
launched
almost
act
make
different,
kind
the
we
the
an
Italian
What
very
or
me
had
any
success.
this
regard
sanction
her.
nation,
something
Power
It
was
in
that
totality
several
an
upon
inevitably
lead
members
the
the
an
the
atmosphere
of
opposed
conversations
of
threatened
themember
to
military
began,
States
and
…
appeared
to
the
be
action.
[It]
seemed
to
me
that
Anglo-French
of
was
essential
if
there
was
to
armed
covenants
no
breach
at
Geneva.
For
two
days
M.
of
and
I
discussed
the
basis
of
a
possible
League.
photograph
…
of
US
protesters,
to
League.
effective
Source B
1936.
These
…
I
or
a
is
a
Italy
made
the
all
unsatisfactory
these
League
that
member
contemplated
and
in
I
is
facts
will
that
the
States
the
will
place.
co-operation
the
kind
that
suggestions
up.
up,
result
taking
full
and
are
break
peace
now
compromise
put
less
demand
summer.
between
of
Laval
the
unsatisfactory
of
M.
immensely
unless
the
conict
choice
the
are
than
last
that
either
most
from
It
to
believe
faced…
…
proposals
favourable
Mussolini
210
Italy
military
attacked
with
negotiation
A
in
1935.
against
dissolution
Laval
the
speech,
Commons
not.
be
forces
a
quite
as
co-operation
the
of
state,
…
military,
war
was
that
as
Italians
retaliate
war
It
…
position
the
…
whether
clear
embargo
isolated
covenant-breaking
of
was
oil
If
covenant-
of
resignation
House
December
whatever,
relations,
personal
of
nationals
it
prevention
or
be
19
the
League
against
nancial
of
the
which
exchange
the
of
covenants
subject
nationals
and
its
League,
nationals
the
of
act
the
commercial
the
member
or
trade
the
state,
nancial,
of
all
and
breaking
state
13
immediately
prohibition
nationals
any
disregard
committed
undertake
the
Should
Articles
have
other
–
war
Hoare’s
in
was
which
C H A P T E R
2 . 6 :
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
I T A L I A N
A G G R E S S I O N
amongst
Source D
Italian
Ruth
Henig,
a
British
academic
historian,
academic
book
The
Origins
of
the
War
they
tentatively
struck
immediately
of
in
leaked
in
the
French
failed
press,
had
member
suffered
state.
its
in
ve
years,
and
this
second
time
the
“Hoare-Laval
pact”
Britain.
The
repudiate
Hoare’s
caused
government
negotiations
Hoare
himself
was
resigned,
who
supporter.
was
to
in
be
The
much
nearer
again,
the
great
powers
had
shown
their
to
to
work
peace
together
or
to
to
resolve
protect
the
serious
interests
of
Paris,
replaced
perceived
British
aggression
forced
as
a
League
members.
These
lessons
were
by
not
Eden,
prevent
an
weaker
Anthony
to
and
threats
League
Nations
setback
inability
and
of
Europe.
Once
to
League
the
was
to
uproar
a
proclaim
(1985).
bargain
reports
of
and
Second
had
The
weapons,
conquest
League
serious
World
other
in
The
an
( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 )
lost
on
Hitler.
strong
government
First question, par t a – 3 marks
now
led
the
way
at
Geneva
in
calling
for
In
economic
sanctions
against
Mussolini,
Source
League
dragged
a
reluctant
French
oil
to
it.
But
sanctions,
agree
to
the
French
whilst
the
the
closure
would
the
not
measures
major
The
which
problems
French
had
for
would
the
not
were
Suez
the
Stresa
have
Italian
reluctant
want
to
run
a
serious
and
risk
effort.
hopes
the
of
to
is
the
naval
war
in
the
British
condent
victory.
For
imperial
not
its
be
own
crush
naval
the
British
–
such
commanders
outcome
a
war
to
exploit
expansionist
action
troops
was
were
resistance
by
the
able
situation
the
with
to
use
in
of
the
photograph
in
Source
B?
reference
to
its
origin,
purpose
and
content,
did
the
values
and
limitations
of
Source
studying
the
international
C
for
response
vital
would
to
to
crisis.
Third question – 6 marks
Compare
Source
C
and
and
contrast
D
the
regarding
views
the
expressed
Hoare–Laval
in
Pact.
further
result
So
that
Abyssinia,
poison
Abyssinian
were
British
China.
the
overrun
of
a
Japan
ambitions
muted,
be
threaten
and
message
even
there
would
would
war?
unleashing
Mediterranean
communications,
slow
League
Italian
that
the
state
Second question – 4 marks
the
though
about
member
of
historians
a
made
a
First question, par t b – 2 marks
assess
not
to
caused
war
abandoned
front,
are
Canal,
With
restoring
points
response
support
What
both
key
its
government
British
of
what
regarding
resorting
behind
A,
and
gas
Four th question – 9 marks
Using
the
examine
to
the
sources
the
and
impact
Abyssinian
of
your
the
own
knowledge,
Anglo–French
response
crisis.
211
2
References
Fermi,
Henig
L.
R.
Roberts,
Allen
1966.
1985.
A.
Taylor,
AJP
.
Warner,
G.
1961.
Storm
On
the
the
of
Second
War:
A
Chicago
World
New
Press.
War.
History
Chicago,
Routledge.
of
the
USA
London,
Second
World
UK
War .
Fiery
March:
Mussolini
Prepares
for
War.
Praeger.
of
The
Origins
1968.
of
the
Second
World
War .
Penguin.
UK
State.
Government
Spottiswoode.
212
of
of
USA
Department
1931–1941.
The
2003.
CT,
Harmondsworth,
US
Origins
University
UK.
GB.
Westport
The
2009.
Lane,
Strang,
Mussolini.
Pierre
London,
1943.
Peace
Printing
Laval
UK
and
Ofce.
and
the
War:
United
States
Washington
Eclipse
of
DC,
France .
Foreign
USA
Eyre
and
Policy,
2.7
The international response to German
aggression, 1933–1940
Conceptual understanding
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Consequence
➔
Signicance
Key question
➔
Examine the international community’s
response to German aggression.
The
international
Germany,
much
reaction
1935–39,
criticism
and
has
to
the
been
debate
actions
the
of
subject
amongst
of
historians.
A car toon by David Low, “What’s Czechoslovakia to me, anyway?”
▲
As
you
read
this
next
section,
consider
the
18 July 1938
options
stage
available
of
Britain
German
and
to
Britain
and
expansion,
France
took
France
and
the
at
each
extent
encouraged
to
German
which
the
decisions
that
aggression.
What was the international reaction to German rearmament?
As
we
desire
have
to
Germany’s
League
of
Germany
allowed
in
the
Nations
back
Treaty
However,
the
French
an
new
the
realization
already
bring
conditions
the
other
2.7
billion
still
was
a
militarily.
marks
relatively
force
if
it
a
of
the
in
Britain
Treaty
of
Disarmament
page
157),
It
200,000
that
and
could
in
Britain
(rather
be
towards
Germany’s
Versailles.
Following
Conference
proposed
France
should
1935
had
for
of
an
worked
that
than
also
allowed
an
and
100,000
reduce
air
the
hard
Germany
the
should
8
not
of
its
force
to
get
should
be
stipulated
army
half
to
the
size
of
them
see
of
in
would
peaceful
while
for
was
now
from
was
(GNP),
that
further
to
to
blatantly
this
clear
able
British
and
obviously
product
was
be
the
increased
1935;
demands
was
Germany
national
It
by
Nations
actions
This
that
France.
Germany
by
League
expenditure
gross
and
introducing
attempts
Germany’s
marks
German
indeed,
get
the
could
the
was
ended
Versailles.
military
Britain
strengthen
that,
who
of
billion
proportion
to
into
Treaty
powers,
to
Germany
force
rearmament.
the
1933
that
air
back
German
worry
would
modications
by
in
low
nonetheless
rearmament
(see
Germany
a
to
the
Germany
terms
up
of
conference.
army
the
concern
from
1933
contravened
catching
sympathy
aspects
force.
and
to
was
Versailles),
that
air
conscription
establish
of
and
in
into
have
French
and
there
certain
withdrawal
to
200,000,
the
seen,
reverse
it
such
treaty
achieve
these
means.
213
2
In
response
to
threatening
Stresa
in
Italy,
ministers
protest
of
at
Austrian
This
the
However,
united
●
three
and
of
by
the
Italy.
the
following
a
prime
The
their
Hitler’s
conference
was
ministers
ministers
Versailles
reafrmed
and
as
it
you
have
could
read
have
developments
concluded
of
in
Nations;
conclude
any
worried
and
opposed
believing
The
the
enter
was
a
held
and
drew
provisions
commitment
in
acted
now
Chapter
as
took
a
2.3,
at
foreign
up
a
formal
regarding
to
Locarno
was
deterrent
place
might
Washington
respond
British
navy
the
to
race
want
and
to
that
to
and
known
Hitler’s
undermined
its
Henig
in
size.
(see
fact
On
eet
navy
summarises
gave
as
plans.
this
the
thus
effect
been
of
made
eet
The
it
for
35%
the
was
treaty
in
set
that
treaties
tempting
to
to
strength
concern
of
of
to
the
German
agreed
also
Versailles
completely
this
offended
unwilling
naval
agreement
Britain’s.
was
alliances,
naval
percentage
The
159),
Germany
it
was
a
the
opportunity
this
with
its
also
German
Agreement.
to
when
This
Britain
and
Britain
of
page
unwilling
encircled.
Britain
was
Treaty
the
(see
was
contain
feeling
terms
22).
the
June,
equal
had
the
page
to
Germany
time
there
the
limit
18
Naval
submarine
German
capacity;
a
Italy
government.
by
into
Germany
country
initiated
renegotiate
to
with
governments.
at
Assistance
entry
However,
Germany
Germany
offers
which
to
Mutual
Russia’s
surrounding
was
London
Anglo–German
the
of
lead
to
pact
side.
communist
Italian
with
a
on
with
communist
idea
stretched
triple
German
a
a
would
Hitler’s
eet,
to
with
development
naval
in
Russia
using
and
Franco–Soviet
coincided
Poland
keep
France’s
this
the
This
with
pact
French
already
Japan
to
about
that
second
both
1935.
important
also
Ruth
they
action,
Russia,
was
on
Britain
and
1934,
independence.
Front,
League
●
in
attended
disregard
and
France
with
to
Austria
front.
First,
it
was
France,
collective
Stresa
rearmament,
over
and
Hitler’s
disarmament,
to
German
moves
in
allowed
aside.
Source
A
below.
Source skills
eld
Source A
of
arms
process,
Ruth
Henig.
The
Origins
of
the
Second
While
such
an
agreement
may
have
had,
in
of
the
the
of
Versailles
desirable
from
a
British
considerably
by
agreeing
view,
the
treaty,
it
was
politically
inept.
It
drove
the
and
between
the
time
French
when
it
Britain
and
was
on
the
Italians
vitally
one
on
powers
to
a
to
work
could
the
other,
important
together.
claim
that
it
for
to
stop
do
business
with
Nazi
they
had
German
stipulated
not
of
attempted
the
other
to
major
and
Italy.
of
the
What
other
was
now
provisions
at
The
British
possible
in
repudiating
treaty,
fortied
by
the
knowledge
that
the
was
Germany
agreement
France
Hitler
British
strenuous
to
that
a
government
supporting
government
of
hand
the
three
and
prior
signatories,
wedge
excess
point
secure
of
in
been
by
militarily
214
they
violation
(1985).
navy
a
But
German
World
Treaty
War
limitation.
condoned
the
him,
most
was,
if
unlikely
opposition?
not
to
a
restrictions
tacitly
offer
C H A P T E R
2 . 7:
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
G E R M A N
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Source B
A
cartoon
minister
Ramsay
went
to
by
David
Pierre
Low,
Laval,
MacDonald
sea
in
a
in
Barrel.
24
June
Italian
If
a
boat
the
1935
prime
labelled
Barrel
The
(with
added
minister
had
“ Collective
been
Anglo-German
annotations),
Benito
Mussolini
isolation”.
stronger,
my
story
The
depicting
and
British
text
would
reads
have
French
prime
“3
been
prime
minister
wise
men
of
Stresa
longer .”
Naval
Agreement – Mussolini
furious
Germany
Rough
watching:
seas
also
a
indicating
reference
tricky
to
the
international
terms
of
situation
the
Anglo-
naval
Treaty?
”Collective
The
isolation”
totally
opposite
the
collective
of
limitations
●
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to
of
third
”boat”
inadequate
rough
for
seas
security
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
Stresa
Source
the
A
what
were
Anglo–German
development
which
First question, par t b – 2 marks
the
key
Naval
What
is
the
message
of
the
cartoon
undermined
the
Stresa
Front
invasion
of
Abyssinia
in
October
1935.
In
fact,
this
Stresa
Front
in
ruins.
After
this,
Hitler
was
able
to
pursue
with
greater
hint:
on
the
Use
the
cartoon
to
his
help
aims
B?
left
annotations
the
Source
was
Examiner’s
Mussolini’s
in
agreement?
you
write
your
answer.
condence.
Here
What was the international reaction to the remilitarization
The
is
a
starting
overall
cartoon
is
sentence:
message
that
the
of
this
Stresa
of the Rhineland?
Front
When
Hitler
Treaty
of
from
marched
Versailles
either
Britain
into
and
or
the
the
Rhineland
Locarno
France.
in
1936,
Treaties,
he
violating
faced
no
both
the
opposition
to
is
last
by
the
details
up
weak
long.
fact
of
your
and
This
that
the
unlikely
is
…
shown
(use
cartoon
to
the
back
points)
215
2
The
French
and
thus
society
to
of
265,000
such
The
to
long,
French
(see
to
of
the
not
any
only
offered
that
it
It
into
for
Minister
the
such
a
failure
the
to
But
a
is
that
that
it
to
a
Staff
there
clear
had
To
to
little
but
it
clear
its
too,
army
in
the
would
in
France.
Minister
were
for
1936
this
the
armed
against
and
this
reason
and
at
invasion
that
Prime
One
that
war
an
the
them
support
they,
Rhineland.
successful
with
mobilize
that
elections.
putting
ministers
was
French
right
exaggerated
deal
commitments,
made
a
in
nor
forthcoming
response,
it
the
at
the
would
political
negotiating
same
Craig
to
…
turn
to
a
lead
have
and
with
at
forces
Germany
has
this
if
stop
than
to
as
it,
particularly
“ The
course,
(see
Germans
had
page
also
163),
smokescreen”;
confront
where
for
a
it
Great
on
Hitler
a
this
move
made
directly.
Star
made
now
country
–
view
for
opinion
is
the
were
our
a
there
of
British
rmly
be
as
a
that
in
of
…
zone,
troops
turning
will
can
or
The
to
be
only
1940
minority.
favour
enter
the
Macmillan,
government
in
to
1936
his
“ There
war
to
in
Eden,
that
Harold
a
have
German
France
seen
settlement
will
only
a
rights
—
given
newspaper,
–
of
and
of
often
war.
either
face
value.
especially
without
the
would
the
Britain
bargaining
point,
the
we
in
conditions
confronted,
hard
put
of
invading
abandon
got
is
this
been
public
or
in
was
Hitler
diplomatic
attitude
Hitler
wrote
action
Lothian
wrote:
an
back
from
as
surrender
still
this
“a
zone
settlement
time,
garden ”.
preferable
the
Hitler’s
Lord
rather
Eden
be
Hitler
see
time
calls
adopt
for
not
back
settlement
chance
unless
did
politician
the
politician,
vigorous
However,
at
would
stop
last
Conservative
by
over
ght
own
surrender
instructions
now.
to
Anthony
It
had
made
a
negotiations
The
war
for
made
military
[demilitarized]
reoccupation.
point:
which
left
Rhineland,
French
government
divisions
neither
army
the
have
told
“caretaker”
The
with
30,000.
would
Britain
also
their
undesirable
for
while
into
only
for
war
and
French
Staff,
war
British
William
aim
seems
into
of
General
British
the
going
to
ght
the
a
war.
Germany
French
to
position
the
As
historian
Foreign
of
government
negotiations
easier
the
looked
impossible
were
Chief
only
168).
threatening.
are
the
was
consider
marching
overstretched
Signicantly,
…
staff
there
size,
time
to
against
forces
Imperial
in
page
war
contemplate
Britain’s
were
a
drawn-out
thus
the
response
fact
Baldwin’s
unwilling
Chief
in
at
position
general
Gamelin,
Stanley
was
the
supposed
a
a
clear
German
when
General
lead
a
in
propose
addition,
number
of
not
made
wanted
In
government
was
be
1941 ”.
reality
act
peace
a
no
given
and
of
Germany.
Source skills
A.J.P
.
War
Taylor.
The
Origins
of
the
Second
World
(1964).
French
had
of
It
was
said
at
the
time,
and
has
often
been
the
that
7
March
1936
was
“the
last
when
Germany
could
have
been
all
the
sacrice
and
216
Technically,
on
paper,
suffering
this
was
and
truth
…
The
French
it
the
was
army
Germans
the
reverse
could
it
could
extract
march
promises
behaviour
from
the
Germans,
and
of
then
stopped
of
a
would
true:
go
away.
The
situation
would
remain
great
the
war.
army,
chance”
it
without
great
Germany;
good
…
a
Psychologically
said
into
since,
had
none.
the
same
as
before,
or,
if
anything,
worse
–
C H A P T E R
the
2 . 7:
T H E
Germans
ever.
There
Germany
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
more
was
until
in
resentful
fact
there
no
was
and
sense
R E S P O N S E
restless
in
T O
G E R M A N
than
opposing
something
solid
A G G R E S S I O N ,
point.
It
It
opened
also
opened
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
the
the
door
door
for
for
Germany’s
her
ultimate
success.
failure.
to
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undone
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and
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7
the
settlement
Germany
at
victory
March
was
of
Versailles
rearmed.
can
thus
be
a
Only
a
According
country
threatened
double
was
in
with
the
to
Taylor,
Rhineland
why
not
a
was
good
opposing
Germany
idea.
turning
The international reaction to the Spanish Civil War:
The Non-Intervention Committee
In
France,
a
republican
Popular
prime
minister,
it
not
was
that
was
in
could
Blum
of
to
Baldwin’s
the
Spanish
fact
British
faced
in
did
government
that
it
received
nancial
government
aid
interests
risks
in
if
Spain.
as
He
of
so
so
did
the
to
1936.
a
the
The
Spanish
France.
European
regime
However,
knew
came
new
government;
right-wing
and
therefore
to
prevent
to
from
the
Spain,
lost
also
not
upset
that
up
Britain
with
countries
the
the
those
to
that
In
the
would
resulting
supported
It
Union).
in
a
the
plan.
nationalists
an
also
enemy
the
viewed
reinforced
There
believed
socialist
Franco’s
Civil
French.
addition,
impression
investors
the
make
Mussolini.
Soviet
Spanish
French
of
believed
want
Franco.
(an
and
with
from
General
communist
They
encircle
government
and
Franco
the
border
agreed
different
want
in
to
wanted
leader,
not
its
views
June
intervened
all
and
were
war
in
conict.
conict
the
on
move.
whereby
nationalist
business
a
similar
support
Germany
Conservative
win
to
directly
the
with
elected
have
Britain
motives
government
Republican
he
such
of
wider
largely
probably
British
the
a
British
Baldwin’s
of
out
to
and
if
support
government
becoming
However,
would
Italy
was
wanted
interests
with
keeping
Spain
Blum,
opposition
to
government
in
non-intervention,
commit
War
Leon
French
join
feared
unlikely
idea
Party
government
were
that
or
tough
the
by
many
they
communist
anti-union
position.
A
total
three
of
of
16
the
Germany,
countries
key
Italy
completely
and
and,
signed
members
as
the
we
of
the
the
Soviet
have
Non-Intervention
Non-Intervention
Union
seen,
–
sent
ignored
the
substantial
Pact.
However,
Committee
NIC
aid
(NIC)
–
commitment
into
TOK
Spain.
In small groups investigate a
In
addition,
Britain’s
policy
of
non-intervention
favoured
the
nationalists:
current civil war or conict and
nd out how the international
●
It
focused
on
preventing
aid
to
the
Republic
and
allowed
the
community has responded.
Nationalists,
rather
than
the
Republicans,
to
use
Gibraltar
as
a
How does your understanding
communications
base.
of the international response
●
In
December
1936,
Nationalists
that
Franco,
the
Britain
allowed
signed
British
a
trading
companies
agreement
to
trade
with
with
the
the
rebels.
to the Spanish Civil war in the
1930s help you to make sense
of the complexity of responding
●
not
Spanish
republicans,
was
able
to
get
credit
from
to civil conicts today?
British
banks.
217
2
The
to
policy
win
of
the
Republicans,
to
the
The
war
while
in
Spain.
Hitler
thus
played
a
key
Non-intervention
and
Mussolini
role
in
worked
continued
to
allowing
against
give
Franco
the
effective
aid
Nationalists.
failure
policies
which
of
of
a
non-intervention
Britain
was
helped
thus
non-intervention
civil
also
and
the
policy
right-wing
appeared
France.
weak
of
further
Hitler
the
League
government
to
Hitler,
discredited
had
to
and
ignored
of
Nations,
power.
this
the
The
appeasement
non-intervention,
and
had
Western
encouraged
him
successfully
democracies
further
in
his
actions.
What was the international response to Anschluss?
With
Anchluss
Versailles
He
in
which
invaded
an
●
was
have
call
a
up
Italy
was
●
The
which
was
In
now
to
which
that
with
us
had
not
to
was
could
a
he
had
have
of
a
of
stronger
French
Why
political
Treaty
of
Austria.
position
to
to
attack
Berlin,
this?
crisis
and
Ministers
army
and
protests
was
Anschluss.
France’s
the
Germany
but
did
not
even
threatened
needed
to
Britain’s
forthcoming.
dependent
was
feeling
to
that
the
taken
arrested
a
this
after
action
force
to
also
by
union
in
and
help.
affair
and
discussion.
with
the
stated,
Austria
House
actions
Germany
prevent
for
Abyssinian
for
statement
but
friendship
appeals
the
League
Germany’s
place,
use
German
Germany’s
made
condemned
to
on
Schuschnigg’s
discredited
referred
prepared
in
and
internal
time
violated
union
was
British
Chamberlain
which
been
and
Chancellor
even
again
the
response.
an
the
Nations
not
Anschluss
nothing
from
by
at
had
strengthen
was
there
in
state
increasingly
inevitable.
Commons
in
of
was
Britain,
was
to
respond
League
Anschluss
●
apart
paralysed
reservists
refused
Hitler
forbade
international
government
support,
●
Yet,
limited
France
1938,
independent
Czechoslovakia.
there
May
specically
and
“ the
hard
unless
of
the
we
way
fact
and
is
others
it ”.
Source skills
speak
Source A
up
now
Archbishop
David
Faber.
Munich,
1938
14
March
The
Times
newspaper
told
room
with
that
for
“our
doubt
which
correspondent
about
[Hitler]
the
and
public
his
leaves
The
Labour
of
Dollfuss
a
few
years
218
socialists,
had
little
for
judgement”.
“calmness
The
“sooner
told
fellow
were
and
the
balance
or
union
later
of
was
Germany
and
inevitable”
his
recalling
earlier
peers,
and
“nally,
may
he
bring
greeted
stability
too,
against
inclination
to
Europe”.
At
the
Foreign
the
of
Austrian
Lords
jubilation
army
Party,
of
Austria
Ofce
brutality
the
to
no
some
everywhere”.
Even
appealed
its
of
readers
Schuschnigg.
Canterbury
(2008).
House
On
for
of
to
relief.
the
general
feeling
was
one
…
C H A P T E R
2 . 7:
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
G E R M A N
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Source B
A
cartoon
the
by
Evening
David
Low,
Standard,
on
“Not
12
only
April
the
Austrians
First question, par t a – 3 marks
According
Britain’s
to
Source
attitude
A,
what
towards
voted”,
published
in
the
UK
newspaper,
1938.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
factors
inuenced
What
Anschluss?
is
the
message
of
Source
B
concerning
Anschluss?
What was the international reaction to German aggression
Examiner’s
forget
in Czechoslovakia?
to
cartoon
use
to
hint:
the
Don’t
details
support
of
your
the
two
France’s reaction
points.
Following
Anschluss,
Czechoslovakia
France
which
a
had
to
they
argued
follow
with
were
that
Minister
to
their
was
would
be
treaties
committed
threat
that
two
it
France
no
the
with
common
in
clear
to
Britain’s
to
in
and
Hitler’s
However,
not
to
next
a
way
the
defended,
out
of
in
policy
1924
the
event
also
only
too
1925,
of
saw
French
military
moves.
and
obligations.
and
were
a
in
French
treaty
Bonnet
that
foreign
signed
these
be
Minister
nding
France
Czechoslovakia
keep
could
Foreign
lead
of
assisting
position
and
focus
Britain
Czechoslovakia,
interests.
Czechoslovakia
Daladier
to
Start
the
same
the
cartoon
sure
you
the
you
a
by
way
on
look
hint
as
annotating
as
we
page
at
to
the
the
it
in
annotated
215.
title
Make
to
give
meaning
of
cartoon.
They
Prime
happy
showdown
Germany.
219
2
Britain’s reaction
Many
British
survived
in
central
that
a
as
politicians
had
could
and
eastern
articial”
some
Germany.
In
any
case,
a
We
could
going
to
giving
not
Given
their
Britain
to
page
meet
Hitler’s
176),
Hitler
diplomacy,
other
as
rst
the
At
as
leaders
own;
of
to
in
20th
speech
of
Germany.
time
to
one.
century
Over
for
spite
the
despite
of
the
a
the
from
fact
Beneš,
have
on
22
21
that
of
here
be
a
and
of
not
had
states
believe
as
unsustainable.
believed
the
that
he
Sudetenland
military
help
to
that,
simply
be
a
pretext
abandoned
French
conict
was
in
the
for
idea
connection
a
over
said
1938
seize
of
with
her
between
that
50%
the
all
of
by
he
time
an
world
also
to
Rally
y
of
meet
had
marked
the
leaders.
of
Czechoslovakia
should
international
have
rst.
to
Chamberlain
it
population
would
French
the
and
abroad
that
areas
the
in
y
out,
world
Nuremberg
initiative
not
pointed
solution.
the
move
did
rst
has
Czechoslovakia,
at
the
radical
the
that
over
diplomatic
ministers
was
and
a
to
supervised
and
was
to
at
discussed
the
week,
the
that
a
ruthlessness
man
who
I
to
get
in
join
commission.
the
Chamberlain
thought
could
was
face
and
and
be
would
told
that,
Germany
if
mean
these
on
privately
I
relied
saw
in
upon
his
face,
when
he
I
got
had
the
given
able
the
ignoring
get
their
government,
proposals
their
to
French
own.
agreement
government,
alliance
led
were
by
with
President
rejected,
Czechoslovakia
the
Czechs
accepted
the
1938.
Godesberg
were
now
proposals
no
was
and
Czechoslovakian
Poland
Sudetenland
Cabinet
Chamberlain
Bad
previous
Chamberlain
British
this
The
September,
Hungary
the
the
September
demanded
but
September
discussion
been
offer
would
nd
Reynolds
Czechs
following
deal
Edvard
On
to
summits
hardness
that
Czechoslovakia.
plan
Germans
diary
it
Czechoslovakia
handover
to
did
as
new
word.
this
would
saw
ultimately
therefore
or
other
that,
impression
his
would
agreed,
the
He
was
his
she
decided
This
David
comprised
In
12
This
Hitler
of
–
in
have
avoid
prime
meeting,
remarked
I
hard
Germans
agreement
…
to
the
This
position
Czechoslovakia,
which
Chamberlain
a
the
country.
this
one
that
Sudeten
wrote
Czechoslovakia,
than
Chamberlain
for.
negotiated
in
Chamberlain
at
one
Czechoslovakia
worked
historian
Germany.
220
not
Germany
that
France
ghting
the
and
determination
and
Following
(see
was
with
to
with
with
period
However,
and
Chamberlain
guarantees
obligations
longer
worth
peaceful
help
war
a
Europe.
creation
Britain
Czechoslovakia.
sympathy
for
was
sympathy
organize
to
had
democracy
Czechoslovakia
“highly
He
a
to
later
ew
about
agreed
did
not
Czech
than
back
the
1
to
upon.
go
Germany,
proposals
far
territory
October.
that
However,
enough.
met
and
expecting
had
to
have
previously
Hitler
now
He
wanted
the
he
wanted
to
said
claims
occupy
C H A P T E R
Back
in
Britain,
Godesberg
to
2 . 7:
T H E
many
proposals.
Czechoslovakia;
unacceptable.
were
On
dug
27
in
All
and
between
people
third
Armed
that
visit
conict
any
force,
I
people
thing,
great
to
of
should
who
and
issues
between
had
feel
it
and
and
are
if
I
up
be
at
very
the
it
is
a
it
that
of
would
a
I
not
masks
we
would
me;
be
such
worth
we
a
trenches
distributed.
broadcast:
digging
far-away
hesitate
to
country
pay
even
good.
but
the
if
I
world
were
by
domination,
living,
embark
the
were
be
a
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
commitments
were
in
A G G R E S S I O N ,
Britain,
radio
not
any
to
In
should
dominate
Under
before
war.
quarrel
do
its
proposals
for
gas
would
to
rejected
honour
new
nightmare
mind
G E R M A N
following
nothing.
resisted.
clear,
the
because
is
its
would
million
thought
liberty
be
38
made
know
nations
must
that
T O
colleagues
it
preparing
incredible
we
made
in
must
that
said
gas-masks
whom
believe
we
on
said
started
parks
Germany
nation
now
Chamberlain
trying
R E S P O N S E
Chamberlain’s
Czechs
fantastic
trenches
a
the
London’s
horrible,
of
France
countries
September,
How
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
on
but
it,
war
that
it
convinced
fear
life
is
is
of
its
for
a
terrible
really
the
stake.
L TA
Thinking and
Communication skills
Task one
In what way does the car toonist Low in the car toon at the star t of this chapter
disagree with Chamberlain?
Task t wo
Go to www.britishpathe.com/video/the-crisis-latest/query/Sudeten
Watch Chamberlain’s broadcast on this Pathé News clip. What is the British attitude
towards Chamberlain as shown in the clip?
Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPoOTNPYKnQ, or search for “Peace in our time?
(1938 Munich Crisis) Par t 2 of 11”.
Watch par t of the video Peace in our Time? What point is the narrator making
about Czechoslovakia and the British attitude towards Czechoslovakia?
How useful is this documentary for a historian investigating the Munich Crisis?
Task three
Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=BFlsYrTF0, or search for “Hitler and
Chamberlain: The Munich Crisis 1938”.
Watch this documentary by historian David Reynolds on the Munich Conference.
How does this compare to the documentary Peace in our Time? in terms of
presentation and content? (You will need to watch the rest of Peace in our Time?
to answer this question.)
221
2
Hitler
agreed
to
a
third
conference,
which
was
to
be
chaired
by
Mussolini.
TOK
As
you
can
see
Investigate primary sources
was
responding to the Munich
president,
Agreement from around the
the
world in September 1938.
page
Share the key points made in
however,
each source in small groups.
a
Highlight the language used in
problems
the sources and identify where
Chamberlain,
there may be bias. Discuss
that
greeted
in
with
joint
for
highlight
he
through
later
the
of
of
that
to
the
the
below,
in
give
and
and
“peace
the
regretted
last
Stalin,
Sudetenland
Agreement).
was
would
our
hope
Neither
leader,
Germany
in
this
Britain.
Soviet
conference,
Britain
meant
he
clip
Munich
negotiation
this
said
nor
agreed
details
declaration
News
enthusiasm
Beneš,
which
full
the
Pathé
much
Edvard
conference,
178
the
time”
to
securing
to
(see
Chamberlain,
from
to
(though
invited
Germany
only
attempt
peace
Czech
was
For
would
not
the
for
Hitler
deal
use
this
with
force.
was
a
For
phrase
using).
whether the meaning of the
in 1938 has changed over
L TA
words and expressions used
Communication
skills
time. Consider the following
Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=SetNFqcayeA, or search “Neville Chamberlain
question: If language changes
returns from Germany with the Munich Agreement”.
in meaning, what eect might
this have on our understanding
Watch the Pathé News clip showing Chamberlain returning to Britain.
of the past? Can we really
What exactly has Hitler agreed to according to the signed declaration?
understand the past through
What information concerning the agreement is not given in this clip?
primary sources?
There
press
was
support
there
“a
the
both
Labour
and
have
are
in
a
We
have
handed
of
the
resigned
that
war
of
his
the
been
and
However,
Winston
disaster ”,
from
the
party.
agreement.
had
policy
and
Clement
even
at
Churchill
Duff
government.
agreement.
averted.
The
Chamberlain
Cooper,
The
the
Attlee,
time,
called
First
Labour
British
Lord
and
leader
British
had
of
of
Liberal
the
said:
been
the
victory
Britain
Chamberlain’s
unmitigated
opposed
Party,
We
in
majority
criticism
total
Admiralty,
Parties
relief
supported
from
was
policy
the
much
mostly
unable
midst
for
today
over
of
a
reason
a
go
in
tragedy.
and
seen
to
to
a
for
We
carefree
have
humanity.
gallant,
ruthless
It
rejoicing.
felt
has
civilised
We
have
humiliation.
been
and
a
This
victory
democratic
for
felt
that
has
not
brute
people
we
been
force
betrayed
…
and
despotism.
Class discussion
In pairs, discuss the extent to which you agree with the historian Richard Overy’s
appraisal of the Munich Agreement that it “represented a realistic assessment of
the balance between Western interests and Western capabilities” (Overy, 2008).
The invasion of Czechoslovakia: The end of appeasement
Hitler’s
takeover
great
shock
were
not
of
of
put
limited;
He
under
made
There
he
rest
was
new
a
to
of
in
had
could
pressure
his
the
outrage
Czechoslovakia
Germans.
222
and
broken
not
shift
take
stance
Czechoslovakia
Britain.
be
of
a
a
It
signed
justied
opinion
rmer
clear
was
in
a
in
speech
March
clear
any
against
on
and
claim
Britain,
17
1939,
that
agreement
by
stand
in
now
and
to
caused
Hitler’s
his
be
aims
invasion
uniting
Chamberlain
Hitler.
March
1939:
was
C H A P T E R
this
this,
by
the
in
last
effect,
force?
...
it
that
no
war
it
challenge
step
I
upon
in
am
greater
to
will
if
it
be
a
not
were
a
the
small
prepared
senseless
take
ever
of
operating
mistake
part
R E S P O N S E
state
direction
not
commitments
yet
believes
bre
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
attack
a
While
unspecied
foreseen,
T H E
to
and
it
to
engage
be
be
this
of
this
its
to
nation
in
new
so
Is
Communication skills
What does Chamberlain’s
and
now
that
has
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
world
cannot
suppose
power
others?
the
in
which
A G G R E S S I O N ,
by
dominate
country
than
thing,
utmost
G E R M A N
followed
to
conditions
made
cruel
the
is
attempt
under
could
to
or
an
T O
L TA
Is
2 . 7:
speech reveal about his change
be
because
lost
resisting
in policy towards Hitler?
its
such
a
made.
What was the international reaction to Hitler ’s demands
regarding Poland?
Given
on
31
that,
its
Hitler’s
March
if
it
aid.
These
actions
1939,
was
the
France
expansion,
Munich
would
and
and
it
even
did
against
that
of
were
to
difcult
deter
strengthened
position
Meanwhile,
The
Pact
of
Germany
countries.
doubling
In
fact,
allowed
and
the
with
it
military
to
the
to
Poland
it
was
to
on
7
did
said
would
right-wing
Japanese
In
come
to
fact,
as
to
Britain
a
aid
to
of
the
Poland
warning
direct
to
Hitler,
action
still
negotiate.
and
Britain
Mediterranean
in
Italian
part
Chamberlain
May,
assistance
military
and
Czechoslovakia.
more
Hitler
In
as
military
act
taking
April,
Eastern
mutual
a
support
get
Romania.
the
for
was
and
France
that
British
army,
was
clear
position
take
introduction
estimated
to
was
sending
aggression.
strengthened
territorial
1939,
programme
was
Britain
this
them
Danzig,
which
Britain
Czechoslovakia
acting
that
and
conrmed
March,
the
by
stronger
both
In
over
Poland
accepted
from
diplomacy
in
Turkey
attack,
Poland
also
actually
Albania
Greece
demands
to
France
by
case
also
further
negotiating
of
war
in
the
area.
Steel
and
feel
use
invaded
with
had
than
further
to
its
it
guarantee
could
Mussolini
Mediterranean
unprovoked
territory
to
German
guarantee
controversial.
Britain
he
a
assurances.
Moreover,
Britain’s
agreement
an
taken
more
and
offered
similar
gaveguarantees
an
Memel,
anti-Semitic;
had
allow
Hitler
believed
When
a
Agreement.
be
Nevertheless,
and
victim
gave
guarantees
dictatorship
over
Britain
also
that
than
of
radar
set
to
Britain
in
they
stand
was
reach
France
been
in
in
In
militarily,
be
on
was
by
from
the
two
was
introduced.
in
and
it
a
much
this
Britain,
The
1939–40,
that
were
1938,
Hitler.
preparations.
detached
between
conscription
completion.
peak
be
announced
and
against
near
a
would,
had
military
now
collaboration
April
Britain
up
not
government
and
rmer
could
military
that
a
stepped
Italy
fact,
air
too,
defence
rearmament
which
roughly
time
equal
it
terms
Germany.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union
If
a
Britain
and
German
French
France
attack,
were
were
then
more
to
help
be
able
from
enthusiastic
to
the
about
assist
Soviet
this
Poland
Union
than
the
in
the
would
British
event
be
as
key.
they
of
The
had
223
2
a
long
tradition
politicians
quickly;
on
of
the
however,
government
to
Franco–Soviet/Russian
left
there
follow
Union’s
approaches
had
even
not
Even
in
Soviets,
other,
The
●
An
●
If
●
An
In
of
and
which
the
Britain,
with
of
In
addition,
to
intervene
internally
and
local
who
countries.
negotiations
as
in
fascist
saw
the
was
East
There
explained
about
an
British
and
Stalin
alliance
There
such
Stalin’s
Stalin
the
also
alliance:
countries
that
against
push
was
an
with
were
purges.
front
it
also
Chamberlain
However,
agreement
Soviets
Germany.
towards
war.
distrusted,
would
all
and
to
prevent
join
in
the
bowed
different
the
on
the
one
Soviet
for
other.
guarantees
assistance
to
to
expectations
British
mutual
come
nally
the
were
and
to
a
that
an
the
Soviet
This
was
if
treaty
another’s
Union
reasons
were
to
by
aid
being
left
in
to
for
with,
the
Overy
have
by
or
the
even
failure
in
the
right
threatened
outright
interfere
Richard
should
they
rejected
to
other
historian
Union
states
excuse
were
by
the
alone.
forces.
as
British
established
Soviet
crises,
European
French
neighbouring
this
of
the
Russia”.
actually
instead
Russia
This
an
the
proposed
the
could
where
such
and
demanded
militarily
by
other
in
be
Hitler.
wanted
and
attack.
Stalin
French,
over,
just
Germany
in
part
about
of
diplomatic
negotiations.
hand,
Soviets
this
a
the
to
ignored
Sudeten
after
Eastern
form
misgivings,
start
one
France
an
to
Many
had
Conference.
distrust
weak
Poland,
these
to
and
concerned
other
with
included
France
but
event
deal
despite
be
be
hemmed-in
push
on
had
unenthusiastic
militarily
alliance
It
Munich
profound
to
over
alliance
reluctance
Austrian
was
cooperation.
an
action.
the
most
such
a
of
the
to
alienate
might
the
still
reasons
win
agreed
on
and
Poland,
to
felt
an
should
Soviets
Britain
the
into
1939,
what
“the
was
could
hoped
alliance
April
the
army
Germany
pressure
to
that
line
during
practical,
alliance
Spain
was
this
Chamberlain
Soviet
Britain
felt
invited
confessing
more
●
been
1939,
also
of
Source
British
take
the
A,
below.
Source skills
Soviet
Source A
negotiators,
gures,
Richard
Overy.
Origins
of
the
Second
World
found
all
that
top
the
military
British
had
and
political
sent
a
War
junior
representative,
who
had
no
powers
to
(2008).
negotiate
Talks
continued
throughout
the
both
sides
complained
endlessly
obduracy
and
deviousness
of
the
other.
the
Soviet
side
insisted
discussions
before
any
more
offended
on
full
real
progress
could
the
west
showed
what
condemned
as
a
“dilatory”
even
Soviet
attitude.
224
sea
delegation
instead
of
was
by
sent
air.
on
When
a
it
leaders.
western
It
was
soon
delegations
for
the
military
alliance,
had
and
secured
forces
agreement
across
for
Poland
to
the
long
had
passage
ght
army.
The
discussions,
which
the
on
12
August
1939,
broke
trip
arrived
had
The
three
by
Soviet
the
Molotov
begun
British
that
plans
German
later
slight
be
of
Again
This
military
not
made.
agreement.
In
no
August
an
about
discovered
the
sign
summer,
deeply
though
and
the
days
and
were
not
revived.
up
after
C H A P T E R
2 . 7:
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
G E R M A N
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Source B
A
cartoon
by
David
Low,
published
in
the
UK
newspaper
First question, par t a – 3 marks
What,
for
the
according
failure
of
to
Source
the
A,
were
Anglo-Soviet
the
Daily
Mail,
5
April
1939.
First question, par t b – 2 marks
the
reasons
What
is
the
message
of
Source
B?
talks?
L TA
Self-management and communication skills
Review the relationships between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies
and Germany between 1933 and 1939. Refer back to the discussion of the reasons
for the Nazi–Soviet Pact (see page 224; also pages 183–184).
Make notes under the following headings:
●
the view of the British and French concerning an agreement with the
Soviet Union
●
the view of the Soviets on an agreement with the Western democracies
●
the view of Germany on an agreement with the Soviet Union
●
the view of the Soviets on an agreement with Germany.
TOK
Imagine that you are advising Stalin on whether to make an agreement with either
You have used your imagination
Britain and France or with Germany.
in the task here as an “adviser ”
Prepare a presentation to Stalin on the advantages and disadvantages of each
to Stalin. How do historians use
course of action. Make sure you give evidence to suppor t your points.
their imagination when writing
What is your nal advice on the course of action that Stalin should take?
their accounts?
225
2
The international reaction to the invasion of Poland: The
outbreak of war
Chamberlain
have
read
Hitler
in
continued
Chapter
invaded
Chamberlain
and
so
war
Poland
issued
was
to
2.6,
on
an
hope
for
1
negotiated
attempts
September
ultimatum
declared
a
last-minute
at
to
11.00am
1939.
On
Germany.
that
settlement
at
same
but,
diplomacy
3
September,
Germany
as
you
failed.
did
at
9.00am,
not
reply
day.
L TA
Communication
skills
Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=r tJ_zbz1NyY
, or search “Neville Chamberlain -
Britain’s declaration of war 1939”.
Watch Chamberlain’s broadcast to the British that war has been declared. What
emotions is Chamberlain attempting to rouse in his speech?
Source skills
Richard
Overy.
Origins
of
the
Second
World
War
reason
1939
(2008).
before
was
a
particularly
[Hitler
failed]
to
see
that
the
western
reached
their
limit
in
1939.
Hitler
to
much
judge
that
intrinsic
calculations,
Poland
interest
but
he
in
failed
was
not
British
to
see
in
itself
and
assessed
the
Polish
crisis
that
not
but
in
great-power
means
to
terms
status.
assert
of
their
To
global
ght
British
and
for
well.
the
Mediterranean
Given
favourable
and
Allied
when
land
major
its
the
severe
were
military
balance,
economic
continued
crisis
at
if
such
and
war
a
the
was
the
Polish
crisis
was
opportunity
power
was
in
Far
Allies
If
fervently
war
had
hoped
to
that
an
Hitler
the
to
economic
bite
would
The
possibility
effort
dreamed
were
made
in
was
Allied
across
warfare,
the
winter
be
unable
only
to
mount
incalculable
to
of
achieve
German
the
bomb
“knock-out”
of
over
by
the
air
theorists.
summer
to
Great
efforts
complete
the
the
civil
defence
preparations,
to
arrange
East
threat
evacuation
level
into
as
Hitler
–
gas
of
women
and
children,
and
to
attack.
First question, par t a – 3 marks
the
to
this
source,
why
was
September
an
challenge
come
for
of
an
opportune
time
for
Britain
and
France
to
German
make
expansionism.
the
intelligence
viewed
to
and
made
offensive.
blow
1939
unrepeatable
of
of
This
and
According
future,
nature
it.
a
preparations
high
summer
own
prepare
on
the
late
declare
both
on
interests
the
be
a
the
as
blockade
months
necessary
Balkans,
given
to
French
Poland
French
the
of
attacks
merits,
of
could
element
powers
so
–
time
was
which
right
did
powers
strategy
had
it
good
and
would
a
stand
against
Germany?
the
see
L TA
Research skills
Research the response of the international press to Hitler ’s invasion of Poland.
Can you nd headlines and ar ticles about this act of aggression that are:
L TA
●
negative
●
positive
●
neutral.
Communication skills
If possible, try to nd newspapers from dierent regions and countries, and from
226
Present your ndings to
dierent political backgrounds. You should spend no more than two hours on this
the class in a 5–10-minute
task . Make sure your sources are appropriately referenced and that you make a
presentation.
list of works cited.
C H A P T E R
2 . 7:
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
G E R M A N
A G G R E S S I O N ,
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
What were the reactions of Britain and France to Hitler ’s
actions, 1939–1940?
Despite
no
During
also
by
the
help
to
the
Union.
capitulated.
territorial
waters
However
the
Denmark
and
campaign
The
failure
decision
coalition
the
the
defeat
Hitler
determined
to
Battle
London
and
continued
amend
and
By
end
invasion
Zara
of
of
of
which
the
1941
German
ensured
outcome
a
to
global
of
in
Nazis
sent
to
offer
attack.
been
about
to
It
invaded
move,
Norwegian
getting
forces
contributed
the
against
to
Germany.
occupied
to
help
driven
Norway,
but
out.
Chamberlain’s
took
over
“peace
the
evacuation
the
His
British
as
head
over
the
next
few
so
stance.
that
even
1940,
nd
of
a
British
is
At
that
would
Churchill
to
this
possible
prove
Luftwaffe
have
was
key
in
the
attacked
months.
However,
Roosevelt
when
most
was
the
allies.
Britain
the
army.
government
leadership
where
to
It
However,
Blitz
of
German
offensive”.
the
could
Britain
Americans
the
persuaded
buy
arms
stood
USA
Congress
on
alone
in
“a
against
were
not
from
Germany’s
to
cash
favour
Nazi
of
war.
Britain
as
was
also
suffering
explained
Union
powers
bring
victory,
the
the
air
had
was
mines
could
September.
was
to
at
the
ensure
end
of
chapter
Germany’s
U-boat
2.5,
Hitler’s
ultimate
defeat.
writes,
Axis
were
which
ore
Churchill
in
inevitable
were
and
However,
Soviet
lay
Allied
proposals.
ghting.
Acts
the
the
and
of
these
isolationist
in
to
iron
they
began
force
mining,
that
1940
attempted
of
the
Allied
troops
and
alone
members
cities
end
Allied
was
for
decided
began
Poland,
Finland
Swedish
another
Britain
1940,
the
in
stood
Nevertheless,
Steiner
Each
in
the
involved
campaign.
As
basis.
at
an
campaign
consider
its
to
to
which
Britain.
France
Britain
aid
as
then
block
result
in
Neutrality
carry”
the
of
with
the
Germany
getting
The
other
to
just
Allies
aid
prepared
planned
forward
other
1940,
to
of
onslaught
send
Norway.
continue
ensuing
During
Allies
Norway
of
or
prepared
Britain
the
Britain
put
Chamberlain
been
The
order
government
Dunkirk,
promises
Nazi
should
poorly
resign.
from
the
However,
invaded
With
point,
it
after
was
of
to
in
day
French
war”,
whether
Soviet
Finland
and
against
“phoney
debated
the
the
British
Poland
the
conict.
only
the
destruction
the
were
world
encouraged
Soviet
Union
While
entry
of
war
Nazi
and
the
of
Soviet
Germany
shape
embark
the
survival
the
the
to
and
of
for
the
into
the
most
post-war
policies
what
prevented
and
the
aggressive
States
Britain
Union
and,
of
on
United
a
United
part,
became
total
States
dictated
the
settlement.
—
Steiner,
p.
1064
The Second World War: The historical debate
How impor tant was appeasement as a cause of the
Second World War?
In
the
much
the
years
following
debate
war.
Sir
among
Winston
unnecessary
war”
the
end
historians
Churchill
that
would
of
the
as
to
Second
the
called
not
role
the
have
World
of
Second
taken
War,
there
appeasement
World
place
had
War
was
in
causing
“the
Hitler
been
227
2
stopped
earlier,
for
example
over
Czechoslovakia.
men
who
realize
By
had
that
been
they
consistently
aggression
and
that
had
Hitler
Poland,
did
aims,
have
and
the
Fascist
chance
of
that
of
others
the
clear
he
to
dictators
the
that
reacted
not
wickedness
of
he
to
the
and
AJP
carry
to
was
dictators
had
when
war
the
unless
therefore
as
themselves
failed
he
Hitler
foreign
European
they
his
meant
invaded
that
his
to
dictator.
also
had
much
—
1938
encouraged
argued
out
of
in
frightened
ruthless
had
Taylor
actions
gone
who
and
they
or
weak,
Appeasement
would
war
as
continuing
the
have
of
Hitler
Union.
war.
how
cause
to
Rhineland
seen
calculating
policy
for
the
were
demands
Soviet
for
the
a
Hitler’s
on
would
...
over
up
with
trigger
fact
1936
stand
the
plan
in
winning
as
in
gambled
a
to
dealing
giving
was
in
“appeasers”
afraid
were
alienated
which
not
The
seen
the
policy
leaders:
a
blunders
Taylor,
1961
Class discussion
Those who argue that appeasement was a weak policy suggest that other actions
could have been taken by Britain and France. In pairs, consider the advantages
and disadvantages of these alternative routes of action:
●
using the League of Nations more eectively to stop the actions of the dictators
●
being prepared to use force against Hitler when he marched into the Rhineland
●
standing up to Hitler over the Sudetenland
●
spending more on armaments in the early 1930s
●
following Churchill’s idea of establishing a Grand Alliance of the anti-Fascist
countries against Hitler.
L TA
When
British
30–40
years
Cabinet
minutes
and
government
papers
became
available
Communication and
after
the
end
of
the
Second
World
War,
it
became
clear
social skills
that
Chamberlain
Divide the class into two teams.
the
The motion that you will be
realities
debating is:
public
of
difculties
of
and
the
Treaty
been
on
economy,
concerning
of
dealing
constraints
British
opinion
the
had
Versailles
the
on
with
a
complex
Chamberlain
British
horror
of
Germany
–
imperial
which
it
Given
included
commitments,
another
–
situation.
war
becomes
and
the
as
well
the
injustices
to
the
easier
see
as
“Appeasement was both the
forces
that
shaped
appeasement
as
a
policy.
Richard
Overy
argues
that
wrong policy for the 1930s and
Chamberlain’s
policy
was,
in
fact,
the
right
one
for
Britain
at
the
time
a awed policy.”
and
paid
war
earlier
off
in
the
sense
that
Hitler
was
forced
into
a
when
a
general
European
You will need three speakers on
than
he
had
planned,
and
at
date
Britain
was
in
a
each side. The rest of the team
stronger
military
position
than
it
had
been
in
1938.
should help research and write
Indeed,
most
historians
would
now
agree
that
it
was
the
ambitions
of
the speeches, and also prepare
Hitler
that
were
the
key
cause
of
the
Second
World
War.
Ruth
Henig
questions for the opposing team.
sums
up
We
the
debate:
cannot
be
encouraged
view
who
he
and
228
his
already
would
reinforced
But
certain
in
–
not
historians
was
held
put
and
are
the
that
up
this
prepared
of
extent
expansion
now
to
Britain
any
may
in
ght
to
course
and
serious
have
no
a
which
by
the
France
resistance
speeded
doubt
war,
Hitler
lack
or
up
that
to
his
of
might
have
opposition
were
Hitler
series
of
his
powers
eastern
been
he
in
received.
serious
expansion
The
decline,
was
plans.
was
wars,
intent
to
on
achieve
expansion
his
objectives.
C H A P T E R
other
plans
Nazi
or
T H E
powers
try
to
–
it
ultimately
resist
demands
Corridor
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
for
was
them.
the
had
And
return
likely
to
two
R E S P O N S E
choices:
whenever
of
the
provoke
they
—
G E R M A N
could
resistance
Sudetenland,
war.
T O
acquiesce
came
or
Henig,
A G G R E S S I O N ,
–
Danzig
in
whether
and
the
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
L TA
The
2 . 7:
his
Communication skills
over
Draw up your own timeline from
Polish
1933–40.
1999
Above the timeline write the
L TA
Self-management
actions of Hitler and the actions
skills
of Mussolini (use a dierent
colour for each dictator).
Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eu78iaVsBEE, or search “ World War II –
Below the timeline, write
Germany – Road To War ”.
the actions of the Western
Watch the documentary Germany: Road To War to review the key actions taken
democracies.
by Hitler and the responses of the Western powers. (Hitler ’s foreign policy star ts
Make your timeline detailed
15 minutes into the clip.)
and useful as a revision tool.
Full document question: The Munich Conference, 1938
leaders,
Source A
that
Extract
from
The
Times,
a
UK
the
October
conqueror
returning
from
a
victory
battleeld
nobler
have
the
been
it
in
can
every
shown
their
on
have
of
was
to
the
of
three
imposing
that
visits
and
it
to
remains
by
wehave
prepared
he
of
the
been
to
crisis;
civilisation
will
but
injustices
are
faced
and
removed
recur
in
…
may
chiey
great
so
a
to
all
of
For
–
being
left
to
fester
until
“Still
magazine,
Hope”,
21
published
September
in
Punch,
a
1938.
of
a
much
enthusiasm
greeted
these
Führer’s
sentiments,
see
the
to
instead
our
know
of
to
that
of
nation
Mr.
the
through
can,
of
remedy.
…
such
smoke-screen
led
instead
for
as
So
times
learning
worst
late
policy.
gratitude
by
nely
the
cartoon,
UK
wishes
Indeed,
on
at
dangers
the
was
peoples
them
the
times,
too
range,
horror
his
go
them
its
people’s
upon
our
in
is
Kingdom
certain
popular
propaganda.
face
is
A
their
Germany.
own
other
show
Chamberlain,
taught
his
between
ignorance
The
increased
allowing
sentiments
United
it
against
immense
effect
hope
the
in
of
achievement
Chamberlain
have
denite
wisdom
of
and
manner
this
less
of
us
of
out
with
Let
to
a
Source B
people
King
hands,
understanding
a
ruin
in
with
the
incalculable
no
the
Mr.
adorned
from
concerned.
his
seem
home
Chamberlain
the
sense
broken
from
which
each
visits
by
war,
people
clear
with
and
resolute
that
catastrophe
is
Mr.
Government
less
be
would
come
than
yesterday;
reception
Had
has
laurels
Munich
alike
of
prevail
on
it
the
threat
to
1938.
quiet
No
peace
newspaper,
unless
1
cause
lessons
which
only
a
through
people
their
229
2
Source C
Speech
Source D
by
Winston
Commons,
5
Churchill
October
in
the
House
of
1938.
Zara
Steiner.
European
The
Triumph
International
of
the
History
Dark:
1933–1999
(2011).
I
will
begin
would
must
we
like
to
saying
ignore
nevertheless
have
defeat,
than
by
and
that
have
or
be
sustained
we
what
a
everybody
forget
stated,
total
France
but
and
has
which
namely,
Chamberlain
that
unmitigated
suffered
more
only
to
…
one
has
been
a
more
resolute
did
war,
and
no
No
he
he
struggler
for
Minister.
Everyone
there
been
such
peace
knows
intense
and
than
to
maintain
and
that.
done
That
is
quite
true.
quite
clear
why
was
to
Great
Britain
or
France
I
so
much
all
at
this
along
juncture
to
being
if,
sacrice
in
and
that
him
the
…
Prime
could
in
a
war
fact,
they
brought
have
believe,
through
at
any
the
time
been
ordinary
during
to
is
over.
Silent,
broken,
Czechoslovakia
She
suffered
has
association
with
the
always
with
League
been
an
in
the
of
Nations
obedient
I
which
still
of
think
1933
and
of
lay
when
all
growth
the
of
thrown
into
by
which
servant
the
away,
neglected
parallel
or
the
fair
before
Herr
hopes
Europe
Hitler
Nazi
power
when
and
I
of
resources
in
the
I
a
the
so”.
was
darkness.
her
do
not
were
grudge
ready
to
our
do
loyal,
their
she
has
long
peace
beginning
arresting
the
have
the
cannot
of
been
immense
have
been
believe
history
brave
duty
no
a
no
threat
carry
leaders
it
of
out
to
after
its
was
convinced
war,
unless
state
it
prepared
was
to
under
a
crisis
conditions,
worst-case
The
expectation
the
of
a
future
number
of
German
aircraft
and
were
all
the
resulting
assumed
years
behind
Czech
army
planning
grossly
casualty
that
the
Britain
with
was
at
corresponding
Little
…
exaggerated
was
there
the
expected
was
no
French
…
least
it
two
German
from
air
the
substantive
…
that
…
opinion
when
he
people,
matter
of
on
spoke
country
know
the
of
evening
“a
of
believed
There
Britain
and
political
that
the
was
no
no
and
27th
in
people
While
reflected
men
of
quarrel
nothing”.
peace.
British
between
hardening
still
undoubtedly
most
a
of
the
women,
S e p t e m b e r,
f a r- a w a y
whom
we
acknowledging
and
public
country
credible
possible
he
wanted
“war
leader
the
mood,
who
party”
could
him.
who
what
First question, par t a – 3 marks
the
cost
…
I
do
spontaneous
they
learned
not
grudge
outburst
that
the
of
them
joy
hard
and
the
natural,
relief
ordeal
According
to
greeted
enthusiastically
Source
A,
why
was
Chamberlain
when
would
so
on
his
return
no
Munich?
longer
but
be
they
suppose
required
should
that
of
them
know
this
is
the
the
at
the
truth
end.
moment;
…
This
is
and
do
only
not
First question, par t b – 2 marks
the
What
beginning
230
of
the
reckoning.
a
1919
democratic
and
assumed
campaign,
bombs,
replace
I
minster
certainly
Signicantly,
programme.
and
power,
which
whole
Prague
…
obtained
which
think
squandered,
exists
of
against
even
…
of
at
rst
opportunities
combinations
a
of
restore
prime
to
Chamberlain
When
treaty,
back
democracies
of
peace
agreed,
summer
respect
Western
no
The
abandoned,
recedes
every
could
diplomatic
the
mournful,
virtual
little
Czechoslovakia
could
make
ready
gures
All
that
were
and
channels
that
state,
bombing
I
was
in
with
Czechoslovakia.
Minster
easily
protect
The
“no
scenario.
with
Whitehall
war,
Britain’s
terms
There
was
danger
do
ready
civilian
Britain
am
both
Germany
his
Not
go
secure
ought
of
ght.
with
that
might
undaunted
Nevertheless,
there
to
Hitler
Never
that
not
agreed
advisers
in
to
position.
peace.
that
his
strategy.
the
terrible
determination
also
that
high-risk
believe
position
attack
has
a
and
be
Prime
was
military
consensus
uncompromising
understood
intervention
is
the
message
of
Source
B?
from
in
C H A P T E R
2 . 7:
T H E
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
R E S P O N S E
T O
G E R M A N
Second question – 4 marks
With
reference
assess
the
to
values
historians
its
origin,
and
studying
19 3 3 – 19 4 0
Four th question – 9 marks
purpose
limitations
the
A G G R E S S I O N ,
Munich
of
and
content,
Source
C
for
With
reference
knowledge,
Conference.
decision
to
to
the
examine
agree
to
sources
the
and
reasons
Hitler’s
your
for
demands
own
Chamberlain’s
at
Munich.
Third question – 6 marks
Compare
and
contrast
Sources
A
and
C
Munich
Conference.
the
views
regarding
the
expressed
outcome
of
in
the
References
Eden,
A.
Mifin.
Faber,
1962.
Facing
Boston,
D.
2008.
the
Munich,
Henig,
R.
1999.
Modern
Overy,
R.
2008.
Origins
Steiner,
Z.
2011.
1933–1939.
Taylor,
The
Oxford
AJP
.
Dictators:
The
Memoirs
of
Anthony
Eden.
Houghton
USA
1964.
Harmondsworth,
1938.
History
of
the
Triumph
Origins
&
Review,
Second
University
The
Simon
of
the
the
pages
World
Dark:
Press.
of
Schuster.
London,
29–31
War .
Routledge.
European
New
Second
UK
York,
World
London,
International
UK
History
USA
War .
Penguin.
UK
231
Writing the internal assessment
for IB History
copy
of
the
IA.
In
total,
completing
the
IA
should
Key concepts
take
➔
Causation
➔
Change
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
➔
Continuity
➔
Signicance
approximately
designed
guidance
to
give
for
both
20
hours .
students
approaching
This
and
these
chapter
teachers
is
some
tasks.
Class discussion
Key questions
➔
How does the pace and the time you ive in aect the
What is the purpose of the interna assessment in
topics you might be interested in, or curious about?
history?
How might where and when you ive aect the evidence
and sources you have access to? Which topics coud
➔
How is the interna assessment structured and
you investigate that students in other paces coud not?
assessed?
What does this te us about the nature of history?
➔
What are some suggested strategies for choosing a
topic and getting star ted?
What does the IA ook ike?
➔
What are some common mistakes students make?
➔
What are good criteria for seecting sources?
The
IA
Each
➔
What are the chaenges facing the historian?
is
of
divided
these
into
sections
approached
in
Below
overview
is
an
more
three
will
detail
of
be
main
sections .
explained
later
each
in
this
and
chapter.
section:
“Doing history”: Thinking like a
1.
Identication and evaluation of sources
historian
(6 marks)
The
internal
assessment
(IA)
is
an
engaging,
•
inquiry-based
2200
word
Ceary state the topic in the form of an appropriate
investigation
inquiry question.
that
provides
opportunity
select,
teachers
to
students
personalize
research
individual
and
and
interest
write
or
their
on
a
with
the
learning.
historical
You
topic
will
•
Expain the nature and reevance of two of the
sources seected for more detaied anaysis of
of
vaues and imitations with reference to origins,
curiosity.
purpose and content.
The
IA
is
course.
an
essential
Students
higher
level
as
of
in
(20%)
component
both
will
of
standard
the
level
complete
the
IB
History
(25%)
same
and
task
2.
part
their
course
mark.
Your
teacher
•
evaluate
your
nal
draft,
but
only
a
Investigation (15 marks)
will
small,
Using appropriate format and cear organization,
random
provide critica anaysis that is focused on the
sample
of
your
class’
IAs
will
be
submitted
to
the
question under investigation.
IB
for
moderation.
•
The
purpose
of
the
historical
investigation
is
Incude a range of evidence to suppor t an argument
to
and anaysis, and a concusion drawn from the
engage
students
in
the
process
of
thinking
like
anaysis.
historians
own
and
“doing
questions,
analyzing
history”
gathering
perspectives,
and
and
by
creating
examining
their
evidence,
demonstrating
rich
3.
historical
knowledge
in
the
conclusions
•
draw.
Given
its
importance,
your
Reection (4 marks)
they
teacher
Reect on the process of investigating your
should
question and discuss the methods used by
provide
considerable
time,
guidance,
practice
of
historians, and the imitations or chaenges of
skills
and
feedback
throughout
the
process
of
investigating their topic.
planning,
232
drafting,
revising
and
submitting
a
nal
W R I T I N G
Your
history
purposes
design
or
teachers
best
the
and
develop
started
task
is
have
and
at
most
been
you
own
exposed
in
be
IA
the
of
historical
whatever
IA
course,
to
F O R
I B
H I S T O R Y
Beginning with the end in mind:
what does success look like?
select
can
after
the
students
teaching
analysis
Self-management skills
be
however
purposeful
methods,
A S S E S S M E N T
syllabus
students.
The
introduced
some
for
encouraged
question.
during
to
the
context,
learning
should
point
use
school
effectively
practice
writing
can
individual
your
any
the
I N T E R N A L
L TA
Nevertheless,
suit
T H E
and
Throughout the process of panning, researching,
drafting and revising your investigation, you shoud be
continuay checking the criteria. Ask your teacher and
other students to provide specic feedback using the
criteria. Continuay ask yoursef if your work meets
skills.
the criteria.
The
IA
History
is
designed
to
assess
each
of
the
following
objectives:
Before
at
the
getting
started,
assessment
you
criteria
should
to
look
appreciate
carefully
what
each
Assessment objective 1: K nowledge and
section
of
the
IA
demands.
Teachers
will
use
understanding
the
•
Demonstrate understanding of historica sources.
same
important
success
criteria
to
will
have
look
for
a
both
clear
like
SL
and
HL .
understanding
before
you
invest
It
of
the
is
what
time
Assessment objective 2: A pplication and
and
hard
will
use
work
that
this
task
will
require.
Teachers
analysis
•
the
criterion
found
in
the
IB
History
Guide
Anayse and interpret a variety of sources.
to
provide
nal
feedback
draft.
The
to
teachers
assessment
is
and
based
to
on
assess
the
“positive
Assessment objective 3: Synthesis and
achievement”,
meaning
that
teachers
will
try
to
evaluation
nd
•
the
best
t
according
to
the
descriptors
in
Evauate sources as historica evidence, recognizing
each
criterion.
Students
do
not
have
to
write
a
their vaue and imitations.
perfect
•
Synthesize information from a seection of reevant
and
sources.
based
of
paper
teachers
the
on
25
to
achieve
should
whether
marks
in
the
not
highest
think
scores
are
in
descriptors,
terms
above
or
of
pass/fail
below
50%
total.
Assessment objective 4: Use and application
To
simplify
the
criterion
and
to
provide
some
xed
of appropriate skills
targets
•
for
what
success
looks
like,
consider
using
Reect on the methods used by, and chaenges
the
assessment
tool
provided
on
the
next
page.
facing, the historian.
•
Formuate an appropriate, focused question to guide
a historica inquiry.
•
Demonstrate evidence of research skis,
organization, referencing and seection of
appropriate sources.
233
IA
Teacher, Peer and Self-Assessment Tool
Criterion A: Identication and evaluation of sources (6 marks)
Suggested word count: 500
Improvements
Criteria for success
Strengths
needed
•
Does the investigation have an appropriate question clearly stated?
•
Has the student selected, identied, and referenced (using a consistent
format) appropriate and relevant sources?
•
Is there a clear explanation of the relevance of the sources to the
investigation?
•
Is there detailed analysis and evaluation of two sources with explicit
discussion of the value and limitations, with reference to their origins,
purpose and content?
Criterion B: Investigation (15 marks)
Suggested word count: 1,300
Improvements
Criteria for success
Strengths
needed
•
Is the investigation clear, coherent and eectively organized?
•
Does the investigation contain well-developed critical analysis clearly
focused on the stated question?
•
Is there evidence from a range of sources used eectively to support an
argument?
•
Is there evaluation of dierent perspectives (arguments, claims,
experiences etc.) on the topic and/or question?
•
Does the investigation provide a reasoned conclusion that is consistent
with the evidence and arguments provided?
Criterion C: Reection (4 marks)
Suggested word count: 400
Improvements
Criteria for success
Strengths
needed
•
Does the student focus clearly on what the investigation revealed about
the methods used by historians?
•
Does the reection demonstrate clear awareness of the challenges facing
historians and/or the limitations of the methods used by historians?
•
Is there an explicit connection between the reection and the rest of the
investigation (question, sources used, evaluation and analysis)?
234
W R I T I N G
T H E
I N T E R N A L
A S S E S S M E N T
F O R
I B
H I S T O R Y
Bibliography & formatting (no marks applicable)
Suggested word count: Not incuded in tota
Improvements
Criteria for success
Strengths
needed
•
Is the word count clearly stated on the cover? (2200 maximum)
•
Is a single bibliographic style or format consistently used?
•
Is the bibliography clearly organized and include all the sources you
have referenced or used as evidence in the investigation?
●
Co-develop
Getting started: Approaches to
good
investigation
of
questions
a
historical
and
carry
event
as
out
a
an
entire
class.
learning history
●
Read
L TA
Thinking skills
an
identify
excerpt
which
from
parts
a
historian’s
are
analysis,
work
and
evidence
and
narrative.
To star t generating ideas for a topic and to hep you focus
your question, use a research-based thinking routine
If
such as Think-Puzzle-Explore (see Ritchhar t, Church and
than
Morrison, 2011. Make Thinking Visible, Jossey-Bass).
dates
and
more
likely
students
better
simply
understand
memorizing
chronological
to
be
and
that
history
reporting
narratives,
curious,
engaged
is
on
then
and
more
facts,
they
are
motivated
Think: What topics do you think might interest you?
learners
of
history.
Accordingly,
they
will
more
Puzzle: What puzzles you about these topics?
likely
develop
Explore: How can you explore more about each of
investigation
these topics?
how
Ideally,
you
will
have
opportunities
to
appropriate
and
organize
have
and
a
questions
better
write
for
their
understanding
effective
of
analysis.
throughout
Seecting a topic and appropriate questions
the
IB
History
course
nature
of
develop
other
about
history.
the
skills
assessment
Additionally,
provide
clear
explore
the
This
methods
will
prepare
necessary
papers
these
links
in
kinds
to
and
of
for
the
the
IB
develop
and
you
IA
the
to
learning
Self-management skills
better
and
History
L TA
understandings
to
the
Before beginning, ask your teacher to nd some
course.
exampes of student IAs with examiner ’s feedback .
activities
These can be found on the IB Online Curriculum Centre
TOK.
or in the Teachers’ Suppor t Materials for History.
Examine the formatting and ayout of each component to
●
Debate
●
Compare
controversial
historical
events
and
claims.
visuaize in advance what your IA might ook ike, and the
and
corroborate
conicting
sources
of
steps that wi be required to compete them.
evidence.
Once
●
Take
on,
role
play
or
defend
IA
perspectives
or
experiences
you
Discuss
the
arguments
value
and
and
of
an
limitations
Develop
of
historian’s
evidence.
criteria
often
for
it
do
Identify
selecting
and
well
is
time
not
a
by
Gather
of
understanding
familiar
with
the
of
the
assessment
historical
select
how
topic
conducting
a
to
of
some
topic
begin
focus.
Students
selecting
interest
and
background
a
get
topic.
to
know
reading
a
general
history
textbook
or
an
online
sources.
and
sources
maps,
to
know
encyclopaedia.
●
general
are
comparing
from
historical
and
event.
it
●
some
components
criteria,
●
have
different
analyze
(photos,
etc.)
focused
a
variety
artwork,
on
the
of
different
journal
same
kinds
entries,
event
or
issue.
that
will
These
help
kinds
of
perspectives,
You
you
may
nd
narrow
sources
some
the
often
interpretations
topic
information
focus
outline
and
the
quickly.
differing
controversies
235
IA
that
make
written
for
an
engaging
textbooks
references,
and
investigation.
articles
annotated
will
also
bibliographies
for
Well-
and
sources.
essential
include
additional,
more
detailed
sources
that
will
help
research
After
selecting
a
topic,
formulating
question
can
essential
that
take
what
questions
of
the
most
common
planning
you
kinds
for
of
also
be
an
very
appropriate
challenging.
the
time
to
topics
help
produce
investigations.
carefully
Before
you
It
is
think
a
poor
and
a
good
helps
question
that
you
select,
it
is
question.
errors
writing
question
ensure
researchable
criteria
good
begin
about
is
that
you
should
submit
a
proposal
to
their
essential
the
IA
is
students
the
IA
when
formulating
topic.
for
a
investigation.
make
is
formulating
Formulating
success
Consider
a
and
manageable
good
the
and
following
question:
any
There is an adequate variety and
•
writing,
topic
good
stage.
research
about
the
a
in
when
the
Whatever
formulate
footnotes
One
of
to
your
availability of sources related to
teacher
to
ensure
that
the
investigation
will
be
1 The
your topic.
successful.
question is
The sources are readable,
•
Some
teachers
recommend
that
students
write
about
researchable.
available and in a language that
a
topic
related
to
their
course
syllabus,
but
there
is accessible.
are
a
countless
are
better
motivate
off
choosing
you
however,
so
number
to
possible
topics
learn.
students
of
The
may
that
topic
not
topics
and
interest
must
be
you
you
and
Questions that are vague or too
•
historical
investigate
broad make it dicult to write a
any
focused investigation limited to
2 The
topic
that
happened
within
the
last
ten
years.
2200 words.
question is
All
investigations
will
take
one
of
three
forms:
Questions that are too broad
•
focused.
1
An
investigation
issue,
of
2
person
or
of
a
historical
event
based
make it dicult to manage the
theme,
on
a
number of sources needed to
variety
adequately address the topic.
sources.
An
investigation
historical
based
building,
on
place
eldwork
or
of
Interesting, controversial or
•
a
challenging historical problems
site.
make better questions.
3 The
3
An
investigation
of
a
local
history.
topic,
students
question is
When
selecting
a
historical
Questions with obvious answers
•
often
(i.e. Did economic factors play a
engaging
fail
to
select
a
topic
that
is
manageable.
For
role in Hitler ’s rise to power?) do
example,
examining
all
of
the
causes
of
the
Second
not make good investigations.
World
word
War
is
too
broad
investigation.
topics
that
cannot
for
Many
be
the
purposes
students
researched
also
in
of
a
2200
select
depth
because
Using the concepts to formuate good
there
are
and/or
not
secondary
Investigating
of
literature
students
write
perspective
entire
very
a
community
engage
to
the
in
work
engaging;
particular
itself.
in
of
the
history,
site,
often
lot
of
to
piece
focus
portrayal
rather
who
are
an
historians,
challenges
the
or
to
local
opportunity
more
authentic
but
when
The
IB
History
concepts:
than
choose
investigate
have
that
professional
a
work,
or
many
they
claim,
or
lm
but
when
Students
experiences
produce
primary
questions
papers
historical
to
also
be
contained
a
available
sources.
better
on
or
can
readily
historically-themed
work
investigate
236
a
can
investigation
the
enough
these
looking
course
change,
consequence,
Each
of
about
these
the
as
a
able
the
to
for
topic
successful
they
they
are
thinking
can
be
key
perspectives .
ask
helpful
good
thinking
and
to
IA
concepts,
good
investigations.
six
causation,
historians’
formulating
several
that
on
and
shape
questions
historical
generate
historical
of
Therefore,
framework
Using
focused
signicance
concepts
kinds
investigate.
is
continuity,
you
questions
eventually
students
questions.
may
about
focused
be
any
into
W R I T I N G
T H E
I N T E R N A L
Concepts
A S S E S S M E N T
F O R
I B
H I S T O R Y
Possible investigation prompts
•
What changes resuted from this topic?
•
To what extent did this event, person or issue cause change?
•
To what extent did the topic remain the same?
•
Did this event, person or issue cause progress or decine?
•
What were the ong term, shor t term and immediate causes?
•
What were the factors that caused the event reated to the topic?
•
How has this topic had immediate and ong-asting eects?
•
How signicant were the eects of this topic?
•
To what extent is this topic signicant? Is the signicance of this
change
continuity
causation
Student’s topic
consequence
signicance
topic justied?
What events, peope or issues are impor tant to know about this
•
topic?
What dierent perspectives or interpretations are there about this
•
perspectives
topic?
How did peope experience this topic?
•
To
illustrate,
Revolution
the
a
student
might
following
use
interested
the
possible
in
concepts
the
to
question
Russian
brainstorm
singular
questions,
investigations:
Paper
Change:
change
In
what
Russian
ways
did
the
Russian
3
You
society?
To
what
extent
did
the
Tsarist
Stalin’s
in
causing
How
the
should
signicant
were
long
term
factors
Revolution?
think
likely
To
what
extent
did
Stalin’s
of
one
will
or
accounts
Paper
the
2
or
questions
concept.
require
there
historians.
will
Here
because
of
be
are
showing
how
the
Most
good
students
there
issue
some
some
they
How
important
was
Lenin’s
role
key
historical
concepts:
will
under
controversy
question
capture
more
than
How
signicant
was
in
To
what
extent
did
Doctor
Allied
area
bombing
in
reducing
experience
of
upper
class
industrial
capacity
during
the
Second
World
Zhivago
War?
Russians
(signicance;
consequence)
during
●
To
what
extent
did
Gandhi’s
leadership
achieve
Revolution?
Indian
After
many
than
perspectives
multiple
German
the
specic,
Revolution?
Perspectives:
the
a
purges
●
capture
of
historical
preparedness?
Signicance:
October
past
of
questions.
that
more
about
be
investigation,
one
the
signicance
examples
consult
investigations
exemplars
military
should
notice
include
between
affect
the
system?
February
Consequence:
you
on
good
regime
to
Causation:
For
examination
historical
resemble
focused
Revolution
above
Continuity:
is
cause.
generating
some
possible
questions,
independence?
(signicance;
perspectives;
students
causation)
can
bring
greater
focus
to
their
topic.
For
example,
All
a
student
interested
in
how
women
successful
thoughtful
Stalinism
may
narrow
the
focus
to
a
or
causes
event.
of
an
A
student
event
may
investigating
have
more
and
begin
focused
with
a
well-developed,
question
that
is
based
on
particular
one
place
IAs
experienced
or
more
of
the
historical
concepts.
long-term
success
if
the
237
IA
Internal Assessment skills
2 Researching
Gather information sources and
•
evidence.
Categorize the following questions (Good – Needs
Carefuy read and evauate
•
Improvement – Poor) according to their suitability as a
information.
historical investigation according to the criteria provided
above. Suggest ways the questions might be improved.
3 Organizing
1
Which Second Word War m is the most accurate?
2
To what extent did nationaism pay a roe in causing
•
Create notes.
•
Record references using a
and
processing
standard citation format.
the First Word War?
3
•
Create a bibiography.
•
Organize ideas into an outine.
•
Formuate an argument.
•
Write each section of the IA .
•
Revise and edit.
•
Check assessment criteria.
5 Sharing
•
Submit a draft for feedback .
6 Revising
•
Revise based on feedback from
How did women win the right to vote in the United
States?
4
Did Hiter use m for propaganda?
5
In what ways did Stain star t the Cod War?
6
To what extent was the inuenza epidemic a factor in
4 Drafting
the coapse of the Centra Powers in 1918?
Common probems when seecting a topic and question:
Poory focused question – too broad and
•
your teacher.
unmanageabe.
7 Publishing
•
Obvious question.
•
Question is not researchabe.
•
Submit na copy to your teacher.
•
Evauate using criteria.
Getting organized: researching
L TA
Getting organized: making a pan
Communication skills
of investigation
When suppor ting historica caims, it is impor tant to make
L TA
Self-management skills
your evidence visibe to your reader. Make sure you use
a standard bibiographic format to show the reader where
Create your own pan for competion with target dates
your evidence was found. In the discipine of history, the
and goas. Submit this with your proposed topic and
University of Chicago stye or MLA stye is most commony
question. Incude some initia sources of information you
used because it provides signicant information about
wi use.
the origins of the source, and the endnotes or footnotes
format aows the historian to inser t additiona information
Completing
the
IA
successfully
requires
that
about the source where necessary.
students
includes
create
several
a
plan
for
important
completion
steps
of
the
that
inquiry
Take
process.
Some
of
the
steps
may
overlap,
but
it
good
Post-it
important
that
you
organize
your
tasks
and
track
dates.
and
for
Your
give
completion
teacher
some
by
should
feedback
to
setting
goals
read
least
at
ensure
that
and
one
the
notes
next
A
plan
of
investigation
should
following
to
the
Using
different
research
record
stage.
thoughts
passages
as
you
read
and
and
think
information
in
IA
is
coloured
relation
to
the
highlighters
to
question.
identify
not
perspectives
on
the
question
as
you
read
books,
take
include
also
be
helpful.
If
using
borrowed
steps:
•
photo
Seect a topic and formuate a
use
a
question.
write
of
note
•
Submit a proposa to your teacher.
•
Identify information sources.
time
of
important
taking
notes
thinking
on
writing
the
event
as
later
you
is
pages
on
application
the
visible
chronology
238
key
about
a
1 Planning
the
to
due
can
the
during
helpful
draft
different
plagiarised.
are
stay
ideas
on
notes
is
page.
they
in
are
clear
tablet
will
process.
researching
in
your
device
highlight
Students
read
the
a
to
who
have
make
a
Create
to
mind.
and
and
their
easier
a
timeline
ensure
the
W R I T I N G
It
is
strongly
recommended
bibliographic
where
you
information
nd
that
and
important
you
page
T H E
record
I N T E R N A L
most
the
and
common
university
numbers
evidence
A S S E S S M E N T
F O R
I B
formats
history
H I S T O R Y
used
for
bibliographies
in
departments.
analysis.
Common probems when panning and organizing an IA :
Many
students
writing
but
process
this
is
is
afterthought
most
and
to
much
information
several
wait
Chicago
the
is
web
of
of
the
sites
that
MLA
if
instead
nished.
Style
chicagomanualofstyle.org ),
of
bibliography,
throughout,
versions
Manual
end
accomplished
draft
accessible
very
their
easily
recorded
up-to-date
the
compile
more
when
easily
until
•
Lack of genera background knowedge of the topic.
•
No feedback on proposed topic and question.
•
No pan for competion.
•
Inaccuratey recording page numbers and references.
•
Poory organized notes; or no notes at a.
the
of
as
There
are
provide
the
an
(www.mla.org),
(www.
which
are
the
two
Internal Assessment skills
Create a proposal for the IA using the template shown.
Topic:
Student:
Research question:
Proposed sources:
Sources (2) proposed for evauation in Section A :
Section A : Identication and
Common probems with Section A :
evaluation of sources
Section
A
is
worth
recommended
much
does
more
not
marks,
a
strong
this
1
than
count
most
6
that
of
the
500
for
a
A.
25
total
marks.
count
does
words.
While
this
substantial
students
Section
the
word
will
not
There
are
portion
be
It
not
key
Question is not ceary stated.
•
Reevance or signicance of seected sources not
expained.
exceed
section
of
•
Student summarizes the content of seected sources.
•
Limited anaysis.
•
Discussion of origins, purpose and content is in
the
successful
three
is
•
without
aspects
of
isoation to vaue and imitations.
section.
Clearly
(This
state
must
the
be
topic
stated
of
as
a
the
•
Poory chosen sources.
•
Specuates vaguey about the vaues and imitations
investigation.
question).
of sources.
2
Include
sources
a
the
detailed
3
brief
explanation
student
analysis,
their
relevance
With
reference
to
to
has
and
the
a
of
the
selected
brief
two
•
for
explanation
of
Reference to origins, purpose and content is not
expicit.
investigation.
their
origins,
purpose
and
Thinking about evidence: origins,
content,
analyse
the
value
and
limitations
purpose, vaue and imitations
of
the
two
sources.
Because
history
it
is
is
by
built
on
nature
a
foundation
interpretive
of
and
evidence,
controversial.
239
IA
This
to
is
not
them
and
something
history
dead
is
people.
many
simply
While
a
people
long
there
understand
list
are
of
a
–
great
have
that
dates
historians
agree
upon,
there
are
is
questions
that
are
is
important
enshrouded
in
controversy.
Since
relatively
few
witness
the
the
the
past
events
they
depends
to
study,
how
source.
largely
on
of
evidence
interpreted.
agree
upon
Ambrose
future,
Even
can
only
once
a
used,
that
change
Bierce
but
are
facts
historian
how
historians
over
said,
and
time.
“ God
can
the
fact
that
you
understand
how
to
value
the
and
limitations
origins,
purpose
of
sources
and
with
content
Discussing
the
origin,
purpose
of
and
outside
they
will
the
context
result
in
a
of
the
poor
value
and
assessment.
are
generally
Origins
•
Where did the source come from?
•
Who wrote or created it?
•
Whose perspectives are represented?
Philosopher
alone
alter
beyond
which
limitations
sources
this
one
content
understands
of
people
the
personally
support
source.
debate
reference
and
in
primary
countless
evaluate
historical
reasons
a
many
It
things
poor
it
the
knows
past .”
the
Though
Whose are not?
the
past
cannot
memory
as
each
new
and
actually
be
changed,
understanding
generation
evidence
brings
and
of
changing
as
revisionism.
new
historical
is
historical
always
forward
new
perspectives.
questions,
This
interpretations
Purpose
changing
is
who
challenge
arguments
orthodox,
and
historians
or
referred
are
generally
Why was this created?
•
What purpose might this document have
process
served?
to
Content
Revisionist
•
•
What does the source mean?
•
What does it revea or contain?
•
How usefu is the information? Is it
those
accepted
interpretations.
reasonabe to beieve it is accurate? Can
Besides
revisionism,
another
reason
why
history
it be corroborated?
is
controversial
the
same
events
and
kinds
events
from
for
might
of
time
typically
accounts
differ
a
limitless
Sources
and
place
referred
interpretations
documentaries,
to
and
or
evidence
drastically.
origins
purposes.
from
sources.
are
in
can
different
same
that
different
come
the
The
is
and
number
that
as
all
we
possible
originate
primary
and
record
evidence
of
are
narratives
articles
People
perspectives,
Historical
that
from
from
investigating
sources.
that
books
we
the
it
origin
has
to
sources,
to
the
are
called
secondary
primary
and
often
sources
therefore
limitations
always
give
the
events
range
of
Students
valuable
240
are
have
than
case.
greater
sometimes
at
make
the
error
more
more
insight
into
of
value,
there
thinking
and
is
from
multiple
perspectives
often
and
speculate
signicant
that
to
a
to
in
the
that
(place
the
can
conrm)
source
likely
cause
value
to
of
by
greater
may
to
other
value
include
question
a
time)
value
ways
source
has
someone
or
and
more
nd
a
Limitations
validity
mind,
isn’t
and
the
use
the
value
they
have
own
can
look
a
wide
eyewitness.
source
investigation,
is
but
useful
identify
error
indeed,
primary
their
to
necessarily
Historians
available
that
reliable,
This
not
opposite
not
true.
students
(support,
then
is,
the
source.
by
fewer
sources.
the
evidence
and
and
does
events,
If
proximity
source
that
using
the
term
bias
is
not
sources.
authentic
secondary
Being
historians.
factors
in
primary
investigation.
always
Students
closer
a
truthfulness,
Keep
historians
the
of
corroborate
any
nd
created
Generally,
of
bias,
of
a
history
but
biased
bias.
offer
clearly
you
us.
how
content
in
does
is
Remember
You
the
is
time
and
often
that
used.
make
most
are
that
value
to
does
the
you
of
able
limit
the
people
This
dismiss
the
be
because
unique
place.
ensure
to
necessarily
unreliable
blindly
affects
source
not
that
should
bias
important
Students
should
the
it
source
perspectives
experiences,
that
a
–
bias
source.
assuming
detect
mean
they
in
will
their
not
evidence
explain
the
W R I T I N G
T H E
I N T E R N A L
A S S E S S M E N T
F O R
I B
H I S T O R Y
Internal Assessment skills
Use this template for taking notes from each of the sources used in the investigation.
Research Question:
Source (bibiographic information):
Primary or
How is the source reevant/signicant to the
secondary
investigation?
Origins/Purpose?
source?
Vaue/Limitations?
Page#:
What evidence does the source provide?
What is your interpretation? How does the content of
(quote, paraphrase, describe)
the source reate to your question? What perspective
does it add?
●
Seecting sources for the IA
Select
clear
One
of
the
challenges
to
students
writing
Section
A
is
making
sure
that
two
appropriate
sources
to
able
to
should
be
why
able
the
to
clearly
chosen
and
sources
to
the
relevant
students
content
heavily
are
the
mistake
of
non-scholarly
encyclopaedia
The
sources
such
As
of
the
nding
a
largely
your
of
articles
and
general
stated,
topic,
these
but
are
they
investigation
choices
to
good
sources.
both
starting
this
may
Before
why
important
to
the
choose
sources
or
vaguely
related
to
are
not
upon.
use
for
good
They
detailed
selecting
are
a
include
general
an
rule,
appropriate
you
should
primary
not
and
work
secondary
with
some
sources,
types
sources
While
secondary
sources
of
on
a
to
are
likely
to
be
easily
obtained,
they
often
especially
analysis
sources
should
As
points
in
less
consider
to
discuss
in
Section
A.
this
Interviews,
section.
explain
history
provide
poor
is
students
irrelevant
investigation
topic
build
source
Some
investigations.
for
explicitly
as
but
textbooks.
and
relying
include
online
have
should
investigation.
make
on
that
You
question.
range
too
sources
and
●
Often
of
question.
effectively
are
the
important
the
evaluate.
that
explain
to
clearly,
investigation.
You
excerpts
they
the
choose
or
a
be
successful
sources
signicance
personal
correspondence,
the
newspaper
articles,
journals,
speeches,
letters,
following:
and
●
You
will
about
as
be
the
possible.
you
can
If
why
it
much
Be
when
was
of
as
discuss
purpose
to
choose
much
was
of
where
information
you
will
have
as
of
is
much
the
to
created.
and
limitations
with
difculty
explicit
sources
which
to
origins
and
more
Section
come
than
they
A.
more
might
generally,
present
often
meaningful
Ideas
about
readily
when
but
balanced
provide
with
using
not
material
origins
primary
secondary
always,
arguments
and
evaluating
reference
Choose
secondary
sources
that
reference
the
to
evidence
the
much
in
purpose
sources
perspectives.
●
value
with
sources
strive
readily
primary
evaluate
and
as
created
was
not
students
where
following
who
it
detail
source
sources
the
created;
created;
this
identiable,
it
to
and
sure
identify
possible:
it;
expected
origins
other
the
historians
used
to
support
their
less
difcult
to
purpose.
arguments.
You
will
nd
it
241
IA
assess
uses,
the
or
validity
how
arguments,
evidence
the
if
of
the
evidence
evidence
the
is
historian
the
historian
interpreted
has
in
the
documented
the
clearly.
the
investigation,
should
Depending
discussed
they
●
Consider
using
focus
periodical
articles.
can
write
excellent,
topics
for
be
articles
and
articles
often
bibliographies
peer-reviewed
additional
sources
Be
about
have
that
for
rich
you
the
careful
web-based
not
sources.
referenced
difcult
to
or
use
to
nd
●
investigation.
purpose
hand,
great
too
Many
heavily
online
can
is
be
found
online,
of
as
rich
well
It
is
respected
so
On
●
is
as
Consider
have
written
people
Be
careful
other
or
an
audio
be
Discussing
advantageous
origins,
that
purpose,
any
or
them
because
value
arguments
make
origins
that
on
the
the
about
reliability
and
and
about
specic
the
references
purpose.
of
value
basis
why
the
of
of
a
source
bias
the
is
without
bias
limits
not
a
the
strong
validity
content.
sources
articles
You
should
avoid
summarizing
the
content
written
much.
interviews.
exceptional
or
by
Some
IAs
strong
students
based
interviewing
on
Summarize
and
describe
with
extensive
knowledge
the
When
using
interviews,
le
for
reference
and
extent
analysis
necessary
about
the
to
content
construct
source’s
value
a
and
limitations.
people’s
historians
to
or
You
should
be
thorough
in
examining
all
and
record
of
the
source’s
origins
including
date
of
them
origin,
as
can
explicit.
content,
aspects
experience.
more
limitations
argument
●
other
they
comparatively,
separately.
A
historians.
using
experiences,
and
dismissed
the
the
primary
are
it
only
●
the
more
important
the
too
by
Section
general
●
can
often
make
value
sources
about
authorship.
number
on
properly
information
and
discussed
chosen,
and
of
sources.
footnoting
can
footnoted
validate
origins,
a
relying
sources
two
journals.
to
●
the
portion
the
on
limitations
These
largest
Many
concise
you
historical
on
the
analysing
simultaneously
separately
historians
on
cultural
context,
author’s
background,
accuracy.
publisher
or
information
is
likely
a
other
about
poorly
important
the
details.
origins
chosen
is
source
If
little
identiable,
for
it
analysis.
Anaysing the seected sources
After
the
stating
two
the
selected
research
sources
question
and
their
and
explaining
relevance
to
Internal Assessment skills
Use the Section A assessment criteria to discuss and
Source 1: Prisoner of State: the secret journal of
evaluate this excerpt of a student’s work . Identify
Zhao Ziyang
1
where the student has explicitly discussed origins and
The origin of the source is of great value because the
purpose, and value and limitations.
author is Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the
This investigation will seek to answer the question “ What
Communist Par ty during the Tiananmen Square Protest
did the Tiananmen Square protest reveal about the
(the Protest). Zhao attempted to use a non-violent
democratic sentiments in China between 1980 and 1989?”
approach to resolve the protest and spoke against the
Democratic sentiments are dened as people’s attitudes
par ty’s hardliners. After a power struggle, Zhao was
toward democratic ideals. This investigation will analyze
dismissed and put under house arrest until his death
factors that inuenced democratic sentiments from multiple
in 2005. The content of the journal is translated from
perspectives, but will not assess the ethics and justication
thir ty audiotapes recorded secretly by Zhao while he was
of the Chinese government’s response to the protest.
under house arrest between 1999 and 2000. The book
is published in 2009 by Simon & Schuster, one of the
In order to take into account the opposing views on this
largest and most reputable nglish-language publishers.
event and keep the scope of the investigation manageable,
The reputation of the author and publisher increases the
I have made use of a variety of carefully selected sources.
reliability of this source.
Two primary sources will be evaluated…
242
W R I T I N G
T H E
I N T E R N A L
A S S E S S M E N T
F O R
I B
H I S T O R Y
Zhao’s purpose for recording these tapes is to publicize
within the Communist Par ty through the lens of the
his political opinions and express his regret for failing to
progressive bloc.
prevent the massacre. This is valuable because Zhao was
However, its exclusivity may limit its value because there
not allowed to publicize his opinions while under house
are no counterparts to compare with and to verify its claims.
arrest, so this source is the only surviving public record
As a translated material, the source may not accurately
of Zhao’s opinions and perspectives on the Protest. This
present Zhao’s intentions and may have lost some cultural
source is also valuable because its author, Zhao, was
expressions. In addition, this source may be biased in that
directly involved in the government’s decision-making
Zhao speaks in favour of political reform and democracy,
process during the protest. It reveals the power struggle
which does not represent the Party’s position…
1
Zhao, Ziyang, Pu Bao, Renee Chiang, Adi Ignatius, and Roderick MacFarquhar. Prisoner of the state: the secret journal of Zhao Ziyang.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.
commentary
Section B: Investigation
to
Common probems with Section B:
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243
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Internal Assessment skills
Use the Section B assessment criteria to evaluate
power gave people an optimistic belief in democracy, and
an excerpt of this student’s investigation. Has the
encouraged other progressives to act more openly.
student eectively integrated evidence and critical
However, contrary to the revolutionary attitudes later
commentary?
in the protest, the democratic sentiment under Zhao’s
…Sentimentality played a key role in the events leading
leadership was relatively constructive. Based on the
up to the protest in 1989. Western democracy and
Seven Demands
parliamentary system were believed to be the panacea
that, in the beginning of the Protest, protesters did not
for China’s social problems. As Zhao Ziyang stated in his
intend to be anti-governmental or anti-communist; they
memoir: “in fact, it is the Western parliamentary democratic
merely demanded that the Par ty take actions to end
system that has demonstrated the most vitality. It seems
corruption and grant citizens more political freedom.
3
drafted by the protesters, it was clear
4
1
that this system is currently the best one available.”
As the leading gure behind the Par ty’s progressive
The death of Hu Yaobang, the former General Secretary
bloc, Zhao was generally in line with the protestors.
of the Party who advocated strongly for democratic
Internally, he attempted to persuade hardliner par ty
reform, created a unied sense of democratic sentiments
ocials, par ticularly Deng, into making concession with
2
that united both ideological and practical groups.
5
Hu’s
the protestors.
He also allowed the media, such as the
successor, Zhao Ziyang, an even more progressive leader,
People’s Daily and the China Central Television to bypass
spoke publicly in favour of political reform. Zhao’s rise in
censorship and broadcast the protest…
1
Zhao, Ziyang, Pu Bao, Renee Chiang, Adi Ignatius, and Roderick MacFarquhar. “Preface.” In Prisoner of the state: the secret journal
of Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. xv.
2
Meaning the inteectuas and the working cass.
3
Liang, Zhang. “ The Tiananmen Papers.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/books/rst//iang-tiananmen.htm
(accessed May 26, 2014).
4
Ziyang, op. cit.
5
Zhao, Dingxin. The power of Tiananmen state-society relations and the 1989 Beijing student movement. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2001. 156.
244
W R I T I N G
T H E
I N T E R N A L
●
Section C: Reection
A S S E S S M E N T
What
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E.E. Carr, 1961. What is History? Penguin Books. London, UK
●
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M. MacMian, 2008. The Uses and Abuses of History.
●
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Viking. Toronto.
all
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J. l. Gaddis, 2004. The Landscape of History. New York ,
●
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●
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Oxford University Press.
a
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th
Discuss and evaluate the student example below using
on June 4
the criteria for Section C:
historians, can be biased and unreliable. Therefore, historians
. These sources, although highly valuable to
should exercise caution when evaluating these sources.
Ever since Deng declared martial law on May 20th, 1989,
the Tiananmen Square Protest had been a taboo topic in
In order to counterbalance the aforementioned dilemma,
Mainland China. There are no public records of the Protest,
I purposely limited the number of sources originated
and any discussion regarding the Protest is immediately
from the protestors. I also took advantage of my Chinese
censored. In the educational system, particularly, the
prociency by looking through Chinese newspaper
Protest was considered “non-existent”. The Party’s
archives and talking with former protestors and former
illegitimate historical revisionism illustrates the extent
Par ty ocials during the protest. These methods of
to which history can be manipulated to inuence public
acquiring evidence should have helped me gain a more
opinions. Therefore, historians have the morally imperative
balanced understanding of the democratic sentiments
role to present a balanced account of the Protest.
during the protest.
However, historians hoping to investigate the Protest face
Apart from balancing dierent perspectives, historians who
a dilemma: most primary sources are not made public by
investigate this issue are under social and ethical pressures.
the Chinese government, and most available sources are
If they suggest that there were democratic sentiments
from the protestors’ perspectives. Historians either have no
within the Party and the Army executing the martial law,
primary sources to work with, or have a disproportionate
many former protesters (especially families of victims who
number of pro-protest sources. This dilemma is a common
were killed during the June 4
problem caused by illegitimate historical revisionism,
historians of downplaying the Party’s crime. In addition, the
which made it dicult for historians to remain objective.
Western world almost unanimously agrees that the June
Government records are not available. Media coverage during
4
the Protest is censored. Government and military ocers who
antagonist. Historians who propose otherwise are under
gave orders during the Protest are not permitted to publicize
signicant ideological pressure. Therefore, historians should
their narratives. On the other hand, a large number of sources
prevent these pressures from inuencing the investigation.
originate from political dissidents, protesters who sought
Any conclusions should be re-examined by other historians
asylum overseas, and families of protestors who were killed
to ensure a higher degree of objectivity.
th
incident) would accuse the
th
246
incident was a massacre and that the Party was the
I N D E X
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181
(GMD)
debate
demands
impact
111
Great
appeasement
aggression
invasion
Guomindang
see
the
historical
166
121–2
Greece
of
German
Britain
Depression
impact
85,
161,
132,
Britain
Great
end
174–5
170
Giolitti,
Great
174
Nations
36,
37,
60,
61,
192–3
69,
73
I N D E X
Germany
110,
international
Italy
130,
155
137,
organization
of
response
139,
and
to
aggression
aims
of
the
to
events
in
to
Italian
invasion
response
to
Japan’s
response
to
the
Libya
Italy
102,
Lithuania
Little
Lytton
Nazism
Night
of
the
of
of
Nations
61–6,
after
1932
SA
203–4
67
to
why
support
World
85
Nuremberg
180
War?
impact
83,
101–2,
132,
133,
165
60
156
viewpoints
Steel
1
1939
32–3
of
Nation’s
Nations
response
failure
to
take
action
Pearl
to
events
in
Manchuria
37,
for
Japan’s
results
for
Manchuria
results
for
the
Polo
China’s
Japanese
37,
Bridge,
actions
incident
60,
Filippo
Monroe
15,
Mukden
did
224,
of
1933
60
of
not
Nations
take
63–4
stronger
action
against
130,
145–6,
178–9,
200,
how
successful
85,
143,
129,
160,
130,
165,
132,
181
172
alignments
in
alignments
with
a
totalitarian
of
after
Hitler
was
state?
Mussolini’s
consolidate
and
his
Mussolini’s
96–7
Italy
Socialist
what
power?
foreign
96
policy
Ruhr
in
the
issues
on
the
foreign
policies
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Sudetenland
Russia
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201–9,
crisis
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September
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October
actions
in
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the
82,
inuenced
1922
war
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1941
152
Italy
join
why
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Italy
remain
why
did
Mussolini
Mussolini’s
foreign
policy?
the
war
in
June
1940?
non-belligerent
invade
Abyssinia
in
in
150–2
1939?
150
(Nanking),
15,
Pact
China
43–4
phoney
1939
149,
views
of
170,
the
183–5
Nazi–Soviet
Pact
of
Tientsin
Treaty
of
Versailles
Italy
Depression
on
the
Nazi
Party
Munich
Putsch
of
1923
on
the
success
83,
aggression
149,
143,
155,
212,
231
UK
15,
see
199,
165,
165
208
15,
did
of
37,
38
Shidehara
Kijuro
to
expansionist
Acts
the
72,
to
192,
USA
on
actions
to
Japan
with
response
to
response
to
21,
the
see
USA
1938?
Panay
187–9
Victor
as
a
cause
of
the
60,
invasion
of
powers
the
USA
193,
the
international
199
21
199
attack
on
Pearl
Harbor
74–5
regard
to
Japan
1930–41
54–5,
events
1937–38
Japanese
change
its
71–2
actions
policy
1931–37
towards
70–1
Japan
72–4
72
Soviet
Union
Emmanuel
Vietnam
to
Wall
of
Italy
the
attack
on
Pearl
Harbor
Street
Crash
86,
95,
97,
134,
149,
165
Conference
Washington
Treaty
Weimar
Republic
II
of
15
14
1921
System
15,
21–2,
21
23,
36,
214
119–20
Germany
Woodrow
Wilson’s
internationalism
111
Washington
22
110,
111,
112
113
points
113
23
Y
Young
14,
III
29
W
226
Wilson,
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18–19,
24
Plan
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111
83,
101,
152,
156
43–4
War
of
105,
105
Germany
the
on
171–2
237
Unity
to
policy
227–31
Shidehara’s
Darwinism
foreign
immigration
of
did
Wilhelm
and
US
156–7
respond
208–9
USA
’s
USSR
54
29,
Social
USA
USA
’s
why
75–6
Social
86–7
1933–38
the
pressure
USA
’s
19
appeasement
186–91,
Shanghai
help
83,
75–6
187
Nanking
157–69
V
War?
USA
of
156,
130
Neutrality
149–52
War
113–15,
Britain
36,
161
160–1
Europe
was
Expedition
214
21
Entente
Japanese
69
the
Rape
110,
215–17
155,
1904–05
Japan
to
90,
15
14
90–1
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160,
war
16
86,
77–8
of
source
the
Portsmouth
of
US
D.
War,
Sino–Japanese
Great
121–2
impact
of
Treaty
152
over
for
193–5
174–5
U
to
von
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83,
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161
168–9,
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World
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110–11
the
226
181
reaction
War
of
signicance
185–6
of
Poland
159,
156
war
reaction
Siberian
105
contrasting
impact
of
London
181
1933–40
opposition
Nazism
invasion
Germany
of
response
important
outbreak
October
135–6
N
two
the
Treaty
81
162–4,
Kurt
Second
Italy
214–15
174
96–7
Kanagawa
impact
1935
takes
170,
143
of
Union
World
70–1
192,
120
Treaty
USS
how
86–7
118,
Germany
59,
Franklin
outcome
did
Nazi–Soviet
regarding
14
Second
60,
155,
121
intervention
Reich
154
Axis
plebiscite
217–18
Doctrine
133–4,
111,
Germans
International
after
Saar
165
141–5
224
145–6,
Third
of
97–8
nationalism
121,
Joachim
Soviet
141
119
129,
Third
240
120,
200,
Chamberlain’s
245–6
110,
Hitler
why
Nanjing
demands
S
to
156,
Crisis
how
Russo-Japanese
response
Party
1935?
to
with
response
Erwin
199–200
183–5
223–5
Europe
Committee
Non-Recognition
Sudetenland
28
156,
in
1936–39
110,
Conference
Triple
1931–41
Roosevelt,
see
during
factors
Pact
1922
155,
214
130
129,
position
162,
international
164–5
Gustav
USA
Schuschnigg,
Mussolini’s
Hitler’s
109
Rommel,
209–10
145–6
on
reaction
1933–40
102–3,
the
powers
170,
Union
1936–39
Stresemann,
December
149,
Treaty
on
expansionist
Italy
uprising
totalitarianism
to
191
Romania
210–11
March
7
155
reaction
1938–40
Rhineland
82
domestic
role
on
53
Germany
revisionism
Europe
98–100
1938
Harbor
secondary
24
169
reection
100–4
d’Italia
international
Italy’s
Harbor
128
Rome–Berlin
Mussolini
of
Pearl
policy
Soviet
intervention
Japan
Ribbentrop,
create
did
Italy
133,
84,
appeasement
how
impact
82–3,
160
1920s?
on
Assistance
1939
Hitler’s
Sudetenland
16,
the
with
War
Josef
with
165
foreign
Pact
Germany
Stimson
Stresa
attack
Pearl
1933–38
Japan
diplomatic
Popolo
3–4
69
the
Germany
italy
132–4
the
60,
to
1?
223
Treaty
italy
1938
to
with
Germany
Japan
Mussolini
of
29,
Paper
associated
T
150,
international
120–1
129,
Austria
Il
42,
Soviet
on
Spartacist
references
diplomatic
changing
4–12
Stalin,
1931–1941
130,
Rapallo
League
Benito
changing
questions
R
64–5
Anschluss
Nazi
152
Non-Aggression
180
34–5,
of
46–7,
Mutual
Non-Intervention
on
attack
14,
international
League
Putsch
the
237
international
38
the
the
in
49–52
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Poland
229–31
Mussolini,
end
53
Bridge
103
170,
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Munich
did
44,
Polo
time
11
USA
Japan
Germany
Japan?
Munich
42–3,
Marco
the
my
source
Hawaii
Poland
96,
29,
Civil
Italy’s
12–13
expect
Matthew
Japan
29,
13
distribute
10,
of
did
Italy
102
response
why
38–9
105
incident
Union
Spanish
175–6
Doctrine
Morocco
I
you
perspectives
86
Lithuania
militarism
Perry,
67–9
Giacomo
1938
36–7
37
45
Beijing
Matteotti,
Crisis
relations
China
government
following
Marinetti,
Memel,
can
1941?
and
181–2
75–6
45
international
170,
242–3
241–2
5–8
Nazi–Soviet
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78–80
limitations
Franco-Soviet
130,
approach
Harbor,
why
29,
results
May
to
what
61–6
Marco
Soviet
240
analysis
markbands
34–5
31,
and
sources
impact
should
reaction
Zedong
First
2–3
how
31,
“Manchukuo”
Mao
the
167
examination?
League
of
after
relations
of
Paper
66
League
grow
P
Pact
crisis
of
values
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sources
negotiations
how
19,
selecting
123–5
for
57–8,
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analysing
124
114
83
Manchuria
124
1931–41
response
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113,
M
Manchuria
120,
120,
25–8
Japan
119–23
Trials
document
Line
Nazi
O
156
David
Commission
Maginot
and
impact
195
Macedonia
Italy
105–9
Japan
sources
dictatorship
did
124
143
(Schutzstaffel)
steps
120,
Fascist
(Sturmabteilung)
SS
63–5
Italy
Knives
between
Germany
192
Abyssinia
incident
62–3
120–1
Long
152
Treaties
David
198
85
101,
George,
Locarno
Low,
170,
Entente
Lloyd
policies
1870–1923
129,
League
Manchuria
Mukden
democracy
1930s
relationship
response
Liberal
the
143
response
liberal
in
hints
1937
117–18
29,
42–6
Z
Zhang
Zhou
Zog
Zuolin
Enlai
of
31,
34,
67
67
Albania
101,
147–9
127–8
249
Laura
Fermi:
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