With reference to the Philosophy of Science, analyse the place of observation in scientific theory development for the “realists” and for the “instrumentalists”. Word count for essay: 775 words (excluding title and references). The philosophy of science is a branch of study that concerns itself with the fundamental principles from a philosophical point of view that bring about scientific inquiry. One of the most debated topics in this field is the role of observation in scientific theory development and the different views that realists and instrumentalists have on this matter. There are varying interpretations of realism and instrumentalism among the individual philosophers and within the field of philosophy in general. The realist approach refers to the belief that explanations, theories and other aspects in science are a reflection of the true or approximately true descriptions of the natural physical world. This mean that it is more of an intellectually-based belief that if something can be proven true by theory, then it does exist, regardless of whether it can be perceived or not. They argue that observation is important in developing scientific theories. If, for example, there are two competing theories on the same topic, they can be used to argue against each other and it can be argued that one theory has more validity than the other (Chakravartty 2017). Scientific realists regard theories as attempts to describe reality even beyond the realm of observable things and regularities, so that theories can be regarded as statements having a truth value. They argue that theories are only useful when they have real-world applications; therefore they must be applied in order to make sense of the world. Scientific theories are theoretical and usually amenable in theory. Hypotheses should be testable by empirical evidence and experimentation to validate their inductive reasoning (Chakravartty 2017). The instrumentalists follow Duhem in thinking that theories are merely conceptual tool for classifying, systematizing and predicting observational statement so that the genuine content of science is not to be found on the level of theories (Duhem 1954). Instrumentalism theory claims that science has no absolute truths or any specific way of knowing what is true. These theories have been used for many years and are based on observation and or experimentation to prove a hypothesis true or false. This approach in scientific methodology has been used to explain many different phenomena such as observations and studies of natural disasters or laboratory experiments (i.e. titration experiments to prove or disprove existence of a particular substance in solution). It is based on the systematic approach to research that attempts to explain phenomena using data collected from observation and experiments under the assumption that all phenomena have been observed before they are discovered. Instrumentalists do not believe that scientific theories are used to achieve specific goals, but rather to provide a practical means for organizing and making sense of our experiences in the world. Theories are not seen as absolute truths, but rather as logical tools that can be used to accomplish specific tasks. Theories are judged based on their predictive power, rather than their correspondence to reality. This can be seen as a theory of how things work and why they happened. The place of observation in scientific theory development is thus different for realists and instrumentalists. For realists, observation is a crucial aspect of scientific theory development, as theories must be grounded in empirical evidence to be considered true. For instrumentalists, observation is important only insofar as it allows for the creation of useful predictive models. They do not believe that theories need to be grounded in reality to be useful. In conclusion, many philosophers believe that there isn’t enough evidence to soundly conclude which scientific approach is the most preferred or acceptable when it comes to conducting research. To quote Shirazi 2008): “In this light, the difference between the realist and the instrumentalist amounts to a difference in a prediction about the future: If a realist takes a successful scientific theory to be true a description of reality, then he must deny the possibility that anyone could in the future think of a question to successfully overthrow a core concept of that theory, because no such questions actually exist. An instrumentalist, however, would by his conviction be forced to admit that such questions do in fact exist and that therefore the success of that theory is simply due to the fact that so far no one has been imaginative enough to ask them.” Scientific studies are a multifaceted practice where different interests and methodologies will dictate which strategy to use during the different phases of theory development and application (Hendry 2001). While realists rely on knowledge as their primary way of discovering the world, and the instrumentalist make observation that are useful in predicting the world; both philosophies are important in assessing and interpreting the world objectively. References: Shirazi A.N. (2008). Instrumentalism vs. Realism and Social Construction. https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/79042/Realism_v_In strumentalism_and_Social_Construction.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed 13 April, 2023). De Neufville, R. (2020) "instrumentalism". Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/instrumentalism. (Accessed 13 April 2023). Duhem. P.: (1954). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans, by Philip P. Wiener from the 1914. 2nd ed. Princeton University Press. Princeton. New Jersey. Crowe M.J. (1990). Pierre Duhem: Historian and Philosopher of Science. Part II: Duhem as Philosopher of Science. Synthese pp. 431-447 Philosophy of science (2023) Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-science (Accessed: 13 April, 2023). Hendry R.F. (2001). Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent? Philosophy of Science. Vol. 68, No. 3, Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers (Sep., 2001), pp. S25-S37. https://www.jstor.org/stable/i355243 Chakravartty A, (2017) "Scientific Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/cgibin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=scientific-realism (Accessed 13 April 2023)