Fighting terrorism: Why formal institutions are more effective than informal institutions Zeng Fan Yi U1840312K 30 November 2018 Abstract With the rise of transnational terrorism, finding ways to combat terrorism is becoming ever more relevant today. In this paper, I will argue that formal institutions are more effective than informal institutions in preventing the spread of terrorism. Formal institutions, unlike informal institutions, are capable of shaping unfavorable external conditions against terrorists, restricting opportunities for terrorist attacks. This can be done using the tools formal institutions have at their disposal, such as surveillance, intelligence, and screening. By making it more likely for terrorists to be caught, formal institutions can also increase the risks of terrorist activities, deterring individuals from engaging in terrorism. Furthermore, formal institutions are able to directly address structural deficits which provide motivation for terrorism, improving material standards of living so that individuals neither need nor want to turn to terrorism. The appeal of terrorism is reduced even more as the value of leading a non-terrorist life increases with economic progress. It would therefore be more pragmatic and effective to focus existing resources on using formal institutions to address terrorism. Suicide bombings, mass shootings, and gruesome videos of beheadings—these are just some of the many methods terrorists use to spread fear and gain worldwide attention. Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or the threat of violence, in the pursuit of political changes or goals (Hoffman, 2017). While not a new phenomenon, terrorism is becoming more challenging to tackle due to its increasingly transnational nature in the recent years (Bohemen, 2016). It is therefore of urgent necessity to understand how best to curb terrorism. Finding the root causes of terrorism is a challenging endeavor, and there is still an ongoing debate on whether terrorism stems from inherent conflicts between cultures (Huntington, 2011), economic constraints (Schneider, Brück & Meierrieks, 2009), or other reasons (Meierrieks & Krieger, 2010). While examining the causes of terrorism is important for a comprehensive understanding of terrorism, time is of essence and it is impractical to wait for a consensus on the main causes before we attempt to begin solving the problem. It would therefore be more pragmatic for solutions—at least in the short term—to focus on addressing the contributing factors to terrorism which have been pinpointed, such as structural deficiencies and the spread of extremist ideologies (Newman, 2006). Institutions are humanly-devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions (North, 1991). Formal institutions are openly codified, in the sense that they are established and communicated through channels that are widely accepted as official. Informal institutions are socially-shared rules that exist and are enforced outside formal channels of communication (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). A combination of both formal and informal institutions is needed to address the different factors contributing to terrorism, minimizing both the motivation and opportunity for terrorism. However, it is crucial to determine whether using formal or informal institutions would be more effective in tackling terrorism, as resources can then be focused on formulating the most effective counter-terrorism strategy. In this paper, I will argue that formal institutions are more effective than informal institutions in preventing the spread of terrorism. Strip a terrorist of his weapons, and he is a normal man Formal institutions have more capacity to manipulate external conditions than informal institutions. Parliaments have the legislative power to draft policies prohibiting the private ownership of resources which are deemed dangerous, such as firearms, explosives and the like. Since the state claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a given territory (Weber, 1972), formal institutions also have the power and authority to execute and enforce such policies. Strict gun control by the state in countries such as Japan and Singapore, for one, has successfully led to low rates of gun ownership (Gun Policy, 2018), demonstrating the power of formal institutions in restricting access to specialized, higher-risk resources. By making it highly difficult for terrorists to obtain weapons, formal institutions can minimize the opportunities for terrorists to execute attacks. However, it must be acknowledged that such restrictions would not be able to completely prevent terrorists from obtaining or creating weapons. Terrorists have found ways to make bombs out of widely-available materials, the effects of which have been seen in the 2015 Paris attacks (Dodd, 2018). Furthermore, with increasingly unconventional methods of attacks being used by terrorists recently, the definition of ‘weapon’ itself is broadening. Trucks have been used to drive into crowds, such as in the 2016 Nice truck attack (Al Jazeera, 2018). Given that more objects found in everyday life are being used as weapons, restricting access to such items is not only difficult but unfeasible. As such, the increasing difficulty faced by formal institutions in controlling terrorism through restricting resources does not mean that formal institutions have been rendered ineffective. Rather, it highlights the need to focus more on the other tools formal institutions have at their disposal, such as intelligence-gathering, which has been shown to be effective in intercepting potential terrorist attacks (The Spectator, 2018). Surveillance mechanisms such as CCTV networks are also able to monitor and track suspicious movement, while screening procedures at strategic locations like airports can reveal the presence of possible weapons. By focusing more on developing these tools and making external circumstances more difficult for terrorists to navigate, formal institutions can minimize opportunities for terrorism. Deterrence: Be a terrorist if you want, but face the repercussions Using formal institutions to indirectly influence motivations is more feasible than using informal institutions to directly influence motivations. While both formal and informal institutions can shape and change motivations, formal institutions do it indirectly via shaping the external environment in which individuals live. By increasing the chances of being caught through the methods mentioned earlier, formal institutions are able to create a deterrence effect by making the option of becoming a terrorist seem less desirable, appealing to the rationality of individuals. Although it cannot be assumed that all individuals are rational actors, even individuals who are motivated by irrational motivation—as long as they still possess some semblance of rationality—would still have to weigh the perceived benefits of their irrational actions against the material costs. In fact, those who are overwhelmingly irrational are noted to be outliers, implying that a significant proportion of terrorists are still subject to rational considerations even if they possess irrational motivations (Caplan, 2006). Therefore, formal institutions, through increasing the perceived risks of terrorism, can deter individuals from terrorism by appealing to the common rational desire in most to maximize utility. In comparison, while informal institutions are able to influence motivations directly, they are of arguably little help in the short term. Indeed, building social capital can increase trust among individuals (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman & Soutter, 1999), contributing to a socially-cohesive community which is more psychologically resistant to extremist ideology. Unfortunately, social capital takes a long time to build, and solutions focused on building social capital cannot be immediately effective. Furthermore, although informal institutions can be used to shape positive morals and virtues, such a method would not be sufficiently comprehensive to curb terrorism. Undeniably, informal institutions have the power to influence our world views significantly, prescribing a set of beliefs and ethical standards which we live by. Similar to how certain interpretations of religious texts can be used to promote religious extremism (Dandachli, 2017), informal institutions can also be used to encourage a peaceful way of living. However, the thoughts and interpretations of individuals ultimately cannot be controlled: To the extent that religious leaders can step out to denounce extremist interpretations of religious texts, terrorist groups can also reach out to spread and support such interpretations. Therefore, attempting to curb terrorism by using informal institutions to spread a peaceful world view to everyone—while ideal— would hardly be feasible. Informal institutions are doubtlessly important in influencing motivations. However, we have more control over our use of formal institutions as compared to informal institutions in achieving the desired outcome. Focusing on formal institutions to influence motivations via shaping external conditions would therefore be the more pragmatic choice. Rectifying structural deficiencies: increasing terrorism’s opportunity cost Formal institutions, unlike informal institutions, have the capacity to directly close structural gaps, such as in addressing economic constraints which have been identified to contribute to terrorism (Newman, 2006). States are able to implement policies directed at alleviating poverty and reducing inequity, improving material standards of living. This reduces the perceived need of individuals to turn to terrorism. Such a method also increases terrorism’s opportunity cost, which is defined economically as the cost of the next best alternative foregone (Henderson, 2018). Increasing material standards of living raises the value of leading a non-terrorist life: With more to lose, there is less incentive for individuals to resort to terrorism, given that most individuals are still guided (albeit to different extents) by their rationality (Caplan, 2006). Informal institutions, on the other hand, are unable to change material conditions. While some may argue that informal institutions can change an individual’s outlook such that individuals do not resort to terrorism—whether these individuals end up attempting to improve their material conditions through other means or accepting their present economic reality—the impact of informal institutions is limited especially in circumstances where material conditions are poor to the extent that even basic survival becomes a challenge. In such cases, informal institutions would not be able to influence one’s outlook as the foremost priority of individuals would be to ensure their survival through whatever means possible, including terrorism. The most effective solution to grievances arising from poor material standards of living would thus be to change the economic reality itself, which can only be achieved by formal institutions. Formal institutions, therefore, are more helpful in addressing material factors contributing to terrorism. Counter-terrorism: Focusing on formal institutions Formal institutions have the power to manipulate external conditions such that they are disadvantageous for terrorists, restricting opportunities for terrorism. Formal institutions are also able to appeal to the rationality of individuals, deterring the latter from resorting to terrorism by heightening the risk of facing consequences, and increasing the opportunity cost of terrorism by raising material standards of living. Meanwhile, informal institutions—although necessary—operate with higher levels of uncertainty in terms of achieving the desired outcome, as compared to formal institutions, which are able to provide more feasible and comprehensive plans. Therefore, formal institutions are more effective than informal institutions in preventing the spread of terrorism. This is true at least in the present climate of terrorism as well as in the foreseeable future. However, changes in the form, scope, and range of terrorism over time means that the relative importance of formal and informal institutions are also subject to change. The effectiveness of informal institutions, for one, may rise given a longer time frame, and focusing on using informal institutions may become more feasible when terrorism is no longer as urgent a threat. 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